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FOREWORD

The processes implied by transition, the phenomenon *per se*, and its effects on political, economic, social and cultural spheres have been intensely debated in the Political Science literature in the past decades. The increased attention paid to transitions, especially after the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leads to testing theories and hypotheses elaborated in other contexts and provides the ground for making new ones. If the end of the Cold War could not be predicted, scholars seemed to take this as a failure and tried to predict the end of transition. However, this significant failure did not deter a new generation of scholars from approaching the issues of transition.

The Graduate Conference organized by Central European University in May 2006 approached the issue of transition from a multi-disciplinary perspective. It was primarily targeted at providing the framework for an interdisciplinary academic debate and contributing to the development of knowledge networks among peers and academics outside their field of study and specific methodological approaches. As a direct result, the conference produced valuable work with respect to its topic. Out of the forty papers presented, six were selected to be transformed into articles for the special issue of the journal. An additional paper

related to the topic was added due to its theoretical value on democracy and democratization. The articles' multidisciplinary character is a direct result of the complexity of issues present within the transition process.

The goal of this fourth issue of the CEU Political Science Journal is to reveal the multitude of topics involved in many subfields of political science, ranging from theories of democratization to the status of the international system and from party nationalization and elite behavior to gender-segregated analysis on labor markets and social policy reforms. The combination of neo-institutional and behavioralist approaches on one side, and single case-studies, comparative and large-N cases on the other side indicates the preoccupation on in-depth analysis of the phenomena, most of them challenging existing theories in the literature. The theoretical perspectives serve to strengthen the efforts made in providing new frameworks for analysis and identifying new causes for regional or world processes and phenomena.

Based on the analysis of party elites, Alexandra Ionascu and Oksana Polyuga's articles trace two current problems in the transition process in central and Eastern Europe. The former, using a case-study on Romania, emphasizes the theoretical and methodological difficulties in analyzing the professionalization of governmental elites and the development of decision-

making procedures in the cabinets, whereas Oksana Polyuga, in a comparative case-study of Russia and Ukraine, analyzes and compares how the power elite makes use of its attributes to shape voters' behavior. In the same area of parties, Daniel Bochsler focuses on party nationalization in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, presenting for a first time the degree of party nationalization in 16 countries of the region.

In the subfields of public policy and political economy two different approaches shed light on problems faced by Central and Eastern European states. Using the example of Romania, Simona Vonica-Radutiu elaborates on the context of social policy reform in East European countries, addressing the question of development paths in the welfare state. By conducting an analysis of ten former communist countries, Vessela Daskalova's research focuses on gender-segregated aspects of the labor market, providing an alternative explanation to the current literature on macro-economic reforms.

The two works on International Relations included in this issue follow different tracks, with different goals. Dylan Kissane's research provides a critique to the anarchic view that characterizes the discipline, drawing on inter-disciplinary approach and suggesting that, in the example of the origins of World War One,

there is evidence for an international system that is something other than anarchical. Nikolaos Panagiotou's effort of analyzing democratic peace theory rests on the premise that democratization can be seen both as an internal process towards democracy and external effort to promote or establish democratic regimes. The main argument of the paper is that democratization fails to deter states from pursuing their interests through war and fits in with the current debates regarding the newly emerging democracies.

Overall, this issue of the journal represents a survey of the preoccupations of young scholars interested in the region. These articles do not only include innovative methods to approaching classical problems in social sciences, but also provide a clear and straightforward development of solid arguments.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

CEU Political Science Journal publishes scholarly research of merit focusing on the topics promoted by the Journal and meeting the standard requirements for academic research in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, methodological application and analysis of results. We strive to promote those works that approach a significant research problem and answer research questions of general interest in political science. Due to the fact that the Journal addresses a wide range of academics we encourage

presentation of research to be made at a level where it is understandable to the vast majority most of the target group.

In our attempt to promote original works, we do not accept articles that are under review at other publications or articles that have parts that were published or are forthcoming under the same form in other places. Contributions using statistical analysis have to make the proof of the data available in order to allow replicability. Formal requirements are found in “the paper requirements” section of our webpage:

www.personal.ceu.hu/PolSciJournal/paper_requirements Any paper that does not meet these requirements may be rejected.

Manuscripts should be no longer than 6,000 words (for exceptional cases please address the Editorial Board), and footnotes should provide references and should not including supplementary text. The appendix must be a maximum of 5 pages.

Starting with the first issue in 2007, CEU Political Science Journal encourages contributions in the form of book reviews.

There are two standard requirements for the reviews: they should not exceed 1,200 words and should address books that are considered of general importance in political science and the related fields. If you are the author of a book you wish to be considered for review, please send us an e-mail and we can arrange the details concerning the mailing of the book. If you are interested in reviewing books for our Journal please send your CV to the e-mail addresses indicated in the “contact” section of the website.

SERGIU GHERGHINA

ARPAD TODOR

THE NATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

A triangle model, applied on the Central and Eastern European countries

DANIEL BOCHSLER

Tartu Ülikooli, Tartu (Estonia) / Université de Genève, Geneva (Switzerland),
bochsler@politic.unige.ch

Abstract¹

The study of "party nationalization" is a young topic in the field of political party research. It investigates the regional heterogeneity of political parties. "Nationalization" stands for the homogeneity of parties' electoral support across regions, or the absence of regional differences in the party system. This article shall discuss party nationalization in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, presenting for a first time the degree of party nationalization in 16 countries of the region.

Previous studies on Western societies have related party nationalization to the degree of financial centralization: Party nationalization was seen as a consequence of centralization of government activities. This dominating explanation may be criticized because of endogeneity problems. Both on theoretical terms and empirical terms, there is evidence that party nationalization may be the

consequence for government centralization – while the existence of regionally distinct party system (low nationalization) may lead to claims for decentralization.

Instead, the cleavage structure, and particularly ethnic cleavage, appears to be important for the regional structure of the party system. An empirical test on Central and Eastern European countries shows that indeed the ethnic structure, combined with electoral system constraints (high national thresholds) are the best predictor of the party nationalization degree.

"It's the economy, stupid." James Carville, Clinton campaign manager, 1992.

It's the ethnicity, stupid.

Elections in Western societies are often won on economic issues. In the new European democracies however, many parties attract their voters with their position on ethnic issues.² Elections in ethnically divided societies have frequently been described as "ethnic censuses", for instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina³. There were many attempts

¹ I am grateful for help on data, councils and remarks to Alex Fischer, Vello Pettai, Rein Taagepera, the comparative politics research group at the University of Tartu, and two anonymous reviewers. This article is a revised version of my presentation at the CEU Graduate Conference in Social Sciences, "The End of Transitions", 6 May 2006, in Budapest.

² I define ethnicity as a fluid perception of collective identity of a people through a social group itself or through strangers. Examples in the article will help to substantiate this definition.

³ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). *Ethnisierung der Politik in Bosnien-Herzegowina* (Bonn: FES,

to apply the social cleavage approach⁴ to the Central and Eastern European party systems. According to the cleavage approach, political parties consolidated among cleavages that distinguish social groups from each other: the class, the rural-urban, church-state and the centre-periphery cleavages. However, in Central and Eastern Europe, social cleavages in the Western style can hardly be seen as a basis for the formation of post-communist party systems.⁵ During half a century of

1996); International Crisis Group (ICG). *Doing Democracy A Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report N°42, 9 September 1998).

⁴ Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967). "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967). 1-64.

⁵ Scholars who translated the cleavage approach to Central and Eastern Europe include for instance Kitschelt, Herbert et al.. *Post-communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Johannsen, Lars. "The foundations of state: emerging urban-rural cleavages in transitions countries." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36(3) (2003): 291-309; Whitefield, Stephen. "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002): 181-200; Zarycki, Tomasz. "Politics in the Periphery: Political Cleavages in Poland Interpreted in their Historical and International Context," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(5) (July 2000): 851-873.

For the problems of the cleavage approach, see for instance Bielasiak, Jack. "Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30(1) (March 1997): 23-44; Miller, Arthur H., Gwyn Erb, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli. "Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact of Fiction?," *Journal of Politics* 62(2) (May 2000): 455-490; Elster, John, Claus

communist rule, the differences in society levelled off. However, after the end of the communist period, with the formation of new independent nation-states in some of the regions, and with the uprising of parties that tried to attract voters with nationalistic speech, ethnicity grew to an important socially defined voter basis for political parties in many Central and Eastern European countries.⁶

My article shall discuss if ethnic diversity leads to regional heterogeneity of the party system. The study of party nationalization⁷ is a young topic in the

Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss. *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); White, Stephen, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister. *How Russia Votes* (Chatham: Chatham House, 1997), 64ff. For an overview of literature, see Tucker, Joshua A. "The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002): 271-304, 292f.

⁶ Cf. for instance Elster et al. *Institutional Design; Friedman, Eben. "Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and Macedonia"*, *Ethnopolitics* 4(4) (2005): 381-396.

Information on ethnic cleavages in Central and Eastern European countries can be found as well in Trifunovska, Snežana, ed.. *Minorities in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

However, studies failed to show that ethnic diversity leads to fractionalization of the party system. Some empirical results surprisingly point even in the opposed direction. Moser, Robert G. "Ethnic Diversity, Electoral Systems, and the Number of Parties in Post-communist States." (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 2001).

⁷Some authors prefer the notions of "district heterogeneity", Morgenstern, Scott and Richard F. Potthoff. "The components of elections: district heterogeneity, district-time effects, and volatility,"

field of political party research. Previously, research treated party systems as a national unit. However, often they are regionally heterogeneous, with important differences in electoral support across regions. This is what party nationalization studies investigate. Recent studies have measured degrees of party nationalization in Western Europe, the Americas and some Asian countries.⁸ My article

however provides new data for the post-communist democracies in Europe. In some of those countries, such as Hungary, parties exist nationwide and their support is regionally almost homogeneous (defined as perfect "nationalization" of the party system). In other cases e.g. Bosnia, many parties compete only regionally or the support varies from one region to the other (a low degree of party nationalization).

Electoral Studies 24(1) (March 2005): 17-40; "party aggregation", Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), Allik, Mirjam. "Parteisüsteemid Föderaalriikides." (Master thesis, University of Tartu, 2006) or „party-linkage across districts“, Cox, Gary W. (1997): *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 182ff., Hicken, Allen. "Stuck in the Mud: Coordination and Party System Development in Thailand and the Philippines." (Draft manuscript, forthcoming 2005)., Moenius, Johannes and Yuko Kasuya. "Measuring party linkage across districts," *Party Politics* 10 (5) (Sept. 2004): 543-564.. With the term „party nationalization“ I refer to Jones, Mark P. and Scott Mainwaring. "The Nationalization of Parties and Party Systems. An Empirical Measure and an Application to the Americas." *Party Politics* 9(2) (March 2003): 139-166, Caramani, Daniele. *The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Ishiyama, John T. "Regionalism and the nationalization of the legislative vote in post-communist Russian politics." *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 35 (June 2002): 155-168.

⁸ For Western Europe, see Caramani, *Nationalization*; North- and South America: Jones/Mainwaring, "Nationalization of Parties and Party Systems". Further studies provide punctual data for countries in other regions. For India: Chhibber/Kollman: *Formation*; Russia: Ishiyama, "Regionalism and the nationalization"; Thailand

Most frequently, variance in party nationalization has been explained through the degree of government centralization: government decentralization gives incentives for regional parties to exist, while concentration of power at the national level of government gives incentives to form national political organizations. However, researchers have not given a lot of attention to the objection that causality might go the other way round. It is both plausible and empirically frequent that regional parties wish for government decentralization, whereas national parties want to centralize the authorities.

With this article, I shall meet two goals. First, I shall test the common centralization hypothesis for Central and Eastern Europe. Although it might be possible that such a correlation of

and the Philippines: Kasuya, Yuko. "Party System Linkage: Explaining its Variation in the Philippine Case." (Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29-September 1, 2001.) Hicken, "Stuck in the Mud"; Australia: Allik, Parteisüsteemid"; Japan: Cox, Gary. "Electoral rules and electoral coordination", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 145-61.

centralization and party nationalization exists in the region under study, it is possible that the causality goes the other way round. A test of empirical cases in the region shall show the relation of both variables and might dismiss the validity of the centralization hypothesis for the region. Instead, secondly, I shall introduce an alternative explanation that might account for differences in party nationalization. I shall show how the regional (or non-regional) structure of social-political cleavages, particularly ethnic cleavages, may explain differing degrees of party nationalization and show how some electoral system elements support party nationalization. Namely, national legal thresholds block regional parties and lead to a high party nationalization, even in the case of a regional cleavage structure. In order to carry out quantitative tests, I use my database with electoral results from Central and Eastern European countries at the district level (in some cases even at a municipal level). This allows me to establish the degree of nationalization of the parties and party systems in this region. Quantitative correlation analyzes are completed by case discussions in order to focus on causalities of processes.

The first part of this article discusses the different concepts explaining party nationalization and the limits of those models. Then, the degrees of party nationalization for Central and Eastern European countries are calculated. This is followed by correlations and a regression model to explain party nationalization according to the formulated hypotheses, and a discussion of the problem of

endogeneity. In the last section, I conclude.

Drawing a “Triangle Model” of Party Nationalization, Decentralization and Ethnic Groups

How can the varying degree of party nationalization be explained? Most of the existing studies state that centralization of government spending leads to a high degree of party nationalization, whereas decentralization or strong federalism brings along opportunities for regional parties. However which of these variables is the origin and which is the consequence? Often, regional parties themselves demand for government decentralization. If this was a general pattern, then centralization would be the consequence rather than the cause of party nationalization. Therefore, a second explanation, based on the social cleavages underlying the party system, appears promising. The focus may be on the ethnic structure of a country. Both decentralization and the ethnic diversity are opportunities for the creation of regional parties (or the non-nationalization of party systems). While decentralization and cleavages both may be a basis for regional diversity in the party system, a third aspect could possibly limit this phenomenon: the impact of electoral systems. They may introduce constraints against regional parties and favour nationalization of the party system. With those three approaches, a new model explaining party nationalization shall be provided. In this section, I discuss those three approaches based on the centralization of government expenses, the

ethnic structure of the countries, and the electoral systems

The institutional hypothesis: Centralized state, centralized parties, or the other way round?

One explanatory model discusses party nationalization as a consequence of the centralization of state expenses. In heavily centralized states, it is argued that parties are incited to design their campaign based on national political issues.⁹ From the voters' perspective, in Westminster systems, where two parties compete for a parliamentary majority and the winning party takes on barely-restricted government power, "voters [...] focus on the outcome in national legislature".¹⁰ To them, it is less important who will win in the constituency. Instead, they want to know which of the two main parties will hold national power, and only a large party may do so. Consequently, if national politics are important, large national parties should be strengthened. Because the local or regional level of government is less important, voting for regional parties is not attractive, as they have no prospect of gaining regional power. In significantly decentralized or federalized states however, regional parties can have important positions at the provincial level.¹¹ Because of those prospects, they may find it easier to become established

and they may attract voters with a campaign on regional issues.

Although this argument has dominated, some voices do not agree with it. Caramani¹² argues that federalist institutions may "reduce the expression of regional protest in the party system by opening up institutional channels of voice". Further, the argument seems to be inspired by two-party-systems, where indeed the main national parties form the government. Does it stand for larger party systems? Regional parties may have important influence on the central government level, providing major parties with the necessary votes for an absolute majority; interestingly enough, even in the Westminster systems governments often rely on the support of regional or ethnic parties (as the British Conservatives who were until the 1980s closely allied to the Ulster Unionist party).

This leads me to a second criticism of the centralization approach: regional parties may be particularly interested in increasing the state's decentralization. The non-nationalization of the party system thus may lead to a decentralization of political institutions and may lead to the distribution of more public finances to the regional level. Furthermore, regional parties, which help governments to gain majorities, may ask to be awarded in financial decentralization (a typical case is the regional parties in the recent government in Spain¹³). Hence, there is a

⁹ Chhibber and Kollman, *Formation*.

¹⁰ Cox, *Making*, 182ff.

¹¹ Blais, André; Carty, R. K.. "The psychological impact of electoral laws: Measuring Duverger's elusive factor", *British Journal of Political Science* 21(1) (Jan. 1991): 79-93, 85.

¹² Caramani, *Nationalization*, 292.

¹³ Cf. Agranoff, Robert. *Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain*. (Asymmetry Series. Ontario: Queens University, 2005).

problem of endogeneity, as the direction of influence may be the opposite one as previously believed. In many cases, a non-nationalized party system may lead to more autonomy, de-centralization or even secession (the most extreme form of decentralization).

The ethnic cleavage hypothesis: Party systems as a mirror of a country's ethnic structure?

What are the alternative explanations for different degrees of party nationalization? Lipset and Rokkan¹⁴ identify four major cleavages that structure politics and party competition in Western Europe. Some of those cleavages relate to territorial dimensions, particularly if we speak of the centre – periphery and the urban – rural cleavage. There are other cleavages discussed, particularly the economic cleavage of capital – labour, that do not have such a territorial dimension and may not be fixed on regional grounds. Instead, the cleavage exists inside (almost) each regional and local unit.

The cleavage approach¹⁵ works quite well for the explanation of party systems in Western democracies, and one field of scholars finds some patterns of political

cleavages in Central and Eastern European countries too,¹⁶ arguing that those divisions are related to the communist legacy of the countries. However, party politics in those countries has been shown to be less dominated by those cleavages.¹⁷ Some authors investigate party positions regarding policy fields and defined policy divisions¹⁸ that are less strongly tied to society than Western political cleavages. The ethnic cleavage is an exception, as many parties mobilise their electorate around ethnic lines.¹⁹ Some authors address it as the centre – periphery cleavage²⁰; Kitschelt et al.²¹ situate it as part of a greater cultural cleavage. We might see in many Central and Eastern European countries that voters often vote for parties of their ethnic group, or they vote according to their view about how the ethnic conflict should be resolved (radicals vs. moderates). In consequence, ethnicity and questions related to it may structure party systems.

The investigation of ethnic cleavages in order to explain party nationalization degrees may lead to promising results, as

¹⁴ Lipset/Rokkan, "Cleavage".

¹⁵ The notion of "political cleavage" is used in different ways in the literature. I employ a rather narrow definition of a "cleavage", describing a clearly defined social group, which is enduringly represented by its own political parties. I use instead the term "divisions" when speaking of conflict lines that either lack a clearly defined and stable social basis or political parties that are situated enduringly on those conflict line.

¹⁶ Kitschelt, Herbert et al., *Post-communist Party Systems*.

¹⁷ Cf. Elster et al., *Institutional Design*, 247ff.; Sitter, Nick. "Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, East and West," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3(3) (2002). 425-451.

¹⁸ For instance Miller et al., "Emerging Party Systems"; Marks, Gary et al. "Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West. Different Structure, Same Casualty," *Comparative Political Studies* 39(2) (March 2006): 155-175.

¹⁹ Elster et al., *Institutional Design*, 252.

²⁰ According to Lipset/Rokkan, "Cleavage", 10.

²¹ Kitschelt et al., *Post-communist*.

ethnic minorities in many of the Central and Eastern European countries are territorially settled. For this purpose, I draw on Caramani's study on Western European countries. Caramani describes the social basis for a national homogenization of party systems and voting behavior. A very important aspect of this national homogenization is the "hegemony" of the economical (left-right) cleavage, a cleavage that structures the society among social classes and holders of capital and employees, rather than on territorial characteristics. Other cleavages argues Caramani²², have gotten less important. Namely, ethno-linguistic, religious, centre-periphery, and urban-rural cleavages (the main pre-industrial cleavages) often have a strong connotation with territories. But those cleavages still persist, with varying degrees of importance. They may explain differing degrees of party nationalization among West European countries.

What Caramani observed for Western Europe seems to be even more evident for Central and Eastern European countries. On the one hand, the economic cleavage has much less and sometimes even no importance for elections.²³ On the other hand, ethno-regional conflicts have been present to a great extent in the transitional politics of those countries. Especially where ethnic groups are concentrated geographically, the ethnic cleavage thus has a territorial structure and leads to a nationally heterogeneous voting behavior.

²² Caramani, *Nationalization*, 31.

²³ Elster et al., *Institutional Design*; Whitefield, Stephen. "Political Cleavages".

We may thus relate low party nationalization to three conjunctural causes: 1) High ethnic fractionalization; 2) geographical concentration of ethnic minorities; and 3) a politicized ethnic conflict. The more those three characteristics apply, the less the party system will be nationalized.

As discussed earlier for the case of government centralization, the ethnic cleavage approach too has its limits in determining causality. The actions of political elites may have an impact on the social structure and social cleavages in a society²⁴ and ethnicity is not an exception to this influence. Caramani²⁵ describes national ethnicity and nation unity as a "two-way process", where one part influences the other. In a similar way, this may be stated for ethnic minorities and regional autonomy. Post-communist transformation has known three different sets of action for changes to the ethnic structure of a population, or "ethnic engineering": (1) changing the ethnic awareness of the population or a part of it; (2) inciting or forcing mass migration ("ethnic cleansing"); and (3) even genocide (cf. next section).

Triangle model with interdependent variables


The patterns of interdependency among ethnic identification, political party

²⁴ Cf. Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. "Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies," in *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe. The First Wave*. ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Ekkehard Mochmann and Kenneth Newton (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 2000). 36-67.

²⁵ Caramani, *Nationalization*, 23.

nationalization, and centralization may vary from case to case, but I may suggest that processes – even if not so extreme, rapid and obvious – may be generalized in the following way:

Figure 1. Mutual interdependency of the three main variables²⁶



How electoral systems may work as constraints against regional parties

Up to this point, facilitating conditions for the formation of regional parties – and thus reasons for weak party nationalization - have been discussed. However, before testing my hypotheses empirically for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is important to consider a restricting condition against regional parties as well, given some of the electoral systems applied in the region. Some electoral laws have national legal thresholds, allowing only parties gaining a minimal percentage of votes to secure seats in parliament. Often, those thresholds may be a serious obstacle to regional parties (as for parties of regionally concentrated ethnic minorities), as they fail to win a sufficient amount of votes at the national level. The region in which those parties compete (or the ethnic

minority they aim to represent) may simply be smaller than the threshold needed, and thus it would be impossible to achieve electoral success without attracting non-regional voters too. It might be possible for a regional or ethnic minority party to pass the threshold, but only if it attracts all or at least a very large part of the regional or ethnic minority vote. This is often not realistic, as some of the voters prefer national parties or there might be several regional or ethnic minority parties competing with each other. In consequence, each of those regional parties (or ethnic minority parties) may fail. Such national legal thresholds often allow only national parties to win seats and discourage regional or ethnic minority parties from even competing. Thus, they work as a constraint in favour of party nationalization.²⁷

Hypotheses to test

My model contains two variables that might weaken the nationalization of political parties and one variable that might promote party nationalization. Those variables might explain differences in party nationalization degrees across countries, my variable of interest. In the empirical part, I shall thus test the following two hypotheses explaining party nationalization:

²⁶ See Appendix D for definitions.

²⁷ Cf. Bochsler, Daniel. "Les raisons pour une régionalisation des partis. Institutions contre les clivages à l'exemple des cantons suisses." (Paper presented at the Congrès des quatre pays, Lausanne, 18-19 November 2005.)

Hypothesis A: The degree of party nationalization is a consequence of the centralization or decentralization of the government, with increasing centralization pushing for a nationalization of political parties.

Hypothesis B: The degree of party nationalization is an expression of the territorial structure of ethnic identities in a country: Ethnic groups that live territorially concentrated are likely to decrease the degree of party nationalization, while in countries with territorially non-concentrated ethnic groups or in ethnic homogeneous countries, parties might be strongly nationalized.

Hypothesis C: National legal thresholds in the electoral systems work as nationalization constraints and thus do not allow for low party nationalization.

Due to the mutual influences of these factors (according to my triangle model), one has to pay attention to problems of endogeneity when testing these hypotheses.

Why explaining party nationalization for Central and Eastern European countries?

To test my hypotheses, I consider Central and Eastern European democracies as particularly fruitful, since many of them show degrees of party nationalization that are remarkably lower than in older democracies. This might be a consequence of the importance of ethnic cleavages and the absence of a clear-cut left-right dimension – a cleavage that in the West leads to a certain nationalization of politics. Furthermore, those countries

show an interesting pattern regarding the other related variables, having varying degree of ethnic heterogeneity. And, while electoral systems with nationalization constraints were rare in the world before the 1990s, countries in Central and Eastern Europe introduced them in a high number.

While party nationalization has been calculated for many countries, Central and Eastern Europe remained a blind spot for the study of this phenomenon. This is no wonder, as it required detailed regional electoral results, data that in some cases is difficult to find. This investigation is based on the author's database on elections in Central and Eastern Europe, including electoral results on the regional or local level, for elections after 1990. 16 countries in Central and Eastern Europe are included in the empirical analysis.²⁸ Before testing my hypotheses on party

²⁸ Russia and Ukraine have to be excluded, as it is not possible to establish the ethnicity of the independent candidates. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate the ethnic structure of the party system (Moser investigates this question, Moser, Robert G.. "Ethnicity, Electoral Politics, and Minority Representation in Post-Communist States." (International Research & Exchanges Board, Project Database. <http://www.irex.org/programs/stg/research/05/moser.pdf>, 2005)). Belarus is excluded because it lacks democracy. Serbia and Montenegro are included as single entities (similar to Horowitz, Shale and Eric C. Browne. "Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation. Ideology Versus Institutions." *Party Politics* 11(6) (2005): 689-706), because recently they only had direct elections to the sub-entity parliaments; the last direct elections to the Union parliament date from 1996. Kosovo however could not be included, as electoral results on the municipal level are lacking.

nationalization I shall explain the measurement of the dependent variable.

Measuring party nationalization

The variable that shall be discussed and explained in this article is the level of party nationalization in the region, which as of yet has not been calculated. The nationalization degree is established for every single party competing in elections. There are almost more different measures of party nationalization than scholars who have been carrying out studies in this field. In common, those indicators should measure to what degree party support varies across regions. All those indicators have to deal with the difficult task of providing an unbiased measure suitable for comparative research. Especially, the varying number of regional units (number of electoral districts, number of sub-national regions, etc.) taken into account for the calculation brings along major problems for the measures. Known indicators of party nationalization are sensitive to the number of the regional units, as they provide lower values for more fine-grained data.²⁹ Studies using such indicators risk being influenced by a hidden correlation between party nationalization and the number of units

²⁹ Other measures are simply unreliable, providing similar results for very different levels of party nationalization due to incomplete consideration of information. Chhibber/Kollman, *Formation* and Moenius/Kasuya, "Measuring", neutralize positive and negative deviations from the national average mutually. In result, they may indicate perfect party nationalization even if it varies widely from region to region. For an overview of known indicators and their biases and problems, see Bochsler, Daniel: "The standardized 'Gini-coefficient' to measure party nationalisation." (Working Paper. Idheap, Lausanne, 2005.).

(number of electoral districts, number of sub-national units, etc.) or other variables related to it. Interpretation of such findings may be biased and may be result just from the measurement³⁰.

Our considerations are based on the Gini-coefficient, which was originally used to measure inequalities in wealth distributions.³¹ Jones and Mainwaring³² applied it to political parties, measuring inequalities in vote distributions across regions. A score of 100% represents a perfectly homogeneous distribution of votes (the party gets exactly the same percentage of votes in every region), whereas low values (close to 0%) mean that the votes for each party are concentrated in a small part of the territory. Using a logarithm, I correct this indicator, making it insensitive to the number of units taken into account. I call it "standardized party nationalization score" (cf. appendix A for more information).

Party nationalization in Central and Eastern Europe

My results show that party nationalization in some of the countries under investigation scores up to 0.92 points (Hungary) – a value close to Western

³⁰ For instance: Tiemann, Guido. "The Nationalization of East European Party Systems." (Paper presented at the ECPR 3rd General Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September 2005,) 25: "Coordination across districts becomes the more complicated, the greater the number of districts is."

³¹ Gini, Corrado. *Variabilità e Mutabilità* (Bologna: Tipografia di Paolo Cuppini, 1912).

³² Jones/Mainwaring, *Nationalization*.

European countries with highly nationalized party systems - with many other cases are just below. At the lower end of the scale, one may find Macedonia (0.67 pt) or Bosnia with a spectacularly low value of approximately 0.45 points. For the calculation of those values, the most recent elections (up to the end of 2005) to the first chamber of the national parliament were considered.³³

Testing the centralization hypothesis

In order to explain the different degrees of party nationalization, I first test my centralization hypothesis (hypothesis A) before testing the ethnic cleavages and the electoral system hypotheses (hypotheses B and C). In addition to providing correlation and regression results, I shall discuss important cases in order to check for the problem of endogeneity.

Party nationalization and decentralization: Only Bosnian values fit with this explanatory approach

First, I shall test if the empirical data from this region fits with the common centralization hypothesis.³⁴ Figure 2

³³ For Albania, Hungary and Lithuania – countries with mixed electoral systems (both proportional and majority/plurality systems for the elections of the same chamber, and each voter has two votes) – the nationalization degree of the proportional votes are listed in order to be congruent with the operationalization of the national threshold variable. However, for the countries included in the calculation, there is not a major difference between the two votes regarding the party nationalization degree.

³⁴ Decentralization may be measured either by institutional institutionalization or by

shows a positive correlation of centralization of government expenses and party nationalization. Decentralized countries in Central and Eastern Europe have regional party systems; centralized countries have nationalized ones instead. However, the correlation tests do not give any information about the direction of the relationship. This may be investigated more thoroughly with case studies or more fine-grained quantitative and time-series analyzes.




Figure 2. Centralization (share of government expenditures at the national level) and party nationalization.

Sources: own database, see Appendix C.

My data show that in the period around 2005 there was a connection between centralization and party nationalization, but this connection relied only on the Bosnian case (if the case is excluded, the correlation changes its sign!). Bosnia is both extremely decentralized and has an

decentralization of government spending. For the first method, no data with the necessary quality could be found. The considerations are based on the most recent data found on the share of government expenditures on the sub-national level (see Appendix B).

almost completely non-nationalized party system. If analysing the sequence of how party nationalization and state decentralization in Bosnia developed, we can understand the relation of both variables better. This shall be done in the following paragraph.

Bosnia's decentralization as a result of ethno-regional political parties

Bosnia underwent a drastic change in decentralization that has never – or very rarely – happened in other countries. In 1992, Bosnia did not have any significant administrative level between the municipalities and the Republic. Today's constitutional order in Bosnia accords almost all the competencies to regional entities.³⁵ This development was preceded by the political parties, and party leaders were in charge of the policies that led to this outcome. During the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1990, the Bosnian parties

were created along ethnic lines.³⁶ The most important forces were the ultra-nationalist parties of the Bosnian Serb and the Bosnian Croat minority - the SDS and HDŽ - and the SDA party, which is commonly defined as almost an ethnic party, since it was predominantly supported by Bosniaks (Muslims) but wanted to keep a common state for all ethnic groups. Those parties gained an overwhelming majority of the votes in the first multiparty elections in 1990, with voters voting strictly according ethnic lines. The Bosnian Serb's SDS and Croatian's HDŽ demanded significant autonomy or secession of regions of the country and wanted to govern those regions. They reached this goal through the means of war (1992-95), where they fought with their own armed forces, in conjunction with foreign armies. In this way, both SDS and HDŽ rushed the change of factual power of the central government. A peace accord could only be reached through acceptance of almost

³⁵ Many comparative studies exclude Bosnia and Herzegovina because of the institution of the High Representative and thus the lack of complete sovereignty of the political institutions. Mostly, they measure the outcome of the political institutions on the quality of democracy (for instance Beliaev, Michael. "Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies* 39(3) (April 2006): 375-398) or policy results, where the High Representative's veto rights indeed make a difference. I focus on patterns of elections and the party system, which are not touched by the institution of the High Representative, so there would be no reason not to include this country into my study. On the contrary, Bosnia increases the variance among all the variables included in the study. Nevertheless, quantitative results will be checked if they rely only on the influence of the particular Bosnian case.

³⁶ Information on this subject is drawn from Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD). *Srebrenica - a 'safe' area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyzes of the fall of a Safe Area* (Amsterdam: NIOD, 2002, <http://www.srebrenica.nl>); Bianchini, Stefano. *Sarajevo – le radici dell'odio. Identità e destino dei popoli balcanici*. (Roma: Edizioni Associate Editrice Internazionale, 1996); ICG, *Democracy*; International Crisis Group (ICG). *Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years After The Peace Agreement* (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): *Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić. Case No. IT-98-33-A. Judgement in the Appeals Chamber* (ICTY, The Hague. <http://www.icty.org>, 19 April 2004). It is not the goal of this paper to show how the conclusions on the history of Yugoslavia are drawn.

complete decentralization, bringing regional autonomy for Bosnian Serbs (with an own "entity") and Croats (through a federalization of the Muslim-Croat entity into cantons with important autonomy). Despite massive pressure from the international community, resistance and sabotage by ultra-nationalist parties hindered the central government from fulfilling even minimal competence. Indeed, "central government institutions exist largely on paper".³⁷ Initially, even the defence competencies remained at the sub-state level. There has still not been a fundamental turnover towards centralization. In those extremely federalist structures, the regionalized party system divided along ethnic lines was preserved.³⁸

Ethno-regional parties thus have transformed the state into a heavily decentralized system. Therefore, decentralization and weak party nationalization are connected. However, the causal and temporal sequence goes both as the commonly supposed centralization hypothesis suggests and the other way around. The Bosnian case does not help to illustrate the criticism on this literature. Furthermore, being a rare case of strong decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe, it is important for the study of the causality of centralization and party nationalization in this region. And since the positive correlation of centralization and party nationalization (figure 2) relies only on Bosnia, it would be the only case to support the

centralization hypothesis. But after having seen that the causality goes the other way round, I have to dismiss the validity of the centralization hypothesis for Central and Eastern Europe.

In the foreseeable future, developments in Macedonia might be a second case and reinforce the correlation that has been shown in figure 2 of centralization and party nationalization. As a result of an ethnic-territorial division of political forces and violent struggles, the parties agreed to reform the municipalities and to decentralize political power ("Ohrid agreement"). Again, the sequence of developments in Macedonia – if the Ohrid plan will be implemented – would not follow the centralization hypothesis, but be one more example of a move in the opposite direction: weak party nationalization anticipates and causes decentralization.

Regionalization of the political forces and weakening of the central state
Drawing on the Bosnian example, we might formulate a counter-hypothesis for the relationship. Instead of state centralization affecting party nationalization, on the contrary the shape of the state institutions reflects the territorial structure of political parties (or that of political organizations and movements in a broader sense). Nationally homogeneous forces will push towards a unified state with a high degree of centralization, while territorially split organizations will lead to demands for decentralization or even separatism. However, the latter idea is however related to a methodological problem. If weak nationalization of political parties

³⁷ ICG, *Dayton*, 3.

³⁸ ICG, *Democracy*.

leads to separatism, then countries disappear or split off, and interesting cases – where party nationalization indeed affected the structure of political institutions – disappear from the map. This problem is not alien to Central and Eastern Europe, as both the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are cases that split off according to this pattern. The de-nationalization of the Yugoslav party system after the breakdown of the Communist party was one of the elements in the chain that lead to the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. The XIV congress of the “League of Communists of Yugoslavia” (20-22 January 1990) marked the dissolution of the former monopoly party, followed by successor organizations at the sub-national level and competing ethno-regionalist movements, some of them with a secessionist platform. Regional parties in the Yugoslav sub-national regions preceded the dissolution of the central government; they were even the basis and driving force behind this development on the institutional level. Similarly, after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, a split of the party system into a Czech and a Slovak part anticipated the split of the state.³⁹

To summarize, for the group of Central and Eastern European countries, the common hypothesis about party

nationalization being a consequence of government centralization finds no empirical confirmation. To the contrary, the most prominent case of Bosnia shows a sequence in the opposite direction. Generally, I suppose that there is a strong pressure coming from territorially split political organizations towards decentralization or separatism.

Testing the ethnic cleavage and the electoral threshold hypotheses

In my theoretical framework, I discussed two more hypotheses (2 and 3) that could explain different degrees of party nationalization. I connected party nationalization to the ethnic structure of the countries and to national legal thresholds in electoral laws. This model shall be tested both on grounds of the nationalization of party families and of the party systems of the countries under study. I distinguish ethnic minority parties from others – either ethnic majority parties or non-ethnically defined parties⁴⁰ - and furthermore, among ethnic minority parties, I draw distinctions according to the structure of the reliant ethnic group: The parties of ethnic groups who live concentrated in one region and those of groups who live spread throughout the country.⁴¹ Non-ethnically defined political

³⁹ Cf. Elster et al., *Institutional Design*, 142f.; Olson, David M. “Dissolution of the state: Political parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26(3) 1993: 301-314; Henderson, Karen. “Minorities and Politics in the Slovak Republic,” in *Minorities in Europe*, ed. Snežana Trifunovska (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). 143-174, 148.

⁴⁰ A distinction of both would be very difficult in countries with non-intensive ethnic cleavages, not to say not feasible. This is why they have to be tested as a common category. However, the degree of party nationalization might be similar for both types of political parties.

⁴¹ The classification is based on country-specific analyzes of the party systems, such as country-specific reports and party labels. In cases where

parties or parties appealing to ethnic majority votes are quite nationalized.

Ethnic minority parties have a substantially lower degree of nationalization than ethnically mixed or ethnic majority parties. Particularly, parties related to territorially concentrated ethnic minorities appear as the least nationalized, gathering a nationalization degree of as few as 0.43 points. Those of non-concentrated minorities⁴² have a slightly higher nationalization degree (table 1).

When comparing these values country by country, we see that the observed pattern prevails in (almost) all the 16 countries under study. Ethnically mixed or ethnic majority parties are quite nationalized (0.75 to 0.92 points, only Bosnia below). Ethnic minority parties however are more regional. This is especially important when they represent territorially concentrated ethnic minorities. Where parties related to non-concentrated ethnic minorities groups exist, they have an

those sources were not enough, we consulted further relevant party manifests, analyzed the ethnic structure of the parties' executive board or consulted specialists for the country's party system. (Those cases as the sources are listed in Appendix C). The distinction between concentrated and non-concentrated was made using census data or qualitative descriptions of the ethnic minorities. Sources are listed in Appendix C. A more precise indicator was used by Lijphart, Arend: "Consociation and Federalism: Conceptual and Empirical Links." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 12(3) (1979): 499-515, and Allik, "Parteisüsteemid", but data is not available for the countries of my research.

⁴² The most notable cases in this smaller category are the Russian minority oriented party in Latvia and the Turkish oriented party in Bulgaria.

intermediate nationalization degree (about 0.6-0.7 points) (cf. figure 3).⁴³

The figure also shows important differences among the countries: In Bosnia and in Macedonia, ethnic majority parties or ethnically mixed parties have considerably low party nationalization degrees. Furthermore, there is considerable variation of party nationalization degrees among ethnic minority parties. Overall, there is a very significant correlation among the nationalization degree of ethnic minority parties and the population share of the relative ethnic or linguistic minority (+0.43, 99.9% significance, cases weighted by the parties' vote shares).⁴⁴ This variation may be the consequence of some minorities being small and others having a larger share of the country's population. When concentrated, small ethnic minorities live in a very small part

⁴³ The values for parties of non-concentrated ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic, in Macedonia and in Slovakia are not very significant, as only very tiny parties contribute to this result, none of them resembling more than 0.6% the national electorate.

⁴⁴ Where available, data on the population size of ethnic among citizens over 20 years old; for Latvia the data were calculated among citizens. The share of Roma population may be underestimated as census data on Roma communities appears to be biased. Milcher, Susanne and Andrey Ivanov. "The United Nations Development Programme's Vulnerability Projects: Roma and Ethnic Data" *Roma Rights Quarterly* 2/2004. Existing databases (Gurr, Ted Robert et al. *Minorities at Risk Project*. (<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/>, 2005); Alesina, Alberto et al. "Fractionalization", *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 155-194) of ethnic minorities appear not to be very useful for our purposes, as they are not complete for the region under study. Often they list only ethnic minorities that are in political conflict.

Type of party	Party nationalization ^a	Cumulative vote share (16 countries)
Ethnically mixed or ethnic majority ^b	0,87	1490%
Parties of non-concentrated minorities	0,65	47%
Parties of concentrated minorities	0,42	138%

Table 1. Party types and party nationalization degree in 16 Central and Eastern European democracies; average value

^a Average standardized party nationalization score, weighted with the national vote share of the parties. ^b For 28 tiny parties (altogether gathering 6.3% vote share, 21 of them count each less than 0.2% of the national vote), the type could not be defined. They are treated as ethnically mixed. Sources: own database, see Appendix C.

of a country. This gives their parties a very local character. Larger minorities however live in somewhat larger regions and thus the nationalization degree of their parties is higher. The German minority in Poland counts only 0.4% of the country's population, and most of them live in one single district. Consequently, both political parties of the Polish Germans have a very local character and a very low nationalization degree of about 0.09 points. Albanians in Macedonia are as well a territorially concentrated minority, living in the Western parts of the country. Comprising 23% of Macedonia's population, they are one of the largest ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, which gives Albanian parties in Macedonia a higher nationalization degree, scoring from 0.34 up to 0.44 points (for different parties). So far, I have used correlation analyzes to show some of the connections among variables. On this basis, I calculate a comprehensive model explaining the party nationalization degree by country (considering all ethnic minority, majority and mixed ethnic parties) (cf. table 2).

Besides the ethnic structure, national electoral thresholds are included into the explanatory model. I consider them only if they apply for ethnic minority parties as well (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, cf. appendix B). In five other countries, there are no such thresholds (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia), they do not apply for ethnic minority harming regional parties to get represented in the electoral districts (Slovenia).

Ethnic cleavages and political parties – causes and consequences

There is however a problem of endogeneity related to the relationship of ethnic cleavages and party nationalization (as discussed before, cf. triangle model). As in the previous section on endogeneity of the centralization hypothesis, the Bosnian example raises questions about endogeneity related to the ethnic cleavage hypothesis. Indeed, the country appears to be the most significant case in post-communist Europe that shows how political actors change the structure about

Figure 3. Party types and party nationalization by country; average values. Sources: own database, see Appendix C.




Table 2. OLS regression to explain the party nationalization degree, ethnic minority model. Independent variables were z-standardized.

	B	Std. Error
Constant	.845	.009
Population share of concentrated minorities	-.015	.015
National legal threshold in the electoral law	.043**	.010
Multiplicative term ethnic minorities * threshold.	.064**	.011
Adjusted R ² = 0.899 / N = 16		

Figure 4. (cf. data points x and ▲) shows, how the party nationalization score is related to the ethnic structure of the relative country. Not surprisingly, countries with large territorially concentrated ethnic groups have lower party nationalization




Figure 4 shows ethnic structure, national legal threshold and party nationalization: The figure shows both the calculated regression values (lines) and the empirical data points (x for countries with a low threshold, without national threshold or with exceptions for ethnic minorities, ▲ for countries with a national threshold of 4% or more). Sources: own database, see Appendix C.

The dotted line (- - -) estimates party nationalization for countries with national legal thresholds (▲) (usually those thresholds are about 4-6% of the national vote). Party nationalization is rather high, in most of the cases above 0.85 points, and does not vary with a differing share of concentrated ethnic minorities.

The second line (____) estimates party nationalization for countries without a national legal threshold. As expected, in this group of countries (marked as X), one may see that party nationalization is not only lower, but also more influenced by the ethnic structure. However, results may be heavily influenced by the Bosnian case. There, all the ethnic groups are geographically decentralized and party nationalization is low, due to three parallel ethno-regional party systems. Besides, there might be other cleavages, which follow geographic patterns. However, the ethnic cleavages appear as to be important ones for the regional structure of the party systems.¹

¹ Although the results presented on the ethnic cleavage appear conclusive, it is not plausible to predict party nationalization in perfectly in the countries under consideration, as the ethnic dimension is just one singular cleavage that may account for party nationalization. It may be one part of the puzzle, about other territorial oriented

endogeneity related to the ethnic cleavage hypothesis. Indeed, the country appears to be the most significant case in post-communist Europe that shows how political actors change the structure of ethnic cleavages. The ethnic differences dominating Bosnian politics nowadays were already recognised during the Tito regime in former Yugoslavia, but kept at a low level. Post-Tito politics reinforced and changed those divisions willingly. “In an attempt to deflect attention away from their own problems or to justify claims in terms of other republics, the party elite in the various republics began to appeal increasingly to the ethnic Regional political forces in the former Yugoslavia and ultra-nationalist ethno-regional parties provoked and raised inter-ethnic conflicts on both grounds, and politically-supported campaigns incited many citizens to join a

cleavages co-exist. The most apparent of those is the urban-rural cleavage, which is reflected in some Central and Eastern European countries through a number of declared rural parties or parties that are strongly linked to voters either in urban or rural areas. For a test of the urban-rural cleavage's impact on party nationalization, I correlated it – as measured by Whitefield (2002: 188f.) - to the party nationalization score. As only ten countries overlapped with our cases (Russia and Ukraine had to be excluded), the sample is very small for quantitative analysis, and results should be interpreted with caution. Surprisingly, a positive correlation of the importance of the urban-rural cleavage and party nationalization was reported, but it was not significant. However, a test based on the same data works for the ethnic cleavage, even almost at a 95% level of significance, despite the small number of cases, and even if the countries with most variance (Bosnia, Macedonia) were not part of the sample. The latter appears to be dominant for the explanation of differing degrees of party nationalization in Central and Eastern European countries.

religious community. Language policies introduced new linguistic differences in order to strengthen ethno-linguistic identities. Serbo-Croat, which is spoken in four of the six Yugoslavian Republics, was formerly the official language in those entities. Governments under the control of ultra-nationalist ethno-regionalist parties changed the official language of their countries.

They defined dialectic forms of this unique language as new “national languages”. Language policies in the newly independent states were aimed at emphasizing language differences through new vocabulary and discouraging the use of formerly common vocabulary. Today, citizens of the successor states overwhelmingly accept those politically imposed linguistic borders.² Furthermore, the ultra-nationalist parties, their office representatives, and armed forces changed the regional ethnic structure of the country by the means of ethnic cleansing and – in the case of East-Bosnian Srebrenica – through genocide.³

It would thus be particularly perverted to explain the low party nationalization degree in Bosnia and Herzegovina through territorial ethnic lines without mentioning

²Focussing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, this *official language* aspect is particularly interesting: The country today counts three official languages. However, two of those languages, formerly known as Serbo-Croat dialects, had not been spoken in Bosnia before the war, but rather belong to other former Yugoslav Republics. They may have been formally introduced as new official language for political reasons.

³ ICTY, *Krstić*.

that the ethnic lines are themselves a result of the implementation of ultra-nationalist party policies, changing languages, ethnicizing the society, and social division through genocide and ethnic cleansing. Political actors both reinforced the ethnic division and separated those groups territorially, forging thus a new map of ethnic cleavages in Bosnia. This example shows that questions of ethnic identity and party nationalization stand in a two-sided relationship. Ethnic lines and regional identities may be the result of policies of non-nationalized parties. On the other side, there are numerous examples showing how nationalized political parties promote a nationalization of identities. Cases according to this pattern can be found both in the history of Central and Eastern European countries and in more recent developments:

The unification of the Slovak language, previously consisting of different dialects, was a project of the movement for the independence of Slovakia in the 19th century. A nationally united language was seen as a means for the creation of a national identity, which was the basis for the separatist movement.⁴

In the Soviet Union, the communist party used centralized political institutions to impose the Russian language as countrywide standard. Even in regions with previously different languages, the

⁴ Cf. Tomkova, Zuzana. “Inclusion and exclusion in language and beyond: What to make of endangered European dialects in the field of language endangerment.” (Paper presented at the 7th Postgraduate Conference, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 16-18 February 2006.)

spread of Russian should have facilitated communication, reduced ethnic differences (besides widespread deportation policies) and raised the national identity. Modification of languages further should help to alienate ethnic minorities from peoples outside the Soviet Union. For instance, for the Moldavian language, the Cyrillic alphabet has been imposed and new vocabulary introduced in order to differentiate the language (the Romanian dialect spoken in Moldova) from Romanian.

After regaining national independence in the 1990s, two Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) employed policies in order to reinforce the languages of the national majorities. The countries' citizenship laws⁵ "have left large Russian minority populations outside the states' political communities".⁶ This has created an electorate that is ethnically more homogeneous than the whole population, and might be one of the reasons why minority parties were less successful. In consequence, it reduces the potential for an ethnically-based regionalization of the party system, and thus increases party nationalization. Although those examples reflect very different processes (regarding time period, intensity, popular support for those policies, respect of human rights, democratic legitimacy), they underline the pattern that nationalized political actors might – and sometimes do – harmonize

the ethnic-cultural structure of a country. This happens either through homogenization of cultural values or languages, or through the imposition of some aspects of a "Leitkultur" (core culture) to national minorities, and the same process might over the long term even further increase party nationalization. Such two-sided process dependencies are typical for social sciences, where cases consist not of laboratory experiments but where all the variables involved might have direct or indirect impacts on each other. Nevertheless, there are arguments that approve the discussion of ethnic cleavages as explanatory factors for party nationalization. We might suppose that in democratic regimes the influence of the voters' will and the voters' identity on the political parties might be more immediate than the rather long-term formation of ethnic identities. For the group of countries investigated, this argument might be, as shown, at least true for Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose ethnic composition was largely affected by civil war. However, even in this case the ethnic political players that are responsible for "ethnic engineering" had previously (in 1990) been elected, and thus there is a reason to link party nationalization to ethnic boundaries. In Bosnia, as in many other countries of the region, nationalist parties in the post-communist transition might have reinforced ethnic awareness and politicized those cleavages.⁷ However,

⁵ Applicants were for instance required to speak the language of the national majority.

⁶ Chinn, Jeff and Lise A. Truex,. "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics", *Journal of Democracy* 7(1) (1996): 133-147.

⁷ This problem of mutual influences is not exclusive to the study of party nationalization, but rather inherent to all studies of *political cleavages* that might be both the cause and the consequence of a party system. It might be fruitful to investigate how ethnic cleavages in the society and ethnic divisions

we do not have any cases of a completely new, artificial identity created through one of the political players; we deal instead with pre-existing ethnic boundaries, and, excepting Bosnia and Croatia, there was no large-scale ethnic cleansing in the post-communist period happening in the region. The processes of homogenization (Baltic States) or reinforcement of ethnic differences (former Yugoslavia) are in harmony with some pre-existing identities or affect just some aspects of culture. The processes were partly supported by the population everywhere and were not only elite-imposed. Lastly, one may stress that the use of data on all known and measurable ethnic groups as an explanatory variable – and not only on politicized cleavages – reduces the endogeneity problem.

Conclusion and outlook

In this article, I calculated the level of party nationalization in Central and Eastern European countries and explained it through the ethnic structure of the countries under study. Most non-ethnically defined parties (or ethnic majority parties) compete nationally and have a national electorate, whereas parties of territorially concentrated minorities are particularly weakly nationalized. The study showed that party nationalization in Central and Eastern Europe widely

in the party system interact with each other. Do they mutually reinforce each other, leading to a *self-reinforcing spiral*, as it might be argued for the dissolution of former Yugoslavia? Or, does a non-correspondence of ethnic cleavages and the party system lead to pressure on each of them to reach a new, *stable, balanced situation*?

reflects the ethnic structure of those countries but electoral systems (national legal thresholds) may reinforce party nationalization. Thus, the ethnic cleavage and the electoral system hypotheses (B and C) have been approved by the empirical data. The results may be best illustrated in two countries of the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Both those countries had significant inter-ethnic tensions, and in both the ethnic cleavage is an important factor of electoral competition. Instead of one nationalized party system there are two party systems in Macedonia and even three regional party systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following territorial ethnic boundaries. However, we should be aware of the causality problem. To some degree, ethnic tensions may stand at the starting point of a development that leads to ethno-regional party systems. But on the other hand, to some degree the regionalization of party systems among ethnic boundaries might reinforce ethnic identities and separation and deepen the cleavages further.

Equally interesting are my negative findings concerning the centralization hypothesis (hypothesis A): There is no evidence that centralization of government expenditures in Central and Eastern Europe leads to an increase in party nationalization. Instead, the analysis of the Bosnian case (the only empirical case that contributes to the correlation of government centralization and party nationalization) shows that the ethnically-based regionalization of the Bosnian party system led to a never-before-seen degree of state decentralization. In Macedonia, a similar process should take place soon,

while in other cases (Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia) it did lead to separatism and dissolution instead of decentralization. The question of how particular the strong empirical relationship of the ethnic structure, electoral systems, and party nationalization is to Central and Eastern Europe shall be discussed in future research. It would be particularly interesting to test the criticism and negative empirical findings (inverted dependency) regarding the centralization hypothesis for other groups of countries.

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Appendix A. The calculation of the “standardized party nationalization score”

In the research on party nationalization, many different kinds of indicators have been used to compare the degree of party system nationalization. They all measure the territorial homogeneity of electoral support for political parties. They are based on electoral outcomes across districts (or regions, municipalities etc. – hereafter “territorial units”).

The most popular indicators include the *standard deviation* used by Caramani, the *party nationalization score* (Jones/Mainwaring), the *indicator of party aggregation* (Chhibber/Kollman) or the *inflation index* (Moenius/Kasuya). However, those indicators may be biased because of several shortcomings:¹

- Some of the indicators (indicator of party aggregation, inflation index) simply may take wrong results and under some circumstances lead to unjustified high values;
- others (standard deviation and transformations of this measure) are biased if not all the territorial units on which the indicator is calculated have the same size;
- they lead to low values for small parties (standard deviation);
- and finally, the values may diminish or rise if a large number of territorial units is taken into account (a common problem of party nationalization measures).

The *party nationalization score* “PNS” by Jones and Mainwaring performs best of the known indicators, being only biased by the number of territorial units on which the calculation is carried out. The indicator is a simple transformation of the *Gini coefficient*, a measure for inequalities across units that is most frequently used to quantify wealth heterogeneity within a society.² The Gini coefficient takes the value 0 for perfectly equal distributions (a party has exactly the same vote share across all territorial units) and the value 1 for perfectly unequal distributions (all the party’s votes are concentrated in one single point of the country). Jones and Mainwaring invert this scale for their “Party Nationalization Score” ($PNS = 1 - \text{Gini-coefficient}$). Their score is calculated in a first step for each single political party, and afterwards averaged for the whole party system. However, the larger the number of territorial units a county is divided into, the lower the values of the PNS score. Thus, if we have more detailed data for a country, its party system would seem to be more heterogeneous than if it took only larger units as a basis for the calculation. In consequence, the PNS can only be compared across countries with the same number of territorial units. This is an impractical restriction, since in some countries we have very fine-grained data and in others only data from half a dozen units. This is why I propose a standardization of the indicator by the number of territorial units, in order to transform the indicator into a comparable format. I use the number of 10 units as a standard for the comparison. I suppose (and show empirically) that the PNS indicator increases exponentially with the logarithm of the number of units taken into account. From this, I derive the following function that allows me to calculate the *standardized party nationalization score* (sPNS), based on the PNS and the number of units (unit).

¹ Caramani, *Nationalization*; Jones/Mainwaring, “Nationalization”; Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman, „Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States”, *American Political Science Review* 92(2) (June 1998): 329–342, 333; Moenius/Kasuya, “Measuring”; for a systematic overview, see Bochsler, “Gini-coefficient”.

² For information on the calculation of the Gini coefficient see Jones/Mainwaring, “Nationalization”, or Bochsler, “Gini-coefficient”.

$$sPNS = PNS (\log 10 / \log \text{unit})$$

The *standardized party nationalization score* is estimating what the PNS value would be if we had data from exactly 10 territorial units.

Appendix B. Data

Decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe

Partial data on decentralization of institutions in some Central and European countries may be found in the World Bank Database on Political Institutions,¹ and further in Marcou's article.² Quantitative indicators for institutional decentralization are not known to the author and not all information on institutions is easily comparable. This is why I used data on budget decentralization. For EU member states, data have been taken from the World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.³ As some values vary considerably over time, I calculated the average for the last three years contained in the 1996-2000 period. For non-EU member countries, data for the years 2000 or 2003 was found in a Council of Europe publication⁴. Where different sources contained data on the same country, they were usually congruent. In the cases of Croatia and Romania, data that appeared more solid and not out-of-date were used.

Table B1. Decentralization of government expenses

Country	Decentralization
Albania	17,6%
Bosnia	98,7%
Bulgaria	16,8%
Croatia	10,0%
Czech Republic	20,2%
Estonia	21,0%
Hungary	23,3%

¹ Beck, Thorsten et al. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions", *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1) (2001): 165-176, but they are not complete and are out of date in some cases, as described in Horváth, Tamás M., eds. *Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms*. Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2000.

² Marcou Gérard: "The State of Local and Regional Democracy in South-Eastern Europe," in *Effective democratic governance at local and regional level*, ed. The Council of Europe et al. Budapest: Open Society Institute / The Council of Europe, 2005.

³ Based on the Government Finance Statistics Manual, available on <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm>.

⁴ Davey, Kenneth. "Fiscal Decentralization in South-East Europe," in: *Effective democratic governance at local and regional level*, ed. The Council of Europe et al. Budapest: Open Society Institute / The Council of Europe, 2005, and Marcou, "Local and Regional Democracy".

Latvia	23,9%
Lithuania	20,8%
Macedonia	7,0%
Moldova	29,0%
Montenegro	14,0%
Poland	24,0%
Romania	25,0%
Serbia	25,0%
Slovakia	7,9%
Slovenia	11,2%

Table B2. National thresholds in Central and Eastern Europe at the latest national legislative elections.

Country	Thres hold	Special threshold for ethnic minorities	Remarks
Albania	2.5%	Ban on ethnic minority parties.	Mixed electoral system, threshold applies for the compensatory mandates; 4% for coalitions. The legal ban is not implemented for all minority parties.
Bulgaria	4%	Ban on ethnic minority parties.	The legal ban is not implemented for all minority parties.
Czech Republic	5%	No	10% for coalitions
Estonia	5%	No	Exceptions for district candidates who gain a vote share equivalent to one parliamentary seat.
Hungary	5%	No	Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional mandates; 10% or 15% for coalitions.
Latvia	5%	No	
Lithuania	5%	No	Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional mandates.
Moldova	6%	No	12% for coalitions, 3% for independent candidates.
Montenegro	3%	No threshold for the Ulcinj district	Special district without threshold in the municipality of Ulcinj, mainly populated by Albanians. Albanians not living in Ulcinj – along with other minorities (Bosnians, Serbs, etc.) are affected by the threshold requirement.
Poland	5%	0%	8% for coalitions.
Romania	5%	No	8-10% for coalitions. 18 special mandates for ethnic minorities.
Russia	5%	No	Mixed system, threshold applies for proportional mandates
Serbia	5%	No	(After the last elections, the threshold has been removed for ethnic minorities.)

Slovakia	5%	No	
Slovenia	(4%)	No	Threshold applies only for remaining mandates, which are accorded on the national level. Two of the countries' ethnic minorities vote in special non-territorial constituencies.
Ukraine	4%	No.	Threshold applies for proportional mandates.

No legal thresholds in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia.

Source: own database.

Appendix C. Elections, electoral laws and parties in the new European democracies: Sources for my database and remarks

General sources

Population data: Alesina, "Fractionalization", and Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*.

Electoral systems:

Jovanović, Milan. *Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država* (Beograd: Službeni list SCG/Fakultet političkih nauka/Institut za političke studije, 2004), and Shvetsova, Olga. "A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998," *Electoral Studies* 18(3) (Sept. 1999): 397-409.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina

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- Punctual information on ethnic minority members in political parties executive board: <http://www.hidra.hr/stranke/501int4.htm>.

Czech Republic

- Regarding the ethnic minority structure: Radio Praha, Minorities in the Czech Republic.

<http://www.radio.cz/en/article/26138>.

- Electoral results: University of Essex, Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe; <http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/>.

Estonia

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Latvia

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Moldova

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Montenegro

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Romania

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Appendix D. Interdependency of the three main variables

- **Party nationalization** \Leftrightarrow **state centralization**: A regionalization of political parties may create the demand for government decentralization, whereas national political parties may be inclined to centralize the political competencies at the national level. On the other hand, centralized political competencies may incite political parties to create more national structures, and voters to vote for national parties. Regionalized political competencies, however, may give regional parties the opportunity to form, gain substantial power, and win votes.

- **Party nationalization** \Leftrightarrow **regional "ethnic" identities**: Distinct regional identities (regionalized ethnic diversity) may be the basis for regional political parties to win a significant basis of voters, while a national identity connected strongly to the central state may make it difficult for regional movements. On the other hand, regional political movements may provide a political agenda and program aimed at creating or stressing differences in regional identities. National

political movements, however, may support a harmonization and creation of a national identity (for instance a unified language¹), as a social basis for national political unity.

State centralization \Leftrightarrow **regional "ethnic" identities**: Decentralized institutions help to raise the awareness of regional distinctiveness among citizens. First, citizens may identify with public services; second, decentralization in the education sector allows differing curricula and helps, for instance, the promotion of distinct regional use of language or distinct regional views of history. Even national public services provided by central states might be an element of national identity building processes. Centralization allows the spread of a national image, particularly, if it creates a nationwide mass media, a national education curriculum with a harmonized language, and a common view of history. Sometimes, states use violence or incite migration in order to increase ethnic homogeneity. On the other hand, distinct regional identities may be used as a political argument for government decentralization. A strong national identity may be used as an argument for the centralization of competencies.

¹ For a discussion of language policies and ethnic minorities, see Daftary, Farimah and François Grin, *Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries* (Budapest: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2003).

ANALYZING THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENTAL SCENE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES

ALEXANDRA IONASCU

PhD Candidate, University of Bucharest and Université Libre de Bruxelles (CEVIPOL)
aionascu@ulb.ac.be

Abstract

This paper aims to emphasize some theoretical and methodological difficulties in analyzing post-communist countries through a case study concerning the professionalization of governmental elites and the development of decision-making procedures in the cabinets of post-communist Romania. Are the existing theories applicable to the Romanian case? What methods can we apply in order to capture the function of government, and what are the limitations they imply? The paper will show that only a research design both quantitative and qualitative in nature can respond to the challenges raised by a post-communist country. The study is constructed on two main axes. The first one concerns an analysis of the governmental personnel and the decision-making process through quantitative methods, and the second axis concerns the same analysis, but from qualitative perspective. The last section of the paper presents a discussion about the research approaches, emphasizing the importance of a hybrid methodological research design in order to understand the Romanian case, as an image of the analysis of a transitional country.

Introduction

The political regime change that occurred in Romania after the fall of Communism elicited a process of emergence of new political elites and new patterns of practice in the functioning of political institutions. But new political elites do not emerge *ex nihilo* and institutional changes are in practice slower than the ambition of change. At the political level, the first phase of transition was characterized by a process of diffusion of power and by a multiplying effect in the decision-making process. However, the fact that transition is accompanied by political reconfiguration raises a valid scientific question. When does the transition end? When is it possible, without the risk of being accused of conceptual stretching¹, to discuss post-Communist political systems with the theoretical and methodological

¹ Giovanni Sartori, "Bien comparer, mal comparer"[Good comparison, Bad Comparison], *Revue Internationale de la Politique Comparée* 1(April 1994):19. One of the causes of the conceptual errors resides in conceptual stretching, which implies a definition of the concepts which reduces them to a series of conceptual notes (attributes) that do not identify it and which produce a great flexibility of the concept.

tools applied to the Western European democracies?

This paper aims to emphasize some theoretical and methodological difficulties in analyzing post-communist countries through a case study concerning the professionalization of governmental elites and the development of decision-making procedures in the cabinets of post-communist Romania². It will be shown that only a hybrid research design both quantitative and qualitative in scope can deal with the difficulties raised by the coexistence and functioning of formal and informal mechanisms that characterize the political sphere of a transitional country. The end of transition in this particular case would theoretically mean that the concept of “professionalization” (seen as the creation of stable political careers) and the analysis of the procedures of decision-making can be explained by the existing conceptual frameworks, and by the quantitative or qualitative methodological tools available. Although the multiplication of concepts creates the possibility of capturing the *sui generis* character of the transitions, the study upholds that only a hybrid research design, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, can have sufficient explanatory power to understand the evolutionary process which takes place in

² In our study we employ a wider definition of the government, by including in our analysis not only the ministers but also the secretaries of state and leaders of the state agencies (political appointees). See Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta eds., *The nature of party government - A Comparative European Perspective* (London:Palgrave, 2000), Chap. I, Introduction. 14.

a post-communist country. Consequently, when studying the transitional countries, localism (the proliferation of concepts describing similar phenomena) can be avoided by using adequate research designs and thus intermingling different levels of analysis.

The research will focus on ministers and secretaries of state as political appointees³ and on the mechanisms of decision-making in the post-communist cabinets. The choice of these two dimensions allows us to analyze not only the professionalization process, but also the relationships created between these actors at the decision-making level, because they can create and implement policies with an impact at the national level⁴. Two main reasons explain our focus on the governmental level: (1) the decline of parliaments and the process of delegation of competences towards the executive branch⁵; and (2) the limited magnitude of this population, their importance in the decision-making procedures, and the exponential dimension of the political system, created by the fact that the function of governmental is conceived as

³ Blondel/ Cotta *The nature of party government*. 14; Alain Eraly, *Le pouvoir enchaîné – Etre ministre en Belgique*[The chains of power – Being a Minister in Belgium], Bruxelles: Labor, 2002; Mattei Dogan, “Sociologia elitelor politice,”[The Sociology of Political Elites] in *Sociologie politica. Opere alese*[Political Sociology], București: Alternative, 1999.

⁴Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 1976). 6.

⁵ Mattei Dogan, *The mandarins of Western Europe. The Political Role of the Top Civil Servants* (Sage Publications, 1975) 7.

the summit of a political career⁶. In the Romanian case, although the Constitution adopted in 1991 and its revised form (2003) established several mechanisms allowing for equilibrium between the legislative and the executive branches⁷, in practice an imbalanced relationship was established, favoring the executive area.

Looking at the ways in which the relationship between the Parliaments and cabinets was shaped in the Romanian case, we can realize the extended role played by the executive power. Several elements suggest this situation. During the period from 1990-2005, out of 4822 law projects that became laws after the legislative procedures were accomplished, (89.88%)⁸ were initiated by the

governments. Meanwhile the ten percent initiated by the MPs were concerned mainly with marginal topics such as the reconfiguration of the statute of a village or of a town or ceremonies. Furthermore, there was an extended use of legislative delegation (art 114, 1991). In this way, since 1992 until 2005 the Romanian cabinets adopted 1581 decisions that were supposed to appear only in extreme cases. In its turn, the Parliament never successfully used its forms of control, such as sanction over cabinets. No cabinet has been dismissed as a result of parliamentary actions. Consequently there is a certain tendency towards concentration of power at the governmental level. This transfer of power towards the executive branch can be placed at the political or at the bureaucratic level. Taking into account the high degree of politicization of the civil servants in Romania⁹, this population is to be considered in consistence with the concept of “political bureaucracy”

⁶ Jean Blondel, *Government Ministers in the Contemporary World* (London: Sage, 1986). 16 and 24., Jean Blondel et Maurizio Cotta eds., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Governments and Supporting Parties in Liberal Democracies*(London: MacMillan Press LTD,1996). 249 and 252.

⁷ The cabinet is responsible in front of the parliament (according to part 102 of the 1991 Constitution/part 108 of the revised constitution). There are also several forms of parliamentary control such as motions, interpellations or questions (art 111-112, 2003). Furthermore the Parliament controls the nomination of the Prime Minister and in certain conditions can depose a motion to dismiss the government in function (art.113, 2003). While the role of the Parliament regards the creation of laws, the role of the cabinets is to conduct internal and external policies and to control the central administration (art.101, 2003). Nevertheless the Romanian legal framework stipulates that the cabinets also beneficiate from some leverage in order to balance the parliamentary power.

⁸Data obtained as a result of centralization and reconfiguration of the information provided by the site of the Deputies Chamber. www.cdep.ro

⁹ The politicization of high civil servants in Romania is signaled by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries (SIGMA) REPORTS concerning the functioning of the Romanian administration as well as by the commission reports. These general reports are sustained by the declarations of central actors of the administration: chiefs of the Civil Servants Agency, trade union leaders of the civil servants as well as some central administration high civil servants as resulted from a survey conducted during January-February 2006. For further information see Alexandra Ionascu, “The Evolution of Parties Supporting Government Forms of Patronage In Post-communist Romania”, Paper prepared for ECPR joint Sessions, (April, Nicosia, 2006).

developed by Robert Putnam¹⁰ and in this case the center of political power is constituted by the members of the cabinets¹¹.

The study proposes an analysis of ministerial governmental careers through the concept of professionalization and the process of decision-making procedures and their evolution of forms in post-communist Romania. However the main aim of this paper is to concentrate on the different effects that research strategies and various levels of analysis can have on the study of a certain subject. Therefore, the paper is constructed on two main axes. The first one concerns an analysis of the governmental personnel and of the decision-making process through quantitative methods, and the second axis concerns the same analysis, but from a qualitative perspective. The second section of the paper presents a discussion about the research approaches, highlighting the importance of a hybrid methodological research design in order to understand the Romanian case.

¹⁰ Putnam makes the distinction between the Weberian type of bureaucracy and the political bureaucracy. This second type describes the bureaucracies that are not separated from the political realm (Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, 87-126). Mattei Dogan underpins the fact that in countries where the high civil servants are politicized, the political actors play the major role in the decision making process (Mattei Dogan, *The mandarins of Western Europe. The political role of Top Civil Servants*, (London:Sage Publications, 1975),14.

¹¹ Jean Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe," in Richard Gunther et al eds., *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 235.

The present paper comprises a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the same phenomenon at different levels of analysis. The quantitative analysis is based on the analysis of the political trajectories of the governmental personnel synthesized in a database, as well as the governmental decisions regarding the governmental restructuring. The database counts 194 persons appointed to ministerial positions (302 appointments)¹², starting with the first government established after 1989, the provisional government, and ending at 21 December 2004, when Adrian Nastase's cabinet completed its mandate¹³. The second set of data comprises the governmental decisions regarding the restructuring of the ministries. The analysis of the professionalization of the political actors is based upon mean comparisons, cross-tabulation, correlations between the duration of mandates and cluster analysis in order to delimitate the main governmental trajectories. The restructure of government concerns the general tendencies and is

¹² The database we constructed is the result of crossing several sources (**ROMPRES, *Protagonisți ai vieții publice I,II and III [Actors of the public life]*, București:Agenția Naționala de Presa Rompres, 1995; Gheorghe CRIȘAN, *Piramida puterii I and II [The pyramid of power]*, București: Pro Historia2004; Stelian NEAGOE, *Istoria guvernelor României - de la începuturi -1859 până în zilele noastre 1999[The history of Romanian governments from the Beginning until today 1999]*, București:Machiavelli, 1999, as well as some of the official documents and information available on the official websites.

¹³ Although our study does not cover the period of the present cabinet in function, some insights will be presented in order to emphasize some evolutions in the recruitment process on the political scene.

constructed mainly by a simple analysis of the descriptive statistics indicators.

The qualitative analysis uses the results of semi-structured interviews conducted with ministers and junior ministers in post-communist Romania. The interviews were conducted between January and May 2005 and the selection of cases was made on the basis of participation in different cabinets, the political party that sustained the nomination, the importance of the portfolio, and the domain of the ministry. The main dimensions of the interviews concerned recruitment into an executive function as a part of career development, their role perception on their involvement in the decision-making process, their relationship with their colleagues as well as with their own party, and their perception of the dynamics of governmental personnel. The information provided by the interviews was completed through an analysis of the insights offered by the memoirs published by the political leaders of the period.

How to study the professionalization of elites and the decision-making procedures?

The governmental actors constitute the center of the political scene through their visibility and their decision-making power. Their appointment depends upon the decision of the Prime Minister but in practice, they are delegates of the political parties that support the government¹⁴.

¹⁴ Jean Blondel, Daria Malova, "The process of decision-making in Cabinets In East-Central and Southeastern Europe since 1990 : A Success Equilibrium?", paper prepared for *ECPR Joint*

Furthermore, the political parties tend to appoint actors high in the party hierarchy or actors having a consolidated political career into the central positions¹⁵. One of the main reasons for these appointments is the fact that this allows political parties to control the structure of opportunity and the areas of uncertainty at the party level¹⁶. Therefore, in stable democracies the general tendency is to appoint political actors with long political careers, with technocratic appointments being made only as a result of a major political crisis¹⁷. Studies of ministerial trajectories, as an image of career construction, have revealed the existence of two main trajectories for governmental personnel: party cum parliament and civil servants¹⁸. In the second case, political parties

Sessions of Workshops, Workshop No. 10: The Process of Decision-Making in Cabinets, in Central-Eastern and Southern Europe, Uppsala, Sweden, (April 13–18, 2004) : 12-14.

¹⁵ J. Blondel, D. Malova, "The process of decision-making in Cabinets In East-Central and Southeastern Europe since 1990 : A Success Equilibrium?", 12-14

¹⁶ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties. Organization and power*(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1988) .36.

¹⁷ Jean Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe", in *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*. Richard Gunther et al (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002), 233-256.

¹⁸ Jean Blondel, *Government Ministers*. 29-55, Mattei Dogan, "How to Become a Cabinet Minister in France. Career Pathways, 1870 -1978,"in *Comparative Politics 12: 1*(October 1979):.1-24; Kenig, Shlomit Barnea, "The Selection of Ministers in Israel: Is the Prime Minister a 'Master of His Domain'?" " paper prepared for the workshop *Selection and De-selection of Ministers*, European Consortium of Political Research, 33th Joint Session Workshops, 14-19 April 2005, Granada

conduct a process of recruitment in order to benefit from the expertise of civil servants. Therefore, the level of politicization and of political and technical expertise are very high in the case of the governmental personnel, conceived as the core of the decision-making process. Most ministers and secretaries of state consolidate their position on the political arena after maintaining such functions¹⁹. Consequently, in the existing models the analysis of the careers of governmental personnel should underpin a pattern of a professional politician, one which sees politics as a vocation, to employ the Weberian term²⁰, and one who lives for and from politics.

Besides the analysis of trajectories, the political professionalization of governmental actors can be described by two indicators: the duration in different offices, and the governmental and portfolio experience that imply a certain specialization in a certain sector of the government²¹. Following the existing theories, professionalization occurs when there is a certain dedication of the actor to the political scene and the actor remains in

the political arena in different functions at the state level or in the party.

Furthermore, given the fact that the power to distribute these functions is at the discretion of the party supporting the government, the logic that should prevail at the governmental level would be one of cohesion in the decision-making process. This does not preclude the possibility of having different patterns of decision-making as a result of the form of government, such as collective decision-making. But we expect the decision-making process to be controlled by the party supporting the government, and that there will be a certain degree of cooperation between the political actors in government. In addition, it should also be expected that once in government, the political appointees will use institutional leverage in order to cooperate and to establish common ground in the decision-making process.

Findings on the romanian case: quantitative analysis

In post-Communist Romania, nine governments²² have marked the landscape

¹⁹ Ezra Suleiman, *Les élites en France. Grands corps et grandes écoles* [Elites in France. Corporate spirit and ivy league schools] (Paris : Seuil, 1978), 106.

²⁰ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans Gerth and Wright C. Mills eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1958.

²¹John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez, "Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet- the French Fourth and Fifth Republic in Comparative Perspective," in *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(January 2004).

²² In order to delineate the government duration we retain three of the fives criteria that Lijphart identified. The selective choice of the criteria of delimitation is determined by the fact that our study is centered on the individuals forming the cabinets and less on the political composition of the cabinets. Given our interest for the elites' behavior three criteria are employed: 1. any change in the prime ministership, 2 any intervening parliamentary elections, 3 the resignation of all cabinet members. See Arendt Lijphart, "Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation," in *Comparative Politics Studies* 172 (1984): 256-279.

of the Romanian political sphere. For the first eight governments²³ the short cabinet duration shows the difficulties that arose in developing a lasting parliamentary majority. Apart from the 1990-1992 period, in all other cases there was a negotiated majority²⁴ with different types of coalitions²⁵: in 1992-1996 there was a multi-party minority government (where the parties in government do not possess the majority of seats in parliament), in 1996-2000 an oversized/surplus coalition (coalition governments that exceeded the

²³ The post-communist cabinets and their duration : Petre Roman (30.12.1989-28.06.1990) – 179 jours; Petre Roman (29.06.1990-15.10.1991) – 473 jours; Theodor Stolojan (16.10.1991–15.10.1992) – 393 jours; Nicolae Văcăroiu (13.11.1992-10.12.1996) – 1489 jours; Victor Ciorbea (11.12.1996-15.04.1998) – 491 jours; Radu Vasile (16.04.1998–13.12.1999) – 616 jours; Mugur Isărescu (14.12.1999-12.12.2000) – 366 et Adrian Năstase (13.12. 2000-21.12.2004) – 1469 jours. Cristian Preda, *Partide și alegeri în România postcomunistă: 1989-2004*[Parties and elections in the postcommunist Romania : 1989-2004] (București:Nemira, 2005).

²⁴ *Ibid*, 42.

²⁵ In the literature, we differentiate between the types of single-party and coalition governments. The study uses the classification of Woldendorp who argues that party governments can be classified into six types: Single party government (one party holds the majority in parliament and all government seats); Minimal winning coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government); Surplus coalition (coalition governments which exceed the minimal winning criteria); Single party minority government (the party in government does not possess the majority of seats in parliament); Multi party minority government (the parties in government do not possess the majority of seats in parliament); Caretaker government (temporary cabinet). For further details see: Jaap Woldendorp and all. *Party in Government in 48 democracies 1945-1998*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

minimal winning criteria), and since 2000 a minimal winning coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government).

Nevertheless, when looking at the elite strata one can observe that governmental instability also matches the process of portfolio volatility²⁶. The average duration in office of a minister is 14.85 months²⁷, which represents 68% of the average duration of the Romanian cabinets and 30.2% of the duration of a four-year classical mandate. Only 55% of ministers remain in office during the mandate of the cabinet in which they were nominated. This is an indicator of the existence of personnel instability. Furthermore, looking at the types of mandate²⁸ that prevailed on the Romanian scene, we notice that there is not a very strong tendency towards retention of ministerial personnel: 75.5% of the ministers only secured one mandate, 15.6% had two mandates, and 9.9% had a mandate which lasted more than three years. It is however important to note that the rotation or

²⁶ John D. Huber introduces the concept of portfolio volatility referring to the replacements of the ministers not only at the end of the cabinet, See John D. Huber, “How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies?” in *The American Political Science Review* 92:3(Sept. 1998): 577-591 (581).

²⁷ We have calculated the average duration of the ministerial mandate, by taking into account the number of months he stays in office.

²⁸ Jean Blondel employed several categories of mandates : one mandate, 2 continuous mandates, 2 interrupted or dissociated mandates, 3 continuous mandates or interrupted or two continuous mandates and one dissociated and or more mandates.

promotion of a junior minister to a ministerial position during the same cabinet is considered as one mandate. There are only two political actors on the Romanian governmental scene that succeeded in having a mandate which lasted more than eight years. Even if we take into account the period of filling a function such as deputy minister, 21.1% of the ministers had two mandates and 18.6% had secured three mandates or more. It can be argued however that there is a certain reproduction of elites. Nevertheless the results of the analysis of the duration of a ministerial mandate show that 27.3% of the ministers occupied the portfolios for less than one year and 76.3% of the population had a mandate shorter than four years. Only 6.2% (or 12 persons) of the ministers have had tenures which lasted more than four years, from which nine of them are members of the Romanian successor party PDSR which governed Romania during ten years of Romanian post-communism. Therefore, there is not a general tendency in the construction of stable governmental careers at the ministerial level (See tables 1-3).

However, lowering the level of the analysis and looking at the way in which every government was formed, certain patterns of political careers can be observed in the case of governmental personal. These patterns also depend on the political affiliation of the actor in question. Nevertheless, three main patterns of selection can be identified. Two of them are identical to the classical forms of promotion outlined in the literature on the recruitment of

governmental personnel: 1. the parliamentary pathway – 19.7%²⁹ of the ministers were MPs before occupying an executive function; 2. the “mandarinate” - 15% of the executive actors came from the high civil servant levels. The third pattern refers to the academic world - 13% of the ministers occupied different positions in the academic field before being appointed in an executive position. Table 5 shows the occupation of governmental actors before their first nomination in a governmental function.

Using a more detailed analysis, what are the credentials that recommend one political actor for appointment or reappointment in the governmental sphere at ministerial and deputy ministerial positions³⁰? First, the predominance of the parliamentary trajectory seems to constitute an important resource in determining promotion to an executive office. 24.6% of the appointed ministers had benefited from such experience and another 13.1% were nominated to a ministerial portfolio immediately after they were elected MPs (thus accumulating electoral campaign experience and having

²⁹ The percentage refers only to those ministers that had an MP function before being appointed to a ministerial position. Therefore previous parliamentary experience was not taken into account if the minister had occupied other functions before his nomination, nor if his nomination follows an immediate election into the parliament. In this second case, we considered that it is not due to their parliamentary experience that they were recommended for such a function.

³⁰ For this part of the analysis we are taking into account just the political personnel which occupied at least one time a ministerial portfolio.

received the trust of the electorate³¹). The first Chamber constitutes the main pool of selection for the ministers. 73.6% of those having parliamentary experience came from the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, while 8.3% of them had experience in two chambers. Most of the ministers also kept certain functions during their parliamentary mandate (64.8% of this category), especially in parliamentary commissions. In the

selection of the commissions they participated in, most of the commissions occupied the juridical, economical, and foreign affairs domains. However, it is important to note the fact that if a parliamentary career is an asset in the appointment to an executive function, it also constitutes an important point of retreat for the political actors. 43.8% of the ministers chose this path after they ceased to exercise their executive mandate.

³¹ The Romanian legislative elections are organized on the basis of Proportional Representation with closed lists, with a threshold varying during the post-communist years from 0.2% in 1990, 3% in 1992 and 1996, and 5% in 2000 for individual political parties. Elections were to be held under this formula in a two-tier system (district level and national level for remainder seats) following the Hondt system. For further details see: Cristian Preda, "Système politique et familles partisans en Roumanie post-communiste" [Political System and partisan families in postcommunist Romania], in *Studia Politica Revista Romana de Stiinte Politice* 2:2(București:Meridiane, 2003).555-561. and also Cristian Preda, *România post-comunistă și România interbelică* [Interwar years and post-communist Romania] (București: Meridiane, 2002). Given these characteristics of the electoral system one could question the legitimacy of the election of the MPs, the electoral validation being the electoral validation of a list not of the individual actors. However this aspect is not relevant for our study. First, the main selector for a ministerial office is the party, the same party that constructs the lists for the parliamentary elections. The electoral success of a list is at least partially due to its composition. The victory in the electoral process in a certain district also depends of the actors nominated on the list. Secondly the political parties appreciate the participation of the MPs in the electoral campaigns. Therefore, parliamentary activity is not the only element that can recommend a political actor to an executive position but also his fighting spirit and efficiency during the electoral campaign.

Another pattern of selection is in regard to those who have executive experience. Only 24 of the ministers representing 12.37% of the population had positions of leadership in the lower political levels of the executive branches. Taking into account the case of the chief of the departments (only directors and deputy directors) and high civil servants, we noticed that 14.5% of the ministers also occupied such functions. Therefore 42 ministers, representing 21.65% of the population studied, retained political and non political functions in the lower strata of the executive. This procedure characterizes mainly the PDSR/PSD cabinets, with two thirds of such ministers from the cabinets Nicolae Vacaroiu and Adrian Nastase and only 9.6% of them members in the cabinets during the period of 1996-2000. To this general pattern we should also add another phenomenon marking the selection of the ministers by promotion. Looking at the ways in which the secretaries of state's experience is valued by the political parties (in the appointment of the members of the cabinets), a general trend can be determined. All the FSN/FDSN/ PDSR/

PSD cabinets were characterized by high percentages of ministers who had already occupied functions of secretaries of state before their appointment (Petre Roman I 44.12%, Petre Roman II 34.62%, Theodor Stolojan 35%, Nicolae Vacaroiu 40.40%, and Adrian Nastase 43.75%). On the opposite side are the cabinets formed by the historical parties: Victor Ciorbea (15.39%), Radu Vasile (16.67%) and Mugur Isarescu (13.04%) with lower percentages. Thus, there is a certain emerging pattern regarding the selection for promotion in the interior of the executive branch, but these procedures touched only one part of the political spectrum. The PDSR/PSD governments have chosen a process of professionalization in function and favored the accumulation of executive experience³². This situation is more balanced because the cabinets formed during 1996-2000 period, especially the second and the third one, employed an alternative strategy consisting of a high level of the reproduction of ministerial actors from one cabinet to another (in the

³² One explanation of this phenomenon is the long period that the PDSR/PSD spent in government, a fact that permitted the formation of a basis of selection in the construction of the ministerial team. In opposition to this situation, the cabinets in the period 1996-2000 did not benefit from this pool of selection because they were in government for the first time. Nevertheless, by looking at the composition of the first formulation of the cabinet in function we can observe that only 16.66% of the members were secretaries of state in the previous cabinets during the period of 1996-2000. Therefore we can assess until present there is no evidence that this procedure of selection by promotion is a characteristic of the cabinets formed by the historical parties too.

case of the Radu Vasile cabinet, 66.67% of the ministers had already occupied a similar position in other cabinets; the same phenomenon is identifiable in the case of the cabinet of Mugur Isarescu - 77.27%)³³. Besides this post-revolutionary executive experience, we can also identify, in the case of 29% of the ministers, the presence of governmental experience during the communist period. However only 11% of the ministers occupied high positions such as junior minister or minister in the communist cabinets. We should also specify the fact that the presence of such actors in the post-communist cabinets is distributed mainly in the first years after the breakdown of communism. Taking into account all these elements, one can claim that the governmental sphere constituted by itself one of the main pathways toward a ministerial career.

In what concerns the professionalization in “politics as a vocation”, this condition is not filled by a wide majority of the members of the extended cabinets (68%). In fact, the political actors do not dedicate themselves only to political areas, but they also maintain a non political profile. The main case of such “occupational safeguards” is constituted by the academic field, but there are also political actors with, for instance, economic capital. The existence and perpetuation of non political profiles shows an attempt to use these credentials as an alternative exit point in

³³ This process of selection is also identifiable in the other cases, but in those cases the level of reproduction is lower: Roman I - 14.71%, Roman II - 26.92 %, Theodor Stolojan – 55 %, Nicolae Vacaroiu - 7.44 %, Adrian Nastase - 10.42%.

case their political career is abruptly interrupted, and as a resource in their appointment process. The public profile of the ministers is displayed in the following manner: while 19% had economic capital (10.9% of the private economy) and 10.2% had a civil servant's profile, the wide majority presented an academic profile. This social capital constitutes a resource in the political career. Furthermore, 36.3% of the appointed ministers occupied a position of leadership in the non political sphere (chiefs of research centers, deans, chiefs of hospitals, chiefs of trade unions).

But what can we say about the procedures of decision-making in such cabinets, and have they reconfigured over time? The indicator chosen is the number of governmental decisions regarding the restructuring of ministries. The Romanian cabinets in the period of 1990 - March 2004 are oversized, presenting on average 24.14 portfolios. Furthermore, their structure is highly unstable. During the first 14 years of post-communism, 291 governmental decisions were adopted in order to restructure the configuration of the ministries, which shows that on average every year 14.03 decisions modified the structure of ministries. What is important to mention is that there is not a decrease over the years of the dimension of the government restructuring, as one could expect. When looking at the domains that are the most affected by the governmental restructuring, it clearly appears that the ministries that are reconfigured most often are the ministries dealing with different economic dimensions. Meanwhile, the health and

justice ministries are the most stable ones (See graphic 4). Consequently, it cannot be established that there is a direct link between the advancement of the reforms and the degree of the restructuring of the governmental structures, as both the economic sector and the justice domain are constantly criticized by the country reports of the EU's Commission. The expandable nature of the executives³⁴ and of the governmental agencies and their proliferation after 1998 constitute an important element showing the shifting nature of the governmental structure and the general tendency towards an expandable structure.

Interpretation of the quantitative findings

The analysis of cabinets through quantitative data revealed certain patterns of governmental behavior. What can we say about the professionalization of the governmental actors as well as governmental decision-making? Several elements that depend on this level of analysis adopted can be identified:

³⁴ The number of portfolios in the post-communist cabinets: Petre Roman II 25, Theodor Stolojan 23, Văcăroiu 22, Victor Ciorbea 28, Radu Vasile 25, Mugur Isărescu 19, Adrian Năstase 27 (Source: the appendix regarding the composition of cabinets in the moment of investiture Monitorul Oficial, Ist part). Concerning the proliferation of governmental agencies, it starts in 1998. One illustrative example is the case of the Radu Vasile cabinet that reduced his governmental structure from 28 to 25 portfolios. The same year saw the creation of ten governmental agencies. The same tendency also characterizes the Nastase's cabinet.

1. There is no tendency towards the construction of a stable governmental career, with most of the ministers presenting short durations for their mandate.
2. There is no general pattern of rotation or reproduction of governmental elites.
3. In the case of the selection of portfolios, the patterns of career construction are similar to those described in Western European countries. The basis for the selection of ministers presents some tendencies towards the construction of political careers, but these tendencies are not definitive.
4. There is a certain procedure of selection through promotion in the case of PDSR ministers, and a systematic reproduction of the ministers during the 1996-2000 period.
5. Politics as a vocation does not occur often in the Romanian case, with political actors maintaining alternative occupations to their political activities.

Concerning the decision making procedures, there are certain elements that can theoretically affect this process:

1. High governmental instability and the high volatility of political personnel.
2. The expendable structure of Romanian cabinets and their sub-units.
3. The constant reconfiguration of the ministries.
4. A tendency (however not very strong) of the political parties to diminish

discontinuities through the selection or reproduction of political elites.

We can therefore observe that the quantitative analysis emphasizes the fact that even if the classical definition of professionalization of elites in terms of “politics as a vocation” and a certain stability in the duration of a mandate are not present, there are some elements, such as the construction of patterns of trajectories, which can indicate the existence of a tendency toward the professionalization of political elites. However, this is an ongoing process that depends on the political parties that are forming the government. As regards the decision making procedures, several elements (1-3) can suggest the presence of powerful discontinuities in the decision making, and only one (4) tends toward the opposite position.

Qualitative findings: professionalization as careers trajectories and the decision-making process

The quantitative analysis gave us some insights into the process of professionalization of the political actors as well the factors that can influence the process of decision-making. The same factors are now going to be scrutinized from the perspective of qualitative analysis. Can we speak about a process of professionalization and about the continuity factors of decision-making?

Four patterns of governmental behavior can be identified: a. 1990-1992: the match between continuity of governmental elites and the objective of decision-making continuity, b. 1992-1996: continuities and

illusory discontinuities of personnel, the socialization process, and the fluidity of the decision making, c. dis-unified elites in power and a decision-making blockage, d. extreme cohesiveness of the elites and hierarchical decision-making.

On 26 December 1989, the first decision of the Council of National Salvation Front, a body which was formed in order to seize all the responsibilities for a provisional state structure, concerned the nomination of Petre Roman as Prime Minister of the first democratic government. The task of the new government was to ensure the continuity of the decision-making process and to prepare the first free elections. After the elections on 20th May 1990 and the crushing victory of a successor party, the National Salvation Front (winning 66.31% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies), Petre Roman was for the second time appointed Prime Minister. However, powerful social movements such as the riot of miners and their violent marches on the streets of Bucharest interrupted his mandate. The reshuffle of Roman's cabinet produced a split in the major governing party. As a result, the newly appointed Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, a technocrat, had an extended mandate lasting over a year.

During the period between 1990 and 1992, it can best be described as politics of coincidence between the reproduction of political elites and the continuity of decision-making. In other words, FSN leaders considered that the main objective of the cabinets was to ensure the continuity and expertise necessary in the

decision-making process. Therefore, the politicization of the cabinet and the allocation of portfolios to party members was a secondary objective³⁵. In this period, the main criterion employed in the selection of ministers was the decision-making expertise acquired in the communist executive structures. One third of the members had governmental experience in communist cabinets (39.3% Roman, and 28.6% in Stolojan). Besides that aspect, the importance of governmental expertise in the recruitment of governmental functionaries was recognized by the main selectors of the moment: President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman³⁶. What is important to note is the manner in which the secretaries of state and political dignitaries were appointed, because the formula was applied several times in the post-communist governments. The

³⁵ The proportion of independents in the post-communist cabinets is as follows: the provisional government 100%, Petre Roman II 32.1%, Theodor Stolojan 33.3%, Nicolae Vacaroiu 42.2%, Victor Ciorbea 15.8%, Radu Vasile 10.3% Mugur Isarescu 18.2%, Adrian Nastase 2.1%, Calin Popescu Tariceanu (in 2004) 16.66%. (The percentages were calculated using our own set of data on governmental trajectories).

³⁶ See Petre Roman and Elena Ștefci, *Mărturiile provocate* [Provoked Testimonies], București: Paideia, 2002; Ion Iliescu în dialog cu Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Marele șoc Din finalul unui secol scurt* [Dialogue between Ion Iliescu and Vladimir Tismăneanu. The Great Shock at the End of a Short Century: On Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy] (București: Enciclopedică, 2004):197; Ion Iliescu, *Revoluție și Reformă*, *Stenograma primei ședințe plenare a CFSN* [Reform and Revolution, The transcript of the first general assembly of the CFSN] (București: Enciclopedică, 1994). 80.

principle applied in their selection and de-selection were the personal choice of the minister in function, who had a formal obligation to present the secretaries of state to the Prime Minister, who, in turn, made the legal nominations. No party affiliation conditionality was taken into account. These procedures are not the effect of the independence of the ministers, but rather represent the cabinet's politics. However, this recruitment pattern was not always applied in this manner. For instance, in the case of secretaries of state who were promoted from the bureaucratic level, there were not as many dismissals in the bureaucratic area.

The autonomous method of appointment is in fact an image of the functioning of the government and explains the construction of a culture of autonomy in the case of ministries, which was highly utilized until 2000. The relationship with the minister in office or the Prime Minister accounts for a certain pattern of constructing governmental relations. As Petre Roman declared, the secretaries of state were replaced "when the ministers observed they blocked the reform policies." Therefore, we cannot speak of professionalization. Although the members of the cabinet had the technical expertise they needed, the continuity at the level of political elites was based upon clientelistic relations established between political actors. The logic that dominated the appointments was one that bypassed the party level. The main logic of governmental functioning concerned a process of autonomy of ministries.

The second free electoral process, held on 27th September 1992, marked the victory of the main faction of the old FSN, now named The Social Democratic Party - PDSR. However, the victory was not clear-cut and PDSR had to negotiate the political support of the cabinet with other parties. Nevertheless, given the fragmentation of the political opposition, the PDSR formed the new government, and a technocrat, Nicolae Văcăroiu, was appointed as the head of cabinet. The cabinet formed by the conservative wing of the party after the split of FSN functioned as a minority cabinet and constantly negotiated parliamentary support with three other extremist parties: PSM, PUNR and PRM.

The new Prime Minister, a former secretary of state in post-communist cabinets also with experience in governmental structures before 1989, was not a member of PDSR, but his mandate was highly controlled by the chiefs of the main governmental party. The cabinet was formed on the principle of continuity, but continuity based on socialization in institutions before and after 1989. As regards the appointment of secretaries of state, their nomination is marked by three different logics: 1. autonomy – generally the ministers in office could appoint the secretaries of state they wanted; 2. continuity with the previous cabinets; and 3. negotiation – the appointment of secretaries of state reflected the state of negotiation with other parties in order to achieve a majority in Parliament. It is interesting to note the fact that personnel nominated in different positions, for example secretaries of state, became

PDSR members at the end of the cabinet mandate. In this manner, the party recovered trained personnel considered loyal to the political party. In order to repay the loyalty and activity of the personnel, the secretaries of state were invited to run in eligible positions on the PDSR electoral lists. With concern to the professionalization of political actors, the same dilemma applies. They were not party members, but they had some executive decision-making experience, and most of them were very close to the party in office. Therefore, there is not a general trend towards the creation of political careers in the classical sense. The construction of careers was not based upon the evolution of the actor on the governmental scene, but instead was dependent on the degree of insertion of the minister in certain networks, which was not necessarily constructed on the logic of party affiliation. The socialization in institutions of the members of the cabinets contributed to a certain extent to cohesion in the decision-making process, but only on a small scale, because the principle that prevailed was the autonomy of ministries and the constant fight over the state resources.

The first political alternation took place on 3rd November 1996. The victorious coalition, The Democratic Convention (CDR), joined its forces with the Social Democratic Union (formed by the historic party PSDR and the other split faction of the FSN – The Democratic Party) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians (UDMR). The first appointed Prime Minister was Victor Ciorbea, former mayor of Bucharest, coming from the

main historical party the CDR, the National Peasants Party (PNTcd). Ciorbea resigned after 16 months and was replaced by Radu Vasile, member of the same party and the representative of an important wing of the party. The third Prime Minister of this mandate was Mugur Isărescu, an independent. Isărescu was the governor of the National Bank of Romania; his mandate as a Prime Minister only lasted one year. The anti-communist alliance, which is the manner in which CDR presented itself during the electoral campaign³⁷, applied a strong ‘politics of algorithm’, the portfolios being distributed to political parties not only at the ministerial level, but also at the level of each office of secretary of state. Therefore, the selection of ministries was not the result of the Prime Minister’s choice; instead, they were selected directly by the political parties. This procedure of appointment dominated all three cabinets of the period, although the latter two cabinets, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu, to a large extent reproduced the structure of the previous ones, because the change in government was mainly the result of the contestation of the Prime Minister in power. However, the main criteria of selection were the degree of insertion in networks of the future ministers, privileged relations at the party level (not necessarily constructed on a political basis, but rather on the existence of socialization in positions that preceded their party affiliation), and the

³⁷ Cristian Preda, “Les partis politiques dans le postcommunisme roumain” [The political parties in the Romanian post-communism], in *Studia Politica* 8 :4 (București, 2003):943-987.

parliamentary experience. The political parties in the coalition perceived themselves in a competition process and not as allies and there was a strong tendency towards autonomy of ministries. Given the lack of consensus between parties, a process of personalization and segregation of the policy domains was assumed even by the Prime Minister in office.

The eighth government of the Romanian political field was formed as a result of the second political alternation in power, which took place on 26th November 2000. The Social Democratic Pole, formed mainly by the PDSR (two small parties also adhered to this body: PSDR and PUR), won the elections. Benefiting also from the political support of the UDMR, PDSR (later known as the Social Democratic Party PSD) formed the cabinet. The Prime Minister of the cabinet, Adrian Năstase, was also head of the main government party, the Social Democratic Party and drafted the construction of the team in government. The main aspect that was taken into account at the declarative level was the parliamentary experience of potential ministers. This selection procedure allowed the Prime Minister to have a very good knowledge of all the cabinet members (which is unique in the Romanian governmental field) and to achieve a certain cohesion between the governmental actors that had worked together within the Parliament. However, the appointment procedure at the ministerial level was founded on a principle of selection by promotion, because the ministers appointed had

secretary of state experience and then benefited from a double advantage of the lack of visibility and the accumulation of decision-making expertise. To this criterion, another one can be added: the high degree of politicization of the cabinet, where almost all the ministers were prominent leaders of the party. Nevertheless, this criterion of selection only concerned the first level of power. As regards the selection of secretaries of state, the previous procedure of appointment was mainly preserved. It was the duty of the minister to present to the Prime Minister the secretary of state he wanted and to support his candidacy. On this second level of power, party affiliation was not a definite criterion of selection, but what counted instead was a good relationship with the minister in power. This procedure allowed PSD to coordinate a ‘politics of cooption’ of personnel, which embraced the same form as did the ‘politics of selective incentives’ in the Văcăroiu cabinet. The cabinet’s decisions were taken by the actors in government and the Prime Minister had the chance to appeal in decision-making procedures. The principle of autonomy and personalistic decision-making remained, but the centralization and control over the party’s organization and the cabinets were unified in the same hands. This principle of extreme cohesion generated a very hierarchical system, in which the center of power was the cabinet.

Interpretation of the qualitative findings

The qualitative analysis of the cabinets reveals some interesting aspects

concerning the process of professionalization of political actors:

1. Their selection and promotion are dependent not on their career in the party, but on direct relationships with key persons who are not necessarily the party leaders. There has been, however, a shift in recent years towards more involvement of the central party organization in the recruitment of ministers. The selection of governmental personnel is a function of the degree of insertion of the actor in certain networks.

2. There was a powerful personalization of the appointment process that depended on the relationship with the persons making the appointments and their entourage. However, Nastase's cabinet showed a tendency towards the party level in making appointments.

As concerns the decision-making procedures, the study reveals the following findings:

1. The ministers had a high degree of autonomy in nominating the secretaries of state.

2. The autonomy of the ministries is a characteristic of the governmental functioning. Ministers tend to see the functioning of their institution as being independent from the rest of the ministries. During the first decade after the breakdown of communism, this culture of decision-making was accepted by the Prime Ministers in office.

3. Certain discontinuities resulting from governmental restructuring and

reshuffling were diminished by the different strategies of appointment of governmental actors.

General discussion of the findings

Both the quantitative and the qualitative study of the cabinets emphasize the absence of a sufficient "accumulation of political experience"³⁸ of the governmental personnel in order to speak of their proper professionalization. Furthermore, both analyses conclude that the process of decision-making suffers from discontinuity. However there are some differences in the interpretation of the findings of those two dimensions in terms of the methodological approach adopted. In our quantitative study, the image of the Romanian governmental elites is one of under-professionalized individuals, with a minimal duration in office, little experience in politics, and no special competencies in a certain domain. This first image is completed by a somewhat opposing phenomenon: the rotation and selection by promotion of governmental elites. Even if the average duration in office of a minister is very low, certain political actors are selected and promoted in a way that acts as

³⁸ The accumulation of political experience refers to the fact that governmental actors who manage to maintain their position despite the termination of a government acquire certain competencies that allow them to exercise their functions and consolidate their positions as central actors in the cabinet. See Mattei Dogan and Peter Campbell, "Le personnel ministériel en France et en Grande Bretagne"[The ministerial personnel in France and in Great Britain], in *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, 7:2 (April - June, October - December 1957) :313-345 and 793-824(326).

leverage in the creation of networks of cohesion in and outside the governmental sphere.

The second image of the professionalization of political elites is created through a qualitative analysis. It underpins the role that socialization in institutions plays in the construction of political careers³⁹. The findings in the qualitative research stress the fact that in the absence of institutionalized parties, the role in the selection and the promotion of ministers and junior ministers is played by different networks of cohesion. In this sense, the professionalization process, which should be emphasized by the emergence of different career patterns of governmental actors, instead underpins a strong politicization of the appointment process.

The two images presented are not contradictory, but complementary ones. The two of them consider the Romanian elites as not being professionalized. The quantitative analysis allows us not only to understand the degrees of professionalization, but also to identify the most important elements in the construction of political trajectories. Therefore the first image can best be described by the following attributes: a consolidation of patterns of selection; reproduction in governmental areas vs. a lack of sufficient governmental

experience; absence of specialization; and the absence of politics as a vocation. The qualitative analysis not only identifies the mechanisms of selection, but it also offers some explanations for the formation of the cabinet. By only looking at the career trajectories, one might think that even though there is not a professionalization of elites, there is an emerging tendency for the creation of such careers. Or, when looking at those procedures from the perspective of the second image, we realize that these promotions referred, in the first seven cabinets, to a different logic. It is not the party in government⁴⁰ (a term that cannot be applied in the case of the first Romanian cabinets) that constitutes the main selector, but promotion in a governmental position depends upon their insertion in social and political networks that are not integrated at the party level. During the first ten years of post-communism, the Romanian political field was not directed towards professionalization, but rather towards personalization, two elements that do not share a contradictory relationship.

The second dimension of analysis regarded the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the procedures of decision-making. While the quantitative analysis can only provide some insights into the

³⁹ In the sense in which Searing introduces the idea that the principal of socialization in institutions creates cohesiveness, see Donald D. Searing, "Two Theories of Elite Consensus: Tests with West German Data" in *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15:3 (August 1971):442-447.

⁴⁰ Richard Katz identifies three main aspects that characterize the "party in government": the ministers are appointed by the party supporting the government as well as the Prime Minister, and that it is the party forming the cabinet that decides the main lines of the decisions which are to be taken by the cabinet. See Richard Katz, "Party Government. A Rationalistic Conception", in F.G. Castels and R. Wildenmann eds. *Visions and Realities of Party Government* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).42.

decision-making process as being discontinuous and blocked by over-regulation by the governmental apparatus, the qualitative analysis allows for both the understanding that the governmental discontinuities are a result of ministry autonomy and the continuity of the decision-making process is based upon a certain cohesion of the political actors and informal bargaining between the actors. If the quantitative analysis underlines the unstable character of the institutional design and the stabilization as a result of a certain reproduction of the rotation of governmental actors, the qualitative analysis depicts the informal mechanisms of the decision-making process. The personalized manner of the decision-making procedures accompanies the institutional design mechanisms and passes over them, producing a certain continuity at the decision-making level.

The two methods underline different aspects of the building process of the careers of governmental actors. The main objection that one could bring is that the different results result from the variations in the methodology and the epistemological *a priori* in the analysis. However, it should be noted that the differences are mainly the consequence of variations in the level of analysis and establishing the level of analysis at different layers – structural (general trends of behavior of the political actors) or individual (the strategic actions of ministers). Consequently, the complete picture of the governmental sphere can only be constructed by scrutinizing the different levels of analysis with different methodological approaches. Thus, our

study underpins the fact that without the double approach - qualitative and quantitative - the conclusions drawn from the analysis of only the quantitative and qualitative findings will bring other interpretations of the data. In the case of the quantitative analysis we have the general image of cabinets that are marked by instability at the cabinet level, the political actors' level, and the institutional level. In addition, there are two elements of stabilization: a certain reproduction of the political elites, and the process of construction of certain patterns of careers. In case of the qualitative analysis, the situation is quite opposite, where the improvisational character of the construction of careers as well as the personalized nature of appointments and decision-making should be identified. Therefore the two dimensions do not exclude each other, but are rather complementary, allowing for an in depth understanding of the collusion of formal and informal mechanisms on the political scene. The process of stabilization of both careers and decision-making procedures make use of the personalization process. Of course, there is a process of professionalization and construction of functional mechanisms of decision-making, and the personalized nature of decision-making constitutes an important element in this respect. Through this double approach applied to the same theme, the study emphasizes how different methodological approaches can generate different explanations for the same case without falsifying the general findings. Instead it shows that the mechanisms of explanation are similar to the images associated with the existing models of

interpretation of the appointments. Therefore, it is important to adopt a hybrid methodological approach that can allow for in depth interpretation of the political phenomena as well as a measurement of magnitude.

The main question of this study should then address how we can speak about a process of professionalization and stabilization of decision-making while sustaining the idea that there is wide personalization of the governmental sphere. Is such an approach then not conceptual stretching? Is it sufficient to state the existence of the accumulation of political experience to conclude that there is professionalization? When comparing the theoretical assumptions and the findings one notices a general trend towards professionalization and consolidated decision-making procedures. However, in the Romanian case, the process followed certain particular mechanisms implying a personalistic nature. How is it possible to avoid the argument of gradualism and to set the limits of transitions?

When comparing the general theoretical expectations and the empirical findings in our paper, one can discern only a comparative perspective. The flaws resulting from such a research strategy can be controlled by considering hybrid qualitative-quantitative approaches in the research designs and by noting the limitation of the explanatory power of the concepts. In this context, emphasizing the ratio between the formal and informal mechanisms is essential to understanding the democratization process. partial

similarity. The application of the existing theoretical concepts on the Romanian case is not perfect, and could therefore tend towards conceptual stretching. However, this strategy is the only one available in order to develop a Therefore, only a hybrid methodological model and a critical theoretical stance can constitute the basis for the development of studies on transitional countries. In this way, the theories concerning the end of transitions and the applicability of concepts become a secondary axis of questioning, and the central focus of the discussion is transferred onto the practical construction of an adequate research design.

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minister]. (București: Humanitas, 2002).

Woldendrop Jaap and all. Party in
Government in 48 democracies 1945-
1998. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

Appendix

Table 1. Internal governmental instability. The dynamics of governmental personnel (1989-2004)

Cabinets	Life duration	Mean 01	Mean 02	M01 - M02	Ratio 01	Ratio 02	Mean1 1	Mean 021	Ratio0 11	Ratio 021
Provisoire	6	4,78	5,2	0,42	0,8	0,87	4,32	4,41	0,72	0,74
Roman II	16	11,5	13,27	1,77	0,72	0,83	9,66	10,32	0,6	0,65
Stolojan	13	12,95	12,95	0	1	1	10,56	10,88	0,81	0,84
Văcăroiu	49	25,87	27,71	1,84	0,53	0,57	21,34	23,94	0,44	0,49
Ciorbea	16	9,31	10,54	1,23	0,57	0,66	11,53	12,09	0,72	0,76
Vasile	20	13	13,44	0,44	0,65	0,67	10,7	12,5	0,54	0,63
Isărescu	12	10,32	10,32	0	0,86	0,86	9,98	10,23	0,83	0,85

Mean 01 – the mean duration of a ministerial mandate (months). The internal rotation at the governmental level was considered as generating from different mandates.

Mean 02 – The mean duration of ministerial mandate. The internal rotation is not taken into account.

Ratio 01 – shows to what extent the mean duration of the mandates is close to the value of the cabinets' life duration. The ratio is obtained in the following manner Mean 01/ n. of months representing the duration of each cabinet.

Ratio 02 – Mean 02/ life duration of each cabinet

Mean 011, Mean 021, Ratio 011 et Ratio 021 – the same indicators as for the ministerial strata, but calculated for the junior ministers

Table 2. Inter-governmental rotation (1989-2004)

N°	Prime Minister	Date of Nomination	Date of Dismissal	Ministerial rotation (%)	Degree of promotion (%)
1	Petre ROMAN (provisoire)	30.12.1989	28.06.1990	14.71	44.12
2	Petre ROMAN II	29.06.1990	15.10.1991	26.92	34.62
3	Theodor STOLOJAN	16.10.1991	15.10.1992	55	35
4	Nicolae VĂCĂROIU	13.11.1992	10.12.1996	7.44	40.40
5	Victor CIORBEA	11.12.1996	15.04.1998	12.91	15.39
6	Radu VASILE	16.04.1998	13.12.1999	66.67	16.67
7	Mugur ISĂRESCU	14.12.1999	12.12.2000	77.27	13.04
8	Adrian NASTASE	13.12.2000	21.12.2004	10.42	43.75

Table 3. Types of executive mandates (1989-2004)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Single mandates	145	74,7	75,5	75,5
2 continuous mandates	19	9,8	9,9	85,4
2 discontinuous or dissociated mandates	9	4,6	4,7	90,1
3 continuous or discontinuous mandates	15	7,7	7,8	97,9
4 mandates or more	4	2,1	2,1	100

Table 4. Mandate categories (1989-2004)


Cabinets	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than one year	53	27.3	27.3	27.3
Between 1 and 2 years	41	21.1	21.1	48.5
Between 2 and 3 years	34	17.5	17.5	66.0
Between 3 and 4 years	20	10.3	10.3	76.3
Between 4 and 5 years	25	12.9	12.9	89.2
Between 5 and 6 years	7	3.6	3.6	92.8
Between 6 and 7 years	12	6.2	6.2	99.0
Between 7 and 8 years	2	1.0	1.0	100.0

Table 5. The occupation of governmental actors before their first nomination


No	Cabinet	Academics (%)	Civil servants (%)	Appointed in the government structures (%)	MP
1.	Provisoire	19,4	5,6	2,8	0
2.	Roman	14,3	14,3	10,7	10,7
3.	Stolojan	9,5	14,3	9,5	23,8
4.	Vacaroiu	4,5	18,2	9,1	18,2
5.	Ciorbea	21,1	7,9	5,3	31,6
6.	Vasile	17,9	10,7	3,6	46,1
7.	Isarescu	18,2	18,2	4,5	36,4

No	Cabinet	Engineer (%)	Military (%)	Judge/ Prosecutor (%)	Journalist, Writer (%)
1.	Provisoire	11,8	5,6	-	8,3
2.	Roman	14,3	3,6	3,6	7,1
3.	Stolojan	4,8	4,8	4,8	4,8
4.	Vacaroiu	2,3	4,5	2,3	4,5
5.	Ciorbea	2,6	-	2,6	2,6
6.	Vasile	3,6	-	3,6	3,6
7.	Isarescu	4,5	-	4,5	4,5

Graph 1. The instability of governmental personnel in post-communist Romania



Graph 2. The rotation of governmental elites 1989-2004



SHAPING VOTERS' BEHAVIOR IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: COMPARING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA (2000) AND UKRAINE (2004)

OKSANA POLYUGA

MA in Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto,
oksana.polyuga@utoronto.ca

Abstract

The paper analyzes and compares how the power elite in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine exercise their power in order to shape voters' behavior and win the elections. While approaching this question, the author analyzes common strategies employed by the ruling elite in Russia and Ukraine: control over media, abuse of the so called "administrative resource," suppression of opposition, and manipulation of opinion polls results. However, the elections led to different results: in the case of Russia 2000, the incumbent regime reached its goal and won the elections, whereas in the case of Ukraine 2004, the power elite lost. Given the power elites' similar approach to shaping voters behavior, the paper attempts to answer why the outcomes of the two elections in question differ and what it tells us about democratic development in these two countries.

Introduction

This study concentrates on the analysis and comparison of two presidential elections: Russia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004. The reason behind this choice is the author's belief that both events marked a turning point in the modern political history of those countries. The Russian and Ukrainian presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma respectively, had served two terms and were about to leave their offices. Besides, as we argue here, by the end of the second term in office, these presidents shared common fears and security concerns related to the protection of the [political] "family" business which would be threatened if an 'unfriendly' candidate came to power.

The research reveals similar patterns in applying electoral strategies by elites in Russia 1999-2000 and Ukraine 2004. These strategies are the following: establishing control over the media, suppressing opposition and resorting to the abuse of administrative resource. Considering such similar approaches to elections, the work attempts to answer a set of its key questions: why were the outcomes of these two elections so

different? Why did the Russian authorities win the 2000 elections, and their Ukrainian counterparts lose? What can be learned from the Ukrainian election and what are the future implications for ruling elites in other post-Soviet countries?

When describing the strategies applied by elites during Russian and Ukrainian elections we use several terms: political technologies, electoral techniques, election/electoral strategies, and manipulative measures. In the context of this paper these terms mean the same, and they are aimed at shaping the behavior of the electorate in the presidential elections analysed here.

Where did the Transition go: the state of democratic development in Russia 2000 and Ukraine 2004

Russia and Ukraine chose the path of democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. By the end of the 90s both countries had undoubtedly made certain steps away from the Soviet model of governance that is nowadays referred to by many as a totalitarian regime. At the same time, neither Russia nor Ukraine prior to the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 respectively had reached a consolidated democracy in its classic interpretation. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identify “consolidated democracy” as a political situation where democracy becomes “the only game in town.”¹

¹ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-* 66

According to the authors, transition to democracy is complete when the “government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and a popular vote.”² Discussions on where the democratic transition went in post-Soviet countries, including Russia and Ukraine, are still taking place. Scholars are divided. Some believe that the transition is over, while others argue that it has not yet been completed. Oleh Havrylyshyn is one of those arguing that the transition to democracy in some post-Soviet countries, like Russia and Belarus, is over.³ By that he means that those countries have turned away from a democratic path, and will never, or not in the near future, be back on the same track. While being less categorical regarding the future of post-communist transition as Havrylyshyn, Volkov and Ryabchuk refer to the post-Soviet regimes of Russia and Ukraine as authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rules respectively.⁴ At the same time, the majority of scholars remain more optimistic arguing that the transition towards democracy is a time-consuming

Communist Europe, (The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), (part 1), 5.

² Linz and Stepan, p.3.

³ Oleh Havrylyshyn, academic lecture at CREES, University of Toronto, Fall 2004.

⁴ Vladimir Volkov, “Russian President Putin Moves Toward Authoritarian Rule,” *World Socialist Web Site*, 3 June 2000, available at <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/jun2000/put-j03.shtml>.

Mykola Ryabchuk, “From ‘Dysfunctional’ to ‘Blackmail’ State: Paradoxes of the Post-Soviet Transition” (Text of the 38th Annual Shevchenko Lecture, delivered by Mykola Ryabchuk at the University of Alberta on March 14, 2004).

process and, therefore, still underway in Russia and Ukraine.

Alternatively, Andrew Wilson and Michael McFaul identify post-Soviet countries as those developing their own types of democracy. In his book *Virtual Politics*, Wilson refers to Russia and Ukraine as ‘directed’, ‘virtual’ or ‘faked’ democracies.⁵ He argues that much of what passes for democratic participation in these, and most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, is entirely fake, a carefully choreographed performance designed to maintain the political *status quo*.⁶ At the same time, Wilson tries to remain as optimistic as possible stating that democracy in countries like Russia and Ukraine is not yet dead, “it is just distorted.”⁷ Michael McFaul calls Russia a ‘managed democracy’— judging by the way the elections are conducted there.⁸

Thomas Carothers argues that in the late 90s both Russia and Ukraine “have adopted the institutional forms of democracy, including regular elections, yet they manipulate the political process and the degree of political liberty sufficiently to ensure that their basic hold on power is not threatened.”⁹ Carothers’s argument corresponds to Andrew

Wilson’s statement that, in post-Soviet countries, the final act of voting could remain relatively ‘free and fair’ after the struggle for voters’ attention is won.¹⁰ In other words, in post-Soviet “managed democracies” it is the pre-election stage that matters. It is during this stage that the ruling elite struggle to shape the electorate’s behavior, and the opposition struggles to contest the power of the authorities.

It is normal practice in truly democratic countries for the elite to attempt to shape the electorate’s behavior to a larger or smaller extent in order to win elections. However, as this paper highlights, the elections in Russia and Ukraine were characterized by widespread usage of undemocratic ways of shaping the behavior of voters, forcing them to betray their true political beliefs. Such force may be implemented through misinformation and even threat from those in power. Undemocratically conducted elections, as the 2004 presidential election experience in Ukraine has shown, do not always lead to undemocratic outcomes. Therefore, this paper aims to discuss and compare how and why undemocratic ways of shaping voters’ behavior led to different election outcomes in Russia 2000 and Ukraine 2004.

It is important to point out that in nascent democracies like Russia and Ukraine, it is not only elections that primarily embody the virtual nature of politics. The generally democratic façade of these states’ politics has been reached by adopting institutional

⁵ Wilson, *Virtual Politics*.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p.273.

⁸ Michael McFaul, “Unfinished Business In Europe,” *The Washington Post*, Washington: DC, September 22, 2002.

⁹ Thomas Carothers, "Western Civil Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," *East European Constitutional Review* 8, no. 3 (Fall 1999).

¹⁰ Wilson, 90.

forms of democracy, including regular elections, and allowing a certain degree of political liberty.¹¹ This façade according to Carothers, has been “enough to gain international legitimacy and to relieve domestic political pressure.”¹² However, in practice these countries politics remain conducted with the exercise of “informal mechanisms of control” over the state institutions.¹³

Given the rather artificial nature of Russian and Ukrainian politics in the period in question, Mykola Ryabchuk chooses to avoid applying the term “transition” when describing the shift from the Soviet style totalitarian regime. To support his statement, the author argues that what had been happening in Russia and Ukraine prior to the elections in question contradicts the definition of “transition”, which linguistically implies a "smooth, evolutionary and rather unproblematic, i.e., basically 'technical' shift from one type of societal organization to another."¹⁴

The different outcomes of the elections in Russia 2000 and in Ukraine 2004, which was arguably a democratic standstill in the former and a democratic breakthrough in the latter, proved that these two countries suddenly appeared to be in different stages of transformation from the Soviet style

totalitarian regime. This implies that, unlike in Russia 2000, the undemocratically conducted but democratically ended presidential elections in Ukraine 2004 marked a turning point in the latter country’s transition to democracy.

Candidates Chosen by Power Elite

The first evidence of the undemocratic treatment of the electorate in both countries was the attempts by the incumbent presidents, Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, to promote and prioritise candidates they [the incumbents] wanted to see as successors, openly disregarding democratic standards. These candidates were Vladimir Putin in Russia 1999 and Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine 2004. Before discussing the ways the ruling elites promoted their candidates, it is worthwhile to list the concerns of incumbents and those surrounding them and electoral preferences prior to these elections.

The idea of incumbents serving third terms in office, which has been popular in some post-Soviet countries,¹⁵ was not overwhelmingly supported in either 1999 Russia or Ukraine 2004. In Russia, such a

¹¹ Carothers, 1999.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Keith A. Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma," *East European Constitutional Review* 10, # 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2001).

¹⁴ Ryabchuk, “From ‘Dysfunctional’ to ‘Blackmail’ State”, 1.

¹⁵ On November 27, 2005, Armenia held a referendum on amendments to the 1995 Constitution. The result of the referendum enables current president Robert Kocharian to run for a third term in 2008. On December 4, 2005 Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev was re-elected to serve a third seven year term in office. Belarusian president Alexandr Lukashenko also received a right to run for the third term as a result of a referendum and was re-elected for another 7 years on March 18, 2006.

decision was made as a result of the deteriorating health of the incumbent president Yeltsin. In Ukraine, the idea of Kuchma running for a third term was rejected due to his dramatically decreasing popularity¹⁶ after the country was overwhelmed by political crisis following the disappearance and mysterious murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze.

It appears that those surrounding the incumbents in both Russia 1999 and Ukraine 2004 expressed similar fears and security concerns related to the protection of “family” businesses. Therefore, it was important for representatives of the “family business” to search for reliable candidates who would guarantee future economic security for incumbents and those surrounding them. It was decided that both candidates who were promoted by the power elite, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Viktor Yanukovich of Ukraine, paved their way to the presidency through the prime minister’s chair. Both Putin and Yanukovich were relatively new politicians to the majority of the electorate, making it easier for the incumbents to create their images as the best candidates for the presidential chair.

¹⁶ According to various sociological surveys the level of distrust of president Kuchma fluctuated between 51-71% amongst those questioned in 2003 – a year when the idea of Kuchma running for the third term was discussed. (Source: Institute of Politics, available in Ukrainian at <http://www.tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redirect?url=pk-17102003.html> and <http://www.tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redirect?url=pc07-2003-05.html>).

It is believed that Putin’s lack of charisma and also his ascetic nature helped his rise to power,¹⁷ solving major Kremlin concerns about “who could win the 2000 presidential elections and how the victory could be achieved?”¹⁸ Vladimir Putin appeared on Russia’s public political stage in August 1999 when he was appointed as the country’s prime minister. Initially, he was seen as ‘just one more premier in a long line’¹⁹ of constantly changing prime ministers.²⁰ Besides, the appointment of a person who had previously worked for the Soviet security service (the KGB) and had recently been in charge of its Russian equivalent (the FSB), was considered by many as “something of a joke.”²¹ However, the relatively young (48 years in 1999) Putin, who had a rather limited political biography and a non-existent position statement, personified what could be called a *Russkoe Chudo* (Russian Miracle) after his popularity skyrocketed from 2% in August 1999 to 41% in late December 1999.²² The Russian Prime Minister left behind his potential opponents - Gennady Zyuganov, Yevgeny

¹⁷ Shevtsova, “From Yeltsin to Putin,” 71.

¹⁸ Richard Rose and Neil Munro eds., *Elections Without Order: Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin*, (Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 4, 90.

¹⁹ Lilia Shevtsova, “From Yeltsin to Putin: The Evolution of Presidential Power,” in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin : Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*, ed. Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova,, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 30.

²⁰ President Yeltsin changed five prime ministers in less than 18 months (1998-99).

²¹ Shentsova, 30

²² Levada Centre, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2000022401.html>

Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov in the presidential elections. The popularity of the latter candidates in August 1999 was 19%, 15% and 8% respectively, and went down to 12%, 7% and 2% in December 1999.²³ Overwhelmingly supported by the Russian population, Putin also embodied the ruling elite's view of the "friendly candidate,"²⁴ who would guarantee their problem-free future. Besides, the young and physically strong Putin could be easily contrasted with the old and fragile Yeltsin whose ruling was associated by many with his drinking habits, which undermined the country's image on the world arena. Taking into consideration this negative image of the incumbent president, the new Kremlin boss came to embody both continuity and change: while he was linked with the past, he also signified a sharp break from it.

Putin's popularity was added to by his chosen strategy of a 'no-campaign campaign.' Rose and Munro compare Putin with Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, who also presented themselves as "leaders of all people". This strategy helped to avoid engaging with traditional political issues, including a critique of the policies of Yeltsin administration.

Due to Yeltsin's early retirement, the 2000 presidential elections were held earlier than planned - in March instead of June. This change of date arguably benefited Putin's victory, as his popularity could have decreased by the summer 2000 as fast as it sky-rocketed in August 1999-

January 2000. In other words, if presidential elections in Russia were held at their originally scheduled time, it would have decreased the power elite's chances of shaping the behaviour of the electorate. Therefore, in due time, ailing incumbent president Yeltsin handed the country's leadership over to the virtually unknown former intelligence officer Vladimir Putin.²⁵

Yanukovych, similarly to Putin, was relatively new to the general voting population in Ukraine. Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister (21 November 2002), he headed the Donetsk regional administration (1999-2001).²⁶ During the Ukrainian presidential campaign, voters were presented with a 'slightly revised' version of Victor Yanukovych's biography, the basis of which was the *American dream* myth.²⁷ This was a story a 'self-made' person who experienced a difficult childhood and went up the career ladder from a metal worker on the state enterprise to the Prime Minister of the country.²⁸ However, it appears that Yanukovych was the wrong choice due to his affiliation with the so-called "Donetsk Clan", a group of entrepreneurs of the coal-rich Donetsk region who gained their capital through semi-legal means. In addition, one hidden

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Rose and Munro, 89.

²⁵ Heisli and Reisinger, 7.

²⁶ Biography of Viktor Yanukovych is available at http://vybory.osp-ua.info/ch-5_fl-Yanukovych.html

²⁷ Olena Yatsunskaya, "The Myths of 2004 Presidential Election Campaign in Ukraine," unpublished paper, presented on November 29, 2004, at Center for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto.

²⁸ Biography of Viktor Yanukovych.

detail of Yanukovych's biography came out in the course of the campaign - his criminal past²⁹ - significantly reducing the number of his supporters. Even an attempt by his team to compare Yanukovych with Czech President Václav Havel, who spent 5 years in prison for anti-communist feelings, did not save his reputation. There is evidence that for some late-deciding voters, this detail of Yanukovych's biography became a considerable argument against voting for him.³⁰

By choosing Yanukovych with his criminal past, the Ukrainian authorities arguably complicated the campaign for themselves. As a result, oppositional parties appeared to be in an advantageous position while being able to contrast the biography of their candidate Viktor Yushenko with the criminal past of Yanukovych. The former was not only famous for introducing and stabilizing Ukraine's national currency the *hryvna*, but also for his wise monetary policy as the head of Ukraine's National Bank and his notorious economic stabilization strategy while in the Prime Minister's chair in 2000-2001. However, Yanukovych's political and economic achievements in the Prime Minister's chair were overshadowed by his criminal convictions.

²⁹ Yanukovych was charged twice – in 1967 with robbery and in 1970 with causing physical injuries.

³⁰ Opinion poll was conducted by "Ukrainske Demokratichne Kolo"/ "Ukrainian Democratic Circle" on 6-13 August, 2004, results are available at

http://www.tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redirect?url=prozpol38.html#_stat2 .

In summary, if Putin turned out to be a win-win candidate for Russia's incumbent regime at the turn of the millennium, the success of Yanukovych was much harder to achieve. The circumstances in the latter case forced those surrounding the incumbent Kuchma to resort to extreme measures: a ruthless media manipulation campaign and eventually election fraud. In addition to mysterious attempts to poison oppositional candidate Yushenko, various sociological surveys suggest that these factors contributed to the so-called failure of the Ukrainian ruling elite during the 2004 presidential elections.

Delivering Power Elite Scenario "State of Emergency"

Given visible economic security concerns expressed by those surrounding presidents Yeltsin in 1999 Russia and Kuchma in Ukraine 2004, the election campaigns can be characterised as having a lot at stake. Therefore, political advisers in the Kremlin, just like their counterparts on Bankova Street in Kyiv,³¹ developed scenarios on how to win the elections. Since the election strategies of the past were not applicable this time, the advisers of Yeltsin and Kuchma invented so called "state of emergency" scenarios.

Prior to the 2000 presidential elections in Russia, the background for the state of emergency scenario already existed. By the time the election campaign started, the

³¹ Presidential Administration of Ukraine is located on Bankova street in Kiev.

country's society was affected by severe economic decline that followed the 1998 economic crisis. A decreasing standard of living for ordinary citizens was one of the major worries of ordinary Russians in the late 90s, as sociological surveys showed. When asked, "What bad things and what good things did the years of Yeltsin's rule bring?" 40% of the respondents said that they worried about economic decline, 36% about unemployment and 34% that the Yeltsin regime brought about a decrease in living conditions.³² The economic situation in Russia was depressing, with money shortages and labor strikes being a characteristic feature of that period. When describing the voters' mood in late 90s Russia, Michael McFall and Timothy Colton apply epithets like 'angry', 'alienated', 'stressed' and 'volatile'.³³

The sequence of events that followed after Putin was appointed prime minister of the Russian Federation and seemed to have been managed by an 'invisible hand' arguably contributed to the significant rise of social tensions in the country. These events included the invasion of the Russian Republic of Dagestan by separatists from the neighboring Republic of Chechnya (August 2, 1999) and the mysterious explosions in apartment

buildings in Moscow killing about 300 civilians (September 8, 1999).³⁴

While interpreting the events of August-September 1999 as ones that could lead to a state of emergency in the country, Russian authorities resorted to a military invasion of Chechnya on September 23, 1999. Until this point there has been no satisfactory proof of who was behind the invasion of Dagestan and the explosions in Moscow, and whether, as some believe,³⁵ Russian authorities were involved. However, the way the Kremlin reacted to the aforementioned events was almost unanimously supported by citizens of Russia. In other words, the majority of people supported the military campaign in Chechnya.³⁶ This campaign was conducted under the direct control of the country's recently appointed Prime Minister Putin who in his comments on national TV presented it as a fight against terrorists.³⁷ The events of August-September 1999 undoubtedly gave Putin

³⁴ Shevtsova, "From Yeltsin to Putin," 36.

³⁵ Michael McFaul argues that the first two events were instigated by the authorities in order to boost Putin's popularity before the 2000 elections (source: Michael McFaul, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.11:3 (July, 2000): 19-33. Shevtsova provides with similar suggestion referring to the reaction of some Russian journalists who openly claimed that people close to Kremlin encouraged Chechen fighters to attack Dagestan (source: Shevtsova, "From Yeltsin to Putin," 36.)

³⁶ The opinion poll conducted in February suggests that 70% of Russians supported the continuation of military campaign in Chechnya (the first Chechen campaign was in 1993-96). (Source: Levada Centre, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2000022401.html>).

³⁷ Rose and Munro, *Elections Without Order*.

³² Opinion poll conducted by Levada Centre, January 2000, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2000011201.html>).

³³ Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: the Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*, (Brookings Institution Press, 2003), chap 2, 15-46.

the chance to show himself to be a “strong and powerful politician”³⁸ and demonstrate his willingness to stand up for the country.

Popular support of Putin’s deeds can be traced in the opinion polls conducted at that time. His popularity rose in the polls relatively quickly within the month following the military campaign in Chechnya.³⁹ As Lilia Shevtsova states, the relatively young Putin, whose political biography and party affiliation were rather limited, appeared in the voters’ eyes as the embodiment of negation of past leadership traditions.⁴⁰ The prime minister’s support amongst Russians never declined, proving that the ruling elite had met the population’s demands regarding the future leadership of Russia. In other words, Russia’s incumbent regime had chosen the right candidate at the right time, thus winning the 2000 elections.

³⁸ Shevtsova, “From Yeltsin to Putin,” 37.

³⁹ When asked “if the presidential elections were held next Saturday, which candidate would you vote for,” the proportion of Putin’s supporters skyrocketed from 5% on September 21 (two days before Russian military campaign in Chechnya began) to 41% in December. (Source: Levada Centre, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2000022401.html>).

Another source, Agency for Regional Political Research, suggests that in December 1999 Putin was supported by 72% of the electorate. (McFaul in “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back” refers to this source).

⁴⁰ Lilia Shevtsova, “From Yeltsin to Putin: The Evolution of Presidential Power,” in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin : Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*, ed. Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova Lilia (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 92

Although there was no appropriate background for the “state of emergency” scenario on Bankova Street in Kyiv in 2004, this option was also considered. However, none of the various political scenarios invented by political advisors employed by Kuchma were as powerful as the notion of the “Chechen threat” exploited in Russia 1999. In addition, unlike in Russia, where Putin’s candidacy was not seriously challenged by a powerful oppositional candidate, the ruling elites in Ukraine realised that if they did not interfere, there was nothing to stop Yuschenko from winning the 2004 elections apart from his physical death.⁴¹

The head of Kuchma’s Presidential Administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, with the assistance of Russian political advisers (Marat Gelman and Gleb Pavlovsky), developed a strategy for presenting oppositional Yuschenko as a “nationalist” and an “instigator of inter-ethnic conflict”⁴² in the country. This strategy received the unofficial name of the “Stop Yuschenko Project” or *Spetsoperatsiya Yanukovych* (Special Operation “Yanukovych”).⁴³ The strategy was supposed to undermine Yuschenko’s reputation by destabilizing the situation in the country’s regions and dragging him into these processes so that the electorate would perceive him as the source of the

⁴¹ Oleksandr Panasiuk, “Peredchuttya Nadzvichaynogo Stanu”/“The Feeling of the State of Emergency”, *Ukrayina Moloda /Young Ukraine* (November 6, 2003).

⁴² Panasiuk, “The Feeling of the State of Emergency.”

⁴³ Such definition is offered by political expert Andrey Okara.

state of emergency in the country.⁴⁴ After that, Yanukovich was supposed to be presented as a unifying candidate who would guarantee stability in the country. Such a scenario was tested in October 2003 when Yuschenko arrived in the Eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk to hold the “Our Ukraine” Party Conference.⁴⁵ While the city was crowded with anti-Yuschenko protesters holding posters of Nazi content,⁴⁶ the national TV also showed Yuschenko accompanied by anti-terrorist “Alpha” forces from the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU). Such images were deemed as embodying the spin-doctors’ attempts to present Yuschenko as a source of instability in the country.

The “Stop Yuschenko” project had several options of a “conflict scenario” to undermine Yuschenko’s reputation. First, they could boost Crimean conflict based on the land dispute between Tatars and Russian or Ukrainian groups.⁴⁷ Russians would claim their historical role as “frontiersmen in Crimea,” and Yuschenko, who was supported by the Tatars, would be presented as an enemy in Crimea.⁴⁸ Second, they could stimulate conflict between the Poles and Western Ukrainians by escalating an almost forgotten dispute over the ‘Orliat’ cemetery (where some

Polish war soldiers are buried in the west-Ukrainian city of Lviv).⁴⁹ The third scenario was to encourage religious conflict within the Orthodox Church, whose adherents are divided into two groups: one considering Moscow to be its religious centre and the other seeing Kyiv in this role. Yuschenko, an Orthodox Church member believing Kyiv to be its religious centre, could be presented as an enemy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The fourth scenario was to promote the idea of the threat of “East versus West” conflict, and this turned out to be the easiest scenario to implement. Despite being rather artificial, this idea was grounded in some historical explanations. The predominantly Russian-speaking East of Ukraine, with its dominating industrial spheres and deeper links with Russia, historically differs from the primarily Ukrainian speaking West of Ukraine, with its history interlaced with Europe and its deep religious (Catholic/Greek Catholic) and cultural traditions.

Political advisers in Russia and Ukraine both chose to deliver the aforementioned strategies via the mass media. In both Russia 2000 and Ukraine 2004, the mass media served a powerfully manipulative role – much greater than in previous elections. When analyzing the election campaign in Russia 1999-2000, Sarah Oats calls it a “media manipulative

⁴⁴Panasiuk.

⁴⁵ Panasiuk

⁴⁶ BBC (November 1, 2003), www.bbc.ua

⁴⁷ “Tretiy Termin Kuchmi. Yak tse Povinno Buti”/“The Third Term of Kuchma. How it was Supposed to Be,” *Ukrainska Pravda* (June 25, 2004), available at <http://pravda.com.ua/news/2004/6/25/10179.htm>

⁴⁸ Wilson, *Virtual Politics*, 179.

⁴⁹ Polish-Ukrainian relations remained quite hostile before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the improvement of those relations was considered one of the greatest achievements of Ukrainian and Polish history.

campaign.”⁵⁰ Given that TV has been quite popular in post-Soviet Russia,⁵¹ this way of delivering election strategies and reaching the electorate was perceived by the elite to be the most efficient.

By the time of the 1999 election campaign, the Russian media market was well-prepared to serve the needs of those in power. The country had a mixture of state-controlled and commercial television stations, with the former prevailing over the latter in terms of areas of coverage and also popularity among the electorate across the country. It was represented by the ORT channel and the RTR channel,⁵² with 51% of shares of the ORT being under state ownership, with the rest belonging to oligarch Boris Berezovskii, who, according to Colton and McFaul, had *de facto* control over the channel. The RTR was at that time 100% state-owned. NTV, the only commercial network that had significant coverage across the country (75%) and was critical of Yeltsin’s regime, faced serious suppression during the 1999-2000 presidential campaign.⁵³

During the 1999-2000 election campaign, Russian state-controlled TV had different

coverage of events involving candidates unfavorable to the Kremlin than those involving Vladimir Putin.⁵⁴ As regards the time allocated for events involving the participation of presidential candidates, the same TV channels openly favored Putin, allocating the events with his participation the same amount of broadcasting time as the total time allocated to his main opponents: Yavlinsky, Ziuganov and Zhirinovskiy.⁵⁵ McFaul argues that during the campaign, Russian TV served as a source of propaganda rather than of information.⁵⁶ One presenter, Serhey Dorenko from the ORT Channel, was called a major TV figure of the 1999-2000 campaign. Appearing every Sunday evening on state-controlled ORT, Dorenko eloquently supported Putin’s block “Unity” and discredited the opposition party “Otechestvo Vsyia Rosiya” (“Fatherland-All Russia”) and its leader, Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. Aleksandr Kabakov, when referring to Dorenko’s weekly programs, called them “biased monologues.”⁵⁷ Because of that, the presenter became known as a symbol of *prodazhniy* journalism (journalism for hire)⁵⁸ in Russia.

⁵⁰ Oates, “Television, Voters, and the Development of the ‘Broadcast Party.’”

⁵¹ According to opinion polls that Colton and McFaul (241) refer to, in the late 90-s, around 90% of Russians considered television as their primary source of information; whereas radio and printed media lagged behind being popular among 8% and 3% of those asked respectively.

⁵² Colton and McFaul, *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy*, 242.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ European Institute for the Media (<http://www.eim.org/>)

⁵⁶ McFaul “One step Forward Two Steps Back”.

⁵⁷ Aleksandr Kabakov, “Nikto Ne Ostanetsya V Belom,” *Kommersant* (November 1, 1999), available at <http://www.gazeta.ru/kabakov.shtml>.

⁵⁸ Andrey Agafonov, “Dorenko: Chelovek Govoryaschiy”/“Dorenko: the Person that Speaks”, *Lyudi (People)*, available at <http://www.peoples.ru/tv/dorenko/history3.html>.

Yeltsin's retirement, another pre-election political shift invented by the Kremlin, could not have become powerful enough without TV coverage.⁵⁹ The electorate found out about the incumbent's retirement during the traditional televised New Year speech that presidents of post-Soviet countries tend to give. From that point on, project "Putin" was on its way.⁶⁰ Kremlin political advisers were right, as most of the voters who relied on state-controlled TV channels when searching for information about the election campaign more often than not voted for Putin.⁶¹

In a situation similar to Russia, a powerful media campaign preceded the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and the ruling elite there also gradually established control over the country's mass media. Such control was exercised through the owners. Most of them were either representatives of business groups tolerated by the incumbent regime or politicians who favored incumbent president Kuchma. At the end of Kuchma's term in office, there were four major TV owners in Ukraine. The most famous was the so-called "donez'ka" business group, which included representatives from the industrial eastern part of the country, with billionaire Rinat

Akhmetov at the helm.⁶² Another TV magnate was the President's son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, who acquired the majority of shares of three popular national TV channels: *STB*, *Noviy Channel* and *ICTV*.⁶³ The third business-group headed by Viktor Medvedchuk (the head of president's administration in 2004) controlled the TV channel *I+I*.⁶⁴ The popular TV Channel "Inter" is a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture where 50% of programming is in Russian or produced in Russia.⁶⁵

After "Ukraine's most pro-Russian oligarch"⁶⁶ Viktor Medvedchuk became the head of the presidential administration, this organisation introduced *temnyky* (or instructions on how to cover particular events), which were sent daily to television stations. As a result, Ukrainian TV, with the exception of two channels (*Channel 5* and *Era TV*) available in Kyiv and a few other regions, became visibly biased,⁶⁷ minimizing the coverage of

⁵⁹ Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, *The 1999-2000 elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7.

⁶⁰ Author's [e-mail correspondence] interview with Andrey Okara, July 2005.

⁶¹ Colton and McFaul, *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy*.

⁶² Vakhtang Kipiani, "Media Take Color in Orange Ukraine," (2005), available at <http://kipiani.org/plain.cgi?638>. also available at *Global Journalist Magazine* <http://www.globaljournalist.org/magazine/2005-2/orange.html>

⁶³ Marta Dyczok "Ukraine's Media Landscape" in Wsevolod W. Isajiw eds. *Society in Transition: Social Change in Ukraine in Western Perspectives*, (Canadian Scholars' Press: Toronto, 2003), 289.

⁶⁴ Kipiani

⁶⁵ Dyczok, 289.

⁶⁶ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Election. The Orange Revolution," *Elections Today, International Foundation Electoral Systems*, vol.12, no.4 (2005).

⁶⁷ Media monitoring conducted by The Academy of Ukrainian Press suggests that in September 2004 (or 2 months before elections) 90% of reports on

events involving opposition leaders.⁶⁸ Other mass media that tried to present the audience with alternative information to the official line experienced their gloomiest times since Ukraine's independence in 1991.⁶⁹

A content analysis of media coverage during the presidential campaign proves that Prime Minister Yanukovich, just like Prime Minister Putin, was favored in the state-controlled media.⁷⁰ The time allocated during TV news to events with Yanukovich's participation prevailed over events with the participation of other candidates. One sociological survey suggests that 80% of the information about Yuschenko on Ukrainian TV was negative or ironic, while Yanukovich, with the support of the authorities, appeared in the TV news in a positive or neutral context and was criticized only a few times⁷¹. There have been assumptions that the state-controlled media contributed to the demonization of Yuschenko as a "nationalist", "the enemy of Russian people", "the enemy of the Orthodox church", "the enemy of the Industry of

Ukrainian TV were one-sided and biased. ("Results of contents analysis of news (Oct. 2003 – Sep. 2004) and political advertisement (July 2004 – Sep. 2004) on leading Ukrainian TV channels", *The Academy of Ukrainian Press*,

<http://www.aup.com.ua/?cat=materials&subcat=full&id=180>)

⁶⁸ Kipiani.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Kyrylo Loukerenko, BBC correspondent, Ukrainian Service, Kiev (conducted in May 2005).

⁷⁰ *Manipulating Public Opinion Through Mass Media* (School of Political Analysis of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Kyiv 2004), 12.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Donetsk", and "the American spy".⁷² Political technologists (spin doctors) developed those labels as a part of their strategy aimed at shaping voters' behavior to oppose Yuschenko. It was done in a visibly ruthless way, ignoring any kind of standards of objectivity. In terms of the time share of coverage in TV news, in July, August, and September 2004, Prime Minister Yanukovich had an "absolute advantage"⁷³ over others (13% in September, 8% in August). TV news coverage of events with the participation of Yanukovich was three or four times higher than that of Yuschenko in October 2004 and November 2004 respectively.⁷⁴

Ukrainian media in 2004 had several equivalents to the Russian journalist Dorenko who shared his mission to undermine the image of the opposition candidate. Ukrainian 'Dorenkos' were evident on different TV channels. These included Russian journalist Dmitriy Kyselyov, seen daily on ICTV channel, Dmitro Korchinsky, the leader of the nationalist group UNA-UNSO seen daily on channel "1+1", Vyacheslav Pichovshek seen weekly on "1+1", and Sergiy Dolganov seen weekly on National [state-controlled] channel "UT-1". Ukrainian 'Dorenkos' presented Kuchma

⁷² Interview with Andrey Okara (December 24, 2004), available in Russian at <http://www.obkom.net.ua/articles/2004-12/24.1526.shtml>

⁷³ "Results of contents analysis of TV news during the election campaign, November 2004," *Academy of Ukrainian Press*, available at <http://www.aup.com.ua/?cat=materials&subcat=full&id=207>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

and his protégé [Yanukovych] as a source of stability in the country and depicted Yushenko as someone who was likely to cause regional and national conflicts.⁷⁵

The Ukrainian media were also used in order to implement the relatively new election technique of running fake opinion and exit polls.⁷⁶ This strategy was not widely used in Russia 1999-2000, but turned out to work effectively in Ukraine 2004. This strategy is referred to by political experts as *reitingovii pressing* (using ratings of certain candidates to pressure opponents). It was used to mislead voters, make them “bandwagon with orchestra”⁷⁷ and convince them to vote for the generally supported candidate, whom according to those dubious surveys more often than not was Viktor Yanukovych. There is evidence that most of those dubious surveys were subject to close reviews by the presidential administration.⁷⁸ The questionable nature of those sociological surveys is proven by the fact that when their results were presented on state controlled TV, quite often neither the source nor an alternative

survey was offered to the audience.⁷⁹ The results of one such survey, presented on the news program of the state run TV channel “UT-1”, suggested that “46% of the voters believe that Yanukovych would become the president, and 16.5% claimed that it would be Yushenko.”⁸⁰

It is hard to overlook the fact that Yanukovych, supported by the incumbent regime, was visibly and sometimes ruthlessly promoted in daily news programs on Ukrainian television. There was hardly any positive coverage of opposition opponent Viktor Yushenko, making it obvious even for outsiders that the latter was not preferred by the controlling elite. Unlike in Russia 1999, where the majority of voters were open to the positive news coverage of Putin, a considerable number of voters in Ukraine, as the opinion poll results suggest,⁸¹ did not rely on TV.

⁷⁵ Taras Kuzio, “Russian and Ukrainian Authorities Resort to Inter-Ethnic Violence to Block Yushenko,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.1 no. 4 (June 29, 2004).

⁷⁶ Sergiy Taran and Viktoriya Siumar, “Exit Poll in the shadow of ‘shadow’ sociology”, *Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth)*, 18 November 2004, available at <http://www2.pravda.com.ua/archive/2004/november/18/4.shtml>.

⁷⁷ Wilson, *Virtual Politics* 67.

⁷⁸ Volodymyr Polohalo, Iryna Popova, *Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth)*, 18 November 2004.

⁷⁹ *Manipulating Public Opinion Through Mass Media* (School of Political Analysis of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Kyiv 2004), 13.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ When asked in September 2004 where the voters looked for information on the election campaign, almost one third of Ukrainians (31%) said that they searched for information about the election campaign in private conversations with their friends, relatives and colleagues. 60% of the voters still received this information from national TV, 21% - from local TV, and 27% - from national newspapers. These numbers suggest that most voters seek information. At the same time, the amount of voters (31%) relying on private conversations is surprisingly high. Given that most voters seek information on the election campaign from few sources, a great reliance on TV in searching the news on election campaign does not necessarily imply that that source influenced the electorate’s final decision.

These arguments partially bring us to the main question of this paper, providing us with the answer that overplaying manipulative strategies through the media may backfire on those preferred by the incumbent regime and lead to a reversed election result.

The Power Elite's Administrative Resources

Another tool of influence over electoral behavior in Russia and Ukraine was the widespread usage of administrative resources. Under the “abuse of administrative resources” we mean the improper use of administrative offices to promote the candidate favored by the regime.⁸² Administrative resources could be allocated directly, indirectly and or by concealed means. According to Dmytro Vydryn, direct resources are the customary vulgar command-order methods, when local bureaucrats dictate whom to vote for and whom to block during elections.⁸³ An indirect administrative resource is implemented in budget financing for electoral projects supported by the ‘powers-that-be’ and ‘one or another information projects’

⁸² Dominique Arel, “The Orange Revolution in Ukraine and Its Implications for our Understanding of the Post-Communist Transition,” Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine (25 February 2005), 8 (available at http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel_Cambridge.pdf)

⁸³ Dmytro Vydryn, “Pentahrama-2002: Formula Osoblyvostei Parlaments'koi Vyborchoi Kampanii” (“Pentagram-2002: Formula of the Specifics of Parliamentary Election Campaign”), *Mirror Weekly* (6-12 October 2001), available at <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/363/32487/>.

linked to the former government for a more general purpose.⁸⁴ In the case of Russia in 1999-2000 we do not observe severe abuse of administrative resources, but the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine were conducted with a wide engagement of indirect administrative resources aimed at manipulating voting lists, names of voters, and even falsification of election results. It could be argued that the election fraud was the last resort for the incumbent regime in Ukraine, where the candidate supported by the ruling elite was not overwhelmingly accepted across Ukraine.

Arguably, Yanukovych had a much greater chance of losing rather than winning. This explains why the power elite resorted to massive abuse of administrative resources involving enormous financial support.⁸⁵ Unfortunately for political advisers of Kuchma, the high cost of the campaign and sophisticated electoral techniques aimed at shaping the outcome of the elections did not lead to the results desired by those surrounding the incumbent president. An opposite result occurred, as the manipulations and election falsifications of the Ukrainian authorities enhanced public anger. This, together with the memory of the recent mysterious poisoning of Viktor Yushenko⁸⁶ and the

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ It is now known to almost everyone in Ukraine that Yanukovych's campaign cost as much as the 2004 campaign of US President George Bush.

⁸⁶ Given that the investigation of Yushenko's poisoning is not complete yet (September 2006), it is not clear whether that was another manipulative technique employed by ruling elites.

ruthless media propaganda, put an end to public patience and elicited massive street protests across Ukraine that will remain known in post-Soviet history as the Orange Revolution. Generally speaking, the visibly ruthless election campaign orchestrated by the power elite utilizing enormous financial and administrative resources turned out to be completely ineffective in Ukraine 2004.

Role of Opposition

In addition to the aforementioned factors contributing to the failure or success of the strategies of the ruling elite, one should not ignore the presence of a powerful opposition in Ukraine and its virtual non-existence in Russia. Therefore, in the case of the latter, shaping the behavior of the electorate was a much easier task than in the case of the former.

Ukraine entered the election campaign of 2004 with the presence of a powerful opposition that included several parties (“Our Ukraine”, “Socialist Party”, “Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs”). Unlike in other post-Soviet countries including Russia, Ukraine’s opposition had already learned a good lesson from the failed actions of anti-Kuchma protests in March 2001.

The leader of the most popular opposition party, “Our Ukraine”, Viktor Yushenko, posed a serious challenge to the power elite candidate Yanukovitch. There were beliefs that only physical death could prevent Yushenko from winning the elections – provided that they

were democratically held. It was also clear that, in the second run-off, Yushenko would receive the support of the voters of a few other oppositional candidates (Oleksandr Moroz of the Socialist Party and Anatoly Kinakh of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs), undermining the ruling elites’ ambitions for 2004 presidential elections.

In Russia 1999-2000 the situation was much clearer. The oppositional parties, like “Otechestvo Vsyia Rosiya” (“Fatherland-All Russia”) with its leader Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, Zyuganov’s Communist Party and even liberal-oriented party “Yabloko” with its leader Grigory Yavlinsky were weak in terms of public support and ineffective in terms of political influence. None of the aforementioned politicians stood a chance of making it in a second round. Thus, Putin’s candidacy was not challenged by a strong competition. To summarise, with the Chechen threat in hand and weak opposition, there was almost nothing to stop spin doctors at the Kremlin from winning the presidential elections of 2000, especially with young and promising Putin as a candidate.

To summarize, while in Ukraine 2004 the attempts of the incumbent regime to shape the electorate’s behaviour were challenged by a powerful opposition led by a nationally supported leader, in the case of Russia 2000 the incumbent regime had hardly any obstacles to shaping the country’s voters decisions, leading to different election outcomes in these two countries.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to answer the question that was most likely posed by the ruling elite in Russia and Ukraine following the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 respectively. Why did Russian authorities win the elections and their Ukrainian counterparts lose? Most arguments presented in the paper imply that there was a cumulative sequence of events and circumstances in both countries. However, some peculiarities contributed to the outcome desired by the incumbent president in the Russian case and hindered it in the case of Ukraine 2004. These reasons are as follows: the right candidate was chosen by Kremlin political advisers and the wrong candidate preferred by those surrounding incumbent Kuchma; there was the ability in the Kremlin to create a powerful myth of rescuer and a failure to invent a similar sustainable myth in Ukraine; there was a more cautious approach to the abuse of administrative resources in Russia and a clear abuse of it embodied in the election falsifications in Ukraine; and finally, there was weak opposition in Russia 1999 and a strong one in Ukraine 2004.

These arguments lead us to the conclusion that the attempts by representatives of the incumbent regime to shape the behavior of voters in an undemocratic way do not necessary lead to the result desired by those making the orders. The clear abuse of power during the election campaign may even lead to an unexpectedly democratic outcome - providing the population is ready and the international support is present – just like in Ukraine

2004. The financial ability to deliver election strategies through the control of mass media, as experience in Ukraine 2004, does not necessary translate into the election outcome desired by those orchestrating the campaign. In other words, a totally controlled media does not always change the behavior of the electorate during election campaigns. Given the outcome of the Ukrainian elections in 2004, other incumbent regimes aiming to shape the behavior of its electorate could perhaps learn that the open attempt to cheat the electorate angered the population in that emerging democracy.

It should be argued that the 2004 elections in Ukraine, unlike the presidential elections in Russia 2000, marked the end of the Soviet traditions of election campaigning with the electorate being threatened and instructed on how to vote. Nationwide public protest (the Orange Revolution) became known to the world as the peaceful reaction of civil society to falsifications implemented by authorities. Through this protest, the Ukrainian electorate entered a new phase of transition to democracy, where falsifications and abuse of administrative resources are not tolerated.

To put it in a broader post-Soviet context, the Russian and Ukrainian experiences have arguably served as learning examples for other post-Soviet leaders, some of whom, like Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev and Belarussian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, have already learned from previous non-democratic elections in other post-Soviet countries.

While preparing for recent presidential elections in Kazakhstan (2005) and Belarus (2006), the aforementioned leaders realized that there is no need to resort to ruthless manipulations or vote rigging. Instead, they realized it is worthwhile preparing for elections in advance by establishing control over the country's media, suppressing or eliminating the opposition, and by keeping the power elites aware of any underground changes that pose a threat to the regime.

Such a state of affairs is obviously hazardous to democratic development in post-Soviet space in the future. In countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Turkmenistan, the elite continues to resort to "virtual politics"⁸⁷ while trying to manage, manipulate, and contain democracy. As long as the democratic process in post-Soviet countries remains choreographed by political technologists and the ruling elites attempt to manipulate voters' behaviour in order to shape election results, the transition will remain distorted or simply frozen in that part of the world.

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⁸⁷ Wilson, *Virtual Politics*.

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THE BALKAN BULLET WITH BUTTERFLY WINGS

DYLAN KISSANE

School of International Studies University of South Australia Adelaide, Australia,
dylan.kissane@unisa.edu.au

Abstract¹

In physics, biology, and meteorology, scientists have come to understand that the natural systems they study can be extremely sensitive to small events. The so-called 'butterfly effect' is testament to such seemingly insignificant events having significant implications for the wider system. Such knowledge has led to an interest in the natural sciences in both chaotic and complex systems and, in turn, has led to social scientists searching for parallels in the systems they examine. However, within the field of international relations theory, there has been little attempt to move towards such new understandings and away from a fundamental belief in anarchy as the defining feature of international politics. This paper offers a critique of this almost discipline-wide stance, drawing on inter-disciplinary approach and suggesting

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that, in the example of the origins of World War One, there exists evidence for an international system that is something other than anarchical.

Introduction

The discipline of international relations is, like all other social sciences, riddled with contests between committed academics. Passionate debates ensue where theoretical realists and theoretical liberals argue over the hope for cooperation in the international system, the former arguing that any cooperation will be time and commitment limited and the latter arguing that, with understanding and rules, cooperation is likely.² Consider also the reasons for conflict in international relations: some argue it is simply a manifestation of human nature, others that irrational leaders are too quick to act, other still that the constraints of the system result in a system that will always

² This debate is constant within the major journals in the field. A classic example is the exchange of views in *International Security* in the mid-1990s. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994): 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 39-51; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 52-61; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Promise of Realism," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 62-70; John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 82-93.

be subject to conflict and war regardless of the individual actor's intents.³ Debates rage too between those who see changes in international polarity as explicitly dangerous and those who see little difference between a multipolar, bipolar or unipolar world with regard to the incidence and extent of conflict.⁴ Further still, arguments proceed between those who see a state's military as the best expression of power and those who consider economic power much more important, those who see a rising China as good for the US and those who see it as bad, and those who see the UN as the culmination of humanity's moral advance and those who consider the organisation merely a manifestation of great power politics.⁵ Anything within the discipline of

international relations is, it seems, open to contention by other scholars. Anything, that is, except the one notion that defines the field, separating it from wider political science: anarchy.

Traditionally, to imagine international relations as a distinct discipline within political science is to imagine politics and political interactions taking place within an anarchic realm.⁶ Indeed, Brian Schmidt's history of the study of international relations is simply titled *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*, a nod to his argument that international relations has been and continues to be the study of political interaction in an anarchic world.⁷

³ The classic study on this subject is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). See also David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations? Towards a Causal Theory of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (September 1991): 337-355; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 (Summer 1995): 379-414; Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (June 1998): 139-165.

⁴ See, for example, the exchange between John Mearsheimer, Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman in *International Security*: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," *International Security* 15 (Autumn 1990): 191-199.

⁵ On military versus economic power see Norman Z. Alcock and Alan G. Newcombe, "The Perception of National Power," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14 (September 1970): 335-343; AFK Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958),

436. On China and the US see Robert Sutter, "China's Regional Strategy and Why It May Not Be Good For America," in *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 289-305; David M. Lampton, "China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's Expense," in *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 306-326. On the UN see Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-25; David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

⁶ Brian C. Schmidt, "On the History and Historiography of International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons (London: SAGE, 2006). 12.

⁷ Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York, 1998). A complementary argument is offered in Steve Smith, *The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?* Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Political Science Association, Canberra, Australia, 5th October 2000.

Where personal, domestic, and intra-actor politics may be rule bound and have legally enforceable sanctions for unacceptable actions, in the international system there is no such sanctioning power and no higher government to whom an aggrieved power may appeal for restitution.⁸ No higher authority exists that maintains the power to control all other actors, nor does an actor exist that has the power to influence every other actor. Even if the system can be described as unipolar – that is, where a sole superpower maintains influence and power unequalled and unchallenged by any other single power – anarchy remains a constant, and challengers to the unipolar power are historically quick to rise and topple its predominance.⁹ Thus, as Waltz argues, the elements within the system can change,

⁸ Waltz explains the interactions, alliances, and conflict that emerge in such an anarchic system thus: “Despite changes that constantly take place in the relations of nations, the basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic. Each state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others.” See Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security* 18 (Autumn 1993): 59.

⁹ Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Special Issue: America and the World 1990/91): 23-33. On the difficulties faced by states in maintaining such ‘unipolar moments’ see Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 49-88. A practical public policy approach to doing the same is outlined in Thomas Donnelly, *Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* (Washington, DC: Project for the New American Century, 2000).

but the essential, anarchic nature of the system does not change.¹⁰

Agreement on the anarchic nature of the system exists across most of the major theories of international relations. Realism, for example – being the theoretical approach that remains the primary or alternative theory in virtually every book and article addressing general theories of world politics – has maintained the centrality of anarchy to its assessment of the international realm since its precepts were first outlined.¹¹ Anarchy, for realists, is the defining feature of international politics and the implications of anarchy for actors within the international sphere are what drive both peaceful and non-peaceful interactions.¹² Theoretical liberals also agree that anarchy forms a central tenet of international interaction, though they derive significantly different implications from the reality of an anarchic system.¹³

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 5-6.

¹¹ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security* 24 (Autumn 1999): 5. See also Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 35; Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.

¹² See, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Latest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1998): 485-507.

¹³ Liberals tend to emphasise cooperation over competition in international relations. For example, see Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” 45-6. For a useful survey of the literature on realist and liberal attitudes to cooperation see Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the

As Alexander Wendt notes, there is wide agreement between these two paradigms on the nature of anarchy; indeed, both realists and liberals (who comprise the majority of international relations scholars) share an agreed understanding of anarchy, resulting in its acceptance throughout the discipline as the basis for all international interaction.¹⁴

Even the so-called constructivists do not deny the *existence* of anarchy, only its implications and its construction. As Wendt himself claims:

I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.¹⁵

For Wendt and other constructivists, anarchy remains existential but the implications are constructed by the actors and not present in some sort of ‘anarchic logic’ as others have claimed.¹⁶

Debate,” *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 42-63.

¹⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics,” *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992): 392-393. See also Uwe Hartmann, *Carl von Clausewitz and the Making of Modern Strategy* (Germany: Books on Demand, 2002), 19.

¹⁵ Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” 394-395. This is echoed by Robert Powell, “Anarchy in international relations theory: the neorealists-neoliberal debate,” *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 314.

¹⁶ Claims that anarchy has an inherent ‘logic’ of its own can be found in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones

Constructivists submit that the implications and behaviors claimed by both realists and liberals emerge not from anarchy itself but from processes and interactions in which anarchy plays only a permissive, not causal, role.¹⁷ Thus, we find that no matter the theoretical perspective adopted by international relations scholars – be they realists, liberals, or constructivists – anarchy remains a base for explaining interactions and a defining feature in the international domain.

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that this assumption of anarchy limits the analysis of international affairs by international relations scholars. This paper will argue, first, that the international system is not clearly anarchic. Instead, it will be suggested that the system is complexly interdependent, sensitive to initial conditions and particularly sensitive to small events both at and below the international level. It will be argued that the system is, indeed, not anarchic but chaotic.¹⁸ Second, it will be argued that

and Richard Little *The Logic of Anarchy/Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Partly in response to Buzan, Jones and Little’s claims, Wendt published Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (December 2003): 491-542.

¹⁷ Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” 403.

¹⁸ A state of anarchy is defined by a lack of a central controlling entity or force. A state of chaos, while still lacking a central hegemonic power, is defined by the small interactions that develop into dominating influences. The differentiation between the two terms will be highlighted further later in the text.

this alternate conception of the international political system has some major implications for the explanation of significant international events. Drawing on this premise, this paper will then offer a case study of the reasons for World War One as an example of the differing explanations that result when one begins from the premise that the system is anarchic and, alternatively, when one begins from the premise that the international system is chaotic. The differences that are readily apparent between conventional anarchic analysis and the suggested complex, time-sensitive analysis will, it will be argued, allow for better explanations of international interactions and conflict and, if applied in the analysis of other international events, may well provide superior explanation for what occurs at the international level.

Anarchy: Evident or Illusory

Brian Schmidt argues that it is anarchy that has given international relations its “distinct discursive identity” and, noting the arguments already put in the introduction, there can be little doubt that he is correct in this conclusion.¹⁹ While traditional political science concerns itself with the theory and practice of political interactions in a bounded political space, international relations scholars concentrate on the unbounded, anarchic domain of the international system. For many such scholars, the fact that this system is anarchic is never in question: it is more a background condition that is accepted without question, allowing theorists to move straight to the discussion of

anarchy’s construction and implications.²⁰ But is this truly the case? Is it possible that the international system only *appears* anarchic and, in fact, is something entirely different?²¹ To answer these questions, this paper begins by outlining how anarchy at the international level is described and the particular connotations of the term within the discipline of international relations.

The term ‘anarchy’, in popular discourse, implies some sort of chaos. Thus, *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* defines anarchy as “disorder, especially political or social”.²² While it is true that an anarchic international system can be disorderly, it is not *necessarily* disorderly. Indeed, it is more common for international relations scholars to discuss international *order* than to discuss international *disorder* under anarchy.²³

²⁰ Schmidt, “On the History,” 9; Young Jong Choi and James A. Caporaso, “Comparative Regional Integration,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2006), 486-487.

²¹ Helen Milner asks a similar question, though she does not deny that the system is anarchic, only that there are other qualities – including interdependence – that are more important than anarchy. See Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory,” *Review of International Studies* 17 (January 1991): 67-85.

²² Frank Abate, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 49.

²³ See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (Spring/Summer 1990): 21-37; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Christian Reus-Smith, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental

¹⁹ Schmidt, “On the History,” 12.

Within the discourse of international relations, anarchy does not imply a lack or order but a lack of overarching authority; that is, the interactions of international actors are not constrained by a more powerful force.²⁴ Unlike, for example, interactions within a nation-state that may be constrained by the threat of police sanctions or by legal and moral norms, interactions at the international level are essentially unconstrained.²⁵ Thus anarchy in international relations refers more to the orientation of the system, the nature of the system, and the background to the interactions that take place.

At first impression it seems that the international system is indeed anarchical. While there are certainly and have always been powerful and less powerful states, this by itself does not imply a situation that is any less anarchical. To be clear, the

Institutions,” *International Organization* 51 (Autumn 1997): 555-589; G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” *International Security* 23 (Winter 1998/1999): 43-78.

²⁴ Typical is the argument of David Lake: “In anarchy...each possesses full residual rights of control; while constrained by its environment, each state is master of its own fate...”. See David Lake, “Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations,” *International Organization* 50 (Winter 1996): 7.

²⁵ See John Mearsheimer’s take on the sanctioning of lying at the international and the domestic level in John J. Mearsheimer, *Lying in International Politics*, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2nd – 5th September 2004. On the notion of amorality in international relations see Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 45.

lack of equality in the distribution of capabilities is a factor at the actor level, not at the system level; a system where capabilities are distributed unequally might be hierarchical but it might just as well be anarchical.²⁶ As well, while there are changes in polarity over time, these changes are again at the actor level and not the system level. Thus, the rise of a unipolar power, with relative power far in excess of every other international actor in almost every field of human endeavor, does not make an anarchic system less anarchic. Indeed, as Waltz makes clear, the international system will only change from being anarchic if and when change *of* the system occurs and not simply change *within* the system. In his own words:

[w]ithin-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possible for others’ security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system.²⁷

Essentially, Waltz argues, the anarchic international system of today is the same anarchic international system that greeted

²⁶ On this point see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Lake, “Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations,”.

²⁷ Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 5.

Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr, and Morgenthau – the significant changes at the unit level (the level of states and international actors), including the development of nuclear weapons, have not been enough to displace anarchy from its system-defining place in the international political system.²⁸

But is the lack of an overarching authority enough to label the system anarchic? There are other systems where no single unit is strong enough to control all others. Consider the meteorological system, which is generally talked about in terms of weather or climate. Here is a system that is composed of ‘actors’ (or variables) such as pressure, temperature, humidity, cloud cover and sunlight, among many others, none of which has the ‘ability’ to control all the others. None of these elements is more important than the others as a change in one will eventually affect all of the others in some way.²⁹ So, is the global

²⁸ The five scholars mentioned, along with Waltz himself, are generally considered among the most influential of the realist scholars in international political theory. Ariel Colonomos uses the evocative term “cold monsters” to describe states and actors within the amoral, realist world of international relations espoused by these five theorists. See Ariel Colonomos, “Diffusion of Ideas and International Relations,” in *The New International Relations: Theory and Practice*, ed. Marie-Claude Smouts (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998), 121.

²⁹ Recognising the difficulties involved in distinguishing between the significant number of variables that might affect weather and climate, meteorologists differentiate between ‘basic’ atmospheric variables and ‘other’ variables. Basic variables include temperature, relative humidity, geopotential height, wind speed and wind direction – all others are to be considered ‘other’ variables.

climate anarchic? No: we know that the global climate is very much more complex than a ‘simple’ anarchy; indeed, meteorologists generally refer to climate and weather systems as chaotic, a term with similar popular connotations to anarchic but, again, with a very specific definition in the context of systems analysis.³⁰

A chaotic system, in the meteorological context, can be defined as a dynamical system that has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions. The classic metaphor that demonstrates this sensitive dependence is the so-called ‘butterfly effect’. As explained by Thiéart and Forgues, the butterfly effect is where “the flap of a butterfly’s wing which creates, a few months after, a storm” somewhere

See David J. Stensrud, Harold E. Brooks, Jun Du, Steven Tracton and Eric Rogers, “Using Ensembles for Short-Range Forecasting,” *Monthly Weather Review* 127 (April 1999): 444.

³⁰ The original work on chaotic climate models is Edward Lorenz, “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow,” *Journal of Atmospheric Sciences* 20 (March 1963): 130-141. Today the literature on chaotic effects in meteorology is immense. Examples include AA Tsonis and JB Elsner, “Chaos, Strange Attractors, and Weather,” *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society* 70 (January 1989): 14-23; Edward Ott, *Chaos in Dynamical Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Richard J. Bird, *Chaos and Life: Complexity and Order in Evolution and Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 8. The classic popular book on the subject is James Gleick, *Chaos: The Making of a New Science* (London: Penguin, 1988). The idea of anarchy being ‘simple’ is taken from Raymond Hinnebusch, “Introduction: The Analytical Framework,” in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 1-2.

else on the planet.³¹ As the pair explains, small variations – even seemingly insignificant ones such as a butterfly flapping its wings – might have monumental effects on the wider system.³² As such, a chaotic system is complexly interdependent, with every small permutation or ‘wrinkle’ in the system having the potential to disturb the remainder of the system. Such systems may have no single controlling element but they are *not* anarchic; indeed chaotic systems are infinitely more complex than anarchic systems, such as the one claimed by international relations scholars to exist in the shape of the international political structure.

Is it possible that the international political system is chaotic instead of anarchic? Does a chaotic metaphor better fit the international reality than an anarchic one? If so, it would require a different theoretical understanding of international relations between states and actors, because anarchy, which allows for individual agents to make choices without automatic sanction, would be replaced by a system where the impacts of every decision have the potential to be felt across the system. This ‘feedback’ in the system would mean that even very small events or realities could have the same monumental effects as a butterfly in China causing a storm in Florida.

³¹ RA Thiétart and B Forgues, “Chaos Theory and Organization,” *Organization Science* 6 (January/February 1995): 21.

³² Thiétart and Forgues, “Chaos Theory and Organization,”

What evidence points to a chaotic system rather than an anarchic one? To begin with, one could point to the small events that are held, in diplomatic history, to ‘spiral out of control’ and outside of all expectation. Fred Lawson, for example, outlines a trajectory of just this type in his study of the Iranian crisis of 1945 and 1946.³³ Jeffrey Frieden and David Lake note a similar pattern of feedback and ‘spiraling out of control’ evident in the international system, drawing on the MAD doctrine as a strategic setting in which such spiraling might indeed be possible.³⁴ As well, one could point to events that seem of little significance to agents in one part of the world but eventually have a large and perhaps devastating effect.³⁵ Take, for example, the 2000 US Presidential election in which a matter of only a few hundred votes in a single continental state gave a victory to a candidate whom, it is claimed, was always more likely to invade Iraq than his opponent.³⁶ The lives of tens of thousands

³³ Fred H. Lawson, “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Spiral Mode of International Conflict,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (August 1989): 307-326.

³⁴ Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, “International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance,” *The Annals of the American Association of Political Science* 600 (July 2005): 140.

³⁵ Such feedback effects are covered in great detail in Chapter 4 of Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life*, E-book edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

³⁶ Though it is impossible to say for sure exactly what action a President Gore would have taken on Iraq, speeches and debate suggest he may have chosen an option other than war. In support of this conclusion see Al Gore, *Iraq and the War on*

Iraqi citizens essentially turned on the actions of a relatively few persons in Florida in 2000. Is this not evidence of massive feedback in a chaotic system rather than an anarchic system experiencing yet another stochastic upheaval?³⁷

Such feedbacks are inevitable in a chaotic system but not necessarily expected in an anarchic one. Indeed, the trend in international relations analysis has, in recent years, been to analyze events at the system level (for example, Waltzian analysis) or some sort of integration of system- and unit-level events.³⁸ But no analysis has sought to examine events at the individual level of analysis for its larger effects on the international system.³⁹ Such a move would be fraught with difficulties, of course. If the analysis of interactions between a system and some

200 state actors is yet to provide any real predictive power for international relations scholars and very little discipline-wide acceptance of explanative analysis, then attempting to analyze the interactions of billions of individuals with their states, corporations, international institutions, NGOs, and the system itself is likely to seem impossible. However, to be clear, if the system is not anarchic, then analyzing events as if it *is* anarchic opens up the possibility of erroneous conclusions, poor explanations, and fallible predictions.⁴⁰

The Nature of Chaos

If we imagine the international system as chaotic and not anarchic, we must also admit that this will have significant implications on the analysis and base assumptions of international relations theory. Indeed, as has been seen in meteorology, a revised understanding of the system means that all assumptions based on the nature of the previously-assumed system will need to be reviewed and, perhaps, overhauled.⁴¹ It is the

Terrorism. Speech delivered to the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, 23rd September 2002, viewed 12th April 2006 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/gore/gore092302sp.html>>; Joe Lieberman and Al Gore, "Should We Go To War With Iraq?" *World & I* 17 (December 2002): 38-43; David Masci, "Confronting Iraq: The Issues," *The CQ Researcher* 12 (October 2002): 797, 802.

³⁷ As of 12th April 2006 the NGO IraqBodyCount reported between 34 030 and 38 164 civilians had been killed following the invasion by the 'Coalition of the Willing'. IraqBodyCount, *IraqBodyCount.net*, viewed 12th April 2006, <<http://www.iraqbodycount.net/>>.

³⁸ This is essentially the neorealist-neoliberal debate, which in many ways dominated the discipline in recent years.

³⁹ This should be distinguished from analysis in the style of the 'Great Man of History' that remains, particularly in popular accounts of history and historical conflicts, a fashionable approach.

⁴⁰ This is not necessarily so. Consider the analysis of other systems, for example economic interactions and global financial systems, where assumptions about actors are made on the basis of ideal types which likely do not exist. 'Economic man' is a useful tool despite the fact that he does not exist in any real shape or form in reality. However, there remains the possibility that analysis based on incorrect information and assumptions is likely to be in error, just as much economic analysis, explanation and prediction in the end proves to be wrong.

⁴¹ On this revolution in meteorological theory see Michelle Young, "Chaos All Around: Butterflies, Demons, and the Weather," *Harvard Science Review* (Winter 2002): 30. Broader discussion of the paradigm shifts in meteorology and other

purpose of this section to identify some of the expectations and implications of assuming a chaotic system, particularly those that differ from those arising from the 'normal' anarchic system. Though the differences are many, there are three that will be highlighted here: (1) the complex, time sensitive dependence of the system; (2) the importance of seemingly minor permutations within the system; and (3) the impossibility of long-term prediction.⁴² Dealing with each in turn, it will be shown that a chaotic international relations system is not only conceptually and intellectually different to the system as it is imagined today, but also *fundamentally* and *essentially* different with regard to what is expected of an anarchic one.

The first of the differences to be highlighted concerns the notion of complex time-sensitivity to events occurring within the system. In a chaotic system, the precise time and nature of events makes a significant difference to the result within the wider system. For example, a difference of only a few thousandths of a degree in a temperature

scientific fields can be found in David Aubin and Amy Dahan Dalmedico, "Writing the History of Dynamical Systems and Chaos: *Longue Durée* and Revolution, Disciplines and Cultures," *Historia Mathematica* 29 (May 2002): 273-339.

⁴² These three elements are common to all chaotic systems. For interdisciplinary examples of such properties in other chaotic and complex systems see Thiétart and Forgues, "Chaos Theory and Organization,"; Troy Shinbrot, "Progress in the control of chaos," *Advances in Physics* 44 (March/April 1995): 73-111; JC Sprott and Stefan J Linz, "Algebraically Simple Chaotic Flows," *International Journal of Chaos Theory and Applications* 5 (April 2000): 1-20.

reading can have significant impacts on the behavior of a weather system some weeks or months in the future.⁴³ Though the system is deterministic – that is, it follows simple rules – it is so sensitive to changes in conditions that prediction becomes almost impossible. To take an example at a less abstract level, consider a typical ten-day forecast by a television weather service. While it would be normal to consider the first and second days forecasts as likely to be nearly correct, few people would place great trust in the predictions for the ninth or tenth days.⁴⁴ The reason why the trust is misplaced is because of human experience with weather forecasts, but the reason the forecasts are wrong is because of the small permutations that have an impact on the ability of the forecaster to predict the system under study. Edward Lorenz identified this systemic quality in conducting experiments on a very basic modeling system in which three simple non-linear equations formed the boundaries of 'climate'. Despite entering figures within one one-thousandth of being exactly correct, Lorenz found that the climate models he produced varied extensively over the longer term.⁴⁵ Such variation is typical of chaotic systems and

⁴³ This is precisely the problem that, with its emergence, convinced Lorenz that his climatic model might be chaotic. See Gleick, *Chaos*; Sprott and Linz, "Algebraically Simple," 1-2.

⁴⁴ Naomi Oreskes, "Why Predict? Historical Perspectives on Prediction in Earth Science," in *Prediction: Science, Decision Making and the Future of Nature*, eds. Daniel Sarewitz, Roger A. Pielke, Jr. and Radford Byerly, Jr. (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000), 36.

⁴⁵ See Gleick, *Chaos*, 17 for further elaboration on Lorenz's experiments with his climate model.

– if the international system is imagined to be chaotic – we should expect similar sensitivity to small elements within the system having an increasing effect on the wider system over time.⁴⁶

Secondly, the importance of unit or individual level events in a chaotic system cannot be underestimated.⁴⁷ What seems at face value to be unimportant may have far reaching effects on the wider system and may have a great impact on actors or agents that might usually ignore such matters.⁴⁸ Again, the metaphor of the butterfly effect is useful to illustrate this point: for all the information that is gathered on pressure, temperature, tides, wind speed and direction, daylight hours, humidity, and cloud cover, there is no data gathered on the habits of butterflies.⁴⁹ Though we know it is possible for such unit level effects to have significant system level impacts, it is either impractical or impossible to collect and analyze such data. In effect, our models

are never truly complete and, therefore, never truly correct.⁵⁰

It must be noted, however, that not every butterfly creates a distant storm every time it moves from flower to flower.⁵¹ Should this be the case then there would be no stability at all within the climatic system and even short-term predictions – for example, the likelihood of rain tomorrow – would become impossible. Thus, it should be noted, that just as these small events can have an impact on the wider system in significant ways, they could also *not have* an impact on the system in significant ways. There is no compulsion implied, only possibility, which, in turn, ensures that the chaotic system is sometimes driven by these tiny events and, at other times, does not react at all, despite being faced with perhaps millions of such small interactions at a time.

Finally, in a chaotic system we would expect that long-term prediction is not only unlikely but also truly impossible. Again returning to the example of the chaotic climate system, it is clear that short-term prediction is possible. After all, most meteorologists can predict with reasonable accuracy the weather for the following day and, in reality, many

⁴⁶ There has been previous suggestion that the international system might indeed be chaotic. Diana Richards investigated the quantitative data sets of George Modelski and William Thompson and found that the rise and fall of the great powers over the centuries of European and American hegemony was, indeed, chaotic in nature. See Diana Richards, “A Chaotic Model of Power Concentration in the International System,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (March 1993): 55-72. For the original data see George Modelski and William R. Thompson., *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*. (London: Macmillan Press, 1988).

⁴⁷ Young, “Chaos All Around,”.

⁴⁸ Young, “Chaos All Around,” 32.

⁴⁹ Excluding the work of lepidopterists, that is.

⁵⁰ As Henri Poincare points out, “Small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena.” in Marissa P. Justan, *The Butterfly Effect = Chaos Theory.*, Speech delivered to the Philippine Society of Youth Science Clubs, Cebu City, The Philippines, 4th April 2001.

⁵¹ In a similar vein, Freud noted: “Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar”. In chaos, sometimes a seemingly small and insignificant event is exactly that: small and insignificant.

laypersons can do the same.⁵² In the medium term, prediction is less likely to be correct, though it would still be most likely correct to claim that there will be a significant difference in temperature between January and August even if the exact difference is unknown. In the long-term, however, it is impossible to predict the chaotic climate outside of such general terms as ‘summer will be warmer than winter’ or ‘there will be more snow in Switzerland than the Sahara’.⁵³ The multiplication effect of billions of unit and system level events leads to a situation where the future is unpredictable in all but the most general terms – something useless to, say, a fisherman wanting to know whether some weekend will be rainy in some future time and place.

A chaotic international system would exhibit similar traits. Long-term prediction would prove impossible outside of general terms. While short-term prediction and even medium-term prediction would remain of some utility (for example, ‘next week the US will still be the world’s leading power’) long-term prediction will be impossible and such predictions are just as likely to be wrong as right (for example, ‘the US will be the world’s leading power in 2100’). Some correlation on this point can be drawn between the predictions of pundits at the dawn of the

20th century – who imagined that the Concert of European powers would reign in peace and authority for years to come – and the situation at the close of that same century: the Soviet Union had risen and then collapsed; Germany was again peaceful; Japan had demilitarized; the US was the global hegemon; China was a rising world power; the UK and France had retained only memories of colonial domination; and Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist as an entity at all.⁵⁴

It would seem, then, that there is at least a case to be made for the international system being a chaotic one rather than an anarchic one. Though it would seem that equating meteorological systems with political systems is, at first, a strange analogy to draw, it has also been demonstrated how there are more than superficial links between the two systems. Assuming the implications of chaos, particularly the three mentioned above, it is clear that the analysis, explanation, and prediction of international affairs by international relations scholars must also evolve with this changing concept of the system. Thus, let us turn to an example from within Central and Eastern Europe

⁵² There is indeed some meteorological truth to the folk saying, “Red sky at night, shepherds delight. Red sky in the morning, shepherd’s warning”.

⁵³ A parallel prediction in the international relations system might be something like ‘North America will still be further north than South America’. Of course, this is (very) likely to be true but it is not necessarily very useful information.

⁵⁴ One historian writes that in 1906 when US Ambassador to Britain, Whitelaw Reid, gave a speech entitled ‘The Greatest Fact in Modern History’ on the topic of the rise of the United States, it was not at all obvious to the audience that this was either the greatest fact or even a fact at all. See RA Mundell, “A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century,” *The American Economic Review* 90 (June 2000): 327. See discussion on the effects of the First World War on the major powers of the world in Paul M Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984): 30-37.

from the last century in order to demonstrate the difference between anarchic and chaotic interpretations of the international system. This paper turns, then, to the debate on the reasons for the outbreak of World War One.

The Origins of World War One: A Conventional Account

For the purposes of this paper, accounts of the origins of the First World War will be considered ‘conventional’ if they attach great significance to states, state actions and reactions, interlocking alliances, and anarchic interpretations of international relations. Conventional accounts would include, for example, Austrian Chief-of-Staff Conrad von Hötzendorff’s pronouncement that “...the First World War came about inevitably and irresistibly as the result of the motive forces in the lives of states...like a thunderstorm that must by nature discharge itself”.⁵⁵ Such accounts often rely on interpretations of the Grand Alliances that dominated European relations at the time of the outbreak of war in the Balkans. The most common sees Austria-Hungary drawn into conflict with Serbia; Russia mobilizing to assist Serbia; Germany moving to support Austria; France, bound by treaty to Russia, moving to counter Germany; and Britain moving to support neutral Belgium and, in some interpretations, France.⁵⁶ As

⁵⁵ Quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, *Franz Ferdinand Found Alive: World War One Unnecessary*, viewed 12th April 2006, <http://www2.hu-berlin.de/gesint/lehre/2002_2003/counterfact/lebow_wk1.pdf>, 2.

⁵⁶ Such accounts are standard in the international relations literature, painting a picture of inevitable

historian Richard Lebow notes, reasons for the inevitability of war in the anarchic system of the early 20th century range from “social Darwinism, [to] nationalism, the alliance structure, and shifts in the balance of power”.⁵⁷ Such terms resonate with not only historians but also international relations scholars: the ‘balance of power’ thesis and alliance politics remain central concepts in the realist and neorealist paradigms of international relations theory.⁵⁸

But such accounts also attach causal significance to these large factors – the alliances, the balancing – and little, if any, attention is paid to events or factors at the individual level of analysis. Thus, the importance of the Triple Entente is highlighted while local terrorist operations in Serbia are marginalized; the Germany/Austria-Hungary pact is brought to the fore while the interpretation by individuals of their responsibilities under

war brought on by alliance politics. Prototypical examples include: Organski, *World Politics*, 202-203; Robert Gilpin *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 200-201; F.H. Hinsley, “The Origins of the First World War,” in *Decisions for War*, ed. Keith Wilson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), and 4.
⁵⁷ Richard Ned Lebow, “Contingency, Catalysts and International System Change,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (Winter 2000/2001): 592.

⁵⁸ The ‘balance of power’ literature is immense. Diverse examples of this literature can be found in Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 3-43; R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” *World Politics* 38 (July 1986): 546-576; Han Dorussen, “Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (July 2000): 443-462.

such a pact are often left unexamined.⁵⁹ While the scale of the conflict had never been seen before (and, in some ways, has not been seen since), it would seem that international relations analysts have taken it upon themselves to also consider only the grand interactions that, in an anarchic realm, are the only ones that are held to matter anyway.⁶⁰ Thus, it is clear that the standard explanation for the beginning of the First World War is mainly concerned with Great Power Politics, entangling alliances, and a feeling of inevitability. In an anarchic system, where conflict is usually seen to be inevitable, this is to be expected.⁶¹ But imagining a system that is chaotic instead allows the analyst to draw different conclusions, even to suggest that the war might not have been inevitable after all.

The First World War in a Chaotic System

What would be different in an analysis of the beginnings of World War One if the

⁵⁹ Jack Levy attempts to counter the common claim that alliances lead to war in Jack S Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (December 1981): 581-613.

⁶⁰ There remain exceptions, of course. Bruce Russett lists many factors as contributing to the outbreak of World War One but the smaller, immediate events that spin out of control are labelled only 'surprises' and not 'real' causes. In doing so, Russett implies that such small matters have some importance in the beginning of the war but he does not attribute cause to them as one might in a chaotic system. See Bruce M. Russett, "Cause, Surprise, and No Escape," *The Journal of Politics* 24 (February 1962): 7-9.

⁶¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Mearsheimer, "False Promise,"

international system is assumed to be chaotic instead of anarchic? How much difference would it make to the explanation of the occurrence of the War and would it shed light on any issues that the conventional explanation does not? This section of the paper will address these questions in turn, showing by the time of its conclusion that the chaotic explanation is indeed different, the reasons for the war's occurrence are indeed very different, and that it provides far more illuminating treatment of the interdependencies that are the characteristic of both the pre-World War One system and the modern globalised system of today.

To begin with, a chaotic analysis would begin by paying less attention to the usual 'big' causal factors outlined above – for example, the alliance politics and power balancing of the great European rivals – and instead search for small unit or agent level realities that can be seen to have had a significant effect on the wider system. For example, consider the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo on the 28th of June 1914. The Archduke was only in Sarajevo for reasons of protocol, having arrived in Bosnia with the main mission of overseeing troop movements in the region.⁶² He traveled with his wife in an open car and – after surviving one unsuccessful assassination attempt in the morning – died in a successful second

⁶² Michael Duffy, *Who's Who: Archduke Franz Ferdinand*, viewed 14th April 2006, <<http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/ferdinand.htm>>

attempt just before midday. But what of this second attempt? History holds that it was only a wrong turn by a confused chauffeur that put the Archduke and his wife anywhere near the assassin who eventually killed them. Could the lives of millions in World War One really have hung on the driving skills of a single man?⁶³

In a chaotic system, such seemingly insignificant events are *exactly* what determine the outcomes, even ones as devastating as the Great War. But consider not only this single event but also all of the others that were involved in putting the Archduke in Bosnia that day. Firstly, had his closer-to-the-throne relative not died, it would have been unlikely that the Ferdinand would have even been sent to Bosnia to review the troop exercises. Indeed, when he was born it seemed that there was little chance that Franz would

⁶³ Indeed, such questions haunt security scholars. Consider this from an editorial in *International Security*: “Though distant in time, the disaster of 1914 continues to haunt the contemporary security debate. In the nuclear age, the images that remain from the summer of 1914 – the escalation from an isolated event in a far corner of Europe to global war, the apparent loss of control of the situation by key decision-makers, the crowding out of diplomacy by military exigencies, the awful, protracted, often senseless slaughter on the battlefield – raise troubling doubts about our ability to forever conduct affairs of state safely in an international environment plagued by the ever-present risk of thermonuclear war” (emphasis added). Such escalation, or feedback, and the ‘apparent’ loss of control can be interpreted as signposts of a chaotic system. *International Security*, “The Great War and the Nuclear Age: Sarajevo after Seventy Years,” *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984): 3.

ever be close to being heir to the throne, let alone be groomed for the crown, as he was when he died.⁶⁴ Secondly, had his political views not been so widely misinterpreted outside of his own empire, it would seem that he would be an unlikely target for the Black Hand group.⁶⁵ Thirdly, had he not chosen to visit Sarajevo on the feast of St Vitus – a day on which the local Serbians traditionally take part in patriotic observances – the Archduke might not have been targeted at all.⁶⁶ Fourthly, as the Archduke’s wife,

⁶⁴ Samuel Williamson’s history of Ferdinand’s rise to the position of heir, along with the increased policy role that he played in the Austria-Hungary Empire, is instructive on this point. See Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, “Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906-1914,” *The Historical Journal* 17 (June 1974): 417-434.

⁶⁵ Historian John Langdon describes the Archduke as a “misunderstood statesman” and argues that most in the monarchy were “thoroughly wrong in their evaluations of Ferdinand”. See John W. Langdon, “Emerging From Fischer’s Shadow: Recent Examinations of the Crisis of July 1914,” *The History Teacher* 20 (November 1986): 67-68.

⁶⁶ The entry of the Archduke to the region on St Vitus’ Day was interpreted as an insult to the Serbs. See Michael S. Neiburg, *Warfare and Society in Europe: 1898 to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2004) 27. Also, though she finishes with placing the blame for the outbreak of war on Germany, Bernadotte Schmitt does note the significance of St Vitus’ Day in Serbia and in motivating the Black Hand. Bernadotte Schmitt, “The Origins of the War of 1914,” *The Journal of Modern History* 24 (March 1952): 71. Other authors who allude to the significance of this day for nationalist Serbians – both historically and in more recent times – include: Fred Singleton, *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 47; Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) 44-45.

Sophie, was not accorded the respect in Austria-Hungary a woman in her position would normally expect (owing to her parentage and 'station' in life at the time they were married), then Ferdinand would not have had to leave Austria-Hungary in order to fete her in public for their anniversary.⁶⁷ Whereas at home it would not be normal for the heir to parade with his wife in public, in Bosnia, far from home, it was completely acceptable. Thus, to celebrate their anniversary, the couple set to the streets of Sarajevo together, an action that might not have occurred had the Archduke been able to parade his wife in Vienna.

Thus, we see that some distinctly sub-system events conspired and interacted to place the Archduke in the firing line of Gavrilo Princip, the assassin who finally took the lives of the couple. A few small changes in the historical, cultural, or social realities of the time would have seen either a completely different series of events lead up to the war or, perhaps and more interestingly, the war not occur at all. It is obviously fantasy to imagine the shape of the world without a war that took millions of lives, saw the birth of new international institutions, and – it is argued – was a factor in the destruction that would occur as a result of World War Two. Indeed, some would say that these are simply the musings of someone with an interest in the 'what ifs?' and 'but ifs?'

⁶⁷ On the nature of Ferdinand and Sophie's particular style of marriage, known as morganatic, see discussion in David DeVoss, *Searching for Gavrilo Princip*. Viewed 17th April 2006, <http://w3.salemstate.edu/~cmauriello/pdf_his102/princip.pdf>.

of history – but in the chaotic realm it is the what-ifs and but-ifs that, in interacting, define the system. The little things in a system *do* matter and the smallest events eventually conspire to effect massive change. Unlike an anarchic system where nobody is in control, everyone in a chaotic system is in control and every interaction can affect every other.

Conclusion: The Utility of the Chaotic System Metaphor

This article argues that the assumption of anarchy limits the analysis of international affairs by international relations scholars. It argues that such limitations can be overcome by assuming an international system that is complexly interdependent, sensitive to initial conditions, and particularly sensitive to small effects both at and below the international level. Further, it is argued that this alternate conception of the international political system has some major implications for the explanation of significant international events. Drawing on this premise, this article offers a case study of the origins of World War One as an example of the differing explanations that result when one begins from the premise that the system is anarchic and, alternatively, when one begins from the premise that the international system is, in fact, chaotic.

Imagining the pre-World War I system as chaotic not only allows the analyst to see the impact that small events have on a wider system, but it also instructs us in the failures of those who attempt to analyze the happenings of the time. With a concentration on events at the national or

international level, few analysts or foreign policy advisors would have had cause to warn the Archduke not to travel to a region that, officially and legally, was part of his domain. With a concentration on the alliances of the continent, people of the time ignored local uprisings and terrorist groups – perhaps in much the same way that, during the Cold War, the great powers ignored an emerging terrorist problem of their own. In a chaotic system the analyst is forced to look beyond the great problems and powers or else he or she is likely to miss the ‘little things’ that eventually shape the world and, in this case study, the greatest conflict humankind had known to that point in global history.

The origin of World War One remains one of the most contested questions in international political and military history. Some continue to point to the inevitability of the conflict, resorting to theoretical support from realists and neorealists who maintain that, under anarchy, war is likely and often just a matter of poor balancing by states. But a focus on the large matters in international relations has not helped to explain the modern international system, nor predict major events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the falling of the Berlin Wall. Unit or individual level analysis would have helped to predict and explain these events, but only when the individual level interactions are considered important enough to affect the entire system. Thus, the same seemingly insignificant matters – a small group of terrorists in a Soviet occupied Afghanistan, for example – arise time and again. And, time and again, we are

surprised that such small matters can have such a significant impact on the entire system. As Richard Lebow argues, “what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of its alleged causes but the pattern of interaction between them” – assuming a chaotic system allows the analyst to focus on the effects of such interactions, an option not open to those who base their analysis on an anarchic model.⁶⁸

It remains the argument of this article that this is unlikely to change while international relations studies persist with the notion that the international system is anarchic when, it would seem, there is at least a chance that it may be something else. The example of the beginning of World War One is simply a pertinent case study where a series of small matters – the date of arrival in a hostile area and the woman the heir to the throne fell in love with, for example – combine to bring about an event so massive that it became known as ‘The War to End All Wars’. Without a new paradigm, international relations will continue to misdiagnose the past, hampering its ability to explain the present and, one day, predict the storms which sweep the system as we know it today.

⁶⁸ Lebow, *Franz Ferdinand Found Alive*, 3.

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IS THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION THE MEAN FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

NIKOLAOS PANAGIOTOU

Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Public Relations & Communication, Technological Educational Institution (TEI) of Western Macedonia, Greece. nikpanagio@yahoo.com

Abstract

The article examines democratic peace theory. Considerable research has examined how the regime type and the level of democracy relate with the probability of war. In addressing this issue, the article rests on the premise that democratization can be seen in two forms: a) as an internal process towards democracy b) as an external effort to promote or establish democratic regimes. Contributing to the debate regarding democratic peace theory, it is argued that democratization fails to deter states from pursuing their interests through war. However, and with regard to new forms of 'wars' like "terrorism", democratization can provide both the much needed space for cooperation and the creation of pluralistic societies that will accordingly help to confront some of the sources of rage.

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the world believed that a new era was starting - one that would be characterized by democracy, stability, and economic

prosperity. As the former Communist regimes were making their first steps towards democracy, some suggested that the world reached the end of history¹, and the majority of public opinion believed that we were reaching a more peaceful world. The question of whether democratization might be the answer for a safer world, however, has been in the world's agenda again after the last Iraqi elections.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate regarding democratic peace theory, a well established research field that has been extremely divisive among political scientists. The first part of the paper will mainly focus on the presentation of the debate regarding the democratic peace hypothesis while the second part will focus on my contribution to the topic. It is argued that the theory makes a positive contribution in cases of political exclusion that accordingly lead to acts of terrorism, as democratization confronts some of the sources of rage. In these cases, supporting internal democratic movements may be far more successful and less costly. It fails though to deter states from pursuing their interests

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of History and the Last Man* (Harmondsworth 1992)

through the use of force. In addition, I argue that democratic peace theory draws necessary attention to domestic factors by widening and enriching the research field of international relations.

The Democratic Peace Hypothesis

As early as 1795, the German Philosopher Immanuel Kant posited that governmental form could influence the overall characteristic for peacefulness of a particular state. Republican states would enjoy a “perpetual peace” with other republics.² This peace would be the result of a legally protected freedom, representative government, and the separation of powers. “Cosmopolitan law” would characterize their external relations and a “pacific union” would be established by a treaty among the republics. Despite the fact that Kant focuses on ‘republics’, some academics, even politicians, have applied his approach to democracies too.

The debate that linked democracy with peace, called democratic peace theory, was put forward in the early 1980s following the work of R. Rummel, M. Doyle and, in 1993, that of B. Russett.³

² Immanuel Kant, *Kant's political writings*, Edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B.Nisbet, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970)

³ R.J.Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (27:11983): 27-71; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12:3 (1983),205-235, Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12:4(1983): 323-353; Russett Bruce,

The theory of democratic peace has been used to explain and predict the behaviour of international actors with respect to the decision to engage in war. It relies upon two primary principles: a) “major war (over 1000 total casualties) has been occurring between democracies at an extremely low rate, and b) the support of this “proposition relies upon a definition of what constitutes major war that limits it to conflicts that resulted in greater than 1000 casualties”⁴ In line with these views, Huntington has argued that “the spread of democracy in the world means the expansion of the zone of peace in the world”³ and Boutros-Ghali, the former General Secretary of UN, stated that “democratic” states are more legitimate than others and as a result are less likely to have domestic conflicts or become embroiled in regional wars. Other recent efforts to expand the empirical evidence for this claim include the work of Bremer 1992, Maoz and Abdolali 1989, Oneal and Russett 1997, and Ray 1995.

Democratic peace theory challenges realist prospects about peace and their

Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman OK 1991); Mintz, Alex and Bruce Russett, “Why Don't Democracies fight each other? An experimental assessment of the “Political Incentive” explanation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993)

⁴ John Norton Moore, *Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) supra note 1, at xviii

emphasis on systemic factors. Even more, it challenges the argument that domestic factors hardly play any role in international relations. As Dixon argues,

international disputes of democratic states are in the hands of individuals who have experienced the politics of competing values and interests and who have consistently responded within the normative guidelines of bounded competition. In situations where both parties to a dispute are democracies, not only do both sides subscribe to these norms, but the leaders of both are also fully cognizant that bounded competition is the norm, both for themselves and their opponents.⁵

In spite of the argument that democracies may never fight each other, the theory of democratic peace relies upon the assumption that democracies do not initiate wars, but rather respond in self defence to actions by non-democracies. In this case “liberal democracies can, of course, fight states that are not”,⁶ since it will result in a more peaceful world. Democratic peace theory divides the world into peace and war zones. The former includes the zones that are constituted of democracies, while the latter zones are constituted of non-democratic regimes. Democratic governments are more reluctant to go to war because of the importance of public opinion and the existence of democratic institutions. Public opinion is perceived as a moral notion. It plays an important role

in questioning and approving the policy makers, as citizens are called to contribute in blood and money. This concept relies upon the idea that in a democracy, the electorate bears the costs of any decision to engage in aggressive military behavior.⁷ This appears to be valid, as Lyndon Johnson discovered in 1968 where the Vietnam conflict played a major role in that year’s elections.⁸ The existence of democratic institutions imposes restraints on government decisions. “States with executives responsible to a selection body, with institutionalized political competition, and with decision making responsibility spread among multiple institutions or individuals, can be expected to be more highly constrained and hence less likely to go to war.”⁹

Importantly, the relationship of relative peace among democracies is a result of some features of democracy, rather than being caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with democracy.¹⁰ The phenomenon of democratic peace can be explained by the pervasiveness of the normative restraints on conflict between democracies. The cultural norm of “live and let live” constitutes another important factor that

⁵ Dixon, William, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict" *American Political Science Review* 88, (1994):14--32

⁶ Fukuyama, The end, 263

⁷ Moore, Solving, 11

⁸ Nick Cohen, “Come on, you liberals” *The Observer* (4 November 2001):33

⁹ Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth Of the Democratic Peace” in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michalel Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (The MIT Press, 1996). 161

¹⁰ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)

operates between democracies, a spirit which leads them to peaceful resolution of disputes between themselves.

Doyle¹¹ argues that democratic peace does not result from a commonly shared political system. Rather than constitutional restraints, their common commercial-economical interests and their interest in preserving and guarding the rights of individuals constitute the basis upon which democratic peace is established. In the event that they go to war, they are still more cautious than autocracies. These common principles enable the creation of peace between democracies, but might also be the reason for conflict between democratic and non-democratic states. Doyle suggests that liberalism in this relationship with non-democratic regimes leads to three confusing failings: The first two are what Hume called “imprudent vehemence” and conversely, a “careless and supine complaisance” the third is the political uncertainty that is introduced by the moral ambiguity of the liberal principles which govern the international distribution of property.¹²

Doyle and Russett support the “perpetual peace” that has been represented by Immanuel Kant, based upon states bound by “republican constitutions”. They consider that his meaning is compatible

with the basic contemporary understanding of democracy.

Democratic peace theory rooted in the idealist and classical liberalist tradition has come to be widely accepted while equally faced with several logically distinguishable classes of criticism.

Democratization Does Not Lead To Peace

Alexis de Tocqueville¹³ seriously doubted the democratic ability to pursue stable and enlightened foreign policies. Following de Tocqueville’s ideas, Waltz and Layne¹⁴ challenge the idea that democratic states abandon the power balance game in order to pursue universal values. Domestic factors or ideology do not have an impact on the international behaviour of a state, since systemic factors of the international system are the ones that determine the behaviour of a state. As Kenneth Waltz argues, “[i]n self-help systems, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures”.¹⁵ According to Layne, “[f]ear and distrust of the other states is the normal state of affairs,” whilst “in realist world, survival and security are always at risk, and democratic states will respond no differently to democratic rivals

¹¹ Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (The MIT Press, 1996). 30-50

¹² Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, 31

¹³ Tocqueville Alexis de, *Democracy in America* (New York: Anchor Books, 1969).

¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, “A Reply to my Critics” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 329; Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth Of the Democratic Peace”, 163-164.

¹⁵ Waltz, “A Reply to my Critics”, 329.

than to non-democratic ones”.¹⁶ Realists support their view with references to wars that have been fought between democracies, like the US Civil War, the Fashoda Crisis, and the Franco-German Crisis in 1923.

Layne¹⁷ examines the normative explanation of why democracies will not go to war. His findings demonstrate that democracies pursue their national interest as the realists predict. Layne dismisses recent perceptions espoused mostly by American policymakers and present even in President Bush speeches, that through the spread of democracy, peace zones will be created, which will serve US interests. As he argues, democratic peace illusions probably will lead to “disastrous military interventions abroad, strategic overextension, and the relative decline of American Power”¹⁸.

In another study, Mansfield and Snyder equally criticize the theory that democratization promotes peace by suggesting that “democratizing states are much more war-prone than states that have undergone no regime change”¹⁵. During the transitional era towards democracy the risk of war is greater, since

“threatened elites from the collapsing autocratic regime...use nationalist appeals to compete mass allies with each other and new elites”.¹⁹

According to critics of democratic peace theory, facts and not hope should be what guide the foreign policies of states. The adoption of democratic peace theory among policy makers, especially after the collapse of Communism, jeopardizes stability and creates more dangers for the international system. Interventionism in implementing democracy would lead to a “crusade” and inevitably to the eruption of more conflicts.

Contesting Democratic Peace Theory?

Nevertheless, democratic peace theory has triggered an important debate. Its importance has increased with developments in the late 20th century, and more recently, before and after the Iraq war. Many academics, writers, and journalists argued in favor or against the Iraqi war in terms of the benefits or lack thereof that democracy would bring to the country and to the region. This debate enables us to evaluate the democratization process and the hopes put upon it. Although Russett and Doyle present their hypothesis as a proven theory, their ideas are better characterised as a hypothesis. As Layne states: “... the casual relationship between the independent and dependent variables (that Doyle and Russett, using to prove their theory) is

¹⁶ Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, 163-164.

¹⁷ Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth Of the Democratic Peace”, 199

¹⁸ Ido Oren, “The Subjectivity of the “Democratic” Peace” in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (The MIT Press, 1996), 205.

¹⁵ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War” *International Security*, Vol.20, No. 1, (Summer 1995): 34

¹⁹ Mansfield & Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, 34.

neither nor adequately explained.”²⁰ If we examine democratization as an internal process we see that there is a strong connection, as Mansfield and Snyder argue²¹, between democratization and internal conflict. During the transition period and because of the power vacuum and the absence of democratic institutions, as the examples of Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia show, competition between the ruling elites can lead to war. The Soviet Union’s path towards democracy has been characterized by the eruption of internal conflicts. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the most recent one of Iraq demonstrate the risks contained during democratization. The institutional arrangements within consolidated democracies and the absence of that aspect in transitional democracies is a crucial factor that alters or ‘endorses’ conflict within a democratic state. The existence of institutional arrangements provides opportunities to negotiate a resolution of their mutual disputes rather than to fight. This is clearly shown in the analysis made by Hegre, Ellings, Scott, Gates, Gleditsch who suggest that “... regime change clearly and strongly increases the probability of civil war in the short run”²⁰

²⁰Cristopher Layne, “Kant or Cant. The Myth of Democratic Peace” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No2 (Fall1994): 5-49

²¹Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War” in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. M.Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (The MIT Press, 1996),302.

²⁰ Hegre Harvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petters Cleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil

If democratization is seen as an effort by democratic states to establish democracy elsewhere in the world we may in fact deal with another round of violent conflicts, due to what Chan calls a democratic crusade.²¹ Democratization as a tool of foreign policy can often be perceived as expansionist and interventionist by those inside the countries in the process of democratization. Such a process can destabilize the status quo and be exploited by internal forces for their own ends, thereby endangering conflict. Pursuing a policy of democratization may create wars in precisely those situations where the intention is to avoid them. Intervention in Somalia is a useful empirical example of a country where the attempts to implement a Western-type democracy lead to disregard of the internal power balance and traditions, with disastrous consequences. In addition, the case of Iraq clearly demonstrates that “the main lesson to be learned is that while the development of democracy can be aided from outside, it cannot easily be imposed by force”.²²

I consider the distinction between zones of democratic peace and zones of war forwarded by the democratic peace hypothesis to be as dogmatic as the Islamic division of the world into a peaceful part (the Islamic community, Dar

War, 1816-1992” *American Political Science Review* v95 i1, (March 2001):33

²¹ Chan, Steve, “In search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise” *Mershon International Studies Review*47 (1997): 45-65.

²² Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Does increasing democracy undercut terrorists?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, (Sept 22, 2005): 09.

al-Islam) and a hostile part (the unbelievers, the house of war, Dar al-Harb). In fact both the democratic zone and the Islamic world are characterised by internal conflicts and wars. This is a critical factor that the Russett and Doyle hypothesis overlooks. In their hypothesis democracies are presented as a unified and unproblematic variable whilst they fail to capture the power struggle in two crucial stages: a) inside democratic regimes and b) the power balance in relations between democratic states. In international relations and even in organizations that are being formed by democratic states, there is a power struggle.

We should acknowledge, however, that Democratic peace theory has made a positive contribution to International Relations theory by drawing attention to the dynamic and dialectical logic of domestic factors upon the construction of foreign policy. It demonstrates that governments are not the only factors that should be taken into account. In contrast, it has widened and enriched the research field to encompass non-governmental organizations, citizens, lobby groups, corporations, and media.

Contrary to what the “realist” approach suggests, we are witnessing a change in the way governments are conducting foreign policy. Democratic peace theory is right to emphasize the role of public opinion in influencing foreign policy, despite the fact that it is not a factor that permanently advances the cause of peace. That domestic politics matter is proven by the case of Britain when it lost interest in an alliance with Austria-Hungary when

the Conservatives took office in 1880, and from Germany, which dropped its alliance with Russia in 1891 partly because of “political shifts within [Germany]”²³. In addition and in contrast to the terrible human losses of World War I, governments are today more reluctant to take action using ground troops and feel the need to appease public opinion. The effort made to persuade the public of the necessity of action both in the Gulf War, in Afghanistan, and recently in Iraq proves that governments cannot ignore other factors in the conduct of foreign policy. I consider that democratic peace theory, whilst having a positive effect on International Relations theory, fails since it ignores the power struggle between and inside the states. In the first case, states might share the same type of regime, but this does not automatically mean that they share the same interests or the methods of securing them. In relation though with the number of casualties that is used as a method of evaluation of what constitutes a major war, it is unclear why an act of aggression resulting in fewer than 1000 casualties should be ignored in the evaluation. Whilst in the second case, and especially in the intermediate period of transition to democracy as Mansfield and Snyder found, “domestic political competition is intense. Politicians, vying for power, appeased domestic hard-liners by resorting to nationalistic appeals that vilified foreigners, and these policies often

²³ Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73.

led to wars that were not in the countries' strategic interests".²⁴

Terrorism and civil wars pose the biggest threat to today's international system since "these acts are conducted outside normal political bounds, involving symbolic violence ...in order to weaken the bonds between the legitimate government and society"²⁵. If we perceive terrorist acts as acts of war or acts that lead to war, I suggest that democracy might have a positive effect since "the name of the game is precisely to shift their calculus of self-interest towards peaceful politics, by increasing both the costs of violence and the benefits of participation".²⁶ Dictatorships and non-democratic regimes, in particular those in the Arab world, through the prohibition of political parties, as Talat Masood argues, have "created a gap that it is being filled by radical religious extremists who represent 'disintegrative tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism'".²⁷ This religious extremism is based mainly on the lack of representative institutions through which people can claim their beliefs and determine their future. The prohibition of political activity, the corruption, and the chasm between the ruling elites and the rest of the population

results in people turning to religion extremism. In this case we have to notice that democratization in itself cannot address in whole the problem that terrorism poses to modern societies. After all, the terrorist attacks in London were carried out by British citizens in one of the world's oldest democracies, while the Oklahoma City bombing was carried out by Timothy McVeigh, an American citizen. With regard though to these challenges, democracy can be a useful tool, promoting pluralistic societies and minimizing the chances that citizens will resort to terrorist's calls, as proven by the recent moderate steps that have been taken in Bahrain, Oman, and Morocco (Nye 2005, 9).²⁸ As Moore notes "the absence of democracy, the absence of effective deterrence, and, most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both are conditions or factors that predispose to war"²⁹. In the case of terrorism, the dynamic and dialectical nature of the democratization process might be a solution, since as Nye suggests, "[w]e need to create a narrative about a better future that undercuts the message of hate and violence promoted by the extremists".³⁰ In this case, the development of political institutions will provide the political space needed for

²⁴ John M. Owen IV, "Iraq and the Democratic Peace" *Foreign Affairs* v84 i6 (Nov-Dec 2005):122.

²⁵ Baljit Singh, "An Overview," in *Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977). 7

²⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, "A little democracy is a dangerous thing-so let's have more of it" p.25

²⁷ Benjamin R. Barber: "Ballots versus bullets" *Financial Times Weekend* (20/21October 2001) p. I.

²⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Does increasing democracy undercut terrorists?" 09.

²⁹ Moore, *Solving*, 67

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Does increasing democracy undercut terrorists?" 09.

genuine participation that in turn can be channelled toward social progress.³¹

Conclusions

In the light of the evolution that has taken place in international relations, I have attempted to evaluate the democratic peace hypothesis. As it results from my analysis, the claim that democratic states hardly ever fight each other remains contested since democracy as a regime type fails to deter states from pursuing their interests through war. As Paul and Hall suggests “we do not think that the nature of international relations can be read off the brute structure of the power of states”.³² We have to recognize, though, that in cases of political exclusion that encourage people to resort to means of violence, democratization could contribute to some extent in dealing with these issues. The democratic process triggers transformations in institutions that favour participation and thus deter people from resorting to other means of action such as terrorism etc. This process might ‘not deflect them (Al Qaeda) from their course’ but it will certainly limit their possibilities to find followers³³ since it will contribute to their isolation from the majority of the population. In that sense, what “we in the community of established liberal democracies should do is not

abandon the pursuit of democratisation but refine it”.³⁴ Bearing that in mind, it is evident that much theoretical, empirical, and methodological work remains to be done, in order to reach firmer conclusions as to whether or not a regime change contributes to the fight against terrorism.

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³¹ Anwar Ibrahim, “The growth of democracy is the answer to terrorism,” *International Herald Tribune* (September 2003): 7.

³² T.V.Paul and J.A.Hall ed, *International Order and the Future of World Politics* (Cambridge: University Press 1999).125

³³ Anwar Ibrahim, “The growth of democracy is the answer to terrorism,” 7.

³⁴ Ash, “A little democracy is a dangerous thing-so let’s have more of it,” 7.

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SOCIAL POLICY REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA: FACING THE EU CHANGES

SIMONA VONICA RADUTIU

PhD student in Sociology, University of Bucharest,
simona_vonica@yahoo.com

Abstract

*This paper elaborates on the context of social policy reform in East European countries. The research question addressed by this paper is through which path of development the Romanian welfare state is facing post-communist challenges, particularly the accession to EU. What are the implications of adopting the *acquis communautaire* for the configuration of Romanian social policy? The research hypothesis is that the negotiation process in the social field is shaping the development of Romanian social policy, particularly as regards the institutional design. The first part of the paper outlines Romanian social policy during the communist period and the social achievements during the transition period. The second part takes a closer look at social Europe and the impact of the negotiation process on Romanian social policy. The paper concludes that the EU has played an important role in shaping Romanian social policy during the postcommunist period.*

Introduction

The accession of ten countries on the 1st of May 2004 has represented the first stage

of the fifth EU enlargement¹, a complex process set to be finished by the forthcoming accession of Romania and Bulgaria. The negotiation process with the 12 candidate countries was officially opened in two consecutive approval sessions in 1998 and 2000.² The second wave countries (including Romania and Bulgaria) were expected to catch up with the first wave countries and join the EU at once. Due to delays in the negotiation process, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania was postponed until 2007, but it was considered to be part of the same “inclusive and irreversible enlargement process”.³

The EU enlargement has a direct impact on the political, economic, and social configuration of Europe today. The

¹ The earlier EU enlargements took place as follow: 1st enlargement 1973 (Britain, Denmark, Ireland), 2nd enlargement 1981 (Greece), 3rd enlargement 1986 (Spain and Portugal) and 4th enlargement 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden)

² On 31 March 1998 negotiations started with six candidate countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and continued on 15 February 2000 with a second session of negotiations with the other six countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia)

³ “*Presidency Conclusions – Copenhagen, 12 and 23 December 2002*” (European Commission, Brussels, 2002): 2, 5

greater stability of the region is a strategic condition to maintain peace and avoid conflicts such as the Yugoslavian war. With more than 460 million people, the EU 25 is the largest international market with a focus on achieving Lisbon's goal of becoming the "*most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world*"⁴ by 2010. January 2007 will represent a historical unification of the East and West part of Europe oriented towards commonly agreed-upon goals such as the Economic and Monetary Union.

Beside advantages, the coexistence of all member states poses many problems in terms of adjusting the mechanisms of EU 15 to the needs of EU 25, and the compatibility of various national structures. In the social area, one of the main challenges of EU enlargement is the implementation of *acquis* related to compatibility of social insurance schemes at the European level. More precisely all member states have to assure the institutional and administrative support necessary to successfully implement Council Regulation 1408/1971 modified by version 118/1997 for applying social security systems to employees, self-employed, and their family members moving in the European Union.

While compatibility within the EU 15 has a history, efforts are required for new members. In this context, the analysis of the status of affairs in the new member

states and the candidate countries is highly relevant. The social policy reform in East European countries, in particular the Romanian case, represents the context of this study. It explores the impact of the transition period on the development of post-communist social policy. The research question addressed by this paper is through which path of development the Romanian welfare state is facing post-communist challenges, particularly the accession to EU. As a candidate country, Romania has to completely adopt the *acquis communautaire*, which represents the minimum set of common legal regulations all member states must share. The institutional and administrative capacities necessary to implement all legal provisions represent a key condition to be fulfilled by candidate countries.

The goal of the paper is to explore the impact of EU enlargement on Romanian social policy from the institutional and legislative point of view. What are the implications of adopting the *acquis communautaire* for the configuration of Romanian social policy framework? The research hypothesis is that the negotiation process in the social field is shaping the development of Romanian social policy, particularly the institutional design.

In terms of methodology, Romanian social policy is analyzed as a case study. Primary research was concentrated on an overview of the legislation and institutional design. The sources of information were national and European legislation in the social area, research reports, publications, and official reports related to the negotiation process. The reports on monitoring the

⁴ "Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23/ 24 March 2000" (European Commission, Brussels, 2000):2

progress of Romania were also analyzed, as their main purpose was to assess the achievements made towards accession. The progress relative to chapter 13 'Employment and social policy' were selected due to relevance for this paper.

The concept use in this paper is 'social policy' interlinked with the 'welfare state'. Christoffer Green-Pedersen distinguishes two sets of definition for the 'welfare state'. In a wider sense, the welfare state refers to the space between state and labor, and it is focused on specific areas such as social policy, macroeconomic policy, industrial policy, tax policy, and industrial relations. In a narrower sense, the welfare state is synonymous with social security including transfers such as unemployment benefits, pensions, social assistance, social services and health services, childcare, and education.⁵ In this paper, the welfare state is approached in the narrow sense because of the interest in exploring the impact of EU accession on national social policy from the point of view of compatibility with other European systems, especially in terms of institutional design and legislation.

For a better understanding of the 'social policy' concept, it should be mentioned that it is organized as a public system and is considered the "main preoccupation of modern public policy".⁶ Social policy

⁵ Christoffer Green-Pedersen, "How Politics Still Matters" (PhD diss., University of Aalborg, 2000): 13

⁶ Francis G. Castels, *The future of the welfare state – crisis myths and crisis realities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 169

refers to the state's actions concerned with welfare provision to all citizens. This state intervention follows social directions established by political actors,⁷ taking into consideration inputs from all relevant social actors: trade unions, civil society, representatives of communities, and citizens. Social policy can be defined as activities of the Government and other actors which modify the free play of labor forces in the form of social redistribution, social regularization, and social rights.⁸

The paper is structured in two parts. The first part of the paper gives an overview of Romanian social policy during the communist period and the social achievements made during the transition period. The second part takes a closer look at social Europe and the impact of the negotiations process on Romanian social policy.

PART I: Social policy in Romania during the communist period

This part examines the developments of institutional design and analyzes the configuration of the social protection scheme. During the communist period, one could identify two taboos in discussion on social policy: unemployment and social expenditures. Unemployment was not recognized by

⁷ Catalin Zamfir, "Directii ale reformei statului bunastarii" (Directions of welfare state reform) in "Politici sociale în Romania în context european" (*Social policies in Romania within European context*), Catalin Zamfir and Elena Zamfir, eds., (Bucharest: Alternative Publishing House, 1995): 12

⁸ Bob Deacon, "Editorial" in "Global Social Policy", (SAGE, 2001): 5

authorities despite the large proportion of people affected in the 1980s. The lack of unemployment was considered to be an effect of the complete use of the labor force.⁹ The social expenditure taboo was connected to the fear of admitting the excessive costs of maintaining the social design of socialist societies. If they cut social benefits, political elites would lose the political support of workers not willing to accept social benefits decrease.¹⁰

The core of social policy was oriented towards work and the protection of workers. The institutional design developed slowly during the communist regime mainly because of the lack of a coherent strategy in the context of ideological constraints. At the central level, the institution in charge of regulating the social field was the Ministry of Labor, a public body established in 1920, and oriented towards labor organization and protection. The Ministry was reorganized several times under different names: the Ministry of Labor, Public Health, and Social Care; the Ministry of Labor, Cooperation, and Social Insurances; the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Care; and the State Committee for Labor Issues, and Salaries. During this time, other areas of responsibility under the umbrella of work

protection were taken into consideration such as labor legislation, work repartition, and labor education. In 1943 the State Department of Labor was set up inside the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Care. In 1944 the ministry was separated into three institutions. During 1960-1967, the State Committee for Labor Issues and Salaries was fully responsible for labor. The Ministry of Labor was re-established in 1968 and functioned until 1990, when specific responsibilities and areas of concern were reorganized¹¹.

Other institutions involved in social policy provision were politically controlled. In collaboration with institutions at the central level, enterprises and trade unions were formally involved in managing the distribution of social services or family allowances depending on political decisions, but access to welfare was conditioned by access to the labor market, as the state was assuring jobs for all.¹²

The development of legislation in the social field followed the same ideological preference for work. First, laws adopted were focused primarily on work protection. The Law on Organization of Labor Repartition adopted in 1921 was followed by other regulations in the field of employment such as the Law for Professional Training and Jobs (1936), the Law Regulating Minimal Salaries in

⁹ Zamfir. "Directii ale reformei statului bunastarii" (*Directions of welfare state reform*): 25

¹⁰ Vladimir Rys, "From the Communist welfare state to social benefits of market economy: the determinants of the transition process in Central Europe", in *Challenges to the welfare state: internal and external dynamics for change*, Cavanna, Henry ed., (Edward Elgar, 1998): 142

¹¹ <http://www.prahova.anofm.ro/istoric.html> (accessed 10.11.2006)

¹² Malina Voicu, "Legitimitate si suport social pentru politicile sociale: Romania dupa 1989", (Legitimacy and support for social policies: Romania after 1989), (PhD. diss., University of Bucharest, 2004): 31

Private, Commercial, and Transport Enterprises (1939), and the Labor Code (1950). No references to unemployment benefits or means-tested benefits were stipulated in the law. The configuration of social policy was more focused on the protection of workers than the provision of welfare for all citizens. The main characteristics of the social policy were: wide coverage of social insurance schemes covering a broad set of risks related to income loss situations; work-based universal social benefits (in money or in kind); generous social benefits focused on children; preferences for providing social services rather than direct transfers of money; a non-discriminatory ethnic policy; and social housing support. The goal was to guarantee a relatively homogenous collective welfare in terms of complete eradication of poverty and promotion of an active policy to compensate differences between needs and resources through social benefits (applicable especially in the case of families with many children).¹³ Social policies promoted during the communist period were ideologically based, and unsustainable in a long term perspective mainly due to the high costs involved.¹⁴

In conclusion, the social protection scheme in communist Romania was a comprehensive one designed for workers.

¹³ Catalin Zamfir, ed. *Politica sociala in Romania (Social Policy in Romania)* (Bucharest: Expert Publishing House, 1999): 25 – 30

¹⁴ Bogdan Voicu, “Resurse, valori, strategii de viata. Spatii sociale de alegere in tranzitie” (Resources, values and life strategies. Social spaces of choice in transition) (PhD. diss., University of Bucharest, 2004): 27

In line with the ideological-based full use of the labor force, the social institutions were focused on issues related to work protection rather than social protection. Social legislation developed during the communist regime was ideologically focused on labor protection, not including means tested benefits or unemployment benefits.

Social policy in Romania during the transition period

After the revolution in 1989, social problems have constantly amplified and started to affect a higher number of people. The emergence and rapid increase of unemployment in Romania after 1989 has forced the authorities to officially recognize it and adopt necessary social measures to cope with the problem. The first step was the adoption of the Law 1/1991 on the social protection and professional reinsertion of unemployed persons. Little political attention was paid to the social field and it lasted more than 10 years, until an improved version was adopted. The Law 76/2002 on unemployment insurances and employment stimulation referred to active measures to increase employment. The negotiation process was opened at that time.

One element of change for Romanian social policy during transition was the establishment of a non-contributive system in Romania. The contributory scheme during communist period was a comprehensive one focused exclusively on workers. During the transition period, both contributive and non-contributive assistance systems in Romania kept the

same path of development and have only slowly progressed further.¹⁵ Developments in the 1990s in these two areas were not part of a comprehensive national social policy approach.¹⁶ The non-contributive assistance system was slow to react to social problems like children (especially adopted ones) and persons with disabilities. The care and constant involvement of NGOs has partially supplied social services provisions to those in need. The results, especially in the field of child care and youth protection, are remarkable and more visible than in any other area.

Social policies implemented during the transition period could have been characterized as a “*governmental culture of poverty*”¹⁷, with poor diagnosis of social problems and a lack of development and implementation of more appropriate social policies. Impact evaluations showed the low political interest, attention, and understanding of social issues in Romania. Social costs of transition included increased unemployment rates, a decreased number of paid jobs, a

decreased level of medium and small incomes, an explosion of the informal economy as an employment alternative, a decreased value of social benefits, increased social polarization, and social segregation.¹⁸ Major social problems during the transition from a planned to market economy in Romania were explosive rates of poverty, the spread of social exclusion, an increased informal economy, unemployment, lack of access to social services, and low education. Highly vulnerable groups exposed to social exclusion were children, young people, the elderly, long-term unemployed, the homeless, and the Roma population.

Political attention paid to social issues has increased considerably in the last several years mainly because of the assumed responsibilities towards accession into the EU. One area of visible developments is institution building in the social field. The Ministry of Labor and Social Care was established in 1920. As presented in the above section, the institution was reorganized several times under various names. The Ministry of Labor was reestablished in 1968 and functioned under this name till the decree on 5.01.1990 which changed the name to the Ministry of Labor and Social Care. By Governmental Decision 185/ 1990, representatives of the Ministry at the local level were established in each county residence and Bucharest. In 1992 the

¹⁵ Simona Ilie and Simona Vonica Radutiu, “Romanian Minimum Income Provision as a Mechanism to Promote Social Inclusion”, *NISPAcee Occasional papers in Public Administration and Public Policy*, (no. 1, Winter 2004): 4

¹⁶ Catalin Zamfir, ed. *Poverty in Romania: causes, anti-poverty policies, recommendations for action*, (Bucharest: Creative ID Publishing House, 2001)

¹⁷ Marian Preda, (2000) “The results of social policy in post-communist Romania: An increasing underclass and extensive social exclusion”, presented at the Conference on Social Security “*Social security in the global village*”, (Helsinki, 2000) : 17

¹⁸ Catalin. Zamfir, *O analiza critica a tranzitiei – ce va fi ‘dupa’ (A critical analyse of transition – what will be ‘after’)* (Iasi: Polirom Publishing House, 2004): 141 - 142

ministry was reorganized and the name changed to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, which again was transformed by reorganization in 2001 into the Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity. Finally, the 2003 reorganization changed the name to the Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarity and Family¹⁹. Despite these name changes, the structure of the central institution followed the same major interest in work and workers as during the communist regime. Despite structures formally adopted in each county in the early '90s, the provision of social benefits remained centralized. In the text of monitoring reports, it should be noted that the implementation of a decentralization process in Romania was the only element of constant criticism on behalf of the Commission.

Several legislative measures were initiated in the 2000s, especially under the framework of negotiation to EU. One major step was represented by the adoption of the Law 705/2001 on the national social assistance system. The law was followed by numerous secondary measures regulating the provision of family allowances, indemnities, and social services. It was adopted more than a decade after the change of political regime but it represents one of the first indicators of a coherent vision and strategy on social policy in Romania.

In line with the negotiation process, the Law 47/ 2006 on the organizing, functioning, and finance of the national social assistance system was adopted.²⁰ The establishment of the National Agency for Payment is envisaged in line with other efforts to assure the exportability of social security rights for workers. Other institutions to be created are Social Inspection, and the Social Observatory.²¹ These institutions are set up with the support of EU technical assistance and are to be functional soon after accession to EU.

During the transition period, social policy remained concentrated mainly on wage class protection and it has confronted difficulties in reacting to the reality of transition. Little political attention was paid to social policy. In the early 1990s, social legislation was adopted as a proactive measure to crisis situations, rather than as part of a coherent social policy with clearly established priorities. The slow development of unemployment and means-tested benefits exposed vulnerable groups to social exclusion. The path-dependencies of Romanian social policy during the transition period followed the communist heritage in terms of workers protection. However, the negotiation process has shifted to a more integrated vision. The next part will take a closer look at the progress achieved in this field.

PART II

The European social dimension

¹⁹<http://www.prahova.anofm.ro/istoric.html>,
<http://www.ddfssiasi.ro/prezentare.php> ,
<http://www.munca-valcea.ro/> and www.mmssf.ro
(accessed 10.11.2006)

²⁰ www.mmssf.ro (accessed 10.11.2006)

²¹ Law 47/ 2006, art. 28-30

This part is composed of two sections. The first one takes into account the characteristics of social Europe. The second one is more oriented towards progress in negotiating chapter 13 of the *acquis*: “Employment and social policy”.

When referring to social Europe, two aspects should be taken into consideration: the ‘*European social model*’ and *acquis communautaire*. The European social model does not represent a unique set of social measures imposed on member states. The essence of the European social model is a set of values commonly shared by all member states²². Common ideas are economic competitiveness, social cohesion, solidarity and responsibility of all actors involved, social dialogue, non-discrimination principle, and gender equality. Other aspects relate to education, culture, and environment protection.²³ According to recommendations of the Lisbon summit (2000), the *European social model* would support a knowledge-based society. Conclusions of the Nice summit (2000) and the Barcelona summit (2002) referred to modernization, improvement, and the role played by the *European social model*. EU social policy agenda 2000 – 2005 emphasized that the *European social model* would support the

Lisbon Agenda by promoting “full employment, economic dynamism and a higher social cohesion and equity in EU”.²⁴ Even if the ‘*European social model*’ is frequently mentioned in official documents, there is no definition in the Commission Glossary, a symptom of what the critics claimed was the Commission’s low interest in the social field.

References to the European Social Model converge on social cohesion as the common goal achievable by implementing national social policies that are able to assure opportunities for all EU citizens. The concept of European citizenship implies that the responsibility is on member states to assure equal rights and full access to social services and social assistance according to legal instruments agreed at the European level and taking into consideration national social regulations under the subsidiarity principle. The first step was represented by the Treaty of Rome guaranteeing the free movement of workers within the EU. The next step was the elaboration and implementation of the Council Regulation 1408/71 modified by version 118 / 1997 and 574/ 1972 on the exportability of social and family allowances within member states. Concretely a worker moving within the EU can receive social rights no matter the member state where she/he is located. General principles of EU regulations respected by member states are the exportability principle, the legislative principle, the non-

²² Alhadeff Giampiero and Katrin Hugendubel “What future for a social Europe?” in “*The Nordic model: A recipe for European success*”, Carlos Buhigas Schubert, Hans Martens eds., EPC Working Paper no 20, (September 2005): 101

²³ Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, “*EU enlargement versus social Europe? – The uncertain future of the European Social Model*”, (Cheltenham:Edward Elgar, 2003): 4-5

²⁴

<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10115.htm> (accessed 09.11.2006)

discrimination principle, and the summing up principle. Family allowances are provided depending on residence (if the working place is in the country of residence), the excepted countries being Belgium, Spain, Italy and Greece where allocations are granted depending on access to the labor market (e.g. Children allowances for employees). If the working country does not correspond to the residence country, the right is granted in favor of selecting the bigger amount without accumulation.²⁵

The negotiation with candidate countries implies three elements: the accomplishment of the Copenhagen criteria, adoption of *acquis communautaire*, and European status by geographical, economical, and cultural affiliation. As established at the Copenhagen Council (1993) the member state has to accomplish political and economic conditions and ensure the capacity to assume the obligations of member state. This involves the adherence to EU political, economical, and monetary goals. According to the Madrid European Council (1995) a candidate country must also assure the “conditions for a harmonious integration by adapting the administrative structures”.²⁶ The *acquis communautaire* includes:

²⁵ Yves Jorens, “EU regulations and family allowances”, Training session for the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family on the implementation of regulation 1408 / 1971 (09.09.2005) : 3, 7-12

²⁶

<http://www.infoeuropa.ro/jsp/page.jsp?cid=6422&lid=1> (accessed 04.03.2006)

the primary and secondary EU legislation adopted by EU institutions and included in the jurisprudence of the Justice Court of the European Union, in documents adopted in the framework of the external and Common Security Policy and Justice and Internal Affairs, in international agreements in which EU is involved and the ones signed between EU member states and referring to its activity²⁷

The *acquis* is organized into 31 chapters that correspond to common areas of interest for member states. The adoption of the *acquis* means integration in the national law and implementation. According to conclusions of the 1997 Luxemburg Council, the adoption of *acquis* equally means effective implementation by appropriate functioning institutions and allocated resources. Pre-adherence funds are available for a candidate country: PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD.

The references to European social model reflect a set of common visions in the social field at the European level. The negotiation process with a candidate country is achieved in line with these social goals and by use of specific tools such as the *acquis* and the pre-accession funds.

Negotiation of social acquis communautaire

²⁷ Romania si Uniunea Europeana (*Romania and European Union*) (Romanian Government, Bucharest): 6 www.mie.ro (accessed 05.04.2004)

This part more closely analyzes the progress of Romania in negotiating chapter 13, with a special focus on social protection and institution building. The negotiation of chapter 13 was considered by Romanian authorities to be a success due to the relatively short time allocated. It was opened in the second semester of 2001 during the Belgian presidency and provisionally closed in the first semester of 2002 during the Spanish presidency. The negotiation of chapter 13 was officially closed in December 2004.

The 1997 Opinion of the European Commission and 1998 – 2000 reports on the progress towards accession assessed the Romanian social area as not in line with EU regulations mainly due to slow progress registered in the areas concerned (labor law, equal treatment, health and safety at work, public health, social assistance) and low institutional capacity in terms of unclearly established responsibilities, inappropriately allocated resources, and weak inter-institutional cooperation. The 1998 Romanian government was criticized for the “lack of commitment to structural reforms”.²⁸ It was also criticized for the pace of strengthening the capacity of the Romanian public administration. As regards institutions yet to be established, the formal adoption of a legal framework without any real interest in allocating the necessary resources was criticized. Institutionally, it was expected that the Economic and Social Council would work

efficiently in cooperation with social partners. Despite the slow progress registered, the Romanian legislation was considered still not in line with the *acquis*, especially in areas such as health and safety at work, equal treatment, public health, and labor.²⁹ The situation of Romanian legislation remained unchanged in 1999 despite slow progress in the field of equal opportunities.³⁰ The opening of negotiation was affected by the capacity to implement structural reform of child care institutions, as it was assessed that the situation of institutionalized child care had deteriorated in Romania.³¹ The 2000 report of the Commission mentioned limited progress in adopting the *acquis* and refers to further efforts needed in the field of legal and institutional frameworks.³²

The 2001 report is the first one that mentions mixed progress in labor law and social protection areas but next steps were needed, especially as the 2001 Gothenburg European Council recommended to candidate states to incorporate the promotion of social

²⁸ *Reports on progress toward accession by each of the candidate countries*, Composite paper, (European Commission, Brussels, 1998): 16

²⁹ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 1998): 37- 38

³⁰ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 1999): 50-51

³¹ *Reports on progress toward accession by each of the candidate countries*, Composite paper 1999, (European Commission, Brussels, 1999): 15, 39

³² *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2000): 58 – 60

inclusion in national policies.³³ In 2002 good progress was made in implementing the *acquis* in equal treatment, social assistance, social inclusion, and anti-discrimination, but further developments were required. Institutional progress is still slow, especially in the area of decentralization and clarification of responsibilities.³⁴ After provisional closure of chapter 13, recommendations were made on respecting the responsibilities outlined by the *acquis* by taking new legislative initiatives in line with the *acquis* and strengthening inter-institutional capacity through a decentralization process.³⁵ The 2003 monitoring report noticed the achievement of progress especially through the adoption of the new Labor code. The commitments and requirements are generally considered to be achieved but further adjustments are to be made in the areas of health and safety at work, the health sector, and social protection. The negotiation was provisionally closed in 2002 and no transitional arrangements were asked of Romania.³⁶ Development of secondary legislation was recommended, especially for implementing the Law 705/2001 on the national social assistance system. Institutionally, recommendations

were made to set up monitoring and control systems of social assistance as well as to improve inter-ministerial cooperation and assure the provision of resources necessary for the decentralization process.³⁷ Progress was continued in 2004 and successful key conditions of implementing the decentralization process in the social protection area were mentioned. Access to social assistance especially for the Roma population was recommended.³⁸ No significant achievements were noted in implementing the decentralization process and access to social assistance, as these two aspects were mentioned in the 2005 report.³⁹ According to 2006 EU reports, Romania will join the EU in January 2007, but further efforts are still needed related to chapter 13, especially in implementing the legislation and strengthening the administrative capacity.⁴⁰

The implementation of the *acquis* in the social field is not completely achieved and continuous efforts are still required, especially for effective application, monitoring, and consolidation of the

³³ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2001): 66-68

³⁴ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2002): 82-86

³⁵ *Roadmap for Romania*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2002): 15-16

³⁶ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2003): 76-80

³⁷ *Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Romania*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2003): 16

³⁸ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2004): 90 - 95

³⁹ *Regular report from the Commission on Romania's progress towards accession*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2005): 52 - 57

⁴⁰ *Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania*, (European Commission, Brussels, 2006): 49

necessary institutional frameworks. In the *'Memorandum regarding administrative reform in the social assistance field'*, Romania has proposed to establish three institutions within the 2005 – 2007 period - the Social Observatory, Social Inspection, and the National Agency for Social Benefits - in order to create more efficient and modern institutional building.⁴¹ Continuous improvement of inter-institutional arrangements is to be taken into consideration. Identified risks include various overlaps of tasks and responsibilities at the central level, insufficient coordination between the central and local level, and insufficient financial and human resources allocated at the local level despite the constant preoccupation with the decentralization process. Strengthening administrative capacity is conditioned by successful decentralization. Without strengthening the administrative capacity, the main risk is that Romania will lack the functional structures necessary at the date of accession to the EU.⁴² Successful continuation of the on-going reforms depends on some key conditions such as further articulation of social legislation, effective implementation of primary and secondary legislation, successful inter-ministerial coordination, and appropriate allocation of resources for the decentralization process.

Conclusions

⁴¹ "ADDENDUM (July – September 2005) to 2005 report on progresses achieved towards accession to EU", (Romanian Government 2005): 202

⁴² "Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report" (European Commission, Brussels, 2005): 55

This paper has analyzed the path of development for the Romanian welfare state, including post-communist challenges and particularly the accession to the EU. The first part analyzed the configuration of social policy during the communist and transition periods. It concluded that during the communist regime social policy in general was ideologically supported. The establishment of institutional design and legislative initiatives adopted were focused on the protection of workers. The Romanian institutional framework in the social field slowly developed during the communist period and the early transitional period. The system has lacked unemployment and means tested benefits. In the early '90s, social protection coverage remained focused on workers' protection. The slow development of non-contributory schemes, unemployment, and means-tested benefits has exposed many people to irreversible social exclusion.

The development of social policy during the transition period followed different rhythms: a slow one during early '90s which sped up after the negotiation process with the EU was opened. Because little attention had been paid to social policy in Romania and there was no coherent vision and strategy, the shift registered during the transition was clearly an effect of the negotiation with European Union.

The second part of this paper analyzed social Europe and the implications of negotiation of the social *acquis communautaire*. The main implications of adopting the *acquis* are reflected in

institution building and social legislation. At the beginning of the negotiation process, both areas were not in compliance with the regulations included in the *acquis* and Romania made serious efforts in order to catch up.

The negotiation process in the social field represents for Romania a continuous effort to adjust the national mechanisms and structures to EU requirements. In many cases, structures are to be created in order to respond to EU demands. Progress has been made in this direction but according to conclusions of the monitoring reports, the compatibility with EU structures must be improved, especially through further implementation of the social *acquis*.

With regard to the research hypothesis stated in the beginning, it stands without doubt that the development of social policy in Romania is mainly influenced by the EU. As has been shown above, the scope and focus of social policy as well as institution building reflect the points that have been stressed by Romania's European counterparts in the accession negotiations, much more so than they reflect an internal national idea about what Romanian social policy should consist of. The negotiation process with an actor such as the EU is an experience in terms of designing the social policy. The shaping of a national vision of the social policy in Romania is more related to the negotiation process than to an internal awareness of the particularities of the nation. Because Romania lacks a strong national vision on social policy and because its social policy is so heavily influenced by the *acquis communautaire*, the sustainability of

social policy in the long term cannot be guaranteed. For this, Romania will have to develop a social vision of its own and not only carry out changes that are required by the EU.

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GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN: WOMEN ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LABOR MARKETS DURING THE TRANSITION

VESSELA DASKALOVA

MA Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Germany
Vessela.Daskalova@campus.lmu.de

Abstract¹

Upon a close examination, one finds that mainstream economic literature on Central and Eastern European transitions focuses predominantly on macroeconomic reforms, making generalized statements on transitional developments most often without taking into account that outcomes might differ with respect to factors such as gender. This paper purposefully goes against this trend in an attempt at a gender-segregated analysis of the labor markets in ten former socialist countries (the eight that became members of the European Union in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania, which are to join in 2007). Using the framework of the neoclassical labor market model as a basis for

empirical analysis of quantitative labor market indicators, but also taking into account findings of gender and development economists, sociologists, historians and other social scientists, particularly in relation to qualitative indicators, the paper takes an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of the situation of women on transitional labor markets.

1. Introduction

Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have been the focus of both regional and international debates of the past decade and an issue in many fields such as economics, politics, sociology, and gender studies, to name but a few. However, upon a closer examination of scholarly literature on the region, one finds that the majority of the papers focus on a rather narrow aspect of the transitions instead of viewing problems from a wider perspective. Accordingly, mainstream economic literature on the transitions concentrates predominantly on macroeconomic developments and thereby generalizes transitional outcomes without taking into account that such outcomes might differ with respect to factors such as gender and/or ethnicity.

This paper goes against this trend and examines the question of how the

¹ The paper presented here is a shorter version of my Bachelor's thesis presented at the University of Göttingen under the supervision of Prof. Stephan Klasen, Ph.D. Due to a restriction regarding space I have omitted several sections from the original text: a theoretical section presenting the economic framework of labor market analysis, a section discussing the historical background (the socialist economy and the reforms undertaken during the transition period) as well as a part containing a more thorough analysis of quantitative labor market indicators (which also contains an analysis on the aggregate level, i.e. not segregated by gender). I would be glad to provide the full version of the paper to those interested upon request.

economic, political and social transformations in Central and Eastern Europe affected labor market outcomes taking into account gender differences. Although the main theoretical framework used is the one developed by neoclassical economists for labor market analysis, the findings and arguments of development and gender economists, sociologists, historians and other social scientists as well as of NGO networks are integrated where appropriate. I argue that this approach not only enriches and complements the economical analyses, but is, indeed, indispensable when examining such a complex issue, connected as much to economic and political reforms as to perceptions and persisting models in society.

Thus, a careful gendered analysis of Eastern European labor markets reveals that the lack of gender sensitivity on the part of politicians and economists has most often affected women's situation more negatively than men's (in terms of falling employment and participation rates as well as rising unemployment). Moreover and most importantly, the qualitative characteristics of the labor situation both before and after the transition clearly show vertical and horizontal segregation in the labor market and a large gender pay gap.

Due to reasons of space and time, I have chosen to limit myself to an analysis of the eight former socialist countries that became members of the European Union

(EU) in 2004² and Bulgaria and Romania, which are to join the EU in 2007. In writing this paper I start from an assumption of a common background (often termed the Communist legacy) and similar transitional reforms in the above mentioned countries, thus viewing them as a group. These are specific characteristics that distinguish them from other groups of countries (such as the old EU member states or developing countries). However, it is important to note that in spite of these common traits, there are many country-specific features (of a historical, geographical, cultural, political, and geopolitical nature) that play an important role in the development of these countries.

The paper is structured as follows: in the next section I give a brief overview of economic theories explaining gender differences in labor market outcomes; the third section builds on them and presents a gendered analysis of the main quantitative labor market indicators (employment, participation, and unemployment rates). The fourth section discusses qualitative differences with respect to gender in Central and Eastern European labor markets. Finally, the fifth section draws some conclusions from the research.

2. Theoretical Framework

According to the neoclassical model of the labor market³, the wage (price of labor)

² These countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

³ For an overview of the model, see Francine D. Blau, Marianne A. Ferber, and Anne E. Winkler, *The Economics of Women, Men, and Work*. Third

and the employment level (quantity of labor) in the economy are determined through the interaction of supply and demand on the labor market. The supply side is constituted of workers, renting their labor for pay to finance consumption of goods and services. The demand side is constituted of employers, hiring labor to use it as an input along with other factors of production.

2.1. Factors behind Men's and Women's Labor Force Participation⁴

As women's and men's labor force participation levels in many countries have converged in the second half of the 20th century, economic theory has been reemployed to examine the factors behind

Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998), 8-11; Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, *Modern Labor Economics. Theory and Public Policy*. Eight Edition (Boston et al.: Addison-Wesley, 2003), 56-87 and 163-200; Richard B. Freeman, *Labor Economics*. Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 16-34 and 60-80; Joyce P. Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*. Second Edition (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 26-29. For more comprehensive analyses see also Part I and Part II of Volume 1 of the Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, eds. *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 1 (Amsterdam et al.: North-Holland, 1986).

⁴ The discussion that follows is based on Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, *The Economics of Men, Women, and Work*, 76-122; Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 106-153; James J. Heckman and Mark R. Killingsworth, "Female Labor Supply: A Survey," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 1, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986). 103-204; John Pencavel, "Labor Supply of Men: A Survey," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 1, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard (Amsterdam: North Holland, Amsterdam, 1986). 3-102.

these developments. A change in labor force participation is influenced by both demand and supply side factors⁵. As the demand for labor is derived from the demand for goods and services, economic growth leads to increased labor demand for both sexes. Changes in the composition of the economy also involve changes in the demand for labor. For example, shrinking of the (predominantly male) manufacturing sector and expansion of the services sector leads to decreased demand for male labor and increased demand for female labor. With the introduction of more complex production technologies, more skilled labor is demanded. Increases in female/male education relevant for market work lead to increased demand for female/male labor. As competition in labor supply increases (all else remaining equal), demand for more qualified workers rises, while that for less qualified labor declines, sometimes pushing the less qualified out of the labor force.

As for the supply side, an individual is said to weigh different alternatives for the allocation of time available to him (subtracting the hours biologically necessary for sleeping) when deciding to work or not. Here it is assumed that one has two possibilities – either to work for pay or to spend time for leisure (or formulated otherwise, the choice is between paid and unpaid work in the home). The individual's decision depends on several factors: the opportunity cost of leisure (i.e. the hourly wage one would receive if he/she were to work instead of

⁵ Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 118-130.

spending the hour in leisure activities), one's wealth level (the income one has independent of working) and one's set of preferences. Greater availability of substitutes for home produced goods and services as well as greater efficiency due to labor saving machines (washing-machine, microwave) make household production less time consuming or easier to substitute and will most likely lead to increased substitution of home produced for market goods and thus to more time allocated for market work. Family composition is also an important factor influencing the participation decision. A single or divorced person is likely to have less non-earned income available to him/her (otherwise earned, for example, by a working spouse), thus he/she is more likely to decide to work. A person with children, on the other hand, faces lower opportunity costs for not working as he/she has to subtract eventual costs for childcare from the wage he/she receives. Thus it has been argued that a person with lower earnings opportunities would more likely be induced to stay home if childcare costs increase⁶. A rise in early-retirement pensions, disability, and unemployment benefits will, on the other hand, set off an income effect⁷ that will reduce labor supply.

⁶ See Gary S. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*. Enlarged Edition. Third Printing (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1994) for a neoclassical analysis of division of labor within a household.

⁷ The income effect depicts the idea that if non-earned income rises keeping all other factors (one's wage rate and preferences) constant, a person will choose to work less as the income available to him

2.2. Theories explaining different labor market outcomes for men and women

Gender differences in labor market outcomes usually amount to occupational segregation and differences in earnings. Occupational segregation can be both horizontal (inter-occupational) and vertical (intra-occupational), the first one denoting the idea that some occupations are predominantly male and others predominantly female⁸. Vertical occupational segregation means that in occupations where both sexes are represented women tend to occupy positions of lower pay and lower prestige, while men tend to occupy the well-paid supervisory positions. A number of

has increased while the opportunity cost of leisure has remained the same.

⁸ The most common method of measuring horizontal occupational segregation is the Duncan segregation index, which shows what percentage of either group would have to change occupations in order to arrive at a level of representation proportional to the labor force participation of the respective group of the population (Jacobson, *The Economics of Gender*, 212). For overviews of segregation indexes see Joseph Deutsch, Yves Flückiger, and Jacques Silber, „On Industrial versus Occupational Segregation by Gender: Measurement and an Illustration,” in *Inequality in Labor Markets: The Economics of Labor Market Segregation and Discrimination, Research on Economic Inequality*. Vol. 5, ed. Shoshana Neuman and Jacques Silber (Greenwich, CT and London: Jai Press Inc, 1994). 27-54; Beverly Duncan and Otis Dudley Duncan, “A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes,” *American Sociological Review* 20, No. 2 (1955): 210-218; Nanak C. Kakwani, “Segregation by Sex: Measurement and Hypothesis Testing,” in *Inequality in Labor Markets: The Economics of Labor Market Segregation and Discrimination, Research on Economic Inequality*. Vol. 5. ed. Shoshana Neuman and Jacques Silber (Greenwich, CT and London: Jai Press Inc, 1994). 1-26.

theories have been developed by economists to explain these differences in outcomes (both from a supply side and from a demand side perspective), and while none of them are universally valid, most offer an important partial insight on the situation⁹.

2.2.1. *Supply side theories*

Supply side theories attribute differences in men's and women's positions in the labor market to differences in preferences and abilities. The most cited of those theories - human capital theory - views education and on-the-job training as investments in future earnings, as they lead to rising productivity (be it real or perceived), which in turn leads to higher pay. In this connection, Nobel-prize winner Gary Becker argues that women have less incentive to invest in human capital because they anticipate to spend time out of the labor force in child bearing and child rearing (they have a smaller rate

of return due to the shorter period of time in which they are able to reap the benefits of their investment)¹⁰. In another article he even goes as far as arguing that due to their household and childcare obligations, women face a greater burden and that married women therefore put less effort into each hour of paid work than married men. According to him, as a consequence, women's labor market productivity is lower than men's, which in turn leads to gender differences in occupations and earnings¹¹. Another theory takes up on the theory of compensating differentials that traces back differences in earnings to different tastes and claims that jobs that are less pleasant receive higher pay as compensation and men are more likely to choose such jobs, while women place more value on the pleasantness of a job¹². Supply-side theorists have been largely criticized for speaking of women's and

⁹ For critical overviews see Richard Anker, "Theories of Occupational Segregation by Sex: An Overview", *International Labour Review* 136, No. 3 (1997): 315-397. <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/revue/articles/ank97-3.htm> (accessed July 14, 2005); Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, *The Economics of Men, Women, and Work*, 141-233; Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 219-227 and 241-323; Elias H. Tuma, *The Persistence of Economic Discrimination: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender. A Comparative Analysis* (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1995), 119-142. On methodological questions regarding the measurement of occupational differences in earnings by gender, see Derek Robinson, "Differences in Occupational Earnings by Sex," *International Labour Review* 137, No. 1 (1998): 3-31.

¹⁰ Gary S. Becker, *Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education*. Third Edition (Chicago, ILL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 85-88.

¹¹ Gary S. Becker, "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor," *Journal of Labor Economics* 3, No.1, Part 2, (1985): 33-58.

¹² Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 271-288; Ehrenberg and Smith, *Modern Labor Economics*, 231-259. An important point advanced by feminist economists concerns determining how valuable, skilled or productive a certain type of work is. Many argue that sometimes work is devalued and lower paid just because it is performed by women, although it requires a similar level of skills as a higher paid male job (see Drucilla K. Barker and Susan F. Feiner, *Liberating Economics. Feminist Perspectives on Families, Work, and Globalization* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 68.

men's "preferences" without acknowledging that these preferences are formed within a society, which by teaching and reinforcing stereotypes often discriminates against women (or against men). Richard Anker as well as Blau, Ferber, and Winkler name this "societal discrimination".

2.2.2. Demand side theories

On the demand side, a number of economic theories of discrimination have been developed¹³. In them: "Labor market discrimination is said to exist if individual workers who have identical productive characteristics are treated differently because of the demographic groups to which they belong"¹⁴.

¹³ See Joseph G. Altonji and Rebecca M. Blank, "Race and Gender in the Labor Market," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 3C, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999), 3143-3259; Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination," in *Discrimination in Labor Markets*, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 3-33. Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957); Glen G. Cain, "The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 1, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986), 693-785; Janice F. Madden, *The Economics of Sex Discrimination* (Lexington, MA, Toronto and London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973); Ronald Oaxaca, "Sex Discrimination in Wages," in *Discrimination in Labor Markets*, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 124-151.

¹⁴ Ehrenberg and Smith, *Modern Labor Economics*, 382.

Discrimination models can be divided into those involving tastes for discrimination and others stemming from market imperfections¹⁵. Gary Becker's models, in which either an employer, an employee or a customer act as if they incur psychic non-pecuniary costs of production, employment, or consumption by employing, working with or consuming through someone they discriminate against, pertain to the first group¹⁶.

The second group of discrimination models relevant for gender concerns includes monopsony models¹⁷, institutional or two sector models (Bergmann's overcrowding model can be viewed as a special case of them¹⁸) and statistical discrimination models¹⁹.

¹⁵ The classification is used in Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 300-311.

¹⁶ Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination*, 122.

¹⁷ Madden, *The Economics of Sex Discrimination*, 69-85.

¹⁸ Barbara Bergmann, "Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate by Race and Sex," *Eastern Economic Journal* 1, No. 2 (Apr. 1974): 103-110.

¹⁹ Dennis J. Aigner and Glen G. Cain, "Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 30, No. 2 (Jan. 1977): 175-187; Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination", 23-33; David L. Dickinson and Ronald L. Oaxaca, "Statistical Discrimination in Labor Markets: An Experimental Analysis," *Department of Economics Working Paper* 05-11 (2005). Boone, NC: Appalachian State University, <http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp0511.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2005); Edmund S. Phelps, "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," *The American Economic Review* 62, No. 4 (Sept. 1972): 659-661.

Due to market imperfections, employers in a monopsonist industry might be able to discriminate given that some conditions are met²⁰. Institutional models depart from the assumption of an internal labor market (which involves a continuous climb up the ladder within a firm, less accessible to women due to breaks in their career) or from dual labor markets, which involve institutional streaming in primary and secondary jobs. Once hired in a secondary job, one can move up only in this job. Barbara Bergmann's overcrowding model takes a similar approach in departing from dual labor markets. It suggests that overcrowding (excess supply) in female industries might drive wages in these industries down, given that there are fewer female-dominated than male-dominated jobs in the economy and that women are more likely to look for a job in a female rather than a male-dominated sector, either due to preferences or discrimination in the male sector²¹. Statistical discrimination models depart from the assumption that there is imperfect information of worker's actual productivity on the labor market²². They claim that employers make their decision on the basis of information on *average* productivity of a group of workers. Thus in the case that women are *perceived* to be less productive or less reliable on average than men or in the case that they *are*

actually less productive on average in market activities due to their double burden as Becker has argued, employers are more likely to prefer a man to a woman even if they are equally qualified.

The above-mentioned discrimination models have been criticized on many grounds (incompatibility with long-term equilibrium, failure to explain both occupational segregation and the gender pay gap, as well as for legitimizing the status quo of gender inequality, etc.) by economists and non-economists²³. Many have pointed out that static economic models fail to depict the feedback effects of gender discrimination²⁴. Here, I will not go into any further details of the critiques, as the purpose instead is to use the above-mentioned models as complementary lines of thought for explaining labor market outcomes in transition countries rather than to comment on the theoretical qualities of the models.

3. Quantitative Labor Market Indicators

In this section I use the standard economic framework introduced above in an attempt to explain the development of the main quantitative labor market indicators (namely: employment, participation, and unemployment rates) during the transition²⁵. The main questions in each

²⁰ Madden, *The Economics of Sex Discrimination*, 71.

²¹ Bergmann, "Occupational Segregation, Wages, and Profits".

²² Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination"; Dickinson and Oaxaca, "Statistical Discrimination in Labor Markets"; Phelps, "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism".

²³ For critiques see: Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, *The Economics of Men, Women, and Work*, 179-183 and 185-214; Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 219-226, 249-259, 277-283, and 300-312; Tuma, *The Persistence of Economic Discrimination*, 119-142.

²⁴ Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 312.

²⁵ In this section I will look just at the statistics disaggregated by gender due to restrictions in space. A thorough analysis of the labor market

case will be: What was women's labor market position as compared to men's before and after the transition? Have women been more or differently affected by recent changes, and if so, in what respect?

There are, however, several points that I would like to note before undertaking an analysis of the statistical data. To begin with, statistics from the socialist period are not very reliable due to the fact that they were often distorted or censored to serve legitimating purposes for the governments. A second problem emerges from the change of measurement methods and definitions of the indicators in the 1990s, which result in breaks in the series. Thus, the data are not always comparable across periods. Third, data are not always comparable across countries, because of differences in definitions and measurement methods. However, most countries started to use international measurement standards at some point in the 1990s²⁶. Fourth, as is well-known, the

indicators on an aggregate basis as well as a more detailed introduction to the neoclassical labor market model is to be found in the complete version of the paper. On labor supply and labor demand, see for example Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, *The Economics of Men, Women, and Work*, 8-11; Ehrenberg and Smith, *Modern Labor Economics*, 56-87 and 163-200; Freeman, *Labor Economics*, 16-34 and 60-80; Jacobson *The Economics of Gender*, 26-29 as well as Part I and Part II of Volume 1 of the *Handbook of Labor Economics* by Ashenfelter and Layard, eds.

²⁶ For an account of statistics under socialism, the restructuring of statistics in accordance to the needs of market economies and the introduction of new methods in the transition countries see Igor Chernyshev, ed., *Labour Statistics for a Market Economy. Challenges and Solutions in the*

empirical evidence includes just the formal sector of the economy while the informal sector, which has grown significantly during the transition, is not registered. Fifth, and maybe most important for our concerns, is the selection of indicators to be measured and the criteria for desegregation of data applied in a country. As Adriana Mata Greenwood from the ILO notes, the choice of labor market statistics reflects society's idea of what deserves measurement. Thus they often misrepresent, devalue, or fail to depict women's roles and positions in the economy, which often differ from the mainstream perception of labor market involvement²⁷.

As sensitivity to gender issues was not well-developed in post-socialist countries (and was somewhat distorted under socialism), it is often the case that some important issues regarding either sex fail to be represented by official data. Taking the above-listed problems into account, I will turn to a discussion of the available data.

Transition Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Budapest, London and New York: CEU Press, 1994); Igor Chernyshev and Guy Standing, *Statistics for Emerging Labour Markets in Transition Economies. A Technical Guide on Sources, Methods, Classifications and Policies* (Houndmills et al.: McMillan Press Ltd and St. Martin's Press, 1997).

²⁷ Adriana M. Greenwood, "Labour Statistics which are useful for Gender Concerns", Geneva: ILO Bureau of Statistics (1999): 1-2.

<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/mata.pdf> (accessed June 21, 2005).

3.1. Employment

As Figure 1 shows, employment ratios (defined as the annual average number of employed as a per cent of the working-age population, here defined as the population aged 15-59) have fallen dramatically in all countries since the beginning of the transition (Figure 1). In 1989 the Central and Eastern European countries boasted of relatively high employment rates as compared to EU countries. The employment ratio was highest in Estonia (87.9%), the Czech Republic (86.9%), and Lithuania (83.9%) and lowest in Romania (77.4%), Poland (74.7%), and Slovenia (74.5%)²⁸.

By 2002 employment dropped by more than 15 per cent (as compared to the 1989 level) in all countries, except for Slovenia (where it fell by just 3.3 %). Employment losses have been most pronounced in Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria (more than 20%).

3.1.2. Employment rates by gender

Although a higher share of the female working-age population was employed in the socialist countries than in many Western European countries in the late 1980s, female employment rates in the socialist countries were always considerably lower than the male employment rates in the same countries, a tendency similar to the one prevailing in Western Europe and the rest of the


world²⁹. Figure 2 shows the employment rates by gender in 2004. As is to be expected, in all countries male employment rates are still considerably higher than female. Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania still have higher female employment rates than the EU-15 average, while the rest of the transitional countries under examination have lower.

The difference between the male and the female employment rate is higher than the EU-15 average (15.9 per cent) only in the Czech Republic (16.3 per cent). It is lower in all other countries, signifying that the communist legacy of a relatively good performance in female employment with respect to male employment rates has not disappeared. The smallest differences between the male and the female employment rates are found in the three Baltic States and Bulgaria (roughly 7 per cent). However, this compares unfavorably to Sweden, which is often cited as the best performer concerning gender equality in the EU, where both the female and male employment rates are very high (70.5 and 73.6 per cent, respectively) and the difference between them is very low (just 3.1 per cent) (see Table 3.A. in the Annex).

²⁸ Data from TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence.


²⁹ Data from Jacobsen, *The Economics of Gender*, 373, 11.1 show an East European average female participation rate of 71% in and an East European average male participation rate of 80% in 1989. The OECD averages are 58% for the female and 83% for the male participation rate in the same year. Considering that there was no open unemployment under socialism, this could be considered fairly identical to the employment rates in Eastern European countries.

Figure 1. Employment Ratio (Annual average number of employed as per cent of population aged 15-59) in the ten transition economies, 1989 and 2002.



Source: TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence

Figure 2. Employment Rates by Gender, 2004



A part (although a very small one) of the differences in female and male employment rates as defined by Eurostat, i.e. employed women/men aged 15-64 as a share of the total female/male population of the same age group, can be attributed to the fact that the official retirement age in many of the countries is generally five years lower for females than for males. Taking this into account, it is highly improbable that the employment rates for the population 15-64 would become equal for males and females unless retirement ages were equalized first. In some countries this has already been done, but inquiries in other cases show that there is considerable opposition among the population¹. There are, however, other reasons behind gender differences in employment rates that will now be reviewed considering both the demand and the supply side.

A demand side factor is that male employment has fallen predominantly due to the fall in labor demand and labor shedding in the predominantly male heavy industries. On the supply side, some men

might have experienced a rise in non-earned income due to the restitution of pre-communist property, and many men also made use of the widely offered disability and early retirement schemes at the beginning of the transition, as they were more likely to work in dangerous jobs or in the military, where such schemes were initially offered to offset firing shocks².

Women's employment losses can be explained as a result of a number of factors. On the demand side, an often cited reason has been the reduction of some formerly predominantly female industries such as textiles. Women were also affected from the closure of male dominated industries and the dismantling of state bureaucracy, where they constituted the predominant share of the administrative personnel (secretaries, accountants, etc.)³. Second, overwhelming anecdotal evidence has shown discrimination in firing practices⁴,

¹ A sociological survey of the National Public Opinion Center, "Bulgarian Women: Social Status and Political Participation," Sofia: National Public Opinion Center, 2000, quoted in: Women's Alliance for Development (WAD), *Gender Labor Markets and Poverty. Background Paper for the Gender Assessment. Bulgaria CAS 2000*, mimeographed. Sofia: Women's Alliance for Development, 2000: 13, Figure 8 indicates that 66.1% of men and 76.4% of women don't think that the retirement age of men and women in Bulgaria should be leveled off. This is a curious finding given the fact that the pension calculating methodology entails higher pensions for those with longer employment records.

² Christine Allison and Dina Ringold, eds., *Labor Markets in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 1989-1995. World Bank Technical Paper No. 352* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), 14; Tito Boeri, "Unemployment Dynamics and Labor Market Policies," in *Unemployment, Restructuring, and the Labor Market in Eastern Europe and Russia*, ed. Simon Commander and Fabrizio Coricelli (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995). 371.

³ Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market. Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London and New York: Verso, 1993), 130.

⁴ Stefano Paternostro and David E. Sahn, "Wage Determination and Gender Discrimination in a Transition Economy: The Case of Romania," *Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 2113* (April 1998). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

probably due to the fact that men are perceived as the main earners in the household and employers are thus more likely to get rid of female labor first, in order to spare the families. Third, there is some evidence of discrimination against women in hiring practices. Employers are unwilling to hire young women or women with children as they perceive them as “unreliable workers” and do not want to bear costs of maternity leaves and child benefits⁵. This is a case of statistical discrimination, already discussed in the theoretical section. As one author also points out, there is also discrimination against hiring older women, mainly attributed to employer’s prejudice and their preferences for “young and pretty female workers” (this could be considered taste discrimination)⁶.

On the supply side, some might have experienced a rise in non-earned income

<http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Worldpapers/wps2000series/wps2113/wps2113.pdf>

(accessed September 28, 2005).

⁵ On Latvia: Astrida Neimanis, “Who Would Dare to Hire Her?” *Fair Play. Gender & Development Magazine of KARAT Coalition 2* (2000): 14-15; On Poland: Kinga Lohmann and Anita Seibert, eds., *Gender Assessment on the Impact of EU Accession on the Status of Women in the Labour Market in CEE. National Study: Poland* (Warsaw: Karat Coalition, 2003).

⁶ Krassimira Todorova, “Kak si tursih rabota.” (“How I Searched for a Job.”), *Zharava 5*, No. 33 (2000): 9. Anecdotal evidence also points out at discrimination practices in hiring against young men. In Bulgaria employers often refuse to hire those who have not yet completed their military service in fear that they might discontinue their job in order to do so at some point. However, no official research has been done on the issue yet.

(through increases in their husbands’ earnings or restitution of pre-communist property) and have preferred to withdraw from employment (an example of the income effect). However, it is very unlikely that this has contributed much to employment decline, as there are very few who can afford it and the prevailing attitude is that women should work⁷. A second supply side factor, probably the one most cited in the literature, is the dismantling of the welfare state caused by fiscal difficulties and by labor market liberalization policies⁸. The generous maternity leaves and childcare benefits were cut drastically and government provision of childcare facilities was also reduced, which created the effect of rising prices for childcare costs (and possible lowering quality). As is to be expected by the theoretical model of the decision to work, this has contributed to women’s falling employment and participation by raising the opportunity costs of working. Other supply side factors, some of them working in the opposite direction, will be mentioned in the next section.

Where did people who lost their employment go? An examination of the destination of the outflows from employment shows that the highest share of employment outflows have been destined to inactivity (or more correctly

⁷ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Women in Transition. The MONEE Project. CEE/CIS/Baltics, Regional Monitoring Report No.6.* (Florence: UNICEF ICDC, 1999), 23.

⁸ Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova, *Labour Markets in Transition. Balancing Flexibility and Security in Central and Eastern Europe* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2003), 77.

former sector inactivity), followed by unemployment and just a small share to reemployment⁹.

3.2. Labor Force Participation

Labor force participation is defined as the share of the labor force (total of employed and unemployed persons) in the total working-age population (here: in the population aged 15-64).

As indicated earlier, a large part of the decline in employment rates was reflected in declines in labor force participation. Participation rates have declined considerably in all countries during the transition period as the following table will illustrate. As no official comparable data on labor force participation in the early years of transition is available, I have used the calculation by Cazes and Nesporova for the year 1990. The data for 2003 is taken from the LABORSTA comparable estimates data of the International Labor Organization. Both refer to the participation rates of the population aged 15-64. Thus, although the exact numbers should be used with caution, it is worth comparing them in order to get a sense of how labor force participation has evolved during the transition. Total labor force participation rates have fallen by over 15 percentage points in Slovakia, Poland, and the three Baltic states. Declines have been lowest in the Czech Republic and Romania at 7.7 and 6.1 per cent, respectively. No

comparable data is available for Bulgaria and Hungary in 2003.

3.2.1. Labor force participation by gender

According to the data, the decline in labor force participation in the course of transition has been significantly higher for women than for men in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Latvia. It has been nearly the same in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia and slightly lower for women in Romania. Figure 3 shows the differences between male and female participation rates at the beginning of the transition and in 2003.

Men have higher participation rates in all countries both at the outset of transition and in 2003 (in the preceding section we saw that they had higher employment rates as well). Moreover, the differences in male and female participation rates have risen in most countries – in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia and somewhat less in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. They have dropped in Poland and Romania by 0.6 and 1.9 per cent, respectively. However, the last two countries entered the transition with very high differences between male and female participation rates. In Poland in 1990, 15 % more men than women between the ages 15-64 participated in the labor force. In Romania, the difference was 16.2 %. The data thus suggests that Central and Eastern European countries are actually heading backwards in terms of women's participation in the economy. Comparing it to the tendency of rising female

⁹ Data on the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia is presented in Cazes and Nesporova, *Labour Markets in Transition*, 79, Table 4.10.

employment rates in old EU countries¹⁰, this signifies that they are likely to lose one of the few advantages inherited from socialism. Age has been an important factor driving changes in participation rates¹¹. The decline in men's participation rates can be traced back to the factors discussed in the section on employment, as well as a rise in non-earned income for the older groups of the working-age population due to disability and early retirement provisions (an income effect)¹² and lack of demand for the skills of industrial workers, which led to a "discouraged worker" effect.

For women, the fall in participation can be explained by the factors discussed in the employment section, namely the eventual rise in non-earned income, deterioration of the kindergarten system and rising costs of childcare, shorter maternity leaves (all of which directly affecting labor supply), a mismatch of skills possessed and skills demanded in the new sectors of the economy, and discrimination in hiring and firing practices (indirectly affecting supply through feedback effects)¹³. An

increase in divorce rates, decrease in marriages, and drastic decreases in fertility rates (see tables 2.A. to 3.A.) have most probably worked in the opposite direction, as an incentive for women to seek work¹⁴. Also, greater availability of labor-saving household appliances as a result of the opening of markets is likely to have contributed to increasing women's participation¹⁵. On the other hand, the statistical recording of women on extended maternity and childcare leaves under socialism as participating might lead current participation rates to appear lower as a result of changes in social policy and not of changes in actual activity¹⁶. Both the discouraged and the added worker effect might have influenced women's and men's participation rates in opposite directions. The second effect denotes the idea that high male unemployment might induce married women formerly not working to enter the labor force¹⁷.

3.3. Unemployment

Open unemployment, which was virtually nonexistent during communism, emerged and escalated in the course of the transition. Broadly speaking, there were

¹⁰ Silke Steinhilber, "Gender Relations and Labour Market Transformation: Status Quo and Policy Responses in Central and Eastern Europe," in *Gender in Transition in Eastern and Central Europe. Proceedings*, ed. Gabriele Jähnert et al. (Berlin: trafo verlag, 2001). 203.

¹¹ Allison and Ringold, eds., *Labor Markets in Transition*, 11-14. For more details see the complete version of this paper.

¹² Tito Boeri, "Unemployment Dynamics and Labor Market Policies," 371.

¹³ See Catherine Saget, "The Determinants of Female Labour Supply in Hungary," *The Economics of Transition* 7, No. 3 (Nov. 1999): 575-591.

¹⁴ On Poland see Irena E. Kotowska, "Demographic and Labor Market Developments in the 1990s," in *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, ed. Henryk Domanski, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). 94.

¹⁵ Hillary Ingham and Mike Ingham, eds., *Women on the Polish Labor Market* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). 44.

¹⁶ Ingham and Ingham, eds., *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, 44.

¹⁷ Ingham and Ingham, eds., *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, 44.

two periods of significant rises in unemployment in most countries, 1990-1994 and 1998-2002 (see Table 5.A. in the annex)¹⁸. The two methods of unemployment measurement, Registered Unemployment and Labor Force Surveys (LFS), however, often result in different numbers, mainly dependent on the varying incentives to register as unemployed in different years (or more concretely on changes in government policies regarding the provision of unemployment benefits and people's expectations to find a job through the Labor Offices)¹⁹.

3.3.1. Unemployment Rates by Gender

As with most empirical data, comparable gender-disaggregated statistics on unemployment rates are lacking for the beginning of the transition or there is a break in series (change in measurement methods). There are also disparities in the empirical data from the LFS and from registered unemployment and in some countries gendered patterns have emerged. For example, it seems that in Poland women are more likely to register as unemployed. The registered female unemployment rate was higher both than the male and the female unemployment rate as measured by the LFS²⁰.

In 2004 the female unemployment rate was higher than the male in seven of the countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. It was only slightly higher in Hungary and lower in Romania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. In the Czech Republic and in Poland this has been the case since 1998 and 1997, respectively (comparable data is lacking before that.) In many of the other countries where the female unemployment rate is higher than the male rate, this trend has developed only in recent years (see Table 6.A.). Some authors point out that women have more difficulty becoming reemployed once unemployed and therefore constitute a much greater share of the long-term unemployed²¹. Viewing the transition from the prism of the standard labor market model offers multi-causal and multi-directional explanations of labor market changes on both the supply and the demand side. However, so far I have reviewed what is known as the quantitative aspects of employment. Next I present and analyze the data on qualitative differences in the labor market situation of men and women in the countries under discussion.

4. Occupational Segregation, the Gender Pay Gap, and Education

4.1 Occupational Segregation

Numerous studies point out that the Central and Eastern European economies

¹⁸ For a thorough analysis, see the complete version of the paper.

¹⁹ Boeri, "Unemployment Dynamics and Labor Market Policies," 363.

²⁰ Ingham and Ingham, eds., *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, 67. For a micro-survey of women's unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics, see John C. Ham, Jan Svenjar and Katherine Terrell, "Women's Unemployment during Transition. Evidence from Czech and Slovak micro-

data," *The Economics of Transition* 7, No. 1 (March 1999): 47-78.


²¹ Kotowska, "Demographic and Labor Market Developments in the 1990s," 102.

Table 1. Participation rates of population aged 15-64 for the ten transition countries, 1990 and 2003 (percentages)

Country	1990			2003		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Bulgaria	77.7	72.2	75.0	:	:	:
Czech Republic	82.2	74.1	78.1	78.2	62.5	70.4
Estonia	83.3	75.9	79.4	69.5	57.8	63.3
Hungary	74.5	57.3	65.4	:	:	:
Latvia	83.6	75.3	79.4	68.3	56.5	62
Lithuania	81.8	70.5	76.0	64.7	52.7	58.2
Poland	80.1	65.1	72.5	62.4	48	54.8
Romania	76.7	60.5	68.5	69.6	55.3	62.4
Slovakia	82.5	74.2	78.3	68.4	52.9	60.3
Slovenia	76.7	64.8	70.7	63.2	50.2	56.5

Sources: For 1990 data Cazes and Nesporova, *Labour Markets in Transition*: 12, table 2.2; for 2003 data LABORSTA, Comparable Estimates Data

Figure 3. Difference in Participation Rates by Sex for the transition economies, 1990 and 2003



Sources: For 1990 data Cazes and Nesporova, *Labour Markets in Transition*, 12, table 2.2; for 2003 data LABORSTA, Comparable Estimates Data

were highly gender segregated under socialism, both vertically and horizontally, and continue to be so at present¹.

Also, even if women were represented in universities, they did not reach the level of rectors and academicians (the highest academic title under the socialist system). The highly valued blue-collar jobs in heavy industry and mining were reserved for men².

White-collar professions such as lawyers and doctors became more valued than blue-collar jobs in industry. At the beginning of transition, women had a comparative advantage due to their broader educational pattern and their overrepresentation in some white-

¹ Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, 121; Mariya Gencheva and Jivka Marinova, eds., *Gender Assessment on the Impact of EU Accession on the Status of Women in the Labour Market in CEE. National Study: Bulgaria*. (Sofia: Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation, 2003), 43; Irena E. Kotowska, "Discrimination against Women in the Labor Market in Poland during the Transition to a Market Economy," *Social Politics* 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995): 79-80; Lohmann and Seibert, eds., *Gender Assessment on the Impact of EU Accession on the Status of Women in the Labour Market in CEE*, 47; Michaela Marksová-Tominová, ed., *Gender Assessment on the Impact of EU Accession on the Status of Women in the Labour Market in CEE. National Study: Czech Republic* (Praha: GENDER STUDIES o.p.s., 2003), 42; UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 36-37; Pierella Paci, ed., *Gender in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: TheWorld Bank, 2002), 9. [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Gender+in+Transition/\\$File/GenderDraftPaper052802cFINAL.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Gender+in+Transition/$File/GenderDraftPaper052802cFINAL.pdf) (accessed October 3, 2005).

² Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*.


collar jobs under socialism. But a clear trend of masculinization or at least defeminization of *some* formerly female-dominated professions such as banking and insurance has emerged recently as they become more prestigious and better paid³.

As elsewhere, women in Central and Eastern Europe are underrepresented in the high levels of the economy. A Polish survey of the mid 1990s shows that women are fully absent from the executive boards of over sixty per cent of companies registered on the Polish Stock Exchange and from the supervisory boards of almost half of them. Furthermore, women constitute only 4.4 per cent of executive board presidents and 8 per cent of supervisory board presidents in the rest of the companies surveyed. They form 16.6 per cent of other members in the executive boards and 12.1 per cent of other members in the supervisory boards⁴.

³ Ludmila N. Zavadskaya, "Gender Paradoxes of the Transition Period," in *Making the Transition Work for Women in Europe and Central Asia, World Bank Discussion Paper 411*, ed. Marnia Lazreg (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000), 9.

⁴ Aleksandra Dukaczewska-Nalecz, "The Participation and Power of Women in Public Life," in *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, ed. Henryk Domański, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001), 233.

Figure 6. Unemployment Rates by Gender, 2004 (per cent)



Notes: The female/male unemployment rate is defined as the share of unemployed women/men aged 15-74 in the total female/male active population. *Source:* Eurostat

The fact that women were absent from management levels under socialism also resulted in a much higher share of males among the self-employed and employers in the transition economies, while women formed a larger part of employees. The contrary is the case only in Romania, where most self-employment occurs in small-scale family agriculture¹.

Men have also tended to move faster to private sector employment, so that women are currently overrepresented in public sector jobs in many countries². This is mainly attributed to the fact that formerly female-dominated sectors are either more likely to remain public (such as education and healthcare) or are becoming defeminized after privatization (banking and insurance). One author points out that

if one considers that in the transition power shifted from the public to the private sector, this might represent a disadvantage for women³.

Usually unpaid domestic work and care giving are not included in an analysis of the occupational structure of the economy. This paper purposefully goes against this trend in order to emphasize the fact that various household tasks as well as caring for the children and the elderly do in fact constitute work, which should be equally acknowledged as paid labor⁴. An argument supporting this idea is that

¹ UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 31.

² UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 31.

³ Dukaczewska-Nalecz, "The Participation and Power of Women in Public Life," 229.

⁴ The idea has been announced in numerous analyses recently. See, for example, Drucilla K. Barker and Susan F. Feiner, *Liberating Economics. Feminist Perspectives on Families, Work, and Globalization* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 43-44.

should there be no one from the household available or ready to perform them, these services will become marketable (as the occupations of babysitter and housekeeper suggest). In Central and Eastern European countries it is commonly acknowledged that women do a greater share of unpaid household work. In Poland and Hungary, for example, although both men and women participated full-time in the economy under socialism, their unequal participation in the home led to the fact that women worked on the average seven hours more per week than men⁵. This is what has been termed the “double burden” of women in socialist countries.

Women’s role in high level decision-making in the government is also limited. As the quotas for women’s representation in Parliament were abolished at the outset of transition, women’s share in Parliament dropped by more than 10 per cent in all countries (in the 1980s women constituted around 20-30 per cent of members of Parliament), but has recently recovered to some extent⁶.

As mentioned earlier, the informal economy has grown significantly during the transition. However, due to lack of data it is hard to determine whether more women or men work in the grey sector.

4.2 *The Gender Pay Gap*

Women in all Central and Eastern European countries (as well as in most other countries in the world) earn on average less than men⁷. The Gender Pay Gap is usually measured as women’s average monthly earnings as a per cent of men’s average monthly earnings or as women’s average hourly earnings as a per cent of men’s average hourly earnings. In order to understand what part of this unadjusted gender pay gap remains unexplained by differences in productivity and might therefore be due to discrimination, one needs to control for human capital factors (such as education and experience), and for job factors (such as occupation and sector of the economy). In case one considers the pay gap on the basis of monthly and not hourly earnings, one also needs to take into account the number of hours worked⁸.

⁵ Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, 117.

⁶ However, the high share of parliamentary seats occupied by women under socialism didn’t represent their real power, as they were de facto absent from the governing bodies of the Central Committees of the Communist Party, where actual decision-making took place, see Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*; UNICEF, *Women in Transition*. On women and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe see Valentine M. Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); for an international perspective on gender and democracy, see the volume edited by Shirin Rai, ed. *International Perspectives on Gender and Democratisation* (Basingstoke and

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New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 2000); for a comparison Latin America and Eastern Europe, see the volume edited by Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., *Women and Democracy. Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

⁷ Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, 122; Kotowska, “Discrimination against Women in the Labor Market in Poland,” 75; UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 33; Pierella Paci, ed., *Gender in Transition*, 25.

⁸ UNICEF, *Women in Transition*.

In the 1980s women in the socialist economies earned on average 66-75% of men's incomes across all sectors⁹. According to the UNICEF report, the gender pay gap has diminished (considerably in the first two cases) in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, while it has widened in Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania. In the late 1990s, women in the above-mentioned countries earned on average between 70 and 90% of men's monthly wages. Part of the decline in the gender pay gap can be explained by the fact that more men than women are employed in each of the above-mentioned economies and these women tend to be better qualified than those who have withdrawn from formal sector employment during the transition¹⁰. According to the same report, the gender pay gap widens after accounting for education, as women tended to have a higher level of education than men in CEE countries. Part of the pay gap can be explained by job factors; as discussed earlier women tend to work in lower-paid jobs. Another part of it might be accounted for by shorter working hours for women. However, after adjusting for all these factors, the gender pay gap still persists, which shows a

⁹ Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market*, 122. The number denotes the gender-pay gap in unadjusted form, i.e. without considering adjusting for human capital and job factors. There is probably no need to adjust for the number of hours worked, as generally both men and women worked full-time in the socialist economies.

¹⁰ In UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 33, this is referred to as the "selectivity bias problem".

certain degree of gender discrimination in the economy, with a man tending to earn more than a woman even if they are equally productive.

A study of the gender pay gap in Poland, for example, explains 50-60 % of the wage gap by differences in observed characteristics (observed characteristics include human capital factors and job factors). Most of it is accounted for through occupational segregation. However, 40-50 % of the gap still remains unexplained and is attributed to gender discrimination¹¹.

4.3. Explanations for differences in outcomes

Several possible explanations, such as occupational segregation and the gender pay gap, were introduced in the theoretical section. Supply side theories advance the idea that different labor market outcomes can be explained by differences in preferences and abilities. Human capital theorists stress the importance of education and on-the-job training in determining gendered outcomes.

Under socialism education was free and the socialist countries achieved near-universal basic education. Secondary education extended to between 70 and 90% of the population in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Higher educational enrolment ranged from 9% of those aged 20-24 in

¹¹ Vera A. Adamchik and Arjun S. Bedi, "Gender Pay Differentials during the Transition in Poland," *The Economics of Transition* 11, No. 4 (Dec. 2003): 697-726.

Romania to 26% of the same age group in Bulgaria¹². In accordance with government priorities, educational quality was very high in fields such as mathematics and natural sciences and not as high in the social sciences (law, economics, sociology, etc., which were highly ideologized)¹³. Women's education increased rapidly during socialism and already in the 1970s women constituted at least half of the university students in most Central and Eastern European countries, a noteworthy achievement that has been achieved only about a decade later in some Western European countries¹⁴.

Some authors have argued that women's educational attainment was more a byproduct than a real purpose of the socialist system, in which educational policies were designed to advance the interests of the state, rather than to promote gender equality. In accordance with the drive to develop heavy industries, technical education was favored and males were those more likely to participate in it and have better paid jobs in the industrial sector. A characteristic feature that has received much attention

recently was the high share of vocational secondary schools, which offered narrow technical training and very little general education. They were frequented mostly by males. Females enrolled predominantly in general secondary schools and therefore became more represented in universities in fields such as law, medicine, economics, pedagogy, etc., which (as pointed out earlier) received lower recognition and lower pay in the socialist economy, in contrast to Western European countries¹⁵.

In the course of transition advantages shifted, as those with general secondary education have greater opportunities and are more likely to continue to university studies, which are higher rewarded in a market economy. Accordingly, boys' secondary educational enrollment also shifted towards general secondary schools¹⁶.

Thus, a particularity of Central and Eastern European countries is women's high educational attainment as compared to men's. In accordance with this, one study found that after controlling for education the wage gap widens¹⁷, at first glance suggesting that human capital theory might be of less relevance in this case. However, as is also the case in other countries women are overrepresented in some fields of education and men in

¹² Bruno Laporte and Julian Schweitzer, „Education and Training,” in *Labor Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Transition and Beyond*, ed. Nicholas Barr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 262. Table 11-1.

¹³ Laporte and Schweitzer, „Education and Training,” 263.

¹⁴ Ireneusz Białecki and Barbara Heyns, “Educational Attainment, the Status of Women, and the Private School Movement in Poland,” in *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies*, ed. Valentine Moghadam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 110-111.

¹⁵ Białecki and Heyns, “Educational Attainment, the Status of Women, and the Private School Movement in Poland,” 131.

¹⁶ Białecki and Heyns, “Educational Attainment, the Status of Women, and the Private School Movement in Poland,” 131

¹⁷ UNICEF, *Women in Transition*, 34.

others, which could to a large extent account for occupational segregation. Unfortunately, no gendered data is available on formal and informal job training.

On the other hand, it has already been mentioned that supply side theories also consider the different preferences of men and women as a key determinant of occupational segregation and, through it, the gender pay gap. Gendered educational attainments can also be viewed through this prism. However, as already mentioned “preferences” might be subject to “societal discrimination”, or the influence that society exerts on preference formation through teaching and reinforcing roles and stereotypes, confining men and women to certain jobs or spheres. Societal discrimination is also of particular importance as it entails feedback effects¹⁸. Thus it is very likely that “preferences” influence women’s and men’s positions in Central and Eastern European economies. However, it can be argued that these preferences are formed through traditional roles and stereotyping¹⁹.

¹⁸ For an example of societal discrimination in education, more particularly of teaching and reinforcing gender stereotypes in history textbooks in Bulgaria, see Krassimira Daskalova, „Der Einschluß und Ausschluß von Frauen in bulgarischen Geschichtsbüchern der 1990er Jahre,“ *L’Homme. Europäische Zeitschrift für feministische Geschichtswissenschaft* 15.Jg., No. 2 (Jan. 2004): 331-343.

¹⁹ See Anker, “Theories of Occupational Segregation by Sex.” On stereotypes regarding women’s role in Poland, see Anna Titkow, “On the Appreciated Role of Women,” in *Women on the*

Becker’s theory²⁰ might suggest that women in Central and Eastern Europe are less productive on the job due to the double burden (work and family) they carry, but this is an issue that needs further examination and cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, such considerations might induce statistical discrimination, damaging individual highly-qualified women.

The theory of compensating differentials might also be useful in explaining outcomes in Central and Eastern European countries, taking into account that under socialism (and in many cases at present), women were protected from taking up jobs entailing compensating differentials such as night shifts and overtime work, as they were considered dangerous for their health²¹. In such a case it is questionable whether women’s occupational choice is a question of their own preferences.

On the demand side, there are a few econometric studies of the factors behind

Polish Labor Market, ed. Henryk Domański, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). 21-40. On stereotyped opinions on women entrepreneurs in Poland, see Irena Reszke, “Stereotypes: Opinions of Female Entrepreneurs in Poland,” in *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, ed. Henryk Domański, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). 177-192.

²⁰ See Becker, “Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor.”

²¹ Henryk Domański, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham, “Women on the Labor Market: Poland’s Second Great Transformation,” in *Women on the Polish Labor Market*, ed. Henryk Domański, Hilary Ingham, and Mike Ingham (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). 3.

the wage gap²². They conclude that almost half of the gender wage gap remains unexplained by observed characteristics and might be attributed to discrimination. Some reports point at taste discrimination against older women, for example, in the case of job ads directed explicitly to young and good-looking women²³. Statistical discrimination has been found to exist in Central Europe - the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia and to a lesser extent in Hungary – and in Poland and Slovakia is closely linked to occupational segregation²⁴. Similarly, the presence of a “glass ceiling”, which refers to the prejudice-based barriers that women face in promotion opportunities, has been discussed²⁵. Institutional models could be considered when examining the structure of state enterprises in heavy industry (where women were hired chiefly in dead-end administrative jobs, while men could climb up the ladder in industrial jobs in the enterprises). Bergmann’s overcrowding model might help explain low wages in female dominated occupations such as teaching and health care. However, one might conclude that the issue of discrimination needs much further examination, as econometric studies on it have been very limited, most

probably due to the insufficiency of gender-segregated statistics.

5. Conclusions

This paper analyzed women’s position in Eastern European labor markets in the framework of the transition from a socialist-type to a market-type economy. It posed several questions. First, were women’s participation, employment, and unemployment affected differently than men’s in the course of transition, and why? Second, how different are labor market outcomes for men and women in terms of occupations and earnings? These issues were examined on the basis of available empirical data and the relevant literature on transition, labor markets, and women’s labor market position in the transition process. The neoclassical model of the labor market and its consideration of supply and demand factors served as guidelines for multi-causal and multi-directional explanations of the changes in employment and participation rates for both men and women. Here, briefly are some conclusions.

First, although the socialist countries boasted of very high women’s employment rates as compared to the rest of the world, women’s employment and participation in the region has always been lower than men’s (as is the case in the rest of the world).

Second, changes in women’s and men’s employment and participation rates have been influenced by a variety of factors both on the supply and the demand side. However, in view of the transformational

²² Adamchik and Bedi, “Gender Pay Differentials during the Transition in Poland”; UNICEF, *Women in Transition*.

²³ Neimanis, “Who Would Dare to Hire Her?”

²⁴ Ariane Pailhé, “Gender Discrimination in Central Europe during the Systemic Transition,” *The Economics of Transition* 8, No. 2 (July 2000): 505-535.

²⁵ Kotowska, “Discrimination against Women in the Labor Market in Poland,” 79.

recession, the fall in labor demand should be highlighted. As a result, both women's and men's employment and participation have declined considerably, and in a slight majority of the cases women's participation has declined more than men's. Meanwhile, unemployment has risen. In 2004 women had higher unemployment rates than men in seven of the countries, which can partly be explained by their share among the long-term unemployed and difficulties in finding work once unemployed.

Third, there is widespread occupational segregation and a gender pay gap. Although the issue has been only partially examined so far, the available econometric studies suggest that 40-50% of the gender wage gap remains unexplained by observed characteristics and might be caused by gender discrimination.

In fact, reports by international organizations and publications by NGO networks also provide evidence for gender discrimination, most often taking the form of statistical discrimination, which suggests a need for improving information on actual employee abilities. Feminist economists and other social scientists point out that widespread societal discrimination (an issue not considered by main stream economists) is also involved in influencing women's and men's labor market positions and restricts equality of opportunities.

Fourth, regarding the available data, I argue that statistical information is very often gender blind. Hence, improving the

quality of statistics to better reflect men's and women's performance and specific situations would supply valuable and currently scarce information to policy makers. It will also provide valuable sources for scholars trying to analyze the factors behind different labor market outcomes for men and women.

Recently, many studies by development economists have found that gender inequality is of both intrinsic and instrumental concern²⁶ as it entails costs to people's well-being, productivity and growth, and to governance²⁷. Therefore it is important that the existing inequality of opportunities be examined further by scholars from all fields and addressed by policy makers in the transitional economies.

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²⁶ Stephan Klasen, "Does Gender Inequality Reduce Growth and Development? Evidence from Cross-Country Regressions," *Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper Series 7* (Nov. 1999). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/26/000094946_0008120532279/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf, (accessed July 14, 2005).

²⁷ World Bank, *Engendering Development. Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2001).

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Appendix

Table 2.A. Crude Marriage Rate (Marriages per thousand mid-year population), 1989-2002.

Table 1. A. Total Fertility Rate (Births per woman), 1989-2002															
Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
Czech Republic	1.87	1.89	1.86	1.72	1.67	1.44	1.28	1.18	1.17	1.16	1.13	1.14	1.15	1.17	
Hungary	1.8	1.84	1.85	1.76	1.68	1.64	1.57	1.45	1.37	1.33	1.29	1.33	1.31	1.31	
Poland	2.05	2.04	2.05	1.93	1.85	1.8	1.61	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	
Slovakia	2.08	2.09	2.05	1.98	1.92	1.66	1.52	1.47	1.43	1.38	1.33	1.28	1.2	1.2	
Slovenia	1.52	1.46	1.42	1.34	1.34	1.32	1.29	1.28	1.25	1.23	1.21	1.26	1.21	1.21	
Estonia	2.22	2.05	1.8	1.71	1.49	1.42	1.38	1.37	1.32	1.28	1.32	1.39	1.34	1.37	
Latvia	2.04	2	1.85	1.74	1.52	1.41	1.27	1.18	1.13	1.11	1.18	1.24	1.21	1.23	
Lithuania	1.98	2.03	2.01	1.97	1.74	1.57	1.55	1.49	1.47	1.46	1.46	1.39	1.3	1.24	
Bulgaria	1.9	1.81	1.65	1.54	1.45	1.37	1.23	1.24	1.09	1.11	1.23	1.27	1.24	1.21	
Romania	2.2	1.84	1.57	1.52	1.44	1.41	1.34	1.3	1.32	1.32	1.3	1.3	1.23	1.25	
<i>Notes:</i>															
a. 1999 survey reports 1.3 for 1997-1999 (Serbanescu, Morris and Marin, 2001).															
<i>Source:</i> TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence															
Country	_Note	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Czech Republic	a	7.8	8.8	7	7.2	6.4	5.7	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.1	5.3
Hungary		6.4	6.4	5.9	5.5	5.2	5.2	5.2	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.7	4.3	4.5
Poland	b	6.7	6.7	6.1	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.5	5	5
Slovakia	a	6.9	7.7	6.2	6.4	5.8	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.1	4.8	4.4	4.7
Slovenia		4.9	4.3	4.1	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.6	3.5	3.5

Estonia		8.1	7.5	6.6	5.8	5.2	5	4.9	3.9	4	3.9	4.1	4	4.1	4.3
Latvia		9.2	8.9	8.4	7.2	5.7	4.6	4.5	3.9	4	4	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.2
Lithuania		9.4	9.8	9.2	8.1	6.4	6.4	6.1	5.7	5.3	5.2	5.1	4.8	4.5	4.7
Bulgaria	a	7.1	6.9	5.7	5.2	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.1	3.7
Romania	b	7.7	8.3	8	7.7	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.1	5.8	5.9
<i>Notes:</i>															
a. Rates for 2001-2002 based on on 2001 census.															
b. Rate for 2002 based on 2002 census.															
<i>Source:</i> TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence															

Table 3.A. General Divorce Rate (Divorces per hundred marriages), 1989-2002.

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
Czech Republic	38.6	35.2	40.8	38.6	45.8	52.9	56.7	61.4	56.2	58.8	44.2	53.7	60.3	59.1	
Hungary	37.3	37.5	39.9	37.9	41.3	43.3	46.5	46.2	53.3	57.4	56.3	49.9	56	55.4	
Poland	18.5	16.6	14.5	14.7	13.4	15.2	18.4	19.4	20.8	21.7	19.2	20.3	23.2	23.7	
Slovakia	22.7	21.9	24.1	23.8	26.5	30.8	32.7	34.2	32.7	33.9	35.3	35.8	41.3	43.7	
Slovenia	22.1	21.8	22.4	21.6	21.7	23.1	19.2	26.5	26.6	27.6	26.9	29.5	33.1	34.8	
Estonia	46.8	49.1	55.8	74.9	74.3	76	106.4	102.5	94.5	82.7	81.6	77.1	76.4	69.6	
Latvia	45.9	45.7	49.6	77	70.4	72.7	70.6	62.8	63	64.4	63.9	66.6	62	61.1	
Lithuania	35.5	35.1	44.5	46.4	58.6	47.4	46.1	55.4	60.5	63.6	63.7	64.4	69.9	65.5	
Bulgaria	20	19	22.6	21.1	18.3	21.1	29	28	26.9	29.2	27.5	30.1	32.1	34.9	
Romania	20.2	17.1	20.2	16.8	19.3	25.7	22.7	23.7	23.6	27.5	24.6	22.6	24	24.6	
<i>Source:</i> TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence															

Table 4.A. Employment Rates by Gender, 2004.

Employment rate - females - Employed women aged 15-64 as a share of the total female population of the same age group		
Employment rate - males - Employed men aged 15-64 as a share of the total male population of the same age group		
Country	females	males
EU (15 countries)	56.8	72.7
Czech Republic	56	72.3
Denmark	71.6	79.7
Germany	59.2	70.8
Estonia	60	66.4
Greece	45.2	73.7
France	57.4	68.9
Italy	45.2	70.1
Latvia	58.5	66.4
Lithuania	57.8	64.7
Hungary	50.7	63.1
Poland	46.2	57.2
Slovenia	60.5	70
Slovakia	50.9	63.2
Sweden	70.5	73.6
United Kingdom	65.6	77.8
Bulgaria	50.6	57.9
Romania	52.1	63.4
<i>Source:</i> Eurostat		

Table 5.A. Annual Registered Unemployment Rate (Annual average per cent of labour force), 1989-2002

Country	_Note_	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Czech Republic	a		0.3	2.6	3.1	3	3.3	3	3.1	4.3	6	8.5	9	8.5	9.2
Hungary	a	0.4	0.8	8.5	12.3	12.1	10.4	10.4	10.5	10.4	9.1	9.6	8.7	8	
Poland			3.4	9.2	12.9	14.9	16.5	15.2	14.3	11.5	10	12	14	16.2	17.8
Slovakia			0.6	6.6	11.4	12.7	14.4	13.8	12.6	12.9	13.7	17.3	18.2	18.2	17.8
Slovenia		2.9	4.7	8.2	11.5	14.4	14.4	13.9	13.9	14.4	14.5	13.6	12.2	11.6	11.6
Estonia						3.9	4.4	4.1	4.4	4	3.7	5.1	5.3	6.5	5.9
Latvia					0.9	4.6	6.4	6.4	7	7.5	7.6	9.7	8.5	7.8	8.9
Lithuania				0.3	1.3	4.4	3.8	6.1	7.1	5.9	6.4	8.4	11.5	12.5	11.3
Bulgaria					13.2	15.8	14	11.4	11.1	14	12.2	13.8	18.1	17.5	17.7
Romania	a			3	8.2	10.4	10.9	9.5	6.6	8.9	10.4	11.8	10.5	8.8	8.1
<i>Notes:</i>															
a. End-of-year.															
<i>Source:</i> TransMONEE 2004 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence															

Table 6.A. Unemployment Rate by Gender - Unemployed women/men aged 15-74 as a share of the total female/male active population, 1996-2004 (*Source: Eurostat*)

	1996	1996	1997	1997	1998	1998	1999	1999	2000	2000
Country	female	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	Female	male
Czech Republic	:	:	:	:	8.1	5	10.3	7.2	10.3	7.3
Estonia	:	:	8.9	10.3	8.3	9.9	10.1	12.5	11.5	13.4
Latvia	:	:	:	:	13.6	15.1	13.6	14.4	12.9	14.4
Lithuania	:	:	:	:	11.7	14.6	12.3	15.1	14.1	18.6
Hungary	8.8	10.2	8.1	9.7	7.8	9	6.3	7.4	5.6	6.8
Poland	:	:	13	9.1	12.2	8.5	15.3	11.8	18.6	14.6
Slovenia	6.7	7	7.1	6.8	7.5	7.3	7.4	7	6.8	6.4
Slovakia	:	:	:	:	:	:	16.9	16.6	18.5	18.9
Bulgaria	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	16.2	16.7
Romania	:	:	5.7	5	5.3	5.5	5.6	6.8	6.3	7.2
	2001	2001	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004	2004		
Country	female	male	female	male	female	male	female	Male		
Czech Republic	9.7	6.7	9	5.9	9.9	6.2	9.9	7.1		
Estonia	12	11.5	8.9	10.1	9.9	10.5	8.1	10.3		
Latvia	11.5	14.2	11.4	13.6	10.6	10.1	10.3	9.2		
Lithuania	14.3	18.5	13.4	13.6	13.1	12.3	11.3	10.3		
Hungary	4.9	6.1	5.1	6	5.5	6	6	5.8		
Poland	20.2	17.1	20.7	19	20	18.6	19.7	18		
Slovenia	6.2	5.5	6.5	5.8	7	6	6.4	5.6		
Slovakia	18.9	19.8	18.9	18.6	17.8	17.2	19.3	17		
Bulgaria	18.4	20	17	18.5	13.2	13.9	11.5	12.2		
Romania	6.2	6.9	7.1	7.8	6.3	7.2	5.9	8.2		