

Book Reviews

Paul Robert Magocsi. *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*. Third revised and expanded edition. Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2018. 224 pages, 61 main maps and 40 smaller maps, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-4875-2331-2

This is the rare case of a book that has been reviewed almost one hundred times before, if we include the eighty reviews of the first edition of 1993 and the fifteen reviews of the second edition of 2001, which introduced twenty new maps, partly because of political changes during the 1990s. It was also a different kind of atlas, because in contrast to the first edition, now the maps were produced digitally, which allowed for easier revision for the third edition that we review here. (Readers should consider buying the electronic version, with added features, which is available at the same price as the paperback!)

The “Historical Atlas of Central Europe” has been a major Canadian-US research project for more than a quarter century. The book has even changed its name, after many Central Europeans found the designation “East Central Europe” in the first edition somehow offensive; but more importantly because the territory covered by the atlas is “Central Europe” “in purely geographical terms” (xiii). It could easily be argued that such purity can be contested, because geographers are part of the ongoing struggle to define what “Europe” is and where the “center” of the continent lies.¹ The same problem, from the standpoint of constructivist approaches, arises regarding “ethnic groups.” In the atlas there are maps and statistics (Map 30, p. 97; Map 55, p. 189) that show and list the main “ethnolinguistic groups” that represent more than fifty percent of a population marked in bold font, and other such groups with colors that cover certain areas; this could also be seen as a simplification of a very complex reality. However, we would not have the atlas if it would have been created by constructivist historians. And that would be a great problem, because the *Historical Atlas of Central*

Europe is not only a very useful tool for research and (most of all) teaching, but also a very beautiful, very well-edited publication. And it is a very direct way to tell the history of this part of the continent with the help of short descriptions (mostly not longer than one to two pages), geographical maps, and statistics in sixty-one chapters. The third edition also adds new materials, mostly because of political changes in the Balkans, where Montenegro and Kosovo have appeared, although the renaming of Macedonia as “North Macedonia” came too late to be included in the maps. This shows how important the atlas is, because it documents all these changes and makes them easily visible. The text of the second edition has been revised, and, what is more important, the statistical data in the tables has been corrected and updated; finally, the bibliography has been extended. The quality of the photographic representation of the maps is also much better than in the second edition.

The narrative the maps and statistics tell begins with geography in the stricter sense of the word, looking at the geographical parts of the area with the main mountains and plains, rivers and seashores (Map 1, p. 3). Two smaller maps look at rainfall (Map 1a, p. 4) and “vegetation and land use” (Map 1b, p. 4), and a short text describes the climate of the three main zones (Northern, Alpine, Balkans). Chapter 2 starts the historical narrative, beginning with the fifth century, when Central Europe was divided into a “civilized” Roman Empire and an “uncivilized” world beyond its borders (5). The end of antiquity had a major impact on Central Europe, because it was a time of large movements of various peoples, illustrated in Map 2 (p. 5). Chapters 3 through 13 deal with the medieval period, providing maps of various kingdoms and empires, but also provide looks into the economy (chapter 11), cities (chapter 12) and the church administration (chapter 13). Chapters 14 through 22 focus on the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and chapters 23 through 36 on the “long nineteenth century.” Chapter 38 and 39 are dedicated to the dramatic five years after World War I, 1918-23, that completely changed the political borders and state system of Central Europe. Chapters 39 through 48 describe the major changes in specific sub-regions, from Poland and Lithuania (ch. 38) to Bulgaria and Greece (ch. 48), during the twentieth century. The following five chapters, 49–53, are about the catastrophic two decades between 1930 and the late 1940s, when Central Europe was the theater of another World War, the Holocaust, and major population “movements,” very often brutally enforced. The last eight chapters are more mixed; they look into population (ch. 54) and “ethnolinguistic distribution” (ch. 55); post-war

industrial development (ch. 56); Communism in 1980 and post-communism after 1989 (ch. 56, 61); and the Catholic and Orthodox churches (ch. 59, 60). I have summarized the structure of the *Atlas* here because it shows the main themes and directions of the volume. The reader will get quick and very reliable information about the major political, economic and demographic developments of Central Europe from the end of the Roman Empire until today.

In addition to the maps and the short chapter texts there is an extremely useful index of place names. The editor decided to use today's place names as well as the relatively few English names that are available (like Belgrade, Warsaw, or Vienna), but all the different historical names or the names in other languages are listed in the index, making it extremely helpful.

I did not expect that I would be one of the reviewers who could help Paul Robert Magocsi to further improve his maps by finding mistakes, because I do not have the eye for such details, but I found one: the diocese of "Perugia" on Map 59 (The Latin (Roman) Catholic Church in the twentieth century) is misspelled as "Perugio." But this is a very small mistake that can easily be overlooked in such a major accomplishment for all who are interested in the history and present situation of (not only Central) Europe today!

Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America

NOTE

1. See the discussion in James Koranyi and Bernhard Struck, "Space: Empires, Nations, Borders" in *The Routledge History of East Central Europe since 1700*, ed. Irina Livezeanu and Árpád von Klimó (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), 27–78.

Norman Stone. *Hungary: A Short History*. London: Profile Books, 2019. 245 pages. ISBN 978-1-7881-6050-9

This was supposed to be a book review. But the fact that the author of the book, the British historian Norman Stone (March 8, 1941 – June 19, 2019) passed away shortly after its appearance does in some way connect this last work with the life of the scholar. What is also extraordinary

about this book is the fact that it is the very last book of a historian who had never written a book on Hungary before, although he did study Hungarian, and visited archives there already in 1962, surely one of the very first Western scholars to work in the country only a few years after the 1956 revolution and just months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This tells us something about the author. Norman Stone was an unusual, and surely more adventurous historian compared to his colleagues. In Czechoslovakia—or to be more precise, in Bratislava—he was even arrested and imprisoned for a couple of months for trying to smuggle a Hungarian dissident out of the bloc. After writing his dissertation about the Eastern Front of World War I—a topic almost completely neglected by British, French, or German research at that time, mostly because of lack of command of Eastern European languages—Stone unfortunately (from the perspective of Hungarian Studies!) turned to other topics and other parts of the world. His career continued in three phases, first in Cambridge (1967–84), then in Oxford (1984–97), and finally, again quite unusually, at Bilkent University in Ankara (1997–2017). Stone spent the last years of his life in Budapest, somehow bridging the distance between England and Turkey. His historiography, as demonstrated in his *Europe Transformed, 1878–1919* (1983) and *The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War* (2010),¹ tended to be extremely well-written, funny, thought-provoking, and broad in scope, though not without an eye for telling details; and it always found a large audience, which also had to do with Stone’s journalistic talent. He was called a “maverick”; he had many personal problems and his conservatism was loathed by many academics in Oxford and in other places, which explains why he fled to Turkey, where he was allowed to smoke and did not have to bow to absurd political correctness. His defenses of Margaret Thatcher and Turkey (he did not qualify the massacres of Armenians as “genocide”), and, in this book, his praise for Viktor Orbán, will not please many liberals and leftists. But those who would avoid him for these reasons would miss one of the best-written books on Hungarian history in the English language, that is partly very funny and full of insightful anecdotes and stories. And Stone is very honest when he mentions his own flaws and the limits of his knowledge. The best things about *Hungary: A Short History*, however, are the broad, European perspective and the distance with which he looks at the history of the small country in the center of the continent. Specialists of Hungarian history will not find many new ideas, but the book is not written for them, although it is mostly accurate and reliable—if we

overlook Stone's tendency to leave out the more problematic aspects of the Fidesz regime of the last decade. But apart from that, Stone does not fail to criticize the stupidity of Hungarian nationalism and the often short-sightedness of her elites in often tragic historical situations, which they made worse by their own stubbornness.

The story begins with the consequences of Mohács, when "Hungary fell to foreigners" in 1526 (2), explaining, in the next chapters, why it took more than three hundred years for the country to recover from the setback and enjoy a European modernization, looking to Britain for a liberal model. This long period is covered in the first four chapters, and was marked by the struggle against the Habsburgs for self-determination, which ended in national independence in 1918, but also in absolute disaster. Under Regent Miklós Horthy, whose lack of intelligence Stone emphasizes, the country became more and more dependent on Germany, driven by the desire to revise the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which ended in an even greater catastrophe with the Holocaust (1944/45) and the complete breakdown in 1945 of "Hitler's Last Ally" (149). Chapter 6 describes the brutal Communist takeover, and chapter 7 the horrors and ludicrous paradoxes created by Stalinism. Stone's assessment of János Kádár (ch. 8) is balanced, and it shows how this historian has a great idea of the tragedies of human lives, recounting the miserable youth of János Csermanek (Kádár's name when he was born in the then-(Austro-)Hungarian port city of Fiume, now Rijeka, Croatia). The final chapter is a very condensed, and somewhat open-ended, history of Hungary since 1980, which ends with a paragraph that speaks about "a moment of hope"—obviously in comparison to Hungarian history since the sixteenth century!—and the sentence "A shadowy version of the old Habsburg unity is coming about, and Hungarians learn" (245). Stone seems to indicate that since the end of state socialism in 1989 the European Union made mistakes and "mismanaged" the transition, but that the disappearance of borders dividing Hungary from other former parts of St. Stephen's realm will bring some advantages in the long run. This is a great book, and it is fun to reading even if one does not share the author's political leanings. When reading it, we should mourn a great historian, who we might wish had turned to writing Hungarian history earlier on.

Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America

NOTE

1. Norman Stone, *Europe Transformed, 1878–1919* (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1983); Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

John Zametica. *Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One*. London: Shephard-Walwyn, 2017. 766 pages. ISBN 978-0-8568-3513-1

The application to the graduate school where I ended up doing my Ph.D. in modern European history required all candidates to write an essay on the following question: which work of historical significance do you wish you had written, and why? This was quite annoying to your typical college student, since none of the other graduate programs required such additional labor. In hindsight, however, the exercise was brilliant, as it made one think deeply about what makes for good history and how historians enrich, and complicate, our understanding of the past. If I were writing that essay today, I might choose John Zametica's book *Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One*.

I say that with two major caveats. First, I disagree ardently with the author's overarching argument that the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire—the "sick man on the Danube," as the prologue is entitled—was "an anomaly condemned to death by the progress of history" (4). Zametica's work unfolds as unabashedly determinist in its view that the nation-state was not only ascendant in the nineteenth century, but that national interests make any kind of supranational governing system, including today's European Union, a largely futile undertaking. Overlooking or willfully ignoring decades of research that has demolished the notion of a decrepit and doomed dual monarchy (and several pages of the prologue are devoted to the "shambles of the [dualist] system" created by the 1867 Compromise), Zametica comes off as such an extreme evangelist for national identity and sovereignty that he specifies the ethnic origins of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (actually a Cincar whose real surname was Pasku) and cites a Serbian general's satisfaction at learning that the June 11, 1903 conspirators who murdered Serbian King Alexander and his dreadful wife Draga Mašin were not Serbs per se, but rather "Cincars, Bulgars, Czechs, Vlachs and Jews" (9, 197).

While such ethnic precision points to the awe-inspiring meticulousness that pervades this work and about which I will write more, the above example is also indicative of its second significant flaw: Zametica's bulky, 643-page tome (not including seventy-five pages of detailed endnotes and a useful bibliography) tips heavily towards exculpating Serbs from any kind of activities that might have antagonized Austria-Hungary in the period before the First World War. The historiography on the war's origins sorely needed a corrective to the abundant literature, capped in 2012 by Christopher Clark's more broadly conceived study *The Sleepwalkers*,¹ that makes Serbia out to be the south Slavic nemesis par excellence, whose irredentist pretensions and propaganda explain, if not excuse, Habsburg leaders' decisive choice of war against the small Serbian thorn in its side in the immediate aftermath of the Sarajevo assassination. Yet rather than nudging the needle toward a more balanced accounting of Austro-Hungarian insecurity and Serb nationalist agitation, Zametica practically leaves the latter out of the big picture altogether. So, for example, we learn that Croatia rather than Serbia was the hotbed for south Slavic nationalism, and that Ilija Garašanin's famous *Načertanije* (outline) for "Great Serbia" was originally penned by a Polish exile, revised by a Czech, and in any case had little influence on Serbian foreign policy, making it "a classic example of a historiographical straw man argument" (190). In both instances, the author's highly detailed clarifications are essential contributions to the scholarly literature. Yet one reads this book wondering whether all the so-called Serbian nationalism ever even existed outside the imaginations of Habsburg officialdom and careless historians.

Another case in point concerns the influence on young Bosnians of Serb nationalist Bogdan Žerajić's suicide after attempting to assassinate Bosnian Governor-General Marijan Varešanin in Sarajevo in June 1910, despite Gavrilo Princip and friends' Yugoslavist rather than Serb nationalist ideological orientation (which Zametica proves conclusively and crucially, considering how many scholars unthinkingly label the Bosnian assassin a "Serbian nationalist"). Yet here too there is no mention of how the Serbian press heroized Žerajić, including in the August 5, 1910 issue of *Politika*. Similarly, one finishes this book feeling that Austro-Hungarian leaders in July 1914 were scrambling to find any evidence whatsoever of the anti-Habsburg propaganda alleged in their ultimatum to Serbia; or that Serbs respectfully stopped celebrating the national holiday Vidovdan the moment they heard about the Sarajevo assassination. Instead, Zametica painstakingly documents the relentless efforts of official Serbia to live peacefully with the vast empire to its

north—even after the regime annexed what he attests are the irrefutably Serb lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina—and in the days following the Archduke’s murder.

Yet document it does, and therein lies the main reason that any historian of the origins of World War I should take this book seriously. If the author’s presentation is one-sided, the case he makes for Serbia is firmly grounded in a close reading of primary sources, their context, and all the major literature in every relevant language. Whether Zametica is explaining why Franz Ferdinand—a “die-hard paleoconservative” (635)—was not the peace-loving and reform-minded Successor he is often made out to be (the Archduke’s alleged Trialism, which still crops up in serious literature, is decisively and, one hopes, lastingly undermined here); showing how the 1903 regicide was not the turning point in Serbian foreign policy away from Austria-Hungary and toward Russia (in fact, he shows how, right up to the July Crisis in 1914, Russia was never a dependable ally and support for Serbia); or dissecting the hidden aggression behind the June 1914 Matscheko Memorandum, which most scholars interpret as being devoid of war planning against Serbia, his cascade of revisionist arguments are intricately sourced and fastidiously reasoned.

Indeed, this book is as much a polemic with other historians as it is a narrative of the origins of World War I in the Balkans. On numerous occasions, Zametica feistily takes scholars to task—Christopher Clark, Luigi Albertini, and Sean McMeekin earn particular opprobrium—for uncritically accepting and enthusiastically furthering such “fantastic hogwash” (401), “false constructs” (456), “misleading legends” (482), and other “myths” (634), as the appearance of a telegram from Russia fortifying Serbian leaders on the deadline of the ultimatum (July 25), or the role of the Black Hand in the Sarajevo assassination.

Regarding the latter, Zametica’s erudition is awesome, the pace and detail of the narrative exciting (he exactly corrects both the order of the cars in the imperial procession and of the assassins lining the Appel Quay), and no scholar will ever again be able to write on the political murder without first reading him. For what Zametica has essentially done is not to prove conclusively what individual or organization was behind the Sarajevo assassination (confoundingly, definitive documentation is just not there), but to reason his way through the maze of original sources and testimonies (including an impressively close reading of the assassins’ trial transcript) to show the origins and weaknesses of the near century-long obsession with Apis’s “terrorist” Black Hand Society. In a chapter wittily entitled “Black Hand—Red Herring,”

Zametica contextualizes Apis's actions within the domestic political crisis in Serbia in order to undermine the Black Hand leader's own confession (at the 1917 Salonika show trial) to having organized the Sarajevo conspiracy. Rather, he argues, the loose cannon Major Vojislav Tankosić, who was named in the ultimatum and whose personality is given great attention in this work, handed over the weapons to Princip and friends on his own initiative. Apis, concludes the author, actually tried to stop the assassination (both through the Serbian ambassador to Vienna and directly with the assassins in Sarajevo) once he learned about his freewheeling subordinate's precipitous action in support of the young Bosnians (who, again contrary to many standard historical accounts, initiated the conspiracy on their own rather than being "recruited" by the Black Hand).

It may be easy to criticize Zametica for the broad, pre-determined brushstrokes that encompass his arguments and for what he leaves out in terms of Serbian nationalist activities. But dismissing his work outright, say because of the author's unseemly support for Radovan Karadžić during the Yugoslav secessionary wars and at the Bosnian Serb leader's trial in the Hague Tribunal, would be an easy way for scholars to continue avoiding some of the fictional hand-me-downs about this critical era that are rooted in the work of the likes of Luigi Albertini and Stanoje Stanojević on the Sarajevo assassination, and which Zametica has finally rooted out. It's one thing to write "a rip-roaring good [his]story" (396), but it's quite another to do so based on the primary sources rather than relying on dated secondary literature that often played fast and loose with such critical facts as the ideology of the Sarajevo assassins and an alleged last-minute Russian telegram bolstering Belgrade before the ultimatum expired. Zametica's blatant biases aside, *Folly and Malice* is a breathtaking display of how expert historical sleuthing works, and how easily even the most respected academics incorporate and transmit "false constructs" in the process of writing their complicated works.

Paul Miller-Melamed
McDaniel College

NOTE

1. Christopher Clark, *Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

Borislav Chernev. *Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. 301 pages. ISBN 978-1-4875-2449-4

On March 3, 1918, the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia signed the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (the first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been concluded between the Central Powers and Ukraine on February 9, 1918). According to the terms of the second treaty, Russia (or, more accurately, the “old empire”) ceded 780,000 square kilometres of territory and roughly fifty-six million people. Russian losses amounted to “twenty-seven percent of the former empire’s arable land, twenty-six percent of its railways, thirty-three percent of its textile industry, seventy-three percent of its iron and steel production, eighty-nine percent of its coal deposits, and ninety percent of its sugar production.” From the point of view of many observers, the conditions imposed by the treaty were unnecessarily harsh, and marked an “imperial collapse on [a] scale [that] was almost wholly unprecedented” (214).

As Borislav Chernev notes in his recent book commemorating the centenary of the Brest-Litovsk Conference, “few treaties in the history of international relations have been vilified as much as the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk” (213). Given the magnitude of what Russia appeared to lose and what the Central Powers temporarily gained, it is of course understandable that many scholars have zeroed in on the supposedly draconian nature of the treaty, or that they have treated the Brest-Litovsk Conference as a massive and misguided diplomatic failure on the part of the inexperienced Bolsheviks. Though there is undoubtedly some truth to these claims, Chernev nevertheless argues that such black-and-white assessments of Brest-Litovsk conceal the complexity and nuanced history behind the conference and the two treaties that resulted from it. Drawing on a rich body of primary sources from archives in multiple countries, Chernev’s well-researched and provocative study challenges readers to think about the history of the Brest-Litovsk Conference in new ways, not only with regard to who may have won or lost, but also in terms of the role the conference played in shaping Europe—and especially East Central Europe—in the early twentieth century.

For students of World War I who have viewed the conflict and its aftermath primarily from a Western-centric perspective, the

biggest surprise will no doubt come in the opening chapters of the book. Though the armistice of November 11, 1918 and the Paris Peace Talks that followed may have marked a distinct end to the war on the Western Front, Chernev points out that, in East Central Europe, peace talks began already in December 1917, with hostilities extending well into 1923. In terms of the peace talks themselves, it was at the Brest-Litovsk Conference, and not the Paris Peace Conference, that the notion of open negotiations was first introduced, largely because of the Bolshevik desire to use the conference as a platform for the articulation and dissemination of revolutionary propaganda. Perhaps more surprisingly, it was at Brest-Litovsk, and not Paris, that the concept of national self-determination made its debut as part of peace negotiations. Introduced on the first day of the peace conference by Adolf Ioffe, chairman of the Russian delegation, the concept of national self-determination was announced as the cornerstone of Bolshevik peace conditions. Based upon ideas first espoused by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in a pamphlet published in 1915, the so-called Ioffe Program prompted Western liberal-democratic leaders to articulate similar policies, and predated not only Woodrow Wilson's announcement of his Fourteen Points by a few weeks, but also David Lloyd George's commitment to a postwar peace settlement "based on the right to self-determination or the consent of the governed" (48).

The Bolshevik insistence on a peace plan based on the principle of national self-determination proved popular—or at least potentially useful—to multiple parties taking part in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. For the Bolsheviks, national self-determination was first and foremost an ideological commitment, one that ran parallel with the Marxist call for "the suppression of the ruling classes by the proletariat at home and abroad as a prelude to permanent revolutions" (49). As Chernev points out, however, Bolshevik support of self-determination for "suppressed" nations was also a key aspect of their foreign policy, and was deployed tactically, if also sincerely, as a means of transforming inherited imperial structures along communist lines. The Central Powers, by comparison, also latched on to the notion of national self-determination, and were determined to use it to their advantage over the course of the negotiations. Austria-Hungary and Germany, for example, posed as "liberators and protectors of small nations in the East" (67), and in this way attempted to justify the occupation of eastern territories. Bulgaria, in turn, found the concept useful as a means of formulating foreign policy goals. Mobilizing the idea of national self-determination in their ultimately failed quest to secure regional

hegemony in the Balkans, the Bulgarian delegation sought “international recognition for the annexation of newly-conquered territories,” arguing that the expansion of the state would liberate ethnic Bulgarians living outside the country, thus achieving national unification.

As the Bolsheviks themselves recognized, support for national self-determination could, and likely would, fuel movements for independence and decolonization, and would thus hasten the collapse of empires, including the Russian Empire that they had just inherited. Ukraine is perhaps a good case in point. Highlighting the ways in which Ukrainian delegates appealed to the Brest-Litovsk system as a means of pursuing their own domestic goals, Chernev argues that there was a clear connection between the peace process in 1917–1918 and the origins of modern Ukrainian statehood as an anti-colonial project. Given the imperial war aims of Germany and Austria-Hungary, it is perhaps ironic that the signing of the peace treaty with the Central Powers in February 1918 laid both the ideological and practical groundwork for Ukrainization. Having been assured the right to national self-determination, the brief period of nation-building that followed the signing of the treaty in fact anticipated “certain elements” of the indigenization [*korenizatsiia*] policy that would later be implemented in Ukraine by Soviet authorities in the interwar period (121).

For the Central Powers, the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations presented significant opportunities for the continuation and even temporary fulfilment of imperial goals. The rise of nationalist fervour throughout the region, however, coupled with the growing frustration of the masses at home (especially over food shortages), only contributed to growing discontent and radicalization. Chernev argues that, as the talks dragged on, the Central Powers were motivated increasingly by fear of revolution, particularly in Austria-Hungary. Though the October Revolution arguably had “little immediate effect on the workers of Habsburg East Central Europe,” the deteriorating food situation, which had politicized the masses and had been provoking protests since the middle of the war, created conditions within which the Brest-Litovsk conference “captured the popular imagination” (84). This growing sense of fear was only heightened in mid-January 1918 as strikes broke out in Austria, and spread to Hungary and Germany. Beginning at the Daimler Motor Works in Wiener Neustadt on January 14 after officials announced that flour rations would be cut in half, the number of protesters grew quickly and strikes flared up in other towns and cities, with workers and strikers demanding bread and peace. As Chernev suggests,

the Great January Strike was “the opening act of the Central European revolutions of 1918–1919” (119).

While there is much to like about this book, Hungarian specialists will find little regarding the Hungarian perspective on Brest-Litovsk, save for a few brief and isolated statements regarding Hungarian responses to diplomatic developments during the conference. The reader learns, for example, that the Hungarian prime minister, Sándor Wekerle, was very uncomfortable with Austria-Hungary’s rather favourable response to Ioffe’s notion of national self-determination, and in particular with the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister’s claims that aspects of the Ioffe Program could in principle serve as the basis of “a general and just peace” (51). From Wekerle’s perspective, Austria-Hungary’s admittedly opportunistic accommodation of Bolshevik principles regarding self-determination and minority rights “had the potential to undermine Magyar dominance in the Kingdom of Hungary” (55). This is an important point that would be worth pursuing more fully, though Chernev fails to develop it any further. Likewise, he indicates that the January strikes in 1918 also spilled over into Hungary as early as January 18, when streetcar workers walked off the job in Budapest. As in Austria, these strikes grew in size very quickly, and spread to other cities like Nagykanizsa and Szeged (110). Unfortunately, by limiting his analysis to one page, and by drawing on only a few non-Hungarian primary sources and József Galántai’s otherwise dated *Hungary in the First World War*,¹ the reader is left wondering not only about the impact that these strikes had in Hungary, and how they may have differed from those in Austria and Germany, but also about the role they may have played as precursors to the Hungarian revolutions of 1918 and 1919.

Of course, given the already impressive linguistic and geographic scope of the book, it is both understandable and perhaps also forgivable that Chernev has given the Hungarian side of the story short shrift. That being said, he does drop a bomb of sorts near the very end of the final chapter, one that makes up for earlier oversights. Reflecting on the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk from “the perspective of Imperial collapse and decolonization,” Chernev argues that it has less in common with Versailles (the treaty to which it is typically compared), and more in common with Trianon, which the victorious powers “imposed on Hungary” in 1920. Though often regarded simply as a nation-state in and of itself, Chernev suggests that, like the Russian Empire, Hungary was in many ways also a colonial power, albeit a junior one within the much bigger Habsburg Empire.

As provocative—and I think necessary—as Chernev’s comparison between the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Trianon might be, I doubt the book will find its way into many university-level courses that focus specifically on Hungarian history. But it can and should find a home on the shelves of students and scholars interested not only in the history of World War I and the peace negotiations and treaties that followed, but also in the history of East Central Europe and the early years of the Soviet Union more generally. Chernev’s masterful study will also appeal to readers who revel in the detail-oriented analyses of diplomatic history, or who appreciate the intricacies and complexities of international relations. Beautifully written and skilfully edited, *Twilight of Empire* is a valuable and entertaining history, and if nothing else, provides clear and often dramatic insight into the meeting of “two vastly different worlds,” one bent on shaping the future along revolutionary lines, and the other content with preserving the imperial status quo, and containing the Bolshevik threat.

Steven Jobbitt
Lakehead University

NOTE

1. József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1989).

Zsolt Nagy. *Great Expectations and Interwar Realities: Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2017. 341 pages. ISBN: 978-9-6338-6194-3

With the country lacking the possibility of a nationally driven foreign policy during the years of Austro-Hungarian dualism, cultural diplomacy was a pursuit that Hungarian politicians could engage in only with the creation of an independent state in 1918. After the turmoil of the immediate post-war years, punctuated by the demise of the short-lived democratic-liberal Hungarian republic born on November 16, 1918 and the rise and fall of the Soviet Republic of Councils in the spring and summer of 1919, Hungary turned into a conservative authoritarian regime under the leadership of Regent Miklós Horthy for the rest of the interwar period. It is therefore the cultural diplomacy of this regime that

Zsolt Nagy's book examines, by focusing on state agencies, cultural institutions, scholarly publications, tourism, radio, and newsreels as instruments for creating a specific image of Hungary for audiences abroad.

The core chapters of the book are framed by the perspective of the transition from a rather ineffective wartime propaganda, whose reach was limited, to a more coordinated peacetime cultural diplomacy supervised by the government and various national institutions during the interwar years. After uncoordinated attempts during the early 1920s by a variety of right-wing groups at persuading the Allies of the injustice of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, it was mostly after 1927 that cultural diplomacy gained more traction in Hungary's foreign policy. The institutions in charge of this effort were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Religion and Public Education. Subordinated to the broad goals of revisionism and improving Hungary's image abroad, Hungarian cultural diplomacy of the late 1920s and 1930s tried to change negative Western European perceptions of Hungary. It attempted this by emphasizing the country's belonging to the sphere of Western civilization and modernity, which—in the interpretation of its proponents—entitled Hungarians to claim cultural superiority over their southeastern neighbors. The architects of this new strategy were Count Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion and Public Education in the István Bethlen government between 1922 and 1931 and, to a lesser extent, Miklós Kozma, the first head of Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI – Hungarian Telegraphic Office), whose reach as cultural propagandist also extended to a variety of other media such as radio and newsreels.

However, there was often disagreement about what kind of image of Hungarianness to highlight for the consumption of foreign audiences. Ever since the rise of Hungarian nationalism in the nineteenth century, Magyars oscillated between adopting Western and Oriental identities. The split consciousness that the continuous movement between the two caused in Hungarians' self-image was well encapsulated by Endre Ady's metaphor of *komp-ország* (ferry-land) that he coined at the beginning of the twentieth century. During the interwar period, however, rejecting both the internationalist image proposed in 1918–19 by liberals and communists and the oriental fantasies of extreme right-wing groups, conservative nationalist governments chose to emphasize instead the Western and Christian character of Hungary. Instantiated by the promotion of the image and cult of St. Stephen, the first Christian king of Hungary, over that of Árpád, the pagan chieftain who led the Magyar tribes to Pannonia, this self-image connected Hungary both to

European civilization and a transnational Catholic ecumene. By virtue of the battles that the medieval kingdom of Hungary fought against the Ottomans, this connection was further cemented in the portrayal of Hungary as *scutus Christi* (the shield of Christianity), a trope that came to be frequently used in debates about the Hungarian national character that took center stage during the interwar period.

As the chief architect of Hungary's cultural diplomacy, Klebelsberg warned against relying on past achievements; he wanted the country to enter the future on new terms based "on the rejuvenation and reconstruction of the country's cultural life," which would allow "Hungary to join European cultural life" (94). Therefore the ambitious cultural reconstruction program that he set out for Hungary included not just the expansion of public education domestically and the borrowing of foreign models for the rebuilding of the country's scientific infrastructure, but also the establishment of several outposts of Hungarian culture abroad. Following in the footsteps of some older Hungarian cultural institutions established in Vienna and Rome prior to the war, he developed a new network of Collegium Hungaricum institutes in Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, together with a "Hungarian-French University Information Institute in Paris, and five lectureships at institutions of higher education in Germany, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Poland" (117). A lesser-known outpost of Hungarian culture abroad, discussed in detail by Nagy, is the Hungarian Reference Library in New York City, opened in 1937 with materials purchased indirectly by the Hungarian government from the widow of Károly (Charles) Feleky, an American-Hungarian collector of English-language books, journals, and news clippings about Hungary. The activities of these institutions were supported from home not just financially but also through a wide array of foreign-language publications aiming to acquaint foreign audiences with Hungarian culture, science, and literature, among which the *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* and the *Hungarian Quarterly* stood out.

Propaganda in the service of tourism was also soon enrolled to help with these efforts. With the foreign orientation of its tourism development, Hungary differed from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, where the focus of the state fell on developing domestic tourism. Based on a wide array of archival evidence, Nagy convincingly explores the variety of connections and interactions between different government organizations, Hungarian embassies abroad, and municipal and civic tourist organizations at home, whose ultimate aim was to attract more foreign tourists to Hungary. In parallel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

also made it one of its priorities to sponsor foreign journalists and public figures to write and speak favorably about Hungary, a practice in which the country competed with the Little Entente powers. The 1930s indeed turned into a golden age of Hungarian tourism, with Budapest and Lake Balaton being visited by many Germans, Austrians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Americans, along with travelers from the neighboring countries. Conflict over the meaning of Hungarianness resulted in tourism promoters presenting an image of Hungary which included the modern architecture, spa culture, and cosmopolitan nightlife of Budapest, together with romantic and folkloristic highlights such as the wilderness of the Hungarian *puszta* (plain) and the *matyó* costumes of Mezőkövesd—a composite image which continued to place the country in an ambivalent Western/Eastern position.

In the last chapter of the book, Nagy analyzes the role that radio programming and *Kulturfilme* (culture shorts) had in Hungary's overall cultural diplomacy efforts. Once turned operational, radio broadcasts were used by the government both as an effective outreach tool to Hungarian speakers living in the neighboring countries and as a medium enabling it to promote Hungarian culture abroad. Economic considerations were also important, since radio programming enabled the government to collect a license fee from listeners. Rather than giving in to pressure from extreme right-wing groups to broadcast exclusively in Hungarian, and in line with Klebelsberg's efforts to Europeanize Hungarian culture, radio broadcasting was multi-lingual, including numerous programs in English, French, German, and Italian, as well as music ranging from *magyar nóta* (Hungarian folk songs) to American jazz. The author's discussion of the infrastructural development of radio broadcasting, with a veritable race developing between Hungary and its neighbors for the greatest possible power and reach of their respective radio stations, provides another interesting comparative insight. The production of Hungarian newsreels and *Kulturfilme* was also an endeavor that encountered fierce competition on the international market for such fare from the Little Entente countries. Although Hungarian propagandistic shorts like *Hungária* (produced in 1928 and remade in 1934) were successful both at home and abroad, they had to compete against similar products such as the Czech *Saint Wenceslas* and the Romanian *Romania Today—Picturesque Romania*, which lessened their overall impact on foreign audiences.

The book breaks new ground by providing thematic, comparative, and analytical insights into the way interwar Hungarian cultural propaganda was developed at the intersection of governmental and

private interests. With its wide and informed coverage of the history of Hungarian cultural diplomacy during the interwar years, Nagy's work can be usefully read along such publications as Andrea Orzoff's *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948* (2009),¹ which discusses parallel propagandistic image-making efforts in interwar Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, whose propaganda campaigns were largely effective, Hungary's efforts—based as they were on the promotion of the country's cultural superiority and the need for the revision of its borders—ultimately foundered, due not just to the country's siding with Germany in WWII, but also to a sense of cultural arrogance that could not accept Hungary's status as a minor power and acknowledge interwar realities.

Alexander Vari
Marywood University

NOTE

1. Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Frey, David. *Jews, Nazis, and the Cinema of Hungary: The Tragedy of Success, 1929–44*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018. 462 pages. ISBN 978-1-7807-6451-1

The late (Jewish) American-Hungarian Andy Vajna, known for producing the *Rambo* films, among many others, was in 2011 installed by the then-new Fidesz government as “film czar,” and established the Hungarian National Film Fund. In late 2018, he came under fierce attack in the pages of the regime-true paper *Magyar Idők* for his “un-Hungarian” choices of director and screenwriter for a historical epic about János Hunyadi, hero of the 1453 defense of Belgrade (the project was suspended after Vajna's sudden death a few months later). Around the time Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was being savaged by Jewish communities and their allies at home and abroad for the 2014 erection in central Budapest of the Memorial for Victims of the German Occupation, which was seen as a nationalist distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, the Vajna-controlled fund rescued the production of the universally acclaimed, Oscar-winning Auschwitz drama *Saul fia* (Son of Saul).

David Frey's award-winning study¹ of the Hungarian film industry from the advent of sound film to the German occupation concludes with a blistering critique of Orbán's revival of a "conceptualization of national identity based on cultural, and even racial, distinction" (397). He does not mention Vajna—who, as fate would have it, was born the year Frey's account ends—but the contradictions of the Hollywood producer imported to nationalize Hungarian film, denounced by his patron's allies for crimes against Hungarian memory, after having either defied the prime minister's anti-Semitism or protected his flank in a crisis, generating an international triumph for the state, seem to perfectly reprise and reflect the continuous and convoluted political and economic struggles thoroughly detailed in this excellent volume.

As his title indicates, Frey sees both the determinant conditions and the internal nature of Hungarian film in this period as riven with paradoxes. The industry operated on a capitalist basis, while subject to state domination; the 1932 film *Repülő arany* (Flying gold), for example, was an "attempt to leverage international backing to forge a Hungarian cosmopolitanism . . . [which] functioned as national" (52). Hungarian film thereafter took advantage of "international film nationalism" (53), in the form of émigrés returning from Nazifying Germany, while the construction of "a 'Christian national' Hungarian film industry" depended on "Hungarian 'film Jews'" (13). These ambiguities left "Hungarian bureaucrats, from censors to diplomats . . . tantalized and confused" (74). Ironically, however, "it was also these internal contradictions and imbalances that prevented the Hungarian motion picture industry from ruining itself" (11). By the end of the decade, when a would-be *Gleichschaltung* was on the table, it was sabotaged at every turn by conflict and competition between different interests (producers, distributors, exhibitors), institutions and agencies, and political orientations.

The narrative begins with a brief description of the 1912–18 "first golden age of Hungarian film" (29), which produced such later international luminaries as Alexander [Sándor] Korda, Michael Curtiz, and Béla Lugosi, and ended with Hungary as the third-greatest film power, behind the US and Denmark, in terms of numbers of films produced. But the brutality of the counterrevolution, and the early Horthy regime's heavy-handedness, left the industry in ruins within a decade. The arrival of sound film at the end of the 1920s constituted a challenge, especially to a linguistically isolated, relatively poor country, but also

an opportunity. At a moment when defining national identity became paramount, especially in the new states of East Central Europe, “sound nationalized film.” (35). While the interwar state was historically conditioned to want to dominate culture, the memory of the nationalizations during the reviled 1919 Council Republic, as well as continuing economic crisis, prevented it from playing a major role in film financing. Combined with the capital-intensive nature of film production, especially in the sound era, and the particular nature of Hungarian development, this meant that “Jewish capital” predominated. The influx of exiles from Berlin (site of the European vanguard until the end of the Weimar Republic); the possession of relevant skills, education, and aptitudes conducive to success in a thoroughly modern arena; and their local and international connections meant that Jews (or, “Jews”—Frey makes clear his view of the term as ascriptive) dominated the creative side as well.

The power and popularity of the “Hollywood model” offered great success to its imitators and developers in Hungary, but also “a clear concept of nation, envisaging the liberal cosmopolitan, consumption-oriented middle class of Budapest as the symbol of modern Hungary” (91). Inevitably, however, this “urbanist” ideal was contested, as “discussions of ‘national film’ and a healthy ‘national film culture’ became surrogates for the basic question of ‘What is Hungarian?’” (76). The mogul István Gerő, head of what was known as the “Gerő trust,” a movie theater conglomerate which soon moved into film production, became the target of attacks on what nationalists such as the Turul Society saw as a “Jewish conspiracy” (112). The so-called “Jewish Question,” which by the late 1930s became an obsession across the Hungarian intelligentsia, was “not always linked to the Jewishness of those who made the films” but to “cosmopolitan, middle-class, and urban Hungary and its mass culture” (183). This was compounded by the growing influence of Germany—a desperately desired market for Hungarian film—and its attempts to impose its “Aryan paragraph” (146). The government’s response was the creation of the Film Chamber, “a component of a corporatist wave” (194) meant to subject the industry to the perceived national will; but it was continually foiled by “jurisdictional questions” (193) and “conflicts of interest” (203).

The passage of the First Jewish Law in 1938 was followed by the 1939 “production crisis” which, Frey argues, though not unconnected, (also) “came down to matters of risk, entrepreneurship, and interwar Hungary’s tormented relationship with the capitalist system” (208). The

outcome was a “hybrid system . . . partially sat[ing] rightist desires for centralization, increased government direction, and minimized risk,” but also “reintegrat[ing] Jewish capital and talent” (210). As might be expected, this led to the well-known “strawman” practice, of Christian fronts for Jewish talent and capital, and an order “fraught with contradictory bureaucratic, financial, and moral imperatives” (211). At the same time, the 1938 and 1940 Vienna Awards, and the Transcarpathian and especially Yugoslav territories annexed in 1939 and 1941, coupled with the destruction, disabling, or absorption by Nazi aggression of much of European film production capacity, opened up unprecedented opportunities for Hungarian film: “Hungarian Garbos and Gables were the means by which their nation would re-establish its pre-1918 cultural, political, and economic authority in Central Europe and the Balkans” (274). These dreams were fulfilled to a surprising degree through the course of the war, but were ultimately foiled by Germany’s manipulations to prevent any challenge to its dominance in the Nazi “New Order.” In the final analysis, “political squabbles, contrary political and economic imperatives, talent shortages, cultural inertia, and international pressures . . . stymied the establishment’s attempts to unite behind any lucid concept of a Christian national film system” (336).

Based on exhaustive and wide-ranging research carried out for his 2003 dissertation and since in numerous archives in Hungary, Germany, and the US, covering and illuminating a veritable alphabet soup of governmental, quasi-governmental, and private agencies and institutions, this work fills a significant lacuna in Hungarian film studies in English, which have mostly focused on the postwar period, and, to the extent this era is covered at all, on individual films and directors.² Its transnational perspective—not just during the war, but from the start, with the “transnational origins” (46) of Hungarian film—is most welcome, in the context of still largely national film studies. Also appreciated is its relentless excavation of the conflicted, contested, multi-sided nature of national identity and the struggles around it, which belies the traditional picture of uniform and “totalitarian” forces of anti-Semitism and German-occupied Europe. It also introduces the reader to fascinating, largely unknown aspects of Hungarian film history, such as the “lynchpin” (274) role of Yugoslavia post-1936 in the expansion of the industry; the role of the “narrow” (16 mm) film trade, for alternative genres and venues, and mightily struggled over both domestically and vis-à-vis Germany; and the wartime crisis of raw film stock supply, dominated by Germany and used as a cudgel against Hungarian production, leading to forced economizing and loss of quality.

A couple quibbles, in no way meant to diminish Frey's achievement: I find unfortunate his uncritical use of the term "backwardness," as in "an intermixing of government, business, and culture unique to the smaller and less democratic European states" (36). Alongside the almost uniformly positive portrayal of the role of Hollywood, and of those acting according to purely capitalist or market dictates, as questioned only by narrow-minded nationalists, this seems to privilege a Western and liberal orientation. (Here it should be noted that plenty of "Jewish" cosmopolitan "urbanists" in interwar Hungary were critical of capitalism, liberalism, and the West.) And while Frey introduces "populism" as "encompassing an enormous spectrum of thought" (89), and as "simultaneously conservative, revolutionary, and divided, with strong left and right-wing components" (125n68), as his narrative and the spread of Right-radical ideology proceed, the use of the term becomes (e.g., at 338 and 364) increasingly constricted, as practically a surrogate for anti-Semitic proponents of a "changing of the guard." While it is true that the interwar Hungarian populist movement had an increasingly problematic stance on the "Jewish Question," and several individuals drifted close to or into the Arrow Cross orbit (while others were or became Communists), the movement had significant roots in agrarian socialism and stood (mostly) steadfastly opposed to the neo-feudal aristocratic order. Several populist writers in fact signed onto the intellectuals' protest letter against the First Jewish Law, or otherwise opposed the wartime regime. Thus the "failure of populism" was not just bureaucratic, or a conflict between ideological and commercial imperatives: it was political—as Frey actually shows in his fascinating analyses of several wartime films, in which "dangerous" class critiques were forcibly transferred by the powers that be into racial ones (A harmincadik [The thirtieth]; Dr. Kovács István [Dr. István Kovács]); or shelved altogether (Szerető fia, Péter [Your loving son, Peter]). (I would have loved to see such incisive analyses of some of the prewar films.) Finally, while the book is well written, I found numerous typos, missing or misplaced hyphens, and other minor technical issues.

I will close with another aside: the prominent actor Antal Páger appears here as the exemplar of artistic anti-Semitism, labeled as "fascist-leaning" (347) and "the ubiquitous face of Hungarian rightist populism" (359), and said to have been enlisted to "prepare an industry blacklist"—all no doubt true. What Frey doesn't mention is that, after fleeing to Austria, France, and finally South America at the end of the war, Páger was rehabilitated and returned to Hungary in August 1956, on a special plane chartered by the Communist government. He then

went on to star in the most remarkable Holocaust film of the pre-1989 era, Zoltán Fábri's 1966 *Utószezon* (Late season).³ Perhaps his story indicates a way forward?

Richard S. Esbshade
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

NOTES

1. Frey's book was awarded the Hungarian Studies Association Book Prize in 2019.
2. But see also, appearing roughly simultaneously, Gábor Gergely, *Hungarian Film, 1929-1947: National Identity, Anti-Semitism, and Popular Cinema* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).
3. See Máté Zombory, András Lénárt, and Anna Lujza Szász, "Elfeleltett szembenézés: Holokauszt és emlékezés Fábri Zoltán *Utószezon* c. filmjében" [Forgotten reckoning: Holocaust and memory in Zoltán Fábri's film *Late season*], *BUKSZ* 25, no. 3 (2013), 245–56.

Árpád von Klimó. *Remembering Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi Sad, Hungarian Politics, and Society, 1942–1989*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. 268 pages. ISBN 978-0-8229-6545-9

In January 1942, Hungarian occupying forces conducted a series of raids against Serbian partisans in the occupied territory of Vojvodina, which Hungary had reannexed during the invasion of Yugoslavia several months before. The most eventful of these raids occurred in the city of Novi Sad, where over the course of three days Hungarian soldiers and gendarmes executed more than a thousand civilians, most of whom had no connection to the partisans. Witnesses both in the city and in neighboring Croatia (where the executions could be seen from the southern bank of the Danube) brought immediate attention to the atrocities, and it became one of the most high-profile crimes of the Second World War. The Novi Sad massacre and its long afterlife as a site of memory is the subject of Árpád von Klimó's latest monograph.

The first section of the book chronicles the raids and their immediate aftermath. Klimó describes how military leaders in Novi Sad summoned tens of thousands of people to appear before ad-hoc verification committees, over the protests of civilian authorities, who

argued that the actions would destabilize the city. The action quickly devolved into “the random killing of innocent civilians,” with Jews making up a disproportionate number of the victims (27). This has led scholars to suggest that Novi Sad be considered a precursor to the Holocaust in Hungary in 1944. Klimó argues that Serbian–Hungarian territorial rivalry over the city, as well as the growing belief among members of Hungarian society that persecuting Jews furthered social justice and aimed to rectify “the unequal distribution of wealth” in the country, were important contributing factors to the atrocities in Novi Sad (38). However, he contends that the desire on the part of Hungarian officers to contribute to Hitler’s vision of a “New Europe” by copying German occupational strategies was the main reason for the massacre (41). Klimó’s detailed description of the historical event brings in new scholarship on borderlands, wartime atrocities, and perpetrator motivations that contextualize the Novi Sad massacre within the broader European historiography of the Second World War. From a meta perspective, it also serves as his own contribution to the memory of the massacre.

The first section concludes with two chapters describing various responses to the Novi Sad massacres. These included a somewhat half-hearted attempt to hold officers responsible for the raid during the war, mass reprisals against ethnic Hungarians by Tito’s partisans, and a series of postwar trials in both Hungary and Yugoslavia. Klimó argues that the postwar trials had revenge as their main motivator, part of the continent-wide phenomenon of the “politics of retribution” explored by István Deák, Jan Gross, and Tony Judt, among others. The postwar period also saw a distortion of the memory of the crime, as many commentators, especially those aligned with the Hungarian Communist Party, attempted to exonerate the “Hungarian people” from any responsibility for war crimes, attributing them solely to class enemies or the country’s German minority (92).

In the second part of the book, Klimó explores Novi Sad as a “site of memory” by tracing the development of popular memory of the massacre through the post-World War II decades. He begins with the Stalinist period in Hungary, where he argues that the “future-oriented Stalinist discourse” had little place for remembrance of the massacre, or the war in general (109). It was not until the 1960s that the Novi Sad massacre became widely discussed, due largely to the success of the novel *Cold Days* and its subsequent film version, which was one

of the first explorations of personal responsibility for crimes committed in the name of the “institutional structures” of the state (142). By dramatizing the event, author Tibor Cseres and director András Kovács transformed Novi Sad into a “symbol of Hungarian guilt” and gave a lasting descriptor—the Cold Days—to the 1942 massacre (156).

Remembering Cold Days concludes with a look at how memory of the Novi Sad massacre intersected with larger trends in historical memory in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. Klimó suggests that “radical shifts in Hungarians’ understanding of their past and in remembering the victims of mass violence” might be considered one of the domestic catalysts for regime change (153). While Novi Sad was one of the first instances of mass violence that was widely discussed, this process broadened in the 1980s to include remembrance of the Second World War in Hungary more generally. Klimó also touches upon contested interpretations of the Novi Sad massacre and the postwar reprisals in Yugoslavia, and the 2011 trial of Sándor Képiró for his role as an officer during the raids, which brought a renewed focus to the Cold Days in the twenty-first century.

Remembering Cold Days moves forward the historiography of a number of fields, including the history of World War II violence, postwar trials, the cultural history of postwar Hungary, domestic and international politics of memory, and 1989 regime change. It also effectively demonstrates the many ways in which collective memory manifests—politically, juridically, artistically, historically—and weaves these strands together into a compelling narrative. Klimó’s work offers plenty of avenues for future research: the specifically Jewish aspects of the memory of Novi Sad, the postwar massacres of Hungarians and Germans in Vojvodina, and the distinct role of the Cold Days in the much broader memory wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia all deserve deeper investigation than this one monograph can provide. In particular, Klimó’s contention that changes in historical memory in Hungary helped motivate regime change has implications for Central and Eastern European historiography more broadly, and will hopefully lead other scholars to take up similar case studies in order to determine whether this was a regional or even continent-wide phenomenon in the leadup to 1989.

Leslie Waters
The University of Texas at El Paso

Zsuzsa Gille. *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud. The Politics of Materiality in the European Union*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016. 164 pages. ISBN 978-0-2530-1946-2

When in 2017, after the publication of this volume, an openly discussed double standard for food quality within the European Union shook the public in East Central Europe, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared at the extraordinary Consumer Summit of the Visegrád Four countries in Bratislava, “Central Europeans are treated as second-class citizens when it comes to the quality of food products.” The scandal came in more than handy for his populist-nationalist Fidesz party. While official rhetoric typically alludes to the threat of immigrants to Hungarian cultural identity and sovereignty, this outcry confirmed another dominant narrative of the relationship with the European Union, whereby Hungary is subject to inequality and exploitation. In this account, mainly western European multinational companies use the eastern market to sell goods of inferior quality, exemplifying the developmental chasm between East and West, despite Hungary being a full member of the single market. Hungarian-American sociologist Zsuzsa Gille, in her study *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud: The Politics of Materiality in the European Union*, connects her analysis brilliantly with the above-mentioned discourse, and shows that nothing less than national identity is complicating the relationship between the nation state and the supranational European Union. She argues that practices of production and consumption which became increasingly governed by new regulative EU standards began to negatively affect public opinion on the question of Hungary’s EU membership.

With the Hungarian paprika ban in 2004, the foie gras boycott in 2008, and finally the red mud spill in 2010, Gille introduces three distinct scandals that shaped how ordinary Hungarians view the European Union’s impact on their daily lives. Each of the incidents discussed touches upon domestic economic practices and notions of national identity, and, as Gille intends, will provide the reader with an alternative understanding of the relationship between them. By grasping the political in seemingly apolitical practices, Gille attempts to conceptualise a “new modality of power” (4) from the context of the local, shedding new light on globalisation as an external force.

The bulk of the book is devoted to three concrete case studies, starting with the first to take place, the paprika ban in the autumn of 2004. Anyone who has ever been to Hungary, and even those who have

not, may well know that paprika powder is a basic ingredient of Hungarian cuisine. When it was found that the concentration of aflatoxin B1, a carcinogenic mycotoxin, in some paprika powder products far exceeded allowed EU levels, the elementary spice in domestic cooking practices disappeared overnight from the shelves, becoming unavailable to Hungarian consumers for several days. Gille shows how Hungary's accession to the single market led to paprika powder being diluted with cheap imports from Spain and Brazil. Hungary assumed that paprika from these markets would be protected by EU regulations, but instead discovered that tests at ports of entry and in Spain were not carried out at all. It is therefore an example of how confusion about competencies of supranational and national authorities can lead to the entry of contaminated paprika into the single market and then Hungary. Gille demonstrates in this chapter how EU membership also amounted to deregulation and selective regulation in Hungary.

In the subsequent chapter she moves on to highly specialised foie gras production, a product which Hungary succeeded in retaining and even increasing its market share of. Gille describes how in 2006 the Austrian animal rights organisation Vier Pfoten (Four Paws) charged the Hungarian foie gras industry with operating unethically. After the paprika fiasco, this was the second such scandal to shake the Hungarian public. Gille succeeds brilliantly in creating a balanced analysis of different players in the conflict, including the Hungarian poultry industry, small-scale farmers, workers, and Four Paws, as well as substantial German economic interests in the form of the German poultry giant Wiesenhof. Various inconsistencies within the Austrian-led animal rights campaign resulted in defensive reactions from the Hungarian public, which saw national traditions that had been practiced for centuries—and therefore national identity itself—at stake. Official narratives responding to this controversy expressed a general sense of victimhood in relation to the powerful supranational organisation.

The third case study, on the red mud catastrophe in 2010, differs insofar as it is not centred on food production but on the waste product of a highly alkaline by-product of aluminium production. When the largest pond, Number 10, burst its banks, it covered the small town of Devecser in western Hungary in red mud, not only making major parts of the area inhabitable but taking the lives of ten inhabitants. During the investigation of this environmental and human disaster, it became obvious that a major factor was the EU's waste code, which did not categorise red mud as hazardous, as it had been previously considered

according to the Basel Convention. Gille points to the imbalances in the regulation processes whereby marketisation and democratisation had to be accomplished by the time of EU accession, while environmental regulations were given a period of up to 15 years to align. In addition to other factors, Gille also detects controversial privatisation strategies among the causes of the catastrophe.

The last, methodologically rich chapter, “Neoliberalism, Molecularization, and the Shift to Governance,” further elaborates the relationship between small and big in the context of nation states and supranational organisations. Here she is especially interested in questions of agency, and in how supranational governing practices are fulfilling their criteria of transparency and democracy.

While *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud* is meticulously researched and convincingly argued, one would have liked to know more about the potential benefits of EU membership, how EU funds are being used and who specifically is profiting from them. Other than as potential beneficiaries, the role of the party in power, Fidesz, remains underexposed in the analysis. It would have enriched the scope of the book to look deeper into contradictions between the party’s rhetoric and its political practices.

Beyond that, the methodologically profound study gives a highly original interpretation of the rise of EU scepticism in the region and specifically in Hungary. Fidesz’s critique of immigration policies and the allegedly illegitimate influence of internationally operating NGOs is connected with a particular form of national identity which has been shaken by the three cases Gille describes in her book. To a major extent these cases explain why Orbán is able to build his political success partly by criticizing the European Union, from which Hungary as well as a tightly connected political elite is profiting.

Ultimately, its main merit lies in deepening the understanding of the real issues at stake between the European Union and the Hungarian population, without looking through the lenses of Fidesz’s performative rhetorical practices. Gille rather explains why Fidesz’s anti-EU campaigns, including questions of unequal food quality and the challenge of migration, fall on a hotbed of popular perceptions shaped by mechanisms for coping with new standards and regulations which came along with EU membership.

In this context, Gille identifies a weakness in liberal politicians in addressing inequalities between Western Europe and Hungary within the frame of the supranational European Union. Therefore, her aim is

nothing less than to provide sociologically informed “alternative interpretations of [the inequalities’] origins, not in order to strengthen the right wing but to combat it” (135). It can only be wished that Gille’s book will be read not only by people interested in the small nation of Hungary. Above all it should be read by those concerned about the increasingly tense relationship between East Central Europe and the European Union, and who wish to increase their understanding beyond well-known patterns of interpretation.

Annina Gagyiova
Charles University Prague