ANALYZING THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENTAL SCENE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES

ALEXANDRA IONASCU
PhD Candidate, University of Bucharest and Université Libre de Bruxelles (CEVIPOL)
aionascu@ulb.ac.be

Abstract

This paper aims to emphasize some theoretical and methodological difficulties in analyzing post-communist countries through a case study concerning the professionalization of governmental elites and the development of decision-making procedures in the cabinets of post-communist Romania. Are the existing theories applicable to the Romanian case? What methods can we apply in order to capture the function of government, and what are the limitations they imply? The paper will show that only a research design both quantitative and qualitative in nature can respond to the challenges raised by a post-communist country. The study is constructed on two main axes. The first one concerns an analysis of the governmental personnel and the decision-making process through quantitative methods, and the second axis concerns the same analysis, but from qualitative perspective. The last section of the paper presents a discussion about the research approaches, emphasizing the importance of a hybrid methodological research design in order to understand the Romanian case, as an image of the analysis of a transitional country.

Introduction

The political regime change that occurred in Romania after the fall of Communism elicited a process of emergence of new political elites and new patterns of practice in the functioning of political institutions. But new political elites do not emerge *ex nihilo* and institutional changes are in practice slower than the ambition of change. At the political level, the first phase of transition was characterized by a process of diffusion of power and by a multiplying effect in the decision-making process. However, the fact that transition is accompanied by political reconfiguration raises a valid scientific question. When does the transition end? When is it possible, without the risk of being accused of conceptual stretching[1], to discuss post-Communist political systems with the theoretical and methodological

[1] Giovanni Sartori, "Bien comparer, mal comparer"[Good comparison, Bad Comparison] , Revue Internationale de la Politique Comparée 1(April 1994) :19. One of the causes of the conceptual errors resides in conceptual stretching, which implies a definition of the concepts which reduces them to a series of conceptual notes (attributes) that do not identify it and which produce a great flexibility of the concept.

tools applied to the Western European democracies?

This paper aims to emphasize some theoretical and methodological difficulties in analyzing post-communist countries through a case study concerning the professionalization of governmental elites and the development of decision-making procedures in the cabinets of post-communist Romania[2]. It will be shown that only a hybrid research design both quantitative and qualitative in scope can deal with the difficulties raised by the coexistence and functioning of formal and informal mechanisms that characterize the political sphere of a transitional country. The end of transition in this particular case would theoretically mean that the concept of "professionalization" (seen as the creation of stable political careers) and the analysis of the procedures of decision-making can be explained by the existing conceptual frameworks, and by the quantitative or qualitative methodological tools available. Although the multiplication of concepts creates the possibility of capturing the *sui generis* character of the transitions, the study upholds that only a hybrid research design, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, can have sufficient explanatory power to understand the evolutionary process which takes place in a post-communist country. Consequently, when studying the transitional countries, localism (the proliferation of concepts describing similar phenomena) can be avoided by using adequate research designs and thus intermingling different levels of analysis.

The research will focus on ministers and secretaries of state as political appointees[3] and on the mechanisms of decision-making in the post-communist cabinets. The choice of these two dimensions allows us to analyze not only the professionalization process, but also the relationships created between these actors at the decision-making level, because they can create and implement policies with an impact at the national level[4]. Two main reasons explain our focus on the governmental level: (1) the decline of parliaments and the process of delegation of competences towards the executive branch[5]; and (2) the limited magnitude of this population, their importance in the decision-making procedures, and the exponential dimension of the political system, created by the fact that the function of governmental is conceived as

[2] In our study we employ a wider definition of the government, by including in our analysis not only the ministers but also the secretaries of state and leaders of the state agencies (political appointees). See Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta eds., The nature of party government - A Comparative European Perspective (London:Palgrave, 2000), Chap. I, Introduction. 14.

[3] Blondel/ Cotta The nature of party government. 14; Alain Eraly, Le pouvoir enchaîné – Etre ministre en Belgique[The chains of power – Being a Minister in Belgium], Bruxelles: Labor, 2002; Mattei Dogan , "Sociologia elitelor politice,"[The Sociology of Political Elites] in Sociologie politica. Opere alese[Political Sociology], Bucureşti: Alternative, 1999.

[4]Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 1976). 6.

[5] Mattei Dogan, The mandarins of Western Europe. The Political Role of the Top Civil Servants (Sage Publications, 1975) 7.

the summit of a political career[6]. In the Romanian case, although the Constitution adopted in 1991 and its revised form (2003) established several mechanisms allowing for equilibrium between the legislative and the executive branches[7], in practice an imbalanced relationship was established, favoring the executive area.

Looking at the ways in which the relationship between the Parliaments and cabinets was shaped in the Romanian case, we can realize the extended role played by the executive power. Several elements suggest this situation. During the period from 1990-2005, out of 4822 law projects that became laws after the legislative procedures were accomplished, (89.88%)[8] were initiated by the governments. Meanwhile the ten percent initiated by the MPs were concerned mainly with marginal topics such as the reconfiguration of the statute of a village or of a town or ceremonies. Furthermore, there was an extended use of legislative delegation (art 114, 1991). In this way, since 1992 until 2005 the Romanian cabinets adopted 1581 decisions that were supposed to appear only in extreme cases. In its turn, the Parliament never successfully used its forms of control, such as sanction over cabinets. No cabinet has been dismissed as a result of parliamentary actions. Consequently there is a certain tendency towards concentration of power at the governmental level. This transfer of power towards the executive branch can be placed at the political or at the bureaucratic level. Taking into account the high degree of politicization of the civil servants in Romania[9], this population is to be considered in consistence with the concept of "political bureaucracy"

[6] Jean Blondel, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World (London: Sage, 1986). 16 and 24., Jean Blondel et Maurizio Cotta eds., Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Governments and Supporting Parties in Liberal Democracies(London: MacMillan Press LTD,1996). 249 and 252.

[7] The cabinet is responsible in front of the parliament (according to part 102 of the 1991 Constitution/part 108 of the revised constitution). There are also several forms of parliamentary control such as motions, interpellations or questions (art 111-112, 2003). Furthermore the Parliament controls the nomination of the Prime Minister and in certain conditions can depose a motion to dismiss the government in function (art.113, 2003). While the role of the Parliament regards the creation of laws, the role of the cabinets is to conduct internal and external policies and to control the central administration (art.101, 2003). Nevertheless the Romanian legal framework stipulates that the cabinets also beneficiate from some leverage in order to balance the parliamentary power.

[8]Data obtained as a result of centralization and reconfiguration of the information provided by the site of the Deputies Chamber. *www.cdep.ro*

[9] The politicization of high civil servants in Romania is signaled by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries (SIGMA) REPORTS concerning the functioning of the Romanian administration as well as by the commission reports. These general reports are sustained by the declarations of central actors of the administration: chiefs of the Civil Servants Agency, trade union leaders of the civil servants as well as some central administration high civil servants as resulted from a survey conducted during January-February 2006. For further information see Alexandra Ionascu, "The Evolution of Parties Supporting Government Forms of Patronage In Post-communist Romania", Paper prepared for ECPR joint Sessions, (April, Nicosia, 2006).

developed by Robert Putnam[10] and in this case the center of political power is constituted by the members of the cabinets[11].

The study proposes an analysis of ministerial governmental careers through the concept of professionalization and the process of decision-making procedures and their evolution of forms in post-communist Romania. However the main aim of this paper is to concentrate on the different effects that research strategies and various levels of analysis can have on the study of a certain subject. Therefore, the paper is constructed on two main axes. The first one concerns an analysis of the governmental personnel and of the decision-making process through quantitative methods, and the second axis concerns the same analysis, but from a qualitative perspective. The second section of the paper presents a discussion about the research approaches, highlighting the importance of a hybrid methodological research design in order to understand the Romanian case.

The present paper comprises a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the same phenomenon at different levels of analysis. The quantitative analysis is based on the analysis of the political trajectories of the governmental personnel synthesized in a database, as well as the governmental decisions regarding the governmental restructuring. The database counts 194 persons appointed to ministerial positions (302 appointments)[12], starting with the first government established after 1989, the provisional government, and ending at 21 December 2004, when Adrian Nastase's cabinet completed its mandate[13]. The second set of data comprises the governmental decisions regarding the restructuring of the ministries. The analysis of the professionalization of the political actors is based upon mean comparisons, cross-tabulation, correlations between the duration of mandates and cluster analysis in order to delimitate the main governmental trajectories. The restructure of government concerns the general tendencies and is

[10] Putnam makes the distinction between the Weberian type of bureaucracy and the political bureaucracy. This second type describes the bureaucracies that are not separated from the political realm (Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 87-126). Mattei Dogan underpins the fact that in countries where the high civil servants are politicized, the political actors play the major role in the decision making process Mattei Dogan, The mandarins of Western Europe. The political role of Top Civil Sevants, (London:Sage Publications, 1975),14.

[11] Jean Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe," in Richard Gunther et all eds., Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 235.

[12] The database we constructed is the result of crossing several sources (***ROMPRES, Protagonişti ai vieții publice I,II and III [Actors of the public life], Bucureşti:Agenția Naționala de Presa Rompres, 1995; Gheorghe CRIŞAN, Piramida puterii I and II [The pyramid of power], Bucureşti: Pro Historia2004; Stelian NEAGOE, Istoria guvernelor României - de la începuturi -1859 până în zilele noastre 1999[The history of Romanian governments from the Begining until today 1999], Bucureşti:Machiavelli, 1999, as well as some of the official documents and information available on the official websites.

[13] Although our study does not cover the period of the present cabinet in function, some insights will be presented in order to emphasize some evolutions in the recruitment process on the political scene.

constructed mainly by a simple analysis of the descriptive statistics indicators.

The qualitative analysis uses the results of semi-structured interviews conducted with ministers and junior ministers in post-communist Romania. The interviews were conducted between January and May 2005 and the selection of cases was made on the basis of participation in different cabinets, the political party that sustained the nomination, the importance of the portfolio, and the domain of the ministry. The main dimensions of the interviews concerned recruitment into an executive function as a part of career development, their role perception on their involvement in the decision-making process, their relationship with their colleagues as well as with their own party, and their perception of the dynamics of governmental personnel. The information provided by the interviews was completed through an analysis of the insights offered by the memoirs published by the political leaders of the period.

How to study the rofessionalization of elites and the decision-making procedures?

The governmental actors constitute the center of the political scene through their visibility and their decision-making power. Their appointment depends upon the decision of the Prime Minister but in practice, they are delegates of the political parties that support the government[14]. Furthermore, the political parties tend to appoint actors high in the party hierarchy or actors having a consolidated political career into the central positions[15]. One of the main reasons for these appointments is the fact that this allows political parties to control the structure of opportunity and the areas of incertitude at the party level[16]. Therefore, in stable democracies the general tendency is to appoint political actors with long political careers, with technocratic appointments being made only as a result of a major political crisis[17]. Studies of ministerial trajectories, as an image of career construction, have revealed the existence of two main trajectories for governmental personnel: party cum parliament and civil servants[18]. In the second case, political parties

[14] Jean Blondel, Daria Malova, "The process of decision-making in Cabinets In East-Central and Southeastern Europe since 1990 : A Succes Equilibrum?", paper prepared for *ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops*, *Workshop No. 10: The Process of Decision-Making in Cabinets, in Central-Eastern and Southern Europe*, Uppsala, Sweden, (April 13–18, 2004) : 12-14.

[15] J. Blondel, D. Malova, "The process of decision-making in Cabinets In East-Central and Southeastern Europe since 1990 : A Succes Equilibrum?", 12-14

[16] Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties. Organization and power(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1988) .36.

[17] Jean Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe", in Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges. Richard Gunther et al (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002), 233-256**.**

[18] Jean Blondel, Government Ministers. 29-55*,* Mattei Dogan, *"*How to Become a Cabinet Minister in France. Career Pathways, 1870 -1978,"in Comparative Politics *12: 1(*October 1979)*:*.1-24*;* Kenig, Shlomit Barnea, "The Selection of Ministers in Israel: Is the Prime Minister a 'Master of His Domain'? " paper prepared for the workshop *Selection and De-selection of Ministers*, European Consortium of Political Research, 33th Joint Session Workshops, 14-19 April 2005, Granada

conduct a process of recruitment in order to benefit from the expertise of civil servants. Therefore, the level of politicization and of political and technical expertise are very high in the case of the governmental personnel, conceived as the core of the decision-making process. Most ministers and secretaries of state consolidate their position on the political arena after maintaining such functions[19]. Consequently, in the existing models the analysis of the careers of governmental personnel should underpin a pattern of a professional politician, one which sees politics as a vocation, to employ the Weberian term[20], and one who lives for and from politics.

Besides the analysis of trajectories, the political professionalization of governmental actors can be described by two indicators: the duration in different offices, and the governmental and portfolio experience that imply a certain specialization in a certain sector of the government[21]. Following the existing theories, professionalization occurs when there is a certain dedication of the actor to the political scene and the actor remains in the political arena in different functions at the state level or in the party.

Furthermore, given the fact that the power to distribute these functions is at the discretion of the party supporting the government, the logic that should prevail at the governmental level would be one of cohesion in the decision-making process. This does not preclude the possibility of having different patterns of decision-making as a result of the form of government, such as collective decision-making. But we expect the decision-making process to be controlled by the party supporting the government, and that there will be a certain degree of cooperation between the political actors in government. In addition, it should also be expected that once in government, the political appointees will use institutional leverage in order to cooperate and to establish common ground in the decision-making process.

Findings on the romanian case: quantitative analysis

In post-Communist Romania, nine governments[22] have marked the landscape

[19] Ezra Suleiman, Les élites en France. Grands corps et grandes écoles [Elites in France. Corporate spirit and ivy league schools] (Paris : Seuil, 1978), 106.

[20] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans Gerth and Wright C. Mills eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1958.

[21] John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez, "Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet- the French Fourth and Fifth Republic in Comparative Perspective," in British Journal of Political Science, 34(January 2004).

[22] In order to delineate the government duration we retain three of the fives criteria that Lijphart identified. The selective choice of the criteria of delimitation is determined by the fact that our study is centered on the individuals forming the cabinets and less on the political composition of the cabinets. Given our interest for the elites' behavior three criteria are employed: 1. any change in the prime ministership, 2 any intervening parliamentary elections, 3 the resignation of all cabinet members. See Arendt Lijphart, "Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation," in Comparative Politics Studies 172 (1984): 256-279.

of the Romanian political sphere. For the first eight governments[23] the short cabinet duration shows the difficulties that arose in developing a lasting parliamentary majority. Apart from the 1990-1992 period, in all other cases there was a negotiated majority[24] with different types of coalitions[25]: in 1992-1996 there was a multi-party minority government (where the parties in government do not possess the majority of seats in parliament), in 1996-2000 an oversized/surplus coalition (coalition governments that exceeded the minimal winning criteria), and since 2000 a minimal wining coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government).

Nevertheless, when looking at the elite strata one can observe that governmental instability also matches the process of portfolio volatility[26]. The average duration in office of a minister is 14.85 months[27], which represents 68% of the average duration of the Romanian cabinets and 30.2% of the duration of a four-year classical mandate. Only 55% of ministers remain in office during the mandate of the cabinet in which they were nominated. This is an indicator of the existence of personnel instability. Furthermore, looking at the types of mandate[28] that prevailed on the Romanian scene, we notice that there is not a very strong tendency towards retention of ministerial personnel: 75.5% of the ministers only secured one mandate, 15.6% had two mandates, and 9.9% had a mandate which lasted more that three years. It is however important to note that the rotation or

[23] The post-communist cabinets and their duration : Petre Roman (30.12.1989-28.06.1990) – 179 jours; Petre Roman (29.06.1990-15.10.1991) – 473 jours; Theodor Stolojan (16.10.1991–15.10.1992) – 393 jours; Nicolae Văcăroiu (13.11.1992-10.12.1996) – 1489 jours; Victor Ciorbea (11.12.1996-15.04.1998) – 491 jours; Radu Vasile (16.04.1998–13.12.1999) – 616 jours; Mugur Isărescu (14.12.1999-12.12.2000) – 366 et Adrian Năstase (13.12. 2000-21.12.2004) – 1469 jours. Cristian Preda, Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă: 1989-2004[Parties and elections in the postcommunist Romania : 1989-2004] (Bucureşti:Nemira, 2005).

[24] *Ibid*, 42.

[25] In the literature, we differentiate between the types of single-party and coalition governments. The study uses the classification of Woldendorp who argues that party governments can be classified into six types: Single party government (one party holds the majority in parliament and all government seats); Minimal winning coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government); Surplus coalition (coalition governments which exceed the minimal winning criteria); Single party minority government (the party in government does not possess the majority of seats in parliament); Multi party minority government (the parties in government do not possess the majority of seats in parliament); Caretaker government (temporary cabinet). For further details see: Jaap Woldendrop and all. Party in Government in 48 democracies 1945-1998, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

[26] John D. Huber introduces the concept of portfolio volatility referring to the replacements of the ministers not only at the end of the cabinet, See John D. Huber, "How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies?" in The American Political Science Review 92:.3(Sept. 1998): 577-591 (581).

[27] We have calculated the average duration of the ministerial mandate, by taking into account the number of months he stays in office.

[28] Jean Blondel employed several categories of mandates : one mandate, 2 continuous mandates, 2 interrupted or dissociated mandates, 3 continuous mandates or interrupted or two continuous mandates and one dissociated and or more mandates.

promotion of a junior minister to a ministerial position during the same cabinet is considered as one mandate. There are only two political actors on the Romanian governmental scene that succeeded in having a mandate which lasted more than eight years. Even if we take into account the period of filling a function such as deputy minister, 21.1% of the ministers had two mandates and 18.6% had secured three mandates or more. It can be argued however that there is a certain reproduction of elites. Nevertheless the results of the analysis of the duration of a ministerial mandate show that 27.3% of the ministers occupied the portfolios for less than one year and 76.3% of the population had a mandate shorter than four years. Only 6.2% (or 12 persons) of the ministers have had tenures which lasted more than four years, from which nine of them are members of the Romanian successor party PDSR which governed Romania during ten years of Romanian post-communism. Therefore, there is not a general tendency in the construction of stable governmental careers at the ministerial level (See tables 1-3).

However, lowering the level of the analysis and looking at the way in which every government was formed, certain patterns of political careers can be observed in the case of governmental personal. These patterns also depend on the political affiliation of the actor in question. Nevertheless, three main patterns of selection can be identified. Two of them are identical to the classical forms of promotion outlined in the literature on the recruitment of governmental personnel: 1. the parliamentary pathway – 19.7%[29] of the ministers were MPs before occupying an executive function; 2. the "mandarinate" - 15% of the executive actors came from the high civil servant levels. The third pattern refers to the academic world - 13% of the ministers occupied different positions in the academic field before being appointed in an executive position. Table 5 shows the occupation of governmental actors before their first nomination in a governmental function.

Using a more detailed analysis, what are the credentials that recommend one political actor for appointment or reappointment in the governmental sphere at ministerial and deputy ministerial positions[30]? First, the predominance of the parliamentary trajectory seems to constitute an important resource in determining promotion to an executive office. 24.6% of the appointed ministers had benefited from such experience and another 13.1% were nominated to a ministerial portfolio immediately after they were elected MPs (thus accumulating electoral campaign experience and having

[29] The percentage refers only to those ministers that had an MP function before being appointed to a ministerial position. Therefore previous parliamentary experience was not taken into account if the minister had occupied other functions before his nomination, nor if his nomination follows an immediate election into the parliament. In this second case, we considered that it is not due to their parliamentary experience that they were recommended for such a function.

[30] For this part of the analysis we are taking into account just the political personnel which occupied at least one time a ministerial portfolio.

received the trust of the electorate[31]). The first Chamber constitutes the main pool of selection for the ministers. 73.6% of those having parliamentary experience came from the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, while 8.3% of them had experience in two chambers. Most of the ministers also kept certain functions during their parliamentary mandate (64.8% of this category), especially in parliamentary commissions. In the selection of the commissions they participated in, most of the commissions occupied the juridical, economical, and foreign affairs domains. However, it is important to note the fact that if a parliamentary career is an asset in the appointment to an executive function, it also constitutes an important point of retreat for the political actors. 43.8% of the ministers chose this path after they ceased to exercise their executive mandate.

Another pattern of selection is in regard to those who have executive experience. Only 24 of the ministers representing 12.37% of the population had positions of leadership in the lower political levels of the executive branches. Taking into account the case of the chief of the departments (only directors and deputy directors) and high civil servants, we noticed that 14.5% of the ministers also occupied such functions. Therefore 42 ministers, representing 21.65% of the population studied, retained political and non political functions in the lower strata of the executive. This procedure characterizes mainly the PDSR/PSD cabinets, with two thirds of such ministers from the cabinets Nicolae Vacaroiu and Adrian Nastase and only 9.6% of them members in the cabinets during the period of 1996-2000. To this general pattern we should also add another phenomenon marking the selection of the ministers by promotion. Looking at the ways in which the secretaries of state's experience is valued by the political parties (in the appointment of the members of the cabinets), a general trend can be determined. All the FSN/FDSN/ PDSR/

[31] The Romanian legislatives elections are organized on the basis of Proportional Representation with closed lists, with a threshold varying during the post-communist years from 0.2% in 1990, 3% in 1992 and 1996, and 5% in 2000 for individual political parties. Elections were to be held under this formula in a two-tier system (district level and national level for remainder seats) following the Hondt system. For further details see: Cristian Preda, "Système politique et familles partisanes en Roumanie post-communiste" [Political System and partisan families in postcommunist Romania], in Studia Politica Revista Romana de Stiinte Politice 2:2(Bucureşti:Meridiane, 2003).555-561. and also Cristian Preda, România post-comunistă şi România interbelică [Interwar years and post-communist Romania] (Bucureşti: Meridiane, 2002). Given these characteristics of the electoral system one could question the legitimacy of the election of the MPs, the electoral validation being the electoral validation of a list not of the individual actors. However this aspect is not relevant for our study. First, the main selector for a ministerial office is the party, the same party that constructs the lists for the parliamentary elections. The electoral success of a list is at least partially due to its composition. The victory in the electoral process in a certain district also depends of the actors nominated on the list. Secondly the political parties appreciate the participation of the MPs in the electoral campaigns. Therefore, parliamentary activity is not the only element that can recommend a political actor to an executive position but also his fighting spirit and efficiency during the electoral campaign.

PSD cabinets were characterized by high percentages of ministers who had already occupied functions of secretaries of state before their appointment (Petre Roman I 44.12%, Petre Roman II 34.62%, Theodor Stolojan 35%, Nicolae Vacaroiu 40.40%, and Adrian Nastase 43.75%). On the opposite side are the cabinets formed by the historical parties: Victor Ciorbea (15.39%), Radu Vasile (16 .67%) and Mugur Isarescu (13.04%) with lower percentages. Thus, there is a certain emerging pattern regarding the selection for promotion in the interior of the executive branch, but these procedures touched only one part of the political spectrum. The PDSR/PSD governments have chosen a process of professionalization in function and favored the accumulation of executive experience[32]. This situation is more balanced because the cabinets formed during 1996-2000 period, especially the second and the third one, employed an alternative strategy consisting of a high level of the reproduction of ministerial actors from one cabinet to another (in the case of the Radu Vasile cabinet, 66.67% of the ministers had already occupied a similar position in other cabinets; the same phenomenon is identifiable in the case of the cabinet of Mugur Isarescu - 77.27%)[33]. Besides this post-revolutionary executive experience, we can also identify, in the case of 29% of the ministers, the presence of governmental experience during the communist period. However only 11% of the ministers occupied high positions such as junior minister or minister in the communist cabinets. We should also specify the fact that the presence of such actors in the post-communist cabinets is distributed mainly in the first years after the breakdown of communism. Taking into account all these elements, one can claim that the governmental sphere constituted by itself one of the main pathways toward a ministerial career.

In what concerns the professionalization in "politics as a vocation", this condition is not filled by a wide majority of the members of the extended cabinets (68%). In fact, the political actors do not dedicate themselves only to political areas, but they also maintain a non political profile. The main case of such "occupational safeguards" is constituted by the academic field, but there are also political actors with, for instance, economic capital. The existence and perpetuation of non political profiles shows an attempt to use these credentials as an alternative exit point in

[32] One explanation of this phenomenon is the long period that the PDSR/PSD spent in government, a fact that permitted the formation of a basis of selection in the construction of the ministerial team. In opposition to this situation, the cabinets in the period 1996-2000 did not benefit from this pool of selection because they were in government for the first time. Nevertheless, by looking at the composition of the first formulation of the cabinet in function we can observe that only 16.66% of the members were secretaries of state in the previous cabinets during the period of 1996-2000. Therefore we can asses until present there is no evidence that this procedure of selection by promotion is a characteristic of the cabinets formed by the historical parties too.

[33] This process of selection is also identifiable in the other cases, but in those cases the level of reproduction is lower: Roman I - 14.71%, Roman II - 26.92 %, Theodor Stolojan – 55 %, Nicolae Vacaroiu - 7.44 %, Adrian Nastase - 10.42%.

case their political career is abruptly interrupted, and as a resource in their appointment process. The public profile of the ministers is displayed in the following manner: while 19% had economic capital (10.9% of the private economy) and 10.2% had a civil servant's profile, the wide majority presented an academic profile. This social capital constitutes a resource in the political career. Furthermore, 36.3% of the appointed ministers occupied a position of leadership in the non political sphere (chiefs of research centers, deans, chiefs of hospitals, chiefs of trade unions).

But what can we say about the procedures of decision-making in such cabinets, and have they reconfigured over time? The indicator chosen is the number of governmental decisions regarding the restructuring of ministries. The Romanian cabinets in the period of 1990 - March 2004 are oversized, presenting on average 24.14 portfolios. Furthermore, their structure is highly unstable. During the first 14 years of post-communism, 291 governmental decisions were adopted in order to restructure the configuration of the ministries, which shows that on average every year 14.03 decisions modified the structure of ministries. What is important to mention is that there is not a decrease over the years of the dimension of the government restructuring, as one could expect. When looking at the domains that are the most affected by the governmental restructuring, it clearly appears that the ministries that are reconfigured most often are the ministries dealing with different economic dimensions. Meanwhile, the health and justice ministries are the most stable ones (See graphic 4). Consequently, it cannot be established that there is a direct link between the advancement of the reforms and the degree of the restructuring of the governmental structures, as both the economic sector and the justice domain are constantly criticized by the country reports of the EU's Commission. The expandable nature of the executives[34] and of the governmental agencies and their proliferation after 1998 constitute an important element showing the shifting nature of the governmental structure and the general tendency towards an expandable structure.

Interpretation of the quantitative findings

The analysis of cabinets through quantitative data revealed certain patterns of governmental behavior. What can we say about the professionalization of the governmental actors as well as governmental decision-making? Several elements that depend on this level of analysis adopted can be identified:

[34] The number of portofolios in the post-communist cabinets: Petre Roman II 25, Theodor Stolojan 23, Văcăroiu 22, Victor Ciorbea 28, Radu Vasile 25, Mugur Isărescu 19, Adrian Năstase 27 (Souce: the appendix regarding the composition of cabinets in the moment of investiture Monitorul Oficial, Ist part). Concerning the proliferation of governmental agencies, it starts in 1998. One illustrative example is the case of the Radu Vasile cabinet that reduced his governmental structure from 28 to 25 portfolios. The same year saw the creation of ten governmental agencies. The same tendency also characterizes the Nastase's cabinet.

1. There is no tendency towards the construction of a stable governmental career, with most of the ministers presenting short durations for their mandate.
2. There is no general pattern of rotation or reproduction of governmental elites.
3. In the case of the selection of portfolios, the patterns of career construction are similar to those described in Western European countries. The basis for the selection of ministers presents some tendencies towards the construction of political careers, but these tendencies are not definitive.
4. There is a certain procedure of selection through promotion in the case of PDSR ministers, and a systematic reproduction of the ministers during the 1996-2000 period.
5. Politics as a vocation does not occur often in the Romanian case, with political actors maintaining alternative occupations to their political activities.

Concerning the decision making procedures, there are certain elements that can theoretically affect this process:

1. High governmental instability and the high volatility of political personnel.
2. The expendable structure of Romanian cabinets and their sub-units.
3. The constant reconfiguration of the ministries.
4. A tendency (however not very strong) of the political parties to diminish discontinuities through the selection or reproduction of political elites.

We can therefore observe that the quantitative analysis emphasizes the fact that even if the classical definition of professionalization of elites in terms of "politics as a vocation" and a certain stability in the duration of a mandate are not present, there are some elements, such as the construction of patterns of trajectories, which can indicate the existence of a tendency toward the professionalization of political elites. However, this is an ongoing process that depends on the political parties that are forming the government. As regards the decision making procedures, several elements (1-3) can suggest the presence of powerful discontinuities in the decision making, and only one (4) tends toward the opposite position.

Qualitative findings: professionalization as careers trajectories and the decision-making process

The quantitative analysis gave us some insights into the process of professionalization of the political actors as well the factors that can influence the process of decision-making. The same factors are now going to be scrutinized from the perspective of qualitative analysis. Can we speak about a process of professionalization and about the continuity factors of decision-making?

Four patterns of governmental behavior can be identified: a. 1990-1992: the match between continuity of governmental elites and the objective of decision-making continuity, b. 1992-1996: continuities and

illusory discontinuities of personnel, the socialization process, and the fluidity of the decision making, c. dis-unified elites in power and a decision-making blockage, d. extreme cohesiveness of the elites and hierarchical decision-making.

On 26 December 1989, the first decision of the Council of National Salvation Front, a body which was formed in order to seize all the responsibilities for a provisional state structure, concerned the nomination of Petre Roman as Prime Minister of the first democratic government. The task of the new government was to ensure the continuity of the decision-making process and to prepare the first free elections. After the elections on 20th May 1990 and the crushing victory of a successor party, the National Salvation Front (winning 66.31% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies), Petre Roman was for the second time appointed Prime Minister. However, powerful social movements such as the riot of miners and their violent marches on the streets of Bucharest interrupted his mandate. The reshuffle of Roman's cabinet produced a split in the major governing party. As a result, the newly appointed Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, a technocrat, had an extended mandate lasting over a year.

During the period between 1990 and 1992, it can best be described as politics of coincidence between the reproduction of political elites and the continuity of decision-making. In other words, FSN leaders considered that the main objective of the cabinets was to ensure the continuity and expertise necessary in the decision-making process. Therefore, the politicization of the cabinet and the allocation of portfolios to party members was a secondary objective[35]. In this period, the main criterion employed in the selection of ministers was the decision-making expertise acquired in the communist executive structures. One third of the members had governmental experience in communist cabinets (39.3% Roman, and 28.6% in Stolojan). Besides that aspect, the importance of governmental expertise in the recruitment of governmental functionaries was recognized by the main selectors of the moment: President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman[36]. What is important to note is the manner in which the secretaries of state and political dignitaries were appointed, because the formula was applied several times in the post-communist governments. The

[35] The proportion of independents in the post-communist cabinets is as follows: the provisional government 100%, Petre Roman II 32.1%, Theodor Stolojan 33.3%, Nicolae Vacaroiu 42.2%, Victor Ciorbea 15.8%, Radu Vasile 10.3% Mugur Isarescu 18.2%, Adrian Nastase 2.1%, Calin Popescu Tariceanu(in 2004) 16.66%. (The percentages were calculated using our own set of data on governmental trajectories).

[36] See Petre Roman and Elena Ştefoi, Mărturii provocate [Provoked Testimonies], Bucureşti:Paideia, 2002; Ion Iliescu în dialog cu Vladimir Tismăneanu, Marele şoc Din finalul unui secol scurt [Dialogue between Ion Iliescu and Vladimir Tismăneanu. The Great Shock at the End of a Short Century: On Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy] (Bucureşti: Enciclopedică, 2004):197; Ion Iliescu, Revoluție şi Reformă, Stenograma primei şedințe plenare a CFSN [Reform and Revolution, The transcript of the first general assembly of the CFSN] (Bucureşti:Enciplopedică, 1994). 80.

principle applied in their selection and de-selection were the personal choice of the minister in function, who had a formal obligation to present the secretaries of state to the Prime Minister, who, in turn, made the legal nominations. No party affiliation conditionality was taken into account. These procedures are not the effect of the independence of the ministers, but rather represent the cabinet's politics. However, this recruitment pattern was not always applied in this manner. For instance, in the case of secretaries of state who were promoted from the bureaucratic level, there were not as many dismissals in the bureaucratic area.

The autonomous method of appointment is in fact an image of the functioning of the government and explains the construction of a culture of autonomy in the case of ministries, which was highly utilized until 2000. The relationship with the minister in office or the Prime Minister accounts for a certain pattern of constructing governmental relations. As Petre Roman declared, the secretaries of state were replaced "when the ministers observed they blocked the reform policies." Therefore, we cannot speak of professionalization. Although the members of the cabinet had the technical expertise they needed, the continuity at the level of political elites was based upon clientelistic relations established between political actors. The logic that dominated the appointments was one that bypassed the party level. The main logic of governmental functioning concerned a process of autonomy of ministries.

The second free electoral process, held on 27th September 1992, marked the victory of the main faction of the old FSN, now named The Social Democratic Party - PDSR. However, the victory was not clear-cut and PDSR had to negotiate the political support of the cabinet with other parties. Nevertheless, given the fragmentation of the political opposition, the PDSR formed the new government, and a technocrat, Nicolae Văcăroiu, was appointed as the head of cabinet. The cabinet formed by the conservative wing of the party after the split of FSN functioned as a minority cabinet and constantly negotiated parliamentary support with three other extremist parties: PSM, PUNR and PRM.

The new Prime Minister, a former secretary of state in post-communist cabinets also with experience in governmental structures before 1989, was not a member of PDSR, but his mandate was highly controlled by the chiefs of the main governmental party. The cabinet was formed on the principle of continuity, but continuity based on socialization in institutions before and after 1989. As regards the appointment of secretaries of state, their nomination is marked by three different logics: 1. autonomy – generally the ministers in office could appoint the secretaries of state they wanted; 2. continuity with the previous cabinets; and 3. negotiation – the appointment of secretaries of state reflected the state of negotiation with other parties in order to achieve a majority in Parliament. It is interesting to note the fact that personnel nominated in different positions, for example secretaries of state, became

PDSR members at the end of the cabinet mandate. In this manner, the party recovered trained personnel considered loyal to the political party. In order to repay the loyalty and activity of the personnel, the secretaries of state were invited to run in eligible positions on the PDSR electoral lists. With concern to the professionalization of political actors, the same dilemma applies. They were not party members, but they had some executive decision-making experience, and most of them were very close to the party in office. Therefore, there is not a general trend towards the creation of political careers in the classical sense. The construction of careers was not based upon the evolution of the actor on the governmental scene, but instead was dependent on the degree of insertion of the minister in certain networks, which was not necessarily constructed on the logic of party affiliation. The socialization in institutions of the members of the cabinets contributed to a certain extent to cohesion in the decision-making process, but only on a small scale, because the principle that prevailed was the autonomy of ministries and the constant fight over the state resources.

The first political alternation took place on 3rd November 1996. The victorious coalition, The Democratic Convention (CDR), joined its forces with the Social Democratic Union (formed by the historic party PSDR and the other split faction of the FSN – The Democratic Party) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians (UDMR). The first appointed Prime Minister was Victor Ciorbea, former mayor of Bucharest, coming from the main historical party the CDR, the National Peasants Party (PNTcd). Ciorbea resigned after 16 months and was replaced by Radu Vasile, member of the same party and the representative of an important wing of the party. The third Prime Minister of this mandate was Mugur Isărescu, an independent. Isărescu was the governor of the National Bank of Romania; his mandate as a Prime Minister only lasted one year. The anti-communist alliance, which is the manner in which CDR presented itself during the electoral campaign[37], applied a strong 'politics of algorithm', the portfolios being distributed to political parties not only at the ministerial level, but also at the level of each office of secretary of state. Therefore, the selection of ministries was not the result of the Prime Minister's choice; instead, they were selected directly by the political parties. This procedure of appointment dominated all three cabinets of the period, although the latter two cabinets, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu, to a large extent reproduced the structure of the previous ones, because the change in government was mainly the result of the contestation of the Prime Minister in power. However, the main criteria of selection were the degree of insertion in networks of the future ministers, privileged relations at the party level (not necessarily constructed on a political basis, but rather on the existence of socialization in positions that preceded their party affiliation), and the

[37] Cristian Preda, "Les partis politiques dans le postcommunisme roumain" [The political parties in the Romanian post-communism], in Studia Politica 8 :4 (Bucureşti, 2003):943-987.

parliamentary experience. The political parties in the coalition perceived themselves in a competition process and not as allies and there was a strong tendency towards autonomy of ministries. Given the lack of consensus between parties, a process of personalization and segregation of the policy domains was assumed even by the Prime Minister in office.

The eighth government of the Romanian political field was formed as a result of the second political alternation in power, which took place on 26th November 2000. The Social Democratic Pole, formed mainly by the PDSR (two small parties also adhered to this body: PSDR and PUR), won the elections. Benefiting also from the political support of the UDMR, PDSR (later known as the Social Democratic Party PSD) formed the cabinet. The Prime Minister of the cabinet, Adrian Năstase, was also head of the main government party, the Social Democratic Party and drafted the construction of the team in government. The main aspect that was taken into account at the declarative level was the parliamentary experience of potential ministers. This selection procedure allowed the Prime Minister to have a very good knowledge of all the cabinet members (which is unique in the Romanian governmental field) and to achieve a certain cohesion between the governmental actors that had worked together within the Parliament. However, the appointment procedure at the ministerial level was founded on a principle of selection by promotion, because the ministers appointed had secretary of state experience and then benefited from a double advantage of the lack of visibility and the accumulation of decision-making expertise. To this criterion, another one can be added: the high degree of politicization of the cabinet, where almost all the ministers were prominent leaders of the party. Nevertheless, this criterion of selection only concerned the first level of power. As regards the selection of secretaries of state, the previous procedure of appointment was mainly preserved. It was the duty of the minister to present to the Prime Minister the secretary of state he wanted and to support his candidacy. On this second level of power, party affiliation was not a definite criterion of selection, but what counted instead was a good relationship with the minister in power. This procedure allowed PSD to coordinate a 'politics of cooption' of personnel, which embraced the same form as did the 'politics of selective incentives' in the Văcăroiu cabinet. The cabinet's decisions were taken by the actors in government and the Prime Minister had the chance to appeal in decision-making procedures. The principle of autonomy and personalistic decision-making remained, but the centralization and control over the party's organization and the cabinets were unified in the same hands. This principle of extreme cohesion generated a very hierarchical system, in which the center of power was the cabinet.

Interpretation of the qualitative findings

The qualitative analysis of the cabinets reveals some interesting aspects

concerning the process of professionalization of political actors:

1. Their selection and promotion are dependent not on their career in the party, but on direct relationships with key persons who are not necessarily the party leaders. There has been, however, a shift in recent years towards more involvement of the central party organization in the recruitment of ministers. The selection of governmental personnel is a function of the degree of insertion of the actor in certain networks.

2. There was a powerful personalization of the appointment process that depended on the relationship with the persons making the appointments and their entourage. However, Nastase's cabinet showed a tendency towards the party level in making appointments.

As concerns the decision-making procedures, the study reveals the following findings:

1. The ministers had a high degree of autonomy in nominating the secretaries of state.

2. The autonomy of the ministries is a characteristic of the governmental functioning. Ministers tend to see the functioning of their institution as being independent from the rest of the ministries. During the first decade after the breakdown of communism, this culture of decision-making was accepted by the Prime Ministers in office.

3. Certain discontinuities resulting from governmental restructuring and reshuffling were diminished by the different strategies of appointment of governmental actors.

General discussion of the findings

Both the quantitative and the qualitative study of the cabinets emphasize the absence of a sufficient "accumulation of political experience"[38] of the governmental personnel in order to speak of their proper professionalization. Furthermore, both analyses conclude that the process of decision-making suffers from discontinuity. However there are some differences in the interpretation of the findings of those two dimensions in terms of the methodological approach adopted. In our quantitative study, the image of the Romanian governmental elites is one of under-professionalized individuals, with a minimal duration in office, little experience in politics, and no special competencies in a certain domain. This first image is completed by a somewhat opposing phenomenon: the rotation and selection by promotion of governmental elites. Even if the average duration in office of a minister is very low, certain political actors are selected and promoted in a way that acts as

[38] The accumulation of political experience refers to the fact that governmental actors who manage to maintain their position despite the termination of a government acquire certain competencies that allow them to exercise their functions and consolidate their positions as central actors in the cabinet. See Mattei Dogan and Peter Campbell, "Le personnel ministériel en France et en Grande Bretagne"[The ministerial personnel in France and in Great Britain], in Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, 7:2 (April - June, October – December 1957) :313-345 and 793-824(326).

leverage in the creation of networks of cohesion in and outside the governmental sphere.

The second image of the professionalization of political elites is created through a qualitative analysis. It underpins the role that socialization in institutions plays in the construction of political careers[39]. The findings in the qualitative research stress the fact that in the absence of institutionalized parties, the role in the selection and the promotion of ministers and junior ministers is played by different networks of cohesion. In this sense, the professionalization process, which should be emphasized by the emergence of different career patterns of governmental actors, instead underpins a strong politicization of the appointment process.

The two images presented are not contradictory, but complementary ones. The two of them consider the Romanian elites as not being professionalized. The quantitative analysis allows us not only to understand the degrees of professionalization, but also to identify the most important elements in the construction of political trajectories. Therefore the first image can best be described by the following attributes: a consolidation of patterns of selection; reproduction in governmental areas vs. a lack of sufficient governmental experience; absence of specialization; and the absence of politics as a vocation. The qualitative analysis not only identifies the mechanisms of selection, but it also offers some explanations for the formation of the cabinet. By only looking at the career trajectories, one might think that even though there is not a professionalization of elites, there is an emerging tendency for the creation of such careers. Or, when looking at those procedures from the perspective of the second image, we realize that these promotions referred, in the first seven cabinets, to a different logic. It is not the party in government[40] (a term that cannot be applied in the case of the first Romanian cabinets) that constitutes the main selector, but promotion in a governmental position depends upon their insertion in social and political networks that are not integrated at the party level. During the first ten years of post-communism, the Romanian political field was not directed towards professionalization, but rather towards personalization, two elements that do not share a contradictory relationship.

The second dimension of analysis regarded the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the procedures of decision-making. While the quantitative analysis can only provide some insights into the

[39] In the sense in which Searing introduces the idea that the principal of socialization in institutions creates cohesiveness, see Donald D. Searing, "Two Theories of Elite Consensus: Tests with West German Data" in Midwest Journal of Political Science,15:3 (August 1971):442-447.

[40] Richard Katz identifies three main aspects that characterize the "party in government": the ministers are appointed by the party supporting the government as well as the Prime Minister, and that it is the party forming the cabinet that decides the main lines of the decisions which are to be taken by the cabinet. See Richard Katz, "Party Government. A Rationalistic Conception", in F.G. Castels and R. Wildenmann eds. *Visions and Realities of Party Government* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).42.

decision-making process as being discontinuous and blocked by over-regulation by the governmental apparatus, the qualitative analysis allows for both the understanding that the governmental discontinuities are a result of ministry autonomy and the continuity of the decision-making process is based upon a certain cohesion of the political actors and informal bargaining between the actors. If the quantitative analysis underlines the unstable character of the institutional design and the stabilization as a result of a certain reproduction of the rotation of governmental actors, the qualitative analysis depicts the informal mechanisms of the decision-making process. The personalized manner of the decision-making procedures accompanies the institutional design mechanisms and passes over them, producing a certain continuity at the decision-making level.

The two methods underline different aspects of the building process of the careers of governmental actors. The main objection that one could bring is that the different results result from the variations in the methodology and the epistemological *a priori* in the analysis. However, it should be noted that the differences are mainly the consequence of variations in the level of analysis and establishing the level of analysis at different layers – structural (general trends of behavior of the political actors) or individual (the strategic actions of ministers). Consequently, the complete picture of the governmental sphere can only be constructed by scrutinizing the different levels of analysis with different methodological approaches. Thus, our study underpins the fact that without the double approach - qualitative and quantitative - the conclusions drawn from the analysis of only the quantitative and qualitative findings will bring other interpretations of the data. In the case of the quantitative analysis we have the general image of cabinets that are marked by instability at the cabinet level, the political actors' level, and the institutional level. In addition, there are two elements of stabilization: a certain reproduction of the political elites, and the process of construction of certain patterns of careers. In case of the qualitative analysis, the situation is quite opposite, where the improvisational character of the construction of careers as well as the personalized nature of appointments and decision-making should be identified. Therefore the two dimensions do not exclude each other, but are rather complementary, allowing for an in depth understanding of the collusion of formal and informal mechanisms on the political scene. The process of stabilization of both careers and decision-making procedures make use of the personalization process. Of course, there is a process of professionalization and construction of functional mechanisms of decision-making, and the personalized nature of decision-making constitutes an important element in this respect. Through this double approach applied to the same theme, the study emphasizes how different methodological approaches can generate different explanations for the same case without falsifying the general findings. Instead it shows that the mechanisms of explanation are similar to the images associated with the existing models of

interpretation of the appointments. Therefore, it is important to adopt a hybrid methodological approach that can allow for in depth interpretation of the political phenomena as well as a measurement of magnitude.

The main question of this study should then address how we can speak about a process of professionalization and stabilization of decision-making while sustaining the idea that there is wide personalization of the governmental sphere. Is such an approach then not conceptual stretching? Is it sufficient to state the existence of the accumulation of political experience to conclude that there is professionalization? When comparing the theoretical assumptions and the findings one notices a general trend towards professionalization and consolidated decision-making procedures. However, in the Romanian case, the process followed certain particular mechanisms implying a personalistic nature. How is it possible to avoid the argument of gradualism and to set the limits of transitions?

When comparing the general theoretical expectations and the empirical findings in our paper, one can discern only a comparative perspective. The flaws resulting from such a research strategy can be controlled by considering hybrid qualitative-quantitative approaches in the research designs and by noting the limitation of the explanatory power of the concepts. In this context, emphasizing the ratio between the formal and informal mechanisms is essential to understanding the democratization process. partial similarity. The application of the existing theoretical concepts on the Romanian case is not perfect, and could therefore tend towards conceptual stretching. However, this strategy is the only one available in order to develop a Therefore, only a hybrid methodological model and a critical theoretical stance can constitute the basis for the development of studies on transitional countries. In this way, the theories concerning the end of transitions and the applicability of concepts become a secondary axis of questioning, and the central focus of the discussion is transferred onto the practical construction of an adequate research design.

Bibliography

*** Monitorul Oficial [Official Journal]. first part, Regia Autonoma Monitorul Oficial 1989-2004.

***Rompres. Protagonişti ai vieții publice I,II and III[Actors of the public life]. Bucureşti:Agenția Naționala de Presa Rompres, 1995.

Berindei, Mihnea and Thedrel, Arielle. “ Turning the page. Interview with Theodor Stolojan, ” in Politique Internationale – Romania at the threshold of the European Union, 105 (automn 2004).

Blondel, Jean and Cotta, Maurizio. The nature of party government - A comparative European Perspective. (Basingstone: Palgrave, 2000).

Blondel, Jean and Malova, Darina. “The process of decision-making in Cabinets in East-Central and Southeastern Europe since 1990: A successful equilibrium?,” Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions

of Workshops (Uppsala, 13-18 April 2004).

Blondel, Jean and Muller-Rommel, Ferdinand. Cabinets in Eastern Europe. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

Blondel, Jean. Government Ministers in the Contemporary World. (London: Sage, 1986).

Budge, Ian and Kerman, Hans. Parties and Democracy. Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Ciorbea, Victor and Vălenaş, Liviu. Republica iresponsabililor - Convorbiri cu Victor Ciorbea[The Republic of irresponsibles]. (Bucureşti:Tritonic, 2003).

Constantinescu, Emil. *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii* II and III[The time for destruction and the time for construction]. (Bucureşti: Universalia, 2002).

Coposu, Corneliu and Arachelian Vartan. Mărturisiri.Dialog cu Vartan Arachelian[Testimonies. A Dialogue with Vartan Arachelian]. (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1996): 146-163.

Crişan, Gheorghe. Piramida puterii, I, II [The pyramid of power]. (Bucureşti: Pro Historia, 2004).

Diermeier, Daniel and Van Roozendaal, Peter. "The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies," in British Journal of Political Science 28 (Cambridge University Press, 1998): 609-626.

Dogan, Mattei and Campbell, Peter. " Le personnel ministériel en France et en Grande Bretagne "[The ministerial personnel in France and in Great Britain], in Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, 7:2 (April - June, October–December 1957) :.313-345 and 793-824.

Dogan, Mattei. The mandarins of Western Europe. The political role of Top Civil Sevants. (London: Sage Publications, 1975).

Dogan, Mattei. "Sociologia elitelor politice " The Sociology of Political Elites]. in Sociologie politica. Opere alese [Political Sociology]. (Bucureşti : Alternative, 1999): 13-139.

Dogan, Mattei. "Filières pour devenir ministre de Thiers à Mitterand" [Pathways toward a ministerial carrier from Thiers to Mitterand], Pouvoirs 36 (1986) : 1-22.

Dogan, Mattei. "How to Become a Cabinet Minister in France – Career Pathways, 1870-1978," in Comparative Politics 12 (october 1979).

Eraly, Alain. Le pouvoir enchaîné – Etre ministre en Belgique [The chains of power – Being a Minister in Belgium]. Bruxelles :Labor, 2002.

Gerth, Hans and Mills, Wright C. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). Chap. VIII "Bureaucracy" :196-267; Chap. VII " Politics as a Vocation ": 77-128.

Higley, John and Gunther, Richard eds. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. (Cambridge University Press, 1992): Pp. 1-38.

Huber, John D. "How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary

Democracies?, " in The American Political Science Review 92(Sept. 1998): 577-591.

Huber, John D. and Lupia, Arthur. "Cabinet instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies," in American Journal of Political Science 45 (Jan. 2001): 18-32.

Huber, John D. and McCarty, Nolan. "Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining," in American Political Science Review 95(June 2001).

Hubern, John D. and Martinez-Gallardo, Cecilia. "Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet - The French Fourth and Fifth Republic, Comparative Perspective," in British Journal of Political Science 34 (January 2004): 27-48.

Iliescu, Ion and Tismăneanu, Vladimir. Marele şoc Din finalul unui secol scurt [The Great Shock at the End of a Short Century: On Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy]. Bucureşti:Enciclopedică, 2004.

Iliescu, Ion. Revoluție şi Reformă[Reform and Revolution], (Bucureşti: Enciplopedică, 1994): 69-109.

Ionescu Quintus, Mircea. *C*e ați făcut în ultimii cinci ani?[What have you done in the last five years?] (Bucureşti:Maşina de Scris, 2004).

Ionescu Quintus, Mircea. Liberal din tată-n fiu[Liberal from father to son]. (Bucureşti: Vitruviu, 1996).

Ionescu, Alexandra and Tomescu-Hatto, Odette. Politique et société dans le Roumanie contemporaine [Politics and society in the contemporary Romania]. (Paris : Harmattan, 2004).

Katz, Richard. "Party Government. A Rationalistic Conception,*"* in F.G. Castels and R. Wildenmann eds. Visions and Realities of Party Government. Berlin :De Gruyter, 1986.

Kenig, Ofer and Barnea, Shlomit. "The Selection of Ministers in Israel : Is the Prime Minister a 'Master of His Domain'?", Paper prepared for the workshop "Selection and De-selection of Ministers", 33rd ECPR Joint Session Workshops, (14-19 April 2005, Granada).

Laver, Michael and Schepsle, Kenneth A. Making and Breaking Governments, Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Lijphart, Arendt. "A Note on the Meaning of Cabinet Durability," in Comparative Political Studies 17:2 (1984): 163-166.

Lijphart, Arendt. "Measures of Cabinet Durability " in Comparative Political Studies 17:2 (1984): 265-279.

Nastase, Adrian and Teodorescu, Alin. Adrian Năstase în dialog deschis cu Alin Teodorescu - De la Karl Marx la Coca-Cola[From Karl Marx to Coca Cola. Adrian Năstase in a friendly dialogue with Alin Teodorescu]. Bucureşti: Nemira, 2004.

Neagoe, Stelian. Istoria guvernelor României - de la începuturi -1859 până în zilele noastre 1999[The history of Romanian governments from the Begining until today 1999]. (Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 1999).

Panebianco, Angelo. Political Parties. Organization and power. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Preda, Cristian. Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă: 1989-2004 Parties and elections in the postcommunist Romania : 1989-2004]. Bucureşti: Nemira, 2005.

Preda, Cristian. România post-comunistă şi România interbelică[Interwar years and post-communism in Romania]. Bucureşti:Meridiane, 2002.

Pridham, Geoffrey and Lewis, Paul G. eds. Stabilizing fragile Democracies. Comparing new party systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London/New York: Routlege, 1994).

Putnam, Robert. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

Roman, Petre and Stefoi, Elena. Mărturii provocate - Convorbiri cu Elena Ştefoi [Provoked Testimonies. A Dialogue with Elena Ştefoi]. (Bucureşti: Paideia, 2002).

Roman, Petre. Libertatea ca datorie[The liberty as a duty]. (Bucureşti : Paideia, 2000).

Sanders, David and Herman, Valentine. "The stability and survival of governments in Western Democracies," in Pacta Politica 12:1(July 1977): 346-377.

Sartori, Giovanni. "Bien comparer, mal comparer" [Good comparison, Bad Comparison], in Revue Internationale de la Politique Comparée 1 (April 1994).

Sava, Iosif. Invitații Eutherpei[Eutherpe's guests]. (Iasi: Polirom, 1997).

Ştefănescu, Domnița(a). Cinci ani din istoria României. O cronologie a evenimentelor (decembrie 1989 – decembrie 1994)[Five years of the Romanian's history. A chronology of the events (decembrie 1989 – decembrie 1994)]. (Bucureşti: Maşina de Scris, 1998).

Ştefănescu, Domnița(b). Doi ani din istoria României. O istorie a evenimentelor (ianuarie 1995 – ianuarie 1997) [Two years of the Romanian's history. A chronology of the events(ianuarie 1995 – ianuarie 1997)]. (Bucureşti: Maşina de Scris, 1998).

Stoica, Stan. România. Dicționarul partidelor politice din România 1989-2003[Romania. A dictionary of the political parties in Romania 1989-2003]. (Bucureşti: Meronia, 2003).

Stoica, Stan. România. O istorie cronologica 1989-2002. (Bucureşti: Meronia, 2002).

Stoica, Valeriu and ALIGICĂ, Paul. Provocari liberale – in dialog cu Dragos Paul Aligică[Liberal incitements. A Dialogue with Dragos Paul Aligică]. (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2003).

Strom, Kaare Browne, Eric C. Frendris, John F. and Glieber, Dennis W. "Contending Models of Cabinet Stability," in The American Political Science Review 82:3 (Sept 1988): 923-941.

Strom, Kaare Budge, Ian and Laver, Michel. "Constraints of government formation in Parliamentary Democracy, " in American Journal of Political Science, 38(May 1994): 303-335.

Suleiman, Ezra. Les élites en France. Grands corps et grandes écoles [Elites in France]. (Paris : Seuil, 1978).

Taylor, Michel and Herman Valentine M. "Party System and Government Stability" in American Political Science Review 65(1971): 28-37.

Tinca, Gheorghe. De vorbă cu Gheorghe Tinca[Talking to Gheorghe Tinca]. (Bucureşti: Enciclopedică, 1996).

Văcăroiu, Nicolae and Smeoreanu, Gheorghe. *Nicolae Văcăroiu al 60-lea Prim ministru- Carte de interviuri de Gheorghe Smeoreanu*[*Nicolae Văcăroiu the 60th Prime minister. A book of interviews with Gheorghe Smeoreanu*]. (Bucureşti: Intact, 1998).

Vasile, Radu. Cursă pe contrasens - Amintirile unui Prim-ministru[A trip in the opposite direction. The memories of a Prime minister]. (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2002).

Woldendrop Jaap and all. Party in Government in 48 democracies 1945-1998. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.

Appendix

Table 1. Internal governmental instability.The dynamics of governmental personnel (1989-2004)

Cabinets	Life duration	Mean 01	Mean 02	M01 - M02	Ratio 01	Ratio 02	Mean11	Mean 021	Ratio011	Ratio 021
Provisoire	6	4,78	5,2	0,42	0,8	0,87	4,32	4,41	0,72	0,74
Roman II	16	11,5	13,27	1,77	0,72	0,83	9,66	10,32	0,6	0,65
Stolojan	13	12,95	12,95	0	1	1	10,56	10,88	0,81	0,84
Văcăroiu	49	25,87	27,71	1,84	0,53	0,57	21,34	23,94	0,44	0,49
Ciorbea	16	9,31	10,54	1,23	0,57	0,66	11,53	12,09	0,72	0,76
Vasile	20	13	13,44	0,44	0,65	0,67	10,7	12,5	0,54	0,63
Isărescu	12	10,32	10,32	0	0,86	0,86	9,98	10,23	0,83	0,85

Mean 01 – the mean duration of a ministerial mandate (months). The internal rotation at the governmental level was considered as generating from different mandates.

Mean 02 – The mean duration of ministerial mandate. The internal rotation is not taken into account.

Ratio 01 – shows to what extent the mean duration of the mandates is close to the value of the cabinets' life duration. The ratio is obtained in the following manner Mean 01/ n. of months representing the duration of each cabinet.

Ratio 02 –Mean 02/ life duration of each cabinet

Mean 011, Mean 021, Ratio 011 et Ratio 021 – the same indicators as for the ministerial strata, but calculated for the junior ministers

Table 2. Inter-governmental rotation (1989-2004)

N°	Prime Minister	Date of Nomination	Date of Dismissal	Ministerial rotation (%)	Degree of promotion (%)
1	Petre ROMAN (provisoire)	30.12.1989	28.06.1990	14.71	44.12
2	Petre ROMAN II	29.06.1990	15.10.1991	26.92	34.62
3	Theodor STOLOJAN	16.10.1991	15.10.1992	55	35
4	Nicolae VĂCĂROIU	13.11.1992	10.12.1996	7.44	40.40
5	Victor CIORBEA	11.12.1996	15.04.1998	12.91	15.39
6	Radu VASILE	16.04.1998	13.12.1999	66.67	16 .67
7	Mugur ISĂRESCU	14.12.1999	12.12.2000	77.27	13.04
8	Adrian NASTASE	13.12.2000	21.12.2004	10.42	43.75

Table 3. Types of executive mandates (1989-2004)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Single mandates	145	74,7	75,5	75,5
2 continuous mandates	19	9,8	9,9	85,4
2 discontinuous or dissociated mandates	9	4,6	4,7	90,1
3 continuous or discontinuous mandates	15	7,7	7,8	97,9
4 mandates or more	4	2,1	2,1	100

Table 4. Mandate categories (1989-2004)

Cabinets	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than one year	53	27.3	27.3	27.3
Between 1 and 2 years	41	21.1	21.1	48.5
Between 2 and 3 years	34	17.5	17.5	66.0
Between 3 and 4 years	20	10.3	10.3	76.3
Between 4 and 5 years	25	12.9	12.9	89.2
Between 5 and 6 years	7	3.6	3.6	92.8
Between 6 and 7 years	12	6.2	6.2	99.0
Between 7 and 8 years	2	1.0	1.0	100.0

Table 5. The occupation of governmental actors before their first nomination

No	Cabinet	Academics (%)	Civil servants (%)	Appointed in the governmentstructures (%)	MP
1.	Provisoire	19,4	5,6	2,8	0
2.	Roman	14,3	14,3	10,7	10,7
3.	Stolojan	9,5	14,3	9,5	23,8
4.	Vacaroiu	4,5	18,2	9,1	18,2
5.	Ciorbea	21,1	7,9	5,3	31,6
6.	Vasile	17,9	10,7	3,6	46,1
7.	Isarescu	18,2	18,2	4,5	36,4

No	Cabinet	Engineer (%)	Military (%)	Judge/ Prosecutor (%)	Journalist, Writer (%)
1.	Provisoire	11,8	5,6	-	8,3
2.	Roman	14,3	3,6	3,6	7,1
3.	Stolojan	4,8	4,8	4,8	4,8
4.	Vacaroiu	2,3	4,5	2,3	4,5
5.	Ciorbea	2,6	-	2,6	2,6
6.	Vasile	3,6	-	3,6	3,6
7.	Isarescu	4,5	-	4,5	4,5

Graph 1. The instability of governmental personnel in post-communist Romania



Graph 2. The rotation of governmental elites 1989-2004