

BOOK REVIEWS

Norbert Götz and Jörg Hackman (eds.), *Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003).

Ann von Below
King's College London

Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region is a collection of articles on civil society as a national and border-crossing concept, and a combination of theoretical and empirical study and analysis. It is informative, broad, analytical, hopeful and inspiring, albeit somewhat unclear at times. It is a relevant study in times of European integration, globalisation and increasing potential for non-state action, and a good addition to the study of civil society. In its first chapter the book states that its purpose is not to be just another contribution to the theory of civil society, but that it first and foremost aims to provide empirical material for comparative analysis. And this, it does. However, it also claims to aim to inspire theorizing, and does quite a bit of it itself too. Mentioning the first chapter again, "Civil society in the Baltic Sea region: towards a hybrid theory" is the best and most comprehensive theoretical input of the book, introducing "a theory of civil society as a hybrid and fuzzy society" which "rather than representing a clear-cut sphere – will appear as a perspective on society at large, focusing on private, non-commercial networks and initiatives in the public realm, which are connected to features of 'civility'" (p. 5).

The second and third parts of the book concentrate on facts and realities of civil society from historical and contemporary perspectives. Part 5, "Limits of civil society" is an enlightening contribution which, partly does what it says on the tin, i.e. elaborates on the limits of civil society, e.g. in the case of the Russian mafia and the partial ethnic exclusion from civil society in the Baltic states. However, it also adds to the notion that civil society is a reflection of society at large. The historical and contemporary account of Swedish child day-care shows how civil initiatives have functioned as substitutes to public welfare, and

how the former has influenced the latter and how the latter has supported the former. To this reviewer it remains unclear why the chapter is placed under the heading "Limits of civil society", as the development between the civil and public initiatives, arguably implies a limitation of the state, or, simply, a relatively smooth relationship between civil society and the state. Child day-care, as presented here, thus exemplifies a hybrid of state and civil society-led effort, which may be regarded as a partial reflection of Swedish society. As is pointed out numerous times throughout the book, the Northern societies have not seen the antagonistic relationship between civil society and the state, as Eastern societies have.

The chapter on the Russian mafia is undoubtedly a good illustration of how the emergence and function of the mafia as a slightly unusual "civil" initiative and generator of trust and security reflects a flawed relationship between different actors in Russian society, especially between businesses and the state. However, this "civil society" is also a kind of reverse reflection of what the Russian society is not, and the mafia in this way constitutes a substitute for the regulations and structures that sustain trust and functioning relationships between different actors in society (state, businesses etc.).

The last section of the book, on trans-national cooperation on the civil level is an inspiring elaboration on cross-border civil society, progress and improvement. This is illustrated partly as a necessary "traditional" development for the sake of survival and strength, such as in the case of the Saami people of Norway, Sweden and Finland, who have had to cross borders in order to unite against years of discrimination. The potential of cross-border civil cooperation is also explained as a so-called "post-civil" (p. 238) phenomena where, in the globalised world in which we live, regional and international civil society overtakes the relationships and priorities of and between states. In the very last paragraph it asks "what would the outcome be once the 'civil' is thought of in post-binary terms, without the burden of state-related concerns?" (p. 238). And again, the very existence and expansion of regional and transnational civil cooperation reflects the regional and international society at large, fuzzy and

intertwined, on so many levels. The trans-national perspective underlines the character of civil society as a large, changeable and not an immediately definable concept. The book does very well in illustrating this, through the spread of sub-topics within the topic covered.

There is, however, something confusing about the book, especially when it comes back to theorizing or defining civil society. For example, chapter 2 discusses three different approaches to understanding civil society: a general conceptual framework; analyzing different civil societies in the context of different political cultures, and approaching the relevant region as one and identify common social and political problems. The author also states a clear preference among the approaches, favoring the latter. Firstly, in the spirit of the book, it seems unnecessary to grade the different approaches, as they by no means are mutually exclusive and as they all serve a perfectly valid purpose. A common conceptual framework or theory certainly does not hurt, as long as it is inclusive and flexible. And the importance and relevance of political culture in understanding civil society, including at the regional level, is repeatedly pointed out elsewhere in the book. Secondly, it seems somewhat premature to focus on civil society as a regional phenomenon only.

Moreover, and in connection with the above mentioned confusion, the book could perhaps have done with a conclusion, if for no other reason than to re-state and re-clarify some theoretical suggestions about civil society.

However, essentially lacking an introduction, this book does not promise anything. In the first chapter it states: "With its empirical approach, this publication even aims to inspire theorizing. Despite numerous differences in the perception and understanding of civil society, we are convinced of a common theory implicit in these articles, as suggested by regional experience; namely, a theory of civil society as a hybrid and fuzzy society" (p. 5). Essentially, this is exactly what it does. However, it might be suggested that the individual chapters have more value as free-standing articles, and maybe that is, first and foremost, how they should be read.

Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron (eds.), *Toleration and Its Limits* (Nomos XLVIII Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy) (New York: New York University Press, 2008).

Asim Jusic
Central European University

Toleration, alongside many other recent and not so recent terms like multiculturalism or respect for values of others, is a contemporary catchword dear to everyone's hearts with (almost) everyone having different idea of what the word entails in practice. Those who would like to justify the status quo as well as those looking to get their own way and/or normalize unpopular or previously unaccepted practices are all raising the flag of toleration in furtherance of their goals.

The collection of essays *Toleration and Its Limits*, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron, includes contributions of a host of renowned names in political science, philosophy, and legal theory. Editors profess that they will not fully answer the question of why toleration and its limits has suddenly become such a debated issue, yet reasons are obvious: the state of affairs in a post 9/11 world and immigration issues in Europe (almost implying the world was a rather peaceful place before said events). From there on, both temporally and geographically (with some exceptions), the essays aim at re-examining the question of normative and epistemological sources of toleration and (more importantly) its practical limits; theoretical and practical virtues and vices of toleration as such; and its relationship as a concept and practice to other ideals of human society like justice, legal equality and images of life worth living.

The book is organized around four thematic parts. Toleration as a concept in the western canon of political philosophy is discussed in the first part. There, Jeremy Waldron discusses Hobbes' perspective of a desirable state-governed public religious worship without a distinctly modern sensitivity and calls for neutrality and "all worldviews included" *chuspah*. Michael Rosenthal and Rainer Forst analyze the position of toleration in works of Spinoza and

Pierre Bayle, respectively, whereas Alex Tuckness focuses on the universalisation argument in Locke's *Letters on Toleration* and treatises on government. This is followed by Glyn Morgan's analysis of J.S. Mill's "no harm" and "other-regarding action" principles as commonly and somewhat mistakenly, assumed foundations for the toleration of unpopular practices. Instead of the two said principles, Morgan argues, Mill held that security and equality are *the* criteria for differentiating tolerable from intolerable – hence Mill is again happily a good guide for resolving contemporary problems.

In the second part, with contributions of David Heyd, Kathryn Abrams and Andrew Sabl, the position of toleration as a political and moral virtue in both theory and practice is analyzed. The authors devote much attention to the incommensurability of values and the demographics of value pluralism, as well as the interrelationship between value holders, which tends to fluctuate from indifference to mutual engagement.

In the third part, a renowned law and religion scholar, Steven D. Smith, criticizes what he thinks is an "ultraliberal" stance in contemporary (American) politics, law and public discourse, arguing that the rhetorically professed liberal commitment to "neutrality" between value systems (notably religious and nonreligious ones) produces a somewhat schizophrenic split between personal and public, causing "impoverishment" and ultimately confusion and disorientation in the legal arena and politics. Reiner Forst resists Smith's thesis on epistemological grounds by contrasting worlds of "faith knowledge" to "reason knowledge." Unsurprisingly, Forst allows the latter into the public sphere while leaving the former out as inaccessible to everyone, though Forst does not explain fully what to do with persons holding to the first type of knowledge, especially if they are many. Glyn Morgan, responding to Smith, argues that no "impoverishment" of religious life has been noted in a contemporary democracy such as the US, allegations of "ultraliberalism" notwithstanding, and in fact, Morgan argues, things seem to be moving in opposite direction. Finally, Lawrence Alexander shares comments on all three essays, wondering

whether the idea of toleration belongs to a moral map rather than a "purely" political or practical one.

The nexus between toleration, politics and the individual and group identity is analyzed in part four of the book. Ingrid Creppell's argument for the toleration between conflicting identities on the principle of "mutuality" – a willingness to relate to each other – is countered by Glen Newey, who thinks (using Northern Ireland as an example) that good fences make good neighbors and that, in the presence of a Hobbesian sovereign, opposing identities living next to each other rather than with each other is best we can hope for (what he terms "murality"). Noah Feldman examines the relationship between self-interest, politics of toleration and morality in the messy world of Iraq, showing that the sincere knowledge of what toleration implies does not necessarily bend before self-interest, even if that entails a path towards joint destruction. Finally, in a most interesting essay, Wendy Brown shows, relying on Foucault, that toleration itself can become a tool of governance paradoxically producing the opposite of what it's meant to be on any commonsensical definition of toleration.

The book is well written, rich with details and raises many pertinent questions. Its strongest contribution is a fresh reexamination of some well entrenched theoretical foundations of toleration in the canon of Western philosophy, as well as its current utility. An example will suffice. Locke's "true belief" argument (holding that the disestablishment of a state church is necessary as no sincere religious belief can be compelled by force) is his most famous and stands easily against the background conditions Locke was dealing with (a more or less Protestant population and few rules and doctrinal demands). In the absence of background conditions, however, the argument will have to be remodeled and Tuckness brings a fresh perspective when showing that Locke's universalisation argument (holding that doctrinal establishment has to be opposed in one place so that it can be opposed in all places, differences notwithstanding) was the one Locke thought to be more persuasive.

On the other hand, throughout many parts of the book, relapses from theory to practice show ambiguity and inconsistency of all theories of toleration – and this is a fault of the subject being dealt with rather than the fault of authors. Unsurprisingly, one finds toleration a useful tool for curbing racial and ethnic discrimination, legalizing same-sex marriage, and so on; and, willingly or not, it is a tool for promoting hideous forms of de-facto segregation and ghettoization, since consistently tolerating and “respecting” other people's practices on the condition (or, rather, with the aim) that they do not disturb others might lead exactly there – and this is where things could end. Yet, as Stanley Fish's “first law of toleration” states, toleration between conflicting groups and identities is inversely proportional to there anything being at stake; and (my own restatement first) calls for toleration are directly proportional to neither side being able to prevail in the long run. The contemporary problem, to my mind, is twofold: how to find unity in the midst of plurality and in the light of demise of any sufficiently powerful Hobbesian sovereign that will impose peace while stakes are getting higher.

The book is an important contribution and it is very highly recommended, especially for those looking to find new perspectives and raise new questions about this old subject.

Russell Hardin, *How Do You Know? The Economics of Ordinary Knowledge* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).

Hans Dubois
Kozminski University

Some people know that drinking a glass of red wine every night is good for their health. Others know the contrary, that any quantity of wine damages one's health. Assuming health is the only thing these groups care about, and they behave according to their convictions, they will perceive each other's behavior as irrational. Nevertheless, given the difference in knowledge, from an individual point of view, both behave perfectly rationally. It is the same with religion: some people bend over on the floor in the

direction of Mecca at sunrise, others move their heads up-and-down toward a wall, while again others move their hands rapidly over their chests depicting a cross. This all looks rather odd to some, but for those who do it, it makes perfect sense. Regardless of who 'is right', it is highly interesting to try to understand why different people are convinced of their knowledge and beliefs. Russell Hardin intends to give an economic theoretical account of such highly relevant, under-researched 'ordinary knowledge'.

Hardin analyzes different sources of knowledge, the overwhelming bulk of which is untraceable, but probably has been accepted on authority of some kind. His approach is to apply his theory to different types of knowledge, with chapters devoted to scientific, political, religious, moral, institutional and cultural knowledge. He takes a micro-economic perspective, with knowledge as a valuable economic good. Individuals search to maximize their utility functions, and will put relatively much effort into obtaining knowledge that is highly relevant for them (e.g. medical knowledge). Sometimes people deliberately search for knowledge, sometimes they happen onto it, or it is imposed on them. Frequently, people rely on experts in acquiring knowledge, because there is no way to obtain knowledge in all desired areas without some division of labor.

There is no meaningful distinction between factual and moral knowledge for the ordinary person, Hardin argues, as they both guide one's behavior. Religious belief, for example, just as other knowledge, depends on the cost and benefits of discovering bits of knowledge. Hardin convincingly challenges the usual functional account, arguing that it serves to explain why people proclaim to believe, but it fails to explain why people truly believe. He presents an alternative explanation, connecting the functionalist account and his theory of ordinary knowledge. At first, people might well adopt a belief not to be excluded from their societies. Subsequently, as a result of participating in the group, they hear many things which support their pretended belief. At some point, all this acquired confirmative knowledge actually makes them believe the things they only pretended to believe.

Hardin further discusses the complications of ordinary knowledge in institutional settings. Institutional knowledge differs from individual knowledge. Individuals can come to know you in a way, of potential great importance for your welfare, which institutions cannot. It is only 'on the whole' that an organization may be superior to aggregated individuals in handling certain problems.

For political scientists, the most relevant – but probably not the most innovating – chapter is the one on democratic participation. Basically, here, Hardin argues the median voter model of candidate placement does not apply. Reasons for this include that voters are ignorant about issues of importance, and that stances of candidates are multidimensional. Hardin further dismisses the theoretical argument that it is irrational for people to vote because costs outweigh benefits. People vote, Hardin argues, because they do not calculate rationally, or vote for other reasons than for impacting the outcome. More enlightening is the closing chapter, where Hardin discusses how fanaticism can be intensified inter-generationally, but also through exit of its moderate members. They are shunned by others in the group, have greater opportunities outside, or simply because the group's mindset became stultifying for them.

The book takes an ambivalent stance on whether there is a truth out there, or not. On the one hand, Hardin notes "[e]ven once rock-solid intuitions about the geometry of space have been chiseled down by Einstein's theory of relativity and later advances in physics. To suppose that one could have a correct intuition about the rightness of always telling the truth seems utterly preposterous." (p. 105) This seems to contradict the frequently normative tone of the book. For example, Harding speaks of "crippled belief systems" of extremists (p. 204). Hardin seems especially preoccupied - and rightly so - with "the Taliban, the Ayatollahs, and many other fundamentalist groups" (p. 100). This concern seems to be one of his principal drives in writing the book, and pops up even in chapters only loosely related to these issues. The section on evolution reads more as a lengthy defense of evolution theory than as a focused building-block of his key argument. It seems not key to the development of an economic theory to judge, but rather to analyze how people obtain certain

beliefs and how it impacts their actions. I think this is a problem throughout the book. The claimed focus is on "... the use and subjectivity of knowledge, not on justification of any claim that it is "true" knowledge. It is subjective because it is about *your* knowledge or *my* knowledge, not about knowledge per se." (p.4) Nevertheless, in fact, Hardin gives opinions on everything and everyone. From arrogant popes (p. 47), to open-minded liberalists (p. 93). He depicts the latter to be superior to ideologists from the 'extreme left or right', because they take their own beliefs into doubt. This assertion is easily dismissed when only looking at 'uncompromising', 'absolutist' liberalists such as Ayn Rand (The Economist, 24-30 October 2009). Actually, this is an illustration of one of many questions left uncovered: why do religious groups usually know they are open to new knowledge, while outsiders usually know they are not? In short, Hardin's often normative approach need not be problematic, if only he would analyze *why* he himself holds these beliefs, but he fails to do so.

Related, the book is not always focused on answering the question it claims to answer. This is especially confusing in concluding chapters, which you would expect to re-state how the chapter contributes to answering the principal question: "How do you know?". It is sometimes hard to see how they do. Examples include conclusions such as that it is not meaningful to say of culture that it is bad or not, that people's interest are not represented by democracy, etc. Incoherence could be caused by the fact that chapters have been published earlier as separate articles.

Overall, this book is a good choice for anybody with broad interests, as Hardin is highly knowledgeable on an impressive broad scale of issues. It is well-written, and the many international examples give this book a rare global perspective. As can be expected from such a complex topic, it is disappointing for those who expect clear-cut answers in understanding why people know what they know. Nevertheless, as a starting point for understanding different dimensions of knowledge-gathering, it is an essential reference that serves as an excellent guide to a fast, multidisciplinary theme. You will certainly economize on your

resources by relying upon this authoritative source in expanding your ordinary knowledge.

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Fouad Touzani
Central European University

The book is an ambitious attempt to offer tentative answers to some age-old questions in political economy and political science. Questions such as what makes a country a democracy? Why does democracy persevere and consolidate in some countries and crumble in others? How do we understand and analyze the establishment and consolidation of democracy? Acemoglu (Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at MIT) and Robinson (Professor of Government at Harvard) build a three-pillar unified framework in an attempt to answer the what, why and how questions. First, based on game theory, they adopt an economic approach to understand political attitudes; In other words, the authors argue that people's political attitudes are economically driven and strategically chosen based on economic incentives. For example, democracy is preferred by the majority because it puts the allocation of power and resources in the hands of citizens rather than elites. However, the elites tend to oppose democracy but they might be compelled to engage in a process of democratization in order to ensure social stability and avoid social disorder. Second, the authors highlight conflict of interests between different social groups as an important factor in determining political outcomes. They argue that the opposing interests of different social classes (elites & citizens) translate into different forms of political institutions which determine political outcomes. Third, the authors claim that the role of political institutions remains important for solving the problem of commitment through redistributing political power. For instance, it is necessary for the elites to reduce their political power to show credible commitment to pro-citizen policies rather than offering bare promises. The process of transferring or

redistributing political power among different groups (elites & citizens) is connected to the process of democratizing political institutions through allowing a greater involvement of citizens in their policy endeavors.

In sum, the authors' three-pillar modal seem to describe the struggle for democracy as a strategic game between two players; namely, citizens and elites. These players are rational and sagacious, economically rather than ideologically driven, and their opposing interests translate into different forms of political institutions resulting in different political outcomes: Democracy, dictatorship, or an oscillation between the two. Surprisingly enough, Acemoglu & Robinson treat the players as if they constitute one entity and represent one decision maker; however, elites and citizens can represent various social, economic and ideological strata which might affect the overall game and the process of decision making.

Using only four cases, the authors ambitiously attempt to use their abstract highly mathematical model to explain the lanes that democratic and non-democratic countries usually go through to attain democracy. Their explanation might appeal to political scientists, political economists, and especially the champions of game theory; however, it might enrage historians and anthropologists or, at least, grab their attention. Britain and Sweden epitomize the path to a consolidated democracy; Argentina exemplifies a path of oscillation between democracy and non-democracy. Singapore illustrates a stable dictatorship with a little repression and few concessions; in contrast, South Africa during the apartheid typifies a dictatorship that survived using repression. While the proposed three dimensional model might explain the selected cases, one might question the case selection, especially that the authors provide little or no justification for selecting these particular countries. In so saying, it is fair to argue that the authors can be easily accused of falling into a kind of selection bias that might affect the predictability and generality of the model. To put it differently, it is not clear whether designing the model precedes selecting the cases or the other way around, although the authors begin their book presenting their cases and proceed with creating a framework

that fits these cases. Apparently, the countries were not randomly selected, at least geographically speaking. As a result, a series of queries might be posed: How representative are the selected cases? Can we use the model to predict or expect a particular path of democracy versus another in other countries? Is the model generalizable? Answers to these questions might shed light on the empirical strength of the findings in this book. In fact, the model sounds ingenious but the case studies seem more like a tool to illustrate the model than empirical findings owing to their sparse distribution throughout the book.

In addition to the problem of case selection bias, one might wonder whether there are other variations for the paths of political development apart from the ones indicated by the authors and embodied by the four selected countries. For instance, I cannot categorize most Middle Eastern and North African countries in one of these four paths, although a lot of MENA experts would classify them into the fourth category which is characterized by a surviving dictatorship thanks to repression. However, repression is often relatively defined and the line between repression and freedom can be too fine to draw due to cultural factors. This might result in a kind of reductionism as it is too parsimonious to reduce numerous paths of political development to four only. Similarly, reductionism does also extend to explaining political attitudes as the authors adopt a one-dimensional approach guided by economic interests.

Despite these few anomalies, the book is well-written and structured as well as innovative and newsworthy, allowing Acemoglu & Robinson to win a general audience from political science. Additionally, the book can be useful for graduate students from economics with a focus on political economy.

Talani, Leila Simona (ed.), *EU and the Balkans: Policies of Integration and Disintegration* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).

Tyler James Callaway
University of Cambridge

The European Union's (EU) current enlargement into the Balkans has raised important questions about the changes, which for numerous Balkan countries can be drastic, that candidate countries must undergo in order to accede to the EU and the effectiveness of EU policies regarding these changes. Candidate countries must incorporate new political and economic regulations and assimilate to foreign cultural expectations while the EU must delicately implement the inculcation of its values and directives on potential and new member states. Lecturer in European Political Economy at the University of Bath Dr. Leila Simona Talani has enlisted a team of political scientists and analysts from the Balkans and Western Europe to address the EU accession procedure and its integrating and disintegrating consequences for candidate countries. Dr. Talani has published their findings in *EU and the Balkans: Policies of Integration and Disintegration*.

Talani claims in the introduction that the authors' main concern is to question whether the integration of the Balkans into the EU will cultivate or depress the integration of the region itself and the internal ethnic relations of individual countries. Focusing on social, political, and economic integration, the authors attempt to examine the effects of the accession process on candidate countries. The purports conclusion that the current process for accession to the EU is dismantling the consensus within candidate countries that is essential to the completion of the expensive and demanding process.

Literature on the expansion of the EU is extensive and the debate over the integration of the Balkans is not new. Nevertheless, the negative effects of the accession process on integration development are often not tackled by committees when assessing individual country qualifications and lack a significant presence in the literature on EU expansion. During debate on the accession

process, the possible retarding and invalidating effects of the process itself on integration and consensus are often overlooked. Because the current candidate countries and potential candidate countries within the Balkans all have troubled histories in regards to ethnic integration and political consensus, the effects of the accession process on these is significant. In this respect, *EU and the Balkans* can be commended for dealing with the issue of accession; however, the end result presents neither a manageable framework for examining the effects of the accession process nor strong support from its separately authored chapters for its conclusion that the accession process breaks down consensus.

Despite a title incorporating the entire region, Talani et al. offer five chapters focusing largely on Macedonia and Bulgaria in relation to the EU accession process, and one chapter on Bulgaria's accession to the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), that focus on minority rights, nationalism, public opinion, and economics. Only chapters one, four, and five, which focus on the EU's stance on minorities within candidate countries and the resulting possibility of nationalist tendencies, offer support for the book's concluding claim that the accession process breaks down consensus within candidate countries. The final chapter presents an analysis of predicted winners and losers from Bulgaria's future accession to the EMU, but neither details the effects of the process of accession to the EMU nor the similarity between the accession processes for the EU and the EMU, which need to be addressed for the chapter to support the final conclusion. Chapters two and three appear out of place as they both maintain that there is currently consensus within Macedonia both from the government and the public for EU accession and that the issue of the Albanian minority will not affect this consensus. Although the claims in chapters two and three are compelling and relevant to the larger debate on EU expansion into the Balkans, they challenge the stated overall argument of the book by claiming that the process will not threaten consensus within the country. Overall, the book lacks sufficient support for its central claim and presents multiple solid claims against it.

A comparison with the accession processes of non Balkan countries could have established the uniqueness of the Balkan candidate countries' situations, and inclusion of case studies from other Balkan nations could have presented stronger support for the book's central argument. Romania would have been an ideal subject for the claims on minority rights and nationalist tendencies. The same applies to Bulgaria, whose accession to the EU itself should have been scrutinized and not just the country's potential accession to the EMU. Chapter five provides a general overview of the EU's Stabilization and Accession Process for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, but the absence of an examination of Croatia specifically, which is a candidate country and would provide a good comparison with Macedonia, leaves the central claim of the book with unbalanced support. The dearth of material and examples related to these countries leads the reader to question the methodology used.

The book's methodology is further suspect because a significant amount of the source material is attained from unofficial and informal Internet sites. The most troublesome example is the repeated citing of Wikipedia by Zhidas Daskalovski in chapter two. Daskalovski cites Wikipedia for all information regarding Kosovo's declaration of independence. Such an important and controversial issue requires more reliable sources and the author's disregard for the use of credible and sound source material, as well as the editor's acceptance of this disregard, lead the reader to question the credibility of the entire book.

The book also contains significant grammatical and stylistic errors. Typographical errors are sprinkled throughout and there are numerous cases of notably absent punctuation. The concluding sentence to the first chapter is one example of incomprehensible syntax that is repeated multiple times.¹ In regards to style, citations are inconsistent, altering between footnotes and in-text citations, and many quotes have no citation.

1 Maria Bakalova, "Balkan Nationalism in the European Integration Processes: Ambiguous Impacts and Controversial Outcomes," in *EU and the Balkans: Policies of Integration and Disintegration*, ed. Leila Simona Talani (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 5-17, 16. "Indeed Balkan nationalisms are not, in the opinion of the author, any special or different form other nationalisms [sic]"

The multiple tables and graphs presented in chapter three are often incoherent and repetitious. The same summary paragraphs for each chapter are unnecessarily repeated in the book's introduction, the abstract of each chapter, and in two cases, in the introduction to the chapter. Chapter six begins with the same paragraph repeated practically verbatim, once in the chapter abstract and once in the chapter introduction that immediately follows. All these errors and stylistic blemishes make the work appear rushed and lacking editorial review.

Although the effects of the process of accession to the EU on candidate countries is an important and under-examined topic, the lack of a strong argument, the use of questionable methodology and unreliable sources, and the high frequency of grammatical and stylistic errors make *EU and the Balkans* a mostly unhelpful and uncritical piece of scholarship. There appears to have been little collaborative strategy among the authors for supporting the claim that the process of accession dissolves consensus in candidate countries and the relationship between the chapters is obscure. Because of its numerous shortcomings and lack of merit, the book is unworthy of recommendation.

Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, *The Funding of Party Competition. Political Finance in 25 Democracies* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009).

Gabriela Borz
University of Aberdeen

In this book, Karl-Heinz Nassmacher presents comprehensive cross-national research which aims to assess the long-term impacts of party funding on the democratic process. Not only does his study employ data previously not available, but he also offers evidence about three important areas of political finance: party spending, sources of political revenue and the impact of funding on party competition.

This empirical study is a valuable contribution to the field, taking further and complementing previous research on party finance presented either in the form of comparative studies (relatively scarce) or country monographs published by Grant (2005), Pierre, Svåsand and Whidfeld (2000), van Biezen (2010), Austin and Tjernström (2003) or Walecki (2005). Nassmacher's comparative analysis focuses on 25 European, mainly Western established democracies. If one combines his study with the latest books on Central and Eastern Europe edited by Smilov and Toplak (2007), Roper and Ikstend (2008) the result is a comprehensive picture of party finance in Europe. The number of countries considered in the book is not constant across chapters and cases outside Europe such as Canada, United States, Japan, Mexico and Israel also feature in various parts of the book. The time frame also varies from chapter to chapter, but notwithstanding these, the contribution to comparative politics lies in the richness of material compared across time and also in the testing of many previous assumptions and hypotheses in relation to party finance.

A reader's knowledge about political spending (chapters II to V) will be greatly extended by the information provided in the book. Whilst growth of electorate and inflation have made many believe that we are dealing with a cost explosion, the empirical evidence of the book shows a less worrying picture. Paid TV, new campaign technology or growing party apparatus with skilled professionals 'may be a symptom for changes in political competition, but [they] are not the unavoidable cause for financial needs' (p. 192). The book concludes that due to donations, state subsidies or corrupt exchanges, parties can afford to spend large amounts of money and it introduces a supply-side theory of spending. According to this theory, the pace of political spending in recent decades is not out of step with the general standard of living. Parties are spending more, proportional with the increase in the general standard of living.

Regarding party revenues (chapters VI to VIII), the book presents empirical evidence from Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.S. pointing to the fact that considerable amounts of parties' revenues still come from grass-

roots membership, though these will never suffice to cover all the costs of politics. Various strategies, such as recruiting party members, direct mail drives, Internet campaigns or local social events (p. 237) have proved to be successful for raising and increasing party revenues. The study also concludes that corporate donations are not a real danger for democratic politics. Their amount has declined and has been partly substituted by public subsidies. As for the latter, they are portrayed as desirable but not problem-solving sources of political revenue, because they come with problems such as specific rules for access and distribution. The research confirms in a comparative setting that the petrification hypothesis, according to which state aid preserves the party system, does not hold because new parties have entered parliament in countries with and without public subsidies.

As for the influence of money on the political competition (chapters IX to X), the study shows that "the influence of money is not strong enough to make the competitor who can dispose of the most funds the likely winner of a political contest" (p.360) as quite the reverse may happen. State subsidies have not prevented several changes within party systems such as access, volatility and government participation. Different political finance regimes can be observed: candidate-orientation is dominant in a presidential federal system such as U.S., while in parliamentary systems, party-orientation is stronger. The party organization at all levels can be affected by competition among fundraisers and can lead to conflicts both within parties and between parties and affiliated associations for resources of power. Nassmacher contends that party organization is still double layered - centrally and locally. As party activity shifts towards professional operation at the centre and at the local level, the balance of power within the party organization is predicted therefore 'to shift towards all those elements that wield the purse-strings, especially those which are able to raise additional funds[...]' (p.391).

The book uses the evidence gathered and touches upon old and new theories of party types from mass parties to cartel parties. On this subject matter, the book concludes that recently created party types have not deepened the core substance of party

analysis as many of their details have already been identified by earlier party theorists. Given the richness of material presented and its analytical character, the book can be recommended and is equally interesting to both academic and non-academic audiences concerned with political finance and its impact on a democratic political system.

References:

- Austin, Reginald and Maja Tjernström. (eds). 2003. *Founding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*. Stockholm: International Idea.
- Biezen, Ingrid van. 2010. 'Campaign and Party Finance', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.), *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, 3rd ed. London: Sage, pp. 65-94.
- Grant, Thomas D. (ed). 2005. *Lobbying. Government Relations, and Campaign Finance Worldwide Navigating the Laws, Regulations and Practices of National Regimes*. Oxford: Oceana Publications.
- Pierre, Jon, Lars Svåsand and Anders Whidfeld. 2000. "State subsidies to political parties: Confronting rhetoric with reality." *West European Politics*, 23 (3): 1-24.
- Roper, Steven D. and Janis Ikstend. 2008. *Public Finance in Post-Communist Party Development*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Smilov, Daniel and Jurij Toplak 2007. *Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe. The transition period*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Walecki, Marcin. 2005. *Money and Politics in Poland*. Warszawa: Institute of Public Affairs.

Jane Hardy, *Poland's New Capitalism* (London: Pluto Press, 2009).

Konstantin Kilibarda
York University

Poland was the only EU country in 2009 that successfully avoided sliding into recession.² It thus managed to retain its status as a poster-child of neoliberal transition in postcommunist Europe. Even a recent *Lancet* study that linked declining life expectancy in the 1990s to rapid and comprehensive privatization programs in Central and Eastern Europe found that Poland was one of the few countries to buck the general trend (Stuckler *et. al.* 2009). Now, twenty years after *Solidarity's* sweeping and dramatic victory in the Polish elections of 1989 - following nearly a decade of mass-struggle - the consolidation of democracy and capitalist social relations in Poland seems as solid as ever.

In this context, Jane Hardy's *Poland's New Capitalism* (2009) offers a critical and nuanced (neo)Marxist take on Poland's reintegration into an emerging European and international division of labour. Hardy's book complicates the above narrative by incorporating landscapes of poverty, de-industrialization, mass migration, and workplace insecurity that accompanied successive iterations of Poland's experiment with neoliberal 'shock therapy.' The scope of Hardy's analysis - spanning the conceptual and analytical terrains of class-analysis, feminism, political economy, migration and labor studies, new social movement theory, etc. - highlights her strength as a scholar. It also highlights a panoply of issues that have largely remained marginalized in post-communist studies.

2 The Polish economy benefited from a weak zloty that encouraged exports and was further boosted by rising demand for its automotive production lines in light of Western European car-replacement schemes. Poland has also benefited from a strong internal market, sustained consumer demand, the securing a \$20.6-billion IMF reserve credit line and a range of EU funded construction projects. With the looming threat of budgetary cuts in 2010 - spurred by constitutionally mandated provisions triggering cutbacks if public debt mounts to 55% of GDP - Donald Tusk's Civic Platform (PO) government has announced a new round of privatizations valued at some 37-billion zlotys (including the selling off of minority shares in energy producers PGE and Tauron, copper miner KGHM, oil refiner Lotos, Polish national airline LOT, and the Warsaw Stock Exchange).

Poland's New Capitalism (2009) is thus organized around three broad themes, including: (i) Hardy's revisionist account of the Polish economy prior to the institution of neoliberalism; (ii) the impact of Poland's re-integration into the global economy on the worlds of 'work, welfare and everyday life;' and (iii) the importance of recovering resistances to neoliberalism as a central feature of our understanding of Poland's recent transitions. At its most basic, Hardy's thesis is that:

"The experience of neoliberalism in Poland has been similar to that of other countries, with a polarization of income, resulting from a redistribution of income and wealth to those at the top end of society, and the majority of people facing increasing insecurity in the workplace and more precarious access to services as welfare is commodified" (Hardy 2009: 3).

While viewing postcommunist transition as 'combined, uneven and contested' (31), Hardy avoids slipping into nostalgic accounts of the communist past – recovering instead a long legacy of working class resistance to the state-centralism of the PZPR regime (1945-1989) – while also remaining critical of one dimensional accounts of neoliberal reform (by both its champions and critics). In fact, Hardy traces a progression from Edward Gierek's reforms in the early 1970s, which tentatively set Poland on the path to integration within the global economy, with the later wholesale adoption of market reform. As a result, she claims that postcommunism in Poland is best understood: "not [as] a movement from one system – communism – to another – capitalism, but...as a 'leap' to integration with the global economy, the foundations of which were laid in the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s" (5).

In this context, Hardy argues that "the working class, organized or otherwise, have played a central role in patterning economic change" (52). In fact, Hardy's book is at its most engaging when recovering the working class history of both Poland's communist era and its neoliberal present. She opens an important space for scholars wishing to revisit the position of organized labor in contesting, shaping and building alternatives to neoliberal state restructuring. Explicitly conceived as an alternative to what she sees as David Ost's (2006) more pessimistic reading of this

legacy, Hardy claims that class has been mistakenly “eviscerated from most accounts of transformation” (48). Instead, by focusing on revived labor militancy in Poland since 2005 (and earlier), she contends that new areas of study are possible.³

Hardy’s chapter on the dynamics of Poland’s integration into the global economy also highlights her ability to balance competing perspectives on the massive inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) it has experienced. She finds little evidence that Poland has simply become a *maquiladora* for the rest of Europe as some critics claim. However, she also questions whether FDI in Poland has produced the desired technology transfer with the ability to move Poland further along global value-added chains. Hardy argues instead that in “this sea of peripherality there are islands of innovation in relation to [sectors such as] automobiles, IT and defense,” though such developments have been “highly uneven as some parts [of the economy] have been destroyed while others have been upgraded” (93).⁴

Hardy is also successful at shedding light on the adverse impacts of transition on the position of Polish women. According to Hardy: “cuts in public spending and welfare provision...have both pushed women out of work and pulled them back into the home” (163). Again, Hardy is critical of both the communist past and the neoliberal present here, critiquing the communist system’s failure to secure full equality and the subsequent rollback of many welfare and workplace rights that contributed to greater reproductive freedom. Statistics on women’s current over-

3 Some examples include: the shift by labor from defensive to more proactive demands; the adoption of new recruiting methods; creative forms of industrial action; attempts to organize emerging sectors of the economy; the development of transnational links with other unions; the need to organize migrant workers entering Poland from North Korea, India, Belarus and Ukraine as well as Polish migrant workers employed in the UK, Ireland and in other parts of the EU; and, the willingness to raise novel issues such as mobbing (bullying) and discrimination in the workplace.

4 In class terms this has translated into an emerging core of increasingly wealthy white-collar professionals clustered around key sectors of the knowledge economy, including business and financial services, with an increasing mass of workers thrown into increasingly precarious service sector jobs. It also suggests the need to pay greater attention to new management techniques and forms of labour discipline introduced into Polish workplaces (Hardy provides a highly insightful account of such practices in the sixth chapter of her book).

representation within the ranks of the unemployed and among labour migrants, as well as anecdotal evidence of intensified gender-based discrimination in the workplace, reinforce the image of rollback. In this context, Hardy discusses both the impact of right-wing social movements in attempting to reassert conservative and patriarchal values in Polish society as well as new forms of feminist resistance seeking to address discrimination on the grounds of both sexuality and gender (163-183).

One shortcoming of Hardy's study is that she often relies on assertions without providing any data to back her claims - e.g. when claiming that "migrant workers are central to British and Irish capitalism" or when discussing the increasingly proactive nature of labor organizing in Poland (while failing to produce recent figures on the frequency or concrete successes of industrial action). At other times, Hardy allows broad concepts familiar in Marxist literature to do some of the heavy-theoretical lifting in her account and thereby skim over important contradictions (for instance, the term 'ruling class' litters Hardy's account, in contrast to her own contention at other points that Poland's communist *nomenklatura* and its postcommunist elite should be conceptually disaggregated).⁵

Nevertheless, Hardy's study is still worth reading for those interested in exploring the dominant tensions and contradictions likely to continue animating Poland's political economy in the coming years. It is also useful for those interested in movements across the region that are, "starting to reclaim the language of emancipation, workers' democracy and women's liberation, which was brutally distorted by the Stalinist regimes" (11). While Hardy's account remains unfortunately thin in its discussion of

5 While Hardy's book provides a broad set of interesting starting points for further research and inquiry, it fails to take into consideration some other potential points of departure for an alternative research agenda, including: a more detailed discussion of the legal and constitutional constraints imposed on successive Polish governments that limit the range of policy options; the role and nature of popular culture as a contested space in Poland for articulating various forms of working class consciousness, mass-culture, etc.; as well as the environmental impact of Poland's disproportionate reliance on a policy of using coal to fuel its current development model.

these movements, *Poland's New Capitalism* nevertheless remains a rich, nuanced and layered attempt to capture the divergent landscapes and life-worlds of Polish capitalism within which such movements have emerged following two-decades of neoliberal reform.

Timothy McCajor Hall and Rosie Read (eds.), *Changes in the Heart of Europe (Recent Ethnographies of Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, and Sorbs)* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag 2006).

Soeren Keil
University of Kent in Canterbury

In the light of the current financial crisis, questions about the stability of democratic governance in Eastern and Central Europe were raised. Violent protests in Hungary in 2006, the change of the Czech government during its European Union Council Presidency in the first half of 2009 and the growth of radical-right wing and racist parties in the elections to the European Parliament in June 2009 are only some indicators that led commentators to question the stability of democracy and its ability to moderate people's frustration in the light of one of the most severe economic crises in history.

The book *Changes in the Heart of Europe* addresses some of the issues involved in the long-term democratization and transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe. The book consists of 14 essays by Czech, Slovak and mainly American authors plus a useful introduction by the editors and an afterword by Zdeněk Salzmann, one of the leading scholars on ethnographies and anthropology in the former Czechoslovakia. The essays are organized in four categories, the first one being Civil Society and Social Change and including such wide topics as corruption in Czech society (Raymond June), Structural Violence and transformation (David Karjanen), and the role of Women's organizations (Karen Kapusta-Pofahl, Hana Hašková and Marta Kolářová). The second part of the book looks at gender and sexuality issues and includes essays about family-state relations

in the Czech Republic (Rebecca Nash), Cancer stigmatization (Denise Kozikowski), sterilization of Romani Women in Communist Czechoslovakia (Věra Sokolová), the role of pornography in postsocialist Slovakia (James Quin) and a case study about the role of gender, honesty and change in a Moravian Toy Factory (Ben Hill Passmore). The third category examines ethnic minorities and includes papers on the Roma (Krista Hegburg), Czechs in Bosnia (Zdeněk Uherek and Kateřina Plochová) and the Sorbs (Leoš Šatava). Finally, a selection of international authors examines the role of memory, history and the ethnographic present, including contributions about autobiographies after socialism (Haldis Haukanes), the role of memory, space and time perceptions (Davide Torsello) and a proposal for new research in the area of community re-studies (Petr Skalník).

The variety of topics and the different approaches used, including case studies, anthropological examinations and a number of case studies built on extensive field work by the authors lead to an interesting collection on core changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. All authors highlight to some extent or another the importance of change as an "experience" for the individual as a result of the end of communism, the creation of two new states and the introduction of democratic government. The collection of essays as a whole demonstrates the complicated transformation processes in societies that needed to transform their political, economic and societal models simultaneously. From the perspective of anthropology the authors highlight the importance of deep-societal changes for the individual as well as for the group. Different aspects are balanced differently, a majority of essays focus on the Czech Republic, and the study of ethnic minorities in particular could have been much more comprehensive when focusing on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, for example.

The variety of topics gives deep insight into the societal changes in the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent in Slovakia, but the essays, even those in the same category, sometimes lack cohesion; while one essay concerns the change of family-state relations in postsocialist Czech Republic, the next discusses the

role of cancer. A different organization of essays would have been useful.

The book itself will be of value for a variety of readers. Those who study social anthropology and questions of inclusion and exclusion in new democracies should have a keen interest in the book. Political scientists dealing with minority issues in Central Europe will value the third part of the book in particular, while doctors and psychologists will be interested in the studies of the first and second part. Historians and scholars of ethnographies will enjoy the fourth part of the book, dealing with the role of memory in post-communist Central Europe. Finally, those interested in the democratization processes at the grassroots level will find many interesting aspects and problems discussed throughout the collected edition. Indeed, here lies the key strength of the book, that it demonstrates how problematic change can be at grassroots level, be it through the creation of a viable and effective civil society or through the transformation of people's relations with the state, such as the difference of family-state relations in socialist Czechoslovakia and postsocialist Czech Republic, as highlighted by Rebecca Nash. Another core strength of the book is the study of the Sorbs in the Czech Republic as well as the Czechs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two often marginalized and forgotten minorities.

The essays themselves are well written and referenced and often based on extensive data and field work. This adds another strength to the collection, as each essay by itself is worth reading. The afterword written by leading scholar Zdeněk Salzman summarises the changes described and highlights the new research areas in anthropology studies in Central Europe. However, his words sometimes become praise for the book and miss the important role of a summative afterword. One of the weakest chapters in the book is the introduction, although it does include all elements of a good introduction, namely a short introduction to the topic, a brief research outline and summary of the papers. However, because the papers are so diverse, the authors find it hard to give them the cohesion needed. It was a useful choice of the editors to put the chapter on new research approaches in community re-studies by Petr Skalník at the end of

the edition, as it summarizes the new research areas in anthropological studies and outlines future research agenda. All in all it can be said that the edition is a well written book, worth reading for scholars of political anthropology and democratization. While the cohesion of the essays in the collection is not always a given, the variety of topics discussed are a distinct advantage. Future research, possibly comparative, including the developments in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be required to assess the effects of transition, transformation and post-transformation not only on the political system of a country, but on its society and people. To understand how democracy can reach the grassroots level and whether or not people see an improvement in their lives under democratic governance can only be examined through studies like this edition. Furthermore, the effects of Europeanization on Central and Eastern European grassroots development will have to be analyzed, a topic which is unfortunately completely ignored by this study.

Changes in the Heart of Europe is an interesting collection of essays, especially because the book covers a variety of topics including civil society, gender, minority issues and memory in the post-communist context of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Furthermore, the book offers explanations for a variety of ongoing transformations and therefore focuses on the long-term implementation of democratic government. It will add to the existing studies on democratization in Central Europe, in particular because it does not focus on institutional changes, but focuses on the grassroots level and the implementation of democratic values within a society.

John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).

Valentin Stoian
Central European University

John Rawls's latest book, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, completes his theoretical works and provides an interpretation of six classic authors: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J.S. Mill, David Hume and Karl Marx. The book represents a collection of lectures which Rawls delivered during his Harvard professorship, edited after his death by Samuel Freeman. In his classic works, Rawls expounded the principles of modern political liberalism. In this latest publication, he outlines the intellectual predecessors from whom he drew his inspiration. The volume adds to Rawls' work by offering the reader the possibility to glimpse the way Rawls understood classical philosophy.

In the book's introduction, Rawls sets out the principles of political liberalism, seen as a regime of free and politically equal citizens. Moreover, this regime has to be justifiable to those over whom it imposes binding regulations. The book looks at six attempts at such justification. Further, the collection is divided into six parts, each corresponding to several lectures delivered by Rawls on different occasions. Each of these lectures touches upon a certain feature in the conception of the classical authors. The book's first chapter is dedicated to Hobbes' doctrine of state and law of nature and to his justification of the absolute sovereign. Further, Locke's doctrine is related to his resistance to royal absolutism and features discussions of the social contract and the theory of property. The principle of utility, as understood by Hume and Mill and the latter's justification of rights in term of utility are the central features of the next two chapters. Then, Rawls comes to Rousseau and discusses the issues of general will and *amour-propre*. Finally, Marx is understood as criticizing liberalism and capitalism from the point of view of justice.

The most important goal of the book, as Rawls repeatedly explains, is to place classical philosophy in its own context, rather than interpreting it from the point of view of our times. Thus, we should first understand the questions which the respective author was trying to answer. When such an exercise is attempted, Rawls avers, the answers given, though shallow and outdated by our time, seem deep and intriguing.

The innovation brought by this book is the application of modern concepts of philosophy to the interpretation of classical authors. Rather than scholastically reading old texts and summarizing views, Rawls breaks down these texts and arguments and builds upon them using concepts invented in the last decades. Two such examples easily come to mind when Rawls sets out to interpret Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes' theories are put in the context of the British civil war. Rawls sees Hobbes as arguing for the necessity of a sovereign to end civil strife. On Rawls' interpretation, the Hobbesian state of nature is assimilated to the prisoner's dilemma game which was invented by mathematicians in the fifties and which has long since passed into philosophical use. By this analogy, Rawls shows how people in the Hobbesian state of nature face the collective action dilemmas associated with the lack of an enforcement agency. Moreover, by this comparison, Rawls aims to show how for Hobbes' people, it is rational to obey an absolute sovereign, under whom life cannot be worse than in the state of nature. Furthermore, Rawls employs the distinction between reasonable and rational to present Hobbes' conception of the law of nature as reasonable and the way of enforcing it, the absolute sovereign, as rational, given the uncertain conditions of the state of nature. Reasonable action is taken to mean offering fair terms of cooperation, while rational is understood as maximizing one's own advantage.

Secondly, Rawls argues that Locke's doctrine is a way to justify resistance to royal absolutism under a mixed constitution. Rather than discussing whether a social contract ever took place in the form described by Locke, Rawls interprets Locke's social contract theory as a hypothetical contract under which only certain

political regimes could arise. He shows how, even if a meeting of primeval people never occurred, the social contract method could be understood as a test for the legitimacy of regimes. Rawls interprets Locke as asking "What regimes could and could not be instituted if a gathering of rational and politically equal and free individuals would have ever occurred?" This interrogation is valid regardless of how actual regimes actually came about. When viewed in this light, the only regime which is excluded, in Rawls's interpretation of Locke, is royal absolutism, which violates the natural rights individuals would have kept for themselves. Moreover, Rawls defends Locke's limitations of suffrage by showing how they are consistent with his approach, even if unjustifiable under modern standards. By interpreting Locke's social contract as an original position with a very thin veil of ignorance and by using game-theoretical approaches, Rawls maintains that a class state could have come about in Locke's conception.

Another clarification and innovation is brought by two interpretations of Rousseau which save the latter from charges of being a totalitarian political philosopher. Firstly, Rawls interprets Rousseau's concept of the general will very differently than others, for example Isaiah Berlin. Rawls refuses the holist and collectivist interpretation of the general will and maintains that Rousseau never envisioned it as the will of the supra-individual collectivity. Rousseau opposed the sacrifice of a single individual for the survival of the community. Rather, the general will is the aggregation of the reflections of each citizen when this citizen chooses to abstract from his thinking reasons pertaining to his own personal interests. When each citizen thinks in rational terms, detaching themselves from the issue at hand, and when these thoughts are aggregated by a vote, the general will is revealed. Moreover, Rawls' Kant-inspired interpretation of Rousseau's concept of *amour-propre*, as having both an equalitarian meaning, the desire to be recognized by others as an equal and a perverted meaning, the desire to dominate others, show Rousseau to not be inconsistent when arguing that in the society of the social contract, *amour-propre* is fully realized.

One weakness comes from the way it was conceived. A mix of tape-recorded lectures and handwritten notes make the book somewhat more difficult to read than the Rawlsian classics, which are known for their clear style. Rather than including complicated sentences and ambiguous philosophical utterances (see Karl Popper's denunciation of Hegel for such examples), Rawls set out his philosophy in clearly separated thrusts, each explaining and arguing for a certain principle. This fluency and readability is often encountered in the book under review. However, at other times, the writing is incongruent and the argument simply jumps from one idea to the other. Most probably, these passages have been compiled from different sources and the disparities are obvious.

Concluding, Rawls' *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, represents a new way to approach old sources. It allows the modern reader an interpretation more akin to the style of current writings in political philosophy. Moreover, the book is addressed not only to philosophers, but also to the general public, contributing thus to Rawls' goal of making political philosophy a part of democratic culture.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dylan Kissane holds BA, BA(Hons) and PhD degrees from the University of South Australia. He is the Research Coordinator at the Centre d'Etudes Franco-Américain de Management in Lyon, France. E-mail: dylan.kissane@laposte.net

Minhua Lin holds a M.A. in Public Policy from CEU. She is now a researcher in Guangzhou Academy of Social Science. Email: minhua.lam@gmail.com

Ellen Hallams is lecturer in Defense Studies at King's College, London, at the Joint Services Staff and Command College. In 2010, she published *The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The transatlantic alliance renewed* (Routledge). E-mail: EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk

Alec Charles is Principal Lecturer in Media at the University of Bedfordshire. He is the editor of *Media in the Enlarged Europe* (2009) and co-editor of *The End of Journalism* (forthcoming). He has published widely in the areas of film, television, journalism and new media. E-mail: alec.charles@beds.ac.uk

Kevin Fernandez is a Ph.D candidate and a fellowship recipient at the Universiti Sains of Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia. His research focuses on trust of mainstream and alternative media in the Malaysian context. Email: drkevinfernandez@gmail.com

Ann von Below is a recent graduate of European Studies at King's College London (MA). Her academic interests relate to how society works. E-mail: belows_brev@hotmail.com.

Gabriela Borz is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen (UK). E-mail: g.borz@abdn.ac.uk.

Tyler James Callaway received a Master of Philosophy in modern European history from Cambridge University. His research focuses on Balkan and German history, especially during the First and Second World Wars.

Hans Dubois is Assistant Professor at Kozminski University, Warsaw. E-mail: hansdubois@mail.com.

Asim Jusic is an SJD candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law at Central European University (CEU), Budapest. He received his LLB from University of Sarajevo, an MA in American Studies at University of Heidelberg, and an LLM from CEU.

Soeren Keil is PhD candidate at the Centre for Federal Studies, University of Kent in Canterbury, UK- Studies of Political Science in Würzburg and Canterbury. E-mail: S.Keil@kent.ac.uk.

Konstantin Kilibarda is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at York University and a Graduate Researcher at the York Center for International and Security Studies (YCISS) in Toronto (Canada). E-mail: koliya.k@gmail.com

Valentin Stoian holds and M.A. in Political Science from CEU and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Bucharest. Email: stoian_valentin@ceu-budapest.edu.

Fouad Touzani holds an MA in Political Science from the Central European University. He currently works as the director of Ibn Ghazi El Fassi, a post-secondary school of Economics in Fes, Morocco.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Vol. 6, No. 2
April 2011
General Issue

CEU PSJ accepts now submissions for its April 2011 issue. Authors should ensure that their submissions are original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time. Full guidelines for the presentation of the papers are available at the guidelines for submission section.

Authors should send their articles to ceu_polsci@yahoo.com before 15 January 2010.

Peer Review Process

All submitted articles are subject to a rigorous peer review process, based on initial editor screening and double-blind refereeing by a minimum of two reviewers.

The journal includes also a book review section.

Books Available for Review:

1. Judy Smith-Höhn, *Rebuilding the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies: Perceptions from Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone*
2. Rajah Rasiah (ed.), *The New Political Economy of Southeast Asia*
3. Simon Teune (ed.), *The Transnational Condition. Protest Dynamics in an Entangled Europe*
4. Josette Baer, *Revolution, Modus Vivendi or Sovereignty? The Political Thought of the Slovak National Movement from 1861 to 1914*

If you are interested in reviewing any of these titles or becoming a book reviewer for CEU PSJ, send along a short resume (maximum 2 pages) including your areas of expertise to: ceu_polsci@yahoo.com.