

Kossuth and Újházi on Establishing a Colony of Hungarian 48-ers in America, 1849-1852*

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I

Although much has been written about Lajos Kossuth's motives for going to America in the wake of the unsuccessful Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49, serious scholarly research exploiting sources on both sides of the Atlantic commenced only in the 1940s. Perhaps because it could never be questioned that Kossuth's primary motive for visiting America was to generate aid for Hungary's cause, even this recent scholarship has neglected to assess the degree to which he considered the option of founding a Hungarian colony in America, or to fully assess László Újházi's efforts to bring such a plan to fruition. Thus, for example, Dénes Jánossy's seminal work on the Kossuth emigration and Tivadar Ács's more modest study of Újházi's short-lived colony in Iowa generally ignored the portions of the Kossuth-Újházi correspondence dealing with the colonization scheme and concluded that Kossuth had always opposed the idea.¹ Éva Gál's recent biography of Újházi portrayed this long neglected emigrant more thoroughly, but gave short shrift to Újházi's colonization activities and concurred that Kossuth was against colonization.² John H. Komlos' recent study on the Kossuth emigration excelled in its treatment of Kossuth's position on the settlement question before his American journey, but ignored Kossuth's colonization policy after his arrival, presumably on the assumption that thereafter it no longer played a role in his plans.³ This essay attempts to demonstrate that these assumptions have over-simplified Kossuth's complex, often contradictory, motivations. As the accepted leader of the Revolution and of the subsequent emigration, Kossuth recognized that

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an important question to be resolved was how best to regroup the exiles in preparation for resuming the battle for their homeland. Should they be kept in Europe, prepared to invade Hungary whenever political circumstances turned auspicious, or should they be gathered into a closed colony in a country which guaranteed their freedom of action while they established a power base in preparation for a renewed revolution? Kossuth favored the first of these alternatives, but his indecision and vacillation during his first three exile years (1849–52) encouraged one of his followers, László Újházi, to promote the idea of founding a Hungarian colony in the United States. Until early in 1852 Újházi was led to believe that colonization remained a viable option for the Kossuth emigration.

II

The allure of America, with its Utopian image of limitless land in a country of free institutions, did not fail to attract many of the Hungarians exiled from their homeland.⁴ Such a man was László Újházi, government commissioner of the fortress of Komárom at the time of its capitulation in September 1849. Újházi was fifty-four years of age at the time of the revolution. Since the early 1830s, he had been an avid participant in that era of reform, spearheaded by liberal aristocrats and lesser nobility, which had prepared Hungary for the achievements of 1848–49. Steadfastly more leftist in his political sentiments than most of his contemporaries, he had been a leader of the erstwhile radical party which had supported total independence from Austria and the establishment of a republican form of government in 1849. With the capitulation of Komárom, however, a passive, even pessimistic state of mind overcame the old ex-revolutionary. His revulsion with the tenacity of absolutism and with what he perceived to be the ephemeral quality of revolutionary ardor among his associates prepared him for the psychological leap necessary to accept the idea of permanent exile.⁵ Unlike most of his comrades who continued to indulge in romantic dreams about renewing the revolution, he was determined that the United States, whose democratic and republican institutions he admired, should become the goal of the emigration. In a series of meetings during the negotiated evacuation of Komárom, he persuaded 96 officers of the besieged garrison to form an American emigration society with himself as president. The stated purpose of the association was to emigrate to the American republic, to become free citizens thereof, and there to “form a

united agricultural colony.”⁶ In October of 1849, Újházi and the fifty-odd officers who had followed him to Hamburg drew up detailed plans for the American emigration. They were assisted by Dr. Károly Kraitsir, a Hungarian-American physician from Boston, who had successfully aided 235 Polish exiles after the abortive Polish Revolution of 1830–31 to acquire free federal land for a Polish colony in the United States.⁷ Having solicited President Zachary Taylor’s permission to seek asylum in America, Újházi and a small advance party departed with the understanding that they would prepare for the reception of the others, soon to follow.

The Újházi party’s warm welcome in New York City on December 16, 1849, was to be surpassed only by Kossuth’s reception there two years later. As the first exiles to arrive after the news of Hungary’s defeat had become public, they received the full sympathy of a young America which had followed and identified with every event in Hungary’s revolutionary struggle throughout 1849.⁸ One society magazine reported a veritable “Hungarian fever” in New York City during the next two months.⁹ Fund raising dinners, balls, and speeches were the order of the day for weeks, as the Hungarians found themselves lionized wherever they went. Most celebrated were Újházi and Apollonia Jagello, a young Polish woman accompanying the party, who was portrayed by the press as a “Hungarian heroine” of the revolution.¹⁰

In view of this universal sympathy for the Hungarian cause, not surprisingly Újházi was accepted as Kossuth’s surrogate in America. Popular and official opinion considered his widely publicized colonization plans to be that of Kossuth and the rest of the Hungarian exiles. Újházi promoted two goals: the liberation of Kossuth from Turkish captivity and the establishment of a Hungarian colony in the United States. Emphasizing the need to prevent the emigrants from scattering, he advocated a colony to “serve as a haven of refuge to those following us.” To provide for their self-sufficiency, he favored an agricultural settlement as the most suitable alternative for Hungarians accustomed to agrarian pursuits. A compact, closed colony would not only preserve their Hungarian identity and culture, he stressed, but would provide a power base from which to prepare for the eventual liberation of their homeland. Since the United States was a free nation with a republican form of government and possessed limitless empty lands available for settlement, such a plan would best serve their purposes. As Hungarian-American citizens living in their own colony, they would learn to practice America’s democratic processes in order to better exercise them

upon their return to liberated Hungary. As representatives of their own state in the Union, they would keep alive America's sympathy for Hungary.¹¹

Since Újházi had to convince both the American public and his compatriots of the viability of his plans, his emphasis differed, depending on his audience. To the Americans he stressed his compatriots' wish for asylum and self-reliance, and their desire to settle in a land of freedom. To convince the public of their sincerity, the Újházi group immediately filed for American citizenship with much fanfare and publicity.¹² Simultaneously, however, to Kossuth and his companions, Újházi emphasized that only by establishing a compact colony could they expect to receive the necessary financial and military aid from American sympathizers.¹³ Not yet having heard from Kossuth, but knowing full well the younger man's revolutionary zeal, Újházi suspected that the settlement plan had to be made palatable to those whose only motivation was the immediate resumption of revolution.

As Újházi incessantly promoted the dual concepts of Kossuth's liberation and emigration to America together with the permanent settlement of the exiles in America, these two ideas became fused in popular and official minds in the United States. To a proud young America conscious of its self-image as the ultimate asylum of freedom and liberty to which all those who suffered from the burdens of European autocracy aspired, the prospect of the heroic Kossuth and his followers finding a new home on its shores was appealing. Újházi capitalized on this appeal, as he pressed the issue in his numerous speeches and his contacts with friends of the Hungarian cause. He persuaded the future Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, of the exiles' desire for a place of asylum where they might find permanent security and peace.¹⁴ In Washington in January 1850, President Taylor, who in his correspondence with Újházi had repeatedly coupled the concept of an American home for the exiles with Kossuth's release, greeted him with the statement: "here . . . you and they [Kossuth and his companions] will forget much of the hardships and trials you have gone through, in the enjoyment of the liberties and blessings of a new Home."¹⁵ A series of Congressional resolutions conveyed a similar message. Senator Foote's resolution of February 5, 1850, demanded Kossuth's liberation so that he might emigrate to America and requested that the Hungarians be offered land in America.¹⁶ Similarly, Senator Seward's resolution of January 30, 1850, favoring a free grant of land to the Hungarians, corresponded almost simultaneously with Senator Soule's proposal that the United States Government bring Kossuth to America.¹⁷ At the same time, the first

steps were taken toward the liberation of Kossuth from Turkey under American auspices, and Kossuth was queried if he desired a permanent home in America.¹⁸

The Seward resolution advocating a grant of land to the Hungarians and to other European revolutionary exiles drew spirited debate not only in Congress, but also in the public arena. The press, although generally supporting the proposal, strongly advocated the granting of free lands to all landless citizens of America.¹⁹ In fact, the resolution would have established a precedent whereby immigrants would have received privileges not enjoyed by native born Americans. This impediment proved detrimental to its chances of acceptance in Congress. But it was the sectional dispute over the Clay compromise for Californian statehood in 1850 that finally doomed the Hungarian land grant proposal. Notwithstanding Újházi's steady proddings and the support of numerous friends in Washington, no lands were ever granted to the Hungarians.

But when Újházi returned to New York in January 1850, after the flurry of support he received in Washington, he had reason to be optimistic about an imminent grant of lands to the Hungarians. Much to his chagrin, however, he found that his countrymen, augmented by the arrival of the remaining members of the Komárom American association, did not greet his accomplishment with jubilation. Instead, they had quarreled and split among themselves. The majority voted to replace him with Major Imre Hamvassy, leader of the new arrivals, at the head of the 62 member committee. Grievances against Újházi centered around his soft approach to political action. He was found too humble and inflexible in formulating the Hungarian cause to the American people, too modest in his approach to collecting funds, and too acquiescent to what many of them claimed to be a misrepresentation of Apollonia Jagello as a "Hungarian heroine."²⁰ As a gesture of their new radical approach, Újházi's opponents issued a formal proclamation declaring the Habsburgs unlawful usurpers of power in Hungary and presented it to members of Congress and foreign embassies in Washington.²¹ The committee also declared that Újházi's efforts to acquire land for a colony were unsolicited by the Hungarians. Indeed, unmasking ulterior motives for their actions, some members of the committee even told Congressmen that instead of land the Hungarians wanted money, "because the Hungarians, being true gentlemen, would not labor with their hands."²² And when they sensed that some of their number were still tempted by Újházi's colonization plan, they further discredited his efforts by proposing an alternative scheme for a Hungarian colony in

Texas, for which they submitted a formal request for free land to Congressional members.²³

It was Újházi's misfortune to be forced to convince a mixed group of opportunistic and radical elements of the revolution to accept a quiet, sedentary existence in the wilderness. Many of these first arrivals were enterprising men who had risen as a result of the chaos of revolution and, hoping to exploit their newly gained status, perceived Újházi's goals as opposed to their own.²⁴ There were also radical leftist elements among them, especially the two leaders of the movement: Ágost Wimmer, an ex-Lutheran minister who had served as Kossuth's representative to Prussia, and Colonel János Prágay, the ex-adjutant to General György Klapka at Komárom. Wimmer was reputed to believe that all land must be redistributed and the aristocracy destroyed before a true revolution could occur and, according to Újházi, had spent most of his time blaming Kossuth for the failures of the revolution and emigration; Prágay had fallen under similar influences. In the estimation of the more practical leaders of the emigration, both men were counted among the romantics, Jacobins, and "Red Republicans" of the revolution.²⁵ Desiring results instead of dreams, these practical leaders perceived the United States as an expedient place to acquire support and repeatedly warned each other to avoid associating with the Jacobin "Reds."²⁶ Prágay, always the man of action, died in the ill-fated 1851 Cuban Expedition, and Wimmer, finding his influence waning, soon returned to seek more fertile grounds for his activities in Europe. To convince such men to become farmers in the American wilderness was perhaps beyond the realm of the possible.

The committee's gestures to gain attention by issuing radical statements and attacks on Újházi proved counterproductive. American observers deemed its radical political approach as inappropriate as its transparent desire for pocket money. The shabby treatment of Újházi, a man whom New Yorkers had learned to respect and admire, was also deplored. Far from deflecting funds from Újházi's colonial scheme to their own treasury, as the committee had planned, support for the Hungarians ground to an abrupt halt. The committee dissolved, dividing its treasury among its members (\$80 per person), who, until then, had received free care from New Yorkers. Now they were forced to scatter, each seeking his livelihood as best as he could.²⁷

At a time of greatest need for a Hungarian association of some type to help arriving exiles remain together and provide for their transportation to the planned Hungarian colony, the source of aid dissolved virtually at its inception. Later, after settling in the Iowa wilderness, Újházi la-

mented the absence of a central office in a key city to which the exiles might report as they trickled into the United States. As he told a friend, more harm than good was done to new arrivals by the Hungarians who still lived in New York.²⁸ This initial schism would plague the Hungarian cause in America for years to come. As additional groups of exiles arrived during the next two years, a few émigrés supported Újházi's plan and even joined him. But others, who found American sympathies cool due to the recent confrontation, or who were simply disgruntled by unemployment or lack of aid, too readily accepted the condemnations of Újházi's detractors; they accused him of pocketing all of the funds and placed the blame for their plight upon his head.²⁹

For his part, Újházi withdrew from the controversy and endured the attacks of his companions in silence. He hoped to salvage what he might of the emigrants' reputation by avoiding publicity of their quarrels. As before, his humility did not go unappreciated. During a second Washington trip in an attempt to redress the harm, he was assured by American supporters that his objectives had not been jeopardized. But these events, like those that had driven him from his homeland, were taking their toll on the older man. Notwithstanding his radical reform plans and republican sentiments during the Hungarian Revolution, his personal mannerisms were those of a quiet, humble, non-ostentatious man, whose main goal was to achieve personal integrity for himself and his companions by means of self-sufficient hard labor on free soil. These personality traits proved to be his strongest assets in America, as they impressed sympathizers who identified with the image of self-made men seeking asylum in America. But his plans directly contrasted with the motives of Kossuth and most of his other companions. Despite his intimate association with Kossuth and his many years of observing the younger man's meteoric political career in Hungary, Újházi naively believed that Kossuth would come to share his desire to escape to the peace of a quiet haven in America. Thus he went to the extreme of inviting Kossuth to share with him the simplicity and charm of rustic existence in the American wilderness, away from the corruption of European civilization, which offered only "suffering and servitude for mankind." Notwithstanding his protestations that this did not imply his lack of interest in participating in a renewed battle for Hungary, his sentiments were manifest.³⁰ Moreover, by his willingness to isolate himself and his companions in the western wilderness of Iowa, away from important contacts and sources of aid, he further demonstrated that for him the colony took precedence over the revolution, the reverse of Kossuth's approach. When he later suggested to Kossuth that Cali-

fornia might be a better alternative to Iowa, if re-locating the Hungarian colony was to be considered, he further demonstrated these personal priorities.³¹

After silently awaiting Congressional action on his request for land during the early months of 1850, Újházi finally sensed the futility of procrastinating any further. Accompanied by a small band of devoted followers, he left New York in April to seek his promised land. Four months of hard travel brought them to Decatur County, Iowa, where they established the settlement they called New Buda. For the next two years Újházi was to remain here collecting exiles around himself. He thereby managed to keep at least part of the emigration together in anticipation of Kossuth's joining them in America.

III

Since only Kossuth's emigration to America and his willingness to support Újházi's settlement scheme could assure its ultimate success, Kossuth's views on this plan deserve analysis. During the first months of his exile in Turkey, he first conceived the idea of establishing a Hungarian military colony as a means of preventing the Hungarians from drifting apart and of maintaining their martial preparedness for Hungary's liberation. In early 1850 land was purchased and outfitted for this purpose in Smyrna, but the Turkish Government rejected the plan.³² As Austrian pressures continued to diminish his options in Turkey, Kossuth next considered exploiting American sympathies to solicit military and political support.³³ Manifestations of American sympathies were evident in reports about Újházi's successes, as well as in an American offer to Kossuth for a "quiet and tranquil home" in the United States.³⁴ By February 1850 Kossuth publicly implied that he had adopted Újházi's scheme by urging a large group of Hungarians at Sumla about to embark for America to organize an American settlement association.³⁵ In their letter of introduction he stated that ". . . the free land of North America is the place where I too wish to be put to rest, if my bones are not allowed to combine with the dust of my homeland."³⁶

One month later Kossuth received Újházi's letter summarizing his colonization goals as a means of keeping the emigrants together for renewing the revolution. Újházi also requested Kossuth's strong support in order to legitimize his own status and actions in America. Kossuth's immediate response demonstrated his growing belief in the potential of American aid and his growing pessimism about his continued internment in Turkey. It also reflected much about Kossuth's goals and

philosophy in contrast to Újházi's. His main thrust remained strictly political: his every move was motivated by the desire to resume Hungary's liberation. He provided Újházi with credentials to serve as Hungary's and his own representative in the United States. Since the greatest need was for funds to facilitate agitation and the purchase of arms, he urged Újházi to raise or borrow what he could in America. But he also supported the colonization idea. If and when all hope must be relinquished for Hungary's liberation, he wrote, then an extensive Hungarian colony should be founded in America. With American aid, a new Hungarian state would be added to the Union; he would expatriate thousands of his countrymen for that purpose. But, he added, the United States must do its part. One communications agent should be appointed to stay with Kossuth and another one must be placed in Belgrade to provide financial aid and transportation to potential emigrants. Barring this, he concluded, "there cannot be a new Hungary" in the United States.³⁷ A few months later, Kossuth explicitly stipulated that substantial financial support must be forthcoming from the United States before he would consider American colonization. Although he perceived no alternative solution for the émigrés than their settlement in America, he wrote to his Paris representative, he would permit this only if twenty thousand pounds sterling were promised for this purpose. This was to be raised by borrowing it against the expected productive value of the Hungarian colony.³⁸

Kossuth had in fact proposed that the settlement of the exiles in America be considered a contingency plan, to be acted upon if all other efforts to liberate Hungary failed. In the meantime, however, colonization would remain a live option which would be exploited to elicit American financial and political support. Since with variations this remained Kossuth's policy during the succeeding two years, it did much to encourage Újházi and his American sympathizers to assume that Kossuth would ultimately settle in the United States.

The remaining months of 1850 proved even less promising for Kossuth's release from Turkey. When George P. Marsh, the American Minister to Turkey, officially requested Kossuth's release, the Sublime Porte refused and, bowing to Austrian pressure, removed Kossuth and a contingent of his closest followers even further into isolation to Kutahia, in Asia Minor. With growing despair, Kossuth corresponded with Marsh, often raising the colonization question by requesting information about land grants for the Hungarians and about provisions for passage to the United States.³⁹ Among official circles in America the conviction grew that Kossuth did, indeed, desire asylum in the United States. And when

John Brown, the Dragoman of the American Legation on home leave in the fall of 1850, told Secretary of State Daniel Webster and other officials in Washington that Kossuth desired nothing more than "a quiet home on the soil of America," he only added more support for this conviction.⁴⁰

By early 1851 the general American assumption about Kossuth's motives was probably best stated by Daniel Webster, when he wrote to Marsh that Kossuth and his companions

... by their desire to remove so far from the scene of their late conflict, declare, that they entertain no hope, or thought, of other similar attempts, and wish only to be permitted to withdraw themselves altogether from all European association, and seek new homes in the vast interior of the United States.⁴¹

Webster reiterated these assumptions by directing Marsh to request the refugees' release so that they may come "to the uncultivated regions of America, and leave, forever, a continent which to them has become more dreary than the desert."⁴² Almost simultaneously, in March 1851, Congress passed a joint resolution empowering the President to dispatch a vessel for the Hungarians on condition that they express desire to settle in the United States.⁴³ Further corroborating the assumptions about Kossuth's intentions was the announcement by the Sumla group upon its arrival in New York in the fall of 1851 that "our leader Kossuth will, as he said, join us [at New Buda], if he be allowed to come here."⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, public appeals were again made to Congress to grant the Hungarians land, because "Kossuth will probably proceed to the colony of New Buda."⁴⁵

In light of the agreeable response of the Porte in February 1851 to renewed American representations for Kossuth's release, in April H. A. Homes, the Second Dragoman of the Legation, requested the Hungarians at Kutahia to sign a statement accepting the Congressional conditions for their emigration to America. With some difficulty Kossuth persuaded his men to comply, but refused to commit himself to emigration on grounds that it would impede his future activities.⁴⁶ Apparently, this evasiveness was not reported to Webster. Indeed, by late April, when the Porte offered to liberate all of the Hungarians except Kossuth and a handful of officers (who were to be detained until September) without any stipulation as to where they must emigrate, Homes was hard put to persuade the Hungarians to remain committed to America.⁴⁷ In reporting to Webster, Homes explained that the Hungarians had originally agreed to the conditions "when they regarded this course as the means of obtaining their freedom"; since they now re-

ceived it unconditionally, he noted, they seek assurance that "they will come under no obligation to remain any longer in America than they please."⁴⁸ In view of these new circumstances, Homes made renewed efforts in June to obtain "a more explicit and fresh answer" as to the Hungarians' "disposition to avail themselves of the offer of the American Government."⁴⁹ For the official record Kossuth complied, but privately he informed Homes that he intended only to visit America.⁵⁰ Thus, despite Kossuth's forthrightness with Homes, according to official American records he was still expected to arrive as a permanent emigrant in compliance with the Congressional conditions.

With his liberation imminent by mid-1851, Kossuth recognized the danger of having erroneous assumptions circulating about his intentions. In his May 1851 letter to Újházi he used a different tone from that of the previous year. Criticizing Újházi's readiness to find a new home and for having lost hope in Hungary's rebirth, he expressed irritation that this pessimistic approach was "not without influence on weaker individuals." He reiterated his own faith that political changes in European conditions were imminent within the next ten months, three of which he intended to spend in America to gain support. He requested Újházi, as his representative in America, to intensify American sympathies, but for the correct reasons: humanitarian reasons should be deemphasized, and sentiment for defeated Hungary's struggle for independence and democratic principles should be stressed. He expressed disappointment that Webster's directives to Marsh assumed that "I and my companions, having relinquished all efforts for the liberation of our country, desire nothing more than to permanently emigrate to America." Finally, he requested Újházi to communicate with the President and Webster to correct these false views, based upon the suggestions which he [Kossuth] had outlined in his letter.⁵¹

Despite his changed tactics, Kossuth did not entirely abandon his settlement contingency plan. If all else failed, he wrote to Újházi, a "free Hungary" would be founded in America; but a small settlement must be avoided, as it will be swallowed up by the surrounding masses. Having selected 1852 as the year of liberation, he also implied indirectly that the colonization decision would be reached that year.⁵² Shortly thereafter, in a letter to Ferenc Pulszky, his London representative, Kossuth reiterated his willingness to colonize should his new attempt to liberate Hungary fail in 1852, though on this occasion he again suggested that the scheme be utilized as a fund raising device. Tell the American minister in London, he instructed, that "I will either liberate Hungary, or, if I am unable to accomplish this in 1852, then with 2 to 300

thousand Hungarians I will begin a settlement. If I get the opportunity to do so, I would like to increase the United States by a new state." Stressing the need for raising funds to purchase ships and military supplies for the revolution, he further instructed Pulszky to query the minister whether two million dollars might be borrowed from American banks on condition that, "if we liberate Hungary, naturally our country will repay the debt; if we don't succeed, it will become the debt of our new state in the Union."⁵³

IV

In 1850 much of the United States comprised empty, unoccupied land. In Iowa alone, where statehood had recently been proclaimed, six million acres stood at the disposal of homesteaders. Congress annually auctioned off parcels of this federal land at \$1.25 per acre. Most of these lands, however, found no buyers. The unsold lands could be freely cultivated by squatters with preemptive rights to purchase these lands for \$1.25 per acre, should they again come up for auction. In the meantime, the squatter could hold the lands he occupied free of taxes, rental fees, or any other form of encumbrance.

Since in 1850, the new state of Iowa became the focus of settlement interest, Washington officials naturally recommended it for Újházi's planned colony. The Hungarians hoped to acquire the land as a free gift. At the very least, they assumed that since their Iowa lands had only recently been up for auction, they would be left alone to work these lands until they had earned enough to pay for them. Of the 75,000 acres assumed necessary for the extensive colony planned, Újházi staked out twelve sections of land (or 7,680 acres)⁵⁴ in Decatur County, located near the Missouri border in southern Iowa. His companions settled on lands adjacent to his. By the spring of 1851, as news of the colony spread, other Hungarians arrived, and as they did, they settled more of the surrounding empty lands, sometimes as much as several hours of travel from each other. They came in groups or as individuals, some seeking Hungarian company in a strange land, others merely looking for a source of livelihood. But nearly all arrived in the hope that this would become the headquarters of the emigration which Kossuth would soon join. Although many departed after a short time, mostly because they could not bear the hard life of the homesteader, sufficient replacements kept arriving for a core colony to prevail, with much planning and hoping for the future.

In letters and circulars to his oppressed countrymen in Hungary,

Újházi planned to entice hundreds of families to come to his colony.⁵⁵ In veritable real estate prospectuses, he advertised it as an extensive, closed community in which the social and domestic life would remain that of the Magyar landed gentry.⁵⁶ He also provided detailed lists of the types of professionals and craftsmen required to complete his colony.⁵⁷ Somehow evading Austrian censorship, optimistic descriptions of the colony regularly appeared in the Hungarian press.⁵⁸ The symbolic impact of New Buda in Hungary is best illustrated by the abrupt arrest and interrogation of an American citizen in Hungary during 1850, when he expressed sympathy for Újházi's colony.⁵⁹

Újházi's letters to fellow exiles in England and Turkey were no less enticing. The departure of the Sumla group from Turkey in early 1850 with the expressed purpose of joining Újházi was one result. An American Society and a Hungarian Committee were also founded in London to encourage and aid Hungarians about to settle in America. The Hungarians in London were informed that Kossuth was expected to settle in America.⁶⁰

In the United States the colony's existence was a matter of common knowledge. On the road to New Buda in the fall of 1850, Sándor Lukács discovered that everywhere the Hungarians and their settlement were spoken of with respect.⁶¹ In September 1850 New Buda was designated as the site for a post office, with Újházi as its postmaster. This not only facilitated correspondence with the outside world, but provided official recognition of the settlement. The new colony's prominence on the nearly empty map of Iowa was described by Ferenc Varga. The map he used to find the colony in 1851 "pointed out with large letters 'Hungarian Colony — post office New Buda'" (though few people could direct him to its exact location in the wilderness once he reached its vicinity).⁶² A steady stream of national sympathy and publicity for the colony continued to keep it before the public eye at least until 1852, when Kossuth made his tour through midwestern United States.

Nor did Újházi slacken in his determination to keep the land grant question and Kossuth's liberation before Washington officials. Upon learning of President Taylor's death, he immediately wrote to Millard Fillmore, his successor, describing New Buda and soliciting his aid. Although Fillmore refused to recognize Újházi's appointment as Hungary's representative, he was warmly encouraging on the land grant issue. Similarly, in response to Újházi's letters, Senators Seward, Cass and Buel expressed confidence that both of his projected goals would soon be satisfied by Congress.⁶³ Újházi was undoubtedly greatly buoyed by the passage of the March 1851 bill in Congress approving Kossuth's

emigration to America on condition that he settle there. Coupled with this came the favorable news that by the President's orders the lands they occupied in Iowa would be exempted from auction to provide more time for Congress to act on the land grant bill.⁶⁴ Those at New Buda had much reason for optimism: they would get their land, and their leader was on his way, too.

Indeed, the expectation that Kossuth was arriving to join them at New Buda, perhaps as their permanent governor, was common among the settlers.⁶⁵ Újházi's appointment as Kossuth's representative convinced many that Kossuth shared Újházi's views and plans. With confidence, Újházi told the surveyor dispatched by the Land Office to New Buda in the summer of 1851 that he had letters from Kossuth stating that the latter was "determined on coming to that settlement there to make his permanent home," and that "a large colony of Hungarians would be formed."⁶⁶ In his last message to Kossuth in Turkey, at a time when the latter's liberation appeared to be a certainty, Újházi alluded to a time soon when the two of them would "embrace each other as republicans on this free soil," and he rationalized the continued Congressional procrastination on the land grant question by surmising that the Americans were awaiting Kossuth's arrival to surprise him with it. He also implored Kossuth to "chase out" the large number of Hungarians from England and bring them with himself,⁶⁷ so as to enable them to remain together cultivating the free soil of democratic America. Finally, he repeated his desire to establish a "compact colony" of Hungarians, and assured Kossuth that if he were to prefer another location for a colony, "we are prepared to follow you."⁶⁸

It is not clear when, if ever, Újházi received Kossuth's 1851 letter in which the latter denounced Újházi's settlement activities. What is clear is that, despite the untimely death of his wife in October 1851 which shook him deeply, Újházi remained convinced that his friend and leader would soon join him in Iowa. This alone drove him on. Anticipating Kossuth's arrival, in November 1851 Újházi sent several letters addressed to him in New York, in which he outlined the methods by which Kossuth should divide the Congressional lands among the Hungarians.⁶⁹ He also urged Kossuth to pressure Washington officials to grant the required lands, and asked him to support the Sumla group of emigrants currently awaiting financial aid to defray their transportation expenses from Chicago to New Buda.⁷⁰

Almost to the moment of Kossuth's arrival in America, the United States Government remained persuaded that the exiled leader was seeking no other purpose than to accept its offer of asylum. Most revealing in this respect was President Fillmore's happy announcement to Újházi in October 1851 that Kossuth and his men were coming to enjoy life in America, "for the remainder of their lives, and [to] leave their posterity in a land of freedom and equal rights."⁷¹ However, several incidents occurred while Kossuth was in transit to America, such as his attempts to agitate in France and in England, which raised suspicions about his real motives. Kossuth's statement to the American people on the day after his arrival in New York on December 5, 1851, erased all remaining doubts. He openly declared that he had not come to settle in comfort but to continue the battle for Hungary's liberation. Thereupon he embarked upon one of the most brilliant tours of political agitation that America had ever witnessed. Despite the enormous popular acclaim for Kossuth's revolutionary purpose, however, the Whig Government was shaken by Kossuth's policy which it considered

at variance with the understanding under which the intervention of the United States government was offered for his release . . . It was intended and clearly stated that the intention of the United States government was to offer him an asylum in this country but not to afford him the means of carrying out the objectives of a political mission.⁷²

Thus the Government remained cool toward him, and Congress spent several weeks debating whether or not to offer him an official welcome.

The universal acclaim he received as he traveled from New York to Philadelphia deluded Kossuth into assuming that he would encounter similar support in Washington. Not until he met with President Fillmore on December 31 was he shocked to learn that the United States' official policy of strict neutrality in European affairs varied widely from that suggested by popular demonstrations. "From that hour," wrote Fillmore's chronicler, "Kossuth's mission as a propagandist of his wild opinions was a failure. . . ."⁷³ Chagrined over this turn of affairs, Kossuth remained sulky and broody throughout the rest of his two-week Washington stay, a crucial time, during which he was to decide his future strategy in light of these new circumstances.

Given his temporary mood of pessimism about the possibility of renewing European revolutions or of receiving American aid, Kossuth evidently turned to a serious consideration of the option of pursuing his

settlement contingency plan. In a meeting with the Secretary of Interior during the first week of January, he was quoted as saying that

the opposition which he met at the hands of Congress and the Executive, convinced him that his mission to this country had completely failed.

He therefore inquired of the Secretary whether land would be provided for a body of Hungarian settlers, "so located that the Hungarians would live together in a separate community." Unfortunately, his conversation with the Secretary was not wholly amicable. An embarrassing misunderstanding occurred over the question as to whether Kossuth would have to pay for the requested land or would receive it as a free gift.⁷⁴ A few days later Kossuth also met with the Iowa Congressional delegation concerning the potential for land at New Buda. The senators informed him that at most 160 acres per person could be hoped for.⁷⁵ According to one interpretation, "The details pleased him and he decided to ask Congress to approve an act of free land;" but another source has suggested that he was disappointed with the information and may have decided that the potential for the sizable colony he envisioned was not promising.⁷⁶ Whatever his response, during the first days of January 1852, Kossuth carefully investigated the potentials for a Hungarian colony in America.

Soon thereafter, however, Kossuth again reversed himself — this time permanently. Kossuth the revolutionary could not become a farmer, nor could he consider terminating his perennial battle with the Habsburgs for long. Recognizing that the recent publication of his statement suggesting his willingness to settle implied a despair on his part which was proving counterproductive to his purpose, he repudiated it, claiming to have been misquoted.⁷⁷ Under these circumstances, further efforts on behalf of a Hungarian colony had to be abandoned. Thereafter, Kossuth turned to the alternative tactic of touring the remaining populated regions of the United States, gathering financial support for the revolution which he declared with renewed vigor to be imminent in 1852.

Although this explains Kossuth's decision against forming a large Hungarian colony, it may not fully account for his refusal to support payment of the Sumla group's transportation costs from Chicago to New Buda. Financial aid for this purpose was available from a millionaire on condition that Kossuth approved it. Since Kossuth himself had specifically dispatched the Sumla group to America in order to settle them at New Buda,⁷⁸ and since earlier he had accepted the humanitarian argument that those exiles who found themselves destitute owing to lack of language or occupational skills should be settled on farms,⁷⁹ his

refusal to approve it appears contradictory. Certainly the Sumla group, consisting mostly of common soldiers, fit the humanitarian argument, and their settlement could have been justified on those grounds alone before the American public. The alternative, already too obvious, was their scattering in destitution throughout the United States. Moreover, if Iowa was not to his liking, Kossuth had a wide choice of other locations for settlement purposes. He had land offers from private sources in New York, Missouri, Virginia, Tennessee, and Texas.

There is reason to suspect that the culmination of the so-called Tochman affair, in which Kossuth found himself directly embroiled during his stay in Washington, and which was closely associated in the public mind with the settlement scheme and especially with the Sumla group's plan to reach New Buda, contributed to Kossuth's negative decision, at a time when he was known to have been irritated and despondent.

The Tochman affair had its beginnings in the disturbance occasioned among the Hungarian emigrants over the attentions paid to Apollonia Jagello. Miss Jagello later married Major Gaspar Tochman, a Washington lawyer of Polish descent, and together the couple remained influential supporters of the Hungarian cause in America. Irritated by her continued prominence, a Bavarian officer by the name of De Ahna, who had accompanied the Hungarians to America, published a slanderous tract attacking the Tochmans.⁸⁰ In response, the Tochmans brought suit against De Ahna, thereby providing further fuel for the already festering feud among the Hungarians.

Since Tochman had been his most effective agent in Washington, Újházi became one of his strongest advocates. Among other things, Tochman had effectively worked behind the scenes for Kossuth's liberation and had distributed Kossuth's address to the American people; Mrs. Tochman had actively lobbied on behalf of the successful bill to liberate Kossuth; and Tochman had persuaded the President to withdraw the settlers' land from auction.⁸¹ Újházi often expressed his gratitude to the Tochmans, promising that when Kossuth arrived, "he will, in more energetic language, express our thanks, than I am able to do in writing."⁸² József Prick and his Sumla group, whose trip to Chicago (with the expectation of continuing to New Buda after Kossuth approved it) had been financed with the Tochmans' help, also strongly favored the Polish couple. In an appeal to the American people signed by 67 members (23 of whom were members of the Komárom garrison whence Apollonia had emigrated), this group defended Apollonia's character as "in all respects above impeachment."⁸³

Upon his arrival in Washington, Kossuth, like many of the quarreling Hungarians, attempted to appear neutral, "being anxious to prevent exposure of the private affairs of the exiles, because the trial is likely to give an insight into matters not known to the public."⁸⁴ Already disturbed over his political failure, he managed to excuse himself from a court summons in the case and attempted completely to ignore the Tochmans while in the capital. That his public image was not enhanced by this action was illustrated by an editorial accusing him of anti-Slavic racism for having refused publicly to vindicate the Tochmans.⁸⁵ Then, in early February, what had now become the Kossuth-Tochman feud broke into the open. In an effort to vindicate themselves, the Tochmans published a series of letters they had exchanged with Kossuth. In introducing the correspondence, the *National Era's* editor reflected the dismay felt by many Hungarian and Tochman supporters when he conjectured that Kossuth must have acted under great pressures in perpetrating "this unintentional injustice," because

No two private individuals in this country have labored so earnestly, disinterestedly, and successfully, to promote the welfare of the Hungarian exiles, as Major Tochman and his estimable wife.⁸⁶

The letters revealed that at a Kossuth reception on New Year's Day, Mrs. Tochman had been treated with "coldness and reserve" by the Kossuth party, which was "misconstrued to her injury" by Washington society. Learning that Kossuth believed the charges laid against his wife⁸⁷ and finding himself unable to gain access to the Hungarian leader, Tochman attempted to vindicate his wife's reputation by mail. Kossuth responded impersonally through his secretary that Mrs. Tochman "could not of course expect to be received otherwise than with the normal civility one meets thousands of unknown persons," and made no further reference to Tochman's defense of his wife. Thoroughly aroused now, Tochman reminded Kossuth of his friendship with Újházi and listed his many services to the Hungarian cause, including his role in financing the Sumla group, and asked whether Kossuth thought that the 67 Hungarians who had testified to Mrs. Tochman's good character had given false testimony.⁸⁸ Kossuth made no further response. By the time this exchange appeared in the newspapers he had left Washington and embarked on his tour. That his feud with the Tochmans did no good for his political cause can be safely assumed. Accepting (or expecting) further help for the Hungarians waiting to be transferred from Chicago to New Buda now was obviously out of the question, and the Sumla group was permitted to scatter.

Meanwhile, for six weeks Újházi's anxious requests for information about Kossuth's plans had been avoided by short, uninformative, almost flippant letters from Kossuth's closest aid, Pulszky, greatly exasperating the old and loyal supporter of the revolutionary leader.⁸⁹ Since Újházi expected nothing from what he cynically labeled the "messianic" year of 1852, or from any other year in the near future, he predicted that the Hungarian exiles lingering in Europe would soon tire of waiting for non-existent opportunities to renew the revolution and would join him in America.⁹⁰ As Kossuth himself had set 1852 as the year of decision, Újházi had reason to hope that his colonization scheme might yet achieve the support of the émigrés.

Kossuth finally replied in mid-January. He informed Újházi that he still disagreed with the colonization scheme because it was tantamount to an admission of failure and lack of confidence in Hungary's future. Surprisingly, however, even at this late date, he hinted that he would support the creation of a new Hungary in America if liberating the old one proved to be hopeless. But he reiterated that the time for such a decision had not yet arrived.⁹¹ The Sumla group, anxiously awaiting Kossuth's support for its journey to New Buda, received a similar message, but couched in even stronger language.⁹² Thus the final opportunity for founding a sizable Hungarian settlement in America was lost forever.

Precisely what transpired between Újházi and Kossuth when the two men finally met in St. Louis during March 1852 remains unrecorded. Presumably, Újházi informed the leader of his decision to settle in a warmer southern climate, but probably repeated his willingness to remain at New Buda or anywhere else upon Kossuth's orders. Convinced that new opportunities for Hungary's liberation were imminent, Kossuth reiterated his opinion that the emigrants would be too isolated in America's wilderness to exploit European opportunities.⁹³ Yet, in view of Kossuth's consistent espousal of his settlement contingency plan, it is not inconceivable that he again repeated it at this time. Perhaps partly for this reason, when he asked Újházi if he would take possession of a gift of land that had been offered to him (Kossuth) in Texas, the older man jumped at the opportunity.⁹⁴ Not only could he seek land for himself in Texas while remaining in Kossuth's service, but there remained the hope that at some later time Kossuth would support a Hungarian colony there. Újházi managed to attract as many as twenty Hungarian exiles to his San Antonio settlement, where he remained for the rest of his days, a broken and frustrated man.

Did Kossuth commit an error by not remaining in America to keep

the émigrés together? There are those who believe he did.⁹⁵ However, disregarding the totally impractical plan of exploiting the colony as a base for fomenting revolution, even Újházi's simpler goal of keeping the emigrants together in one colony was probably an impossible task. Certainly, with Kossuth's support a large number of exiles could have been gathered. But even while optimism prevailed about Kossuth's support for a permanent colony, most of the settlers had departed from New Buda soon after their arrival. They were politicians, soldiers, aristocrats, who could not accept the hard labor or isolation required of the pioneer farmer in the wilderness.

Even less likely was the feasibility of maintaining a compact, closed Hungarian community. As Kossuth himself suspected, unless the colony was very large, assimilation was inevitable.⁹⁶ There was also the problem of continuous dissension. As Pulszky phrased it, "the Hungarian's nature is such that they can't keep together, but instead quarrel among each other; therefore, there could be no talk about a Hungarian colony."⁹⁷ Besides the quarreling in the cities, there is ample evidence to suggest land divisions and speculation at New Buda caused similar disagreements.⁹⁸ Finally, continuing Congressional inaction on the land grant question produced insecurity at first, and eventually the realization that free soil would never be forthcoming. By 1852, everywhere they went the disillusioned settlers who left New Buda carried negative news. One emigrant arriving in New Orleans with intentions of settling there was told that the colony was down to nineteen settlers and in the process of dissolution (in fact, there were thirty settlers in March 1852).⁹⁹ Another émigré reflected the general consensus in 1852 by comparing New Buda to a "Siberian exile."¹⁰⁰ Although a short time after Újházi's departure a renewed effort to promote the colony met with some success, within a few years the colony disappeared altogether.

After departing from the United States in June 1852, Kossuth relinquished all further hope for American political or financial aid. He spent the remainder of his long life in perpetual efforts to renew the battle for Hungary in Europe. In the process, he often reconsidered the colonization scheme as a means of achieving his ultimate goal. Even before leaving the United States he became involved in an unsuccessful plan to establish a combined Hungarian-American colony in the Dominican Republic to serve as a base for invading Hungary.¹⁰¹ Rumors of other American locations selected for this purpose continued to circulate. But his most preferred location for colonization had always been, and continued to be, in Turkey, thanks to its proximity to Austria and Hungary, and owing to its natural enmity with the Habsburgs and

Romanovs.¹⁰² On different occasions, Italy and Crete were also considered. However, all of Kossuth's settlement dreams, like his myriad of other plans for liberating his homeland, remained just that — the unfulfilled dreams of one of the most dedicated and persistent nationalist revolutionaries of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

1. Dénes Jánosy, *A Kossuth emigráció Angliában és Amerikában* (Budapest, 1940–48); Tivadar Ács, *New Buda* (Budapest, 1941).
2. Éva Gál, *Újházi László, a szabadságharc utolsó kormánybiztosa* (Budapest, 1971).
3. John H. Komlos, *Kossuth in America, 1851–1852* (New York, 1973).
4. Aladár Urbán, "A Lesson for the Old Continent: The Image of America in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848/49," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* 17 (Autumn 1976): 85–97.
5. Gál, *Újházi*, p. 64; see also Újházi's similar sentiments in Újházi to Vukovics, New Buda, Sept. 12, 1851, Vukovics Papers, R section 216, Magyar Országos Levéltár, hereafter cited as O.L.
6. Ladislaus Újházy, *A Brief Explanatory Report, as to the Termination of the Hungarian Struggle . . . and . . . Circumstances of the Hungarian Emigration* (New York, 1850), pp. 16–17. See also Zsigmond Thaly, *The Fortress of Komárom* (London, 1852), pp. 233–234.
7. The 1834 Congressional act granting 36 sections of land to the Poles at the minimum price of \$1.25 per acre on condition that they continuously cultivate their lands for ten years became a model for the Hungarians as well. The Polish venture failed, due to misuse of funds collected for that purpose. See Charles Kraitsir, *The Poles in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1837), pp. 193–196. The Polish precedent remained alive in the minds of Americans and was often used to argue for or against the proposed grant to the Hungarians during 1850.
8. Arthur J. May, *Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe* (Philadelphia, 1927), pp. 41–50.
9. *The Lorgnette*, Jan. 23, 1850, pp. 50–54.
10. *New York Herald*, Dec. 19, 1849.
11. *New York Tribune*, Dec. 10, 1849, Suppl.; *Ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1849; *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1849; *Ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1849, Suppl.; *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1849; *Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1850; *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1850; Újházi, *Explanatory Report*, pp. 16–17. See also Jánosy, *Emigráció*, pp. 192–193.
12. *New York Tribune*, Jan. 4, 1850.
13. Újházi to Kossuth, Washington, Jan. 19, 1850, Kossuth Collection, R. Section 90, Chronological Series I.688, O.L. (in all Kossuth correspondence hereafter cited assume R. Section 90; only series number will be noted).
14. *New York Herald*, Dec. 19, 1849; *The Daily Union* (Washington), Dec. 21, 1849.
15. *New York Herald*, Jan. 18, 1850; for Taylor's previous correspondence with Újházi, see *Ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1849.
16. *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, Feb. 5, 1850, p. 244.
17. *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1850, p. 128; *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1850, pp. 289–296; *Ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1850, p. 293; *Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 143–148; *Ibid.*, Miscellaneous, No. 13. See also R.

- Section 90, I.698, O.L. It was proposed that these lands be granted, "on condition of their [the Hungarians] permanent settlement . . . , and their eventual naturalization, in conformity with existing laws."
18. Komlos, *Kossuth*, pp. 38-40.
 19. *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, Jan. 30, 1850, pp. 262-264; *New York Tribune*, Jan. 11, 22, 25, 29, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 1850. As attested by the flow of petitions into succeeding sessions of Congress, support in favor of granting free land to the Hungarians remained spirited throughout 1850-51.
 20. Újházi to Kossuth, New York, April 10, 1850, I.736, O.L.; Henri De Ahna, *The Greatest Humbug of the Day* (Washington, Sept. 14, 1851), pp. 2-4.
 21. Large posters entitled "In the Name of the Hungarian Nation," dated February 28, 1850, were printed and distributed in four languages. They were signed by Prágay, Wimmer, Hamvassy, Szalay, Fornet, Radnich, and Damburghy. Copies sent to Kossuth can be found in the Hungarian National Archives (I.716, O.L.). Wimmer and the committee kept Kossuth apprised of their activities in an attempt to win the latter's support away from Újházi and other key leaders of the emigration. See Wimmer to Kossuth, New York, Feb. 9, 1850, I.705, O.L.; Wimmer to Kossuth, Washington, March 12, 1850, I.723, O.L.; Wimmer and other committee members to Kossuth, New York, April 16, 1850, I.737, O.L.; Wimmer to Kossuth, Kingston, June 15, 1850, I.794, O.L.
 22. Újházi to Kossuth, New York, April 10, 1850, I.736, O.L. "Surely no people will support emigrants who can labor but will not," wrote the U.S. representative in Turkey to Kossuth, in reference to Wimmer's complaints. Homes to Kossuth, Constantinople, Aug. 17, 1850, I.878, O.L.
 23. *Pesti Napló*, Feb. 15, 1851. Col. János Prágay, ex-adjutant to General György Klapka at Komárom, led this movement for a competing colony. The distribution of the land was planned along military rank lines, as in the case of the earlier proposed colony in Turkey. Prágay requested for each ex-soldier half a section of land; for each officer one section (one section=320 acres); and for Kossuth six sections, with the guarantee that payment for the land would not have to be made for ten years.
 24. *Ibid.*; Újházi to Kossuth, Apr. 10, 1850, I.736, O.L. In a similar case, the U.S. representative in Turkey complained in 1851 that many who had exploited the opportunity for a free passage to America were "the dregs of the emigration," and not *bona fide* Hungarians. Homes to Webster, July 5, 1851, Correspondence from Turkey to the Department of State, Book G. No. 3, Record Group 84, National Archives (hereafter cited as N.A.; unless otherwise noted, hereafter assume R.G. 84 in all N.A. citations).
 25. Jánossy, *Emigráció*, I: 58-60; Ádám Anderle, "A 48-as magyar emigráció és Narciso López 1851-es kubai expedíciója," *Századok* 107 (1973): 700-701. It should be noted that Újházi himself had counted among the radicals of the revolution. See Gál, *Újházi*, pp. 46-47; Újházi, *Explanatory Report*, pp. 5-6; Thaly, *Komárom*, p. 132. However, Újházi's radicalism focused on republicanism, not socialism. He was also an older, more practical man, whose disappointments may in any case have cooled his radical zeal. His cautious approach apparently brought about his break with his younger, more romantically oriented colleagues.
 26. Teleki to Kossuth, Paris, Dec. 27, 1849, in István Hajnal, *A Kossuth emigráció Törökországban* (Budapest, 1927) I: 598.
 27. *Pesti Napló*, Feb. 15, 1851.
 28. Újházi to Vukovics, New Buda, Sept. 12, 1851, Vukovics Papers, R. section 216, O.L.
 29. Csapkay brothers to Pulszky, New York, July 2, 1850, in Acs, *New Buda*,

- pp. 106–108. Destitution among the Hungarians remained so acute that by early 1852 Congress was debating how it could save them from starvation. That this destitution played no small part in the exiles' attacks on Újházi and later on Kossuth, when it became apparent that both were collecting for special purposes and would not share the funds with them, can be safely assumed.
30. Újházi to Kossuth, New York, Apr. 10, 1850, I.736, O.L.
 31. Újházi to Kossuth, New Buda, Apr. 29, 1851, I.1200, O.L.
 32. Károly László, *Napló-töredékek az 1848/49-i menekülteket, internáltakat, különösen Kossuthot és környezetét illetőleg, Törökországban és az Egyesült Államokban* (Budapest, 1887), pp. 58–59. The colony was to be under military orders, with all those willing to train for military service drawing sustenance from it. The idea of establishing a Hungarian colony in Turkey was reconsidered in December 1850. See I.971, O.L.
 33. Kossuth's representative in Paris, László Teleki, was first to suggest the potentials for exploiting American sympathies for Hungary's cause. See Hajnal, *Törökországban*, pp. 518, 596–98.
 34. Komlos, *Kossuth*, p. 40.
 35. *National Era* (Washington), Sept. 18, 1851.
 36. Letter of introduction for emigrants about to depart to America, Sumla, Feb. 14, 1850, in Hajnal, *Törökországban*, p. 695. See also I.706, O.L.
 37. Kossuth to Újházi, Broussa, March 27, 1850, Manuscripts Division, Magyar Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, hereafter cited as O.Sz.K.
 38. Kossuth to Teleki, Kutahia, July 23, 1850, I.844, O.L. Kossuth made it clear that the administration of the colony would be based on the assumption that the Hungarian colonists would eventually return to their homeland.
 39. Marsh to Kossuth, Constantinople, June 2, 1850, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the U.S. Legation, Vol. J-5, N.A.
 40. Brown to Webster, Sept. 26, 1850, Miscellaneous Correspondence Received, 1850, N.A.; Brown also wrote to Újházi to persuade him to go to Washington in Kossuth's behalf. See Brown to Újházi, Detroit, Nov. 17, 1850, Mss. Division, O.Sz.K.
 41. Webster to Marsh, Washington, Feb. 28, 1851. Dispatches from the Department of State, Vol. 14, N.A.
 42. *Ibid.* These were, of course, very erroneous views of Kossuth's objectives. Újházi, whose personal sentiments were perhaps better reflected by these statements, suspected that Kossuth would be upset by them: "Webster — I believe — could have spoken otherwise . . . he made unnecessary declarations about our future and our convictions," he wrote to Kossuth in 1851. Újházi to Kossuth, New Buda, Apr. 29, 1851, I.1200, O.L.
 43. *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 710, 778, 816.
 44. *National Era* (Washington), Sept. 18, 1851.
 45. *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1851.
 46. László, *Napló*, pp. 63–64. This exchange of correspondence between Homes and Kossuth is cited in Komlos, *Kossuth*, pp. 44–45.
 47. Homes to Kossuth, Constantinople, Apr. 29, 1851, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Legation, Vol. J-5, N.A.
 48. Homes to Webster, Constantinople, May 5, 1851, Correspondence from Turkey with the Department of State, Book G, No. 3, N.A.
 49. Homes to Morgan, Constantinople, May 15, 1851, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Legation, Vol. J-5, N.A.
 50. Komlos, *Kossuth*, p. 46. Homes suggested to Kossuth the probability that Austria will insist he emigrate to America as a condition of his release if he does not elect to do so voluntarily. See Homes to Kossuth, Constantinople, June 16, 1851, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Legation, Vol. J-5, N.A.

51. Kossuth to Újházi, Kutahia, May 21, 1851, I.1222, O.L. This letter is part of a group of letters entitled, "Kossuth's letter book, May 21–June 18, 1851," located in I.1222, O.L. All of the letters appear to be carbon copies, written in Kossuth's hand on very fine paper. Since the letter to Újházi suddenly ends in mid-sentence on the second page, there is some reason to suspect that it may never have been sent.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Kossuth to Pulszky, Kutahia, May 31, 1851, I.1222, O.L. Pulszky, one of the closest confidants of Kossuth and his representative in London, seemed to be under the impression in early 1851 that Kossuth intended to establish a Hungarian colony in America. See Maythényi to his wife, London, Jan. 18, 1851, in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 154–159.
54. Ferenc Varga, *Varga Ferenc följegyzései* (n.p., n.d.), p. 3, Quart. Hung. 2359, O.Sz.K. For other estimates of the size of Újházi's claim, see *Pesti Napló*, Dec. 14, 1850 and Jan. 7, 1851, in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 128–135, 143–151, and János Xántus, *Xántus János levelei Északamerikából* (Pest, 1858), p. 45. In the final analysis, only the few acres Újházi worked were effectively occupied. The rest remained part of future dreams never realized.
55. His plans attracted many who said that due to oppression in Hungary they would soon join him in his new colony. See Újházi to Kossuth, New York, Apr. 10, 1850, I.736, O.L.
56. Jenő Pivány, "A New Budai magyar colonia," *Magyar Történelmi Szemle* 3 (1914): 142. Újházi apparently expected to entice landed gentry to join him by promising the life-style they were accustomed to in Hungary. He was criticized for this by some of the exiles. For example, János Fiala reported prevailing negative opinion of Újházi's colony in the spring of 1852: "Újházi assumes a Dionysius role there [at New Buda]. He wants to transplant the Hungarian aristocratic manner of behavior to the West." See Tivadar Ács, *A száműzöttek. Fiala János 1848–49-i honvédelezredes emlékiratai az emigrációból* (n.p., n.d.), p. 214.
57. Rácz Rónay to Feleki, Budapest, Jan. 25, 1923, Charles Feleký Papers, Miscellaneous Mss Collection #63, Library of Congress. Rácz Rónay claimed to have in his possession several copies of what he called Újházy's real estate prospectuses sent to Hungary.
58. *Pesti Napló*, Dec. 14, 1850, and Jan. 17, 1851, in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 128–135, 147–151; *Pesti Napló*, Feb. 15, 1851; *Magyar Hírlap*, Dec. 22, 1850. All of these consisted of letters from exiles at New Buda.
59. Charles L. Brace, *Hungary in 1851* (New York, 1852), pp. 274–277.
60. Maythényi to his wife, London, Jan. 18, 1851 in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 154–159.
61. *Pesti Napló*, Jan. 7, 1851 in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 147–151.
62. Varga, *Följegyzései*, p. 6. Another of the emigrants with Újházi stated that most Americans he met knew of the "Hungarian Colony." *Magyar Hírlap*, Dec. 22, 1850.
63. Most of the originals of this correspondence are found in the Mss. Division, O.Sz.K. Some are reproduced in Lillian M. Wilson, "Some Hungarian Patriots in Iowa," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 11 (1913), and in Ács, *New Buda*.
64. Order of General Land Office, Washington, D.C. to Registrar and Receiver, Fairfield, Iowa, April 7, 1851. *The National Era* (Washington), Apr. 24, 1851.
65. Klára Újházi to her family, New Buda, May 22, 1851, Újházi Papers, P section 1539, O.L.
66. *The Boston Daily Advertiser*, Feb. 4, 1852; also excerpts in *Albany Evening Journal*, Feb. 9, 1852.

67. During his October 1851 visit to London on his way to America, Kossuth did just the opposite by ordering the exiles to remain in Europe in preparation for renewing the revolution. A Kossuth Fund was formed under his encouragement with war-like objectives, distracting moneys and sympathies from the previously successful Hungarian Relief Committee which had financed the emigration of large numbers of Hungarians to America for settlement purposes. The Committee was forced to dissolve, thus terminating its aid to potential settlers at New Buda. See Esterházy to Kossuth, in Jánossy, *Emigráció*, 1: 581-585.
68. Újházi to Kossuth, New Buda, Apr. 29, 1851, I.1200, O.L.
69. Újházi recommended that previous status or rank of individuals be ignored and that instead of attempting to divide the land among them, Kossuth would avoid quarreling if the American method of distributing Congressional lands were followed. Újházi to Kossuth, New Buda, Nov. 22, 1851, in Vasváry Collection, Hungarian-American Foundation, New Brunswick, N.J., and cited in Jánossy, *Emigráció* 1: 226.
70. *Ibid.*; see also Újházi to Mrs. Tochman, New Buda, Dec. 4, 1851, *National Era* (Washington), Feb. 5, 1852.
71. Fillmore to Újházi, Washington, Oct. 10, 1851, Mss. Division, O.Sz.K.
72. Crampton to Palmerston, Washington, Dec. 15, 1851, Jánossy, *Emigráció* 2, part 1: 204-206.
73. Frank H. Severance, ed., *Millard Fillmore Papers* (Buffalo, 1907), 11: 138, 467-468.
74. *New York Herald*, Jan. 6, 1852; *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1852.
75. *Washington Union*, Jan. 13, 1852.
76. May, *Mid-Century Revolutions*, p. 72; Jánossy, *Emigráció* 1: 336-337.
77. *New York Herald*, Jan. 9, 1852, reporting Kossuth's disclaimer of January 7.
78. Brick to the Tochmans, Sept. 16, 1851, in *National Era* (Washington), Sept. 18, 1851. Since no written directive by Kossuth to this effect was produced by the Sumla group to document its claims, it is possible that in its desperate state of destitution the group misrepresented or exaggerated Kossuth's orders. It should also be recalled that in early 1850, when Kossuth sent this group to America, his plans on permanent settlement in America were as yet undecided.
79. Jánossy, *Emigráció* 1: 225-226.
80. De Ahna, *Greatest Humbug*. That the Tochmans enjoyed strong support among top official circles in Washington, from the President down, is attested by the fact that after De Ahna's attacks on the Tochmans, he was fired from his job at the Public Land Office, and the entire Executive Branch of the Government was thereafter directed not to employ him.
81. Újházi to Tochman, New Buda, Jan. 24, 1851, I.1070, O.L.; Tochman to Újházi, Washington, Mar. 24, 1851, Mss. Division, O.Sz.K.
82. Újházi to Mrs. Tochman, New Buda, Dec. 4, 1851, *National Era* (Washington), Feb. 5, 1852.
83. *National Era* (Washington), Oct. 9, 1851. In their appeal, dated September 26, 1851, the Hungarians declared De Ahna a "tool" hired by European despots to foment divisions among the exiles.
84. *New York Herald*, Jan. 14, 1852.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *National Era* (Washington), Feb. 5, 1852.
87. Apollonia Jagello was an adventuress whose penchant for publicity had gotten her into trouble. The contemporary press often described her dressed in a military uniform during her first weeks in New York. Sources also agree that the Jagello name, implying noble roots, had been adopted by her. Most debatable remains

- the question as to whether she served as a soldier at Komárom. When later forced to defend her reputation, she and her supporters stated that she had never claimed to be any more than a nurse in the Komárom military hospital.
88. Tochman to Kossuth, Washington, Jan. 6, 1852; Nagy to Tochman, Washington, Jan. 11, 1852; Tochman to Kossuth, Jan. 15, 1852. All reproduced in *National Era* (Washington), Feb. 5, 1852.
 89. Újházi to Pulszky, New Buda, Jan. 31, 1851, in Ács, *New Buda*, pp. 220–222.
 90. Újházi to Vukovics, New Buda, Sept. 12, 1851, Vukovics Papers, R section 216, O.L.
 91. Kossuth to Újházi, Harrisburg, Jan. 15, 1852, Mss. Division, O.Sz.K.
 92. Rác Rónay to Feleki, Budapest, Jan. 25, 1923, Charles Feleký Papers, Miscellaneous Mss. Collection #63, Library of Congress. Rác-Rónay was quoting from fragments of Prick's diary in his possession.
 93. Péter Bogáti, "Flamingók New Budán," *Magyar Hírek*, Apr. 14, 1976.
 94. Újházi to Kossuth, Austin City, Texas, Apr. 22, 1852, in Jánossy, *Emigráció*, 2, part 2: 797–800.
 95. For example, Géza Kende, *Magyarok Amerikában* (Cleveland, 1927), 1: 326.
 96. See Kossuth's May 21, 1851 letter to Újházi, I.1222, O.L.
 97. Ferenc Pulszky, *Életem és korom* (Budapest, 1884), 2: 97.
 98. For example, see Varga, *Följegyzései*, p. 6; and Xántus, *Levelei*, p. 45.
 99. Ács, *A száműzöttek*, p. 214; Farkas Újházi to family, New Buda, March 30, 1852, cited in *Magyar Hírek*, Feb. 14, 1976.
 100. Kossuth to Asbóth, London, Sept. 9, 1852, *Adalékok a kényuralom ellenes mozgalmak történetéhez. Az Asbóth család irataiból* (Pest, 1871), p. 71.
 101. Komlos, *Kossuth*, pp. 123–125.
 102. Jánossy, *Emigráció*, 1: 336.

In Memoriam Miklós Radnóti (1909-1944)

Marianna D. Birnbaum

On June 23, 1946 a mass grave was reopened at Abda, a small village in Western Hungary. The event was by no means unique at this stage of Hungarian history. Hardly a day went by that the authorities of one region or another would not receive word that local people had come upon corpses or hastily covered graves in the fields. According to the findings of the preliminary investigations, approximately six hundred feet away from the Rábca, a small river running through the area, inmates of a forced labor camp had been executed. The ensuing exhumation proved to be a rather difficult job: the corpses were partially decomposed and the coroners had to identify the dead and the time and cause of death on the basis of shreds of clothing and disintegrated scraps of paper. On the corpse which they registered as number 12 the following items were found:

A visiting card with the name Dr. Miklós Radnóti printed on it. An ID card stating the mother's name as Ilona Gross. Father's name illegible. Born in Budapest, May 5, 1909. Cause of death: shot in the head. In the back pocket of the trousers a small notebook was found soaked in the juices of the body, and blackened by wet earth. This was cleaned and dried in the sun.¹

On the first page of the notebook there was a short text in Hungarian, Serbian, German, French and English. The latter reads "... contains the poems of the Hungarian poet Miklós Radnóti... to Mr. Gyula Ortutay, Budapest, University lecturer... Thank you in anticipation."² It is followed by his last poems with a final entry dated October 31, 1944:

I fell beside him; his body turned over
already taut as a string about to snap.
Shot in the back of the neck. That's how you too will end
I whispered to myself: just lie quietly.
Patience now flowers into death.