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The State of Education in Hungary on
the Eve of the Battle of Mohács (1526)

L.S. DOMONKOS

Travel Reports on Hungarian
Settlements in Canada, 1905-1928

PAUL BODY

Count István Tisza and the
Preservation of the Old Order

GABOR VERMES

Horthy, Hitler and
the Hungary of 1944

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The State of Education in Hungary on the Eve of the Battle of Mohács (1526)*

L. S. Domonkos

1. *Political and Economic Conditions 1490-1526*

A number of studies have been published on various aspects of cultural and educational history in Hungary, but no work focuses on the period between the death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490, and the Battle of Mohács in 1526. Therefore, I shall attempt to fill this lacuna by focusing on the state of education in Hungary, encompassing all levels, from university training down to the village schools.

The 36 years under discussion are generally considered an age of decline and decadence in the history of Hungary, culminating in the defeat of Hungarian forces and the death of King Louis II on the battlefield of Mohács.

The decadence and decline during this period is not difficult to explain. The strong and centralized state forged by Matthias Corvinus did not survive his death, and the decline began almost immediately.¹ The designated heir of Matthias, his illegitimate son, John, was rejected by the majority of the nobility, who instead, invited the Jagellonian prince, Wladislaus II, to become their king. Wladislaus already held the throne of Bohemia, and thus, the two countries were jointly ruled. The ineffectiveness of this king increased dissensions in the already divided ranks of the Hungarian nobility. This division was manifested in the desire of the lesser nobility to maintain greater voice in the affairs of state, as they had under King Matthias, versus the attempts of the oligarchy to regain their former prominence. This clash of interests created deep political division, and constant tension. The economic state was just as unstable, for the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. The royal treasury was empty, new taxes were

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almost impossible to levy, customary sources of royal revenue fell off, and towns declined in size and wealth.² The oppression of the lower classes by the nobility became so unbearable, that, in 1514 it spawned the most bloody and extensive insurrection of the peasantry ever to occur in the history of Hungary.³ The ensuing suppression of this revolt and the subsequent imposition of perpetual serfdom upon the peasants, added to the already deep-seated division, prevented unified action against the increasingly menacing Turks.

Wladislaus's son, Louis II (1516-1526), was equally unable to unify the country under his rule, and he rode into battle with Suleiman the Magnificent at Mohács, with a small and ill-equipped army. The overwhelming defeat and subsequent death of the king left Hungary at the mercy of the Turks, the Hapsburgs and the divided nobility.⁴

2. *Hungarian University Foundations to 1526.*

The turbulence of these 36 years does not seem to be reflected in the state of education or the intellectual level of the nation. The intellectual ferment of the reign of Matthias continued to thrive, despite the decline evident in other areas. Under the rule of Matthias' successors, the center of Renaissance studies moved from the royal court to the episcopal seats and spread among the officials of the Chancery.⁵

Let us now turn to the various levels of education evident in Hungary at the turn of the 16th century and begin our discussion with the universities. While flourishing universities were solidly established in Bohemia, Poland and Austria, Hungary's efforts to do the same were invariably unsuccessful. Four attempts were made during the late Middle Ages at establishing institutions of higher learning, but after initial success, all four faltered and disappeared.

The university at Pécs (Fünfkirchen), established in 1367, seems to have been dissolved by the end of the 14th century. Some historians, with vivid imaginations, contend that several hundred students of this university fought valiantly and "died for God and country" in the Battle of Mohács. This, obviously, is pure fabrication, since no documents supporting the existence of this university exist beyond the 14th century.⁶

A second university was established at Óbuda in 1395, and the last evidence of its existence is a delegation of masters to the Council of Constance (1414-1418).⁷

Matthias Corvinus established the third university in 1465, at Pozsony (Bratislava, Pressburg). Following an auspicious start two years later, the university flourished but began to decline in 1472, following the death of its Chancellor, Archbishop Vitéz. By the 1490's, the buildings of the university were either used for storage or

were in disrepair, indicating that students and faculty had abandoned Pozsony.⁸

The last attempt in establishing an institution of higher learning is also associated with Matthias, for in 1485 he undertook steps to raise the Dominican *studium generale* of Buda to a full-fledged university. This institution never developed beyond the *Ordens Studium* common to the Dominicans, and, therefore, cannot be called a university. The General Chapter of the Dominican Order made several attempts to expand the Stadium of Buda and even ordered the transfer in 1507 of eight teachers from its school in Paris, to strengthen the school in Buda.⁹ The fact is, however, that these teachers never left Paris; thus, the *Studium Generale* in Buda continued to decline. Although scattered references to a *Studium Generale* continue to appear in the General Chapter deliberations, there is no concrete evidence that a truly viable institution of higher learning existed in Hungary on the eve of the Battle of Mohács.¹⁰

The reason for the inability of universities to flourish in Hungary are great in number. The most obvious among these seem to be the lack of sustained interest and financial support on the part of the monarchy and the upper clergy, a general lack of urbanization, and the availability of university education in neighboring countries.

3. *Hungarian Students at the Universities of Cracow and Vienna.*

The desirability of a university education was recognized early by Hungarians, and from the 13th century on, they frequented such foreign universities as Bologna and Paris in increasing numbers. Closest to the borders of Hungary were the universities of Prague, Cracow and Vienna, and, due to their proximity, they had large numbers of Hungarian students during the 15th and 16th centuries. This is particularly true of Vienna and Cracow, while the cultural influence of the university of Prague was negligible.¹¹

Fortunately, the registers of Hungarian students at Cracow have survived. A separate *bursa* was formed for the large number of Hungarian students enrolled there from the years 1493 to 1558. The records of the *bursa* and the matriculation lists of the university show, that between 1460 and 1500, 1,673 students from Hungary studied there.¹² In the first two decades of the 16th century, between 40 and 50 students from Hungary were immatriculated each year. After the Battle of Mohács, there was a dramatic decline of students, and the *bursa* was eventually forced to close, due to diminished numbers.¹³ Some of those who received degrees migrated to Vienna, but more often to the Italian universities, seeking further studies. Those who returned to Hungary after the completion of their studies at Cracow often received ecclesiastical benefices, found employment in the lower

echelons of the royal Chancery,¹⁴ or became teachers in the municipal or cathedral schools. The influence of the *bursa* was twofold, in that it played an active role in the life of the university¹⁵ and created close intellectual ties between Cracow and Hungarian centers of learning, particularly the cities of Northeastern Hungary. It was through the Hungarian *bursa* that Conrad Celtis, and other scholars, established contacts in Hungary.¹⁶

In Vienna, the number of students from Hungary was so large, that they constituted a separate nation, *Natio Hungariae*.¹⁷ From 1450, to the Battle of Mohács, the total number of students was greater than 2,900, according to the records of this nation. Here, as in Cracow, the number of students from Hungary decreased dramatically following the battle.¹⁸ The University of Vienna did, however, continue to play an important role in the cultural life of Hungary for centuries, even after the establishment of permanent institutions of higher learning in the kingdom.

4. *Italian Universities: Bologna, Padua, Ferrara.*

Because of the excellence of Italian universities as well as the close Italo-Hungarian relations since the Angevin Period, a large number of Hungarians made the journey to Italy to study at the renowned Universities of Bologna, Padua and Ferrara. While it is true that students from Hungary could be found at almost all the other centers of learning in Italy, Bologna, Padua and Ferrara were the three institutions which attracted the largest number of Hungarians in the second half of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.¹⁹ The list of those who had studied at these universities reads almost like a *Who is Who* of important ecclesiastical dignitaries, chancery officials and humanist scholars.²⁰

The relative closeness and accessibility of the great Italian universities probably relieved the pressure for the establishment of a university in Hungary. As long as students could get university degrees, mainly legal training, in Italy, the need for a local institution of higher learning was not so acute.

Of the Hungarian born Bishops and Archbishops who presided over the eleven dioceses of the kingdom between 1490 and 1526, over 60% were graduates of Italian universities. Graduates of Italian universities are also numerous among the officials of the Royal Chancery under Wladislaus and Louis II.²¹ About half of the Chancery secretaries were trained in Italy, and what is more important, they often kept in close touch with professors at their *alma mater* and with influential printers such as the Venetian Aldus Manucius.²² These ties with Italy resulted in the spread and the deepening of the humanistic influence which had begun under Matthias, and fortunately did not die with him.

Before leaving the subject of Hungarians at Italian universities, mention must also be made of the large number of mendicants, mainly Dominicans, sent by the Hungarian provinces to study in Italy. Dominicans can be found at Bologna, Padua, Naples, Siena, Pavia and Florence.²³ Franciscans can be found in far fewer numbers. The presence of large numbers of Dominicans in Italy also seems to support the previously expressed view, that the *Studium Generale* of Buda did not develop into an important center of education. Not only did it fail to meet the educational needs of the kingdom, but apparently it did not even satisfy the requirements of the Dominican Province.

Hungarian students also frequented the University of Paris, but in small numbers. The one outstanding figure of this period is Johannes Gosztonyi who arrived in Paris after attending the Universities of Vienna and Bologna. During his stay in Paris he developed a life-long friendship with the Flemish scholar, Josse van Clichtove. Upon returning to Hungary he became Bishop of Veszprém, Győr and Transylvania, and was a major promoter of Erasmian ideas.²⁴

5. *The Effects of the Lack of Hungarian Universities.*

The lack of a dynamic university within the boundaries of Hungary is an obvious source of weakness which placed the country at a disadvantage when compared to its immediate neighbors Poland, Bohemia and Austria. Yet the results of this failure are not all negative as they first may appear. Since all the universities in the Pre-Reformation period failed in Hungary, there was no alternative other than to study abroad. The result was the rise of a fairly cosmopolitan intellectual class whose members were aware of the main currents of thought of western and central Europe. Hungarian students received far more than just academic degrees at the universities they attended. Close personal friendships developed with Italian, French, German, Austrian and Polish scholars and these ties of affection and shared interest often lasted for a lifetime. Upon returning to their native land Hungarian students often found that former professors or fellow students sent their dedicated books to them.²⁵ Books for the Hungarian market were being printed in Italy, Vienna and Cracow with increasing frequency in the sixteenth century.²⁶ When Conrad Celtis came to Buda in 1497, he found a large number of enthusiastic supporters, among them Bishop Johannes Vitéz the Younger who was made head of the *Sodalitas Litteraria Danubiana* until his death in 1499.²⁷ Aside from Hungarian admirers Celtis also found Italians, Czechs and Austrians at the Hungarian court.²⁸ There seems to be no doubt that an East-Central European humanism was in full bloom and the three centers of it were Vienna, Cracow and Buda. That Buda

could compete on about equal terms with Vienna and Cracow shows that the lack of a university in Hungary was compensated by study abroad and an intense interest in the intellectual currents prevalent at the time.

6. *Cathedral and Chantry Schools 1490-1526.*

Turning our attention from University education to other forms of instruction available, let us discuss the cathedral and chantry schools. The development of cathedral and chantry schools in Hungary follows the general pattern in Western Europe. The decrees of the Third (1179), and Fourth (1215) Lateran Councils, called for the establishment of schools by the cathedral chapters so that instruction could be given to students in each diocese. How closely these orders were followed in Hungary is hard to determine, especially prior to the Tatar incursions in 1242.

During the 15th and early 16th Centuries, the fog of uncertainty lifts and some insight into the life of cathedral and chantry schools can be gained. A fairly complete list of the Canons of each of the dioceses of Hungary is available for this period and thus, allows the identification of some of the teachers. According to the statutes of the Cathedral Chapters of Várad and Zagreb the *lector* was in charge of instruction in the school.²⁹ If the *lector* did not teach, he delegated his position to a *sublector*. Also among the canons, the *cantor* and *succentor* were called upon to teach. The term *lector* or *scholasticus* were often used interchangeably as well as *rector scholae*.³⁰ Although all of the eleven Hungarian dioceses (plus Bosnia and Zagreb) show *lectors*, *sublectors*, *cantors* in their registers, still it is uncertain that schools with continuous instruction can be found at each of these cathedral seats. For the 36-year period on which we place our focus there is definite reference to schools or students in six cathedral towns and at one chantry. In the city of Eger students greeted Archbishop Bakocz on several occasions between 1493-1496 and received money for their singing. Those students who during Holy Week stood guard at the Holy Sepulcher, were also paid special fees.³¹ At the archiepiscopal seat of Esztergom a cathedral school of great fame had existed for a long time. Among its *lectors* and *cantors* are a number of outstanding men who played an important role in the ecclesiastical and intellectual life of the kingdom.³² The bishopric of Pécs had a flourishing cathedral school. This was especially true in the early years of the sixteenth century when a large number of students studied here. This cathedral school is referred to as a *scola maior*. The term *scola maior* has been translated into *Hochschule*, which in German is another name for university and thus, lead to considerable confusion. The fact is, however, that we are dealing with a cathedral school here

and under no circumstances a university.³³ The city of Várad (Grosswardein), which became a center of scholarship under Bishop Johannes Vitéz³⁴ in the mid 15th Century, continued to be an important cathedral school well into the sixteenth century. Among the notable alumni of this school was Petrus Váradi, one of the main exponents of Neo Platonism in Hungary, who ended his career as Archbishop of Kalocsa in 1501.³⁵ Another student, Nicolaus Gerendi became Bishop of Transylvania. The most famous student at Várad was Nicolaus Olah, who studied here between 1506 and 1512. Olah later became a Canon at Esztergom, Privy Chancellor and after the Battle of Mohács accompanied the widowed queen Maria to Bruxelles.³⁶ He became a friend of Erasmus and upon returning to Hungary ended his career as Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate. Olah played a major role in the history of late humanism in Hungary as well as the beginnings of the Counter-Reformation.³⁷

The cathedral school of Veszprém was the most famous of the institutions of learning in 13th Century Hungary. Some over-zealous scholars have even called it a university.³⁸ During the period 1490-1526, mention is made on several occasions of the teachers of the cathedral school.³⁹ The first mention of the cathedral school of Zagreb occurs in 1334. Almost two hundred years later, a month before the battle of Mohács, king Louis II instructed the *bán* (governor) of Dalmatia-Croatia and Slavonia to use his best judgment when dealing with the clergy and students in preparation for military emergencies.⁴⁰ After this date (July 31, 1526), there is no information on the school of Zagreb.

7. *Students and Teachers at the Cathedral and Chantry Schools.*

Scattered evidence allows us to make some generalizations about the operation of the cathedral schools. Indication is that most of the students at these schools were *clerici* and had Minor Orders. There is, however, evidence that lay students attended as well. The statutes of Esztergom indicate clearly what fees the non-clerical students had to pay.⁴¹ There are repeated references also to students singing at Mass and on other religious occasions receiving payment. Sometimes they begged for food.⁴² Students as well as teachers show up in lawsuits as well as in criminal cases. A canon from the chapter of Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg), who was teacher or *scholasticus*, asked for dispensation in 1504, for having caused the death of a woman. It appears that the pious canon was asleep when somebody woke him in the middle of the night with loud knocks on the church door. Armed with his sword he ran out, found only a woman, cursed her saying that the Devil had brought her there and in a fit of anger stabbed her in the thigh. At this point two eager students also show up and with a

shield delivered a few blows "ad partem posteriorem sui." The poor woman expired in a week.⁴³ Prohibitions against students carrying arms show up repeatedly in the documents, as do prohibitions against extravagance of dress and equipment.⁴⁴

A synod at Lőcse decreed that students (scholars) should wear long and proper attire. They should not wear gold or silver rings on their fingers. Also to be avoided in public are belts, bags, saddles with gold decorations; even Venetian copper should not be used. Their hair should be properly cut, their outer garment should be closed and red or green stocking should not be worn. In general the students are to behave decently and properly so as not to offend the sensibilities of laymen.⁴⁵ Transgressions were severely punished.

The instruction at cathedral and chantry schools followed the example of western European standards. The curriculum follows the *artes-liberales*. Once the student learned to read and write, the teacher introduced the pupils to Donatus and later to the *Docrinale* of Alexander of Villedieu, Priscianus, the *Disticha Moralia* of Cato. The preparation of the students was very similar to the preparatory teaching at Parisian Colleges.⁴⁶

Those who finished their education at a cathedral or chantry school either continued their studies at one of the neighboring universities or became parish priests in villages, towns or cities. Some received ecclesiastical benefices but were often slow in taking their Major Orders, a practice very common in late 15th - early 16th century Hungary.⁴⁷ Students who went abroad for further studies often returned to their dioceses after receiving one or more degrees and were rewarded with canonships. The number of university educated canons in this period is fairly high. Among these canons are a number of scholars, bibliophiles and art connoisseurs⁴⁸ whose role in the history of early sixteenth century humanism has not yet been adequately treated.

8. *The Schools of the Mendicant Orders*

The schools of the religious orders present a special problem. The two major mendicant orders in Hungary, the Dominicans and Franciscans, placed renewed emphasis on education in the second half of the fifteenth century. Giovanni Capistrano exhorted the Franciscans to devote more attention to the schooling of their members in his tract *De promovendo studio inter Minores Observantes*.⁴⁹ In 1454, the provincial meeting of Franciscans in Eger decried the lack of opportunity for higher education for the younger members of the order and encouraged that they be sent abroad.⁵⁰ Franciscans did frequent the University of Cracow in fairly large numbers. The Dominican province in Hungary was reorganized and reformed by the Viennese

theology professor, Leonhardus Huntpichler of Brixenthal, who undertook the task of reform after 1454 and visited the Hungarian convents on several occasions.⁵¹ As a man of great learning it is not surprising that he stressed education for members of his order and later recommended several Viennese Dominicans for the newly founded University of Pozsony.⁵² Beside the many Dominicans in Italy we know that the Hungarian province also sent some of its members to Paris and Cologne.⁵³

Exactly what type of education was available in the various convents does leave, however, a number of unanswered questions. Although documentary evidence is scarce, there seems to be no doubt that the mendicants had some excellent schools for their members. The fact that Franciscans and Dominicans frequented universities obviously implies that they had adequate preparation at the *studium particulare* of their respective convents. Another indication of their intellectual awareness is the active work of the mendicant orders in preaching and the role they played in the development of vernacular literature in Hungary in the last years of the fifteenth century and the early decades of the sixteenth.⁵⁴

Important centers of Franciscan activity where sizable schools or libraries can be found were Buda, Pest, Gyöngyös, Szeged and Csiksomlyo in Transylvania.⁵⁵ The major Dominican houses were at Buda, Pozsony, and Kassa.⁵⁶ Mention must also be made of the school of the Hermits of St. Augustine in Esztergom.⁵⁷

9. *The Rise of Education in the Towns and Cities.*

The increasing secularization of society in the later Middle Ages is evident in the rise of schools in the towns and cities. While urbanization in Hungary did lag behind western European standards, still a fairly large number of schools were in existence in the last decade of the 15th century and the first quarter of the sixteenth. The need for some elementary acquaintance with reading, writing, mathematics, which are obvious prerequisites for commerce and some of the trades, is the basic factor behind the rise of municipal schools. Well established schools, however, went far beyond instruction on the elementary level and many of the graduates of municipal schools found themselves at the universities, which Hungarian students frequented. The students were drawn mainly from the town itself and its immediate hinterlands although occasionally students from far away places were enrolled for instruction.⁵⁸

The teacher at the municipal schools was elected by the burghers with the consent of the parish priest. The schoolmaster was invited to the town and offered a yearly contract.⁵⁹ Since towns often competed with each other for the services of well known schoolmasters it is not

surprising that the turnover was considerable. We also know of instances where the schoolmaster returned to a university for further study. A fairly large number of teachers were already university graduates when they were hired, some had even risen to the magisterial dignity.⁶⁰ In some cases the schoolmaster had one or more assistants, *socius*, *Geselle*, *locatus*, to aid him in carrying out the task of teaching.

The towns and the schoolmaster agreed on a yearly salary which was paid according to various installment schemes, differing with each locality. The set amount the city paid was, however, supplemented by various additional payments to which the schoolmaster was entitled. First of all the parents were sometimes obliged to pay a sum for each child attending the school.⁶¹ Further income was derived from one or more of the following sources: Singing the "Salve Regina" in Church, singing on the feast of Corpus Christi, the Vigil of Christmas, Feast of St. George, and other feast days. The teacher could also receive payment for participation in processions, attendance at funerals or singing the Psalms at the Holy Sepulchre on Easter.⁶² Some of the towns also provided for firewood and in the mining town of Selmezbánya the schoolmaster received a half "haufen" of meat each week.⁶³ A short distance away, at Kőrmőczbánya, a bonus was given to the master for extra effort among the young people.⁶⁴ The pay seems rather good and holds fairly steady in our period. By mid century, however, inflation more than doubled the salaries.⁶⁵ While it is true that most schoolmasters were at least in Minor Orders, there were some who were laymen. Furthermore, those who stayed in a city or town for several years often became part of the municipal power structure. Several schoolmasters became notaries, others rose to the position of justice or became members of the city council.⁶⁶

The students either lived with their parents or roomed with strangers. In some instances we hear of students living in the school building itself.⁶⁷ Just as the schoolmaster had opportunities to get extra monies for various services, the student also could earn funds from benefactors, both from the city or from individuals. The most common way for students to receive money was to sing at Mass or during special religious devotions such as guarding the Holy Sepulchre at Eastertime. Money was also paid for students for greeting newly elected judges and city council fathers or in case the king or a powerful ecclesiastical lord passed through town. Students were paid for ringing the church bells at the opening of a fair or in warning of an approaching thunderstorm. In the Northwestern town of Sopron all students received 3 pints of wine at Christmas time.⁶⁸

10. *The Szalkai Codex and the Curriculum at Sárospaták.*

A most interesting document concerning education in the late fifteenth century is preserved at the Archepiscopal Library of Esztergom. It is a codex of 258 pages and contains six sections. This volume was used at the school of Sárospaták as a textbook and contains extensive marginal notations by its original owner Ladislaus de Szalka, who finished copying it in 1490.⁶⁹ The codex indicates that the schoolmaster was a certain Johannes de Kiswarda who had received his bachelors degree at Cracow in 1484.⁷⁰ The six sections of the codex reveal the material that Ladislaus de Szalka and his fellow students at the Sárospaták school had to master. The Szalkai codex is divided in the following way: section 1—astronomy; section 2—music theory; 3—legal studies; 4—literature poetry; 5—same; 6—letter writing. Since the sections were later bound together we do not know what other parts there might have been which were not included in the book. Both the astronomical and legal material of the codex shows "modernity", i.e. acquaintance with the prevailing interpretations of the day. The most original part of the volume seems to be the section dealing with music.⁷¹

Ladislaus Szalkai, whose school book this volume was, had an interesting career before him. There is no indication that he ever attended a university, and although his social origins were lowly, his father was a cobbler, he rose to become Archbishop-Primate of Hungary and died on the Battlefield of Mohács. According to his own account he was a school teacher at one time, and in that capacity was always able to get women to bed down with,—quite a recommendation for a future archbishop.⁷²

11. *Level of instruction, number and location of schools.*

The Szalkai Codex shows that instruction was in Latin at the municipal schools but it is also probable that German and possibly Hungarian was also taught.⁷³ The level of excellence of at least some of the schools can be seen by the fact that a number of teachers with considerable reputation taught at these municipal schools. Andreas Gónczi (Melczer), who had received his degree from Cracow became a much respected teacher at the school in Pest until an invitation was extended to him to become head of the school of Kassa. He left Pest, settled in Kassa, taught, became notary, judge and councilman and later married a local woman.⁷⁴ The excellence of the Kassa school also attracted the English wandering scholar and poet Leonardus Coxe, who came to Hungary by way of Cracow.⁷⁵ Another poet-scholar Valentinus Eck was schoolmaster at Bártfa in 1518.⁷⁶ It is hard to imagine that university trained men with considerable international reputations would have consented to become schoolmasters at

municipal *scolae* if the level of instruction would have been elementary. The subsequent history of many of these city schools supports this view completely. The municipal schools did become, in the next decades, an important factor in the spread of Lutheranism in Hungary and played a major role in the spread of Reformation doctrines. Schools such as the one in Bártfa under Leonardus Stöckel, who had studied at Wittenberg and knew Melanchton,⁷⁷ or the school of Sárospatak under the great pedagogue, Comenius, a century later, remained important centers of learning and religion.⁷⁸

The number of municipal schools in existence between 1490 and 1526, can be fairly well established. There is definite documentary evidence for 37 towns with school during this period as well as several references to schools either immediately before this period or after it. We also know that a number of the towns had more than one school within their walls. In 1525, there were 7 schools in Buda, 4 in Pozsony (also possibly a Jewish school), 3 in Brassó and the city of Szeged had 5 school masters.⁷⁹

Before leaving the subject of city schools one more observation must be made concerning them, i.e. their geographic location. If we examine a map of the kingdom of Hungary and indicate the location of the city schools, it becomes obvious that an overwhelming majority of them were located in the cities of north Hungary (Zips), and to a lesser degree Transylvania. The reasons for this can be briefly summarized in the following way: the weight of urbanization was in these regions; because of mining and trade these cities were still relatively rich; the closeness of Cracow both as a center of trade and learning; these cities had a large German population and were more culturally advanced than their Hungarian or Slavic neighbors.⁸⁰ Added to this is an important factor: these regions did not suffer the utter devastation the Turks inflicted on the Hungarian lowlands, therefore, records, documents and buildings have survived in Northern Hungary and part of Transylvania in far greater quantities than in Turkish occupied regions. To blame everything on the Turkish occupation, however, is historically not sound, for they were *always* the more highly developed regions of the Hungarian kingdom.

12. *The Village Schools. Conclusion.*

Finally a few comments on the village schools of Hungary. The most rudimentary education, instruction in the *Pater Noster*, the *Ave Maria* and the *Credo* took place in the villages. The instruction was provided by the parish priest and in some rare instances by a village school teacher. Attempts were also made to teach singing so that the children could more fully assist at Mass. Because of the general insignificance of village schools reference to them in documents are

not very frequent and usually are of an indirect nature.⁸¹ About six dozen village schools are mentioned in the thirty-six years between 1440 and 1526.⁸² It is most unfortunate that we have such paucity of documents dealing with the village schools. More information on this elementary level of instruction would facilitate the evaluation of the status of literacy in Hungary.

What is evident here is that an intellectual continuity remained following the death of Matthias Corvinus and that the general decline of the kingdom in all other respects is not reflected in education or culture. The disaster of Mohács, on the other hand, marks a great turning point not only in the political history, but cultural development as well. Because of the subsequent tri-partate division of the kingdom, sectarian antagonism and incessant wars, it really seemed that Hungary, in mid sixteenth century, was the stepchild of Fate.

NOTES

1. Lajos Elekes, *Rendiség és központosság a feudális államokban* [Estates and Centralization in the Feudal States], Budapest, 1963; also by the same author: "Systeme dietal des Ordres et centralisation dans les Etats feodaux," *La Renaissance et la Reformation en Pologne et en Hongrie (1450-1650)*, Budapest, 1963, pp. 331-395. György Bónis, "Recherches hongroises sur les institutions des Ordres," *Acta Historica*, 17 (1971), pp. 173-204.
2. The problems of urbanization and economic development have been treated in a number of studies in recent years, especially: Jenő Szűcs, *Városok és kézművesesség a XV századi Magyarországon* [Cities and Artisans in 15th Century Hungary], Budapest, 1955, pp. 172-179; also by the same author: "Das Stadtwesen in Ungarn im 15-17 Jh.," *La Renaissance et la Reformation en Pologne et en Hongrie, 1450-1650*, Budapest, 1963, pp. 117-119. Also see: Vera Bácskai, *Magyar mezővárosok a XV században* [Hungarian Manorial Towns in the 15th century], Budapest, 1965, pp. 20-21; 30-43; István Szabó, "La repertition de la population de la Hongrie entre les bourgades et les villages dans les années 1449-1526", *Études Historiques*, Budapest, 1960, I, pp. 359-368. On social and economic development see: László Makkai, "Die Hauptzuge der wirtschaftlichsozialen Entwicklung Ungarns im 15-17 Jh.," *Ren.Ref. en Pol. et Hong.*, pp. 33-38; cf. Erik Fügedi, "Die Aussenhandel Ungarns am Anfang des 16 Jahrhunderts", *Der Aussenhandel Ostmitteleuropas 1450-1650*, Köln-Wien, 1971, pp. 56-79. The best study on agrarian development is by: Zsigmond-Pál Pach, *Nyugat-Európai és Magyarországi agrárfejlődés a XV-XVII században* [Western European and Hungarian Agrarian Development in the XV-XVIII centuries], Budapest, 1963, pp. 45-95.
3. The most recent study on the uprising is by Gábor Barta and Antal Fekete-Nagy, *Parasztháború 1514-ben* [The Peasant War of 1514], Budapest, 1973; also Gábor Barta, *1514*, Budapest, 1972. On the plight of the peasantry see: Zsigmond-Pál Pach, "Die Stellung des ungarischen Bauernkrieges von 1514 in der Agrargeschichte", *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Strukturen im saekularen Wandel: Festschrift für Wilhelm Abel*, Hannover, 1974, pp. 199-211. An excellent contemporary account was written by the poet Stephanus Taurinus entitled *Stauromachia*, edited and translated by László Geréb, Budapest, [1945?], pp. 11-84. On the leader of the rebellion and the general background also see: Sándor Marki, *Dosa György*, Budapest, 1913.

4. The battle of Mohács and its results are told by a contemporary historian Georgius Sirimiensis, *De Perditione Regni Hungarorum* (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Medii Recentisque Aevorum), edit. L. Juhász, Budapest, 1938; In Hungarian translation: György Szerémi, *Magyarország romlásáról* (Monumenta Hungarica V.), transl. L. Juhász, Budapest, 1961. Also see: László Erdélyi, *A Mohácsi vész nemzedéke* [The Generation of the Mohács Disaster] Szeged, 1941, and Imre Lukinich (ed.), *Mohácsi Emlékkönyv 1526* [Commemorative for the Battle of Mohács 1526], Budapest, 1926.
5. Loránd Szilágyi, *A Magyar királyi kancellária szerepe az államkormányzatban, 1458-1526* [The Role of the Royal Chancery in the Government of the Realm, 1458-1526], Budapest, 1930, pp. 1-24; György Bónis, *A jogtudó értelmiség a Mohács előtti Magyarországon* [The Legally Trained Intelligensia in Hungary before the Battle of Mohács], Budapest, 1971, pp. 219-244.
6. Concerning the University of Pécs, see: Jenő Ábel, *Egyetemeink a középkorban* [Our Universities in the Middle Ages], Budapest, 1881, pp. 9-17; 49-56. Remig Békefi, *A pécsi egyetem* [The University of Pécs], Budapest, 1909. Also: Andor Csizmadia (ed.), *Jubileumi Tanulmányok a Pécsi egyetem történetéből* [Studies on the Occasion of the Jubilee of the University of Pécs] Pécs, 1967. Astrik L. Gábriel, *The Medieval Universities of Pécs and Pozsony*, Frankfurt a.M., 1969, pp. 9-35, and the most recent summary: Tibor Klaniczay, "Megoldott és megoldatlan kérdések az első Magyar egyetem körül" [Solved and Unsolved Questions Concerning the First Hungarian University]. *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 78 (1974), pp. 161-177.
7. For the university of Óbuda see: Konrád Heilig, "Zur Geschichte der Ältesten ungarischen Universitäten und des Magister Benedikt von Makra", *Jahrbuch des Wiener ungarischen Historischen Instituts*, 1 (1931), pp. 41-49; Herman Diener, "Zur Geschichte der Universitäts Gründungen in Alt-Ofen (1935) und Nantes (1423)", *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 42-43 (1963), pp. 265-284; Leslie S. Domonkos, "The History of the Sigismundean Foundation of the University of Óbuda (Hungary)" *Studium Generale; Studies Offered to Astrik L. Gábriel*, University of Notre Dame, 1967, pp. 1-33.
8. On Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava) see: Gábriel, *Medieval Universities*, pp. 37-50; Mihály Császár, *Az Akadémia Istropolitana; Mátyás király pozsonyi egyeteme* [The Academia Istropolitana; the University of Pozsony founded by King Matthias], Pozsony, 1914; Jenő Ábel, *Egyetemeink a középkorban*, pp. 27-37; 61-83; Péter Ratkos, "Vztah Jana zo Zredny a Juraja Schonberga k univerzite Istropolitana" [The Relations of Johannes de Zredna and Georgius Schonberg to the Istropolitana University], *Humanismus a renesancia na Slovensky v 15-16 storoci*, Bratislava, 1967, pp. 67-87. Also see my study: "The Origins of the University of Pozsony in the Fifteenth Century", *The New Review, Journal of East European History*, 9 (1969), pp. 270-289; Károly Rebro, "K Dejinam academie Istropolitany" [Concerning the Academia Istropolitana], *Slovenska Archivista*, 2 (1967), pp. 3-28.
9. Concerning the University of Buda see: Nándor Knauz, "Mátyás király budai egyeteme" [Matthias's University of Buda], *Magyar Sion*, 3 (1865), p. 71; András Harsányi, *A Domonkosrend Magyarországon a reformáció előtt* [The Dominican Order in Hungary before the Reformation], Debrecen, 1938, pp. 145-231; Leslie S. Domonkos, *A History of Three Early Hungarian Universities: Óbuda, Pozsony and Buda*, Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1966, pp. 126-174. On the assignment of the Parisian scholars to Buda see: Benedictus Reickert (ed.), *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica IX: Acta Capitolorum Generalium IV*, Rome, 1899, pp. 68-69.
10. *Mon. Ord. Praed. Hist. IX: Act. Cap. Gen. IV*, pp. 68, 115, 211, 205, 238.
11. Etienne Barta, "L'Université Charles de Prague et la Hongrie", *Revue d'histoire comparée*, 7 (1948), pp. 219-278.
12. Károly Schrauf, *Regestrum Bursae Hungarorum Cracoviensis 1493-1558*, Budapest, 1893, p. XVI; Endre Kovács, *A krakkói egyetem és a Magyar*

- művelődés: Adalékok a Magyar-Lengyel kapcsolatok XV-XVI századi történetéhez* [The University of Cracow and Hungarian Culture: Contributions to the History of Hungarian-Polish Relations], Budapest, 1964, pp. 23-24. For an attempt to identify students from Northern Hungary at the university of Cracow, see the study of Pavel Horváth, "Studenti zo Slovenska na krakovskej univerzitet v 15. a v prvej polovici 16. storicia" [Students from Slovakia at the University of Cracow in the 15th and first half of the 16th Centuries], *Humanizmus a renesancia na Slovensky v. 15-16 storici*, Bratislava, 1967, pp. 162-172.
13. Schrauf, *op. cit.*, p. 41 " . . . quod per ista disturbia nostre patrie pauci studiosi hanc domum incolerent, nos hac ipsa domo privare statuerant."
 14. Bónis, *Jogtudó értelmiség*, pp. 325-333.
 15. On the role of the Hungarian *bursa* see H. Barycz, *Historia Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego w epoce humanizmu* [The History of the Jagellonian University in the Age of Humanism], Cracow, 1935, p. 43; cf. Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 79. Unfortunately, many of the Hungarian students became involved in fights at the university and the *Acta Rectoralia* is full of complaints against them. (See; *Acta Rec. I.*, nos. 1356, 1732, 2315, 2131, 2132, II: 399, 400.)
 16. Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
 17. The records of the Hungarian nation have fortunately survived and have been published: Károly Schrauf, *A bécsi egyetem Magyar nemzetének anyakönyve, 1453-1630* [The Registers of the Hungarian Nation at the University of Vienna, 1453-1630], Budapest, 1902. An attempt to identify the students from Northern Hungary who studied at Vienna is undertaken by Matus Kucera, "Studenti zo Slovenska na viedenskej univerzite do r. 1530" [Students from Slovakia at the University of Vienna to 1530], *Humanizmus a renesancia na Slovensky v. 15-16 storici*, Bratislava, 1967, pp. 173-188.
 18. Schrauf, *A bécsi egyetem*, pp. 188-191.
 19. Endre Veress, *Matricula et Acta Hungarorum in Universitatibus Italiae Studentium 1221-1864*, Budapest, 1941, pp. LIII-LX, LXXXIX, CLIII-CLV. Also by the same author: *Matricula et Acta Hungarorum in Universitate Patavina Studentium 1264-1864*, Budapest, 1915, pp. 11-28. Also see: György Bónis, "Gli scolari ungheresi di Padova alla corte degli Jagelloni", *Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento*, Florence, 1973, pp. 227-244; Elda Martellozzo Forin, "Note d'Archivio sul soggiorno Padovano di studenti ungheresi, 1492-1563", *Ibid.*, pp. 245-260.
 20. Bónis, *Jogtudó értelmiség*, pp. 219-245.
 21. Bónis, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-334. Tibor Kardos, *A Magyarországi Humanizmus kora* [The Age of Humanism in Hungary], Budapest, 1955, pp. 202-227.
 22. Rabán Gerézdi, "Aldus Manutius magyar barátai" [Hungarian friends of Aldus Manutius], *Janus Pannoniustól Balassi Bálintig: Tanulmányok* [From Janus Pannonius to Bálint Balassi: Studies], Budapest, 1968, pp. 215-266.
 23. Veress, *Matricula et Acta Hung. Univ. Ital. Stud.*, (Bologna), p. 59-88; (Padua) 170-182; (Perugia) 311-314; (Florence) 329-330; (Vienna) 333-335; (Pavia) 342; (Ferrara) 377-385.
 24. Asztrik Gábriel, "Gosztonyi püspök és Párizsi mestere" [Bishop Gosztonyi and his Parisian Master], *Egyetemes Philológiai közlöny*, 60 (1936), pp. 15-29.
 25. A good example of this is the Bolognese professor Philippo Beroaldo, who dedicated his edition of Apuleius' *Golden Ass* to Petrus Váradi, Archbishop of Kalocsa: Rabán Gerézdi, "A levélíró Váradi Péter" [The Letter-writer Petrus Váradi], *Pannonius-Balassi*, pp. 120-126.
 26. Jozsef Fitz, *A magyar nyomdászat, könyvkiadás és könyvkereskedelem története a Mohácsi vész előtt* [History of Hungarian Printing, Editing and Book Trade before the Battle of Mohács], Vol. I, Budapest, 1959, pp. 204-220. On the book dealers of Buda who secured volumes for the Hungarian market see: Gyula Végh, *Budai könyvárusok jelvényei 1488-1525* [The Printers' Signs of Buda Book Sellers 1488-1525], Budapest, 1923, pp.

- 6-31. On the special significance of Cracow as center of Hungarian printing; Béla Varjas "A magyar könyvkiadás kezdetei és a krakkói magyar nyelvű kiadványok" [The Beginnings of Hungarian Printing and the First Hungarian Language Editions], *Tanulmányok a Lengyel-Magyar irodalmi kapcsolatok köréből*, Budapest, 1969, pp. 79-128.
27. Sándor Fögel, *Celtis Konrád és a Magyarországi Humanisták* [Conrad Celtis and the Humanists of Hungary], Budapest, 1916, pp. 36-49; Jenő Ábel, *Magyarországi humanisták és a Dunai tudós társaság* [The Sodalitas Litteraria Danubiana and the Humanist of Hungary], Budapest, 1880, pp. 102-110. On the broader subject of ties between Vienna and Buda see: Péter Klimes, *Bécs és a Magyar Humanizmus* [Vienna and Hungarian Humanism], Budapest, 1934.
 28. Ábel, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-102; Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
 29. Vincze Bunyitai, *A váradi káptalan legrégebbi statumai* [The Oldest Statutes of the Chapter of Várad], Nagyvárad, 1886, 1887. On the statutes of Zagreb see: J.B. Tkalčić, *Monumenta Historica Episcopatus Zagrebiensis, II*, Zagreb, 1874, pp. 68 ff.
 30. Remig Békefi, *A káptalani iskolák története Magyarországon 1540-ig* [The History of Cathedral Schools in Hungary until 1540], Budapest, 1910, pp. 41-42.
 31. Remig Békefi, *A népoktatás története Magyarországon 1540-ig* [The History of Popular Education until 1540], Budapest, 1914, pp. 342-344.
 32. Among the *lectors* we find Michael Keszthölcsi (1486-1497), who collected the poems of Janus Pannonius, Sigismundus Thurzo (1500), the future Bishop of Várad. Stephanus Brodarich, future Chancery official and historian was *cantor* in 1524. Békefi, *A káptalani iskolák*, pp. 99-103.
 33. Ede Petrovich, "A középkori pécsi egyetem megszűnése" [The Disappearance of the Medieval University of Pécs], *A Janus Pannonius Múzeum Évkönyve* (1966), pp. 153-170; cf. Klaniczay, "Megoldott . . .", p. 172.
 34. Vilmos Franknoi, *Vitéz János Esztergomi érsek élete* [The Life of Johannes Vitéz, Archbishop of Esztergom], Budapest, 1879, pp. 147-166. Also see my article "Archbishop Johannes Vitéz, The Father of Hungarian Humanism, *New Hungarian Quarterly*, 15 (1975), in print.
 35. Gerézi, "Levéliőr, Váradi", p. 141. Also: Jozsef Huszti, "Platonista törekvések Mátyás király udvarában" [Platonic Aspirations at the Court of King Matthias], *Minerva* (1924), pp. 212-214.
 36. János Horváth, *Az irodalmi műveltség megoszlása: Magyar Humanizmus* [The Division of Literary Culture: Hungarian Humanism], Budapest, 1944, pp. 237-239. See also: Tibor Klaniczay (ed.), *A Magyar irodalom története 1600-ig* [The History of Hungarian Literature to 1600], I, Budapest, 1964, pp. 281-284.
 37. Kardos, *Humanizmus kora*, pp. 314-318.
 38. See: Heinrich Denifle, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400*, Graz, 1956, p. 413; Ábel, *Egyetemeink*, pp. 3-9; 47-49.
 39. Békefi, *A káptalani iskolák*, pp. 173-174.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
 42. *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 285.
 43. "... cui dixit: si diabolus illam hic adduxisset, et mox cum illam in femore non leviter percussit cum duobus scholaribus . . . cum clipeo ad partem posteriorem sui corporis pluribus ictibus verbertavit", *Ibid.*, p. 435.
 44. The carrying of weapons by students from Hungary was always a major problem. At universities abroad, as well as in schools at home, they insisted that weapons, especially the sword, were part of their dress.
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 410; cf. László Zolnai, *Ünnep és hétköznap a középkori Budán* [Feastday and Everyday in Medieval Buda] Budapest, 1969, p. 172.
 46. Asztrik Gábiel, "Preparatory teaching in the Parisian Colleges during the

- Fourteenth Century", *Garlandia: Studies in the History of the Medieval University*, Frankfurt a.M., 1969, pp. 97-124.
47. Elemér Mályusz, *Egyházi társadalom a középkori Magyarországon* [Ecclesiastical Society in Medieval Hungary], Budapest, 1971, pp. 171-173.
 48. See my article "Ecclesiastical Patronage as a Factor in the Hungarian Renaissance". *New Review of East European History*. 14 (1974), pp. 100-116.
 49. *Ödön Bölcskey, Capistránói Szent János élete és kora* [The life and Times of Saint John Capistrano], Vol. III, Budapest, 1924, p. 325.
 50. Arnold Magyar, "Die Ungarischen Reformstatuten des Fabian Ingali aus dem Jahre 1454. Vorgeschichte und Auswirkungen der Statuten", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, (1971), pp. 99-100. The previous interpretation of this reform was inaccurate: János Karácsonyi, *Szent Ferenc rendjének története Magyarországon 1710-ig* [The History of the Order of St. Francis in Hungary to 1710], Vol. I, Budapest, 1922, p. 64.
 51. Isnard W. Frank, "Leonhard Huntpichler O.P. (+ 1478). Theologie-professor und Ordensreformer in Wien", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, 36 (1966) pp. 338-340.
 52. Isnard W. Frank, "Das Gutachten eines Wiener Dominikaners für die Universität Pressburg aus dem Jahre 1467", *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 16 (1967), pp. 418-439.
 53. Béla Iványi, "Bilder aus der Vergangenheit der Ungarischen Dominikanerprovinz", *Melanges Mandonnet*, II, Paris, 1930, pp. 455-456.
 54. János Horváth, *A Magyar irodalmi műveltség kezdetei - Szent Istvántól Mohácsig* [The Beginnings of Hungarian Literacy from St. Stephen to Mohács], Budapest, 1944, pp. 120-125; 201-238. Klaniczay (ed.), *Irodalom történet*, pp. 138-145 particularly on preaching of Pelbart of Temesvár and Oswat of Laska.
 55. Karácsonyi, *op. cit.*, II, p. 19-22; 26-27; 59-60; 160-163; 137-139.
 56. Iványi, *op. cit.*, p. 453; Harsányi, *op. cit.*, pp. 145 ff.
 57. Ferenc Fallenbüchl, *Az Agostonrendiek Magyarországon* [The Hermits of St. Augustine in Hungary], Budapest, 1943, pp. 58-59.
 58. Békefi, *Népoktatás*, p. 35.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 102 (Magister Steynhofer), pp. 110-111 (Masters at Kassa).
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 153.
 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 125-126.
 65. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
 66. The career of Andreas Melczer Gonczi who settled in the city of Kassa is a fine example of this. See *ibid.*, note 74.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
 68. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37, 159, 389.
 69. The book is at the Archbishopal Library: Mss II. 395. For a full description of the codex see: István Genthon, *Magyarország műemlékei topográfijára* [The Topography of Historical Monuments in Hungary], I, *Esztergom*, Budapest, 1948, pp. 306-308. Cf. István Mészáros, *A Szalkai kódex és a XV. század végi Sárospataki iskola* [The Szalkai codex and the School of Sárospatak at the end of the 15th century], Budapest, 1972, pp. 11.
 70. In the fall semester of 1481, he entered the University of Cracow; "Johannes Petri Pelificis Kyswarda". See Adam Chmiel, *Album Studiosorum Universitatis Cracoviensis*, I, Cracow., 1881, p. 250. Among the list of Bachelors in September of 1484: Josephus Muczkowski (ed.), *Statuta nec non Liber Promotionum philosophorum ordinis in Universitate studiorum Jagellonica ab anno 1402 and annum 1849*, Cracow, 1849, p. 91.
 71. Mészáros, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-198.
 72. According to the anecdotal account of Szerémi *De perditione*, p. 101, Archbishop Szalkai was the main instigator of action against the Turks before the

- Battle of Mohács. To show his bravery and resourcefulness he told the king, "when I was a student and the rector of the school, I was always able to get bed partners, with the help of my sword, from the herdsmen. Even when I was outnumbered, sometimes there were twelve of them, I was always able to get her."
73. On the problem of Hungarian instruction in schools see: István Mészáros, "Magyar nyelvű iskolai oktatásunk 15. századi kezdetei" [The Beginnings of Instruction in the Hungarian Language in the 15th Century], *Magyar Pedagogia*, 4 (1964), pp. 213-228; also: Békefi, *Népoktatás*, pp. 40-41. Of special interest is a school book written by Sebald Heyden entitled *Formulae Puerilium Colloquiorum* published in Strassburg in 1528. This work, which had paralleled dialogues in Latin and German, was expanded to quadrilingual by adding Polish and Hungarian in 1531. See: Lajos Dézsi, "Heyden Sebald gyermeki beszélgetéseinek latin-magyar szövege 1531-ből" [The Latin-Hungarian Texts of Sebald Heyden's Elementary Conversations from 1531], *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 7 (1897), pp. 55-60.
 74. Békefi, *Népoktatás*, pp. 111-113.
 75. Kovács, pp. 91f. Cox had attended the Universities of Cambridge, Oxford and Paris before arriving at Cracow in 1518. On his career see the article by Thompson Cooper in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, London, 1908, Vol. IV, pp. 1336-1337.
 76. Kovács, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-90. Even while in Hungary, Eck continued to visit Cracow and had his books printed there.
 77. Békefi, *Népoktatás*, pp. 68-69; 73-83.
 78. For the impact of Comenius in Sárospatak see the studies in: Éva Földes-István Mészáros, *Comenius and Hungary*, Budapest, 1973. Also Endre Kovács (ed.), *Comenius Magyarországon-Comenius Sárospatakon irt műveiből* [Comenius in Hungary - From the Works of Comenius written in Hungary], Budapest, 1970.
 79. Békefi, *Népoktatás*, pp. 48-49, 50-51.
 80. Some of the richest municipal libraries and archives as well as the finest Gothic and Renaissance building could be found in Northeastern Hungary (Zips), now part of Slovakia.
 81. Endre Ivánka, "Iskolázás és népművelés" [Schooling and public instruction], *Magyar Művelődéstörténet: Magyar renaissance* [The History of Hungarian Culture; Hungarian Renaissance], II. Budapest, [1940], p. 439.
 82. Békefi, *Népoktatás*, pp. 461-482, puts the number of village and municipal schools at 130. See also Ivánka, *op. cit.*, p. 439, who places the number of schools in Hungary at the end of the 15th Century at about 150.

Travel Reports on Hungarian Settlements In Canada, 1905-1928*

Paul Bódy

Historical investigations of early Hungarian settlements in Canada have made relatively little use of a valuable contemporary source: reports by travellers who have observed early immigrant life and recorded their impressions. This paper seeks to illustrate the richness and value of these sources by commenting on the most noteworthy travel reports on Hungarian settlements.

The first published commentary and also the most significant report on the early Hungarian settlements is contained in the travel notes of Reverend Peter A. Vay.¹ The author was a high-ranking church dignitary (apostolic protonary and titular bishop), a missionary, and a noted interpreter of Oriental art who had visited China, Korea, Japan, Siberia and North America. Vay's general background and, especially, his broad knowledge of Asiatic and American cultures, make him a qualified commentator not only on immigrant settlements but also on Canadian society in 1905, the time of his visit to the young dominion. What makes Vay's travel notes even more useful and interesting is their spontaneous and unfinished form: his report consists of personal comments and reflections recorded during his journey. These notes and observations provide many insights into the lives of immigrants to Canada and serve as a suggestive commentary on Canadian social and political life at the turn of the century.

On arrival in Canada, Vay paid brief visits to Quebec City and Montreal. From here he proceeded to Ottawa where he was received by notables of Canadian public life including Governor General Lord Grey, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, the President of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

In the Canadian capital Vay had hoped to obtain information concerning the Hungarian settlements of Western Canada, but his inquiries apparently yielded no definite results. He was advised to go

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on to Winnipeg where he would find the necessary directions. Vay's own explanation of this remarkable situation best conveys the state of knowledge in Ottawa concerning Hungarian immigrants:

From Ottawa I struck out to the prairies in order to visit the Hungarians. No one could give me definite information. I was told merely that in Winnipeg I would receive further assistance. Therefore I went on to Winnipeg. The journey lasted two days and two nights with the Canadian Pacific.²

On his arrival in Winnipeg, Vay was greeted by a crowd of several hundred flag-waving and cheering Hungarians. He made good use of his stay in this growing centre of immigrant life in Canada. As the Archbishop's guest, he visited religious, cultural and social institutions and managed to obtain information on the Hungarian community of Winnipeg. He also attended receptions given by Sir Daniel H. Macmillan, the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba, and by the Manitoba Club. Vay's contacts provided him with excellent opportunities for gaining valuable glimpses into Canadian social and political life as the following remarks on his visit to the Manitoba Club suggest:

...the Manitoba Club sponsored a reception. I was frankly surprised to see this tastefully constructed and well-appointed building. It impressed me in every respect as a first-class club. The members were of serious bearing and well-mannered. As I noted, this is considered important and considerable efforts are made to create a cultured English impression.

No doubt, English influence is on the decline in Canada. English domination has ended a long time ago. The citizens of Canada consider their country a sovereign nation. Even more dangerous is the fact that the influence of the United States is gaining ground everywhere. Especially in the Western provinces, people, institutions, and ideas are characterized by Yankee traits.³

During his Winnipeg visit, Reverend Vay received detailed information on the location of the oldest Hungarian settlements in Saskatchewan. His main purpose had been to visit these communities. From Winnipeg Vay travelled to Kaposvar and Esterhazy, the two main centres of Hungarian settlement in the Canadian West. There he was received with joy by the local settlers as the first Hungarian clergyman to visit them. The event was celebrated with traditional religious ceremonies and community festivities. It was attended by local residents as well as settlers from the more distant, newer Hungarian settlements. Reverend Vay had ample opportunities to obtain information on the situation of the Hungarian colonists of Saskatchewan. Following his visit to Esterhazy and Kaposvar, he spent some time in the more recently established Hungarian communities north of Regina.

Vay's impression of the Hungarian colonies are highly interesting. In his view, the settlements were prosperous and

successful pioneer communities. He recognized that their general well-being was the accomplishment of those settlers who had come to Canada since the mid-1880's and had transformed the wild prairies into prosperous farming communities through years of persistence and strenuous effort. The hardships that the early colonists had faced throughout the years had been rewarded through the establishment of prosperous communities. According to Vay, a sense of satisfaction and achievement characterized the general attitude of the Hungarian settlers.

Reverend Vay also commented on the process of assimilation which he saw taking place among the immigrants of the Canadian West. He believed that the establishment of successful farming communities was an essential part of the transformation of newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe into Canadian citizens. According to him this transformation was especially evident in the change of personal values and psychological attitudes of the immigrants. Vay saw a difference in the speed with which the process of Canadianization worked among the various ethnic groups. He thought that Slavic and German immigrants adapted to Canadian ways more rapidly than Hungarians who tended to cling to their language and customs longer. At the same time Vay observed that second-generation Hungarians had generally adopted Canadian habits and attitudes.

Reverend Vay's travel notes also provide interesting information on Hungarian miners and construction workers in Canada at the time of his visit. He had visited Lethbridge and the Crow's-nest Pass area of Alberta where many Hungarians worked in local coal-mines. In Lethbridge, the Hungarian miners were generally satisfied, but in the Crow's-nest Pass region the situation was different. There, working conditions were unsafe, mine accidents frequent, and the immigrant workers dissatisfied and disillusioned. Vay's comments on this region are reminiscent of reports on industrial conditions in nineteenth century England:

Even if no explosions take place, the region is dark and mournful. Bleak. I have never seen a darker, bleaker region. The shafts are placed along the narrow ridge, chimney after chimney...all vomiting black suffocating smoke. Our unfortunate emigrated compatriots! They feel deeply the bleak atmosphere of this saddening landscape. They are full of complaints. But what can they do? Here they have earnings to secure their living. They would gladly return home at any time . . . But none of them will ever return . . .⁴

A brief visit to Niagara Falls gave Vay another glimpse of the life of Hungarian workers in Canada. Near the famous cataract, Hungarian immigrants were employed in the construction of a hydro-electric power station. Here, too, accidents were frequent

among the workers, most of whom were involved in dangerous tunnelling and underground blasting operations.

Aside from these and other sketches of Hungarian immigrant life, Vay's travel notes contain reflections on Canada. An entire chapter of his work is devoted to an analysis of political and social developments in the country. As the most dramatic feature of the young dominion he singled out the construction of a national railway system which in turn was making the colonization of Western Canada possible. In discussing the Canadian settler, Vay made an interesting observation. He felt that Canadian pioneer's outlook on life was an important ingredient of the emerging Canadian cultural and social milieu. This outlook Vay defined as a dedication to the settlement of Canada and an awareness of the value of the European heritage. He considered this attitude a sharp contrast to the unbridled materialism of the United States and a promising foundation for the development of Canadian culture. But Vay was aware of the dangers inherent in the influx of large masses of immigrants to the Canadian West. His impressions of Canadian society and his feelings of apprehension regarding the continued survival and growth of a distinct Canadian culture are conveyed by the following passage:

Cultural development in Canada follows the traditions of England and not those of America Man has not yet completely become a machine, life does not exclusively mean drudgery. The distribution of work and leisure is more proportional. And above all, the value of gold is not as overestimated, the struggle for money not yet desperate.

In short, the moral aspects of life are not yet completely sacrificed to material purposes. Feelings are not completely destroyed by the struggle for existence, or more correctly for well-being. The family, the home, the nation are still ideals of happiness. Love, responsibility, loyalty are still influential.

The continuously increasing immigration and rapid development make the preservation of high ideas and ideals difficult. The danger is especially acute that among the mixed populations of the Western territories the old traditions and social customs will not flourish to the extent that they do in the Eastern provinces. Briefly, I mean the danger that the so-called Americanism or materialism will conquer the new generation.⁵

Another highly interesting report on the early settlers can be found in the public reports and unpublished papers of Ferenc Hoffmann. The author was a professor of economics at the Agricultural Academy of Kassa whom the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture had sent to North America to study agricultural and horticultural technology. His first trip was to the United States and Mexico in 1907. His second, lasting from March, 1909 to June, 1910, was devoted completely to Canada. Hoffmann's unpublished reports and published articles are based on the impressions and information he gained during his visits.⁶

Of primary interest to the present discussion is his Canadian trip and his recorded observations. In the initial phase of his Canadian visit he established contacts with leading authorities in the field of agriculture in Montreal and Ottawa. He visited the Macdonald Agricultural Academy in St. Anne de Bellevue near Montreal and received detailed information from its director, I.W. Robertson. He also made the acquaintance of G.T. Bell, a member of the board of the Grand Trunk Railway System. In Ottawa he received assistance from the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Sydney Fisher, and William Saunders, the Director of the Central Experimental Farm. These contacts not only provided him with information on Canadian agricultural technology, but facilitated the second important purpose of his trip: the study of Hungarian settlements in Western Canada.⁷

Ferenc Hoffmann first encountered Hungarian immigrants in Winnipeg, where he observed the arrival and settlement of new immigrants. His observations are summarized in an article published in Hungary following his return.⁸ Noteworthy is the author's vivid description of scenes of Hungarian immigrants arriving at Immigrant Hall. Hoffmann also gave an account of the immigrants' first Canadian impressions. In the course of their journey via CPR trains to Winnipeg, they noted the practicality of kitchen facilities and adjustable sleeping beds. On arrival, they were escorted into temporary quarters in Immigration Hall and offered warm showers and meals cooked by native Hungarian peasant chefs. All this made a profound impression on peasants who were not at all accustomed to such treatment. In another observation the author referred to the instinctive tendency of new arrivals to remain attached to fellow-immigrants hailing from their native village or nearby districts. Hoffmann interpreted this behaviour as a natural defense mechanism of the peasant immigrant in the face of the strange Canadian society. Furthermore, he noted, this pattern of association generally formed the basis of group settlements on the Saskatchewan prairies, not only because of the importance of relating to a familiar community, but also because frequently immigrants coming from a certain region of Hungary had similar social-economic status. Thus immigrants from northeastern Hungary were generally destitute, while those from western and southern Hungary possessed modest financial resources.

Perhaps the most interesting point of Hoffmann's report is the discussion of Hungarian immigrant settlement.⁹ He noted two general types of settlement. The first was homestead farming on the Saskatchewan plains. This course was open to those who possessed financial resources sufficient for the purchase of farm implements and farm animals. The second was the occupation of forested homesteads, usually near Winnipeg, where forest clearing provided basic main-

tenance until such time as the capital required for homestead farming was in hand. Those lacking financial resources usually chose this course. Hoffmann noted that the majority of newcomers belonged to this group.

The first type of settlement usually evolved in the following manner. After the selection of a homestead, a rudimentary shelter was built: a large tent, mud or wooden structure. Later permanent farm buildings were erected. Since no significant income could be expected in the first three years, the settler and his family sought employment in nearby towns during the winter. After the first three years of farming, the homestead was usually well-developed and provided sufficient income for the maintenance of the family.

The second type was quite different. The settler, having no funds of his own, first had to obtain temporary employment in Winnipeg through the assistance of the immigration office. From his earnings he purchased the bare necessities which enabled him to occupy a forested homestead. These included a pair of axes, a saw, food for five or six days and a railway ticket to his destination, usually Spurgo or Woodridge. After his arrival, he selected an available homestead and began clearing the forest. Usually he shipped lumber to Winnipeg, but he could also sell it to the local merchant, who made handsome profits on the transaction. As the forest was cleared, an area was prepared for planting. Initially garden vegetables were planted, later they were replaced with grain. Poultry and other farm animals were kept. Fishing and hunting of caribou and moose provided supplementary sources of income.

Hoffmann reported that, although the second type of settlement did provide basic maintenance, the settler was easily discouraged by the slow progress made in clearing the land. As a result, it was a frequent practice to sell these homesteads after three years of occupancy. These sales constituted, in effect, the real earnings of the homestead farmer for three years of hard work. Comparing the average sale price of these homesteads with the average earnings of industrial workers in the United States, the author concluded that the Canadian immigrant was generally better off than an American immigrant worker. Consequently, argued Hoffmann, the Hungarian immigrant to Canada ought to be considered as a temporary resident, comparable to the immigrants in the United States who intended to return to Hungary after saving a certain amount of money.

Another point related by Hoffmann is an account of his conversations with J. Bruce Walker, the Commissioner of Immigration in Winnipeg. The Canadian official was favorably impressed with the ability of the Hungarian immigrant to adjust to the simplicities of pioneer life. Walker explained to his visitor that the Hungarian

immigrant was especially adept in bearing the hardships of homestead settlement. He also stressed the ability of immigrants to organize a traditional way of life within the confines of a farm and home constructed by themselves. Hungarian settlers, furthermore, were known in Western Canada for their strong attachment to the land. Finally, the Commissioner praised Hungarian immigrants for their judgement and knowledge of land suitable for farming. On the latter point Walker's comments are worth quoting:

He examines the soil by touring the forests and prairies for days and weeks, testing soil conditions. He observes the location of trees and the condition of haygrass. He seeks out gentle slopes to facilitate the flow of water. He prefers areas with air passage, especially in forested areas, because they decrease the danger of frost. Because of these extraordinary perceptions of farming, Hungarian settlers are frequently chosen as guides of new colonists.¹⁰

The Commissioner of Immigration also had some critical comments on the Hungarian immigrant. He thought that Hungarians were strongly attached to native customs and resisted the adoption of Canadian ways. As a result of these attitudes, the Hungarian immigrant made very slow progress in learning English. The Commissioner added that the Canadian government wished to assist the immigrant in spite of these objectionable traits. Such assistance took the form of reduced rail fares, emergency relief, lumber grants from crownlands, job assistance and free medical care. This policy was designed to foster confidence between the immigrant and the Canadian government. In the words of the Commissioner: "The nearer the government comes to the immigrant, the nearer the immigrant comes to the government. It makes him a better citizen."

Hoffman generally agreed with this assessment of the Hungarian peasant immigrant. In his view, the Hungarian peasant continued his traditional way of life in Canada. In the new environment he constructed log houses covered by a thatched or wooden roof. His family wore clothing traditionally worn in Hungary. New winter clothing was prepared from furs obtained through hunting in Canada. Food was prepared essentially in the Hungarian style, with the exception that tea and coffee were now consumed in great quantities. Such a life-style seemed simple in contrast to modern Canadian customs, but for the Hungarian peasant it represented an advantageous blend of Hungarian tradition and Canadian economic opportunity. Concerning the traditional attitudes of the Hungarian immigrant Hoffmann remarked that immigrants who came to Canada directly from Hungary exhibited a very strong attachment to traditions. He noted that the acquisition of the English language was naturally difficult given the circumstances of pioneer life. He

mentioned two specific causes of the Hungarian immigrants' indifference to Canadian society: first, the lack of adequate religious leadership and pastoral care for the Hungarian communities, and second, the fact that more Hungarian immigrants planned to return to Hungary after several years of Canadian residence.¹¹ His assessment of this question is summarized in the following manner:

Settlers coming from the old country will always remain strangers to Canadian society. Children of school age learn English in Canadian schools. Even in Hungarian communities no more than two hours per week of Hungarian language instruction are available. These include the townships of Otthon, Bekevar, Kaposvar, Esterhazy, Szekelyfold, Matyasfold, Howell and Estevan. In mixed settlements children can learn Hungarian only at the expense of their parents. In the family, Hungarian is spoken at all times, but in mixed settlements English is used outside the family circle.¹²

These brief references to the Canadian reports of Ferenc Hoffmann illustrate their value as source materials on Hungarian immigrant life. They are particularly interesting as evaluations of the social attitudes of Hungarian immigrants at the time of their entry into Canadian society. In addition, they provide a contemporary viewpoint on the complex process of transition from traditional European society to modernized Canadian ways. It would be therefore desirable to make the unpublished reports of Ferenc Hoffmann available to researchers in the field of immigration and ethnic history.

The third report on Hungarians in Canada to be discussed in this paper is the comprehensive travel commentary of the Hungarian journalist, Ödön Paizs.¹³ The author had toured Canada in 1928 with the specific purpose of discovering and reporting on the Canadian-Hungarian communities. The publication can best be described as a high-quality journalistic report of Hungarian immigrant life in 1928. Its value as an historical record can be seen in its portrayal of Hungarian immigrants at a critical stage of the history of Canadian immigration: at a time when agrarian settlements had already reached their peak and the beginnings of urban immigrant life could be observed. The report focuses on those issues which played prominent roles for Hungarian immigrants at that date: the stability of the established Western settlements, the transience of urban immigrants and the attitudes of the Canadian government toward these highly disparate segments of immigrant society.

The most important theme of the author is the early phase of urban life among Hungarian immigrants in Canada. The clarification of this complex social process required in the first place an assessment of the predominantly rural Hungarian settlements and their role in subsequent urbanization. According to Paizs, Hungarian immigrants in 1928 were predominantly residents of rural Saskatchewan. Only a

fraction of Hungarians were urbanized and settlement outside of Saskatchewan was insignificant and of recent origin. In view of the concentration of Hungarian immigrants in Western Canada, the towns and cities located in the West became the earliest centres of Hungarian urban life. Paizs discussed especially the roles of Winnipeg and Lethbridge as immigrant urban centres. He noted that Hungarian settlement in Winnipeg dated back to the turn of the century. Nevertheless a permanent Hungarian community emerged only after 1925. The author considered important in this respect the formation of Hungarian community organizations, Hungarian churches and of a small group of urban professionals of Hungarian descent. In spite of these encouraging signs of an immigrant urban population, however, the author remarked that Winnipeg's Hungarian population belongs essentially to an unstable, transient labour force seeking employment or moving on to other regions. Winnipeg was therefore primarily a transit station for Hungarians in 1928.

Lethbridge had also been an established centre of Hungarian immigrants. The first to settle there were miners, previously employed in Eastern United States mines, who, according to Paizs' information, arrived in Lethbridge in 1893. Later, others joined them and obtained employment in the coal mines. At the time of the report, the Lethbridge Hungarian community numbered about 100 families. Lethbridge constituted, however, not so much an urban centre, but primarily an industrial concentration located in a rural environment. As a result, no significant urbanization or population growth was expected there.

More important as potential urban immigrant centres were the cities of Eastern Canada. But in 1928 only the beginnings of an urban immigrant population could be observed here as well. Toronto, according to the Hungarian report, was a transit station for Hungarian immigrants. Only a very small group of permanently established merchants, tradesmen or workers of Hungarian descent resided in the city. Oshawa offered employment to a small group of skilled automobile workers. Paizs considered Hamilton the real centre of Hungarian urban life in Eastern Canada. At the time of his visit approximately 1,500 Hungarians lived there. The core of the Hungarian population was a substantial group of skilled and unskilled workers. Furthermore, an active social and cultural life flourished among Hungarian immigrants. The author noted particularly the roles of musical and literary programs, the presence of Hungarian community groups and the sponsorship of English language classes for immigrants. Significantly, one of the two Hungarian newspapers in Canada at the time was published in Hamilton: the *Kanadai Magyar Nepszava* [Canadian Hungarian Voice of the People].

These sketches of immigrant communities are supplemented by a series of contemporary personal statements, obtained by the author in the course of his Canadian tour, concerning the first phase of immigrant urbanization in Canada. They consist in the first place of personal interviews with Canadian civil servants and political notables. They illustrate by way of verbatim citations the firm policy of the Canadian government to admit only those immigrants who were willing to accept employment on farms. They also refer to specific statistical and economic data on the substantial numbers of immigrants who were primarily interested in urban-industrial employment. As a result of the large-scale attempts to evade official Canadian immigration policies, Canadian immigration officials tended, understandably, to regard the new, industrially-oriented immigrants with disfavor. The personal statements cited by the Hungarian reporter provide interesting and detailed information on these themes. Another series of personal testimonies provide information of the viewpoints of established Hungarian settlers respecting the new Hungarian immigrants arriving in Canada in the 1920's. Interestingly these statements indicate that the old immigrants regarded the new arrivals in much the same light as did Canadian immigration officials. The newcomers appear in these personal records as more or less troublesome transients, deeply affected by experiences in World War I and the subsequent revolutionary movements, who seemed unwilling to adjust to Canadian society. The author gave the following assessment of the new immigration, based on his extensive discussions with Canadians and Hungarian immigrants:

The majority of the new Hungarians do not come to Canada to settle permanently as the old immigrants; they come here to make money and then to return home. For this reason, they do not settle down, they do not establish new Hungarian colonies. The new Hungarian settlements are at best transit stations. Their only reason for existence is that jobs are more abundant there than elsewhere and therefore it is better to spend the time of employment there.¹⁴

The report of Ödön Paizs provides a glimpse of Hungarian immigrant life at the time of the early formation of immigrant urbanization. For this reason it makes a worthwhile contribution to the history of Canadian immigrant groups as well as to our understanding of Canadian urban history. The two reports of Vay and Hoffmann discussed earlier are concerned with an equally important aspect of Canadian immigrant life, the analysis of immigrant social attitudes at the time of their entry into modern Canadian society. The latter reports contribute therefore to the prehistory of those social and ethnic influences which have played a significant role in the emergence of present day Canadian ethnic societies. In view of their value as

records of immigrant social attitudes, the reports discussed in this paper ought to be considered as informative sources for an understanding of contemporary Canadian social history.

NOTES

1. A. P. Vay, *Amerikai naplókivonatok. Utijegyzetek. Levéltöredékek* [American Diary Excerpts. Travel Notes. Letter Fragments] (Budapest, 1910).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.
5. *Ibid.*, pp 141-142.
6. Hoffmann published three articles in Hungarian journals concerning his American and Canadian experiences: "A magyar telepesekről" [*Concerning Hungarian settlers*], *Magyar Gazdák Szemléje* [Hungarian Smallholders' Review], Vol. XVI (February 1911), pp.129-133; "Az amerikai kivándorlás újabb iránya" [The new direction of emigration to America], *Pesti Hírlap*, August 20, 1910; and "Tapasztalatok a jelen és jövő kivándorlásának színhelyéről" [Observations concerning the place of present and future emigration], *Pesti Hírlap*, November 20. 1910. Of the three, the first article is the most substantial. Hoffmann's most detailed account of his travels is contained in two reports submitted by him to the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture. Both are accessible to scholarly research in the Hungarian National Archives. His report on his American tour is dated January 25, 1908 and is located in the following collection: Földművelésügyi Minisztérium, Eln. K-178, 1908-5859, Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives], Budapest. His report on the Canadian tour is dated July 14, 1910, and is entitled "Dr. Hoffmann Ferencz kassai m. kir. gaz dasági akad. s. tanár jelentése kanadai közgazdasági tanulmány utjáról 1909. március - 1910 június-ig," Földművelésügyi Minisztérium, Eln. K-178, 1911-3749, Magyar Országos Levéltár. Hereafter this latter report will be referred to as "Canadian Report, OL."
7. Canadian Report, OL.
8. Hoffmann, "A magyar telepesekről," pp. 129-133.
9. *Ibid.* For a more detailed discussion see the Canadian Report, OL.
10. Hoffmann, "A magyar telepesekről," p. 131.
11. Canadian Report, OL.
12. Hoffmann, "A magyar telepesekről," p. 131.
13. Ödön Paizs, *Magyarok Kanadában* [Hungarians in Canada] (Budapest, 1928).
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

Count István Tisza and the Preservation of the Old Order*

Gabor Vermes

The first unsure though exhilarating movements of the national re-awakening in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans were very much like the first steps of infants who are painfully aware of their weakness and then compensate for it with cries of self-induced encouragement. In the history of nations, this dichotomy unfolds in the latent or open struggle between national anxiety and national self-exaltation. In Hungary's case, the former was fuelled by the consciousness of being a small nation, surrounded by a "sea" of aliens, Germans, Slavs, and Rumanians, and by Hungary's subordinate status in the Habsburg Empire; while the latter was thriving on the memories of a heroic historical past and on the exaggerated political and literary rhetoric of the present. Coexistence between these two opposites was hardly possible, and the efforts by the best among Hungarian statesmen were spent on finding a way out from this predicament.

Count István Széchenyi hoped to find a solution to this dichotomy in a close relationship with Austria, in tolerance of and understanding with the non-Magyar national minorities, and simultaneously, in the building of an economically and socially progressive Hungary. Such a solution would have quelled any anxiety stemming from the sense of being alone and surrounded, and it also would have satisfied national pride. However, the highly emotional content of Magyar national self-exaltation could hardly be pacified by such a rational approach, nor did a shortsighted Austrian policy make the realization of such a plan possible. The torch thus passed to Lajos Kossuth who harbored the illusion that Hungary could carve out a place for itself in the Danube-basin and could, by its example, attract

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all non-Magyar subjects of Hungary to the cause of liberty under Magyar leadership. The waning appeal and increasing hopelessness of the Széchenyi concept had to lead to Kossuth, but Kossuth's plan in turn had to end up in flames, in the total destruction of the short-lived Hungarian independence in 1848-1849.

Nevertheless, the abortive revolution did not happen in vain, because both the Hungarians and the Austrians learned from it. Ferenc Deák revived the Széchenyi plan in essence but combined it with the most significant achievement of 1848: the *de facto* independent Hungary under the protective umbrella of the Habsburg Empire. Emperor Francis Joseph came to accept the Deák concept once the war against Prussia was lost. He then considered it advisable to carry out an act of reconciliation, through a restoration of constitutionalism and a duplication of constitutional authority, with the most powerful non-German people in his Empire, the Magyars. The outcome of such an understanding resulted in the Compromise of 1867, which elevated Hungary to equal partnership with Austria.

Theoretically and ideally, the gap between apprehension and illusion was eliminated. Through its association with Austria, Hungary did become a great power, at least in its own estimation, a fact which should have served as a source for both self-assurance and pride. In reality, genuine self-assurance, through an elimination of fear and anxiety, never did come about. The excruciating awareness of being small in numbers and surrounded remained and so did the real and imaginary slights inflicted by the Austrian partner. Thus, behind a deceptively stable surface, the old dichotomy persisted. At the risk of ignoring crucial social and economic issues in a rapidly changing and industrializing society, the epigons of Széchenyi, Kossuth, and Deák kept spending their energies on either trying to prove that 1867 was the final solution, or challenging this view and working to undermine it.

As a minimum guarantee for Hungary's survival, the partnership with Austria was acknowledged by all. Ironically, even the Party of Independence, the so-called "48-ers," paid only lip-service to the ideas of Kossuth, who in his exile persisted stubbornly in defending not only 1848 but 1849, the dethronement of the Habsburgs and the establishment of a Hungarian republic. Instead of following Kossuth all the way, the 48-ers accepted the security offered by the 1867 Compromise, but tried simultaneously to dissociate Hungary further and further from Austria, thereby undermining the basic assumption of close cooperation upon which the 1867 Compromise was built. The absurdity of their paradoxical attitude came to light during their short reign in Hungary between 1906 and 1910, when they could not but govern in the old ways while pretending to be different, or as one

observer put it, "The whole coalition rule was like a circus performance, where the colored lamps had to be lit and turned in such a way that the audience should cherish the illusion that what was black was really white, and what was 67 was really 48."¹ Neither the 48-ers, nor the defenders of the Compromise, the 67-ers, indicated any serious concern about the nationalities question and the social conditions of the peasantry and the gradually emerging urban proletariat. However, social-political stagnation, as well as growing frustration in the wake of the resurgence of the post-coalition power of the 67-ers in the 1910's, drove at least the Justh-Károlyi faction of the 48-ers towards a genuinely more democratic stand, albeit not without a certain degree of ambivalence, particularly on the question of the non-Magyar national minorities. They hoped that universal suffrage would most likely bring to power a government in Hungary which would increasingly rely on the inner resources of the country along with a gradual and partial secession from Austria.

For the 67-ers, the Liberty or later the Party of National Work, the 1867 Compromise was not an act of convenience liable to change, but rather an article of faith and the sole guarantee for the preservation of Magyar supremacy in Hungary. Count István Tisza represented this view most forcefully in the last two decades of the Monarchy's existence. He repeatedly extolled the virtues of the Hungarian people, yet he never truly had faith in their political maturity; he believed that they could easily fall prey to kossuthist "demagoguery" or even to radical and socialist teachings. He feared, not without reason, that a full and free expression of the popular will might terminate the rule of the gentry and aristocracy and endanger Magyar supremacy. Such an eventuality might also end the close association with Austria which then would reduce Hungary from its assumed great power status to insignificance, gravely exposed to non-Magyar hostility within and outside the country. For Tisza, patriotism did not depend on whether Hungarian soldiers in the Common Army responded to commands in Magyar or in German. Rather, the essence of patriotism to him was maintaining Hungary as a great power, through its partnership with Austria, and through Austria as an ally of Germany.

István Tisza did feel most keenly the Magyar paradox, the gap between the nation's dynamic thrust forward and the fear of losing all the gains. The average 67-er was usually a complacent beneficiary and guardian of the *status quo*, but Tisza could see that, even though the alliance with Austria had to be retained as long as Austria abided by the 1867 Compromise, the growing instability on the Austrian domestic scene made it imperative for Hungary to broaden its base of support in some other direction. For him, democratization was out of

the question, and he repudiated forced magyarization and the dream of a Hungarian Empire of "30 million Magyars," an idea which cut across party lines in the Hungarian political arena. Rather, defying the all-pervasive chauvinistic sentiment, he attempted to pursue a policy of reconciliation and compromise with the largest national minority, the Rumanians of Transylvania. His reasons were manifold, but above all, he was motivated by his concern for Hungary's future. This is clear from the underlying theme of his conciliatory policy which stressed the vital interests of Hungarians and Rumanians in the Danube-basin, their interdependence against the common enemy, Pan-Slavism.² Tisza's negotiations with leaders of the Rumanian national minority did strike some response in individual members of this group, especially the clergy, but, on the whole, they did not produce the desired results.

Simultaneously to these negotiations, Tisza as the Speaker of the Lower House (May, 1912 - June, 1913) suppressed by forceful measures the opposition parties in the Hungarian Parliament in order to enable the passage of laws which assured continuous and growing support for the Austro-Hungarian Army. A progressively deteriorating Austro-Hungarian position in the Balkan Peninsula made such a support imperative, and also provoked the necessity, in addition to other domestic factors, of Tisza's appointment as prime minister of Hungary. He was, after all, acknowledged by the monarch as the only politician who had the will and the authority to push through the unpopular military measures. Tisza, over the violent protest of the opposition, formed his second cabinet on June 10, 1913. During these critical times, he used his powerful influence to counter the warmongering of the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, and worked against the growing Russian and Serbian influence on the Balkans by peaceful means, particularly by supporting Bulgaria as the pivot of Austro-Hungarian influence there. Tisza's attitude prior to the outbreak of World War I was proud, assertive, even pugnacious at times. Yet, he was very much aware of the dangers threatening Hungary's assumed great power status, and therefore, he was circumspect, cautious, and calculating as well.

It is well-known that Tisza was the only leading statesman in the Monarchy, who—after the fateful shots in Sarajevo—adamantly opposed the war for nearly two critical weeks, the first half of July, 1914, and he changed his mind only by the middle of the month. His reasons for opposing the war were enumerated in two memoranda, submitted to the Emperor-King on July 1 and July 8 and exposed in the minutes of the Council of Ministers for Joint Affairs on July 7. In sum, Tisza, consistent with his foreign policy of prudence and caution,

asserted that to use the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand as an excuse for reckoning with Serbia would be a fatal mistake. Lacking sufficient proof of Serbia's complicity, the Monarchy would incur the odium of disturbing the peace and would therefore begin the war under the most unfavorable circumstances. Rumania was virtually lost to the Central Powers and Bulgaria was too exhausted to be relied upon. Also, an attack on Serbia could easily lead to a major war which, in turn, would mean unbearable sacrifices and a heavy burden on the Monarchy's financial and economic resources. In spite of such forceful arguments, Tisza called on the German Ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, on July 14, and told him that finally he too had decided to pursue an energetic policy against Serbia in order to prove the vitality of the Monarchy and to put an end to an intolerable situation in the South. While saying farewell to Tschirschky, Tisza clasped his hands warmly and said, "We have to face the future newly united, calm, and firm." Emperor William noted on the margin of his ambassador's telegraphic account, "Finally a Man!"³

Tisza's abrupt change of heart has puzzled historians ever since, especially because Tisza was a man of the highest integrity who would never go against his convictions. The historical background was outlined in detail, because placing Tisza's action within a broader historical context may shed some new light on this puzzle. Tisza's first impulses prompted him to opt for peace, because Hungary could only lose in a war. Victory might bring more Slavs into Austria-Hungary, thereby upsetting the delicate ethnic balance of the Monarchy at the expense of the Magyars; on the other hand, a defeat might lead to the dismemberment of Hungary and to the loss of Transylvania in particular. Tisza knew that the failure of his negotiations with the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians left the conflict between them and the Magyar state unresolved and kept Transylvania as a potential trouble spot. It also assured, in defense of the co-nationals, the continual hostility of the nominal ally, Rumania, towards Hungary. In sum, Tisza knew instinctively that Hungary's interest, which in his mind was identical with the interest of the Monarchy, demanded not to go on the offensive but to hold the line for the time being. As a staunch advocate of Dualism, Tisza's fundamental sense of security rested with the great power status of the Monarchy. It was quite clear that by 1914, this assumed great power status depended on German support in any major conflict. Austria-Hungary could carry out a punitive expedition against Serbia on its own but never a major war against Russia. Tisza's time of crisis arrived when the German alliance, this *sine qua non* of his sense of security, was called into question. By the second week of July, 1914, a series of messages,

ambassadorial dispatches, and telegrams emphasized that the German government was considering the situation as a test case of resolve for the Central Powers in general and for Austria-Hungary in particular. Should Austria-Hungary fail to act boldly and assert itself as a great power, it would jeopardize German support in the future. Such a "threat" was not spelled out openly but it was implied, and certainly this was the message which registered with the Austrian and Hungarian leaders. Consequently, Tisza had two alternatives left. One was to persist in his opposition to the war and thereby risk Germany's goodwill and support without which the edifice of Austro-Hungarian power would crumble; the other was to suppress all doubts and hope for the best behind Germany's protective shield. Tisza came to reject the first alternative, because no Hungarian leader would risk leaving his nation in a vulnerable and unprotected position. The only exception, Kossuth's example in 1848-1849, was a frightening memento. Sensing this, the leaders of the opposition, Andrassy and Apponyi jumped on the German bandwagon just as enthusiastically if not more than the 67-ers. Even Count Mihály Károlyi, the leader of the left-wing of the 48-ers, supported the war at the beginning, though admittedly, he did not openly endorse the alliance with Germany.

What made Tisza enter von Tschirschky's office on that fateful July 14, was the same concern for Hungary's survival, which had motivated the thoughts and actions of most Hungarian statesmen, from Széchenyi to Eötvös, Deák, Andrassy Sr., and Kálmán Tisza. One may argue that Hungary's survival was not at stake in July, 1914, but by then, the component of national self-exaltation had reached a point where the existence of the illusion of Hungary as a great power was considered tantamount to the country's survival, and for such a cause no risk seemed to be great enough to take.

An additional question concerns Tisza's frantic emotional involvement in the war, hovering between enthusiasm and despair, even hysteria at times,⁴ in a man who had always been in full control of his emotions. One should, of course, make allowances for the hyperbolic rhetoric of the times and for the high stakes involved in the conflict. After all, a war of cataclysmic dimensions was going on, and the prime minister in charge of his country's war effort was bound to react to the events differently from the imperturbable and all-knowing "coffee-house conrads" around the corner. Yet, there was a certain almost predictably Hungarian quality in his state of excitement. As early as 1889, he had said in the Hungarian Parliament, "We have to prepare for war in peace. If this war comes then we can all agree that it will not be a child's play, neither for the Monarchy nor for the Hungarian nation, rather it may well be a life and death struggle."⁵ Four

years later, he pin-pointed Hungary's place in such a struggle, "We can hardly find an example in world history of such a small nation receiving such a great mission from the Divine Providence. This small nation (Hungary) is placed in perhaps the most exposed spot in Europe, in the crossroads of grave dangers and ambitious plans by powerful nations. This little nation defended civilization and freedom against Islam through centuries and had to defend them now against another danger which threatens European culture in the form of Slav absolutism."⁶ The frustrations of his first cabinet (June 17, 1903 - June 18, 1905) prompted Tisza to modify this exalted view and draw a gloomy picture of his nation, capable of fighting for its existence but unable to cope with problems in peace, "It has been demonstrated again what has been a 1000 years old curse upon the nation that only the grave dangers can bring forth the nation's good qualities, that the Hungarian nation can always suffer, bleed, and fight heroic battles for its liberty, but to live with it usefully in peace, to exploit it for the augmentation of its strength, and to utilize it steadily for patriotic and constructive work; no, the Hungarian nation has never been able to do so."⁷ But then better years were to come, and the disaster of the coalition propelled Tisza back to power, and before the outbreak of the war, he found himself in much firmer control over the political situation in Hungary than 10 years earlier. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, on August 27, 1914, Tisza laid bare his thoughts to his friend, Albert Berzeviczy, as follows: "Through 20 years the thought had tormented me that the Monarchy and within it the Hungarian nation is doomed to extinction, because God wishes to abandon the one whose mind He has taken away. In the past few years the situation began to change for the better, because newer and newer events awakened the hope that world history would not brush us aside. Now in these very critical days the die will be cast, but a nation which behaves in such a way confronting the mounting threats can not be condemned by Providence."⁸ Thus, Hungary's precarious position prompted Tisza to follow caution, but once his concern for Hungary could not be alleviated by the peaceful prolongation of the *status quo*, Hungary was called upon in Tisza's mind to perform its historic role as the defender of Western Civilization in Central Europe, a role, which by the gigantic task it implied, demanded the utmost in heroism, dedication, involvement, and sacrifices. Tisza himself then embraced the battle fully as the supreme test of his nation's prowess and vitality, as a providentially predestined ordeal.

Tisza's deep emotional involvement in the war did not of course dull his sense of caution completely. He remained adamantly opposed to territorial annexations in case of a victory, to the incorporation of Serbia in particular, and he was most unenthusiastic about Germany's

unconditional submarine warfare. His sense of fairness was outraged upon receiving news about atrocities committed by the Austro-Hungarian military and civilian authorities in occupied lands and in territories where national minorities were suspected to collaborate with the enemy. Tisza talked of "character assassination of innocents,"⁹ "wanton pestering," and scandalous arbitrariness,¹⁰ and he angrily reprimanded the Hungarian government commissioner of Transylvania, "The best way to set Transylvania ablaze is if we treat every educated Rumanian as a scoundrel and an enemy."¹¹ Nevertheless, his overpowering ambition during the war was to expand and fortify Magyar influence in the Monarchy and enhance his country's prestige. He could do so because no one in Austria among the politicians matched the single-minded forcefulness of his personality, and because he had a parliamentary majority behind him even after his resignation as prime minister on May 23, 1917, while in Austria the *Reichsrat* was not even called into session until late in the war. Also, Hungary's relative weight, as the granary of the Monarchy under Entente blockade, grew beyond the limits set by any constitutional clause or population census.

The gigantic life-and-death struggle and Tisza's total involvement in it made it imperative for him never to allow any erosion of his justification for the Hungarian war effort. Such a single-minded determination, assisted by Hungary's increasing influence and a concomitant contempt for Austria's weakness, caused him to handle Austria not as a respected equal but rather as a junior partner with a mixture of annoyance, condescension, and mistrust. He wrote to the Minister of Finance in the Council of Ministers for Joint Affairs, Count Istvan Burian, on June 6, 1917, "The traditional Austrian brotherly love embraces everything with a passion which does damage to Hungary."¹² He also spoke of the "slumbering virility of the people of Vienna."¹³ In a January 5, 1915, letter to the Foreign Minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, Tisza wrote, "The efforts of Austria and also the average value of the Austrian troops are way below ours. This is a fact that I am naturally silent about, nevertheless I cannot maintain the opposite."¹⁴ It is an admittedly thin credit to his often mentioned sense of fairness that he still manifested some understanding of Austria's needs as documented by those Austrian leaders who had frequent dealings with him. According to General Landwehr, the head of the Central Food Office in the latter part of the war, "Though he (Tisza) often pursued a policy of Magyar particularism, he still had a general view of things and did not ignore the common interest. When I confronted him with demands to help Austria, he never became impatient, he never promised much, but he kept the promises he made."¹⁵ Tisza's official correctness notwithstanding, the

overall Hungarian attitude towards Austria undoubtedly helped to undermine Dualism during the war. In Tisza's case, his sense or proportion on the parity with Austria faded rapidly beside the elementary force of his love and fear for Hungary.

While it was relatively easy to exert Magyar influence over Austria, to do the same *vis-à-vis* Germany was another matter. Here Hungary was on the defensive, and Tisza's thinking in this connection was expressed in his letter to Berchtold on September 3, 1914, "We cannot appear as the weak and timid protégé in the eyes of Germany."¹⁶ He had to fend off constant German pressure to make concessions to Italy and to the Rumanians in Transylvania. He also fought the German "Mitteleuropa" plan which he characterized as follows in a letter to a journalist friend: "No one appreciates our allies more than I do, but they have the 'good habit' of reaching for the whole arm when one offers them the little finger."¹⁷

Tisza's most perplexing attitude during the war concerned domestic politics. At a time, when most of the warring countries established coalition governments under the banner of the "union sacrée," Tisza refused to swim with the tide and still kept the opposition at arm's length. Also, at a time when mass participation in the war, both on the fronts and in the hinterlands, accelerated the process of democratization everywhere, Tisza stubbornly refused to concede any meaningful extension of the right to vote. Part of the reason for such inflexibility may have been purely personal; after all, he was not a man prone to change and alter his deeply ingrained habits and convictions. Beyond that, however, the high risks involved in the war may have made him less rather than more ready to compromise. In combatting the extension of suffrage, Tisza repeated the old arguments with unusual vehemence, which may indicate that he still believed that radical democratization would lead to national disaster, and if so, then such an attempt was to him even more inappropriate if not outrightly sinful when Hungary's survival was at stake.

In conclusion, Tisza's faith in his nation's ability to measure up to the challenge of a life-and-death struggle was destined either to reward him with at least a temporary victory over fear, anxiety, doubts plaguing the Magyar existence for over a century, or to condemn him to be crushed completely. Unknowingly, Tisza played out the ultimate stage of the battle between national anxiety and national illusion, and it was no wonder that when on October 18, 1918, he let slip the words, "We lost the war" in the Hungarian Parliament, according to an eyewitness, "What he said and what he did after that were the movements of a half-dead sleepwalker."¹⁸ When the Károlyi Revolution broke out on the night of October 30-31, he refused to escape from Budapest as if wishing to stay and die. And truly, the Old Order,

his Hungary lay in shambles. 1918 signalled an irretrievable blow to, if not the end of, the Magyar illusion, the idea of national grandeur. Perhaps it was an act of mercy that Tisza did not survive the passing of Great Hungary. On October 31, 1918, he was assassinated by a group of soldiers who held him responsible for the war. The same unshakable Calvinist faith in God's will which has characterized him throughout his long political career, accompanied him to his last moment; when falling to the floor, mortally wounded, he uttered his last words: "It had to happen this way!"¹⁹

NOTES

1. Lóránt Hegedüs, *Két Andrássy és Két Tisza* [The Two Andrassys and Two Tiszas] (Budapest, 1937), p. 283.
2. Gróf István Tisza, *Összes Művei* [Collected Works] (Budapest, 1923), III, 56.
3. Max Montgelas, ed., *Die Deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914* (Berlin, 1927), I, 70.
4. Excerpts from his letter of April 17, 1915, to Burián, "I hope that I shall receive the telegram which reports on Bülow's conversation with Sonnino. Isn't there any news from Bucharest yet? Can not Fasciotti report anything interesting? My dear friend, I am not a nervous man, but I must feel the burden of the moment. Literally, the fate of the Monarchy is at stake, and a delay in decision may provoke a catastrophe which we must avert with exerting ourselves to the utmost . . . we must do more to alleviate the Italians' hostility . . . we must dispel their bad humor which we caused by our dilatory attitude . . . we have no time to lose . . . I write to you in haste with a tormented soul; I do express myself flimsily. The essence of the matter is that time is flying and only days separate us from the moment when inertia or inadequate activity might create an irreparable situation." — Tisza, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
5. Gróf István Tisza, *Képviselőházi Beszédei* [Parliamentary Speeches] (Budapest, 1930), I, 22.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
7. Speech at the "Terézváros" Casino on October 10, 1904, quoted in József Östör, *Tisza István Saját Szavaiban* [István Tisza through his Own Words] (Budapest, 1927), p. 130.
8. Tisza, *Összes Művei*, II, 93.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
11. *Ibid.*, III, 21.
12. *Ibid.*, VI, 352.
13. *Ibid.*, III, 318.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
15. Ottokar Landwehr, *Hunger* (Wien, 1931), p. 85.
16. Tisza, *op. cit.*, II, 117.
17. *Ibid.*, III, 140.
18. Farkas József, ed., *Mindenki Új Utakra Készül* [Everyone is Preparing for the New] (Budapest, 1962), I, 50.
19. Gusztáv Erényi, *Graf Stefan Tisza* (Wien, 1935), p. 378.

Horthy, Hitler and the Hungary of 1944*

Peter Gosztony

Was the Hungarian Regent deluding himself when on the seventeenth of March, 1944, on Hitler's invitation, he left Budapest on a special train to meet the *Führer* at Klessheim castle near Salzburg? We know today that in Horthy's own entourage there were a few who had tried to dissuade him from making this journey. But the 76 year old head-of-state was still thinking in terms of the political morality which had prevailed in the days of Emperor-King Francis-Joseph. He had no conception of totalitarian politics, albeit the example of President Hacha (whom Hitler had lured to Berlin in 1939 so that he could bully this sickly man into consenting to a German occupation of rump-Czechoslovakia) should have made him wary of Hitler. But Horthy welcomed the German invitation: he did want to talk to the *Führer* in person, so that he could intervene with him personally and effect the release of the Hungarian divisions still fighting on the Eastern Front. "These divisions must be used to strengthen the Carpathians," was Horthy's excuse: in the spring of 1944 the Red Army was not more than a hundred kilometers from the Hungarian border.¹ In reality, through the return of the troops, Horthy had hoped to effect the defection of Hungary from the Axis in spite of the fact that the plan which he and Premier Miklos Kallay had concocted earlier (calling for Anglo-American paratroopers in the heart of Hungary) had proved unworkable.²

Ever since the spring of 1942, the Regent and the Premier had sought the opportunity and the means of taking Hungary out of the "German war" as smoothly as possible. After the Axis disasters at Stalingrad and Voronezh, they had put out feelers even to Moscow, but the response of the Soviets was negative.³ The discussions with the Anglo-Americans had gotten under way in earnest only after the fall of Mussolini; but plans which might have had concrete results were formulated in theory only, and were executed only on "paper".

* The author would like to express his thanks to Professor N.F. Dreisziger for translating this article from Hungarian into English.

The Kállay government's freedom of action was limited by Hungary's geographic location. Not without good reason did Horthy complain in the summer of 1943 to Colonel Gyula Kádár, the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Division of the General Staff: "Many urge that we should get out of the war, but no one can tell me how. I cannot simply appear on the Royal Palace's balcony and shout: I have defected! In 24 hours the Germans would bring [i.e., install in office] Szálasi . . ."⁴

By this time Horthy had behind him the tense encounter with Hitler of April, 1943 (also in Klessheim). On this occasion the *Führer* had denounced Kállay, accusing him of "treason" and "dealings with the enemy". He had demanded the Premier's removal and urged Horthy to implement "strict controls" over the Jews of Hungary. Ribbentrop, who was also present, abetted Hitler: all Jews were paid agents of the British Secret Service, they must not be allowed to come and go freely. In Hungary, *horribile dictu*, there were Jews sitting even in Parliament! According to the records of the meeting which have survived, Hitler advised Horthy to collect the Jews in concentration camps and put them to work in the mines. Horthy defended Kállay and denied his "English connections." In regard to the Jews, he declared with indignation: "He had done everything against the Jews that can be done with decency. After all, he could not murder them or do away with them in some other way!"⁵

The war years had made relations between Hitler and Horthy tense. In 1936 the Regent, after their first encounter, had talked with admiration of the *Führer*. After the Kiel visit of 1938 (when Hitler had tried to get the Hungarians to join in on an invasion of Czechoslovakia) his enthusiasm diminished.⁶ The conservative Horthy was repelled by the primitiveness of Hitler and his parvenu followers. The Regent's dislike of Hitler was reciprocated by the latter. "Moreover," explained Edmund Veesenmayer to this writer in a letter, "[Horthy] despised [Hitler], believed him to be untruthful and lacking all traces of humanitarian feeling. Horthy was smart enough to respect the enormous power of the German *Reich* and try to use it to his own advantage, but he did not and could not like Hitler even as a politician. Von Papen stood ten times closer to the Regent. After all, Papen was a former diplomat, an ex-officer who had the manners of a landed aristocrat. This was Horthy's world! Hitler represented the exact opposite . . ."

Veesenmayer, German Minister and Plenipotentiary in Hungary during the last year of the war, was familiar with conditions in that country and had kept a close eye on Horthy. In 1943 he had prepared a detailed report on Hungary's internal and external policies and had been one of the originators of the idea of the occupation of Hungary by German troops. He did not have a high opinion of Hungarians as a

nation, albeit in his private conversations he still likes to reminisce about the "beautiful days in Budapest." Veesenmayer arrived in Hungary in Horthy's company on 19 March 1944. What had transpired in Klessheim during the previous 48 hours is quite well known, although no official German record of these discussions has been found to date. The fact that, after Hitler's threats and arguments, Horthy gave his consent to a "peaceful" German occupation of his country, was a recognition of the realities of the situation. The German war-machine had gone into action on the 18th of March, it could not have been called to a halt easily. Moreover, the Hungarian military leaders, who were summoned to a conference with Kállay in the early hours of the 19th, with the exception of General Lajos Veress, voiced the hopelessness of armed resistance. Kállay was not blind and knew what he was saying when he said: "I will not be a part to a comedy! Either the nation resists as a whole, or it does not resist at all!"⁷ Horthy's assurances, sent by telegram from his special train, dashed all thoughts of resisting that had been entertained in government circles.

Why did the Regent consent to the German occupation? Why did he buckle under before Hitler and if he did, why did he not resign and give up his exalted position? Horthy answers these questions honestly and in detail in his memoirs. What he had written is confirmed by the numerous documents that have come to light since. Horthy had agreed to replace Kállay, to appoint a government agreeable to the Germans and to mobilize Hungary for total war in the interest of Nazi Europe. In return, Hitler promised that no Slovak, Croat and especially, Rumanian units would participate in Hungary's occupation and that the German troops would remain for three months only at the most, until the new German Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, "Parteigenosse Veesenmayer" would assure the *Reich's* government that Hungary was fulfilling its obligations toward the Axis. All what Horthy saw in this was that, even though he would have to toe the German line at first, *later* he could use his influence as head-of-state to turn events to his country's advantage. Even communist historians admit the rationale and soundness of this approach.⁸

As Horthy arrived in the Royal Palace of Buda, he was met by German guards. It was only now that it really registered in the old man's mind that Hungary had come under German occupation. Kállay had fled to the Turkish Embassy. Many of his associates had been arrested by the Gestapo, while his friends and acquaintances were hiding in the country. Colonel Kádár describes the spirit of Hungary after March 19th in his unpublished memoirs:

Unfortunately I cannot say that in Budapest there was general bitterness or even indignation. Rather, a kind of submissiveness had taken over the city. The people blamed Kállay who, according to them, had gone too far. If someone's arrest became known, people said there must have been a reason for it. At General Staff Headquarters retired officers sought their reinstatement in active service; others demanded their overdue promotions saying that they had been passed over because of their rightist outlook. The right-radicals were celebrating . . . As far as the general public was concerned, there was no reaction worthy of mention. In the offices and factories the work continued as if nothing had happened . . . Leftist groups went underground.⁹

Kádár (who was arrested several days later by the Gestapo because of his English connections) spent the next couple of days trying to reach Miklós Horthy Jr. (the official leader of the "Bureau of Defection"). On March 22, in the midst of a downpour, he sought admission at the gate of the Royal Palace. "In the courtyard, huddled to the wall, German soldiers stood in raincoats with their sub-machine-guns. All exits were closed. Near the gates guards stood with machine-guns. The young Horthy informed me that his father had been confronted by a German ultimatum. If no government was appointed by 6 p.m., the Germans would take power themselves. And then he said that preparations had been taken for resistance—with a handful of guards? Not one of the units of the Honvéd knew about these preparations . . ."10

That same evening Horthy consented to the appointment of the cabinet of Sztójay.¹¹ Veessenmayer must have been satisfied. At least this is what his telegram to Ribbentrop suggests. Ribbentrop took the message to the *Führer* who was in conference with Marshal Antonescu. Hitler explained to the Rumanian leader, who must have been elated with joy, that Hungary had lost his trust forever, and that he would tighten the regime of occupation if necessary. As far as Transylvania was concerned, he could say that for him the Vienna Award of 1940 had lost its validity. Through her double dealing, Hungary had lost her right to Northern Transylvania. But the tense political situation in the Danube Valley required that for some time this decision be kept secret. Common interest required that there should not be partizan resistance in Hungary. Every division that can be diverted from Hungary, will strengthen the Eastern Front!¹²

Contrary to the wishes of Regent Horthy, Sztójay's cabinet became a coalition. Veessenmayer had desired it so. Every right-wing group was represented in it except the Arrow Cross Party of which Hitler's plenipotentiary thought very little. And 112 hours after the occupation, Horthy had to agree to a joint Hungarian-German press release, according to which the *Wehrmacht* had entered Hungary as a result of a "mutual agreement."

The following weeks were spent in the country's "total mobiliza-

tion" for war on the German model. The establishment of a full Hungarian army was completed, and it was sent to the front beyond the Carpathians. Rationing of food and consumer goods was introduced and work discipline was tightened especially in munitions factories. Legislation was passed dissolving all leftist and liberal parties and associations. Their press organs and assets were confiscated. The Gestapo, along with the suddenly reorganized Hungarian secret police, began hunting down people whose names appeared on "political black lists." The radical solution of the "Jewish question" became one of the main tasks of the new government. The wearing of the yellow star was enforced, and the collection of Jews in "ghettos" started. Next came the deportation from Hungary of the Jews living outside the capital. From the Royal Palace Horthy viewed these developments with resignation. He felt a prisoner in his own residence. Right before his eyes his country, until then an oasis in war-torn Europe, became a supply base for the *Wehrmacht*. He had been informed of the deportations from several sources. But he, like his immediate associates, were under the illusion that the Jews were being deported "only" to work in Germany where there were great shortages of labour. "We at that time had never heard of the extermination camps: how could we even think that such things existed?"¹³

During mid-May, however, reports concerning the treatment of the Jews by the gendarmerie and their fate in German concentration camps, became more frequent. The Hungarian churches protested. The papal nuncio to Hungary appealed to Horthy in a note. In June the Jewish Council also succeeded in reaching the Regent: through the late István Horthy's widow and through Miklós Horthy Jr. they let Horthy know about the terrible fate that awaited Hungarians of the Jewish faith abroad.¹⁴ Horthy still did not want to believe that a cultured nation like the German could be capable of such barbarities as the senseless slaughter of defenceless persons. But when the so-called "Auschwitz record book" reached his hands, Horthy decided to act. In his note of early June to Sztójay, he requested "the curbing of the excesses in the implementation of the measures designed for the solution of the Jewish question" and stated:

I have not had the power to veto any measures which had been taken by the Germans or by the government on German wishes. Although I have never been told of these measures in advance, and have not kept informed on many of them at all, recently it has been brought to my attention that in this regard often more is done here than in Germany, and in such brutal and even inhuman manner that has no parallel in the measures taken by the Germans.¹⁵

Next, Horthy argued for the exemption of certain Jews on grounds of their profession or religious beliefs and demanded that the

During early June, Horthy thought of replacing the Sztójay government with Géza Lakatos and other loyal men through a *coup d'état*. But the General excused himself on various grounds and refused to accept the task assigned to him. This incident should have served as a warning to Horthy that he may not be able to co-operate fully with Lakatos. During the next few weeks Horthy was conspiring to bring home the Hungarian units from the Front. In this matter he again approached Hitler. At the same time he summoned General János Vörös, the Chief-of-Staff, and put the question to him squarely: if Hitler refuses to consent to the withdrawal of the Gestapo and the SS from Hungary, would the Hungarian Army be ready and able to confront the Germans in a military showdown? General Vörös described his answer in his personal diaries:

I reported that our strength was inadequate for an armed confrontation with the Germans. In spite of their many difficulties on the fronts, the Germans still had enough strength, especially heavy armour, to crush any resistance here. In this case the country would look as it did after the Mongol invasion. Such a move would cause the weakening of the Carpathian front and would free the road for a Soviet invasion of the Danube Valley. This would mean our certain destruction. I emphatically asked his Highness not to entertain the idea of such a military solution under the present circumstances . . . ²⁰

On July 17th Horthy received the Minister of Defence, Lajos Csataj and General Vörös. The subject was again the question of military action against the Germans. Vörös once again opposed the idea. "The Eastern Front would collapse, the Soviet troops would pour in, from the south Tito's partizans would come; the whole country would become a battlefield. The best service we can do for the civilized West is to resist the advance of Bolshevism with our blood . . ." ²¹ And when Horthy declared that he would not wait any longer for Hitler's reply and at the end of the month he would appoint a new government without consulting Berlin, Vörös, instead of supporting him, responded negatively. ²² That same day, moreover, the Chief-of-Staff revealed the contents of the interview to his deputy and to Colonel Lajos Nádas, the Chief of Defence Operations, who (as it became known later) was a secret member of the Arrow Cross Party and was Szálasi's adviser on military matters.

On the 22nd of June the Soviet Army launched an attack on a wide front north of the Carpathians. As a result of the Russian's success, the 1st Hungarian Army was split in two. The German commander of the North Ukraine Army Group ordered General Károly Beregfy to hand his command over the Hungarian units north of the Carpathians to the 1st German Panzer Army for the duration of the defence of Lemberg (Lvov). Beregfy delayed with the execution of this order. The Germans took the matter to Horthy. The Regent got

two officials in charge of deportations László Endre and László Baky, be dismissed from the government. By the time these lines had reached Premier Sztójay, the fate of the Hungarian Jewry had been sealed. From a report of Veessenmayer we know that to the end of June, 437, 402 Magyar Jews had been deported from the country.¹⁶

As a result of Horthy's emphatic intervention, the Jews of Budapest, some 200,000 people, were saved from deportation. But Horthy had done even more. When, on July 2nd, on the orders of Baky, 1,500 gendarmes arrived in the capital and some three to four thousand took up positions in its environs in order to start the deportations there, the Regent, acting through the liberal wing of the resistance movement, had some Honvéd units put on alert to forestall the plan.¹⁷ Albeit Horthy was never a friend of the Jews, his anti-semitism stood far removed from that of Hitler. The Regent can be blamed for much, with or without good reason, but he cannot be accused of inhumanity. His stand on the question of the Hungarian Jewry was a belated one, but he stuck to it during the following months and made no concessions. He emphatically rejected all attempts by the Sztójay government aimed at elevating its anti-Jewish measures to laws. This had led to the resignation of Deputy-Premier Jenő Rácz who left office in protest over the Regent's veto. Vessenmayer was forced to report to Berlin at the end of June: ". . . nothing has happened in connection with the Jewish question. The halt [in deportations] is still in effect on the Regent's orders. He is completely unbending on this issue."¹⁸

In May Horthy had received Szálasi, on the Arrow Cross leader's repeated requests. He never expected much of the man who saluted him with the words "Heil Horthy" [Kitartás Éljen Horthy!], but formed the worst opinion of him after a ninety minute interview. Later, before his confidants, Horthy called Szálasi muddleheaded and a political fanatic. By this time Horthy had begun to formulate a plan for the regaining of control over the direction of the country's affairs. Following the advice of Count István Bethlen, he wished to dismiss the Sztójay government at the first opportunity and replace it with a cabinet of military men. For his next premier, Horthy decided on General Géza Lakatos who had just returned from the Front in possession of a German Iron Cross; as such he was above suspicion in Hitler's eyes. Early in June, before D-day, Horthy wrote a letter to Hitler. He described developments in Hungary and asked for an end to the occupation. In rather frank and undiplomatic language Horthy outlined his country's situation and even complained about the occupation. "In contravention of the orders of their superiors, the Gestapo and the SS treat Hungary as an enemy country. I refrain from detailing what has gone on here and what is still going on . . ."¹⁹ Horthy's letter remained unanswered.

through to Beregfy on the telephone. "The German Minister had just left my office," he said. "He registered his protest according to which you are not executing the orders of the German command. You know that the units on the front are subordinate to the Germans and their orders have to be carried out. But do you remember the verbal instruction I gave you the last time we took leave of each other? Do you recall what I told you when you took command of the army?" Beregfy replied with a yes. And when the call was ended, the General wiped his perspiring forehead, stared in front of him for a moment and turned to the two other staff officers present in the room:

Although I should not, I must tell you what his Excellency had told me when we last took leave of each other. He had advised me that according to the agreement with the Germans he had no say in the deployment of Hungarian units on the front. But, if the Germans attempt to take away as much as one single division from the Carpathian zone, the agreement becomes void. Hungarian units can be deployed only in the Carpathian sector and can withdraw only in the direction of the country's boundaries!²³

On the 31st of July General Beregfy was replaced. The new commander of the 1st Hungarian army, which by this time was moving towards the Carpathians, became Béla Miklós, the former director of Horthy's Military Bureau. It was at this time that the still existing and, indeed, very active "Bureau of Defection" succeeded in finding someone with contacts in Soviet Russia. He was, by his own confession, a former landowner from Upper Hungary who had fought in the Russian Civil War on the side of the Reds. He claimed to know the Soviet leaders and said that he had been a friend of General Voroshilov.²⁴ In the Royal Palace of Buda there was a sigh of relief: the contact man had been found! The reason for this feeling of satisfaction in Budapest was the fact that the Regent, while making the preparations for the changeover in Hungary, was also anxious to make the necessary foreign policy moves. In Switzerland, György Bakách-Bessenyei (Hungarian Minister in Bern until March 19th 1944) began discussions with Allen Dulles and the British. What he was aiming for was a joint Anglo-American occupation of Hungary. But the Red Army could not be neglected either. Strange as it may seem, however, the Hungarians had no contacts whatever with the Soviets. In the neutral countries, Hungary's representatives had resigned in March to protest the German occupation. They were replaced mostly by pro-German *chargés*. And in Switzerland, where the loyal Bakách-Bessenyei was operating, there were no Soviet diplomats.

Early in September Rosemberg, the "former landowner" and the newly found contact man, was taken by special limousine to Huszt, the headquarters of the 1st Hungarian Army. But there he had a

change of heart. "He brought up all kinds of excuses, including his advanced age, and said that he was afraid to go on the mission" wrote the officer who had accompanied Rosemberg on a subsequent car trip to Budapest.²⁵ Soon thereafter, on the initiative of the Bureau of Defection and a few leaders of the resistance movement, attempts were made to establish contacts with the Soviets. But none of the Hungarian agents had official accreditation, and Moscow did not react to the feelers. In fact, the Soviet leaders took the mission of Baron Ede Aczél almost as an insult: how could Horthy entrust the negotiation of an armistice to an ensign?

The month of August had brought many important, in fact, fateful developments both in the realm of the internal and that of external affairs. Horthy received representatives of the liberal resistance movement who came to him with a completed government list. Either Zoltán Tildy, the leader of the Smallholder Party, or (temporarily) István Bethlen must become the new premier. There must be a coalition government in which all the democratic parties and even the communists had representation. Horthy announced that he had decided to break with the Germans for good. At the first opportunity he would appoint a military caretaker government. This would do what he wanted it to do because he would "retain control over the forces."²⁶

On the 23rd of August King Michael of Rumania had the pro-German government of Antonescu removed. The Marshal himself was arrested in the Royal Palace. The new government, headed by General Sanatescu, appealed for and obtained an immediate armistice with the Allies. Responding to a Royal proclamation, the Rumanian Army opened the front before the Soviets. In his rage, Hitler had Bucharest bombed. What this had achieved was that the Rumanians declared war on their former allies and began hostilities against them. Horthy used these dislocations in the political and military affairs of southeastern Europe to make his move. While assuring Veesebmayer of Hungary's continued loyalty and promising to "send all available units" to the front to compensate for the Rumanian perfidy, Horthy sent for Lakatos and on the 25th forced Sztójay to submit his resignation. Still, the formation of the new government took four days. Veesebmayer refused to agree to the appointment of the Lakatos government unless two reliable pro-Germans (Béla Jurcsek and Lajos Reményi-Schneller) were included in it.

The government of Géza Lakatos was the government of "defection." At least, this was the task assigned to the General by the Regent. Although we have no reason to doubt Lakatos' honesty and his loyalty to the Regent, events proved that the Premier was more of a hindrance than an asset to Horthy's subsequent plans. He could not

understand that the extraordinary times and circumstances had placed special demands on him and his country. He wanted to discharge the responsibilities of his high office in strict observance of constitutional formulas as if it had been peace time. One must agree with Lieutenant-General Béla Aggteleky, presently of the city of Genf, who, after many years of research, has come to the conclusion that the appointment of Lakatos as Premier was a grave mistake which predetermined the outcome of the events of October 15th.

Immediately following his appointment, Lakatos was confronted by several important decisions. As a result of Rumania's defection, the Transylvanian question again became the central issue of Hungarian politics. Extreme nationalists and even some high-ranking officers were calling for the invasion of southern Transylvania: here was the opportunity to regain the rest of Transylvania from the "perfidious Rumanians." The strategic situation also demanded that Hungarian or German forces occupy the passes of south and eastern Transylvania and thereby prevent the Red Army from crossing the Carpathians. But neither Hungarian nor German troops could be spared for this purpose. And Hitler was still hoping to establish a Rumanian "counter-government" with whose aid he could dislodge the "king and his clique" in Bucharest. If he consented to a Hungarian occupation of southern Transylvania, however, no Rumanian politician would cooperate with him. In Budapest, the Council of State also dealt with the question of southern Transylvania. By that time Horthy had in his hand a telegram from Bakách-Bessenyei warning against any anti-Rumanian moves: after all, Rumania had joined the Allies and it would be a grave mistake to get involved in a war with the Sanatescu government.²⁷ The question of the uprising in Slovakia was also discussed. This anti-Nazi rising had broken out on the 29th of August. The Germans had asked for Hungarian troops to help to quell it, but the Lakatos government refused the request on various grounds.²⁸ By doing so it made a significant contribution to the initial success of the uprising.

On the 31st of August the new Rumanian government officially requested Budapest to evacuate Northern Transylvania which had been awarded to Hungary "illegally through the Diktat of Vienna."²⁹ Hungary was given 48 hours to accept the ultimatum. Even before this time was up, military operations were started by Rumania. In response to this an attack was launched by the Honvéd in the Kolozsvár-Torda sector.³⁰ After some successes the Hungarian offensive was halted; moreover, the Rumanians soon mounted a counter-offensive with the aid of Soviet units which in the meantime had crossed the Carpathians. Within two weeks the Soviet-Rumanian forces reached and in some places even crossed the pre-1940 border of Hungary.

The whole month of September was spent in frantic discussions. Horthy wanted to return to the basic foreign policy line of the Kállay government and call for an English-American occupation of Hungary—even if only with a token force of one or two divisions of paratroopers. He sent General Náday to Allied headquarters in Caserta, Italy, for negotiations. Through Colonel-General Gustáv Henyey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he tried to attain his aim in the secret discussions with Allied representatives in Bern. All this was done in spite of the fact that Bakách-Bessenyei had warned in a telegram already at the end of August: “. . . in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be made clear that discussions cannot be limited to the English and the Americans; every attempt at the exclusion of the Russians from them could lead to disaster.”³¹ And when Horthy continued to adhere to the idea of an “Anglo-American” solution, the message arrived from Bern on the 21st of September. “Nothing,” began the telegram in a plain and clear language, “but an unconditional surrender can be entertained. It is hopeless to imagine that the English and the Americans will sacrifice their own troops so as to save us who have persevered against them to the very end, from the Russians and the other, smaller allied powers. The only course of action left to us is to offer an unconditional armistice and thereby prevent the further waste of Hungarian blood!”³²

Among Horthy’s advisers perhaps the only realistic statesman was Count Bethlen.³³ He had realized early in September that for an armistice Hungary had to turn to the Russians and could not turn to anyone else. Bethlen had reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that the wildest rumours were reaching the Palace in these days. “Well-informed members of the resistance movement” on the fifth of September claimed to have learned from the Swedish Embassy that an Anglo-American force was to appear on the Drava River within five days. Indeed, in mid-September some English units landed on the islands of the Dalmatian coast. In the Royal Palace in Budapest this was taken as the beginning of the long awaited invasion of the Balkans by the Western Powers.

In the meantime there were talks and more talks. Horthy received General Guderian and, on several occasions, Ambassador Veesenmayer. He held discussions with the more prominent figures of the resistance movement and, on the 14th, even Samu Stern, the President of the Jewish Council, paid a visit to the Palace. From the beginning of the month, Horthy was stressing the need for a break with the Germans and the ending of Hungary’s involvement in the war at “any price.” On the 7th there was a meeting of the Council of State presided over by Horthy himself. The whole cabinet was there as well as the Chief-of-Staff and the heads of the Regent’s Military Bureau and

Bureau of State. At this meeting Horthy "officially" announced his plan. Lakatos immediately asked to speak and declared that without the consent of Parliament he, as Premier, would not undertake the task. The Regent replied that "Parliament no longer reflected the will of the nation because many members were under arrest, others were hiding and the rest were intimidated. He did not agree with the Premier's views. He concluded the debate by the sentence: I stand accountable before the nation and history!"³⁴

In his recollections, written on 28 October 1944 in Tihany, Lakatos described the Regent's plans in the following way:

The difference of opinion between His Excellency the Regent and the union government had become manifest already during the first weeks . . . He was guided by the highest of ideals when he repeatedly voiced the view that a way had to be found to approach the Allies lest the end of the war would find us on the side of vanquished Germany. This was in essence his basic aim. It must be added that through this policy he wanted to prevent useless loss of blood and the slaughter of Hungarian youths. He was confident that if the Russians flooded the country not as conquerors but as a force occupying a country which had concluded an armistice, the extermination of the educated, the mass deportations and material destruction would take place on a reduced scale . . .³⁵

On the 11th of September, at a meeting of Horthy's "secret advisers" the decision was reached: Hungary had to turn to the Soviet Union for an armistice. Gradually Horthy realized that in this manner he could not count on the support of the Lakatos government. But that government could not be replaced. "[Horthy] was determined to carry out his plan . . ." wrote Lieutenant-General Antal Vattay, the Regent's aide-de-camp, in his unpublished memoirs, "even though he was left to himself; there was no other solution for him: he had to leave the government out and act alone!" Vattay remarks that "At the time the Regent was 77 years old but despite this he undertook the difficult step, against his government's wishes. Everyone in close contact with him could notice that the years and the many family tragedies did not pass him by without leaving their marks. His will and vitality was not the same any more, the signs of advanced age were showing, but in spite of his many years he persevered in his decision even though his spirit had been strongly shaken by the behaviour of his government."³⁶

During the next few weeks the delegation which was to be sent to the Soviet government was selected, while the tireless Lieutenant-General Bakay reinforced the security forces of Budapest and began preparations for the expected developments. Through General Újzászy, and with the aid of Imre Kovács, contact was made with the leaders of the illegal Communist Party, László Rajk who promised to arm the workers of Budapest if the party could get weapons from the

army.³⁷ (Rajk was under false illusions: his party had a "membership" of 80 to 100 men. The workers followed either Szálasi or Demény and Weissshaus, the leaders of the Communist Party's Trotskyist faction.) Strangely enough, the Regent trusted Chief-of-Staff Vörös and even on the 15th of October, he was convinced that his orders would be obeyed by the Honvéd down to the last man. Only Colonel-General József Heszlényi, the pro-Nazi commander of the 3rd Army, was slated for dismissal. General Ferenc Farkas, the commander of the Fourth Army Corps, was to take over the 3rd Army. The Commanders of the other two armies, Béla Miklós and Lajos Veress, were dedicated followers of the Regent. When they advised Horthy to issue the armistice proclamation from the headquarters of the 1st Army in the Carpathians, the old gentleman indignantly rejected the suggestion: in these stormy days how could he leave the ship's bridge that the Palace represented?

The well-known events of the 15th of October quickly foiled the plan which had taken Horthy many months to prepare. The reason for this is easy to establish from the distance of three decades: the pro-Nazi elements within the government and the high command were informed about every move made by the Regent. They alerted the Germans who, with Veessenmayer at the helm, could take immediate counter-measures. In fact, the Germans even had an advantage: they had plenty of time to prepare Szálasi's *coup d'état*. In the critical hour Horthy found himself alone. The Germans had made sure that his most loyal followers: Generals Szilárd Bakay, Kálmán Hárty, Lajos Veress and Béla Aggteleky, were not at their assigned posts. Moreover, by kidnapping Miklos Horthy Jr., the Germans assumed the initiative. The population of the capital and the country watched the unfolding of events in the Royal Palace with apathy, as if their fate was not affected by the struggle. The members of the resistance movement, liberals or communists, did not stir. Only in three places in Budapest was there armed resistance against the Germans and their Arrow Cross allies: in the Royal Palace, where General Lázár and the palace guards fought a besieging force under SS-Colonel Skorzenyi, on Népszínház Street where Jewish conscript workers fired on a column of Arrow Cross men, and in the Andrásy Armories where officers with Arrow Cross sympathies shot Colonel István Latorczay as he tried to rally the soldiers to the defence of the Palace. On the front, the units were silent. János Vörös went into hiding so that while matters were being decided he did not have to give orders. Local commands seeking directives were instructed by Colonel Lajos Nádas in accordance with Szálasi's wishes.

The last act of the tragedy that had taken place in the Palace, started on the 16th. From Lakatos down almost to the last man, all

urged Horthy to reach a compromise with the Germans: to withdraw his proclamation of the previous day and resign. The tension of the past 24 hours had broken Horthy. In return for the life of his one remaining son (whose safety Veesenmayer swore to guarantee) the Regent signed the papers placed before him including the appointment of Szálasi as Premier.

No, Horthy did not become a General Moscardo as the Palace of Buda did not become the Alkazar of Toledo. To his credit, Horthy in the last hour had tried to save his country from destruction by the German and Russian armies. In the interest of his nation he was willing even to come to terms with the Soviets, although (as Imre Kovács puts it in one of his studies) "what communism represented and practiced went against his upbringing, heritage, ideals and entire past . . ." In connection with the "defection," Horthy himself had committed blunders: he made a poor choice of associates, trusted blindly in the loyalty of the army and refused to attack his former ally, the *Wehrmacht*, in the back. Furthermore, to the very end he honoured the promise he had given to Hitler that if Hungary ended the war against the Allies, he would inform Berlin in advance.

In the evening of the 16th, the Germans took ex-Regent Horthy and his family to Kelenföld station where a train was waiting for them. On Hitler's orders, they were to be taken for detention to Hirschberg near Weilheim in Barvaria. Almost twenty-five years earlier Horthy had arrived at Kelenföld station to start his march into the "evil city" to restore order. The era associated with his name was born then in blood and disgrace. Now, in 1944, that era expired in blood and disgrace despite Horthy's best intentions.

NOTES

1. Miklós Horthy's letter to Adolf Hitler in the matter of the withdrawal of the Hungarian divisions on the front to the Carpathian line of defence. Miklós Szinai and László Szücs (eds.), *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai* [The confidential papers of Miklós Horthy] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1962), p. 409.
2. For details see: Nicholas Kállay, *Hungarian Premier: A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
3. Sándor Radó, *Dóra Jelenti* [Dóra reports] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1971), p. 269. Radó, a colonel in the Red Army, was the chief of Soviet intelligence operations in Switzerland during World War II. At the end of February, 1943 the Hungarian Ministry of External Affairs contacted Radó in Bern, requesting that he mediate between the Soviet Union and Hungary concerning a peace-pact. In March of 1943 Radó got a negative answer from Moscow. In his recollections he writes: "This move had no chance of ascertaining the attitude of the Soviet Union toward a compromise peace!"
4. Gyula Kádár, "Emlékezés az ország német megszállására: 1944 március 19" [Memories of the country's occupation: 19 March 1944] *Hadtörténelmi*

- Közlemények [Military History Communications] 1974 no. 1, p. 78.
5. Andreas Hillgruber (ed.), *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes, Zweiter Teil: 1942-1944* (Frankfurt am Mai: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1970) p. 245.
 6. For details see: Pál Pritz, "A kieli találkozó" [The Kiel meeting], *Századok* [Centuries] 1974 no. 3, pp. 646-679.
 7. *A tízhónapos tragédia. 1944 március 19 - 1945 január 20* [The ten-month-long tragedy: 19 March 1944 to 20 January 1945] First and second part. (Budapest, 1945), p. 47.
 8. György Ránki, *1944 március 19* [19 March 1944] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1968).
 9. Kádár, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. Döme Sztójay, Hungarian Minister to Berlin, 1936-44; Hungary's Premier from March to August of 1944.
 12. Hillgruber, *op. cit.*, p. 392.
 13. Information from a source very close to the Horthy family.
 14. For further details see: Ernő Mucsi, *Hogyan történt? Adatok és okmányok a magyar zsidóság tragédiájához* [How did it happen? Facts and documents on the tragedy of the Hungarian Jewry] (Budapest: Renaissance Kiadás, 1947), especially chapters 5 and 6.
 15. Miklós Horthy's memorandum to Döme Sztójay in the matter of the moderation of the excesses of the government measures taken for the "solution" of the Jewish question, also in the matter of the dismissal of László Baky and László Endre. Szinai and Szücs, *op. cit.*, pp. 450-53.
 16. Veessenmayer's telegram to the German Foreign Office, 11 July 1944, in György Ránki *et al.* (eds.) *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933-1944* [The Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. German diplomatic documents on Hungary, 1933-1944] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1968), p. 881.
 17. See the manuscript of Ferenc Koszorus, "Az első erőszakos náci hatalom átvételi kísérlet meghiúsítása Budapesten 1944 júliusában" [The defeat of the first Nazi attempt to take power in Budapest, July, 1944], in the author's possession. Colonel Koszorus was the commander of the armored division which, on Horthy's order, was dispatched in the direction of Budapest in order to prevent by force a possible coup by the gendarmerie.
 18. Veessenmayer's telegram to Ribbentrop, 21 July 1944, in Ránki, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 455.
 20. Peter Gosztony (editor and translator), "Das private Kriegstagebuch des Chefs des ungarischen Generalstabes vom Jahre 1944," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 1970 No. 12, p. 706.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 708.
 22. *Ibid.*
 23. Béla Király to Peter Gosztony. In 1944 Király served with the Fourth Hungarian Army Corps as a captain of the General Staff. He had been present during Beregfy's telephone conversation.
 24. The letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Lajos Csukássy-Gartner to the author, 25 February 1969. Csukássy-Gartner was Béla Miklós' personal aide in 1944. According to other sources, Rosenberg claimed to have made the acquaintance of Voroshilov in the 1930's when he had sold horses to the Soviets.
 25. The letter of Csukássy-Gartner, *cit.*
 26. For details see István Pintér, *Magyar antifaszizmus és ellenállás* [Hungarian anti-fascism and resistance] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1975) pp. 346ff. See also the unpublished recollections of Dr. Pál Jaczkó dealing with the liberal resistance movement of 1944 (MS in the author's possession).
 27. János Csima (ed.), "A horthista diplomácia előzetes fegyverszüneti tárgyalásai Bernben 1944 augusztusának végén és szeptember havában. Táviratok."

- [The preliminary armistice negotiations of horthyite diplomacy in Bern at the end of August and in September of 1944. Telegrams], *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* [Military History Communications] 1965 No. 4, p. 732.
28. The manuscript of István Bárczy de Bárcziháza on the 1941-44 period, p. 97. Copy in the author's possession. (From 1928 to 1944 Bárczy was the *chef de protocole* of the Premier's office as well as the keeper of the minutes of the Ministerial Council.)
 29. V. Anescu *et al.* (eds.), *Rumania in razboiul antihitlerist 23 august 1944 - 9 mai 1945* [Rumania in the war against Hitler 23 August 1944 to 9 May 1945] (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1966) Also: Daniel Csatári, *Forgószélben. A magyar-román viszony, 1940-1945* [In the whirlwind: Hungarian-Rumanian relations, 1940-1945] (Budapest: Akadémiai Könyvkiadó, 1968).
 30. For details see Lajos Veress, *Magyarország honvédelme a II. világháboru előtt es alatt, 1920-1945* [Hungary's defence before and during World War II, 1920-1945] (Munich: Nemzetőr, 1973), Vol. III. pp. 9-68. During the autumn of 1944, General Veress was the commander of the Transylvanian (Second) Hungarian Army.
 31. Csima, *op. cit.*, p. 732.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 734.
 33. Count István Bethlen, from 1921 to 1931 Hungary's Premier during the Second World War one of Horthy's pro-English advisers.
 34. Bárczy, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
 35. Peter Gosztony (ed.), "Lakatos Géza beszámolója a miniszterelnöki tevékenységéről" [Géza Lakatos' account of his activities as Premier] *Új Látóhatár* [New Horizon], 1970, No. 5. p. 444.
 36. The recollections of Lieutenant-General Antal Vattay; a manuscript written in 1965. Copy in the possession of the author.
 37. For details see Imre Kovács, *In Schatten der Sowjets* (Zürich: Thomas Verlag, 1948), pp. 50-54.
 38. János Kádár, "A Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja felosztása körülményeinek és a Békepárt munkájának néhány kérdéséről, 1943 június - 1944 szeptember" [Concerning the circumstances of the dissolution of the Hungarian Communist Party and the work of the Peace Party, June 1943 to September 1944] *Párttörténelmi Közlemények* [Party History Communications] 1956, No. 3, p. 20.
 39. Imre Kovács, "Kiugrási kísérletek a második világháboruban" [Attempts at separate peace during the Second World War] *Új Látóhatár*, 1963, No. 3, p. 266.

Book Reviews

Das Völkerwanderungszeitliche Graberfeld von Környe. By Ágnes Salamon and István Erdélyi. (Studia Archaeologica, V.) Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1971. 184 pp., 31 fig. 14 plates, \$16.00.

This book, which was extremely well received by Eastern and Western European scholars, has to my knowledge not yet been reviewed in an American periodical. Among Eastern European scholars, Russians, Czechs, Rumanians, and Hungarians wrote extremely favorable critiques. In the West, German, Swiss, and Austrian experts have also found the work to be trailblazing, opening up a new direction in the research on the Great Migration period after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The book presents documentation which will require a revision of the currently accepted chronology of the appearance of the early Avars in the Carpathian Basin.

The material treated came from 152 graves near the town of Környe. It is worthy of note that about 50% of the bone material discovered was suitable for anthropological examination. The biochemical examination of the skeleton findings was made by I. Lengyel; the morphological and general anthropological analysis, by T. Toth. The book is written in German with the exception of the analysis by Toth, which appears in English.

Toth's anthropological analysis also suggests a possible need for correcting the chronology of the appearance of the Avars in the Danubian area. Toth believes that the predominance of the Proto-Europoid and Mediterranean characteristics of the Avars is possibly connected with an autochthonous group of the Roman period both in the Central Danubian Basin and in the Transdanubian area. All the foregoing shows strong analogies to the early Avaric period. It is noticeable that many horse burials were discovered at Környe. The orientations of certain group graves indicate a possible family burial system. In addition to the assembled wooden coffins, many coffins were carved out of tree trunks.

In the third part of the book the authors describe all their findings in great detail. The presentation of the findings was made by the Computer Code System which Salamon established for Avaric remains and published in 1966.

The scientific treatment of the findings is extremely effective. Well-designed diagrams give quick views for the reader of the results of analyses performed. In the sociological analysis the authors group together the graves as those of the rich, average and poor, which gives a new aspect to their analysis. On another chart, the yields are also grouped together for historical and sociological analysis according to their utility and not to sex of the skeleton. (Female, male, child.) However, a general short tabulation of sexes in relation to the findings is also included.

Since the anthropological report concluded that the autochthonous and the German migrant groups could easily have composed the early Avar epoch in Környe, I would welcome another tabulation to show statistically the stylistic origin (Byzantine, Roman, German, Avaric and other barbaric) of the findings in relation to the position and the network of the graves and to the anthropologically established racial distribution.

On the basis of the classification in six groups and the analysis of all grave articles, the authors conclude that the stylistically heterogeneous origins of the findings are represented in most of the graves. This fact suggests quite a cosmopolitan though homogeneous society of the early Avars, who maintained and mixed Western, Byzantine, and inner Asiatic artistic and utilitarian traditions.

The assumption of the heterogeneous nature of the Avars has long preoccupied scholars as a highly hypothetical and controversial issue. The excavation in Környe is indeed a great step forward toward the acceptance of this highly disputed thesis. Perhaps this is the reason why both Eastern and Western scholars were so eager to review and evaluate this book so positively.

By suggesting the heterogeneous nature of the Avars the authors are opening the door to further hypotheses which will stimulate scholars to further scientific disputes. It is stated as a possibility that the cemetery of Környe holds the remains of the settlement of mercenary groups from Byzantium. This settlement also contained racially heterogeneous elements.

Since the publication of the book, the result of research on the weapons found at the excavation in Környe has been published. The scholarly world now is awaiting the publication of the physico-chemical examination of the ceramics and the serological date of the bones. Such additional information will complete the evaluation of the finding of the Avaric cemetery in Környe, for which the book of Salamon and Erdélyi is essential.

Sándor Petőfi; His Entire Poetic Works. A translation by Frank Szomy. 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, Fla., Published by the Author, 1972. Illus. Pp. 773).

Frank Szomy's intention, to make available an English translation of the poetic works of Sandor Petofi is a laudable one. Unfortunately, neither his command of the nuances of Hungarian nor his talent for English versification is equal to the task. In all fairness it should be noted that Mr. Szomy assumes no false airs and acknowledges in the "Foreword" that "the effort has been devoted to giving an accurate version of the thoughts and ideas of the poet." This much is generally accomplished, even when some of the thoughts suffer so much in the translation that their freshness and vitality disappear.

In general, poems that are chiefly narrative or descriptive are more successfully translated than those lyrics in which both the imagery and the music of the lines are essential to the total meaning. So a poem like *The Apostle* communicates the meaning of Petofi's original. However, since the excellent verse translation of Victor Clement has been in print for more than ten years, Mr. Szomy would have been well advised to give merely a brief prose summary and direct the reader to that work. It is this lack of awareness of the scholarly work in progress, this isolation from current scholarship in Hungarian literature that is one of the major drawbacks of the work. It is certainly at the root of most of the errors found in the volume.

The two other long narrative poems, *The Village Hammer* and *John the Hero* have not yet appeared in a better English version, so Szomy's rendering of the story is adequate. Unfortunately, Petofi's playful and ironic style does not come across in the translation of the former, and the mock heroic tone is lost. A study of the techniques of Pope's *Rape of the Lock* or Byron's *Don Juan* would profit any translator of the satiric Petofi. The second epic is an even more difficult poem to translate. Petofi uses a genre and a vocabulary that is not familiar to the Western reader. The imaginative world of the poem is closed to the translator, as it had been to John Bowring and William Loew, though Szomy at least gives an accurate version. Still, some disturbing elements remain: "Kanaan" of Canto XI is translated as "Caen," and in Canto XIII the imagery is transformed into pedestrian verbosity:

 Johnnie Corn and the princess
 Reached the battlefield at sunset.
 The setting sun's last rays
 Looked with reddened eyes at the terrible scene.

Even the name, "Johnnie Corn"—a literal translation—comes across in English quite differently from the melodic and romantic "Kukoricza Jancsi."

In most of the poems the failure to render the connotation of the words prevents the translator from capturing the tone of the poem even when the "dictionary" equivalent is accurate. The real meaning is lost when "Asszonyom" in "Maria Szechy" appears as "My woman; the literal translation of "kikeltik" by "hatch out" in "I Hear the Sound of the Lark Again" brings in connotations that are inappropriate to the poem. The list can go on, and regrettably these are not always merely errors in tone but also in sense: "könynyü termetedet" translated by "your light nature" is inaccurate as well as destructive to the mood of the poem; "a varmegye embere" is not "the men from Var County," nor is "lovagkor" the same as "days of horses." Finally, the poem on his parents' death speaks of a reunion (vizontlatas; , not a farewell. Other times the translation is disturbing even when not quite so far from the mark: "saloon" is not the equivalent of "kocsma" and there is no such word as "saloon-keepstress."

This would be nitpicking, were it not that such errors detract from the meaning and effect of the poem. If the purpose of translation is to make an author's work known beyond his country, and Mr. Szomy avows this is his intention, these errors are real problems. The poet's passionate appeal against German tyranny is lost in "Governor Bank" as the first stanza degenerates into meaningless phrases:

That second Endre . . .
Labored, under a slipper, to breath;
His wife held the reins
Of the country,
And the wagon did sway because of this,
First this way and then that way.

The English idiom of "henpecked" and the original of "from one side to the other" would render the sense much better. The use of slang ("own bunch," "gotten lost") and grammatical errors of case and tense further dilute the effect of the original. "Okatootaia" (shortened for some reason to Ikatoota"), a satire on Hungarian backwardness and an attack on Austria, loses its point when the parentheses in "Austr(al)ia" are eliminated.

In the foreword, the translator disclaims any effort at a poetic translation, yet some poetic effects can not be ignored. One expects an accurate reproduction of the sense of the poem, and often this means a duplication of tone and mood as well as words. "From Afar" loses its meaning when the limpid iambics disappear in halting prose arranged in short lines; "At the End of September" likewise fails. Marital poems such as "I Dream of Bloody Days" and "National Song" or a marching

song like "Rise to the Holy War!" are not the same when the beat is lost.

As mentioned earlier, many poems in the book give an accurate idea of Petofi's thoughts. Thus "Patriotic Song," one of the early poems, captures both the meaning and the spirit of the original, as does "Finally I Can Have Julia" and the poem "To Laci Arany." Others could be added to the list, but there is no point in such a catalogue. The reader should consult the work and, keeping in mind the shortcomings, use the literal translations as a guide. Unfortunately, it can not be used to savor the poetry of Petofi.

Many problems could have been solved if Mr. Szomy had had an editor, or at least had consulted with someone who was acquainted with Hungarian literature and the rules of formal English. Such glaring errors as the translation of "Vörösmartyhoz" as "To Marti Voros" or Ottokar as "Otto Karol" would have been avoided. Similarly, the use of capitals for common nouns (Komondorok, Kikiris), possessives for plurals (Szekely's), and the nominative case where the accusative is required for the indicative mood where the subjunctive is needed would have been corrected. Typographical errors (a execrated; *slim* for *slime*; Visakna), though relatively few, are nevertheless disturbing, especially since one is never certain that these were not intentionally written so. Finally, an editor would have caught the problem of using only one source: "Egri hangok" is translated as "The Bells of Eger" since the text used by Mr. Szomy has this error; to anyone who is acquainted with Petofi's poetry the mistake is obvious, though even without this prescience, the title has no relevance to the poem.

The final problem is Mr. Szomy's desire to give an "Americanized" version. To attain this this, he takes liberties with idiom and names. The latter is extremely disturbing when historical or literary figures are re-named, when proper names appear without accents (Gomor; Kecskemet; Alfold; Honderu; Matyas) or when a needless reversal of order results in the poem "To Miss B.O."

The book, published by the author, is handsomely bound and the pen and ink drawings that illustrate it further enhance its appearance. The typed manuscript, photographically reproduced, is neat and very readable, though a drawback of this method of printing is that the book is too bulky. The arrangement of the poems follows the chronological one generally used in editions of Petofi's complete poems. The table of contents helpfully gives the Hungarian as well as the English titles, though the lack of an alphabetical index is regrettable.

The magnitude of the undertaking, and the evidence of dedicated work, deserve praise. Furthermore, as a working tool for other trans-

lators—in the nature of an interlinear version—this volume can be of service. It is the only *complete* translation of *all* of Petofi's poems into English, and it certainly surpasses the recent issue of some rudimentary notes by Anton Nyerges (*Petofi*. Ed. by Joseph Ertavy-Barath. Buffalo, Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1973) precisely in this. Later translators can certainly be indebted to Frank Szomy and his family for this systematic work.

The American University

Eniko Molnar Basa

NEWS ITEM

The Immigration History Research Center will again offer grants-in-aid and research assistantships during 1976-77.

Grants-in-aid up to \$3,000 for travel and living expenses are available to doctoral candidates, recent Ph.D's and established scholars. Deadline for 1976 applications is November 15, 1975.

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Review of Reviews*

Hungary. By Paul Ignotus. Nations of the Modern World. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, Pp. 333.

The very first impression is disconcerting. Here is another brief history to be added to the dozen other brief histories headed by C.A. Macartney's *Hungary: A Short History* (Edinburgh University Press, 1962) when what we need is a long history of Hungary in English . . . The first chapter seems to confirm the disillusionment: history until the end of the eighteenth century is dismissed in forty-odd pages not free of clichés and factual mistakes . . . But then, Mr. Ignotus, a well-known and talented writer but not a professional historian, himself protests his bias in the introduction as to what he finds interesting in Hungarian history and what he doesn't. He comes into his own with the description of the first Reform Generation of intellectuals in Hungary, and his writings thereafter becomes breathtakingly interesting. Foreign policy remains neglected to the end, but domestic affairs are treated judiciously and in great detail, and we learn more and more of the role intellectuals, especially writers and poets, played in politics. The approach is urban and liberal, which causes some peasant politicians and populist writers to come out badly: a judgement which I cannot but agree with. There are beautiful passages on Hungarian society, the explosive role of the Jews, the accomplishments of the second Reform Generation of intellectuals in the early twentieth century, the troubles of the interwar period—that Ignotus knows personally—and the triumphs and disasters of the post-1945 era in which the author played a distinguished role, except when he languished in prison as a victim of Mátyás Rákosi. The concluding description of Hungary today is scholarly and fascinating; the style is always elegant and witty, but factual errors continue almost to the end . . . This is a travelogue that takes the reader through history and through the lives of Hungary's political and cultural leaders: the guide

* The inclusion of a book in this section does not preclude a review of it in the Book Review section of a future issue of *CARHS*.

shows only what he wishes to show, but his explanations are almost always excellent. There are good pictures and a fine appendix on Hungarian language and poetry.

Istvan Deak (Columbia University), *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (March 1973).

Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism, 1791-1841. By George Barany. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 487.

Unlike some studies of the past dealing with Hungarian history Professor Barany's work relies on a formidable array of primary material. He also utilizes documents previously unknown to Széchenyi scholars. This ambitious study sets out, according to the title, to deal with the life story of Count Stephen Széchenyi and his impact on the emergence of Hungarian nationalism. Actually, it covers only the first fifty years of his life. Yet the scope is much broader than suggested by the title: it also encompasses numerous related aspects and details of the Hungarian, the Austrian imperial, and European backgrounds . . .

The name of Stephen Széchenyi (1791-1860) pertains to the same historical context as that of Louis Kossuth. While in the 1840's the image of the latter was gradually growing into an epitome of freedom and national reform, it was the former who could not avoid regarding it as his misfortune to have enabled Kossuth to become the spokesman for the nation. It was Széchenyi whose mind proved most susceptible to the new ideas of Europe of the time. Thus he adopted sufficient liberalism to initiate and stand up for social, political, and economic changes on a large scale . . . He became enough of a nationalist to feel emotionally involved in the promotion of what he considered Magyar national interests. But he showed himself circumspect in discerning danger in the introduction of sweeping changes. He was sufficiently cosmopolitan and courageous to insist on the according of fair and just treatment to all the nationalities of Hungary. His attempt, however, to unmask Kossuth as a reckless agitator and a firebrand, only facilitated "the rise of a new star [Kossuth] over the horizon." Széchenyi himself suffered an agonizing blow in both losing popularity with the liberal opposition and failing to gain moral and political support from Metternich . . .

Széchenyi kept diaries regularly—an almost unique occurrence among Hungarian politicians—from the age of twenty-three through

all his adult life. The author interprets them "as analogous to subconscious material elicited by psychiatrists during the process of free association." This assumption enables him to argue on the basis of psychoanalytical considerations that some of the motives for Széchenyi's reforming zeal and many of his public activities derived in a large degree from highly subjective motives . . .

The author does refer to Széchenyi's "system" of thought, but is content at this stage to present the related material grouped as it occurs in Széchenyi's successive writings. However, even such terse references to it as "idealistic," "romantic" and that it is "rested on the immovable values of supreme justice and the rewarding inner calm of one's conscience" tend to stress the true dimensions of the mental conflicts analyzed in the book. Not enough prominence is accorded to the salient role that philosophy, ancient and modern, as well as religion played in the cultural climate of Széchenyi's era. Indeed, he was a true son of his age in this respect and consistently adhered to principles adopted in his youth . . .

The proper evaluation of influences leading to Széchenyi's mental collapse and eventual suicide remains to be presented in the continuation of the present volume, alongside the integration into a final summation of many penetrating, but somewhat isolated observations, often the results of brilliant analysis.

Factual errors apart . . . this is an exhaustively researched book, written in a crisp, very readable style. It will be an indispensable tool for Széchenyi historians and students of the history of nineteenth-century East-Central Europe.

Martin L. Kovacs (University of Regina), *Canadian Journal of History*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (April 1972).

Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870. A Study of Ideas of Individuality and Social Pluralism in Modern Politics. By Paul Bódy. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Volume 62, Part 2, Philadelphia, 1972. Pp. 134.

One of the major assumptions of the study posits that it was the ideas and ideals embraced by Joseph Eötvös (1813-1871) in his formative years that were, often against the pressure of public opinion or prevailing political trends, the decisive factor in the formulation of his political recommendations, as writer, creative politician, and Minister of Public Instruction in 1848 and 1867-71, towards the resolution of the long-festered problems of his country.

The early influences most active in the formation of young Eötvös's thought are traced in the study very appropriately through the guidance of his cultured German mother to the classical humanism of Goethe's and Herder's Weimar, and to patriotism and reforming liberalism through the mediation of his private tutor of Jacobin leanings. During his university studies he became more involved in the Hungarian past and its unique and original bearer and custodian, the Magyar peasant. The readings of Victor Hugo, Sismondi, Tocqueville and Guizot tended to sharpen his existing views and to deepen his understanding of the working of society . . . Eötvös, a true son of his intellectual forebears, was also fascinated by the harmonious coherence of things and by their underlying unity and wholeness. But to him, the most important of all unities was *man* who, as a free agent, ought to possess dignity and freedom in its political, social, economic and cultural aspects. Man's separation from his dignity and freedom, his alienation from *wholeness*, from belongingness to human community, owing to such accidents as sociocultural differences, was regarded by Eötvös as the most serious ailment, the root of all other evils. Thus Hungary's manifold problems in his time tended for the statesman to come to a head in three major issues: the abolition of noble privileges or, conversely, the emancipation of the peasants; a clear and acceptable definition of the relationship between Hungary and the empire; and the question of the national minorities. The remedy for such types of alienation Eötvös hoped to find in the judicious extension of political rights, autonomy both at the private and at the institutional-group levels yet within the same *existing* political structure. However, as Eötvös had the occasion to argue against Széchenyi, the necessary condition for the proper exercise of civil rights, which in turn forms the prerequisite of all peaceful reforms, is constituted by education. For it is cultural progress and the resultant deeper insight that enhance respect for the rights of others and human dignity . . .

Dr. Bódy finds that the continuity between Eötvös's youthful thought as expressed most systematically in his novel *The Carthusian* and his greatest political feat, the Elementary Education Act, 1868, is very tangible indeed. This fact and the modernity of the intentions of the Act emerge strikingly from the author's terse summary describing this law as "the attempt to protect the variety and freedom of education in the broadest sense by acknowledging the right of each individual, township, association, nationality and church to sponsor and exercise control over schools."

Evidently, his educational proposals, incorporating recommendations on secondary and higher education as well which, however, never became laws, were meant by Eötvös to complement his Nation-

ality Bill of 1867. This much-debated proposal recommended the use in public official communication by each citizen, township, church and county of his or its native or official language, but with the strict observation of the related rights of the central Hungarian government, and of individuals or groups constituting minorities within minorities. The resultant *Nationality Act, 1868*, was passed only with major amendments . . . The reluctance with which Eötvös's two Acts were passed by the legislature and the lack of appreciation on the part of most minority leaders indicated absence of sufficient public support for the measures. These attitudes and the gradual whittling away by successive Hungarian ministries of some of the guarantees provided in the two Acts do not appear quite unexpected, we may add, in the atmosphere of post-1850 Europe of *Realpolitik*, linguistic nationalism, and social Darwinism . . .

One major strength of Dr. Bódy's study lies in his fine, penetrating and sustained analysis of Eötvös's thought and its interaction with the harsh reality of his contemporaries' political opinions and ambitions. He skillfully portrays Eötvös's growing private frustrations over the failure, with a few exceptions, of politicians both of the governing Magyar nation and of the national minorities to rise above the fragmented state of ethnocentric interests and to create a truly pluralistic multi-national state as earnestly requested by the statesman, and simultaneously suggests the same failure as one of the main reasons for the ultimate collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. Further, this volume constitutes, in English, the first and only comprehensive treatment of Eötvös as thinker and politician, and is written in a lucid and very readable style . . .

Martin L. Kovacs (University of Regina), *Canadian Journal of History*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (December 1972).

Nationalism in Eastern Europe. By Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969. Pp. 465.

This collective volume, which intends to explore the pattern of Eastern European nationalism from the eighteenth century to the present, is introduced by Professor Sugar's comprehensive and highly perceptive essay "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism." . . .

Historical literature in English is deficient in works on Albanian and Bulgarian history and in particular on nationalism in these countries. Unfortunately, the reader who looks with keen interest to

Mr. Zavalani's essay on Albanian nationalism and to Professor Pundeff's on Bulgarian, will be disappointed. These are nothing but brief political surveys and as such quite useful . . . Professor Zacek's brief contribution in character, yet unlike the previously noted two essays his is concerned with the history of political nationalism and not just with political history. His survey is certainly rich in factual information. Professor Zydis' longer chapter on Greek nationalism is more strongly steeped in intellectual history and offers much valuable information to the Western reader. Professor Fischer-Galati attempts in a brief essay on "Romanian Nationalism" to do equal justice to political, economic, and cultural factors. His task is complicated by the fact that he has to deal with his problem in the frame of different political units. The same is true for Professor Lederer's "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs." . . .

Unquestionably, the four essays by Zacek, Zydis, Fischer-Galati, and Lederer, each in its own way, make a contribution to their subject; but the two best studies are the ones by Professor Barany, "Hungary: from Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism" and Peter Brock, "Polish Nationalism." What distinguishes these two essays is that they put chief emphasis where it belongs, namely on the evolution of ideologies in a broad social frame. They do so, each in a different way, in a comparative, critical manner . . .

All things considered, the reader of the eight essays will have great difficulty in finding even a loose common pattern of nationalism in Eastern Europe which Professor Sugar's challenging introduction invites the authors to pursue further. Yet, he will get much information and some stimulating suggestions as well, altogether not a bad bargain.

Robert A. Kann (Rutgers University) *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. I. No. 1 (Fall 1973).

Ausztria és a Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság, [Austria and the Hungarian Republic of Councils]. By Sándorné Gábor, [Mrs. Sándor Gábor] Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969. Pp. 301.

Hungary's 400-year association with Austria provoked continual dissension between the two peoples. At the end of the Great War, when the two countries finally emerged as sovereign powers, the old antagonisms continued unabated. The newly proclaimed Socialist sister republics paid only grudging lip service to Socialist unity and solidarity. Far from supporting one another, the two Social Democra-

tic regimes became immediately embroiled in a bitter struggle for the possession of West Hungary (Burgenland), a predominantly German speaking region belonging to Hungary. The controversy intensified when in March 1919, Hungary's Social Democratic and Communist Parties merged, and thus strengthened Bela Kun's Marxist regime rode to power in Hungary. While professing friendship for Hungary's working classes, Austria's Socialists colluded with the Entente to appropriate West Hungary. Not to be outdone, the Hungarian Marxists retaliated by plotting to overthrow Austrian Social Democracy and impose a Marxist regime on their troublesome neighbour. Gabor's work is devoted to the explication of these complex events . . .

The problems with Gabor's work—and unfortunately several serious flaws do exist—lie elsewhere. The work is thorough and exhaustive to a fault; so much so in fact that the themes frequently disappear in a welter of detail and marginalia . . . The author has also tended to make sweeping generalizations without the benefit of evidence . . .

Gabor's topic is important, her research fairly thorough, her presentation unfortunately chaotic and out of focus. The author ought to approach the text with red pencil and scissors in hand, and attempt to rectify the serious organizational and interpretive flaws of what could otherwise have been a valuable monograph.

Thomas Spira (University of Prince Edward Island), *East European Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (summer 1974).

Revolution in Perspective Essays on the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Edited by Andrew C. Janos and William B. Slottman. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California, 1971. Pp. 181.

Revolution in Perspective is the edited work that grew out of a conference held in March, 1969 at the University of California at Berkeley commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Its editors are both professors at Berkeley and the slick publication of the University of California press provides an excellent little volume for readers interested in the Hungarian communist movement in particular and in Hungarian history in general.

The content of the volume is highly uneven and deals with issues which are extremely varied. By far the best two essays are written by Professor Janos, the first dealing with the decline of oligarchy from the Compromise of 1867 to the end of World War 1, and the second dealing with the agrarian opposition present at the National Congress

of Soviets during the 133 day existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The first article deserves special mention . . . Professor Janos' analysis of the change that takes place in the pattern of the ruling classes is perhaps the best documented study of the social change in Hungary during the fifty years of the Dual Monarchy. His conclusion, that it was the "breakdown of communication that allowed the ascendance of new elites who were neither more humane, nor more democratic than the gentry, but were more skillful in manipulating the symbols of modern politics," (p. 60) sums up the essay as the best single study of those fifty years.

Peter Kenez's article on "Coalition Politics in the Hungarian Soviet Republic" challenges the notion that the Hungarian Soviet Republic was solely a Communist organized and led affair. He also takes issue with the view that Communists bear the whole responsibility for the failures of that era. Although this contention is debated by many historians, it seems to this reviewer that Kenez's viewpoint is the only interpretation uncolored by historical bias. In March, 1919 the ideological distinctions between Hungarian Communists and Socialists were less exaggerated than they are today . . .

Keith Hitchens' article on the Rumanian Socialists and their contact with the Hungarian Soviet Republic as well as the influence of the Kun regime on Rumanian socialism also as a solid piece of historical research. His article points out the split in the Rumanian socialist movement, torn between their nationalistic attachment to Rumania and their Communist attachment to Moscow. Given the historical circumstances and the "strong national feeling and belief that socialism could develop most effectively within the framework of the national state," (p. 144) there was really nothing that the Hungarian Communists could do to create closer contact with Rumanians in general and Rumanian Communists in particular . . .

Professor Slottman's article dealing with the attitude of some Viennese intellectuals (the *Geistesaristokraten*) toward Hungary and—peripherally—toward the Hungarian Soviet Republic is an entertaining essay . . .

The final brief statement by Richard Lowenthal on the Hungarian Soviet Republic and international communism is a melange of personal analysis interspersed with ideas already exploited elsewhere . . .

Ivan Volgyes (University of Nebraska), *East European Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (Fall 1973).

Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19; nine essays. Edited by Ivan Volgyes. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971. Pp. X, 219.

Perhaps because of the delays our university presses are subject to, *Hungary in Revolution* missed out on the fiftieth anniversary of the "Kun regime" by about two years. No matter, for . . . the volume remains a distinguished scholarly contribution, whether timely or not. The nine authors who have contributed an essay each to the work are already known in the field of recent Hungarian or recent Central European history, and this volume can only enhance their reputation.

Most of the essays are based on documents and many provide an unusual, if not altogether unique, interpretation of these. We learn from the essay by Eva Balogh that the Hungarian leaders were not eager to help establish an independent Slovak Soviet Republic, and that there was confusion in Slovakia as well as in Hungary regarding the nature of the relationship between those two "Soviet" regimes. Balogh's assertion finds indirect confirmation in Rudolph Tokes' brief biography of Bela Kun (the last essay) in which he notes that, in his youth at least, the Transylvanian Kun was something of a Hungarian cultural chauvinist. According to Alfred D. Low, the Great Powers, although more than a bit shaken by the events in Hungary, demonstrated a great deal of weakness (France included), if not outright moderation, in handling the Hungarian situation—a point of view not generally shared by either Hungarian nationalist or Hungarian Marxist historians . . .

What remains unexplained is why the work has taken the form of a cooperative venture, especially since the essays amount to a more or less complete and chronologically ordered account of the "Kun regime" and the Karolyi regime preceding it. Without meaning to deprecate some original and distinguished contributions, I am convinced that Ivan Volgyes . . . could have written the work by himself; in fact, he probably should have, if only to avoid repetitions and provide a more continuous narrative.

But the overall note of my evaluation is that the work is a worthwhile contribution . . .

Mario Fenyo (Universidad Catolica de Puerto Rico), *East European Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1973).

Magyarország külpolitikája 1919-1945 [Hungary's Foreign Policy, 1919-1945]. By Gyula Juhász. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiado, 1969, Pp. 374.

One of the main tasks Hungarian Marxist historians have set for themselves has been a thorough investigation of Hungarian foreign relations during the interwar period. Though an initial motivation may have been the desire to discredit the "Horthy regime," the result has been the appearance since the early 1960's of a noteworthy series of scholarly monographs covering many important topics from the peace settlement to the German occupation . . . This preliminary work has been done, the opportunity was present for the writing of a scholarly survey of Hungarian diplomacy in this period. Gyula Juhász has undertaken this assignment, and this resulting volume, the only one of its kind in any language, is a admirable and valuable contribution to the study of recent Hungarian history.

Juhász, the author of a previous study dealing with Hungarian foreign policy under Pál Teleki, has blended secondary and archival material to present a skillfully balanced account of the intricacies of Hungary's interwar diplomatic history. His thesis is that Hungary was thrust into the ultimately disastrous cooperation with Hitler's Germany by two factors: the unceasing quest for integral revision of the Treaty of Trianon and the need for the counterrevolutionary government to seek ideologically compatible allies. The only diplomatic constellation which would serve these purposes, as Hungarian leaders from Bethlen to Teleki came to discover, was one in which Hungary maintained firm ties with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. These latter two states, like Hungary, were intent on disrupting the peace settlement, and were far more likely than the Western Powers to sanction territorial revision for Hungary . . .

Juhász is at his best in describing the tangled negotiations for a separate peace in 1943 and 1944, the frustrations of the Teleki period, and the attitude of the Great Powers during the peace settlement after World War I . . . Somewhat weaker is the author's treatment of the crisis years of the 1930s. The subtle and complex policy of Kálmán Kánya, Foreign Minister from 1933 to 1938, is not properly examined, and the critical role of the Hungarian military in the formulation of foreign policy is not mentioned . . .

These minor criticisms notwithstanding, Professor Juhász is to be congratulated for his mastering of the relevant primary and secondary materials in at least five languages and his skillful weaving of this material into a balanced and readable narrative. The work is an important contribution to modern East European history and deserves to rank high on the list of books awaiting translation into a Western language.

Thomas L. Sakmyster (University of Cincinnati), *East European Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 3 (September 1972).

Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-44. By Mario D. Fenyo. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. xii + 279.

Felicitous language, clarity of style, and lucid logic make this a delight to read. The author has amassed and digested into a well-organized study all the available material. With admirable thoroughness he has checked and rechecked his data in all that has recently been published and in the archives of Hungary and abroad, and he has worked them into a fluent and coherent entity.

His extensive dependence on secondary sources currently in print in Hungary, however, poses a serious and important question. How far should such an approach be taken? It must be acknowledged that historical works produced in Hungary are generally scholarly, rich in variety, and remarkably objective. The more distant the subject is in time, the more evident these qualities are, but the Marxist-Leninist line makes it inevitable that these characteristics become weaker the nearer the subject is to the present time. Treating the Horthy regime academically is simply not tolerated; it has to be viewed mostly from an ideological standpoint. Hungarian works on it have to be used with great caution. Yet Fenyo writes that according to a "Hungarian legal publication," the Hungarian state was "monarchical and Fascist" (p. 9). On this and other occasions the author fails to alert the reader to the partisan nature of such value judgments. He himself terms the Horthy regime "semi-feudal" or "outright feudal" (p. 113). But such a statement surely fails as academic synthesis . . .

Bela K. Kiraly (Brooklyn College and Columbia University), *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1973).

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- Agnes Huszar Vardy. *A Study in Austrian Romanticism: Hungarian Influences in Lenau's Poetry*. Buffalo, New York: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1974.
- Steven Bela Vardy. *Hungarian Historiography and the Geistesgeschichte School*. Cleveland, Ohio, Arpad Academy, 1974.
- For a list of further books, mainly verse, prose and fiction, please contact the editor.