

RESUMES

KÁLMÁN ÁRPÁD KOVÁCS
THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE 19TH-CENTURY
HUNGARIAN PROTESTANT DEBATES ON SPIRITUAL REBIRTH

19th-century Protestant consciousness often operated – conforming to the modern media relations of the time – with watchword-like formations that could be circulated like press materials. This study provides a missing link that demonstrates that the Protestant Church in Hungary experienced similar debates at least four times over the course of a prolonged generation (for example, Baron Miklós Vay [1802–1894], Zsigmond Beöthy [1819–1896], Kálmán Tisza [1830–1902] and Count Kún Kocsárd [1803–1895] between 1841–45, between 1858–59, approximately 1879 and between 1891–97, respectively). The main points of debate were religious equality, rebirth, home mission, voluntary charity, pastoral poverty, subvention and Protestant Church autonomy. One of the most important markers of Protestant consciousness was “evangelical”, whose broad interpretation also contained the “born-again Christianity” that arose from the sermonic foundation of the “message of the cross”. The starting point of this study is that in the final decade of the 19th century, attitudes towards “born-again Christianity” were hardly dogmatic and much more a question of social organization. The more isolated and/or scattered the congregation was on a given territory or in a given community, the more likely their spiritual leader was to emphasize the necessity of spiritual rebirth. On the other hand, the more compact a given Protestant community was, even if located in a majority-minority area but maintaining a network connection to the main Protestant bloc, the less likely the spiritual leader was. The awakening of the personal faith of the congregation was vital for those living in isolation (Budapest included, for it was a textbook example of the irreligious modern metropolis), while the Protestant bloc was more “like a castle under siege”, where public morale was maintained collectively. In addition to the already existing orthodox-liberal, pastoral-laic and noble-prole divides, a fourth disruptive factor was unacceptable with its additional contradictory terminology: “spiritual-bodily”, “spiritual-worldly” and “awoken-tepid”. According to research by Jenő Gergely, László Kósa and Ábrahám Kovács, the “schools” of the home missionary awakening and the constructive (neo)-orthodoxy were both parts of the so-called “Hungarian Protestant Awakening” after 1990. Why were adherents of these factions specifically so severely opposed to each other? To answer the question, we must reexamine the question of spiritual rebirth from the perspective of theological and spiritual historical background with an eye on the role that tradition and forgiveness played. The current study traces the history from the biblical theological roots to 1864.

ÁDÁM SCHWARCZWÖLDER
MARRIAGE AND CAREER-LAUNCH AT THE TIME OF THE 1867
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMPROMISE: KÁLMÁN SZÉLL, ILONA
VÖRÖSMARTY AND FERENC DEÁK

In getting his career in public service off the ground, the talented and ever-ready Kálmán Széll (1843–1915), who had earned a doctorate in law from the University of Pest in 1866, was helped significantly by his influential father József Széll's (1801–1871) social network, specifically his close relationship with Ferenc Deák. “The Wise Man of Hungary” had known the Széll boys since they were children, kept abreast of their studies and, on more than one occasion, doled out good advice to them. However, Kálmán Széll's relationship to Deák was truly solidified in summer-autumn 1867, when he married Ilona Vörösmarty, the daughter of one of the most popular poets in Hungary and the ward of Deák, who had taken responsibility for the girl's wellbeing in 1855, upon the death of her father Mihály Vörösmarty.

At the time, there was a widespread rumor that Deák was not only Ilona Vörösmarty's (1846–1910) ward, but also her biological father, although no corroborating evidence has ever surfaced. What was certain was the ward's close relationship to her ageing guardian, whom she watched over with devotion in his old age. Kálmán Széll and Ilona Vörösmarty, who were three years apart in age, were married in autumn 1867. Their wedding was supported by both the Széll family and Deák. Although there is some indication that their union was not entirely born out of love, Kálmán Széll and Ilona Vörösmarty were bound by a deep human connection. Emotionally supportive of each other, they enjoyed a balanced marriage.

Did young Széll's career take off in 1867–1868 because of the wedding and his closeness to Deák, or would it have occurred irrespective? Providing a completely objective answer to this complicated question is of course impossible, but by analyzing the antecedents, circumstances and consequences of the marriage, we are able to provide a more nuanced picture. No doubt Széll's career path was made smoother by his close *relationship* to Deák, which, supplemented by a dash of good fortune, provided the *possibility* for fast career advancement. However, without *talent*, *determination* and *hard work*, he would not have been able to endure the trials and tribulations of Hungarian national politics. Our best course of action is to take the two extreme positions – well-connected careerist versus the “up by the bootstraps” self-made man – and placing Kálmán Széll as close to the center as possible.

LÁSZLÓ L. LAJTAI
CULTURAL NATION-BUILDING AND THE REGULATION OF HISTORY
TEACHING IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN THE ERA OF THE DUAL
MONARCHY

The simultaneously held debates on Article XXXVIII on primary education and Article XLIV on nationality rights taking place in the House of Representatives in November 1868 were of critical importance to both sides, the supporters of federalism by autonomous ethnicities (who made up the parliamentary minority) and the majority that believed in a united nation-building agenda. As part of both debates, educational institutionalization of collective identity discourses, either by differentiating ethnic communities making up of the country or, on the contrary, by an overarching national one was at stake. As a result of the debates, it was decided that the majority of Hungarian legislators did not support “ethno-history” proportioning in a mutual homeland, which would have educationally institutionalized common cultural memory of past historic events along ethnic lines. However, some groups, e. g. the Serbian community in particular, who could advocate more strongly for their own ethnic interests because of denominational autonomy won earlier, were allowed the opportunity to teach their own alternative interpretation of history as an independent subject instead of the (implicitly Hungarian) national one. As part of the Hungarian-Croatian legal-political compromise (Act XXX of 1868), Croatia-Slavonia, a nominally autonomous country within the Kingdom of Hungary, also enjoyed complete educational independence.

Regarding the autonomy of domestic religious denominations and the educational infrastructure in their maintenance, the pre-1918 leaders of the Hungarian state were, in point of fact, not in position to set up public education directly, even less so exclusively, in service of Hungarian language and Hungarian-minded pedagogic indoctrination. Nevertheless, the decision-makers of domestic education policy became increasingly bothered by rival domestic nation-building challenges and after a while took steps to rewrite the *content* taught in history classes in a manner reflective of Hungarian patriotism. In theory, this latter expectation hurt the interests of fewer parties (at least domestically), and in light of its antecedents, aligned perfectly with the expectations, specifications, and spirit of a Hungarian-centric curriculum that had been in development since the final decades of the 18th century. However, only at the turn of the century, due to public pressure which by that time had markedly changed in this respect, did the curriculum planners of the centralized state start placing greater emphasis on the familiarization of past domestic positive events and begin working on promoting the patriotic perspective as the main focus. In any case,

denominational, education managerial and instructional language fragmentation placed major constraints on the realization of nation-statehood, which was desired by a relative majority, from both the top down and the bottom up. These circumstances remained characteristic until the end of the era, despite a slight tendency towards homogeneity.

RÓBERT HERMANN

MEMOIR OR DEFENSE STATEMENT? THE MYSTERIOUS WORK OF
ZSIGMOND KEMÉNY

One of the publishing sensations of 1883 was the excerpted edition of Zsigmond Kemény's 1849 "memoir". The work was associated with the renowned publicist of the era Gusztáv Beksics. In *Zsigmond Kemény: The Revolution and Compromise* (*Kemény Zsigmond: A forradalom s kiegyezés*) Beksics put together a book that not only included Kemény's "memoir" but also several dozen letters that Kemény had written, mainly to Miksa Falk.

The book generated lively discussion, especially in the debate that was raging in the press between the former 1849-ers and the devotees of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Beksics did not include the entire text, only the parts that included Kemény and/or shined a light on the events of the revolution. In the 20th century, several researchers questioned the authenticity of the work. Moreover, despite the availability of the original manuscript at the National Archives of Hungary since 1954, most researchers specializing in the era have shunned it.

The study looks at the reception of Beksics's work, carefully weighs the drawn conclusions of the original manuscript and considers the question of the authenticity of the book. According to the author, the work is not a classic memoir, but rather the defense statement that Zsigmond Kemény submitted to the imperial royal court martial in Pest at the turn of 1849–1850. Concerning the principal questions, the defense statement interprets the events of 1848–1849 along the same lines as Kemény's famous 1850 pamphlet *After the Revolution* (*Forradalom után*). According to the author, the book is a valuable historical source, its occasional errors or overstatements resulting from contextual circumstances. That is, the text of *After the Revolution* strengthens the (already altogether supported) conclusion that the defense statement is neither a compilation nor a fabrication. It is simply the work of Zsigmond Kemény.

JUDIT ANTÓNIA FARKAS

STATE, SOCIETY AND BOOK CONSUMPTION: EFFORTS TO
STIMULATE THE PUBLICATION, PURCHASE AND READING OF
“GOOD” HUNGARIAN BOOKS IN THE LAST THIRD OF THE 19TH
CENTURY

In my study I look at the state and civil initiatives of the 1880's that attempted to make Hungarian quality books more popular in terms of readership and increased sales. Having actively captivated writers, publishers and a significant portion of the educated public for many years, the so-called Pulp Debate was initiated by the famous novelist, Mór Jókai's article (1880) and Lajos Kossuth's written reply (1882) to Tamás Szana, the secretary of the Petőfi Association. Because Hungarian quality books, literature, educational and scientific works were much less popular and competitive than foreign works translated into Hungarian and Hungarian-language popular books, thus the livelihoods and professional success of Hungarian publishers, booksellers and writers were under threat. The anomalous operation of the book market adversely impacted culture, science, community education and economics. Everyone involved played the blame game: the writers pointed the finger at book and media publishers and booksellers; the booksellers criticized the reading public and the media; and the book-buying public complained about the booksellers and the high prices they charged. However, there was almost unanimous agreement that the main drivers of the problem were the small size and lack of good taste among the Hungarian book-buying public, cultural, social and economic backwardness, procrastination of copyright legislation, minimal and unsystematic state support of literature and publishing which resulted in the advantage low-cost pulp publications. Hungarian publishers produced most translated works without the knowledge and the permission of their respective authors. Not only did they save on copyright expenses, but also on translation. The Hungarian-language publication of a foreign author's popular novel promised much greater profits than a contemporary Hungarian author's. Moreover, these mass publications were often distributed by foreign book agents who used clever tricks and received installment payments for their sales. If a publisher still agreed to publish the work of a talented Hungarian writer, it was considered a success if the book recouped printing costs. As a result of lively discussions that had been ongoing for years, a committee made up of the members of the Association of Hungarian Writers and Artists and the Association of Hungarian Booksellers was formed in 1887 to start a movement (asking for the cooperation of society and the state) to popularize reading as an activity and to raise demand for Hungarian books. Their lobbying efforts resulted in curbing the number of books

bought abroad by state schools, establishing and expanding debating club and spa libraries and the placement of book reviews in the newspapers of the countryside. Although they seemed small on the surface, these steps played a significant role in the propagation of Hungarian books and from the perspective of cultural education.

LÁSZLÓ ANKA
FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MAMELUKE.
KÁLMÁN TISZA'S LETTERS TO GYULA WLIASSICS, MINISTER OF
RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1895–1902)

Kálmán Tisza served fifteen years as prime minister, stepping down in spring 1890. His party colleagues called him the “General” and his nickname was widely known to the public as a result of Kálmán Mikszáth’s humorous short stories about him. A Mameluke was a parliamentary representative – always a member of the Liberal Party – who unwaveringly supported the parliamentary submissions, draft bills and draft resolutions of the General’s cabinets. Upon vacating his role as prime minister, the General himself became one of the Mamelukes of his successor Gyula Szapáry. As a parliamentary representative and one of the most influential secular leaders of the Reformed Church in Hungary, he was a serious and active political player behind the scenes, especially on behalf of his church and the people who sought his help.

These lobbying efforts were a focal point of his written correspondence between 1895 and 1902 with Gyula Wlassics, who served as the Minister of Religion and Education during those years and was one of the most effective of the era.

Tisza’s letters to Wlassics reveal how a former head of government lobbied, which matters Tisza turned to him for, his writing style (power of persuasion) and how often Tisza wrote. We also find out what kind of lifestyle the General had, for the dates and locations themselves divulge myriad information about the writer. But the most important knowledge we learn from the letters is how Tisza went about advancing the interests of his church.

ATTILA RÉFI

THE CENTURY-LONG LIFE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL IMRE CSÉCSI NAGY (1868–1967)

PART I: FROM THE LUDOVIKA ACADEMY TO THE END OF THE GREAT WAR

The study looks at *Vitéz* Imre Csécsi Nagy, onetime hussar officer, Royal Hungarian Lieutenant General, World War I hero, active public figure and Calvinist churchwarden, who was born in Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare, Romania, today) on May 11th, 1868. His parents were Miklós Csécsi Nagy (1840–1908) and Katalin Horváth de Likovich. His father was a Protestant pastor in Makó, doctor of humanities and ecclesiastical writer. His grandfather Imre Csécsi Nagy (1804–1847) was a physician, naturalist and corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

He attended high school (for six years) in Makó, afterwards enrolling at the Royal Hungarian Ludovika Military Academy, where he studied between 1884 and 1888. He graduated second in his class and first among the cadets of the cavalry school. On August 18th, 1888, he joined the 15th Hussar Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army as a cadet. A few months later, on November 1st, 1888, he became a lieutenant in the 3rd Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment in Arad. In October 1889, he participated in a cavalry officer course in Budapest. Upon completion, he rejoined the 3rd Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment. In 1891, he was promoted to first lieutenant. Over the course of 1891–1892, he finished top-level officer training in Budapest, which was followed by the *Kriegsschule* (School of War) of the *k.u.k* Army in Vienna in 1892–1894. He married Aranka Mayer (1869–1929), daughter of Ferdinánd Mayer, a wholesaler from Szeged, in 1892. She bore him five sons.

From 1894 onwards, he served in various roles on the general staff, initially in Pozsony (today Bratislava) and later in Szeged. In 1896, he was promoted to captain. In 1897, he was placed with the 1st Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment in Budapest. Later that same year, he rejoined the 3rd Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment in Szeged. In December 1900, he joined the department of the chief of staff of the command in Pozsony. In May 1903, he rejoined the hussars (9th Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment), this time in Marosvásárhely. In November 1905, he joined the 2nd Division of the 1st Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment stationed in Kecskemét. In 1908, he joined the 2nd Royal Hungarian Honved Hussar Regiment. In 1909, he was promoted to major. In November 1912, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In the wake of the start of World War I, in August 1914, he was taken to the Galician theater of war as part of the regiment. On November 1st, 1914, he was promoted

to colonel. In December, he was given command of the newly organized 1st Royal Hungarian Landsturm Cavalry Brigade. In May 1915, he was given command of the 1st Popular Uprising Cavalry Brigade, which he led heroically on the battlefields of Galicia and Transylvania. Because of his gallantry and resistance, he was awarded numerous medals of honor, for example, the Knight's Cross of the Order of Leopold, the Order of the Iron Crown (Third Class and Second Class, respectively) and the Military Merit Cross Third Class. In 1917, he was the deputy commander in Pozsony, after which he served in the 5th Army Command in Kolozsvár. On January 1st, 1919, he was retired from active duty by force.

DÁVID LIGETI
FROM CORPS COMMANDER TO ARMY HIGH COMMAND:
EMPEROR CHARLES I IN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE GREAT WAR

1916 was an eventful year for Charles I, the last Emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Beginning with the command of Corps XX, the heir to the throne took part in the South Tyrolean campaign, where he saw significant success at the Asiago breakthrough. In the summer of that same year, he was promoted successively to Army Commander and then Army Group Commander on the Eastern and Transylvanian Fronts, where he gained valuable experience. However, by then the cruelty of war had convinced him of the necessity to make peace.

Following the death of Franz Joseph I on November 21st, Charles was appointed Army High Command of the Monarchy. He also took over the Army Supreme Command of *k.u.k.* troops on December 2nd.

GÁBOR HOLLÓSI

THE ISSUES OF THE LEGAL CONTINUITY AND THE FORM OF STATE: THE ERA OF THE PUBLIC LAW PROVISORY AND THE “MINOR” CONSTITUTION OF 1946

In the wake of WWI, two “revolutions” took place in Hungary, a “civil” in 1918 and a “communist” in 1919. Not for the first time in the history of the Hungarian state did public law continuity break, for we may recall the transitional phase that prevailed between 1849 and 1867 (the period between the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867). The change associated with the events of the late 1910’s, however, surpassed everything that had come before. Thereafter, the Habsburgs’ right to the Hungarian throne was revoked forever. The victorious Entente Powers also announced that they would not recognize any restoration aspirations. Thus a decades-long transitional condition (*provizórium*) settled upon Hungarian public law. In the first part of our work, we outline its legal roots.

Act I of 1920 made Hungary a kingdom once again, albeit with a regent temporarily at the helm of the country. Even the legitimists accepted Miklós Horthy for the position, for they hoped that Franz Joseph’s onetime naval aide-de-camp would help clear the way for the eventual return of the Habsburgs. However, in 1921, under intensifying external pressure, the Hungarian National Assembly was forced to declare the dethronement of the Habsburgs. As a result, Horthy’s status as head of state became permanent; Hungary was henceforth a “kingdom without a king”. In the second part of our work, we examine whether the expansion of the authority of the regent conforms to the historical constitution, specifically the Doctrine of the Holy Crown. We also consider to what extent the authority of the regent can be regarded as a transition to a republican form of state.

The constitution of 1946 is also referred to as the “minor” constitution to differentiate it from the “major” or “Bukharin” constitution that superseded it in 1949 and was based on a Soviet template. The significance of the “minor” constitution was that with the declaration of the republican form of state, the era of public law provisory came to an end, having lasted more than a quarter-century, since 1918. Nevertheless, the constitution of 1946 raises numerous questions, and not only related to the circumstances of its origin. From a public law perspective, most of the problems associated with it arose in relation to legal continuity. That is, can the “minor” constitution be considered as a part of the historic Hungarian constitution, and does it even have to be? Furthermore, to what extent can the “new” republican form of state be reconciled with Hungarian tradition, and should it reconcile? In the third part of our work, we examine these problems.

LÁSZLÓ OROSZ

“[...] WHOEVER VOTES FOR ME ALSO VOTES FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUNGARIAN HOMELAND.”

KUNÓ KLEBELSBERG AS THE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVE OF SOPRON (1920–1922)

The study looks at the role that Kunó Klebelsberg, the future great Minister of Culture, played in the life of the city of Sopron and how his powers of persuasion were assessed by his contemporaries and by later generations. “The Count” – as he was often referred to by his contemporaries – was the first man to represent the city of Sopron in the National Assembly following the mutilation of the country by the Treaty of Trianon. His parliamentary mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1922, was but a brief episode of his life, but already by then, as the representative of a local community, the policy priorities that he would champion on a national level (specifically his cultural policy efforts) were clearly recognizable. Since he lacked roots in Sopron, we should not consider his election as an initiative of the voters of Sopron. Instead, his German-sounding name, Habsburg orientation and his steadfastly anti-Bolshevik attitude made him, for the new political elite of the counterrevolutionary period, the perfect candidate to run in Sopron, where the voters (owing to their traditional Christian-social and legitimist sentiments) smoothly legitimized his way into the National Assembly.

On the one hand, his endeavors were dictated by the Western Hungary-specific question of whether Sopron would remain territorially part of Hungary or shift to Austria. To that end, he gave two parliamentary speeches opposing the Austrian annexation of the city. On the other hand, from the beginning, he was an active and influential player in national politics (at the expense of his local responsibilities according to his critics). In the media coverage of the period, the portrayal of Klebelsberg as a *national* rather than *local* politician slowly became evident, especially after spring 1920. Compared to newsworthy issues in Sopron, the consolidation, the formation of a stable governing coalition built on the foundation of a strong parliamentary majority, the departure of “dissidents” from the Christian political party and the founding of the Unity Party by Bethlen and Klebelsberg were all topics in relation to which Klebelsberg’s name appeared much more frequently in the media.

Simultaneously, his voters began to distance themselves from him; by the turn of 1921/22, Klebelsberg’s favorability had essentially crumbled. There are numerous reasons for us to draw this conclusion. In the 1922 electoral campaign (during bitter parliamentary debates and even at his own rallies in Sopron), on more than one occasion he was accused of not speaking up often or loudly enough, nor as energetically

as had become expected of him, in the interests of Western Hungary. The people of Sopron were further disenchanted by the fact that their representative considered the “Ragged Guards” and volunteer paramilitary units (whose pressure had helped bring about the referendum) as a burden and complication. Regarding legitimacy and the attempt by Charles IV to return to the throne, Klebelsberg went against the expectations of his voting constituents. Finally, they clearly wanted to punish him for his involvement in the administration, for as Minister of the Interior, he had tightened voting rules, which had adversely impacted women and the main potential rivals of the Unity Party, the Christian-social and legitimist political parties. These factors led to his spectacular defeat in the 1922 election, which shocked the nation.

Historians today do not assess Klebelsberg’s relationship to Sopron on the basis of the results of his day-to-day political battles, but rather from the long-view perspective of everything that the minister, who loved Sopron, did for the city. The title of Sopron as *civitas fidelissima* (The Most Loyal Town), which was codified into law, the many lasting gestures of the commemoration of the referendum and above all the development of the higher education center in the city are all mainly Klebelsberg’s doing. Moreover, Sopron greatly benefitted from his decentralization and cultural policy efforts. It is no coincidence that despite denying him another term as its representative in the National Assembly in 1922, Sopron was the first city in Hungary to award Kunó Klebelsberg honorary citizenship.

ÁGNES VARGA

THE RIGHTWING OPPOSITION OF THE BETHLEN CONSOLIDATION:
ISTVÁN MILOTAY, EDITOR-IN CHIEF OF *MAGYARSÁG* (1920–1931)

According to his contemporaries, the journalist of Hungarian autotelism during the Interwar Period was István Milotay, who played the same representative role in the Horthy Era as Jenő Rákosi had for the liberal generation of the Dualist Era.

The continuity of pre-Trianon and counterrevolutionary systemic radical rightwing conceptions were validated through him (and his writings). The pre- and post-war essence of Milotay's ideological and conceptual interpretation truly became relevant after Trianon, when he propagated Hungarian national renewal, the crux of which was that only an economically, socially and culturally strong nation could achieve a revision of the borders and usher in a modern and new Hungary. Milotay's criticism of the Bethlen consolidation, which was the Hungarian prime minister's eponymous developmental plan, grew more caustic as a result of a lack of significant results. Milotay wanted radical land reform, the bolstering of the Christian Hungarian middle class, pushback against the political and intellectual dominance of Jews, the majority of whom he considered unassimilable, and the creation of a civil society that also included the peasantry; all of these considerations were missing from the consolidation. Milotay considered the political-economic-social order that István Bethlen devised as the alter ego of the liberal and elitist István Tisza-type system, which Milotay blamed for the war and its aftermath. Milotay wanted to supplant the unsatisfactory reforms of the government with a radical reform plan of accelerated embourgeoisement (which included uplift of the peasantry), with the backbone and leadership of his new society consisting of a broad and proudly Hungarian middle class.

KISSNÉ BOGNÁR KRISZTINA
“UNIVERSITY VERSUS ACADEMY”
TEMPORARY CURRICULUM OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT
OF JÓZSEF NÁDOR UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS

With the exception of medieval institutions that operated for a short time, the first university in Hungary to open its doors was in Nagyszombat in the 17th century. By the end of the 18th century, the *universitas*, founded by Cardinal Archbishop Péter Pázmány, had come under the authority of the king and been moved initially to Buda and then Pest. From the end of the 1700's, institutions and departments began to emerge, seemingly one after the other, providing the foundation for higher education, which gradually evolved from the latter half of the 19th century.

From the end of the 18th century, agricultural education and studies took place in university departments, agricultural institutions and academies. The first institution where agricultural fundamentals were taught at the university level was the Agricultural Advisory Group of the Economics Faculty of the Royal Hungarian University in Budapest. The new institute of higher education began operating in especially difficult circumstances in 1920. The Royal Hungarian University ultimately chose not to accept it, while the Technical University considered it as a potential rival to its own economics program. Moreover, the agricultural academies worried that another alternative providing agricultural studies would lead to their own graduates facing greater competition in finding employment.

The difficult economic situation facing the country essentially determined whether the department, with no university affiliation and an uncertain future, would operate and survive. The faculty wanted to continue its work within unchanged organizational parameters, but due to substantial overlap with the curriculum of the Technical University, Hungarian cultural policy leadership saw the answer to the temporary situation in the consolidation of the two institutions. Act 10 of 1934 declared the founding of the Royal Hungarian József Nádor University of Technology and Economics. The university leadership protested against the temporary curriculum of the Agricultural Department of the Agricultural and Veterinary Faculty, which was set by Order 22.745 of 1934 of the Ministry of Religion and Education. They were unhappy because the decision bound the university to the academy. For example, as a prerequisite of enrolling at the university, a prospective attendee was first required to finish two semesters at the academy and a 6-week summer internship. On the other hand, a student with a certificate from the agricultural academy could obtain his university degree by completing three semesters' worth of classes and passing

a comprehensive examination. The university leadership and faculty filed an official protest against the order, which they argued curtailed the autonomy of the university. No adjudication would take place during the 1934-35 academic year. The Minister of Religion and Education modified the order in several steps. Complete university autonomy of the agricultural department was safeguarded by Order 25.426 of 1936 of the Ministry of Religion and Education, which went into effect on September 1st, 1936. The study examines in detail the official protest and adjudication thereof using original university sources. It also looks at the debate that simultaneously took place in the professional journals of Hungarian agricultural society.

VIVIEN RAPALI
“THERE IS NO REST IN THE QUEST FOR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE”
THE BALANCE OF THE JEREMIAH SMITH SCHOLARSHIP
FOUNDATION

The Jeremiah Smith Scholarship, established by the Jeremiah Smith Scholarship Fund in 1927, served as a tool of Hungarian technical elite training. The study looks at the unusual circumstances of the origin of the scholarship fund (which operated between 1927 and 1941), the history of its name, how the scholarship was funded and the assessment of the effectiveness of the program. We delve into a section of the professional literature on Interwar Era education and scholarship policy that has heretofore only superficially been analyzed. As part of the historical analysis of this technical scholarship, the study pays special attention to the determinants of success as defined in the charter letter as well as the attainment of its unofficial goals. In addition to analyzing success and elite education, the study goes through the sociohistorical projections of the technical intellectuals of the period (relevant from the perspective of the scholarship), the problems associated with Hungarian natural science research in the Interwar Era and the discussion points (and consequences thereof) of the National Congress on Natural-, Medical-, Technical- and Agricultural Science that was held in January 1926. Finally the study provides a methodological solution key to the disclosure of technical scholarships that have heretofore been ignored in historiological research, while answering the question of whether the scholarship contributed to Hungarian elite education in science and led to advances in the technical sciences.

GYULA KOSZTYÓ

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK OF MARTIAL LAW IN SUBCARPATHIA IN 1939

One of the main objectives of Hungarian foreign policy during the Interwar period was territorial revision. The 2-step re-annexation of what we refer to as Subcarpathia today was one such success. The lowlands where the ethnic Hungarians made up the majority of the population were initially returned via the First Vienna Award and then by the military action of the Royal Hungarian Army between March 14th and 18th, 1939. In the reoccupied territory where ethnic minorities made up the majority, martial law was implemented between March 18th and July 7th, 1939.

The main objective of my study is to provide a perspective on this period that heretofore has been neglected by the historians studying the subject. Thus, I focus my attention on the economic and social measures of martial law in Subcarpathia, for which Lieutenant General Béla Novákovits was responsible. These two aspects enjoy particular significance, for Subcarpathia was one of the most backward regions of Europe at the time.

I have used archival sources that have previously not been researched by historians. I have primarily leaned on the documents stored at the Beregszász (Berehove, UA) branch of the State Archive of the Subcarpathian Territory. A part of the surviving documents of the military commanders responsible for administering martial law in Subcarpathia is available at the institution. I have also used documents kept at the National Archives of Hungary and the Hungarian Military History Archives.

As a result of my research, I have come to the conclusion that martial law was implemented in very difficult social conditions. The economic measures taken by Béla Novákovits were necessarily direct, for unemployment and the lack of capital were severe. As was his handling of social assistance and public healthcare. Despite these best efforts, martial law could not provide a solution to these problems, mainly due to limited resources.

ANDRÁS JOÓ
SECRET DIPLOMACY AND THE FATE OF NATIONS:
ANTAL ULLEIN-REVICZY

Hungarian historians have long been aware of Antal Ullein-Reviczky's memoir *Guerre allemande – paix russe*, which was published in 1947, shortly after World War II. However, do we really know the author of these writings, who was the star witness and key player in the decisive years between 1938 and 1945? He was a son of Sopron, the emblematic city of Western Hungary, which after 1920 came to symbolize Hungarian defiance, for it was there that Hungary, via referendum, favorably redrew the border imposed by the Treaty of Trianon. Ullein-Reviczky, as a young diplomat, played a key role in the success of the referendum, after which his career took off. He represented Hungary in Paris and later Turkey. In 1929, he married into the family of an eminent British diplomat (Cumberbatch). Among his assignments, leading the consulate in Zagreb from 1935 was significant and politically important. After 1938, he played an exemplary role in setting forth foreign press policy during the tenures of several prime ministers. In the wake of László Bárdossy's departure, he accepted the role of press chief for Miklós Kállay, the new prime minister, in addition to being also the head of the press department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During Kállay's tenure, he played a pivotal part in initiating Hungarian peace feelers in Istanbul, taking advantage of the extensive network of his father-in-law Cyril James Cumberbatch, who lived on the shores of the Bosphorus. All of the secret Hungarian peace emissaries (for example, András Frey, Professor Ferenc A. Váli and László Veress, the latter of whom playing a key role later in the secret Anglo-Hungarian armistice agreement) who traveled to Istanbul did so with his approval. Ullein-Reviczky tried to integrate the secret peace efforts into his media messaging. To that end, he would hold weekly meetings with the editors-in-chief of the major Hungarian newspapers. In early autumn 1943, he was given another important responsibility with his appointment as minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Sweden. In Stockholm, he contacted the embassies of the Anglo-American allies and also negotiated with representatives of the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff. In early 1944, the importance of the city where he had been sent was magnified, since Stockholm was considered as a potential location for armistice talks. As Soviet troops approached the Hungarian border, Ullein-Reviczky stressed the urgent need to get in touch with Moscow directly. Following the German occupation of Hungary, he refused to recognize the illegitimate Sztójay government. Subsequently, he was stripped of both his post at the legation and his Hungarian citizenship. On April 8th, 1944, Ullein-Reviczky sent an impassioned letter to the Royal Swedish Government

in which he voiced his grave concern about “800,000 Hungarian citizens, either of Jewish faith or of Jewish descent”, who, due to the occupation of the country, were being “submitted to incredible persecution, unworthy of human beings”. It was his plea which gave rise to Swedish initiatives that saved the lives of many thousands of Hungarian Jews. It is also important to bear in mind the bond between Raoul Wallenberg and Ullein-Reviczky, which ran deeper and broader than historians had up to now realized. Most probably it was Ullein-Reviczky’s friendship with Wallenberg which induced the brave Swede to go to Hungary in 1944 and help thousands of Hungarian Jews escape persecution and death. After 1945, he was forced to emigrate and lived in Turkey, Geneva and Paris before moving to London, where he represented the Hungarian National Committee until his death in 1955. This portrait of Antal Ullein-Reviczky reflects a most eventful and meritorious career – the career of a soldier, diplomat, academic and statesman who served his country faithfully throughout his entire life and who is therefore an example for future generations. The author used Ullein-Reviczky’s private documents as source material, including his wife’s (née Lovice Grace Cumberbatch) valuable diary entries, to which he had access through Lovice Mária Ullein-Reviczky, who returned her beloved father’s historical archives to Hungary in 1992.

MÁTÉ GALI
FROM NÓGRÁDSÁP TO THE MOUNT PARNASSUS OF SCIENCE:
THE LIFE AND WORK OF ATOMIC PHYSICIST LÁSZLÓ GRENÁCS
(1933–2017)

Atomic physicist László Grenács was born in Nógrádsáp on November 16th, 1933. He attended elementary school in his hometown before graduating from Balassi Bálint Hungarian State High School in Balassagyarmat in 1952, where he aced his matriculation examination. In October 1956, when the Hungarian Revolution broke out, he was a senior majoring in physics at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest.

During the uprising, László Grenács volunteered as an armed security guard at public institutions and also distributed pro-revolutionary leaflets. Later, he participated in the production and distribution of *Október Huszonharmadika (October 23rd)*, a samizdat paper. In February 1957, in anticipation of reprisals, he and one of his friends fled from Hungary via Yugoslavia.

He settled in Belgium, where he finished his studies in physics at the Catholic University of Leuven. He also earned his doctorate there on the eve of the 60's. In the following decades, he became internationally renowned and recognized for his high quality work within the physics profession, the foundation of which was his research in low-energy core spectroscopy. He was also responsible for working out the “Alignment Switch” method, which proved American physicist and Nobel Prize recipient Murray Gell-Mann’s theory on the existence of weak magnetism, thereby confirming that there were no so-called second class currents.

At the beginning of 1989, László Grenács received a letter from Bengt Nagel, a Swedish physicist and representative of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, informing him that he had been nominated for the 1989 Nobel Prize in physics. Although he would ultimately not win the prestigious award, he received the Belgian Academy of Science Award in 1990, and King Albert II of Belgium awarded him the title of Grand Officier de l’Ordre de la Couronne in 1999. He was also elected as an external member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2007.

László Grenács passed away in Brussels on October 16th, 2017. Since his speaking ability had been severely impeded in the final years of his life as a result of multiple strokes, we decided to interview his son Mathias/Mátyás, who had been born in 1964, about his life. The interview was conducted in two sessions in Nógrádsáp over the course of 2018–19. Nowadays, Mathias/Mátyás lives in Mantes-la-Ville, France, and teaches high school physics at Lycée Jean Rostand in the neighboring town of Mantes-la-Jolie.

DÁVID KISS

THE FOUNDING AND EARLY ENDEAVORS OF THE ORGANIZING
GUARD OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKING PEOPLE'S PARTY

In Hungary after World War II, following earlier examples, several political parties formed their own *párthadsereg* or military wing, the most successful of which was the Hungarian Communist Party's (HCP). In the wake of the dissolution of civil organizations and political parties, the Hungarian Working People's Party stood unrivaled. In the second half of 1948, one of the essential tasks of the party was to sift through party member and organizing guard registers. Moreover, in regard to the latter, the party wished to assemble its own military wing. From an organizational perspective and in light of the makeup of the force, it was built mainly on the remnants of the earlier guard of the HCP. From the beginning, the obsolescence of the organization could be witnessed through the transfer of personnel elsewhere, while talk of expanding the force to 40 thousand dissipated. Since the HCP exercised absolute power by that time, maintaining a military wing diminished in importance. After 1948, the Organizing Guard did not play as significant a role as the Workers' Militia would in the wake of its founding in 1957, which was in contrast to the other Eastern Bloc countries, where similar paramilitary organizations enjoyed much greater relevancy.

PÉTER BERTALAN

THE MEDIUM OF THE STATE PROTECTION AUTHORITY:
WHOSE ROLE, JUDAS OR PETER? PAULINE MONKS IN LIMBO

The dramatic and violent post-1945 liquidation of religious orders by the state is a far-reaching and shocking story.

The actions taken by the State Protection Authority – hidden under a veneer of procedural legality – were often very violent attempts to uproot the Church. Per the rehabilitatory resolution of the Presidential Council of the Supreme Court of Hungary from February 17th, 1992: *The political conception of the Rákosi-type party leadership was the total annihilation of the spiritual influence of the Church. That was the reason why it was necessary to prove the resolutely evil, even “murderous”, nature of the “moral cesspool” that was the monastic accused.* The first phase of the initiated legal proceedings against the Pauline Order in Hungary was discovery, related to which exists a treasure-trove of archived source material. On the basis of contemporary sources and documents that we have analyzed, the study familiarizes the reader with the process whereby the State Protection Authority apparatus attempted to break the will of the imprisoned Pauline monks – which was similar to what József Mindszenty was put through – including the use of psychological torture. Stress induced in the interrogation rooms was also among the coercive tools used by the authorities to goad confessions from the wrongfully accused. These are the two foundational pillars of the introduction of the “Pauline Case”, which is supplemented and placed in context by an introduction of the contemporary historical and political circumstances.

EMŐKE KOVÁCS
“A MAN WHO DIED TWICE...”
A FORGOTTEN PRIEST: A PORTRAIT OF LAJOS IFY

Among enthusiasts of Lake Balaton, the historical memory of Lajos Ify (1893–1967) is shrouded in mystery. Although his life is known in broad strokes, no fact-finding work has ever been written about him. Having combined my earlier research with information obtained from newly discovered archival sources, other experts who have studied Ify and the recollection of eyewitness, I present an authentic account of Ify’s life in this study. Following his mandatory retirement in July 1949, Lajos Ify, a onetime successful and respected Catholic priest, chose to live as an internal emigre in the seclusion of Szent György Hill in the Balaton Highlands, where his Emmaus chapel would become unique in both Hungarian and Church history.

In the beginning, Ify, who was born in Keszthely, served in the Diocese of Pécs. Following his chaplaincy, he joined the Diocese of Veszprém. In 1929, he was assigned to Fonyód, where his parish soon flourished, earning him great respect. He invited the School Sisters of Szeged to his community and, among other things, built chapels in both Balatonfenyves and Fonyódliget. Ify was often praised for his great talent at building organs and harmoniums. Inexplicably, however, information on his life seems to stop. We do not know, for example, why he chose the solitude of Szent György Hill in summer 1949. Some sources hint at political reasons, while archival sources point to Church discipline for poor performance. Whatever the case, Lajos Ify had already constructed his own Emmaus – a chapel and hermitage – on Szent György Hill prior to the start of WWII.

Through my research, I have pasted together in large part this abbreviated period of his life. I have found that his undertakings in the 1950’s were just as praiseworthy as his priestly service during the Interwar Era. Naturally, these two periods – despite the changed historical context – complement each other in many instances. In my study, I present the unique life of this man of God, while correcting a few misconceptions and reinforcing certain assumptions related to his exceptional story.

KRISZTIÁN ISTVÁN GLAUB
EXCERPTS ON MIHÁLY FARKAS' ROLE DURING THE "NEW PHASE"
OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKING PEOPLE'S PARTY (1953–1954)

In June 1953, a change took place in the life of the Stalinist system in Hungary. Under pressure from Moscow, Mátyás Rákosi, supreme dictator since 1948, was pushed aside and lost his seat as prime minister. The leader of the "New Phase" was the new prime minister Imre Nagy, who as a devoted communist tried to follow the new line from Moscow, which was primarily associated with Soviet Prime Minister G. M. Malenkov. However, due to the resistance of the hardline Stalinists, he was in need of a strong ally within the Political Committee and Secretariat. To that end, he brought back a man who was a fanatic disciple of Rákosi and had played a key role in the development of the Stalinist dictatorship in Hungary. That man was Mihály Farkas, formerly Deputy First Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party and Minister of National Defense. Partly careerism but mostly his unconditional loyalty to and alignment with Moscow drove him to accept the assignment. For more than a year, from summer 1953 to late autumn 1954, he was an unconditional supporter of the New Phase. He was chosen as the secretary of the Central Leadership and rejoined the Political Committee, the top-most organization of the party. Genuinely embracing the situation at hand, Farkas endeavored in numerous important areas during the New Phase, including inspection of culture and media, issues related to the economy and the rehabilitation of members of the workers movement punished for malfeasance. However, because of another change of direction by Moscow, continuous attacks by the far-left coalition dominated by Rákosi and Ernő Gerő and numerous other difficulties, the program of the New Phase had permanently foundered by the beginning of 1955. Moreover, to save himself from the examination of illegalities that were gradually seeing the light of day, Farkas once again approached the dogmatic wing of the party, which had ultimately resulted in his about-face and betrayal of Imre Nagy by the end of 1954. The adherents of the old line had succeeded in completely crushing the New Phase and Prime Minister Nagy by April 1955. Along with Nagy, Farkas was also pushed aside, for Rákosi and the Stalinists would not forgive his "betrayal". Moreover, by spring 1956, they had zealously abetted the investigation solely examining Farkas' direct responsibility in the illegalities. But that is another story.

JÁNOS RÁCZ THE ANDAU LIST

In November 1956, the Nádasés, a Hungarian family living in Austria, did much to ensure that Hungarian refugees received immediate help from Austria. Róbert Nádas and his family were at the right place at the right time to help nearly three thousand Hungarians; working together with the Austrian Red Cross, they provided food and water to the refugees. Róbert's mother Anna Jura and his sister Alíz Nádas also actively participated in the humanitarian effort.

Róbert's father Sándor Nádas had been the high steward and master hunter of the House of Eszterházy in Hanságújmajor. Upon graduating from the Mosonmagyaróvár Academy, Róbert became an assistant and steward in Hanságújmajor, following in his father's footsteps. The flat in which he and his family lived lay near the Andau Bridge, over which several thousand Hungarians crossed in the hopes of reaching freedom. Sándor Nádas used tractors to transport the Hungarians to the Austrian refugee camps. Hoping to stay in touch with the refugees in the future, he wrote their personal information down in a notebook: name, place and date of birth, address. He included 1,460 entries about the nearly three thousand women, children and men he encountered, with the expectation that they would someday be able to share with historians their stories about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. At the time, Sándor used his notebook as "a kind of telephone book". Whenever he received a message about a refugee, he used the information at his disposal to identify the person. Today that information has become a source of much more interesting conclusions.

The notebook eventually ended up in the hands of the President of the Európa Club András Smuk, who Róbert's widow had felt would take good care of the valuable historical resource. With Smuk's assistance, the VERITAS Research Institute later came into possession of the heirloom. The study attempts to provide a more nuanced picture of the general perception of the 1956 Hungarian refugees using the information in the Nádas notebook.

ZOLTÁN DÉVAVÁRI
THE LONGEST YEAR
THE DÉLVIDÉK / VOJVODINA HUNGARIANS AND THE ANTALL
GOVERNMENT WHEN YUGOSLAVIA COLLAPSED (1991)

Using relevant Hungarian foreign affairs documents, the study presents the evolution of Hungarian-Serbian relations, focusing on events in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.

With the culmination of the Yugoslav crisis, Hungarian-Serbian relations steadily worsened, the main catalyst of which was the plight of the Hungarian minority in Délvidék / Vojvodina. Belgrade's preferred answers to the Hungarian minority question – applying pressure, staging frontal attacks against Hungarian institutions, waging psychological warfare and restricting civil rights – which the official Hungarian government considered as a constant provocation, steadily deteriorated relations between the two countries.

The nonstop media wars caused severe damage to the two countries' relations, along with the constant anti-Hungarian outbursts, the diplomatic exchanges and protests, and later, as Serbian public sentiment turned more and more intolerant, Délvidék/Vojvodina Hungarian men were drafted into the Yugoslav People's Army, which fought for Serbian interests, and a mass of 20–25 thousand Délvidék /Vojvodina Hungarians, making up the first wave of refugees, fled from Yugoslavia, which violently and radically upended the ancestral ethnic makeup of Délvidék/Vojvodina.

When the crisis culminated, international obliviousness to the dilemma of the Délvidék / Vojvodina Hungarian minority hampered Hungarian diplomatic efforts.

The breakthrough occurred only in late autumn 1991, when the first Serbian irregular troops appeared along the banks of the Tisza River with the intention of ethnically cleansing the Bácska region. Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall wrote letters to George Bush and Lord Carington, following which the Dutch were the first to recognize the seriousness of the situation of the Hungarians in Délvidék/Vojvodina. The clearest indication that the plight of the Hungarian minority was finally on the radar of the Great Powers was when French diplomacy took up the question.

MIHÁLY NOSZKÓ-HORVÁTH
GHETTOIZATION AND DEPORTATION AS PRESENTED IN THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION IN HUNGARY AND IN THE RELEVANT
RESTITUTIONARY DOCUMENTS

The law of restitution provided the possibility for compensation through several statutory channels to Hungarian Jews who had suffered harm at the time of the Holocaust. Ghettoization and deportation are two examples of victimization that occurred seventy years ago. In consideration of the anniversary, the current study provides an overview of the measures taken after the System Changeover by the State of Hungary to provide legal (both ethical and monetary) restitution to the victims of ghettoization and/or deportation. In the study, whenever factors for consideration in restitution are disclosed, the history of the legislation as it relates to individual cases of injustice is also shared, considering initially the size of recompense, followed by a general introduction of the documents that resulted from the process of restitution.

