

## **Twenty Years After: Kádár and His Rule Assessed, 1956–1976**

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Twenty years ago a regime arose from the ruins of a Revolution suppressed by the Soviet army. Whoever wishes to discuss the nature, achievements, or failures of János Kádár and his group since November 1956 cannot avoid looking back to this time.

In a way, it was a genuine Leninist beginning: this regime was born by means of a conspiratorial act. A group headed by Kádár and the old Moscow-hand Ferenc Münnich assembled on Soviet soil in the Carpatho-Ukrainian town of Uzhgorod. On November 4, 1956, at the moment when the Red Army opened its operation to wipe out the uprising and to oust the government of Imre Nagy, Kádár's team declared itself to be the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government." The orthodoxy of the action was assured by the presence of Nikita S. Khrushchev who also ruled that Kádár, already First Secretary of the Communist Party since October 25, and not Münnich, should head the new government.<sup>1</sup>

Under the protection of Soviet tanks, the Kádár team entered Budapest on November 7. Sporadic fighting still continued, production was at a standstill; the administration had collapsed and had been replaced by workers' councils or local national councils. The Communist Party had, since the early days of the Revolution, disintegrated; only the Party Headquarters continued to operate.

To rebuild the Party and to restore the order and authority of the government was a risky and arduous task. The Soviet military protected the new Hungarian central authority, but this certainly failed to enhance its prestige among the masses.

It seems fairly well established that Kádár first attempted to restore what he considered order and to reestablish Party authority by persuasion. He may have prided himself on maintaining or implementing the revolutionary achievements of 1956 without abandoning socialism and Party control. He presumably flirted with the idea of a "purified socialism" and a "rejuvenated" Party.<sup>2</sup> In November and December

1956, however, the infamy of Soviet aggression was so much in the mind of everybody that the principal popular demand was directed at the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Even if Kádár had wanted to comply with this demand (which would have meant the eviction of his regime), it was beyond his powers to do so. As Major General Grebennik, the Soviet commander of Budapest, told the workers' councils: "Soviet troops will leave Hungary only when crayfish whistle and fishes sing."<sup>3</sup> So they have not left since.

By the end of 1956 the Kádár regime had made little progress either in consolidating its government or in resolving the confused situation of Party and state. Towards these ends the leaders of five Communist Parties (Soviet, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Hungarian) assembled on January 1, 1957, in a rubble-strewn Budapest to instruct Kádár in these circumstances.

Thereafter, on January 5, the Hungarian leader announced his program, and this time he insisted that the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be secured. Political activity was again to be the monopoly of the Communist Party, all other political parties were forbidden, workers' councils were to be deprived of all power; the Revolution was declared to have been a "counter-revolution" and Imre Nagy, for the first time, was reproached for "treachery" and for having supported the "counter-revolution." The period of repression was to begin.

### *The Period of Repression*

The repressive measures were first aimed at the total liquidation of the remnants of the Revolution. The workers' councils were instructed to desist from all political activity; in November 1957 they were formally dissolved. The Writers' Association which on December 28, 1956, was still able to vote a resolution condemning the Kádár regime, was suspended on January 17 and finally dissolved on April 21, 1957.

Next came punitive measures against the "counter-revolutionaries." On January 15 an "accelerated criminal trial procedure" was decreed, under which special courts could summarily pass sentences ranging from five-year imprisonments to death. The death penalty could now be imposed also on juveniles (many of the freedom fighters were below 18 years). Initial restraints on prosecuting participants in the Revolution were now abandoned.<sup>4</sup> Also various other measures "to intensify the class struggle" were introduced: for example, reluctant judges were enjoined to pass sentences in the spirit of class struggle, and institutions of learning were cleansed of class enemies.

To implement all these coercive measures and to practice terror, the notorious Security Police (AVH), broken up during the Revolution, was reorganized under the name of “Political Investigation Division” of the Central Office of the Police. It showed itself to be as ruthless as its precursor in the Stalinist period. Totalitarian measures of torture and intimidation were practiced to extort confessions. Thousands suspected or accused of “counter-revolutionary” acts were arrested, many thousands interned (internment camps dissolved during the Thaw were again set up). At least 2,000 persons were executed and more than 20,000 imprisoned, among them prominent writers and other intellectuals. Members of the Bar were purged; of 1,600 attorneys in Budapest, 720 were disbarred.

The most conspicuous judicial murder was that of the revolutionary Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, and his three associates. Nagy, an old-time Communist, had sought refuge at the Yugoslav Embassy after the entry of Soviet troops into Budapest. He was promised safe conduct by Kádár but was promptly kidnapped by a Soviet security unit upon leaving the Embassy, and interned in Rumania. Kádár had given assurances to Tito that he would not be tried. However, the renewed conflict between Moscow and Belgrade in early 1958 seemed to have sealed Nagy’s fate. Brought back to Hungary he was secretly tried. On June 16, 1958, a governmental announcement revealed that the former Prime Minister, General Pál Maléter, and two of Nagy’s advisers had been sentenced to death and that the sentences had already been carried out.

There was no valid legal excuse for these condemnations: the adoption of the multiparty system during the Revolution, the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—the chief points of accusation against Nagy—were no violations of Hungarian law and certainly not “high treason.” Kádár himself as a member of the cabinet participated in and approved of these decisions. The Hungarian public and the non-Communist world considered these executions to be expressions of base revenge by Moscow; and Kádár was viewed as an accomplice. This event was correctly characterized by the United Nations Special Committee on Hungary as one “in which these men, symbols of the hope of a nation for freedom from foreign domination, were secretly sent to death in circumstances which call for full exposure, in violation of solemn undertakings that their persons would not be harmed.”<sup>5</sup>

The last act of this period of terror was the forceful collectivization of Hungarian agriculture. During the Revolution more than half of the existing kolkhozes were disbanded. By late 1958 the regime decided to

renew and fully implement the program of collectivization which even Rákosi's terrorism in the fifties had not achieved.

The campaign to herd farmers into agricultural collectives began in February 1959. By January 1960 about 60 percent of the arable land was incorporated into the socialist sector. After a pause of several months, the drive was taken up again in the winter of 1960–61, and in February 1961 the Communist Party announced the great victory: 90 percent of all cultivated land had been turned into collectives or had become state farmland.

The methods to achieve this “victory” included various pressures, intimidation, and even physical coercion. Peasants eventually consented because they considered resistance to be hopeless. Now they also became a deeply frustrated and discontented segment of the population.

By the middle of 1961 such a yawning gap existed between the people and their rulers, such as had not been seen since the imposition of Kádár on Hungary in 1956. But Party control had then been firmly reestablished, the Party itself reorganized; and the last independent element, the land-owning peasantry, safely brought under control. This also must have been the view held in the Kremlin, where the fear of a recurrence of the 1956 events was never absent.<sup>6</sup>

### *Goulash-Communism*

It can be safely accepted that, just as the period of repression was a carefully planned and methodically executed performance, so too the period of relaxation and liberalization—which extends to the present time—was also a systematically conceived and gradually introduced accomplishment. It must also be assumed that both policies were, if not initiated by Moscow, at least discussed with the leaders of the Kremlin and their approval obtained. While Khrushchev was in power, he personally supervised the various phases of these developments.

Hungarian ideologues have subsequently revealed the main train of ideas which guided Kádár's repressive as well as liberal performances. In the past, Stalin and Rákosi had committed the same grave mistakes: they used excessive force when not required. In Hungary, grave distortions in the political and economic system then ensued which, in turn, helped the counter-revolution to erupt. Thereafter, repression was necessary, even if it meant a temporary absence of “democratic forms.” But as soon as these methods were no longer needed, they had to be discontinued.<sup>7</sup>

The change first became perceptible when in late 1961 Kádár pronounced his since famous dictum before a meeting of the People's

Patriotic Front: “Who is not against us is with us.” This was an intended reversal of what Mátyás Rákosi had said in his time: “Who is not with us is against us.”

In March 1962 Kádár addressed workers of the Icarus truck plant and told them:

We must bear in mind that different people, with different pasts and views live together with us in our people’s system. . . . They don’t rise against us—and we only want to fight those who try to overthrow the people’s power. . . . The people of this category—and they are the majority—are on our side. . . . But they are not Marxists. We must never forget that the trained Marxists are not in the majority.<sup>8</sup>

And the directives for the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party contained the following sentence:

The Party invites those sectors of society which previously did not sympathize with it and even opposed its objectives to join in helping to build socialism.

All these pronouncements heralded a new policy: an attempt at “peaceful coexistence” between the regime and “the silent majority” which it had to face. The terms were clear: the regime would desist from using undue coercion, indeed, it would use it only to defend its existence; in turn, the regime would expect its opponents to cooperate in helping to improve living conditions, to strengthen the economy of the country. Through these measures Kádár and his associates also hoped to popularize themselves, at least to the measure of the possible.

Evidently these developments have taken place with the express consent of the Soviet leadership. When Khrushchev visited Hungary for the last time before his ouster, he assured his worker audience it was erroneous to believe that revolution was the only matter of significance. Instead, “the important thing is that we should have more to eat—good goulash—schools, housing and ballet. . . .”<sup>9</sup> The de-emphasis of Marxism-Leninism, which is noticeable in these words, and the emphasis upon what has been nicknamed “goulash-communism” was turned into practice by Kádár’s Hungarian regime.

Implicitly it was now admitted that the class struggle had ended. As a sign of this, educational institutions were instructed not to discriminate against applicants on the basis of their class origin.<sup>10</sup> This change was also recommended because academic standards had become diluted; many otherwise well-qualified students had been rejected due to their “defective” class origin or the stain of “counter-revolutionary” parentage.

Kádár was also ready to make his peace with the intellectuals. In 1959 the Writers’ Association was allowed to function again, and slowly

hitherto “silent” writers were induced to publish. Imprisoned writers were freed under a partial amnesty granted in March 1960. Censorship was also relaxed, the requirement for “party-mindedness” in literature, theatre, and art was reduced or often eliminated.

With much fanfare and as a culmination of the trend toward appeasement, an amnesty decree of March 22, 1963, claimed to have freed all political prisoners. But the decree contained many reservations: those condemned for murder or arson—and many freedom fighters were condemned for such alleged crimes—and those sentenced for treason were exempted from the scope of the amnesty. Thus Cardinal Mindszenty could not just walk out of the American Embassy where he had been living since the entry of Soviet forces into Budapest in November 1956.

Relations between the Catholic Church and the Party remained strained until 1964, when an agreement between the Hungarian government and the Vatican was reached concerning many vacant bishoprics. Vatican appointees to high church offices were recognized only when approved by the Hungarian state. Bishops were to take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution. In 1968, another agreement, besides settling further vacancies, granted greater liberty to the bishops in appointing parish priests. Thus, while the Church probably will always remain unhappy under this atheist regime, a limited *modus vivendi* may have been achieved. In September 1971, Cardinal Mindszenty, with Hungarian and papal consent, left Hungary, though still refusing to abdicate as Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary.<sup>11</sup>

Since the early 1960's the regime's concern has been directed toward the improvement of living conditions and the increase of production and stabilization of Hungary's international trade position. However, the planned economy, with its bureaucratic impediments, hemmed in any such development. It was of prime importance for the regime to create some modicum of material prosperity. Since no genuine freedom and free political expression could be provided, at least material benefits might serve to satisfy the people.

### *NEM and Democratization*

The New Economic Mechanism (NEM), introduced on January 1, 1968, was to place the Hungarian economy on solid and rational footing. As experts have pointed out since the early 1960's, a planned economy, as applied to Hungary, compressed the productive forces into a rigid and bureaucratic Procrustean bed—instead of allowing them to pursue the life of living organisms. Economic targets were

unrealistic, price levels artificial, and in no relation to the cost of production, and productivity, for lack of incentives, was declining.

Economic development was vital in order to comply with the promise of building socialism. The regime at last discovered that empty promises, self-praise, prospects of a remote prosperity, as well as ideological phraseology would never convince the masses. Frank exposure of problems and action in the right direction was expected.

The NEM was to decentralize the economy by introducing the market-principle in relations between state enterprises and by encouraging “cost-consciousness.” Enterprises were required to act autonomously, a method which should be pleasing to the individualistic Hungarians.

It seems well substantiated that the reform was a success, but so far only a partial success. To become really operative the NEM needed a slow and gradual transition. The public had been warned that the full implementation of the program would require several five-year plans. And the NEM already has created some new problems of its own. However, no return to the command-economy was envisaged.

The economic and social problems created by NEM were partly due to the deficient human element, unaccustomed to operating independently under the demand and supply method. The relative liberty caused managers to expand their investments excessively; the level of imports rose considerably, while exports stagnated. The incentive system—the differential in wages between various categories of workers—caused strained relations and discontent. Opponents of the reform—mostly old-time *apparatchiki*—accused it of fostering irresponsibility, adventurism, and a petit-bourgeois atmosphere.<sup>12</sup> These accusations were also repeated across the Soviet press, giving rise to the suspicion that Moscow now looked upon this latest development of liberalization with a jaundiced eye.<sup>13</sup>

It is true that many in Hungary hoped that the liberalization of the economy would be followed by a democratization in the area of politics. The few concessions the government was willing to offer (a limited choice of candidates at elections, insistence that democratization be restricted to the “local” level) were considered entirely insignificant. On the other hand, it is recognized that with the NEM certain interest groups have emerged (competition between enterprises is now considered legitimate) and thus a modicum of pluralism has been initiated.

However, it is being realized that all these improvements are concessions by the leadership and not irremovable elements of the social or economic structure. Moreover, the Kádár regime could not eliminate

the malaise felt in respect to the lack of national independence, the tutelage exercised by the Soviet Union, which remains a *noli me tangere* of the government. The Hungarian public appeared to be little impressed by the achievements of its government in the international field, the ending of the country's isolation after the Revolution. Since 1956, with the help of some insignificant concessions, Kádár managed to restore Hungary's status in the United Nations and to reestablish full diplomatic relations with the United States. The international reputation of the country has also gained because of the well-advertised liberalization as well as the apparent stability of the leadership.

### *Kádár and His Fellow Leaders*

Since Ulbricht's departure from top leadership, Kádár has been the senior leader in the Soviet camp (Zhivkov, although First Secretary of the Bulgarian Party since 1954, became national leader only after Chervenkov's ouster in 1962). Not unlike other countries of the Soviet sphere, prior to November 1956, Hungary was led by Muscovites—leaders who had spent many years in the USSR before returning to their country of origin in the wake of the Red Army. In contrast, Kádár and his fellow top leaders, except Antal Apró, are “home” Communists who never spent any considerable time in the Soviet Union.

Only two of the present Politburo members participated in the conspiratorial act of Uzhgorod: Kádár and Apró. Others who were there have either died or been discarded for reasons of incompatibility or incompetence. But six others joined the Kádár clique immediately after the suppression of the Revolution, when the situation was still highly critical: Biszku, Fehér, Fock, Kállai, Nyers, and Nemes. The remainder of the twelve Politburo members were later co-opted. The majority of its members consist of the earliest acolytes of Kádár, a group held together by the memory of their bold decision to serve as a regime tainted with the stigma of being Soviet stooges. It is this past trial-and-adventure period which has created a cohesiveness among the members of the leadership group, a spirit which helped to assimilate the later comers to comradeship. The cement of the original risk-taking also kept the group loyal to its erstwhile leader. This is the reason why the leadership in Hungary more closely approximates the ideal of collective leadership than in any other Communist country. Apprehension of yet another collapse, unsavory memories of past dissensions, the odious example of Rákosi's rule, and also a never-admitted bad conscience at obviously having been installed by a foreign military power—are all factors stimulating leadership coherence.

Kádár determinedly has pursued a centrist policy, waging a two-front struggle both against dogmatists on the one hand and revisionists on the other. This has also served the purpose of persuading the public that there will be no return to Stalinism, but also to warn them that no repetition of 1956 will be tolerated.

Kádár is not a tyrannic leader, neither is he really charismatic or a spellbinder. He is a strange mixture of mediocrity and astute realism. But first and foremost, he is an opportunist. Evidently he attempted to whitewash his sullied past, which includes the treachery he committed against his friend and collaborator, László Rajk, and the slaughter of Imre Nagy. The rehabilitation of his image before the masses and abroad has been systematically pursued. Many of the non-Party elite who were placed in secure and comfortable positions under his regime are among his best advertisers. Thus, it is emphasized that he was one of the victims of the "cult of personality," that he saved the country from Horthyist reactionaries in 1956, that he was absent when Imre Nagy was executed. It is also said that he was anxious to mediate between Dubček and Moscow and suffered a nervous breakdown when Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968.

The surprising metamorphoses of his career developed his chameleon-like qualities. He can speak in one fashion and act in another. He pretends to oppose something while he is really in favor of it. He is, of course, pro-Soviet, but lets it be hinted that he disfavors excessive Soviet control. He is a Marxist but he also supports the market principle. There is no need—he declares—for an opposition because he also represents the opposition.

Kádár, unlike Rákosi, is no sadist; he is more a skillful operator than a supreme politician—shrewd in tactics but weak on principles. But he does pretend to know the limits of Soviet permissiveness. Since the departure of his mentor, Khrushchev, he has apparently become acceptable to Brezhnev. Moscow considers him firmly established and reliable.

The Hungarian leader has managed to surround himself with persons who were neither outstanding as politicians nor overly ambitious. No one who could have been his rival has survived in office. His fellow leaders are mostly good bureaucrats or specialists in their fields. But he is also assisted by a non-Party managerial-technocratic elite. The former and the latter are to a great measure apolitical in the sense that they could not care less about Marxist-Leninist ideology, while possibly paying some lip-service to its tenets. Among these non-Party experts are also publicists and journalists, whose job includes travel abroad and meeting foreign visitors. They also contribute to create a halo of

high-mindedness and brilliant statesmanship around the head of Kádár. Prisoners of their opportunism, their career is inescapably linked with the success or failure of the regime.

### *Balance Sheet and Prospects*

Those who have witnessed the few successful days of the Revolution of 1956 must have been amazed by the spirit of unity which swept over non-Communists and Communists alike, except for a tiny minority of compromised individuals. When Kádár took over, the prime obstacle was this very same national unity which confronted him. On June 29, 1957, at the constituent Party Conference, he admitted that:

. . . we had to make serious efforts to destroy the national unity. . . . Why did we have to destroy this national unity? Because it was born on a reactionary platform. . . . We do not want this kind of unity.<sup>14</sup>

Evidently his goal was to create another kind of national unity, one that would support him, the Communist cause, and accept Soviet paramountcy. Has he succeeded?

No doubt he has travelled a long way from 1956. Although he was not able to destroy the resistance he faced, he at least neutralized it, thereby fragmenting the national unity and creating different segments of attitudes toward his administration.

Naturally, it is impossible reliably to assess present political attitudes in Hungary, based on opinion polls or voting patterns. Empirical evaluation must rely on diverse and often highly imprecise symptoms: interviews with Hungarians abroad, impressions of visitors to Hungary, pronouncements in the Hungarian press or by public figures—often to be read between the lines.

Thus, it would be hazardous to guess percentage-wise the number of those politically articulate adults who wholeheartedly support the regime. Wholeheartedly would mean in this context that the persons in question would do so without qualification and would be ready to make meaningful sacrifices in its defense. Surely, only a fraction of Party members would be willing to do so. On the other hand, a great many people would be afraid of *any* change and therefore favor the status quo. Historic experience suggests that in autocratically-ruled countries most people would be willing to take sides against the regime only if they saw a reasonable opportunity for action of this sort. And then there is the great number of opportunists who would change color and join any bandwagon moving toward apparent success. Since there is now no prospect for any successful political change, such potential attitudes cannot be tested. Seemingly, those supporting the regime are more visible, appear more numerous than they really are.

It is certainly due to the skillful operations of the Kádár regime and its doubtless achievements in many sectors that the average man-in-the-street will conclude that this is the best Communist regime which can be expected. Many of these individuals would base their judgment on their experience with the odious Stalinist period under Rákosi. Resignation to what cannot be altered, fatalism to the inevitable, and a striving “to be realistic” also play a role here. Many console themselves with the thought that the Revolution has not been in vain, that the improvements under Kádár are due to the developments of 1956. Others again would consider the uprising a tragic, hopeless mistake, a manifestation of a lack of realistic thinking which has to be avoided in the future.

It is the view of this writer that the largest segment of the politically conscious public would be found in the above, neither white nor black, but gray majority. This segment neither favors the regime nor is it ready to oppose it. They cooperate where it is inevitable to cooperate and where it is in their personal interest to do so. But ideologically they are indifferent or rather opposed to Marxism-Leninism. They may yearn for some ideal form of Socialism and be cognizant of its absence in Hungary, and they may therefore even call themselves socialists. So they have an excuse for participating in the building of Socialism while it is not *their* Socialism.

The number of determined and *all-out* opponents of the regime (speaking of sentiment only because open opposition is hardly perceptible) is certainly reduced to relatively small numbers, but represented not only by the segment of older people. This is certainly an achievement of the regime. On the other hand, Kádár did not succeed in converting the overwhelming masses of Hungarians into a body committed to building Soviet Socialism. There are complaints—and not only in Moscow—that these masses display *petit-bourgeois* attitudes, that a “considerable stratum” of the population is politically apathetic.

The weakest point of Kádár’s political structure is the evident lack of national independence. In vain does the regime try to explain that it just happens that “the country’s policy corresponds to that of the USSR,” and that it is therefore unjustifiable to call Hungary a satellite of the Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup> No sensible person would pretend that it was Hungary’s national interest to sever diplomatic ties with Israel in 1967, or that Hungary has an interest in condemning Communist China, or that Budapest had a stake in the victory of the Vietcong. The average Hungarian feels attracted to the West and therefore is disappointed

and envious to observe that President Nixon visited Yugoslavia, Poland, and—of all countries—neighboring Rumania, while carefully avoiding Hungary, as did General de Gaulle. While Kádár is trying and succeeds in satisfying at least some of the material needs of the people, in the field of foreign policy he cannot but obey Moscow's commands.

Thus, nationalist feeling—and in many respects the younger generation is more nationalist than their elders—cannot endorse Kádár's policies. While the legitimacy of his rule is thus questioned, so long as the regime pursues a reasonable domestic policy, no violent upsurge may be expected.<sup>16</sup> And Kádár is very careful not to commit any major mistakes. As Hungarian officials have remarked, Budapest is unlikely to make the blunder of raising food prices before Christmas, as Gomulka did in 1970, in an act which led to his dismissal.

Kádár is now 64 years old and may be in office for a long time. Rumors about his health are not substantiated; he may suffer the fatigue of office and may leave more and more matters to his business-like, pragmatic associates, who will also do their best to avoid making mistakes. Should he for any reason depart from his leadership post, the most likely successor is Béla Biszku. In such event, the collective character of the leadership will become even more prominent. Biszku does not possess even the factitious charisma which Kádár contrived to assemble over the years. He is nine years younger than Kádár and may extend the years of the Kádár regime for another decade.

Over the past twenty years Hungary, the *enfant terrible* of the Soviet bloc in 1956, has grown into an orderly member of the Soviet-led group of East European countries, especially from the point of view of the Kremlin. Both severe repression and, in turn, gradual relaxation and liberalization have worked to keep her "orderly." Save for major blunders by her leaders, enticing precedents in other Communist countries of the area, a possible but still unlikely change in Mother Russia, or a radical upheaval in the global balance of power, the present type of regime, with or without Kádár, is likely to continue. But the above-mentioned "ifs" are numerous and not merely hypothetical. As some precedents have shown, the "character of unexpectedness" is unquestionably not alien to that part of the world.

## NOTES

1. For details, see Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 358–380.
2. On November 15, 1956, Kádár told representatives of the workers' councils: "We surrender the Party's monopoly; we want a multiparty system and clean and honest elections. . . ." United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Suppl. No. 18 (A/3592), New York, p. 109.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.
4. For details of these repressive measures, see International Commission of Jurists, *The Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law*, The Hague, 1957.
5. From the communiqué issued by the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, June 21, 1958.
6. There is evidence that the causes and circumstances of the Revolution were carefully investigated by the Soviet Union. See United Nations, *Report*, pp. 125–126.
7. See, for instance, the article by I. Pozsgai, "Some Problems of the Development of Socialist Democracy," *Társadalmi Szemle*, No. 10, October 1968.
8. *Népszabadság*, March 4, 1962.
9. *New York Times*, April 2, 1964.
10. Ministerial Decree No. 2/1963 of May 19, 1963.
11. *New York Times*, September 28, 1971. In December 1973 the Vatican decided to consider the See of Esztergom vacant and next year, with the approval of the Hungarian government a new archbishop (who is also Primate of Hungary) was appointed by Rome. See József Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs* (New York, 1974), pp. 244–247.
12. This criticism was repeated, quoting Hungarian sources, by *Rude Pravo* of March 25, 1972, in an article subtitled "Criticism of *Petit-Bourgeois* Attitudes in Hungary." See also *New York Times*, April 9, 1972.
13. See *Pravda*, February 3, 1972; the article is hinting that in Hungary attitudes and activities are tinged with excessively liberal or anti-Marxist sentiments.
14. Radio Free Europe, *Hungary 1957-61: Background and Current Situation*, Special Report (mimeographed), May 16, 1961.
15. See the article "Hungary and the USSR" in *Nemzetközi Szemle*, November, 1971.
16. However, after many years of absence of demonstrations, on March 15, 1972, Hungary's national day, youthful demonstrators shouted down Communist Party speakers and the police had to intervene; *New York Times*, April 12, 1972.