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# HUNGARIAN STUDIES

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
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### Issue Editor's Preface

During the last fifteen years Indiana University had a considerable number of conferences on Hungarian topics. In the early 1980s the roundtables and colloquia organized by the late György Ránki were devoted mainly to history, although I remember a conference entitled "Hungary and European Civilization" that had a wider scope and thus was somewhat comparable to our present meeting. Professor Jeffrey Harlig was one of the speakers at a later conference which had participants from the United States who were writing dissertations on Hungarian subjects. At the time I was the holder of the Hungarian Chair we also discussed the legacy of the great pianist and eminent composer Ernő Dohnányi, whereas on another occasion we focused on the activities of the American Hungarian community and had the pleasure of listening to several distinguished scholars ranging from Professor Edward Teller to Professor György Bisztray. My successors were scholars of great excellence and enlarged the circle of participants. Professor Csaba Pléh organized a highly successful conference for linguists, Professor László Csorba asked his guests to analyze the role played by religion in modern Hungary, and the current Hungarian Chair Professor, László Borhi and myself were among the participants of the scholarly meeting planned and led by Professor Ignác Romsics entitled "Hungary and the Great Powers." I am happy to say that the material of all these colloquia is available in print. In view of the fact that outstanding scholars from Hungary have been invited to our present meeting, there is every reason to believe that our discussions will be stimulating. It is a distinct pleasure for me to open the conference entitled "Hungarian Contributions to Scholarship."

*Mihály Szegedy-Maszák*



# THE CONTRIBUTION OF HUNGARY TO INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP

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The contribution of Hungary to international classical scholarship is considerable and significant.<sup>1</sup> But where should I begin? Should I start with the Renaissance epoch when J. Megyericsey, or Mezerzius, prepared a collection of Roman inscriptions in Hungary for publishing at Aldus, which although not printed, was worthy of the praise of Mommsen?<sup>2</sup> Or should I begin with Matthaëus Fortunatus who edited Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones* better than the first editor Erasmus, as the latter himself acknowledged?<sup>3</sup> Or perhaps I might introduce E. Ponori Thewrewk, who prepared a new edition of Festus, did not finish the work, but gave his whole material to D. Lindsay, contributing by this to the edition of the British scholar, which has remained the standard edition of this important work till now?<sup>4</sup> This would be a survey in thirty minutes, but it would be unavoidably superficial. Or should I give a *bibliographie raisonnée* of certain topics treated by Hungarian scholars?<sup>5</sup> This would be unavoidably boring. Thus I have chosen a third way. I want to bring into prominence a contribution that seems to be of principal significance, and to examine at least briefly, what practical consequences, if any, it had, i. e. what practical contributions resulted from it. Since the process of this contribution started at about the turn of the century, let me begin there.

Classical scholarship seemed to be flourishing toward the end of the nineteenth century. The excavations of Schliemann, Dörpfeld and others had unearthed an immense mass of archaeological objects, the remains of towns or important buildings, many inscriptions, almost countless papyri, which gave deep insight into the life of the Hellenistic world, or contained texts of works known till then only from scanty fragments, and many oriental writings were deciphered. To make a long story short, the material for our knowledge of antiquity increased astoundingly. This multifarious material was collected in series of learned handbooks and many-volumed encyclopedias, and in most countries periodicals of classical scholarship were started. Still, behind this splendour a crisis was maturing.

Classical scholarship as developed by German classicism at the end of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth had two characteristic fea-

tures. First, it aimed at a synoptic view of Greek and Roman antiquity, i. e. it strived to know classical culture as a whole, in its totality; and second, it was in close contact with the ideas and problems of its age. Its outlook was a definitely historical one, historicity being of one of the great discoveries of the Enlightenment.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, due to the enormous increment of the material, the synoptic view was lost. It crumbled into detail-studies, and the special branches of scholarship made themselves independent. Handbook-series and monumental encyclopedias were necessary just in order to sum up, to tie up, as it were, the disintegrated parts of the once unified scholarship. This shift of accent onto the details and detail-investigations was dangerous, not the least because scholarship refrained in general from synthesis.

This fragmentation came about as a result of a general epistemological crisis. The trust in the reliability of cognition became undermined by new discoveries. Sciences thought to be on firm ground till then and even the belief in linear evolution, consequently the accuracy of the historical view, became problematic. The epistemological crisis came about because of the development of depth psychology and partly because of social and political problems. Classical scholars, however, mesmerized by the great achievements of their craft, did not take notice of these changes. Scholarship lost connection with the problems and sentiments of the age, and in turn the problems and outlook of classical scholarship seemed to be obsolete and dull to the greater public. Erudite spirits outside of the world of professional scholarship demanded a renewal of classical studies.

Among these erudit spirits were also Hungarians. As early as 1863 the outstanding poet and translator of all comedies of Aristophanes, János Arany protested against the way classics were treated in schools, where only grammatical explanations were urged and the aesthetic qualities of the texts were left out of consideration. The same line was continued by the aesthetician Ágost Greguss, who wrote a "literary tale," *The Locksmiths*. *The Locksmiths* had two lovely keys, the Greek and Latin language, and they were so fascinated by their beauty that they only admired the refinements of the keys, discussed them among themselves, but did not open the lock. At long last they opened the door of the treasury, but did not enter, nor did they allow others to do so. Finally some people, "though not worthy of the name 'classical scholar'" cast a glance into the treasury and told others what they had seen. The story does not need any comment. The most famous attack, however, because it was written in German and thus internationally available, was launched by Lajos Hatvany in his book *Die Wissenschaft des Nicht-Wissenswerten*,<sup>6</sup> [The Study of Things Not Worthy to be Studied]. It was a satire, consequently exaggerated and in some respects unjust, but it pointed toward the same direction as Greguss or Arany. Classical scholarship needed to be reformed, otherwise it would lose its importance, unlike the classics themselves, which will continue to be studied by those outside the guild. Hun-

garians were not the first to criticize classical scholarship in its traditional German form, but certainly they were among the first. This criticism was probably the first principal contribution of Hungarians, but this is not to say that of Hungarian classical scholarship. Paul Friedländer's moving letter to his master Wilamowitz, published by W. Caulder some years ago,<sup>7</sup> in which he exposes that he is desirous of a classical scholarship different from that of his most honoured and beloved master, was written only after the first World War; and even in 1936 when Eric Dodds argued in his inaugural lecture at Oxford that the progress of classical scholarship is to be expected not in textual criticism, but in seeking the message of the classics, somebody made him the scornful remark: „I hear, Dodds, you will kill scholarship at Oxford.”

But criticism, however proper and witty it may be, is only negative; and the road to a positive example proved more difficult. Even Hatvany referred to Saint Beuve's method, when Saint Beuve was some forty years dead. From the turn of the century, however, progress in positive direction also began. At first under the influence of British ethnology and French sociology, Frazer, Durkheim and especially Jane Harrison, who was herself also influenced by Durkheim, the positive steps were taken on old paths. The pioneer in this direction was Gyula Hornyánszky, a classical scholar by erudition, but in his activity he proved to be more of a sociologist and philosopher. Following the Cambridge school, he not only wrote interesting papers on some aspects of Greek religion but also a book on Hippocrates, a sketch of the sociography of ancient Greece, and based on the speeches in the Homeric epics investigated problems of Greek culture from the view-point of mass-psychology.<sup>8</sup> As far as I know, no one had done similar research prior to him. All these important works passed, however, internationally unnoticed, because they were published in Hungarian.

Still, Hornyánszky's activity was stimulating, and soon Károly Marót continued this line of investigation.<sup>9</sup> After publishing in a series of papers an immense comparative material to many passages of Homer, in the 1920s he elaborated a theory of poetry and religion based on up-to-date psychology. According to his argument, in poetry elements of the sub-conscious, the constant, historically non-determined world of the instincts, which Marót called essence — are moulded to conscious thought in a way historically determined, that is dependent on historical circumstances. This consideration and his knowledge of folklore epics led him to the recognition of the importance of constant structures in the epic as early as 1934. To term these structures he used the French word *chablon*, or mould, and the minstrel poured into these moulds the substance of his tale; and of course the minstrel also embellished the story. Later, in 1948 Marót spoke of sequences and referred to the Jungian archetypes. A. B. Lord only began to speak in the same vein in 1951; and the investigation of constant sequences started only hereafter, when M. Nagler started to explain of preverbal *Gestalts*, existant in the soul of the singer of tales.<sup>10</sup>

Marót's conception, nevertheless, also has another bearing. The same instincts, as in the singer, are operative in the auditorium. In order to be effective, the singer has to hit, so to say, the proper wave-length, the proper chord, which resounds sympathetically in the soul of his audience. According to Marót's understanding, the poet made a proposal and it depended on the public, whether it accepted the proposal unaltered, rounded it off according to its own taste, or rejected it. These are very similar ideas to those R. Jakobson and P. Bogatyrev put forward at about the same time.<sup>11</sup> Thus Marót, who was unaware of the later theories of communication, interpreted the process of poetic composing in much the same sense.

Marót strived to regain the lost totality by expanding classical scholarship toward deeper psychological insight. András Alföldi used his supreme knowledge of all kinds of sources to promote the unity of classical studies.<sup>12</sup> His first important works dealt with the archaeology and history of Pannonia and Dacia and, despite many in-depth studies, his book on the end of the Roman domination in Pannonia, published seventy years ago, still commands the field. He, however, knew not only the history of Pannonia and Dacia, but also that of the whole frontier from the Black Sea to the Rhine; and he also contributed a chapter to the *Cambridge Ancient History*. His expertise extended not only to the frontiers, but also to the ceremonies and insignia of the imperial court, not only to the pagan culture, but also to Christianity in the Roman Empire, not only to the conversion of Constantine, but also to the pagan counter-propaganda. The so-called contorniat-coins, had been totally misunderstood before him. I will not speak of his activity after he had left Hungary in 1947 and lived in the United States, though he confessed himself to be a Hungarian for the rest of his life. It is impossible to appreciate his work duly in such a short survey. I wish only to indicate that his entire lifework is one of the most important contributions to international scholarship. Still one element of his scholarly activity must be mentioned, because it is of principal importance; namely his investigations of the culture of the so-called border peoples and the mounted nomads. He published important papers on the theriomorphic world-conception of these peoples, on the social position of the smiths in these societies, on bear-cult in Eurasia, and knew how to use this material in the study of early Rome.

The third member of this significant generation was Károly Kerényi.<sup>13</sup> From the beginning he emphasized the necessity of the synoptic view of antiquity. First, in the sense of Wilamowitz he stressed that all branches of classical scholarship constitute an indivisible unity and antiquity has to be studied in its totality by making use of all branches and all sorts of sources. Later, however, he understood totality in a different sense. First, influenced by Nietzsche and phenomenology, he understood classical scholarship as the expression and interpretation of the relationship of modern men to the ancient world in all its manifestations.

Later, under the influence of Jung, he came to the conviction that the basis of this relation are the archetypes to which manifestations of cultures can be traced.

Thus Hungarian scholarship incorporated the study of the border cultures and of the Ancient Orient into classical scholarship, restoring by this synoptic view of German new humanism on a higher level, insofar as it incorporated into the notion of classical – or, to use a perhaps more apt word, ancient – studies the achievements of scholarship from the second half of the nineteenth century on, and emphasized that the Greek and Roman world cannot be studied and understood without the Orient, the two having been in close contact with each other. Even today this does not seem self-evident to everyone because prior to this Hungarian conception of ancient studies only Ed Meyer treated ancient history in this spirit<sup>14</sup> and contemporaneously with the Hungarians the Cambridge Ancient History. This, then, was a considerable contribution of Hungary to international scholarship.

There is, however, perhaps one more important contribution. During the nineteenth century people understood the unity of mankind and of human culture in the terms of evolution and history in a linear way. True, even the most developed peoples had lived sometime in circumstances similar to those of primitives, but they had overcome these victoriously through their development. Evolutionary and historical theory, however, became problematic at the end of the nineteenth century because depth psychology appeared to show that instincts primitive or barbarous or simply ancestral are not exceeded, merely suppressed and sublimated in present forms. Consequently by reducing manifestations of cultures to archetypes or some sort of „common denominators” the unity of mankind could also be understood in an unhistoric way. How far, of course, the historic approach could be abandoned was another question.

The sowing of the aforementioned concepts brought its fruits after the war. There were very few scholars in Hungary who remained untouched by Alföldi, or Kerényi, or both. A generation had grown up for whom the study of the Graeco-Roman world and the Orient, of archaeology and philology, of religion and literature were an indissoluble unity. This generation was active on several fields, and most of its members commanded a thorough knowledge not only of Greek and Latin, but also of several oriental languages.

Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel dealt with the history of religion, philosophy, and epics. His paper on the Danae-myth in the East and the West analysed an immense mass of variants of the myth and their background. The same combined use of Greek, Roman and oriental sources was characteristic of his papers on Golden Age myths, on the Hesiodic prooemia and their eastern parallels, on the Homeric epics of Central Asia, especially the Kazakh epics (read by him in the original language), and a joint use of written sources and works of fine arts distinguished his paper on the Christopher legend.<sup>15</sup>

István Borzsák, however, had been principally a Latinist. He was the author of the article "Cornelius Tacitus" (practically a book in itself) in the *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* and editor of Tacitus and Horace. He threw new light not only upon the relation of Roman to Hellenistic historiography and showed that more than one element of the legendary Roman history is simply a transplantation of stories told by Hellenistic authors into Roman circumstances, but also analysed the images of the Orient and of some oriental monarchs (Semiramis and Xerxes) in Greek and Roman literature and the survival of these in later epochs. He also pointed out how oriental beliefs survived in Greek and Roman culture.<sup>16</sup>

István Hahn's papers on the movements of the poor free in the towns of late antiquity were important not only because these movements were not often treated, but also because they proved the untenableness of the rather wide-spread (and not only in marxist circles) view that the urban proletariat was a mere parasitic mass. Even more important was his paper on dependency relations in antiquity, which questioned the simplifying view that took notice only of slaves and free in general. Hahn revealed how many types of dependencies existed in the East and the West. The paper, originally published in German, proved to be so important that it was translated soon into English. Not less interesting is his paper on the forms of proprietorship in archaic Greece, which pointed out that citizens in the city-states were considered as co-proprietors of the land, and that this was of great importance for their way of thinking.<sup>17</sup>

Similarly active in the fields of both classical and oriental studies and both comparative philology and archaeology (but also familiar with problems of the migration period and of Hungarian early history) was János Harmatta. Here, too, I will mention only a few of his achievements. The problem, whether the word Ahhiyawa in the Hittite documents denotes the Achaeans had been a vigorously discussed problem since the beginning of the 1930s. From the point of view of comparative philology the identification seemed rather improbable, or even impossible, due to phonological reasons. Harmatta showed, taking into consideration cuneiform orthography, that the Ahhiyawa ~ Ἀχαιῶα identification with the Achaeans correct. It was he who deciphered the Parthian ostraca and papyri of Dura Europos and solved their problems in learned commentaries. He was the first to decipher a major Bactrian inscription and clarified several problems of a previously unknown Iranian language. He is the editor and to a considerable part also the author of two volumes of an important history on the civilizations of Central Asia, published under the patronage of the UNESCO. He also discoursed on the Hittite influence on Greek mythology and the Hyperborean myth, on the prehistory of Greek language and on the literary patterns of the Babylonian edict of Cyrus, as well as on the significance of the eagle as a symbol in Iranian royal ideology. These all proved to be rather important contributions to scholarship.<sup>18</sup>

Another combination of several different branches of classical studies can be seen in János György Szilágyi's work. Confidently at home in the world of both the monuments of classical art and the written sources, he published a collection of written sources of Greek art. This proved to be in several respects an unparalleled work in international scholarly literature and a penetrating study on the origins of Etruscan and Roman theatre as well as histrionic art.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand he wrote elegant essays on the Pygmalion and on the Arachne myth of Ovid, an excellent treatise on Lucian, revealing him as a critic of an oppression, on the other he is the author of the first volume of series containing a scholarly description of all Greek vases to be found in Hungary.<sup>20</sup> This series is part of a larger one, an international undertaking under the patronage of the Union Académique Internationale of the Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum. He directed the Hungarian contribution to the *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*. His chef d'œuvre, nevertheless, is the monumental work on Etrusco—Corinthian vase-painting. It was Szilágyi who perceived the importance of this rather neglected field of classical art and having meticulously analysed the full material — which no one had done before — he established a detailed chronology. This again was of great importance for classical archaeology in general, since on the basis of Szilágyi's painstaking chronology many other works could be dated.<sup>21</sup>

The main field of Árpád Szabó's activity has been the history of Greek science, especially mathematics. He was led to it by his research in early Greek philosophy. First he demonstrated that under the influence of Eleatic dialectics Greek mathematics became an axiomatic, deductive science, in this surpassing methodically oriental mathematics. As a next step Szabó analysed the terminology of Greek mathematics and music, examined what common, or everyday, meaning lies behind the technical terms, how and why they became technical terms, and in doing so he could reveal important, but before him unrecognized details in the development of Greek mathematical thought.<sup>22</sup> He, nevertheless did not neglect the study of literature either. As early as 1955 he pointed out that Achilles is a tragic hero in the Iliad — an idea picked up only in the last decades by C. MacLeod and R. Rutherford.<sup>23</sup>

The combination of the knowledge and methods of different branches of scholarship survived in the next generation, though not in all fields in the same way. The late András Mócsy was not only well versed in all problems of Pannonia — he wrote the article Pannonia in the aforementioned *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* and wrote a book on Pannonia and Upper Moesia, as well as a number of learned papers — but also developed a school of onomatology, i. e. on the research of names. These investigations, continued after his death by his pupils, are of considerable importance both for historians of the Roman Empire and for comparative philology.<sup>24</sup>

Research on Pannonia was and remains a field where Hungarians can always contribute to international scholarship, simply because so much material is in

Hungary. Although I have no time to delve into the details, I cannot omit to mention the contribution to the *Tabula Imperii Romani*,<sup>25</sup> likewise an international undertaking supported by the Union Académique Internationale.

In two respects Miklós Maróth combined Greek studies with oriental, especially with Arabic, in his investigations of the history of logic. On the one hand he explored how Greek logic and theory of science survived in Arabic scholarship, and on the other what lessons are offered by the texts of Arab philosophers for research in Greek philosophy, especially logic.<sup>26</sup>

The indivisibility of ancient studies was promoted in another way by the Egyptologists headed by László Kákosy.<sup>27</sup> The simultaneous application of written sources – written in more than one language and scripture – and of archaeological objects on the one hand and the history both of society and of culture of some three thousand, or with the Meroitic age even more, years on the other makes the thorough knowledge of large areas of scholarship absolutely necessary. Instead of describing many detailed studies, however important they might be, I will mention only one important undertaking of Hungarian Egyptologists, the excavation of the grave of the high official Djehutimes. This was the first grave from Ramsesseean times that was properly excavated with due regard to all details by competent specialists. The excavation is still in progress, but even now it is clear that the discoveries resulting from it will enrich our knowledge of the age considerably. One of the best specialists of the Meroitic age is also working in Hungary.

May I include, finally, two fields not belonging to ancient studies in the strict sense of the word, but in Hungary considered as connected to them: Byzantine and Middle-Latin studies. In both there are achievements worthy at mention. At the centre of Gyula Moravcsik's interests stood the relationship of Byzantium and the Turcic peoples. (Turcic in the broadest sense of the word, more or less as Byzantine historians used the word, so even Hungarians were included.) His monumental *Byzantino-turcica* remains an indispensable instrument for all who deal with Byzantine history and with Turcic languages because the first volume of the work gives a detailed survey with a full bibliography of all Byzantine historians who mention some Turcic people. The second volume contains all references to Turcic peoples and records of their languages on the basis not only of printed texts, but also on the examination of the manuscript tradition. It was he, further, who produced the standard edition of Constantine Porphyrogenetus' work *De administrando imperio*.<sup>28</sup>

On the field of medieval Latin studies I feel obligated to include the important series *Scriptores Latini Medii Recentisque Aevorum*, which was started by László Juhász, in which many unedited, or not duly edited, texts from the Middle Ages and from the Renaissance epoch were published and thus made accessible for international scholarship. The second significant achievement was an important dictionary of medieval Latin in Hungary.<sup>29</sup> Four volumes have been pub-

lished and some four more are still awaited. From this rich material Hungary is able to participate in the „new Ducange,” the new dictionary of medieval Latin in Europe, the *Novum Glossarium Mediae Latinitatis*.

By way of conclusion let me try to sum up Hungary's contribution. Hungarians were among the first who perceived that classical scholarship must move beyond its nineteenth-century traditions. Hungarians were among the first who developed a new conception of ancient studies. They thought of ancient studies as a unity, including not only diverse knowledge of the Greek and Roman world but also of the ancient orient. By this they expanded the synoptic view of German new humanism to a higher level. By taking into consideration the achievements of psychology, they came to understand the history and culture of antiquity not as precious but outmoded stage of cultural development, but as continually present at the center of human psyche. Thus they provided a new, non-historical interpretation of the idea of the unity of human culture. Hungarians, nevertheless, not only developed a new conception of ancient studies but also cultivated this spirit in studying special problems. In finding the points of contact and the possibility of perceiving the message of the past on a deeper level than the historical interpretation of the nineteenth century, they were eager also to understand this message and to reconnect classical studies to the ideas and problems of their own age. Of course many interesting papers and books written in a more traditional way contributed to international scholarship and are important and useful in their own way, but I think the contributions of principal significance are those that have been mentioned here.

### Notes

1. For a brief outline of the history of classical scholarship in Hungary see J. Harmatta, *The Study of the Ancient World*. In: T. Erdey-Grúz and K. Kulcsár eds., *Science and Scholarship in Hungary*. 2. ed. (Budapest 1975), 343–63.
2. E. Ábel, „Johannes Mezerzius, der Begründer der dazischen Epigraphik,” *Ungarische Revue* 3, (1883): 373–83.
3. R. Weiss, „Matthaeus Fortunatus,” *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny* 12, (1888): 346–62.
4. Zs. Ritoók, *Ponori Thewrewk Emil* (Budapest 1993) includes a bibliography of his works.
5. Bibliographies of classical scholarship in Hungary: E. Moravek, *A magyar klasszika-filológiai irodalom bibliográfiája 1901–1925* (Budapest, 1930); I. Borzsák, *A magyar klasszika-filológiai irodalom bibliográfiája 1926–1950* (Budapest 1952); Zs. Ritoók, *A magyar ókortudomány bibliográfiája 1951–1975* (Budapest, 1986). I. Bellus, *A magyar ókortudomány bibliográfiája 1976–1990*. (Budapest 1996).
6. J. Arany in the review of a translation of Vergil's Aeneid: *Koszoru* I. 2. 498–9; Á. Greguss, *Meséi* (Budapest, 1878); L. v. Hatvany, *Die Wissenschaft des Nicht-Wissenswerten* (Leipzig, 1908).
7. *Antike und Abendland* 26 (1980): 93–100.

8. On Hornyánszky K. Marót, "Hornyánszky Gyula" *Egyetemes Philologiai Közöny* 58 (1934): 45–72; 147–64. A bibliography of Hornyánszky's works has been compiled by L. Juhász in the periodical *Társadalomtudomány* 13 (1933): 350–7.
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# HUNGARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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At first I would like to try to answer a question, which many would raise as I did when I received the invitation to Bloomington. It was and is still not obvious, why the organizers of the conference considered it necessary to make somebody speak about Hungarian archaeology? Looking at the program, this question will become meaningful, because one may observe that there are other branches of social sciences neglected at this conference, although they play – or appear to play – a more important role in our modern world. I think that many people in academic circles, at least Professors Mihály Szegedy-Maszák and László Borhi most certainly knew: Hungary played an eminent role in archaeology for about a century. This is one more reason to survey the greater part of the facts and factors connected with the subject.

Hungarian archaeology was in good health and flourishing until about the 1960s. This period appears to us as to have been the golden age, but it is doubtless the chronological distance that can make such impression. In fact the overall state of development in Central Europe until World War II did not actually favor a real golden period, and it would be a grave error to embellish those times when archaeologists were compelled to count every penny. This epitaph “golden age” may be justified exclusively in comparison to other countries within the region in the same period. Why it was so reaches far beyond my profession, being not specialized in nineteenth- and twentieth-century history, but the fact is that the latter mentioned circumstance contributed also to the good reputation of Hungarians in world archaeological research.

Considering the actual “health” of Hungarian archaeology, it is surely still not “ill”, but fits the general situation in countries within the former Soviet block. The cessation of the formerly outstanding international representation of Hungarian archaeology is simply due to the fact that the financial support for archaeology in this country lags far behind that provided in other Central and Eastern European lands. This paper is doubtlessly not the right place to analyze this political phenomenon. (In using the word “political” I don’t mean the actually general policy of states all over the world in financing social sciences and science in general as such.) Let it be enough to remember very briefly the exclusive role of

archaeology in the state ideology of a good number of Central and Eastern European countries (reflected in Pan-Slavism and of the theory of Daco-Rumanian continuity) and of certain Asian and African states too (e.g. the recent interdiction of all research on pre-Islamic times in certain Islamic lands). As for Hungarian archaeology, it represented always a relatively refreshing island in the turbulence of nationalism. Namely when Hungarian archaeologists were theoretically in position to provide a place for ideological influences (until 1944/45), they kept a clear distance from all non-scientific tendencies in their research. Later, after World War II none of them would dare to make the mistake of right-wing deviation (when left-wing deviations and "internationalism" were in the 1950s officially expected...). No wonder that post-communist Hungary is actually searching in its cultural policy for a new attitude towards its past and its cultural heritage.

But let us now turn to the first century of Hungarian archaeology. (The developments since the 1960s concern too much the present day and will have to be by the following generation.) There were three factors that ensured a differentiated role in international research to Hungarian archaeology and archaeologists until the arrival of modern times.

### 1. Geographical and cultural factors

The climate of the Carpathian Basin is temperate continental: the summer is warm but not hot (the average temperature is 25 °C), the winter is mild (around 0 °C) rarely decreasing under -10 and only for shorter periods. This climate is due to the Carpathians which protect the basin against a 'Russian winter'. (The winter average temperatures is -7 °C to the north and east of the Carpathians.) Another example serves as an important climatic and far-reaching cultural basis for comparison: vine does not grow north and northeast of the Carpathian mountains. The Carpathian Basin is very rich in rivers, and Lake Balaton is the largest lake in Central Europe. These waters offered an inexhaustible source of nourishment until the middle of the twentieth century and relatively easy communication by water between the Western and Southeastern Europe. (Travelers crossing Hungary in the Middle Ages wrote that in Hungarian rivers only half is water while the other half is fish. It was also said that until river regulations in the middle of the nineteenth century watering horses proved difficult in the Tisza River because they were incessantly disturbed by the fish.) The Carpathian Basin has natural resources, which were known as early as in the Palaeolithic period and, which have been used basic raw materials for millennia. Such were for example the obsidian, the volcanic glass in the Tokaj-Eperjes mountains, which was sent hundreds of kilometers during the Palaeolithic and Neolithic periods, and also the salt and the copper mined in Transylvania. (For millennia this was one of the only salt sources in Central and Eastern Europe; the nearest other source was in

the area of present-day Salzburg. These especially favorable geographical circumstances lie behind the following facts:

a) The Carpathian basin has continuously been inhabited since the Palaeolithic age (one of the oldest Palaeolithic sites in Europe – uninhabited by 350 thousand B.C. – was found at Vértesszöllös.)

b) The Neolithic evolution (its population and/or its inventions) expanding from the Near East in the 6th millennium B.C. reached this area. In fact further toward the north or west it would not have found suitable natural setting for its agricultural and animal herding way of life.

c) The vast grasslands of the Great Hungarian Plain always attracted the mounted nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes. (Kimmerians in the sixth century B.C., Scythians in the fifth century, Sarmathians in the first through third centuries A.D., Huns in the fifth century, Avars in the sixth century, Magyars in the ninth century, Cumanians in the thirteenth century.)

d) Peoples migrating out from their homes in Western Europe chose this region to cross or to settle (the people of bell beakers ceramic and of the urn-field culture, the Celts).

e) The Roman Empire set up a province named Pannonia in the western part of the basin at the beginning of the first century.

There were only a few groups that could settle and/or rule over the whole of the Carpathian Basin as the Celts, the Avars and the Magyars. This is why it was always a culturally divided frontier zone where western, eastern and southern elements were mixed together. It is also the cause, together with the intensity of Hungarian archaeological research, that the number of sites is compared with other regions of Central and Eastern Europe exceedingly high. For example, 160 sites have been registered in the area of a single little village on the Great Hungarian Plain. There are sometimes not that many sites from a whole archaeological period in certain countries of Northern and Western Europe! For them it is hard to imagine the several thousands of sherds unearthed in a single Neolithic site! There are archaeologists who constantly try to develop more perfect methods, for example, in counting and evaluating the ceramic findings in Northern and Northwestern Europe. In the meantime their colleagues in Central and Southeastern Europe have to face the problem of where to store the tons of sherds dug up during one single excavation campaign of a Neolithic or Bronze Age settlement. The registration and excavation of all these requires considerable energy and resources. So Hungarian archaeologists, as most of their neighbouring colleagues, do not feel the necessity – and certainly do not have the time – to waste energy on purely theoretical problems. This is also why we do not have New Archaeology or post-processualism. Hungarians like their colleagues in the Carpathian Basin have to rescue the finds from ultimate destruction. This is doubtless more urgent than to write the ethical codex of archaeology.

We also need to draw to the front attention that danger lurks not only in deep ploughing or highway constructions which demolish whole settlements and cemeteries, but international smugglers cause an even greater loss. I mention this here because the degree of the damage is not generally known outside the circle of archaeologists. I do not want to speak about the one of the most sensational finds of the whole late Roman era, the silverware treasure called Seuso, whose origin was considered by the New York judiciary without paying attention to the soil analysis that proved its Hungarian origin and did not support the Lebanese version, as certain documents and quittances of international art dealers would suggest. The consequences of illegal excavations and antiquity trade cause unimaginable and irremediable damage to science. The greatest loss for archaeology is that some beautiful objects may get into the show cases of Western or Japanese museums, or private collections through these sources. But first, these objects have been removed from that scientific context, which is indispensable for their evaluation, determination of chronology, and reconstruction of everyday use. Second, the curators of the collections, those who write the catalogues, sometimes do so without much knowledge of the local language and culture, and being often inexperienced in local archaeology do not know how to handle their finds. So they are often not able to provide more than an art historical analysis. Third, the gap between "royal," "princely" finds and that of common people becomes even more deep, regardless of the fact that they belonged to the same society, to the same culture. If these objects had been left in their original context, they might have served as historical sources, which is the final aim of the archaeology.

## 2. Cultural factors and traditions

It is obvious that the variability and richness of archaeological material in the Carpathian Basin, which meant Hungary until 1920, stimulated the formation of Hungarian archaeology and attracted specialists from all over the world. Moreover, this variable and rich material was easily accessible to archaeologists from other countries. Hungary borders Western Europe and at the end of the nineteenth century the total length of its railway lines was triple that of the neighbouring countries. Public security at that time was excellent. Hungarian scholars, even if their strong accent is easily recognizable all over the world, are polyglots, which is rooted in three psychological circumstances. The fact of their linguistic isolation, the old notion that 'we are alone,' and the political structure and mentality of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Beside the politically and culturally decisive role of the German language in Hungarian, and in general in Central European archaeology, a historical aspect must also be considered. Europe was born in the Early Middle Ages, most cer-

tainly in Carolingien Empire from joining of the Latin mentality and the German capacity for industry. The birth of the modern archaeology was similarly, on the basis of the eternal attraction of the Germanic peoples to the Roman world. It was the German Johann Winckelmann in the eighteenth century, the Danish Christian Thomsen in the first half of the nineteenth century and the Swedish Oscar Montelius in the second half of the nineteenth century who founded an archaeology that was no longer restricted to the collection of singular objects but included the need for their systematic analysis. The affinity of Hungarian archaeology to its German counterpart can not exclusively be explained by geographical, political and cultural connections. German archaeology is the only one where science is not directed by ephemeral personal or institutional contacts, by casual excavations, or a preference for certain periods. It has a general interest toward the whole region. For leading German scholars, researchers and leaders come and go, institutions close down or change, but finds of world historical importance stay in the earth and they must be reached.

In this situation it is evident that for Hungarian archaeologists the German language has been essential. I must, however, emphasize that should the need arise, each of us could cope with English and/or French or Italian, and it should also be mentioned that until 1945 Latin was a compulsory subject for the examinations. From 1950 on Russian became compulsory in primary and secondary schools. Its knowledge is indispensable for specialists in Hungarian prehistory and can be very useful for an understanding of publications in all Slavic languages. (The abandonment of teaching Russian for sake of the English followed the change of the political system. It deprives the younger generation of direct contact with some of the neighbouring countries.)

Archaeology does not mean exclusively work in a library. Excavations, visiting museums, and monuments is also integral part of it. Study trips of Hungarian archaeologists, naturally, were aimed at Austria and/or Germany, and it was also evident that the regular spring or autumn excursions of archaeological departments were organized mostly in Italy and Greece. The possession of a classical education was also natural until the 1920s and 1930s not only for archaeologists but for everybody who studied social sciences. Classical archaeology is also an indispensable skill for researchers of the migration period (even if many of them unfortunately still do not know it). The question of belonging to Europe did not emerge as a problem for Hungarian archaeologists – they did belong to Europe until 1945 – or even until the Communist takeover in 1948.

So perhaps it is more understandable that at the beginning of world archaeology, in 1876, the International Congress of Anthropology and Prehistory held its meeting in Budapest. That is also why the Union Internationale des Sciences Préhistoriques et Protohistoriques, uniting all archaeologists of the world (until the secession in 1986) appointed Budapest to be the host of the first congress after its foundation in 1936. It was “only” history that impeded its organization.

First, Hitler banned it in 1940, as did Stalin eight years later. After 1945 there were endeavors on both sides of the Iron Curtain to ease isolation even in the hardest times of the dictatorship. In 1955 János Banner (1888–1981) a professor acknowledged both within and outside Hungary succeeded in organizing a 'mini-Pan-European' congress. During the Dark Age of political isolations at the middle of the twentieth century, the greatest help in maintaining contacts was provided by German and Austrian colleagues and by the Swede Wilhelm Holmquist and Holger Arbman, who by sending off-prints, books and later, when it became possible, invited well-known specialists to ease their isolation and organized study trips for their students to Hungary. In this way they helped to maintain the standard of Hungarian archaeology in spite of political circumstances. One of the greatest personalities of world archaeology, the English Gordon Childe, also added considerably to it. Due of course to his international esteem and Childe's flirtation with Marxism, he was an endured or even a favored guest in the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet block.

### 3. Institutional and personal contributions

Founded in 1802 the Hungarian National Museum (Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum) is one of the oldest museums in Europe that was not established royal or princely finds. The leading Hungarian archaeological journal (*Archaeologiai Értésítő*) is one of the oldest still existing periodicals in the world (published since 1867), while the *Archaeologiai Közlemények* was started in 1858. The chair of archaeology ("Cathedra numismatica et archaeologica") of the Péter Pázmány (since 1951 Loránd Eötvös) University founded in 1778 was the very first among Central and Eastern European universities. Its first professor was István Schönvizner (1738–1818) who started the excavations of the Roman cities Aquincum and Savaria and published the first synthesis of Hungarian numismatics. After the foundation of Hungary's second university at Kolozsvár (today Cluj, Rumania) Béla Pósta in 1899 began systematic exploration and archaeological research in Transylvania. After the peace treaty of World War I the former Kolozsvár University settled in Szeged and from 1929 on archeological research came under the leadership of János Banner and his chair became the seed of modern Hungarian archaeology. Aside from the most important excavations on sites of the Neolithic era, the Migration Period and the Middle Ages, they developed settlement archaeology, and prepared the concept of Archaeological Topography, which would be realized some thirty years later. Approximately a dozen provincial museums have been founded in the second half of the nineteenth century, and a monographic series and periodicals in German or in bilingual version have been published (*Dolgozatok* [Kolozsvár and later, Szeged University, from 1910], *Archaeologia Hungarica* [National Museum, from 1926], *Dissertationes*

*Pannonicae* [Budapest University, from 1933]. It is impossible to give even a shortened list of the many excavations, which has been made and constitute the basis of archaeology in the whole Carpathian Basin.

As everywhere in Europe at the turn of the century, only a few full-time researchers with university degrees represented "official" Hungarian archaeology: János Érdy (1796–1881), archaeologist and numismatist of the National Museum, and Bálint Kuzsinszky (1864–1938) whose name is inseparable from the excavation of the ancient Roman city of Aquincum and who was the founder of its museum. Pioneers of the well-excavated prehistoric settlements were Lajos Márton (1867–1934) and Ferenc Tompa (1893–1945). Between the 1920s and 1950s under the direction of the Count István Zichy in the National Museum and Árpád Buday and János Banner at Szeged University Hungarian archaeologists did their best work. Between the 1930s and 1960s, and beyond the following also made important contributions to archeology Jenő Hillebrand, Aladár Radnóti, Tibor Nagy, Károly Sági, Ilona Kovrig, László Barkóczi, Ida Kutzián, Éva Bónis, Pál Patay, Amália Mozsolics, respectively Mihály Párducz, Alajos Bálint, József Korek and Gyula Török). The Kolozsvár school worked obviously on the archaeological exploration of Transylvania, but its achievements contributed to the research of all Central and Southeastern Europe. The prehistorian Márton Roska (1880–1961) also deserves mention. History didn't care, of course, not even archaeologists. The careers at József Csalog, a specialist in prehistory and of Dezső Csallány (1903–1977) who worked on the early Middle Ages stopped after 1945 and they were compelled to live and work in less advantageous circumstances.

Under these academic "generals," a long line of "emlisted men," often with very modest education, constituted the real "army." The battle, however, was fought and won at the birth and in the childhood of Hungarian archaeology. From the point of view of European archaeology and science we are and will be grateful to them. In Hungary at the turn of the century researchers carried out archaeological work modestly and with due reverence and respect toward scholarship. The researchers of the Hungarian conquest period remain grateful forever to a chief medical officer András Jósa (1834–1918) for the excavation of hundreds of graves from the tenth-eleventh centuries in the region of Nyíregyháza which provides one of the richest finds of this period. The exemplary personality of medieval archaeology in the 1950s István Méri (1911–1976) was originally a modest restorer. His professional humbleness and relentless effort to note every minor detail exceeded those of many academic colleagues. All specialists of medieval settlements consider themselves, at least indirectly, as his pupils. Scientific ethics and love of work can be learnt from them and from many others in Hungary as well as abroad.

It is very difficult to exactly estimate the significance of the pioneers. Everything should be evaluated by taking into consideration the tendencies of the ep-

och and the social and cultural opportunities of the given region. We hardly note any longer Miklós Jankovich (1772–1846), who discovered the first grave of the conquering Magyars in 1832; Ferenc Pulszky (1814–1897) ambassador of the first independent Hungarian government to London (1849), when in 1883 showed that in Central and Eastern Europe prehistory did not only consist of the Stone and Bronze Ages but Copper Age as well. He was also the first who found some of the archaeological material of the Celts in Central Europe and that of the sixth and seventh century Avars. The polymath Ottó Herman (1835–1914) excavated the first Paleolithic site of the Carpathian Basin. He wrote among others monographs on spiders and on the fishing of the Hungarians as well. Working on the prehistory of this part of Europe, who can forget or avoid the publications of the Benedictin Flóris Rómer (1815–1889) and the Cistercian Arnold Marosi (1873–1939)? It is a big loss to research that the lifework of Géza Nagy (1855–1915), remains unknown. He first attempted to evaluate finds of the Migration period together with that of the orient and also combined archaeological data. Interestingly little of the work of József Hampel (1849–1913), a young archaeologist of the Hungarian National Museum on the Bronze Age, is valid any more. It has nevertheless been used all over the world for the great bulk of material it contains. His other important book, the complete publication of finds from the Migration Period in 1905 has many items that have retained their value. And when at the turn of the century the modern archaeology of the Near East appeared, Ferenc László (1873–1925), a grammar school professor in Sepsiszentgyörgy having unearthed the first early Neolithic settlement in 1907, already knew that the seemingly insignificant and esthetically minor sherds and objects from his excavations were traces of a civilization born in the Near East and the Aegean.

A special contribution to European archaeology represented the greater part of Géza Fehér's (1890–1955) lifework. Working in Bulgaria as member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences he became the "father" of modern archaeology of the Protobulgar period in Bulgaria. His excavations collecting data on history and archaeology were supported by the king of Bulgaria. Unfortunately his name and his work became banned during the Communist time.

Study trips abroad did not mean cultural tourism for Hungarian archaeologists. In 1895 in the expedition to the Orient sent by the count Zichy, Mór Wosinsky (1854–1907), a parish priest from Szekszárd and Béla Pósta (1862–1919), later the first university professor of archaeology in Kolozsvár, were looking for the antecedents of the Avar and Magyar finds. And when the modern period arrived, it was the Hungarian Nándor Fettich (1900–1971), as well as the Finn A. M. Tallgren, who first went in 1924 to the Soviet Union and saw the collections in the Ural region. He collected data and published them in the following decades, rendering it accessible to the whole scientific world. As editor of the journal

*Archaeologiai Értesítő*, he concentrated on publishing the papers of eminent foreign scholars. The same Nándor Fettich together with Gyula László (1910– ), a master of many generations of specialists of the early Middle Ages, who in the midst of the war, dressed in hated German uniforms but packed and rescued the collections of the Kiev Museum and the Church Treasury. The Red Army thanked them in a special dispatch. (This latter was “forgotten” by the communist authorities and both of them got into trouble on account of this journey to the East.)

I want to finish the review of the accomplishment of Hungarian archaeology with the activities around the end of the World War II. The real achievements (excavations, publications) reached with smaller or larger delays the scientific world. The real scholars themselves could travel to Western Europe first in exceptional cases, but then more and more frequently. The scientific community of the Western world, however, similarly to the politicians accepted the status quo. László Vértes (1914–1968), acquired great international acknowledgment for his study of the Palaeolithic age got his post at the end of the 1940s based on political consideration and without any university degree. From his own enthusiasm real scientific achievement emerged and he became a well-known specialist with academic degrees.

It is impossible to forget to mention here that Hungarian archaeology was the first in Central and Eastern Europe to introduce intensively interdisciplinary researches. The contribution of well-known paleoanthropologists (Lajos Bartucz, János Nemeskéri, Pál Lipták) and a paleozoologist (Sándor Bökönyi) have served scholarship.

As for the chronological limit of the present paper, I do make an exception here in the case of Hungarian archaeologists, who become established abroad. Their emigration was not simply a change of residence. The first name on the list must be that of András Alföldi (1895–1981), professor of the Budapest University, author of classical books on archaeology and the history of the Roman Age, as well as the Migration period. He left the country in 1947 and after a stay in Switzerland went to Princeton, the Institute for Advanced Studies, where he continued to write basic monographs on Roman history. István Foltiny (1909–1996), who dealt with the Copper and Bronze Ages joined him there later. During his visits back to Hungary in the 1970s, he always found a way to give some help to Hungarian colleagues. Nobody knows what direction the research of eleventh through fourteenth century Hungarian art would have taken in Hungary if Magda Bárány-Oberschall had not emigrated and settled in Germany after the World War II. The young György Szabó was forced by the failure of the revolution in 1956 to New York, where he became curator of a private collection. At home he could have become a dynamic personality of the newborn medieval archaeology. At the same time it was good luck for universal science that these losses are not real “war losses” since the emigrants always enriched the recipient

country. It can also be added that in the harshest years of the Stalinistic period (1949–1953) they could do research easier than their friends and colleagues, who stayed at home and were obliged e.g. to hear ideological seminars.

However, notwithstanding the political atmosphere, it would be a mistake to omit the positive achievements after the World War II. The campaign to inventory the finds kept in provincial museums, the foundation of the *Acta Archaeologica* by the Academy of Sciences (1951), a journal in foreign languages, the project to publish the whole list of names and the materials of the greatest cemeteries of the Avar and early Hungarian period, the first volume of the *Handbook of Archaeology*, the start of a series of long-term excavations on the Neolithic and Middle Ages, the establishment of a supervisory board of the provincial museums were doubtlessly signs of a more serious attention to archeology.

### Epilogue

Despite of all developments and results made scientiometry, I am simply convinced that achievements in the social sciences are numerically not measurable, especially not research, which has a certain national character. Of course one may become a well-known Egyptologist or specialist of John Donne's poetry in Hungary too, but publishing papers of the provincial museums or universities can certainly not bring them big international reputation. So what could be expected if somebody is working on the subject of popular theaters in Hungary in the eighteenth century? If somebody takes seriously the concept of multiculturalism, it is unimaginable without national cultures.

It can be stated that Hungarians as compared to the other Eastern and Central European countries have an outstanding place. To preserve it, or at least to stay in the vicinity of the top, individual achievements are no longer enough. Our science needs better financing we need also a regularly functioning institutional background, libraries and relevant publication possibilities. Politicians simply must decide, shall they answer to the question of Marc Bloch, put exactly sixty years ago: "Que demander ... l'histoire?" And afterwards they should reflect a little bit on another question, that of Paul Gauguin: "D'ou venons-nous? Qui sommes nous? Ou allons-nous?" If they do it, the past will have future.

# MY 'SHORT HAPPY LIFE' IN FINNO-UGRIC STUDIES

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My twenty years or so in Finno-Ugric (FU) studies, as reflected in my list of publications, began in 1942 and, except for a few oddments, appear to have come to an end in 1962. In later years, I did issue, responding to special requests – seldom for original work but rather for scattered reminiscences about this portion of my early academic life – some pertinent reports. Thus, in a pedagogical vein rather than intending to contribute to scholarship, I wrote in 1969 on “The Study of Finnish in the United States,” and in 1992(c) on “Uralic Studies and English for Hungarians at Indiana University.” More generally, in my retirement address to my colleagues at a festive convention on March 22, 1991, informally looking over my half-century academic career, I included a synoptic account of my “Finno-Ugric years” at Indiana University (1992b).

In the Fall of 1993, I was a visiting professor at the University of Helsinki, also lecturing at the Universities of Tampere, Turku, and Vaasa, as well as to various Finnish learned societies, including the Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura. After my talk to this group one afternoon, a lady approached me from the audience introducing herself as having come from Ioshkar-Ola, the capital of the Mari (Cheremis) Republic in Russia, and as being a native speaker of the Cheremis language. Since, from the second half of the 1940s into the early 1960s, I had conducted an intensive study of this language and culture, then finally publishing two additional books on Cheremis subjects as recently as the 1970s (1974, 1078), she allowed that my name was well-known among her people. However, because I had published nothing more about them lately, the conclusion had been reached in Mari-land that I must have died two decades before. Determined to prove the contrary to her people, she, Dr. Lidia Tojdebekova (whom I have met with several times since), insisted on taping a lengthy “live” interview with me for transmission to and deposit in Ioshkar-Ola’s archives.

Any narrative of my activities as an Finno-Ugric practitioner has necessarily two aspects: a private one and a public one. The latter is bound to be the more interesting, but makes little sense without the former to illuminate it. So I will begin with some personal background.

In my beginning years at the University of Chicago I had every intention of becoming a biologist, viz., a geneticist. Not to belabor my academic trajectory here, the outbreak of World War II in 1939 inexorably impelled me toward linguistics instead. My eminent professor, Leonard Bloomfield, advised me to build upon my native knowledge of Hungarian but to expand upon that base by learning as much as possible about Finnish and the other accessible languages of the family to which both of the aforementioned belonged. This was sensible advice, except for what soon loomed an insuperable quandary: none of the Finno-Ugric languages were taught, programmatically or otherwise, at Chicago or, as far as I could ascertain, anywhere else in the Americas. Not long before Professor Bloomfield left Chicago for Yale, he somehow found the time to read with me and critique a just-published *Outline of Hungarian Grammar*, but it soon became obvious that, were I to expand my glottal horizons in the directions he counseled, I had to fall back on my own resources and devices. The theoretically obvious option of continuing my studies somewhere in Europe was blocked by the inaccessibility of all regions, even Swedish Lapland, where Finno-Ugric populations were indigenous.

In 1941 I too left Chicago for the East Coast, to continue my formal studies at Princeton University, supplemented by semiformal but demanding studies with Roman Jakobson at Columbia University and vicinity. I was also appointed civilian chief of the War Department's Hungarian and Finnish desks at one of its New York City offices, and was, moreover, busily engaged in other kinds of war work. However, before the war ended in 1945, I was able to publish, besides more than a dozen papers on Finno-Ugric topics, two hefty pedagogically oriented books plus a monograph constituting my doctoral dissertation. My first book, which ran to about 500 printed pages, was titled *Spoken Hungarian* (1945a), and was enhanced by twenty-five 12-inch vinylite recordings, as well as a separate *Guide's Manual*. My second book, of about the same size, was titled *Spoken Finnish* (1947a); comparable recordings accompanied it. On the bilingual recordings for my Hungarian book, the English voice was that of the American linguist, Henry Lee Smith, Jr. (d. 1972), the Hungarian my own; to the contrary, on those to go with my Finnish book, while I spoke the English parts the native voice was that of His Excellency, the Ambassador of Finland to Washington, Mr. Jutila.

In a special study I was invited to prepare at the time for the *Modern Language Journal* (1945b), I described the pedagogical and other uses to which the materials on which these twin manuals were based had been put to train a large numbers of armed personnel as well as, after the war, Foreign Service Officers of the U.S. Department of State. The books eventually became available for civilian uses in a somewhat different, commercial version and both may still be in print.

During my residency in Princeton I frequently commuted to meet with Jakobson and to attend various lectures and colloquia he offered at several institu-

tions in New York, including a semester he spent leading an advanced evening seminar at Columbia devoted entirely to the typology of case systems. Since case constitutes a pivotal grammatical category in several Finno-Ugric languages, he asked me to prepare detailed accounts of relevant materials for a series of class presentations and discerning discussions. In this way, the idea for a dissertation topic came to me, namely, to conduct an inquiry into the shape of the case system in the Finno-Ugric protolanguage as reconstructed by a comparison of the case systems of extant daughter languages.

Jakobson urged me to establish contact with John Lotz, who was at the time Director of the Hungarian Institute (1936–1957) at the University of Stockholm. I wrote to Lotz immediately and he responded promptly. Massive correspondence and thoroughgoing exchange of ideas between us ensued, in spite of wartime delays and interruptions. "Lotz asked to see my dissertation, then offered to publish a portion of it, edited by himself. I accepted his assistance with gratitude, but asked to see my proofs. These never reached me, however, for, as we learned afterward, the ship bringing them [from Sweden] was torpedoed. The monograph was therefore published in the raw [1946] and I received my authors' copies only some two years after the war" (1989:235).

In the spring of 1945 I received a Ph. D. from Princeton University's Department of Oriental Languages and Civilizations, with probably the first dissertation on a Finno-Ugric topic awarded to anyone by any North American institution; and, the following year, I joined the peacetime faculty of Indiana University. Even before the war in the Pacific drew to a close, I proposed to Herman B. Wells, this institution's "visionary and international-minded President, that we immediately commence building, solidly and with an eye to permanence, upon the resources that had serendipitously accumulated here during those years. He strongly supported all such endeavors, which ultimately flowered into an amazing diversity of research, teaching, and publication schemes" (1992b: 115), among which I shall concentrate here only on developments that bear directly on Finno-Ugric studies.

By now it was amply clear to me that no one, anywhere in this country, could receive anything approaching adequate professional training in the full extent and depth of Finno-Ugric studies. I therefore resolved to proceed along two tracks simultaneously, one *personal*, the other *institutional*.

To realize my *personal* goal, I initiated conversations with the American-Scandinavian Foundation, and presented a coherent plan which would enable me to visit Sweden and Finland for three or four months in 1947 in order to:

(1) Spend as much time as was necessary to get a feel for the shape of the field, over-all, from John Lotz, who, by dint of his assignment to the University of Stockholm since 1936, was at its sole neutral epicenter throughout the war years;

(2) Get acquainted with as many Finno-Ugric specialists in the Nordic countries, or, as it turned out in practice, mostly in Finland;

(3) Conduct a summer's worth of all-out but as yet preliminary field-work among one of the Finno-Ugric groups of the region (I chose to settle in a Lapp speech community in Outakoski, on the Finnish shore of the Teno River across from Norway); and to

(4) Determine, in consultation with Lotz and others, to which of the extant dozen or so Finno-Ugric language-and-culture configurations I could most productively devote my own research energies in the decade or more ahead. For various reasons, I settled on the Cheremis (Mari), pursuing my intensive studies initially with Paavo Siro in Helsinki, thereafter moving on for some months to what turned out to be a remarkable one-on-one learning experience with the controversial but surely greatest living specialist of those times, Ödön Beke, in Budapest. (See further below.)

The American-Scandinavian Foundation approved all the facets of my application, enabling me to obtain some of the training post-doctorally that I was unable to get in my graduate years. This, however, was the lesser, personal part of my strategy, which would have been relatively worthless without the institutional part of the scheme.

To prepare the ground locally, I first submitted an internal proposal to President Wells, calling for the creation of a curricular Program in Uralic and Altaic Studies. This entity, which was rapidly approved by the board of trustees, grew organically out of my wartime duties and experiences.

(The term "Uralic" is a well-established linguistic concept, which comprehends all of the Finno-Ugric languages plus several languages spoken in Siberia, together called Samoyedic; on the other hand, "Altaic" is a much looser areal concept. This logical incongruity notwithstanding, these two concepts are sometimes combined mainly for institutional convenience, as they were, by mutual agreement with Lotz, at both Columbia University and ourselves.)

Now armed with the authority of the Chairmanship of this new academic unit, I turned for assistance to The Rockefeller Foundation.

Fortunately, as I had reported elsewhere (1992b:7),

I had befriended an exceptionally farsighted officer..., Mr. Stevens, who most bountifully financed the launching of a sound academic program in this arcane field, then and again today uniquely featured at Indiana University, with a multi-year donation which enabled me to invite a series of senior visiting professors from Scandinavia and Finland to help give it a durable shape.

The first of these visiting scholars, Björn Collinder was a Swede, and two who succeeded him, Asbjörn Nesheim and Knut Bergsland (both Lapp specialists) were Norwegians; the rest were prominent Finns: Paavo Rivila, Lauri Posti, Aimo Turunen, Osmo Ikola, and Valentin Kiparsky (a Slavist). Most of them taught in our Program for about a year, usually taking a vigorous role in building

up basic resources, mainly our library holdings. The Rockefeller Foundation and the University both provided liberal funding for stockpiling books and other research materials, which enabled me to purchase large private libraries and special collections on sale, notably, in Finland. To cite just a single example, rich materials from the heritage of Professor Yrjö Wichmann were transferred here wholesale. There were so many books available at the time that Wichmann's Hungarian widow, Julia, having wearied of preparing catalogues, preferred to sell them to me by weight – so many kilos of printed matter for a price she chose to set.

To veer from the main story-line, I should mention here that in 1960 I inaugurated and became the editor for nine years of a unique *Uralic and Altaic Series*. By 1969, when I retired as the editor, one hundred numbered volumes had appeared, with Vol. 67 alone consisting of 21 separate tomes. Contributors of Hungarian provenance – living and dead – included, *inter alia*, Péter Hajdú, Kálmán Keresztes, Béla Kálmán, Károly Rédei, Gyula Décsy, János Gulya, Stephen Erdély, Ioannes Sylvester Pannonius, Vilmos Diószegi, János Eckman, János Zsilka, Edith Vértes, László Szabó, Ferenc Kiefer, Stephen Foltinyi, György Lakó, Lajos Tamás, Erzsébet Beöthy, László Arany, Joannes Sajnovics, Sámuel Gyarmany, Denis Sinor, Klára Magdics, Albert Molnár of Szenc, besides John Lotz and myself. Among the Finnish contributors were: Alexander Castrén, Lauri Hakulinen, Valter Tauli, Meri Lehtinen, Toivo Vuorela, Paavo Ravila, Elli Köngäs, and Jaako Ahokas. And among the Estonian contributors were: Ants Oras, Felix Oinas, Alo Raun, Ilse Lehist, Paul Ariste, and George Kurman. There were also Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, German, Swedish, French, Turkish, Mongolian, and Chinese authors, to say nothing of the dozen or more native Americans. The series enjoyed an immense domestic and world-wide popularity, with scores of volumes going out of print or achieving multiple editions. A long time afterwards, when I spent some time in Ulan Bator, I found these many volumes in the library of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences; but I was truly astonished, although not displeased, to be widely introduced by my hosts as the editor of the series!

Returning to Paavo Ravila: he was an admirable linguistic technician, a warm human being, and a visionary organizer, who returned to Finland eventually to serve as the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki. While he was at Indiana University, I proposed to him the establishment of a permanent, rotating Chair for Finnish Studies within the frame of our Uralic and Altaic Program. Indeed, such a Chair was created, even financed on Ravila's initiative largely by the Finnish government, but these fruitful arrangements were some years afterwards abrogated because of destructive internal political machinations of a later administration.

The visiting professors – especially the Finns, who generously shared with me facets of their vast collective scholarly expertise as well as their individual friendship – contributed to my education in varying degree. Via this unconventional route – since (to paraphrase the Russian proverb) the mountain could not come to Mahomet, a throng of Mahomets graciously came to the mountain, such hav-

ing been the only practical avenue open to me in those times – I gradually secured my footing in the Finno-Ugric field at large. At the same time, however, I was busy forging a particular specialty on and of my own, to wit, in studies of the language and culture of a particular Finno-Ugric population situated mainly in the Mari Republic of the Soviet Union, better known to Western scholarship as the Cheremis. In this endeavor – having been coached as to the basics by my Finnish tutor, Siro, and thereafter guided far beyond by my Hungarian mentor Beke (see above) – I henceforth came to increasingly rely on the services of a native speaker, Ivan Jevsky.

Jevsky had fortuitously landed in the United States in February 1952. It soon became possible for me to secure the necessary funding for importing him to and supporting him in Bloomington, and formally to embark upon what became known as the Cheremis Project (under circumstances described elsewhere, e.g., in 1956:7). The attendant intensive research, which concluded in 1963, was funded by a substantial grant from Indiana University, with additional aid, to name only some of the major contributors, from the Department of State, Department of the Air Force, Office of Education, the Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center of the Research Studies Institute, located at Maxwell Air Force Base, the National Science Foundation, the American Philosophical Society, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and the Newberry Library. I enumerate these in some detail to attest that in the decades whereof I write many U.S. funding agencies – federal, state, and private – were concerned with the national development of not just Finno-Ugric studies in general but such specialized branches of it as Cheremis studies.

A deserter from the Red Army to a German camp from which he was in due course “liberated” by advancing American forces, a semi-literate barber by trade, Jevsky was the first member of his culture and the first speaker of his language ever to have come to this continent; beside his native Cheremis, Jevsky spoke only some Tatar and a little Russian. Although by and large he cooperated with my team of assistants and students cheerfully enough, he complained with some regularity that “work with the head is almost unbearably fatiguing as opposed to work with hand.” He seemed relieved finally to be allowed to revert to his tonorial slog at the conclusion of our dedicated undertaking.

Some half dozen students participated in the Cheremis project, three of them (one a Finn, Eeva K. Minn) earning their doctorates with dissertations on relevant topics. In 1952 I launched and edited a mini-series, *Studies in Cheremis*, in which eleven volumes by members of the faculty or advanced graduate students at Indiana University appeared before the series petered out twenty-six years afterwards (for a list, see 1978:5). I should also mention that in the course of some half dozen professional trips to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, I man-

aged to purchase hundreds of books published in the Mari Republic, anything from grade school textbooks to technical training manuals to novels and poetry to transcribed folklore texts of various genres. I eventually donated this unique stockpile to the Indiana University Libraries, along with my entire Finno-Ugric collection, which included not only hundreds of grammars, dictionaries, and the like, but complete bound runs of practically every journal series, both Hungarian and Finnish, in the field, plus many items from Soviet times and well before.

It would be erroneous to conclude from the foregoing account that Finno-Ugric studies constituted my exclusive academic preoccupation during the twenty years covered here. In addition to a host of articles having to do with the Cheremis and other FU groups and their languages I wrote, as early as 1951, several papers eventuating from parallel investigations of a language spoken by the Aymará, a large community of Indians in Bolivia. Among the latter I compiled a sizeable collection of materials for a modern dictionary (1951). And as far back as the mid-1940s I had conducted extensive field work, under the auspices of the Cranbrook Academy, among the Winnebago, a Siouan population in the Green Bay area of Wisconsin (see, e.g., 1947b).

By the mid-1950s, I was also, and remained for more than a decade to come, thickly involved in collaborative work, under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, with several colleagues in psychology and linguistics (1954) – but this is not the place to recount these attendant experiences. Furthermore during the 1950s and 1960s I became engaged in problems of stylistics, along with Lotz, Jakobson, I. A. Richards, and a host of others, including several prominent psychologists (1960). This aspect of my work is particularly relevant here because it served as one bridge – although I was not explicitly aware of it being so at the time – between my fading efforts in the Finno-Ugric field on the one hand and my fumbling entry into the domain of general semiotics on the other. Let me briefly describe one such Janus-like project, which resulted in a major – although, for FU studies, a highly unconventional – book: the *Concordance and Thesaurus of Cheremis Poetic Language*, which became simultaneously the eighth in the Studies in Cheremis series (1961).

As a part of the Cheremis project over-all, I had assembled a rather large corpus of about 1,200 folksong texts, which I began to analyze off and on throughout 1958–59, while I was in residence at the Department of Anthropology of the University of Arizona and a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. Then for 1960–61 I was unexpectedly appointed a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, with absolutely no restrictions as to my activities there. In consequence of this total freedom, my year's stay at the Center had a momentous, if unforeseen, effect on the remainder of my scholarly career. While on the one hand I saw this as a singular opportunity to strike out in a wholly novel research direction – to examine how animals communicate – I also felt bound to finish up, albeit in an innovative way, the

analysis of the corpus of folksong texts I had been working on for the past few years.

As to the latter, I was fortunate to be accompanied to the center by one of my "postdocs," the late V. J. Zeps, supported by two consecutive grants I obtained for him from the National Science Foundation for "Computer Research in Psycholinguistics." Zeps was a member of my team, which had worked with Ivan Jevsky, but his true talents and inspired enthusiasms lay in computational linguistics, these at the dawn of the era – almost forty years ago – when such predilections and preoccupations became the rage. Zeps was a quintessential hacker *au pied de la lettre*, who conceived and implemented our programs. Based on an empirical exploration of large quantities of Cheremis verse and other such devices in the light of considerations of problems of poetic language in the widest sense, this investigation was, for its time, a pioneering effort in the automatic compilation of concordances and related scholarly tools with a then-state-of-the-art IBM 650 electronic data processing system, equipped with four magnetic tape units, three index accumulators, and a host of separate peripheral equipment. While the over-all design of and prose passages in the resulting book (finished on New Year's Eve in 1960) were mine, Zeps accomplished most of the computational work, thus becoming its junior author. Perhaps not surprisingly, this particular work of ours was greeted with complete silence by all Finno-Ugric media – who, after all, would have been competent to review it?

Over a decade, I faithfully attended international congresses of Finno-Ugric studies, for instance, in Helsinki (1965), Tallinn (1970), and Budapest (1975); in due course I was even elected to represent the United States on the world-wide body that was responsible for organizing them. At each of these conventions I gave a paper on some traditional topic, most often on a Cheremis theme. However, at the Budapest congress I decided to tackle a seemingly unfamiliar subject. In my presentation I argued that since human beings communicate amongst each other by both verbal and non-verbal means – indeed, according to some scholars (notably John Lotz), most messages by far are transmitted non-verbally – it would be instructive to scrutinize the non-verbal behavior of each extant Finno-Ugric population and to juxtapose this with their corresponding verbal behavior as well as to compare every system with every other. There was of course nothing radical about this research proposal, which was implemented with rich multiple inflections by ancient orators and actors (Hamlet: "Suit the action to the word, the word to the action"); which in "the systematic use of gesture speech" so assiduously explored Garrick Mallery among North American Indian tribes in the 1880s; which David Efron, the Argentinian Ph.D. of Franz Boas, famously carried out in the 1930s in his exemplary comparison of facial expressions and body movements among Italian and Jewish immigrants in New York City; and by countless others (1991: 27–32). Notwithstanding a highly respectable pedigree for probes of this sort, the reception for my Budapest overtures of over two dec-

ades ago was so uncompromisingly frosty that I knew, for me, a change of venue became henceforth mandatory.

My paramount preoccupation at the Center for Advanced Study started out with a youthfully naive premise. As I have noted elsewhere, I always considered myself a biologist *manqué* – a student who, frustrated by World War II, had missed his true vocation. So, having been told by Ralph Tyler, the Center's Director, to spend my time during my residence doing what I liked, I mistakenly imagined that I could, in a single year, "catch up" with developments in the life sciences over the past twenty years. Soon I was so overburdened that I had strictly to confine my readings to a narrow segment of biology. The wedge of this pie I settled on was ethology, the biological study of behavior, which led me straight to a review of the literature on animal communication.

Readings in this domain led me to formulate the following hypothesis: the attentive, empirically founded, study of communication systems in the other animals will clarify fundamental questions about the evolution of language in hominids. By way of a series of publications since then (periodically collected, e.g., in 1972, 1980, 1990), I satisfied myself that this hypothesis has been *falsified*. Nonetheless, this literature, supplemented by my own observations of animals in the wild and in captivity led me, through multifarious fascinating detours and occasional blind alleys, to develop what I regard as my principal contribution to general semiotics, the field which I (and now many others) call Biosemiotics (1992a). That, however, is a convoluted story that would carry us far beyond – in Ernest Hemingway's evocative 1936 attribution to Francis Macomber – my "short happy life."

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# HUNGARIAN LINGUISTICS IN A GENERAL DISCOURSE

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If one has only a few pages to summarize the contribution of Hungarian linguistics to scholarship, the most fruitful way to accomplish the task would perhaps be to give a taxonomic overview, starting with *Gramatica Hvngarolatina* of János Sylvester (1539), continuing with the other grammars first in the seventeenth century (see the works by Albert Szenci Molnár 1610; István Geleji Kátóna 1645, György Komáromi Csipkés 1655; Pál Pereszlényi 1682; Pál Kövesdi 1686), then with a new wave of grammars from the end of the eighteenth century (cf. Sámuel Gyarmathy 1794; Debreceni grammatika 1795; Miklós Révai 1803–6; the works of Ferenc Verseghy 1821, József Kassai, András Vályi etc), proceeding with the start of Hungarian comparative linguistics (Sajnovics, Gyarmathy), with the beginnings of academic researches in the 1830s, then with the formation of professional linguistics from the 1860s (including names such as Budenz, Simonyi, Brassai), with a modernization period between the two world wars (revealed by the works of Gombocz, Laziczius, Lotz), with a centralized period after 1949 with growing Saussurean conservatism (developed in the so called Budapest school of Pais and Bárczi), and finishing with another period of modernization from the 1960s, based on American structuralism and later transformational generative grammar, and the beginnings of Hungarian text linguistics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics. One should only enumerate the best linguists, the most important works from period to period, the several branches of linguistics studied, and the most obvious contacts with other linguistics. Everybody would get a clear picture of that contribution.

Nevertheless the case is a bit more complicated, and that clarity would be a simplified one. First, the theme or concept of contribution has a historical character. Therefore I have to speak about processes, about facts in those processes (i. e. in history) that are connected here with one central concept, namely contribution. History cannot be seen in itself, but in description it is immediately connected with a conceptual web, and so description of history is based on the relation of facts and concepts, and one cannot speak about history without making somehow clear the most important concepts (as R. Koselleck gave a theoretical frame for this question already in his early works; cf. 1979: 349).

Contribution to scholarship has a general discourse character within history. I use this category in the way Michel Foucault discussed it (Foucault 1971). Dis-

course means interaction, talk through time and space, so in our case a talk about language with a teleology to approach language as much as possible. Even at this first stage we have to face further questions. How can or must one approach language: from the standpoint of specific languages or of universal grammar, from a historical or a descriptive view, in the frame of an autonomous syntax or in a more complex, pragmatic one. But this dilemma is only one of many. According to Foucault the other characteristic of discourse is its institution-like feature. Every discourse has a kind of order, and this institutionalized order makes the decisions how and under what conditions to take part in a discourse. (This idea is relatively close to the theory of T. Kuhn.)

When talking about the contribution of Hungarian linguistics to scholarship, in the next step I have the task of giving an approximate definition of the scope of interest, in other words what belongs to Hungarian and what belongs to linguistics.

Although the general discourse of linguistics (or the discourse of science) gives a relatively stiff frame to describe Hungarian linguistics, the two above mentioned categories can also be seen in another way. And that is the first point where I can show the open-ended, fuzzy nature of the question set here. Hungarian means ethnicity on one hand, and it means language on the other hand. There have been Hungarian linguists, who have dealt with Iranian, Turkic, Germanic, and Slavic languages or with classical Greek and Latin (e.g. János Harmatta, Lajos Ligeti, Miklós Hutterer, István Kniezsa, Károly Marót), as well as Finno-ugric studies (cf. the works of György Lakó, Péter Hajdú) or whose scope of interest concentrated on the general questions of linguistics (e.g. János S. Petőfi, Edit Moravcsik). They all have been respected and often cited scholars, though in some of their works there has not been a single word about the Hungarian language or linguistics. And there have been all those linguists who have always dealt with Hungarian language as linguists (from János Sylvester to the latest generation). In the present overview I will take the wider frame; I do not want to draw a narrow and strict borderline.

The next question I want to consider is the scope of linguistics itself. Again I have to take this domain of the question in the broad sense, so for example stylistics, text linguistics or sociolinguistics belong to linguistics as well as syntax or semantics. This decision is not based on some kind of power politics of one particular tendency but on the linguistic considerations achieved during the last few decades in such work as in the phonetics of Iván Fónagy (e. g. Fónagy 1963), in the text model of János S. Petőfi (e.g. Petőfi 1978) or – to mention non Hungarians – in general pragmatics, in the functional grammar of M. A. K. Halliday (1978) and in the holistic type of cognitive grammar (by Talmy Givón, Ronald Langacker etc.). Nevertheless because of restricted space my examples will refer mainly to those works and trends that have formed the grammar writing of Hungarian language.

Let us return now to the discourse of linguistics. This order gives us a canonized history of the discipline from the classical ages. Since we can talk about

Hungarian approaches to language from the sixteenth century, now I will follow this linear sequence from that time forward, and after demonstrating this compact history I will return to the question of the main characteristics of its structure. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Hungarian approaches to language can be considered a first step toward descriptive grammar writing, the patterns of which were Latin European school grammars. Not only the grammatical pattern was Latin, but also the general setting of these grammars had its origins in the Middle Ages. Language as a divine or natural phenomenon was set in a linear history and interpreted in the manner of the chronicles. The first such grammatical works concerning Hungarian were written in Latin and also started out of Latin, i. e. Sylvester's grammar (1539) was written as a Latin grammar and the parallel Hungarian forms were given to that system. The grammar (1610) and dictionary (1604) of Albert Szenci Molnár were also based on and written in Latin. This kind of early language description contributed to linguistics mainly through the information about the Hungarian language available in the volumes published. As these works followed the system of Latin grammars, they were highly understandable for those not of Hungarian origin. So for a general discourse of linguistics this method resulted also in a certain distortion of the language described.

So even by that time the discourse order of Hungarian scholarship dealing with language was divided into two main directions and these directions were not completely in balance. From the point of view of Hungarian language research I can call one of the directions the import direction and the other one the export direction. The discourse order of linguistics made the import direction a substantial one that gave the theoretical frames, the major categories and methodology; and the export direction provided data about Hungarian language in those frames. The non-balance of import-export relations in linguistics have remained a major question in Hungarian linguistics and in *geisteswissenschaftliche* studies in general. And as we will see it in the following paragraphs, this type of participation in the discourse of linguistics has not (or not always) been a result of the lack of originality, but was due to other phenomena.

Continuing the historical overview, I can refer to the canonized history of European and American history from the eighteenth century. If we accept the interpretation of the major trends of general linguistics in the following linear sequence: comparative linguistics → nineteenth-century historical linguistics and language typology → new grammarians → structuralism (with the schools of Saussure, the Prague Circle, Hjelmslev, Bloomfield and Harris) → generative grammar, then we can get a certain picture of the import-export relations of Hungarian linguistics in general. In comparative linguistics the Hungarian contribution was a major one. After some earlier attempts János Sajnovics published his book with the first proofs of Hungarian–Finno-ugric (Hungarian–Lappish) linguistic affinity (Sajnovics 1770); then Sámuel Gyarmathy's work appeared (Gyarmathy 1799). Both linguistic works seem to be the first ones in the history

of comparative linguistics, therefore their contribution includes not only providing data but also the foundation of comparative methodology and theory at the same time. As the first really important contribution, this episode raises also questions. These works were written in Latin, so they were understandable for scholars at least in Europe; and they certainly had some effect, but not as much as one would expect. Nevertheless at that time Hungarian contribution to general linguistics was balanced.

On the other hand the slow exploration of the Finno-ugric language family, the need for the standard variety and the new interpretation of the concept of Hungarian language community and nation led to a different kind of linguistics at the end of the eighteenth century. Since the concept of history was changing too, the whole question appeared as the history of the community in the reflexive mind. The concept of history was considered to contain the unity of the sphere of mind and the sphere of acts (Koselleck 1979, 130). In this respect Hungarian linguistics was producing Hungarian grammars in great number from the mid 1790s until the first academic grammar in 1846 (Gyarmathy 1974, Debreceni grammatika 1795, Révai 1803–6, Kassai 1817, Versegly 1821 etc.) documenting the codification process of standard Hungarian. These grammars had a main descriptive part and an even more important preface, an introductory chapter that explained the relation between language (which meant grammar) and language community. These prefaces refused every foreign pattern in the codified language itself, but not of course in the descriptive methodology. Due to the influence of Herder and Humboldt *Sprachgeist* became the most important notion in the overall idea of language; and because in this theory every language had its own special form, its own special spirit, the Hungarian contribution meant the explication of the special Hungarian component among the world's languages. So in the age of comparative linguistics Hungarian research concentrated on descriptive and prescriptive work. On the other hand the aesthetical views of Kazinczy emphasized the importance of discourse both in practical and theoretical questions of language and he himself provided the best example (cf. Kazinczy 1819, Teleki 1821).

This was the first time when Hungarian grammarians wanted to describe Hungarian in its own terms in a teleological act for the community. So they turned inwards, though always in some kind of discourse with European linguistics, which was not a purely descriptive science at the time, but a discipline led by linguistic ideals (see the works of the authors of the French Encyclopedia, Herder, Humboldt, Gottsched, Adelung, Jenisch). The Hungarian contribution was becoming somewhat latent because as a substantial part of the question of language at that time, the most important works were written in the Hungarian language. The earlier works of Miklós Révai and Ferenc Versegly had still been in Latin; and this fact had been building an obstacle between the two participants in the language discourse. From that time on the rare knowledge of Hungarian among

foreigners has become a central difficulty in communicating new achievements. However the example of Farkas Kempelen shows that initiating ideas about language in general and phonetics in particular could be mediated effectively (see Kempelen 1791).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the romantic comparative linguistics was turned into a positivist comparative and historical linguistics (united in the new grammarian school), Hungarian linguistics continued to approach language in the frame of community viewed through its own history. Enormous efforts were taken to gather as much linguistic data as possible for the history, the descriptive grammar, and the varieties (i. e. rural dialects) of Hungarian. However, the positivist philosophical background had only a restricted effect on Hungarian linguistics. The preeminent role of grammatical rules and the importance of data and philological evidence were accepted and built in to the methodology; but the strongly evaluating language typology of Steinthal, Müller, Schleicher and others, which were based on the theory of Darwin and Spencer, was rejected because in this general typology Hungarian as an agglutinative language received only a middle position. And although Zsigmond Simonyi wrote an article discussing the whole idea, and it was published in Hungarian (Simonyi 1889a), it did not achieve its purpose.

While European linguistics considered itself a positive science (i. e. part of the natural sciences), Hungarian linguistics was positivistic only in part; while European language typology accepted the interpretation system of Spencer or Taine, Hungarian linguists tried to modernize the idea of historical community and its language. Zsigmond Simonyi, the greatest Hungarian linguist at the end of the nineteenth century, published excellent and extensive volumes on Hungarian grammar (especially on morphology and syntax) from both the historical and the descriptive aspects of the problem; and instead of applying determinist theories he tried in a heroic effort to unite the idea of historical (ethnic) community and its traditional language with the literary standard, the *Gemeinsprache* of Hermann Paul. Since this view of language and community came from the features of Hungarian history and from the linguistic ideal that was still alive, it could be mediated (exported) only with difficulty. One of his main works, *A magyar nyelv* (1889b) [The Hungarian Language] was published also in German (*Die ungarische Sprache*, 1907), but it could be understood rather in the parts detailing Hungarian grammar.

Therefore the discourse was relatively one-sided during this period. The European influence was quite strong, although it was transformed, but despite new results in Hungarian linguistics the world took little notice. The example of Sámuel Brassai clearly illuminates this situation. He worked out the first version of functional sentence perspective – for Hungarian and a general perspective as well – before Gabelentz (Brassai 1863–65), but he had little effect on linguistics in Europe because outside Hungary few could read his works, and in Hungary

the discourse proved to be too strong in maintaining the traditional subject–predicate structure in the sentence. Later he discussed Gabelentz's ideas in a profound study, again in Hungarian, but without much effect (Brassai 1885).

With the appearance of Saussure the position of Hungarian linguistics in the general discourse has also changed. European and American linguistics turned toward another direction of the "positive" sciences: instead of a historical basis scholars started to build on formal logic (and behaviorist psychology) and restricted the scope of linguistics to formal phonology, morphology and syntax (as Saussure himself, Hjelmslev and Bloomfield had done). It was a major choice between different philosophical backgrounds: between the semiotic systems of Saussure and Pierce and the Cartesian and hermeneutic theories. As a result of an earlier choice in the eighteenth century when language was to be considered a mere instrument of mediation (cf. Foucault 1966) the former proved more viable. The heritage of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rationalism became alive once more. Language became an object totally independent of the speaking man, his community and its historical character, first in Saussure's *langue*, later from the 1960s in computer analogy. Hungarian academic linguistics recognized only in part the significance of this turn. The main field of research in the period between the two world wars was the history of language, mainly etymology, the history of soundsystem and morphology. However, the historical grammar of Imre Antal Klemm was a considerable achievement for descriptive linguistics as well (Klemm 1928, 1940, 1942). Nevertheless most of the planned projects remained in fragments. The unfinished character of historical works and the new geopolitical situation created by the Paris treaties after World War I put a psychological burden on Hungarian linguistics to produce the important syntheses of the history of Hungarian language, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century language ideal. But this work was completed only in the works of Dezső Pais and Géza Bárczi in the 1950s and 1960s and led to a certain isolation, a partial decline of linguistic exchange (Pais 1953, Bárczi 1963).

In the interwar period we can note individual achievements, revealing the particular twentieth-century character of Hungarian linguistics. Those who took part in the general discourse were actually not in central positions in Hungarian linguistics and thus their influence was stronger abroad than in Hungarian linguistics itself. Perhaps Zoltán Gombocz was the exception. He was accepted at home as a historian of language, but his papers on linguistic theories, on Saussure and others (especially in the last period of his life) did not get sufficient attention or response in Hungarian linguistics. Nevertheless he was one of the better informed linguists of his time, well-cited by his foreign contemporary colleagues. His *Jelentéstan* [Semantics] published at Pécs, in 1926 was cited by Stephen Ullmann. Until now it had not been understood that Gombocz wanted to give a new synthesis of structuralism and the traditional view of language, a synthesis of autonomous descriptive syntax and historical processes, a synthesis of

language and its sociocultural background – a project of anthropologically based linguistics (cf. the works of Dell Hymes) from the seventies and cognitive grammar from the eighties.

Gyula Laziczius with his *Fonétika* [Phonetics] of 1944 and *Általános nyelvészet* [General linguistics] in 1942 represented another significant but short chapter in the history of Hungarian linguistics. He had a great influence among his young contemporaries before 1945 in giving a new, modern direction to Hungarian linguistics by introducing structuralism (together with the late Gombocz and the young Lotz), but after this short period he was “forgotten” for at least two decades. János Lotz published a Hungarian grammar written in German in 1939. Full of ingenious ideas, it created the first structuralist descriptive grammar of Hungarian; but again it did not have much influence on Hungarian linguistics, especially on academic linguistics. This grammar is employed even today as the most usable one on Hungarian in a foreign language. Although his influence and contribution on Hungarian language was great abroad, his next volume of selected papers was published in Hungary only in 1976. Lotz was the first of those linguists living partly or mainly abroad who were forced to break contacts with linguists at home, at least on the official level. Naturally this political intervention damaged the conditions of scientific discourse.

After 1949 the situation of Hungarian linguistics changed once more, this time radically. Total centralization and total isolation was introduced. Inner linguistic discourse was centred around the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and at the same time nearly every connection with western linguistics was broken. This political and ideological intervention resulted in the conservation of the just adopted Saussurean structuralism mixed with some remains of new grammarian theory. And we can assert that while Hungarian linguistics (in the stricter sense, i. e. dealing with the Hungarian language itself) produced much more general works (a descriptive grammar, cf. Tompa, ed., 1961–62; a dictionary, cf. Bárczi and Országh, eds, 1959–1962; an etymological dictionary, cf. Benkő, ed., 1967, 1970, 1976; a university grammar, cf. Rácz, ed., 1968; a semantics, cf. Károly 1970; a linguistic atlas, and monographs on standard Hungarian, cf. Pais 1953, Benkő 1960; monographs on Hungarian historical syntax, cf. Benkő, ed., 1991, Benkő, ed., 1992) than ever before, in this process it was withdrawing from general discourse concerning theory, methodology, and terminology. Therefore Hungarian and general discourse on language started to diverge. The data gathered and treated by academic linguistics could not enter into general discourse, because it was processed in another language and theory. This was a time when a considerable part of Hungarian linguists were used to one particular way of discourse. Ideas and theories came from outside; and therefore these ideas were considered foreign ones and largely refused. On the other hand scholars of Slavic, Finno-ugric, Roman, Greek, Turkic and Oriental studies took part in international discourse to an extent never seen before.

Beginning with the 1960s there emerged a slow change. When László Antal, Zsigmond Telegdi, György Szépe, László Dezső, Ilona Molnár and others introduced formal linguistic methodology and when the first papers were published on generative grammar (cf. Antal 1964, Szépe 1969, Telegdi 1977 and the volumes of *Általános Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok*) a new period began. Although again the adaptation proved to be strong and the special Hungarian contribution weaker, a discourse started again with linguistics in general.

This was also the period of emigrant linguists. Some of those who could not stay at home became the most well-known Hungarian linguists in the 1960s and 1970s. In completely different fields: Thomas A. Sebeok (semiotics), Iván Fónagy (phonetics), Gyula Décsy and Denis Sinor (Finno-ugristics, Orientalistics), János S. Petőfi (text linguistics), Edit Moravcsik (language universals), István Fodor (languages of the world), Ádám Makkai (functional grammar), Susan Gal (bilingualism) made important contributions. As their achievements have been individual ones, mainly independent from Hungarian academic linguistics, they have hardly become part of Hungarian discourse on language. It became possible chiefly with Hungarian translations or Hungarian originals only beginning with the 1970s (as in the example of Sebeok or Petőfi; Iván Fónagy was perhaps the only one who published his influential works parallel in Hungarian and in French, German or English).

This situation was changed when Ferenc Kiefer, who had studied under Chomsky, returned to Hungary after several years abroad. He was the first linguist after 1945 who was accepted and became well-known among western linguists and returned back to Hungary to establish closer links in at least in one important area, generative grammar, between Hungarian, European, and American linguistics. Although generative research parallel to structuralist approaches started already in the 1960s on Hungarian grammar, the first serious results appeared at the beginning of the 1980s and the significant ones only emerged in the 1990s (cf. Kiefer, ed., 1982, Kiefer, ed., 1992, Kiefer, ed., 1994, Kenesei ed., 1985, 1987, 1990). The direct participation of the generative school in general discourse has been the strongest in the last decades and in complete synchrony with the prevailing main stream of transformational generative grammar. Interestingly enough one of the most successful contributions to that kind of language description is the work of Katalin É. Kiss (1981), who united the generative conceptual framework with the functional sentence perspective of Brassai, modelling Hungarian sentence in a unique way, and giving new and language specific contribution to the general theory.

The Hungarian generative school showed the possibility of direct contribution to the general discourse. New achievements in psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics has begun to be the part of general discourse in the 1980s, while text linguistics has only started to demonstrate the Hungarian specialities, and stylistics is in the process of modernization. By the end of that decade new trends (especially cognitive

linguistics) have appeared in many fields in Hungarian linguistics from English to German or Slavic syntax; (cf. the works of Zoltán Kövecses and András Kertész), and also in Hungarian grammar. For the new generation participation in general discourse is a more natural phenomenon than for their predecessors. However, it has to be emphasized that the quantity and quality of citation of Hungarian linguistics in internationally used handbooks and monographs (e. g. in the Cambridge textbooks, in recent handbooks) is far from sufficient.

In a very concise way and leaving many schools and persons unmentioned the history of Hungarian contributions to the general linguistic discourse was presented here as a linear one, according to the canonized history of linguistics. Looking over this history once more we can recognize that it was not linear at all. The history of Hungarian linguistics and therefore its contribution to general scholarship is full of discontinuities, corrections and resumptions, which were due partly to the failure of Hungarian linguists to mediate their achievements in describing their mother tongue, and due partly to external political and ideological circumstances. Our hope is that the positive period starting about ten or fifteen years ago will last for a longer time than any previous one.

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# HUNGARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY\*

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## Traditions of History Writing in Psychology

I wish to argue in this paper that in terms of its sociological background psychology is not entirely neutralized and decontextualized as a science. Therefore in analyzing its trends there is something to be learned from its national characteristics, beyond the mere fact of there being national differences.

### The Linear View: A Caricature

The received or accepted tradition of historiography in psychology is one of *the linear traditions*. This conception is present in points of views emphasizing an unbroken and monocentric image of the unfolding of this young discipline. They assume several linearities.

(i) There is a clear development from psychology characterized by an unarticulated, speculative view on human nature and especially an understanding of the mind and behavior contaminated by considerations of philosophy and, even worse, religion, toward an end point, the implied goal, which is a solid and reliable view of the human mind based on disinterested natural science.

(ii) According to this view, psychology as a modern science, as a profession, as well as a disciplinary subject taught at universities had articulated itself starting from the world of academia "downward." There is one center for modernization in this linear perspective: that of the leading universities and their theoretical approaches. These may change over time, such as moving from a mentalistic psychology to a behavioral one, but at any given period there is only one center. The center may change nationally as well. It may move from Germany to the United States, but there still would only be one true center at any given time. All the rest like Russian-Soviet psychology, or Spanish language psychology with its

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peculiarities would be atavistic phenomena of the periphery. Also, in any given cultural and temporal context the academic world would be the dominant and decisively interesting one.

(iii) The received conception is also linear in the sense that it treats national features as belonging to the obscure, early and difficult times in the formation of the discipline. Psychology with its institutionalization will have basically lost all of its national characteristics.

The development of psychology will be in harmony with political globalization. National trends belong to the past and will disappear with liberalization.

### Questioning Linearity

This line of thought is of course valid not only for psychology but for traditional historiography of science at large. In order to prove an almost religious progress from obscurity to clarity, one had to assume this kind of unification. Present day revisionist approaches, however, seriously question this attitude. The different networks in the life of the scientist (intellectual, private, political and national) as Bruno Latour (1993) claims most clearly, are interwoven; they are competitive and sometimes cooperative determiners of the growth of science. Science should not be interpreted as the equivalent of a religious sacred realm that should not be tied to profane issues (Bloor, 1991).

In the conception of Latour (1993) the entire process of modernity is characterized by dualities. The basic one in fact is the duality between division and unification. Interestingly enough, both could support the neglect of national differences and the ideal of studying science in its pure essence. Certainly there is a shared presupposition behind the constant thriving of modernity towards *autonomy* of the different spheres of life, which results – using Latour's symbolic expression – in *great divides*. It started with the separation of state and church, between faith and knowledge on the intellectual side, and continued in the governmental separation of powers, to arrive in the nineteenth century to a *de facto* separation of intellectual activities (the separation of art, science, and philosophy being the clear-cut example, to be followed by the drawing of clear boundaries between sciences and humanities, between the different sciences, and so on). This continued into a further separation in "science studies" as well, and one vision of linearity and national neutrality was a consequence of this. The idea of "divide" supported the neopositivist notion of separating the *context of discovery* (ephemeral, disorganized, irrational and individual) from the context of verification (eternal, organized, rational and institutionalized) and a separation of the logical-structural versus the contingent aspects of scientific theories. (For a recent clear critique of this division see Brown, 1989).

The other governing feature of modernity analyzed so powerfully by Toulmin (1990) is universalistic decontextualization, accompanied by its two sisters, depersonalization and disinterest (Shapin, 1996). These attitudes also clearly deny the continuous importance of any national peculiarities and entail a belief in a universal and algorithmic way of making science.

Today all of this bold belief in separations starts to belong to the past. We begin to realize that separation and total autonomy is only an ideal, and it is always supplemented by hybridization on all levels, which is the complementary process proposed by Latour (1993). This is true for the actual research process, as well as for its history. As Latour and Woolgar (1986) in their path breaking and rather controversial work describe "laboratory science," it is a process where data, internal determination and external issues (rivalry, cooperation, primacy issues, technical nets) are always interwoven. Where "facts" behave according to their Latin etymology: they are "made" and not simply discovered.

The hybridization and network ideas of Latour propose that there is an interplay between the three basic contexts in the historical development of science as well. One is the intellectual context so dear to the proponents believing in an internalist approach to science, the other two being the personal and social aspects so dear to the proponents of an externalist view on science (see Shapin, 1992 for a critical review of this opposition). The new and more radical sociology (incomparably more radical than the social view of science represented by Mannheim, 1952 or Merton, 1938, 1973) is referred to as the strong program because it claims science to be strictly determined by social factors (Bloor, 1991).

This attitude presupposes all the three contexts, or networks, and claims that they are also mixed networks in the history of the enterprise. If we take science to be a human undertaking rather than a divine longing for truth, that should be the state of the affairs. Ideas (the so called internalist aspect) do belong to the everyday social and personal net of the scientist, and they are the moving forces for larger social nets from journals and associations to founding agencies. Thus they enter into the external aspect. Or, to start from the other way around, ideas and even experimental methods are formed under the impact of social and personal factors. Even the structure of the movement of science reflects this. The intersection and constant friction between autonomy (or in the words of Latour, *divide*) and *hybridization* is valid for the classical natural sciences as well. However, psychology's subject matter should make the historiographer more sensitive to this multiple embeddedness. This embedding implies destruction of the classical linearity hypothesis because rival social worlds are present even today, and they were coexisting during the entire period of modernity.

### What Do Historians of Psychology Do?

Let us move nearer to our specific issue and take a look at how unification and the problem of hybrids shows up in histories of psychology. The most well-known modern histories, starting with Murphy (1949), and Boring (1950), in several respects follow the tradition of the "modern great divides." They divide psychology into an *implicit* and an *explicit* period: one in which the separation of the (would be) science from philosophy was not yet clearly made, and with fuzzy outlines among many issues of general human knowledge, and one in which scientific issues and methods got their division from speculation and the like. Though they provide a few chapters on the implicit period, as Richards (1992) points out, due to seeing everything as a preparation for the great divide in their treatment even of the implicit period they are rather parochial. Only high brow philosophy is of relevance to them. And due to this, they only see one kind of role hybridization in the emergence of psychology: that of the philosopher and the natural scientist.

This simplification has taken time. Earlier histories, like the ones written by Baldwin (1913) and Dessoir (1911) were much more generous regarding the impact of philosophy, and regarding the importance of other domains of knowledge, including even literature in the formation of psychology. When simplification was done, however, it resulted in a view where on the one hand there was a clear divide postulated between the prescientific and the scientific. On the other hand, there was a clear divide of what was being treated as relevant from the prescientific period. Only those pieces of knowledge were relevant that had become integrated into the new discipline. This new discipline, to use the expression introduced by Ben-David and Collins (1966) was a result of *a hybridization of the attitudes of two disciplines*: that of philosophical epistemology and experimental physiology. It tried to present a competitive advantage by promising answers based on natural science to issues of philosophy.

Under the influence of Kuhn (1970) several attempts have been made to interpret the history of our discipline as one where paradigms change rather rapidly. Thus there would be a sequence of Psychology of Consciousness, Behaviorism, Cognitivism and so on (Palermo, 1971). Other alternative voices claim a non-linearity by suggesting that psychology is a "multi paradigmatic science," where different paradigms would coexist (Leahey, 1980). This would, of course contradict the very notion of paradigm as introduced by Kuhn (1970). Therefore still others claim that psychology is not organized around paradigms but around prescription pairs or eternal dichotomies such as: objectivism-subjectivism, determinism-indeterminism, staticism-dyanamism and the like (Watson, 1967).

All of this "loosening," however, does not change the status of national differences. It seems to be an unspoken assumption to accept the image introduced by Boring. Boring's (1950) classic text shows how experimental psychology was

born in Germany, England, and the United States, and suggests that after these nationally different birth processes the discipline has taken a cosmopolitan turn. Even the revisionist approaches of historiography stick to this image. Based on the example of Hungarian psychology, I shall try to show that by taking a realistic sociological and historical attitude, on the contrary, one can find some meaning to the study of surviving national differences.

### **Traditions within Hungarian Psychology**

It would be too ambitious to describe in a short paper what are the implications of a broader and non-linear view for treating national elements in the history of psychology. I shall concentrate on the continuous *multiplicity of the approaches* and their close relation to each other, due to a small and therefore relatively transparent set of networks. A rather direct consequence of this is the other peculiarity of Hungarian psychology: the relatively limited intellectual narrow-mindedness, which is such a danger in contemporary psychology. I should suggest that both are features we should not feel inferior about and that should be preserved, if we want our students to have as much impact in "world psychology" as they have now.

In the following I am going to attempt to explain the last one hundred years of Hungarian psychology by trying to redress the received view of historiography and by encouraging a more open and multifaceted view of the history and the present status of psychology.

### **Multiple Hybridizations**

Psychology, as Ben David and Collins (1966), in the paper already noted clearly document, has gained its autonomy both on the institutional and academic side as a result of a process of role hybridization. The social conditioning for the hybridization of the natural science background obtained in German medical schools with philosophical issues was the shortage of physiology chairs in the 60s of the last century in Germany. Thus a job tension was present for a generation of newly "habilitated" people on the one hand, and this coincided with a shortage of talented philosophers on the other hand. The birth of academic psychology was a fortunate meeting of these two trends.

In my view this is only part of the picture, however. This is certainly the dominant trend, the kind of "top down" academic psychology that tries to move philosophical issues close to natural science, and then tries to campaign for disciplinary independence, chairs, labs, etc. While it is born out of a process of hybridization, due to its own academic interests soon turns into a self-conscious

partisan and champion of autonomy. It remains conscientiously theoretical. In the first institutionalized primary centers talks about "man in general" and avoids touchy mundane issues. (Wilhelm Wundt, the German founding father was, for example, as it is well known, an open opponent of applied psychology.)

Another hybridization, however, proceeded parallel to this development. This involved a role hybridization between issues of the practical man and the naturalist biological approach to man. It led to a combination of the problems of the governor, the military man, the industrialist, the educator, i.e. the issues of society dealing with human life, and the developing evolutionary theory of organisms represented mainly by Darwin. As for its substance, this hybridization resulted in the formation of several functionalist psychologies, which were much less oriented towards disciplinary autonomy than towards practical success and application. As for its social aspect, this kind of psychology started to deal with development, individual differences, and pathology as well. It usually started off outside of academia proper, and when institutionalized, its institutions were practical social institutions, rather than those of the academia.

The case of Hungarian psychology is interesting in this regard for several reasons. The most important aspect is that as things happened in Hungary, the early role hybridizations took place in parallel along three planes. The first one was academic hybridization. However, since it was nearer to the practice it only partially followed the usual pattern in the early period. Psychology was introduced to philosophy departments in the form of lectures, then "seminars," and constituted something similar to a sub-department, or the like. But during this process many of the early Hungarian academic psychologists were less academic than some of the first German leaders. The second role hybridization was a special Central European version of the practical and functionalist hybridization: that of psychoanalysis and the different trends of depth psychology. This carried with it an emphasis on the well-known openings toward cultural studies, literary and artistic culture, as well as medicine. The third hybridization was the practical institutionalization of psychology for education, dealing with retarded populations, and industrial selection. This latter attempt partly started from hygienic considerations of modern city life and also derived from considerations of educational reform connected to child-centered and sometimes radical social ideologies.

It is essential to keep in mind the parallel and interactive existence of all three of these networks, because there is a frequent peculiar and intellectually disadvantageous treatment of them in the literature on Hungarian intellectual history. Most people who try to make psychology a part of their vision of the turn of century or of Hungary between the wars usually include only psychoanalysis as a point of reference. Some exceptions, such as Kende (1974), take notice of the other networks, mainly that of the educational reform movements, but also neglect academic psychology as such. Theirs is not simply a one-sided selection. It is also a radical distortion of the *de facto* situation, even of the extraacademic

networks themselves. For several decades a very interesting aspect of Hungarian psychology was the close interaction between the different networks, or more accurately, the fact that individuals participated in the different nets in a parallel way. Let me point to two individualized cases of this. Ferenc (Franz) Alexander, the founder of psychoanalytically minded psychosomatic medicine and an organizer of American and international psychoanalytic training, was the son of the philosopher Bernát Alexander; and as he recounts in his partly autobiographical work (Alexander, 1960) he was influenced by the intensive academic and non-academic networks around his father and turn of century Budapest at large. Or, to take another extreme, the experimental psychologist Lajos Kardos recalled in an interview, that while he was a perceptual psychologist in the 1930s, he was also a devoted disciple of Lipót Szondi (Pléh, 1995), as was, among others, Ferenc Mérei.

### **Hungarian Psychology and the "Great World"**

One can take three different perspectives in trying to relate Hungarian psychology to that of the world. One can talk of the stars who "made it", i.e. have contributed to world psychology, with world psychology recognizing their contribution, and examine if there any specificities either to the internal aspect of their scientific work or to their background, i.e. regarding the external net in which their work was produced. Another possibility is to take a look at the work of people who followed important international trends but remained unnoticed outside Hungary. This work might be worth pointing out because it is a part of the hidden train and trade of ideas. Finally, a third possible approach focuses on the internal trends, to see if the local nets have any substantial message about the structure and development of the discipline at large. I shall try to use a combination of these possibilities.

### **The Stars of Hungarian Psychology and Their Impact**

There are several quasi-established ways to identify who are the real stars in the history of psychology. One is the influence list compiled by Myers (1970) based on the citation statistics of fourteen American professional journals between 1962 and 1967, analysing 7200 articles with 140.000 citations. Another one is the Boring list (Anin, Boring and Watson, 1968) based on the judgement of 9 eminent psychologists. Finally, the third is citation in the biographical dictionaries of Zusne (1975), which based on Boring, but expanded to include the recent period.

The following Hungarian names can be found in the Zusne book. The numbers indicate how important the author is judged to be by the panel. The original ranking went from zero to twenty-seven points. György Békésy is included due to his Nobel prize. The rest of the list is rather meager. If we take strict criteria and only include those who were related to Hungary only through some of their professional activity, we have: Paul Ranschburg (12), Géza Révész (23), and four psychoanalysts: Sándor Ferenczi (19), Ferenc Alexander (18), Géza Róheim (11) and Dezső (Dávid) Rapaport (21).

I took the liberty of adding to this compilation a few other authors from the academic tradition, where textbook or historical references support their international impact. I deliberately excluded living persons from my remarks.

### The Philosophical Past

Three names stand out from the philosophical dawn of Hungarian psychology, who, though they did not make to the "big league" (the above mentioned impact lists), are still quoted in the literature covering particular topics.

Gyula Pikler (Julius under his German pen name) the left-wing legal philosopher and organizer of modernist social science life (*Huszdik Század, Társadalomtudományi Társaság*) was also a reknown psychologist in the German speaking world. His work (Pikler, 1908, 1917), which has also appeared in Hungarian, made a serious contribution to the issues regarding the basic units and events of mental life. His synthetizing work (Pikler, 1917) tries to promote the principle of *negation in sensation* as a result of the active components of perception. It was intended to be a notion that would subsume all the already known "counterphenomena" in perceptual organization, such as contrasts, after images and so on.

But interestingly enough, and this is a continuous symptom, he is never much cited by the later generation of German oriented Hungarian experimentalists like Révész or Ranschburg. Even present day historical summaries (Kiss, 1995b) ignore his substantial message and only mention him with reference to an earlier review of Ranschburg (1942). This has a clear explanation: though he was socially in the right circles, that was not true intellectually. He did not try to make an intellectual niche out of his speculative contributions to modern psychology. Jenő (Eugene) Posch was both a rather interesting theoretical psychologist outside academia and inadvertently became a *cause celebre* on the intellectual political scene. He was criticized in the Parliament for his supposedly atheistic teaching to high school students and even faced suspension as a teacher (Kende, 1974). His "objective psychology," which appeared in two bulky volumes at the beginning of World War I, (Posch, 1914/15), was an elaboration of Herbert Spencer's ideas about objective psychology in the direction of a motor theory of

behavior. He basically borrowed the idea of the adaptive function of the mental from Spencer. But he elaborated it in a direction where most of our higher functions would originate somehow in motor organization. This is a radical parallel to early motor theories of perception, such as the one proposed by the French Théodule Ribot, or the German-American Hugo Münsterberg (see about these developments Murphy, 1948). The radical element in Posch is that his elaborate motor theory of the mind was phrased in terms of adaptation rather than in terms of mental attitudes, as was true for some of the early German motor theories. As a matter of fact, a present-day historian of behaviorism has treated the largely forgotten Posch as pointing towards Watson and the radical motor theories of the mind (McGuigan 1978).

**Lajos (Lewis) Leopold** was an economist and early social theorist, who had a surprisingly influential book in his time, *The Prestige*. It was translated into German and English (Leopold, 1915). This was an early attempt to treat the entire problem of social influences on behavior and mental representation within a more general and more flexible framework than the imitation theories of Tarde and Le Bon and later G.H. Mead, which were so popular at the time. "Prestige" for Leopold is a mediating representational concept that is responsible for the spread of ideas rather than simple imitation. Prestige involves and also helps to recreate social stratification. It is this aspect of his work that drew the attention of sociological theorists such as Max Weber and also appeared in a review of the English edition (Park, 1915).

### The Experimental Tradition

The heritage of **Paul Ranschburg** (1870–1945) is certainly the dominant element here. He was a key figure, not only with respect to the reputation of Hungarian experimental psychology (see already Schiller, 1947a), but also regarding our understanding of the overlapping networks in Hungarian psychology. While he was the founder of the experimental psychology tradition, due to his medical training he made his early accomplishments in a clinical setting; and after being unable to settle there, he became the founding father of the introduction of modern psychology and especially experimental psychology into special education in Hungary.

He is interesting in our context for two reasons. One has to do with his international fame. Ranschburg, after working on hypnosis, published in 1902 a paper on the difficulty of recall of similar or homogeneous elements from a learning list. He used the then classic methods of memory research and even extended them with his own mnemometer apparatus (see Ranschburg, 1912 for a comparative presentation of the sophisticated mechanical devices) to cover nonsense material. He observed a phenomenon and gave it a name: homogenous inhibi-

tion. The phenomenon proved to be of overall import. It has become customary to refer to it as the *Ranschburg phenomenon*. It is much discussed and researched even in contemporary experimental psychology (for a review of its relevance see e.g. Marton, 1971).

His case is a very telling example for the importance of an identifiable effect, not only in the history of ideas but also in the fate of individual achievements. If an effect is named after the person who discovered it (as is the case with the homogeneous inhibition concept introduced by Ranschburg in 1902), that might prove to be the royal road to "eternity". The name of Ranschburg appears in present-day discussions well beyond the range of the original effect and well beyond Hungary. His effect is called on as a possible explanation of new effects found in memory research (Fago, 1995), and detailed discussions about the explanation of the original effect still go on (Greene, 1991). The important sociological point is that the early introduction of a reliable effect into an experimental science pays off.

The other important aspect of Ranschburg is his initiation of a network of followers. Ranschburg was not the first to use methods of experimental psychology in Hungary. As a detailed report of Fodor and Kós (1995) shows, Károly Lechner (1850–1922), the first professor of psychiatry at Kolozsvár, had started to use reaction time measurements there in the 1890s. Lechner, however, used these methods only as part of his clinical practice and teaching; he did not try to get internationally accepted publications on the basis of his measurements. Ranschburg in 1912 also published a successful overall survey on the pathology of memory, where he presented his experimental studies and contrasted them with the different approaches to pathology in neuropathology proper but also in psychopathology and included a detailed account of the Freudian theory of forgetting!

Ranschburg started his work at a medical institution. His situation at the turn of the century in the Nervous Diseases Department, led by Károly Laufenauer, is usually described in an idyllic way. Experimental psychology made a breakthrough at the medical school. The situation was much less idyllic, however. It was full of occupational tensions and struggles for recognition. As Ágnes Torda (1995) reported in a philologically detailed account the inside story of the first Hungarian psychological laboratory, and how its proponent on the medical faculty had a difficult time. The idea of giving lectures on "experimental psychology" and setting up a laboratory to study the mind was not welcome at all. The faculty committees repeatedly questioned even the titles of courses proposed by Ranschburg and the official affiliations referring to a "laboratory of psychophysiology" that the author used in his publications. Thus, one could find suspicion, jealousy, and probably a bit of antisemitism as well. Was this, however, peculiarly Hungarian, peculiarly a characteristic of backwardness and being on the periphery? Definitely not. Cambridge University in England allowed a department of

experimental psychology to be established only in 1947! Similarly, French experimental psychology was mainly developing in medical and educational labs that did not become part of the established philosophical faculties. Sorbonne integrated a full scale laboratory of experimental psychology only after the Second World War. Jean Piaget thought it opportune to commemorate this event in 1968 as a victory of facts over speculations!

Thus, one interesting implication of the life of Ranschburg regarding "the networks of science" was that his vicissitudes were not specifically due to Hungarian backwardness. The other interesting aspect is what followed, which at first glance has more local relevance but may contain a more general message. The psychophysiological laboratory set up within the special education system for retarded children first on Mosonyi street in 1902 proved to be a very fruitful and consequential change. Ranschburg (1923) did not lose his ambitions in the new environment. He wrote a two volume treatise that is worthy reading even today. It was an early synthetic attempt to "reconcile" experimental psychology with experimental and clinical neuroscience.

Today two institutions, the psychological laboratory of the Training College for Special Education and the Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences both recognize their founder in Ranschburg and trace back their activity to his laboratory. This constitutes more than historic name dropping on their part. It reflects the fact that the two fields of clinically applied psychology and experimental psychology did indeed develop in overlapping networks in Hungary.

What was on the personal level an injustice towards Ranschburg (the slowdown of his process of habilitation at the medical school, and his being practically tossed out together with his lab from high brow medical academia) carried a distinctive flavor for the development of Hungarian psychology: a closer relationship between the academic and the applied networks, and a continuous special role for the Training College for Teachers of the Handicapped in the development of psychology, which was continued by Lipót Szondi and his students.

**Géza Révész** (1878–1955) was another Hungarian experimentalist, who achieved recognition in the "international hall of fame." He belonged to that generation of young radical Budapest intellectuals who were ambitious in their science as well as open and outgoing, to say the least, in their political views (see about this climate in Kende, 1974; Janos, 1982; Kovács, 1994; Harmat, 1995).

Révész as an experimentalist established himself while still in Hungary. After obtaining a degree at a leading German university (that was typical at the time), he established himself as a leading expert on hearing (Révész, 1913, in English 1954b). His monograph assured his entry into textbooks, or into Boring's (1942) famous history book; and he had also established his other continuous preoccupation: the study of childhood talent. His study on Ervin Nyíregyházi (Révész, 1916) was among the first of its kind. In Holland his fame was partly based on

his decade long study of touch (1938, English summary Révész, 1958) and his publications about the then outmoded and questionable issues concerning the origin of language, and the relationships between language and thought. The wide reception of these later books showed the need for continuous study of these “forbidden topics” and assured a well-deserved fame for the author in his later years.

As far the institutional aspects are concerned, Révész managed to break into the world of the philosophical faculty and have a Department of Psychology established in Budapest during the revolutions following the First World War. This was a major breakthrough on the level of institutions and networks, but one of no lasting impact. In 1920 Révész had to leave the country for Holland and he established his international fame both as a scholar and as an organizer of European psychological life mainly through the first international journal of psychology *Acta Psychologica*.

In Hungary, meanwhile, psychology itself, due to its political associations and connotations, had become discredited in the world of high academia and in the world of earthly politics as well. It took a good decade to reestablish psychology at the universities, in Budapest by Pál Harkai Schiller and at Szeged by Dezső Várkonyi Hildebrand.

**Pál (Harkai) Schiller** (1908–1949) seemed to be a largely forgotten author, who reentered the Hungarian scene mainly through his philosophically minded historical writings (Harkai, 1940) as a critic of Cartesian dualism and a proponent of a functional approach to the body-mind relation (Pléh, 1984). Thanks to the efforts of Magda Marton in Hungary (see e.g. Marton, 1994) and Donald Dewsbury (1994, 1996) in the United States, the heritage of Harkai is no more a blank spot on our maps of the intellectual past. Harkai Schiller was a fine experimentalist and a very erudite theoretician. In my view he tried to combine some of the best trends of the period between the two wars. He took from Kurt Lewin the idea of the contextual determination of the motivating forces in human life and characteristically applied it to the explanation of jokes (Schiller, 1938). Harkai Schiller had a general attraction toward a combination of *Gestalt* ideas, intentionality theory, and an “action theoretical approach” to complex behavioral phenomena (see Dewsbury, 1996). This is clearly shown together with his inspiration from the semiotic conception of the mind and the anti-Cartesian attitude regarding the body-mind issue proposed by Karl Bühler (1922, 1927, 1934, 1936) in his theoretical work (Harkai, 1940, 1944, Schiller, 1947b). But it has taken a concrete form in the numerous (partly posthumous) publications he prepared on what we would today call representational phenomena in animals; such as detour behavior (Schiller, 1948, 1949a,b, 1950), and the drawing of chimpanzees (Schiller, 1951, 1952, Schiller and Hartmann, 1951). He is remembered today most of all as a fine comparative psychologist (Dewsbury, 1994). As Dewsbury (1996) reports, due to the advent of more cognitive approaches to

learning and animal behavior his impact in that field was interestingly the largest in the late seventies.

As for the "networking aspect," two important moments should be emphasized in connection with Harkai Schiller. The first is that he was the first to be able to make a stable breakthrough for experimental psychology at a philosophy faculty. In this process some of his eclectic predecessors played a significant role. Especially Gyula Kornis, the prolific writer (his 1917 eclectic treaty on the mind is only one step in a long series of books on psychology) and Catholic intellectual power broker, made many steps toward rehabilitating the idea of experimental psychology after its ostracism. Harkai Schiller in a way belongs to a second generation. The members of this generation were not merely reading about experimental psychology but turned it into a working discipline at philosophical faculties. This was accompanied by a surprisingly non-aristocratic attitude regarding the role of academia on the part of Harkai Schiller. The theoretician and experimentally minded Harkai Schiller at the same time participated in the formation of networks of professional guidance and selection, as Völgyesi (1995) has documented. This was another area where in the Hungarian case, there was an interesting overlap between different networks.

**Lajos [Ludwig], Kardos** (1900–1985) had been the doyen of Hungarian experimental psychology for the time between 1947 and 1985. Internationally, mainly his early work done under Karl Bühler in Vienna and under the influence of *Gestalt* psychology is much appreciated. His monograph on the role of shadows and brightness constancy in object perception (Kardos, 1934) is still a classic of the field. They are standard textbook material in perception and in experimental psychology at large. He was among the first among perceptual psychologists to combine the attitudes of careful experimentation with that of courageous mathematical modeling. It is not surprising that decades later he became an exponent of the application of cybernetic principles to psychology (Kardos, 1980). The other two aspects of his work, his later achievements, are less well-known abroad. In the fifties he tried to combine serious comparative psychology with the ideas of Pavlov (Kardos, 1960), a work that is of historical interest since it shows how a scientist tried to smuggle new ideas into an intellectually closed world. His works on animal memory (Kardos, 1988) and on the filogenesis of mental life (Kardos, 1980) deserve serious study. As a critical examiner of the behaviorist learning traditions, he has developed ingenious techniques to study the organization of spatial memory in animals. His theory, based on experimentation over three decades, basically claims that animals have an image-like memory that stores things together with their localizations.

In the area of networks Kardos had a difficult time. As soon as academic psychology was established under his guidance in 1947 it became discredited for over a decade, and structurally it had to start everything from scratch in the 1960s. Kardos played the crucial role of defending principles and representing

scientific quality during these difficult years. However, if we take a look at the sequence of Révész, Harkai Schiller and Kardos as the three foremost experimentalists at the philosophy faculty in Budapest, their fate illustrates the most tragic element of the history of Hungarian psychology: politically motivated discontinuity. The thread of mentor to students relationships, that most active and most crucial element in establishing working paradigms in science, was twice broken. The living continuity is missing, and therefore the organic development of the "craft aspect" of science was seriously impaired. That has the consequence of having a technically (on the skill level) much less articulated discipline than we would otherwise have had. The multiple political "interventions" also had the consequence of *de facto* limiting rivalry, without any intention on the part of the participants. That has set up a combined set of detrimental attitudes: open discord and dissent should be limited because we (i.e. we psychologists) are living in a basically hostile environment. As ugly as it may sound, as Joravsky (1989) has pointed out regarding Russian-Soviet psychology, this is basically a Stalinist attitude towards science, even on the part of those who are the most ardently anti-Stalinist themselves. This is an attitude that can hopefully be changed by the Western experience incorporating the role of peer pressure and controversy in intellectual life.

**György Békésy** (1899–1972). The Nobel prize winning physicist, who won the prize in medicine, made most of his outstanding experimental and modeling research while still in Hungary (Békésy, 1928–29), which were only summarized in his famous 1960 book. He was also famous in the thirties. Boring took a detailed account of Békésy already in 1942, and in the late thirties scores of Americans visited him in Budapest (see the obituary of Newman, 1973).

At the same time he was rather unnoticed on the intellectual scene in Budapest itself. He got a professorship in 1939 at the Department of Physics in Budapest, but his work did not make much of an impression on psychological circles. That implies an interesting barrier. It seems that while the academic, psychoanalytic, medical, and educational networks were transparent towards each other and there was quite a lot of communication both of ideas and people, there were boundaries between them and natural science *strictu sensu* at the same time. That is an interesting warning for today, too. Psychologists should keep their eyes more open toward the hard natural sciences, not only towards their medical cousins.

### The Missing Ones

There is another curious aspect to Hungarian related experimental psychology. Aside from the people who started their career here and made their impact from Hungary, and then left mainly for political reasons (Révész, Békésy, Harkai Schiller), there are the ones who are of Hungarian descent, so to speak, but never had a working relation to Hungarian higher education. Thus, it would be rather

generous to treat them as Hungarian psychologists. This could be said of Egon Brunswick, who was a student of Karl Bühler and later became a rather influential American psychologist, the first one to campaign for a psychology based on probabilistic ecological validity. The same could also be said of the *Gestaltist* researcher of memory, George Katona, who has become a leader in the field of economic psychology in the United States. This trend, to be sure, never stopped. We have famous Hungarian born young psychologists today as well, who have never had any contact with the universities at home, often out of fear of being rejected. That is a constant warning: our institutes of higher learning should be more attractive and open.

### Hungarian Depth Psychology

This is the area where there is the most interesting modern research available, both in Hungarian and in English. Informative and at the same time intellectually stimulating evaluative reviews on special topics as by Ferenczi and Hermann (Bernard, 1993/94, Harmat, 1986, 1987, Nemes, 1988, 1990) as well as about the entire movement are provided by Harmat (1986, 1987, 1994, 1995), Déri (1990), Vajda (1995).

My intent is merely to point out again some of the basic characteristics that are usually highlighted by depth psychologists themselves. These are features that show the embeddedness of Hungarian psychoanalysis in the general issues of social science network formation in Hungary.

From the work of Ferenczi on *social engagement* of a mostly leftist nature is a dominant feature of Hungarian psychoanalysts. That originally implied positive aspects, namely the social commitments of psychoanalysis to the causes of educational reform, to the cause of the poor, and so on. Later on this social engagement, however, led to many negative experiences both due to the engagement of right wing critics and the works of fellow leftists. The social aspects of psychoanalysis were used as pretexts for its harsh ideological criticism (see Harmat, 1995 about this).

*Relations with natural science* were very crucial to Hungarian psychoanalysts. The typical Hungarian approach would not lead psychoanalysis into the realms of hermeneutics but rather would try to ground it in natural science. This was true both on the substantive level and on the level of methodology. **Imre Hermann** in his "clinging theory" (new edition Hermann, 1984) tried to relate the psychoanalytic instinct concept to the ethological formation of the notion of instinct. This in a way antedates the work of people like Bowlby who attempted this kind of synthesis much later. That was true on the methodological level, too. The monograph of Hermann (1929) on psychoanalysis as a method, which was reviewed in its own time (Ruggles, 1929), related the technique of psychoanalysis,

not only to the general issues of introspective knowledge and experimental psychology, but also to the then very up to date notions of operational definitions of science (like the work of Bridgmann) and the like.

**David (Dezső) Rapaport** (d. 1974) in his doctoral dissertation, originally published in 1939 in Hungarian, showed an early interest in trying to relate psychoanalytic dynamic concepts both to the history of ideas and to the contemporary schools of psychology. His main contribution to psychoanalysis later during his American career was in a way a continuation of this Hungarian start. He widely published on the relationship between experimental and psychoanalytic theories of forgetting (Rapaport, 1942), on the analytic and laboratory studies of thought (1951), and later on the conceptual analysis of psychoanalytic systems (Rapaport, 1959). He was a very interesting proponent of a biologically based Freudian metapsychology.

All of this is rather interesting not only from the point of view of the intellectual affinities but for the relationships between networks. Hermann was an assistant to Révész, and Rapaport worked at the same time as a psychoanalyst and a student of Harkai Schiller in Budapest. He expressed his gratitude to Harkai Schiller even in his notable American reader on thought processes (Rapaport, 1951).

Another important feature of the Hungarian psychoanalysts is their early emphasis on Ego theory and early infancy. Déri (1990) even claims that the Hungarian depth psychologists were object-relations theorists decades before the term was coined in psychoanalytic literature. They all concentrated on the earliest dyadic, mother-child relationship, and on the traumatizing effects of its unsatisfactory nature and disruption. Vajda Zsuzsanna gives a clear account of these aspects especially as they are relevant for education and the social vocation of psychoanalysis (1995).

### **The Issue of Networks Once More**

An interesting feature of Hungarian psychology is its reliance on rather elaborate networks. Due to the small number of significant colleagues, for about 80 years "everybody knew everyone relevant", and that started to change only during the last two decades. On a day-to-day basis this network based world meant several important things. Professional relations were always personalized creating closed circles and boundaries between them, but at the same time the work on the other side of the boundary was visible and made its influence felt. Most of the networks had their own "guru." The everyday professional activity of many of the important local figures as well as of some of the internationally renowned ones took place among a circle of devoted disciples.

There were several significant figures I will not deal with here in any depth, who exemplify the relevance of this factor from early on. This was true of László Nagy, the leader of the Hungarian child study (pedology) movement. But it was true on the whole for education oriented psychology in general. Valéria Dienes (1914), the first promoter of a functionalist child psychology and the later leader of the artistic dance program named *Orchestra*, for example, always had lived in different social nets and elaborated her Bergsonian psychology as part of these nets (Pléh, 1989). Similar things could also be said of the distinctively Hungarian social psychology promoted by Sándor Karácsony (edition 1985) as well. His entire theory mainly lived in an interactive field of followers and disciples.

Because of the small size of the networks, many that were non-partisan in their outlook were indeed open to others. Recently, Paul Völgyesi (1995) has pointed out, the many overlaps between academic psychology at the universities (e.g. Harkai Schiller in Budapest, Várkonyi Hildebrand at Szeged) and the vocational guidance activity as well as psychotechnology connected with it. Similarly both social psychologists like the young Ferenc Mérei and educational innovators like the senior László Nagy then head of the Municipal Institute for Education in Budapest, had out of a feeling of social responsibility and obligation all been involved in the guidance movement during the 1930s.

**Ferenc Mérei** (1909–1985) was the archetypical network guru and at the same time the most internationally claimed author of the cult figures. His entire life was defined and fulfilled through the networks he not only belonged to but also had brought to life. At the same time his main scientific contributions also had to do with the issue of the relationships between the group and the individual, the relationship between networking and democracy, and individual happiness. The paper, which made him internationally known was originally published in 1947 and two years later in English. The article was included in important social psychology readers for decades. Its essential point is that group interaction can create an “experiential surplus” that is different from the mere sum of the individual experiences. Later on he developed this notion in several directions. He elaborated the notion of “allusion” as a semiotic way to remind us of our group belongingness (see e.g. Mérei, 1994, which has also triggered a psychoanalytic interpretation of his personal journals, Virág, 1987) and also worked out a theory of the relationships between leaders and groups, where efficient leaders always take over the values of the group. (For a Hungarian summary of this work see Mérei, 1989). Mérei’s life and work later on can be seen as an exemplification of the implications of some of his early insights. His life was also a living witness for the intervention of politics into the life of the scholar. As Erős (1995) has recently pointed out, the active political leader of educational reform of the forties, when fallen from grace and even put into prison learned from his own example two important things for a Central European scholar. First, the shaky nature of life and power, the constant shift between inner and outer circles, led to

a reflective consideration of the relationships between power and human groups. A theory and a practice followed, which claimed a central place for spontaneity and for spontaneous group formation on the scientific level. Hence the unprecedented and long lasting influence of the ideas of sociometry in Hungarian social and educational psychology. The guru had frozen the methodology. Second, a *de facto* practice of unofficial groups followed, almost unofficial extra-academic universities, where togetherness, training, and the supportive value of group relations against the power structure of society came to be constantly reexperienced. Primary groups and their emotional aspects had become for Mérei both the cementing factors of human life at large and the keys to survival and protection of individual integrity against officialdom.

The archetypical network man found a way for real human groups in a society that had put all its official weight into the idea of organized and institutional socialization and group life. The originally left-oriented emphasis on the non-official spheres of life in the pre-socialist times became a theoretically motivated niche of natural groupings and leadership under official socialism.

### **Some National Features of Hungarian Psychology the World Can Learn About**

There are some features of Hungarian psychology that are worth summarizing because they carry with them some non trivial messages about the sociological determinants of psychology as a whole.

Some of these are non-specific to our discipline but originate in the general cultural context.

#### **Culture and Politics Related**

*Central organization and centrifugal factors.* There is always an attempt to create a type of "official doctrine" and leadership but the multiple identities, and the different role hybridization we surveyed always counteract this. This creates a curious dialogue, however. Many times the "alternatives" also wish to become the "officials" and do not always realize that their real interest is to fight against centralization rather than replacing one center with another.

*Discontinuity of tradition.* Due to the repeated politically motivated cleansing and the self-imposed exiles, the normal master to pupil type of transmission of traditions was disrupted several times during the one hundred year period. The cleanings were politically motivated but many times constituted new ways of continuing academic rivalries. Politics was a new means to limit academic competition. Thanks to the nature of their trade, only the psychoanalysts escaped from this and managed to preserve a continuity. This is not an exaggeration. I have

reviewed the Hungarian psychological periodical literature between 1958 and 1975 (Pléh, 1979). In this vast literature there was no single reference to a non living Hungarian psychologist! It is as if Binet or James would never be quoted by present day French or American psychologists. Certainly, there are changes towards an increased historical consciousness. That is, however, never going to replace the missing immediate links.

This does not mean that Hungarian psychologists do not have role models in their disciplinary socialization. In statistics we compiled of the solicited autobiographies of senior Hungarian psychologists (Pléh, Bodor, Lányi 1995) we found the following order of mention of Hungarian psychologists: L. Kardos, F. Mérei, Ferenczi, L. Szondi, P. Schiller, B. Radnai, H. Várkonyi, Gegesi. K. P., I. Herrmann, E. Grastyán, S. Karácsony.

This contradicts the image we obtain from the publications of the same people. It seems to be a constant interest of the political winners to put the past into oblivion. Furthermore, psychology belongs to those sciences that in the impressionistic classification of Bourdieu (1984) are always cosmopolitan versus the national ones such as literature, linguistics and so on. That means not only that they are "gauchiste" but also that they are much more sensitive to the demands of politically motivated rewriting.

*The role of informal networks* has been mentioned several times. I would merely like to reemphasize that it also is very important in training, in professional advance, and in the formation of professional "expert opinion."

### **Social Science Related**

Some other features are related to social science in general in Hungary, or rather, in this part of Europe.

*Responsibility.* Psychology has a "vocation" centered self-image. Science should not be done for its own sake and professions are responsible not only for the individuals they deal with but also for the social good. In my view this is a clearly negative image. It has led several times to prophetic visions of the possibilities of social science, including psychology, only to be thrown away entirely for the same social and politicized reasons.

The overemphasis on the social responsibility and common interest aspects of science carries its own dangers. It certainly is a peculiar competitive advantage in our region for those who want to avoid the harsh workings of the real moving force in science, as identified by Merton (1972), peer recognition. However, it discourages and drives away those young scientists who seem to see it working only abroad, and it can slow down the intellectual development of those who obey the calls to comply with the valuation of the political peer group rather than the tougher peer group of their colleagues.

### Struggling for Independence and Impact

Social scientists and psychologists are many times trapped between two needs: they want to be left alone, but at the same time gain central support. This is a tension that is typical of the countries with centralized educational systems but its past can teach many things for those colleagues who have to face these issues now.

#### Disciplinary Specifics

*Closer relations between academic and applied fields:* possible combinations and shifts between the two.

*Relative autonomy.* Though I mentioned social pressures several times, they have to be understood in a balanced way. Compared to other social sciences in the last three decades psychology has obtained enough distance from most of the social pressures. It has become more autonomous than philosophy or sociology, unconsciously following the advice of Mérei to value more the little liberties than great prophetic promises.

It is also important to keep the relationships between networks. As a matter of fact that might be the key for future developments. But it is also important to remember the isolation, such as the sometimes self-selected secretive networks of the psychoanalysts, and also the separation of psychology from natural science, such as the non recognition of Békésy, carry a warning. The overlapping in such small networks should be wider and broader.

Scientists in Central Europe certainly have to face the hard decisions outlined by Barry Smith (1993) for philosophers. Should they continue the national (local) tradition or become psychologists *a la* Stanford or MIT? The historian of psychology, however, should not obey the laws of cosmopolitan motion. Regarding the history and the social conditions of the disciplines the study of the "Magyar background" is and remains relevant even for a comparative study of the science. This is the sense in which the monocentric and linear image, mentioned in the introduction, is naturally compensated by the peculiar messages the detailed study of a given cultural context of a science provides us.

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# LUKÁCS AS A PRECURSOR OF 20TH CENTURY EXISTENTIALISM

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It has been with considerable pleasure that I have accepted the invitation of the organizers of this conference to be dedicated to the theme of "Hungarian Contributions to Scholarship." It is an honor for me to address the participants of this conference, and to speak about, or contribute a modest piece to, the "Hungarian Contributions to Scholarship" in the field of philosophy.

Is "Scholarship" something solid and eternal, to which the different nations have at different times added smaller or larger pieces of contribution? The more or less Platonizing perspective, which this way of putting things suggests, seems nowadays – in an age characterized and indeed invaded by the postmodern – to be more problematic than ever. However, be it as it may, we do not need to raise questions of such enormous import. One way to avoid putting such questions may be to understand the title of this conference as attempting to assess the extent to which Hungarian contributions at different times have come close to, or were equal to, or were moving pretty much in the vicinity of, the foremost level that a given discipline had reached at a given time. In the field of philosophy, Martin Heidegger who has had a long lasting impact on a number of disciplines, is nowadays widely acknowledged to be one of the most outstanding thinkers of our century. It is not insignificant then to realize that some interpreters have discovered, and argued for, parallels between his thought and that of György Lukács. The turn that Heidegger carried out right after World War One – a turn also called the hermeneutic turn,<sup>1</sup> paralleling, or even outweighing, the significance of the well-known "linguistic turn" – proved in several important respects to have a durable impact for decades to come. After World War Two the movement he initiated had come to be called Existentialism – and although this term was firmly rejected by Heidegger himself as an inappropriate characterization of his own thought, and it has become outdated for quite some-time, the movement under the name of hermeneutics or hermeneutic philosophy remained influential up to our own days.<sup>2</sup>

It was Lucien Goldmann – a philosopher of Rumanian origin, who lived and published most of his significant life-work in France – who first presented the surprising and provocative thesis that there is a strict correlation between the

philosophical development of Lukács and Heidegger. Goldmann's remarks, contained in the appendix of his book on Kant, (a book first published in 1945) amounted to two points: first, Lukács' collection of essays, *Soul and Form*, may be regarded as the foundation of modern Existentialism, insofar as it anticipates, and to a certain extent even elaborates, Heidegger's later concepts of *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*; second, the whole of *Being and Time* is a hidden, and perhaps unconscious, polemic with Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* – a book considered by Goldmann as radically overcoming its author's earlier Existentialism.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately Goldmann did not live to elaborate the subject in detail. His posthumously published book contains no more than an introduction and a collection of lecture notes taken and edited by students.<sup>4</sup> In this work he focuses almost exclusively on the second point, while neglecting the first. The question is then still open today. My thesis is that Goldmann's observations are fairly justified. Moreover, books by Lukács and Heidegger, published after Goldmann's death in 1970, seem to me to bring to light further evidence in favor of his thesis, making it at the same time more complex and revealing new dimensions of it.

In what follows I propose to address and develop in some detail the first of Goldmann's two points. In doing so, I wish finally to assess it against the background of the change of intellectual and philosophical climate that characterized the first decades of our century in Germany and Austria-Hungary.

One of the central claims that occur in Heidegger's *Being and Time* is that traditional philosophy, in its description of man, operated with totally inadequate concepts, such as "ego cogito," "subject," "spirit," "person," "res cogitans," "consciousness in general." These are domains which on the one hand "remain uninterrogated as to their Being," and on the other tend to describe a "fantastically idealized subject," failing to capture nothing less than the "apriori of the merely 'real' subject, Dasein."<sup>5</sup> By contrast Heidegger's existential analytic proposes to explore those very dimensions that remained hidden in the classical tradition, and that can eventually also account for the admission of these fictitious subjects. In sheer opposition to that of every other thing, the being of humans, *Dasein*, is characterized for Heidegger by the fundamental fact that it is always their own. Humans can however – and they often do – exist in such a way that their being is not their own. It is these two central modes of being that Heidegger calls authenticity and inauthenticity. Man always lives originally in an inauthentic way and can attain authenticity only in *Sein zum Tode* [*Being-towards-death*] and *Entschlossenheit* [*resoluteness*]. The concept of authentic existence is often explained by interpreters very rudely as some kind of an aristocratic detachment from, and a scornful contempt of, everyday life – an interpretation which a closer reading of the relevant texts dismisses as wholly unfounded. Authenticity, insofar as it derives from inauthenticity, remains for ever bound to it; it is, as it were, blocked at half way. Authenticity, if I may use a paradox definition, is but the constant

transition, or passage, from the inauthentic existence to the authentic. Authenticity is not a kind of independent and self-autonomous realm opposed to inauthenticity. To put it roughly, authenticity consists in setting consciously a limit to one's manifold possibilities, a limitation seen from now on against the background of one's ultimate possibility, that is, death. Once taken the resolution is capable of transforming one's life into a *whole* and lending it *selfhood* [*Ganzheit, Selbstheit*]. The structure of authenticity contains then in Heidegger the mutually related elements of the whole, or totality, and selfhood. Being-towards-death is the primary answer to the question of the whole and the resolution to that of selfhood.<sup>7</sup> The interrelatedness of the same structural elements in the concept of authenticity, and sometimes even the same terms, occur in the early work of Lukács.

The search for authentic existence, for selfhood, is the central theme of the most important essay in Lukács' *Soul and Form*, entitled "The Metaphysics of Tragedy." "The deepest longing of human existence is [...] the longing of man for selfhood [*Selbstheit*],"<sup>8</sup> writes Lukács here and finds that only tragical heroes can reach it. "In ordinary life," we can read further, "we experience ourselves [*erleben wir uns*] only peripherally"; "our life has no real necessity here"; "in life nothing is unambiguous."<sup>9</sup> The point of reaching one's own personality coincides, curiously enough, with a sort of de-personalization consisting in getting rid of, and leaving behind, the confused variety of psychological motives and properties so characteristic of people in everyday life. The abundance as well as the domination of individual habits, customs, inclinations, and their determining role in human relations of modern life, are seen by Lukács as a sign of decadence, dispersion, alienation. The realm of what he calls "psychology," or "empirical psychology," and its reflection in art, impressionism, is one of chaos, which makes it almost impossible for people to communicate among themselves. In this aversion for psychology, Lukács's attitude shows apparent parallels with the anti-psychologism of many contemporary thinkers, such as Husserl and Wittgenstein,<sup>10</sup> and also with Heidegger whose central thesis was that psychology can by no means claim to be a leading science in the examination of human beings.<sup>11</sup>

The concept that serves Lukács' effort to show the transition from inauthentic existence to selfhood, as well as to differentiate between the two modes of living, is that of limit [*Grenze*]. Since inauthentic existence knows of no limits, it is small wonder that the moment in which the tragic hero finds himself, his own personality, is identical with his becoming conscious of his own unsurmountable limits. "The experiencing of the limit [*Das Erleben der Grenze*] is the awakening of the soul to consciousness, to self-consciousness."<sup>12</sup> It is the limit that gives the hero selfhood, and the limit in itself, Lukács says significantly, is death. The limit however, explains Lukács, should not be conceived as merely external. It is "only outwardly a limiting and possibility-destroying principle. For the awakened soul it is the recognition of that which is truly its own."<sup>13</sup> The limit is seen to be external

only from the point of view of inauthentic man, for whom real existence, freedom, is equivalent with “being liberated from all bonds [...] from every strong interior bond.”<sup>14</sup> Becoming conscious of the limit is gaining a new and definite knowledge. In everyday life, however, “people hate and fear the unambiguous.”<sup>15</sup> – Apart from the apparent similarities with Heidegger’s later analyses, here we also come upon an identity in terminology. For one of the concepts applied by Heidegger in his description of inauthentic existence, of *das Man*, is *Zweideutigkeit*.<sup>16</sup>

The word “Grenze” rarely occurs in Heidegger, and when it does, it has different connotations. There is another concept, however, that bears much the same methodological function and is elaborated in great detail: namely *finitude*. By way of illustration let me quote just two examples: “Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate* [Schicksal].” “Only authentic temporality, which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate [...]”<sup>17</sup> It should also be noted that the concept of “Schicksal” is also found in Lukács’s essay “The Metaphysics of Tragedy” and is reserved, just as in Heidegger, for the authentic way of existence. A further parallel is that both Lukács and Heidegger connect in their analyses authenticity and guilt.<sup>18</sup>

The Lukácsian characterization of everyday life shows considerable resemblance to Heidegger’s analyses of *Alltäglichkeit* and *das Man*. There is an important difference, however, between the vivid and pictorial style of the Lukácsian essays and the highly compressed phenomenological language of Heidegger. Describing *Alltäglichkeit*, Lukács does not stick to a single term; he uses expressions such as “gewöhnliches Leben” [ordinary life], “wirkliches Leben,” or just “Leben.” In a subsequent work, however, generally known as the *Heidelberg Aesthetics*, written during World War One but published only posthumously in 1974, we can find a rigorously philosophical – I should say the first properly philosophical – analysis of *Alltäglichkeit* fixed terminologically as *Erlebnismwirklichkeit*. The description of the subject of *Erlebnismwirklichkeit*, named also “*der ganze Mensch*,” within the framework of a Neokantian-Husserlian philosophical perspective may be regarded as a mediating link between his earlier essays and Heidegger’s subsequent analysis of *Alltäglichkeit*.

What is characteristic of “*ganze Mensch*,” we can read here, is that the “expansion of his subjectivity knows of no obstacle and no limits”; “he is as subject, on the one hand, without any objective bond whatsoever [...], on the other, he is at the mercy of the objects of his lived experiences [Erlebnisse]: he is only in so far as he has some lived experience with regard to an object. This ambiguity of unlimited arbitrariness and bondage without norm,” Lukács concludes, “makes the subject amorphous and nebulous.”<sup>19</sup> “*Schrankenlose Willkür*” [un-

limited arbitrariness] and “*normenlose Gebundenheit*” [bondage without norm] are two opposed and yet closely connected poles of everyday existence in which, as he wrote earlier, everything is always possible because nothing is ever fulfilled and inversely, nothing is ever fulfilled because everything is, and remains, always possible.<sup>20</sup> And the adjectives “*gestaltlos*” and “*verschwimmend*” remind us of the world of *das Man*, characterized by the fact that “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.”<sup>21</sup>

In another collection of essays, *Aesthetic Culture*, Lukács writes that complete freedom is the most terrible bondage, the most cruel enslavement, because one is at the mercy of what the ever changing instants happen to offer him.<sup>22</sup> The dissolution of everything organic, or, as he wrote, of “every strong interior bond,” is the manifestation of freedom in the world of inauthentic existence. These are phenomena to which Heidegger applies terms like “*Bodenlosigkeit*” [groundlessness] and “*Zerstreuung*” [dispersion].<sup>23</sup> Every kind of stability has disappeared from life, Lukács complains, and then it is no mere accident that authentic existence should by contrast reveal stability. Heidegger also lays great emphasis on the stability of the self; and in his analysis of authenticity, of “*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*,” he arrives at uniting the structural elements of “*Selbstheit*,” “*Ständigkeit*,” and “*Selbstständigkeit*.” In one of his typical and revealing neologisms he opposes “*Selbstständigkeit*” to the “*Unselbstständigkeit*” of *das Man* and the “*Beharrlichkeit*” of things.<sup>24</sup> Stability as an element is contained in the Lukácsian concept of “*Grenze*” too. “[The soul] exists because it is limited; it is only because and insofar as it is limited,” he writes in “The Metaphysics of Tragedy,” and in his dialogue on *Sterne* one of the protagonists says: “we must never forget that there are limits within us which are not drawn by our own weakness or cowardice or lack of sensibility [...] but by life itself. By our own life. [...] We feel that our life lies only within these limits, and whatever is outside them is mere sickness and dissolution. Anarchy is death. That is why I hate it and fight against it. In the name of life. In the name of the richness of life.”<sup>25</sup>

The repugnance against the idea of man becoming God, the idea of the infinite, the Absolute – an almost indispensable requisite of classical philosophy – is an ever recurring theme in the texts of both thinkers. Humans, Lukács and Heidegger suggest, in order to be able to live and act *qua* humans should be finite and limited and ought also to accept their finitude and limits in making them the conditions of their activity. “It is only for an abstractly absolute idea of man that everything human is possible,” Lukács remarks significantly, suggesting that those ideas contribute only to make man more and more rootless. The idea of divine existence, when referred to man, becomes contradictory, he claims in quoting approvingly Paul Ernst: “Can I still want when there is nothing that I cannot do [Kann ich noch wollen, wenn ich alles kann]?” He then proceeds to ask: “Can a god live?”<sup>26</sup> meaning of course not the mere conceivability of divine life but this: could man, if he were unlimited, still live; that is to say, have aims

and realize them? Does not perfection make every active existence impossible? And the answer, clearly suggested but not provided by Lukács himself, may be given by Wittgenstein's words: "Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul," he writes, "[...] but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life as much of a riddle as our present life?"<sup>27</sup> I think it is needless to dwell upon the central role which "*Grenze*" and other similar concepts play both in the *Tractatus* and in his later work, or upon Wittgenstein's constant refusal of the idea of man's unlimited autonomy.<sup>28</sup> In the above formulation Wittgenstein plainly turns the fundamental question upside down. And also Heidegger thinks that the question primarily to be answered is not why man is finite and not infinite, or whether and how he can ever attain to the infinite. The question to be asked is, rather, why, under what conditions man, who is originally and definitely finite, comes to ask the question concerning the infinite and whether, to put it bluntly, the form of life it suggests, the constant pursuit of the infinite, leads him selfhood or not.<sup>29</sup>

That is the new starting point of philosophy in the first decades of the 20th century, a point of departure that may both transcend and comprehend in itself the perspective of classical philosophy: overcome its restrictions and still not totally break with it. The question concerning the Absolute need not be wholly dispensed with, as if it were a mere historical relic; nor for that matter has it to be embraced uncritically as a necessary and self-evident question philosophies of all times should ask. It may be preserved, but in any case the occasional shifts of meaning, which it may have undergone from an age to another, are to be taken into account. Seen in this light, I think it would be too much to say that the attack launched against the Absolute should imply a radical break with it: it means rather an abandonment of its old concept and the elaboration of a new one. For not only is the concept of finite authentic existence a rival of that of the Absolute, but is, for this very reason, a new concept of it.

What is the reason, we might ask finally, that these significant thinkers launched an attack against *that* idea of the Absolute – an idea that eventually cast the previous century under its spell? The obvious answer would be to say that the reason is that the hopes and expectations connected to it had not, or had only partly, come true. But I think it would also be true, or perhaps truer, to say that the change of the intellectual atmosphere in Austria-Hungary and in Germany at the beginning of our century is due to the fact that those ideas *did* come true and in doing so, they revealed their internal contradictions and turned finally into their respective opposites. The idea of total freedom e.g., when put into practice, turned out to be a world of inauthenticity, mediocrity, an ever growing mechanization of life, a world of *das Man* – the very opposite of what was contained in the idea. It is the diagnosis of this fact, the elaboration of concepts for its comprehension, as well as of a philosophical perspective for a new under-

standing of the humans and their world that these thinkers accomplished – a perspective which was itself to be subject to various transformations in their subsequent philosophical thought.<sup>30</sup>

### Notes

1. See, e. g., David C. Hoy: "Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Ch. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 170–194. I may also refer to my paper "Heidegger's Postwar Turn: The Emergence of the Hermeneutic Viewpoint of His Philosophy and the Idea of 'Destruktion' on the Way to *Being and Time*," in *Phenomenology and Beyond: Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, vol. 21, eds. John D. Caputo and Lenore Langsdorf (*Philosophy Today*, vol. 40, n. 1, Spring 1996), 9–35.
2. In Otto Pöggeler's characterization "that which is called Existentialism has resumed motives from life philosophy and linked itself with phenomenological philosophy"; thereby, however, "it attained its prominent form not by taking 'private' limit situations as its point of departure, for in it the question was asked about how philosophy and technology shape our world, or what kind of meaning the arts and the human sciences have in a world dominated by technology, etc. If this philosophy attempts to understand as well as interpret the way in which we come across that which is in the particular spheres of our world in different ways, and if it thereby tries to draw upon the history of philosophy, that is to say, its own history, then one is entitled to speak about a 'hermeneutic' philosophy, rather than about 'Existentialism', or about existential ontology and phenomenology." O. Pöggeler, "Hermeneutische Philosophie," in *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie* (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1983), 251f.: ["das, was als Existenzialismus angesprochen wird, [hat] Motive der Lebensphilosophie fortgeführt und sich mit der phänomenologischen Philosophie verbunden", wodurch "es seine maßgebliche Prägung nicht durch den Ausgang von 'privaten' Grenzsituationen erhielt, da in ihm ja gerade gefragt wurde, wie Wissenschaft und Technik unsere Welt gestalten, welchen Sinn die Kunst und die Geisteswissenschaften in einer vorwiegend technisch geprägten Welt haben, usf. Wenn dieses Philosophieren zu verstehen und auszulegen versucht, wie uns in den einzelnen Sphären unserer Welt das, was ist, in unterschiedlicher Weise begegnet, und wenn es dabei die Geschichte der Philosophie, also die Geschichte seiner selbst, gegenwärtig zu halten sucht, dann kann man eher als von 'Existenzialismus' oder auch von existenzialer Ontologie und Phänomenologie von einer 'hermeneutischen' Philosophie sprechen."] See recently Jean Grondin, *Der Sinn für Hermeneutik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), XII: "[In contemporary philosophy] hermeneutics has, in fact, taken the place of phenomenology and existential philosophy as the main forms of the so-called continental philosophy; by doing so, it has at the same time also entered upon their inheritance." ["Faktisch hat die Hermeneutik die Phänomenologie und die Existenzphilosophie als die Hauptform der sog. kontinentalen Philosophie abgelöst, aber zugleich auch deren Erbe angetreten."]. More in detail, see J. Grondin, *Sources of Hermeneutics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995), 1ff. – See also Gunter Scholtz: "Was ist und seit

- wann gibt es 'hermeneutische Philosophie'?" *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, 8 (1992–93): 93–119.
3. See L. Goldmann, *Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Studien zur Geschichte der Dialektik* (Zürich/New York: Europa Verlag, 1945), 241ff. In the French edition of the book *La communauté humaine et l'univers chez Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1948), Goldmann omitted this appendix.
  4. L. Goldmann, *Lukács et Heidegger, Fragments posthumes établis et présentés par Youssef Ishaghpour* (Paris: Denoël/Gonthier, 1973); English translation: *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
  5. M. Heidegger *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 43f., 125f., 272.
  6. See, e.g., *ibid.*, 168, 224, 344f.
  7. For a more detailed discussion of the reciprocal connection of these two elements in Heidegger's concept of authenticity, see my paper "Eigentlichkeit, Gewissen und Schuld in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit': Eine Interpretation mit Ausblicken auf seinen späteren Denkweg," *Man and World*, 23 (1990): 35–62, esp. 36f.
  8. G. Lukács, *Soul and Form*, trans. Anna Bostock (London: The Merlin Press, 1974), 162. (First German edition: *Die Seele und die Formen* (Berlin: Egon Fleischel, 1911); first Hungarian edition: *A lélek és a formák. Kísérletek* (Budapest: Franklin, 1910).
  9. G. Lukács, *Soul and Form*, 157, 40. (Here and subsequently I have sometimes slightly modified the translations.)
  10. See, e.g., L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, 5.641; E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, esp. §§ 17ff.
  11. See, e.g., *Being and Time*, § 10.
  12. *Soul and Form*, 161.
  13. *Ibid.*, 162.
  14. *Ibid.*, 173 ["von allem, was stark und von innen bindet"].
  15. *Ibid.*, 153.
  16. Cf. *Being and Time*, § 37.
  17. *Ibid.*, 435, 437.
  18. See *Soul and Form*, 165: "Through guilt, man says 'Yes' to everything that has happened to him; by feeling it to be his own action and his own guilt, he conquers it [...];" on Heidegger, see my paper quoted above in note 7, 44ff.
  19. G. Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik (1916–1918)*, Lukács, *Werke*, vol. 17, eds. Gy. Márkus and F. Benseler (Darmstadt und Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1974), 34: "die Ausdehnung seiner Subjektivitätändliche Gebundenheit [...] ist, andererseits jedoch vollständig den Objekten seiner Erlebnisse ausgeliefert ist: er ist nur insofern als er an einem Objekt [...] etwas erlebt [...] Diese Doppelseitigkeit der schrankenlosen Willkür und der normenlosen Gebundenheit macht das Subjekt von sich aus [...] gestaltlos und verschwimmend [...]."
  20. See *Soul and Form*, 153.
  21. *Being and Time*, 165.
  22. G. Lukács, "Eszttétikai kultúra," in Lukács, *Ifjúkori művek (1902–1918)*, ed. Á. Timár (Budapest: Magvető, 1977), 425; first edition in Lukács, *Eszttétikai kultúra* (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1913).
  23. See *Being and Time*, 43, 223, 441f.

24. *Ibid.*, § 64: 364ff., especially 369f.
25. *Soul and Form*, 128f.
26. *Ibid.*, 161, 162.
27. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* 6.4312.
28. See, e.g., his Preface to the *Tractatus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 27), further *ibid.*, 5.6, 5.61. For a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's conservative *Weltanschauung*, see Ch. Nyiri's paper, "Wittgenstein's Later Work in Relation to Conservatism," in *Wittgenstein and His Times*, ed. B. McGuinness Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, 44–68.
29. On the non-originality of infinite time and its derivation from finite time, see *Being and Time*, § 65 (esp. 378ff.), and § 81 (esp. 476f.).
30. Lukács, for example, was to adopt later the standpoint of a Hegelian-Marxian philosophy of history which Goldmann claimed was an overcoming of his early "Existentialism"; still later, he retracted this and ambiguously subscribed to a more or less orthodox viewpoint of *Diamat*. For a discussion of the second of Goldmann's two points, as well as for comparisons between Lukács and Heidegger against the background of their philosophical paths and their political engagements, see my papers, "Heidegger und Lukács. Überlegungen zu L. Goldmanns Untersuchungen aus der Sicht der heutigen Forschung," *Mesotes. Zeitschrift für philosophischen Ost-West-Dialog*, 1/1 (1991), 25–38; "Heidegger und Lukács. Eine Hundertjahresbilanz" in *Wege und Irrwege des neueren Umganges mit Heideggers Werk. Ein deutsch-ungarisches Symposium*, ed. I. M. Fehér (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 43–70; and "Fakten und Apriori in der neueren Beschäftigung mit Heideggers politischem Engagement," in *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, eds. D. Papenfuß and O. Pöggeler, vol 1, *Philosophie und Politik* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1991), 380–408. For comparisons between Lukács and Heidegger in the context of the history of philosophy, I may refer to my papers "Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: The Problem of Irrationality and the Theory of Categories," in *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments*, ed. C. Macann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992), vol. 2, 373–405; and "Parallelen zwischen Heideggers und Lukács' Schelling-Interpretation," (in *Philosophie der Subjektivität? Zur Bestimmung des neuzeitlichen Philosophierens*), eds. H. M. Baumgartner and W. G. Jacobs (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1993), vol. 2, 391–402.

Given the specific purposes of this paper, it may be in order to make two further points. First, it should not be ignored that there are several important differences between Lukács' and Heidegger's position, which could not be discussed here. The major one is perhaps that authentic existence in Heidegger, contrary to the understanding the young Lukács has of it, as well as to the way the old Lukács viewed Heidegger's position in his late work (mainly in *The Destruction of Reason*), does not have a necessarily tragic character. This point was given much prominence by Jan Patočka, who claimed that Heidegger's "analysis of Being-towards-death is discussed by Lukács in a superficial manner; it is, however, obvious." He went on to argue, "that Lukács goes on understanding it in terms of his own 'Metaphysics of Tragedy'. [...] He overlooks totally the fact that Heideggerian Dasein and its authentic existence do not necessarily have tragic character, that it is not so much in factual death, as in taking over the responsibility, and in opening up the situation in a responsible way, that Dasein reaches an unavoidable height of its existence." Patočka also added—and this is a further difference between Lukács and Heidegger—that "there is here [in Heidegger] no question about leaving the social and his-

torical domains, rather inversely: it is very much a question of opening oneself radically, or keeping oneself open, for them. In such a way Lukács has, in his interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, fallen a victim to his own Existentialist beginnings, which he had failed to think over coherently. Heidegger's main intention, that of breaking up the concept of the closed subjectivity, is thus wholly overlooked." (Jan Patočka, "Heidegger vom anderen Ufer," in *Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1970), 394–411; quote on 402: "Die Analyse des Seins zum Tode bei Heidegger wird nur flüchtig berührt, es ist aber offenbar, daß Lukács sie noch immer von seiner 'Metaphysik der Tragödie' aus versteht. [...] Es entgeht ihm vollständig, daß das Dasein Heideggers und seine eigentliche Existenz gerade *keinen* notwendig tragischen Charakter haben, daß sie im faktischen Tode keine unumgängliche Aufgipfelung besitzen, sondern in der Verantwortung und dem verantwortlichen Erschließen der Situation [...]. [...] es sich hier nicht um das Verlassen der Sozialität und der Geschichte handelt, sondern im Gegenteil um eine ursprüngliche Aufgeschlossenheit, Offenheit für sie. So ist Lukács bei seiner Interpretation der Heideggerschen Philosophie zum Opfer seiner eigenen, philosophisch nicht zu Ende gedachten existentialistischen Anfänge geworden. Die Grundabsicht Heideggers, die geschlossene Subjektivität aufzubrechen, wird dadurch aus den Augen verloren."

The second point is related to a further connection between Lukács and Heidegger that emerged recently and may be seen to have some relevance precisely in anticipating certain main features of contemporary hermeneutic philosophy (see notes and above). Following a suggestion of Lucien Goldmann's, Gadamer has recently claimed that certain passages of Lukács' Heidelberg manuscripts, possibly under the impact of Emil Lask's anti-idealistic turn and his reception of American pragmatism, show the influence of the latter (even with regard to terminology) and come close to Heidegger's analysis of the enviroing world in *Being and Time*. See H.-G. Gadamer, "Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge," in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, 4 (1986/87): 24. Following up on Gadamer's hints we see that Lukács does in fact characterize what he calls *Erlebniswirklichkeit* as a 'world of pragmatism,' and if we search for Heideggerian parallels or anticipations, the following passage might prove useful: "Das 'Denken' der Erlebniswirklichkeit ist [...] nichts anderes, als der Versuch, sich der Wirklichkeit der dem handelnden 'ganzen Menschen' gegenüberstehenden, hemmenden oder fördernden Gebilde zu bemächtigen" (Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, 29, 31). The "'Denken' der Erlebniswirklichkeit," so characterized (and not terminologically emphasized), shows obvious parallels to Heidegger's *Umsicht*, namely in so far as "der gebrauchend-hantierende Umgang ist [...] nicht blind, er hat seine eigene Sichtart, die das Hantieren führt und ihm seine spezifische Sicherheit verleiht [...] die *Umsicht*." *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), 69; or *Being and Time*, 98: "when we deal with [things] by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided [...]. [It] is *circumspection*." What the "'Denken' der Erlebniswirklichkeit" and "Umsicht" have in common is characteristically that neither of them is the application of already existing theoretical knowledge; Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, 31: "Ein kontemplatives 'Denken' ist auf dem Niveau der Erlebniswirklichkeit per definitionem unmöglich, denn durch den Akt des simpelsten Meinens ist die Erlebniswirklichkeit aufgehoben. [...] Daneben bleibt aber

zweifellos die Tatsache bestehen, dass aus der Erlebnistotalität des 'ganzen Menschen' das Denken doch nicht ausgeschaltet werden kann."

And Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 69 (*Being and Time*, 99): "Das 'praktische' Verhalten ist nicht 'atheoretisch' im Sinne der Sichtlosigkeit, und sein Unterschied gegen das theoretische Verhalten liegt nicht nur darin, daß hier betrachtet und dort gehandelt wird, und daß das Handeln, um nicht blind zu bleiben, theoretisches Erkennes anwendet." [*'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of sightlessness. The way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one acts, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not remain blind...*]



# LUKÁCS AND LIMBO: THE LEGACY OF MARXIST LITERARY CRITICISM

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When I was on a sabbatical in Hungary last year, I noticed, and not without qualm, that the cigar-toting statue of György Lukács, the venerable Hungarian philosopher and literary critic, had been removed from the lobby of the University Library in Budapest. I really don't know where the statue is; perhaps it has been posited in the "Cold War" museum near Szentendre (there is such a museum there), or perhaps it has been temporarily relocated for the sake of repairs; at any rate, when I inquired about the famous Marxist's whereabouts, I was told by a graduate student that Lukács was in limbo. By that remark I understood that György Lukács has not only lost his halo in his native country, but may have been victim of the new regime's rather hasty purge of icons, however venerable, that were associated with the doctrinaire and now discredited Marxist tradition.

Because of the fall of Communism one may assume that the legacy of Marxist literary criticism is in a limbo of sorts in America as well. Yet, according to American critic Susan Sontag, while it was more difficult if not impossible to discuss Marxism seriously because of the "sterilities of the Cold War" (Sontag, 87), now, we can look at Marxist literary criticism without the uncomfortable stigma that is identified with political repression. In spite of the disintegration of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union or, as Susan Sontag suggests, precisely because of it, American interest in Lukács is enjoying what may ultimately be a renaissance. There are some very interesting statistics that bear this out. Today, American universities offer a variety of courses in Marxist literary criticism, or at least incorporate Marxist theory as part of general courses in practical literary criticism – alongside rival theories like structuralist, deconstructionist, psychological, historical, neo-historical, mythopoeic, Freudian, Jungian, archetypal, formalist, feminist, readers-response, post-colonial and sociological criticism. In some universities like Florida International University, where I have been teaching, in the guise of Freshman Composition we include writers such as Attila József and Antal Szerb (my own humble Hungarian contribution to American scholarship). We teach Marxist literary criticism as a sub-category of sociological criticism. At other schools, many of them distinguished institutions of higher learning, entire courses are offered in Lukács; and there is one

that I know of at Cornell University, where Professor Peter Hohendal offers a course as specific as "The Early Lukács." And when I was teaching undergraduate English at the University of Massachusetts in the late eighties, a surprising number of Ph.D. candidates were writing doctoral dissertations on or about Lukács and Marxist literary theory.

Since Lukács' death in Budapest in 1971, numerous important studies of Lukács have been published in the United States. In the interest of space I should like to mention no more than sixteen of these:

- Arato, Andrew and Paul Brienens. *The young Lukács and the origins of western marxism*. New York: Seabury Press, 1979.
- Bernstein, J.M. *The philosophy of the novel: Lukács, marxism, and the dialectics of form*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
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American interest in Lukács began in earnest in the 1970s when his monumental *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* and *Die Theorie des Romans* became available in English as *History and class consciousness* and *The theory of the novel*. The works were embraced almost immediately, suggesting, as they have, a new and exciting critical paradigm. Lukács' contribution of a Marxist criticism, espe-

cially when applied to the historical novel, has been profound. His half a century of work as a Marxist theorist has been regarded as seminal, and indeed many scholars are indebted to him, not only in America but throughout the world, as the father of Marxist literary criticism. Save for György Lukács, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe produced few global literary critics of lasting significance. The early Lukács, who was at the time writing in German, influenced the so-called Frankfurt School and the work of Walter Benjamin, a notable scholar of the Weimar period; in France, the Rumanian Lucian Goldmann drew heavily upon Lukács' earlier writings, especially Lukács' *History of class consciousness*; and in England, George Steiner had this to say about Lukács:

[He] is one of the great literary critics of the twentieth century. Heir to Lessing and Sainte-Beuve, no less than to Hegel and Marx, he has produced a body of theoretic and practical criticism which can be compared for tenacity of influence, with that of T.S. Eliot, and for breadth of compass with that of Edmund Wilson (Steiner, 92).

American Marxist scholars like Fredric Jameson and Andrew Feenberg readily concede their indebtedness to Lukács, with Feenberg crediting Lukács' *History and class consciousness* as playing, "a major role in the breakdown of the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism and the consequent revival of interest in Marxist thought among literary scholars, philosophers and sociologists" (Feenberg, vii). In the year of Lukács' death Fredric Jameson published *Marxism and form: Twentieth-century dealectical theories of literature* in which he acknowledges Lukács for

laying the foundation in a technical manner for a new Marxist theory of knowledge...[that] distinguishes itself from the outset from more familiar Western critique of ideology as it is practiced by such writers as Lucian Goldmann and Sartre (Jameson, 182).

English professor Stuart Sim, in his 1994 study *George Lukács*, says that Jameson has struggled to keep alive a Lukács-inspired Hegelian-Marxist tradition in American academic culture in the face of stiff competition from, successively, Althusserian structuralism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. Admitting the rampant pluralism of today's intellectual marketplace, Jameson sets out in his *Marxism and form* to argue the case for Marxism, conceiving of the theory as "that untranscendable horizon" that subsumes such apparently antagonistic or incommensurable critical operations (Sim, 120). According to Sim, Jameson's is an unabashed defense of Marxism as meta-narrative, which meets the postmodernist challenge head on. The virtue of Lukács' *Theory of novel* is that it conceives of the novel as a modern attempt to reconcile matter and spirit, life and essence, which, because of the unfavorable conditions of the modern world, is inherently

problematical in its structure, a form requiring continual reinvention in response to events (Sim, 121). Although such reinvention, or the architectural restructuring of narrative, is one of the hallmarks of postmodernist fiction, critics of the Lukácsian method would accuse Lukács of being unfair and judgmental in his treatment of modernism and postmodernism altogether. Perhaps this point is not wide of the mark, and there is lively dialogue about just how relevant a paradigm can be in its insistence on realism unclear; it is true that Lukács culls most of his models from Balzac, Zola, Tolstoy and Gorky, since these works best demonstrate social reality. But what of the twentieth century? Lukács certainly had great admiration for Thomas Mann and even Sholzhenitsyn. But what did Lukács say about writers like Joyce, Kafka and Beckett, or Brecht for that matter? Lukács is rather severe in his near universal condemnation of Western avant-garde and its exulted psychological preoccupations; for by focusing on the individual, it ignores the narrative of socio-historical process as it relates to the Lukácsian process of "totality." In his *A case for Lukács* Jameson argues that Lukács' *Theory of the novel* is

the attempt in modern times to recapture something of the quality of the epic narration....As such, the novel is no longer a closed and established form with built-in conventions, like tragedy or epic, rather it is problematical in its very structure, a hybrid from which must be reinvented at every moment of its development. Each novel is a process in which the very possibility of narration must begin in a void, without any acquired momentum: its privileged subject matter will, therefore, be the search, in a world in which neither goals nor paths are established beforehand. It is a process in which we witness the very invention of those problems whose solution is its story. Where the epic hero represented collectively, forming part of a meaningful, organic world, the hero of the novel is always solitary: he is problematical; that is to say, he must always stand in opposition to his setting, to nature or society, inasmuch as it is precisely his relationship to them, his integration into them, which is the issue at hand. Any reconciliation between the hero and his environment which was given from the beginning of the book and not painfully won in the course of it would stand as a kind of illicit presupposition, a kind of cheating with the form, in which the whole novel as process would be invalidated [parenthetically, I may add that such cheating characterizes nearly all commercial genre fiction today]. The prototype of the true novel's hero, therefore may be the madman or the criminal; the work is his biography, the story is his setting forth to "prove his soul" in the emptiness of the world (Jameson, 172).

Jameson's argument, a refinement of the Lukács method, would certainly be sympathetic to such modern narratives as Joyce's *Portrait* and *Ulysses*. Conceding that Lukács had in general rejected modernism, Jameson offers the following on the subject of Kafka:

In Kafka's *Castle*, after one of the characters has shown K. that all of his actions can be interpreted in a quite different and far more unfavorable light, the hero replies: "It's not that what you say is false: it's just that it's hostile." Such might be the motto for Lukács' observations on modern art. It is both diagnosis and judgement: yet the whole dimension of judgement rests on ambiguity, for it presupposes that the modernist writer has some personal choice in the matter, and that his fate is not sealed for him by the logic of his moment in history. The same ambiguity is visible in Marxist revolutionary theory, as well, where the revolution cannot come into being until all the objective conditions are ripe for it, but where at the same time Lenin can apparently force this condition by sheer willpower, can create a proletarian revolution before the preceding middle-class revolution has had time to run its course (Jameson, 198).

Now, what did Lukács make of Sartre, Beckett and existential nihilism? In his *Marxism and human liberation*, Lukács savagely attacked existentialism by calling it "a myth of declining capitalism" (Lukács, 254). Rather strong words. Yet again, Jameson shows how the Marxist paradigm, by means of an adjustment, can accommodate even the works of Sartre and Beckett. According to Jameson, this new modernism differs from the older, classical one of the turn of the century in at least one very essential way: the older modernism was in its essence profoundly antisocial, and reckoned with the instinctive hostility of the middle-class public of which it stood as a negation and a refusal. What characterizes the new modernism is however precisely that it is *popular*: maybe not in small Mid-western towns, says Jameson, but in the dominant world of fashion and media. That can only mean that there has come to be something socially useful about such art from the point of view of the existing socio-economic structure; or something suspect about it (Jameson, 414).

Professor István Fehér goes as far as to suggest that Lukács may even be regarded as the precursor of twentieth century existentialism, rather than its staunch nemesis. The insistence on realism and historical necessity need not be regarded as contrary either to existentialism or to the new postmodernist tradition. In his 1994 study of Lukács Professor Stuart Sim says:

while the commitment to realism can make Lukács seem old-fashioned, the advent of postmodernism and its radical problematisation of modern aesthetics has led to a revival of interest in Lukács' work. Lukács has become a test case as to whether anything can be saved from Marxism as a political force (Sim, 150).

Perhaps this requires some elaboration. For Sim, and for a great many of us, I suppose, postmodernism is a term with inherent difficulties. Since it covers a multitude of theoretical perspectives, Sim calls the term "amorphous"; but at

least in some versions of it, a sense of dialogue with the past is demanded (Sim, 126).

Sim quotes from the architecture theorist Charles Jencks, who defines post-modernism

...as double coding – the combination of modern techniques with something else (usually tradition building) in order for architecture to communicate with the public and a concerned minority, usually other architects....The point of this double coding was itself double. Modern architecture had failed to remain credible because it didn't communicate effectively with its ultimate users...and partly because it didn't make effective links with the city and history (Jencks, 4).

The past, be they events from human history, the history of ideas or myth itself, is not only manifest in postmodern work but alters the architecture of narrative, often infusing it with metafictional elements that add yet another perspective to the idea of historical context. "Postmodernism for Jencks is representational art, metaphorically oriented and historically conscious in its attempt to reintegrate the present with the past" (Sim 127) as, for instance, in the provocative works of Umberto Eco.

Although, as we have seen, we can account for Lukács' relevance insofar as modernist and postmodernist texts are concerned, does this mean that Marxist theory is useful in interpreting *all* manner of narrative texts? The answer is a categorical *no*. Applying the paradigm works best with the realistic novel, that which contains at least an undercurrent of social consciousness. But we can not force the template on every genre; and as my Florida colleague Professor Elkins points out, Marxist theory is *e pluribus unum* or one out of many tools at the disposal of the literary critic. The works of Steinbeck, for example, invite a Marxist interpretation, while Barth or Pynchon do not. Perhaps one of Lukács' weaknesses was his obstinacy about his method, that it was his way or no way, that there were not other viable critical perspectives, no other critical tools. Such dogmatism risks being reductive if not prescriptive. And prescribing what and how writers ought to be writing, echoes, and rather unpleasantly, the dictates of socialist realism, or, to be blunt, Stalinist propaganda.

In the main, Lukács' association with Stalinism presents for some a ready excuse to discount his theories. His personal involvement with the Hungarian Communist Party, his recantations, his political waffling, his chameleonism, his bewildering opportunism, his dogmatism, his technocratic language, have often elicited less-than-an-objective assessment of his work. To some of my Cuban-American students at my university, the very word "Marxism" carries with it a pejorative nuance. One student has told me, and I quote: "I'm sorry, Professor, but I just can't take a philosopher like Marx seriously because he let his kids

starve. Marx refused to get a job because he was too busy glorifying the worker.” Other students complain that Lukács seems to them a little snooty, a literary snob or pundit, part of the intellectual elite that was as accessible to the masses as so much gobbledygook. They accuse him of everything from Ash-Can oligarchy, to being a cult-leader of the aristocracy of the proletariat. True, some of these students have been force-fed materialistic dialectic, “a la Castro” before they escaped to the United States, to the land of opportunity, where the last thing they expected was more of the same. Perhaps this is the case in Hungary today. Perhaps that is why Lukács’ statue is missing from the University Library in Budapest. But these, I believe, are not more than simple knee-jerk reactions and certainly not serious thoughtful assessments. There are, of course, thoughtful critics of Lukács, who present rather persuasive arguments against his critical theory. The most articulate of these critics is René Wellek, and the most hostile (perhaps with the exception of Professor Victor Zitta) is George Lichtheim. Mr. Lichtheim, in his book *George Lukács*, takes great pains to show that Lukács’ work is derivative. In a chapter entitled “Heritage,” Lichtheim discovers in Lukács’ *History of class consciousness* a veritable honeycomb of notions borrowed from other philosophers:

When we come [says Lichtheim] to Lukács’ most controversial work, the 1923 essay entitled *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, we shall see that its strictly philosophical content was mediated by Lask’s interpretation of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Heidegger; its politics and economics were taken over bodily from Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg (the incompatibility of these two great Marxists was not yet plain to him); and its criticism of Engels’ “dialectical materialism” was subsequently abandoned in response to pressing demands for intellectual conformity. Nor can one overlook the circumstance that it was Dilthey who had originally opened Lukács’ eyes to the radical difference between natural science and history: In noting all this [says Lichtheim], one simply registers the fact that while Lukács distinguished himself at an early age by productions of considerable brilliance, one cannot say that he manifested the kind of originality which commonly marks even the immature productions of genius. *The theory of the novel* is no exception. It is an exquisitely talented piece of writing, and that is all (Lichtheim, 10).

Professor Sim disagrees. In his “Conclusion” to his 1994 study of Lukács, he argues that Lukács’

work deserves to survive the collapse of Marxism in the West: realism is back on the agenda, so, too, is dialogue with the past, as is generalized skepticism of doctrine-led political and social systems, and in each of these cases Lukács’ original writing have something important and thought-provoking to add to the debate. Marxism’s

great success as an aesthetic theory has been to make us aware of art's ideological role. The need for that awareness outlives Marxism's political decline — feminism alone would be enough to prove the point, as is the rise of the culturally philistine right — and we should not forget Lukács' critical role in bringing about that awareness. Perhaps what is needed now, Professor if the Lukács to be treated with the same kind of generosity that he extended toward the great realists of the nineteenth century: to acknowledge that, whatever ideological imperfections may exist in his work, he managed to put the right kind of questions to his society (Sim, 159).

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# THE PERMANENCE AND MUTABILITY OF AESTHETIC VALUES

(Mihály Babits: *The History of European Literature*)

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This is an expanded version of a paper I read at Indiana University on 5 April 1997. The topic of the conference – “Hungarian Contributions to Scholarship” – suggested a synthetic approach. My decision was to discuss the Hungarian contribution to Comparative Literature studies with a special focus on a book that exerted a profound influence on literary opinion in Hungary during the decades following its publication. In preparing the fuller presentation published here, I have decided to omit the introductory section and give a somewhat lengthier analysis of what may be regarded as the most important history of European literature published in Hungarian.

It is common knowledge that among the larger works that attempt synthesis and take panoramic views on Western literature there are two that still continue to play a major role in the formation of literary taste in Hungary. The first is *The History of European Literature* (1935) by Mihály Babits, one of the major Hungarian poets and prose writers of his age, and the second *The History of World Literature* (1941) by Antal Szerb, essayist, critic, novelist and short-story writer. This essay is devoted to the first of these two works. On another occasion I will examine the later work, which is a much more ambitious undertaking but heavily indebted to its predecessor in the sense that it is based on the idea that literature is a closed concept. Since Szerb does not act critically in relation to Babits (he refrains from problematizing the distinction between literature and nonliterature), his work can be read almost as a commentary on its predecessor that leaves most of the ideals of the poet-essayist unchallenged. Although the title *The History of World Literature* would suggest an extension of scope, it does not attempt to move beyond the Eurocentrism that is more justifiable in the work by Babits. Because of this, some of the remarks made in the following pages may apply to both works.

## 1. The Concept of World Literature

What is the justification for writing a comparative history of literature? When asking this question, Babits expressed his conviction that in his age national literatures tended to keep a growing distance from their common legacy. "World literature is a unified, coherent process, blood circulation on a monumental scale," he wrote at the beginning of *The History of European Literature*. "It existed a long time before Goethe recognized its existence and gave it a name; it is much older than national literatures." In the 1930s such an opening statement had obvious political implications. "It is not a modern task to draw the picture of world literature as a traditional unity. If someone tries to do this today, he or she has to bear in mind that such an effort is conservative, even reactionary. The power of European tradition is declining; the different nations insist on continuing their fights in the field of human spirit, looking at each other with hostility; our literary culture seems to disintegrate."

It would be a simplification to assert that in drawing the distinction between national and world literature, Babits simply ignored the cultures of other continents. He never denied the artistic value of works composed outside Europe but viewed them as the manifestation of various national literatures. World literature was not born in Europe, he added, and it certainly extended to other continents. His criterion was not geographical when he maintained that more readers had a first-hand knowledge of the works of Dante, Shakespeare, or Goethe than of the poetry of any other continent. Although his focus on Europe may seem unjustifiable from the perspective of the late twentieth century, his emphasis on the international character of literature was exceptional rather than typical in 1935. His taste was "Catholic" in the original sense of the word, and his attack on provincialism was comparable in strength to those made by Ford Madox Ford, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot in the English-speaking countries, Valéry Larbaud in France, or Ernst Robert Curtius in Germany. His goal was that of the curator of an imaginary museum, who would strip works of their local origins and estrange them from their original functions.

The sharp distinction between local and universal values is perceptible throughout his work. "It was a national event rather than a phenomenon of world literature," he remarks about the first performance of *Hernani*. "The battle was won by the Romantics, but the liberty it led to was not too meaningful outside France." Assimilation is viewed as a *sine qua non* of world literature. St. Paul is more central to this ideal than Moses because he was a Roman citizen who relied on Hebrew culture and used the Greek language. It is assumed that world literature from its earliest phase was governed by synthesizing multicultural sources.

The great literature of ancient Rome was not developed by the representatives of some 'national spirit.' The 'true Romans' who were intolerant, isolated themselves from alien forces, and wished to create a culture deeply rooted in local traditions. (...) The glory of literature in Latin was the result of the activity of writers who were the most brilliant spokesman of the alien spirit of Greece.

The Hungarian author's vision of culture has been compared to that of T. S. Eliot. Although the American-born poet-critic is not mentioned in *The History of European Literature*, there are undeniable similarities between the arguments made in *Tradition and Individual Talent* and in the book written by the Hungarian author. Both Eliot and Babits were convinced that the European legacy was in principle accessible to mankind as a whole, whereas national literatures had more limited scope and relevance. From our vantage point such a position may seem Eurocentric. Babits makes occasional references to Asian cultures – when introducing the genre of the "novella," for instance, he mentions the *Panchatantra* and the *Arabian Nights* – yet he takes it for granted that world literature is identical with European literature. It was born in ancient Greece; its tradition was continued later by writers who used Latin; and the legacy of the Christian Middle Ages was further developed by authors who used languages related to Latin. Although it is true that Babits admitted that later other linguistic communities also joined the tradition – otherwise it would have been impossible for him to include literature written in his native language – his conception seems somewhat limited if compared with the canon outlined in *The March of Literature* published three years later by Ford Madox Ford. Ford was the Hungarian author's senior by ten years, yet his book reflects a taste that may be called less dated. Although his treatment of the twentieth century is as scanty as that of Babits, his early chapters on Chinese poetry reveal his closer association with the avant-garde.

In any case, a criticism of the nationalist approach to literature and Eurocentrism are the two main characteristics of *The History of European Literature*. "For the historian of a national literature nation may have greater significance than literature." This statement suggests that for Babits only a work of the greatest artistic value can aspire to a status in world literature. This assumption reflects a strongly canonical view.

Minor literature is attached to time and space. For world literature only great individuals are of interest, who respond to one another through ages and countries. Only the greatest belong to world literature. (...) Those who continue the work of their predecessors and shake hands above the different nations.

A close reading may reveal a self-contradiction in such an approach. On the one hand, world literature is defined as continuity; on the other hand, it represents a canon of works of timeless aesthetic value. The texts central to this canon ask for

slow reading. The reader can go back to them with increased insight and appreciation. "One has to stop at individual lines and drink them drop by drop, as one enjoys good wine," he remarks about Shakespeare. Such semantic plenitude is rare in works composed in more recent periods. When asking for the reason for this decline, the following answer is offered: "The most likely explanation must be found in the higher culture and more refined sensibility of an earlier age that for us is no longer understandable and credible. In the last three centuries literary culture has never ceased to decline, despite some wonderful moments of recovery."

The adherents of the Neoclassical ideal of a timeless canon often tend to be nostalgic. Babits was firmly convinced that the interwar period was marked by cultural decline. When describing the age of Horace, he raised the following questions: "What could have become of mankind if the culture of the nineteenth century had not fallen suddenly into the extreme darkness of the present age? And what achievements could have been made if Roman culture had continued to develop undisturbed?"

History is not regarded as distinct from a critical evaluation, but the unfolding of European literature is not presented as a history of progress towards the achievement of certain ends. Unlike Hegel or Burckhardt, Babits was reluctant to find in all aspects of the Renaissance an improvement on the Middle Ages. Deeply concerned about the disintegration of the unity of world literature and a collective loss of memory, he could not believe in what was usually called the Enlightenment project. This attitude may have developed as a result of the experience of World War I, the short-lived Hungarian Commune of 1919, and the Trianon Peace Treaty. In any case, after the 1920s Babits had become increasingly skeptical of cultural progress. It was a strong fear of a cultural decline that made him a supporter of a supranational canon.

The reader may be insensitive to the greatness of some works but aesthetic values are immanent. Such a preconception underlies the narrative of *The History of European Literature*. The very concept of literature seems unchanged since Homer. Dada is characteristically dismissed as a "Romantic experiment" and "mere illusion" at the end of the introductory section of the book. By ignoring popular culture, oral literature, and folklore, Babits seemed reluctant to admit that the ontic status of the literary work is variable.

The clear-cut distinction between national and world literature is further elaborated at the beginning of the first historical chapter. "The history of a national literature opens with folklore, i. e. collective and anonymous experiments. No comparable start characterizes world literature." Writing at the time of the rise of Populism in Central and Eastern Europe, he dismissed the idea that high culture could draw inspiration from folklore and rejected the cult of the "primitive" advocated by the avant-garde. In his view the evidence for the universality of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was that they were praised, preserved, and canonized in a very early period. Their style and structure are so sophisticated, Babits ar-

gued, that they cannot be viewed as the products of some "primitive" culture. They can be appreciated only by a literate public. Last but not least, a further proof of their supranational character is that their narrator is reluctant to sympathize with any of the communities involved in the war of Troy related by him.

As is well-known, Neoclassicism was one of the dominant movements in the arts of the interwar period. After 1920 Babits became a major representative of this trend, and *The History of European Literature* was written with the purpose of justifying the relevance of international Neoclassicism in a Europe divided by World War I. At a time when the relevance of the Classical heritage for the cultural life of the day was increasingly questioned by the advocates of the avant-garde and by the Populists, he drew attention to the culture of ancient Athens and Rome, as well as to the Latin Middle Ages. He was born into a society in which lawyers and doctors, clergymen, politicians, civil servants, and even bankers read Virgil and Horace, Livius and Tacitus, Cicero and Seneca, and sometimes even the Greek authors, as a matter of course in the original. The type of secondary school called "gymnasium" in which he studied and later worked as a professor convinced him that Graeco-Roman Antiquity represented the core of the canon. As a young instructor he published an essay in the yearbook of the gymnasium of Fogaras, arguing that education was closely tied to articulation, so the study of rhetoric was indispensable for culture. Later he felt dismayed at seeing that the knowledge of classical languages was declining at an alarming rate, viewed the historian as a kind of curator, the keeper of the canon, and insisted that world literature was at least in part a matter of accessibility. Greek and Latin were used by authors with very different ethnic backgrounds; hence their universal character. It was Protestantism that placed a high priority on the Old Testament and constituted a movement that helped the rise of national cultures versus the common European legacy. National cultures as such have limited relevance in so far as they are accessible only to their own interpretive communities. That is the message of the chapter on the Bible in *The History of European Literature*.

I have nothing in common with the Old Testament. I feel the lack of openness and hothouse atmosphere of a self-centred race in the barbaric tales about Moses, the patriarchal family and business relations, the strong sensualism of the love lyrics, the inhuman patience of Job, the fits of anger of the prophets, the national attachment to God, and the cynical skepticism of the Preacher.

Babits can be criticized, and has been, for taking a cultural rather than religious interest in Christianity. He undoubtedly failed to see that many passages in the Old Testament could be interpreted as foreshadowing passages in the New Testament. The statement just quoted is certainly in contradiction with the long and distinguished tradition of emphasizing the unity of the Bible. Readers of Hegel or Northrop Frye may dismiss the Hungarian poet's approach as irrelevant.

Whatever the weaknesses of his reading of the two Testaments, it was inseparable from his opposition between world literature and national literatures. Although Babits was indebted to the legacy of Romanticism, he rejected the idea that literature was the expression of "Volksgeist." For him the individual represented values more fundamental than any community. His conception was marked by a profound self-contradiction: the Platonic ideal of unchanging aesthetic values was undermined by a reader-response orientation. The tacit assumption underlying the narrative of *The History of European Literature* is that the creative artist has the best qualifications to give a valid interpretation of the legacy of his art. This starting point resembles that of Pound, T. S. Eliot, and some New Critics. Somewhat paradoxically, the significance of this work for scholarship is related to the fact that it reflects the views of a European poet-novelist on the international literary canon. One of the features common to *The March of Literature* and *The History of European Literature* is that they can be read both as pieces of historiography and as spiritual autobiographies. Their influence on historical works is at least as important as their influence on literature. This makes it understandable why Babits calls Pindar local in time and space in contrast to Alcaeus, although Pindar's works have survived and Pindaric odes often served as sources of inspiration for poets who rejected the more didactic tradition of Horace.

No one can accuse Babits of having failed to warn his readers that his criteria for selection were subjective. Needless to say, he is willing to accept some results of philological research – he admits, for instance, that the *Iliad* is a much earlier work than the *Odyssey*, so the two epics must have been written by different poets –, but he insists that no history of world literature could be written by a Positivist scholar. "World literature lives in its readers; and I am trying to describe how it lives in me."

To write a history of European literature is an impossible task for one person, yet only the unified perspective of a single individual can make world literature appear as an organic whole. This paradox serves as an excuse for the Hungarian author's admissions of the limitations of his reading. Not knowing Portuguese and finding the available translation weak, he was unable to read the epic by Camoens, and a similar language barrier made it impossible for him to pass a value judgement on the plays of Lope de Vega and Calderon.

## 2. The Historian's Perspective and Narrative Rhythm

One of the characteristics of *The History of European Literature* is that its author does not remain faithful to the principles laid down in the introductory section. At the outset he insists that in reading literature only first-hand knowledge and experience counts. When introducing the eighteenth century, he contradicts himself:

since I cannot say much new about this century, I shall try to be a conscientious chronicler. New things can be said only about what is capable of constant renewal. In England *Pamela* appeared, a novel by Richardson. Who would be able to say anything new about *Pamela*? Certainly not someone who has not read it. (...) Once I glimpsed into it. It must be infernally boring, and the same could be said about the other works of Richardson. (...) 'Who has read Klopstock's *Messiah*?' That question was often asked when I was a young student. Let me confess that I have not read it.

Fortunately such lapses are quite rare. In fact, Babits goes out of his way to define the three perspectives used in his narrative. Works read in the original often receive a stylistic analysis. Such strict scrutiny can be observed in the passages devoted to the author's favourite poets. Similar to Valery or Heidegger, Babits has a strong temptation to regard prose as inferior to poetry. Great prose stylists often seem to have escaped him. The three sentences on Joyce in the final chapter do not go beyond a fairly unoriginal reference to interior monologue, and Fontane or Henry James are not even mentioned. Yet there are some exceptions. "Carlyle is primarily a voice," Babits observes and his characterization of the uniqueness of the language of *Sartor Resartus* is more than apt.

A less careful scrutiny is used in the case of texts inaccessible to the author in the original language. When comparing Byron and Pushkin, he makes the following statement about the Russian author: "my feeling is that he is more authentic than his master, despite the fact that unfortunately I do not know the music of his verse in the original." While it is quite understandable that the readers are frequently warned of the gap between original text and translation, it is somewhat surprising that translators are characterized as useful transmitters and fertilizers rather than artists in their own right, especially in view of the fact that Babits himself was a major translator. The translator is compared to a bee, whereas original works are called flowers. In order to demonstrate his point Babits invokes the example of August Wilhelm Schlegel, a mediocre poet but an extremely influential translator of Shakespeare.

A third narrative modality can be detected in the passages in which Babits admits that he has not read a certain work. This distance is especially felt if the work in question was written in a language known to the author — as in the case of the book entitled *Paroles d'un croyant* by Felicite de Lamennais. The three different perspectives share the idea that history can be written only on the basis of a dialogue between past and present. That explains why generic classification is reinterpreted in the light of later developments. It is suggested, for example, that the odes of Horace could be read as songs in the twentieth century. For the same reason, modernity is treated as a questionable and ambiguous term. The mechanistic materialism of Lucrece was modern yesterday. Today it seems limited and outmoded. When comparing Dante's *Vita nuova* and Boccaccio's *Fiammetta*,

Babits points to the vulnerability of a twentieth-century perspective: "The later work is closer to the taste of the modern reader – which should not be taken as a favourable value judgement." On other occasions it is suggested that the antecedents of later developments do not necessarily correspond to great artistic achievements. "It is by no means true that the good always paves the way for the future." This remark is made about *Manon Lescaut*, which Babits considers to be a conservative novel. "It is certainly true that 'modernity becomes obsolete faster than anything else.' It bears the stamp of the age." Ironically, this generalization applies to some judgements formulated by Babits himself, such as to his claim that in the middle of the nineteenth century the works of Musset seemed to represent modernity, in contrast to those of Tennyson, whereas later the verse of the English poet proved to be of more lasting value. The conclusion is inescapable that comparative value-judgements about works written in different languages are especially vulnerable, and modernity is a matter of perspective: for Taine Musset, for Babits Tennyson seemed to represent it; in our age both authors may seem equally distant.

*The History of European Literature* consists of two halves, which were originally published in separate volumes. The self-contradictions of the work are closely related to this division and testify to the author's growing awareness of the difficulties of writing such a synthetic work. The first half starts with the *Iliad* and ends with the late eighteenth century, whereas the second covers the period between 1760 and "the present age." Babits was perfectly aware of this disproportion. The only explanation he could offer was that the narrator of world literature could not help slowing down when he came to discuss the literature on which he had been brought up.

Narrative rhythm is not the only factor that reveals a shift in focus. Part one starts with Homer, part two with Ossian. In the former timeless aesthetic value, in the latter reception seems to be the governing principle. This dichotomy raises important and difficult theoretical questions. How is it possible to distinguish between interpretation and that which is interpreted? How is the identity of a literary work explained over time? To what extent is the canon of world literature vulnerable to historical changes. The inconsistencies of *The History of European Literature* are closely related to its author's inability to find satisfactory answers to these three questions.

While in the first half of the work the output of a given author is usually treated as a unit, in the second half chronology is observed. Goethe's career is discussed in eight different chapters. Although works are personalized throughout the book in the sense that the status, significance, and value attached to them is bound up with the idea that every poem, play, or novel is the product of a particular individual's compositional activity, in the chapters on the nineteenth-century individual careers are deconstructed for the benefit of emphasizing para-

digm shifts marked by the rise and fall of such movements as Romanticism or Realism.

Today world literature and Hungarian literature are taught as separate subjects in different departments of the Hungarian universities. Babits would be unhappy with such a division. *The History of European Literature* is an attempt to discuss Hungarian literature as an integral part of an international historical process. Insofar as the subject of the work is the image of world literature as it appears to the author, the goal is met; but to the extent that the criterion is international reception, the inconsistency arises that some works are included on the basis of the author's belief in their artistic value. The poetry of Daniel Berzsenyi (1776–1836) is a case in point. "Unlike Byron, Berzsenyi is never turgid; in contrast to Chateaubriand, he is never posing. We Hungarians happen to know a great poet from the years which for others may be associated with the cloak of a Lord and the tie of a 'vicomte.'" Babits felt despair at seeing that Hungarian literature was not known to the rest of the world. His lines about the late poems of Vörösmarty express resignation, perhaps even helplessness: "His last poems are certainly among the greatest achievements of nineteenth-century lyric. Yet they represent a literature 'unknown' to Europe. There can be neither excuse nor consolation for this."

For T. S. Eliot Dante, for Harold Bloom Shakespeare stood in the centre of the Western canon. Babits translated both the *Commedia* and *The Tempest*, yet in *The History of European Literature* he gave more space to the works of Goethe than to those of the two other poets. The chapter entitled "Intermezzo about Goethe" is not only the summary of earlier assessments of the works but also an emphatically subjective homage to the author whose output is the embodiment of world literature in the sense that it is encyclopaedic in genres and sources of inspiration. For Babits Goethe is an author who deserves special attention because he worked within a medium pre-shaped by many traditions.

### 3. The Loss of Narrative Teleology

The study of Goethe's works led Babits to the conclusion that the main challenge to the ideal of a Western canon came from Romanticism. Accordingly, this movement is given a more detailed analysis than any of its counterparts. It is significant that Kleist, an author rejected by Goethe, is presented as one of the most profound exponents of Romanticism, and special emphasis is placed on his poem *Germania an ihre Kinder*. Babits observes,

it is a frightening poem, and unfortunate is the people which includes it in the curriculum. Are we still within 'European' literature? Undoubtedly, it is inseparable from Europe. Nationalism, the intellectual cur-

rent that not only tolerates but even produces such voices, is definitely European. It is not the property of Germans, since it was born elsewhere. It is a European trend, although it divided the European spirit and may succeed in breaking it into tiny and barbaric national 'cultures,' Yet the poet who represented this frightening trend with so much barbaric sincerity should not be blamed, for he stood for Europe.

Romanticism for Babits is a term to be evaluated heuristically, one that is inseparable from the paradoxical nature of history. He seems critical of the antiquated concepts of periodization and influence, never falls prey to the aberration of calling certain authors more or less "Romantic," and refuses to accept the idea of an eternal clash between Classical ideals and their Romantic rejection, in sharp contrast to his "Geistesgeschichte" contemporaries. "To break free from Classicism, we have to turn to the Classics," he wrote. Another remarkable feature of the chapters on the nineteenth century is that Realism is not defined as a reaction against Romanticism. Instead, a gradual transformation is described, a shift from the local colour of the distant to that of the familiar. While Romanticism is characterized as a movement inspired by the tension between the cult of local values and the universal characteristics of the imagination, Realism is called a more one-sided trend that undermined the unity of European culture. "Realism was one of the causes of the gradual disintegration of European literature into separate national literatures. An emphasis on local colour and partial truth may easily lead to division and national selfishness."

This change seems counterbalanced by another teleological process leading to the cult of *l'art pour l'art*. This development makes it possible for Babits to condemn sentimentalism in Dickens, didacticism in George Eliot, Tolstoy, and even Dostoyevski. While trying to sustain the illusion that towards the end of the nineteenth century literature was moving in a specific direction, Babits cannot help realizing that this preconception could easily result in the exclusion of significant works. "How deeply divided the leading intellectuals had become!" he exclaims. Afraid of getting lost in details, he decides to discuss the major works published in the 1870s strictly observing their chronological order. The conclusion of this long chapter is that Naturalism seemed to be decisive in the short term but its opponents proved to be the winners in the end. Still, he is not quite satisfied with this solution, as is clear from the opening of the next chapter:

History as history cannot be continued from this stage. It is no longer unified. Is it possible that our lack of perspective makes it chaotic? Literature is a matter requiring some distance. In its absence only individual works are perceptible.

The history of European literature is related in the form of the narrative of a journey. At the end of this journey Babits noted that texts are not literature as

such, they can only become literary works. What is close in time can be described only in a very subjective manner.

When I started reading, Naturalism was triumphant. Attempts at a revival of the Romantic legacy were not yet known to us. (...) One of the characteristic writers of the age was Maupassant (...). Although I was only eleven years old when he died, I read his short-story collections as the embodiment of what was 'contemporary.'

In some respects, this subjective interpretation seems highly relevant today. The analysis of an immense dialogue between Tolstoy and Nietzsche, for instance reveals that Babits had exceptional insight when reading authors of the later nineteenth century. In other respects, however, the last chapters of his work confirm the truth of his conclusion that contemporary literature might be a self-contradictory concept. Swinburne's works are given a more detailed analysis than those of Mallarmé. While Anatole France, Oscar Wilde, and G. B. Shaw are overrated, and although his brother's works were read by Babits in his formative years, Henry James is not even mentioned. Although none of those born after 1880 – Martin du Gard, Joyce, Woolf, Giraudoux, François Mauriac, Julien Green, Malraux – could be called insignificant, the treatment of the early twentieth century is sketchy. Except for the derogatory allusion to Dada at the beginning of the work, and an equally off-hand mention of "erratic experiments" in the final section, avant-garde movements are excluded and the literatures of the Americas and the smaller European nations are ignored. The New World is represented only by Washington Irving, Emerson, Thoreau, Longfellow, Poe, and Whitman – Dickinson is merely glossed over in the penultimate paragraph among those regretfully left out. No twentieth-century Spanish or Latin American author is discussed, and Sienkiewicz is the only non-Russian Slav whose name appears in the book. His disregard for such writers as Unamuno, Kafka, Reymont, and Faulkner is as surprising as the exclusion of the ancient Chinese and Japanese poets and the representatives of Futurism and Expressionism, since the works of all these authors had been translated into Hungarian by his contemporaries.

Still, such weaknesses are probably found in the final chapter of most, if not all, literary histories. Given the scope of the book, *The History of European Literature* has to be regarded as one of the pioneering attempts at a synthetic approach to the Western canon. The shift from a Platonic concept of immanent aesthetic values to a profoundly historical view is the result of a serious inquiry into the workings of literature. The distinction between timeless values and reception, or the shift from the former to the latter, is by no means a simple polarity or a sharp antithesis. One thinks of it as a passage, transition, or transformation rather than as a sheer opposition. Although the narrative is based on a chronological sequence, it would be erroneous to believe that Babits equates history with linearity. As he constantly reminds his reader the major poet lives not in the present

but in the past and the future. He avoids not only the naive Platonism to be found in the works of such interpreters of European literature as Curtius but also the temptation of subordinating literature to history. Such moments of recognition as between Homer and Virgil, Virgil and Dante, or Dante and Goethe are retrospectively reinterpreted as central articulations in the history of literature. Unlike his contemporary Dezső Kosztolányi – who endorsed a more open concept of literature but assumed that literary works stood by themselves and could be examined in isolation – Babits associated literariness with intertextual relations. Goethe is in the centre of his canon because the author of *Faust* never ceased to recognize himself for what he was in relation to his precursors and opened new territory, which was to be conquered by other poets than himself. Historicity turns out to be a characteristic innate to literature, which has nothing to do with political events. *Weltgeschichte* and *Weltliteratur* are equal parts in a dialogue of great complexity. The relationship between them is both a discontinuity and a continuity. The end of the passage on Chénier can be taken as a clue to understanding the methodological importance of *The History of European Literature*:

His rhymes, and the modality of his verse, had more influence on the future of Poetry than the World Catastrophe which cut his life short. (...) Literature, as organic life, has an inner logic that cannot be broken by any crisis. (...) Those who try to explain literary phenomena with reference to contemporary events are mistaken.

*The History of European Literature* is a spiritual journey. Its starting point is a Platonic belief in the timelessness of aesthetic values; its end is an acceptance of mutability as a consequence of an unfinished dialogue between past and present. In the first half the guiding principle may remind one of what E. H. Gombrich represented in art history in recent decades, when he maintained that the “history of art (...) is rightly considered to be the history of masterpieces,”<sup>1</sup> while in the second half it is admitted that certain works that once seemed unquestionably significant, later proved to have no lasting value. The supremacy of creative activity has been replaced by that of reception. The example of Macpherson has led Babits to the insight that the notion of the canon rests on the definition of the literary work as fixed for all of time. In contrast to such countries as Russia, Bohemia, or the United States, Hungary had no school of textual analysis in the early twentieth century, and this absence made it relatively easy for Babits to reject the idea that the work-concept was fixed. The assumption underlying the later chapters of *The History of European Literature* is that it cannot be argued that literary works, once created, are fully formed and permanently existing entities, unchanging continuants, since the meaning of a work of verbal art is to be found in its interpretive experiences. Once an essentialist concept of literature appears vulnerable and canonic status seems a matter of perspective (the result

of temporal process), the canonic work has to be regarded as an ontological mutant that cannot be viewed as existing outside history. Although *The History of European Literature* has undeniable weaknesses, lacunae, and idiosyncrasies, a shift to a contextual view of the literary work and a questioning of the permanence of the canon in the later chapters of the book are worthy of consideration in so far as they anticipate a thesis formulated in more recent decades. "Despite its irresistible tendency toward canon formation," Paul de Man wrote in 1981, "literature is noncanonical, the critique or, if you wish, the deconstruction of canonical models."<sup>2</sup>

#### Notes

1. E. H. Gombrich, *Ideas and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art* (Oxford: Phaidon, 1979), 152.
2. Paul de Man, *Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 191.



# HUNGARIAN SCHOLARSHIP IN LITERATURE

ENIKŐ MOLNÁR BASA

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Hungarians are well aware of the contributions made by Hungary and individual Hungarians to European, or Western culture. On the occasion of the millennium this theme was touched on again and again in the celebrations in the United States. While any quick list will identify greats in music (Liszt, Kodály, Bartók), in the arts (Kertész, Vasarely, Munkácsi), the physical sciences (Simmelweis, Kandó, Kemény, Szent-Györgyi, Wiegner, Newman) and even the social sciences (economist John C. Harsányi and Dennis Gábor, a pioneer of communication theory), Hungarian contributions in literature are less obvious. Georg Lukács of course comes to mind, but while his theories were often applied in literary analysis, he is really more of a political and social philosopher than a literary theoretician. The disciplines just mentioned cross political and linguistic barriers easily. With other disciplines, especially literature, this is not the case. Yet, Hungary has made important contributions to scholarship in this area also.

Werner Friederich in his *Outline of Comparative Literature* comments that in spreading the Italian culture of the Renaissance, "Of almost equally great importance for Eastern Europe [equal to Francis I of France and Marguerite of Navarre] was King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary who, around 1480, made Budapest [sic] the Danubian center of Italian Humanism."<sup>1</sup> What this meant for European culture is suggested by visitors to Hungary and comments on Matthias court long after his death. His library has remained famous, though its integrity did not long survive the king. He also patronized the printing press: the first press was set up in Buda in 1472 by Andreas Hess. In 1473 Hess printed *The Hungarian Chronicle*, thus predating the first English book to be published by Caxton. Foreign visitors at the court, notably Bonfini and Galeotto, ensured that Buda was more than just a distant outpost of the Renaissance. Janus Pannonius (1434–1472) was "one of the better known figures of Humanist poetry in Europe."<sup>2</sup> In the sixteenth century János Zsámboky, or Sambucus (1531–1584), was similarly recognized as a European philologist, poet, and historian. Since there was no longer a court at Buda, he settled in Vienna and so is associated with the Habsburg court. His book of poems, *Emblemata* (1564), made him one of the foremost figures in this literary fashion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The influence of his work on Shakespeare has been noted.<sup>3</sup> Of equal importance were his editions of classical works, the works of Janus Pannonius,

and those of various Hungarian chroniclers. These allowed at least his contemporaries a glimpse into Hungarian history and letters.

The renown of Hungarian scholars in early modern Europe is also represented by Stephen Parmenius of Buda. While only one of the many Hungarians who studied at Western European universities, or spent time in Western European centers of learning, he is notable for his Latin poem on the achievements of Sir Humphrey Gilbert and English explorers in the Age of Elizabeth, *De Navigatione*. Respected by his contemporaries, he unfortunately drowned off Newfoundland and did not write the epic commemoration of the colonization attempt of Raleigh and Gilbert that he had hoped to do. The comment on his death serves as one of the first “might have beens” of Hungarian influence on English letters. A companion who survived, Edward Hayes, paid tribute to him with these words:

Amongst whom was drowned a learned man, an Hungarian, borne in the citie of Buda, called thereof Budaeus, who of pietie and zeale to good attempts, adventured in this action, minding to record in the Latin tongue, the gests and things of our nation, the same being adorned with the eloquent stile of this Orator, and rare Poet of our time.<sup>4</sup>

The seventeenth century yielded fewer names of European repute. While Miklós Zrínyi, the poet (1620–1664), was a popular figure – as was his ancestor, the hero of Szigetvár – it was his military prowess not his literary skills that brought him fame. Miklós Tótfalusi Kis (1650–1702) is maybe the first of the technocrats to contribute to European scholarship. A preacher and printer from Kolozsvár, he spent time in Amsterdam and became an excellent designer of type: the so-called Jansen type is his legacy to modern type faces.

Matthias had put Hungary on the literary and cultural map of Renaissance and Baroque Europe. Continuity of the tradition of scholarly exchanges, however, was prevented by the fall of Hungary to the Turks and Austrian domination in the succeeding centuries. So in examining our topic we must look at other criteria. The emphasis shifts. George Biztray in his essay on Babits in *A Journey into History* writes, “Babits was one of those outstanding Hungarians who made his nation realize that it, too, was a guardian of traditional classical values as a distant but fully European nook of the continent, and a former Roman colony later Christianized, thereby preserving the continuity of its historical heritage.”<sup>5</sup> It is a paradigm that I will examine in the rest of this paper. Hungarian literature has remained in touch with European trends and practice, though often giving it a unique – or maybe characteristic – twist. For example, Virginia L. Lewis’ study, “The Other Face of Modernization: the Collapse of Rural Society in East Central European Realism and Naturalism,” argues, as she has done elsewhere, that “nation” centered literary discussion relegates important works to a marginal role. Just as Austrian, Swiss, and even East German literatures have been rele-

gated to footnotes of German literature and the representatives of these literatures have been considered marginal, Hungarian literary movements have not been recognized as part of the mainstream of European literature.<sup>6</sup>

Taking a positive spin on this, we should note that just such a difference of interpretation can contribute valuable insights to the understanding of European literary trends. (Need one digress to note the applicability of this principle in the discussion of the model literary cannon, the place of third world literatures in the literary tradition, the synthesis of old cultures (India, Japan, China) with twentieth and twenty-first century world literature? Do we need to reexamine just what comprises world literature?) When writers or critics do become aware of Hungarian literature, it captures their imagination. And it does so precisely because Hungarian literature presents a fresh interpretation of genres, themes and ideas familiar to these critics.

A chronological examination will show that the Renaissance period in Hungary (and East-Central Europe) had much in common with the themes familiar in the literatures of England and Germany. But folklore and folk poetry had maybe a stronger influence here. Or maybe we should say that this tradition had a more immediate impact than in Western Europe. L. Sziklay makes just this point in "The 'Popular' Trend in the Romantic Literature of Some Central-European Nations." He points out that in both Hungarian and the Slavic Central European tradition, the folk literature discovered in the nineteenth century was based on the literary traditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, there was much less questioning of the role and value of folk poetry, much less of a struggle between learned and folk than in England and France.

The Hungarian song emerged as the amalgam of European (world literary) and home traditions, developing from Csokonai through the Kisfaludy brothers, Kölcsey, Vörösmarty, Czuczor, the Slovene Prešeren, the Serbian Radičević, the Rumanian Alecsandri, the Czech Čelakovský, Erben, Mácha — right up to the Hungarian Petőfi.<sup>7</sup>

Epic poetry also owes much to the so-called folk tradition in Hungary, which in many instances is a reflection of Renaissance and Baroque works. Arany, in seeking to create the Hungarian national epic, went back not so much to folk poetry as to this earlier tradition which in the nineteenth century was generally forgotten. He used chronicles, the heritage of narrative poetry, especially Ilosvay, popularized accounts in prose chapbooks, and oral tradition for his *Toldi*. Chronicles and historical accounts are perhaps more important in *Buda halála*. The point is that, while following some European conventions of the epic, he went to *both* folk tradition and Renaissance literary remnants to mold the new literature of Hungary. Vörösmarty was more rooted in the Sturm und Drang of Pre-Romanticism, and Petőfi much more in contemporary folkloristic and lyrical traditions.

In modern literature Ágnes Nemes Nagy and her translator Hugh Maxton can shed light on this same interplay of western influences and Hungarian expression. In the introduction to *Between* Nemes Nagy writes:

The poems which follow were written by a Hungarian poet. This means that they were born in a rather special medium, that of Hungarian poetry. For though I consider world poetry today more or less uniform, I am nevertheless aware that the poetry of the various nations or groups of poets may be regarded as separate dialects of this uniform, universal language of poetry. Nothing is further from my mind than to theorize about the history of literature; I simply wish to make two observations about Hungarian poetry as a whole. The first is that Hungarian poetry – may God forgive me for the word – is *important*.<sup>8</sup>

In her belief that there is a “universal language of poetry” of which national manifestations are merely dialects, Nemes Nagy argues that Hungarian literature, or at least poetry, is part of the heritage of the world. Of course, the problem of linguistic inaccessibility remains, and translations can only partially solve this. But we have to look at literature as a whole. We should be less concerned with periodization, influences, and receptions, or when and how styles and -isms migrated from country to country. Maybe then we will gain a perspective from which universal values can be seen in all literary productions.

She goes on to argue that while the difficulty of the Hungarian language, its isolation, and the challenges of translation are problems in making Hungarian part of the mainstream of world literature, there is also a positive side:

Every language is unique, the Hungarian language is even more unique... As a poet, however, I am not always rejoicing. The Hungarian language is isolated, the Hungarian language means certain death in world literature. But the Hungarian language lends itself extremely well to poetry. If I were to make a paradoxical argument in favour of this daring opinion, I would insist that Hungarian is so well suited to poetry *precisely because* it is isolated, because its existence in world literature is perilous, because a certain kind of hopelessness is part of its essence – which, of course, means hope *vis-à-vis* the ultimate problems of mankind, the constant, centuries (millennia) old experience of living through extreme existential situations.<sup>9</sup>

Ágnes Nemes Nagy’s translator, Hugh Maxton supports her contention that Hungarian literature is part of the universal language of poetry:

For all its isolation from neighboring languages, Hungarian is in this one important regard peculiarly a language of European romanticism, and this generates a tension in the work of such writers as Ágnes Nemes Nagy who are, in their broad literary philosophy, clas-

sicists or modernist/classicists. Perhaps Henrik Ibsen offers a compatible instance of a writer working through a relatively new literary language to achieve a poetic vision at some odds with the energies which led to the renewal of the language.<sup>10</sup>

Often whether a particular writer becomes known abroad is an accident of a fortuitous translation, a favorable political situation, or a publisher willing to gamble on an unknown and give it sufficient publicity to make an impact. As I pointed out in my introductory essay to *Hungarian Literature*,

When Hungarian literature is examined apart from its momentary political role, the universal values it addresses might be noticed. Such an approach would finally ensure a fairer evaluation, whether of the classics or of modern writers. I would not hesitate to call Zrínyi, Petőfi, Arany, and Ady great in the large context of world literature; and Illyés, Csoóri, and Sütő great in contemporary terms: their works address universal problems such as the individual versus the state, loss of identity, the role of the community, the responsibility of the individual to the modern world, the contribution of minorities to national and international cultures, and so on.<sup>11</sup>

The translator of János Pilinszky's *Selected Poems*, Ted Hughes, also appreciates the international impact of his subject. As he writes in the preface, the publication of Pilinszky's second volume of poems in 1959, a total of about fifty-two,

have gradually established his international reputation. It was recognized, from the start, that he spoke from the disaster-core of the modern world. ... Pilinszky's poetry proves itself to be almost a religious activity. Once we have said that, though, we realize it is also a by-product. The chief task is something else, an attitude, and more than that, a sustained commitment to certain loyalties, which involve Pilinszky's whole life at every moment. And it is true, his personality and his life are as exemplary, for Hungarians, as his poems: they are a single fabric. This insistence of Pilinszky's on paying for his words with his whole way of life, has confirmed the authority of his poems. And this is how they come to be an existential challenge to all who are deeply drawn into them.<sup>12</sup>

Such testimony attests to the role of Hungarian literature as a re interpretation of literary genres, themes, and ideas. Citing Maxton again, who is referring to Nemes Nagy but whose comment could be applied to other Hungarian writers as well:

Nemes Nagy remains a central figure in Hungarian writing through such persistent loyalty to responsibilities inherited from her predecessors and heightened by the undifferentiated terrorism of the fascist and post-fascist period. In terms of European literary history,

Thomas Mann provides the best measure for Anglophobe readers, Rilke also perhaps for German readers. In more local terms of literary technique, her prose poems bring her into contact with such figures of the new generation of Hungarian writers as Péter Esterházy whose collected fictions are called, simply, *Introductions to Literature*. She is thus both classicist and avant-garde for her informed readers, a latter-day modernist of great sensibility and intelligence.<sup>13</sup>

His reference to Thomas Mann and Rilke indicates that Hungarian literature should be seen as a new window on other literatures, not just a peripheral comment on them.

Hungarian literature has influenced other literatures directly, though the instances are rare. In the early nineteenth century Theodor Körner turned to the exploits of Zrínyi to inspire the Germans during the Napoleonic wars. His drama falls short of the *Szigeti veszedelem*. The thematic connection, however, put Miklós Zrínyi's work on the map. Similarly, Franz Grillparzer borrowed Hungarian history in his *Ein Treuer Diener Seines Herrn* but created a drama that lacked the national elements of Katona's work. His is a psychological study of loyalty. With even greater generalizations, literary critics often dismiss Petőfi as a populist writer, one who used folkloric elements to good effect, but was essentially an untutored writer of the Romantic era. The truth of course is that Petőfi was a complex poet whose intellectual and philosophical range should be compared to poets such as Wordsworth, Byron, or Shelley. His interpretation of Romantic poetry is certainly more varied than that of Robert Burns, with whom he is often compared. As George Bisztray argues in his essay, *Two Homelands: Mihály Babits and European Consciousness in Modern Hungarian Literature*, Babits

thought that the national value of any literature was in direct relation to its uniqueness, while its value for world literature was, paradoxically, in converse relation to the same. Consequently, certain cherished values of Hungarian literature had no relevance to world literature. Babits mentioned patriotism as an example: an idea worshipped by Hungarian authors and readers in the spirit of Greek and Roman literature as an expression of universal human feelings and rights; while in modern world literature patriotism was but a shallow phrase.<sup>14</sup>

Perspective plays an important part in the assessment of the literary value of a work or of the style, themes, and concerns which characterize a literature. As Babits suggested, it can condemn works to misinterpretation before the critic is able to approach the work without bias. Lack of translation hinders not only the interested reader; it closes off large areas of the literary spectrum from serious students also. Comparative studies, as Anne Paolucci pointed out in her introduction to the Council of National Literatures volume on Hungary, "includes

[besides *emergent* and *neglected* literatures], a third category of literatures generally ranked as *established*. Established literatures provide the standard in comparison with which other literatures get to be ranked as emergent or neglected."<sup>15</sup> But, this ranking is slanted in favor of the major Western European language and literatures, ranking as "emergent" not only the literature of Hungary but that of China, India, and Japan as well. Frank J. Warnke recognized that perhaps by limiting its attention to seven or so major languages (English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, Italian, and Russian) it is the Western European critics who "suffer from provincialism. Are we missing something, perhaps quite a lot?" he asks.<sup>16</sup>

The recognition of this problem of perspective by more and more literary scholars leads one to hope that Hungarian literature can enter as a more equal partner in the dialogue of comparative literature. The tools are not lacking, and these tools can enable students to gain familiarity with Hungarian literature so as to insure its inclusion in world literature surveys or to broaden parallels and comparative aspects dealing with other literary areas.<sup>17</sup> A list would be long and terribly boring, so in conclusion I will highlight only a few significant works which serve to mark the recognition of Hungarian literature in scholarly circles. Though now somewhat out of date, Albert Tezla's two important books, *An Introductory Bibliography to the Study of Hungarian Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) and *Hungarian Authors: a Bibliographical Handbook* (Cambridge: Bellnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), have not been superseded. They not only provide very useful annotations, but also indicate the libraries where the works are held. Several appendices increase the usefulness of the second work: brief descriptions of literary and learned societies and of the serials mentioned in the biographical sketches give histories of the institutions and periodicals that have shaped Hungarian literary life. Then there are bibliographies that give access to English-language materials. These are useful, since often translations appear in small press publications, or are printed by private individuals or foundations; seldom do large publishing houses consider such works sufficiently lucrative to publish them. Magda Czigány's *Hungarian Literature in English Translation Published in Great Britain 1830–1968* (London: Szepsi Csombor Literary Circle, 1969) and *Magyarországi irodalom idegen nyelven: a hazai szépirodalom fordításainak bibliográfiája, 1945–1968* by Magda Fajcsek and Mrs. Zoltán Szilvássy (Budapest: Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, 1975) are worth consulting, though again newer works are needed.

In journals, *World Literature Today* has long been a champion of "neglected" literatures and has not only regularly reviewed publications but also carries articles on individual literary figures or trends. The *Bibliography* of the Modern Language Association has increased its coverage of Hungarian literature also and its on-line bibliography identifies an impressive number of hits on Hungarian literature. Still, many journals, particularly those published in Hungarian, go unno-

ticed even though listed as being reviewed. Until it stopped publication, *Books from Hungary*, the quarterly journal of the Hungarian Publishers and Booksellers Association, carried annotations on recent publications in English, French, and German, and brief articles on selections of popular literature. Unfortunately, there never was a comprehensive index, so its usefulness was limited to information on the most recent publications. Maybe the most useful bibliography for literature, language, history, ethnography, and folklore is the *Hungarológiai Értésítő* of the Nemzetközi Magyar Filológiai Társaság published semiannually. It provides what is possibly the broadest coverage in terms of journals surveyed: over 13 pages in the title list. Many European journals are included, both from the states neighboring Hungary with substantial Hungarian minorities and from Western Europe. But among English-language publications, only *World Literature Today* is reviewed.

Turning to literary histories, a translation of the *Kis magyar irodalomtörténet* by Tibor Klaniczay, József Szauder, and Miklós Szabolcsi was published as *History of Hungarian Literature* (London: Collet, 1964). Unfortunately, the work is far too general and too ideologically committed to make much of an impact on Western literary analysis. Two other works, both almost double in length of the above, were intended to fill the ever-increasingly felt need for a definitive history of Hungarian literature. Neither fulfills this mission, though if read together, they can give a fairly accurate picture. The *Oxford History of Hungarian Literature from the Earliest Times to the Present* by Lóránt Czigány dismisses all literary activity up to the 18th century in some 80 pages out of a text of four-hundred and eighty-four. The lack of proportion, even the absence of certain important authors, remains a limiting feature. It also lacks a unified critical view which hampers the work. The inclusion of Hungarian writers living in the West is a useful feature, but with barely seven pages, the information is sketchy and incomplete. *A History of Hungarian Literature* by István Nemeskürty, et al. (Budapest: Corvina, 1982) is somewhat more popularizing than scholarly in its style and concerns, but it does cover all of Hungarian literature, not ignoring the earlier periods to concentrate on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It does not, however, include the literature of the Hungarians in the former Hungarian territories, or Hungarian literature produced in the West. On the other hand, it is, as H. H. Remak characterized it in the Preface, "a lively, direct, clear, and rich introduction to the literary facet of a noteworthy culture." The bibliography is particularly useful in that it includes English translations. The general sections have the breadth one would expect from such a work, but what is a particularly nice feature is a section on comparative aspects of Hungarian and European or American literature, and the interactions of individual authors with Western literature. A very full index and many portraits in the appendix complement the work nicely.

Better represented in English language works than Hungarian literary history are special topics. József Reményi's *Hungarian Writers and Literature* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964) is a collection of essays on individual writers and themes. Most of the essays were written for periodicals and they are fairly general and somewhat more popular than scholarly. While again concentrating on the twentieth century, an extensive bibliography which includes periodical articles as well as monographs adds to its usefulness. David Mervyn Jones' *Five Hungarian Writers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) is an excellent study of five major authors: Sándor Petőfi, József Eötvös, Kelemen Mikes, Mihály Vörösmarty, and Miklós Zrínyi. With the exception of Petőfi, these men are hardly known in the English world, and certainly there has been very little written on them. The praiseworthy project that Twayne Publishers began in 1974 could have led to a series of monographic studies on the major Hungarian authors; unfortunately, only a few appeared before the publisher decided to terminate his commitment in favor of more profitable ventures. The ones that did appear are: *Kálmán Mikszáth* by Steven C. Scheer (Boston, 1977); *Mihály Vitéz Csokonai* by Anna Katona, *Ferenc Molnár* by Clara Györgyey, and *Sándor Petőfi* by Enikő Molnár Basa, all in 1980, and *Imre Madách* by Dieter Lotze in 1981. Two other volumes, on *Miklós Radnóti* by Marianne Birnbaum, and on *Dezső Kosztolányi* by Dalma and Stephen Brunauer, were accepted, but not published. Fortunately, the *Uralaltaische Jahrbücher of Munich* published both manuscripts upon Twayne's default, so these volumes are also available. Since the purpose of the Twayne series is to introduce the non-professionals to little-known literatures, each volume is designed as a critical introduction, supplemented only by the necessary bibliographical, cultural, and historical background. These are not intended as definitive studies of any one author. A bibliography ensures the usefulness of the studies beyond the mere introductory function, however.

In the past few years, various compilations have included Hungarian literature in their repertory. The *Critical Survey of Poetry: Foreign Language Series*, edited by Frank N. Magill (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Salem Press, 1984) includes essays on Hungarian poetry and some individual authors. Regrettably, there is some unevenness in the essays, which stricter editorial supervision could have helped. What is more disturbing is that uninformed copy-editing led to essential passages being omitted. A brief bibliography is included for each poet, and thus some Hungarian writers who would otherwise remain quite unknown are introduced to the English reader. A significant contribution has been made by the series *World Authors* (New York: H. W. Wilson). The first volume covered 1950–1970; subsequent volumes cover five years each and present several significant modern writers whose works are available in English translation. Although many writers have appeared in the several volumes that have been published so far, the requirement that each author have work published in English translation has restricted the number of Hungarian writers who can be considered; I have been

unable to propose new ones for the forthcoming volume. The essays take the authors' own works as the starting point, and a bibliography leads the reader to further sources. The similar series, *European Authors, 1000–1900* and *Twentieth Century Authors* devote essays to classical authors. Mention should also be made of *World Literature since 1945*, edited by Ivar Ivask and Gero von Wilpert (New York: F. Unger, 1973), which contains a survey of Hungarian literature.

The Gale series, *Twentieth Century Literary Criticism* (Detroit, 1981–) ranges widely in English critical literature to present a collection of essays, or excerpts from longer studies, on several major writers – Ady, Babits, József, Radnóti, Mikszáth and Móricz among them – as well as devoting a substantial section to Hungarian literature in general. The purpose of the series is to give a biographical-critical introduction to the writer; since the essays cover essentially the same ground from different perspectives, they can be very useful. Specific periods in Hungarian literature have recently received attention: Marianne Birnbaum's essay, "Humanism in Hungary" in *Renaissance Humanism, Foundations, Forms, Legacy*, edited by Albert Rabil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988) places the early Hungarian Renaissance in context. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich's *Romanticism in National Context* (Cambridge University Press, 1988) gives space to Mihály Szegedy-Maszák's essay, "Romanticism in Hungary." The dominant concern of Hungarian literature for most of the modern period is addressed by George F. Cushing in "Social Criticism in Hungarian Literature since 1956" in *Perspectives on Literature and Society in Eastern and Western Europe*, edited by Geoffrey A. Hasking and G.F. Cushing (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). Women writers are represented in two recent anthologies. Suzanne Fónay Wemple wrote on Lea Ráskay in *Women Writers of the Renaissance and Reformation* and Enikő Molnár Basa on Kata Szidonia Petrőczy in *Women Writers of the Seventeenth Century*.<sup>18</sup> The format of these volumes calls for a brief biographical-critical introduction followed by a selection of translations from the work of the writer being discussed.

In conclusion, then, we can say that there have been contributions to scholarship in Hungarian literature on various levels. Hungary and Hungarians have made significant contributions to literary study and history. Critics have been sensitive to comparisons and writers have been receptive to influences. Both have shed light on generally accepted values, genres, and themes from a unique perspective. It is time for some of these works to be more widely known, and particularly for more texts to be available in good translations so that the interplay of contexts can truly be two-way.

## Notes

1. Werner P. Friederich, *Outline of Comparative Literature from Dante Alighieri to Eugene O'Neill* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 52.
2. Lóránt Czigány, *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 28.
3. Lajos Dézsi, "Magyar irodalmi hatás Shakespeare költészetében", *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 21 (1929): 235–242. Other studies of Hungarian references in Renaissance drama are to be found in: Lajos Bodrogi, "Shakespeare mirőlünk," in *Magyar Shakespeare Tár*, ed. Zoltán Ferenczi (Budapest, F. Kilián, 1908–1916?) 1 (1908), 178–209, and Fest, *op. cit.* "Mit tud a Shakespeare-korabeli angol irodalom Magyarországról?" 6 (1913), 168–182; "Adalékok a Shakespeare-korabeli irodalom magyar vonatkozásairól," 9 (1916), 282–283; and two other articles by Fest: "Magyar vonatkozások Ben Jonson műveiben," *Egyetemes Philológiai Közöny*, 37 (1913): 206–208, and "Magyar vonatkozások Marlowe drámáiban," *Irodalomtörténet*, 1 (1912): 117–119; László Országh, "Magyar tárgyú angol renaissance-drámák," *Egyetemes Philológiai Közöny*, 67 (1943): 405–411; Eugene Pivány, "Hungarians of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Literature," *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, 2 (1937): 83–92.
4. David B. Quinn, *Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*, 2 vols. (1940; rpt. Nedeln, Liechtenstein, Kraus Reprint, 1967), 413.
5. Moses M. Nagy, ed., *A Journey into History: Essays on Hungarian Literature* (New York: P. Lang, c1990) (American University Studies), 158.
6. Virginia L. Lewis, "The Other Face of Modernization: the Collapse of Rural Society in East Central European Realism and Naturalism," *Neohelicon*, v. 22, no. 2 (1995): 223–225.
7. *European Romanticism* ed. I. Sötér and I. Neupokoyeva. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977), 329–330.
8. Ágnes Nemes Nagy, *Between; Selected Poems of Ágnes Nemes Nagy*, translated by Hugh Maxton. (Budapest: Corvina; Dublin: Dedalus, c1988), 7.
9. *Ibid.*, 8
10. *Ibid.*, 80–81.
11. *Hungarian Literature*, Enikő Molnár Basa, ed. Review of National Literatures, v. 17. (New York: Griffon House Publications, c1993), 30.
12. János Pilinszky, *Selected Poems*, translated by Ted Hughes and János Csokits. (Manchester: Carcanet New Press, c1976), 9, 12.
13. Nemes Nagy, 90–91.
14. Moses Nagy, (*op. cit.*) 150.
15. *Hungarian Literature*, 12–13.
16. *Ibid.*, 14–15.
17. *Ibid.*, 136–137.
18. Both books are edited by Katharina M. Wilson, the second with Frank J. Warnke, and published by the University of Georgia Press, Athens and London, in 1987 and 1989 respectively.



# THE POETRY OF ATTILA JÓZSEF IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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Poetry is what gets left out in translation. (Robert Frost)

The translation of literature is a balancing act, an attempt to establish an equilibrium between the desire for faithfulness to an original and the necessity of creating something idiomatic and convincing in its own right in the target language. Such balance is hard to attain, and the result of any attempt to do so, regardless of whether the attempt succeeds, is necessarily a new original. Even the most slavishly literal scholarly translation of a text is a new text, one that did not exist before, and not simply a version of, or variation on, its antecedent. The translator's job is made more difficult when the original itself, whether by design or default, is vague or inaccessible, or both. Since obscurity is a fixture in much poetry, it is genre that consistently poses the greatest challenge to the translator. After all, poetry is unique in the emphasis it places on compression and sometimes, as a result, on ambiguity.

Though the pronouncement quoted above (a now legendary piece of Frostiana, full of his typical, impish, Yankee humor) could easily serve as an example of casual reductionism, it does reflect something basic to the nature of poetry and translation, and of the relationship between the two. Certainly, many poets, even some who translate (or translated) copiously, have come to a conclusion similar to Frost's. The early twentieth century Hungarian poet, essayist and fiction writer, Dezső Kosztolányi, for example, translated much and well from many languages, despite his conviction that translation is essentially impossible. There is a certain ambivalence, characteristic of many who try to translate poetry, that comes of seeing clearly the nature of the work at hand. It is a difficult endeavor, and one which regularly culminates in a flawed and imbalanced compromise only. It should be no surprise, then, that good translation of poetry are hard to find. It follows also from the same argument that mediocre and outright bad translations should abound. As a matter of fact, they do, and their publication is sometimes even received with critical acclaim.

Peter Hargitai's selection of translations from the poems of the Hungarian poet, Attila József (1905–1937), brings together 40 poems, along with the poet's "Curriculum Vitae," a document famous in his own country, and a short intro-

duction by David Kirby. Illustrated by Elizabeth Woodsmall, the book has generally been praised by critics (including the American poets, Donald Justice and May Swenson) and received the 1988 Landon Translation Prize from the Academy of American Poets. Hargitai, an American of Hungarian origin, is himself a published poet, and brings to the task a knowledge of Hungarian sufficient at least to translate József more or less on his own, without the aid of a literal translation. While there is no fail-safe set of criteria that enables one person to translate poetry well and relegates another to the ranks of the second-rate, a grasp of the target language is an obvious *sine qua non* in the field, as is the ability to write a poem in that language. Many have done well without it, but a knowledge of the language of the original also clearly helps the translator. In his possession of all these skills, Hargitai on paper is a translator full of promise.

The volume begins with "Curriculum Vitae," a spare, poignant account of József's life, which includes the story of his expulsion from Szeged University, and which he wrote in 1937, the year he committed suicide by throwing himself under a train at Balatonszárszó in western Hungary.

Though he wrote it ostensibly only with the intention of using it to find a job, József put so much of himself and his view of the world into the plain, cold facts of the C. V., that since his death it has taken on the significance of autobiography. It reveals too much of certain controversial episodes in his life ever to have been much use to József in getting work. Still, it is a great piece of short prose, a type of consolation or apology, and if not remarkable stylistically, it is certainly striking in its urgency and candor. Hargitai's translation of "Curriculum Vitae" is readable and accurate on the whole, though somewhat shaky in one or two places. One passage, for example, which Hargitai translates as "I had stopped studying and going to lectures but I still knew my lessons," should in fact read: "I did not study, because I understood the lessons after hearing the teachers' explanations of them." This sort of misunderstanding of the original may not drastically impair Hargitai's prose text, but it does not bode well for his translations of József's poems. Sadly, this presentiment is borne out by a closer reading of these translations, which are quirky in places (as are József's poems, though unfortunately not in the same way or the same places) and patchy in others, and fail largely to imitate the metrical structure of their counterparts in József's work. More importantly, they fail with few exceptions as poems in English, and are thus caught in that no-man's-land between languages into which so much translation of poetry slips.

The first poem in the collection, "Strength Song," is an early piece, and though not one of József's most famous, it does represent well an element common to his work, a sort of tragic-heroic pose more fully developed in two later poems, one which Hargitai does not translate here and another which does appear in this collection under the title, "With All My Heart" (though "With a Pure Heart" would be a more literal rendering of the Hungarian). "Strength Song" is a

lyric of 15 lines, for some reason reduced to 12 in Hargitai's treatment, apparently due largely to a series of misreadings and omissions on the translator's part. For example, three lines which in the original (in the reviewer's literal translation) read:

Under my feet the world of the pyramids crumbles away,  
and the dizzied spirit of the timeless sun  
crowns my head, which is tipped into the sky,

are reduced in Hargitai to the cryptic, "I crown my head, stagger the heavens." Lost, along with clarity, in the economy of this sweeping gesture is something essential to the poem, the image of the speaker as a colossus, towering into the stratosphere over the earth. Given this and other, more minor quiddities ("seventeen year-old muscles" becomes the awkward "seventeen-year muscles" in translation), it can come as no surprise that Hargitai's "Strenght Song" is hesitant and vague, and decidedly weaker than József's original. The problems with this first poem are not mere aberrations. They are diagnostic, and their symptoms can be found throughout the collection. "Mamma," a translation of one of József's best-known poems, concludes with the line "she blues the waters of the sky." The word "blues," apparently the third person singular of a verb of Hargitai's own invention, mars an otherwise decent effort. "Mamma" also suffers from another problem, likewise typical of these translations and even more troubling than the vagueness and inattention to detail already discussed — namely, the poor versification which is Hargitai's Achilles' heel as a translator. József wrote this poem ("Mama" in the Hungarian original) in wonderfully-cadenced lines of nine syllables each. In Hargitai's translation, line lengths range from four to ten syllables, not manipulated for effect but punctuated rather by irregular stresses in much the same way as everyday speech in English. The stresses of everyday speech are the basis of prose rhythm, and distinguish that genre from verse, where rhythm is subjected to certain patterns and thus controlled. Free verse, which attempts to remove the language of poetry from this constraint and return it to its origins in the colloquial, clearly has its place in the translator's bag of tricks. It is the obvious and apposite choice for the translation of poetry written in free verse. But its application to metrical poetry, whether in the service of contemporary taste or the translator's whim, is as problematic as the translation of a free verse poem into tetrameter quatrains. Even so, for those who insist on translating the formal into the free, the success of their endeavor rides largely on the quality of their free verse. In Hargitai's case, that quality is generally low. In fact, he renders nearly all of József's poems in a slack, free verse that borders in places on prose. This lax approach to metrics is something wholly foreign to József (even his prose poems and free verse "move" well), and is also great weakness of "With All My Heart," Hargitai's translation of a poem, another one of József's

most famous, which got its author expelled from university, and which in 1924 the Hungarian critic Pál Ignóty saw as the herald of a new poetry. Even here, where Hargitai is actually plainly concerned with meter, his inability to establish a consistent metrical pattern from which to deviate at times results in versification not quite free but not regular, more exception than rule, and thus more staccato than fluent. Still, "With All My Heart" succeeds in terms of metrics as well as any other translation in the collection, both in its own right and as a mimesis of the original. It is also one of the few translations in which Hargitai makes any attempt at preserving rhyme, a feature common to many of József's poems. (In fairness to Hargitai, he does substitute slant rhyme for full with varied success in a number of poems.) Despite its shortcomings, "With All My Heart" is one of the better efforts in the volume and as such (and considering its importance in József's work) is worth quoting in full:

I have no father and no mother,  
I have no God, I have no land,  
neither cradle, nor a cover,  
nor kiss, nor lover's hand.

Three days I haven't eaten  
neither scarcely nor well,  
all I have is twenty years,  
twenty years I'll gladly sell.

If no one will take them,  
then maybe the devil will.  
I'll break in with all my heart,  
And if need be, kill.

They'll catch and they'll hang me,  
cover me up with blessed earth,  
and death-eating grass will start  
growing on my lovely heart.

Though Hargitai's punctuation is erratic, here as elsewhere, and the reading of "death-eating grass" for "death-bringing grass" is curious, the translation does have some good moments, such as the enjambment, "start/growing," in the last two lines. A few other translations stand out from the rest. "Weary Man," which works as a poem in its own right, is one of the best translations of those collected here. "Eulogy" is another one of Hargitai's limited successes, as are "Bitter," a great prose poem in the original, "Everything Is Old" and "Dew." At the other end of the spectrum, "Medallions," in József a cryptic, unfinished poem in eleven and a half sections, each one a sort of riddle in rhyme, is predictably one of Hargitai's worst. In his hands it becomes a short primer on everything he does badly in the book.

While he lived, József wrote under conditions imposed by poverty, hunger and, towards the end of his life, mental illness. When he died, very few people had any sense of his greatness. So much has changed in Hungary in this regard in the nearly sixty years since 1937 that today it is taken for granted that he is one of the greatest Hungarian poets of any time. He has become a truly popular figure, popular in a way that few poets, if any, ever have been in this country. Nearly all Hungarians know something about him. The state university in Szeged, a school he was once kicked out of for writing and publishing the poem, "Tiszta szívvel" (Hargitai's "With All My Heart"), which one professor objected to on moral grounds, ironically now bears his name, as do streets and institutions throughout the country. National Poetry Day, an official state holiday, is even celebrated on József's birthday. His critical reputation also seems secure (though reputations, subject as they are fashion, are never stable for long). This all attests to the fact that he has come full circle, from isolation to veneration, though only posthumously, as is so often the case.

Despite his stature at home, and despite the fact that even a cursory examination indicates he is a poet worthy of serious attention, József is relatively unknown in the West, even in academia, outside a small group of scholars and poets. This discrepancy is easy to explain. József wrote in Hungarian, naturally, a fact that places him alongside most of his compatriots in linguistic isolation. As a Finno-Ugric language, Hungarian is fundamentally different in terms of grammar and vocabulary from the Indo-European languages that surround Hungary in Central Europe. It is also notoriously difficult to learn, and thus difficult to translate. In fact, Hungarian literature has suffered centuries of neglect in the scholarship of many countries due to this linguistic separateness, and in this sense József represents just one chapter in a history of isolation. What little attention József has received from scholars outside Hungary has been so heavily biased and uneven that it has perhaps done him more harm than good. These commentators sometimes refer to him as a Socialist poet, a label so superficial and ill-fitting that a no more than passing familiarity with his work is enough to call it into question. József was associated with the then underground Communist movement in Hungary for a time, and he did write some programmatic pieces, but branding him a Socialist poet on this basis is ludicrous. In fact, József's poetry is so eclectic and yet so much his own that it consistently defies attempts at classification. This recalcitrance does not sit well with those who insist on labeling everything they study, but it should be accepted as a more accurate reflection of reality than any standard descriptive tag. In any case, the fact that his work will not submit meagerly to captivity in an easy generalization is as much a testimony to that work as it is an illustration of a shortcoming in scholarship.

In his introduction to the book, a generally perceptive short essay, David Kirby asserts that "Peter Hargitai's versions are as colloquial and emotionally charged as the original," a statement which says more about Kirby's own knowl-

edge of the originals than it does about Hargitai's translations. The truth is, the translations collected in *Perched on Nothing's Branch* reflect next to nothing of the strength and originality of József's language. The style most typical of his poetry is the result of a combination of informal yet intense, insistent diction, sometimes accessible, sometimes obscure, and certain elements of traditional prosody. József is primarily a metrist, a writer of verse, and many of his poems rely for their effect on rhyme and meter. Hargitai's generally limp, aimless free verse is naturally hard-pressed to reflect this formalism. Hargitai's selection of poems for translation is also regrettable at times, especially in its omission of "For My Birthday," a great poem, easily one of József's best and most innovative, which should be read as a companion to "With a Pure Heart." Still, Hargitai's collection represents a distinct improvement on Anton Nyerges' 1973 book, *Attila József*, a more representative but wholly unreadable selection of translations published by the Hungarian Cultural Foundation in Buffalo. *Perched on Nothing's Branch* adds very little, however, in terms of quality to the work of John Bátky, whose *Attila József: Selected Texts and Poems* was published in Great Britain by the Carcanet Press, also in 1973. It is clear that József's poetry has yet to find its definitive translator (or translators) in English. Though patently flawed, if Hargitai's translations gain József new readers, they will have done some service. After all, an ideal translator may be out there now, as yet unfamiliar with József's work.

# HUNGARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO MUSIC

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Hungary's geography and history have contributed to a sense of cultural ambiguity. While firmly planted in Central Europe with its German-Austrian-Italian traditions, Hungary's nomadic roots provided it with an identity more exotic than that of its neighbors to the west. This effect is evident in its politics, social structures, and, of course, in its culture. In the area of music, Hungary has adopted the *forms* of the west while bringing to them *content* influenced by the east. Indeed, Hungary has often served the art music of Europe as a safe broker providing exotic elements to composers from other countries and by adopting their conventions through which Hungary has expressed its own unique musical spirit.

The contributions of Hungary to music can be found in folk and popular music, as well as among the composers, compositions, and performers in the field of art music. This paper identifies the innovations Hungary has brought to the art of music through its own creations and points to those "Hungarianisms" that can be found as borrowings in the music of others.

As Hungarians reached Latin Europe at the end of the ninth century, they brought with them their traditional music, the most ancient of which often had a narrow range, an overall descending line, and rhythm derived recitative-like from the text. Remnants of this style can be found in folk laments collected in the twentieth century, but certainly derived from the most ancient styles.

A somewhat newer style could also be found among the Hungarians' folk melodies: more metric, with a more diverse pitch set, and pentatonic in arrangement. The overall shape of the melody still descended, but was based on an initial motive repeated, in sequence-like fashion, the interval of a fifth below the original.

What the Hungarian settlers in Europe found was a musical practice somewhat similar to that which they had brought with them from their Ural mountain and Volga river homeland. The "Gregorian" religious chants of St. Gall in Switzerland, for example, had a narrow range, few notes moving stepwise, and a rhythm derived from the text. During the Middle Ages, as Hungary was Christianized, it developed its own "dialect" of plainsong chant, which preserved some of the pentatonic instincts of the folk style. Esztergom also developed its own variant on chant notation, which is somewhat different from that found in Italy and Germany.

A particular performance practice came about in Hungary and persisted into the later periods. Cathedral and parish schools in Hungary taught musical skills to the boys who formed the choirs. In other countries specialized singing and music reading skills were learned by only a small select group of singers who sang the chant verses and later the polyphonic compositions, with the whole group joining in only on relatively easy sung and easily remembered responsories. In Hungary everyone received the same education, and therefore the whole congregation was able to perform the whole of the music. This "democratic" tradition owing to unusually effective instruction characterized Hungarian musical life for centuries.

In the late Middle Ages, the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, Hungary enjoyed a rich cultural life. In 1483 a Spanish nobleman wrote, concerning a visit he had made to King Mátyás, that he "has a choir the better of which I have not yet seen. It resembles the one we had at the papal court before the devastation of the plague. When the king had a high mass sung in his chapel...I had to realize with embarrassment that they have surpassed us in the things that belong to divine worship." (Dobszay, 39)

Although polyphony came relatively late to Hungary, the reign of Mátyás was, indeed, the golden age of Hungary's late medieval music during which the intense musical life of the court was comparable with any of the Renaissance courts of Europe. This flourishing was due, at least in part, to Queen Beatrix of Aragon whom Mátyás married in 1476. As the daughter of the King of Naples, her music master had been Johannes Tinctoris, and it was through him that many musicians of international repute visited Hungary and influenced its music. One of them, Pietrobono wrote in 1488, "I am made welcome here in Buda, and my playing is listened to with pleasure, and if it should please Their Highnesses I would never leave this place." (Kárpáti, 5) Works from this period were published by the famous French printer and publisher Pierre Attaignant.

The establishment of towns and middle class during this period also enhanced musical life. In addition to singers of chant and polyphony, instrumentalists also flourished. The Pauline order in particular excelled in the building of organs for the growing number of churches in towns. A variety of other instruments, including string, wind, and percussion were used. It was considered a particularly Hungarian speciality to have mounted timpanists in military ensembles.

Lutenists were considered the elite of instrumentalists and, it appears, that they were able to make a profession of music. Foremost among Hungarian lutenists was Bálint Bakfark, who was court musician of János Zápolya, Prince of Transylvania in the sixteenth century. Bakfark's performing skills and his transcriptions for lute, as well as his own compositions for the instrument won him fame in his travels elsewhere, and the reputation of Hungarian musicians spread throughout Europe. There is a Polish saying, "To take up the lute after Bakfark," which means attempting something that one cannot do well enough.

The sixteenth century also saw the development of verse chronicles, epics sung on Biblical and historical themes. These historical songs were sung by minstrels, who traveled the country rather as the medieval troubadours had. The most famous of the chroniclers was Tinódi Sebestyén, also a lutenist, who served the nobleman Bálint Török.

With the collapse at the battle of Mohács in 1526, not only did most of Hungary fall to the Turks, but musical life changed dramatically as well. For a time the Transylvanian court tried to sustain an active musical culture, but its influence was limited. Much, if not most, of the written legacy of Hungarian music from the Renaissance and Medieval periods was destroyed during the Turkish occupation. The codices that remain come primarily from the borders of the Hungarian state: Croatia, Slovakia, and Transylvania.

In the instrumental music of the Baroque period in Europe a variety of dance movements of a more or less national character played a prominent part: for example, the French courante, the German allemande, the Italian *padovana* (*pavan*), and so on. This explains why the lure of the exotic led Europe to take an interest in the countries to its east and to develop the two most common Polish and Hungarian dance forms, the *polacca* and the *ungaresca*. It is characteristic that these national dances did not come into being in their own countries first, but abroad, as if typifying how the German or Italian musicians of the time imagined such "foreign," particularly East European dances. The first pieces of this kind, entitled "Ungarisch Tanzi," "Passamezzo Ungaresca," and the like appear as early as the sixteenth century in German, Dutch, French, and Italian lute tablature manuscripts and printed editions. These foreign examples were, of course, followed by a continuing fashion in Hungary too, particularly where urban culture played a major role, as in Transylvania (Kolozsvár, Csiksomlyó), Western Hungary (Sopron, Győr) and Upper Hungary (Lócse, Kassa).

The name of János Kájoni (1629–1687), a Franciscan monk, an excellent organist and organ builder, is associated with an important manuscript known as the Kájoni Codex. It contains Italian and German church music, French suites, and church vocal and also a number of Hungarian secular songs and dances in a simple two-part arrangement for virginal, with organ tablature notation. Kájoni also compiled a mass book called the Organ Missal, which contains sacred music.

The devastation of 150 years of Turkish occupation was not easily overcome. In the process of musical rebirth, the aristocratic families played a pivotal role. The interest in music shown by the princely Esterházy family of Western Hungary is well known from the biography of Joseph Haydn. Pál Esterházy was a very talented amateur musician; and his name is associated with an extremely interesting work, which is also very important from the point of view of Hungarian music history, the *Harmonia caelestis*. This collection of fifty-five short cantata-

tas dates to about 1700, and Esterházy enlisted the help of several professional musicians as he wrote these works.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the Esterházy name and that of the palace at Fertőd (Eszterháza) were most closely associated with that of Joseph Haydn, who from about 1766 served the family as *Kapellmeister* and musical director. Under Haydn and his successor, Johann Nepomuk Hummel, Eszterháza brought the finest music of the day to Hungary.

The proximity of Vienna to Pozsony and Buda ensured that all of the musical developments of the period were immediately heard and assimilated in Hungary. The chamber music, symphonies, and operas of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were performed throughout Hungary within a year or two of their premieres. In Kolozsvár, for example, a debate surrounding Beethoven's music degenerated into a free-for-all early in the nineteenth century.

This picture of high culture should not be construed to characterize the whole of Hungary. Only a relatively narrow geographic band and even narrower social stratum enjoyed music of the quality of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven or even that of Péter Stärk, Druschetzky, or Fusz, to name Hungarian composers of the period. The a significant part of the population came under the strict cultural dicta of the Calvinist church. The establishment of the Calvinist colleges brought about a demand for secular songs among amateurs, eager to learn music notation. "Melodiariums," or books of simple songs were produced for this new social stratum. One of these is the huge collection of 450 songs compiled in 1813 by Ádám Pálóczi Horváth (1760–1820) entitled "About 450 Songs" [Ötödfélszáz Énekek] which typifies the somewhat banal literary and musical taste of the provincial Hungarian nobility and middle class of the period. Remarking on this situation, Dobszay says, "When one remembers that about 200 kilometres away from these schools, urban audiences listened to Haydn's music, while [in the country] a battle had to be fought – and unsuccessfully at that – for the introduction of a most simple chordal technique, which was 200 years out of date, then the picture is quite depressing" (124). In later describing this anomaly, Kodály remarked that "educated people were not Hungarian enough and the Hungarians were not educated enough." What was of a higher quality musically had a much too narrow social foundation in Hungary, and what the broader middle classes cultivated was musically of little worth and unsuitable for development. While down below (at the "third level") folk music lived on, preserving its ancient beauties, and being affected here and there by the newer influences.

Around the middle of the eighteenth century a change took place in which the *ungaresca* dance type of the previous centuries developed into the new romantic dances known as the *verbunkos*. In Hungarian dances of this new type the "slow" and "quick" (*lassú-gyors*) dances characteristic of the *verbunkos* were juxtaposed. Sets of Hungarian dances arranged for the piano and entitled Ungarische Tänze, Hongroises, or even Zinagrese can be found in considerable num-

bers in Vienna as well as in Pest and Pozsony. This *verbunkos* style can be found being used as local color in works such as Haydn's Piano Concerto in D major; Mozart's Violin Concerto in A major; Beethoven's Third Symphony, and Diabelli's Hungarian Dances.

At the same time the Hungarian dance itself was gradually influenced by the art music that surrounded it and adapted itself to the harmonic, melodic, and formal characteristics of the period. "The mutual interaction between art music and popular music that prevailed from the inception of the style led to the cherishing of the veritable apotheosis of "*verbunkos*" as the foundation of a Hungarian art music that had never existed before." (Dobszay, 129)

The peak of the development of the *verbunkos* style coincided with the nationalist spirit that flared during the nineteenth century in Hungary. The *verbunkos*, as performed with fiery virtuosity by Gypsy musicians, seemed to embody all that was truly Hungarian and thus became the virtual background music of the revolution of 1848. Although many composers of the period set the *verbunkos*, it is Franz Liszt (1811–1886) who most fully captured and idealized its nationalistic spirit in his Hungarian rhapsodies and fantasias.

Franz Liszt, one of the greatest of nineteenth-century composers, spent most of his life abroad but took a keen interest in everything in music that was known as Hungarian. In 1859 his book on Gypsies was published turning many in the press against him. "Shall I put it in words? The uproar surrounding my volume on the Gypsies made me feel that I am a much truer Hungarian than my adversaries, the would-be Magyars..." (Dobszay, 151). Liszt was certainly a universal European figure, but in his incorporation of national elements into his music, he began the establishment of a truly Hungarian national musical style that was to be achieved only in the twentieth century.

Second only to Liszt in the nineteenth century was Ferenc Erkel. Creating an operatic culture became part of the fight for independence. The Pest National Theater was established in 1837, and in 1838 Ferenc Erkel was named its conductor and musical director. As a composer he was influenced by Hungarian songs, the *verbunkos*, and Italian opera. It was his grand operas that brought him national fame and success, the first being *László Hunyadi* (1844) which was to the Hungarian national movement what Verdi's *Nabucco* was to Italy. Even more successful was *Bánk Bán* (1851), and both of these works continue to be performed in Hungary today. But even if some Hungarians are not familiar with his stage works, everyone knows his setting to melody the poem of Kölcsey, which became the Hungarian national anthem and is widely thought to be one of the most beautiful of the national hymns.

Nineteenth-century Hungarian music was perhaps more successful in creating musical institutions and developing a functioning musical life than in producing composers. Modern public concerts developed first in major cities and then in provincial towns. Musical societies and choirs were formed, which brought local

audiences into contact with professional musicians. There was a rapid development of virtuoso soloists, chiefly violinists who won recognition across Europe — Ede Reményi, József Bóhm, and József Joachim — and began Hungary's tradition of internationally renown string stars. Music educational institutions were also established. These ranged from municipal schools to the National Royal Academy of Music (today the Liszt Academy) with Liszt as the president and Erkel as the director. Music educational literature, the growth in musical instrument making, the printing of music, and a growing number of musical periodicals all attest to the burgeoning of world-class musical activity in Hungary.

By the end of the nineteenth century this "high musical culture" was supplemented by some more widely accessible forms. Among these was the Hungarian operetta, which in the hands of Ferenc Lehár and Imre Kálmán, achieved success world-wide.

Another highly "Hungarianized" form was the *magyar nóta* or popular song. The nineteenth-century fascination with the fabled past and idealized rural life brought about the first efforts at collecting folk poetry and music in the 1830s. These first researchers committed all of the scientific "sins" possible including selectivity in what to take down, a lack of skill—and, of course, technology — in recording information, and an absence of scruples when meddling with the material. The sources of these folk songs were often the country gentry rather than peasants, and what was considered "folk" was what was popular among this group, the simple eighteenth-century student songs. Many of the so-called Hungarian folk songs were actually sentimental tunes. These popular *magyar nóta* became so completely identified as Hungarian folk songs, that even today, after nearly a century of research into authentic Hungarian folk music, many Hungarians are incensed by the suggestion that the *magyar nóta* is not the essence of Hungarian music. The *magyar nóta* is sentimentally loved by most non-musicians and almost universally despised by musicians. Dobszay's characterization is typical: "A fashion of lengthy, sentimental tunes relying on romantic harmony brought a great change, bringing an expression of individual, indeed exhibitionistic attitudes. At this point the *magyar nóta*, which until then could only be condemned for its emptiness and its power to distract people from what was better, turned into a force inimical to good taste" (Dobszay, 166).

The Gypsy band, which had been known since the eighteenth century, provided the ideal medium for the *magyar nóta*. The remarkable ability of the Gypsy people themselves and of these bands to adapt to their surroundings meant that they had no real Gypsy repertoire of their own and readily took up the *magyar nóta* as well as popular dance music. The special style of playing with its displays of virtuosity and unabashed sentimentality enshrined the music they played as *the* Hungarian music in the minds of many Hungarians and surely those of much of the rest of the world.

The non-Hungarian nineteenth-century composer most profoundly influenced by Hungarian musical elements was Johannes Brahms. Although in some ways Liszt and Brahms are viewed as two poles of an aesthetic axis, their music shares some striking similarities, and Brahms was surely influenced by the color of Liszt's style. Their personal friendship might have developed as well, but for an event described by István Lakatos:

A group of well-known artists, writers, and statesmen had invited Liszt and, at his intervention, Brahms as well. The company asked Liszt to play something for them at the piano. Liszt played a composition of Brahms's, which delighted the audience. Afterwards Liszt played his own B-minor sonata. At a particular point, which had great meaning for him, he turned toward Brahms to indicate his respect; he looked at him with a smile but Brahms — had fallen asleep. This hurt Liszt very deeply; he stopped playing and stood up. (Lakatos, 4)

Not only was Brahms influenced by Liszt but also by József Joachim, the great violinist. The *Variations on a Hungarian Song*, Op. 21 and his *Zigeunerlieder* are well-known, but "magyarisms" can be found in many of his compositions, notably in his chamber music. The first piano quartet, Op. 25 in G minor, for example, has "Rondo alla Zingarese, Presto" as the indication for its last movement. Among the piano compositions the B minor Capriccio, Op. 76, No. 2 displays a decided Hungarian character. Although he could know only the popularized *verbunkos* style of the *magyar nóta*, Brahms brought a concept of Hungarian music to the rest of Europe and beyond.

While the *magyar nóta* suffused coffee houses and restaurants, quite a different musical tradition continued in the villages. Ancient Hungarian folk songs had continued to develop and change with the centuries. By the nineteenth century a "new" style of Hungarian folksong had emerged, which combined church hymns, the *magyar nóta*, ancient folksong traditions and echoes of art music. In a general sense it consisted of four lines, each with 11 syllables set syllabically, and in an ABBA or AA5A5A structure.

The Hungarian folksong formed the bridge to twentieth-century art music, just as it had done in other periods and with other styles of art music. The two composers who launched Hungarian composition into the new century are, Béla Bartók (1881–1945) and Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967). They, along with Ernő Dohnányi, who was a few years older, studied composition with János Koessler, an Austrian student of Brahms whose influence can be felt in the early compositions of all three.

Although the names of Bartók and Kodály are often spoken in one breath, they share as many differences as they do commonalities. Each felt an obligation to the task of creating a truly Hungarian art music style. Both found a "pure

source" for that style in the ancient and newer folk music that was just coming to consciousness among musicians. Kodály's collecting efforts concentrated on Hungarian music, but Bartók's interests quickly took him to Romania, Turkey, and even Africa. Both wished to revitalize Hungarian musical culture, to make it more authentic, and to bring it to more people. It is characteristic of Bartók that his means toward this goal were primarily compositional, while Kodály's were also scientific and social. Bartók's view, and indeed, his life, became international in experience and influence, while Kodály's remained more steadfastly Hungarian. Bartók's primary medium was instrumental music, while for Kodály the voice informed all of his compositions. Kodály is said, with some exaggeration, to be the last nineteenth-century Hungarian composer, while Bartók was the first Hungarian composer of the twentieth century. With Bartók, his music is the focus; with Kodály, the man himself is at the center.

From World War I Hungary endured wars as well as political and social changes that at the very least distracted from the rapid experimentation and change that characterized music composition elsewhere in Europe. The parallels with the effects of the period of Turkish occupation are inevitable. During the twentieth century, just as in the Renaissance, many talented Hungarian musicians – composers, performers, and conductors – sought opportunities elsewhere. America was an especially fortunate beneficiary of the talents of this musical diaspora some of whom have become household names. Curiously, however, Géza Anda, Antal Doráti, Annie Fischer, György Ligeti, Eugene Ormandy, Miklós Rózsa, György Sebök, János Starker, George Szell, József Szigeti, and Ede Zaturecky are not always recognized as Hungarians.

At the same time many Hungarian musicians remained in their country and contended with a kaleidoscope of changing political – or, rather, musical – correctness. Among the first generation or two to emerge after Bartók and Kodály were László Lajtha, Lajos Bárdos, Ferenc Farkas, Pál Kadosa, and Sándor Veress. A later generation includes János Viski, Ferenc Szabó, Endre Szervánsky, Pál Járdányi and György Ránki. It can be debated whether they were successful or not in taking this new Hungarian art music beyond Kodály and Bartók, but no one can deny the courage it took to walk the political and cultural tightrope that stretched across the middle decades of this century.

The current generation of composers as well as performers seems to have slipped into the easy internationalism where most art music exists today. The generation of violin virtuosi seems to have given way to internationally acclaimed pianists, Zoltán Kocsis, Dezső Ránki, and András Schiff among them. The music of György Kurtág is as well-known, or perhaps better known in Tokyo today as it is in Budapest. The analytical techniques of Ernő Lendvai are argued alongside those of Heinrich Schenker, and the musicological writings of János Kárpáti, György Kroó, and László Somfai turn up in *Acta Musicologica* on a regular basis. Kodály's efforts at reform in Hungarian music education may be facing economic

difficulties in his native land today, but adaptations of his ideas continue to be made from Argentina to Zimbabwe.

Just as our aging eyes have trouble seeing clearly things that are quite close to us, it is difficult to make judgments about the current musical scene in Hungary. On the one hand less "steely" oversight in cultural matters has given musicians greater freedom to look around and ahead, without having to glance back over their shoulders constantly. On the other hand it might be argued that economic difficulties pose a less-noble adversary, than did those of principle and politics. Were it not for the language, it might be difficult to discern anything particularly Hungarian in current pop music or in current art compositions.

Perhaps this internationalism is just another swing in the balance between foreign effects on Hungarian music and the assertion of Hungarian influences on the music of others. It may be a sign of cultural health that Hungarian self-identity, at least in music, need not take the form of nationalistic "magyarisms." In fact the value of national music in this day of multicultural music is very high indeed; and in consulting the Top-Ten list, one is likely to find Spanish monks singing Gregorian chants or Bulgarian women's choirs, or a Hungarian folksong with a techno-pop accompaniment.

Hungary has benefitted by the influence of other countries on its music, but it has made its contribution as well — and not an insignificant one at that.

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# HUNGARIAN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND NEW FINDINGS IN THE HISTORY OF 20TH CENTURY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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The short twentieth century witnessed tectonic changes in the pattern of international relations. Old empires, which had shaped the face of world politics for centuries, collapsed or gradually declined into relative political and military insignificance. The phenomenal rise of the Soviet empire into superpowerdom was as unforeseeable as its rapid collapse. Together with the United States, the influence of which on world affairs is probably unparalleled since the Roman empire, the Soviet Union had the power to unleash a war that could have destroyed the human race.

The twentieth century saw the emergence of the total war, the scientifically designed destruction of human beings and nuclear terror. Germany's bid for hegemony in Europe threatened the survival of European civilization as we know it. In trying to explain this trajectory from the global perspective, historians are confronted with the basic question whether the great cataclysms were inevitable, whether the course of twentieth century history proceeded on a predetermined track? Historians of small powers view the same events from a different perspective. For them there is an inescapable question to answer: are small states masters of their own fate, or is their lot decided by the more significant actors of the international arena? This approach adds also to our understanding of the global scene. Often times the in depth examination of problems neglected by historians of great powers because of their seeming insignificance in the larger framework of global relations sheds new light on the causes of major events and can in fact significantly modify our view on the bigger, fundamental issues of international relations.

This paper will present three cases where the findings of Hungarian historians give significant new insight into our understanding of international relations in the short twentieth century – 1918–1990.

The first such case will be the origins of the post-World War I settlement in Central Europe, which is widely regarded as one of the chief culprits in the onset of the most destructive war in human history, the Second World War. The Versailles settlement engendered regional animosity and thus destroyed all hopes of

resistance to German economic, later military expansion. It is widely believed that the Versailles agreements, bad as they were could not have been made any better because of the complexities of the issues involved. This reasoning adds the element of inevitability to future developments. But was there no other way? Do new sources help us understand better why the international system created by the victors failed to replace the stability of the 1815 settlement and collapsed so easily?

1918 saw the emergence of a power vacuum in the territories between Russia and Germany. The victors attempted to fill that power vacuum without considering the interests of those two, only temporarily incapacitated great powers.

In their quest to explain the disastrous treaty imposed on Hungary, Hungarian historians have paid a great deal of attention to the settlement in the Danubian basin. A breakthrough in this research came a relatively short while ago, when related French diplomatic and military documents became available for research for the first time. The Hungarian pioneers of research in French policies toward the Carpathian basin were Magda Ádám, Mária Ormos, Zsuzsa L. Nagy, and Ernő Raffay.<sup>1</sup> Recently a group of historians have published approximately 1600 of the most important French documents related to the settlement in the Danubian basin – most of them hitherto unknown – in two volumes. These two volumes are a product of a decade of research and for the first time enable us to gain an insight into the ideas behind the peace settlement in Central Europe in their full complexity. The findings reveal more than the causes of Trianon, they reveal the very motives behind the arrangement in Central Europe. We find that the Allies and their local clients consciously built the settlement on hostility rather than cooperation. The Wilsonian principles of national self-determination were discarded even for territories where they were recognized to be applicable.

The status of the Danubian basin was decided by territorial committees with the participation of the victorious powers. Behind the political and economic arguments put forward by the two countries really calling the shots, England and France, there were considerations of Western security. Namely, the desire of Paris and London to hem in Russia and Germany among friendly states, which in the case of a war would be able to mobilize quickly, and efficiently and without political obstacles. A few examples will illustrate this point.<sup>2</sup> The American representative wanted Hungary to retain Csallóköz and the town of Sátoraljaújhely because their populations were overwhelmingly Hungarian. Although the French did not dispute this claim, they insisted that Csallóköz should belong to Czechoslovakia partly for economic, but mainly for strategic reasons. Namely, they wanted the full length of the Ipoly railway line to run through Slovakia because that line provided a direct link with Subcarpathian Ukraine and points east. Sátoraljaújhely was split between Hungary and its new northern neighbour, so that a critical railway junction connecting the railway line due east with the line due south should remain in Czechoslovakia. A strategically significant rail-

road carried the day regarding the Hungarian–Rumanian boundary as well. Until the March of 1919 the exact tracing of that line was still undecided. Here, as in Northern Hungary, strategic arguments overcame the ethnic principle. The Americans were inclined to award Szatmárnémeti, Nagykároly and Nagyvárad to Hungary on ethnic grounds. The British representative admitted that these towns had a Magyar majority. Nonetheless, he recommended that because of the Szatmárnémeti–Nagyvárad line, this area should belong to Rumania. The French representative, Laroche declared: “The security of the Rumanian frontier will not be assured if the Hungarians at the same time control both the Debrecen–Békéscsaba and the Szatmárnémeti–Nagyvárad lines.” Laroche added: “If the Germans were in conflict with the Poles or the Czechoslovaks, the Allies would be obliged, in order to reinforce these states, to count on the goodwill of Hungary and they would run the risk of experiencing the greatest difficulties.” Leeper of Great Britain argued that if the triangle on the north–eastern part of the line, which the Americans wanted to give to Hungary, did not become part of Rumania, then the lines of communication between Czechoslovakia and Rumania would be broken. The railway lines allotted to Rumania had to be linked up with the international railway network of the Allies. Thanks to the lines bound north–south and east–west through Slovakia and Rumania respectively, the Allies were theoretically able to mobilize from the Adriatic to the Baltic and right to Ukraine through friendly territory. In such a way they had the opportunity to project military power against Russia and even Germany from all directions in the protection of their allies in Central Europe. In the context of such strategic considerations the ethnic question was of secondary importance, especially as far as the former enemy was concerned. Already in 1919 it was recognized that the territorial losses would thrust Hungary into the arms of a *revisionist* Germany but it was hoped that with the help of security arrangements in Eastern Europe the revisionist menace there would be *contained*.

In such a manner the seeds of revisionism were knowingly sown from the outset, and the possibility of a regional cooperation was jeopardized. The eventuality of a new conflict was foreseeable from the cradle of the new European order and the victorious powers committed a blunder when instead of mitigating hostility they actually attempted to build a system to contain it. When in the mid 1930s Germany began to reassert itself in the region and the West found no strength and resolve to arrest her ambitions, the region collapsed like a house of cards under the weight of German pressure and regional hostility.

The German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944 among other things resulted in the deportation and destruction of the majority of the last intact Jewish population in Europe, a community of 825 thousand people. These Jews were protected from the policy of “Endlösung” by the Kállay–Horthy leadership and their fate was decided by Hitler’s decision to invade Hungary. Why did Hitler come to this resolve? The answer seems all too obvious: he got wind of the Hun-

garian manouvers to abandon the war and was forced to resort to this solution in order to maintain the flow of Hungarian goods like oil, bauxite and wheat and to secure Hungary against the advancing Red Army. Yet, there are several problems with this traditionally held view. Hitler had known about Kállay's manouverings since at least April 1943, but instructed the Wehrmacht's planning body to work out the plans for Hungary's military occupation only in the wake of Italy's surrender in September 1943. In Goebbels's words, so that such "Schweinerei" should not happen again. Yet, Hitler did not decide on occupation until late February 1944. Why did he wait so long? In the early 1960s it was noticed that the occupation plans were worked out for the western part of Hungary only, but not the Trans-Tisza region. In fact, Hitler made the occupation of the Trans-Tisza region contingent upon further developments. This would be illogical if the German aim had been to arrest the advance of the Red Army. In the late 1970s the work of the diplomatic historian Gyula Juhász shed light on this apparent contradiction and helped to explain Hitler's real motives.<sup>3</sup> From the works of British historians we now know that at the conference of Teheran in late December 1943 the Allies decided on Operation Bodyguard, a plan of deception to convince the Germans that the second front would be opened in the Balkans. Juhász found strong evidence that Hitler 'bought' the ploy and the wish to strengthen his empire's southern flank would account for his decision to occupy Hungary up to the river Tisza.

From Juhász's research we know that the political and military leadership of the Allies would have welcomed the German occupation of Hungary from at least August of 1943. They were guided by the belief that Germany would need to divert a few divisions from the western theatre for Hungary's military occupation. Therefore Hungarians were encouraged and blackmailed to make them take drastic anti-German steps in the hope that such steps would provoke a German invasion. On May 21 1943 György Barcza, who was on a peace mission in Switzerland was told by the representative of the Foreign Office that England did not expect Hungary to do anything that would provoke German occupation and that – in view of the consequences – "could not imagine Hungary jumping out." However, on August 5 1943 the same person warned the Hungarian diplomat that "Hungary should immediately follow the Italian example (i.e. jump out) shouldering the risks... if Hungary failed to draw the consequences of this situation it would mean that she was once more siding with the Germans. She would thereby lose forever her chance of being handled differently from Germany by the victors... *Hungary should take this step even at the risk of temporary German occupation...*" The same message was communicated to Barcza by the American representative Royall Tyler. He told Barcza that Hungary should withdraw all her troops from Russia and turn against the Germans as soon as Italy's surrender was announced. Otherwise, the Hungarians would share the terrible punishment to be imposed on Germany.<sup>4</sup>

In August 1943 the British deputy chief of staff prepared a memorandum according to which Hungary's capitulation would cause political and military crisis in Germany, and in case Rumania should follow suit, Germany would end up in a crisis that she could solve only by occupying Hungary. If Germany would take the risk and pull out troops from elsewhere to invade Hungary, the consequent weakening of her position in other theatres would be to Britain's advantage. The deputy chief of staff recognized that no help could be extended to Hungary. A high official of the Foreign Office, W. Harris thought that Hungarian capitulation should be announced simultaneously with the Allied landing in Normandy.<sup>5</sup> He wrote to Roosevelt that the Germans obviously attached great importance to the eastern front and would not hesitate to divert a major part of their strategic airforce to keep their positions there. He believed that the Germans feared the loss of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. "When we remember what brilliant results have followed from the potential reactions in Italy induced by our military efforts" Churchill continued, "should we not be short-sighted to ignore the possibility of even greater landslide in some or all of the countries I mentioned? If we were able to provoke such reactions and profit by them, our joint task in Italy would be greatly lightened."<sup>6</sup> The American military leadership had a similar view of the situation and informed the president in November 1943 that Allied positions would be enhanced if Hungary or Rumania or maybe both would be eliminated from the war, even if they came under military occupation. Finally, the U.S. government officially called upon Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria to jump out of the war.

Insofar as the Allies did their best to make Hitler occupy Hungary – which the Fuehrer did not seriously consider until February 1944 – they must share the responsibility for the the decimation of the Jewish community in Hungary and all the other consequences of direct Nazi rule there.

The driving force behind Soviet expansionism has been the subject of fervent dispute among politicians, diplomats, political scientists and historians for almost half a century. However, much of what has been said and written on the topic is no more than speculation, because until recently the archives of the Soviet zone have been by and large closed for research. As a result of cooperation between Hungarian and Russian historians three volumes containig hitherto unknown Russian primary sources have been published, which provide a unique glimpse into the Soviet decision-making process. The documents include the minutes of the CPSU Presidium and relate to the Hungarian crisis of 1956.

Was the Soviet military crackdown on the first struggle for independence behind the Iron Curtain predetermined? What was the *concrete* cause of the intervention? What does the Soviet response to the Hungarian Revolution tell us in general about the Soviet decision-making process, Soviet foreign policy, and Cold War international relations?

The CPSU Presidium devoted its October 28, 1956 session to the solution of the Hungarian crisis, based on information obtained from the members of the Soviet fact-finding mission in Budapest: Mikoyan, Suslov and Serov. The Soviet leadership was deeply divided on the course to take. The old Bolshevik hardliners: Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov argued for putting it down. First Secretary Khrushchev on the other hand called for the support of the Nagy government. Prime Minister Bulganin and Minister of Defense Zhukov sided with his view. Zhukov recommended the withdrawal of the Soviet units from the streets of Budapest and grouping them in specified areas; Khrushchev promised a cease-fire. This was too much for the hard-liners. Bulganin, who switched sides, warned: "the people's democracy collapsed in Hungary, the party leadership ceased to exist."<sup>7</sup> The discussion was resumed on October 30. On that day Khrushchev abruptly announced that "a declaration must be accepted today on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the people's democracies." Zhukov agreed with the withdrawal, "if necessary, from Hungary too." Khrushchev talked about redefining relations with the Hungarian government and declared his support for it. A declaration was thereupon accepted on the de-escalation of the Hungarian crisis "in the recognition of the fact that a continued stay of Soviet troops in Hungary may serve as a pretext for the sharpening of the situation." For this reason the Kremlin decided on negotiating a troop withdrawal from Hungary. This decision was maintained in spite of the fact that on the same day Nagy opened his government to non-communists and disbanded the political police.<sup>8</sup>

In the meanwhile the Suez Crisis erupted. On October 29 Israel attacked Egypt and the following day Britain and France issued an ultimatum threatening to invade. On October 31 they proceeded to bomb Egypt. The same day the CPSU Presidium met once more. Khrushchev declared that the previous decision on Hungary should be reversed and the initiative must be taken to restore order.<sup>9</sup> All members of the organ who were present signalled their approval. The Soviet leadership changed its earlier decision for no apparent reason. Why did the Kremlin decide to crack down so suddenly?

Several considerations pointed towards intervention. Hungary had been an enemy in World War II, and Soviet women and children were allegedly being killed in Hungary. The Soviet leaders were handicapped by an inability to analyze the situation because they were captive of their own vulgar Marxist ideology. Bloc countries like the GDR or Rumania urged military action, the Chinese switched to a hawkish position exactly when the Kremlin chose a conciliatory approach. Moscow was worried about Yugoslav and Western designs. It was thought that the imperialists "were bent on smashing the Socialist countries piecemeal." Yet, surprisingly little reference was made to the imperialists in the Presidium meetings. Khrushchev made an allusion that "if we withdraw from Hungary" the imperialists would attack. But this was on October 31 and no one had raised this problem only a few hours earlier. Did hard-liners gain the upper

hand overnight by convincing others that the situation was getting worse and worse? This would be plausible, but the decision not to intervene was made despite the October 28 analysis that the situation was critical in the light of the belief that an intervention might endanger the bloc's existence.

Although we know what led the Soviets to intervene in the long run, we still do not know why peace was not given a chance even for a day in the face of evidence that the use of force was by no means a foregone conclusion. The minutes of the fateful Politburo meeting give some guidance.

On October 31 Khrushchev uttered what I think is the crucial clue: "Besides Egypt we would give the imperialists Hungary as well." There is only one event we can put our fingers on between the Soviet decision *not* to intervene and *to* intervene: the joint British-French ultimatum and the ensuing bombing of Egyptian airfields. The sequence of events reconstructed based on newly available sources suggests that the British-French intervention in the Middle-East was the immediate cause of the Soviet decision to crush the Hungarian Revolution. Bulganin on his November 1 briefing to the Presidium referred explicitly to an external factor: "The international situation changed. If we do not take measures we will lose Hungary."<sup>10</sup>

What general conclusions can we draw from this case study? In Cold War international relations the aggressive action of western powers immediately entailed Soviet response. In this case Moscow responded with its own aggression in spite of the fact that the Suez region was not part of its sphere of interest. Both crises assumed an East-West dimension.

A close scrutiny of the Presidium's proceedings tells us something about the motivations of Soviet expansionism. The element of ideological messianism — detected in Soviet foreign policy by, among others, George F. Kennan — were wholly absent. In fact, Soviet responses were clearly pragmatic and were arrived at after a careful consideration of pros and cons. Moscow was not worried so much about the cause of communism as the possible loss of its strategic periphery and economic empire. The Kremlin was ready to accept even Nagy's coalition government as long as it seemed to be the best way to keep Hungary in the bloc.

The Kremlin leadership acted the same way as any other group of decision-makers. They did not enter the crisis with an a priori decision for action. Military intervention was not predetermined. Yet, their capability to handle the situation was hampered by their ideological self-indoctrination. Nonetheless this did not preclude a genuine debate on the course of action to take. It is hard to squeeze the actors into boxes but rough groups can be defined: The old guard — Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov seem to have been the most hawkish. Khrushchev, Zhukov and Mikoyan, who were more favorably disposed to the West than others, favored a peaceful solution prior to October 31. Bulganin and Suslov clearly

wavered. Instead of a Leviathan monster, as the Kremlin leadership is usually conceived — we are dealing with human beings facing practical dilemmas.

The lesson for small powers was the same as the rest of the century had provided: in situations of international crises their fate is less dependent upon their own actions as the constellation of the international scene and the moves of great powers.

### Notes

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# NEUROSCIENCE IN HUNGARY

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Neuroscience is one of the leading fields of the fast developing biological sciences. It comprises the study of the brain, the nervous system as a whole, and relationships of the brain to behaviour. The unique position of neuroscience lies in the fact that it is at the intersection of biology, the humanities, sociology, and computer sciences. "Basic" neuroscience includes research into the enigma of learning, memory, perception(s), emotions, and in the case of humans the neuronal basis of self-conscious behaviour, intellectual capabilities, creativity, thinking, creating and/or solving problems.

In fact one of the most intriguing questions since the beginning of self-consciousness, and certainly present already in Hellenistic times, is the origin of human cognition, consciousness, and its (at that time hypothetical) connection to the human brain, which is – according to the Nobel prize winner Sir J.C. Eccles – the most complicated, highly developed production of the universe. It is now generally accepted that the understanding of the functions and the mysteries of the brain represents the greatest conceivable intellectual and scientific challenge to mankind. An understanding of the unique nature of man bestowed by the brain is therefore a goal in itself. At the same time far-reaching applications can be expected also from research to solve major brain-related medical and psychosocial problems.

The utmost importance of neuroscience and related technologies in the treatment or prevention of brain-related health problems might be best illustrated by some data from the National Foundation of Brain Research, which reveals direct and indirect costs caused by disorders of the brain in 1992 in the U.S. (Unfortunately similar data are not available in Hungary.) Accordingly, direct and indirect costs for (1) psychiatric disorders were 136.1 billion dollars, (2) neurological disorders: 103.7 billion dollars, (3) alcohol abuse: 90.1 billion dollars, (4) drug abuse: 71.2 billion dollars, altogether 401.1 billion dollars, equivalent to 7.3 % of the GDP!

The magnitude of these costs – both economic and non-economic – illustrates the scope of the problem of brain disorders as well as their social relevance. Furthermore it indicates that, in addition to broadening our general knowledge of the "thinking centre," neuroscience and its clinical applications deserve high priority. Indeed, considerable increase in the investment to neuro-

science has been taking place almost globally in the last twenty years. This trend seems to continue steadily in the United States, Japan and in most West-European countries – particularly since the announcement of the “Decade of the Brain” in 1989 by President Bush. What is the contribution of Hungary, or more precisely Hungarian researchers, to the “global” neuroscience?

### 1. History of Neuroscience in Hungary

Historically Hungary's tradition in neuroscience has very deep roots. In the early decades of the twentieth century a number of excellent, internationally recognized research schools were founded in Hungary. They included in neuroanatomy the schools of István Apáthy, or Mihály Lenhossék (the latter together with Ramon y Cajal and others was one of the founding fathers of the schools of neurone concept); in neuropathology Károly Schaffer, who first described the Tay-Sachs disease and discovered the “Schaffer-axon collaterals” in the hippocampus, important elements in memory consolidation; the schools of the neurologists Robert Bárány (Nobel prize) and Endre Hőgyes (works on the labyrinthine reflexes), or George Békéssy (Nobel prize) with basic discoveries on the physiology of hearing. Béla Issekutz, a pharmacology professor in the thirties, contributed with his research to the establishment of a modern pharmaceutical industry in Hungary.

In the second half of this century Kálmán Lissák, (physiology) and Endre Grastyán (psycho-physiology) founded excellent research schools in Pécs. Grastyán's work on the connection between orientation and learning and on the role of play in the normal neurobiological status of individuals influenced several researchers in the field of psychophysiology and psychology.

A special place in Hungarian neuroscience is reserved for János Szentágothai, a neuroanatomist and a student of Mihály Lenhossék in Budapest. He started his scientific carrier in the thirties and worked until his death in 1994. Szentágothai modernized his main field, neuroanatomy, by giving to his morphological discoveries, whenever it was possible, functional meaning. His main textbook for medical students was entitled *Functional Anatomy*. In addition to the morphological investigation of the central nervous system (functional anatomy of the spinal cord, cerebellar cortex, visual system, cerebral cortex, among others), he had a keen interest in the development of the nervous system, as well as in neuroendocrine regulation. His most cited papers, however, deal with the modular structure of brain stem (reticular formation, actually described earlier by Mihály Lenhossék), cerebellar cortex, and particularly the precise mapping of the main functional cortical network-elements, the cortical modules. He correctly recognized not only that these modules (each consisting of 5000–10000 nerve cells) are the main building blocks of the neocortex, but described also the inner

structure of these elements ("submodules"), including the connectivity between the inhibitory and excitatory neurones. It is only very recently that his functional interpretation of the working modules was fully verified by the use of modern, non-invasive imaging techniques. In his latest works (1988–1994) Szentágothai considered the hierarchically organised interconnected network of approximately two million cortical modules in human cortex as having the capacity of self-organisation and features essential for complex cognitive functions. Though logical, this concept needs further experimental and theoretical verification before a final conclusion of its validity can be drawn. However, this shows clearly the road of this productive scientist as he moved from minute analysis of the details toward a synthesis.

The schools established around these outstanding scientist-teachers helped to educate a large number of disciples and to establish functioning neuroscience research laboratories both within and outside the Hungarian universities.

## 2. Results and Productivity of Neuroscience in Hungary

Presently in Hungary more than 700 researchers are engaged in more than thirty-five laboratories of basic and clinical neuroscience research. These include subfields such as molecular neurobiology, neurochemistry, neuropsychology, and clinical neurosciences. This research is supported, in addition to Hungarian grants, by international cooperation, which also has a long tradition in Hungary. Characteristically, already in the 1970s, more Hungarian researchers from all generations were participating in European and/or American neuroscience meetings, than from all the neighbouring countries put together. Furthermore during the last two decades of the communist era many Hungarian neurobiologists spent shorter or longer periods in West-European, American, and Japanese laboratories, returning home with modern techniques and attitudes. Of course, a significant number of these generally younger scientists settled down at the host institutions and continued their work there. Fortunately, most of them maintain continuous, fruitful connections with parent institutions in Hungary, visiting and inviting young Hungarian trainees to their laboratories. Beside "Hungarian-Hungarian" cooperation other international scientific collaborations also exhibit a growing trend. While in 1980–85 only 15% of all neuroscience publications were the results of international cooperation, by 1995 50% of all papers with Hungarian authorship resulted from international cooperative research. Furthermore Hungary was the first country in Europe that joined by official governmental decree the "Decade of the Brain" initiative of President Bush and the United States Congress.

Internationally recognised scientific results by Hungarian neuroscientists include (among others):

- (1). Discovery and description of the internal structure of cerebellar and cerebral modules, the basis of cognitive and subcognitive functions of the brain.
- (2). The development of a new, efficient anti-Parkinsonian drug, Deprenyl (Eldepryl in the United States).
- (3). Discovery of a new cortical inhibitory structure (the axo-axonal inhibition) essential for the normal functioning of the cortex.
- (4). Connectivity and role of inhibitory elements in the functioning of hippocampus, the main archicortical region responsible for memory processing and retrieval.
- (5). Description and pharmaco-kinetics of a new, interneuronal, but non-synaptic signal transduction.
- (6). Experimental proof for morphological plasticity of nerve cells and neuronal networks of the adult brain.
- (7). Experimental demonstration (via destruction of nerve cells by Capsaicin) of the role of the neuropeptide P-substance in pain perception.

Scientometric data provide also evidence for the relative strength of Hungarian neuroscience. According to international surveys (*Scientometrics*, 16 (1989): 257) Hungary's contribution to the world's scientific production in the eighties was 0.49% of the world production for neuroscience publication in internationally recognized journals and even more, 0.55%, for the citations in the same journals. Hungary occupied the twentieth and the fourteenth place among the world's countries in the number of publications and citations respectively. In that period, moreover, Hungarian neuroscience publications had the highest expected citation rate (ECR) in the world (4.81 per paper). (ECR indicates the visibility of the publication channels used and informs about the publication strategy of the country). It is also remarkable that Hungary's attractivity index (AI) in neuroscience was also the highest in the world (2.03) indicating the enormously high role and prestige of neuroscience in Hungary. (AI: country's share in citation in neuroscience divided by that in all sciences). If we are calculating Hungary's "per capita" production (number of publications) in neuroscience as a function of GDP, it was the highest in the world (USA: 100%, Hungary: 189%). It is not surprising therefore that the Second World Congress of Neurosciences in 1987 was held in Budapest.

### 3. Present State – and the Future

Although Hungary's contribution to global neuroscience is relatively well-recognized, its place and participation in the country's cultural and academic life is equally important. Here, however, a note of warning is necessary. This "success"-story, the high level of neuroscience research in the 1980s could be maintained only through (1) continuous education of a new generation of neuro-

scientists, (2) proper material support for research and researchers, (3) introduction of new, modern techniques such as neuromolecular and neuroimaging methods, (4) further strengthening of international cooperation.

The introduction of up-dated Ph.D. programmes to Hungarian universities in the early 1990s seems to ensure the necessary number and quality of the new generation. Altogether eight neuroscience Ph.D. programmes with more than eighty students are presently in operation. There are, however, problems with finding positions for the fresh Ph.D.s after graduation. Extramural institutions (pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, etc.) for reasons I do not have the time to discuss here, have only very limited possibility to employ fresh Ph.D.s. Although the so-called postdoctoral positions, planned to be introduced beginning in 1997 might partially help to perpetuate research by Ph.D.s in the universities, this is, considering the present economic situation of the universities, clearly only a temporary solution. This helps to explain the rapidly increasing number of Ph.D.s leaving the country and working permanently in other (mostly West-European) laboratories. The necessary increase or at least the maintenance of material support for neuroscience and science in general has become seriously handicapped in the last several years. As an illustration, the steadily decreasing share of research and development expenditures as expressed as a percentage of the decreasing GDP should be mentioned. While in 1989 it was close to 2%, and even in 1992 it was 1.2%, by 1995 it had declined to 0.77% of the GDP! In a country, which would like to join the European Union (where research, testing and development expenditures are well above 2%), this dramatic decline in the support of research might cause serious structural and functional, in some respects irreversible problems for future generations. International cooperation might partially compensate for the decline of domestic support, but only if it does not lead to the mass-emigration of those talented young scientists, who under normal circumstances should become the leaders and teachers of the next generation of Hungarian neuroscientists.

I want to conclude this presentation, however, by expressing the optimistic hope that the declining trends can be stopped in the not distant future and science, as well as neuroscience will continue to be succesful in Hungary during the twenty-first century.



# HUNGARIAN PIONEERS OF THE INFORMATION AGE

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The electronic computer has been in existence only about fifty years, yet the annual sales of personal computers in 1996 exceeded seventy million units. Webs cover the whole globe. We can no longer imagine our life and work without computers, microprocessors, networks, without the information superhighway. This is a success story in which Hungarians had and have an important role. We can find them at many important milestones on the road of computers and computing. In this article I will concentrate on those who have been working in the United States.

The age of information could not have been reached without computers, which regardless of their size, speed, power and cost, all follow the concept defined by **John von Neumann** (**Neumann János**, 1903–1957) who was not only the “father” of the modern computer but also one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century and the inventor of game theory. He published a book on this theory in 1944. Fifty years later another Hungarian, **John G. Harsanyi** (**Harsányi János**, 1920–) received the Nobel prize in economics “for his pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games.”

**John Kemeny** (**Kemény János**, 1928–1992), Einstein’s former research assistant, the president of the Dartmouth College for twelve years and chairman of President Carter’s Commission on the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, is the coauthor of BASIC, the world’s most popular programming language, which can be found in each personal computer. The Esperanto of computers made available programming and computer applications to the masses. He envisioned and helped to make real in many cases the man – machine interaction and networking of computers, thus e-mail, teleconferencing, the Internet, which have led us to the new information galaxy. Charles Simonyi at Microsoft has helped to develop many important Microsoft software products, from Word, through Excel, to Windows.

It is hard to imagine desktops or laptops, supercomputers or even a modern washing machine without microprocessors, the products of Intel, which is the world’s leading manufacturer of computer chips. Its annual earnings in 1996 exceeded \$ 5.2 billion on sales of \$ 20.8 billion. **Andy Grove** (**Gróf András**, 1938–) the former student of the Technical University of Budapest left Hungary in 1956, earned his Ph. D. from the University of California at Berkeley, co-founded Intel

and served as its chief executive officer during the past five years. According to *Fortune* (February 17, 1997) "Intel is the only manufacturer that can afford the gargantuan plants required to make millions of microprocessors." And: "He [Grove] may be the best manager in the world."

As one can see from the above list, Hungarians had and have a key role both in the fields of hardware and software. They achieved their results mainly in the United States. This does not mean that there are no others living and working in Hungary, who contributed significantly to computing and its applications. Those who are working in Hungary have contributed more to software and to applications than to hardware developments. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences has several different research centers in this field. Maybe the most well known is SZTAKI (Számítástechnikai Automatizálási Kutató Intézet).

Two widely known software products – the results of recent development – are Recognita and ArchiCAD. Recognita was originally developed at SZKI (Számítástechnikai Koordinációs Intézet) is a document recognition software with artificial intelligence functions, which is used by many companies producing document scanners (among others by Hewlett Packard, IBM, and Ricoh.). ArchiCAD, a computer aided design program for architects, was developed both for the Apple and for the Windows platform. It sells well all over the world. The software house, Graphisoft has an office in California, another one in Tokyo, not to mention the list of their European presence.

There is a long list of names and institutions that have had a pioneering role in Hungary in the field of computing and automation, and space permits only the mention of a few. At the Measurement Research Center of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Dr. Rezső Tarján headed a department where a successful group worked on different memory and storage systems, as well as delay lines. They had close contact with Dr. László Kozma, professor of the Technical University of Budapest and Dr. László Kalmár, who was working in Szeged at the József Attila Tudományegyetem. Tarján has published a significant number of articles and books. László Kalmár (1905–1976) established a center at his university, where he worked on the problems of programmability and automata. His important "product" was the Szegedi Katica (Ladybird from Szeged), which was programmable and could be used to model different sensors. The first Hungarian made programmable digital computer, M3 was developed by the Cybernetic Research Team of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences during the 1950s. The Central Physical Research Institute of the Academy played a leading role not only in research but in the low volume production of digital compatible computers as well. Their products were the more reliable computers manufactured in those days in the COMECON countries.

As for the future of computing, CNN (cellular neural network) is a super-processor which can have a key role in parallel processing, as for example in the case of image processing. Dr. Tamás Roska, who is the member of the Hungarian

Academy of Sciences from SZTAKI, is working on CNN with Prof. L. O. Chua, who has a laboratory in Berkeley. As a result of Prof. Roska's research the CNN Universal Machine and Supercomputer can combine the 'neural' analog array computation and the logical (digital) one and can be used – among many others – to imitate some functional asymmetries of the human brain.

As Isaac Asimov noted: "A saying circulated among us [who worked on the atomic bomb] that two intelligent species live on earth: humans and Hungarians." The previously mentioned pioneers of the information age belong to the second group, those who have had an essential role in our "new age." We hope there will be many other who will follow them on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

### Neumann János – John von Neumann (1903–1957)

In much of 1867–1913, Budapest sped forward economically faster than anywhere else in Europe, – Norman Macrae, the past editor of *The Economist*, wrote enthusiastically. – The booming Budapest of 1903, into which Johnny [von Neumann] was born, was about to produce one of the most glittering single generations of scientists, writers, artists, musicians, and useful expatriate millionaires to come from one small community. Budapest surfed into the 20th century on a wave of music and operetta down the blue Danube, as an industrializing city that 'still of violets in the spring', pulsing with mental vigor in its six hundred coffehouses and its brilliant elitist schools. One was asked why Hungary in this generation had brought forth so many geniuses. Nobel laureate **Eugene P. Wigner** replied that he did not understand the question. Hungary in that time had produced only one genius, Johnny von Neumann.

He could have been a Nobel laureate in mathematics. But as Theodore von Kármán noted in *The Wind and Beyond*: "There is no Nobel prize in mathematics, possibly because Alfred Nobel could not forgive his mistress for running off with a mathematician."

**Edward Teller** characterizes Neumann's mathematical talent jokingly:

1. *Johnny can prove any statement.*
2. *Anything Johnny proves is right.*

In the late 1920s in Max Born's physics department in Göttingen Bohr, Fermi, Heisenberg, Oppenheimer, Pauli, Schrödinger, Teller, Wigner gave each other the key and quantum mechanics was born. Atomic spectra were explained by Heisenberg with the help of infinite columns of numbers indicating the observable dipole momenta associated with each spectral line. Schrödinger described light emission by the vibration of an electron field. Schrödinger disliked

Heisenberg's abstract algebra, Heisenberg considered Schrödinger's electron jelly to be disgusting. But both theories gave identical results! The old Hilbert asked his assistant Neumann to clarify the situation. The twenty-six year old Neumann gave Hilbert a note in which he proved that both were right. Neumann had given quantum mechanics an interpretation that is accepted now worldwide by physicists and by mathematicians. The era of the constructive coexistence of mathematics and quantum mechanics had begun, and *The Mathematical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics* by Johann von Neumann became its classical text book.

Sensing the changing political climate in Germany, Neumann accepted the invitation from Princeton University and in 1930 sailed to America. For him the practicality of the American people was attractive. In contrast to the reservations of Einstein, Wigner and Béla Bartók for Neumann America was *love at first sight*, and Johann von Neumann became Johnny.

At Princeton he soon became one of the leading personalities of the newly established *Institute for Advanced Studies* and enjoyed high respect. The Neumanns missed the relaxed atmosphere of the European cafés and seminars, so they organized regular parties, not only as social events but as brainstorming meetings for scientists.

Neumann became a citizen of the United States in 1937, and as a good American he learned to play poker and drive a car. To tell the truth, he was a poor player and an equally poor driver because his attention was usually devoted to more exciting topics. He published a paper on the mathematical theory of poker from which his *game theory* developed. Years later the superpowers' game of the Cold War directed Harsányi's attention towards game theory and eventually led to a Nobel prize in economics in 1994. The press release of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences stated, "John G. Harsanyi showed how games of incomplete information can be analyzed, thereby providing a theoretical foundation for a lively field of research which focuses on strategic situations where different agents don't know each others' objectives."

Another important input for von Neumann came from another direction. A military test ground was developed at Aberdeen in Maryland (Aberdeen Proving Ground, established in 1917, is the oldest army testing ground). There **Theodore von Kármán** constructed the first supersonic wind tunnel. Kármán was interested in aerodynamics, in vortices, which became relevant for supersonic flight. But the equations of aerodynamics were highly nonlinear, for solving them the power of conventional mathematical analysis was insufficient. Kármán asked for the help of his Hungarian friend in 1937. Neumann started working enthusiastically for the military, he was made lieutenant of the United States Army. He elaborated artillery tables, studied explosions and shock waves. To calculate non-linear shock waves, Neumann needed machines. In Los Alamos only the electro-mechanical punch card machines of International Business Machines (IBM) were available, developed originally for the census in 1890. The multiplication of

two ten-digit numbers takes about five minutes for a human and took about fifteen seconds for these calculators. The speed of the calculation was low because of the inertia of the mechanical relays.

The turning point in the history of computation was August 7, 1944, when John von Neumann visited Philadelphia and saw ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) constructed by J. Eckert. Neumann was impressed by the ENIAC *imitating the human brain with its 17,000 electron tubes*.

In the case of calculating a new differential equation, the rewiring of ENIAC required a quarter of an hour, followed by the computation time of three seconds. This made the machine inefficient. Neumann got the idea in late August 1944 that not only the initial data but even the program can be input to the computer and stored electronically in the memory. Then *the central processing unit* executes the operations one after the other, according to the stored program. This has become the "von Neumann computer" now in use worldwide.

In his famous book *The Man and the Computer* John Kemeny recalled one of Neumann's most interesting lectures about his proposals for the new computers.

In 1946 I had the privilege of listening to a lecture at Los Alamos by the great Hungarian-born mathematician John von Neumann. I was at that time assigned by the United States Army to work at the Los Alamos computation center. Von Neumann was one of the chief consultants to this computer operation. He must have concluded that even though the work we were doing was useful, with modern technology it should be possible to design computers that would make life a great deal easier. Although I do not have notes on his 1946 lecture, I have never forgotten some of his main points.

Von Neumann's Proposals:

1. Fully Electronic Computers
2. Binary Number System
3. Internal Memory
4. Stored Program
5. Universal Computer

First of all, he argued that the computers of the day, which depended heavily on mechanical parts, were much too slow to be useful. Therefore he proposed an entirely electronic design. He went on to argue that, while the decimal system was perfectly practical for mechanical devices, a binary system would be much easier to implement electronically because of the efficiency of on-off devices. Next he pointed out that if we had faster machines it did not make sense for human beings to have to interfere after each step. He advocated the existence of an 'internal memory' in which partial results could be retained so that the computer could automatically go through many rounds of operations. Next he pointed out that it is not necessary to build specialized computers for different tasks. The English mathematical logician A. M. Turing had shown that a machine which could carry out a few basic operations could, in principle, carry out any calculation. He therefore proposed that computers be such 'universal Turing machines.' His

most important proposals, however, concerned the logical control of computers. Von Neumann proposed that one should be able to store a set of instructions within the internal memory of the machine so that the computer could go from step to step by consulting its own memory without waiting for human interference. Such a set of instructions is now known as a 'program.'

He described the structure and the main components of modern computers as well. There is a need for input and output devices, an arithmetical and control unit (CPU = central processing unit), for memory and storage devices.

The 'first draft' of the *Analyzer with Stored Programme* was finished by Neumann on 30 July 1945. This is considered to be the most important document of the Computer Era. Universities in California, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard and MIT were competing for Johnny and his computer.

"Neumann was undoubtedly a genius. This meant among others that he was able to learn a new subject in an incredibly short time. Before designing the computer he took two weeks off to learn electronics, thus became able to supervise the construction of the hardware." (Maurice Saphiro to George Marx, 1994.) It was decided to build the von Neumann computer in Princeton. The Institute for Advanced Studies covered one third, the army the other third, and the navy the rest of the 300.000 dollar budget. Johnny convinced the military that it would be a good investment to publish regularly about the project, because in this way also the army and the navy would get more computer experts. The reports made a huge impact worldwide. Later Neumann approached *Vladimir Zworikin* to discuss the possible use of the cathode ray tube, developed for RCA, then Zoltán Bay in 1948 to try the electron multipliers for speeding up the rate of computers.

The Princeton computer became ready in 1952, but by that time, thanks to the Princeton reports, seven further sister computers entered the field practically simultaneously, the MANIAC in Los Alamos National Laboratory, the JOHN-NIAC at the Rand Corporation, the AVIDAC at Argonne National Laboratory, the ORDVAC in Aberdeen, the ORACLE in Oak Ridge, the ILLIAC in Illinois, and the IBM-701, which led IBM into its dominance of the market. Today millions and millions of von Neumann computers operate worldwide.

Johnny's second wife Klára Dán became one of the first coders of electronic computers. As an error message she used "E2 A BIDE5 10" (the Hungarian phrase *EZ A BIDES LO*, meaning "this stinking horse"), because only the characters ABCDE and 1234567890 were available (George Gamow to George Marx).

Neumann had the vision that computers will open a new era of (predictive) science. His attention turned to improve the reliability of weather forecasts; he set his goal to turn meteorology from a kitchen art into a predictive science. He wished to rely on electronic computation. But the first computers needed two days to make a weather forecast for the very next day. In modern warfare forecasting the weather could have strategic importance, thus the air force encour-

aged Neumann's effort. Computerized weather forecasting started in 1955 for military purposes.

Neumann's last book was *The Computer and the Brain* in 1957. The roots of his ideas on automata can be traced back to 1939. Neumann's frequent correspondence with his friend **Rudolf Ortvy**, professor of theoretical physics at Budapest University, served as a supply of new ideas. Ortvy wrote to Neumann:

As I see, the operation of the brain is going to be ripe for understanding. The mentality of medical doctors, however does not make them able to solve this problem. Physicists and mathematicians are better trained for such a task. I think only an outsider could give an appropriate push, in a certain cooperation with physicians and physiologists.

In a letter dated in 1940 Ortvy wrote

The brain is a network with neurons as nodes. Each neuron may receive impulses from several others, and may send impulses to them. The state of the neuron (its sensitivity for incoming signals, and its activity for emitting signals) may depend on previous inputs. The state of the brain may be given by the state of its specified neurons. Each mental situation could be characterized by the set of these data. This reminds me of a telephone switching central." Neumann reacted to these ideas favorably: "Your comments about brain structure are interesting. I think one has to take this seriously."

Is it possible to design a reliable machine using unreliable components? Nature has done it in the case of the brain, which is made of neurons. In a Princeton lecture in 1948, Neumann considered the computer as a metaphor for the living cell. He distinguished the two main components of automata: the machine (we now call it hardware) and the stored information (we now call it software). These represent two main functions of life: metabolism and reproduction. In this way, John von Neumann was a **forerunner in modern biology**. (In an unfinished paper he discussed the critical size of an universal automata, built of simple cellular modules, which is able to reproduce itself, or may even be capable of evolution, perhaps producing more and more efficient automata in successive generations.)

Neumann's wife Klára wrote about the story of this book in its foreword:

John von Neumann was invited to present the Sillman series of lectures in the spring of 1956 at Yale University. The Sillman lectures are one of the most well-known and prestigious traditions in the scientific life of the U.S. It is an honor to be invited to become the speaker of such a serial of lectures. The papers of the lectures are published by Yale University Press. The Sillman family had an important role as sponsor in the history of the university. Neumann felt being honored by the invitation and decided to speak about the computer and the brain. He asked the organizers to concentrate the

program for one week (instead of two which was the general practice before) because of his other activities at the presidentially appointed Atomic Energy Committee, but promised to elaborate more on this subject in the written version. While working very actively on the manuscript, the first indications of his mortal illness appeared. From January 1956 he had a wheelchair and had to cancel his planned travels and public appearances but was working on the manuscript. He was fighting with death. He wanted to finish his book.

Neumann was hospitalized in April 1956, and he continued to write his book even in his terminal hospital bed. The book was published only after his death, but initiating a new direction of research, leading to new types of computers, and new ways of understanding human intelligence.

Neumann did not live long enough to see the future developments. Cancer was diagnosed in his collar bone. The cancer was caused by the radioactive contamination during the development of the atomic bomb. When **Zoltán Bay** visited him to discuss how to speed up the computers, he told Bay (in Hungarian): – “I don’t understand why people are afraid of nuclear energy. They have to be afraid of a diagnosis finding cancer in their body.”

A few months later he received the Freedom Medal from President Eisenhower with the president standing and Neumann sitting in a wheelchair. At his hospital bedside politicians and generals asked for his strategical advice. Johnny was still able to run economical, political and military simulations on computers, which were accepted because they worked.

During the Korean War, when Douglas McArthur intended to attack Chinese territory, Neumann’s simulations indicated that the losses would outweigh the advantages and in this way he may have helped to prevent a dangerous escalation of the conflict.

**Edward Teller** who always admired von Neumann wrote once. “Neumann’s brain was working faster than the brain of any other humans.”

When cancer attacked his brain, he himself tried to plan a radiation therapy, but it was too late. “It was depressing for him to experience the decay of his brain. He asked me to visit him frequently, just to have a chance to test and use his logic.” [Teller to George Marx in 1994.] – For safety reasons an army colonel was present in his bedroom, to make sure that in a state of delirium Johnny did not blurt out any state secrets. (The security guard, however, was uncomprehending because in his sleep Johnny spoke Hungarian.)

When Neumann saw the state of his health deteriorating irreversibly, he turned to the Catholic faith, saying: “It is probable that God exists. Many things can be explained more simply in this way than without Him.” He died on 8 February 1957, and he was buried in the Princeton cemetery. At his tomb Bradbury said: “If Johnny is where he thought he was going to, there must be some very interesting conversations going on about now.” [Macrae]

**Kemény János— John G. Kemeny**  
(1926–1992)

**Johnny G. Kemeny**, a boy from Budapest, became one of the most publicized scientists in the American press in 1979 during and after the completion of his investigation on the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant failure. His necrology in *The New York Times* filled three columns in 1992. Obituaries were published among others by the *Washington Post*, the *International Herald Tribune* and *The Guardian*.

His father Tibor Kemény had worked in agricultural trade and banking in Budapest. János Kemény attended the same primary school as **János Neumann**. Later, he was enrolled to the Berzsenyi Gymnasium (**George Soros** attended the same school). About this period he said, "I was very happy in the Berzsenyi Gymnasium. I had a wonderful mathematics teacher."

In 1938 Hitler marched in to Vienna, and on this occasion his father had said: "This is the beginning of the end." Taking advantage on his export-import connections, the older Kemény travelled to the United States to develop his business in America. In January 1940 his family followed him. (John G. Kemeny revisited Hungary only once in 1964.) The fourteen year old boy from Budapest landed in the New World, as many other immigrants he did not know a word of English. He understood Hungarian, German and Latin. In New York he went to the George Washington High School. Certainly this was not a bad school, Henry Kissinger attended it, too. But still, Kemény was not too satisfied with it. "There was a great difference between Budapest and New York. I have learned good mathematics from Mr. Bölcs házy in the Berzsenyi Gymnasium. The next occasion to learn more mathematics was at Princeton University." At this famous university, after a successful exam the professor noticed his alien accent, and asked him about his origin. When Kemeny answered, the professor raised his hands and said, "My God, one more Hungarian!"

The nineteen old young man fulfilled his military service in Los Alamos.

When Kemeny obtained the American citizenship, wrote the news happily to his parents, saying that it went without any complication and delay: — 'Nobody asked me silly questions whether I had been a communist or like that.' — But the letter like other ones mailed from Los Alamos — were censored, even those written in Hungarian. The security officers called Kemeny to a hearing. All his excited friends were waiting for him outside. One hour elapsed, then another one. Finally, after two and a half hours Kemeny emerged. We asked, — 'What happened?' — He answered, — 'Well, I let the security officer acknowledge that there are problems in capitalism as well.' — Kemeny excelled indeed in debates; as freshman he was the head of the Debating Team in Princeton. Otherwise Kemeny was a very liberal man." (Peter Lax, 1994.)

Kemeny worked in the computer laboratory of the theoretical department under *Richard Feynman*. His interest towards computers had originated from here. He had a chance to work with **John von Neumann**, who highly impressed Kemeny. He noted, (*Yankee*, March 1980 issue): "Neumann was quite a normal man, and the greatest mathematician alive. He taught me among others that I don't have to look terrible like some other professors try to do if I wished to become a successful mathematician."

When his army service was over, he got his B. A. degree from Princeton University as the best student in the class of 1947. Later in 1949 he obtained his Ph. D. in logic. In 1948 **Robert Oppenheimer**, the director of the Institute for Advanced Studies elected John G. Kemeny as the assistant of **Albert Einstein**. They worked on unified field theory.

Einstein was the kindest man I ever met. His assistant was always a mathematician. He did not need any assistance in physics, but he could use some help in mathematics. Although Einstein was educated in mathematics he did not know up-to-date mathematics. This is why he needed an assistant. To be frank, I was more familiar with modern mathematics. Certainly I had to know a bit of physics as well. I have become interested mainly in the theory of relativity, I have read a lot about it. (The Voice of the Martians).

Thanks to Einstein's recommendation, Dartmouth College invited John G. Kemeny to be the chair of mathematics. This college (founded in 1759) was older than the United States itself and had inherited very conservative traditions.

Professor Kemeny – feeling the utmost relevance of mathematics in society – considered mathematics teaching to be his profession for life. Once Kemeny complained, "You can study mathematics for fourteen years without meeting any topics created after 1800." He really wanted to change this. That is why he wrote his famous study book *Introduction to Finite Mathematics*. More than 200,000 copies of it were sold. Kemeny wrote about the aim of the book in the Preface to the first edition

In the usual introductory mathematical curriculum the courses are those leading to the calculus. A few years ago, the Department of Mathematics at Dartmouth College decided to introduce a different kind of freshman course, which students could elect along with the more traditional ones. The new course was to be designed to introduce a student to some concepts of modern mathematics early in his college career. While primarily a mathematics course, it was to include applications to the biological and social sciences and thus provide a point of view, other than that given by physics, concerning the uses of mathematics. Our aim was to choose topics which are initially close to the students' experience, which are important in modern day mathematics, and which have interesting and important applications.

This is why the book includes mathematical logic, theory of information, mathematical statistics, linear algebra, theory of games and many exciting problems from behavioral science (business, economics, marriage customs, even genetics.) The book, written forty years ago, makes fresh reading even now.

As Lax said to Professor Marx, "Each generation has one textbook or two, which changes the character of teaching a subject, Kemeny's book was one of them."

Kemeny was deeply interested in education. He chaired the American Committee on Mathematics Education and wrote intensively about the theory of probability, about random walks, games. Even in his late years, when he had heart problems, Professor Kemeny insisted that "teaching is the only cure that helps me".

As early as the first half of the 1960s Kemeny wanted to have computer capacity available for each student of the college.

With Thomas Kurtz John G. Kemeny brought the first computer to the college in his own car. It was as big as a freezer, with a memory of 60K and with a speed of 60 operations per second. But Kemeny was the most dissatisfied with the way computers were used

These computers were huge and expensive beasts. The directors of computer centers considered keeping the user at safe distance from the computer to be their main duty. The user punched the code onto cards and handed the batch to the operator in the morning. The operator collected about a hundred batches, then fed them to the computer. The machine performed all the operations one after the other according to the instructions of the code, then printed the outcome on a page. Then came the next batch. On the next day the user obtained a page with a message like ERROR ON CARD 27. Or there was nothing on the page because the user forgot to add the instruction PRINT X to the programme. Then the search of errors followed, new batch, a new day...

In the old batch environment the typical user needed ten to twenty trial attempts before his program worked correctly. While batch processing is completely efficient from the point of view of keeping the machine busy at all times, it is most inefficient from human point of view. Kemeny started to think about how to change the situation and how to make the computer available to several users. He came out with the idea of time sharing. (In 1990 he received the ever first Robinson Prize from IBM for his pioneering work in investing and realizing the time sharing system.) In a time shared system each user works on his/her own terminal, and the central computer shares the working time of its processor among the users. Each millisecond will be utilized, each user will be satisfied. To organize time sharing is the duty of the central computer, not of people. Such a system was highly needed at Dartmouth, because it was decided to make an introduction to the use of computers a regular part of the Liberal Arts program.

Over 700 students a year received computer training. The time sharing system was established at Dartmouth College (1963). "It was one of the happiest moments in my life: I did not have to punch cards any more," remembered Kemeny.

The DTTS (Dartmouth Time Sharing System) became the prototype not only of time sharing but large education networks as well. Hundreds of terminals (located in New England, and many other parts of the U.S. and in Canada) were connected to the GE computers of the Kiewit Computational Center in Hanover. There were terminals all over the Dartmouth campus. In many cases not only the dormitory building had one or two but the rooms of the students had installed terminals, too. Thus a chance was offered to each student to reach the computer through a terminal.

Dartmouth through its network offered a kind of e-mail service as well as an electronic bulletin board. The author has clear memory of a historical moment. It happened on August 6, 1974. He was working at one of the terminals when all the current jobs were interrupted for a moment and the following message was printed out: "President Nixon resigned." Some seconds later the whole system was up and running again, but business was not as usual.

FORTRAN – the most common programme language at that time – was far from being user-friendly. Kemeny noticed that an *interactive language* had to be developed, at which the machine reacts to the input immediately. In this way the user can build up the program by trial and error, a method used so efficiently by kids. Kemeny formulated the required properties (He described them in his book *Back to BASIC*).

1. *The computer language should be versatile to satisfy different purposes.*
2. *The language should be easy for beginners.*
3. *Its instructions of high level could be learned by the user at a later stage.*
4. *It should be interactive between user and computer.*
5. *It should give error messages which are easily understandable and can help to correct the error.*
6. *It could be used without knowing the specific computer architecture.*
7. *It protects the user from the problems of the operating system.*

This is how BASIC, the *Beginners' All Purpose Symbolic Instruction Code*, was born in the hands of John G. Kemeny and Thomas Kurtz

I did not invent BASIC just to make one more computer language. I made it because I felt that the computer had to be made available for each student. The first BASIC program ran at 5:00 a.m. on May 1st, 1964.

When we applied for support from the National Science Foundation, the referees criticized us that we did not use the computer scientists but students. This was where the NSF erred. I am sure today that we succeeded at first because others relied on computer experts, but we worked with university students! Students are able to work through endless hours, full of new ideas, they attack creatively even the difficult problems.

BASIC is today the most widely used computer language, it is one of the languages that most people understand.

Once Henry Ford created the T-model because he wanted each citizen to have a car. Time sharing and BASIC achieved something similar. They the first steps towards making computers available for everyone.

Everyone was welcome to use or adopt the language freely. As Kemeny remembered in 1988

Microsoft planted BASIC at first into 4K memory, that was a miracle at that time. It is no wonder that one had to make compromises in case of having 4K or 16K memory. Since then the ROM memories grew larger, the necessity of compromising does not exist any longer. Today BASIC is a completely structured language with an international standard. In 1985 we launched the TRUE BASIC, this language (and its graphic) is completely independent of the type of machine. In Dartmouth College each student uses a PC, the Faculties of Humanities, Economy, Medicine included. And each student has access to the mainframe computer of the College with time sharing. Now 90% of the students are computer literate.

The 1960s were the era of student protest movements in the USA. This was the time when the popular and future sensitive John G. Kemeny was elected to be the President of Dartmouth College. On this occasion he learned the rule: "The President may not give lectures." But he revolted "I always considered teaching to be my profession, not presidency." While being the President of the College in the 1970s, Professor Kemeny kept all his classes. He only complained that "professors don't know computer programming and don't know teaching either." When the Security Service of the college asked the president what to do if the revolting students would occupy the president's office, as had happened elsewhere, Kemeny answered: "Give them all the unanswered letters, and oblige them to burn the letters!"

The name of Dartmouth College's football team was the INDIANS, but it was President Kemeny who in the 200 year-long history of the college made it first possible for native Indians to be enrolled. In spite of strong opposition, he achieved also the admittance of girls to the old conservative college.

John G. Kemeny liked crossword puzzles, Sherlock Holmes and Agatha Christie. He kept a teddy bear from his grandson on his bedside table. When he wanted to buy a new house, he sold his present one to the parents of Ms. Harriet Mayor, who later became the second wife of Senator Fulbright. Mrs. Fulbright's parents made changes but kept the patio unchanged. Once Professor Kemeny visited his previous house. Looking around he seemed to like the house in its present form but commented, "It is kind of you that you kept everything in the original form but why was it needed to change the patio?" (The real situation was

just the opposite. Kemeny was much more interested in the details of improving BASIC than in his previous house.) Anyway, the old and the new owner of the house were good friends. (Mrs. Fulbright to the author in 1996.)

John G. Kemeny wrote his famous book *Man and the Computer* in 1972. Let's listen to him about it:

I was delighted to receive an invitation from the American Museum of National History in New York City to deliver the „Man and Nature” lectures in the fall of 1971. It gave me an opportunity to pull together many ideas I have had over the years concerning the impact of computers and their future potential. It was not my intention to present encyclopedic treatments of modern computers, since such treatises are usually thoroughly boring. Since it is too early to write a definitive history of the development of computers, I present instead a personalized view of what has happened in the first twenty-five years of modern computers. From this I go on to a critical evaluation of the present state of the art and the various applications of computers. I conclude with an examination of what seems possible and likely to occur in the next twenty years and a description of several exciting new uses of computers which most of us will live to see.

He envisioned different educational applications, the new electronic library, applications at home, solving social problems, he even elaborated in detail on computers and communication, predicted the Internet, and many many more uses. He confessed, “I believe that next to the original development of general-purpose high-speed computers the most important event was the coming of man – machine interaction. I feel that the true significance of computers in the future will lie precisely in this teamwork of man and computer.” He was perfectly right.

Professor Kemeny was always deeply interested in the problems of society. He noted in one of his lectures in 1973,

The average citizen trusts the statement of an engineer concerning the safety of a bridge, or in that of a medical doctor concerning sickness. But where are social scientists whom we could trust in a similar way? When an excellent social scientist predicts something, it is probable that another equally respected social scientist will make the opposite prediction. After the successful breakthroughs achieved in physical sciences and biological sciences, the incoming generation has to make an equally reliable breakthrough in social studies. Those young people have to do it who are now our students, otherwise no time will be left to prevent the catastrophe endangering humankind.

John G. Kemeny became an honorary doctor at nineteen universities, received the prize of the New York Academy, and was an honorary member of the Eötvös Society. The peak of his career came when he entered the Oval Office of the White House by the invitation of President Carter.

At 4:00 a.m., on the 28th of March 1979, near the town of Harrisburg in the state of Pennsylvania, a very small and completely insignificant technological incident happened in a nuclear power station. Within a week this was made the greatest media sensation of the year. Two weeks after the incident, the President of the United States nominated a Commission of twelve members to investigate the case, and he charged me to chair the Commission. On April 11th, 1979, as we were driving with my wife toward the White House, we tried to figure out what NCR could mean, which I was supposed to cooperate with. Perhaps National Research Council? Because I never had heard about the existence of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Then after six months the NRC wished that they had never heard of me." (Kemeny's talk to students at Dartmouth College, 1979.)

He summarized his findings as follows:

At the Three Mile Island nuclear power station there were a few minor disturbances in the machines, but these were not extraordinary. All the real errors were made by people at different levels: operators, operator trainers, on up to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I was shocked by the huge number of human errors. For me the most important message of the Three Mile Island accident was that humans commit all the mistakes which can be committed. The other important conclusion was that in spite of human errors practically no radiation leaked out. The main problem in the U.S. is that since the case of Three Mile Island people are afraid of nuclear power. I tried to explain that coal mining and smoke is risky as well but public opinion is completely irrational. While we were writing the Report of our Commission, there was a huge explosion in a chemical factory in Canada, not far from the border of the U.S. The escaped chemical poison killed people. A much larger area was evacuated than in the case of the Three Mile Island accident. But the chemical accident made headlines only for one day, the public reaction was negligible compared to that of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. The anxiety with respect to nuclear power is based on the psychological fear from the atomic bomb. (*The Voice of the Martians*) – And he concluded – The modern machines are already reliable. The humans are not yet reliable enough.

President Carter personally thanked Kemeny for the report of the Kemeny Commission. In October Professor Kemeny returned to the Dartmouth College. His students asked him to speak about Three Mile Island. Over 1,000 students assembled, including environmentalists. Professor Kemeny began his lecture by saying: "You can't imagine how good a feeling it is to return to civilization after six months spent in Washington." Following the lecture, the environmentalists cancelled their intended demonstration.

John G. Kemeny died on December 26, 1992 due to a sudden heart attack. The obituary of the New York Times quoted his words told to his students when he retired from the college presidency in 1981:

In the years to come you will hear a voice heard in many guises throughout history, which is the most dangerous voice you will ever hear. It tries to divide us by setting whites against blacks, by setting Christians against Jews, by setting men against women. And if it succeeds in dividing us from our fellow beings, it will impose its evil will upon a fragmented society. Don't listen to this voice! Listen much more to the internal voice which says that mankind may live in harmony, mankind may respect the right and dignity of each human being. I ask you to use your talent for the creation of a better world, for making a liveable world, in which there will be a place for all of us. Sons and daughters of our College: the whole of humankind is your brother and sister, and you are the custodians of your brothers and sisters.

Charles Simonyi joined Microsoft in 1980 as the thirty-third employee. Microsoft had been founded by Bill Gates in 1976, and the software company had managed to plan BASIC first into 4K memory.

In a way the first computers imitated typing machines. The human brain receives more information by seeing images, shapes and colours. When Simonyi met Gates, they decided to change the way of communication between man and computer. "Already at our first meeting it was clear for us that graphics will play the central role in the contact between the computer and the outside world. This is the real precondition to the universal public acceptance of personal computers." (*The Voice of the Martians*)

In Budapest the Russian-made URAL computer consisted of 2000 vacuum tubes. In the mornings, when the URAL was turned on, due to overload a few tubes frequently burnt out. To avoid it, high school students took the position of night custodians. So there was no need of turning the URAL off for the night in the 1960s. During these long nights the young Charles Simonyi collected his first direct experiences on computing, and on the clumsy way of accessing the early computers. In 1966 he sailed to America via Denmark, graduated from Berkeley, and took a job at XEROX in the Silicon Valley. There the user-friendly ALTO computer was under development, and Simonyi constructed the BRAVO word processor for the machine, which was able to show on the screen how the printed page will appear. But the ALTO's cost was about \$20.000, it was not yet for the average person. This is why Charles Simonyi joined Microsoft on February 6, 1981. Even at that time Simonyi was already an ardent prophet of the MENU interface.

He declared, "We have to offer a menu. Everybody can see the option, and simply points to one of them. One should not need to study thick books to find out what he has to do."

The first important creation of Simonyi was the MULTIPLAN spreadsheet with a menu. By making use of the BRAVO experiences, in 1981 Simonyi started to develop the WORD, a user-friendly word processor. which applies mouse and opens several windows to look at the text. Bill Gates, director of Microsoft, declared: "We shall create the most beautiful spreadsheet of the world!" Thus Charles Simonyi has created EXCEL with others. Soon after this Scott McGregor and Charles Simonyi developed WINDOWS.

Simonyi is at present the chief architect of Microsoft and is responsible for showing people that computers are not meant only for number crunching and word processing, but they can communicate with the user through icons, serve humans by regulating traffic, steering cars, and navigating space ships. And they may create virtual reality by interactive graphics capabilities.

### **The CNN Universal Machine and Supercomputer and the CNN Bionic Eve**

The computing power of a modern supercomputer is really breathtaking. There are tasks, however, which are 'solved' by nature quickly. Yet these supercomputers are either very slow to solve them, or they are even unable to solve some 'simple' tasks. A pigeon recognizes its mate in a fraction of a second but a supercomputer cannot process the visual information at such a high speed. Recently researchers started to use simple analog replicas of neurons for computations. These neurocomputers are more efficient in some tasks.

The first breakthrough came on 1988 when in Professor L. O. Chua's laboratory in Berkeley a new computer architecture the 'cellular neural network' or CNN was discovered. This invention set a new stage high speed image processing computations. The tiny analog electronic circuit cells were placed on a regular grid and the interconnecton was local like in the cellular automata of John von Neumann. The major difference is that these elementary computing cells are nonlinear analog dynamic elements (like in the retina), and not just the nearest neighbors are interconnected. The first chips based on this idea showed enormous computing speed-about 300 billion operations per second (calculated on a one square centimeter area).

### **A typical application: Image processing**

We are familiar with image processing systems such as fax machines and television, which carry arrays of visual information from one domain to another. The function of this system is simply to reproduce at the output what appeared at the input. In other cases, like biological visual systems the function is to interpret, or to make some sense out of the visual scene. Other sensory systems, such as

touch, audition and smell also convey 'images,' that are two dimensional arrays of data. All of these systems are designed to recognize objects, to navigate through, and to interpret meaningful entities in the visual scene.

These more sophisticated functions involve some image analysis and interpretation. From what we know about both man-made and biological systems, this interpretation involves transforming the original visual scenario into a variety of altered forms. For example, one of the first visual transformations involves enhancing the edges in a visual scene or increasing the contrast so that one is left with a 'line drawing' of the original scene. This is valuable because, almost all the information is contained in the edges.

A CNN chip is able to process an image with one million frames per second, though we would need separate chips for different problems. So the CNN chip can be a good solution, but the key bottleneck of the CNN was the lack of the programmability.

Professor Leon O. Chua and Professor Tamás Roska started to work closely together in 1988 and since 1989 Professor Roska spends two to three months in Berkeley every year. Their research is supported also by a joint National Science Foundation (NFS-US) and Hungarian Academy of Science grant. In 1988 Roska was working on a peculiar problem: how to combine the two computing disciplines, the 'neural' analog array computation and the logical one. His motivation was to imitate some functional asymmetries at the human brain. The CNN proved to be an excellent platform to do this.

In the summer of 1992 in Berkeley, Roska and Chua made the breakthrough, and they invented the 'CNN Universal Machine and Supercomputer,' the first programmable analog array computer architecture. In this computing engine, each CNN cell is a tiny computer with its own analog memory and logic as well. A new type of stored program, the analogic software, controls all the cells. The nonlinear dynamics of each cell is programmed parallel.

The CNN Universal Machine architecture represents a new paradigm in computing. More and more sophisticated retina models were developed. In Budapest Roska's group started to co-operate with Professor János Hámos's group of neurobiologists. Based on phenomenological evidence they developed some CNN retina models as well.

The CNN chip can be programmed, within a microsecond, to behave like the eye of a cat, an owl, or a salamander. Similarly, other topographic sensory organs (tactile, somatosensory, etc.) can be represented using this chip. In addition, the different sensory modalities can be combined by an analogic program. The 'CNN bionic eye,' on a single chip, can solve some image processing tasks as fast as the huge digital supercomputers.

A recent issue of *IEEE Spectrum* (May 1996) is devoted to the challenging subject: "Towards an Artificial Eye." The projection of the editors is that around the year 2015 we may have artificial eyes to help, to some extent, the visually

impaired. There is another striking possibility: the use of artificial vision systems or bionic eyes in sophisticated machines, such as (robots), or in everyday appliances.

### Acknowledgement

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# THE MOLECULAR MECHANISM OF APOPTOSIS AND ITS REGULATION BY BCL-2 IN THE T-CELL LINEAGE

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Apoptosis, or programmed cell death, is an evolutionarily conserved physiological process that ensures the elimination of unwanted or damaged cells from multicellular organisms (1,2). Although apoptosis can be initiated by diverse physiological and experimental stimuli, ultrastructurally apoptotic cells are characterized by plasma membrane reorganization and blebbing, cell shrinkage and nuclear fragmentation, suggesting the convergence of these signals on a common final effector pathway (1,3). In the last several years, unraveling the details of this molecular mechanism became one of the liveliest areas of molecular biology research.

## Genetic Regulation of Cell Death




Figure 1

Insight into the molecular nature of this effector mechanism has been initially derived from genetic studies of a tiny worm, the nematode *Caenorhabditis elegans* (Figure 1). In this tiny worm of the original 1090 cells that are present in the developing animal 131 dies through apoptosis to form the 959 cell adult animal.

In the nematode, two autosomal recessive death effector genes, *ced-3* and *ced-4* are required for the death of all 131 cells destined to die during worm development (2,4,5), whereas an autosomal dominant death repressor gene, *ced-9*, is essential for cell survival (6). Ced-3 is related to a family of mammalian protein degrading enzymes (caspases), such as ICE, (5,7), that are uniformly activated in mammalian apoptosis and required for certain aspects of cell death through the cleavage of a number of substrate proteins (3,8) (Figure 1). Ced-9 is a functional and structural homologue of Bcl-2 (9), the prototype member of the Bcl-2 protein family in vertebrates, that is able to inhibit the effect of many, but not all, apoptotic stimuli (10) (Figure 1). When expressed in mammalian cells, Ced-9, and the Bcl-2 functional homologue, Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> (11), can interact with (12-14) and inhibit the death inducing function of Ced-4 (12), while recruiting it from the cytosol to intracellular membranes (13). In addition, Ced-4 can simultaneously interact with, and presumably activate, Ced-3, or its mammalian counterparts, ICE (caspase 1), and FLICE (caspase 8), biochemically linking Ced-9 and the Bcl-2 family to Ced-3 and the mammalian caspases (12). These findings suggest that apoptosis is precipitated by the proteolytic cleavage of one or several critical substrates, and Bcl-2 may function by blocking the activation of caspases by inactivating the hitherto unidentified mammalian homologue (or analogue) of Ced-4 (12) (Figure 2).

### The Molecular Mechanism of Apoptosis




Figure 2

In mammalian cells, however, the control of apoptosis appears more complex than seen in *C. elegans*. For instance, mammals contain several genes encoding caspases and Bcl-2 homologues, while only a single essential copy of each type of

gene has been identified to date in the nematode (2,6). Also, Bcl-2 can prevent the mitochondrial release of cytochrome c (15,16) or an apoptogenic protease (AIF)(17), that are implicated in the initiation of some forms of cell death (17-19) (Figure 2). More importantly, in vertebrates two functional classes of Bcl-2 related proteins exist that share highly conserved Bcl-2 homology 1 (BH1), 2 (BH2), and 3 (BH3) domains: antiapoptotic members, including Bcl-2, Bcl-x<sub>L</sub>, Mcl-1, and A1, that inhibit cell death, and proapoptotic members, including Bax, Bak, Bad, Bik, and Bid, that accelerate apoptosis and counter the death repressive function of Bcl-2 or Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> upon receiving a death signal (reviewed in (20,21))(Figure 3). Several *in vivo* studies confirm (22-26), that in vertebrates the balance between death-promoting and death-repressing members of the Bcl-2 family contributes a critical checkpoint that determines a cells' susceptibility to an apoptotic stimulus (27,28) (Figure 3).

### CELL AUTONOMOUS RHEOSTAT OF PROGRAMMED CELL DEATH




Figure 3

The molecular mechanism(s) by which Bax and its homologues exert their death promoting function at physiological expression levels is not clear. Inducible overexpression of Bax in yeast or in mammalian cells can trigger cell death in the absence of additional apoptotic stimuli (29-33). Of note, this Bax induced apoptosis proceeds even when caspase activation is inhibited (32). Similarly, mutations within the BH1, BH2 and BH3 domains of Bcl-2 and Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> that abrogate their function also cause loss of heterodimerization with Bax in mammalian cells (34-36). These data suggest that at high expression levels proapoptotic Bcl-2 re-

lated proteins possess the capacity to be directly cytotoxic and that Bcl-2 and Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> may have to form a protein complex with them to counter cell death. However, selected BH1 and BH2 mutants of Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> can exert their death-repressing activity even in the absence of heterodimerization with Bax (37). In mammalian cells, Bax can also directly compete with Ced-4 for association with Bcl-x<sub>L</sub>, together implying that at physiological expression levels Bax-like proteins may merely act as inert competitive inhibitors of Bcl-2 and its functional homologues (12)(Figure 2).

In a recent study (38), we attempted to assess the antiapoptotic mechanism of Bcl-2 in relation to its capacity to dimerize with Bax and its homologues in a physiological context. The main findings of this study is the topic of this presentation.

### **Bax-like activity in splenic T-cells, but not in thymocytes**

To examine the role of Bax, or Bax-like activity, on thymocyte and splenic T-cell apoptosis, we first examined the effect of zVAD-fmk on their spontaneous cell death. As initial controls, Fas-mediated apoptosis of Jurkat cells in the presence or absence of 100  $\mu$ M zVAD-fmk was tested. As previously described (32), Jurkat cells treated with anti-Fas antibody died rapidly, a process that was completely prevented by simultaneous treatment with zVAD-fmk (Figure 4A).

To test the effect of caspase inhibition on the spontaneous apoptosis of thymocytes and splenic T-cells, suspensions of these cells from non-transgenic littermates were placed *in vitro* in RPMI 1640 medium supplemented with 5% fetal calf serum in the presence or absence of 100  $\mu$ M zVAD-fmk. The spontaneous apoptosis of thymocytes was significantly reduced by zVAD-fmk, almost to the same extent as provided by Bcl-2 mI-3 (Figure 4B). Spontaneous apoptosis of splenic T-cells, however, was essentially unaffected by the addition of identical concentration of zVAD-fmk (Figure 4C). To ensure that zVAD-fmk was equally functional in both cell types, thymocytes and splenic T-cells were also treated with anti-Fas antibody. Of note, murine thymocytes and splenic T-cells are known to present Fas receptor on the cell surface (39,40). Anti-Fas antibody treatment accelerated the rate of spontaneous cell death in both cell types, and simultaneous treatment with 100  $\mu$ M zVAD-fmk completely inhibited this Fas induced acceleration of cell death in both thymocytes and splenic T-cells (Figure 4B,C). Thus, while zVAD-fmk proved functional in both cell types, it did not alter the rate of spontaneous apoptosis in splenic T-cells, an observation identical to that seen with Bax-induced cytotoxicity (32).





Figure 4

### Generation of transgenic mice expressing BH1 mutant Bcl-2 in thymocytes and peripheral T-cells

As thymocyte and splenic T-cell apoptosis differed in their sensitivity to caspase inhibition, this lineage appeared suitable to study the importance of Bcl-2's heterodimerization capacity for its antiapoptotic function. Therefore, we developed a transgenic mouse model to assess the effects of a BH1 domain substitution mutant of Bcl-2 (*mI-3*,  $G_{145}A$ ) (34) upon T-cell development and T-cell death. This well-characterized Bcl-2 mutant fails to counter apoptosis in FL5.12 cells following IL-3 withdrawal, and does not heterodimerize with proapoptotic members of the Bcl-2 family, such as Bax (34), or Bid (21). A transgenic construct was generated by inserting a human *bcl-2 mI-3* cDNA downstream of the *lck<sup>r</sup>* (41)(Figure 5A). The 3' untranslated portion of this construct provided introns, exons, and the poly(A) addition site from the human growth hormone gene hGH. Seven founder animals bearing the *lckpr-bcl-2 mI-3* construct were identi-

fied. Five lines were established, and each line was examined for human Bcl-2 mI-3 expression in the thymus (Figure 5B, top panel) and spleen (Figure 5B, bottom panel) by Western immunoblot analysis utilizing the human Bcl-2 specific monoclonal antibody (moAb), 6C8 (42). The tissue specificity of the *lckpr-bcl-2 mI-3* transgene was examined by Western blot analysis which failed to show transgene expression in non-lymphoid tissues, including the brain, heart, kidney, liver, or lung (data not shown). The thymus of transgenic animals contained a distinct cortex and medulla and was normal in size. The distribution of splenic red and white pulp was similar in transgenic and control littermate mice (data not shown). The two lines, 67 and 72, with the highest levels of human Bcl-2 mI-3 expression in thymocytes (Figure 5B, top panel) and splenocytes (Figure 5B, bottom panel) were further characterized, and compared to the previously established *lckpr-bcl-2 wild-type* (wt) transgenic model (43).

A



B




Figure 5

### Bcl-2 wt, but not Bcl-2 mI-3, heterodimerizes with Bax both in thymocytes and peripheral T-cells

To confirm the inability of overexpressed Bcl-2 mI-3 to heterodimerize with endogenous proapoptotic Bcl-2 family members, such as Bax, co-immunoprecipitation experiments in *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 mI-3* thymocytes and splenic T-cells were

performed. When [<sup>35</sup>S] methionine labeled *bcl-2 wt* thymocytes were immunoprecipitated with the human Bcl-2 specific 6C8 moAb, a low amount of endogenous p21 protein was coprecipitated with human Bcl-2 (lane 2, Figure 6A, top panel). Immunostaining of a Western blot of the same immunoprecipitate with the murine Bax specific polyclonal antibody, 651 (21), confirmed the identity of p21 as murine Bax (lane 2, Figure 6A, bottom panel). Identical immunoprecipitations on [<sup>35</sup>S] methionine labeled *bcl-2 ml-3* thymocytes revealed a lack of heterodimerization between Bcl-2 ml-3 and endogenous Bax. (lane 3, Figure 6A, top panel).




Figure 6

As metabolic labeling of splenic T-cells with [<sup>35</sup>S] methionine was not very effective; co-immunoprecipitation experiments on lysates of unlabeled thymocytes and splenic T-cells were performed (Figure 6B). Equal amount of protein lysates of *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 ml-3* thymocytes and splenic T-cells were immunoprecipitated with the human Bcl-2 specific 6C8 moAb, and Western blots of the immunoprecipitates were immunostained with either biotinylated 6C8 moAb, for human Bcl-2 (Figure 6B, top panel), or with the 651 polyAb, for murine Bax (Figure 6B, bottom panel). Thymocytes and splenic T-cells of both *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 ml-3* transgenics expressed comparable amount of human Bcl-2, although the expression levels in thymocytes were again somewhat higher (Figure 6B, top

panel). Bcl-2 immunoprecipitated either from *bcl-2 wt* thymocytes (Figure 6B, lane 3) or splenic T-cells (Figure 6B, lane 6) demonstrated heterodimerization with endogenous murine Bax, but the amount of Bcl-2/Bax heterodimers were about five fold higher in splenic T-cells compared to that seen in thymocytes. Immunostaining of 6C8 immunoprecipitates from *bcl-2 ml-3* thymocyte (Figure 6B, lane 1) or splenic T-cell lysates (Figure 6B, lane 4) demonstrated no association between Bcl-2 and Bax in either cell types.

Despite comparable level of Bcl-2 wt expression in thymocytes and splenic T-cells, the amount of endogenous Bax that coprecipitated with Bcl-2 wt in splenic T-cells was substantially higher than in thymocytes (Figure 6B, compare lane 3 and 6). Thus, we were interested to determine if this difference was due to varying expression level of endogenous Bax, or represented differential dimerization capacity between Bcl-2 and Bax within the two cell types. Consequently, equal amount of protein lysates of thymocytes and splenic T-cells from *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 ml-3* transgenic mice were assessed for the expression level of endogenous Bax with the murine Bax specific 651 polyclonal Ab. No difference in endogenous Bax expression was seen between *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 ml-3* thymocytes or splenic T-cells (Figure 6C). However, endogenous Bax expression was about five fold higher in splenic T-cells compared to that seen in thymocytes in both the *bcl-2 wt* and *bcl-2 ml-3* transgenics (Figure 6C). Of note, Bcl-2 wt or Bcl-2 ml-3 expression did not alter endogenous Bax levels compared to non-transgenic controls (data not shown).

### The effect of Bcl-2 ml-3 on T-lineage maturation

To assess the functional effect of enforced Bcl-2 ml-3 expression in the T-cell lineage thymic maturation was first studied. Expression of Bcl-2 ml-3 in the thymus did not substantially modify the number of thymocytes, yet it altered the distribution of thymocyte subsets. *bcl-2 ml-3* transgenics uniformly demonstrated an ~ 4 fold increase in CD48<sup>+</sup> single positive thymocytes (Figure 7, top panel). Some animals also displayed an ~ 1.4 fold increased percentage of CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>+</sup> single positive cells. The increase in CD48<sup>+</sup> thymocytes changed the average ratio of CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>+</sup>/CD48<sup>+</sup> cells from 5:1 in control mice to 2:1 in transgenic mice. Immunoblot analysis revealed no difference in the amount of Bcl-2 ml-3 protein in CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>+</sup> versus CD48<sup>+</sup> cells (data not shown). This phenotypic effect of expressing *bcl-2 ml-3* in the thymus is similar to that seen with the *bcl-2 wt* transgene (43,44), namely an increase in mature thymocytes predominantly skewed towards the CD8<sup>+</sup> subset. Similarly, all transgenic animals had an increased percentage of CD3<sup>hi</sup>/TCR<sup>hi</sup> thymocytes (~30%) compared with control littermates (~15%) (Figure 7, bottom panel). Transgenics displayed a reciprocal decrease in CD3<sup>int/lo</sup> cells (Figure 7, bottom panel). Thymocytes that have successfully com-

pleted thymic selection demonstrate increased CD3 expression, whereas CD3<sup>int/lo</sup> cells represent immature thymocytes, most of which are believed to die while undergoing thymic selection. Of note, transgenic thymocytes also contained increased numbers of cells with an intermediate level of TCR and CD3. This TCR/CD3<sup>med</sup> population is thought to represent a transitional intermediate stage following positive selection (45,46).




Figure 7

Flow cytometric analysis of splenocytes from six week old transgenic mice revealed an increase in both the number of T-cells (Thy1<sup>+</sup>, CD3<sup>+</sup> cells) and the percentage of CD8<sup>+</sup> cells (Figure 8). The percentage of CD8<sup>+</sup> T-cells increased ~1.5 fold in young 6 week old transgenic animals (11% to 17%) (Figure 8, top panel), but decreased to a ~1.1 fold increment by 12 weeks of age (data not shown). The ratio of CD4<sup>+</sup>/CD8<sup>+</sup> T-cells in the splenocytes of six week old transgenic mice averaged 1.2 compared with 1.5 in control littermate mice. Similar ratios of CD4<sup>+</sup>/CD8<sup>+</sup> T-cells in the lymph node cells were seen (data not shown). Similarly, all six week old transgenic animals had an increased percentage of CD3<sup>hi</sup>/TCR<sup>hi</sup> splenocytes (~45%) compared with control littermates (~30%) (Figure 8, bottom panel). By twelve weeks of age the differences in CD3 expression level of transgenic and control animals diminished to the same extent as seen in CD4<sup>+</sup>, CD8<sup>+</sup> expression (data not shown). While the percentage of B cells

in six week old transgenic spleens was decreased by 15%, the absolute number of B cells was comparable in transgenic and control spleens. This phenotypic effect of expressing *bcl-2 ml-3* in splenocytes is significantly weaker to that seen with the *bcl-2 wt* transgene where an increase in the CD8<sup>+</sup> subset is more pronounced (43,44).




Figure 8

**Increased survival of *bcl-2 ml-3* transgenic thymocytes, but not transgenic peripheral T-cells in-vitro and in-vivo**

Immature CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>+</sup> cortical thymocytes, as well as peripheral T-cells die rapidly in culture (47), an effect that is countered by overexpression of Bcl-2 (43,44), or Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> (48,49). To assess the effects of *bcl-2 ml-3* on the viability of these cells, suspensions of thymocytes, splenic T-cells, and lymph node cells from *bcl-2 ml-3*, *bcl-2 wt*, and control littermates were placed *in vitro* in RPMI 1640 medium supplemented with 5% fetal calf serum (Figure 9). Western immunostain on equal amounts of protein lysates of each sample demonstrated comparable Bcl-2 expression in thymocytes, lymph node cells and splenic T-cells from *bcl-2 ml-3* and *bcl-2 wt* mice (Figure 9A), although Bcl-2 expression was slightly higher in thymocytes compared to peripheral T-cells.




Figure 9

Thymocytes from *lckpr-bcl-2 wt* mice demonstrated improved survival, while the majority of control thymocytes died within the first three days, as previously described (43,44). Remarkably, the *bcl-2 ml-3* thymocytes demonstrated similar survival rates to that seen with Bcl-2 wt expression (Figure 9B). After 7 days, ~25% of *bcl-2 ml-3* and *bcl-2 wt* thymocytes were still viable whereas <1% of the normal thymocytes survived. Flow cytometric analysis at day 7 revealed the persistence of DP and SP thymocytes from both *bcl-2 ml-3* and *bcl-2 wt* transgenic mice (data not shown). Contrary to that seen with thymocytes, peripheral T-cells of *bcl-2 ml-3* mice exhibited no increased survival *in vitro* (Figure 9C,D). Despite comparable Bcl-2 ml-3 expression to that seen in thymocytes (Figure 9A), splenic T-cells and lymph node cells from *bcl-2 ml-3* mice died at a rate similar to that of control littermates when placed in culture (Figure 9C,D). At the same time, peripheral T-cells from *bcl-2 wt* mice were remarkably resistant, as previously described (43,44); After 7 days, ~36% of splenic T-cells and ~59% of lymph node cells from *bcl-2 wt* mice were still viable (Figure 9C,D).

As Bcl-2 ml-3 was able to block the spontaneous apoptosis of thymocytes *in vitro*, it was of interest to determine whether Bcl-2 ml-3 could also extend thymocyte survival *in vivo*. Triggering thymocytes with dexamethasone or anti-CD3 both *in vivo* and *in vitro* has been shown to induce apoptosis of primarily the immature CD4<sup>+</sup>CD8<sup>+</sup> DP cell population (50-53). Consequently, mice were treated with dexamethasone or anti-CD3, and thymocytes were evaluated 48 hours later (Figure 10).




Figure 10

Intraperitoneal injection of 0.5 mg dexamethasone depleted a mean of 98% of thymocytes in control mice, as compared with vehicle treatment alone. However, *bcl-2 ml-3* mice were markedly resistant with an average decrease of only ~25% with this dose. Flow cytometric analysis of the surviving thymocytes indicated that dexamethasone only slightly reduced the CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> thymocytes in transgenic mice, but almost completely eliminated the CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> population from control mice (Figure 10, middle panel). Similarly, 48 hours following the intraperitoneal injection of 50 ug of affinity-purified anti-CD3 monoclonal antibody, the number of CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> thymocytes was decreased substantially (~85%) in control mice. The *bcl-2 ml-3* mice were again resistant to *in vivo* anti-CD3 treatment, although a slight decrease in the number of CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> thymocytes could be observed with an average decrease of ~40% with this dose (Figure 10, bottom panel). Thus, Bcl-2 ml-3 proved capable of countering apoptosis of thymocytes, but not of peripheral T-cells, both *in vitro* and *in vivo*.

### Concluding remarks

In mammalian cells, death-promoting and death-repressing members of the Bcl-2 family readily form heterodimers with each other (reviewed in (20,21)), but the significance of this physical interaction to their respective function is controversial. Inducible overexpression of Bax in mammalian cells can in itself induce apoptosis that is countered by Bcl-2 (31-33). Also, selected mutations within the BH1, BH2 and BH3 domains of Bcl-2 and Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> that disrupt their heterodimerization with proapoptotic Bcl-2 family members, such as Bax or Bid (21,34,35), can also result in the abrogation of their function (34-36). These data argue that a critical level of Bax homodimers activates downstream effector molecules and that antagonists, such as Bcl-2, prevent apoptosis by inactivating Bax through heterodimerization (34). However, recent experimental evidence has challenged and partially invalidated this model. Selected BH1 mutants of Bcl-x<sub>L</sub>, that are unable to dimerize with Bax, can still counter cell death (37). Also, Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> can interact with mammalian caspases through Ced-4, a physical association that is negatively influenced by Bax (12). Moreover, *bcl-2* can functionally substitute for *ced-9* in *C. elegans* (54), an organism in which no *bax* homologue have been identified. These data offer an alternative hypothesis in which Bcl-2 and its functional homologues exert their action by preventing the activation of caspases through the formation of inactive Bcl-2/ Ced-4 homologue/ caspase complexes. In turn, the death repressor function of such complexes may be neutralized by competition with an inert Bax molecule (12).

The data presented in this paper provide evidence for the validity of both models within the T-cell lineage. Our results demonstrate that depending on the physiological context Bcl-2 exerts its antiapoptotic function by one of two separate mechanisms; one that requires heterodimerization with pro-apoptotic Bax-like molecules, and one in which such physical interaction is not required. To determine the antiapoptotic function of Bcl-2 in relation to its capacity to dimerize with Bax or its homologues at their physiological expression levels, we generated transgenic mice expressing a non-dimerizing BH1 mutant of Bcl-2 (Bcl-2 mI-3)(G<sub>145</sub>A) in the T-cell lineage. Previous studies demonstrated that this mutant Bcl-2 is unable to counter apoptosis induced by growth factor deprivation or glucocorticoid treatment in cell lines possessing high levels of endogenous Bax (34). Yet, a similar BH1 mutation of *ced-9* enhanced its survival promoting function in *C. elegans* (55), suggesting a dichotomy between the mammalian and nematode cell death machinery. Similarly, while in thymocytes spontaneous cell death was countered by zVAD-fmk, the spontaneous apoptosis of splenic T-cells remained unaffected by this caspase inhibitor (Figure 4). Inasmuch as resistance to zVAD-fmk represents a hallmark of Bax or Bax-like activity (32), these results implicate an active apoptosis inducing function of Bax or its homologues in peripheral T-cells, but a lack of such activity in thymocytes. Thus, thymocytes appeared a rea-

sonable candidate for a cell type in which Bcl-2 may function in a heterodimerization-independent fashion.

Bcl-2 mI-3 did not heterodimerize with Bax either in thymocytes or in peripheral T-cells, in agreement with previous findings (34). (Figure 6). Yet, enforced thymic expression of Bcl-2 mI-3 protected immature CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> thymocytes from spontaneous, glucocorticoid and anti-CD3-induced apoptosis (Figure 9,10). Bcl-2 mI-3 also altered thymocyte maturation and increased the percentages of CD3<sup>hi</sup> and CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>-</sup> thymocytes (Figure 7), both patterns being similar to that seen with wild-type Bcl-2 (43,44). Thus, within immature thymocytes, the antiapoptotic function of Bcl-2 is apparently independent of its capacity to heterodimerize with Bax or its homologues. In contrast, Bcl-2 mI-3 could not counter apoptosis of peripheral T-cells while wild-type Bcl-2 remained effective (Figure 9). The loss of antiapoptotic activity of Bcl-2 mI-3 correlated with a higher Bax expression level in peripheral T-cells, and the amount of Bax that co-precipitated with wild-type Bcl-2 proved significantly increased compared to that seen in thymocytes (Figure 6). Thus, within peripheral T-cells the antiapoptotic function of Bcl-2 apparently requires a capacity to heterodimerize with Bax or its homologues.




Figure 11

These data together suggest a dual effector function for both death-promoting and death-repressing members of the Bcl-2 family (Figure 11). As shown here within the T-cell lineage, Bcl-2 can counter apoptosis induced by external apoptotic stimuli, such as TCR engagement or glucocorticoid treatment, independent of its association with Bax or its homologues. While thymocytes do express a low amount of endogenous Bax (Figure 6), apoptosis induced by gamma-irradiation or dexamethasone treatment is not altered in bax <sup>-/-</sup> mice (56). Yet, the same apoptotic stimuli in conjunction with enforced expression of Bax results in increased thymocyte cell death (25). Thus, a threshold level of Bax expression is apparently required for its death-accelerating function in thymocytes. Of note,

external death signals themselves can alter the inherent Bcl-2 to Bax ratio (57). As spontaneous *in vivo* thymocyte apoptosis can be delayed by zVAD-fmk (Figure 4), Bax in thymocytes seems to act as an inert competitive inhibitor, perhaps by competing for the Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> expressed in immature CD4<sup>+</sup>8<sup>+</sup> thymocytes (49). In contrast, spontaneous cell death of peripheral T-cells is apparently initiated by the active cytotoxicity of either Bax or one of its functional homologues, as it is not affected by zVAD-fmk (Figure 4). Inactivation of Bax or its homologues in these cells can be achieved either by external survival signals or by heterodimerizing Bcl-2. Several mechanistic possibilities may account for the antiapoptotic effect of Bcl-2 in this case. In one scenario, Bcl-2 might simply act as an inert competitive inhibitor through disrupting the formation of Bax-like homodimers. Alternatively, Bcl-2/Bax heterodimers could possess a biochemical function that is diametrically opposed to Bax homodimers. The identification of loss-of-function Bcl-2 mutants with intact Bax dimerization capacity (58) favours this latter possibility. In either case, whether Bax and its homologues are directly cytotoxic or only act as inert competitive inhibitors appears to depend on the presence of additional mediator molecules, such as proposed for the role of Bid (21).

Cell suicide is present in a variety of unicellular organisms suggesting that apoptosis in multicellular organisms may have very primitive evolutionary origins. For instance, some strains of *E. coli* will activate the expression of bacterial toxins that trigger cell death to insure plasmid maintenance or as a response to external events by suicidal pore or channel formation through their plasma membrane (59-61). The core structure of Bcl-x<sub>L</sub> that resembles the membrane-insertion domain of pore-forming bacterial toxins (62), together with its demonstrated ion-channel function in synthetic lipid bilayers (63), strongly implicate the evolutionary conservation of this mechanism in multicellular organisms. Yet, in the nematode *C. elegans* Ced-9 appears to function by an alternative mechanism that involves blocking the activation of Ced-3 through the formation of inactive Ced-9/ Ced-4/ Ced-3 complexes (12).

Our data suggest the preservation of both pathways of cell death initiation in mammalian cells (Figure 11); one that is initiated by Bax and its homologues and that may operate on the principles of unicellular pore-forming cell suicide systems; and one in which the activation of caspases plays a central role as seen in *C. elegans*. Bcl-2 can counter apoptosis when either pathway is involved, but must heterodimerize with Bax and its homologues when cell death is initiated by their active cytotoxic function.

### FIGURE LEGENDS

#### Fig. 1.

The genetic regulation of programmed cell death

In *C. elegans*, two genes, *ced-3* and *ced-4* are required for the death of all 131 cells destined to die during worm development, whereas another gene, *ced-9*, is essential for cell survival. Ced-3 is homologous to mammalian caspases, such as ICE. Ced-9 is a homologue of mammalian Bcl-2.

#### Fig. 2.

The molecular mechanism of apoptosis

(A) The three main stages of apoptosis.

(B) The control and execution stage. Members of the Bcl-2 family (shown here Bcl-2, Bcl-x<sub>l</sub>, Bax, and Ced-9) can interact with themselves on mitochondrial surface. Antiapoptotic Bcl-2-like proteins can further interact with the Ced-4/Ced-3 complex. See text for further details.

#### Fig. 3.

Schematic model of the Bcl-2 cell death checkpoint

In vertebrates the balance between death-repressing (left panel) and death-promoting (right panel) members of the Bcl-2 family contributes a critical checkpoint that determines a cell's susceptibility to an apoptotic stimulus.

#### Fig. 4.

zVAD-fmk delays spontaneous apoptosis of thymocytes but not of splenic T-cells

(A) Jurkat cells treated with 100ng/ml of anti-human Fas moAb in the presence or absence of zVAD-fmk (100  $\mu$ M).

(B) FL5.12 cells were deprived of IL-3 in the presence or absence of zVAD-fmk (100  $\mu$ M).

(C,D) Thymocytes (C), and splenic T-cells (D) from non-transgenic mice were initially plated in RPMI/ 5% FCS at  $6 \times 10^5$  cells per ml in the presence or absence of zVAD-fmk (100  $\mu$ M) and with or without 100ng/ml of anti-human Fas moAb. Cell viabilities of triplicate cultures were assessed by annexin V-FITC/ PI staining and plotted as the mean $\pm$ SD. Legends shown in (A) is applicable to all panels.

**Fig. 5.**

*lckpr-bcl-2 mI-3* transgene construct and analysis of human Bcl-2 mI-3 expression

(A) A 0.75 kb of human *bcl-2 mI-3* (closed box) was inserted at the BamHI site 3' to the 3.2 kb *lck<sup>pr</sup>* (open box). Introns and exons (hatched boxes) of hGH constitute the 3' untranslated region.

(B) Western blot analyses of cell lysates with the 6C8 moAb. Twenty-five micrograms of protein of cell lysates from thymocytes (top panel) and splenocytes (bottom panel) was analyzed. Tissues were isolated from transgenic lines 60, 67, 69, 72 and 74, and non-transgenic littermates.

**Fig. 6.**

Analysis of Bax expression and its heterodimerization with Bcl-2

(A,B) Cell lysates of (A) [<sup>35</sup>S] methionine-labeled or (B) unlabeled control (non-Tg) or transgenic thymocytes expressing human wild-type Bcl-2 (Bcl-2 wt) or human Bcl-2 mI-3 (Bcl-2 mI-3) were immunoprecipitated with the 6C8 anti-human Bcl-2 moAb. All immunoprecipitated proteins were resolved by SDS-Polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis. Gels were processed for fluorography (A) or electrotransferred and immunostained for Bcl-2 with biotinylated 6C8 moAb (B, top panel) or for Bax with the 651 polyAb (B, bottom panel).

(C) Western blot analyses of cell lysates for Bax expression. Twenty five micrograms of protein of cell lysates from thymus and splenic T-cells was stained for endogenous murine Bax with the 651 polyAb.

**Fig. 7.**

CD3, CD4 and CD8 expression in transgenic (Tg) and non-transgenic (non-Tg) thymocytes

(Top panel) Representative histograms of thymocytes stained with PE-conjugated anti-CD4 and FITC-conjugated anti-CD8 moAb-s. The percentage of cells of each phenotype is indicated.

(Bottom panel) Single-cell suspension of thymocytes from transgenic (solid line) and non-transgenic (dotted line) were stained with FITC-conjugated anti-CD3 moAb. The percentage of cells of that are CD3<sup>lo/int</sup>, and CD3<sup>hi</sup> is indicated. Similar results were obtained in both lines 67 and 72.

**Fig. 8.**

CD3, CD4 and CD8 expression in transgenic (Tg) and non-transgenic (non-Tg) splenocytes

(Top panel) Representative histograms of splenocytes stained with PE-conjugated anti-CD4 and FITC-conjugated anti-CD8 moAb-s. The percentage of cells of each phenotype is indicated.

(Bottom panel) Single-cell suspension of splenocytes from transgenic (solid line) and non-transgenic (dotted line) were stained with FITC-conjugated anti-CD3 moAb. The percentage of cells of that are CD3<sup>+</sup> is indicated. Similar results were obtained in both lines 67 and 72.

**Fig. 9.**

Bcl-2 expression and in-vitro survival of thymocytes and peripheral T-cells

(A) Western blot analyses of cell lysates with the 6C8 moAb. Twenty five micrograms of protein of cell lysates from thymocytes, splenic T-cells and lymph node cells of control (non-Tg) or *lckpr-bcl-2 wt* (Bcl-2 wt) and *lckpr-bcl-2 ml-3* (Bcl-2 ml-3) transgenics was analyzed.

(B,C,D) Viability of thymocytes (B), splenic T-cells (C), and lymph node cells (D). Cells were initially plated in RPMI/ 5% FCS at  $6 \times 10^5$  cells per ml in 96 well flat-bottomed plates and cell viabilities of triplicate cultures were assessed by annexin V-FITC/ PI staining and plotted as the mean $\pm$ SD. Legends shown in (B) is applicable to panels (C,D) as well.

**Fig. 10.**

Dexamethasone and anti-CD3 depletion of thymocytes in-vivo

Representative two-color immunofluorescence dot plots of CD4 and CD8 expression of surviving thymocytes. Thymocytes recovered from *lckpr-bcl-2 ml-3* transgenic (Tg) and non-transgenic (non-Tg) mice 48 hrs following intraperitoneal injection of RPMI 1640 (sham), 0.5 mg dexamethasone, or 50 ug of affinity-purified anti-CD3 moAb, were stained with PE-conjugated anti-CD4 and FITC-conjugated anti-CD8 moAb-s. The percentage of cells of each population is indicated.

**Fig. 11.**

Model for the dual function of Bcl-2 and Bax

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# HISTORY MAKERS TESTIFY, "TANÚK – KORUKRÓL" 1977–1997

The Oral History Program of the Hungarian Alumni Association  
at Rutgers University

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## I.

The Hungarian Alumni Association, Magyar Öregdiák Szövetség – Bessenyei György Kör was founded in 1960 by Hungarian students at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (USA), most of whom left their country after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in which many of them participated and which was crushed by Soviet military intervention.

Some 260 outstanding Hungarian writers, scientists and artists have participated in the association's lecture, conference and exhibit series in the past thirty-seven years.

The association also initiated an educational program. The *Hungarian Saturday Classes* have offered instruction in the basics of Hungarian language and culture for twenty-six years.

In 1977 the association launched an oral history project. The objectives of the *Tanúk – korukról* [Witnesses about their Epoch] "History Makers Testify" program were to enable some of those who actively participated or played leading roles in changing or influencing Hungarian (and in some cases the world's) history to talk about their actions in an open forum – almost like testifying in a court – and, thereby, to preserve their experiences for posterity. In the past twenty years twenty-three such key witnesses have "testified" during thirty-two lectures by Hungarian Alumni Association invitation: Lajos Boros, Miklós Duray, Péter Gosztonyi, János Horváth, Mihály Hógye, Pál Jónás, Béla Király, Sándor Kiss, Sándor Kopácsi, Andor Kovács, Imre Kovács, Elek Nagy, Zoltán Nyeste, László Papp, Gergely Pongrácz, Sándor Püski, Sándor Rácz, Pál Somody, István Szent-Miklós, Sándor Taraszovics, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Gyula Várallyay and Eugene Wigner.

Eight of these lectures were published by the association in book form.<sup>1</sup> Three of these books were republished in four facsimile reprint editions by underground, "samizdat" publishers during the last seven years of the communist dic-

tatorship in Hungary. These eight books are now frequently cited and used as source material by historians in and beyond Hungary.

## II.

Mert olyanokat éltünk meg,  
amire ma sincs ige –

We have lived through such things  
for which there is still no word...

wrote Gyula Illyés (1902–1983), Hungary's poet laureate in one of his most famous poems, the 1955 *Bartók*. These lines from the Illyés poem became the motto of the "History Makers Testify" program.

During the second half of the twentieth century not only the facts of the recent massive atrocities against humanity were hard to uncover but public discourse also exhibited difficulties in finding adequate and fitting words to express some of the unspeakable horrors perpetuated by the heinous dictators, movements and regimes of Fascism, Communism, Nazism, Stalinism, Maoism and their ilk.

And even when the facts were revealed and true words were found, these words of truth were forbidden, suppressed and punished in the countries ruled by dictators. The choice of Illyés' *Bartók*-poem's lines for the oral history program's motif signaled the intent to create a forum where the unspeakable could be articulated, the prohibited words could be freely spoken. A unique opportunity was offered for witnesses and makers of history to publicly share their insights, to provide historically important facts and to reveal, often in the face of officially enforced silence, secrecy or disinformation propaganda, some evidence which only they knew.

The Illyés motto was printed on the front page of all the announcements inviting the public to the lectures of the history makers usually to one of Rutgers University's 100–200 audience capacity lecture halls.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent pages of these announcements contained short autobiographies, specifically requested from the invited lecturers for these and subsequent publications.

*Eugene Wigner* (1902–1995), the 1963 Nobel prize winner and emeritus physics professor of Princeton University, gave an account of his role in the Manhattan Project, which produced the first atomic bombs. His lecture on April 26, 1980 was titled "Az atomkor kezdete" [The Beginning of the Atomic Age].

*Zoltán Nyeste* was invited twice. On October 31, 1980 he offered detailed documentation of one of the Hungarian Communist regime's best kept secrets:

The Recsk political prisoner camp and of the unspeakable abuses and tortures for hundreds of victims. The book version of his lecture, which was published in 1982 by the Hungarian Alumni Association, *Recsk. Emberek az embertelenségben*. [Recsk. Men in the Midst of Inhumanity] – was republished three times in Hungary. Two facsimile versions were distributed by underground "samizdat" publishers (Hitel, 1982; ABC, 1985) and one edition was reprinted by Püski (Budapest) in 1989. Zoltán Nyeste testified once more. On November 2, 1985 his talk was titled: "Útkeresés – adalékok a magyar ifjúsági mozgalmak történetéhez: 1942–1948" [Searching For a Way – Some Data Toward a History of the 1942–1948 Hungarian Youth Movements].

*Miklós Duray* of Pozsony (Bratislava, at the time in Czechoslovakia) was imprisoned twice by the Czechoslovak communist government, once from November 10, 1982 to February 22, 1983 and once again from May 10, 1984 to May 10, 1985 for organizing in 1978 the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia.<sup>3</sup> This committee's name was the title of Miklós Duray's oral history presentation at Rutgers University on February 18, 1989: "A Csehszlovákiai Magyar Kisebbség Jogvédő Bizottsága".

*Mihály Hőgye* (1912–1992) was a consular officer in Berlin between 1942 and 1944. The title of his lecture on November 17, 1984 was: "Utolsó csatlós?" Magyar külpolitika a második világháború végén" [Last Satellite? Hungarian Foreign Policy at the End of the Second World War]. An expanded version of his lecture was published with the same title by Püski (N.Y.) in 1985.

*István Szent-Miklós*y (1909–1995) was a Lieutenant Colonel of the Hungarian Army General Staff. His lecture on May 7, 1983 provided details of Hungary's attempts to break away from the war and from Germany. The name of the clandestine organisation that coordinated these efforts was the title of his lecture: "A Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom, 1943–1946" [The Hungarian Independence Movement, 1943–1946]. His book by essentially the same title was published by Praeger (N.Y.) in 1988: *With the Hungarian Independence Movement, 1943–1947 – an Eyewitness Account*.

But the two topics that were deemed especially in need of fact-finding and free public disclosure by the organizers of the oral history lecture series were the Hungarian Populist Movement and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

### III.

The Hungarian Populist Movement was a reform ethos and program during the late twenties, the thirties and the early forties.<sup>4</sup> István Bibó (1911–1979), one of the most significant modern socio-political thinkers of Central Europe identified with this movement and its search for a "third road" alternative. He wrote in 1978 that the populists "embodied a radical movement that included simultane-

ously demands for complete social liberation and demands for full, institutionalized human rights." The movement's

critical stance, and its ideals... represent and approach which goes beyond the traditional and already sterile conflicts between communism and capitalism still dominating the world. As such some of its perspectives transcend its national and societal boundaries, offering conclusions of general validity.<sup>5</sup>

The pre-World-War II. Conservative regime banned some of the populists' meetings, censored, and later closed down some of their periodicals, confiscated some of the writers' books, jailed some of the authors. The post-war communist dictators also classified the populists as enemies. György Lukács, at the time the chief ideologue of the emerging Stalinist dictatorship, denounced the populist writers between 1945 and 1948 in a series of defamatory and threatening articles and pamphlets.<sup>6</sup>

The Soviet-installed post-1956 Kádár dictatorship also restored the war against the populists.<sup>7</sup> Many books by the most significant populist writers were banned again. Bibó was jailed in 1957 for his role in the Revolution and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1958; and he was released only during the 1963 partial amnesty. Some other thinkers, writers, books and periodicals were also subjected to strictly prohibitive or curtailing censorship until the late 1980s. Many times they were demonized by the official accusation of "exhibiting nationalistic tendencies." Perhaps the foremost of the Hungarian populist writers, Gyula Illyés died in 1983 with a 1978 collection of his essays *Szellem és erőszak* [Spirit and Violence] still forbidden to leave the publisher's warehouses. Some people have been publishing libelous anti-populist slander, cloaked as history, political science or sociology even in the recent past.<sup>8</sup>

Some of the populist movement's major goals of modernization were best characterized by the 1937 manifesto of the short-lived (1937–1939) "Márciusi Front" [March Front] organization.<sup>9</sup> The twelve-point declaration demanded a general and radically democratic transformation of the country. István Bibó once remarked: "During the days of the March Front's foundation the issue was that the cause of the community, the nation could and should become one and the same with the cause of progress, of freedom, of complete human liberation."<sup>10</sup>

Imre Kovács, the populist sociographic writer, one of the founders of the March Front, and one of the authors and signatories to its manifesto was one of the first history makers who testified in three oral history lectures by the invitation of the Hungarian Alumni Association at Rutgers University on February 17, and April 28, 1978.

*Imre Kovács* (1913–1980) read the twelve points of the Manifesto to a public meeting of about five thousand people in 1937 on the same March 15th day and

from the same steps of the Budapest National Museum from which Sándor Petőfi, the most famous Hungarian poet virtually sparked the Revolution and War of Liberation by reciting his poem *Nemzeti Dal* [National Song] and from which Mór Jókai declared the twelve points titled *Mit kíván a magyar nemzet* [What is the Wish of the Hungarian Nation], demanding independence, freedom and equality in 1848. The full text of Imre Kovács' three lectures was published by the association as *A Márciusi Front*, [The March Front] in 1980. Imre Kovács died in the same year.

The populists' foremost concern was the fate of the peasants, about 3 million of whom have not only lived in abject poverty but were almost completely blocked from any opportunities for socio-economic mobility. In 1930 the three million agrarian proleteriat constituted 34% of the country's total population and 67% of the peasant stratum. The populists wanted to diagnose the plight of the rural poor through "village explorer" programs, to publicize the facts, and to mobilize public opinion for necessary reforms. *Ki a faluba!* [To the Villages!] wrote Dániel Fábrián and Attila József in the first publication of the populist, reformist Miklós Bartha Association on May 20, 1930. (Attila József was a member of the Association from 1926 to 1930). They were admonishing all college and older high school students to spend their summer vacations doing research in villages, collecting ethnographic, cultural, social, economic, labor, health, educational and other data. One of the leaders of the Miklós Bartha Association was *Pál Somody* (1900–1993), who on May 7, 1982 gave an interesting lecture about his experiences.

Even when peasant youngsters were admitted to colleges, they and their families were unable to meet the costs of their education. Many of the populist intellectuals started to develop programs to remedy this situation.

*Lajos Boros* was one of these practical organizers, who became a founder and the first director of the first tutorial college for 300 needy and talented peasant and other youngsters in Budapest. His two lectures on February 23, and March 23, 1979 were titled after the names of this college: *Bolyai Kollégium, 1934–1942* and *Györffy István Kollégium, 1942–1945*.<sup>11</sup>

There were some tutorial colleges outside of the capital city, which also became important centers for the reform programs of the populist movement. One such school was in Sárospatak, Sándor Kiss' alma mater. *Sándor Kiss* (1919–1982) played leading roles in Hungarian populist youth organizations and programs and in the 1944 resistance. He was the first president of the *MADISZ* [Hungarian Democratic Youth Alliance] in 1945 and became director of the Peasant Alliance in 1946. He suffered terrible tortures in Gestapo (1944) and in *ÁVÓ* (1947–1950) prisons. He gave two lectures in the oral history series. His first, on February 6, 1981 was titled: "Magyar ifjúság a népi mozgalomban, 1935–1945" [Hungarian Youth in the Populist Movement, 1935–1945]. The second, on March 6, 1981, testified of the "Küzdelem magyar demokráciáért – a

Magyar Parasztszövetség, 1945–1947” (Struggle for Hungarian Democracy – the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, 1945–1947). His lectures were published by the association, unfortunately posthumously in 1983 with the title *A magyar demokráciáért* [For Hungarian Democracy].

*Sándor Püski* became one of the most important publishers and organizers of the populist movement. From 1939 to 1945 he published 125 books – mostly by populist writers – distributing thousands of copies nationwide through his “Könyvbarátok” [Book Friends] network. He organized two week-long conferences of national historic significance in 1942 and in 1943 at Balatonszárszó. His October 1978 lecture at Rutgers was titled: “A Magyar Élet könyvkiadó” [The Hungarian Life Publishing Company]. His second lecture, on November 17, 1978 was about “A második szárszói konferencia” [The Second Szárszó Conference].

#### IV.

Thus thirteen of the twenty-three *Tanúk–Korukról* [History Makers Testify] oral history lectures were about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Until 1989 the single-party communist dictatorial regime under Soviet military occupation in Hungary perpetrated various official lies about the 1956 Revolution:

The building of Socialism was temporarily interrupted by the 1956 counterrevolutionary insurgence. Western imperialist circles and emigrant fascist counterrevolutionary elements were continually inciting against our people, our regime. They prepared the continually inciting against our people, our regime. They prepared the counterrevolution with the aid of secret local centers. Armed counterrevolutionary forces were pouring into our country from the West. They were striving to overthrow the people’s democracy. They were murdering the communists and the progressive people, they were jailing thousands of patriots... Our government requested the help of the Soviet army and liquidated the counterrevolution.<sup>12</sup>

On October 21, and November 18, 1977 and on January 20, 1978 the first three lectures of the oral history series were delivered by *Béla Király*, one of the leaders of the 1956 Revolution.

Freed from a 1951 sentence of life imprisonment in 1956, General Béla K. Király was elected commander-in-chief of the Hungarian National Guard and was also appointed the military commander of Budapest during the revolution. His lectures had the same title as the book published by the association in 1981, *Az első háború szocialista országok között* [The First War Between Socialist Countries]. This book was re-published by the underground Budapest “samizdat” ABC

publisher in 1986. Béla Király testified one more time in the series. On March 16, 1985 his lecture was titled: "Honvédségből – Néphadsereg, 1945–1951, a szovjetesítés módszerei Kelet-Közép-Európában" [From National Guard to People's Army Sovietization of East Central Europe's Armies, 1945–1951]. The book resulting from that lecture was published in 1986 jointly with the "Magyar Füzetek" [Hungarian Notebooks] of Paris and with the title *Honvédségből Néphadsereg, 1944–1956* [From National Guard to People's Army].

*Miklós Vásárhelyi* was chief press officer of the Imre Nagy government during the Revolution of October 23 – November 4, 1956. After the Soviets crushed the Revolution, Vásárhelyi was deported to Rumania and later was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He was freed with amnesty in 1960. His lecture on February 11, 1984 disclosed the reform plans of the 1953 Imre Nagy government. Vásárhelyi was vice president of the Council of Ministers' Communications Office at the time.

*Sándor Kopácsi* was Budapest's Chief of Police during the Stalinist Rákosi regime. In 1956 he joined the revolution, and became Deputy Commander of the National Guard. In 1958 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was freed by the 1963 partial amnesty. His October 20, 1979 lecture was titled: "Az 1956-os magyar forradalom és a Nagy Imre per" [The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Imre Nagy Trial]. His book by the same title was published by the association in 1979 and again in 1980. A facsimile edition was published by the Budapest underground "samizdat" ABC publisher in 1985.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Revolution, on October 24, 1981, *Pál Jónás'* lecture was titled: "Az 1956-os forradalom Petőfi Köre" (The Petőfi Circle of the 1956 Revolution). Pál Jónás was elected president of this Budapest public forum during the Revolution. A year later, on October 23, 1982 the military commander of the Corvin Alley revolutionaries *Gergely Pongrácz* described their armed struggle. His lecture was titled: "A Corvin Köz és az 1956-os magyar forradalom" [The Corvin Alley and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution]. He published his day-by-day account in Chicago *Corvin Köz – 1956* [Corvin Alley – 1956] in the same year.

During the Revolution, spontaneously and yet almost simultaneously, within a few days, democratic organizations of self-governance, National Councils, Workers' Councils, Revolutionary Councils were elected in the entire country. Many considered these councils the most significant achievement of the Revolution. Hannah Arendt noted in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism*: "The rise of the [Hungarian Revolution's] Councils was the clear sign of a true upsurge of democracy against dictatorship, of freedom against tyranny."<sup>13</sup> The association invited three former Revolutionary Council leaders to testify about their actions.

*Sándor Rácz* of Budapest was invited in a letter of October 19, 1985 for a lecture on the thirtieth anniversary – October, 1986 – of the Revolution. He answered by a November 21 letter accepting the invitation. Seven months later,

however, on June 26, 1986, he wrote another letter to the association in which he provided details of how his passport applications and repeated appeals were rejected by the Hungarian Interior Ministry and the ruling party officials. It took another year – and the intervention, by the association's request of the A.F.L. - C.I.O. – for him to send a telegram on March 23, 1987: "Útlevelem megkaptam" (I received my passport).<sup>14</sup>

Sándor Rácz's lecture, on May 16, 1987 was titled: "A Nagy-Budapesti Központi Munkástanács – 1956" [The Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council – 1956]. He was elected president of the council on November 16, 1956, and began organizing strikes and negotiating with the Soviet military authorities and with the traitorous Kádár government until his arrest on December 11. He was sentenced to life imprisonment – locked for a while in the same cell with István Bibó – and was released during the 1963 partial amnesty.

*Andor Kovács* was elected president, on October 29, 1956 of the Revolutionary National Committee of Csurgó district in Somogy county, Transdanubia, which consisted of twenty-nine villages and townships. After the crushing of the Revolution he escaped the reorganized political police forces by crossing the border to Yugoslavia on February 19, 1957. His lecture on October 22, 1988 was titled: "Forradalom Somogyban" [Revolution in Somogy County]. His book by the same title was published by the association the same year, in conjunction with the Basel EPMSZ [Protestant Academy for Hungarians in Europe.]

*Elek Nagy's* oral history presentation provided insight into one of Budapest's most significant industrial center's activities during the Revolution. His testimonial had the title "Az 1956-os csepeli forradalmi munkástanács" [The 1956 Revolutionary Workers' Council of Csepel]. He was elected president of the Central Council which announced its dissolution only on January 10, 1957, after Soviet tanks, completely surrounding the factory complex had demonstrated their overwhelming fire power.

*János Horváth* was acting president of the Imre Nagy appointed National Council for Economic Reconstruction during the last free days of the Revolution. His oral history presentation on October 27, 1984 was titled "Az 1956-os magyar forradalom gazdasági reformtervei [Economic Reform Plans of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution].<sup>15</sup>

*Péter Gosztonyi* was an officer in one of the most important military centers of the revolution, which was commandeered by Pál Maléter, who became Minister of Defense in the Imre Nagy government. His talk on April 10, 1981 had the title: "Maléter Pál és az 1956-os forradalom Kilián Laktanyája" [Pál Maléter and the Kilián Barracks of the 1956 Revolution].

*Sándor Taraszovics* gave an account of his recollections on October 27, 1995. During the Revolution he was a member of the Nyíregyháza Revolutionary Workers' Council and its delegate to the Imre Nagy government in Budapest.

About 200.000 people fled from Hungary to Western countries after the Revolution was crushed. About 7.000 of these refugees were college students. They organized an association in 1957 with the name of Union of Free Hungarian Students. In 1961 they changed their name to United Federation of Hungarian Students – Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Egyesületeinek Szövetsége, MEFESZ. This organization functioned with a Geneva central office until 1967. Its president (1959–1960) *Gyula Várallyay* gave a well-documented account of the organization during a March 19, 1988 lecture. By 1992 he expanded his documentation into a book-length analysis published by Századvég and the 1956 Institute of Budapest. It was titled "*Tanulmányúton*" – az emigráns magyar diákmozgalom 1956 után ["On a Study Tour" – the Hungarian Emigrant Student Movement After 1956].

The Student Federation had member associations on three continents in fourteen countries. The founding (1957) president of the Association of Hungarian Students in North America – Északamerikai Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Egyesületeinek Szövetsége, ÉMEFESZ – was *László Papp*. His March 22, 1986 lecture was titled "Amerikai magyar egyetemista mozgalom az 1956-os forradalom után" [The Movement of American Hungarian College Students after the 1956 Revolution]. Adding ÉMEFESZ, the lecture's title became Papp's documentary book's title as well and was published by the association in 1988.

### Notes

1. The books were edited and the lecture and publication program was organized by Károly Nagy. The project was sponsored by the Magyar Öregdiák Szövetsége – Bessenyei György Kör, Hungarian Alumni Association, (P. O. Box 174, New Brunswick, NJ, USA). Some members who provided especially important assistance included Éva and Pál Fekete, István Hamza, József Held and Katalin T. Nagy.  
The books can be obtained from Hungarian bookstores, most especially from Püski Könyvesház 1012, Budapest, Krisztina krt. 26, Hungary, and Püski-Corvin, 217 E. 83rd. St. New York, NY, USA.  
The audiotapes of the lectures are part of the Archives of the Hungarian Alumni Association at Somogyi Könyvtár, Szeged, Hungary and the Hungarian Heritage Center in New Brunswick, NJ, USA.
2. Title page of the first TANÚK-KORUKRÓL (History Makers Testify) announcement, October, 1977.
3. "Appeal Made on Behalf of Dissident", *The Homes News*, June 3, 1984.  
See also: Károly Nagy, "Hungarian Minority Education Problems in Czechoslovakia – a Case Study of a Social Movement for Ethnic Survival," *Hungarian Studies Review*, University of Toronto XVI nos. 1–2 (Spring-Fall, 1989).

4. The best account and analysis yet of this movement was written by Gyula Borbándi, titled *A magyar népi mozgalom* (The Hungarian Populist Movement), Püski, New York, 1983.
5. István Bibó, *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination*, Social Science Monographs (Boulder CO: Atlantic Research and Publications NJ, 1991, 532, 544.
6. For example: György Lukács, *Írástudók felelőssége* [The Responsibility of Writers], *Szakra*, Budapest, 1945; Népi írók a mérlegen [Populist Writers on the Scale], *Szakra*, 1946; Valóság, Budapest: 1946, nos. 1–2, 86–103; *Irodalom és demokrácia* [Literature and Democracy], Szakra, 1948.
7. "A 'népi' írókról. Az MSZMP Közonti Bizottsága mellett működő kulturális elméleti munkaközösség állásfoglalása" (About the "Populist" Writers. Position Paper of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee's Cultural Theoretical Working Committee), *Társadalmi Szemle* [Social Review], Budapest, June, 1958.
8. See for example: Zsuzsa Nagy in: *Egy ezredév. Magyarország rövid története* [A Millennium: A Short History of Hungary] (Gondolat, Budapest, 1986), 339.; Mátyás Sárközi in: *Századvég* [End of the Century], 4–5 Budapest, (1987): 39. Gati, Charles: *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc*, Duke University Press Durham, 1986, 64–65; Joseph Held edited: *Populism in Eastern Europe*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1996, esp. 133, 134, 142 (György Csepeli) and 246 (Stephen Fisher-Galati).
9. See: Konrád Salamon *A Márciusi Front* [The March Front], Budapest, Akadémiai, 1980., and Borbándi, op. cit., 250–251.
10. Bibó, op. cit., 544.
11. "Hungarian Lectures Begin", *The Home News*, New Brunswick, NJ, February 18, 1979.
12. *Történelem az általános iskolák 8. osztálya számára*, (History for the Eighth Grade of the Public Schools), Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1968.
13. See: Károly Nagy and Peter Pastor, eds.: *The Legacy of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, Magyar Öregdiák Szövetség – Bessenyei György Kör, Hungarian Alumni Association, 1996. (This publication also contains articles by three of the "History Makers Testify" program's lecturers: János Horváth, Béla Király and László Papp.)
14. Pieretti, Fred: "Ex-labor boss breaks silence on '56 Hungarian revolt" *The Central New Jersey Home News*, May 18, 1987, 1.

### Appeal made on behalf of dissident

*June 3, 1984 The Home News*

Hungarian-American cultural leaders here are making an appeal on behalf of dissident Miklos Duray, who was jailed in Czechoslovakia on May 10 and charged with "activities contrary to the international interests of the state," according to Dr. Karoly Nagy of the Hungarian Alumni Association.

Nagy described Duray, 39, a geologist-writer, as a Hungarian minority rights leader in Czechoslovakia. Duray has been in the forefront of protests against attempts to pass a law which could result in the elimination of the minority language schools and classes serving Czechoslovakia's 1 million Hungarians.

Duray faces up to three years imprisonment if he is convicted, Nagy said.

Since 1978, Duray has authored a number of studies smuggled out of the country and published in Paris and New York, documenting official measures which deprive Hungarians of human rights in Czechoslovakia, according to a prepared statement from the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation in New York.

Duray was jailed in 1982 but was released after an international protest joined by American writers, Susan Sontag, Irving Howe and Kurt Vonnegut Jr.

Nagy asks that those concerned by Dubay's plight write to their congressional representatives or to Ambassador Stanislae Suja, Embassy of Czechoslovakia, 3900 Linnean Ave., Washington, D.C. 20008.

### Hungarian lectures begin

*The Home News SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1979*

NEW BRUNSWICK – "History Makers Give Witness," a lecture series on Hungarian history, begins its second year Friday with a talk by a Highland Park man who is credited with founding Hungary's first tutorial college for sons of peasants.

Louis Boros, now a senior researcher in radiation for the state Department of Environmental Protection, will discuss his experiences in pre-revolutionary Hungary during the 8 p. m. lecture, which will be held in Room 212 at the Rutgers University Graduate School of Library Service on College Avenue. Boros will give the second half of his lecture on Friday, March 23 at the same time and place.

The lecture series, sponsored by the Hungarian Alumni Association and Rutgers University's Soviet and Eastern European Studies program, really had the "history makers" in its first year, said President association Károly Nagy, a sociology professor at Rutgers University College an chairman of social rehabilitation services at Middlesex County College.

Guests included Bela Kirlay, commander of the Revolutionary National Guard, which tried to free Hungary from Communist domination; Imre Kovachs, organizer of a reformist group in the late '30s that wanted to modernize the country; and Sandor Puski, a leading publisher of Hungary's populist writers. The alumni association now plans to publish those lectures in a series of booklets.

The program's purpose, according to Nagy, is to fill in the gaps of Hungarian history. "There are unwritten chapters in Hungarian history. That's why this program is quite sensational," he said. One reason for the "unwritten chapters" is that the current Communist-controlled government is unwilling to acknowledge part of Hungary's pre-revolutionary history, Nagy said.

"We have realized that in the midst of us there are many Hungarians who have not only witnessed history but who have made history," Nagy said. The lec-

tures are especially aimed at younger Hungarians, "who some day in the future may participate in the shaping of their world," he said.

The alumni association, formed in 1960, is wellknown for its Saturday morning classes at Rutgers University for Hungarian children. More than 1,000 children have attended the classes since they began.

The association intends to continue the lecture series, Nagy said. He is trying to schedule Eugene Wigner of Princeton, a Hungarian physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project, as a guest.

Referring to the series, Nagy said: "This is like Hungarian 'Roots.' We are trying to make sense of the things that have happened."

### **Ex-labor boss breaks silence on '56 Hungarian revolt**

*The Central New Jersey Home News*

*MONDAY, MAY 18, 1987*

*BY FRED PIERETTI*

*Home News staff writer*

FRANKLIN — For his role in the short-lived Hungarian revolution in October 1956, former labor leader Sandor Racz says he became a "second-class citizen" in his native country.

Imprisonment, expulsion from his trade union and a partial loss of his pension were meted out to Racz for joining thousands of others in attempting to establish a democratic form of government in this small communist bloc nation in Central Europe.

But perhaps the worst punishment of all for Racz was the sentence of silence. The 54-year-old factory worker, who is compared to Polish labor leader Lech Walesa, is forbidden to discuss publicly the events of 1956. Forbidden, that is until now.

In the first trip of his life outside Hungary, Racz has come to the United States to discuss his experience in the uprising at the invitation of the AFL-CIO and the Hungarian Alumni Association of New Brunswick, as part of the association's "History Makers Testify" lecture series.

Racz's appearance is hailed as historic by Hungarian Americans because he is providing a firsthand account of the most traumatic event in Hungary's post-war history.

In an interview yesterday at the home of Karoly Nagy, a director of the association and professor of sociology at Middlesex County Community College in Edison, Racz said officialdom in Budapest purposely downplays the importance of the massive political upheaval that took 20 Soviet divisions to quell.

"The official media of the government view 1956 events not as revolution but talk about it as a counterrevolution," said Racz in Hungarian. "In our experience

we know that in 1956 the Hungarian nation was fighting against Communists and Marxists and demanding freedom, democracy and human rights."

A tool-and-die maker by training, Racz was 23 when he was elected president of Greater Budapest Workers' Council, which staged a general strike against the Soviet troops that suppressed the uprising.

As president of the council, Racz was invited to participate in the rounds of strike negotiations with the Moscow-installed government of Janos Kadar, who today still leads the Communist Party in Hungary. However, Racz was instead arrested as he tried to enter parliament and sentenced for conspiring to overthrow the "people's democracy."

Although he was released from prison by amnesty in 1963, Racz lost 15 years' worth of pension credits, was kicked out of the toolmakers union and has been denied promotion. He earns only the base pay of about 80 cents an hour for a 40-hour week in a communications technology cooperative.

Undaunted and without a trace of self-pity, Racz has continued to risk his personal well-being to fight for his political vision. He is one of 126 people in Central Europe who signed the "Budapest Declaration," a four-page document issued last October to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. The document, Racz said, was a bold reaffirmation of the struggle for democracy for the countries in Central Europe.

Nagy said his organization initially tried to have Racz's trip coincide with this 30th anniversary, but Racz was denied a passport five times. He was finally granted a passport in March – brought to him by two policemen in the middle of the night – only after the AFL-CIO and the American ambassador in Hungary, Mark Palmer, applied heavy pressure on the Kadar government.

Racz says he must be extremely careful in his remarks to American audiences because authorities in Budapest are monitoring his speeches.

One message Racz is bringing to the United States might be hard for his American audiences to hear. He said a lasting peace in Europe, both East and West, would be possible only when the United States and the Soviet Union forgo their "special interests" there.

"There is a danger that Europe may become a battleground of these special interests. Europe must find a humanistic solution to its problems," Racz said.

Racz said Hungary is currently facing dire economic and social problems, including a large foreign debt, growing unemployment and one of the suicide rates in the world. Although he could not speculate on what will happen after Kadar, who turns 75 this month, is replaced, Racz said any government will have its hands full.

Racz, who arrived last week, will spend two months traveling throughout the United States.



# THE ART OF VISUAL POETRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: KASSÁK & SCHWITTERS BETWEEN DADA AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

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European Dada of the first quarter of the twentieth century has traditionally been a difficult an unwilling participant in art historians' attempts to fix and stabilize a coherent history of avant-garde art. This is not surprising given the Dadaist modus operandi of disruption of, attack on, or even refusal to be included in what was perceived to be a corrupt bourgeois social order. Nevertheless, order has prevailed, and art historians of subsequent decades have struggled with the task of determining a coherent stylistic category for Dada, and incorporating Dada into a progress-based history of art. The results of this process have been neither entirely neat nor satisfactory. European Dada history has generally been divided into two trends. One grouping is the Dada that began in Zurich among artists such as Tristan Tzara and Jean Arp, moved to Paris, and culminated with the passing of such values as chance and the attack on logic to Surrealism via primarily Andre Breton. The other major camp is German Dada centered in Berlin, which most agree had a more political character than the Zurich-Paris group, but untidily does not mesh easily, if at all, with Surrealism. To establish a connection with Surrealism it is necessary to include Max Ernst's activity in Cologne. This version of Dada history has produced at least two unintended results that are of concern here. The first is that in the process of establishing a lineage between Dada and Surrealism, one effect has been the decidedly less attention given to a number of artists' engagement with the theories and activities of both Dada and International Constructivism, at times simultaneously.<sup>1</sup> The second factor, a more general observation, is that the art historical models so far established for dealing with Dadaism do not provide a way to account for the activities and concerns of many artists working in Central and Eastern Europe. In a history centered on Zurich, Paris, and Berlin what is missed is the quite interesting, dynamic and fluctuating engagement with Dadaism and International Constructivism that regularly took place outside the mainstream groups on the periphery in Central and Eastern Europe. This essay will discuss some aspects of the complex theoretical and artistic practices occurring in this other part of Europe through an investigation of two artists working in this milieu: the German Merz

artist Kurt Schwitters centered in Hannover, and the Hungarian avant-garde's primary representative and promoter Lajos Kassák, working in Vienna. There are a number of similarities between Schwitters and Kassák, which provide grounds for such an exploration of Central and Eastern European artists and their relationship with Dada and International Constructivism. First, these two artists have not been well served in much of the scholarship concerning Dada to date, as they do not fit into the two traditional streams of the Dada history outlined above. Additionally, classification of their work has been difficult, as it is simply not just Dadaist, nor only Constructivist. In fact, both are artists whose theories and works have not been comfortably contained within any of the standard categories or Isms of early twentieth-century art history.

In attempting to determine why this might be the case, three salient characteristics shared by Schwitters and Kassák seem to be crucial in preventing their complete and successful integration into many art historical accounts. One is the context of the loss World War I and the resulting social and political chaos in Central and Eastern Europe. Both Schwitters, a citizen of the vanquished Germany, and Kassák, a refugee of the destroyed Austro-Hungarian Empire, suffered through wrenching political changes, failed revolutions, and wide-scale social misery. It is these very political and social issues that engaged the Berlin Dadaists as well, and makes them at times such an uneasy fit with the Parisian branch of Dada. Such a disrupted social context demanded the attention of artists in this part of Europe, and however variegated their responses might have been, such was not the case in the milieu of Parisian-based Dada. Further, Schwitters and Kassák were working on the periphery of the major artistic capitals and movements in this period. Although both were particularly aware of events in Berlin, Schwitters was never a fully-accepted or participatory member of Berlin Dada, and centered his individual Merz activity in Hannover. Kassák and many of the other Hungarians were exiled to Vienna, certainly by the early 1920s no longer an important center of modern visual art activity, and have been further marginalized in Western-based art history by virtue of their being Eastern Europeans. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, both Kassák and Schwitters were simultaneously creators in the visual and verbal fields, both being significant poets as well as visual artists. Thus the breadth and variety of their activity has made it difficult to place them fully into either a literary or artistic camp. Not only does this frustrate professional classification, but in fact both purposefully blurred or melded the visual and verbal together in a way that frankly prevents a singular system of classification. Understanding how, and perhaps why they did this, and the subsequent inability of art historical scholarship fully to account for their activities forms the basis of this study.

Initially the route of both Schwitters and Kassák to Dadaist activity in both the visual/poetic spheres began in a rather unlikely place — Herwarth Walden's *Der Sturm*. As the center of German Expressionist publication and exhibition, the

Sturm group was a favorite target of the Berlin Dadaists, who wished to separate themselves from Expressionism in Germany and establish Dada as something quite different.<sup>2</sup> Clearly the activities of the Sturm group were also outside of the Dada matrix that developed in Paris. Thus the artists at the center of this study from the beginning did not feed into the two streams of Dada that are defining centers of the movement as the histories have been written. What then are we to make of Schwitters' and Kassák's interest in Expressionism? And how was the move negotiated between Expressionism and Dada by these two? Answers to these questions can be generated by noting where their interests in Expressionism coincided, and one such site was the poetry of the German Expressionist August Stramm.

The poetry of August Stramm was central to Herwarth Walden's vision of German Expressionism as propagated in the pages of *Der Sturm*, Stramm being published more extensively during his lifetime than any other poet contributing to the journal.<sup>3</sup> Stramm's death on the battlefields of World War I was mourned on the cover of the September 1915 issue of the journal, and his example inspired a host of followers and imitators, many subsequently published in *Der Sturm*.<sup>4</sup> As the literary and stylistic components of Stramm's poetry lie outside the scope of this essay,<sup>5</sup> we will instead focus on where engagement with the work of Stramm impacts the poetry of Schwitters and Kassák, and how this plays out in their work.

Schwitters joined the Sturm group in the spring/summer of 1918. Undoubtedly he was aware of Stramm, as Stramm's work continued to be published by Walden following the poet's death in 1915. In fact, Schwitters at a later date did acknowledge the importance of Stramm to his own poetry, particularly its form.<sup>6</sup> As recognized by most scholars, what was interesting about Stramm's work to Schwitters was not so much the literary and grammatical models that Stramm was challenging in his highly expressive, original and innovative verse, but instead the form of the poems, the material aspects of the words in terms of their manipulation as neologisms and in sentences, and how they were arranged on the page.<sup>7</sup> The results of such interests as evidenced in Schwitters' poems such as "Nächte" (1918) and "Grünes Kind" (1918) have variously been described as nonsensical parodies of Stramm's style, willful play with the grammatical possibilities opened up by Stramm's style, exercises in the poetic/anti-poetic dichotomy typical of Dadaists, or a combination of all of these. What is fairly certain is that Schwitters did not intend to be personally and emotionally expressive in the way that Stramm did. This has resulted in discussions about whether Schwitters was merely parodying Stramm's style, whether he was unable to sustain the vision of Stramm, or whether his literary purposes were far more complex.

My purpose is not to settle that literary issue here, but instead to suggest that Schwitters as a visual artist (as well as poet), was equally captivated by the material/visual aspects of Stramm's style. Looking at the two Schwitters poems men-

tioned above from 1918, one is struck by their similar list-like arrangement on the page, their high number of one or two-word lines, repetition of words, and the visual nature of the words in terms of their evocation of colors and sensations, all hallmarks of Stramm's style. If we look to Schwitters' most famous poem, and the one that is usually indentified as a Dada poem, "An Anna Blume" of 1919, a number of elements that seem to derive from this interest in Stramm are continued. These include the list-like presentation on the page (which is most apparent in Schwitters' English version of his poem),<sup>8</sup> the odd use of punctuation such as exclamation points and question marks, and the heavy frequency of pronouns and words connoting color. More immediately discernible than the meaning of the poem, is Schwitters' act of arranging the poem on the page out of elements such as separate word units and swatches of color. In a sense Schwitters constructed this poem out of highly-charged bits of material (words), by breaking language down into material form, and then arranging the pieces on the page as a poetic equivalent to his Merz collages of discarded materials, ticket stubs and colored swatches of scrap paper.<sup>9</sup> The visual effect of the poem on the page is important, as is the process or experience of visually picking through the material when reading the poem. The words of the poem do not flow in a coherent poetic sense, but instead prevent such a continuous reading through grammatical and syntactical disarrangement, strings of disconnected personal pronouns, repetition of certain words, and various spacings and punctuations that interrupt the visual processing of the eye, and therefore physically affect the reading of the poem.

I agree with John Elderfield that in content "An Anna Blume" can be read as both Dadaist in its nonsensical and banal qualities, and Expressionist in its sentimentality and latent romanticism,<sup>10</sup> but I would like to register this combination on the visual level of the poem as well. There is much of the *look* of Stramm's poetry in Schwitters' work, controlling how the eye moves across the textual material, and how ultimately it is perceived and understood (or not). If Schwitters thought about his own poetic work as assembled or designed,<sup>11</sup> Stramm would have been an important precedent in terms of plotting a poetry of a radically different composure, both within its grammatical and syntactical structure and on the page. In sum, the visual substance of the poem is Expressionist in style, but the disruption and fracturing of a sensical reading of the poem can be identified as Dadaist. The material of language (the world) is used to subvert or at least disrupt meaningful order – visually (in the process of reading), and again in terms of meaning. For Schwitters this move began in Expressionist poetry, and then was carried forward into a Dadaist attack on sensical order, a line of trajectory not typical of Dada poetry. Schwitters himself traced this process from Expressionism to Dadaism, thus: "Ich begann in der Dichtung im Jahre 1917, mit einer Gestaltung, ähnlich der äußeren Form August Stramms. Bald gewann ich eine eigene Form, in meiner dadaistischen Zeit. Sie kennen ja alle mein Gedicht an Anna Blume."<sup>12</sup>

We now need to turn to the other poet/painter under discussion, Lajos Kassák. Kassák was the editor of the literary and art journal *Ma* (1916–1925), which developed into the primary platform for the Hungarian avant-garde in the 1920s.<sup>13</sup> Although he did not begin producing art seriously until 1920, and still today is better known within Hungary as a poet. Kassák, too, was both a poet and artist. His journal was published in two stages; from 1916 to 1919 in Budapest, and after forced political exile, from 1920 to 1925 in Vienna. In the first period of *Ma*'s existence in Budapest, Kassák and the other writers and artists gathered around his journal became well acquainted with Herwarth Walden's *Der Sturm*. Begun in 1910, *Der Sturm* was a leading German Expressionist organ at the time when Kassák was publishing in Budapest and continued throughout the entire run of *Ma*. *Der Sturm* not ceasing publication until 1930. There were early contacts between the two journals, beginning in the years 1917–18, when *Ma* began advertising *Der Sturm* publications, and *Der Sturm* published its first work by a Hungarian artist in June of 1918.<sup>14</sup> Looking at the cover design and layout of these two journals in this period, one could also argue that *Ma* took several cues from *Der Sturm* in terms of designing a modern literary and art journal. The *Der Sturm* cover's style of masthead, typography and prominent featuring of a single art reproduction that varies every number was incorporated by *Ma* (Figure 1).<sup>15</sup> The page layout was also quite similar, with text generally run in two vertical columns per page, and individual elements separated by crisp black bars. *Der Sturm* provided an important model for Kassák and his journal as to what a modern literary and art journal should look like, and the look of such a journal was adopted by Kassák to fit his own purposes.

As the Hungarians working around *Ma* were observant of Walden's *Der Sturm*, they could not have missed the poetry of August Stramm and the importance that Walden placed upon him as a prime representative of German Expressionism. Four of Stramm's poems were published in *Ma* in Hungarian translation,<sup>16</sup> as were many other German Expressionist poets who were also published in *Der Sturm*. There are early examples of Kassák's poetry that certainly suggest a familiarity with Stramm's work, such as "Hirdetőoszloppal" [At the Advertising Kiosk] of 1917.<sup>17</sup> The form of the poem on the page is the same long, list-like presentation typical of Stramm, although some of Kassák's lines are slightly longer, as were Schwitters'. The poem also includes single word lines, often repeated, and a single dramatic punctuation mark at the end. Also like Stramm, Kassák was particularly adept at combining words and using language that creates imagery on a primary level, such as the fourth line which reads: "mint kékvörös tűznyelv" [like blue-red firetongue]. Of course Kassák's word style and disrupted syntax did not come entirely from Stramm, but I do believe that in using this format Kassák was consciously evoking Stramm. Kassák was working within the Stramm mode, and that meant both a consideration of the visual form of the poem on the page, and the forms or images created by a shaping within

and amongst the words as well. By evoking Stramm, Kassák was acknowledging the relationship between material form and the word, and how the visual/material form of the poem helped produce a disjunctive experience of modern life. This clearly was a conscious adaptation on Kassák's part, because by no means do most of his poems maintain this style. Rather, this was an experiment in terms of the effects produced.<sup>18</sup>

Many German Expressionist poets and as noted above artists were published in *Ma*, and often the same that were published in *Der Sturm* by Herwarth Walden. Thus the Hungarians around *Ma* were well familiar with German Expressionism, and I would argue, this occasional incorporation of a clearly identifiable mode of Expressionist poetry indicates both their sophisticated knowledge of what was happening in Germany, as well as the intentional adoption of one manner as opposed to another. That the engagement with the poetry of Stramm was particularly centered on the issues of material and form is demonstrated in a critical appraisal of his style and that of his followers by János Mácza, published in *Ma* in 1919.<sup>19</sup> Entitled "August Stramm és a német expressionizmus" [August Stramm and German Expressionism], Mácza was particularly critical of the German followers of Stramm (such as Lothar Schreyer), because they simply adopted the outward form of his poetry without incorporating the expressive power and meaning that Stramm attempted to make that form produce. Mácza's essay is in fact a rather sustained criticism of the failings he perceived in German Expressionism in general and the German followers of the Stramm cult in particular. According to Mácza, their manipulations of form without a concomitant production of new meaning resulted only in changing the outward elements of life without engaging man's inner self, and thus prevented real, revolutionary change. This reading of Stramm and German Expressionism by Mácza has to be understood as coming from a Hungarian deeply concerned with impending politics on the eve of Hungary's short period of Communist rule in 1919, within a journal that was engaged in attempting to revolutionize man's spirit in preparation for affecting considerable social and political change. What is crucial to point out at this juncture is that the dynamic relationship between form and how it does or does not produce meaning was interesting to the Hungarians publishing in *Ma*, and that German Expressionism (such as practiced by Stramm) was one site where discussion of this issue was focused.

The move from engagement with issues raised by Expressionist poetry to those of Dada and International Constructivism occurred in Kassák's work after his relocation to Vienna in 1920.<sup>20</sup> Within this first year Kassák established contact with two different manifestations of Dada through letters to Tristan Tzara and Kurt Schwitters, thus establishing a link with both Zurich/Paris Dada and Schwitters' Dada activity in Hannover.<sup>21</sup> Throughout the next couple of years Kassák would publish in *Ma* a wide variety of essays, poems and art works from many Dadaists, but a consistent and long-range interest was maintained in

Schwitters' work. This interest in Schwitters occurred at the beginning of the journal's most intense period of Dada engagement (1921/22), and was initiated by Kassák. It is likely that Kassák and the other Hungarians involved with *Ma* first encountered Schwitters' work via the Expressionist journal *Der Sturm*, apparently carried this interest with them to Vienna, and made early efforts to establish contact in Hannover. Secondly, Kassák was himself both a poet and a visual artist, and it is quite possible that the dual nature of his own activity was influential in establishing the course that Dada experiments would take within the *Ma* group. Given these factors, the primary interest in the works of Kurt Schwitters within *Ma* from the beginning of the Dada period begins to make sense as a choice predicated on the concerns of Kassák and the particular elements of Dadaism that would prove interesting for his own work in visual poetry.

A concentration of material concerning Schwitters was published in *Ma* in January of 1921, inaugurating the year of the journal's publication that would most fully demonstrate this group of Hungarians' engagement with Dada. Included in this issue was article by Christof Spengemann on Merz painting, which appears to be similar to, if not a condensation of, a review that Spengemann wrote in 1919 on Schwitters' work.<sup>22</sup> Also included was a section from a Schwitters essay on Merz theater,<sup>23</sup> and a short essay apparently requested by *Ma* from Schwitters entitled "Miképen vagyok elégedetlen az olajfestéssel" [In What Way I Am Dissatisfied with Oil Painting].<sup>24</sup> Arranged on the pages with these texts are three examples of Schwitters' Merz compositions, and rounding out the Schwitters material, is a Hungarian translation of "An Anna Blume".<sup>25</sup>

As the selection of Schwitters material published in *Ma* indicates, the primary interest of the Hungarians focused on Schwitters' poems and other texts, not the visual art of the Merz collages. The three Merz compositions published in January of 1921 were the only Merz pictures that *Ma* ever featured, whereas in subsequent issues *Ma* published three more poems by Schwitters, another text on Merz theater and his "Causes and Outbreak of the Great and Glorious Revolution in Revon".<sup>26</sup> I want to suggest that the greater importance given to the texts of Schwitters in *Ma* is a key to understanding the nature and quality of (particularly) Kassák's involvement with Dada in this period, in that it reveals where the initial interest lay in Dada, and the root of how that interest would play out within the pages of the journal. Primarily the Hungarian interest in Dada is first tied to Dada texts, such as poetry, proceeds to experiments in the visual forming of texts through typography, and transfers the attendant concerns with form and meaning to the realm of International Constructivism.

The works of Kassák presented in *Ma* are integral to following this development, as Kassák was the editor of the journal, therefore making the decisions in terms of what material would be featured in the journal and how; and was additionally the self-appointed leader of this group of the Hungarian avant-garde, establishing policy and generating the primary theoretical statements of the group.

To trace this entire process, we now need to analyze several of the major poetic works of Kassák in the 1921/22 period.

Although Kassák had been publishing poetry for a number of years, in the early 1920s he began presenting very different works that incorporated typography as an integral element within their composition. I will concentrate on several of the most accomplished examples in the following in order to focus on the dynamic relationship between the form of these works (their typography and layout) and how they construct meaning (how they communicate sense).<sup>27</sup> Perhaps the most well-known visual poem by Kassák is "Este a fák alatt" [Evening Under the Trees], which appeared in *Ma* in January of 1922 (Figure 2).<sup>28</sup> As noted in previous studies, this work seems to be composed of four self-contained poems that coincide with the four columns of their layout on the page.<sup>29</sup> Although the four poetic units vary in internal length and word number, Kassák balances them on the page by varying the weight and size of the typography, and their spatial arrangement. Attempts have been made at interpreting the meaning of these four units in terms of poetic sense, and as suggested are most likely Kassák's rather abstract references to the failure of the 1919 Communist government of Béla Kun and the forced emigration to Vienna of those who were associated with it.<sup>30</sup> However, rather than trying to read this work in a linear manner for cohesive sense, here the approach will be to take into account the visual form of the poem, and to appreciate how that form shapes our reading of the text, and ultimately communicates meaning. In general the poetic units are composed of discontinuous elements, which vividly evoke feelings or certain images, but do not adhere together in a linear progression. As representative examples, we will focus on the second and fourth columns of the composition, and analyze the units both of reading and looking at the text, taking note of how the visual arrangement of the words controls their reading and produces meaning.

The second column begins with the lines: "le hát a háló sipkákkal/elmult a 19 nap" [off then with the nightcaps/the 19 days have passed]<sup>31</sup> most likely a reference to the events of 1919, and perhaps a farewell salute to those days by removing the hats. The following lines express the sadness and futility of Kassák with the failure of 1919 and subsequent events that had led him away from Hungary: "Mária átölelte fiát/és könnyeket virágzott/de ez sem ért már semmit/elröpültek/a madarak/elusztak/a halak" [Mary embraced her son/and tears bloomed/but this already was worth nothing/the birds flew away/the fish swam away]. The first lines of this poem express Kassák's conflicted emotions concerning Hungary's revolution. He and many of the *Ma* group no doubt had substantial expectations of a social and political revolution in Hungary in this period, but Kassák was quickly disabused of such notions when *Ma* became a political target of Béla Kun, and was labeled a "product of bourgeois decadence."<sup>32</sup> The threat to artistic freedom that a political regime could pose was a lesson hard learned by Kassák in 1919, and one that would influence his position on the relationship between

politics and art well into the 1920s.<sup>33</sup> Much of the remainder of this poetic unit continues Kassák's theme of sadness, waste and painful memories, ending with the line: "én éhes/vagyok/te éhes/vagy/ő szin/tén/éhes" [I am hungry, you are hungry, he too is hungry]. The typography is throughout the unit integral to how it is read. The beginning words "le hát" [off then] are placed on an incline as if mirroring the angle of physically removing a hat. The next change in typographical weight is the heaviness given to the number nineteen in the line "a 19 nap" [the 19 days], thus marking a time frame. These two elements also function to fix the boundaries of that text block, as the next block of text is in a different typeset. Within this first block of text, one's eye is lead not in a linear manner, but instead begins at an angle, is bumped back and forth by the various starting points of the words, and even has to circle back to pick up the article "a" [the] for the night-caps, which is tucked up under "le hát." The next two blocks of text are bounded on the left side by a vertical line of words "a sövény mellett" [next to the hedgerow], wherein these words duplicate the separating and bounding action of a row of hedges in their function in the textual layout of this poetic unit. An equal white border of space is maintained on both sides of this "hedgerow", and the left margin of the two blocks of text to its right are determined spatially in relation to this line of words.

This second block of text, that bordering the word "mellett" evokes a poignant image: "s a harangozó/örökre/elaludt a kötélén/elaludt/szegényke/kivilágított/városok fölött/de ez is csak két fabatkát/és három gombot ért" [and the bell-ringer/forever fallen asleep on the rope/fallen asleep/poor thing/above the illuminated towns/but this too is worth just two pins and three buttons]. Kassák has placed the bell ringer, the *harangozó*, off to the far right of the poem and emphasized his loneliness and separation by disconnecting him from the flow of the rest of the text of the poem. Here he is separated and physically above the next that describes his actions, much as he is described within the text as acting in solitude above the illuminated towns below. Thus the visual placement of the word separated from the main body of the text makes physical his separation from the subject of the text, thus the form produces meaning.

The bottom third of the poem is divided into two separate block of text by varying the size of the typography and the use of black lines. One part of the text describes an action performed by the narrator, prefaced by the word "én" [I], whereas the other section of text to the left describes the inner state of the narrator related in third voice. Thus the weight of the lettering, as well as the black lines, visually work to reinforce the different voices relating the poetic text, and also function to physically separate the two states of the human being, the one actively speaking, the other whose interior suffering is being described. To the right the text reads: "én/az öregasszony/batyuját átvit/tem a patakon" [I carried the old woman's bundle across the stream], while the text to the left reads: "de az em/ber tenge/reket és le/roskadt hadakat cepel a szemeiben/a hiába hogy valaki

homlokunkra kente/a csillagot [but the man heavily carried seas and collapsed bridges in his eyes and in vain somebody smeared the star on our brows]. Thus on one hand the text may refer to exile through the image of carrying the bundle across the stream, whereas the alternate text describes the inner sadness and futility felt by the Hungarians who were forced to flee after the collapse of the communist government of 1919.

Clearly Kassák emphasizes the star [a csillagot] in the poem, by the heaviness of the lettering and the two lines tipped by arrows that point to it. Perhaps the star is meant to be understood here as the symbol of communism. Within the poem are several units of text that disrupt what little narrative cohesion one can try to fashion for this poem, and escape its signifying processes; such as "Isten szeme mindent lát" [God's eye sees everything] and "szamarak nem mernek vizbe/ereszkedni a sózsákokkal" [donkeys dare not descend into water with the salt bags]. They have been identified as old parables or sayings that would have been familiar to a Hungarian reader, and attempts have been made to fit them into the sense of the poem.<sup>34</sup> Instead, they strike me as examples of text units from other sources that have been spliced into Kassák's work, as if taken out of the context of popular culture or other textual sources and inserted in an arbitrary manner into his own text. This seems a very Dada method of composing a poem; one thinks of Tzara instructions for creating a poem from snippets cut from newspapers and advertising pulled at random from a shaken bag, or Schwitters' prose poem "Aufruf" published in *Der Sturm* in 1921, which mixed together lines from "An Anna Blume" and political clippings from newspapers.<sup>35</sup> A mixing of the various codes of the language of texts seems to be what is at work here.<sup>36</sup> As Schwitters spliced together the Expressionist language of a love poem with newspaper lines about daily political events, a fundamental disruption and reconfiguration of signifying codes is produced. Such disruption and reconfiguration, playing on the border between sense/non-sense is a mode of Dadaist engagement with the prevailing culture, and I suspect that Kassák is doing this as well in "Este a fák alatt". Also noteworthy is that both Schwitters and Kassák are making reference to and incorporating the difficult political events being suffered in Central and Eastern Europe in this period.

Throughout Kassák's work the events are described in a personal, expressive tone emphasizing loss, lamentation and the psychic effect on the writer of the text; in other words, in terms of the effect on the *spirit* of the poet, in a way that is reminiscent of Expressionism. At the same time, the non-linearity and non-cohesion of the sense units within the work disrupt, even often prevent a traditional reading of the poem. As in "An Anna Blume," here too Expressionism and Dada are being combined, and the seeing and understanding of the poems is affected. Additionally, through the manipulation of typography, Kassák makes the reader account for the physical size and placement of the words on the page, drawing our attention to the material form of the words, making reading and un-

derstanding the text a more complex process. The text is no longer a neutral element that is to be read and apprehended in a one-step process, communicating to the reader what the writer wishes to express. Instead the reader becomes aware of and involved in the material form of the text, visually taking into account the typography and spatial disposition of the words, recognizing elements incorporated into the text from outside sources, and at times struggling to make sense out of what is read. In other words, the material form of the text is part and parcel of its production of meaning (sense or non-sense), and the reader is mentally and physically incorporated into this process.

To continue this exploration of the material form of poetry, we next turn to the fourth column of Kassák's "Este a fák alatt." By far the shortest poetic unit in terms of word length, Kassák gives the short text the equal weight and presence of the other columns through typography and the addition of the large black circle above the word *sír* [cries]. In expression the column continues the tone of loss and lamentation that characterizes the entire cycle, reading: "Anna, Anna dear the man appeared above the water and bitterly cries." What is particularly interesting here is the incorporation of the geometric element of the large black circle. In a hand-drawn version of "Este a fák alatt," which was published separately as a *Ma* picture-book in 1922, the poem ends not with this black circle, but with a geometric composition including two squares, a circle and two rectangles (Figure 3). The pages of this book alternate between a page of text and a page containing an abstract composition (Figure 4). These compositions reveal in strictly visual form the mix of both Dada and International Constructivism: some compositions in their linear repetition and word play displaying a Dadaist inspiration, others incorporating pure geometric forms into such compositions, and a third group which are strictly geometric. Clearly these latter compositions, as well as Kassák's separate visual works produced in this period, reveal an interest in the geometric, abstract formal language of Constructivism. What we see in the two versions of "Este a fák alatt," is Kassák as a poet and a visual artist working with both the language of poetic texts and the geometric language of International Constructivism, seeing both simultaneously in formal terms as material to be manipulated visually, and to be apprehended visually. Also significant is that this recognition of and working with these two modes occurs in the period of simultaneous engagement with both Dada and International Constructivism. The fracturing of cohesive narrative sense, the visual manipulation of words through typography (including illustrations that play with lines and letters), and the incorporation of vernacular elements into the aesthetic realm of poetry, i.e., those things which we identify as Dadaist, are being worked with at the same time that Kassák is also engaging with the geometric and constructive possibilities of International Constructivism. Within this mix it is material form and its visual apprehension which becomes dominant.

Such a mix of Dadaist literary style with elements that are typical of a Constructivist visual style is also apparent in Kassák's poem, which is frequently identified as his most Dadaist – "A ló meghal és a madarak kirepülnek" [The Horse Dies and the Birds Fly Away] of 1922 (Figure 5).<sup>37</sup> The lengthy poem relates his youthful journey on foot to Paris and return to Budapest. Just as in "Este a fák alatt" it contains a number of lines and snippets of text that appear to be pulled randomly from outside cultural and textual sources. This discontinuous and densely convoluted Dadaist text was originally published in a highly controlled format: entirely in small case letters with occasional single words in capitals, a solid body of text with line breaks marked by black asterisks, and interspersed with full-page illustrations and a title graphic that are starkly geometric in character (Figure 6). Here the discontinuities and irrationalities of the verbal language are tightly encapsulated in a rigid visual framework that is at odds with the freedom of the verbal language, and highly impacts our visual apprehension of the poem.

The visual look of the poem is forceful and strongly controls our eyes' apprehension of and reading of the text. It could be argued that the visual element is here exceeding or even defying the verbal spirit of the poem. I detect the same ascension of the visual over the verbal (although greater in degree) in Schwitters' poems such as "Cigarren" and "25," both reproduced in *Ma* as well (Figures 7 & 8). In these examples, letters and numbers, both material elements from other signifying systems, are used as formal elements to construct a visual object that insists on being seen as an objet and now resists attempts at verbal interpretation. This ascension of an interest in the visual is also embodied in Kassák's shift from being primarily a poet into being both a poet and an accomplished visual artist in this period of 1921/1922 and the conversion of *Ma* from a literary journal to primarily an art journal during the first years in Vienna. I am not simply suggesting here that Schwitters was somehow an influence on Kassák, or even that either was consciously aware of the full nature of this process. The connection is that both produced works simultaneously as poets and visual artists, and in these "poems" we can see the process of exploring the essence and limits of the textual and visual modes of communication that were an integral part of their work. Neither stopped producing poetry. For example, Kassák was writing poetry of the more familiar kind during this period, and continued to do so throughout his career. But at this moment in the early 1920s the dual interest in words and the visual intersected in the work of both men at the site of visual poetry, at the point of interest in both Dada and International Constructivism.<sup>38</sup>

The future of both involved a growing interest within their visual work in the geometric principles of International Constructivism. In 1922/23 Schwitters' paintings began to fully show a more conscious and clear incorporation of the principles and compositional formats of this variety of Constructivism.<sup>39</sup> In 1921/22 Kassák developed and propagated his own version of International

Constructivism, called *Képarchitektúra* [Picturearchitecture].<sup>40</sup> Although it is not my purpose here to fully discuss Kassák's evolution as a Constructivist, I would like to suggest that some of the ideas contained in his manifesto outlining *Képarchitektúra* have their root in the textual/visual concerns discussed above. For example, his belief that geometric art was creation on a primary level, not derivative of nature or the product of the emotions of the artist, reflects his understanding of material form and how it creates objects that are not reducible to mimesis or narrative. It is interesting to note that Kassák faults Schwitters' Merz pictures in his manifesto on two counts – they transfer emotions into pictures (thus not creating on a primary level), and they have titles which betray their narrative function, attempting to tell us something, through a picture, about something outside of the picture. Kassák's belief that primary form could recreate man's inner self, and therefore could bring about a new world is the same belief that was Máczsa's basis for faulting the work of Stramm's German followers. Certainly too the weight of philosophical and social significance that Kassák believed this geometric art could articulate, reveals his understanding of it as signifying system capable of producing meaning. That the visual art produced could "say" all that he theorized it could is a question for another essay.

By focusing on the examples of Schwitters and Kassák, my purpose was two-fold. One was to follow a different track that began in Expressionism and circled through and among Dada and International Constructivism, but never did end up in Surrealism as so many of the histories of this period have predestined that it should. Certainly some paths did lead into Surrealism, but quite a few others did not, and art historical narratives have in large part not taken this fully into account. Second, my shift from the major centers of Dadaism to what was happening in places like Hannover and Vienna, suggests the complexity and sophistication of artistic experimentation occurring there. It is away from the centers, among Central and East Europeans in places like Zagreb or Bucharest, Vienna and Krakow that I suspect the engagement with Dadaism and the variants of Constructivism was at its most dynamic and complex,<sup>41</sup> and it was not quite like what is available in the histories that focus solely on Paris and Berlin. Finally, what I have presented here is one way of approaching this material, that focused on issues concerning texts and visual art. That there are other avenues of approach, and that this does not purport to be the only way I hope is obvious. What is clear is that there remains much unexplored on the border between Dada and Constructivism, and on that border between Western and Eastern Europe.

## Notes

1. For more on this issue, and critiques of how the history of Dada has been handled, see the essays by Andrei B. Nakov and Dawn Ades in *Dada-Constructivism: The Janus Face of the Twenties* (London: Annelly Juda Fine Art, 1984), 7–45, passim, and John Elderfield, "On the Dada-Constructivist Axis," *Dada and Surrealist Art*, no. 13 (1984): 5–16. I use the term International Constructivism here to distinguish a European-based, yet international manifestation of Constructivism as opposed Russian Constructivism. The most helpful discussions on the differences between various types of Constructivism can be found in the introduction in Stephen Bann, ed., *The Tradition of Constructivism* (New York: Viking Press, 1974; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1990), 25–49 (page references are to reprint edition), Elderfield cited above, and Christina Lodder, *Russian Constructivism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 2–3, 237. In general Russian Constructivism is defined for the purposes of this essay as materials produced by Russian artists for Soviet society, with political and social purpose within Russia's Soviet context, as produced for example by Rodchenko, Stepanova, Klutssis, etc. International Constructivism was more aesthetically based rather than production based in origin, not tied to any specific political ideology, and its primary activity was the creation of utopic projections for a future society based on geometric form and its attendant principles. Artists practicing this kind of Constructivism include Hans Richer, Theo Van Doesburg, Moholy-Nagy, etc.
2. For a more complete discussion of the complex relationship between German Expressionism and Dadaism see Richard Sheppard, "Dada and Expressionism," *Publications of the Goethe Society*, n. s. XLIX (1978–79): 45–83. In terms of how this conflict particularly affected Schwitters' relationship to Dada and the primary German Dadaists, see John Elderfield, *Kurt Schwitters* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985), 35–42.
3. Malcolm Jones, "The Cult of August Stramm in *Der Sturm*," *Seminar* 13, no. 4 (November, 1977): 266.
4. *Ibid.* The above article in fact discusses the followers of Stramm as published in *Der Sturm*, outlining this 'cult' of Stramm developed within *Sturm* circles.
5. As the literature on Stramm is somewhat extensive, here I want to indicate those studies that have been most helpful to this paper: Patrick Bridgwater, "The Sources of Stramm's Originality," in *August Stramm Kritische Essays und unveröffentlichtes Quellenmaterial aus dem Nachlaß des Dichters*, ed. J. D. Adler and J. J. White (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1979), 31–46; Patrick Bridgwater, "the War Poetry of August Stramm," *New German Studies* 8, no. 1 (Spring, 1980): 29–53; Richard Sheppard, "The Poetry of August Stramm: A Suitable Case for Deconstruction," *Journal of European Studies* 15, no. 4 (December, 1985): 261–294; John White, "Aspects of Typography and Layout in August Stramm's Poetry," in *August Stramm Kritische Essays und unveröffentlichtes Quellenmaterial aus dem Nachlaß des Dichters*, ed. J. D. Adler and J. J. White (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1979), 47–68.
6. Jones, 263. The author quotes Schwitters from *Merz* 20 of 1927 as presented in Ernst Schwitters, ed., *Kurt Schwitters Anna Blume und Ich* (Zurich: Peter Schiefferli Verlag, 1965), 42. The line reads: "Ich begann in der Dichtung im Jahre 1917, mit einer Gestaltung, ähnlich der äußeren Form August Stramms."

7. See in particular Jones, 263–65 Philip Thomson, “A Case of Dadaistic Ambivalence: Kurt Schwitters’s Stramm-Imitations and ‘An Anna Blume’,” *The German Quarterly* XLV, no. 1 (January, 1972): 47–56. Elderfield, 96 goes so far as to discuss an “... assertively constructional character of Sturm poetics..”
8. Both the German and English versions are available in Elderfield, 37–8.
9. For an additional study that deals with issues concerning the importance of both the verbal and visual in Schwitters’ work see E. S. Shaffer, “Kurt Schwitters, Merzkünstler: art and word-art.” *Word & Image* 6, no. 1 (Jan.-March, 1990): 100–118.
10. Elderfield, 39.
11. See Elderfield, 44 for Schwitters’ thinking about the fusion of poetry and painting in his work.
12. As quoted in Ernst Schwitters, ed., *Kurt Schwitters Anna Blume und Ich* (Zurich: Peter Schiefferli Verlag, 1965), 42.
13. Although *Ma* is recognized as the most significant journal of the Hungarian avant-garde, Kassák also produced a number of other journals, including *A Tett* (1915–1916); *Dokumentum* (1926–1927); and *Munka* (1928–1939).
14. Although Hungarian literature had been published in *Der Sturm* prior to this date, this was the first work of Hungarian art featured, a woodcut by the Transylvanian artist János Máttis-Teutsch, who was featured frequently in *Ma* in this period.
15. Others have noted some of the visual similarities between the two journals, for example see Júlia Szabó, “»A címlap fontos«: Kassák Lajos kiadványainak címlapjai, 1912–1934,” in *Kassák Lajos 1887–1967*, exhibition catalogue (Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Galéria, 1987), 84–5.
16. *Ma* III, no. 5 (May 1, 1918): 56. All page references to *Ma* are based on the facsimile reprint of the journal, published in Budapest in 1971 by Akadémiai Kiadó.
17. This poem appeared in *Ma* II, no. 12 (October 15, 1917): 182 and reappeared in a volume of poetry, also entitled *Hirdetőszloppal* in 1918. The poem can also be found in *Kassák Lajos összes versei I.* (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1969), 23–4.
18. That this was a mode adopted by some Hungarian poets in this period is indicated by examples other than Kassák, such as the poem “Én” [I] by Árpád Szépal, which is even more clearly an adaptation of Stramm’s style, published in *Ma* in February of 1919.
19. *Ma* IV, no. 2 (February 26, 1919): 23–4.
20. For a purely literature-based analysis of the issues of Dada and Constructivism in Kassák’s work, which differs at times from my reading as an art historian, see relevant sections of Pál Deréky, *Ungarische Avantgarde-Dichtung in Wien 1920–1926* (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1991).
21. A selection of these letters can be found in Ferenc Csaplár, *Kassák az európai avantgárd mozgalmakban, 1916–1928* (Budapest Kassák Múzeum és Archivum, 1994), 18–23. Kassák apparently established contact with Schwitters through Christof Spengemann. Spengemann was a Hannover art critic and publisher, who wrote frequently on Schwitters, and was also a friend of Herwarth Walden.
22. *Ma* IV. No. 3 (January 1, 1921): 28–9. The original review appeared in *Der Cicerone*, 11, 18 (1919): 573–81.
23. This is an early essay by Schwitters on Merz theater, which was originally published in *Sturmbühne* no. 8.

24. The first line of Schwitters' text notes that the journal *Ma* wrote to him asking why he was dissatisfied with art up to now. Schwitters apparently took this question to refer particularly to painting, and answered in that vein.
25. The Hungarian translation, entitled "Annvirágnak", modified the line structure of the poem, and also changed the layout of the dashes within the poem, in large part probably due to translating the text into a different language.
26. The poems include "Die Welt", the letter poem "Cigarren" and the number poem "25."
27. I want to stress at this juncture that by focusing on these visual poems of Kassák, I am also aware of other texts published in *Ma* that incorporate typographical experimentation that betray in particular a familiarity with Berlin Dadaism. One could cite for example Sándor Barta's "S zöldfejű ember" in *Ma* VI, 3 (January 1, 1921): 22–3. We also know that the Hungarians were well aware of the typography and collage work of Dadaism through Dada periodicals such as Tzara's *Dada*, the German *Der Dada* and Schwitters' *Merz*. I agree with Krisztina Passuth, who has noted the importance of the typography of Berlin Dada to the Hungarians (especially Kassák), but also maintains that Kassák developed his typography further, and in rather different ways because of his simultaneous interest in [International] Constructivism. See Krisztina Passuth, *Magyar művészek az európai avantgarde-ban: a kubizmustól a konstruktivizmusig 1919–1925* (Budapest: Corvina, 1974), 112–13. I must emphasize here my discussion of Kassák's typography is but one way to tell the story, and does not claim to be the only route of analysis available.
28. *Ma* VII. 2 (January 1, 1922): 18–9. The Hungarian term for this kind of poem is képvvers [picture-poem], but I will use the term visual poem.
29. János Brendel, "The *Bildgedichte* of Lajos Kassák: Constructivism in Hungarian Avant Garde Poetry," in *The Hungarian Avant Garde: The Eight and the Activists*, Arts Council of Great Britain (London: Hayward Gallery, 1980), 33. The author notes that this cycle of poems was first published in the book entitled *Világanyám*, where it covered seven pages and was not so clearly divided into these four parts. For additional interpretations of this work see also Esther Levinger, "Hungarian Avant-garde Typography and Posters," in *The Hungarian Avant-garde 1914–1933*, ed. John Kish (University of Connecticut, Storrs: The William Benton Museum of Art, 1987), 112–22. Although the following observations concerning this work are mine, some may or may not coincide with previous analyses of the poems.
30. Brendel, 34–6.
31. The translations from the original Hungarian are those of the author.
32. Kassák's response to the attack by Kun on *Ma* is expressed in "Levél Kun Bélához a művészet nevében" in *Ma* IV, 7 (June 15, 1919): 146–48. Kun's charge had been published in *Vörös Újság*, as is related in Ilona Illés, *A Tett (1915–1916) Ma (1916–1925) 2 x 2 (1922) Repertorium* (Budapest: Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, 1975), 106. *Ma* was banned shortly after this exchange.
33. Kassák's refusal to tie *Ma*'s artistic and editorial policies to Communist party politics became a major source of contention between him and several of the former *Ma* group throughout the 1920s, most notably with Béla Uitz, who left *Ma* and began publishing in the Communist journal *Egység* in 1922.
34. Brendel, 35.

35. My attention was drawn to this text by Annegreth Nill's brief discussion of it. See Annegreth Nill, "Weimar Politics and the Theme of Love in Kurt Schwitter's Das Bäumerbild," *Dada/Surrealism* no. 13 (1984): 17.
36. My understanding of the importance of texts in terms of Dadaist intervention into cultural practice was aided by essays by Stephen C. Foster and Timothy O. Benson in *Visible Language* 21, no. 1 (1987) and in connection with the material nature of typography and its signifying processes, by Johanna Drucker, *The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art, 1910–1923* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
37. The poem was originally published in 1922 in Vienna in the only issue of the journal *2x2*, of which Kassák was co-editor with Andor Németh. Although reprinted a number of times subsequently, it is difficult to find in its original typography and layout. For a reprint of the original version, and translations into a variety of languages see György Somlyó, ed., *Arion 16: Nemzetközi Költői Almanach* (Budapest: Corvina, 1988), 59–68.
38. That this was the period of simultaneous engagement with Dada and nascent International Constructivism for both artists is supported by their interest or participation in both the Düsseldorf and Weimar congresses in 1922. Although Kassák did not attend either, he was informed of events by Moholy-Nagy. *Ma* also issued a statement in response to the first congress, and reprinted many of the group statements as they had appeared in *De Stijl*. Both Kassák and Schwitters also had a professional relationship with Van Doesburg (Schwitters more so), who himself was both a poet and visual artist, and reflected his interest in both Dadaism and International Constructivism in his *Bonset/Van Doesburg* split.
39. For a description of how this played out in Schwitters' visual production see Elderfield, 125–28.
40. For a more complete (and different) discussion of this version of Constructivism and the theory developed by Kassák see Esther Levinger, "The Theory of Hungarian Constructivism," *Art Bulletin* 69, no. 3 (September, 1987): 455–66. A translation of the *Képarchitektúra* manifesto into English is appended to the following: Oliver A. I. Botar, "Constructed Reliefs in the Art of the Hungarian Avant-Garde: Kassák, Bortnyik, Uitz, and Moholy-Nagy, 1921–26," *The Structurist* no. 25–6 (1985–6): 96–98.
41. This has been suggested previously, see Nakov, 13. Nakov notes a number of collaborations among artists both Dadaist and Constructivist, and reading the list one is struck by the conspicuous absence of anyone from Paris. Nakov mentions Eastern European sites as important because the fusion of Dada and Constructivism could happen there "more easily." I am not entirely sure what he means by this, is it because of geography? a time element? a greater willingness to experiment? but it certainly merits further study.



# TWO POEMS OF DISCOVERY: MIKLÓS RADNÓTI'S "HYMN TO THE NILE" AND "COLUMBUS"

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## I. Two Poems, Four Sources

When in the spring of 1944 Miklós Radnóti received his copy of the 15 March issue of *Magyar Csillag* (Hungarian Star), in which his poem "Columbus" first appeared,<sup>1</sup> well might he have meditated on the almost three years that had elapsed since his first encounter with its source, Antal Szerb's translated edition of the explorer's ship log. Szerb's *Columbus uti naplója* (Columbus' Travel Journal) appeared with Officina Publishers, Budapest, in 1941, presumably during autumn of that year; in view of the mutual esteem that existed between literary historian and poet, there can be no doubt that Radnóti acquired a copy almost immediately. Twenty months later, he reacted to the volume in the form of a poem. The decisive moment of stimulation came on Sunday, 2 May 1943, when the Radnótis, under the officiating hand of the poet's former professor, the priest father Sándor Sik, were baptized in the Roman Catholic faith. Now was the time to turn to the achievement of Christopher Columbus, one of Radnóti's most unmistakably Catholic subjects. The completed poem dates from 1 June 1943. It does not seem too much to suggest that its opening line, which quotes the opener of the ship log, also sounds like the priest administering the Radnótis' baptismal sacrament: "*In Nomine Domini Nostri Jhesu Christi.*"<sup>2</sup>

Those twenty months of study, waiting, meditation, and writing stand at the opposite extreme from the often all but instantaneous reaction and speed with which Radnóti responds to an invitation to write an important poem.<sup>3</sup> One fine example of encounter with a source for a poem and nearly hair-trigger response to it is "Hymn to the Nile." As did "Columbus," the poem most probably had a double instigation: a "5,000-year-old" AEgyptian hymn, and (my discovery) a distinguished first translation into Hungarian of part of a book on the subject of the river Nile. The book in question is: Emil Ludwig, *Der Nil: Lebenslauf eines Stromes* (translated into English as *The Nile: The Life-Story of a River*).<sup>4</sup> Banned in Nazi Germany, Ludwig's book first appeared with Querido Verlag in Amsterdam: volume 1 (*Von der Quelle bis nach Aegypten*) in 1935; volume 2 (*Der Nil in Aegypten*) in 1937. Tibor Déry's translation of volume 1 appeared with Athenaeum

of Budapest, in what I take to be the first days of 1936;<sup>5</sup> volume 2 of Ludwig's work, in a translation by Endre Csánk, was also published by Athenaeum, very probably in the fall of 1937. Radnóti's verse adaptation of his "five-millennia-old" hymn, titled "A Nílus himnusza" ("Hymn of the Nile"), first saw print in the 31 January 1936 issue of the popular illustrated weekly *Ünnep* (Holiday). "Himnusz a Nílushoz" ("Hymn to the Nile"), the definitive version we know from Radnóti's sixth poetry collection, *Meredek út* (Steep Road) (1938), and from later editions of the poet's work, first appeared in the February 1937 issue of *Szép Szó* (Beautiful Word).<sup>6</sup>

I owe to Mariann Nagy's magisterial bibliography of Miklós Radnóti<sup>7</sup> my awareness that the early version "Hymn of the Nile" has had some scholarly attention before. Tibor Melczer, in a perceptive article in the 16 November 1984 issue of *Élet és Irodalom* (Life and Letters), titled "Egy elfelejtett Radnóti-átköltés" ("A Forgotten Radnóti Adaptation"),<sup>8</sup> identifies the source of the "Hymn of the Nile" prototype as occurring in a work by Adolf Erman, *Die Literatur der Aegypter* (The Literature of the Egyptians) (Leipzig, 1923).<sup>9</sup> In this volume, on pages 193–96, we indeed find a prose hymn titled "An den Nil," a text as passionate as it is diffuse, occupying almost four pages in print. It is not 5,000 years old but dates, rather, from the late Hyksos period, or, from the earlier half of the second millennium B. C. From this source text Radnóti takes what appeals to him, in the process rearranging and compressing his material. The opening "zöldelő" ("gleaming green"), for example, comes from a repetitive feature found at the end of the prose hymn.<sup>10</sup> There can be little doubt, then, as to Radnóti's first source. One recalls that the poet, during his university days at Szeged, similarly adapted an African fire hymn, taken from the *Anthologie Nègre* of Blaise Cendrars.<sup>11</sup> Melczer is also right in pointing to how the definitive "Hymn to the Nile" is no longer adaptation, but rather "to the very roots of its being" a poem by Radnóti. This, to quote the article, is underscored by its "dynamic verbs, reveling participles, and indeed thinly veiled political sentiments."

So far, Melczer and I agree. We part ways where he makes no mention of the possibility that Radnóti may also be directly indebted to volume 1 of Ludwig's book, in the translation by Tibor Déry.<sup>12</sup> I hold this to be not only possible, but also highly probable, for two reasons. First, there is the matter of timing. A friend or editor – or both – may have called Radnóti's attention to Erman's 1923 compilation, whether weeks or years preceding the adaptation, it is not yet possible to determine. As it looks, it took the stimulation of a second, more recent, source, namely, Ludwig's account, to revitalise the poet's interest in the ancient hymn text. That less than a month should elapse between the appearance of the Déry translation and of Radnóti's "Hymn of the Nile" adaptation, is highly suggestive. My second reason has to do with language. Every one of the principal ideas underlying lexicon in either version by Radnóti: green, distant plain, flooding, cattle herds, crowding, tightness, pastureland, irrigation, loaded trees, wandering poor,

billowing waves, generous crop, teeming fish, desert, serpent, fruit, moon, sun — every one of these is attested in one form or another in Ludwig's book in its entirety.<sup>13</sup>

It is almost as if Ludwig himself were acquainted with Erman's anthology, and with ancient hymn, and while this is by no means precluded, I have no data on it. What we do know is that Radnóti could not have seen volume 2 of Ludwig's book, either in the original or in the Csánk translation, in time to profit from it in composing "Hymn to the Nile." He himself may afterwards have marvelled at the similarities in language between poem and book. As to a "trigger" for writing the definitive version, either in fall or late winter of 1936, it could have been a publisher's advertisement for the forthcoming volume 2.<sup>14</sup> In any case, the poet's demonstrable debt to Ludwig seems as strong as it is to Szerb's edition of Columbus' travel log. We keep in mind, of course, that Szerb's work occupies the status of a first source,<sup>15</sup> corresponding to Erman, while Ludwig's role in triggering "Hymn of the Nile," being its immediate occasion, parallels the Radnóti's baptismal rite, the event that directly led to the writing of "Columbus."

## II. Discovery with a Difference

Miklós Radnóti was given seventeen years — from 1928 to 1944 — to unfold as an artist. "Hymn to the Nile," coming in the middle of his career, and "Columbus," coming near its end, are both works of Radnóti's poetic maturity. Their double backgrounds look superficially similar, yet they differ substantially, in that the more recent stimuli differ. As was Erman's anthology, Ludwig's book is again a literary source, a text found from without. Its occasional nature is basic. The Radnóti's baptismal rite, on the other hand, differs radically from Szerb's book, or indeed from any book publication; it is an inner source. Its text may be the published text of the Communion Service; its subtext is a variety of religious experience to which Radnóti felt attracted since student days. As the immediate stimulus, so the product. "Hymn to the Nile" is an important occasional work, while "Columbus" is a poem of self-discovery. The former reflects Radnóti's interest in the outside world; the latter is the poet's personal ship log of his inner journey to his own, ultimate, island of San Salvador.

Comparison will illumine this important difference between two of Radnóti's key exoticist poems. Melczer is right in perceiving a kinship between "Hymn to the Nile" and works showing the poet's exoticist interests of younger days. In particular the image, in lines 10–12, of the beggar gleaning "from trees that, loaded, sink / deep down to earth" conjures the world of Radnóti's earlier narrative poem "Song of the Black Man Who Went to Town" (*CW*).<sup>16</sup> There is, further, the paean to the sun ("Hymn to the Nile," lines 6 "blind with light" and 25 "In bursting sun and flame"), to remind us of the "Hymn to the Sun" section of

"Sunday in Summertime" (*NM*); and the images of poverty in the Nile poetry take us back to youthful poems of the early 1930s nourished, not last, by Radnóti's experience in Paris of the *Exposition Coloniale Mondiale*.<sup>17</sup> The feeling of simultaneous closeness and distance, to and from the terrain and the people who depend on it for their sustenance, is not the least exoticist element in the Nile hymn's evidently gratefully received subject.

Terrain, sun, poverty, and sustenance are all important concerns for the poet to return to, after an absence from them of well over a year.<sup>18</sup> Yet the one overriding feature of the invitation to address the Nile that could not have escaped the poet is that it is once again a chance to write of a great river. *The hymn to the green-gleaming Nile* takes its worthy place among the good dozen poems by Miklós Radnóti that work with the river motif. There are the uncollected "On the Banks of the Danube" and "The Danube Calls" (*UPI*); from among the Reichenberg poetry, there are "Landscapes," numbers 1 and 2 (titled, respectively, "*Dusk on the Riverbank*" and "*Dusk on the Bank and the Tugboat Cries*") (also *UPI*); in published collections, we find "7 July 1932" (from the *Male Diary* cycle, in *CW*); "Sunday in Summertime," "Punctual Poem about Dusk" (both *NM*); and "On the Riverbank" (*WoC*). These eight poems precede "Hymn to the Nile"; later in *Steep Road*, we also find "Elegy on the Death of Gyula Juhász" and "Twenty-Nine Years."<sup>19</sup>

Some of these river poems show distance from and closeness to "Hymn to the Nile" itself. "Punctual Poem about Dusk" is simply a lyric treating the river Tisza (lines 5–6 "Evening arrives; the river Tisza / just laps along with a giant raft, ..."); later, in "Elegy on the Death of Gyula Juhász," direct treatment matures into the use of lyric irrelevance, as in folk song, and of metaphor: "It's spring, and the Tisza, bright and deep, / flows on, and your farmsteads' dull / poverty rolls on flooding; ..."<sup>20</sup> This is already close to the conception of the secret alliance between rolling and flooding river and the poor it nourishes, as celebrated in the Nile opus. But no two poems in Radnóti's entire river oeuvre stand closer to "Hymn to the Nile" than "Sunday in Summertime" and "Twenty-Nine Years." We observe that the former, a poetic record of a student outing from Szeged days, once again has at its center the river Tisza; and that the latter does not name any specific river. Despite this, I submit that "Sunday in Summertime" in effect heralds the Nile writing, while "Twenty-Nine Years" equally effectively looks back on it.

In the "*Hymn to the Sun*" section of "Sunday in Summertime," among many other epithets for the sun, we come upon line 6 "Southern hissing of rivers." For its source, we go back to the poetry of Blaise Cendrars. To quote my critical study of Radnóti's poetry, that telling epithet "evokes the river poetry of *Documentaires*, especially of 'Fleuve.' The 'Le Bahr el-Zeraf' of the explanatory rubric heading it, ..., is a tributary of the White Nile, in southern Sudan."<sup>21</sup> We are in the presence of some of the best of Radnóti's early exoticist readings. Yet even this

specific early allusion does not compare for resonance with that at the close of "Twenty-Nine Years," where the poet, after lengthy contemplation of his own life and oncoming fate, draws without warning on the river motif as a metaphor for the life of an individual. The concluding stanza reads:

The butterfly must die; see, it's heaven's light  
that goes its wandering way through time;  
great rivers keep flowing dreaming on,  
at their deltas, marsh-mud; with crested foam,  
waters dream; and where marsh-reeds mingle  
thickly and sway in the light, there rises  
toward the sun a rose-colored flamingo.<sup>22</sup>

In the Foreword to volume 1 of his Nile book, Emil Ludwig writes: "Every time I have written the life of a man, there has hovered before my mind's eye the image, physical and spiritual, of a river, ..."<sup>23</sup> And while there is no reason to overrate Ludwig as a writer, there can be no doubt that this cultivated German read his river poets, Goethe and Hölderlin in particular. Working with the metaphor of the river as a way to treat the lives of extraordinary humans is precisely Hölderlin's enterprise, for example, in his Pindaric hymn on the river Rhine.<sup>24</sup> And while Radnóti does not, besides the river god himself, celebrate or address specific personages, his subject in "Hymn to the Nile" is above all the inseparability of the river and its good works from the human lives and spirits it nourishes.

In "Hymn to the Nile" Radnóti looks for and finds the river as the focus of his flaming act of praise; in "Columbus" he is at sea, looks for land, and – finds himself. My question is how this works, beyond the status of the poem "Columbus" as largely direct treatment of a worthy historical subject. I have written on both mimesis and form in "Columbus" before;<sup>25</sup> here, let me attempt an interpretation that illumines the poem as an allegory of the poet's own sense of direction and of his hope for innermost exploration and discovery. What I am about to suggest does not negate the mimetic or the historical dimension in any way; I am hoping to add to our understanding of how the poem functions, as seen from the poet's personal vantage point.

The very opener of "Columbus" is tellingly and deeply personal: "*In Nomine Domini Nostri Jhesu Christi*— / That's how he once began." We need but think of Radnóti's poems of early years, with their explicitly Christian iconography, of such pieces as "Meditation" (*PS*), "Portrait," "Mary," and "Fall Berries Ripen in the Sun Now" (all *SMS*),<sup>26</sup> and of how the feelings they formatively express has stayed with him. Going on, let us compare line 2 "No time now for his diary" with the poet's first diary entry for the year 1942: "I have no time to take notes."<sup>27</sup> Indeed, by the time of the writing of "Columbus," there is no diary; the last

known entry is dated 14 March 1943, the day before the date we find under "Fourth Eclogue."<sup>28</sup> Line of "Columbus" opens with: "Wind turns the pages." The personal import of these words is clearly overheard in Radnóti's diary entry for 10 April 1941: "If I really still have work to do here, then I cannot perish. And if I perish, then there was no sense in my being alive to begin with."<sup>29</sup> Similar moments of self-doubt and despondency about the fate of the work are expressed elsewhere in the mature poetry, as, for example, in "Rain Falls. It Dries ...": "What else, in this poem? Shall I maybe let it drift / as does an undressing plane tree its ancient leaf? // They'll forget as it is. Nothing really helps."<sup>30</sup>

"Wind turns the pages. He leaves it, has other thoughts" (line 3), but not for long. Let us listen to line 4: "above him purrs a wild, taut sky with giant claws." Here, Radnóti splits up a single, dominating, image into two centrally personal images. Wild, taut skies are a metaphor for tense times, as elsewhere in Radnóti's poetry; the very title poem of his posthumous collection, "Sky with Clouds," treats its central metaphor personally: "The moon rocks on a sky with clouds, / I'm amazed at being alive." To this collusion of image with feeling the poet then adds, in "Columbus," the conceit of the sky as a gigantic cat. We must go back to the African tale "Why Does the Ape Live in a Tree?," which Radnóti included in his anthology *Karunga, a holtak ura* (Karunga, Lord of the Dead) (1944). Here is cast the "symbolic role of the wildcat that is hard to miss. To escape the 'wildcats,' the murders rampant across the scene on which the poet must live and work, may be a considerable project."<sup>31</sup> How considerable, I illustrate by drawing a parallel between the African tale and the late poem "In a Clamorous Palm Tree." At its close, the poet expresses his hope that in time he too might "be granted that mercy — / a kindly death."<sup>32</sup> In "Columbus," that time has not yet come; here, the sky, a wildcat, does no more than threaten. So do human presences: "in the night / four mutineers sit crouched at bases of the masts" (lines 5–6); so do moments of doubt in Columbus as to whether he is being rightly advised: "Could Rodrigo be wrong? Perhaps. ... Frog in his throat" (line 8).

Just who are those "four mutineers"? In the poet's soul, they are: laziness, neglect of the work, doubts about his own sanity, the temptation to despair. They are the poet's very own Four Horseman of the Apocalypse, and each of these fears can be heard or overheard in the late poetry. Doubts about his sanity are a palpable concern, for example, in "Perhaps..." and in "The Terrible Angel."<sup>33</sup> But the end is not yet; it cannot be: "Columbus, legs apart, stands firm" (line 5); he hears: "the many sails hum one note" (line 7). They hum: "Get back to work!"; to quote the close of "Peace: A Hymn": "spirit, don't cease — hold out, defend!"<sup>34</sup> And Columbus does hold out; he continues questioning and thinking (lines 9–11): "But don't the tufts of grass point to approaching land? / and I saw them myself: a flock of birds flew west, / and yesterday, a dove."

Columbus-Radnóti, the explorer-poet, has had indications, both of being tested and of grace. In the latter category belong those birds who flew west. I

read them as being none other than Radnóti's many translations attending to Western poetry, appearing in one anthology after another.<sup>35</sup> And "yesterday," like Noah, the explorer-poet saw his "dove." Besides the biblical reference, the image bears two interpretations. One is that the "dove" is the divine peace offering of the poet's recent baptismal rite. As a promise that the work will not perish, this, to be sure, has its limitations. Far more convincing seems the second reading I am thinking of, namely, that the word *dove* itself is the divine sign, for, of course, the name Columbus means dove. In a similar fashion, victory — *nike* — is inscribed on the name Miklós — Nicholas. Both Columbus and Radnóti were to emerge victorious. The poet would die, but his work would not. And Columbus' own indications would come to precisely that message. Mutineers, sky, bad councilors may threaten, but in time they withdraw. The explorer reaches port, as does the poet himself. "*Laudetur*" — they murmured and stood, hats in hand."

As shown by the death motif, which recurs throughout Radnóti's late poetry,<sup>36</sup> all of his late imagery is brought to bear on his personal condition, and on his ultimate concerns. The last-named are treated in rhetorical modes ranging from the literal to the allegorical. Other examples of outright allegory in the oeuvre will be found in the similes of "Like a Bull" (*NM*), and in the striking tree metaphors of "First Eclogue" (*SR*) and of the Bor poem "Root."<sup>37</sup> There is also support for the contrast between our two poems; each has its close contrary at the level of the opposition we have looked at. Impersonal "Hymn to the Nile" stands eloquently opposed to the closing seven lines of "Twenty-Nine Years," while deeply personally attuned "Columbus" comes fairly equipped with its impersonal double. "Youth," which bears the date 29 May 1943, is another Columbus poem, but of a very different orientation, carrying as it does a point of strictly historical interest.<sup>38</sup>

### III. Form as a Carrier of Meaning

"Hymn to the Nile" is a slender hymn; "Columbus" is a modified, innovative sonnet. The first interesting formal feature of the Nile opus is that Radnóti did not settle on the slender hymnic form right away. Very probably guided by cadences in the German prose text "An den Nil," he chose for "Hymn to the Nile" a loose iambic line of for the most part four beats, the material arranged in five four-line stanzas. And while the results have a certain ring when compared with the original prose text alone, the particular for his prototype took evidently did not satisfy the poet. Its form tells us that "Hymn to the Nile" was not simply to be another poem about a river. It was to be about an African river, to emerge, on being refashioned into "Hymn to the Nile," out of the slender African hymnic opus, out of tribal song and adaptation.<sup>39</sup> This much undoubtedly guided Radnóti, as in mimesis he overheard formal suggestions. Listening to his prose source

and adaptation together, he was encouraged by the softly drumming beat, of about three iambs per line, of such material in front of the adaptation as: "O Nile, you gleam green," and: "Under earth you are born." Slender and hymnic as "Hymn to the Nile" is with reference to where it properly belongs genetically, so unique is it in conception and particular execution. The performing solo praise of the voice of "Hymn to the Nile" heralds a great stream, the poem's tones changing as the land changes, addressing its subject, "who gently murmur; in turn / break angry; out to farm / your waters run! // Full moon is all your praise, /and praise, the sun!"<sup>40</sup> Subject and form are fulfilled together.

If Radnóti had a clear feeling as to where "Hymn to the Nile" belongs in a mature oeuvre that is always under formal control, he certainly had such a feeling with regard to "Columbus." For this late, and intimately personal, realization is not merely a Renaissance document; it is itself a rebirth. Born of a late fifteenth-century text – the log of Columbus' first Atlantic crossing – it shall bear upon its mimetic substance the unmistakable sign of its formal becoming. "Columbus" is an innovative mannerist-baroque sonnet, baroque certainly by virtue of its powerful alexandrine cadences, sonnet because of its fine articulation, however much the latter may seem to set form and meaning in opposition.

Unlike the slender hymn, the sonnet is a relative newcomer in Radnóti's oeuvre. There are ten restless examples, from section 3 of "War Diary" (*WoC*) through "O Peace of Ancient Prisons" (*SwC*).<sup>41</sup> One of the most audibly sonnet-like of these is "Into a Copy of Steep Road" (*SwC*), with only one line of the second tercet missing; perhaps the least audible is the garland of sonnets in "Twenty-Nine Years." Somewhere in the middle stands the bemusingly off-center sonnet structure of "Columbus." That it has simultaneous Petrarchan and Shakespearean resolutions, we have noted before.<sup>42</sup> Here I would like to add that the puzzle of the tercet, lines 5–7, as preceded by a perfectly convincing opening quatrain and followed by the innovative quatrain, lines 8–11, is not an unsolvable one. To attempt a brief demonstration in the psychology of perception: let us make line 8 the closing line of the second stanza. No – this does not work; line 8 – and this is a structural secret of "Columbus" – is not what we perceive it to be. Line 8 is a great pause after line 7 "the great ship pitches, rolls; the many sails hum one note"; it is a moment of silence preceding Columbus' expression of doubt in what is now line 9: "Could Rodrigo be wrong? Perhaps. ... Frog in his throat." If then we read this as the opening line of the first tercet, the rest falls into place; line 12, with its contrasting images of dove and land, breaks as a line of dramatic exchange breaks. Going back and accepting what the poet has done at face value, we may also say that the poem's progression, its dramatic tension and resolution, are beautifully served by the (4 + 3 + 4 + 3) groupings of lines. In addition the idea of innovative sonnet form is precisely that the disparity between what we expect and what we encounter should encourage us to think of alternate resolu-

tions. In this ongoing formal quandary, Radnóti's Apollinairian penchant for mystification is productively felt.

Different as "Hymn to the Nile" and "Columbus" are, they both deeply weave themselves into the major œuvre; in reconciliation and affinity, they are poems of travel. As Radnóti, in this 1934 Szeged essay on postwar French exoticism observed of Blaise Cendrars, André Gide, and other writers, the author of that school composition was himself and exoticist, hence a traveler.<sup>43</sup> This does not mean to imply that Miklós Radnóti did not long for the "peace of ancient prisons," that is, for the peace and security of home, where, the fates granting, he might for a time continue working undisturbed.<sup>44</sup> But, if we trust the testimony of the poems, to the end of his life Radnóti remained in spirit a traveler, an explorer. His final note on this he sounds in "Eighth Eclogue," where the prophet Nahum suggests that he and his companions seek the kingdom of God by setting out on a journey.

#### Notes

1. *Magyar Csillag* 4, no. 6 (15 March 1944): 329. For timely assistance with materials and data used in the preparation of this paper, grateful thanks are due to the National Széchényi Library, the Metropolitan Ervin Szabó Library, The University of Michigan Graduate Library, The New York Public Library, and Princeton University Library. In a somewhat different form, the present paper was read at the Miklós Radnóti Memorial Conference, held at Darwin College, University of Cambridge, on 4–6 December 1994. For his kind invitation and assistance, I here thank the organizer and chairman of the conference, Dr. George Gömöri.
2. On Antal Szerb's edited translation as the source of the poem "Columbus," see Miklós Radnóti, *The Complete Poetry*, ed. and trans. Emery George (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1980), 386–87. Cited below as *MR* and page. On the Radnóti's conversion, see Emery George, *The Poetry of Miklós Radnóti: A Comparative Study* (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1986), 210, 621 (ch. 9, n. 21). Cited as *PMR* and page. On two other preeminently Catholic subjects for poetic treatment, see the discussion on Radnóti's translation of the "Elegie" of Walther von der Vogelweide (*PMR*, 208–10), and on Radnóti's poem in memory of Mihály Babits, "Only Skin and Bones and Pain" (*PMR*, 274, 452–54).
3. From among numerous examples for this, see especially "Garden on Istenhegy," the opening poem of the collection *Walk On, Condemned!* (1936) (*MR*, 145). The poem bears the date 20 July 1936, the day on which the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War was announced over Radio Granada (see *PMR*, 419, 674 [ch. 16, n. 12]). Radnóti probably read or heard of the event in the afternoon, and wrote the poem in the evening. It seems safe to say that most of the requiem poems, with the notable exceptions of "First" and "Fifth" Eclogues, belong in this category as well.
4. Trans. Mary H. Lindsay (New York: Viking, 1937). This American translation is cited as Ludwig and page.

5. Having presumably missed the Christmas book market of the year before. Information kindly provided by the Reference Department, National Széchényi Library.
6. For the citations to *Ünnep* and *Steep Road*, see *MR*, 375 (n. on "Hymn to the Nile"). The full citation for the first appearance of "Hymn to the Nile" is: *Szép Szó* 4, no. 1 [issue 11] (February 1937): 16–17.
7. *Radnóti Miklós, Bibliográfia*, összehasonlított Nagy Mariann (M. R., Bibliography, comp. M. N.), A Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum Bibliográfiai Füzetei, XX. századi Magyar Írók Bibliográfiai (Bibliographic Brochures of the Petőfi Literary Museum, Bibliographies of Twentieth-Century Hungarian Writers) (Budapest: Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, 1989). Cited as Nagy, entry number, and page.
8. No. 46, 6, with the Hungarian text of the adaptation "Hymn to the Nile" reprinted immediately following the article. See Nagy, entries 317 (81: text of adaptation), 1906 (320: Melczer's article).
9. See Adolf Erman [ed.], *Die Literatur der Aegypter: Gedichte, Erzählungen und Lehrbücher aus dem 3. und 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr.* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1923). Available in English as: Adolf Erman, *The Ancient Egyptians: A Sourcebook of Their Writings*, trans. Aylward M. Blackman (London: Methuen, 1927; New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1966). In the Harper Torchbooks edition, "Hymn to the Nile" appears on 146–49.
10. German text, 196; English, 149.
11. For the adaptation only, see *MR*, 129; it bears the date November 1933, For both original tribal song text and adaptation, see *PMR*, 141–42.
12. There is here a real break in the translation history of Ludwig's work; Déry may have declined an assignment to render volume 2 as well. On the poor relations that had existed between Déry and Athenaeum since the late 1920s, see István Kiss, *Az Athenaeum Könyvkiadó története és szerepe a magyar irodalomban* (The History and Role of Athenaeum Publishers in Hungarian Literature), *Irodalomtörténeti Könyvtár* (Library of Literary History), 35 (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1980), 181.
13. We are here comparing, of course, the language of two translations: that of Lindsay (cited as Ludwig, see above, n. 4) with my version of a poem by Radnóti. In the following list, page numbers higher than 312 cite the equivalent of volume 2 of the Amsterdam edition. First or early occurrences, Ludwig: 3, 313, 333 (green); 6, 7, 313, 331 ([distant] plain); 313, 317, 331 (flooding); 59, 167, 318 ([cattle] herds); 315, 331 (crowding); 319 (tightness); 59, 166, 173, 176 (pastureland); 319, 330 (irrigation); 8, 9, 168 ([loaded] trees); 319, 337 ([wandering] poor); 5, 15, 271, 313 ([billowing] waves); 173, 313, 330 ([generous] crop); 15, 163 ([teeming] fish); 7, 313 (desert); 321 (serpent [motif]); 3, 4, 8, 9, 168 ([golden] fruit); 5, 163, 313 (moon [, and] sun [separately or together]). Two examples for passages that may also have assisted Radnóti in his imagery; "The Nile silt contains gold" (283); "the desert ... grows fruitful" (285). His figure "5,000" for the age of his prototype may well come from what Ludwig writes of the baobab: "Some botanists assert that trees of this kind are five thousand years old" (168).
14. Despite the tight publication schedule for volume 2 of Ludwig's book (with a date line of July 1936 and probable appearance date in early spring of 1937), a Hungarian translation could have been ready for advertising in time for the 1936 winter book market.

15. There are verbal carry-overs from Szerb's edition to Radnóti's poem; see *MR*, 387. Quite discrete of each other, Szerb and Radnóti may also have been indebted to: János Nepomuk Danielik, *Columbus; vagy Amerika fölfedezése* (Columbus; or, the Discovery of America) (Pest: Szent-István Társulat [Society of Saint Stephen], 1856). Danielik's narrated version of the events of 11–12 October will be found on 112–15. It is of considerable interest that Radnóti first learned of Danielik's book during Béla Zolnai's lectures at Szeged. For this information, thanks are due to Professor Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, Eötvös University, Budapest, and Indiana University, Bloomington.
16. "(CW)" intends Radnóti's third published poetry collection, *Convalescent Wind*. Similar abbreviations below follow the list in *PMR*, 555.
17. On the Paris *Exposition*, see *PMR*, 132–34; also *MR*, 18–19 ("Introduction"). The particular poems I have in mind, besides "Song of the Black Man Who Went to Town," will be found in *UP2* (in particular the texts in *MR*, 311–27).
18. That is, since "Hymn" and "An Eskimo Thinks of Death" (*MR*, 148, 156), both in *WoC*, both bearing the date 1935. "Hymn" appeared in the 1 July 1935 issue of *Nyugat* (Occident); "An Eskimo Thinks of Death," in the March 1936 issue of *Válasz* (Reply). It is here assumed that Radnóti did not complete "Hymn to the Nile" before late autumn of 1936.
19. These ten river poems will be found translated in *MR*, 281, 282, 285, 285, 105, 130–31, 133, 162, 190, and 198–99.
20. Lines 15–17 (*MR*, 190).
21. See *PMR*, 143.
22. Lines 50–56 (*MR*, 199). There is a close resemblance between these lines and the opening paragraph of Ludwig's concluding chapter (ch. 31) in volume 2. Let me quote only the first two sentences: "Above the dome of the exchange, slanting up from Rosetta, a flock of flamingos whirs south-west, for on Lake Mareotis, in the marshes at the mouth of the Nile, they will find thousands of their kind. Coloured like a sunset, their slender necks hidden in their wings, they stand on one leg on the shores of the lake, looking over at the cranes which have just alighted by the water in beautiful curves from their flight to the stubble fields" (Ludwig, 601). As does Radnóti's stanza, Ludwig's paragraph too closes on the image of a bird rising toward the sun. This suggests that Radnóti did buy the Csánk volume, and made use of the text in some of his later poetry.
23. Ludwig, vii ("Foreword"). The remainder of that opening sentence: "but only once have I beheld in a river the image of man and his fate," stresses the Faustian – social and universal – point that Ludwig makes in his opening paragraph (in connection with the author's having for the first time seen the Great Dam at Aswan, the experience that provided the impetus for writing the book).
24. See Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke, Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe*, ed. Friedrich Beissner and Adolf Beck, 8 vols. in 15 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1943–1985), 2:1:142–48 (text), 2:2:730–38 (commentary). Proof of Ludwig's own interest in the secret nexus between the river and individual lives as here argued is provided by the fact that on the half title page of his book 4 ("Der bezwungene Strom"), which opens volume 2 of the Amsterdam edition, he quotes six lines from Goethe's early free-verse hymn "Mahomets-Gesang." Goethe's poem celebrates an envisioned parallel between the course of a river and the life of the prophet Muhammad. On

- the pertinent point of influence, hymn to hymn, see Eudo C. Mason, *Hölderlin and Goethe*, ed. P. H. Gaskill, *British and Irish Studies in German Language and Literature*, 3 (Berne, Frankfurt am Main: Herbert Lang, 1975), 31–32.
25. See *PMR*, 41–42 (mimesis), 467–68 (form). See also Emery George, “The Image of America in Miklós Radnóti’s Poetry,” *Cross Currents; A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, ed. Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, The University of Michigan, 1983), 347–61; 357–59, and nn. 28–29.
  26. See *MR*, 63, 88, 88, 92. To this list could be added “Elegy, or Icon, Nailless” (*SMS*) (*MR*, 84).
  27. See Miklós Radnóti, *Napló* (Diary), ed. Mrs. Miklós Radnóti, Tibor Melczer, and Magdolna Sz. Székely (Budapest: Magvető, 1989), 203 (entry for 26 January).
  28. See *Napló*, 280. For the date under “Fourth Eclogue,” see *MR*, 249. Radnóti wrote the poem on one of his tours of forced labor; see Melczer’s commentary, *Napló*, 384.
  29. *Napló*, 158.
  30. *MR*, 227.
  31. See *PMR*, 130. The translated text of the tale “Why Does the Ape Live in a Tree?” will be found there also.
  32. *MR*, 263; discussion, *PMR*, 130.
  33. See *MR*, 223 (“Perhaps ...,” with its brave “Palinode”), 252 (“The Terrible Angel”). Exemplified, further, are laziness (“War Diary,” section 3 [*MR*, 159]), concern about neglect of the poet’s work by others (“In a Restless Hour,” “Rain Falls. It Dries. ...,” “Not Memory, Nor Magic” [*MR*, 213, 227, 264]), and the temptation to despair, also eloquently illustrated by the three poems just cited. We should add the one qualification that in the first and third, there also occurs a comely reaffirmation of faith in the survival of the poet’s voice and achievement.
  34. *MR*, 195.
  35. For lists of citations of Radnóti’s many anthology projects, see *PMR*, ch. 7 (154–56) and Bibliography (740–42). Especially the 1941 entries of *Napló* are replete with references to work on the 1941 *Love Poems* (156–89).
  36. See Zsuzsa Bíró, “A halálmotívum Radnóti költészetének utolsó korszakában (*Tajtékos ég*)” (“The Death Motif in the Final Period of Radnóti’s Poetry [*Sky with Clouds*]”), *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* (Papers in Literary History) 82, no. 3 (1978): 345–53.
  37. See *MR*, 121 (“Like a Bull”), 196–97 (“First Eclogue”), 271 (“Root”).
  38. Text, *MR*, 251; see also note, 387.
  39. See *PMR*, ch. 6 (137–49). Here I must gently disagree with Melczer, in the point he makes in his article in *Élet és Irodalom* that Radnóti did not read the Nile as a specifically African river. The form in which the poet expresses his experience shows that Radnóti’s Nile is indeed African.
  40. I stand by my earlier statement on the horn music of this poem (see *MR*, 375).
  41. See the list in *PMR*, 467.
  42. See *PMR*, 468.
  43. See the quotations from Radnóti’s essay, *PMR*, ch. 5 (101–02).
  44. “Prison” as a metaphor for home is all the more fitting in the late Radnóti’s case; as Ábel Kőszegi writes: “Since 4 April 1944 he has not stirred from his apartment. He will not wear the yellow star” (*Töredék: Radnóti Miklós utolsó hónapjainak krónikája* [Fragment:

Chronicle of M. R.'s Final Months]), *Mikrokozmosz Füzetek* (M. Pamphlets) (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1972), 9. Notable is the fact that "In a Clamorous Palm Tree," that last, Rousseauian, gesture of withdrawal from "civilization," bears the date 5 April 1944.

Miklós Radnóti

HYMN OF THE NILE

(After a 5000-year-old poem)

O Nile, you gleam green, you green-gleaming one!  
 O Nile, praises to you!  
 Under earth you are born and from earth you break forth,  
 and nourish Egypt.

Ra created your billowing waves  
 that he may water gently bellowing cattle,  
 that he may water the desert, which burns  
 and, far from the waters, keeps swallowing hot.

You sprinkle creation and shield it till harvest time,  
 onto our large platters you bring opulent foods;  
 billowing goodness you are, and pulsing strength,  
 o large-eyed, sweetly fragrant one, you!

For crowding herds it is you who water grasses,  
 on your grasses the beast fattens for the sacrifice,  
 you tighten granaries, stuff sheds stuffed,  
 and it is you who nurse the poor on the banks.

O Nile, bringer of gold-gleaming fruits,  
 under earth you are born and from earth you break forth,  
 large-eyed serpent, sweetly fragrant one,  
 o, winged praises to you, you, who gleam green!

Translated from the Hungarian  
 by Emery George

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# THE GREAT POWERS AND THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956

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On November 4, 1956, Marshall Koniev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact instructed the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to put down the first armed uprising against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe after the Empire had been built there in the aftermath of World War II. The crisis in Hungary had been building up since the summer of that year and reached its climax on October 23rd. Koniev's words echoed official Soviet propaganda: "Reactionary and anti-revolutionary forces incited revolt in order to smash the people's democracy and restore the old feudal-capitalist order." Fascism was reviving in Hungary with the active participation of "former Horthyites." The generals, officers and enlisted men of the Red Army were not to forget Hungary's attack on the Soviet Ródina "alongside Hitlerite Germany" when "rendering aid to local authorities in securing order and restoring the country's normal life."<sup>1</sup>

Koniev's words echoed those of Grand Duke Paskiewicz a little over a century before. Then, the Czar's army undertook the restoration of law and order in revolutionary Hungary at the invitation of the Habsburg monarch, Francis Joseph. Now, with the Habsburg Monarchy long gone, the Czar's heirs were intervening on behalf of their own empire – a formation far more brutal, yet more shaky than the Austrian precursor. As events in Poland, Hungary, and earlier in East Berlin showed, it did not enjoy even a token of popular support, but was kept in place by bayonets, terror and the complacency of the West. For Khrushchev, losing the strategic periphery of Eastern Europe, a reward of the victorious struggle against Nazi Germany, was unthinkable. Stalin's legacy had to be kept together. In face of the dual crises in Poland and Hungary, the question was how. Making a special appearance in Warsaw after having made military threats, he was able to come to terms with Gomulka. To a country of lesser importance he dispatched his minions – Anastas Mikoyan, Mikail Suslov and Ivan Serov – but still he found it difficult to see the situation with any degree of clarity.

The hasty decision to crush the revolution by military force has puzzled historians for close to four decades. Even recent treatments of the issue tie the decision to intervene to the declaration of Hungarian neutrality and the lack of Western recognition thereof.<sup>2</sup> Now, new evidence from Russian, American and other archives help us come closer not only to that answer, but also reveal the diplo-

macy behind one of the most important crises of the 1950s from a multi-dimensional perspective.

Events in Poland and Hungary were regarded in the State Department to be "among the most important events in Eastern Europe since the war. They are the first challenge to Soviet control in countries occupied by Soviet troops."<sup>3</sup> A similar conclusion was now drawn by NATO. Indeed, any degree of Soviet withdrawal would have fulfilled a major American goal: the reduction of Soviet military threat in Central Europe. As NSC 58/2 put it in late 1949: the countries of Eastern Europe derived their importance to the United States by virtue of the fact that they extended Soviet military power "to the heart of Europe," a statement reaffirmed by all subsequent NSC position papers. In the early fifties, as in the late forties, economic blockade and psychological warfare were seen as the main tools of softening Communist grip on Eastern Europe. The rhetoric of anti-Communism suggested active American interest in terminating Soviet control of the region and propaganda broadcasts nurtured the belief of the subjugated populations that they would not be forsaken by Washington. The period between 1953-1956 saw a gradual relaxation of America hostility toward the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The new attitude was reflected in the alleviation of economic warfare and a willingness to expand contacts with those regimes. Yet, this changing attitude was not reflected in the propaganda directed at East European populations. Thus, there emerged a dangerous dichotomy between what was said in top secret policy papers and what was being communicated to the captive peoples. The tension between words and practice remained unresolved and the price for double talk was paid by those, who took words at face value and rose up against the foreign and domestic oppressors.

Following the Export Control Act of 1949 and the Cannon Amendment of 1950, which made it possible for the United States to deny financial or commercial aid from countries which were engaged in trade activity endangering peace (i.e. trade with the enemy), the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was passed in 1951. The Act, also known as the Battle Act, provided for a *suspension* of aid to countries which according to the Battle Act Administrator were shipping commodities of primary strategic importance to the Soviet bloc, except in cases where a suspension of aid would be at odds with the interests of the United States. According to an agreement that had been signed before the law was enacted, no sanctions were to be used if the country in question exported strategically important goods. The President and the Administrator were also to consider the transgressor's "contribution to the mutual security of the free world," the American aid's role in "the security of the free world" and, moreover, the "strategic importance of the goods received from the Soviet bloc, as well as its ability to control exports to the Soviet zone."<sup>4</sup> The stipulations were flexible enough for the American administration not to have to resort to sanctions. This would have been difficult anyway – practically all the Allies and friendly nations

were involved in some kind of illegal trade with the East — and when such cases became known, no sanctions were taken. Breaches of the embargo did not involve the most sensitive items anyway, but it irritated the U.S. administration nonetheless. When after 1956 Hungarian refugees were flooding the West, the State Department tried to hunt down individuals who might have been involved in Hungary's illicit trade with the "free world."

The United States did manage to dissuade her Allies from selling weapons, munitions or commodities related to atomic energy; other less important but still embargoed goods did find their way past, primarily under old treaties that had been signed *bona fide* earlier. Thus e.g. Holland sold \$240,000 worth of oil exploration equipment to Poland. Denmark did the same with one oil tanker to the Soviet Union, but the Battle Act was not invoked. Similarly, they turned a blind eye to Great Britain's shipment of Malaysian rubber to the Soviet Union in return for lumber and wheat.

Illegal trade was more of a problem: between 1948 and 1952, 200 legal actions were taken against firms involved in such activity. Often times embargoed goods found their way to the Soviet zone by way of third countries. Furthermore, what made the export control even more difficult to enforce was the fact that some of the Western European countries badly needed lumber, coal, wheat, manganese and other products from the Soviet bloc and some of their own export items found a market in Eastern Europe. Even so, a report to Battle Act administrator Harriman stated that although Soviet armament could not be halted, the production of Moscow's war industry was in fact slowed down.<sup>5</sup>

In 1952 one more piece of legislation was passed on economic defense. The Kem Amendment extended the scope of commodities under export control. The new law elicited protests both inside and outside the United States. Strict restrictions came to be questioned, since the low efficiency of economic warfare could not offset the harm it caused to the Western alliance.

One year after Stalin's death the CIA came to the conclusion that a relaxation of controls would improve the strategic position of the Soviet bloc, but would not at the same time significantly increase its aggregate product in goods and services nor production in the war industry. It was presumed that the bloc's military potential would grow only to a small extent. Yet, on the other hand, benefits would outweigh costs: a reduction of controls would improve relations among the Allies and CoCom members would cooperate in upholding remaining controls more enthusiastically.<sup>6</sup>

President Eisenhower had come to the same conclusion right at the beginning of his term. When a document advocating the tightening of controls was put on his table, he brushed it off immediately. He justified his position by arguing that economic controls were causing far more hardship to Allied economies than to the economy of the United States, and were in fact hampering Western European economic growth, the cohesion of the Western Alliance was being jeopard-

ized. American politics should no longer diminish the standard of living in Western Europe, if America wanted those nations to stand by it in her struggle against the Soviet Union. Eisenhower was skeptical about economic defense measures being able to halt Soviet armament. At his initiative the National Security Council reviewed the policy of economic warfare and in July 1953 a "graduate and moderate relaxation" was put on the agenda. This revised policy had visible results: CoCom and the American positive list were reduced by half.<sup>7</sup>

The President's initiative ran against the preferred policies of the military leadership, which continued to insist on the most complete embargo possible. Their idea was based on a very legitimate concern, namely that it was hard to distinguish strategic goods from non-strategic ones. They also believed that export control was causing a bottleneck in Soviet military industry.<sup>8</sup> The military leadership's concern was not alleviated by the fact that Great Britain and other Western European countries were exporting a significant amount of copper to the Soviet Union and were, in such a way, contributing significantly to Soviet military development. In May 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the British Chief of Staff that Western copper shipments provided 25 percent of Soviet copper output, while their export of copper wire constituted 80 percent of the Soviet Union's production of that strategically important commodity. It was argued that this was an important Western contribution to the development of the Soviet industrial, military and energy sectors, to the production of fissionable material and multi-megaton warheads, as well as the security of Soviet communication systems.<sup>9</sup> Arguments against the relaxation of controls did not end with the notion that even existing controls were not stringent enough. The Operations Coordinating Board was of the opinion that American policy and concrete measures designed to moderate satellite contribution to Soviet power were not altogether unsuccessful. An OCB report stated that the strategic control of east-west trade was able to diminish the Satellites' contribution the Soviet bloc's economic and military potential, since the restriction on technology transfer compelled the Bloc to use largely outdated equipment and production methods. And, at least as importantly, trade controls exacerbated the Satellites' economic lot and in this respect helped realize America's concrete political objectives relating to the Satellites. Even so, it was admitted that economic warfare would not be decisive in bringing about the professed end of terminating Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Its significance was in serving as a complementary element of a programme consisting of other measures.<sup>10</sup> This analysis led to a new paradigm in America economic diplomacy announced in June 1956. From then on economic *incentives* were to be given a higher priority in promoting American interests.<sup>11</sup> That is, the American leadership would be able to ask for political concessions in return for a development of trade links. Going against the recommendations of NSC 58/2 the new line was building on *expanding*, rather than reducing the volume of trade.

As far as Hungary was concerned, the new policy made sense. Hungarian economy had been in dire straits ever since autarchy had been introduced. Her debts toward non-Socialist and Socialist countries alike were growing. Indebtedness towards "capitalist" countries reached 250 million rubles in 1953, and Hungary would have needed to pay 44.3 million rubles to service her debt and interest in 1954. Hungary's debt to Bloc nations – or "friendly countries" as they were called – were at 251.7 million rubles in the same year, Hungarian clearing account being in the negative towards nearly all Communist states, including the Soviet Union and China.<sup>12</sup> Hungary's forced industrialization required Western imports of machinery, which she was unable to purchase elsewhere or to pay for in currency, forcing her to sell agricultural products (e.g. wheat to France) to raise the necessary funds. Yet, while the policy of selling agricultural commodities to earn hard currency led to food shortage and unrest at home, it remained insufficient to meet Hungarian appetite for hard currency. Because of strained political relations, trade was kept to a minimum, and Budapest was forced to make political overtures to the West, including to Washington as early as in 1953. There it was correctly suspected that Communist approaches were prompted by economic motives.

In order to implement the new policy, NSC 5609 proposed that Congress should relax trade restrictions for Soviet bloc countries which were to be treated *individually* and that they should be granted even the *most favoured nation status* if circumstances of required. What this meant was that the Soviet bloc was no longer to be treated as a homogeneous bloc, but on a nation by nation basis. As a first step, the State Department worked out the ground rules of expanding barter trade with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. For political reasons only the import of certain raw materials was deemed acceptable, but not of industrial goods. One reason was that a number of products from Eastern Europe fell in the category of goods produced by slave labour, the entrance of which was barred by legislation. A concrete proposal for trade expansion was made only to Poland.<sup>13</sup>

One of the most contradictory aspects of American policy toward the Satellites was that of psychological warfare. The charge was later leveled against Washington that America was exploiting the misery of the Satellites for selfish ends, namely it was raising false expectations of American willingness to free Eastern Europe of Soviet domination while those promises lacked all substance. Nowhere did this issue arise more forcefully than in relation to the record of RFE during the fateful days of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

The professed objective of psychological warfare was to keep alive the spirit of anti-Communist resistance and the *belief* that dictatorships were not there to stay. Yet, the dilemmas of psychological warfare were not lost to those who formulated it and were summed up in a handbook prepared for RFE in 1951.

According to the guidance provided by the handbook Eastern European peoples saw no hope of liberation without an armed conflict between the free world and the Soviet Union. All reports which confirm Western readiness for an offensive against the Soviet Union tend to improve the audience's state of mind, whereas all reports signaling Western tendency to "appease" Moscow reduces their hopes, the handbook argued. Theoretically at least, Radio Free Europe ought to have observed political realities, namely that Western Europe was longing for peace and feared war, that armed intervention was ruled out in the Soviet zone. RFE reporters had no easy task: they were to be aware that for their listeners peace and disarmament were equal to their abandonment to Moscow. Émigré leaders who were given a chance to speak to their compatriots were not allowed to promise military intervention since that would be a "radical" misrepresentation of Western policy and would "ruthlessly" mislead the audience.

Yet, speakers were supposed to make it clear that no lasting peace could be possible until "the tide of Soviet imperialism" was in some means or another made to recede from its audiences' lands. It had to be stated that Western powers would stand up to Soviet-Russian aggression on any part of the globe, and finally, appropriate sources were to be quoted to demonstrate the intent of "liberation" – with the exception of a pledge for armed intervention.<sup>14</sup>

A sociological survey was made of the broadcasts of the other American propaganda station, Voice of America (VOA), in 1953 by Columbia University. It was concluded that Hungarians who defected from Hungary had not found the programmes of BBC and VOA aggressive enough against Communism, their hopes for their country's liberation had not materialized, and for this they held the British and American governments and their radios responsible. The survey came to the conclusion that VOA should strive to formulate its programming so that the people listening to it should not expect what could not happen now but neither should they give up hope in a better future.<sup>15</sup> Yet, 1956 demonstrated that the fine line between keeping hopes alive and arousing unjustified expectancies was often blurred. Guidances given to programmers was ambiguous and allowed for irresponsible promises made by reporters carried away by events.

Psychological warfare was given greater priority by the new doctrine of "liberation" espoused by the Eisenhower administration. "Liberation" did not necessarily mean either a departure from the Truman administration's policies or a more bellicose attitude towards the bloc. As we have seen, the word "liberation" had been used in connection with propaganda broadcasts aimed at the Satellites, i.e. the operation side of U.S. policy under Truman, already being a slogan before the Republicans ever came up with it. Furthermore, economic warfare was relaxed as compared to the previous administration's line, while under Eisenhower, on the other hand, the objectives, i.e. weakening Communism, remained the same.

Nonetheless, the new élan was brought by the new President, but that élan did not necessarily translate into sensible action. The balloon offensives were launched, the first of which, "Operation Prospero" sent 6500 balloons over Czechoslovak territory with 12 million flyers bearing the following message: the regime is weaker than you think, the hope lies with the people. The balloons caused irritation to the Czechoslovak leadership since even the air force was used to eliminate them. The balloons were used in Hungary too, but all they achieved was to add to the long list of outstanding issues between the Hungarian and the U.S. governments. Nonetheless, the balloon affair in Czechoslovakia was an ominous sign of the darker side of "liberation": inciting resistance against a brutal Communist regime with no back up, not unlike in a battle where the commanding officer having given the order to assault to his infantrymen ducked behind cover leaving the men without leadership. The wording of the "messages" was vague enough to shun responsibility were someone to question the wisdom of such policy. Fortunately, the balloons caused little harm — and caused very little good.

In Berlin, 6 million food packages were shared out between July and October 1953 to reveal the low standard of living in East Germany<sup>16</sup> — something that was public knowledge anyway. Based on the assumption that liberation would come about through the correlation of forces within and outside the Satellites, they sought to provide the "domestic forces," that is the "captive nations," with more spiritual strength. Thus, within Operations "Veto" and "Focus" 10 and 12 demands were transmitted to the peoples of Czechoslovakia and Hungary to level against their governments.<sup>17</sup>

But psychological warfare did not only consist of sending balloons. Another aspect was the use of refugees for propaganda purposes. First and foremost, individuals who by virtue of their positions or special training could provide information on Iron Curtain areas and could be used for psychological offensive purposes were sought after. Yet, it sometimes turned out that those who did get out from behind the Iron Curtain were not used. One Hungarian managed to escape from the forced labour camp at Reesk in Hungary and made it to Austria. When he called on American authorities to tell about the camp and the conditions there, his story was dismissed in disbelief.

The National Security Council came to the conclusion that since defection of Soviet citizens would undermine the political leadership there, the United States had to induce the departure of the greatest number of people possible from all over the Soviet Union and her armed forces. For this purpose American propaganda was to convey the message that the United States would not return defectors, but would assist in obtaining political asylum. This kind of propaganda was not to be pushed towards the Satellites, the reason being that the strongest antidote to a Soviet type system was supposed to be internal dissatisfaction and not emigration. The potential basis for future resistance had to be kept intact and

settling a large number of refugees would have caused problems therefore, a support of mass defection from Eastern Europe was deemed inexpedient.<sup>18</sup> There is no doubt that the most important reason for this was to keep the most militantly anti-Communist elements at home, even if some of them were sitting in jail or working in labour camps. Anti-Communist resistance potential was there, e.g. in 1951 news reached the State Department that an anti-government plot was uncovered in Hungary, the participants of which were planning an armed revolt on the national holiday on March 15.

Congress had different ideas about refugees. In 1951 the Kersten Amendment allocated \$100 million for the military organization of refugees from the Soviet zone. The President of the Psychological Strategy Board, Dr. Gordon Gray, praised the Amendment as the first positive step against Soviet aggression since World War II including the Marshall Plan and the Korean War which were, in his view, only responses to Soviet initiatives.<sup>19</sup>

On December 18, 1951, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take the necessary measures to implement the Congress resolution, which as an economic defense was more hawkish than the administration on matters of psychological warfare as well.

Twenty-five light regiments were to be set up with 14 thousand men. These were later to be integrated into a NATO military framework. This move was seen necessary because it was believed – under what premises is hard to imagine – that the Soviet Union did not look upon NATO as an offensive organization and, therefore, would not view these units as manifestation of aggressive intent.<sup>20</sup> Each armed service prepared its own report, thus, e.g. the air force, worked out its own programme to encourage and foster defection by the personnel of East European and Soviet air forces.<sup>21</sup> The Kersten Amendment was supposed to have been carried out in July 1957 and until mid-1955 some 60 thousand volunteers were to have been given military training. Those with the best results were to be used in psychological, intelligence, and non-conventional military activity. The plan never materialized. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the project to the Secretary of Defense, they signaled that they had their doubts about its practicability.<sup>22</sup> He thought it unlikely that Western European governments would be favourably disposed to having the refugee units stationed in Europe and viewed their relationship to NATO and the then not yet defunct EDC problematic.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the Chiefs of Staff reexamined the ideas relating to the Kersten Amendment's implementation and in September 1952 concluded that they could not be put into practice in the course of the following year. American military commanders in Europe joined the Secretary of Defense in arguing that setting up refugee units was neither desirable nor practicable.<sup>24</sup> Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense gave an order to work out the concrete military plan to implement the Kersten Amendment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again turned down the project on the grounds of the legal, political, and financial difficulties involved.

In June 1953 President Eisenhower decided to set up an organization called Volunteer Freedom Corps, but this idea remained on paper as well, even though its aim would have been to increase anti-Communist resistance and undermine the power of puppet governments behind the Iron Curtain. The idea of the Freedom Corps kept reemerging – e.g. in December 1956 – but always stumbled on the resistance of the military, which was unconvinced of its utility.

The early 1950s were the Cold War's most freezing years. The "loss" of China and the Korean War convinced many that there existed an international Communist plot centered in Moscow, which was out for world mastery. In 1951 the CIA concluded that Moscow's final objective was a Communist world ruled by the Soviet Union, and that the Kremlin was of the opinion that its vital interests could be realized only if it annihilated all governments it could not control. It was argued that because of these reasons no peaceful coexistence between the two world systems was possible. In order to achieve its objectives, the Soviet Union would augment its preparedness for war, attempt to extend the territory under Soviet control, and work to undermine and gain control of governments not yet under its influence. It was further stated that the Soviet army was capable of overrunning Continental Europe, the Near, and the Middle East with the exception India and Pakistan. Moscow would use all means short of a world war to achieve its ends, but the possibility of war could not be ruled out either.<sup>25</sup>

Operation "Ironbark," a military contingency plan for the case of Soviet attack on Western Europe was worked out with the basic assumption that the Red Army would occupy the western part of the Continent, and American troops would have to land in the Europe in order to liberate it. This operation would be followed by the occupation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Ideas were worked out for the administration of those countries, the elimination of Communist regimes, and the restoration of their links with the West.<sup>26</sup>

The State Department shared the military establishment's gloomy outlook. The Policy Planning staff asserted that "the basic conflict" between the two powers (i.e. the Soviet Union and the U.S.) cannot come to a final end as long as those two great powers survive in their present form. The exigencies of their political systems in respect to the world surrounding them put them in such an antagonistic opposition that the conflict between them could not be solved until one or the other was destroyed by decisive defeat or an internal transformation amounting to defeat. In an armed conflict America would aim to overthrow the Soviet system, as a result of which the Soviet Union would withdraw behind its 1938 boundaries.<sup>27</sup> If the United States were drawn into a war against her will she would be guided by "final victory" unless this led to her own annihilation. Clearly the A-bomb bore heavily on the mind of the one who drafted the paper. War was a realistic possibility and the fear of war was omnipresent. Secretary of State Acheson entertained a person for longer than one hour, who asked him to convey a message to the President that a little girl who had paranormal capabilities

predicted a Soviet-American war on Yugoslavia. Acheson was so agitated by what he heard that he passed on a long summary of the discussion to Truman. Yet he did not find time to receive Robert Vogeler who had been released by Hungarian authorities after spending two years in prison, although Vogeler allegedly had important information on developments in Hungary.

It was the openly avowed objective of the United States to eliminate Eastern European Communist regimes and to roll back Soviet influence. Numerous ideas were put forward to this effect but few held out hope of success. Liberation seemed such a distant goal that only common places were ever said about what liberated Eastern Europe's place would be in a "free world." Not even its eventual liberation of Soviet control brought any clarification of this latter issue; and almost 45 years have elapsed since the doctrine of liberation was officially announced. Five years have gone by since the Iron Curtain came down. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, but there is still confusion in the West about what to do about Eastern Europe. It even seems that in many capitals Soviet control of that region in retrospect is seen as a happy alternative to the present state of affairs.

The Republican administration propagated a new, dynamic policy to "roll back" Communism in Eastern Europe instead of the alleged passivity of the previous administration. The new policy was born in a favorable international setting: the death of Stalin ensued by a power struggle in Moscow, disturbances in East Berlin, and Czechoslovakia. The doctrine of liberation emphasized aggressive psychological warfare, including a tougher rhetoric. When, after the 1956 revolution was crushed and emptiness, the utter failure, even immorality, of this policy was raised within the U.S. and abroad, PPS found it necessary to explain the real essence of liberation. According to that version, the unchanging objective of American policy over the years was to keep alive the spirit of hope and liberty but *not to initiate Eastern Europe's forceful liberation*.<sup>28</sup>

When in September 1956 Adlai Stevenson raised the "pledge" of liberation in his election campaign, John Foster Dulles was quick to respond: "There was no such 'pledge.'" According to Dulles, "...United States policy as one of its *peaceful* purposes looks happily forward to the genuine independence of the captive peoples. The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of the end" (emphasis is mine). Dulles claimed credit for the VOA in "creating strains and stresses within the captive world."<sup>29</sup> Although American policy was bold in the interpretation of propaganda broadcast, in its practical steps it was far more cautious in recognition of the fact that unless a miracle happened very little could be done to achieve its ends. *That recognition made the Americans less than eager to antagonize the Soviets over Eastern Europe*. Over this issue Dulles's line was not at all in step with the Cold Warrior image vested on him by his adversaries at home and abroad.

The State Department regularly received inquiries from East European émigré groups, politicians and individuals on American policy toward their native lands. They were, without exception, given a standard answer that lacked the rhetoric of statements made for public consumption and revealed that the new doctrine was no departure from old policies. According to the prefabricated response the people and the government of the United States “was filled with constant, deep anxiety” about the fate of “captive nations” in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. “Responsible officials” of the administration have repeatedly affirmed that the United States does not accept “the slavery of East European nations” to be a permanent condition and is “looking forward” for the peoples of the region to regain their “freedom and independence.”<sup>30</sup> This was hardly the activist, robust policy popularly attributed to the Eisenhower-Dulles line.

As far as free elections were concerned in Eastern Europe – which were the long term objectives of American policy there – it was admitted that “no concrete proposal or programme” had been worked out about that issue.<sup>31</sup> Ferenc Nagy, the former Hungarian prime minister approached the State Department with a request for a high ranking official to speak at the ceremony organized by Hungarian émigrés to commemorate the 1945 democratic elections of Hungary. The State Department did not want anything to do with this since it did not want to identify “publicly and officially” with views and ideas that might be expressed by Hungarian emigres.<sup>32</sup> The speakers were likely to talk about Hungary’s liberation from Soviet and Hungarian Communist mastery, and the State Department shunned identification with an aim that it had been pushing since 1949.

The Eisenhower administration’s goals in Eastern Europe were spelled out in documents prepared by the National Security Council. NSC 158, on the exploitation of unrest in Eastern Europe was inspired by events in East Berlin and Czechoslovakia. *It was the United States’ most important aim to nurture anti-Communist resistance that was not to reach the level of a rebellion.*<sup>33</sup> The document advocated a psychological offensive, but the parts pertaining to the details have been excised and are not available for research.

It was believed that the greater part of Eastern Europe’s population was anti-Communist, governments there depended upon Soviet weapons for their survival, but their own armed forces were unreliable. Nonetheless, it seemed that the Soviet Union was firmly in control, and it did not seem possible that there could be a series of new “Yugoslavias.” The consequence were drawn in NSC 174, which replaced NSC 58/2 as the official statement of American policy toward Eastern Europe. The significance of the region was once again defined in its augmenting the Soviet Union’s political, military and economic power and extending its influence to the “heart of Europe.” For this reason, it was deemed that a permanent soldification of Soviet control in the region posed a serious threat to the security of the United States and Western Europe. Consequently, it was in

Washington's fundamental interest to *eliminate* the Soviet Union's *dominant* influence over the Satellites.

A restoration of East European independence was spelled out as a long term objective; in the shorter run America strove to "undermine" local regimes, create favourable conditions for liberation, and preserve those forces which could contribute to independence and the realization of American interests. More ominously, the ground had to be prepared for possible armed resistance against the Soviet Union. No military means were contemplated in realizing these objectives. Instead UN forces were to be used for those purposes, and a new element was introduced – negotiations with the Soviet Union. In encouraging passive resistance care had to be taken so as not to incite "premature" rebellions, and no promises were to be made as for the timing and nature of American measures to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe. Little wonder, since those measures were likely to have been clouded by mystery even to those who formulated American policy. The opportunities presented by disturbances were to be exploited and *nationalist sentiments*, the "natural enemies" of "Soviet imperialism" were to be supported in an undisclosed manner as a means of resistance. NSC 172 made a distinctly interesting observation, which proves that American policy makers were not altogether blinded by the Cold War paradigm. Namely, in the field of supporting nationalist sentiments the United States was not to assume responsibilities that would be at cross purposes with post-liberation American aims. That is, nationalist dictatorships were no more desirable than Communist ones. In this rare instance of clear sightedness were foreseen events that would happen forty years later: the reemergence of extreme nationalism in Eastern Europe, which had in the interwar period proved to be its undoing and would again threaten the peace and stability of the region. At the same time, this observation pointed to a fundamental dilemma. Democratic elements in Eastern Europe were either driven out into exile in the period *immediately* following Soviet occupation or were vegetating in penitentiary institutions. In some countries democratic traditions were feeble, and consequently, there was little in between the Communists and extreme nationalists. This point is underscored by recent developments in Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia.

Finally, conflicts within Communist leaderships were to be exploited, dissatisfaction was to be fostered in the ranks of the armed forces, preparations were to be made to take advantage of Titoist deviation, not to mention prompting key personalities to defect. There is, as yet, no evidence that practical steps were actually taken to put into effect these guidelines.

In fact, the means at the disposal of the U.S. Legation in Budapest were in stark contrast to the ambitious plans. Propaganda activity ceased altogether, people visiting the mission were under police surveillance, which dissuaded most people from visiting the Legation. The best the American minister in Budapest

could think of was to ask for a more expensive automobile, which would impress Budapesters even more than the one he was driving presently.

Assault on the Soviet system was to use diplomatic, political, propaganda, economic subversive and military tools. Recommendations for the latter two are not yet open to research. Document NSC 54/2 called upon the United States to develop underground resistance, guerrilla activity and make sure that in the case of war the forces of resistance would be available in areas threatened by or under Communist rule.<sup>34</sup>

As documents on American policy are revealed, we are finding out that the Eisenhower administration's stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the issue of Eastern Europe moved from confrontation to an accord through accommodation, negotiation. A solution to the problem of Eastern Europe by a negotiated arrangement was alluded to by NSC 74. There were two alternatives. One was to take advantage of the transition, the power struggle in Moscow. Recent literature points out that in fact Beria may have been amenable to easing East-West tensions by making concessions on post-war Soviet territorial acquisitions. His initiative, which evokes the eerie memory of Himmler's secret approach in 1945 was cut short by his arrest and subsequent execution.<sup>35</sup>

It was argued that in the present stage of Soviet history, negotiations could lead to great concessions from Moscow at the price of smaller concessions from the United States. Even the Iron Curtain might be made to recede if the EDC were not extended to the Soviet boundary.<sup>36</sup>

The alternative approach argued that the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Eastern Europe could be achieved by observing Moscow's security interests. This was an interesting argument, since less than a decade before Moscow's "deciding voice" in East European affairs was recognized exactly with regard to the security needs — real or imagined — of the Soviets. Another line of reasoning was put forward by the PPS to the effect that the periphery of countries running from the Baltic Sea to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas can be viewed from the Russian perspective as a security zone, a cordon sanitaire against the West, which would be hard to give up because of defense considerations. Yet, Western demands were for free elections, which could be menacing to the Soviet Union because governments could come to power that would be hostile to Moscow.<sup>37</sup>

From the above it followed that concessions would have to be made to satisfy Soviet security claims, and in return Western objectives would become realizable Eastern Europe. Thus, if the United States was to make an agreement on the countries making up the periphery, Russia's legitimate claim that her European neighbours could not be openly and actively hostile towards her and could not participate in activities detrimental to Soviet security interests, had to be recognized. In return, the West would demand that the Soviet Union's "totalitarian rule" should cease in Eastern Europe, being a constant threat to European democracy and security. As a compromise solution it would be acceptable if the

Soviet government withdrew its troops from the zone of security and could return only in case they were invited by freely elected governments. Existing governments would be disbanded and elections would be held under international auspices. The new governments would have a free hand in their foreign and domestic policies, but *would be obliged to subordinate their security policies* to Moscow's interests (i.e., they would not be allowed to sign defense arrangements but with the Soviet Union). Their status would be like that of Finland.

In order to have an agreement, further guarantees could be granted to satisfy Soviet defense needs. If firm guarantees could be given against the resurrection of the German threat, and the neutrality of the Soviet Union's limitrophe countries could be assured, then the withdrawal of the Iron Curtain behind the Soviet Union's 1939 boundaries would be compatible with Moscow's security interests.

An agreement would have as its basis a defensible Western Europe, which in turn would not endanger the Soviet Union. The two together would satisfy both Moscow's and Washington's "legitimate aspirations." In spite of the "serious risks" involved an agreement with the Soviets on the size and disposition of armed forces in Europe was considered in relation with a possible Soviet withdrawal.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, according to the above line of reasoning the restoration of Eastern Europe's independence was to be achieved by observing Soviet security interests in such a way that the members of the cordon sanitaire would make defense arrangements with the Soviet Union. Moscow would be guaranteed against Germany, Western Europe against the Soviet Union and there would be an accord on the size and disposition of military forces in Europe. Those countries regaining their independence would be permitted to enter European integrations, *except* defense ones.

A more realistic approach emerged in August 1953, according to which the above reasoning was rational, but unacceptable to the Soviet leadership, since it would spell the end of present Communist regimes in the Satellites, and this would presumably constitute a serious blow to the inner stability of the Soviet system. For this reason the above proposal could serve propaganda aims only, and more modest ones ought to be put forward to find out what concession, if any, the Kremlin would be willing to make. Recommendations were to be made for an amnesty to political prisoners, normalization of diplomatic relations with the West and Yugoslavia freedom to travel, the right to observe and report for Western journalists, observation of human rights conditions, and practical steps for the freedom of navigation on the Danube.<sup>39</sup>

When the Austrian treaty was signed in 1955 and as a result Austria was neutralized, there was a ray of hope that a negotiated agreement on the fate of Eastern European nations could come about. This did not mean the opinion on the Soviet Union had fundamentally changed: it was still seen as seeking to undermine and weaken the Western world and expanding the territory under its con-

trol. Her concessions — like the treaty on Austria — were dismissed as “*tactical*” measures by Soviet diplomacy, which demonstrated its flexibility.<sup>40</sup>

The United States was seeking an advantageous settlement and accordingly advocated Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, independence for Soviet zone nations, German unification and membership in NATO. As far as Eastern Europe was concerned the State Department proposed the following position for the America delegation for the 1955 four power meeting: German unification, after which the Soviet Union was to move out of the GDR and Poland, and subsequently, when the Austrian agreement came into force, from Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.<sup>41</sup>

The problem of Eastern Europe was raised by Secretary of State Dulles to premier Bulganin in Geneva as previously planned. Dulles told the Prime Minister that Eastern Europe was important to the United States because of ethnic ties and therefore its impact on domestic politics. Then, he continued to say that Washington had no desire to surround the Soviet Union with a ring of unfriendly countries. At this point the secretary revealed what he was getting at: that Eastern Europe be granted an opportunity for development along the Finnish model.<sup>42</sup> Bulganin refused to discuss the issue and Eastern Europe was not even put on the agenda. It was tacitly recognized as being outside the scope of influence, for the Western powers. The Empire in Eastern Europe was *not* threatened from the outside at least.

July of 1956 saw a new revision of goals in Eastern Europe in NSC 5608, which contained several new elements. In contrast to the State Department's view according to which the American opportunities to put pressure on Soviet power over the Satellites “*continue to be very limited*,”<sup>43</sup> the NSC stated that the fluid situation in the Satellites increased the United States' *previously* limited chances for an influence toward a profound change in the Soviet domination of the Satellites.<sup>44</sup>

The document which called the liberation of East-Central Europe a “long term perspective” recognized as a new motive that the independence of individual nations could develop in *different* ways. It was, therefore, asserted that some policies and political measures may be applied for the Soviet bloc as a whole, while others were suitable for one or more Satellites only. From now on the carrot and the stick policy was to be employed, elements of political pressure were to be complemented with incentives for good behavior.

Even more importantly American policy was no longer to influence the masses only, but also the governments themselves. Eastern European regimes were to be prodded to pursue policies that would not lose sight of national interests and would also take American interests into account. It was not clearly defined what those interests were. In possibly one of the worst timings of Cold War history “*evolutionary*” processes were given priority over revolutionary ones. The causes of dissatisfaction were supposed to be portrayed to the peoples of the So-

viet bloc in such a manner as to demonstrate that their alleviation was conceivable not only by revolution, but also by the governments themselves should they decide to take the necessary measures. This was a bad omen for the revolutions then in the making. The NSC document was drafted in face of unrest in Poznan (Poland) in late June. Yet, the tide in America was clearly against violent solutions: the Senate failed to pass the Dirksen Amendment which offered a \$25 million subsidy to private organizations dedicated to Eastern Europe's liberation.<sup>45</sup>

Only a few days after NSC 5608 was accepted, the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee passed a resolution to the effect that "... [the imperialists] are out to weaken international relations and want to undermine our unity with the slogan of 'separate roads,' then they want to smash [the socialist countries] one by one."<sup>46</sup> The resolution was a clear signal: if one component of the bloc fell, then the others would follow like dominoes. Therefore, if the Socialist camp was to survive, no deviation, no concession for "national Communism" was to be allowed. Unrest in Poznan and Hungary was attributed to "imperialist subversion." Khrushchev dispatched his trouble-shooter, Anastas Mikoyan to find a solution to the political crisis evolving in Hungary on the future of the Stalinist Party chief Mátyás Rákosi. Mikoyan was also to report on the Hungarian political situation, which was a source of concern for the Kremlin leadership.

Soviet-Hungarian relations of the time could be best characterized as a master-slave relationship. Hungarian foreign policy was a function of the Soviet Union's, her important domestic issues were decided in Moscow or under the guidance of the Kremlin leadership. Hungary's economy was dependent upon Soviet willingness to supply raw materials, and indeed, her five year plan was built on cooperation with the Soviet Union. This relationship remained unchanged even after Stalin died and was to continue the same way all throughout the 1950s. Hungarians were made to feel puny, insignificant — they were invited to view a military exercise where an A-bomb was dropped on the practicing troops; their leaders were shuffled around at Moscow's will.

Foreign trade was one area where the Soviet Union had its strongest grip on Hungary. In 1954 Voroshilov announced that since 1946 commercial turnover between the two sides had risen by 14 times. When in early 1955 the Soviet leadership unexpectedly reduced the list of goods it was willing to purchase from and ship to Hungary, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Trade László Hay admitted to the Political Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party that the whole foreign trade plan for 1955 was built on the assumption that the turnover with the Soviet Union would grow. "The exceedingly sharp reduction of materials coming from the Soviet Union and in the case of some raw materials, even a complete halt of the Soviet import brought our national economy into a very serious situation indeed."<sup>47</sup> Hungarian economy found itself in a critical situation and was obliged to "turn to the capitalist states to cover the missing raw materials and commodi-

ties." Yet, as Prime Minister Imre Nagy admitted, "some raw materials, especially those needed for foundries could not be purchased from the West even for currency."<sup>48</sup> Economic warfare finally bore fruit. Soviet inability or unwillingness to supply certain essential commodities made a satellite turn to the West for assistance, which due to the embargo was not forthcoming, and putting the country in question into dire straits. Just the way it was envisioned in 1948.

This episode is a clear example of a one-sided dependence on Soviet policies, and of Soviet procedure. No warning was given to Budapest about Moscow's changed trade policy, and no explanation was given why essential goods were not supplied.

Yet, it was in the political sphere that the subordinated relationship was felt most. Mátyás Rákosi, who wallowed in a Byzantine cult of personal adulation, literally presided over life and death and reckoned himself as "Stalin's best disciple," suddenly found out in June 1953 that he was worth only as much as the value the Soviets put behind him. As a perceptive British observer put it: "Rákosi's genius for a single minded, unremitting intrigue in his quest for paramour in Hungary has been equaled only by his consistent servility to Moscow... So accurately did his policies reflect those of the Kremlin that one can almost hear Stalin plagiarizing the earlier master's words: 'My most faithful pupil.'"<sup>49</sup>

All of a sudden in June 1953, at the peak of Beria's new initiatives, Rákosi was summoned to Moscow. There, he was told in no uncertain terms that the top echelons of the Hungarian party would need to be reshuffled and he himself had to relinquish his Prime Ministership to Imre Nagy. All sorts of charges were leveled against the shattered Rákosi and the members of his delegation. The most important was that the leadership was dominated by unpopular Jews and younger, truly Hungarian cadres, should now be given a chance. This issue was by no means new. Stalin had originally wanted non-Jews to head the Communist Party, but since the Muscovites were almost exclusively of Jewish stock — with the notable exception of Imre Nagy — he had no other choice. The Rákosi group in turn did their best to convince everyone that the "comrades" of home were not competent enough. Now it all turned back on them, and not even his anti-Semitism could save Rákosi from what he got in Moscow.

The criticism was unequivocal from Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, but the most vocal critic was Beria. He was the one who supplied the most grotesque episode of the meeting when he attacked Defense Minister Farkas for being too harsh with the population, introducing terror, something the Moscow leadership allegedly had warned against. That the Hungarians had acted against the Kremlin's advice was a common theme. Too much emphasis was put on heavy industry as opposed to light and consumer industry and agriculture. All that was to change from now. The Hungarians could hardly speak — they had always acted in line with if not at the direct instructions of those who were now

calling them to account. In the very end Rákosi was even accused by Beria of dealing with the Americans behind the Soviets' back.<sup>50</sup> There was little substance to the latter accusation: the U.S. minister in Budapest had approached the Hungarian Foreign Minister at a reception earlier that year with an offer to improve bilateral relations. The Foreign Minister duly reported on the approach to the party leadership, and as far as it is possible to tell, there was no follow-up.

When in 1952 the Soviet leadership was dissatisfied with Nagy's economic results, Malenkov had the Stalinist economic expert Ernő Gerő take over leadership of the economy. As it turned out, the Prime Minister himself lost favor in Moscow soon. As historian János Rainer wrote: "Imre Nagy's reform initiatives did not fit into the Soviet policy of step-by-step correction, not so much because of their rapidity...but because in the Soviets' judgement they posed the same threat which elicited Moscow's directive for correction: the reform measures would go beyond a certain limit and become destabilizing. The Hungarian thaw was not made a reform by one single spectacular move, it was a lengthy process and thus provided room for consideration. From Moscow's perspective not the actual details, but a tendency seemed dangerous, namely that multi-faceted experiments (economics, social-political, structural) were leading to a democratic reform."<sup>51</sup>

The year 1955 saw a partial restalinization. Nagy was ousted, Rákosi was reinstated as the nation's number one political figure. His tenure was not to last long. Unrest in Hungary was growing visibly, especially among intellectuals. Rákosi was forced to admit that Rajk has been executed innocently but had little success in blaming it on Defense Minister Mihály Farkas.

In June 1956, Mihail Suslov was dispatched to Budapest for a fact finding mission. Suslov reported that "non-technical urban intellectuals, moreover a part of the Central Committee apparatus ...are, to various degrees, dissatisfied with the present Central Committee leadership...the relationship between the Central Committee and the Political Committee is cold." Suslov deemed that dissatisfaction did not spread to the peasants or workers, but made the recommendation that cadres of Hungarian stock be appointed to leading positions. He also reported that disgruntled party cadres were preparing for an attack on Rákosi on the pretext of the Farkas affair.<sup>52</sup> The Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yury Andropov felt that "opposition and enemy elements" were getting "ever more impudent" and "are beginning to feel they can go on with their subversive activities almost unpunished." He felt that the Politburo was wavering about using tough measures against "opportunistic and hostile elements." Furthermore, the Hungarian secret police "was not showing sufficient deceseveness against the *counter-revolutionaries*..." He, therefore, recommended that Soviet press "exercise criticism on right wing views spreading in Hungary, in the course of which Nagy should be mentioned and the assertions, according to which we are supporting him, should be unmasked."

The situation in Hungary clearly worried Khrushchev, who confided to Tito, that he was willing to go to any lengths to keep Hungary.<sup>53</sup> This time Mikoyan was sent to Budapest to take care of the Rákosi issue. He received no instructions to depose the dictator, who was becoming a pain in Moscow's back, but to find a solution acceptable to all parties. Mikoyan, upon his arrival was appalled to find that "hostile elements were active among the masses without being punished" and were now "involving even workers in their struggle to remove the party leadership." It was a cause for alarm that "power was slipping out of the comrades' hand day-by-day," just as control over press and the radio. Mikoyan painted a gloom picture of the schism within the Central Committee, the spread of animosity and the lack of counter measures. Therefore, he demanded that hostile elements be removed from the Central Committee, just like those journalists and radio reporters who did not obey the party's leading organ. In order to find a solution to the crisis, Mikoyan recommended that Rákosi resign of his own accord. Furthermore, he advocated the cooptation of "Hungarian" cadres with a simultaneous strike at the enemy, coupled with "an assault in the front of ideology." Finally, he demanded the restoration of party discipline and unity. In his speech at the July 18 meeting of the Central Committee Mikoyan expressed that he "was worried about the Hungary" and castigated the intellectual debates in the "Petöfi Circles" as "an ideological Poznan without shooting," stating that "détente" and "coexistence...exclude ideological concessions and opportunism to hostile ideas."<sup>54</sup>

Mikoyan's stay ended with Rákosi's removal. Ernő Gerő was appointed his successor. This choice outraged reformers, since it was evident that Gerő was Rákosi's closest associate who shared the same views.

Andropov continued to send distress signals. He thought that the crisis was a result of mistakes made in economic policy, Rákosi's personality cult and the "lack of party democracy" – meaning that no party dissent was allowed. Despite the fact that the enemy was exploiting signs of weakness, Hungarian comrades encouraged them by granting concession.. This policy could lead to a stage where "the Hungarian comrades will deviate from the road of Marxism-Leninism without noticing it," warned the ambassador. He named Western radio stations "especially RFE" as among the chief culprits in inciting nationalist sentiment.<sup>55</sup> Andropov's dispatch reached Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who shared it with the Presidium. Gromyko added his own information to the Ambassador's message, namely that Hungarian nationalists were allegedly reclaiming Transylvania. Reactionary elements were trying to pry away Hungary from the Soviet Union. The Deputy Minister urged that the Soviet ambassador in Hungary be instructed to warn the Hungarian Prime Minister: "anti-party elements are undermining not only the party's respect and its role in the country, but were posing a threat to the unity of the Socialist camp as well..."<sup>56</sup>

Events were quickly reaching their climax. The victims of the Rajk trial were given a state funeral on October 6, 1956, which turned into a mass demonstration. Andropov found Party First Secretary in a "nervous and uncertain" state. Gerő talked to serious proportions. The situation was grave and growing worse. Khrushchev was scheduled to visit Budapest on November 20, but now Gerő was urging the First Secretary of the CPSU to come earlier, since the Hungarian Communists could find no way out of the present situation.

Andropov was at a loss to supply his superiors with a useful analysis of the situation, let alone advice as to what to do about it. He repeated the earlier theme on the lack of resolve in the HWP leadership adding that they were not implementing the advice sent by the CPSU.<sup>57</sup> He did not understand that the crisis was not instigated by hostile elements from above, but dissent in the leadership was caused by widespread discontent from below. Zoltán Vas, an old Muscovite Communist, who had played an instrumental role in the Sovietization of Hungarian economy, warned Andropov of an "impending national catastrophe" caused by the fact that Hungary had become "essentially a republic of the Soviet Union in the 11 years following World War II." He left his role in that process unmentioned.<sup>58</sup> When Gerő told Andropov that anti-Soviet sentiment had spread to workers, the ambassador being convinced that the conflict was generated from above, took no note of the remarks. Nothing could have been further from the truth. By October 23 discontent assumed mass proportions and spilled out onto the streets. Thus, Khrushchev had to face a dual crisis: one in Poland, the other in Hungary. Soon one more was to follow: the Middle East.

The Polish turmoil reached a climax on October 19–20. Khrushchev made a personal appearance in Warsaw, and military threats were made. Gomulka was ready for compromise, and although the Soviet Presidium resolved on October 20 that "there is only one possible solution – to put an end to what is happening in Poland. Military exercise..."<sup>59</sup> On October 21 Khrushchev was able to inform on a peaceful solution. At that point, Hungary erupted.

On October 23, Khrushchev was informed by Minister of Defense Zhukov that Hungarian First Party Secretary Gerő pleaded to the military attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest for armed intervention to suppress "the demonstration which had assumed ever growing, hitherto unprecedented proportions." The Russians were not quick to deliver. The CPSU Presidium gave no permission for the intervention, since no high functionary from Hungary had filed for it. Eventually it was Marshall Zhukov's report on the same day on the developments of the armed uprising that made the Presidium decide on military intervention<sup>60</sup> on the night of October 23. The following day Marshalls Zhukov and Sokolovsky reported that units of the Soviet army had been instructed to occupy key positions in Budapest and the important administrative centres in Hungary. Later Prime Minister Hegedüs signed a document inviting Soviet assistance and anti-dated it October 23.

Parallel to the military measure Khrushchev decided to include Imre Nagy in the political leadership and dispatched Mikoyan, Suslov and KGB Chairman Ivan Serov to Budapest on a fact finding mission. The latter on November 3 would arrest the members of the Hungarian negotiating committee discussing Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets arrived on the 26th and promptly embarked on sizing up the situation. They found that the Hungarian Communists were underestimating their own, and overestimating the enemy's strength. Mikoyan and Suslov reported somewhat contradictorily that all centres of resistance had been eliminated an "the main centre at the Radio was in the process of being eliminated." They reprimanded the Hungarians for not allowing fire on the demonstrators until midnight (nonetheless they had been fired upon earlier the Radio building by the secret police) and declared that were there to help the Hungarians – a task the Soviet military had already undertaken. An action the Soviets saw as "without friction, to public satisfaction."<sup>61</sup> Later that day the Soviet delegation informed the Presidium by phone on the new developments. They found that the situation was "not as dreadful as the Soviet ambassador and the Hungarian comrades depicted it." It was assumed that order would be restored by morning. Imre Nagy was found to be acting "decisively and courageously"; the population was not perceived to be hostile to the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup>

Although Washington followed events in Hungary closely, the developments of October 23 came unexpectedly. Secretary of State Dulles was elated: "We kept alive the yearning for freedom. It worked in Yugoslavia; it will work in Poland and Hungary. The great monolith of Communism is crumbling."<sup>63</sup> On October 25 President Eisenhower deplored Soviet military intervention and expressed sympathy for the freedom struggle of the Hungarian people, wishing there was some way of helping them.

British reactions were more reserved. The British Minister in Hungary, L. A. C. Fry, was carried away by the sight of "...orderly crowds carrying their flags and singing patriotic songs..." He perceived that "the success of this revolt against Communism is clearly in the balance, and as I see it, we leave a magnificent opportunity to tip the scales." He recommended "placing the situation at once before the UN."<sup>64</sup>

His optimism was not shared by all. T. Brimelow, the head of the Foreign Office Northern Department warned: "...We must be careful not to say anything which might encourage hotheads in Budapest to further useless rioting...I recommend that we should say as little as possible."<sup>65</sup>

Eastern Europe never belonged to Britain's first priorities. London was prepared to relegate it into the Soviet sphere of interest from 1944 in return for a free hand in Greece, and never supported strong American representations to the Soviet Union for the sake of Rumania or Hungary. When in the summer of 1956 things began to move, the Foreign Office pointed out that it was in Britain's interest to "encourage national independence and internal relaxation" in the Satel-

lites "and thus to reduce their... contribution to the Soviet Union's military potential and its policy of economic and political penetration of the free world, particularly the Near East." Contacts with Satellite governments were to be kept to a minimum since London would not accept the permanent nature of Communist regimes. Anti-Communist sentiments were to be encouraged, but without "allocation of funds."<sup>66</sup>

October 25th saw new and important developments. Passions were raised high by the bloodbath opposite the Parliament building in Budapest. Unidentified – probably secret police – men used machine guns to fire into the crowd which assembled in front of the building. Mikoyan and Suslov participated in the Political Committee consultations. The results were announced by Hungarian radio at 12:32 p.m. Gerő was relieved of his position as party First Secretary and János Kádár was installed in his place. Kádár who would become a traitor to the revolution, but would later become the nation's "good king," had participated in Hungary's underground Communist movement and was one of the few non-Muscovite Communists who came to prominence in the party after 1945. After persuading Rajk to cooperate with the authorities and confessing his own alleged crimes, he himself was jailed and released in 1955. He enjoyed good standing with Khrushchev and was acceptable to reformers in Hungary, hence he was promotion.

At the Politburo meeting József Kőböl raised the revolutionary issue of Soviet troop withdrawal much to the consternation of the Soviet "guests," who interjected that this issue "should in no circumstances be raised since it would be an invitation to *American troops*." (Emphasis is mine.) The Soviets were upset by a radio speech given by Imre Nagy announcing that talks between the Hungarian and the Soviet governments would be initiated for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, despite the fact that the Political Committee had rejected the idea.<sup>67</sup> The report probably reflected the hard-liner Suslov's position, since later events showed Mikoyan had supported troop withdrawal.

The Western political machines were slowly put into gear on Hungary. President Eisenhower instructed the NSC to work out a *strategy* for the new situation in Eastern Europe.

The American government's approach had been to buy time, and in order to do that Moscow had to be reassured, so as to avoid a new military intervention. The Kremlin was to be informed that Washington had no desire to exploit the situation for its own ends. At the advice of the President's disarmament advisor, Harold Stassen, the Secretary of State stated in his Dallas speech on the 27th that the United States did not regard the countries of Eastern Europe as potential allies. Then, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, was instructed to repeat this sentence to the Soviet leaders, which was duly done at a reception on October 29. Bohlen's message also contained a proposal for Hungary's neutralization.<sup>68</sup> Finally the President himself repeated the reassurance in a speech, ac-

ording to which America did not look upon East European governments as potential allies but was ready to offer them economic aid. Although both Dulles and the President wanted to avoid giving the impression to the Satellites that they were "selling them out or dealing with their hated master behind their backs."<sup>69</sup> The message delivered by Eisenhower was deemed so important that the Legation in Budapest was queried whether the speech had been heard in Hungary and if so, were there any official or public reactions.<sup>70</sup>

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet Union was occupying Eastern Europe because of security reasons. Thus, if Washington "recognized the Soviet Union's legitimate interests on these territories," military interference could be avoided, what's more Hungarian independence would in the future become possible.<sup>71</sup> As Harold Stassen later put it: with a very thorough, rapid intervention we had to give the Russians a chance to grant Hungary's independence by assuring them that Hungary would not be admitted to NATO. Stassen had had the feeling that the Russians would find it hard to swallow if the Red Army were expelled from Hungary.<sup>72</sup>

The idea that Moscow, albeit reluctantly, would accept a Communist government which remained loyal to the Soviet Union in terms of defense and political agreements, but which could realize its national independence and have the right to define its own road to Communism, gained official recognition in Washington.<sup>73</sup> The President's Special Assistant in Disarmament advocated that the U.S. make a deal with the Russians: in return for a troop withdrawal from Hungary, the United States and the United Kingdom would pull back a significant number of troops from the continent. Hungary would become an independent sovereign state, but with no NATO bases or affiliation with NATO. The principle objective would be to discourage a Soviet alternative of armed intervention. It was believed that "such a move may be attractive to Zhukov, who must be reluctant to spread the Red Army throughout the Balkans in increased numbers to hold down indigenous populations; but he may be unable to prevent this deployment if his internal opposition can raise the specter of U.S. bases in Hungary, etc., and the affiliation of these Balkan countries with NATO."<sup>74</sup>

Things seemed to be settling down on October 27. The CPSU Presidium consulted with the Chinese, but no resolution was taken on Hungary. Disquieting news arrived that "popular masses are out of [the HWP's] control, the party's standing plummeted... strong anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet feelings prevail among workers, and the population." But Soviet spirits were raised by the appointment of Ferenc Münnich as Minister of Defense.<sup>75</sup> Khrushchev was satisfied that "the military situation seemed to be well under control."<sup>76</sup>

Nonetheless, the West finally decided to take the issue to the UN. France and Great Britain requested a Security Council discussion of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary based on Article 34 of the UN Charter. Yet, despite appearances there was a lack of cohesion among the three, as the British were un-

convinced of the strength of an argument based on the UN Charter because the Soviets would argue that they had been invited by the Hungarians.<sup>77</sup> At his government's instructions the Hungarian representative of the UN, Dr. Kós, protested against the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the Security Council.<sup>78</sup> The Soviet representative, Sobolev demanded to know the basis for discussing the Hungarian issue and justified Soviet action in the argument that Hungary failed to act along the lines of the 1947 Peace Treaty, Article 4 of which required a suppression of "fascist movements." U.S. representative Cabot Lodge and the British delegate, Sir Pearson Dixon, referred to a violation of the *general* principles of the UN, but did not specify which concrete articles were violated. This weakened their case, despite the fact that Dixon referred to the section of Hungarian Peace Treaty, which guaranteed the Hungarian people the free exercise of their democratic rights.

Based on the minutes taken by the French representative the discussion were dominated by Sobolev, who claimed that the proceedings violated the UN charter and accused the Americans of siding with "Hitler's former collaborators." He also refused the claim that Soviet intervention violated the Warsaw Pact. Cabot Lodge was unable to keep his composure vis-à-vis Sobolev's rantings and exclaimed: "it is inadmissible that murderers of women and children were pointing their fingers at those who were sending Christmas packages." The meeting ended inconclusively; but on a happier note, news arrived on the announcement that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Budapest.<sup>79</sup> In fact, no such decision had been taken.

On the following day the Soviet Presidium met yet again. The day had got off to a bad start for the Soviets. Not only did Nagy announce that the uprising in Hungary could not be called counterrevolution, but word came that Kádár was now leaning towards negotiations with the centers of resistance, and even worse, the workers were supporting the uprising. Ivan Serov made himself heard by sending an alarming report on two Americans, named Oliver and West who talked to a Soviet informer and threatened a UN military intervention and a second Korea.<sup>80</sup>

Khrushchev presided over the proceedings as *primus inter pares*, providing the key notes of the discussion. His pessimistic appraisal of the situation was seconded by the hard liners. Voroshilov complained about Mikoyan's and Suslov's activities and defiantly declared that the troops would not be pulled out. Molotov sounded the alarm of capitulation. Kaganovich found that the counterrevolution was coming alive, but was less sanguine about putting it down than Voroshilov. Khrushchev saw two possibilities: either there would be a pro-Soviet government or one which would be "against us," and would "demand a troop withdrawal." In the first instance it could be "over quickly" with Soviet assistance, but "if Nagy turned against us and demanded a cease fire, and to pull out the military, capitulation could ensue." Either a Committee would need to be set up to assume

power or the government could be kept. The First Secretary answered his own dilemma by calling for the support of the Nagy government. "*There is no other way out,*" he concluded.

At this point the tide turned. The previously hawkish Bulganin stood behind Khrushchev by saying that "...we support the government. Otherwise we would have to revert to occupation. This would take us to adventurism." This was a new voice in the Kremlin. The idealism of the October 1917 – long lost – seemed to make a reappearance. Malenkov talked about an amnesty to the participants. Even Kaganovich sensed the new attitude. At this point, Zhukov – bearing out the analysis made by the Policy Planning Staff – recommended that Soviet units be removed from the streets of Budapest and grouped into specified areas. Khrushchev seconded that and promised a cease-fire: This was too much for the hard-liners. The sweep of the debate started to turn again. Bulganin warned the "people's democracy collapsed in Hungary, the HWP leadership ceased to exist..." There was no one to lean on, added Voroshilov. Kaganovich too, backedpedaled and warned against concessions.

Khrushchev then interjected in favor of a declaration. "The British and the French are stirring up trouble. We should not join their company. But let us have no illusions." The pendulum of the debate was now in the middle. Suslov, who had just come back from Budapest, declared that the sentiment was now against the Soviet military, the reason being that they dispersed the October 24 uprising. He advocated a widening of the government with "a few democrats." Malenkov was in favour of leaving it to Nagy to restore order instead of the Russian troops. All agreed, that Mikoyan should be instructed towards a tougher line vis-à-vis the Hungarians. It was Khrushchev who had the final say: "We do not agree with the [Hungarian] government..." Molotov, Zhukov and Malenkov should fly [to Budapest]."<sup>81</sup>

The final decision on action was still hanging in the air – it could still go either ways. Westerners managed to pick up the basic trend of Soviet policy, which was to "build on [Nagy] as a Gomulka, leave it to him to return order in Budapest if he can, rely on him to secure retention of Soviet troops in Hungary under Warsaw Pact."<sup>82</sup>

From newly available sources it is evident that the Soviet Presidium was genuinely divided over the course to take. For a historical moment it seemed that the road taken would not be the one dictated by Russian imperialist tradition.

On October 30 Mikoyan and Suslov reported that Hungarian army units might side with the insurgents, but recommended that the Minister of Defense halt the sending of Soviet troops to Hungary, deeming that troops already in Hungary ought to be sufficient to put down the resistance.<sup>83</sup> In the meantime, ominous events were taking place in a different part of the world. Frustrated by American unwillingness to put strong pressure on Nasser to undo the Suez Canal's nationalization, Great Britain and France decided to solve the issue unilaterally.

ally. On October 16, Prime Minister Eden and his French counterpart, Guy Mollet, decided for a military solution. They prompted Israel to attack Egypt, which would then give an opportunity of British and French military intervention. On October 29, Israel invaded Egypt taking the American leadership by surprise. American intelligence sources had been serving notice on British-French-Israeli military preparations since the middle of October, and the CIA reported on a new concentration of heavy bombers and transport planes in Cyprus. Nevertheless Eisenhower and Dulles had dismissed the evidence because it conflicted with other sources.<sup>84</sup> Interestingly enough, Khrushchev was expecting something to happen, as witnessed by his remark on October 28 that "the French and the British are stirring trouble." The Soviet leader might actually have been informed than the Americans.

The CPSU Presidium did not discuss Hungary on the 29th, but turned to that issue on the following day with the participation of the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party. Here, Khrushchev came up with what could have been the most important development of the decade in Eastern Europe. In accordance with the Political Committee of the Chinese Communist Party he declared that "a Declaration must be accepted today on the withdrawal of troops from the People's Democracies... bearing in mind the opinion of the countries where our troops are stationed." Molotov stated that a Declaration to the Hungarian people had to be worded so that negotiations on troop withdrawal would begin without delay. He added that because of the Warsaw Pact, the "others should be consulted" and quoted the Chinese comrades saying that relationships between the bloc countries ought to be based on the principles of Pancha Shila. Foreign Minister Shepilov explained that "our relations with the People's Democracies are in a crisis. Anti-Soviet feeling is widespread. The underlying reasons must be discovered [although] the fundamentals would remain the same." Shepilov hinted, however, on a new type of relationship: an "elimination of the elements of giving orders." He expressed Soviet willingness to "pull out troops with Hungary's consent."

Zhukov agreed on withdrawing from Budapest "and if necessary, from Hungary too," but warned that the issue of Soviet troops in Poland and the GDR was much more serious. Khrushchev, too, was thinking of introducing new relations within the bloc, e.g. working toward economic unity. "Let us define our relations with the Hungarian government. We support their measures."<sup>85</sup> Thereupon a declaration was worded on "the relationship between Socialist nations." The first part expounded that "the countries belonging to the great community of Socialist nations – can build their mutual relationships only on the principles of full equality, a respect for territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and independence and non-interference in domestic affairs." The second part dealt with Hungary and made it clear that Moscow opted for a deescalation of conflict "in the recognition of the fact that continued stay of Soviet troops in Hungary may serve as a pretext

for a sharpening of the situation." For this reason the Soviet government "instructed the military command to withdraw the Soviet units from Budapest as soon as the Hungarian government deems it timely. At the same time, the Soviet government is ready to enter into negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the governments of other Warsaw Pact countries on the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary."<sup>86</sup>

Although the decision was potentially of enormous significance, it would be a mistake to think that it meant that Khrushchev would give up to Hungary. As he himself put it, the Declaration was the way for a peaceful solution. Even if withdrawn, Soviet troops could be reintroduced any time through the common boundary, which Stalin had been prudent enough to grab from Czechoslovakia in 1945. Also, the declaration was carefully worded to avoid a statement on party relations which, as Molotov was careful to point out, were distinct from interstate relations.

Yet, the Declaration was an example of *tanto buon, che non val niente*. Omniously, towards the closing of the Presidium's session, Liu Shao-chi interjected that in the view of his party, the Soviet troops should remain in Hungary. This was in stark contrast to the Chinese position taken the previous day. In fact, as later revealed by Beijing Review Mao Tse-tung became convinced that Moscow was in error to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon Hungary to counter-revolution.<sup>87</sup> Later, on the occasion of Prime Minister Munnich's visit to the Chinese capital in 1959 Mao recalled that the Chinese Embassy in Budapest reported that the counterrevolution was gaining ground at an alarming rate and warned that if the Soviet Union should fail to act, capitalism would be restored. This prompted Mao to urge military action against Hungary.<sup>88</sup> Exactly when and why this Chinese change of heart took place is unclear, and so is its impact on Moscow's decision to go back on the October 30th resolution.

The same day, on October 30th, Zhukov told Charles Bohlen at a Kremlin reception that "Soviet troops had been ordered to withdraw from Budapest." What lent credence to his statement for the ambassador was that the Soviet leaders were "noticeably more glum than yesterday." Bohlen thought that there was "an overnight shift in position..."<sup>89</sup> At another reception immediately preceding the momentous Presidium session, Zhukov told Western ambassadors in a discussion on Hungary that as for the Poles, the Soviets exercised restraint, but "we could have crushed them like flies" if needed.<sup>90</sup> Bohlen's British opposite number in Moscow, Hayter waited until November 1 to offer his view on the Soviet declaration. He concluded that "They [the Soviets] must be prepared to see a non-Communist regime set up in Hungary...the Soviet Union now proposes to take practical and concrete steps to abandon its authority over these countries."<sup>91</sup> By the first of November events had outpaced the report. However, for the Americans, who did not learn about the change of heart in Moscow, it seemed that their strategy might have worked after all.

A top secret memorandum prepared by the State Department quoted the Budapest Legation's view that "all signs point to complete Soviet evacuation of Budapest. That what has happened could be achieved without the strongest Western support is... evidence of the tremendous strength of the popular movement which is undoubtedly having a profound effect on Soviet policy. The Legation thinks the Soviets must be seriously considering departing from Hungary within a short time."<sup>92</sup> The situation in Budapest was described as "fantastic." Not only was the State Department optimistic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the future in bright colours as well. They predicted that in view of the uncertainty of Hungarian developments it is conceivable that the Soviet troops would leave without American intervention.<sup>93</sup> Since it now seemed that at least the imminent danger of Soviet intervention had passed, the November 1 meeting of the NSC, after hearing Allen Dulles on the situation in Hungary, turned to discussing Suez. The U.S. administration wanted to act quickly since it was difficult to condemn Soviet aggression in Hungary while Western powers attacked Egypt.

On October 30, the British and the French issued a joint ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to withdraw their battle lines, in case of noncompliance threatening with invasion. Dulles was outraged: "Just when the Soviet orbit was crumbling and we could point to a contrast between the Western world and the Soviets, it appeared the West was producing a similar situation."<sup>94</sup>

On October 31 the National Security Council finally came up with Document 5616 on U.S. strategy in Poland and Hungary. It was now thought that "national communist governments" could emerge in those two countries. As far as Hungary was concerned, there were three policy options: exerting pressure through the UN and public declarations; supporting the rebels by clandestine or open military aid; attempting to secure Soviet troop withdrawal and Hungary's neutralization on the Austrian model.

In the case of Poland it was recommended that the U.S. initiate discussions for a normalization of relations with Warsaw, a reorientation of Polish trade towards the West, economic aid, and an expansion of cultural exchange programs. As an immediate aim in Hungary the NSC wanted to avoid Soviet intervention by convincing the Soviets that the American leadership did not regard Hungary a potential ally. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception to the latter statement.<sup>95</sup> The NSC recommended that an offer of mutual troop withdrawal be given to the Soviets on the lines of the October 29 proposal by the PPS. Here again, the military disagreed with the idea. It seemed that time would be available to implement the proposals. As late as November 2, Bohlen reported that the Soviets were not preparing for military action at this stage and were trying to buy time,<sup>96</sup> despite the fact that Soviet troops had been sent to Hungary the previous day.

Nothing could have been further from the truth. On October 31 the CPSU's leading organ met once more. Khrushchev without much ado, declared that "the evaluation should be revised, the troops should not be withdrawn from Hungary

and Budapest and we should take the initiative to restore order. If we were to pull out from Hungary, it would encourage the American, British and French imperialists. This would be perceived as weakness and they would take the offensive... Besides Egypt we would give them Hungary." Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Saburov signaled their approval.

Now all present at the meeting expressed unequivocal support for Khrushchev's motion. Only Anastas Mikoyan, who was not there and flew back from Budapest that night made a desperate effort to change the first secretary's mind. It was agreed that Khrushchev and Malenkov would consult with Tito, while Brezhnev, while Furtseva and Pospelov would "take care of the propaganda part," Marshall Koniev would issue the order for military intervention.<sup>97</sup>

The leaders of Satellite parties were informed. Molotov and Malenkov consulted with the Poles on November 1 in Brest. Gomulka tried to dissuade the Russian from marching in, but to no avail. On the same day Soviet troops were entering Hungary. This prompted Imre Nagy to declare Hungary's neutrality and to renounce the Warsaw Pact. As we have seen, Nagy's announcement was the result, and not the cause of Soviet decision to intervene. The Soviet leadership reversed its earlier decision overnight for no apparent reason.

In the November 1st meeting of the Presidium, Mikoyan made one more effort to reserve the decision. He argued that the use of force would lead nowhere and recommended negotiations to keep Hungary in the camp. Suslov countered that "the danger of bourgeois restoration is close" and only an occupation could secure a government amenable to the Soviets. Serov seconded this, just like Bulganin who explained that the international situation had changed and Hungary could be lost. Zhukov saw no reason to go back on the October 31 resolution. There was no turning back: Kádár was brought to Moscow, possibly on November 1 and the list of the new government was compiled. Kádár became party first secretary. Despite the fact that military intervention was a foregone conclusion, the Soviets went ahead with negotiating with the Hungarians on troop withdrawal.

The Soviet leadership was gripped by great anxiety in the aftermath of the intervention. Khrushchev and the moderates recommended that they change the Hungarian party's name to Hungarian Socialist Workers Party as a sign of breaking with the past and to condemn the "Rákosi-Gerő clique." When Molotov rejected these ideas, Khrushchev shouted at him: "I don't understand Comrade Molotov. He comes up with the most harmful ideas." The old Bolshevik retorted: "[Khrushchev] should be called to order, so that he can't order about." Kaganovich too, was at a later meeting on the issue of Soviet-Hungarian relations. Khrushchev told him: "When will you mend your ways Kaganovich and when will you stop licking feet? What kind of old fashioned policies are you insisting on?"

There was confusion in the West on the significance of the Soviet reintroduction of troops. The British Legation offered that a) The Russian were seeking to

create an autonomus state, b) want to negotiate from strenght, c) they "reversed their policy and will impose will on country with force of arms," d) fearing the Middle East crisis will lead to world war, the Russians "are strengthening their forward positions."<sup>98</sup> Charles Bohlen in a telegram that was given to the Foreign Office opined on November 2nd that judging by what Zhukov and Shepilov told him, the Soviet government's "decision was to support Nagy government to [the] end...thereby hoping to avoid total military occupation in Hungary."<sup>99</sup>

In order to take off the heat from themselves in the UN, Great Britain now enthusiastically embraced the recognition of Hungarian neutrality. The British mission in New York was instructed to seek its approval in the UN without pushing for a guarantee of it. Because of "difficulties" in Suez, Dixon was to "arrange for [his] American colleague to take the initiative," and to give him "close and firm support."<sup>100</sup> The French delegation in the UN received similar instructions, and on November 3 their chief of mission, Cornut-Gentile, was instructed "not to limit himself to press for neutrality," but to underline also "the need to allow the Hungarian people to express their opinion on their future by free elections."<sup>101</sup> Yet, because the American delegate Cabot-Lodge dragged his feet, the last chance to put the Russians on the defensive about Hungary was lost. Discussion of her neutrality never got off the ground despite the fact that at the Acting Secretary's staff meeting on November 2 Herbert Hoover Jr. declared that "the Hungary (sic) situation was being lost and we should have very promptly a review of what... we have done so that publicly attention should be kept on the situation."<sup>102</sup>

On November 4 Soviet tanks mounted the final offensive on revolutionary Budapest. Ivan Serov was busy arresting government and military officials, who had sided with the insurgents. He seized the occasion to express his contempt for human life: when Sándor Kopácsi protested his arrest by saying that his activities saved Servoc's "colleagues" from being lynched by a mob. The KGB chairman snapped: "Idiot! Why did you protect them? They're replaceable. Men sprout like weeds."<sup>103</sup> The same day the Nagy government was deposed and Kádár's puppet regime – his cabinet was drawn up in Moscow – was installed literally by Soviet tanks. Although armed resistance continued, the Revolution was over.

What were the constraints on Soviet and American policy? What were the considerations and ideas that shaped the superpowers' response to the Hungarian crisis?

The leadership in the U.S. was caught off guard by the events and as a consequence had little time to adapt to the situation. Director of the CIA Allen Dulles stated at the November 12 Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Washington counted on the rebellion,<sup>104</sup> but other sources do not seem to support this statement. In fact, at the November 2nd meeting of the Acting Secretary of State's staff, Robert Murphy, stated: "it should not go unremarked that in the three separate crises of Poland, Hungary and the Middle East,

there had been no notice whatsoever from intelligence sources and that there seemed to be a complete lack of any intelligence which could have permitted anticipation of the events." A report by the NSC on June 27, 1956 ruled out the possibility of "an open popular revolt" in Hungary.<sup>105</sup> Reporting on the Middle East was no better: Even in late September and early October the CIA and the State Department agreed that Anglo-French hostilities against Nasser were unlikely. On October 21 Dulles expressed that a peaceful settlement of the Canal controversy "was in sight."<sup>106</sup>

In fact the Americans were not alone in the lack of foresight. The French Foreign Ministry's analysis on July 21, taking note of unrest in Hungary asserted: "For the moment we cannot say whether the Hungarian people would be resolved, if the circumstances warrant, to show proof of similar courage as the workers of Poznan."<sup>107</sup>

The first warning of a possible explosion in Hungary reached John Foster Dulles on September 26.<sup>108</sup> It was earlier believed that events in Suez "eclipsed" the Hungarian events. Yet, according to available sources the Washington administration attributed great significance to the uprising in Budapest, which seemed to realize an important American policy objective. Both Dulles and the President were mad at their Allies — London and Paris — for jeopardizing chances to put pressure on the Russians. Therefore, the significance of Suez in terms of U.S. policy lies not so much in distracting attention but in that it made condemning the Soviet Union difficult. As Nixon later observed "We couldn't, on the one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser."<sup>109</sup>

Keeping close track of developments was made difficult because until October 27 there was no radio link with the Legation in Budapest. Communication was conducted through a telex machine. Moreover, there was no minister in Hungary. The new head of the diplomatic mission, Edward Wailes only proceeded to Budapest on the day before the last of October.

Most importantly from the American viewpoint the Nagy government was not seen as a desirable alternative to the previous one. This position was reflected by NSC 5616 which alluded to the fact that the government in Budapest could not be regarded as independent as the one in Warsaw. In the course of a telephone conversation on October 29 the Secretary of State pointed out that "the present government is not one we want to do much with."<sup>110</sup> A day after his arrival, Wailes was instructed not to present his credentials to the Nagy government.<sup>111</sup> Nagy did not satisfy the Americans. It was believed that his new course, introduced in 1953 was no more than a tactical measure, which failed to improve the economy or to appease the Hungarian people.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, there was an indication that Nagy was not considered to be sufficiently anti-Soviet.<sup>113</sup>

The most effective means to help out the Hungarian revolution would have been a military intervention. Conventional military action was out of the question because of Hungary's geographical location – Austria even denied use of her airspace to planes carrying aid to Hungary. However, a recommendation was made by the CIA to use the A-bomb,<sup>114</sup> but it was rejected by President Eisenhower off hand. The American leadership was convinced that a military intervention would have led to war with the USSR. The PPS came to the conclusion one day before the Kremlin decided to use military coercion that “effective action would probably involve hostilities with the Soviets,”<sup>115</sup> including the danger of a world war.<sup>116</sup> As for massive retaliation, Dulles seemed to have had “more or less backed away from that concept.”<sup>117</sup> Robert Murphy later remembered that Dulles, “like everybody in the State Department was terribly distressed,” but no one had “whatever imagination it took to discover another solution.” Military force was ruled out, since “any intervention on our part would have meant confrontation militarily with the Soviet Union.”<sup>118</sup> British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd expressed similar sentiments at a conservative party rally in Watford.

To sum up, the United States took the following course toward the revolution in Hungary.

Military intervention was ruled out, because the idea prevailed that it would lead to a general war. Policymakers believed that Hungary (as the other Satellites) came under Soviet occupation because of security reasons, therefore, they sought to convince Moscow that the United States would not exploit the situation to the detriment of Soviet security. It was hoped that such a reassurance would stave off Soviet intervention, allowing time for the consolidation of a government acceptable to the American, which in turn would receive political and economic support. The message was clear to the British, which is an indication that Dulles' message was not unambiguous: “It is... evident that the U.S. administration is anxious to dispel any Soviet fears that the United States intends to exploit the present situation in the Satellite state area to the point of creating a strategic threat to the USSR. Foster Dulles made this quite clear in his speech at Dallas on October 27...”<sup>119</sup>

A half-hearted and haphazard effort was made to put pressure on the Soviets in the UN. In an attempt to save the Revolution Hungary's neutralization was offered in return for military concessions by the U.S.

Henry Kissinger, in a chapter devoted to the 1956 Hungarian crisis in his recent book *Diplomacy* criticized the American leadership for not using the advice of Kremlinologists like George F. Kennan, Fay Kohler, Thompson or Bohlen.<sup>120</sup>

Yet, Bohlen's advice was constantly sought out and his performance and predictions were inconsistent at best. Neither was Llewlyn Thompson able to come up with an alternative idea. Indeed, one of the lessons of the crisis was that in spite of all the money and intellectual effort put into Kremlinology, the results were rather meager: the U.S. completely failed to read the Kremlin's mind. Still

American policy did have a sound inner logic, which determined what can and cannot be done. We are now left with the question: why did the Soviet Union decide overnight to crack down on the Hungarian Revolution?

According to Henry Kissinger the guarantees given by the Dulles-Eisenhower speeches were misleading and even "non-Marxist" governments saw an *arrière-pensée* behind the American pledges that the U.S. would not exploit the Hungarian crisis for its own ends. Yet the British, as we have seen, understood what the message meant, so obviously there were no problems of interpretation. Furthermore, the Soviet records do not even refer to them. What's more, the decision of the Presidium *not* to intervene came *the day after* the *Kremlinologist* Bohlen repeated the key sentence from Dulles' speech to the Kremlin leaders. Kissinger also believed that the U.S. administration should have warned Moscow that an intervention could have serious consequences for East-West relations. Yet, it was Charles Bohlen, who believed that "the USSR intended to retain full control over the satellites even at the risk of general war."<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, the course adopted by the U.S. was as good as any alternative given the level of understanding of the motives of Soviet policy. Moreover, until October 31, it seemed to work out. Finally Kissinger believes that the American government ought to have called the Budapest leadership's attention to the limits of American assistance and urged it not to take irrevocable steps.<sup>122</sup> The former Secretary of State is certainly right in arguing that the U.S. should have warned the Hungarians that no military assistance was forthcoming. This could have even been done through RFE and VOA, where exactly the opposite was actually being implied. On the other hand, Nagy's irrevocable step of renouncing the Warsaw Pact came *after* the decision for military crackdown was taken. Therefore, I am convinced that the American government can be absolved of responsibility in the Soviet action.

In a recent book, Pleshakov and Zubok argue that unlike Gomulka, "Imre Nagy did not pass the test: he did not enjoy Khrushchev's respect (besides, in the 1930s he had been an NKVD agent... and reported on his comrades) and was clearly lost in the powerful vortex of popular revolution."<sup>123</sup> It is hardly likely that Khrushchev minded Nagy's alleged activities in the 30s, since most emigré Communists were involved in such activity in order to survive. Besides, he was the one who installed him to power in 1955 and had no objection to him on October 1956. More importantly even if Nagy was lost in some "vortex" it didn't make any difference, since nothing changed in Hungary between October 30 and 31. Thus, mistrust in Nagy was not a crucial issue in Moscow's rapid decision.

Let us try to sum up first what considerations pointed towards intervention. Not long before, Hungary had been an enemy, which attacked the Soviet Union. There is an allusion to this in Koniev's November 4 order: "We must not forget that in the previous war Horthy Hungary entered the conflict against our country alongside Hitler's Germany." Even 40 years later Evgeny Malashenko, the former head of the operative staff of a special Soviet division in Budapest men-

tions: "our soldiers remember that in 1941 Hungary attacked the Soviet Union with Germany and Hungarian soldiers pillaged our land."<sup>124</sup> Malasenko also mentions that Hungarians tortured Soviet POWs in World War II. The same motive was picked up forty years ago by the Soviet minister in Vienna who, in explaining his country's action, claimed that "Soviet women and children were being killed by the insurgents."<sup>125</sup> We have few records on Soviet reporting during the revolution, but it seems that Andropov kept sending false alarms, as noted by Mikoyan and Suslov in their report to the CPSU Presidium. We also know that Gromyko painted an even darker picture to the Presidium on the eve of the revolution than the Soviet ambassador's dispatch he used as his source had warranted. It is thus conceivable that Soviet sources exaggerated violence in Budapest. In fact no incident of atrocities against Soviet citizens have become known. Hungarian AVH men were, however, lynched on one occasion following the massacre near the Parliament building.

An important consideration in evaluating Soviet actions is to look at their decision makers. Being hampered by a vulgarized Marxist outlook, they faced a significant handicap: an inability to analyze the situation in Hungary. They consistently argued, even from on the spot missions in Budapest, that tension was generated by hostile foreign and domestic elements from above. They lacked the capacity to analyze the situation and thus to offer solutions that could defuse the crisis before it got out of hand.

It is known that the Rumanians and the East Germans were arguing for a military settlement, and more importantly, the Chinese switched to a hawkish position exactly when the Presidium decided to pursue a consiliatory, peaceful line. Significantly, Moscow was obviously worried about the camp's unity: Gromyko argued that "anti-party elements" threaten not only the Hungarian party's leading role, but also "the unity of the Socialist camp..."<sup>126</sup> In the same memorandum Gromyko stated that reactionaries were trying to "sever" Hungary from the Soviet Union "so that Soviet influence could be replaced by a *Yugoslav* one." Even the "dove" Mikoyan emphasized that beside Western, hostile propaganda "Yugoslav radio, press and agents help and encourage hostile elements."<sup>127</sup> Thus, rivalry with Yugoslavia was definitely on the Soviet leaders' minds.

Western intentions were more suspect than Belgrade's. Andropov reported that "Western radio broadcasts play an important role in inciting nationalist sentiment, especially RFE propaganda. The stations... foster a lack of confidence towards the Soviet Union."<sup>128</sup> The CPSU Presidium deemed in July that the imperialists "want to weaken our international relations, with the slogan of the independent road, are out to weaken our unity, then, are bent on smashing the [Socialist countries] peacemeal."<sup>129</sup> During the crisis Mikoyan and Suslov voiced the fear of American troops coming to Hungary if the Soviets withdrew – yet, this was *before* Dulles' speech on October 27.

Indeed, surprisingly little reference was made to the "imperialists" in the Presidium meeting during the crisis. On October 28 the hard-liner Voroshilov mentioned that "imperialist agents are harder at work than Mikoyan or Suslov." The only other allusion to imperialists exploiting the situation at the Presidium sessions was the one made by Khrushchev when reversing the previous day's decision to intervene. He pointed out that "if we withdrew from Hungary, the... imperialists... would attack." But why didn't Khrushchev or anyone else raise this issue only a few hours before? Did hard-liners gain the upper hand and will the day by saying that the situation was getting worse and worse? This would be plausible, but the October 30 decision was made *despite* the fact that the situation in Hungary was critical. On October 28, Bulganin actually declared that "the people's democracy has collapsed. The HWP leadership ceased to exist." Khrushchev pointed out that he "doesn't agree with the government." Still, the recognition that an armed assault could be critical for the survival of the Soviet bloc led Moscow to adopt — even if momentarily — a line which supported the Nagy government and its own effort to restore order.

Thus, although there are plenty of factors which explain why the Soviets decided to invade in the long run, we still do not see why peace wasn't given a chance even for a day. There is evidence that the use of force was by no means a foregone conclusion.

To seek an answer, let us review the minutes of that fateful Presidium meeting. What is striking about this is that the Hungarian question was only the 6th point of the agenda. One would expect that such a momentous issue should be the most important and be put on the top of the agenda. However, it seems that invading a neighbour was not a hard decision to make. Khrushchev stated that "there will be no big war." The sentence could refer to two things: that resistance would be feeble, but more likely the first secretary's confidence that the conflict would not escalate. Khrushchev, after arguing that the imperialists would be encouraged by a Soviet withdrawal, and expressing that "the Party would not understand us," uttered what I think is the crucial sentence: "Besides Egypt we would give them [the imperialists] Hungary as well." At the time, when the Soviets were making their military moves on November 1, the head of the British diplomatic mission commented that one of the reasons was a fear of the escalation of the Middle East crisis.

There was only one crucial event we can pinpoint between the Soviet decision *not to* and *to* intervene and that was the joint British-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt in which they threatened to invade unless the two parties complied with their demands. The following day France and England proceeded to bomb Egyptian military airfields.<sup>130</sup> One historian noted: in the final analysis, the Suez crisis did at least facilitate the Soviet decision to crush the Hungarian rebellion.<sup>131</sup> This argument implies that the Soviets were out to intervene *ab ovo*, they only seized the opportunity presented by the turmoil in the Middle East. Yet, the

sequence of events reconstructed on newly available Soviet sources suggests that escalation of the conflict there may have been not a tool, but *the* major cause of the Kremlin's sudden decision to use military coercion, rather than to allow events to take their course and let Nagy deal with the situation himself. In fact, strikingly, Khrushchev would have been willing on the day before to allow Nagy to stay in the new puppet government as deputy prime minister if the latter "agreed." When the Presidium convened again on November 1, Suslov and Serov argued that the internal situation in Hungary was becoming critical, it was Bulganin – in the absence of Khrushchev – who gave a briefing on the October 31 decision. He explicitly referred to an external factor: "The *international situation changed*. If we do not take measures we will lose Hungary"<sup>132</sup> (emphasis mine). The notes taken at the Presidium meetings by Vladimir N. Malin are not verbatim and are often only summaries of the interjections. Possibly some relevant information was thus lost. But they are rare and invaluable sources of Soviet conduct. From the point of view of criticism of sources, they are of primary value. Together with other documents they suggest that Moscow was willing to give Hungary and a peaceful solution a chance, even though a second intervention was always hanging in the air. But as it often happened in Hungarian history, international events were at cross purposes with Hungary's interests. The fate of a small country was not decided primarily by her own actions, but by the correlation of international tensions within the framework of Cold War politics. Crisis in the Middle East which had not been in Moscow's traditional sphere of interest now seemed to threaten Moscow's vital interests in a different point of the globe.

No one knows what might have transpired had Hungary and diplomacy been given more time. Perhaps the Red Army would have invaded anyway. But there is the chance that events might have taken a different course and different ending. This was not to be owing to the aggressive actions of the two Western powers deeply enmeshed in imperialism, which elicited aggression from their expansionist adversary to match their move. The perhaps unintended result: one small country lost a chance to regain her independence and tension in Europe, rather than abating, flared up once more.

#### Notes

1. Döntés a Kremlben, 1956. A szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról. Decision in the Kremlin, 1956 – The Debates of the Soviet Party Presidium on Hungary = DK 1956 Budapest), 203–204.
2. Bennet Kovrig wrote that "the prompt recognition and symbolic guarantee of Hungary's independence and neutrality by the United States could have at least delayed the Soviet decision to intervene, and any delay would have increased the chances of consolidating

- the gains of the revolution." Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York and London, 1991).
3. National Security Archives, Washington, D.C. (=NSAWDC) Record No. 66141. Memorandum by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (Beam), February 2, 1957.
  4. The Papers of Averrel Harriman. Library of Congress, Box 332.
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. NAWDC RG 263, CIA National Intelligence Estimate (=NIE) 100-3-54 Box 2. March 23, 1954.
  7. Mark Spaulding Jr., *op. cit.*, 233–239.
  8. See NAWDC RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (=FCS) 1951–1953 091 (12-9-49). Memorandum by the Joint Logistics Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the revision of relaxing export control towards the Soviet bloc; NAWDC RG 218 FCS 1954–56 CCS 091.31 (9-28-45) Section 26. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on United States Export Controls.
  9. NAWDC RG 218 FCS Admiral Radford, 1953–57. 091. Russia. May 10, 1956.
  10. NAWDC RG 273 National Security Council (=NSC). The Report of the OCB to the NSC, February 29, 1956.
  11. NAWDC RG 273 NSC 5609/2. June 27, 1956.
  12. See Károly Urbán, A magyar–szovjet gazdasági kapcsolatok a Nagy Imre Kormány időszakában 1953–55 (Hungarian–Soviet Economic Relations under the Imre Nagy Government, 1953–55). In *Társadalmi Szemle* (1996–7): 81–82.
  13. NAWDC RG 59 Lot file 76 D 232. Kalijarvi to the Secretary of State, July 18, 1956.
  14. NSAWDC Record No. 66 367. Radio Free Europe Handbook, November 30, 1951.
  15. NSAWDC Record No. 64 444. An analysis by Columbia University Bureau of Applied Research on listening to VOA and other foreign broadcasts in satellite Hungary, November 1953.
  16. Sir James David Marchio, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953–1959." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1990.
  17. *Ibid.*, 216.
  18. NAWDC RG 273 NSC. The National Security Policy of the U.S., 1951.
  19. NAWDC RG 218 FCS 1951–53. 385 (6-4-46) Box 48. Letter by Charles Kersten to Dean Acheson, October 1, 1952.
  20. NAWDC RG 330 Office of the Secretary of Defense (=OSD) CD 091.3. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, January 1952.
  21. *Ibid.* Report to the Secretary of Defense.
  22. NAWDC RG 330 OSD CD 091.3. Memorandum by the FCS Chairman to the Secretary of Defense. March 17, 1952.
  23. *Ibid.*, September 12, 1952.
  24. NAWDC RG 218 FCS 1951–53. 385 (6-4-46) Box 149. February 13, 1953.
  25. NSAWDC Record no. 68 824. CIA NIE, July 30, 1951.
  26. NAWDC RG 218 FCS 381 (3-2-46) Box 70.
  27. NAWDC RG 59 Policy Planning Staff (=PPS) 1947–53. Members Chronological File, Louis Halle Fr. Box 47, December 9, 1952.

28. NAWDC RG 59 PPS 1956 Lot File 66 D 487 L. W. Fuller. Box 78. Fuller's Memorandum to Stelle, December 3, 1956.
29. NSAWDC Record no. 66083. John Foster Dulles to Dwight. Eisenhower, September 5, 1956.
30. NAWDC RG 59 764.0017-155 microfilm. Memorandum by Robert McKisson, July 1 1953.
31. NAWDC RG 59 764.00/9-2855 microfilm. Memorandum by William A. Crawford to Walwourth Barbour, September 28, 1955.
32. *Ibid.*
33. NAWDC RG 273 NSC 158. June 1953.
34. James D. Marchio, *op. cit.*
35. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge and London, 1996).
36. NAWDC RG 59 PPS 1947-53 Members Chronological File, Louis Halle Jr. Box 47. Memorandum by Louis Halle to Bowie and Beam, July 27, 1953.
37. *Ibid.* Memorandum by L. W. Fuller, July 11, 1953.
38. NAWDC RG 59 PPS Lot file 65D 100 Box 88. Memorandum for the Policy Planning Staff, March 5, 1954.
39. NAWDC RG PPS Chronological File Box 33. Memorandum for the PPS, August 19, 1953.
40. NAWDC RG PPS Lot File 66D Box 64. Memorandum by the Secretary of the NSX (J. S. Lay) to the Secretary of State on the four power talks of 1955, July 11, 1955.
41. *Ibid.* John C. Campbell of the State Department recommended for consideration the following options: German unification and choice of her allegiance, while Soviet troops would leave Czechoslovakia, Poland which in turn would maintain their military agreements with Moscow; American troops would withdraw from NATO countries the Soviets from Eastern Europe where they would not be allowed to return; Germany would be unified on a nonaligned basis, Poland and Czechoslovakia (possibly the rest of the satellites as well) would non-aligned. NAWDC RG 59 PPS 1955 Lot file 66D 70 Box 64. Memorandum by John C. Campbell to the PPS, May 31, 1955.
42. James D. Marchio, *op. cit.*, 243-244
43. NSAWDC Record no. 62620. U.S. Policy towards Eastern Europe, July 3, 1956.
44. *Ibid.* Record no. 6203. NSC 5608, July 3, 1956.
45. See Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 81.
46. DK 1945, 19. Record of the July 9-12 meeting of the CPS CC Presidium, minute no. 28
47. Urbán Károly, A magyar-szovjet gazdasági kapcsolatok, *op. cit.*, 92-93.
48. *Ibid.*, 94.
49. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign Office. Edited by Eva Haraszti-Taylor, 1995. (=HR-CDFO) L.A.C. Fry to the Foreign Secretary (Selwyn Lloyd), September 10, 1956, 78-79.
50. Minutes of the talks between Soviet and Hungarian party-state leaders. Published by T. Varga György. In *Múltunk*, 1992. 2-3.
51. Rainer M. János, Decision in the Kremlin, 1956. An Attempt to Interpret the Minutes. In DK 1956, *op. cit.*, 112.

52. Hiányzó lapok 1956 Történetéből, 1956 (HL 1956) Budapest, 1993. Suslov's report to the Presidium of the CPSU. June 13, 1956. It was a matter of dispute whether Mihály Farkas should be tried for his role in the Rajk trial.
53. See Rainer M. János, Decision in the Kremlin, *op. cit.*, 115.
54. HL 1956. Mikoyan's telegramme to the CPSU Presidium, July 14, 1956.
55. A "Jelcin-Dosszié" – szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ról (The Yeltsin file – Soviet Documents on 1956 = FD 1956) Budapest, 1993. Andropov's letter to the Presidium of the CPSU, August 30, 1956, 34–41.
56. *Ibid.* Memorandum by Gromyko to the Presidium of the CPSU. September 17, 1956, 42–43.
57. *Ibid.* Andropov's report on a discussion with Gerő. October 12, 1956, 84–90.
58. HL 1956. Andropov's discussion with Zoltán Vas. October 14, 1956, 92–96. Vas was Minister of Public Supply at the time, which was not a prominent position. Informally, however, he belonged to the Communist elite.
59. DK 1956, 22–23. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium, October 20, 1956.
60. On the details see Rainer M. János, *op. cit.*, 120-21.
61. FD 1956. Report to the Central Committee Presidium by Suslov and Mikoyan, 47–49.
62. DK 1956. Report on the meeting held by the CPSU Presidium, October 24, 1956.
63. Quoted in Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 89
64. HR-CDFO. Fry to the Foreign Office, October 25, 1956, 101.
65. *Ibid.* Brimelow to the Foreign Office News Department, October 25, 1956, 102.
66. *Ibid.* J. G. Ward to the Foreign Office, July 17, 1956, 65–68; "Special Considerations Applying to Contacts with Satellites," October 12, 1956, 88–90.
67. FD 1956. Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, October 25, 1956, 50–51.
68. See James D. Marchio, *op. cit.*
69. Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 91.
70. NAWDC RG 59 611. 64/11-156. November 1, 1956.
71. NAWDC RG PPS Lot 66D 487 1956 Box 80. Position Paper by the PPS, October 29, 1956.
72. NSAWDC Record no. 65102. Interview with H. Stassen on J. F. Dulles. Stassen felt that Dulles was not disambiguous enough in signalling to the Russian leaders that Washington was taking into account Moscow's defense needs.
73. NAWDC RG 59 PPS Lot 66D 487 Box 80. PPS Position Paper; see also NSC 5616.
74. NSAWDC Record no. 64493. Memorandum by the Special Assistant of the President, October 29, 1956.
75. HL 1956. Report by Mikoyan and Suslov, October 26, 109–113.
76. HR-CDFO Report to the FO by Ambassador William Hayter on discussion with Khrushchev. October 27, 109.
77. *Ibid.* The Foreign Office to the UK Delegation in New York, October 28, 1956, 115.
78. See János Radványi, *Hungary and the Superpowers, The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik* (Stanford, 1972), 9.
79. Archives de Quai d'Orsay, Europe 1944–1960 Hongrie Vol. 62. Fol. 207–216. Minutes of the meeting of the Security Council, October 28, 1956.
80. FD 1956. Serov's report to Mikoyan, October 28, 54–55.
81. DK 1956. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium, October 28, 35–46.

82. HC-CDFO. Hayter to the FO. October 29, 129.
83. HL 1956. Report by Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, October 30, 125–126.
84. See Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), 223–229.
85. DK 1956. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium, October 30, 51–57.
86. FD 1956, 64–65.
87. Quoted in Radványi, *op. cit.*, 12.
88. *Ibid.*, 27.
89. NSAWDC Record no. 65693. Bohlen to the Secretary of State, October 30, 1956.
90. *Ibid.* Record no. 65692. October 30, 1956. See also Documents Diplomatiques, Français 1956. Tome 3. The Chargé d'Affaires (Soutou) to the Foreign Minister (Pineau), 82–83.
91. HR-CBFO. Hayter to the FO. November 1, 1956, 147–48.
92. NSAWDC Record no. 65283. Information memorandum by the Department of State. October 31.
93. NAWDC RG 218 FCS. Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the NSC. October 31.
94. Quoted by Peter L. Hahn, *op. cit.*, 231.
95. NSAWDC Record no. 62423. NSC 5616. October 31. For the FCS view see the Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, *op. cit.*
96. NAWDC RG 59 764.00/11-256. Bohlen to the Secretary of State, November 2.
97. DK 1956. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium, October 31, 62–65.
98. HR-CBFO. Fry to the FO. November 1, 149.
99. *Ibid.*, 155–56.
100. *Ibid.* Draft to U.K. Delegation, New York from FO. November 2, 1956, 161.
101. Documents Diplomatiques, *op. cit.*, 159.
102. NSAWDC Record no. 65307. The Acting Secretary's Staff Meeting. November 2.
103. Sándor Kopácsi, *In the Name of Working Class: The Inside Story of the Hungarian Revolution* (New York, 1987), 206.
104. NSAWDC Record no. 65209. Report by Agerpress, November 25, 1956.
105. *Ibid.* Record no. 62596.
106. Peter L. Hahn, *op. cit.*, 224–25.
107. Archives Diplomatiques de Quai d'Orsay, Europe 1944–60 Hongrie Vol. 88.
108. NSAWDC Record no. 65235.
109. *Ibid.* Record no. 65106. Interview with Richard Nixon regarding J. F. Dulles.
110. *Ibid.* Record no. 64562. Telephone call to Mr. Shanley by J. F. Dulles. October 29. Quoted in Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 92.
111. NAWDC 764-00/10-3156. Hoover to the Legation in Budapest, October 31.
112. NAWDC RG 59 PPS Lot File 66D 487 Box 78. Report on the Satellites, June 7, 1956.
113. NAWDC RG 218 FCS 1953–57.091 Poland, Box 15. Memorandum for the Chairman of the FCS. October 25. “Gomulka may very well be anti-Russian *unlike Nagy in Hungary, he has not spent any considerable time in the USSR*” (emphasis mine).
114. Robert Amory prepared a memorandum for Eisenhower in which he advocated a nuclear preemptive strike on Lvov, mountain passes in the Carpatho-Ukraine, roads and railroads going to Hungary. See Bennet Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 95–96.
115. NSAWDC Record no. 66148. PPS Staff meeting. October 30.

116. *Ibid.* Record no. 62423. October 29.
117. *Ibid.* Record no. 65108. Interview with Freers regarding J. F. Dulles.
118. *Ibid.* Record no. 65105. Interview with Murphy regarding J. F. Dulles.
119. HR-CBFO. The British Embassy in Washington to the FO. November 1, 152–53.
120. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994), 562.
121. NAWDC RG 218 FCS 1957 06 (5-26-45) Box 3.
122. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, 563.
123. Zubok and Pleshakov, *op. cit.*, 186.
124. In Magyar Nemzet, September 1996.
125. The minister's discussion with Figl was reported by the French Minister in Vienna. Archives Diplomatiques, Europe 1944–60 Hongrie vol. 116. Fol. 52.
126. FD 1956. Gromiko's memorandum, September 17, 42–43.
127. HL 1956. Mikoyan's report, July 14, 1956.
128. FD 1956. Andropov's letter to the CPSU Presidium, August 30, 34–41.
129. DK 1956. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium, July 9–12, 19.
130. Peter Hahn, *op. cit.*, 231–32.
131. János Radványi, *op. cit.*, 11. A similar view is implied by Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges*, *op. cit.*, 88.
132. DK 1956. Meeting of the CPSU Presidium. November 1, 69–72.



# CANADA AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 A CANADIAN CHRONICLE

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In writing about the reaction of Canada to the Hungarian revolution of 1956 one does not need to write revisionist history; the topic remains unexplored to date. The role Canada played in the history of the Suez affair so thoroughly overshadowed other events at the time, that the story of Canadian-Hungarian relations during the revolution has not yet found its way into the annals of Canada.

Probably due to the lack of accessible archival resources at the time of publication, Professor N. Dreisziger's book on the Hungarian-Canadians (1982)<sup>2</sup> devoted only five pages to the decade of the 1950s. James Eayrs' excellent analysis of the period was written in the late 1950s<sup>3</sup> without access to memoirs and the archives of External Affairs. The memoirs and other published writings of L. B. Pearson, J. W. Pickersgill and L. St Laurent<sup>4</sup> speak little about the Hungarian revolution. A different approach can be observed in the New Delhi reports of Escott Reid, one of Canada's senior diplomats, who took up the cause of the Magyars in 1956.<sup>5</sup> Although the relevant papers in the National Archives of Canada have been available since the late 1980s, the more recent publication, *Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Movement to Canada*<sup>6</sup> contains no new archival material.

The recent accessibility of archival material concerning Canadian foreign and immigration policies in the mid-1950s now makes possible the examination of the Canadian position on the Hungarian revolution of 1956. External Affairs, albeit preoccupied with the Suez crisis, was forced to pay some attention to events in Hungary because of public pressure. The interruption of the political "thaw" that started with the death of Stalin in 1953 and threatened the interest of the wheat growers of Canada, however, forced the Canadian government to deal with events in Hungary. L. B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, opposed the American-led anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. He preferred a hands-off policy regarding Hungary in 1956. He did not want to provoke the Soviets and cause a rupture in Commonwealth relations. Many third-world commonwealth nations equated the Suez affair with the Hungarian problem. When some Canadian diplomats such as Escott Reid and Jules Léger, who were sympathetic

Canadian diplomats such as Escott Reid and Jules Léger, who were sympathetic to the plight of the Hungarians, proposed negotiations for mutual troop withdrawals between NATO and the Soviet Union, they were unable to make an impact on the cabinet.

In March 1944 the Germans occupied Hungary. A year later they were expelled and their place was taken by the Red Army. Within two years the liberators put their agents and local communists in charge of the government in Budapest. Mátyás Rákosi, the veteran Hungarian communist, established a totalitarian satellite state based on the Soviet model. The regime maintained itself with the support of a powerful secret police organization and the army of the USSR. In 1953 the Cold War began to "thaw," and the East European satellites of the Soviet Union were allowed to take a new "course." In Hungary a new prime minister, Imre Nagy, introduced reforms and moderated the oppressive features of the regime. Rákosi, however, remained at the helm of the communist party, the governing institution of Hungary. Taking advantage of the post-Stalin power-struggle in the Kremlin, Rákosi managed to remove Nagy. He then planned to arrest his followers in the summer of 1956. By now Khrushchev had begun to consolidate his leadership in Moscow. He ordered the removal and replacement of Rákosi in Hungary, not by Imre Nagy, but by another Muscovite, Ernő Gerő. This was a serious political mistake. Hungarian intellectuals who had kept the public in turmoil since 1953 would not embrace the new leader. The weak hand of the Kremlin, the temporary paralysis of the State Security Police in Hungary and the events in Poland encouraged and emboldened students, writers, poets, journalists and professors, to challenge the regime day-by-day. Once the working class joined their movement this challenge turned into a revolution. That happened on 23 October 1956.

The Canadian government watched the events in Hungary with the help of the British embassy in Budapest. Canada had not maintained diplomatic relations with Hungary since the 1941 declaration of war on Canada by the Hungarian government. After the Second World War, Canada participated in the drafting of the Hungarian peace treaty of 1947. During the discussions in Paris the Canadian delegation tried to moderate some of the harsher terms the Great Powers imposed on Hungary but with meager results. During the early Cold War days Canada looked upon Hungary as one of the satellites of Russia. All Hungarian attempts to revive the pre-World War Two commercial contacts failed. The show-trial of Cardinal Mindszenty particularly angered the Canadian Catholics and the Canadian-Hungarians. Nevertheless, Canadian diplomats in Prague, Moscow, Belgrade and Warsaw watched events as they unfolded in Hungary. It was not a coincidence that one of them arrived at Budapest on the eve of the revolution.

**Tuesday, 23 October 1956**

*Party Secretary Gerő and János Kádár, present puppet premier of Hungary, returned from talks with Tito to find Budapest the scene of active demonstrations by students, workers and soldiers. Gerő in a radio address rejected student demands for greater national independence. Demonstrators at radio station and army officials who tried to intervene fired on by Security Police (AVH). Soldiers provided arms and ammunition to the rebels and fighting spread through the city.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>7</sup>

"On Tuesday, October 23, my wife and I, in our car, crossed the Hungarian border just beyond Subotica," reported A. F. Hart, Chargé d'Affaires at the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. "It was an afternoon of bright, warm sunshine and the golden brown tints of autumn gave the countryside a peaceful, tranquil appearance... By the time we entered Budapest... darkness descended... in the centre we ran into complete confusion: large bodies of students were marching in chaotic fashion here, there and everywhere."<sup>8</sup> The chargé stayed until October 26. By then he understood the surprising events that took place in Hungary.

Hart was astonished that an uprising of such large proportions could take place in a Communist-controlled state under Soviet occupation. This is surprising considering events in Poland days earlier. The diplomat characterized the revolution as an anti-Communist, an anti-Soviet and a nationalist insurrection. Hart considered the rebels realistic because they did not advocate the immediate eradication of Communism, but accepted communists like Imre Nagy and János Kádár as transitional leaders. The diplomat correctly predicted that freedom fighters would soon seek to go further and discard all traces of Communism.

One can only speculate how this report could have influenced the attitude of the Canadian government if it would have arrived before it actually did on October 30.

**Wednesday, 24 October 1956**

*Soviet armoured column entered Budapest at 4:30 a.m., reportedly at the request of Gerő. Imre Nagy appointed Premier to succeed Hegedűs. Kádár accused demonstrators of trying to restore capitalism and warned them to surrender. Fighting continued.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons November 26, 1956.<sup>9</sup>

Canadians first read about the outbreak of a revolution in Budapest in their daily papers. "Hungarians Riot All Night" headlined the early morning edition of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*.<sup>10</sup> *The Montreal Star*<sup>11</sup> placed the news on the front page: "350 Dead in Hungarian Riot" *The Winnipeg Free Press*<sup>12</sup> gave a romantic characterization of the Hungarian people: "Hungarians unlike the Czechs are the least calculating, the most fiercely impetuous and romantic of European peoples... They are not satisfied to snatch a few apples from the tree of freedom; their instinct is to shake the tree until the fruit rains down."

The prominent members of the Hungarian-Canadian community promptly set to work on behalf of their kinfolk. Within hours Prime Minister Louis St Laurent's office had received numerous telegrams. "In the name of the Grand Committee of the Hungarian Churches and Societies of Montreal, I beg Your Excellency and the Canadian Government, to intervene and protest with the Russian government..." pleaded Dr. Francis Saad, the spokesman of the Montreal Hungarians.<sup>13</sup> The president of a small Toronto cultural association, the Hungarian Helicon, also addressed St Laurent: "Dear Prime Minister:" he telegraphed Ottawa, "We request you to take immediate action against Russian interference in Hungarian internal affairs and to give all possible help to the Hungarian people fighting for freedom and independence."<sup>14</sup> The Prime Minister's Office could not act promptly. L. B. Pearson had to be consulted at External Affairs and more information was needed from diplomatic posts, from Canada's NATO allies, especially in London and in New York.

Meanwhile, Canadian editorialists advised caution. *The Winnipeg Free Press*<sup>15</sup> warned: "With perils abounding in Eastern Europe, the Western powers will be wise to follow a policy of quiet wariness. It is no time to add the provocations of an aggressive diplomacy to those of the Budapest streets." The Conservative *Globe and Mail*<sup>16</sup> in Toronto was more phlegmatic: "The change we appear to be witnessing in Eastern Europe is very gradual." Both of these influential papers suggested the adoption of a wait-and-see policy. They saw no reason for the disruption of the gradual "thaw" in East-West relations during the past three years. The renewal of the Cold War, the interruption of reviving commercial contacts and the provocation of Russia were all undesirable options.

**Thursday, 25 October 1956**

*Russian party leaders Mikoyan and Suslov arrived in Budapest and Gerő was replaced by Kádár as Party Secretary. Unarmed demonstration in Parliament Square fired on by Security Police and by Russian tanks. Hungarian army units refused to shoot students and workers and joined revolution in large numbers. Kádár and Nagy appealed for end to violence, promising amnesty.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>17</sup>

Two days of disturbances on the streets of Budapest were not enough to interrupt the tranquillity of Canada. News reports indicated that the Hungarian government with the support of the Red Army of the Soviet Union was able to keep the situation under control. *The Montreal Star*<sup>18</sup> headlined: "Deaths Soar As Hungary Riots Continue" but its editorial showed continuing distrust and skepticism: "Long-time Communists are still in control. The freedom resulting will be limited, but hopes have a new perspective already." The *Toronto Globe and Mail*<sup>19</sup> declared that [the] "Budapest Riots Quelled," and for the West nothing left to do but to "...press home the propaganda advantages they have been given." The Canadian organization Mutual Co-operation League sent letters to the US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles and to L. B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, warning them against being too optimistic about the changes going on in the "red realms." The authors claimed that the communist collective leadership and not the revolutionaries still guided events in Budapest. In their view little had changed east of Vienna. Tito and Khrushchev were directing things in Hungary.<sup>20</sup> Neither did the Canadian-Hungarian community had faith in the new politicians and the intellectuals of Hungary who attempted to steer their country towards reform between 1953 and 1956. The community was willing to support the revolution provided the ruling elite was swept away. They had no faith in Imre Nagy at this conjecture. On this point the cautious attitude of the press and the Hungarian community differed little. While Hungarians from Hamilton presented a petition of protest to Senator W. Ross Macdonald with the request that it be sent to the United Nations, Toronto's Hungarian United Church held a special prayer service for the restoration of peace and democracy in Hungary.<sup>21</sup> On that day, October 25, the Prime Minister's Office had received just one demand for action from a small local association, the Toronto Hungarian Sport and Social Club, which safely could be ignored.<sup>22</sup> Ottawa was more interested in reaping the results of the "thaw" and did not wish to upset the trade agreements achieved in the previous six months. The Canadian cabinet concluded on that day: "Whatever happened in Hungary at the moment should not affect Canadian action on the [trade] agreement" [just concluded with Hungary].<sup>23</sup>

The ministers were reacting to the presentation of Lester B. Pearson, who reported to the cabinet that a provisional agreement had been reached on the text of a trade agreement with Hungary. The treaty, which was yet to be ratified, was to cover a period of three years during which Hungary was to purchase 300,000 tons of wheat and, in turn, establish a commercial office in Canada. Pearson suggested that, in view of recent developments in Hungary, it might be desirable to delay the signing of the agreement for a few days. If the Russians were suddenly to re-impose full control over the country, the present would not be the moment

to take this formal step.<sup>24</sup> During the same day the *Winnipeg Free Press*<sup>25</sup> commented that Hungary had just been granted most-favoured-nation status. The paper also quoted an unidentified Ottawa source: "A Canadian government trade official noted that the new regimes being established in Poland and Hungary would probably be anxious to provide more food and other necessities for the average man in their countries. This could lead to increased purchases in Canada of wheat and other commodities."

The trade agreement was brought to a satisfactory conclusion one day before the outbreak of the revolution. This happened although Hungary needed no wheat (the grain was bought for re-export) and had very little cash to pay for the transaction, despite the anger of Canadian Catholics over the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty on trumped up charges by the Hungarian Communist regime and the justified fear of Canadian officials of Communist subversion. All these factors were overlooked in hope of a new market for Canadian wheat. Tomorrow could bring an end to the disturbances in Hungary or victory for the rebels. In either case, the sale appeared secured. The deal been negotiated with the representatives of the communist government but, in case the government was overthrown, the recognition of a new regime could confirm the deal. Uncertainty, however, was counterproductive to business. The revolution acquired a nuisance value.

#### Friday, 26 October 1956

*Fighting spread to provinces. Rebels aided by Hungarian troops, claimed control of Western Hungary. Revolutionary delegations called on Premier Nagy to press demands for a more representative government, free elections, equality of status for Hungary, withdrawal of Soviet troops and economic reforms.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>26</sup>

On that day the fighting in Hungary continued unabated. The international community began to pay close attention to events in Budapest. Canadian-Hungarians viewed their old country more sympathetically and intensified pressure on their government to get involved in the affair.

Canadian press headlines showed enthusiasm for the revolution: "Most of Hungary Under Rebel Control" (*Montreal Star*)<sup>27</sup>, "Russia Without Mask" (*The Winnipeg Free Press*)<sup>28</sup>, "Massacre in Budapest" (*The Globe and Mail*)<sup>29</sup> but the inside pages reflected the deep suspicion of communist eastern Europe. *The Winnipeg Free Press* warned that the rebel students in Hungary were the tools of Titoist leadership. *The Montreal Star* warned that "there is no doubt of the outcome [of the Hungarian uprising]. The limit of Moscow's concession is "Socialist

equality," not freedom. "Whatever has to be done to suppress the rebellion will be done... A tightening of the reins is to be expected." Pearson showed little interest in the events that took place in a far away country. When he addressed a group of journalists that day he warned them about threats to freedom of the press, a rather irrelevant topic for the moment, but made no statement about Hungary. The journalists did not ask him about Canada's position on this matter (*The Montreal Star*).<sup>30</sup>

The silence was deafening. Only the minorities of East European origin cried out. The prime minister's secretary informed St Laurent about the receipt of 32 telegrams begging for action on behalf of a free Hungary.<sup>31</sup> The members of the congregation of the First Hungarian Presbyterian Church in Toronto held a general meeting on that day. They sent a telegram to the prime minister asking him to protest the Russian army massacres in Hungary at the Security Council of the United States. The congregation suggested that Louis St Laurent request the Security Council to compel the Russians to evacuate Hungary.<sup>32</sup> The Port Colborne Hungarian Roman and Greek Catholic Association also requested the prime minister to turn to the UN.<sup>33</sup> "The Western democracies, apparently unconcerned and without protest, speechlessly watch the trampling underfoot of human rights and dignity by the communists. Not realizing that if our people fall the gate is open for the communists to the west... We are asking you Mr. Prime Minister to raise your voice in the name of humanity, against this tyranny and condemn the Budapest and Moscow communists for their deeds," protested and pleaded the Hungarian Canadian Christian Association of Niagara Falls, Ontario.<sup>34</sup> They asked their local member of parliament, W. L. Houck, to forward their demand to the prime minister's office.<sup>35</sup> Other Hungarian associations sent telegrams of a similar vein.<sup>36</sup> The Canadian Citizens of Lithuanian Origin in Toronto was the only non-Hungarian organization that made representations on behalf of Hungary.<sup>37</sup> All this activity on behalf of a "communist" nation made certain civil servants wary, regardless of the humble style of the telegrams that mainly requested diplomatic action.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration prepared a list of Hungarian organizations in Canada identifying them either as pro- or anti-communist.<sup>38</sup> The Department of External Affairs informed the RCMP about a planned demonstration of the Hungarians before the Soviet Embassy. They did not want to upset the Russians. In the eyes of some Hungary was not only part of the communist empire but also the last ally of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. When the Toronto-Hungarians placed a wreath for the dead of Hungary at the Toronto City Hall Cenotaph, Canadian veterans protested against this "desecration" by the members of a former enemy nation.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, in New York the UN representatives of France, the UK and the USA met secretly at the initiative of the United States and agreed to launch a new propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union. They prepared a letter re-

questing the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting for the consideration of an item entitled, "The Situation in Hungary."<sup>40</sup> Despite Pearson's dislike for the State Department's initiative, which he characterized as "unfortunate," once the major powers had made their move, Pearson felt obliged to react.<sup>41</sup> Domestic pro-Hungarian activities, despite their limited nature, also prompted him to respond.

T. Wainman-Wood, the prime minister's secretary, informed St Laurent that Pearson was ready to call on him in the afternoon concerning a statement the Secretary of State was planning to make on Saturday.<sup>42</sup> Earlier that day W. H. Agnew of the Citizenship Branch informed Pearson's office that Hungarian-Canadians were planning to demonstrate in front of the Soviet Embassy on Sunday, October 28. A Hungarian delegation, the representatives of the National Hungarian Federation, was pressing for an interview with Pearson. He agreed to receive them.<sup>43</sup> The Secretary's office was mobilized for the domestic phase of Pearson's counter-offensive. Preparations were made to provide background material on Hungary to Pearson for his Saturday speech at the Toronto Rotary Club. A night telegram was sent to each of the protesting Hungarian organizations.<sup>44</sup> The revolution received Canadian approval. Then Pearson and his advisors turned their attention to the United Nations.

Pearson preferred to let Hungary work out its own affairs internally and provide no excuse for further intervention by the Soviet Union. He had delayed any open condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary as long as he could. He had recently contributed to the thawing of the Cold War when he visited the Soviet Union. His staff worked intensively for months on wheat deals with that country as well as with Poland and Hungary. Neither did he wish to undo his own achievements nor disturb good relations with the non-aligned members of the Commonwealth, whose positions often contained strong pro-Soviet components. Until the Hungarian Revolution there had been a warm relationship between Canada and India. This special relationship had been supported by Canadian public opinion and particularly by liberal and left-wing intellectuals.<sup>45</sup> The Indian representative at the United Nations held the view that "the eastern European states had no right to national freedom and independence since the Soviet Union had a right to have satellites on its western borders."<sup>46</sup> Once the American initiative was made, however, he supported the USA, the country he considered the pivot of Canadian security. He was now ready to clarify Canada's position on the Hungarian question to his UN delegation and Canada's other representatives abroad. External Affairs sent instructions to the Permanent Representatives of Canada at the United Nations ordering them to protest the Soviet use of force, the violation of human right and of the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 to which Canada was a signatory. Pearson warned his diplomats that only constructive steps should be taken. The American propaganda campaign must be toned down.

The Security Council should keep the situation under review or form a fact-finding committee. He continued:

We are interested in this idea especially if India and Yugoslavia take an active part and would see some advantages in inviting USSR to join in sponsoring this or amended proposal although they would probably reject it. If they did by any chance accept, it might provide only foreseeable context in which Hungarian leaders could talk officially to the West. In any case we would hope UN action might facilitate an end to the fighting...However, if USSR would participate fact finding committee might have more than propaganda value.<sup>47</sup>

Pearson wanted the fighting in Hungary to stop and to obtain Moscow's recognition of the new Budapest regime. At that point the recently negotiated commercial treaty between Canada and Hungary could have a firm basis despite the revolution.

#### Saturday, 27 October 1956

*Nagy broadened his cabinet by bringing in Béla Kovács and Zoltán Tildy of the Smallholder's Party, but Politburo remained predominantly communist. Fighting continued. Soviet reinforcements moved in from Roumania.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>48</sup>

On this day at a private meeting in Paris the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the US informed the members of the NATO Council that their governments had agreed in principle to raising before the Security Council the question of Soviet military action in the Hungarian uprising. The Council was unanimous in agreeing that NATO should now take no action whatsoever on this issue, beyond that members keep each other informed. Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium suggested that "Third-World" leaders be asked to intervene with the Soviet authorities but the Council rejected this proposal.<sup>49</sup> Several factors caused major distractions from the events in Hungary. The American election campaign was in progress. Israeli, French and British military authorities were in the process of planning and organizing the invasion of Egypt. Furthermore, the uncertain political situation in Hungary dictated a cautious great power attitude towards Hungary.

Telegrams of concerned Canadian-Hungarians and other citizens and their organizations demanding action on behalf of the Hungarian revolutionaries were arriving at the Ottawa ministries. The Council of Canadian Hungarian Churches and Societies of Manitoba telegraphed the prime minister:

...we beg you and the Canadian government to intervene and protest at the USSR government against the illegal Soviet domination in Hungary and request to intervene with UN to protest right of a member for independence...<sup>50</sup>

The Canadian Croatian Club also sent a telegram. The telegram of another East European emigré association read: "In unity with our Hungarian brothers whose country was subjected to the criminal actions of Soviet imperialism, all member nations of the Mutual Cooperation League demand your help for the liberation of all nations enslaved by communism."<sup>51</sup> Meanwhile, in Montreal the large Hungarian community began a day of feverish activity. A requiem mass was celebrated at the Church of Our Lady of Hungary in memory of those who fell in the anti-Soviet rebellion. The priest urged his parishioners to do everything humanly possible to help the victims. A blood-drive was initiated. Militant Hungarian-Canadians started to organize a legion to fight the Russians in Hungary. According to The Montreal Star's reporter, close to 100 persons signed up on that day.

By noon Pearson was ready to inform the public and an anxious Hungarian delegation of his thoughts concerning events in Budapest. He addressed the members of the Rotary Club in Toronto. "In Hungary," he began, "it is hard to know what is going on behind the smoke and fire of the popular uprising which is being fought out to the end with all the fierce pride and reckless courage for which the Hungarian people are famous. But it is clear that here too [as in Poland] the hunger for freedom, personal and national, has fired a people's demand for the breaking of the shackles that bound the country to Moscow." After praising the heroic and patriotic students and workers of Budapest he continued: "...the effect of whatever happens will surely not be lost on the uncommitted countries whom the Russians have been wooing in recent months..." "It would be naive to imagine that the Moscovite Empire is already crumbling..." Nagy said he is building national communism. Can national communism and the Russians live side by side? "We can only hope that they will... What can we do in Canada, and other free countries; what should we do in such a situation? This is a question which I know presents itself with a special, an agonizing urgency to Canadians of Polish and Hungarian descent; citizens of our country who, though Canadians first in loyalty and devotion, cannot forget their homelands; and cannot help but be deeply stirred by the heroism and the tragedy of what is going on there now." He rejoiced in seeing cracks in the Iron Curtain, but, he said, "...our first concern must be for the present position of the peoples involved... Rash and ill-judged foreign intervention or interference from the West, however well intentioned, would not help these Poles and Hungarians... It might indeed hurt them by provoking a cruel and powerful reaction from those who may be waiting for an opportunity to move in and destroy these new liberating and national forces, using the excuse of foreign threats or interference from our side. But we *can* let the people of these nations... know that we are following with deep and strong admiration their struggle... We can also express our condemnation and abhorrence of brutal and repressive measures taken against them, especially by foreign forces from Russia." The US consulted Canada and others about bringing the issue to

the Security Council. "The view of the Canadian government is that this should be done...in order to prevent further bloodshed and to enable Hungary [to] choose its own course as a new member of the United Nations." Russia should work for this too. "The force of world opinion must be mobilized in favour of the forces of national freedom in these countries and against foreign intervention, and foreign domination. The United Nations is where this should be and can be done." Communists and fellow travellers in Canada should take a second look. The West must be united and unprovocative.<sup>52</sup>

Pearson delivered two messages. Canadian-Hungarians were told that their people were famous, proud, fierce and courageous. The minister, however, spoke against intervention. He reassured the public, generally anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, that no risks would be taken. He accused the Red Army of brutality, and asked Moscow to mend its way to please international public opinion which wanted peace and fair treatment for the Hungarians. Canada offered sympathy without action.

Following the delivery of his speech Pearson met a group of Canadian-Hungarians. A six-man delegation asked him "to compel the Soviet government to withdraw its troops from Hungarian soil." The petitioners asked that the Canadian Government officially denounce the brutality of the Soviet armies and provide some medical aid and food supplies to the Hungarian insurgents. Pearson was encouraging but made no commitment. He told the delegation that he was pressing the UN on behalf of the Hungarians but everyone should beware of "hasty and illadvised" action.<sup>53</sup>

In New York the United Nations Security Council was summoned to meet at 4 p.m. EST to consider the Hungarian situation. The president of the Council issued the call after Britain, France and the United States requested an urgent meeting to deal with "the situation in Hungary." A courier from the American delegation handed in the official request at UN headquarters in the early afternoon. Earlier, Spain had protested to the UN against recent Soviet troop actions in both Hungary and Poland.<sup>54</sup>

At sundown several hundred Canadians of Hungarian origin gathered in the Polish War Veterans' Hall in Montreal to hear speakers laud the rebels' struggle against Soviet oppression. Dr. George Lengváry, a local community leader addressing the crowd, demanded that the United Nations intervene and organize free elections in Hungary.<sup>55</sup> In Toronto 3,000 Hungarians marched through city streets to place a wreath at the Cenotaph to honour their former country men killed in Hungary the preceding week. A requiem mass was celebrated at the St. Elizabeth Church. Eight hundred Magyars dressed in mourning took part in the solemn ceremony. The more militant members of the community wanted to give armed support to the revolutionaries. The Legion of Freedom, a brigade of war veterans and volunteers, was founded that day. Several hundred strong on paper, the brigade opened a recruiting campaign at its headquarters at the Hungarian

Sports Club in Toronto. Eugene Tömöry, a retired Hungarian general and president of the Rákóczy Association, an organization of Hungarian war veterans, headed the Legion of Freedom. Initially, the Canadian Hungarian Federation sponsored this Legion. About 100 Hungarians from Montreal indicated that they also wished to join. "The main problem is getting to Europe,' a spokesman for this group said to a reporter from The Montreal Star. 'Once we get there, we know we'll be able to secure arms.' He said that Hungarian sources in Ottawa would be contacted in the hope that air transportation might be arranged."<sup>56</sup>

The Canadian government could not tolerate the establishment of a private army to fight a war abroad against a country with which Canada was at peace. The problem had to be treated delicately since public opinion by now was pro Hungarian.

#### Sunday, 28 October 1956

*Fighting eased as Revolutionary Councils gained control of provincial towns. Nagy denied [the] Russian claim that [the] uprising was [a] counter-revolution and named it "an all-embracing unifying, national and democratic movement." He asked for immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest and promised to disband the secret police. Soviet intervention [was] condemned in the U. N.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>57</sup>

On October 28, five days after the start of the Hungarian revolution, the Security Council began debating an American-British-French protest proposal against the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary. The proposal had the tacit support of several Western countries, including Canada.<sup>58</sup> Canada had private reservations about the usefulness of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign on behalf of Hungary, but the delegation in New York would not openly challenge the American approach at this time. During the course of the Security Council debate, a diplomat from South East Asia suggested off the record to the Canadian delegation that the main purpose of the exercise was to convey to the people of Hungary that their struggle for freedom had the attention of the western powers, who were following developments with the most sympathy. Canadian diplomats at the UN were told that the Council debate could strengthen the hand of the Hungarian government in its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Some accused the US of exploiting the situation for domestic purposes while others claimed that the Council's action was necessary to head off a possible request for support from a rebel government in Western Hungary.

Through its junior diplomats the USA solicited support for a UN resolution. Canada was approached. The Afro-Asian bloc showed no enthusiasm. P. J. Nehru, prime minister of India, believed that there was a civil war in Hungary and there should be no interference in Hungarian domestic affairs. Nevertheless, an agenda to discuss Hungary was adopted by a vote of 9-1-1. The Council was to be reconvened at the discretion of the President. Private talks on the matter were scheduled for Monday.<sup>59</sup>

The prime minister's office in Ottawa was still receiving telegrams on behalf of Hungary, but none were sent by the mainstream Canadian organizations. Messages came from the Estonian Society of Montreal, the Loyal Finns of Canada, the Lithuanian Canadian Federation, the Canadian Council for Free Europe and by local Hungarian groups.<sup>60</sup> Canadians sympathized but feared confrontation, feared war. Canadian veterans remembered that Hungary was a German ally during the Second World War and many Hungarian-Canadians were veterans of the anti-Allied armed forces.

Canadian-Hungarians took to the streets to demonstrate their support for the new Hungarian revolution and to demand Canadian and, especially, UN action to protect the new freedoms achieved in Eastern Europe. A rally was held in Ottawa with the participation of 600 Hungarians. These were joined by groups representing most of the satellite countries, who declared their solidarity with the Hungarians. The Ottawa police refused to authorize a march on the Soviet embassy, so the participants drove by the Soviet Embassy. Then the procession moved to the national war memorial. The demonstrators laid a wreath, listened to speeches and sang "God Save the Queen." A young man began singing the Hungarian national anthem, "God Bless the Hungarians."

Similar Ontario demonstrations were also held in Hamilton, Welland and Windsor. The Montreal police prevented a Hungarian protest march, much to the dismay of the French press, which showed considerable sympathy for the Hungarians.<sup>61</sup>

While talks continued in New York and demonstrations in Canada, ominous signs appeared on the Middle Eastern horizon. Israeli tanks approached Egyptian territories. "Israeli Army Launches Drive Into Egypt," read the headline of the next day's *Montreal Star*.

#### Monday, 29 October 1956

*Rebels refused to lay down arms till Soviet troops left Budapest. Some Soviet artillery and tank action continued. Pravda denounced the revolutionary forces.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>62</sup>

*The Globe and Mail* reported on Tuesday: "Up to late yesterday close to 1,000 persons, mostly of Hungarian extraction, had signed to serve in a Legion of Freedom." Across Canada some 3,000 Hungarian-Canadians expressed a desire to fight for Hungary. Leaders of Montreal's Hungarian community were seeking ways and means to provide transportation for some 100 volunteers. In Toronto 500 enlisted at the temporary HQ of the Legion. The Hungarian leadership in Winnipeg was more cautious. They decided at their meeting on that day, that money – not men – was urgently required to help their former countrymen in strife-torn Hungary. After they discovered that the week-end recruiting drive for volunteers to join the revolutionaries in Hungary had yielded no more than ten men, the Council of Canadian-Hungarian Churches and Societies decided that it was useless to send men to fight.<sup>63</sup>

The idea of Canadian citizens fighting in Hungary disturbed a number of civil servants in Ottawa. Prime Minister Louis St Laurent's secretary, T. Wainman-Wood, informed External Affairs about two telegrams just received regarding the entry of volunteers from Canada into the struggle in Hungary. One came from the Hungarian Liberation Committee in Vancouver and the other one from the Canadian Hungarian Veterans Association in Welland. "I should appreciate the advice of the Department as to the nature of the reply to be sent to these particular telegrams raising as they do the specter of the problems which we had over volunteers for Israel a few years ago," concluded T. Wainman-Wood.<sup>64</sup> External Affairs now decided to find out how the US was planning to deal with the potential international complication. Jules Léger was preparing a memorandum for Pearson concerning Canadian editorial comments on Poland and Hungary. He found that most editors simply analyzed events and demonstrated sympathy for the Hungarian people but demanded no action. Only *The Winnipeg Free Press* proposed "large-scale aid and quiet diplomacy."<sup>65</sup> This proposal was taken to heart. Ottawa concentrated on quiet diplomacy. In public, however, Canada could not afford to disagree with its NATO allies.

External Affairs sent instructions to the Canadian delegation at the United Nations in New York to associate Canada with the action that the governments of France, the UK and the USA had taken in the Security Council on October 28.<sup>66</sup>

In the Middle East all was ready for the invasion of Egypt.

#### Tuesday, 30 October 1956

*Hungarian Air Force issued ultimatum and Soviet forces began to pull out of Budapest. Premier Nagy promised free elections and an end to forced collectivization of agriculture. Cardinal Mindszenty was freed. Moscow published its October 30 declaration on relations with the satellites and announced its will-*

*ingness to negotiate withdrawal of its Warsaw Pact troops from Hungary, Poland and Roumania. But satellites were to remain "peoples democracies" and stay in Soviet bloc.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>67</sup>

The first suggestion of *The Winnipeg Free Press*, material aid to Hungary, was welcomed and acted on by Canadian-Hungarians. A delegation of 30 members of Montreal's Hungarian community gathered at the Montreal Dorval airport at noon Tuesday, October 30, to bid Godspeed to an RCAF North Star loaded with two tons of medical and hospital supplies. In Toronto the plane took on another three tons of supplies destined for the relief of those wounded or injured in the Budapest fighting. The value of the shipment was \$40,000. The Canadian Red Cross asked the International Red Cross to arrange future deliveries to Hungary through Vienna.<sup>68</sup> At the same time well-informed UN and Red Cross representatives began to reinterpret the situation. Peter Casson, United Nations High Commissioner, forecasted to members of the Canadian Progress Club of Montreal that European refugee camps would soon be swamped by 'freedom seeking' Hungarians. The Canadian Red Cross began to coordinate its activities with the International Rescue Committee.<sup>69</sup> Meanwhile, in Ottawa a more formal arrangement with Hungary was under consideration.

The Canadian-Hungarian trade agreement was ready for signature. According to the draft press release on the proposed treaty, Hungarian goods entering Canada would be entitled to Canadian most-favoured-nation tariff rates. Three hundred thousand tons of wheat would be purchased by Hungary within three years. Canada had agreed to the establishment of a Hungarian trade office in Montreal. The Agreement was to become the first bilateral trade agreement between Canada and Hungary since the Second World War. Previously, Hungarian goods had been subjected to the rates of duty of the Canadian General Tariff. Trade between Canada and Hungary had been at a low level. In 1955, Canadian exports to Hungary were valued at \$165,000, consisting mainly of clover seed, raw hides, wool rags and textile waste. Imports from Hungary totalled \$125,000 and consisted mainly of cut glass tableware, broom corn, brooms and toys. In the first half of 1956, Canada exported to Hungary 30,000 tons of wheat along with smaller shipments of other products. Tibor Barabás, leader of the Hungarian trade delegation, informed Budapest of Jules Léger's reservations that aimed at the avoidance of a political settlement between the two contracting parties. Léger suggested that the office in Montreal was to be a branch office of a Hungarian import-export agency or agencies with a staff of no more than five persons without diplomatic or consular immunity. The office would only remain in existence for the duration of the trade agreement.<sup>70</sup> This was quiet diplomacy: cold war in public, business in private.

The question of Hungarian volunteers still persisted. A morning paper headlined: 1,000 Ready to Serve in Legion of Freedom.<sup>71</sup> In response, Pearson decided to hold a press conference and bring the question to the cabinet the next day. "No legal prohibition exists which would prevent Canadian citizens from proceeding to Hungary to fight alongside the insurgent forces," said Pearson, answering inquires mainly from Hungarians in Toronto and Montreal. "No Canadian citizen wishing to go to Hungary need 'worry' about being allowed to return later," said the minister to reporters. In any event, Pearson doubted that the matter would have practical application. He believed that the trend of events in Hungary indicated that the strife in that country might soon be at an end. Officials at External, nevertheless, were not in a hurry to issue passports to potential Canadian-Hungarian freedom fighters.<sup>72</sup>

On this Tuesday the American Secretary of State J. F. Dulles telephoned Pearson. Dulles, according to Pearson, was in a state of shock on learning about the British-French ultimatum to Egypt. Israel, England and France were readying their troops to invade Egypt in response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Dulles said, that "as a result of their brutalities in Eastern Europe, the Russians were on the run, but now the British and French had done something which, it would be argued, was comparable to the kind of action which the Russians had taken or were accustomed to take in situations which they claimed to be of an emergency kind." Pearson agreed wholeheartedly but would not yet inform the public.<sup>73</sup>

### Wednesday, 31 October 1956

*Soviet tank forces regrouped outside Budapest. In response to demand from Army Revolutionary Council, Nagy asked Russians to negotiate immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary and termination of Hungary's participation in Warsaw Pact. Nagy dropped Stalinists from Cabinet and brought in Social Democrats.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>74</sup>

The cabinet met in Ottawa to discuss the planned Hungarian army of Canada. Pearson opened the session by stating that there had been a number of requests from persons of Hungarian extraction for information on the possibility of going to Hungary to fight against the Russians. Under the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed in 1937, it was an offence for a Canadian to enlist in the forces of a foreign state at war with a friendly nation. It was not, however, clear whether there was a war at present between Hungary and the Soviet Union. According to the Act, it was not an offence to take part in civil conflict in another country un-

less an order-in-council specifically prohibited participation. The Minister said no such order had been passed in regard to the Hungarian conflict nor was one contemplated. Legally, Canadians could go to Hungary to join the Hungarian liberation forces. Of course, persons from Hungary who did not yet have Canadian citizenship might have difficulty returning to Canada, and people of Hungarian origin with Canadian citizenship might also find it difficult to travel to Hungary. The number of requests for passports would probably slacken as the Russians withdrew from Hungary. Cabinet consequently proposed to explain that the legal situation be clarified with the mention that they did not intend to pass the type of order referred to above.<sup>75</sup>

Concurrently, a Toronto spokesman for the volunteers stated that his group was harmonizing action with American-Hungarians and was currently waiting for the signal from New York. Léger asked the State Department if they were discouraging, encouraging or ignoring the budding Hungarian Legion. The State Department replied that they had no objection to the formation of a Legion of Freedom but noted that US citizens had been prohibited from travel to Hungary since February 3, 1956.<sup>76</sup>

NATO also continued, with full Canadian acquiescence, to show little interest in the Hungarian revolution. Canadian Ambassador to NATO, L. D. Wilgress, reported from Paris: "Undoubtedly developments in Hungary and the satellites would have occupied much more of the Council's time had not developments in Palestine become so pressing. As a result discussion at the private session of Council on October 31 concerning Hungary was rather brief and confined to the exchange of info. Both Portugal and ourselves stated that our govt had written to the Secretary General of the support of the approach taken by Britain, France and the USA in the Security Council on this subject."<sup>77</sup> This was not necessarily a negative development as far as East European affairs were concerned. There was an air of optimism everywhere following the issuance of the Moscow Declaration of October 30th, which recognized separate ways to socialism. Optimism also prevailed in Ottawa.

Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State at external Affairs, informed most Canadian diplomatic posts that Canada's aim to end bloodshed in Hungary had been accomplished. External Affairs wanted to postpone all discussion on Hungary in the Security Council until the situation became clearer or, at least, until an authorized Hungarian trade delegation representing Imre Nagy would reach New York. "I hope when discussion is resumed that the Western Powers can avoid the temptation to score a propaganda victory," concluded Léger.<sup>78</sup> The second aim of Canada, of finding a satisfactory solution to the Hungarian question, remained unresolved. For the moment cabinet considered the question of economic aid.

*The Globe and Mail* and *The Montreal Star* made inquiries at External Affairs asking whether the minister contemplated aid to Poland and Hungary and, if so,

would the aid be given directly by Canada or via NATO.<sup>79</sup> Wider Canadian public support emerged for the Hungarian revolution. The 1,050,000 member Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) joined a plan to help East European workers to establish free trade unions. President Claude Jodoin said all CLC affiliates would be asked to contribute to "an international solidarity fund to assist European workers who are victims of Soviet domination."<sup>80</sup> In Montreal, the Hungarian community obtained the support of Senator A. K. Hugessen, Cardinal Léger and Major General Ernest G. Weeks to support the International Rescue Committee. The recently established Hungarian Relief Fund had collected \$10,000 and contributions were pouring into the Montreal office of the Rev. Michael Feher, an officer of the Fund.<sup>81</sup> CCF leader M. J. Coldwell condemned Russia and suggested that economic aid should be given to Hungary. The Hungarian trade delegation was lingering in Montreal, hoping for the resumption of trade discussions.<sup>82</sup> In Ottawa the credentials of the four-member Hungarian trade delegation were reconsidered and declared valid, which could have been interpreted in the circumstances as a *de facto* recognition of the Nagy government of Hungary.<sup>83</sup> At his press conference Pearson encouraged the Hungarians. "The Canada-Hungary trade pact had been agreed to and simply awaited signing." In Hungary the situation is "working itself out" and individual nations, he suggested, could better contribute by aiding the people directly, let us say through the Red Cross, than directly to the Budapest regime. In case of NATO involvement the Russians could claim the West was interfering. This should be avoided.<sup>84</sup> Pearson's hands-off policy did not mean lack of diplomatic activity on behalf of the Nagy government. The minister cabled Ambassador Escott Reid in New Delhi suggesting that he persuade Nehru not to postpone a public denunciation of Soviet actions in Hungary.<sup>85</sup> Third world countries could not, however, be relied upon to help Hungary once Egypt had been invaded.

#### Thursday, 1 November 1956

*Earlier rumours of Russian troop movements confirmed as armoured columns moved into Hungary from Rumania and the Ukraine. Nagy denounced Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary's neutrality and called United Nations for support.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>86</sup>

The planned Canadian-Hungarian Legion frightened not the Russian invaders of Hungary but the hesitant Magyar emigré leaders and their civil servant patrons in Ottawa. In the morning Pearson's representatives met Hungarian leaders in the minister's office. The president of the Canadian-Hungarian Federation said

that their leadership was "discouraging individuals from attempting to go to Hungary as volunteers. They are taking their names and addresses and asking them to stand by in case their services might be needed later. They are firmly of the opinion that it would be foolish to encourage this movement and think that after a week or two the fervour of all except a few individuals will have dissipated."<sup>87</sup> The ministry, however, left nothing to chance. R. A. D. Ford, head of the European Division at External Affairs, informed Pearson that he had taken steps in favour of using administrative delays to avoid issuing certificates of identity for travel to Hungary.<sup>88</sup> By then Ford had written to the Consular Division of his ministry asking them to sabotage any Hungarian travel request. "We understand that you are preparing a memorandum for the Under-Secretary on the question of issuing passports or certificates of identity to applicants seeking to go to the Hungarian area and that you wish to include a section on the political aspects of the problem." "This would seem to be the worst possible time for even a token force of volunteers from Canada or the United States to attempt to join the rebels in Hungary." Their presence could provide excuse for repression; their arrival could endanger negotiations and could widen the conflict in the area. The creation of administrative difficulties re passports would be useful. Individuals should be encouraged to postpone their trips and, in any case, applications should be delayed or refused, advised Ford.<sup>89</sup>

The Hungarian legion affair, despite the potential to become an international embarrassment, was only one of the obstacles to the immediate signing of the Canadian-Hungarian trade agreement. At the cabinet meeting it was reported that Pearson had been asked by the head of the Hungarian delegation if the signature of the trade agreement could be deferred until the latter had had an opportunity to communicate with their government from Paris. The Minister recommended, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance and the Acting Minister of Trade and Commerce, that the Canadian Ambassador in France now be authorized to sign.<sup>90</sup> External Affairs immediately telegraphed the Paris Embassy. "A trade agreement has been negotiated in Ottawa between Hungary and Canada which must be signed in Paris to allow Mr. Barabás, head of the trade delegation, time to contact his government. The agreement is to be signed by Mr. Desy and Mr. Barabás. Full powers have been issued authorizing Mr. Desy to sign."<sup>91</sup> The problem lay with Barabás, who did not know for sure on whose behalf he would sign — Imre Nagy's government or the previous regime.

Paris was not to be the centre of Canadian diplomatic action this day. The Security Council went into session in New York. The Canadian delegation reported little chance of an agreement on the Hungarian question. Unexpectedly, the first secretary of the Hungarian mission turned up as a representative of Hungary and was queried by the Chinese and the American delegations. He had a telegram from Nagy accrediting him as Hungarian representative at the emergency special session of the General Assembly but not accrediting him to the

Security Council. He was expected to be allowed to sit but not to speak until his credentials could be clarified by the Secretary. Assuming a Soviet veto, a General Assembly meeting on the topic became likely on Sunday or Monday.<sup>92</sup> The Canadian High Commissioner in London discussed the question of UN action with the head of the Northern Department in the British Foreign Office. The British welcomed the declaration of Hungarian neutrality but expressed no desire to provide guarantees. The UK delegation was instructed to let the USA set the pace and decide on tactics.<sup>93</sup> In New Delhi the Canadian High Commissioner, continued pressuring India to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Reid, according to his own testimony, was the only diplomatic representative in Delhi who had expressed criticism of Indian inaction concerning Soviet aggression in Hungary. He had done this without explicit instructions from Pearson.<sup>94</sup> At the UN no independent Canadian foreign policy on Hungary had been declared. Many Canadians wanted one.

Events in Budapest deeply embarrassed the communist movement in Canada; "...the presence of Soviet troops in Budapest served to infuriate the people and spread the revolt. National self-determination is an inviolable principle due to every Hungarian as it is to every democratic-minded person in this world. It is our hope that peace will be restored, but a black mark has been left on the name of socialism," editorialized a communist paper in Toronto.<sup>95</sup> The Hungarian-Canadian communist paper celebrated the departure of the Red Army from Budapest and appealed to all Hungarians to aid their mother country.<sup>96</sup>

Most Canadians had begun to pay more attention to events in Hungary. At a large rally in Toronto at Massey Hall "the cheers were for the statement of Allan Grossman (PC, Toronto-St. Andrew), who said Canada must let Hungary and millions still under Communist tyranny know that not only moral support but the kind of support that wins battles is forthcoming." Mayor Phillips spoke for Toronto of the need to contribute moral support, wealth and lives. People contributed on the spot to the Canadian Red Cross Hungarian Relief Fund. A wire was sent to St Laurent expressing gratitude but a demand was made for international guarantees for Hungary.<sup>97</sup> J. Léger, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, assured the Rt. Rev. Steven Horvath, pastor of the Welland Hungarians, that the Canadian government would try to alleviate the plight of Hungary and promote sympathy for its people.<sup>98</sup> He offered blood plasma and medical supplies to the Canadian Hungarian Veterans Association of Welland, Ontario, but warned them:

...while we understand your interest in sending volunteers to Hungary it is possible that such action might raise legal difficulties because of the Foreign Enlistment Act of Canada which forbids Canadians and aliens living in Canada to enlist in foreign armed forces involved in conflict abroad to recruit Canadian residents for this purpose, or to transport them.<sup>99</sup>

Regardless, most Canadian-Hungarians paid more attention to what Pearson was saying and doing. They credited him for keeping the world's attention on Hungary. A popular Hungarian weekly even invented a Pearson statement, which stated that if the Soviets would not give in to world pressure, then the Hungarian freedom fighters will receive the armed support of the West.<sup>100</sup>

**Friday, 2 November 1956**

*More Soviet forces poured into Hungary, sealed off Austrian border, cut communications, took control of highways, airports, railways. Tass complained of "counter-revolutionary activities" in Hungary. Nagy made second appeal to UN.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>101</sup>

Once the anti-Communist nature of the Hungarian revolution became obvious the Canadian political establishment espoused the work of the Hungarian-Canadians on behalf of the freedom fighters. Public opinion in Canada suddenly became most sympathetic. To the federal Liberal Party, in particular, the Hungarian revolution suddenly became a political asset since they wanted to distance themselves from the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, J. Pickersgill, sponsored a Hungarian delegation, which wanted to have a hearing at External Affairs. In Toronto, Paul Hellyer conveyed an encouraging message to Pearson much to the applause of local Hungarians.<sup>102</sup> The Canadian Press reported from Vienna that the RCAF North Star had delivered five tons of Canadian Red Cross supplies to Budapest the previous night, adding that "the flight, was personally authorized by Prime Minister St Laurent."<sup>103</sup> The public praise that followed warmed the Liberals. The pro-Liberal *Montreal Star* was pleased to publish this letter to the editor:

Sir, On behalf of the Hungarian-Canadians I extend our deepest gratitude to External Affairs Minister Honorable Lester B. Pearson for his spontaneous readiness to take our appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations. For his generous act I promise to do everything that is in my power to bring to the knowledge of all of Hungary, that we have found a great man in the West, who was willing to help us in our struggle for his name is never to be forgotten!  
[A] Hungarian.

The same Friday afternoon issue of this paper headlined: "Red Troops Pour Into Hungary".<sup>104</sup>

Saturday, 3 November 1956

*With Soviet forces in Hungary now increased from original two divisions to a reported seven or more divisions totalling 200,000 men and 4,600 tanks, including three divisions deployed around Budapest, Hungarian General Maléter began negotiations with Russian commander for withdrawal of all Soviet troops. Maléter and colleagues subsequently reported arrested.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>105</sup>

That day the Canadian government became aware that the demise of the Hungarian revolution was at hand. Jules Léger, now in charge of East European policy planning at External Affairs, reported to Pearson:

The Russians pulled out of Budapest. The entire Hungarian army and airforce went over to the rebels. It is still uncertain how much prestige or authority this government has...the rebels are violently anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Soviet armoured columns have entered from the USSR and Roumania. Our military intelligence estimates Soviet strength in Hungary has increased to at least three divisions. Armoured columns have closed off the Austro-Hungarian border and telephone communications between Vienna and Budapest appear to have been cut. The main airports, railways and highways are said to be controlled by Soviet forces. Nagy is asking for UN support; withdrawal from Warsaw Pact; neutrality; Our information is that Warsaw Pact had no provision for withdrawal...<sup>106</sup>

The Canadian press blamed not only the Russians but the West as well. According to the *Le Devoir* [Montreal] the Suez crisis stimulated Moscow's reaction against de-Russification in Central Europe and the Balkans. Now that the Russians had re-entered Budapest, the principal victims of the aggression at Suez became the Hungarians.<sup>107</sup> *The Globe and Mail* attacked the Americans, whose "...shortsighted lethargy," wrote the editors that Saturday, "has borne tragic fruit. Budapest is once again ringed by Soviet steel...the Hungarian situation was shrugged off for some future debate. By Tuesday the Middle East crisis had intervened. But there was no dragging of feet by the U. S. State Department there." The Canadian-Hungarian *Kanadai Magyarország* in its Saturday edition also blamed the US and the West for not aiding Hungary. The connection between the Suez crisis and Soviet intervention in Hungary was also considered in Ottawa.

Jules Léger believed the violent overthrow of the Nagy government could have been prevented. He explained to Pearson on the eve of the second Russian intervention that the Anglo-French defiance of the United Nations will put Moscow in a stronger position to resist United Nations demands and to insist on a measure of Soviet control. In his view, one of the most disastrous consequences of the Middle East adventure became the chance given to the Russians to regain at least partial control of their satellites. In his view Moscow would not tolerate

the division of their Satellite empire, the loss of Hungary, and the turning of Hungary into an anti-Soviet base of which the neutrality declared by Imre Nagy simply was the first step. Léger believed that it was not in the interests of the Western powers to attempt to push things too fast in Eastern Europe, although the West, including Canada, was completely passive in the events, which had been played out in Budapest. Léger also blamed the Hungarians for severing their relations with the Russians too quickly after Moscow had announced their willingness to renegotiate the basis of their relations with the Eastern European countries and their willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania all before the Suez crisis really broke. If it had been possible for the West to take a diplomatic initiative at this time, this would have been the best moment to announce NATO's willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany in return for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany and all of Eastern Europe. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would have followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The West would have gained a tremendous political victory. In any case, some political initiative and support would clearly have been of great moral and political aid to the Hungarians.<sup>108</sup>

Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner to India and an admirer of the Hungarian freedom fighters, also remained optimistic. In preparation for the UN emergency session he practically demanded of his government that "the Canadian delegation to the special session of the General Assembly should immediately join with other delegations in pressing as hard as possible for resolutions in respect of the Soviet intervention in Hungary [which would be] as strong as the resolutions on the intervention in Egypt of Israel, the UK and France."<sup>109</sup>

Belatedly, unaware that the death sentence of the Hungarian revolution had been pronounced, Tibor Barabás, head of the Hungarian Trade Delegation, still in Montreal, began to act as a representative of the revolutionary Nagy government. Commenting on the trade negotiations Barabás wrote to Léger:

It is my most sincere hope that these talks can be regarded as the first step to closer ties between our countries. On this occasion may I assure you that the Hungarian people will always appreciate the readiness of the Canadian nation to alleviate the sufferings of our country in the present struggle. We are also touched by the deep sympathy with which this nation is watching our striving for democracy and independence.<sup>110</sup>

Indeed, democracy and independence were the cornerstones of the revolutionary Nagy government's programme by November 3, 1956.

Meanwhile, following appeals from the Nagy Government in Budapest, the Security Council was again convened to consider a Western resolution condemning Soviet military interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. The resolution passed but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The question of Hungary was immediately referred to the second emergency special session of the General Assembly

which was to consider the same resolution on November 4th.<sup>111</sup> *The Globe and Mail* editorial writer reacted quickly: "The value of debating the Hungarian uprising at the UN was not that the United Nations could intervene in any physical way. The value was that the hard, cold light of the world's indignation could be focused upon it. The re-entry of tanks might have been, if only temporarily, forestalled. No less important, Russia's shadow allies, the so-called neutral nations, were spared the responsibility of stating their position firmly and unequivocally." They neither denounced Russian colonialism nor dismissed it as unimportant. They considered the Hungarian problem a Russian domestic or at most a European affair.<sup>112</sup> Reid in New Delhi found this attitude unacceptable and wanted to rally the moral opinion of the world against Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe. He asked Pearson to put India's representative, Krishna Menon, on the spot at the General Assembly by pressing hard on the Hungarian question immediately.<sup>113</sup>

Hungarians in Toronto went farther. A crowd of 12,000 marched in front of the Legislature where speeches were made demanding military support for Hungary. Ontario Attorney General Roberts suggested that NATO should send an army to Hungary.<sup>114</sup>

Meanwhile, Pearson informed the cabinet that the Russians were now occupying Hungary and were showing the true character of their regime.<sup>115</sup> At External Affairs, Léger began preparing the East European segment of Pearson's speech to be delivered the next day, November 4, at a special session of the United Nation's General Assembly. Léger thought that Pearson should say the following:

I hope that the Soviet leaders will recognize the need to grant freedom and equality to the peoples of Eastern Europe. They have said in a statement from Moscow that they are prepared to re-negotiate their relations with Eastern Europe on this basis. The re-entry of Soviet troops in force into Hungary is certainly a poor augury of this, and I should like to make a plea to the Soviet leaders to respect the rights of the Hungarian people, and to honour that statement.<sup>116</sup>

#### Sunday, 4 November 1956

*At 4:00 a.m. Soviet tank forces launched heavy assault on Budapest and other rebel centres. Under threat of bombing Budapest, demanded surrender of the Nagy government by noon. Set up puppet government under János Kádár backed by several Rákosi associates. Hungarian people were informed of the change via Radio Moscow. Nagy reported to have found refuge in Yugoslav Embassy; Cardinal Mindszenty in United States Legation. United Nations called on Russia to withdraw troops... Armed uprising crushed by overwhelming odds except for a few pockets of resistance.*

Calendar of Events in Hungary prepared by the staff of the Department of External Affairs for use in connection with the Special Session of the Canadian House of Commons: November 26, 1956.<sup>117</sup>

Within five hours of the Soviet attack on Budapest, at 3 a.m. in New York, the Security Council met. The General Assembly of the United Nations was in session by 4 a.m. to discuss Hungary. But Pearson's eyes were rigidly focused on the Middle East even when the fate of the Nagy government was fleetingly the centre of his attention. He wanted the West and the unaligned countries to take a united stand against Russia on the Hungarian question. He telegraphed Ottawa from New York: "There is no need to underline the significance for the UN and for the relations between western and Asian countries of this vote [concerning Hungary]."<sup>118</sup> Reid in New Delhi understood Pearson's thinking. He pressured India without specific instructions from his minister. At first Reid tried to convince the Indian government to issue a strong statement at the opening of the UNESCO conference held in India. He sent a verbal message to Nehru asking him not just to deprecate Soviet intervention in Hungary but, as the voice of the conscience of mankind, to speak out at the UNESCO "against the Russian martyrdom of the gallant Hungarian nation."<sup>119</sup>

Pearson, to prevent the alienation of the Asian members of the Commonwealth, refused either to approve or to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, a Third World country whose sovereignty was, to India, more vital than that of Hungary's. A new anti-imperialist propaganda campaign, in the absence of any hope for the restoration of the Nagy government after November 4, remained a realistic basis for international cooperation with India. If the Third World wanted the West out of Suez, adopting a quasi-parallel treatment for East and West could accelerate the process. The trick was to equate the remedy without equating the phenomena. Pearson's approach fitted the bill ideally.

The Hungarian case was brought to the UN assembly where the majority rule applied after the Russians, at an unprecedented pre-dawn meeting of the Security Council, had vetoed a US proposal calling for an end to the fighting in Hungary. Mid-afternoon on that day, 4 November 1956, a second emergency special session of the General Assembly considered the United States resolution calling on the Soviet Union to desist from armed attack on the people of Hungary and to withdraw Russian forces without delay. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to investigate and to assess the need for medical and relief supplies and then report on the situation. The Governments of Hungary and the USSR were called on to permit the United Nations observers to enter Hungary. The resolution also asked all members of the United Nations, as well as humanitarian organizations, to provide emergency relief to the Hungarian people.

In a statement supporting the resolution, Pearson, as Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, portrayed the armed intervention in Hungary as "one of the greatest and grimmest betrayals in history." He contrasted the Soviet action, in

contravention of the principles and ideals of the United Nations, with the decision of the United Kingdom and France to hand over their police role in Egypt to a United Nations force, and he appealed for the admission of the United Nations' observers into Hungary and for freedom for the Hungarian people to choose their own form of government. The United States resolution was adopted by a majority of 50 in favour (including Canada), 8 against (the Soviet bloc, except Hungary, whose representative was absent), with 15 absentions. Many of the Asian and Arab countries abstained, but, as a result of international pressure, certain Asian nations such as Indonesia, India and Ceylon took a firm stand against Soviet intervention in Hungary.<sup>120</sup>

The Hungarian community in Canada despaired as the news of the Russian invasion of Hungary reached them. Five hundred signatures were attached to a telegram addressed to Prime Minister Louis St Laurent:

In the name of Hungarian citizens and people of Hungarian descent living in Edmonton Alberta and district we implore you to do everything within your power to aid our countrymen who at this time are being attacked by Russian forces in Hungary. Hungarians throughout Canada and the world will be grateful to you and your government as long as they live for any help you may give to our homeland which is dying. Long live freedom!<sup>121</sup>

Canadian citizens of Lithuanian origin in Toronto also appealed on behalf of Hungary against Soviet brutality to the prime minister. They asked the government to support and help the Nagy regime. The Canadian Hungarian Federation, on this day of reckoning, would not make a strong stand. They pledged to support the prime minister on whatever measures he thought would be required to serve the cause of freedom and peace. On Sunday, over two thousand representatives, former citizens of the Soviet Union now living in Canada, held a demonstration of protest in a Montreal sports arena. The clapping, sobbing participants stood in deafening ovation at the Palais des Sports when they were told a possible solution for the present strife in their homeland lay in the hands of the United Nations. "...If only one United Nations soldier were sent, there would be possibility of success," said Dr. George Lengváry, the president of the Canadian Hungarian Federation's Quebec branch. He informed the prime minister's office that the people at the gathering identified themselves with the Hungarian cause and declared their readiness to serve it with all appropriate means within their power. The Montreal police did not share their enthusiasm. They refused permission for a torch march that evening. The Canadian Hungarians in Port Colborne (Ontario) also held a protest meeting and sent a message to Ottawa. In their telegram to the prime minister they thanked the government for condemning Russian aggression in Hungary and urged St Laurent to instruct Mr. Pearson to press for United Nations action to bring about immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Hungary. In Regina (Saskatchewan), where the local Hungarian Grand Committee called a meeting for Sunday only sixty people attended.<sup>122</sup> Suspicion

concerning the nature of the revolution lingered on; the Montreal police suspected communists among the Canadian-Hungarians, while some Canadian-Hungarians worried about Imre Nagy's communist past.

In the evening on that fateful day for Hungary, Canada's prime minister delivered a televised post mortem speech to the Canadian people:

Our aim is that the people of Eastern Europe should be free to choose their own form of government, a basic human right they have not enjoyed for years. The Soviet Union's resort to military force against a neighbouring nation is a most serious threat to the peace which we have solemnly pledged ourselves to preserve and defend in signing the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>123</sup>

The prime minister tried to soothe the ruffled feelings of Canadian-Hungarians and to explain Pearson's conduct at the United Nations. The public's concern was not so much the defeat of the "gallant and unarmed people of Hungary" but Pearson's independent anti-British and anti-French stance on Suez.<sup>124</sup>

Pearson's pledge to separate Canada's Russian foreign policy from useless anti-Soviet propaganda remained unfulfilled. The proposals of Reid and Léger were ignored.

#### Post Mortem

After 4 November 1956 there was little anyone could do to save the Hungarian revolution and to sustain the Nagy government. Hungary was quickly occupied by the Red Army and Moscow installed loyal communists. Refugees in the tens of thousands began crossing the border to Austria.

More could have been done in the previous thirteen days. In the opinion of the Montreal *Le Devoir*, the presence of Western troops, that is NATO units in Western Europe, including Canadians, could have provided arms for the rebels. Instead, they attempted to resurrect the old Empire by the invasion of Egypt.<sup>125</sup> Escott Reid came to similar conclusions when he wrote that, in return for Russian withdrawal from Hungary, the West could "agree to the withdrawal of western troops from Germany, thus creating a buffer zone in Europe."<sup>126</sup> Léger at External Affairs also believed that "some kind of political initiative and support would clearly have been of great moral and political aid to the Hungarians."<sup>127</sup>

After November 4 Canada politicians wanted to keep the spotlight of world opinion on the issue without raising false hopes of liberation by force.<sup>128</sup> Segments of the public still demanded action. Fifteen hundred Catholic students of the Cathedral High School of Hamilton (Ontario), expressed surprise at the apparent complacency of the Western nations. In their telegram to the prime minister they called for action, not words.<sup>129</sup> The Hungarian M. D. F. Udvardy, chairman of a protest meeting of several hundred people claiming to represent a cross-section of British Columbia, also urged the government to dispatch immediately

United Nations forces to restore freedom in Hungary. He reminded St Laurent of his alleged promise made along these lines and accepted in good faith by the Hungarians.<sup>130</sup> Another telegram, this one from the Canadian branch of the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, demanded an end to hostilities in the Middle East, an immediate cease-fire in Hungary and the withdrawal of the Russians.<sup>131</sup>

Not everyone supported such demands. *The Montreal Star's* editorial writer on November 5, a day after the invasion of Hungary, showed great understanding of Soviet imperialism. "Moscow is prepared to work out new and more liberal relations with its satellites. It is not, however, prepared to stand by while an anti-Communist regime takes over. Hence, when the anti-Red patriots took complete control of the revolution and looked to the equally vehement anti-Communist, Cardinal Mindszenty as their leader, the Russians made up their minds." In the writer's view, Kádár was not a Stalinist, but a Titoist and, in any case, he wrote, Nagy went too far. On the same day *The Winnipeg Free Press* declared that the United Nations could not do anything for Hungary because of the risk of a hydrogen bomb holocaust. "No generation has ever know so fearful a dilemma and no man, surely, can be condemned for thinking twice before voting in his own mind to save freedom in one country at risk of destroying the world." The Catholic Women's League of Canada offered a conciliatory approach, and, at the same time, a way out of the dilemma for Ottawa. The message to the prime minister read: "On behalf of the 100,000 members of the Catholic Women's League of Canada we wish to express our deep admiration for the people of Hungary in their struggle for freedom against a foreign oppressor and urge that every possible aid be given to alleviate their sufferings."<sup>132</sup> The League's views reflected mainstream Canadian sentiments. Communist-persecuted white Christian European refugees were the proper candidates for integration into Canadian society.

On 7 November 1956 the Cabinet met in Ottawa. The Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs recommended that an offer of assistance of one million dollars should be made through the Red Cross "for relief purposes in Hungary or among Hungarians who had left their country since the uprising began." During the discussion in cabinet it was made clear that "it would be undesirable for any contribution to be made at this time for relief purposes in Hungary itself."<sup>133</sup> Aid to Hungary was opposed but refugee support was approved.

On November 9 Nehru made an unfriendly speech about the Hungarians. Pearson sent a telegram to Reid. Pearson commended Reid's "...prompt and effective efforts to bring to Mr. Nehru's attention the apparent discrepancy between his attitude to the situation in the Middle East and that in Hungary...we should not, I think, press further at the risk of turning the Indians sour. You must protect your excellent position in Delhi and not endanger it too much on the Hungarian question."<sup>134</sup> On Tuesday, 13 November, Reid received another telegram from Pearson. By now the minister considered it unwise to continue to

campaign on the Hungarian question any longer and instructed Reid not to take any further initiatives.<sup>135</sup> In preparation for a speech on Hungary Pearson scribbled for himself a few notes: "keep spotlight of world opinion on the issue; not raising false hopes of liberation by force."<sup>136</sup> At this point Canada's foreign minister considered the Hungarian revolution a closed chapter in history for which it would have been foolish to jeopardize Canada's good relations with India or with any other Third World country.

Reid, however, who did not share Pearson's realism, continued to plead with St Laurent for diplomatic action on behalf of Hungary. St Laurent replied on November 7 but the dispatch reached Reid only on the ninth. "The message from St Laurent did express appreciation of the way the Indian and Canadian delegations in New York had cooperated on the Suez issue but the sole reference to Hungary was banal – that St Laurent had read with great interest the references in your statement at the opening session of UNESCO to the recent tragic events in Hungary."<sup>137</sup> St Laurent blamed both the Russians and the West for the Hungarian tragedy. In November, he said in Toronto: "It would be idle to deny that the Middle East crisis did serve to obscure in the minds of many people around the world and especially in the nations of Asia the enormity of the vicious Soviet intervention in Hungary..."<sup>138</sup> According to Reid, "If St Laurent had his way it is possible that Canada would not have applied a double standard but would have publicly condemned both aggressions."<sup>139</sup> St Laurent did not agree with Pearson's stance on the two issues but was "persuaded by Pearson and other members of the cabinet to tone down the protest he wanted to send to Eden as soon as he heard of the British aggression and he suppressed any public demonstration of his emotions until the crisis was over."<sup>140</sup> Prime Minister St Laurent's sympathies for the insurrectionists is emphasized by Professor N. Dreisziger with the laconic afterthought that he "could do nothing to help the people of Hungary in their struggle for independence."<sup>141</sup> The biographer of Louis St Laurent, Professor Thompson, believes that the future behaviour of the pro-British segment of the Canadian electorate, that is, the fear of losing the next election to the Conservatives, which did indeed become a reality in 1957, guided the prime minister's behaviour in late October and early November.<sup>142</sup> Professor Thompson also speaks of St Laurent's concern about the fighting in Hungary and his frustration "at the inability of the Western nations to come to the assistance of the insurrectionists."<sup>143</sup> The partially quoted letter of St Laurent does not justify this description of the prime minister's views. True, he did send a message to Premier Bulganin in which he expressed Canada's 'horror' at the suffering of the Hungarian people,<sup>144</sup> but he also added to the same letter, originally drafted by Lester B. Pearson, but not containing the soothing phrases, that "It is not, however, my present purpose to attempt to pass judgement on the actions that have been taken but to ask you in the name of humanity, to use your influence to alleviate the sufferings..."<sup>145</sup> He

ignored Pearson's view that Canada should take advantage of the difficulties which the Soviet Union was facing in its European empire.<sup>146</sup>

In his New Years' Eve message Pearson said: "One thing in the record of 1956 is clear. When the free governments failed to work together we lost ground in our search for peace and stability and progress."<sup>147</sup> Pearson never believed that the revolutionaries could succeed in Hungary. He mused publicly on October 27: "It would be naive to imagine that the Moscovite Empire is already crumbling..." Nagy said he is building national communism. "Can national communism and the Russians live side by side? We can only hope that they will." "What can we do in Canada, and in other free countries; what should we do in such a situation?" "The force of world opinion must be mobilized in favour of the forces of national freedom in these countries and against foreign intervention, and foreign domination. The United Nations is where this should be and can be done."<sup>148</sup> He suggested no independent role for Canada. It was through the United Nations that he wished to act and to enhance the international role of his country. Lack of imagination at first drifted him towards empty propaganda gestures, but he never felt comfortable with such a stance. His constructive thoughts for Hungary came too late – on November 4th, when the multiparty government in Budapest was overthrown. "Yesterday my government proposed the intervention of a United Nations force for peaceful purposes in the Middle East..." "Why should we not now establish a United Nations mission or United Nations supervisory machinery of an appropriate kind for the situation in Hungary?"<sup>149</sup> Years later when Pearson was writing his memoirs he was still unable to correctly analyze the problems he had faced in the autumn of 1956. Then Suez was his main concern. "If I had not been so deeply involved in Suez, I would have been much tempted to see if we could get a resolution to have UN Assembly Committee fly straight to Budapest with the UN flag and some men in UN uniforms."<sup>150</sup> Pearson as Secretary for State of External Affairs would not have made such an unrealistic proposal while in office. In 1957 he said: "The reason the United Nations did not save Hungary was that it could not; not that it would not." "If we had intervened in Hungary by force, the first victims would have been the Hungarians themselves, and the rest of the world might have followed into the abyss." If the UN pressure did not save Hungary "it had some effect and what in had was good."<sup>151</sup> He does not elaborate on the positive. The straw enemy had been constructed and successfully demolished. The constructive proposals of Jules Léger and Escott Reid were filed away and eventually put to rest within the walls of the National Archives of Canada.

But there were results. Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth outraged about the Suez affair mellowed once the USSR invaded Hungary. Canada had a role in the pacification of the third world members. In the coming months Canada remained active in the United Nations in pressuring Moscow to ease repression in Hungary. Pearson's people, however, stumbled onto an new success story

for Canadian external affairs; the sponsoring of the Hungarian refugees who in droves, from November 4th, began to leave Hungary in search of freedom abroad. Otherwise, in Ottawa, business was as usual.

On 13 November 1956 External Affairs fired off the following telegram to one of its European embassies: "Would you please tell Swartz [C. O. Swartz, of Northern Sales Limited, Winnipeg] and Mr. Barabás [of Hungary] that we are still anxious to sell wheat to Hungary but that we would prefer to delay for two or three weeks any negotiations (particularly any involving credit) until the situation in Hungary is somewhat clearer. If you are able to see Mr. Barabás we would be interested in knowing what he has in mind concerning wheat purchases in Canada."<sup>152</sup>

#### Notes

1. This project was made possible by financial assistance from Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada and the Research Institute for the Study of the Hungarian Revolution 1956, Budapest.
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10. 24 October 1956.

11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. Telegram to the Prime Minister, 24 October 1956, NAC, RG 2, 90-91/154, Box 108, File H-17-1.
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15. 24 October 1956.
16. *Ibid.*
17. NAC, RG 2, 90-91/154, Box 47, File H-17-1 (b).
18. 25 October 1956.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
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25. 25 October 1956.
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32. Reverend Calma [Kálmán] D. Toth's telegram to the PM, Toronto, 26 October 1956, NAC, RG 2, 90-91/154, Box 108, File H-17-1.
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34. Telegram to PM, Niagara Falls, Ont., 26 October 1956, NAC, RG 2, 90-91/154, Vol. 123, File H-17-1.
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40. Telegram from the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York to External Affairs, 29 October 1956, NAC, RG 25. 84-85/150, Box 111, File 8619-40, part 2: from January 2, 1952, to October 31, 1956.

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46. *Ibid.*, 88.
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50. NAC, RG 2, 90–91/154, Box 108, File H-17-1.
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53. *Ibid.*; *The Globe and Mail*, 29 October 1956.
54. *The Montreal Star*, 27 October 1956.
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59. Telegram from the Canadian Permanent Mission to External Affairs, 29 October 1956, NAC, RG, 84–85/150, Box 111, File 8619–40, part 2; from January 2, 1952, to October 31, 1956; *The Montreal Star*, 29 October 1956; Reid, *op. cit.*, 37.
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