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THE ANXIOUS PARTISAN: A TEST OF AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE THEORY IN ROMANIA

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Abstract

To navigate the complicated world of electoral politics, individuals may make use of cognitive shortcuts. One such heuristic is partisanship. When it comes time to make a choice at the polls, voters will follow their party identification in order to choose a candidate. Yet, for such attachments to develop, voters need time to familiarize themselves with the party system. Using panel data from the Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009, gathered before and after the Presidential Elections, this article identifies three groups of individuals: consistent partisans, inconsistent partisans, and non-partisans. This analysis tests the theory of Affective Intelligence and finds that partisans who are made anxious by a candidate are less likely to rely on their party identification when making a vote choice, while anxiety does not appear to have any effect on non-partisans. The model only applies to partisans of the main challenger's party, and not for partisans of the incumbent's party.

Keywords: party identification, anxiety, Affective Intelligence Theory, Romania

Introduction

One aspect of voting behaviour that has been, until recently, neglected in the literature is the impact of emotions. Research in neuroscience, political psychology and cognitive science suggests that emotions influence a wide range of political and customary activities¹. In political behaviour, Affective Intelligence Theory (AI) posits that individuals who are made anxious tend to seek out more information and will stop relying on habits when taking a decision². When it comes time to vote, partisans anxious about their party's candidate may vote for a different candidate.

1 Barry C. Burden and Casey A. Klofstad, "Affect and Cognition in Party Identification," *Political Psychology* 26, no. 6 (2005). Amanda G. Dumville and Catherine J. Norris, "Affective Forecasting Errors in the 2008 Election: Unpredicting Happiness," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2011). Jennifer Wolak et al., "How the Emotions of Public Policy Affect Citizen Engagement and Public Deliberation," in *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association* (Chicago, Illinois 2003). Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese, "On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger," in *The Political Dynamics of Feeling and Thinking*, ed. Ann Crigle, et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

2 George E. Marcus and Michael MacKuen, "Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 37 (1993).

No endeavour has yet been made to try and better understand the workings of party identification in post-communist countries through emotions. This study strives to improve the understanding of party identification in young democracies. In order to do so, the case of the 2009 presidential elections in Romania was chosen. These elections present an excellent opportunity to study party identification. As presidential elections occur in two rounds, with the two leading candidates competing in a vote-off, some voters will inevitably have to vote for a second preference if they are to vote at all. Using panel data, I investigate which types of voters maintain identification with their stated party and which changes their identification along with their vote.

My results confirm expectations drawn from previous studies. About 60% of Romanians declare themselves close to a party at one point or another. Of these, almost half can be considered consistent partisans, following their declaring themselves close to the same party over a period of one month, before and after the elections. The rest are individuals that consistently declare themselves independent from any political party. A comparison between these groups suggests that consistent partisans behave similarly to their European and American counterparts: they are more likely to vote consistently with the same party, be interested in politics, and trust political parties than non-partisans. I also look at campaign dynamics and find that voters whose preferred candidate did not make it into the second round are quite keen on following their candidate's advice on who they should vote for in the second round. The effect is even stronger for partisans of the losing candidate's party.

I also find some weak but consistent support in favour of AI, but only when the model is applied to voting for the challenging candidate. Supporters of the challenger are more likely to vote for another candidate when experiencing anxiety. Anxiety about one's own candidate and about the whole range of candidates is also linked to increased levels of attention to the campaign and more discussion about the elections. I also analyze the direct relationship between voting behaviour and emotions. My results indicate that emotions do have a direct effect on candidate evaluations, but anxiety only influences assessments of the incumbent, not the challenger. Moreover, emotions have no direct effect on voting behaviour.

Literature review

The traditional understanding of emotions is that they are to be separated from rationality. Emotions stand in the way of calm examination of a given situation, triggering irrational behaviours³. Yet developments in neuroscience and psychology

3 George E. Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); George E. Marcus, W. Russell

suggest that emotions play an irreplaceable role in managing everyday experiences⁴. Emotions have also been shown to have an active role in information seeking behaviours⁵, in predictions⁶, voting⁷, risk assessment⁸ and partisanship⁹. Instead of a think-first-and-feel-second order of managing information, recent research suggests that emotions may be antecedent to actual processing of information by the brain. Evidence that the cognitive and affective components interact is growing: an array of works by Isen and co-authors report a positive relationship between positive affect and problem-solving abilities¹⁰, while Miller¹¹ discusses the enhance effect political sophistication has on experiencing emotions. Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen¹² argue that it is the affective systems, those managing emotions, which also direct individuals' reactions to new situations and their tendency to rely on habits in familiar situations. Marcus¹³ explains that emotional systems hold more information about one's surrounding environment than the conscious. Therefore, emotions are the first to intervene when a new

Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

4 Michael MacKuen et al., "Civic Engagement: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2 (2010); John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being," *American Psychological Association* 54, no. 7 (1999).

5 Wolak et al., "How the Emotions of Public Policy Affect Citizen Engagement and Public Deliberation."

6 Dumville and Norris, "Affective Forecasting Errors in the 2008 Election: Unpredicting Happiness."

7 Marcus and MacKuen, "Anxiety, Enthusiasms, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns."

8 Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, "On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger."

9 Burden and Klostad, "Affect and Cognition in Party Identification."

10 Alice M. Isen and Stanley F. Simmonds, "The Effect of Feeling Good on a Helping Task that Is Incompatible with Good Mood," *Social Psychology* 41, no. 3 (1987); Alice M. Isen, "An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making in Complex Situations: Theoretical Issues with Practical Implications," *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 11, no. 2 (2001); F. Gregory Ashby, Alice M. Isen, and And U. Turken, "A Neuropsychological Theory of Positive Affect and Its Influence on Cognition," *Psychological Review* 106, no. 3 (1999); Alice M. Isen, Kimberly A. Daubman, and Gary P. Nowicki, "Positive Affect Facilitates Creative Problem Solving," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 52, no. 6 (1987).

11 Patrick R. Miller, "The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 4 (2011).

12 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*.

13 Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics*.

situation arises. In charge of these responses are the disposition system and the surveillance system, both found in the limbic region of the brain¹⁴.

Marcus¹⁵ explains that the disposition system is the one that guides learned behaviours by continuously gathering feedback and establishing whether a particular activity can continue. It uses emotional markers to assess the failure or success of each activity as it is being performed. The disposition system guides such activities as writing or riding a bike, which, after being learned, become embedded in the procedural memory. Such behaviours can be performed without attention from the conscious and without occupying resources that the brain needs for other activities. The surveillance system, on the other hand, is connected to the associative memory. It scans the environment for any new element or threat and decides whether special attention is required to deal with any novelty or whether familiar habits are sufficient. The surveillance system does not intervene, but draws attention to the brain that the current plan of action must be stopped and another plan needs to be created to deal with the new situation¹⁶.

Based on the roles of the emotional systems, the theory of Affective Intelligence predicts that voters will rely on their habits to make political decisions when they do not sense any novelty in the political environment¹⁷. When faced with a political decision, individuals will process the information in two steps: first, the surveillance system scans the environment to detect any threatening or unfamiliar element. For example, in an electoral campaign, if an extreme party that the voter deeply dislikes appears to have a chance of winning, it could be perceived as a threatening element and determine the voter to pay more attention to the campaign. If such a situation does not arise and it appears to be 'politics as usual', the voter will rely on his political habits, if she has them. The second step consists of continuing with the familiar plan of action or modifying one's actions. Therefore, in an election that appears to hold nothing out of the ordinary, a partisan will rely on his attachments to make a voting decision.

14 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*; Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics*. Wolak et al., "How the Emotions of Public Policy Affect Citizen Engagement and Public Deliberation."

15 Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics*.

16 The surveillance system should not be confused with the fight-or-flight system, which intervenes before the information of the danger is received by the brain, to ensure survival of the individual e.g. removing one's hand from a hot object.

17 Wolak et al., "How the Emotions of Public Policy Affect Citizen Engagement and Public Deliberation."

One such heuristic that voters may employ in situations that hold nothing out of the ordinary is party identification¹⁸. Some evidence suggests that individuals in post-communist societies are becoming attached to parties in the same way that more experienced voters have developed party identification. Miller and Klobucar¹⁹ argue that half of the electorate in Russia and Ukraine could be described as identifiers in the late 1990s. This is also confirmed by Brader and Tucker²⁰ using Russian data between 1993 and 1996. Barnes, McDonough and Pina²¹ look at a survey panel from Spain, gathered in 1978, 1980 and 1984. They identify 16% of Spanish voters as consistently naming the same party as their close one in consecutive waves, after merely years of democratic experience (Franco had died in 1975).

Marcus and his colleagues apply the theory of affective intelligence to the political realm, hypothesizing that any anxiety caused by a political event will determine voters to abandon their previous habits and attentively consider the situation²². They find that, indeed, anxiety proves to be a strong intervening factor between partisanship and one's perception of political issues. Specifically, supporters of the incumbent president's party are much more likely to have a negative view on the state of the economy if they are made anxious by the president's actions, while supporters of the opposition are just weakly influenced by how they see the president. Moreover, anxiety about the challenger does not appear to have any effect on economic perceptions. Marcus and MacKeun²³ conclude that anxiety motivates voters to pay more attention to the campaign settings and cease relying on their political habits for a voting decision. More recently, MacKuen et al.²⁴ conducted an experiment, presenting subjects with newspaper articles on policy proposals that were meant to generate feelings of anxiety, anger or reassurance. Their findings support previous research. They find that, when confronted with a policy proposal that makes them anxious, individuals are more open to new information.

18 Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

19 Arthur H. Miller and Thomas F. Klobucar, "The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2000).

20 Ted Brader and Joshua A. Tucker, "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001).

21 Samuel H. Barnes, Peter McDonough, and Antonio Lopez Pina, "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain," *American Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 4 (1985).

22 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*.

23 Marcus and MacKuen, "Anxiety, Enthusiasms, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns."

24 MacKuen et al., "Civic Engagement: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation."

The theory, though, is not uncontroversial. Ladd and Lenz argue that emotions explain voting behaviour through a much simpler mechanism.²⁵ They suggest, instead, that there is a direct relation between candidate evaluations and emotions. Appraisal Theory and Affect Transfer Theory suggest that emotions are linked to evaluations of events or individuals, though the theories disagree on the direction of causality. The authors replicate the analyses of Marcus and MacKuen²⁶ and Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen²⁷s and find little support for Affective Intelligence theory. They claim that the initial findings are an artefact of the unusual way in which anxiety was coded, as only anxiety towards the candidate of one's own party was considered. In a second objection the authors refers to the multi-dimensional model of emotions used by Marcus and his colleagues. Ladd and Lenz suggest that anxiety and enthusiasm are only two sides of the same coin.²⁸ They claim that anxiety about one's own candidate is conceptually equivalent to enthusiasm about the opposing candidate, in accordance with a single-dimensional model of positive-negative affect. While some theories of political behaviour depend on a connection between positive and negative emotions²⁹, research suggests that the two dimensions are in fact independent of one another, with individuals holding both positive and negative emotions towards an object³⁰.

The recent discussion in *Political Psychology*³¹ moves the debate on Affective Intelligence Theory forward by showing where the theory is vulnerable. Whether considering only anxiety over one's own candidate or the opposing candidate is debated by the two sides. Some evidence suggests that it should not matter what object generates anxiety (Way and Masters³², for example, use images of snakes, skulls and babies to generate emotions in their study of political attitudes). The question of how to conceptualize anxiety is still open for discussion and in this study

25 Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz, "Reassessing the Role of Anxiety in Vote Choice," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 2 (2008).

26 Marcus and MacKuen, "Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns."

27 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*.

28 Ladd and Lenz, "Reassessing the Role of Anxiety in Vote Choice."

29 Lisa Troyer and Dawn T. Robinson, "Contributions of a Sociological Perspective on Affect to the Study of Political Action," in *Feeling Politics. Emotions in Political Information Processing*, ed. David P. Redlawsk (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).


30 Robert P. Abelson et al., "Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person Perception," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 42, no. 4 (1982).

31 George E. Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and W. Russell Neuman, "Parsimony and Complexity: Developing and Testing Theories of Affective Intelligence," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2011); Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz, "Does Anxiety Improve Voters' Decision Making?," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2011); Ted Brader, "The Political Relevance of Emotions: "Reassessing" Revisited," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2011).

32 Baldwin M. Way and Roger D. Masters, "Political Attitudes: Interaction of Cognition and Affect," *Motivation and Emotion* 20, no. 3 (1996).

I use two different conceptualizations in an attempt to provide an answer. I look both at the effects of anxiety caused by an individual's in-party candidate and at a broader definition of anxiety, caused by a wider range of candidates competing in the elections at hand.

Figure 1: AI Model



Expectations

The first part of my study consists of a descriptive analysis of party identification in Romania. Using two waves of a panel study conducted in the weeks before the first round of the presidential elections in 2009 and in the weeks following the second round I identify two types of identifiers: consistent partisans, who did not change their preferred parties between rounds and inconsistent partisans, who gave different answers when asked which party they felt close to in the two waves.

The last part of my study deals especially with understanding how emotions influence electoral decision-making. A voter that has an enduring party identification should make a voting decision based on this identification when an election appears to be familiar, i. e. with no new parties or candidates out of the ordinary. On the other hand, if the voter's surveillance system detects a new element, she should become more eager to get informed about the election and the candidates. This does not necessarily imply that the individual will abandon the party she feels close to at the polls. Instead, it means that party identification will not be the main mechanism for coming to a decision about who to vote for. I propose that, if Affective Intelligence Theory accurately describes the role of emotions in electoral behaviour, voters that do not reveal signs of anxiety should

behave according to their party identification. In other words, for those low on anxiety, party id should be a strong predictor of vote. On the other hand, partisans who declare themselves anxious about their own party's candidate or about any candidate in the race should show a decreased reliance on party identification in their decision-making process, i. e, anxiety and party identification should interact negatively in their effect on vote choice. For voters who do not consider themselves close to the candidates' parties I do not expect anxiety to have a significant role on vote choice. Since these individuals do not have any voting habits to rely on, there is no mechanism in Affective Intelligence Theory that would predict any change in these individuals' behaviours. Alternatively, if a more accurate portrayal of voting behaviour is characterized by Ladd and Lenz³³'s Affect Transfer Theory I expect to find a direct link between emotions and candidate evaluations. In this case, presumably voters who are made anxious about a candidate will abandon him at the polls irrespective of their party identification or lack thereof. Moreover, emotional reactions towards candidates should be classified along a negative-positive dimension, with anger and anxiety having negative effects on candidate evaluations and hope and pride positively affecting respondents' evaluations of the candidates.

The study of emotions should prove especially fruitful in the context of an electorate with a medium experience with electoral democracy. Arguably, Romanian voters have had some time to familiarize themselves with the electoral process. The rules of presidential elections have remained unchanged since the early 1990s and the dynamics of politics are relatively stable. Electoral volatility decreased in the first decade of democracy below the average of the region and the effective number of electoral parties stabilized at 5. 1 by the year 2000³⁴. Given the relatively high degree of party system institutionalization, there is reason to suspect that the Romanian electorate may have formed attachments to political parties, attachments that resemble those found in more experienced democracies. Yet politics, even more so in East-Central Europe, are emotion-ridden. The complexities of policy making may prove even more challenging in a country where some half of the electorate regularly abstains from voting³⁵. Therefore, the elections of Romania could represent an ideal case to study the way in which emotions and political habits interact and influence voting behaviour.

33 Ladd and Lenz, "Reassessing the Role of Anxiety in Vote Choice."

34 Jack Bielasiak, "The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 2 (2002).

35 "Central Electoral Bureau," http://www.bec2009p.ro/Documente%20PDF/Rezultate/Rezultate%20finale%20turul%20I/P_BEC.pdf.

Furthermore, Affective Intelligence Theory has so far been tested almost exclusively on American electorates. Notable exceptions are Rosema³⁶ and Capelos³⁷ who successfully tested the theory on Dutch voters and Kiss and Hobolt³⁸ who looked at British voters. Multiparty systems should reveal with even more success the interaction of emotions and habit considering the greater pallet of choices voters face at any election. Whereas in two-party systems voters made anxious by their party's candidate have only one other electoral choice, if they are to vote at all, in European multiparty systems the potential for voters to actually abandon their parties' candidates at the polls is even greater. Therefore, if anxiety decreases the impact of party identification on electoral choice, this should be more apparent in multiparty systems.

Data and Methodology

The data used for this study was gathered as part of the Romanian Electoral Studies program. During the 2009 campaign for the presidential elections, a three-wave survey was conducted, with surveys being administered before the first round of the elections, between the two rounds, and after the second and final round of the presidential elections. For this study though, only the first and third waves were used. Questions regarding closeness to a party were not available in the intermediary wave. All variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1. To measure party identification, respondents were asked "Do you feel close to a political organization?" in the first survey and "Would you say that you feel close to a political organization?" in the third one. Further, those who responded affirmatively were asked to identify the party that they felt close to. Based on these questions, respondents were classified as consistent partisans, inconsistent partisans or nonpartisans. **Consistent partisans** are those that responded as feeling close to a party in both waves and identified the same party as the one they felt close to both times. **Inconsistent partisans** are those that changed their answers from one wave to another. Either they switched between feeling and not feeling close to a party or they nominated different parties in the two surveys. Finally, **nonpartisans** are those respondents who said they did not felt close to a party in both waves.

I begin with an investigation the nature of partisans in Romania by using descriptive statistics. In order to test the hypotheses related to AI theory, I use binary logistic regression. Two models are tested, one including the interaction term between

36 Martin Rosema, "How Passionate is the Electorate?," in *4th ECPR Conference* (Pisa, Italy2007).

37 T. Capelos, "Emotionality, Vote, and Party Identification: The Affective Intelligence of Dutch Voters," in *4th ECPR Conference* (Pisa, Italy2007).

38 Zsolt Kiss and Sara B. Hobolt, "The Emotional Voter. An Experimental Study of the Moderationg Effect of Emotions on Partisan Behaviors," in *ECPR General Conference* (Reykjavik2011).

partisanship and anxiety and one without the interaction term. Each model is tested on two candidates, the incumbent president and his main challenger. The dependent variable is vote for that candidate, coded as a dichotomous variable: respondents were coded 1 if they voted for a candidate and 0 if they did not. Party identification in this case measures identification with the party of the candidate in each model. Then the models are replicated using another measure of anxiety, general anxiety. I also test a direct relationship between emotions on the one hand, and voting intentions and feeling thermometers on the other. For this purpose I will use binary logistic regression and linear regression.

Analysis

Partisan Characteristics

Table 1 shows that more than 60% of the sample considers itself close to a political party at one point or another. Of these, nearly half fits the definition of consistent partisan. From the remaining 37, 75% consistently declare themselves nonpartisans. Compared with other studies, the figure may seem low. Rose and Mishler³⁹ found that, in 1995, 41% of Romanians considered themselves close to a party. Using data from the Post-Communist Public Study II, Rudi⁴⁰ reports similar findings, with 40. 4% identifiers in 1998. Data from the 1996 module of CSES shows some 44. 4% partisans in Romania⁴¹.

Table 1: The Typology

Type	Absolute Frequencies	Percentages
Consistent partisans	312	28. 31%
Inconsistent partisans	374	33. 94%
Nonpartisans	416	37. 75%
Total	1102	

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009

But these studies may overestimate the level of identifiers, because they use data gathered at a single point in time. While they capture the affective dimension of party identification, they ignore that some of these partisans may only be reporting

39 Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Negative and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries," *Electoral Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998).

40 Tatjana Rudi, "What Kind of Party Identification Does Exist in Emerging Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe?," in *ECPR Beyond 'Party Identification and Beyond'* (2006).

41 Zsolt Enyedi and B Todosijevc, "Adversarial Politics, Civic Virtues and Party Identification in Eastern and Central Europe," in *Political Parties and Partisanship: Social Identitu and Individual Attitudes*, ed. John Bartle and Paolo Belluci (London: Routledge, 2009).

short-term attachments. The lower figures of partisans that I identify can be accounted by the fact that the measure used not only requires individuals to self-identify as close to a party, but also eliminates very unstable attachments. More likely, the cause of the high instability is the young age of Romanian democracy and the inexperience of voters with the political system. It is worth considering that, even over a one month period, half of partisans change their responses, either by naming another party as the one they feel close to, or by changing between identifying with a party and being non-partisans.

Table 2: Consistent partisans

Party	Share of partisans	% of voters who are consistent partisans
Social-Democratic Party	49.36%	37.3% (148)
Liberal Democratic Party	26.28%	25.9% (81)
National Liberal Party	14.10%	19.6% (40)
Democratic Union of Hungarians	6.73%	36.5% (19)
Greater Romania Party	2.24%	12.2% (6)
New Generation Party	0.96%	15% (3)
Roma Party	0.32%	-

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. #

Numbers in parentheses represent raw figures.

The distribution of consistent partisans reveals that the strongest party from this perspective is the Social-Democratic Party (Table 2). Half of those classified as consistent partisans are supporters of the Social Democrats. The results are to be expected in view of the fact that left-wing parties in Europe have traditionally been characterized by organizational cohesion, admittedly with a downwards trend⁴². The Liberal Democrats come a distant second with 14%. The Social Democrats also benefit greatest from their core supporters when it comes to votes: 37% of their voters consider themselves close to the party. The large number of partisans could explain the party's constant level of support over the last years. Their share of votes in parliamentary elections has remained around 35% since the 2000 elections. As expected, the Democratic Union of Hungarians also benefits from their loyal supporters. 36.5% of its voters are also stable partisans of the party. Of course, considering the ethnic nature foundation of the party, it is plausible that identifying with the party does not only entail a political identification, but also an ethnic one.

42 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Stability: The Stabilization of the European Electorates 1885 - 1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Based on extant literature, I would expect partisanship to be strongly correlated with vote stability⁴³ (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Weisberg 1983; Campbell et al. 1960; Blais et al. 2001). Chi-square tests were performed, on general vote intention (for parties) and vote intention in the presidential elections. Table 3 confirms this expectation: there is a monotonic link between partisanship and vote consistency.

Table 3: Effect of partisanship on vote consistency

	Consistent partisans	Inconsistent	Nonpartisans
Pearson's chi square	1236.156***	1138.062***	720.071***
Df	36	36	36
Cramer's V	.843	.790	.657
Phi	2.065	1.935	1.609

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Consistency in voting.
Chi-square (general vote intention X presidential vote intention)

The idea that these three groups are indeed different from each other is strengthened by further analyses. Table 4 reveals that consistent partisans are more interested in politics than inconsistent ones which, in turn, are more interested than non partisans, these results being in conformity with previous studies⁴⁴. There seems to be no difference between consistent and inconsistent partisans with respect to the amount of knowledge they possess, but non partisans are systematically less well informed than both groups, as also found by Rudi⁴⁵.

43 Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Herbert F. Weisberg, "A New Scale of Partisanship," *Political Behavior* 5, no. 4 (1983); Campbell et al., *The American Voter*. Andre Blais et al., "Measuring Party Identification: Britain, Canada, and the United States," *Political Behavior* 23, no. 1 (2001).

44 Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, "Political Attitudes and Behavior: Some Consequences of Attitudinal Ordering," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 1 (1970); Jennifer Wolak, "Explaining Change in Party Identification in Adolescence," *Electoral Studies* 28(2009).

45 Rudi, "What Kind of Party Identification Does Exist in Emerging Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe?."

Table 4. Differences between consistent partisans, inconsistent ones and nonpartisans

	Consistent	Inconsistent	Nonpartisans	Differences	
				Consistent- Inconsistent	Inconsistent- Nonpartisan
Interest in politics	.4677 (.28)	.3117 (.24)	.2497 (.23)	.1499*	.0680*
Political knowledge	.6795 (.30)	.6513 (.28)	.5758 (.32)	.0281	.0755*
Trust in political parties	.4558 (.25)	.3871 (.24)	.3305 (.25)	.0687*	.0566*
Perceived differences between candidates	.5924 (.25)	.5824 (.25)	.5669 (.22)	.0100	.0154
Turnout intention	.9646 (.18)	.9289 (.20)	.8279 (.42)	.13570	.1009*
Actual turnout	.9600 (.19)	.8774 (.32)	.8191 (.34)	.0825*	.0582

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Entries in the first three columns are means with standard deviations in brackets. The fourth and fifth columns are t-test mean differences.

* $p < .05$

Trust in political parties follows the same expected pattern, with trust increasing as one moves from being a nonpartisan to a consistent partisan. Unlike other findings in the literature,⁴⁶ there appears to be no differences between groups as to how large they perceived the differences between candidates to be. While the differences are in the expected direction, they fail to reach statistical significance. Voting behaviour shows a similar pattern as presented above and conforms to existing literature⁴⁷. Generally, partisans decide earlier in the campaign who they will vote for and they are more likely to actually vote. The actual mean differences between the three analyzed groups reveal that they are indeed separate categories of individuals, with inconsistent partisans oscillating between consistent partisans and non-partisans, but generally behaving as a distinct group.

Campaign Effects

Next, I look at the campaign dynamics and I examine the shift in votes between the two rounds among those respondents who cast votes both times. I am especially interested in the behaviour of voters of the second runner-up, whose preferred candidate failed to make it into the second round. The presidential elections were contested by twelve candidates, but only three of them tallied vote shares that go into double digits. The incumbent, Traian Basescu, was supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL). His main challenger, Mircea Geoana, was nominated by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Crin Antonescu was running on behalf of the National Liberal Party (PNL). Crin Antonescu, who came in third in the first round of the elections, subsequently endorsed one of the two main candidates, the challenger Mircea Geoana. I consider the role party identification has on cue following and also how the campaign influences partisanship.

Voting patterns between the two rounds show striking stability for the two candidates who made it to the second round (Table 5). Around 90% of voters of the incumbent president and the main contender maintained their vote choice. The choices made by voters of other parties reflect the dynamics of the electoral

46 Ryan K. Beasley and Mark R. Joslyn, "Cognitive Dissonance and Post-Decision Attitude Change in Six Presidential Elections," *Political Psychology* 22, no. 3 (2001); Sendhil Mullainathan and Ebonya Washington, "Sticking With Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance Voting," in *Working Papers*, Economics (Yale University, 2007).

47 B. Doosje, N. Ellemers, and R. Spears, "Sticking together or falling apart: ingroup identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus individual mobility," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 72(1997); John Garry, "Making 'Party Identification' More Versatile: Operationalising the Concept for the Multiparty Setting," *Electoral Studies* 26(2007); Miller and Klobucar, "The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies."; Weisberg, "A New Scale of Partisanship."

campaign in the weeks before the run-off as Crin Antonescu advised his supporters to cast their vote for Mircea Geoana in the second round.⁴⁸

Table 5. Vote change between rounds

Round I vote	Round II Vote	
	Traian Basescu	MirceaGeoana
Traian Basescu (PDL)	92% (227)	6. 5% (16)
Mircea Geoana (PSD)	10% (29)	89% (253)
Crin Antonescu (PNL)	24% (33)	75% (105)
Other	45% (116)	39% (102)

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Row percentages add to 100. Differences account for missing data or voters in the first round who did not vote in the second.

As a result, most of the individuals who had previously voted for him, 75%, switched their vote to Mircea Geoana. The large amount of voters who followed his advice is rather surprising, considering that, ideologically, Liberals in Romania are closer to the Liberal Democrats than to the Social Democrats (EuropeanElectionDatabase). Moreover, the Social-Democratic Party is considered the successor party of the Communist Party, and its symbolic leader, Ion Iliescu, is a former communist activist. As well, there is no history of alliance between the Liberals and the Social-Democrats, while the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Party successfully ran as a coalition in the 2004 general elections, which admittedly ended mid-term with the dissolution of the partnership. Perhaps party identification plays a role in explaining the large number of liberal voters who chose to support Mircea Geoana.

Table 6. PNL voters

Round II vote			
PNL partisans		Non-PNL partisans	
Traian Basescu	Mircea Geoana	Traian Basescu	Mircea Geoana
8% (3)	92% (33)	29% (30)	69% (72)

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Entries represent percentages of respondents who voted with the candidate supported by PNL in the first round, distributed according to their partisan status and their vote in the second round of the elections.

Among voters of Crin Antonescu there seems to be a positive relation between being a PNL partisan and following its leader's advice (Table 6), although the Chi-square test falls short of statistical significance, probably due to the small number of

48 Ionel Boamfa, "Orientation of the Voters in the Presidential Elections in Romania 1990-2009," *Forum Geografic. Studii si Cercetari de Geografie si Protectia Mediului (Geographic Forum)* 20, no. 2 (2011).

cases (Pearson's chi-square = 7.261, df=3, p=.064). The results suggest that voters can still make use of partisanship as a cue when they do not have the option of voting for their party's candidate.

Testing Affective Intelligence Theory

For the purpose of the following analyses I only consider consistent partisans as having a party identification and regard inconsistent partisans to be non-identifiers. Following Marcus et al.⁴⁹ and Ladd and Lenz⁵⁰ (2008) I include in the model, besides the variables of interest, also variables that could stand as proxies for policy preference and candidate personal qualities. In order to assess respondents' opinion of the candidates in terms of policies, I use their predictions as whether the state of the economy will improve or deteriorate if each candidate is elected president. As a proxy for candidates' qualities, I use 11-point feeling thermometers. The survey also includes a battery on candidate qualities, but it could not be used due to missing data. Later the models are replicated using another measure of anxiety, general anxiety. If the theory holds, we should observe that the interaction term between party identification and anxiety has a negative effect on voting for the candidate. This hypothesis is tested using two definitions of anxiety. First, I will consider only anxiety caused by the candidate supported by the party the respondent feels close to. Later, I will also test the theory using a general measure of anxiety, defined as the maximum level of anxiety caused by any of the candidates. As an alternative to AIT, I also look at the direct impact emotions have on voting behaviour.

Table 7 reports two logistic regression models, each for the two main contenders. Along with the odds ratios usually reported for logistic regression due to their intuitive interpretation, I also include the γ -standardized coefficients, as they allow me to compare coefficients across models⁵¹ (Mare and Wonship 1984). Before interpreting the results, it should be noted that the models only include the variables 'anxiety' in interaction with party identification, following the example of Marcus and his colleagues⁵² (Marcus 2002; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). While normally all constitutive terms of an interaction should be included, Brambor and Clark⁵³ (2005) demonstrate that under some conditions variables may be excluded. Particularly, a variable may be omitted if the variable it is interacted with

49 Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman, "Parsimony and Complexity: Developing and Testing Theories of Affective Intelligence."

50 Ladd and Lenz, "Reassessing the Role of Anxiety in Vote Choice."

51 Robert D. Mare and Christopher Wonship, "The Paradox of Lessening Racial Inequalities and Joblessness among Black Youth: Enrollment, Enlistment, and Employment, 1964-1981," *American Sociological Review* 49(1984).

52 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*; Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics*.

53 Thomas Brambor and William Roberts Clark, "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," *Political Analysis* 13(2005).

has a 'natural zero' and if the effect of the former on the dependent variable is actually null. In this case, partisanship does in fact have a natural zero, since not being a partisan of a particular party does imply the natural absence of that characteristic. Second, a fully specified model reveals that anxiety has a main effect that is indistinguishable from zero on the dependent variable, vote, for both the incumbent and the challenger. Moreover, Kiss and Hobolt⁵⁴ (2011), in an experiment on British voters, also find no main effects of emotions on partisan vote. Therefore, I feel comfortable in only including the variable 'anxiety' in interaction with party identification.

Overall, the models fare rather well. For the incumbent, model 1 predicts 87.1% of the cases correctly, and for model 2 the figure increases to 87.9%. For the challenger, model 1 predicts 84.6% of the cases correctly, and model 2 predicts 84.5%, a slight decrease. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test does not reach statistical significance for any of the models, indicating a good model fit. Including the interaction term improves the models, as can be seen from the decrease in AIC (from 646.20 to 595.96 for the incumbent and from 661.64 to 617.49 for the challenger). A quick overview of the results reveals that partisanship has a strong positive effect on vote (Model 1). Being consistently close to the president's party, for example, increases the chances of voting for him by 21 times, whereas closeness to the social-democratic party increases the chances to vote for the challenger by almost 12 times. Believing that the candidate will highly improve the economic conditions of the country also has a very large impact on vote, whereas the candidate's personal qualities (summarised through a 11-point feeling thermometer) has just a moderate effect, which is only significant in the model applied to the incumbent. Yet, the effect is in the expected direction, with more positive reviews of the candidate improving the chances of voting for him.

If AI holds, the interaction term between partisanship and anxiety should have a negative effect on vote. As Table 7 reveals, the evidence is limited, although in the expected direction. Both for the incumbent and the challenger, anxiety about the candidate supported by the party one feels close to weakens voters' reliance on partisanship. Yet in neither case do the negative coefficients reach a level of significance. The insignificance of the results does not come as a great surprise since only a very limited number of people declare having been made to feel afraid of their own candidate. In total, only 12.2% of consistent partisans (38 individuals) report anxiety about their own candidate. 10.7% of partisans of the Social Democratic Party report some anxiety about Mircea Geoana and 19% of Liberal Democratic partisans are at least somewhat anxious about President Traian Basescu.

54 Kiss and Hobolt, "The Emotional Voter. An Experimental Study of the Moderation Effect of Emotions on Partisan Behaviors."

Table 7: Indirect Effect of Anxiety on Vote Choice

	Incumbent				Challenger			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.
Partisanship	21.759*	1.0398*	24.752*	1.0849*	11.841*	.8333*	15.459	.9144*
Partisanship x Anxiety Own Economy Feeling Thermometer			.773	-.0872			.151†	-.6320†
Constant	.003*		.002*		.001*		.001*	
Nagelkerke R^2	.553		.555		.561		.564	
AIC	646.20		595.96		661.64		617.49	

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Cell entries represent logistic regression odds ratios and y-standardized coefficients

*significant at .05 level; † significant at .10 level;

For a more intuitive interpretation, Figure 2 displays the change in predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent as a function of anxiety caused by the president. For the partisans of the incumbent's party the probability of voting for the president decreases from 92% to 75% as the level of anxiety caused by the president increases from 'not at all' to 'very often'. On the other hand, in the case of non-partisans, the increase in level of anxiety leaves the probability of voting for the president virtually unchanged, at about 1%. Figure 3 shows the same patterns for the main challenger. Partisans of Mircea Geoana's party who are not made anxious by the candidate experience a probability of 88% of voting for him, while those who are very anxious about the candidate experience a drop in probabilities to 64%. Non-partisans again are not influenced by the increase in anxiety. Their probabilities of voting for the challenger are steady at above 1%. In both cases, the decrease in vote probability for partisans is not quite linear, but the intermediary differences are not significant.

Figure 2: Probability of voting for incumbent as a function of anxiety





Figure 3: Probability of voting for challenger as a function of anxiety



I further look at the impact of emotions on both vote choice and on candidates' individual evaluations. As expected, anger has a negative effect on candidate evaluations, while hope and pride are positively correlated with candidate ratings. Anxiety, on the other hand, is only related to incumbent evaluations. Results suggest that anxiety has only a weak effect (with a coefficient of $-.057$). Ladd and Lenz⁵⁵ (2008) argue in favour of a direct relationship between candidate evaluations and emotions, yet the results presented here show only a weak support for their theory. Moreover, they also support a multi-dimensional view of emotions. While hope and pride, both positive emotions, have similar positive effects on candidate evaluations, anger and anxiety do not function as parts of a single negative emotion. Instead, anxiety has a very weak negative effect compared to that of anger and only in the case of the incumbent president. The failure to find a direct relationship between anxiety and vote choice suggests that the relationship is not so simple. Voters do not simply refuse to vote for a candidate that makes them anxious.

55 Ladd and Lenz, "Reassessing the Role of Anxiety in Vote Choice."

Table 8: Direct/Indirect Effect of Emotions

	Vote Intention (Logistic regression)		Feeling Thermometer (OLS)	
	Incumbent	Challenger	Incumbent	Challenger
Party Identification	48.799*	33.062*	.016	.006
Anger	.565*	.641	-.313*	-.431*
Hope	1.259	.902	.292*	.361*
Fear/Anxiety	1.766†	.720	-.057*	.051
Pride	1.208	.646	.196*	.131*
Constant	.167*	.203*	.490*	.467*
R ²	.223	.333	.440	.424

Data: Romanian Presidential Elections Study 2009. Entries in column 1 and 2 represent logistic regression odds ratios and in columns 3 and 4 OLS coefficients.

* $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Ladd and Lenz⁵⁶ (2008) also argue that general anxiety is a better measure for a test of Affective Intelligence. Therefore, I replicate the previous analysis from Table 7 by replacing anxiety about one's own candidate with general anxiety, conceptualized as the highest value from the items measuring fear towards three major candidates in the race and a generic 'other' candidate. I call this general anxiety, but there are limitations to using such a conceptualization. There may be other elements in the electoral competition that make individuals feel anxious and which could have an influence on their decision-making processes. It could be that other minor candidates have a great enough impact on the electoral campaign so as to influence the dynamics of elections, or other exogenous elements, like the economy. Unfortunately, the data used in this study does not allow a broader definition of anxiety. Yet, the situation is not that dire. If something is to cause sufficient levels of anxiety to change decision-making patterns, it is expected that candidates that have a decent chance of winning the elections should have that impact.

The results in Table 9 are very similar to those presented previously. Of all consistent partisans, 27.8% (87 individuals) report having felt anxious about any of the candidates in the race. Party identification, economic prospects, and feeling thermometers, have the same impact on the dependent variable as in the previous models. Again, for the incumbent's partisans, anxiety does not appear to have an influence. Yet, for the challenger, results suggest with a higher certainty that anxiety decreases voters' dependence on partisanship. The coefficient, though, does not differ much from the previous model in Table 7.

56 Ibid.

Table 9: General anxiety model

	Incumbent				Challenger			
	Model 3		Model 4		Model 3		Model 4	
	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.	Odds Ratios	Y-Std. Coef.
Partisanship	23.420*	1.0398*	22.714*	1.0546*	12.962*	.8333*	19.005*	.9795*
Partisanship x General Anxiety			1.122	.0390			.190*	-.5519*
Economy Own Feeling Thermometer	1803.475*	2.5539*	1810.056*	2.5329*	2359.360*	2.6416*	2615.764*	2.6176*
	2.098*	.2273*	2.098*	.2503*	1.780†	.1775†	1.805†	.1964†
Constant	.002*		.002*		.001*		.001*	
Nagelkerke R²	.555		.555		.563		.567	
AIC	646.20		628.87		661.64		622.90	


Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Cell entries represent logistic regression odds ratios and γ -standardized coefficients

* significant at .05 level;

† significant at .10 level;


As before, I look at the relationship between the predicted probabilities of voting for the two candidates as determined by the levels of general anxiety reported by respondents. In the case of the incumbent president (Figure 4) and partisans of the Liberal Democratic Party, the party supporting him, there is a slight decrease in probability of voting for the president from 92% to 80% as individuals report feeling anxious about any of the candidates very often. For non-partisans, general anxiety does not influence vote propensities. All non-partisans are assigned predicted probabilities of voting for Traian Basescu of about 1.5%, and not higher than 2%. For the main challenger, the results in Figure 5 reveal a stronger relationship between general anxiety and vote in the case of partisans. A respondent who declares herself close to the Social Democratic Party and who is not anxious about any of the candidates has a probability of voting for the party's candidate of 87%. If the respondent reports being made anxious about any candidate very often, the chances of voting for the challenger decrease to 79%. For non-partisans, the chances of voting for Mircea Geoana are 1.7% regardless of the levels of anxiety reported.

Figure 4: Probability of voting for incumbent as a function of general anxiety



It appears that the conceptualization of anxiety does not make a great difference to the explanatory power of Affective Intelligence Theory. Overall, the results suggest that, indifferent to the definition of anxiety, AI is better suited to explain breaking with the partisan preference in the case of the challenger, while a direct relation between emotions and candidate evaluations is apparent only in the case of the incumbent.

Figure 5: Probability of voting for challenger as a function of general anxiety



Another important aspect of AI theory is the mechanism through which individuals come to reconsider their choices. Presumably, when individuals become anxious, they pay more attention to the situation at hand, because the surveillance system flags a disturbance in the environment. MacKuen et al.⁵⁷ (2010) find that individuals who are made anxious are more likely to seek out new information. Therefore, if AI holds, individuals who are made anxious should be more likely to pay attention to the campaign. I test this hypothesis using simple bivariate correlations. I make use of both conceptualizations of anxiety: caused by one's in-party candidate and the maximum level of anxiety caused by any of the competing candidates.

57 MacKuen et al., "Civic Engagement: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation."

Table 10. Relationship between anxiety and following electoral campaign

	Follow campaign	... on TV	... in newspapers	... on radio	Talk with family or friends	Accessed web page
Anxiety Own	.076 (.005)	.010 (.705)	-.013 (.627)	.018 (.519)	.070 (.010)	.011 (.694)
General Anxiety	.011 (.648)	.108 (.000)	.038 (.173)	.059 (.035)	.175 (.000)	.050 (.077)

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Entries represent Pearson correlations. P-values in parentheses, two-tailed.

Again, the data offers support for Affective Intelligence Theory (Table 10). It appears that people made anxious by their own party's candidate are more likely to follow the campaign in general and somewhat more likely to talk with their friends and families about the elections. General anxiety increases the propensity to follow the campaign on TV, on the radio and on the internet, and also has a positive impact on talking about the elections. These results reflect findings by Huddy et al.⁵⁸ (2005).

Conclusion

This study set out to describe the nature of partisanship in Romania. Consistent partisans are those who over the period of one month declared themselves as close to the same political party. They comprise almost one third of the sample analysed. These individuals are more likely to vote with the same party in different types of elections. They are more interested in politics, have higher trust in political parties and are more likely to vote. At the other end of the spectrum, we find nonpartisans, individuals who repeatedly reject any party identification. They represent 37% of the sample. These respondents are less interested in politics, have lower levels of political knowledge, they do not trust political parties, and are less likely to vote. They are also more likely to vote for different parties in different elections. A third category is that of inconsistent partisans, people who change between declaring themselves close to a party at one point and as not close to any party at a different point in time, or report different parties as their close one.

Turning to a test of Affective Intelligence Theory, my analysis suggests a rather weak, yet consistent, support for a model of voting behaviour consistent with it. In

58 Leonie Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety, and Support for Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005).

accordance with established literature⁵⁹ (MacKuen et al. 2010; Marcus 2002; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Wolak et al. 2003) partisans that are made anxious by their in-party candidate are less likely to vote for him and more likely to attentively follow the electoral campaign.

Curiously, only partisans of the main challenger, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, appear to behave according to the theory. Perhaps the reason for this is that supporters of the president's party, even if they were anxious about the president, perceived a lack of electoral alternatives. In an election where the atmosphere was of a competition of all-against-the-incumbent, it is possible that Liberal Democratic partisans may have felt a greater need to rally around their party's candidate and as a result few partisans actually broke ranks come Election Day. Considering that respondents identifying with the Liberal Democratic Party were more ideologically clustered, it is quite reasonable to expect that they had a harder time finding alternatives. Moreover, if individuals vote retrospectively, the elections become a referendum on the incumbent's performance in office⁶⁰ (Ferejohn 1986). If supporters of the president's party felt that the incumbent's track record was good enough, they had even less reason to vote for another candidate. Moreover, an important part of anxiety is uncertainty⁶¹ (Davis 1992). The fact that the incumbent has a portfolio on which he can be evaluated could possibly reduce the effects of anxiety. Considering that the question refers to previous instances in which the candidate made respondents feel afraid, for the incumbent voters should have an easier time projecting his future performance based on his past record. In the case of the challenger, who had no experience with the presidency, the amount of uncertainty attached to his future performance was greater. This may leave more room for anxiety to influence voting behaviour.

The same results are obtained if I replace anxiety about one's own candidate with general anxiety, defined as anxiety caused by any of the competing candidates. Moreover, individuals that are anxious are more engaged with the campaign, discussing events with friends and following the campaign closely. These results are in line with Affective Intelligence Theory. Evidence in favour of a direct effect of emotions on candidate evaluations is limited. While it appears that most emotions do influence candidate ratings in the expected direction, anxiety, the variable of interest, does not behave accordingly. Again, the effect of anxiety on feeling

59 Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen. Emotion in Democratic Politics*; Marcus and MacKuen, "Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns."; MacKuen et al., "Civic Engagement: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation"; Wolak et al., "How the Emotions of Public Policy Affect Citizen Engagement and Public Deliberation."

60 John Ferejohn, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," *Public Choice* 50(1986).

61 Michael Davis, "The Role of the Amygdala in Fear and Anxiety," *Annual Reviews of Neuroscience* 15(1992).

thermometers is only significant in the case of one candidate, in this case the incumbent. But the magnitude of the effect is very small compared with the impact of other emotions, about five times smaller.

These results have implications for both voting behaviour literature and affect-based theories. Voters do not reassess their electoral preferences at each election, instead base their decisions on stable relationships formed with parties in their political system. Conversely, they also do not blindly follow instructions from the parties they identify with. Voters seem to contrast previous information with current situations. If the candidate nominated by the party they feel close to does not conform to their expectation of what such a candidate should be like, they will gather more information on the electoral campaign. In the end, voters made anxious by that candidate or by the whole range of candidates may even come to reconsider their vote.

Future research should dig further into the mechanisms underlying Affective Intelligence Theory. So far it is less clear what causes anxiety in the political arena, as opposed to anger, or other negative emotions, or why is it that voters seem to react differently to different political figures? Perhaps the sources of anxiety can also help differentiate between different effects. It would be worth examining if individuals react differently to distinct stimuli. Can different sources cause different types of anxieties? It is obvious that emotions influence individual behaviour in complex ways. Further studies should seek to better understand the interactions between emotions and rationality, borrowing from the neuropsychology and cognitive science literatures.

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EUROPEANIZATION OF MINORITY PROTECTION POLICIES IN LATVIA: EU CONDITIONALITY AND THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC FACTORS ON THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS

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Abstract

This article assesses the impact of Europeanization on the minority protection policies in Latvia. The diffusion of European norms into European Union and the declaration of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 marked the respect for minority rights as a condition for EU membership which is defined as part of the "acquiscommunitaire" of the European Union.¹ In this paper, I ask "which domestic factors lead to the Europeanization of minority policies" to analyze the impact of Europeanization on the minority policies in Latvia. Utilizing the data from European Union official documents and reports from the year of official candidacy to accession, I explore the influence of "the position governments" and the "veto players" on the Europeanization process of minority protection rights in Latvia.

Keywords: ethnic minorities, Europeanization, linguistic rights, Latvia, Russians

1. Introduction²

The European Union links the "membership conditionality" to minority protection, which refers to the policy changes and legislative reforms in the candidate states that are determined by the "Copenhagen criteria" in 1993.³ These criteria included the rule of law, stable democratic institutions, respect for human rights and respect for minorities. The candidate states of the EU are required to make policy changes in these areas before becoming official member. This policy transfer is called Europeanization and the key concept of this article.⁴ In the literature,

1 *Acquiscommunitaire* is a French term meaning, the rights and obligations that EU member states share.

2 I would like to thank Prof. Donley T. Studlar for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper as well as the anonymous reviewers and editors of this journal for their insightful feedback.

3 The political criteria for EU membership, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf (accessed January 10, 2013).

4 Simon Bulmer and Stephen Padgett, "Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutional Perspective". *B.J. Political Science Journal* 35 (2004):103–126; Simon Bulmer and Claudio Radaelli, "The Europeanisation of National Policy" in ed. Bulmer, Simon and Lequesne, C. (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005): 338-360; Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds. *The Politics of Europeanization*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003); Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse

Europeanization is usually defined as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and structures.⁵ According to Borzel and Risse the EU has an impact on the cultural norms and national identities of both the candidate and member states.⁶ Therefore, Europeanization is not limited to changes in political and administrative structures and policy changes but European values are also to some degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities.⁷ This argument is based on the idea that further political integration is necessary for a closer union.

Accordingly, respect for human rights became part of the required changes for further integration. The transformation of the character of the European Union and the diffusion of European norms facilitated a significant improvement in the protection of the minority rights.⁸ This article aims to analyze the process of Europeanization on the minority policies in Latvia which is a new EU joiner after negotiations focused on the problems of minorities specifically about ethnic Russians. To understand this process, this article covers Latvia's Europeanization process from Latvia's official candidacy for European Union membership in 1998 until its accession in 2004 as this time frame is under the impact of EU conditionality and post-accession period is not monitored by the EU in any particular way. Specifically, the goal is to answer the following research question "under which domestic conditions are the minority protection measures adopted and maintained in the new EU Member States"? To answer the question, I look at the influence of the "position of the governments", and the "veto players" as two major domestic conditions that would have impact on the Europeanization of minority protection policies in Latvia.

This study adopts a qualitative case study analysis of Latvia using a longitudinal perspective based upon the official documents of European Union and academic literature. The generalizability of case study results can be increased by the strategic selection of cases. Case selection therefore is an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study. Hence the case selection for this research follows two criteria; (1) a significant conflict between EU rules and the initial situation in the candidate state and (2) the size of minority groups. For a

"Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics" in K. E. Jorgensen et al, eds. *Handbook of European Union Politics*. (London: Sage 2006):483-504.

5 Lee McGowan, "Europeanization unleashed and rebounding: assessing the modernization of EU cartel policy", *Journal of European Public Policy* 12:6 (December 2005), 996.

6 Borzel and Risse "Europeanization", 483-504.

7 J.P. Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:5, (2002): 921-952.

8 Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182.

better analysis, I select Latvia with size of ethnic minorities greater than 25% within the whole state population.

Thus, as a contribution to the literature of Europeanization, this study reveals how effective the domestic factors are in determining a candidate state's attitude towards the Europeanization process for minority protection. As a contribution to the literature on ethnic politics, it illustrates the situation of ethnic Russians in Latvia. Unlike the previous studies on the topic, this article specifically analyzes the impact of domestic factors on the process. As a broader contribution to the literature, the analysis of Latvia as a case is applicable to the other Central and Eastern European members of the EU, where the ethnic Russians constitute significant size of minorities such as Estonia, Lithuania as well as other EU states with sizable ethnic minorities.

This article has six sections. After a brief introduction to the research, the second section is an introduction to the theoretical framework with a focus on Europeanization and the literature on Central and Eastern European states. Following this is a brief outline of the historical background of ethnic Russians in Latvia that provides the reasons for the current conflicts. The fourth part details what EU conditions and demands exist with regards to minority protection, in particular for Latvia. The fifth section is both an analysis of the Europeanization process in Latvia with a focus on compliance with minority protection policies of the EU and a discussion of the two variables "the position of governments" and "veto players" as the domestic factors that have impact on the process. The conclusion then summarizes the findings and examines the relationship between the theory and the actual practices within the European Union in regards to minority protection as a policy area.

2. Theoretical Framework

Europeanization has become one of the most widely used theoretical approaches for studying the EU and its influence on the current and future EU member states and has emerged as an "academically developing industry".⁹ There is a burgeoning literature on conceptualizing the term and identifying how this process might shape a country's internal politics. There is considerable debate about how to define "Europeanization".¹⁰ The term is generally used with regard to "the domestic impact

9 Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", 921.

10 Bulmer and Padgett, "Policy Transfer in the European Union", 103-126; Bulmer and Radaelli, "The Europeanisation of National Policy", 338-360; Featherstone and Radaelli, eds. *The Politics of Europeanization*, (2003), Borzel and Risse "Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics", 483-504.

of the EU" thus constitutes a crucial concept for analyzing the Union's transformative power through diffusion of ideas namely rules, values and norms.¹¹

The literature in Europeanization studies has traditionally focused on bottom-up perspective analyzing the impact of its transformative power on the states that have already joined the EU.¹² Cowles et al. have used Europeanization to describe the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving which formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules.¹³ According to Borzel uploading is also a way to minimize the costs that the implementation of European norms and rules may impose on member states' constituencies.¹⁴ Therefore, member states have an incentive to upload their domestic policies to the European level in order to minimize the costs of EU adaptation.¹⁵ The member states seek to shape European policy-making according to their interests. Borzel and Risse explain Europeanization as a process of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of rules, procedures and policy paradigms and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.¹⁶

The EU also has an impact on the cultural norms and national identities of the candidate and the member states.¹⁷ Europeanization is not limited to changes in political and administrative structures and policy changes but European values are also to some degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities.¹⁸ Kurzer defined Europeanization as an institutional adjustment to wider European rules, structures, and styles and the diffusion of informal understandings

11 Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Europeanisation in new member and candidate states". *Living Reviews in European Governance*, 6: 1. (2011), 4; Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas", Working Paper No.1, *KollegForscherguppe*, Berlin, (May 2009), URL: http://userpage.fuberlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_1.pdf (accessed February 1, 2013).

12 M.G. Cowles, et al. *Transforming Europe*. (2001); Claudio Radaelli. "Whither Europeanization?: Concept stretching and substantive change". *European Integration online Papers* 4:8(2000); Klaus. H. Goetz and Simon. Hix (eds.) *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*, (London: Cass 2001).

13 Cowles, et al. *Transforming Europe*, 3.

14 Tanja Borzel, "Pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-setting: member states' responses to Europeanization" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:2 (2002), 212.

15 Ibid.

16 Borzel and Risse, "Europeanization", 483-504.

17 Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", 940.

18 Ibid

and meanings of EU norms.¹⁹ This argument is based on the idea that further political integration is necessary for a closer union. Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) called this “domestic assimilation” and stressed the importance of the change in the logic of political behavior in the member states by arguing that Europeanization involves the domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics.²⁰ Similarly, Bulmer and Radaelli argued that the concept of Europeanization is different from EU policy making and thus, the creation of a shared understanding of policy through learning on the part of the states is important for the success of Europeanization.²¹

Regarding the influence of Europeanization on the Central and Eastern states, Grabbe states that the EU’s long-term influence works primarily through persuasion and voluntary adaptation rather than exclusion and coercion, because after accession, the future of policies cannot be envisioned clearly.²² Grabbe refers to Europeanization as an ambiguous process despite the EU’s enormous potential to influence the public policy in candidate countries.²³ Therefore, for the Central and Eastern European members Europeanization started as “a process of meeting of accession requirements and the adoption of EU norms, policies and institutional models” although it aimed to be a process of “moving beyond communist legacies and regaining a full role in the European political and economic space.”²⁴ Focusing on the policy areas concerned with regulating the movement of persons in all Central and Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004, Grabbe finds that requirements had not been entirely fulfilled in these states due to the **inconsistency and lack of precision** in the Union’s membership criteria.²⁵

The policy field of human rights and minority protection is another one of the areas that Europeanization process follows a slower pattern. While most of the Central and Eastern European states “consistently aimed towards European integration” to solidify their economic and political status as liberal democracies, they first had to reconcile Western European norms regarding the protection of minority rights with their own laws and standards.²⁶ Thus, the analysis of the “Europeanization” of Central

19 Kurzer, *Markets and Moral Regulation*, 4.

20 Featherstone and Radaelli, eds. *The Politics of Europeanization*, 30.

21 Bulmer and Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of National Policy”, 338-360.

22 Heather Grabbe. *The EU’s Transformative Power—Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 5.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 David J. Galbreath, “European Integration through Democratic Conditionality: Latvia in the Context of Minority Rights,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14:1(2006), 69.

and Eastern Europe generally focuses on the interplay of contemporary international and domestic conditions. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier provide an explanation for this process by suggesting that the adoption of democratic and human rights norms as well as EU legal norms depends on the size and credibility of tangible, material incentives provided by external actors as well as on the political costs that target governments suffer when adopting and implementing these rules domestically.²⁷

Many of these countries that used to rest behind the Iron Curtain have problems with democratic ideals. As a result, adoption of the rules about the protection of minorities required by the EU's Copenhagen Criteria and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is not easy. In addition to these difficulties, Central and Eastern European states face the dilemmas existing within the Union itself about minority protection policies. Rechellists these dilemmas within the European Union's minority rights policy itself as the lack of minority rights standards within the EU; superficial monitoring of candidate states; concern for regional stability rather than minority protections; and the double standard that require Central and Eastern European states to adopt minority rights policy while Western European states did not.²⁸

Despite these problems within the Union, evidence of the impact of the EU conditionality on minority protection is present and presents the treatment of ethnic minorities in Eastern and Central Europe as one of the most vivid cases of successful EU conditionality.²⁹ Similarly, the cross-country analysis of Schweltnus et al. reveals that the formal adoption and sustainability of minority protection rules in four new EU member states (Poland, Romania, Estonia, and Latvia) over a twelve-year period including pre- and post-accession phases (1997-2008) demonstrate a clear distinction between the developments in five minority protection related issue areas between pre and post-accession periods.³⁰ Although, these positive developments about the minority issues decline after the accession of these countries, the literature on the Europeanization of minority protection in Central and Eastern European states show that due to the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria and the necessity to ensure protection of minority rights to obtain EU membership, countries like Romania have pursued efforts to improve the

27 Frank Schimmelfennig, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (eds) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. (London: Cornell University Press 2005), 173.

28 Bernd Rechel, "What Has Limited the EU's Impact on Minority Rights in Accession Countries?" *East European Politics & Societies* 22: 1 (2008), 171.

29 Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*, 145.

30 Guido Schweltnus et al. "It Ain't Over When It's Over: The Adoption and Sustainability of Minority Protection Rules in New EU Member States", *European Integration Online Papers (ELOP)*, 13:2(2009):1-28.

educational and cultural restrictions on its Hungarian minority.³¹ Thus, the negotiation processes led to the agreements that are respective of the ethnic minorities between Romania and Slovakia and Hungary.³² In addition, the position of the Roma in the Czech Republic and of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States improved because these states were required to regularize their treatment of minorities in order to join the European Union.³³

3. Background of Ethnic Russians and Minority Issues in Latvia

Latvia is a small Baltic state with a population of approximately 2.3 million people. Although Latvia originally gained its independence in 1918, later the Second World War brought Latvia the occupation of the Soviet Union for half a century. Ethnic Latvians represent approximately 58.2% of the population and their mother tongue is Latvian. The largest ethnic minorities are mostly Russian speaking and include Russians (29.2%), Belarusians (4%) and Ukrainians (2.6%). Ethnic groups representing less than 2.5% of the population include Poles, Lithuanians, Roma and Estonians.³⁴

The history of minority issues in Latvia is heavily influenced by the Soviet occupation of Latvia after 1940. Soviet population policies during the Cold War caused major demographic shifts, with the number of Russian-speaking minorities within the country growing from around 33% to 48% by the end of the 1980s.³⁵ As a result of this, according to the 1989 census, native Latvians had become a minority group in the eight largest cities.³⁶ As a result of this large demographic shift, the proportion of native speakers of Latvian faced significant changes and the dominant language was Russian and throughout all of Latvia.³⁷ With regards to the Soviet occupation, Latvian ended up becoming a minority language by the end of Cold War.

31 "The EU and minority policy- does enlargement signal the end of influence?" *Euractiv.com*. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-minority-policy-enlargement-signal-influence/article-110088>, (accessed February 15, 2013).

32 Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*, 145.

33 Tom Gallagher, "Minorities in Central and South-Eastern Europe." *Europa Regional Surveys of the World – Central and South-Eastern Europe*, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2008), 12.

34 *Latvijas Statistika* [database online]; available at <http://www.csb.gov.lv> (accessed December 15, 2012).

35 David Galbreath, "The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 4:1 (2003), 37.

36 Judith Green Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe: the Power of Norms & Incentives*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004), 73.

37 Ibid.

The implementation of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika allowed Latvia to declare its sovereignty in 1989. Despite the objections from the Soviet authorities, Latvia declared the renewal of its independence in 1990.³⁸ With regained independence, Latvia granted automatic citizenship only to those residents who were citizens prior to the commencement of the Soviet occupation in 1940 and their descendants. A large proportion of Latvia's significant Russian-speaking minority was refused Latvian citizenship.³⁹ Since 1999, Latvia's official languages have been the Latvian language and the Liv language, the latter being an indigenous language close to extinction.⁴⁰ Any other language used in Latvia, especially Russian, was declared as a "foreign language". The State Language Law of 1999 proposed "the preservation, protection and development of the Latvian language", and "the integration of national minorities into Latvian society".⁴¹

The result of this significant change in policy had a direct impact on ethnic Russians as they constitute the largest minority group in the state. The reasons behind this control on the usage of language are primarily related to the Latvian fear of losing "Latvian identity". Initially, the major reason is the demographic fears of ethnic Latvians arising from half a century of Soviet occupation. At the end of the Second World War, 83% of Latvia's population was Latvians. However, during the Soviet occupation between 1940 and 1991, Latvia experienced mass immigration from other Soviet territories, mostly ethnic Russians. Therefore, the proportion of Latvian speakers among the population of Latvia dropped to 52% by the end of the Cold War and ethnic Latvians became almost a minority on their own land.⁴²

In addition to demographic reasons, Latvian control over the language was also a part of the "state-building". During the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Russian was approved as the official language. The Latvian language was only allowed in the public sphere. However, although there was no legal restriction for using Latvian language in the public sphere, Latvians faced insults from the ethnic Russian population toward those who used Latvian in public places.⁴³ The nineteenth article of 1977 Constitution asserts that the "Soviet state promotes the intensification of

38 Daina Stukuls Eglitis, *Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity and Revolution in Latvia*. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 2002), 110.

39 Ibid, 113.

40 Section 4 of the State Law states that "the state shall ensure the maintenance, protection and development of the Liv language as the language of the indigenous population".

41 Article 1 of the State Language Law adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia in 1999.

42 Boris Tsilevich, "The Development of the Language Legislation in the Baltic States", *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 3:2 (2001), 137.

43 Eglitis, *Imagining*, 30.

the social homogeneity of the society".⁴⁴ The *sblizheniye* (drawing together) policy of Soviet Russia supported by the Constitution ensured the dominance of the Russian language.⁴⁵ With independence, the reassertion of the Latvian language in the public sphere became vital as the language plays an important role as a symbolism of the state. The status of the Russian language was degraded to the status of an "unofficial" language although the demography of the state pointed to a significant percentage of Russians among the whole population. Despite the fact that Russian-speaking minorities accounted for approximately 36% of the population, while the Livonian language, which gained an official language status, is the first language of only approximately 200 people.⁴⁶

A third reason relates to Latvian fears about identity, and specifically about the preservation of a distinct Latvian culture.⁴⁷ The cultural landscape of Soviet Latvia allowed for a politically passive population of ethnic Latvians with loose ethnic ties. Despite all suppressions, a strong Latvian identity was still present in most of the families with a Latvian background. Therefore, the private sphere allowed for the transfer of culture to younger generations. These cultural activities included the celebration of Latvian holidays, family traditions, decorative art, folk dancing and ethnic music.⁴⁸ The language is at the center of this cultural heritage. Therefore, use of the Latvian language was of vital importance for reawakening Latvian "identity".

Finally, ethnic Latvians felt offended due to the comparatively adverse economic position of ethnic Latvians in relation to ethnic Russians, whose language had dominated the economy and the administration for decades. Soviet equality in Soviet citizenship had privileged ethnic Russians in terms of housing, jobs, language and power.⁴⁹ After independence, the law required employees of the state and of all "institutions, enterprises, and institutes" to know sufficient Latvian to carry out their profession.⁵⁰

4. The European Union's Pre-accession Conditions and Demands

Within the legal framework of the EU accession process, the European Commission is the primary body of the European Union for monitoring of the pre-accession

44 John S. Reshetar, *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR* (New York: Harper & Row 1989), 176.

45 Richard Mole, *The Baltic States: from Soviet Union to European Union*. (London: Routledge 2008), 54.

46 *Litvonian Language*. [database online]; available at http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/lat5_en.htm (accessed December 15, 2012)

47 Eglitis, *Imagining*, 26-7.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid, 115.

50 Article 6 of the State Language Law adopted by the *Saeima* in 1999.

conditionality. In accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union the Commission presented its Opinions on the applications for membership together with *Agenda 2000*, an elaborated strategy paper on the policies of the Union and the impact of enlargement, on 17 July 1997 for Latvia.⁵¹ The relationship between the European Union and Latvia is considered to be a relatively healthy compared to other states during negotiations. Despite all the other conditions required for membership, human rights -specifically minority rights protection issues- had the potential to block Latvia's accession to the European Union. To sum up the situation between the EU and Latvia as of 1997, the Commission reported that in Latvia "thenon-citizens continue to beaffected by various types of discrimination".⁵²

The main demands that the European Union put to Latvia regarding its minority policies were the naturalization process and the integration of minorities. Concerning the fate of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia, the Commission concluded that they have problems of "accessing to certain professions in Latvia".⁵³ Furthermore, the Commission observed that the rate of naturalization of non-citizens has been slow in Latvia and recommended the acceleration of this process to ensure the integration of non-citizens.⁵⁴

The naturalization process has been the concern of the EU as it was directly related to the ethnic Russians that constitute almost 29 % of the whole population in Latvia. The main problem for the EU was the speed of the naturalization process as noted in the *Agenda 2000* Commission Opinion.⁵⁵ Another point that the Commission Opinion on Latvia criticized was the so called "window system", which restricted the right to apply for naturalization according to age brackets. The system of age brackets, initially devised as a way of preventing the administration from being overwhelmed by a flood of applications, had had an inhibiting effect. The "window system" limited until 2003 the numbers of those who could apply for citizenship on the basis of age criteria and gave priority to younger age groups.⁵⁶ These restrictive rules justify the concerns of the European Commission that 1994 Citizenship Law is likely to present an advantage in not possessing Latvian citizenship. In some cases,

51 Article 49 of the EU Treaty defines the procedure for the accession of new states to the European Union.

52 European Commission, *Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the EU, COM(97)*, (European Commission 2005), 17.

53 Ibid: 45.

54 Ibid.

55 European Commission, *Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the European Union*, (European Commission 2000).

56 European Commission, *Annual Progress Report on Latvia*, (European Commission 1998) available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/latvia_en.pdf (accessed December 5, 2012).

non-possession of Latvian citizenship may have appeared as an advantage, which may also help to explain the low number of naturalization applications such as no military service obligation, ease of travel to the countries of the former USSR with the old Soviet passport⁵⁷

Another point that the European Commission declared about minorities is the fact that non-citizens are barred from certain occupations.⁵⁸ In Latvia, minorities representing 28% of the populations do not have Latvian citizenship and a large proportion of that group, consisting of former citizens of the USSR, have no citizenship at all.⁵⁹ In addition, non-citizens cannot directly acquire ownership of land and have no right to vote, even in local elections, even though that would be a powerful factor for encouraging integration. Lastly, some of their fundamental rights are less well protected; they are, for example, excluded from the scope of the 1995 amnesty law. Addressing these was essential with regard to the Europeanization process in minority protection.⁶⁰

Finally, educational rights under the topic of integration were another factor of concern in Latvia. As regards the use of ethnic languages, the European Commission points to the facts that some obstacles exist for those who have no knowledge of Latvian such as the need to know Latvian to receive unemployment benefits and the obligation to pass a high-level language test to be able to stand for election.⁶¹ Further, in higher education, students have to pass a test in Latvian before being admitted.⁶² In the next section, the developments regarding these issues in Latvia will be discussed.

5. Outcome Conditions and Compliance

5.1. The Governments' Position

The likelihood of adoption decreases with net political or power costs to governments from fulfilling the EU requirements. Political actors in the candidate states calculate whether the rewards offered by the EU are worth the costs of adaptation. The size of domestic adoption costs, in this sense, determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions. When the political costs of compliance are high for the target government, that is, when fulfilling EU conditions threatens the security or integrity of the state, or the survival of the regime or the government's domestic power base, and its core political practices for power preservation, even

57 Ibid.

58 European Commission, *Opinion on Latvia*, 17.

59 Ibid, 19.

60 Ibid, 20.

61 Ibid.

62 European Commission, *Opinion on Latvia*, 17.

credible membership incentives turns out to be ineffective.⁶³ Vachudova shows that, although the EU began to implement the conditionality of the pre-accession process, it had little success in changing domestic policies in illiberal democracies in the Western Balkans where “governments turned their backs on the benefits of EU membership to protect their power, autonomy and rent-seeking opportunities”.⁶⁴

In terms of the Europeanization of minority policies, policy preferences of a government can be either in favor of adopting EU standards for minority protection if the government has a pro-minority orientation and/or includes representatives from minorities within the government. As the adoption of rules do not add high adoption costs at the domestic level for the government, the adoption of the EU rules are likely. On the other hand, in the case of a government with nationalist members and/or with a nationalist orientation, the likelihood of the government to postpone the adoption of minority protection due to the fear of political failure in elections is high. According to Kelley the inclusion of national minority parties on the one hand and nationalist parties on the other in the government are important factors in determining the state policy towards minorities and the state’s reaction to external demands to protect minorities.⁶⁵ Coalition governments under the inclusion of parties representing national minorities are likely to be willing to implement minority rights, whereas governments with a strong nationalist influence are likely to resist this. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that political decisions follow directly the policy preferences of the ruling decision-makers.

Focusing on the governments is important for the analysis of Europeanization of minority protection policies in Latvia. Electoral statistics show that Latvian administrations since its independence in 1991 have generally not been very long-lasting, as party coalition shift, party lists disintegrate and reform, and individual politicians change allegiances.⁶⁶ In the 1998 elections, Andris Skele’s newly formed center-right People’s Party (TP), Latvian Way and Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement came first, second and third. Owing to personal conflicts and scandals, they were not able to put together a coalition government. The period 1998-2000 saw the collapse of two governments before the four-party coalition of Andris Berzi’s (Latvian Way) was installed. In terms of minority protection policies, the 1998 amendments to Latvia’s citizenship law were the clearest success of the government on minority rights. Obviously, the amendments were primarily due to external pressures in other words EU conditionality. The

63 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Entrapped Again: The Way to EU Membership Negotiations with Turkey”, *UCD Dublin European Institute Working Paper 08-8*, July 2008, 6.

64 Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*, 2.

65 Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe*, 88.

66 *European Election Database [database online]; available at www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/latvia* (accessed February 23, 2013).

European Commission's progress report stated the EU's satisfaction with the new amendments. These decisions of the government were important in order to speed up the citizenship and naturalization procedures, in response to recommendations in the 1997 Commission Opinion were proffered as a significant step towards accession. When the amendments approved by Parliament were put to a referendum in October, 53% voted in favor of the liberalization of the Citizenship Law. The changes approved in the referendum are expected to facilitate an acceleration of the naturalization process, which would allow for the further development of an integrated Latvian society.⁶⁷ The 53% approval rate for these changes in a referendum signaled significant public support. However, the reason behind the 'yes' vote would likely have come from the desire to join the EU and NATO rather than general realization that resident Russians must be accepted.

With regards to the integration of minorities, Commission reports pointed to some of the attempts of the government to abolish restrictions in the area of employment. As of 1998, the government abolished the restrictions on non-citizens working as fire-fighters, airline staff, pharmacists and veterinary pharmacists.⁶⁸ The knowledge of the official Latvian language remained to be sufficient for employment regulation which gave the minorities two options: to join the Latvian language program under the National Program for the Integration of Society that was developed in order to accelerate the integration process; or remain unemployed which requires knowledge of Latvian language in order to get employment benefits. Although the developments (especially in the field of employment) were appreciated by the European Union, the Latvian parliament amended the language law in July 1999, an act that can be interpreted as an intention to reverse Soviet-era policies. With virtually unanimous support from the four parties comprising the new governing coalition, the law required those working in the service sector, both employees and the self-employed must know and use the state language to the extent necessary to perform their duties.⁶⁹ However, the Law adopted lacks sufficiently integrating standards of proportionality and precision and considers the mandatory use of the state language in the private sector that could impair the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Europe Agreement, such as the exercise of business activities for enterprises from the European Union.⁷⁰ Due to external pressures, newly-elected President Vike-Freiberga returned the language law to parliament for reconsideration. She criticized the law for going against Latvia's constitution and international

67 *European Commission, Annual Progress Report*, (European Commission 1998).

68 *Ibid.*

69 Anatol Lieven, "No Russian Spoken Here". *New York Times Magazine*. (16 July 1999), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/16/opinion/no-russian-spoken-here.html?src=pm> (accessed February 23, 2013).

70 *European Commission, Annual Progress Report*, (European Commission 1999).

commitments as well as for lacking legal precision. Parliament approved a revised law in December 1999.⁷¹

The national parliamentary election in 2000 brought a four-party coalition to power. The Prime Minister Andris Berzins' four-party coalition lasted until parliamentary elections in October 2002. However, this coalition was not able to bring significant developments in the field of minority protection. Several elements limiting the integration of non-citizens still persist in the economic sphere as the non-citizens were not allowed practicing some professions on the grounds of state security.⁷² However, the amendments to the Administrative Violations Code which foresee fines for eleven different violations related to the implementation of the Language Law in 2001 has been one of the few developments during the coalition.⁷³ Although, Latvia signed the European Convention on Nationality in May 2001, reservations on certain aspects related to the acquisition of Latvian citizenship were introduced and the Latvian Parliament rejected a renewed proposal to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.⁷⁴

Prior to the 2002 elections, two new parties entered the stage: New Era (JL) and the Latvia First Party (LPP). Both advocated a fight against corruption and came first and fourth in the elections. The New Era Party gained the most seats and formed a four-party coalition government comprising the of JL, LPP, Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS), and For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement (TB/LNNK). Although, the outcome of the 2002 elections seemed to be a response to the public demand that Latvia develop a new era in its politics, this coalition was not successful in making significant changes about minority issues. Similar to the previous governments of Latvia, the new coalition also failed to ratify the Framework Convention.⁷⁵ Thus, in April 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Latvia had violated the right of Latvian citizen of Russian origin who had not been allowed to stand as a candidate in the 1998 parliamentary elections due to insufficient knowledge of the official language.⁷⁶

Following these failures and the resignation of the Repse administration, a new short-lived, center-right, coalition government was approved by the *Saeima* in 2004. With the support of leftist parties, a minority government led by the Greens

71 Morris, *President*, 548.

72 European Commission, *Annual Progress Report*, (European Commission 2000-2001).

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 European Commission, *Annual Progress Report*, (European Commission 2002).

76 Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, *Report on Human Rights in Latvia 2002*, (Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies 2003), 12.

and the Farmers Union leader Indulis Emsis took office in March 2004. The new government focused on smoothing Latvia's entry into NATO and the European Union, which took place in the first half of 2004. Although Latvia ended up with getting the ultimate incentive, European Union membership, as of 2004, the governments served before and during the accession reported to have some missing points to comply with the European Union conditions on human rights and minority protection policies. Comprehensive monitoring report on Latvia's preparations for membership that was published in 2003 stated that Latvia still had important shortcomings with regards to the full transposition of the *acquis*. In this context, Latvia was strongly encouraged to promote integration of the Russian minority by, in particular, continuing to accelerate the speed of naturalization procedures, and by taking other measures to increase the rate of naturalization. It was also expected to ensure sufficient flexibility regarding transition to bilingual education in minority schools, and to ensure that at all levels the implementation of the language law respects the principle of justified public interest and proportionality, as well as Latvia's international obligations.⁷⁷ However, these factors remained only as advice from the EU and the governments as the effective domestic players blocked the Europeanization of minority protection process in Latvia.

5.2. The Veto Players

Veto players are defined as "actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo".⁷⁸ Veto player theory predicts increasing policy stability with a higher number of veto players, because it becomes increasingly likely that a change from the status quo will be blocked. However, it is not only the institutional power to block a decision that is important, but also the policy preferences of the veto players. A player will only veto a decision if s/he has both the institutional capability to veto and preferences that differ from the government that proposes a policy. Compliance to the EU requirements therefore becomes a challenge if there is a high number of effective veto players who are institutionalized in domestic structures with vested interest in protecting the old normative order and controlling the forces that sustain it.⁷⁹ Thus, if Europeanization threatens the interest of these forces, they are likely to block the process. In terms of minority protection policies, depending on their policy preferences the existence of veto players might block either positive attempts for change or support the required change.

To analyze the influence of the domestic veto players on the Europeanization process of minority protection in Latvia, I take two types of possible veto players

77 European Commission, *Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Latvia's Preparations for Membership*, (European Commission 2003).

78 George Tsebelis, *Veto players: How Political Institutions Work*, (NY: Princeton University Press 2002), 17.

79 Sedelmeier, "Europeanisation in new member and candidate states", 4.

into account: first, the president, who generally has veto powers; second, the constitutional court of Latvia. The European Union is not considered as a veto player *per se* as defined by Tsebelis since its agreement is not necessary in the decision-making process of the states, although it has an important level of influence on the decision-making under 'membership conditionality'.⁸⁰

The presidents are one of the major veto players that have influence on the political setting. The analysis of the performance of the presidents in regards to minority issues points to the effective involvement that leads to changes. The 100-seat unicameral Latvian parliament, the Saeima, is elected by direct popular vote every four years. The president is elected by the *Saeima* in a separate election, also held every four years. The president appoints a prime minister who, together with his cabinet, forms the executive branch of the government, which has to receive a confidence vote by the Saeima. According to article 71 of the Latvian Constitution, the Latvian President can return legislation to the *Saeima* for further deliberation.⁸¹ For the time frame that is analyzed in this chapter, Latvia had two presidents namely Guntis Ulmanis (served between 1993-9) and Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga (served between 1999 and 2007).

Ulmanis was a member of the Latvian Farmers' Union party. His first interference with the minority related policies is his decision to return the citizenship law for reconsideration. As mentioned before, Latvia's citizenship law adopted a 'window system' limiting the number who could apply each year and were designed give citizenship primarily to those who had held it prior to the Soviet occupation in 1940 as well as their descendants, leaving approximately one third of the country's population stateless unless they could demonstrate sufficient command of Latvian, show familiarity with the constitution, prove residence for more than 16 years in the country, and take an oath of allegiance.⁸² However, President Ulmanis then returned the law to parliament for reconsideration, a move that enabled Latvia to join the COE in 1995, and signaled Latvia's change in the direction of harmonizing with EU norms.

Another significant impact of the veto players can be seen with regards to the problematic language law. President Vīķe-Freiberga who came to office in 1999 and served until 2007, encountered external pressures from the European institutions about the strict nature of the language law in Latvia. As a result, the newly-elected President returned the language law to parliament for reconsideration. She

80 Tsebelis, *Veto players*, 17.

81 The official English translation of the Latvian Constitution, http://www.saeima.lv/Likumdosana_eng/likumdosana_satversme.html (accessed December 5, 2012).

82 Morris, *President*, 552.

criticized the law for going against Latvia's constitution and international commitments as well as for lacking legal precision. More specifically, she urged that the law: (1) should restore Latvian as the country's dominant language but should lead integration of non-Latvians by allowing them to use their own languages; and (2) abolish the parts restricting the education and freedom of expression of non-Latvians, and to allow state interference in the private sphere only when going against the public interest.⁸³ Taking Vike-Freiberga's criticisms into account, the Parliament approved a revised law in December 1999.⁸⁴

The second veto player analyzed is the constitutional court of Latvia. *Latvijas Republikas Satversmes Tiesa* (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia) is an independent court, which was established in 1996 on basis of the Constitution of Latvia made in 1994. The Constitutional Court of Latvia had intervened in the Europeanization process in minority policies to some degree in a negative direction.

The Mentzen or Mencena judgment of the Latvian Constitutional Court of 21 December 2001 has been one of the most important domestic cases in Latvia. Names and surnames in Latvian-issued documents are formed in Latvianized form, according to Section 19 of the language law. Juta Mencena submitted a claim at the Constitutional Court, because after marrying a citizen of the Germany, Ferdinand Carl Friedrich Mentzen, the Department of Citizenship and Migration Affairs issued her a passport, spelling her surname Mencena. The Constitutional Court declared the legitimacy of article 19 of the state language law and declared that "there shall be set out in a passport or birth certificate, in addition to the name and surname of the person presented in accordance with the existing norms of the Latvian language."⁸⁵

Another similar case is *Kuhareca v. Latvia* that was rejected by the Constitutional Court of Latvia in 2001 and later by European Court of Human Rights in 2004. Again in this case, the Latvian Constitutional Court had found these provision of the language law constitutional. The complaints were rejected on the basis Article 11 of Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No 49 on "Latvian Non-citizens' Passport" which states that a surname in a passport should be spelt according to the grammar and orthography of the Latvian language.⁸⁶

83 Benjamin Smith, "Latvia's language law nears passage". *The Baltic Times Magazine*, 2 December 1999, available at: <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/1971/> (accessed March 1, 2013).

84 Morris, *President*, 548.

85 *Case No.2001-04-0103*. The English version of the judgment available at <http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/2001-04-0103E.rtf> (accessed March 1, 2013).

86 Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, *Report on Human Rights in Latvia 2002*, (Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 2003), 16.

Relatedly, the original Law on Electronic Media of Latvia requires that films aired on any channel to be in Latvian or to have original soundtrack and Latvian subtitles, TV broadcasts in languages other than Latvian, except news, live events, language learning broadcasts and retranslated content, must be subtitled in Latvian.⁸⁷ The same relates to movie theatres, according to Section 17 of State Language Law. However, in June 2003, the Constitutional Court in Latvia published a decision abolishing the rule providing that no more than 25% of programming broadcast on electronic mass media may be in foreign languages. This decision, which cannot be appealed, has led to an amendment of the Law on Radio and Television. The Court affirmed that "the restrictions as regards the use of foreign languages envisaged by the said rule may not be considered as necessary and proportionate in a democratic society".⁸⁸ The Court also stated that it would have been possible to achieve the aim of integration of society by other means less restrictive of the individual rights of people.⁸⁹ Obviously, the aim of the rule has been to increase the influence of the Latvian language upon the cultural environment in Latvia and to speed up the integration of the ethnic minorities.

6. Conclusions

On the day that Latvia acceded to the European Union, ethnic Russians organized a protest against the government. Ethnic Russians in Latvia held a huge rally in defense of their language rights as the ex-Soviet state Latvia formally joined the EU along with nine other states. The protests were due to the fact that with the education law, at least 60% of classes must be taught in Latvian in public schools, including the ethnic schools. The answer of the President to these protests was to summarize the process of the Europeanization of minority protection policies in Latvia until accession. President Vike-Freiberga went on Latvian radio to defend the language and education law and stated that "laws, in every respect, from every side, have been examined and found to be compatible with human rights. Europe is not going to reject us, whether or not our schoolchildren protest in the streets".⁹⁰

Language and education have been considered two important factors in state-building in independent Latvia. The Latvian educational system has, therefore, been described as the most important driving force of the integration process. National Program of "The Integration of Society in Latvia" was one of these efforts to integrate the ethnic Russians into the society. The Russian-speaking community, on

87 According to Article 19 of the Radio and Television Law a broadcaster's foreign language programs could constitute no more than 30 % of its air time per month.

88 Case No. 2003-02-0106. The English version of the judgment available at www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/2003-02-0106E.rtf (accessed March 3, 2013).

89 Ibid.

90 BBC News, "Protests Mark Latvia's EU Entry", 1 May 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3677383.stm> (accessed March 5, 2013).

the other hand, has been concerned about the increasing limit of the right of education in the minority language.

The results of this case study of Latvia reveal the significant influence of domestic factors on the Europeanization of minority protection policies. During the period between 1998 and 2004, the political sphere in Latvia allowed low level of rule adoption. Unstable governments and coalitions during this period and restrictions via the language law prevented a successful Europeanization of minority protection in Latvia. The European Commission reports between 1998 and 2003 include warning regarding minority issues that criticize governments. However, the analysis of the governmental activities relating to minority issues during this time period shows that the governments of Latvia have not significantly considered these reports for development in minority issues.

The veto players analysis of the case study also shows significant influence of the President and the Constitutional Court on the Europeanization of minority policies in Latvia. Regarding the analysis of the related cases decided by the Constitutional Court, we see that the legislation and practices were not challenged. There are two significant cases relating to minority issues decided by the Constitutional Court during the period between 1998 and 2004. In its decisions about the *Mencena* and *Kuhareca* cases, the Constitutional Court supports the parliamentary activities about the minority related legislation.

On the other hand, the President's activities contradict the governments. During the time period of this analysis, there are two presidents who served Latvia. To increase the slow progress of naturalization President Ulmanis supported the MPs from the ruling Latvian Way party along with a few others against the opposing nationalist FF/LNNK coalition. Similarly, President Vike-Freiberga who came to office in 1999 returned the language law to parliament for reconsideration as she encountered external pressures from the European Commission. She criticized the law for going against Latvia's constitution and international commitments.

These evolutions are important in the light of the European Commission's recommendations. According to the 2003 monitoring report on Latvia's preparations for EU membership, Latvia is expected to ensure "sufficient flexibility" regarding transition to bilingual education in minority schools.⁹¹ This rather general and unclear provision signifies the European Commission's reluctance to take part in the discussions about the Russian minorities in Latvia. The result of

91 European Commission, *Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Latvia's Preparations for Membership*, (European Commission 2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_lv_final.pdf (accessed March 5, 2013)

this ignorance brought the accession of Latvia in the European Union in 2004 despite the critics about the minority related issues. These obvious differences provoke concerns that the EU is using 'double standards' in the field of minority policies.

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HOW ETHNIC CIVIL WAR TRANSFORMS INTO RELIGIOUS CIVIL WAR: EVIDENCE FROM CHECHNYA

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Abstract

Many studies have proved that civil war in which religion is central issue is bloodier and longer than civil war in which religion is peripheral issue. Yet, few studies try to analyze how religion can transform Ethnic Civil War with religious divides into Religious Civil War, especially when the rebels identify themselves as Muslims. Currently, there are two conventional arguments on factors transforming ethnic civil war into religious civil war: the structural and the mobilization explanation. Using the Chechen war as a case study, this paper finds that the structural explanation failed to explain how ethnic civil war where religion is peripheral issue transforms into religious civil war where religion is central issue. While the mobilization explanation can only partially explain the Chechen civil wars it cannot answer the question how the ethnic civil war turns to religious civil war. The evidence clearly suggests that the involvement of transnational religious actors in the form of foreign fighters is the main factor that transforms ethnic civil war with religious divides into religious civil war.

Keywords: religion, Islam, transnational religious actors, Chechen Civil War.

Introduction

Many scholars have tried to examine the relation between religion and civil war, particularly since religious-based civil wars have been increasingly common throughout the world. Overall, between 1940 and 2000, there were 133 civil wars out of which one-third can be classified as religious-based civil wars.¹ After 2000, 50% (7 out of 14) of the on-going civil wars can be classified as religious-based civil wars.²

Another thing that should be noted in the relationship between religion and the dynamic of civil war is the disproportionate role of Islam and Christianity in civil wars. From all thirty two cases of interreligious civil wars, Islam was involved in 25 wars (78%) and Christianity was involved in 22 civil wars (69%). Moreover, half of the interreligious civil wars occurring from 1940 to 2000 were wars between groups which identified themselves with either Islam or Christianity. Civil war is twice more

1 Monica Toft, "Religion, Civil War, and International Order", *BCSIA Discussion Paper* 03 (2006), 1-37.

2 *Ibid.*, 4.

likely to occur when the rebels identify themselves as Muslim and the dominant state religion is Christianity.³

Though religious-based civil wars have increased in number over time, many civil war literatures have found that religion does provoke civil war.⁴ Explanatory variables such as ethnicity along with socio-economic factors are still better in explaining the cause of civil war.⁵ It is widely accepted that religion does not cause civil war. Yet many studies have found that in ethnic civil war with religious divides between the conflicting parties, religion has an effect on the dynamic of the civil war, either in intensifying the war or prolonging the duration of the war.⁶ Furthermore, the civil war becomes deadlier and longer if the civil war has transformed into condition where religion is a central issue.⁷

Therefore, it is clear that religion is unlikely to cause civil war with religious divides; rather, factors such as ethnic differences along with socio-economic factors are still better in explaining the causes of a particular civil war. However, by the time that the civil war is in the progress, religion has an effect on the dynamic of civil war by transforming the civil war in which religion is the peripheral issue into the civil war in which religion is central issue.

The above discussion leads us to the question of how separatist or ethnic civil wars in which religion is peripheral issue, can be transform into religious civil wars in which religion becomes a central issue. For instance why did civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo stay as ethnic civil wars while civil wars in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Ethiopia were transformed into religious civil wars? Moreover, given the fact that civil war is twice more likely to occur when the rebels identify themselves as Muslim, it is important to understand how ethnic civil war with Muslims as a rebel group tends to transform into religious civil war. Therefore the key question is: how does religion become a central issue in ethnic civil wars with religious divides whereas in others it

3 See Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Monica Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007), 97-131.

4 Jonathan Fox, "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 6 (2004), 715-731.

5 Kraue Volker and Susumu Suzuki, "Causes of Civil War in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparison," *Social Science Quarterly* 86, no. 1 (2005), 160-177.

6 Susanna Pearce, "Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Religious Conflicts," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 3 (2005), 333-352.

7 See Andrej Tuscisny, "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (2004): 485-498; Phillip Roeder, "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 5 (2003), 509-540; Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel, Repression and Resistance in the Islamic world* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

does not, especially when the rebels identify themselves as Muslims? By answering this question, the paper seeks to address a gap in the civil war literature regarding the factors transforming ethnic civil war into religious civil war which remains underdeveloped. It is necessary for scholars to provide an explanation for a causal mechanism on how non-religious civil wars can evolve into religious civil war and understanding this transformation would be the first step for policy makers to deal with this kind of problem in the near future.

Using the Chechen civil wars as a case study, this paper argues that both the structural and mobilization explanations fail in explaining how civil war with religious divides transforms into religious civil war. Furthermore, it is argued that the spread of *Salafi-jihadist* ideology via the involvement of transnational actors is the main factor that transforms civil war with religious divides into religious civil war.

Defining Central Terms

Religion

Before a further discussion on the topic, several terms used in this paper should be clarified. The first term that should be clarified is religion. Though this term is widely used in many scholarly works ranging from sociology to psychology, few scholars agree on the definition of religion. Theology scholars define religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude; so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”⁸ However, this definition of religion seems comprehensive yet too personal. This article uses a sociologist’s definition of religion by looking at three primary aspects of religion in order to define religion. The first aspect is religion as a belief system. Unlike other belief systems, religion has powerful doctrinal prepositions that shape society’s world view.⁹ Through its powerful doctrinal preposition, religion can create a strong social commitment among the adherents. Thus, people tend to form a more closed group based on religious belief. The second aspect is religion as identity. Not only does religion serve as a belief system in society, it can also be an essential part of identity formation for a society. In some societies, religion becomes the prime factor in determining identity along with ethnicity. The term ‘ethno-religious group’, in which ethnic groups define their identity as a combination of ancestral heritage and religious affiliation shows how important

8 William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007), 31.

9 Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967).

religion is in forming identity.¹⁰ Religion as an identity is entirely different with religion as a belief system. People can identify themselves as a member of particular religious group despite the lack of commitment on its particular belief system. As a belief system, religion can be politicized by some groups which make religion become a political ideology. The third aspect is religion as an institution.¹¹ Many religious study scholars confirm that to some extent, religious belief systems transform into some sort of institution.¹² According to Durkheim, religion is not only a unified system of beliefs and practices but also unites adherents into a single moral community such as a church.¹³ However, though the world's religions, especially the Abrahamic faiths, tend to have their own religious institution, they have different degrees of institutionalism. For example, unlike the Roman Catholic Church and Shia Islam, which have an ecclesiae institution with formal bureaucratic structure, in many other religions such as Protestantism and Sunni Islam, idiosyncratic factors play an important part in religious institutions. Therefore, the traits of individual religious leaders have a significant role in religious institutions.

It should be noted that in this paper, the term 'religious institution' refers to formal institutional organization that represents the religion in the given time and place. It does not refer to social institutions such as marriages or family. This institution might be the more formal religious institution such as the Catholic Church or Mufti Council. In religion with less complex organization and formal bureaucratic structure, the religious institution might refer to religious community with some informal hierarchical structure lead by individual religious leaders who have a significant role in the society such as charismatic Imam or Priest.

Religious Divides

Another important term used in this article is religious divide. In the civil war literature, religious divides, religious polarization and religious difference are sometimes used interchangeably. This article prefers to use religious divides to refer the divisions among society, where the conflicting parties adhere to different

10 Jonathan Fox, "Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 1 (2004), 55-76.

11 Kristian B. Harpviken and Hanne E. Røislien, *Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking*, (Oslo: PRIO Working Papers, 2005) [database on-line]: Available at:http://www.prio.no/files/file46875_mapping_the_terrain_stateofheartpaper__jul05_.pdf, last accessed on 29 June 2012.

12 Hervé Carrier, *The Sociology of Religious Belonging* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965).

13 Emile Durkheim, *The elementary forms of religious life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56.

religious tradition or identity.¹⁴ In other words, religious divides as used in this article refers to identity-based division in which religion become one part of the constitutive identity among the groups. In this case, there is a religious divide when the two parties maintain separate religious identities.

Civil War

The term internal conflict encompasses situations ranging from communal violence to civil war. Yet many scholars use the term internal conflict interchangeably with intra-state conflict, civil war, or internal violence. However, civil war is different from other types of internal conflict since there are some requirements to defining conflict as a war. In this paper, I will use definition provided by the Correlates of War (COW) Project to define civil war. According to COW, internal conflict can be defined as a civil war if the focus of the war is to gain control over which the winning party would govern as the political unit. Secondly, there must be at least two groups of organized combatants where the state was one of the combatants. Thirdly, there must be at least 1000 battle deaths per year on average and the ratio of total deaths must be, at least, 95% to 5%, meaning the stronger side had to have suffered at least 5% of the casualties.¹⁵

Religious Civil War

In this article, the term religious-based civil war is used to refer to civil wars with the presence of a religious divides in which the conflicting parties have different religion or denomination. However, this term is very broad and includes civil wars in which ethnicity is sometimes defined by religious identity¹⁶. Moreover, religion might have nothing to do as a cause of the conflict between parties that belong to different religions. In fact, conflict between parties who belong to different religions may be caused exclusively by political or economic issues. Hence, there must be a rigid definition on what should be called religious civil war. Monica Toft classified religious-based civil war into two categories; civil war in which either religious belief or practice is a central issue, and a civil war in which it is a peripheral issue in the conflict. According to Toft, to determine whether religion is central in civil war, one need to look at whether “the state or a rebel region would be ruled

14 Jo Lindberg, “Running on Faith? A Quantitative Analysis of the Effect of Religious Cleavages on the Intensity and Duration of Internal Conflicts,” MA thesis, University of Oslo.

15 Meredith R. Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010).

16 The term ethno-religious group in civil war literature well illustrate how in some ethnic groups, religion is one of the most constitutive part in defining their identity. For further discussion see Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil* (Salzburg: Salzburg Seminar, 1997).

according to a specific religious rule".¹⁷ It means that religion becomes a central issue in the civil war if the parties sought to establish the religion's ideology. An example of this would be the case of civil wars in Afghanistan and Sudan where one of the conflicting parties tried to establish the rule of religion in particular place. To determine whether religion is counted as a peripheral issue is by looking at whether the government party or the rebels identify themselves with a specific religious tradition and identity. An example in which religion is a peripheral issue would be the conflict in the Balkans where religion is functioned more as an identity instead of some set of rule and idea.¹⁸ Therefore, in this paper, civil war is defined as a religious civil war if religion is a central issue in the civil war, while, civil war in which religion is peripheral issue will be called ethnic civil war with religious divides as opposed to religious civil war.

The Factors Transforming Ethnic Civil Wars into Religious Civil Wars

At least there are two widely accepted arguments on how ethnic civil war transforms into religious civil war. The first argument focuses on the religious institution. The second one emphasizes on the role the ruling political elite.

The first argument holds that the civil war with religious divides is more likely to become a religious civil war if there is a strong relationship between religious institutions and government institutions, political elites, rebel or opposition groups.¹⁹ In their study on church participation in rebellion, Kowalewski and Greil found that if there is a social contract that is mutually beneficial between the church hierarchy and government elites, the church is more likely to support the government and at the same time be less likely to cooperate with opposition groups.²⁰ While these scholars tend to focus only on the direct relationship between state institutions and religious institutions, other scholars found that the characteristics of religious institutions themselves may have effect on the dynamics of internal conflict. According to Basedau and De Juan, religious institutions such as Catholic Church are able to affect the dynamic of internal conflict either by inciting violence or by calling for peace.²¹ Moreover, according to Basedau and De Juan, a

17 Toft, "Getting Religion?" 100

18 Ibid., 97

19 See David Kowalewski and Arthur Greil, "Religion as Opiate: Church and Revolution in Comparative Structural Perspective," *Journal of Church and State* 32 (1990):511-526; W. Cole Durham, "Perspectives on religious liberty: a Comparative Framework," in *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*, ed. John D. van der Vyver and John Witte Jr. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 24-60.

20 Kowalewski and Greil, "Religion as Opiate: Church and Revolution in Comparative Structural Perspective," 515.

21 Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan, *The 'Ambivalence of the Sacred' in Africa: The Impact of Religion on Peace and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Hamburg: GIGA

crucial factor that makes religious institutions contribute to the escalation of a conflict is when religious institutions lose their nonpartisan stance in the conflict. It can be seen, for example, when religious elites that control religious institutions are involved in the conflict directly.²² The Rwandan genocide can be an example of the latter where the Catholic hierarchy had institutional ties with Habyarimana regime, which explain the silent of Catholic Church on the Rwandan genocide.²³

From the discussion above it transpires that religious institutions, either religious organization or religious clerics, may have an effect on transforming ethnic civil war. Therefore, according to the structural explanation, civil war with religious difference is more likely to transform into a religious civil war if religious institutions and elites support the rebel group.²⁴ However, there are two caveats on this argument. First, the argument can hardly explain the occurrence of the religious civil war where there is less strong religious institution organizational capability in transforming the civil war, such as in Chechnya. Second, the argument is mainly derived from cases where the rebels identify themselves as Christians. Since it is mainly derived from the cases where the rebels identify themselves as Christians, the argument might not be able to provide a strong causal mechanism in the case where the rebels identify themselves as Muslims.

Contrary to the structural explanation, the second argument holds that civil war with religious divides between conflicting parties is more likely to become a religious civil war if the political elites decide to use religion as a source of mobilization for their survival. This explanation is known as mobilization explanation. In this explanation, political elites refer to the ruling political elites who take in charge of the government. In the case of the rebel government, the political elites refer to the political elites in the rebel territory who are in charge in the struggle against the central government.

One of the scholars who presents this explanation is Monica Toft. To answer the puzzle as to why religion becomes a central issue in some civil wars, she proposes the religious outbidding theory in which the central argument is that, when the political elites find that their survival is under immediate threat, they will try to reframe issues of contention as religious issues.²⁵ This can happen because the ruling political elites want to outbid the opposition group by invoking religious issues so that the ruling political elites can gain support from domestic audiences to prolong their chance of survive.

Working Papers, 2008) [database on-line]; Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/gig/wpaper/70.html>, last accessed on 20 July 2012.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 11.

25 Toft, "Getting Religion?", 100.

According to Toft, there are four conditions in which her theory can be seen to explain the transformation of civil wars into religious civil wars. First, one of the parties must be immediately threatened. Second, resources that are needed for eliminating the threat can be attained by invoking religious terms in conflict. Third, there must be a religious hatred between the conflicting parties, though this does not necessarily have to be deep. Fourth, the government parties control public access on information.²⁶

Essentially, according to the religious outbidding theory, the ruling political elites play an important role in transforming civil war into religious civil war in order to increase their opportunities to continue to maintain their power. Using the Sudanese Civil War as a case study, Toft shows us that the more political elites prefer to use religious bids for their survival the more likely it is that the civil war becomes a religious civil war. Despite being narrowly focus on political elite preferences, Toft's argument is better at explaining how civil war transforms into religious civil war in the Muslim world. However, Toft's argument can only explain the case where the ruling government is the party who incite religion in the civil war. It neglects the possibility that the non-state actors who are not the ruling political elites can transform the civil war into religious civil war.

Given the above discussion, the two previous conventional explanations may not really explain the religious civil war transformation especially if the rebels identify themselves as a Muslim. Moreover, both are insufficient to address the role of transnational non-state actors in transforming ethnic civil war into religious civil war.

In the wake of 9/11, many scholars have tried to study the effect of transnational religious involvement in the form of foreign fighters in insurgencies across the Muslim world. In his recent article entitled 'The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters', Thomas Hegghammer tries to examine the impact of Muslim foreign fighter in many internal armed conflicts across the Muslim world. He shows that since the 1980s, armed conflict in the Muslim world has uniquely experienced a rise in foreign fighters in armed conflicts ranging from Bosnia to Philippines. Many of these internal armed conflicts were basically local armed conflicts fought by the local rebels, yet they attracted many foreign Muslim fighters to fight along with the local rebels.²⁷ According to Hegghammer, the rise of foreign Muslim fighters is due to

26 Ibid., 103.

27 Jonathan Fox, "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 6 (2004), 715-731.
Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," *International Security* 35, no. 3 (2010), 53-94.

the spread of what he called populist pan-Islamism which was disseminated by the Saudi Islamists whom are mainly follower of *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology.²⁸ The pan-Islamist movement encouraged all Muslims to defend the land where there are Muslims populations. They believe that every land where Muslim lives is the homeland of the entirety of the Muslim people. By establishing a global network of charities mainly based in the Arab world, these transnational groups can easily mobilise individuals to fight as foreign fighters in a particular Muslim area.²⁹

Hegghammer's article shows how foreign Muslim fighters' involvement is increasing significantly in so many internal armed conflicts in the Muslim world after 1980s. He argued that the spread of the *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology propagated by the oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia is the main factor in encouraging Muslim to fight war in other countries in the name of religion.³⁰ Despite being able to explain the emergence of Muslim fighters in several civil wars in the Muslim world, however, the article does not provide an explanation on whether their involvement has transformed ethnic civil war into religious civil war. Indeed, this article only sought to investigate the extent to which the involvement of transnational religious actor in the form of foreign Muslim fighters assisting the local rebels is able to globalize the idea of Jihad in the Muslim world.

Research Design

A "Before-After" Research Design

Since the current article's objective is to investigate a causal mechanism emerging from commonly accepted hypotheses that religion has an effect on the dynamic of civil wars, this research uses a case study approach employing process tracing method. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, there are several comparative case study research designs. The best known is the method of "controlled comparison".³¹ Ideally, the controlled comparison method should compare two "most similar" cases which are comparable in all aspects except for the independent variable. However, these cases are less likely to appear in the real world. Therefore, George and Bennett suggest that instead of finding two different cases, it is better for the researcher to divide a single longitudinal case into two sub-cases in what they call the "Before-After" research design.³² Following this research design, I will investigate the Chechen Wars which can be divided into two periods;

28 Ibid., 56.

29 Ibid., 57.

30 Ibid., 60.

31 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), 81.

32 Ibid., 166.

the first Chechen war (1994-1996) which was heavily separatist and nationalist civil war, and the second Chechen war (1999-2009) which was becoming a religious civil war.

Justification for the Case Selection

To determine which civil wars can be treated as religious civil wars, I relied heavily on the dataset provided by Monica Toft. Monica Toft listed forty two civil wars from 1940 to 2000 of which twenty five are coded as religious civil wars where religion is a central issue and the other seventeen are coded as religious civil wars where religion are peripheral issue (see Appendix 1).

In this article, I will examine the research question using the Chechen Wars as case studies. There are several reasons why Chechen civil wars fit this study. Firstly, since the research question focuses on Muslims as rebels, the case study should represent the case where the rebel parties identify themselves as Muslims. By this requirement, there are several cases in the list of religious civil war which should be dropped such as the Sudanese civil wars (1955; 1983). Secondly, due to fact that when pairing religion in the war, Islam and Christianity were engaged most often, the case study should represent the case where the dominant state religion is Christianity. Thus, cases such as Kashmir civil war (1988) should be taken out from the list. Thirdly, since one of the hypotheses being tested is considered to be more likely to occur after the 1980s, hence, the Cyprus Civil Wars, the Ethiopian-Ogaden civil war (1977), and Indonesia-Aceh civil war (1953) are not suitable for this research since they occurred prior to the 1980s. Though there were religious based civil wars after 1980s, the Algeria (1992), Afghanistan (1980s), Iran (1980s), Syria (1980s), and Tajikistan (1992) civil wars should be dropped from the list since from the beginning those civil wars were religious civil wars without any significant religious difference between the warring parties. While in the case of the Bosnia and Kosovo Civil Wars, no preliminary evidence suggests that these two civil wars are religious civil war in which religion is a central issue. Given the above reasons, therefore, the Chechen civil war fits with the research design. The data used in this research relies on secondary data, mostly coming from historical reports, analysis on Chechen Civil war by scholars, and journalistic reports.

The Case Study: Chechen Civil Wars

The role of Islamic Institution and Political Elites in Chechen Civil War

Islam has been an integral part of North Caucasus history for hundreds of years. It is believed that Islam reached the North Caucasus back in the eighth to eleventh centuries where the Arab Empires sent emissaries to this region. However, only at the end of the 17th century and until the 19th century did mass Islamization of

Chechen people and the establishment of Islam as integral part of Chechen culture and society took place.³³ The Chechens developed its own unique Islam which is different from Arab Islam. As suggested by Tishkov, Chechen Muslims tended to embrace moderate view of Islam in the form of Sufi *tariqah*, a branch of Sunni Islam which tends to seek a spiritual journey to God. Since Sufi *tariqah* emphasized more the spiritual journey to God, they did not preach the implementation of Islamic Sharia law. Hence, customary law (*adat*) still played a major role in Chechen society.³⁴

Even though Islam has been removed from Chechen society for a long time under communist rule, it still played an important role in the Chechen society. In the era of communism, Islamic traditions were still practiced inside the house though mostly they were celebrated as merrymaking holidays instead of religious holidays. Following the *glasnost* (openness) policy which emerged in the mid-1980s, Islam increasingly appeared in the public life of the Chechen people. Islam was openly preached, the Qur'an was translated in local languages, and the pilgrimage to Mecca was widely initiated.³⁵ Many scholars tend to believe that the *glasnost* era lead to the rise of Islam in Chechen society. The so-called New Muslims phenomenon emerged in Chechnya the *glasnost* era.

Yet, not all Chechens turned to their belief in Islam during the *glasnost* era. Many Chechens had no interest in religion. Besides, the resurgence of religion was isolated from the aspiration toward independence. Islam has never played an important part in the movement toward independence. The Islamic resurgence phenomenon was mainly occurring in social and cultural area. For instance, the declaration of sovereignty made by Dzhokhar Dudayev, the first elected president of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, was purely secular without any reference to Islam.³⁶ Furthermore, his dream of a Chechen state would be a western-style state governed by a secular government with a secular constitution.³⁷ Dudayev himself was a typical Soviet atheist with no knowledge of Islamic teaching in any significant sense. Though Islamic rhetoric was less influential in political area prior to 1993, it would soon enter the political discourse amongst politicians.

The liberalization policies eventually created instability in the central Soviet government. One of the most important liberalization policies held by Gorbachev

33 Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 78.

34 *Ibid.*, 179.

35 *Ibid.*, 25.

36 Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 58.

37 Aleksei Malashenko, "The glitter and poverty of Chechen Islam" in *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region* ed Genadiy Chufirin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 300.

was the restructure of communist political institutions (*Perestroika*).³⁸ Responding to *Perestroika*, on 25 November 1990, a National Congress of Chechen People (NCChP/OKChN) was established under the leadership of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Yusup Soslambekov, Beslan Gantemirov, and Yaragi Mamodayev. In the same month, and at its first national congress, the NCChP declared the establishment of the Chechen Republics. But the Republic was still considered as a part of Russian Federation by the central government in Moscow. Since the nationalists needed a new leader for a new nation, NCChP invited the former Major General of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev, to be head of the Executive Committee of the NCChP due to his high profile record as the only Chechen who became a General in the army of the Soviet Union.

The movement toward separatism became clearer when the third national congress of the NCChP was held in September 1991 and the NCChP declared that the Checheno-Ingushetia Supreme Soviet is illegitimate and, therefore, there should be a parliamentary and presidential election on the 27th of October.³⁹ Furthermore, on October 8, 1991, the NCChP declared itself as the only power in the republic.⁴⁰ In the election, though the election turnout was only 10-12%, Dudayev won the majority of the votes and became the first president of the Chechen Republic.

From the beginning, the ideology of the NCChP, the nationalist movement in Chechnya, was of ethnic nationalism that aimed to solve the problems faced by the nation of Chechnya. Its founding fathers such as Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Yusup Soslambekov, Beslan Gantemirov, and Yaragi Mamodayev were all secular nationalists.⁴¹ Moreover, as the first President, Dudayev's vision of the Chechen state was one of a representative democracy under secular law. Indeed, at the second national congress of the NCChP in 1991, there was an idea to create Chechen Islamic State proposed by a very minor group which called itself the Islamic Rebirth Party. Yet, the idea was rejected by Dudayev and his followers who kept insisting that the future Chechen Republic should be a constitutionally secular state.⁴² Thus, it is clear that at the beginning the nationalists were driven by secular ethno-nationalist ideology in their move to separate from Russia.

Though at the beginning, Dudayev and the NCChP had never envisaged Islam as part of their political goal, both would finally turn to Islam. The growing opposition towards his regime led Dudayev to use Islam as a political tool to unite all of Chechens under his leadership. Moreover, the fact that Russia supported the opposition movement created a fear in Dudayev who would use Islam as ideological

38 Tracey C. German, *Russia's Chechen War* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 9.

39 Ibid., 38

40 Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 62.

41 Lieven, *Chechnya*, 56.

42 Malashenko, "The glitter and poverty of Chechen Islam," 301.

tool towards achieving his political goal. It is odd how a seemingly secular politician uses Islam as ideology for his political purpose, but in the case of Dudayev it shows us that even religion can be used by secular politicians for concrete pragmatic objectives.

In November 1992, Dudayev issued decree No.2 that asked "All Muslims in Moscow to turn Moscow into a disaster zone in the name of our freedom from *kufir* (infidel)".⁴³ Though he did not use the word jihad, his decree was basically a call for jihad against Russia. He started to use religious words to incite hatred toward Russia. Moreover, in 1993, Dudayev invited the well-known Chechen Islamic clergyman Abdul-Baki to Chechnya. He hoped that Abdul-Baki would be a spiritual pillar for his regime. Though at the end, Abdul-Baki criticized Dudayev's regime and later forced Dudayev expel him from Chechnya, his efforts to incorporate the clergy in his regime showed that Dudayev was willing to do anything to make his regime seem more religious.⁴⁴

Although Dudayev tried to use Islam as a tool to mobilize the Chechen people to fight against Russia, the role of Islam was still limited in the Chechen War. As the Russian ethnologist Tishkov suggested, contrary with the belief that 1990 to 1994 was the era of Islamic revival, many Chechen people began to lose their belief in an Islamic revival. The revival of the so-called "New Muslim" only caused greater public antipathy in Chechnya towards Islam. Dudayev and his followers who were trying to use Islam as a source of mobilization have given 'the revival of Islam' a bad name. These "New Muslims" use Islam to serve their pragmatic purposes. In the eye of Chechen people, these New Muslims were encouraging corruption and they were seen as the enemy of the Chechen people.⁴⁵

The role of Transnational Religious Actors Involvement in the Chechen Civil Wars

When the war broke out in December 1994, Islam was not the main motivation for Chechens to fight against Russia. According to Anatol Lieven, for Shamil Basayev who later became the leader of Islamic jihadist group in Chechnya, the central motivation of the war was to expel Russian from Chechnya. For many young Chechen men who fought against Russia, their interpretation of jihad was more a fight against the Russians than a fight against the infidels. Islamic symbols such as jihad have indeed become an integral part in the first Chechen War, but the phrase is becoming synonymous with the Chechen struggle of national identity instead of struggle to establish the Islamic state.⁴⁶

43 Ibid., 299.

44 Emil Souleimanov, *An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2007), 60.

45 Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 168-170.

46 Lieven, *Chechnya*, 138.

The First Chechen War officially broke out in December 1994. At the initial stage from December 1994 to May 1995, Russia was able to continue its offensive against Chechen fighters and forced the Chechen fighters to retreat to the mountains of the Caucasus in the South. However, the Russian army offensive was not without fierce resistance. Thanks to the leadership of local war commanders, most of whom previously served as Soviet officers, Chechen fighters were capable of infiltration into the area occupied by Russian troops leading to casualties on the Russian side.

In March 1996, as the election period in Russia was getting closer, Yeltsin offered a ceasefire. However, Dudayev rejected any kind of ceasefire and kept struggling to drive out Russian troops from Chechen territory.⁴⁷ In April 1996, Dudayev was killed by missiles from a Russian aircraft.⁴⁸ Even though they had lost their highest commander, Chechen fighters kept morale high since many of the soldiers did not fight in the name of the government but in the name of clan and family.⁴⁹ Dudayev's position was taken by another nationalist, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who was an Acting president for the Chechen Republic.⁵⁰ Unlike, Dudayev, Yandarbiyev was willing to end the conflict. In May 1996, he went to Moscow and signed an agreement on the cessation of military activities which secured Yeltsin's re-election for Russian presidency.⁵¹ Two month after the Moscow Peace treaty, fair and free elections were held in Chechnya.⁵²

The First Chechen War was a bloody war. It is estimated that 100,000 civilians were killed and more than 250,000 people were injured in two years of conflict. Furthermore, the war resulted in the total destruction of infrastructure. Many factories and plants had been heavily bombed and the Chechen capital, the centre of economic activity, had been totally destroyed. Moreover, 15% of Chechnya's cultivatable soil was covered by mines and almost 90% of Chechen men found themselves without jobs.⁵³

47 Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lansky, *The Chechen Struggle: Impedence, Won, and Lost* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 77.

48 Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 82.

49 John B Dunlop, *Russia confronts Chechnya: roots of a separatist conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 164.

50 Robert W. Schaefer, *The insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus* (Oxford: Praeger, 2011), 160.

51 Dzhabrail Gakaev, "Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya" in *Chechnya: From Past to Future*, ed. R. Sakwa, (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 29.

52 Ibid.

53 Brian G. Williams, "The Russo-Chechen War: a Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Eurasia?" *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 1 (2001), 128-148. (Williams 2001, p.132).

Besides the economic crisis and increased criminal activity, the other thing that followed after the first Chechen war was the emergence of the *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology amongst both Chechen warlords and society which created a rivalry between local Sufi tradition and harsh foreign *Salafi-jihadist* ideology. Furthermore, the advent of the *Salafi-Jihadist* caused a massive radicalization of both the warlords or politicians and the ordinary people which was encouraged by the brutality of Russian troops during the war, creating a deep hatred of Russia in the heart of the Chechen people. This ideology was brought and disseminated by the foreign fighters who gained a significant role in Chechen society.

According to Al-Shishani, Arab fighters had a marginal role in the outcome of the First Chechen War. However, by mid-1996, they gradually became a major force in Chechnya. Before his death in 1996, Dudayev always distributed funds to local commander to secure his control. After Dudayev's death, his successor, Yandarbiyev had a close relationship with *Salafi-jihadist* groups that were eager to raise money from Gulf States for Chechen fighters. In return, on August 1996, he issued a decree regarding the establishment of Sharia court in which the Arab fighters were invited to work as judges. After the peace agreement was signed, many other charity organizations run by the Arab fighters operated in Chechnya.⁵⁴

Furthermore, under the leadership of Khattab, the Arab fighters built good relationship with local warlords. Many prominent nationalist warlords finally embraced *Salafi-jihadist* ideology because of good relationship built by the leaders of the Arab fighters. Two warlords turning to *Salafi-jihadist* who had a great impact on the political environment during the interwar period were Zelimkan Yandarbiyev and Shamil Basayev.⁵⁵ Both of them were neither Islamists nor employed radical Islamic rhetoric in the first Chechen War.⁵⁶ It seems that the war had radicalised these warlords since, as many sociologists would argue, religious faith will be strengthened during the war as a source for personal comfort as well as a means of interpreting an extreme situation.⁵⁷

For Yandarbiyev, his radicalization is more pragmatic in purpose. According to Lieven, in a lawless situation and with no military hierarchy and military code, the need for military discipline played an important part in the establishment of Sharia court. Stricter laws such as Sharia could establish public order under war conditions

54 Al-Shishani, *The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya*, 9.

55 Other Chechen local warlords that had been radicalised as well as had a connection with the Arab fighters were, Salman Raduev, administrative chief of Gudermes city, Arbi Baraev, Movsar Baraev, Ruslan Gelaev, And Movladi Udugov. See Julie Wilhemsen, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 1 (2005), 35-59.

56 Ibid., 24.

57 Ibid., 25.

where each clan and armed group could loot other clans' and armed group's premises.⁵⁸ Hence, as an acting president, Yandarbiyev's bet on Sharia law was to restore order in the Chechen society.

For Basayev, his radicalization process was more personal. One of the leaders of the Arab fighters, Khattab, was a close friend of his and had a great influence on Basayev's views. According to one of Basayev's friends, he changed his world view after meeting with Khattab: "He started moving from freedom for Chechnya to freedom for the whole Arab world. He changed from a Chechen patriot into an Islamic globalist".⁵⁹

With their presence backed up by prominent warlords and their idea embraced by several political actors as well as with foreign money pouring in to Chechen people, the transnational Islamist actors with their *Salafi-jihadist* ideology had gradually increased their role in Chechen politics. Though it became a major power in Chechen politics, its influence was not yet dominating in Chechen society. *Salafi-jihadist* ideology was usually seen as a foreign religion for most of the Chechen people. According to Souleimanov, only 5% to 10% of the Chechen population embraced the *Salafi-jihadist* ideology.⁶⁰ Even though it was only embraced by a small part of the Chechen population, as one prominent Chechen ethnologist, Dzhabrail Gakaev argues, the coming of the *Salafi-jihadist* ideology has torn Chechen society apart.⁶¹

Though the *Salafi-jihadist* movement gained more support from the Chechen society during the Chechen presidential election on 27 January 1997, it was the moderate Chechen leader who was known for his willingness to cooperate with Russia, Aslan Maskhadov, that won the election. He beat two other candidates that have a strong relationships with the Arab fighters, the charismatic Shamil Basayev and Zelimkan Yandarbiyev, by gaining 64,8% of vote while Basayev got 23,5% and Yandarbiyev got 11,7%.⁶² The election demonstrated the Chechen people's preference for moderate Islam. Maskhadov's strong supporters mainly came from Sufi adherents who opposed the *Salafi-jihadist* ideology and traditional Chechens who disliked this ideology. Among the leading Sufi clerics who supported Maskhadov was Akhmad Kadyrov, the Grand Mufti of Chechnya.

58 Lieven, *Chechnya*,

59 Sharon LaFraniere, "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 26 April 2003, A01.

60 Souleimanov, *An Endless War*, 6.

61 Gakaev, "Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya," 27.

62 Laurent Vinatier, "Political v Military power: Contrasting Basaev and Sadulaev's Roles," *Chechnya Weekly* 36, no. 6 (2005), 39.

Despite being supported by a majority of the Chechen people and especially the Sufi *tariqah*, without any strong governmental institutions and infrastructure Maskhadov found himself in the middle of the growing influence of the *Salafi-jihadist* groups. As argued by some scholars, during the interwar period, many Chechen field commanders were acting more like warlords who usually act without following the order from the legitimate government. As result, the Maskhadov regime had to make concessions with some of the strong warlords especially those who were allied with the Arab fighters. To build a political consensus after his victory, Maskhadov appointed Basayev as deputy Chief of the Chechen Army and later acting Prime Minister of Chechen Republic so that he could control Basayev's attitude, which was highly influenced by the *Salafi-jihadist* groups.⁶³

On 7 August 1999, to fulfill their ambition to create the North Caucasus Emirate as well as to support the Islamic separatist movement in Dagestan, *Salafi-jihadist* fighters under the command of Shamil Basayev and Ibnu Khattab launched an attack on the neighboring Russian republic, Dagestan, which is a predominantly Muslim republic. Maskhadov directly condemned the attempt to invade Dagestan but his condemnation could not stop the *Salafi-jihadist* group from invading Dagestan.⁶⁴ The invasion of Dagestan then became the *casus belli* for the Second Chechen War. On 26 August 1999, the Russian federation launched the second Chechen War in response to the invasion of Dagestan by *Salafi-jihadist* group known as Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB).

From its beginning in October 1999, the Second Chechen War has turned into a never-ending military conflict with the element of terrorism attached in the conflict. The cause of the war was not the aspiration for national independence but the eagerness to establish the supra-state emirate ruled under Islamic law. In the First Chechen War, the Chechens opposing the nationalist regime and Chechen independence collaborated with Russia while, in the Second Chechen War, those Chechen who were opposed to the *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology collaborated with the Russians. While in the First Chechen War, the war seemed to be an effort to maintain Russia's territorial integrity, the Second Chechen War was more of a Russian campaign against the Islamic radicalism which threatened the stability of the North Caucasus. Though the Russian troops effectively occupied Chechnya by the mid-2000, the war has been transformed into an insurgency and terrorist activity in the North Caucasus which is still going on until now.

What are the factors transforming the Chechen Civil Wars?

63 Williams, "The Russo-Chechen War," 200.

64 Schaefer, *The insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus*, 165.

By tracing the history of the First and the Second Chechen Wars, it is clear that the structural explanation cannot explain how ethnic civil war transformed into religious civil war in this case. The structural explanation holds that civil war with religious divides is more likely to transform into religious civil wars if religious institutions support the rebel party. In the case of the Chechen War, we find that religious institutions played a minor role in transforming civil war in which religious issue is peripheral into civil war in which religious issue is central. Though religious institutions and religious elites was almost totally annihilated in the Soviet era, the liberalization policy run by Gorbachev regime has restored the religious institution as well as the role of the religious elites in the Chechen society. Yet, as shown in our discussion about the first Chechen war, there was little evidence that the Chechens fought for religious goals.

In the case of the Chechen Wars, there are several factors that made it hard for religious institutions to trigger religious war. The first factor is the nature of religious institutions and religious elites in Chechnya. Unlike mainstream religious institutions either in the Sunni or Shia world which have a strong organizational capability, the Sufi *tariqah* which is predominantly embraced by Chechen people lacks this organizational capability. The Sufi *tariqah* organized themselves in small groups which can hardly be mobilized as one single massive movement. Moreover, Islam in Chechnya lacked religious elites who have a religious authority, such as an Imam or Mufti. Most of the so-called religious elites in Chechen society were the elders whom Chechen people traditionally respect. Indeed, it was a secular government that tried to build religious elites when, in 1995 during the first war, secular president Dzokhar Dudayev appointed the first Chechen Grand Mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov, in order to mobilize Chechen people in the fight against the Russians. Thus, in the First Chechen War, we found that religious institutions as well as religious elites are less significant on making the First Chechen War as religious civil war. The First Chechen War was mainly separatist war motivated by nationalism.

Prior to the Second Chechen War, the religious elites seemed to be in favor for cooperating with Russia to overcome economic crisis. With the *de facto* 'victory' against Russia but in the wake of the economic downfall, it was illogical for the Chechens not to cooperate with Russia. Moreover, the growing 'foreign' interpretation of Islam has worried the existing religious institutions and religious elites who believed that the new ideology would change Chechen society entirely. No wonder, then, that Sufi *tariqah*, the elders, and the Grand Mufti strongly supported Aslan Maskhadov who was willing to cooperate with Russia. Thus, when the second Chechen war erupted either local religious institution or local religious elites did not play an important part in provoking the war. Furthermore, many of them were on the Russia's side when the war broke out.

Unlike structural explanation, it is evident that mobilization explanation can only partially explain the Chechen Wars. The mobilization explanation which argues that civil war with religious divides is more likely to transform into religious civil war if the political elites use religion to mobilize the mass to gain mass support can explain how the secular local political elites turn to religion in order to gain massive support for their struggle to fight the central government. However the evidence from the first Chechen war shows that, although the political elites in Chechnya tried to use religious rhetoric to mobilize the masses, it did not transform the ethnic civil war into religious civil war. As we see in the first Chechen war, the secular elites in Chechnya found that Islam could serve a pragmatic function to mobilize the Chechen people to fight against the Russians. Also, it was effective in antagonizing the government's political opponents that were more inclined to cooperate with Russia. However, this was not enough to shift religion from a peripheral issue to a central issue. The objective of the first Chechen war was still heavily characterized with ethnic nationalism.

In the second Chechen War, we find that it was not the elites who won the election that tried to invoke religion for their survival. On the contrary, the incumbent political elites tried to dampen the pace of radicalization by sharing the government's responsibilities with the *Salafi-jihadist* groups. The establishment of Sharia government in Chechnya was more a failure by Maskhadov to deal with the growing radical group than any deliberate action to mobilize the masses. With the growing power of the *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology, in 1998 leaders of the regime eventually succumbed to the desire of the Islamic radicals who wanted to replace the Chechen secular state with an Islamic state. When the invasion of Dagestan happened, which became the trigger of the Second Chechen War, President Maskhadov was one of the first who condemned the invasion and stated that the Chechen Republic has nothing to do with the invasion. This was the most tangible evidence that the second Chechen war was not invoked by the ruling political elite.

Indeed, like nationalism or ethnicity, religion can be used as a tool to mobilize the masses to fight the central government, especially in a region where religion is a constitutive part of ethnicity as in Chechnya. However, the religious explanation alone cannot explain how a civil war where religion is a peripheral issue can transform into civil war where religion is central. The Chechen case has shown that though the local political elites invoked religion to mobilize the masses, it cannot transform the civil war into a religious civil war.

In the case of Chechnya an argument relating to the role of transnational religious actors who spread *Salafi-jihadist* ideology in the civil war can explain the transformation of ethnic civil war into religious civil war. The argument holds that civil war with religious divides is more likely to transform into religious civil wars if there is transnational religious actor involvement which seeks the religious goal in

the local civil war. As shown in the Chechen case, in the first Chechen war the foreign fighters were welcomed by the Chechens but they never controlled the course of the war. Their influence remained limited and their presence was considered minimal. However after the war ended, their presence was increasingly significant. For instance, after the capture of Grozny, Khattab, the leader of Arab foreign fighters, was decorated as Brigadier General of the Chechen Republic.⁶⁵

Unlike in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords where the foreign fighters were expelled from Bosnia, after the Kasavyurt Accord no agreement was reached between Chechnya and Russia regarding foreign fighters. Hence, they freely stayed in Chechnya and made some alliances with field commanders who would later become local warlords. These foreign fighters, in the second Chechen war, would be a part of the force that invaded Dagestan.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the Second Chechen War would not start just because of the presence of the foreign fighters in the Chechen territory since most of the fighters who started the invasion of Dagestan and later fought in the second Chechen war were local Chechens. It is evident that the spread of *Salafi-jihadist* ideology preached by the foreign fighters that commanded the establishment of Islamic emirates in North Caucasus is the main motivation for the second Chechen war instead of other consideration such as nationalism or ethnicity.

Conclusion

This article suggests that the involvement of transnational religious actors in the shape of foreign fighters spreading the *Salafi-jihadist* ideology among Chechen population were the main factors that triggered the second Chechen war. This finding fills the gap in the current literature of civil war which mainly focuses on religious institution and political elites as factors transforming the ethnic civil war with religious divide into religious civil war. However, the argument proposed by this article cannot be generalized to explain the causal mechanism of other religious civil wars given the limit of the case study research design. Further study and more complicated methods such as a cross-regional comparison study should be employed to rigidly test the argument. For instance, by comparing the Chechen Civil War and the Bosnian Civil War, we can draw more specific factors in explaining why the civil war in Chechnya transformed into a religious civil war whereas the civil war in Bosnia did not. Is it because immediately after the Bosnia's peace treaty, the foreign fighters must leave the region where in Chechnya, there was no such arrangement? Besides a cross-regional comparison study, future research can employ large-N studies to investigate whether the existence of Muslim foreign

65 Wilhemsen, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place," 29.

fighters correlate with the likelihood for the ethnic civil war to transform into religious civil war.

If the argument survives the more rigorous study and are capable in explaining other cases, then there must be policy implication as to how to reduce the likelihood of a civil war where the rebels identify themselves as a Muslim from transforming into a religious civil war. The clear implication for policy makers is that ending the involvement of the foreign fighters as well as reducing the spread of *Salafi-jihadist* ideology in every conflict related to Muslims is the best way to suspend the likelihood of civil war with religious divides from transforming into religious civil war.

Appendix 1: List of Civil Wars with Religious Cleavages 1940-2000

State	Start Year	Name / Combatant	Dominant Religion	Civil War with Religion central/ Religious Civil War
Afghanistan	1978	Mujahideen/Taliban	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Algeria	1992	Fundamentalists	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Azerbaijan	1988	Nagorno Karabakh	Islam/Shiite	No
Bangladesh	1972	Chittagong Hill	Islam/Sunni	No
Burma	1948	Karens	Budhist	Yes
Burma	1960	Kachins		Yes
Chad	1965	National Liberation Front of Chad	Islam/Sunni	No
China	1950	Tibet	Taoist	Yes
China	1954	Tibet		Yes
Cyprus	1963	Greek/Turk clashes	Christians/Greek Orthodox	No
Cyprus	1974	Coup/Turkey invasion		No
Ethiopia	1977	Ogaden	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Georgia	1992	Abkhazia	Christian/Georgian Orthodox	No
India	1946	Partition	Hindu	Yes
India	1948	Hyderabad		Yes
India	1956	Naga revolt		No
India	1965	Kashmir		Yes
India	1982	Sikh insurrection		Yes
India	1988	Kashmir		Yes
Indonesia	1950	Ambon/Moluccans	Islam/Sunni	No
Indonesia	1953	Aceh revolt		Yes
Indonesia	1975	East Timor		No
Iran	1978	Revolution	Islam/Shiite	Yes
Iran	1981	Mojahedin		Yes
Iraq	1991	Shiite insurrection	Islam/Shiite	Yes
Israel	1945	Independence	Judaism	Yes
Lebanon	1958	First civil war	Islam	No
Lebanon	1975	Second civil war		No
Nigeria	1967	Biafra	Islam	Yes
Nigeria	1980	Maitatsine		Yes
Philippines	1972	Moro rebellion	Christian/Catholic	Yes
Philippines	2000	Moro rebellion		Yes
Russia	1994	First Chechen war	Christian/Russian Orthodox	No
Russia	1999	Second Chechen war		Yes

State	Start Year	Name / Combatant	Dominant Religion	Civil War with Religion central/ Religious Civil War
Sri Lanka	1983	Tamil Insurgency	Budhist	No
Sudan	1955	First Sudan Civil War	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Sudan	1983	Second Sudan Civil War		Yes
Syria	1979	Sunnis vs Alawites	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Tajikistan	1992	Civil war	Islam/Sunni	Yes
Yugoslavia	1991	Croatian secession	Christian/Easter	No
Yugoslavia	1992	Bosnian civil war	n Orthodox	No
Yugoslavia	1998	Kosovo		No

Source: Monica Toft (2006).

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MILITARY DISLOYALTY AND REGIME CHANGE

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Abstract

The study examines the dynamics behind the disloyal behavior of the armed forces in cases of the formation of social movements for regime change. The study adopts a theoretical framework and applies statistical analysis on a dataset from 1990 to 2012 to examine the projected dynamics at work. The proposition is that autocrats create loyalty through financial benefits and the privileged position of the armed forces, which is strengthened by the selection procedures that keep the armed forces distant from society, including the creation of voluntary forces and the application of discriminative selection procedures to both the rank and file and the officer corps.

Keywords: authoritarianism, military disloyalty, social movements, revolutions

1. Introduction¹

Mass protests on the streets demanding regime change are unquestionably extraordinary times in the history of a state. Nevertheless, they are quite frequent phenomena in world history; therefore, the narratives on why certain social movements or revolutionary attempts succeed or fail are countless. The role of the armed forces in determining the outcome of these attempts has received varying attention during the so-called “third wave of democratization”.² During the transitions in Latin America the influence of the military was considered to be a significant factor, as the states of the region were widely impregnated with military power. However, the effect of the military on the outcome of regime change efforts has been somewhat reduced in the literature and the academic discourse following the transitions in East Central Europe, where the armed forces played a relatively minor role in the process. The uprisings in the Middle East beginning in 2010 have, however, raised awareness again about the importance of coercive institutions with regards to the final outcome of the social movements. The result of the protests and revolts of the Middle East demanding democratic reforms and regime change during the Arab Spring seemed to be very much influenced by the position the military took. One could even have made the superficial statement that the military’s position was almost decisive. In Egypt and Tunisia the military sided with

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Carsten Q. Schneider for his invaluable guidance for my thesis on which this study was based, furthermore, to Eszter Tímár for all her advice on academic writing.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization In the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

popular demands and forced autocrats to exit power, whereas in Syria and Bahrain civil society was nearly helpless against the regime, the power of which was supported by the majority of the armed forces. Yet the question as to whether the circumstances influencing the loyalty shifts within the military in each of these cases were systematic or *sui generis*, remained largely unanswered.

The observation that the military has the ability to preserve the regime should not come as a surprise. The armies of the Middle East had played a significant role ever since the formation of the states in the region (for example in Syria, Egypt and Iraq).³ These armies were generally inward-looking, aimed at the repression of the opposition, whether it was under the rule of a colonial power, or a non-democratic government.⁴ The same can be said of Latin America. Interestingly, despite the central role of the armed forces in the maintenance of internal order, in a significant number of cases the armed forces were in favor of transition and liberalization.⁵ Another set of examples, the Color Revolutions, show that weak relations between the regime and the military were conducive to the success of social movements. In Beissinger's study on the Color Revolutions the analysis of structural factors suggests that in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia, the states with successful social movements, the relationship between the armed forces and the regime were troubled, whereas in case of the unsuccessful ones (Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan) these ties were rather strong.⁶

According to the empirical evidence, military loyalty or disloyalty to the regime is an important factor to consider for social movements and for authoritarian regimes who seek survival all over the globe. If we take a closer look at the literature of transition, democratization and revolution, the role of coercive mechanisms was seriously considered by prominent scholars, such as Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, Diana E. H. Russell and Theda Skocpol. The question, however, remains: why remain loyal or why choose to be disloyal? This puzzle has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. Most of the studies that consider military loyalty as an important factor for regime survival usually do not go beyond the scope of small-N

3 Nicola Pratt, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World* (London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2007), 38.

4 Bruce W. Farcau, "Lessons from Latin America for the Muslim World," in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 142.

5 Felipe Agüero, "The Military And The Limits To Democratization," in *Issues In Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies In a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 166.

6 Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Exemplar in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives On Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 2. (2007), 272.

comparative case studies, or they enumerate influential variables for only one historical era and geographic area. On the one hand, comparative case studies are useful to create fine-grained arguments, to understand small differences and the dynamics of certain events. On the other hand, if scholars apply different variables across different studies, the results will not bring political scientists closer to a general understanding of loyalty and disloyalty, not to mention that they might make contradictory conclusions about the same variable for different cases. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a general theory and determine a series of influential variables to complement the case studies. The aim of this article is to embark on a road towards understanding how these dynamics universally work. This article will seek to build a framework to explain the loyalty shifts within the armed forces that occur during a popular attempt to change the regime.

The proposition herein is that autocrats have two fundamental methods to control the population and institutions: loyalty creation (through ideology and rents) and repression.⁷ Those autocrats that manage to distribute rents and those that make efforts to control the armed forces by keeping them distant from society are more likely to survive the storm of an attempted regime change. Based on these background ideas, a series of variables were identified that predict the functioning or the break-down of the loyalty creating mechanisms. The variables include financial benefits, the privileged position of the armed forces as compared to other coercive institutions, specific recruitment methods and the selection of the leadership of the armed forces from a specific group of society in order to keep the army distant from the rest of the population.

Statistical analyses provide evidence for this hypothesis on a cross section of regime change movements throughout the world. The study, therefore, embarks on a road taken by few: to approach civil-military relations from a theoretical point of view and test the theories on a representative sample.

In the first section the theory of military disloyalty and the hypotheses will be established. In the second section the concept of disloyalty and the possible structural variables will be advanced that might influence military loyalty, such as privileges, rivalry and the distance of the armed forces from society. In the third section of the article the variables will be operationalized and the dataset will be introduced. In the last section the effect of the variables on military loyalty will be tested by a series of statistical analyses, with special attention to the influence of budget change, the presence of rival security forces, type of recruitment and discriminative selection mechanisms.

7 Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33, 36.

2. The Theory of Military Disloyalty

The research on why military loyalty is essential for regime survival is quite extensive. Skocpol points out that a successful revolution is impossible without the break-down of the state, which is marked by the inability of the central administration to maintain its control over the coercive institutions.⁸ Therefore, successful uprisings can only be carried out by armed forces abandoning their loyalty towards the regime. Similarly, Stepan claimed that an authoritarian regime can preserve its position if (1) it can maintain its support network including the “unity” of the coercive institutions and (2) its power can be measured against the opposition’s ability to present itself as a compelling option to align to.⁹

Russell examined the potential effect of military loyalty concerning the outcome of rebellions in a comparative framework.¹⁰ She showed that the military and the police had to be coherent and they had to be effectively used in order to make revolutionary aims unsuccessful.¹¹ She did not, however, examine what determined loyalty or the lack of loyalty towards the regime.

Considering the theories, it is difficult to foresee when the armed forces can be expected to break ties with a regime. As Stepan noted,

any large complex organization has some institutional interests of its own and prerogatives its members seek to advance, as well as some changes or outcomes in the overall political system that it, more than other organizations, particularly fears and resists. Complex organizations thus have interests and capacities to advance their interests.¹²

Clearly, the military is one of these institutions. At the cross-section of the interests of the armed forces and the will of the governance to exercise control over the military stands the effort of the governance to build a network of support in the institutions, especially in coercive bodies. In the *Political Economy of a Dictatorship* Wintrobe put forward a theory on the institutions of autocracies, claiming that institutions are merely the tools of the regime to redistribute spoils among its supporters and eliminate its enemies, thus serving as a complementary tool to

8 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.

9 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 55.

10 Diane, E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force* (London: Academic Press, 1974).

11 Jack A. Goldstone, “Theories Of Revolution: The Third Generation,” *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (1980), 436.

12 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 10.

repression.¹³ Therefore, regimes combine loyalty and repression in order to be able to remain in office. Accordingly, gaining loyalty among the members of the armed forces would be a result of the combination of personal, institutional and economic benefits.

Bellin reached similar conclusions, when examining why a regime would lose its means of coercion. She enumerated the following factors: disloyalty is caused by (1) fiscal problems where the state is unable to maintain the means of coercion, (2) when the regime loses its international legitimacy, (3) when there is a large mobilization against the regime, and (4) when there is a high level of institutionalization in the coercive apparatus.¹⁴ Bellin put emphasis on the resources, claiming that the financial difficulties of the autocracies trickle down to the coercive apparatus, thereby making it hard for the government to maintain their military. A case in point is the Middle East, where regimes continued to maintain or even increase the defense budget despite the economic problems they faced.¹⁵

However, it is important to point out that beside to the distribution of spoils, control mechanisms cannot be spared. The control within the military is fundamentally exercised through a "principal-agent" relationship. Feaver proposed that military obedience should not be treated as default but is a result of the threat of civilians (or the superiors) to detect military "shirking".¹⁶ The assumption behind principal-agent relationships is that the agents act on behalf of and in accordance with the will of the principal. However, autocracies often lack formal control mechanisms, which are essential for the systematic control against shirking.¹⁷

Even worse (for an autocrat) is that although the primary route of enforcement functions through the hierarchical chain, it would be an over-simplification to claim that hierarchy is the only influential relation. Wintrobe and Breton analyzed hierarchical organizations where they found that there are fundamentally two directions where trust or loyalty can work: either horizontally or vertically.¹⁸ Vertical loyalty functions when trade occurs between the subordinates and superiors, whereas horizontal loyalty networks mark exchanges between subordinates.

13 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 4.

14 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36. No. 2. (January 2004): 144.

15 Eva Bellin, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32.

16 Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 14.

17 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 27.

18 Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, "The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 94.No. 5. (October 1986): 910.

Consequently, although the operation of hierarchical organizations is primarily rooted in vertical loyalty, horizontal relations have to be taken into account, as well. When horizontal loyalty takes primacy, efficiency is reduced and vertical loyalties will be damaged.¹⁹

Mapping the importance of horizontal relations in a large and socially diverse institution is a difficult, nearly impossible task. When there is a popular challenge to a regime the reactions on the individual level are nearly impossible to forecast. What follows from the theories outlined above is that disloyalty can be the result of three, non-exclusive mechanisms:

- (1) the failure of vertical enforcement and spoiler mechanisms,
- (2) the emerging primacy of the horizontal relations,
- (3) external influences.

In the previous paragraphs the first reason has been already identified. However, the second and third mechanisms need further clarification. When a mass movement challenges the regime, it is hard to avoid taking sides. The question of who is a potentially disloyal soldier or officer is unforeseeable to the outside observer. It is very similar to the "identification problem" raised by Kalyvas in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.²⁰ The identification problem reflects on the issue that it is often hard to grasp for the environment what side the individual takes in case of a crisis. Kalyvas points out that when violence occurs, "preference formation" can be based on grievances, economic considerations, fear of violence, ethnic, religious, class and other ties.²¹ This should be no difference when a regime cracks down on its own citizens.

The identification issue and the preference issue are highly connected to the horizontal loyalty and to external influences. It is logical to assume that when the soldier identifies himself with the opponents of the regime, because of external influences and interests (e.g. grievances, family), or because of horizontal loyalties come into the foreground (e.g. ethnicity), the likelihood of disloyalty will be bigger.

The aim of this study is not to examine individual-level data but to focus on structural variables, certain identifiable mechanisms within the armed forces that raise the probability of the identification problem and raise the odds of disloyalty. Such mechanisms are likely to cause loyalty towards the leadership to be secondary as compared to the external or horizontal influences. An umbrella concept for

19 Ibid.

20 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89.

21 Ibid., 94-104.

these external and horizontal influences is the distance from society. Chenoweth and Stephan used the term “social distance”²² to explain why some coercive institutions are more useful for maintaining repression than others: when the coercive institutions are distant from society, the probability that networks exist between its members and the protestors is smaller, therefore making disloyalty less probable (e.g. the soldiers are recruited from a different country, or they are a member of a special, advantaged group).²³

An example of the measurement of the distance from society is the recruitment of the army: conscription does not entail long-term loyalty-creating mechanisms as compared to voluntary affiliation.²⁴ The conscripts are part of the armed forces for a couple of months and, in most cases, the service does not lead to a career; in comparison, the volunteers, for whom being a member of the armed forces entails long-term interests such as livelihood and career, are likely to demonstrate more loyalty. Another example might be a state where the majority of the population is ruled and disadvantaged by a minority ethnicity. When popular mobilization occurs, defection will be more likely to happen, as the networks between the members of the armed forces and the protestors, or horizontal loyalty between the members of the military coming from the same disadvantaged ethnicity might gain priority over institutional or vertical loyalty.

Before establishing the hypotheses, let us summarize the most important assumptions of this theoretical section. The first assumption claimed that rents and privileges are likely to contribute to the conservation of the loyalty of the armed forces. The second assumption proposed that vertical loyalty has to enjoy primacy over horizontal loyalty in order to maintain the chain of command and the institutional efficiency. When horizontal loyalties or external influences come in the foreground, vertical loyalty becomes endangered. Based on these assumptions the following hypotheses can be formulated:

Hypothesis 1: Armies that continue to receive generous economic benefits are less likely to be disloyal.

Hypothesis 2: Armies whose influence remains primary compared to other coercive institutions (paramilitary forces, police) are less likely to be disloyal.

22 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 189.

23 Ibid., 46.

24 Derek Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*, (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), available at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Arab-Uprisings-and-Armed-Forces-Between-Openness-and-Resistance> (accessed January 10, 2012), 15.

Hypothesis 3: Armies whose selection mechanisms keep the army distant from society are less likely to be disloyal.

Before beginning the hypothesis testing, the following section will elaborate on the conceptual background of the study and the potentially influential variables.

2.1 *The Concept of Disloyalty*

Loyalty, in the context of this study should not only be understood as a motive that necessarily includes emotional attachment, but rather as the acknowledgement of the special relationship between the military and the governance: in theory, the military is a tool of coercion in the hands of the government, therefore, departure from this relationship must entail special considerations.²⁵ Defection, in this case, should be understood as a form of lack of loyalty.

Kalyvas conceptualized defection in the context of civil wars. Although the focuses of the two researches are rather different, there are some concepts that are worth considering for military defection, as well. Firstly, Kalyvas divided defection into "public" and "private", regarding the domain which is affected by the action.²⁶ Secondly, he disaggregated defection into three subgroups: "noncompliance", "informing" and "switching sides".²⁷


Figure 1 shows the disaggregation of the concept of disloyalty applied by this study. At the "softest" end, disloyalty means "noncompliance"²⁸, when the disloyal member does not actively seek to support the contesting power or diminish the power of the regime, but refuse to carry out commands, or refuse to transmit the orders of the government to the troops. This can happen privately and publicly. Private noncompliance causes damage to the extent which the disloyal individual is replaceable. A more active form of noncompliance is when it happens publicly; at the extreme it contains an assurance towards the public and the protestors that they are safe from military intervention. This case is already bordering on defection.

25 Simon Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-23.

26 Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 104.

27 Ibid., 105.

28 Ibid.

Figure 1: The Disaggregation of the Concept of Disloyalty

Defection²⁹ entails the active sabotage of orders, with the inclusion of desertion from the military. The division of defection into private and public is possible, although less straightforward. Desertion from the armed forces might be an example of a private defection. When defection is public (e.g. threatening the police with intervention in case of violence), it is very close to the extreme form of disloyalty, sedition, proving, that sedition and defection are close concepts. Sedition is a legal category, including acts of disloyalty with the sole purpose to bring down a government, usually using violence. Sedition, therefore, is the most extreme form of disloyalty. Although the immense difference between noncompliance and sedition must be acknowledged, the study is restricted to the use of the umbrella concept of disloyalty during the statistical tests. The reason is that the measurement of disloyalty in each case would require sources that are rarely available about military organizations. Still, using the concept of disloyalty is unlikely to distort the results of the tests: the point of the examination is to find variables that make armed forces more likely to abandon loyalty, whatever form that may take.

29 The words "disloyalty" and "defection" are not synonyms, still they are often used synonymously throughout the study. The difference is the degree to which the armed forces or the members of the armed forces become disloyal. Disloyalty is essentially the umbrella concept.

2.2 Finances and Privileges

As the members of the military are just as much connected to the regime through the chain of command and loyalty as to society through horizontal connections, in times of a popular revolt they are exposed to the difficult question whether to stay loyal to the *ancien régime*. The decision to remain loyal can be (partly) the result of interest calculation, as Wintrobe,³⁰ Stepan³¹ or Bellin³² anticipated. According to this understanding the military appears as a “budget-maximizing” group.³³ Therefore, the well-being of the military would make the members more likely to remain loyal to the regime and assumedly, whereas the loss of these financial privileges aggravated by a popular uprising would be quite likely to produce disloyalty.

Naturally, both individual and institutional interests go beyond finances. There are several privileges that might not be on par with the direct financial benefits, but provide the armed forces with influence and power, for example the right to determine the structure, mission and control of the military; constitutional privileges; an authority over or an income from the defense sector and state enterprises; or a role in the executive power, in the legislature and in the jurisdiction.³⁴

However, even privileges are two-edged swords: they might conserve loyalty, but it is also possible that the will to conserve the prerogatives lead to a military takeover. In addition, the overtly privileged armed forces themselves can serve as a reason for social upheaval, thereby making it problematic for the officers to support such claims.

All in all, privileges are assumed to have a loyalty-creating effect. Although the importance of all different kinds of privileges are acknowledged by this study, due to the lack of data on all the aspects of this issue, financial privileges will be in the focus of the dataset.

2.3 Rivalry

If one assumes some sort of rationality on behalf of the members of the armed forces when they weigh the pros and cons of defection, it is quite an intuitive idea that the existence of rival forces is a drive for disloyalty. The rivalry is possible

30 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 341.

31 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 68.

32 Bellin, 32.

33 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 341.

34 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 68, 94.

between the armed forces and the police, the paramilitary forces or those alternative armies that are usually created by autocratic regimes to balance out the army and prevent a coup. Therefore, these “alternative forces” are often indoctrinated and their existence is dependent on the regime alone; consequently their loyalty is nearly unshakable.³⁵ However, regarding the loyalty of the regular army, the creation of a rival force is a two-edged sword: a competition between the security forces is likely to emerge, primarily if the members of the regular army feel relegated in the hierarchy, whether a loss of prestige or a financial loss. Furthermore, it is significantly harder to keep the different branches together and to keep them loyal without a unified leadership.³⁶ Therefore, dividing the armed forces may be an effective protection against military coups, but in the case of a popular uprising it may complicate the task of controlling the different branches and enforcing loyalty.

The rivalry, however, can also emerge between the armed forces and the police. For example, one could explain the lack of loyalty of the Tunisian Armed Forces in 2011 partly by the relatively disadvantaged situation of the armed forces as compared to the police, both in its relation to the regime and in financial terms.³⁷ Also, in Libya, the army was quite underprivileged compared to other security forces, but primarily to the rival paramilitary force.³⁸ Consequently, rivalry both within the armed forces and within the coercive institutions must be examined.

2.4 Distance from Society

Chenoweth and Stephan proposed the intuitive idea that the probability of network-formation between the soldiers and protestors has a strong explanatory value concerning the outcome of social movements. In *Why Civil Resistance Works* the dynamics of violent and nonviolent campaigns were examined and their potential to produce success, showing that the number of participants in the movements had a positive effect on the likelihood of considerable defections in the coercive institutions.³⁹ This is what made nonviolent campaigns more successful: they generally attracted more participants and supporters after which there was a chance that a significant part of the members of the armed forces would be affected

35 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115.No. 1. (2000): 68.

36 Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2011), 11; Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22. No. 4. (October 2011), 29.

37 Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts”, 27.

38 Ibid., 30.

39 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 48.

by it through their social ties.⁴⁰ Therefore, the distance of the armed forces from the social movements could be determined by the approximate number of participants in the movement.

From a different perspective, the closeness of the soldiers to society in general has to be measured, as well. This variable can be approximated as the function of the selection procedures of the army, for example conscription and the connection of forces to certain social groups.⁴¹

The first distinction to be made is between voluntary and conscripted armies. Generally speaking, conscripted armies are closer to society than voluntary armies, as the interest of the rank and file and their prospects within the organization are temporary.⁴² Furthermore, horizontal loyalties easily form between the conscripted members of the rank and file which are detached from the professional members of the institution, and their external loyalties remain important in comparison to their temporary and enforced vertical loyalties. Voluntary armies, in this respect, should be treated differently, as the interests of the members are strongly tied to the institution.

An example of the unstable loyalty of conscripts is Egypt in 2011, where soldiers (the conscripted rank-and-file) were fraternizing with the protestors demanding regime change. The Egyptian army alone had 280 000 -340 000 conscripts⁴³ and the military affected 12.3% of the young male population yearly.⁴⁴ This is quite a significant number, considering that most of the protesting opposition came from the same age group, raising the odds of the formation of linkages between the rank and file and the members of the uprising.

It is also logical to relate the distance of the soldiers from society by differentiating the rank and file from the officers.⁴⁵ In a dictatorship winning the loyalty and preventing the shirking of the officer corps is relatively simple compared to the lower segments of the armed forces. The high-ranking members of the military can be assumed to have a long-term vested interest in the institution, as compared to a conscripted soldier, or a member of the rank and file. In order to further ensure

40 Ibid., 46.

41 Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces*, 18.

42 Ibid., 16.

43 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge, 2011), 306.

44 Stephen H. Gotowicki, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (1995), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/egypt/egypt.htm> (accessed March 20, 2012).

45 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 193.

loyalty, clientelistic relations may also underpin the loyalty of the military beside to the economic interests, privileges and a feeling of attachment to the organization.

In order to strengthen attachment to the regime and distance the armed forces from society, a part or the whole body of the military is often selected from a distinct class of society, or a specific ethnic, religious group. This usually happens in states where definite ethnic or religious affiliations dominate the governance, or where certain groups have a notable role in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. A special case of this relation is where a minority group dominates over the majority. The survival of the government in these cases may be more assured by an officer corps that is selected from the group that the regime represents.⁴⁶ If abundant resources are at hand, the maintenance of loyalty is assumed to be even more likely if the rank and file is also selected from the preferred group.⁴⁷ The situation may be confusing in cases, where the selection mechanisms are only applied to the officers and the rank and file is randomly selected, *horrible dictum*, the mass of the military is randomly selected and conscripted (for example, Syria).

Kyrgyzstan is an example where, despite the fragmented ethnic composition of the country, the dominant ethnic group - the Kyrgyz – dominates the military.⁴⁸ An example of maximized loyalty seeking according to this model is Bahrain, where the Sunni royal family created a mercenary army of foreigner Sunni soldiers (mostly from Pakistan, Syria and Jordan) to keep order in the Shiite-majority society.⁴⁹

All in all, the distance of the armed forces from society in general or from the social movements in particular is essentially determined by four factors: (1) the size of the popular movement, (2) the recruitment of the armed forces, (3) the selection mechanisms of the rank and file (4) and the officers. In the following chapter these variables will be examined throughout a wider cross-section of cases.

3. Explaining Disloyalty

3.1 The Dataset and Variable Operationalization

The cases were selected from the universe of social movements in non-democratic countries in the timeframe between 1990 and 2012 where the declared aim of the

46 Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts", 31.

47 Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces*, 18.

48 Erica Marat, "Kyrgyzstan's Fragmented Police and Armed Forces," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 11. (2010), <http://pipss.revues.org/3803#ftn10> (accessed March 15, 2012).

49 Faisal Husain, "Terror in the Dark," *Yale Daily News* (January 12, 2012), <http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2012/jan/19/husain-terror-in-the-dark/?print> (May 12, 2012).

social movement was transition or regime change. The argument for the selected time frame is that the end of the Cold War brought about changes, following from which regime change were less and less determined by the external dynamics of the bipolar world; furthermore, democracy seemed to triumph over autocracy, creating a more unified positive normative evaluation of democratic regimes in the public opinion throughout the world.

The purpose of the social movement in question had to be regime change in order to qualify as a case in this study. Therefore, an event where the movement did not want to get rid of the autocrat but only, for instance, the ministers, would not be selected. The reason is that without the application of strict selection criteria it would be hard to draw the line between the different shades of democratization efforts which often claim only governmental changes, or the expansion of rights, but not straightforward regime change.⁵⁰

The data was carefully filtered in order to exclude states where military regimes governed and in which these regimes were the object of the regime change attempt.⁵¹ Cases were also excluded where the country was involved in a civil war during the social movement. Data from the post-Communist transition process from the end of the Cold War was disqualified, as well. Lastly, cases where the military initiated the movement for regime change and wherein, therefore, defection was not the effect of popular movements, were excluded (for example, East Timor and Burkina Faso).

Forty-eight cases fulfilled the criteria described above. Among others, the cases include the campaigns of the Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and cases from Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1990's. The small number of cases can be attributed to the strict case selection described above. Furthermore, although avoiding endogeneity in this case is nearly impossible, each country was allowed to be represented in the dataset only if there was a change in the examined variables

50 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 14.

51 Samuel Huntington differentiated three types of possible relationships between the military and the regime in autocracies. The first type is the *military regime*, where absolutely no civil control can be detected and the military engages itself in a series of activities traditionally not related to military functions and missions. The second type is where the military is controlled by the people of the dictator's confidence, using the *divide et impera* principle to exercise close control. The third type is when the military is treated as an *instrument* of the regime, where officers have to be loyal to the regime (and not to the state). Regimes of the first type are excluded from the study. (Samuel P Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4.)

between the cases, be they dependent or independent. The remaining cases were eliminated.⁵²

The gathered data was complemented and cross-checked by the dataset of Chenoweth and Stephan compiled for their book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.⁵³ The data collection was performed with the help of the following sources: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program⁵⁴, the Global Nonviolent Action Database⁵⁵, Military Balance⁵⁶, the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database⁵⁷, the Military Recruitment Data Set⁵⁸, the CIA Factbook⁵⁹, Jane's World Armies⁶⁰, the reports of Human Rights Watch⁶¹, the International Crisis Group⁶² and Amnesty International⁶³, the Coup d'Etat database of the Center for Systemic Peace⁶⁴, the Minorities at Risk Project of the UNHCR⁶⁵, the publications of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)⁶⁶,

52 For example, Egypt was represented twice in the dataset, once as a case of defection and once as a case of loyalty. Madagascar was present three times in the dataset, once as a case of disloyalty and twice as loyalty. However, in case of the two cases with identical outcomes (end year 1993 and 2003) there was no difference in either recruitment, structure, peak membership, the method of the campaign, and so on. Therefore, the case of 1993 was eliminated. The last example is Thailand, where there are two cases of loyalty (1992, 2011). The reason to include both of them was because conscription was abolished in 1997.

53 Dataset available <http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/wcrw/> (accessed February 13, 2012).

54 *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php> (accessed February 15, 2012).

55 The *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/> (accessed February 16, 2012).

56 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1994-2011*, (London: Routledge).

57 *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed February 15, 2012).

58 Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

59 *CIA Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed May 20, 2012).

60 *Jane's World Armies*, <http://jwar.janes.com/public/jwar/index.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2012).

61 *Human Rights Watch*, <http://www.hrw.org/> (accessed April 20, 2012).

62 *International Crisis Group*, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed March 15, 2012).

63 *Amnesty International*, <http://www.amnesty.org/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

64 Center for Systemic Peace, *Coup d'état Database*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (accessed March 10, 2012).

65 UNHCR, *Minorities at Risk Project*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/MARP.html> (accessed May 10, 2012).

news reports and articles from CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera and qualitative academic studies on a case-by case basis.

In order to test the ideas outlined above, disloyalty was coded as a dichotomous dependent variable. The response variable was always determined based on the behavior of the regular military forces. Any significant disloyalty, being where troops, a mass of soldiers, or officers have physically defected from the army, or where at least a declaration of disloyalty or non-compliance with the regime occurred, was coded as disloyalty. 25 of the 48 cases were coded as loyalty and 23 as disloyalty.

The first explanatory variable was budget change, representing the relative economic well-being of the military. In each case the defense budget of the armed forces was calculated, with the possible exclusion of the budget of the paramilitary forces, other irregular forces and the police. As this condition was not met by any single database, the data was calculated from the SIPRI Database and Military Balance judging the values on a case-by-case basis. The budget of the year before the campaigns was compared to the average of the previous five years.⁶⁷

The second explanatory variable marks the existence of a rival security force. This dichotomous variable was coded as '1' if a coercive body existed, which was preferred by the regime as compared to the armed forces, let that be an indoctrinated paramilitary, a mercenary army, or even when the police was given primacy over the armed forces concerning their treatment, and '0' when there was no evidence of the existence of such force.

The following explanatory variable was the type of recruitment in the army. The armed forces were coded as voluntary or conscript army, based on the records of Military Balance and the *Military Recruitment Data Set*⁶⁸ and qualitative studies in debatable cases.

The selective recruitment of the army was categorized as 'unspecified' when the armed forces were mostly representative of the population in general, or at least no specific rules of selection were in place. The variable was coded as 'selective' when minorities or the majority was excluded from the armed forces. Minority in this case should not be only understood along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, but

66 Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), <http://www.iss.co.za/> (accessed March 28, 2012).

67 If the budget of all the five years were not available, the data available from the same timeframe was used, but always at least the average of three years.

68 Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

geographic lines, as well. The variable officer selection was coded along the same lines, with the extension that it was also coded as 'selective' when the officer corps or commanders were selected from the kin or the family of the autocrat.

A dichotomous control variable was applied marking the cases when there was evidence that the army was deployed or requested to restore order during the popular protest. Another control variable estimated the membership of the movement in question. The method of Chenoweth and Stephan was applied and the variable was approximated by the number of participants on the largest protest.⁶⁹ The final control variable represented the method of the campaign, more precisely, whether it was a violent or a nonviolent movement. Physical destruction of property and people were coded as violent campaigns, and the use of economic, social and psychological techniques were coded as nonviolent campaigns.⁷⁰

3.2 Testing the Theory

Before testing the assumptions outlined above, it needs to be established whether some of the independent variables correlate with each other. The suspicion that there might be a correlation is well-founded: for instance, the officer selection and the rank and file selection variable are tightly connected: in all seventeen cases, where the rank and file was selectively recruited, logically the officers were also discriminatively appointed. Furthermore, the discriminative rank and file selection procedures are more realistic in case of volunteer armies than in conscripted forces. Lastly, it is logical to assume that when the governance denoted resources to apply selective or discriminative selection mechanism for the recruitment of the armed forces and the promotion of officers, they would be more likely to deploy that army to restore internal order.

Table 1 illustrates that there is a strong significant correlation between the discriminative rank and file selection and officer selection procedures. Therefore, these two variables had to be separated during the regression. The table also shows evidence that there is a correlation between deployment and discriminative selection procedures (both for the officer corps and the rank and file), furthermore, between army deployment and nonviolent campaigns and although the correlation is statistically significant, it is weak at most.

69 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 31.

70 *Ibid.*, 12-13.

Table 1: The Correlation of the Independent Variables

	Army Deployment	Recruitment	Rank & File Selection	Officer Selection	Rival Security Force
Army Deployment	0.01	0.33**	0.34**	0.07	0.32**
Recruitment		0.15	0.14	-0.15	0.15
Rank & File Selection			0.71***	-0.12	-0.03
Officer Selection				-0.03	-0.20
Rival Security Force					-0.22

Statistical significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01

Table 2 shows the overall significance of each independent variable on disloyalty. The effect of the variables tends to confirm the theoretical propositions of the study. Large campaigns, army deployment, conscription and the presence of a favored rival have a significant effect on disloyalty. The strongest effect can be observed in case of the recruitment variable, which shows that conscript armies are significantly more prone to disloyalty than volunteer one. The other variable with strong explanatory value is the favored rival, which shows that rivalry makes the armed forces significantly more likely to be disloyal.

Table 2: Testing the Effect of the Independent Variables on Disloyalty

	Odds Ratios	
	Model 1	Model 2
Budget change	0.98 (0.03)	0.98 (0.03)
Rival force (yes)	23.13** (1.67)	23.26** (1.69)
Recruitment (conscript)	30.25** (1.96)	25.61** (1.90)
Officer selection (unspecified)	2.85 (1.18)	-
Rank & file selection (unspecified)	-	4.24 (1.16)
Army deployment (yes)	6.27 (1.40)	8.23 (1.42)
Campaign Membership	1.00** (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Nonviolent (yes)	1.56 (1.26)	2.26 (1.36)
Constant	0.00** (3.05)	0.00* (3.12)

Statistical significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01

The non-discriminative rank and file and officer selection also have a positive effect on disloyalty, whereas increasing budgets have an inverse effect, decreasing the odds of disloyalty. These latter two variables are, however, not statistically significant. As for now, the preliminary results show that *Hypothesis 1*, reflecting on the negative effect of financial well-being on the likelihood of military disloyalty is unconfirmed, whereas *Hypothesis 2* and *Hypothesis 3* concerning the negative

effect of an army distant from society and having primacy over other security institutions on military disloyalty has found some support. In the following sections variable will be examined in detail.

3.2.1 Budget change

Since the binary logistic regression tests have raised doubts about the significance of the effect of budget increase on disloyalty, it is necessary to examine the effect of budget change on loyalty versus disloyalty without controlling for other variables.

Table 3: The Comparison of the Means of Budget Change in Loyal and Disloyal Militaries


	Defection	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Budget Change	Loyalty	24	28.08 *	64.75
	Defection	20	2.35 **	11.82

Statistical significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01

Table 3 shows that if nothing else is controlled, the budgets of disloyal armed forces are increasing more slowly than that of loyal forces. The budgets of loyal forces were increasing 28% faster on average compared to previous years, whereas the budget of defecting armies was increasing by only around 2% on average. What is even more interesting is that defection is not caused by a real decrease in economic benefits; on the contrary, a slight increase is still insufficient to keep some armies loyal to the regime. These results would confirm the economic account on the loyalty of the armed forces, claiming that forces treated well are more likely to be loyal. However, the standard deviation show that the values are probably spread out and the significance of the results can be attributed to a couple of the outliers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the cases in each sample according to budget change.

Figure 2 sheds light on the reason why the results concerning budget change are somewhat ambivalent. There are some outliers for both loyalty and disloyalty but the bulk of the disloyalty values are distributed around -10 and 8%, whereas the majority of loyalty cases are spread out around 8 and 15%. The reason why the averages are so different is probably due to the outliers. The outliers, however, are often misleading: for instance, one of the outliers among the loyalty cases is Chad from 1990, where the 21% relative decrease in the defense budget should not be attributed to a political decision rather than a natural process of post-war budget decrease.

Figure 2: The Distribution of Cases According to Budget Change and Loyalty⁷¹



Overall, there is some evidence that budget increases makes the armed forces somewhat more likely to remain loyal; however, the results are ambiguous mostly because of the outliers. The statistical tests and the graph showed that the expected relationship between defense budget increase and loyalty prognosticated by Hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed.

Therefore, budget increase as an indicator should be reconsidered. It is likely that in failing states, and states with inefficient or unfair redistribution of resources, defense budgets may not even reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. A good example is Burkina Faso (not included in the sample) where, although the defense budget has risen by 28% compared to the average of the past five years, in 2011 the soldiers rebelled against the government because of economic reasons and unacceptable working and living conditions.⁷²

Furthermore, budget increases and decreases might be affected by several external factors, such as security considerations, economic crisis, post-war and post-Cold War decreases. This decrease in the budget is not automatic and, indeed, for a while it was firmly believed that not all states adapted their defense budgets to the changes in the economy of the country. However, the most recent data shows that due to the current economic crisis defense budgets are shrinking all over the

71 The case of Georgia from 2007 is not depicted in the graph, as it is an extreme outlier with 317% change in the defense budget and would have hindered the effective demonstration of data.

72 Burkina Faso: Mutiny at President Compaore Barracks, *BBC* (April 15, 2011), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090094> (accessed March 3, 2012).

world.⁷³ Consequently, we can conclude, that there is no proof of a relationship between decreasing defense budgets and military disloyalty; therefore, we can reject Hypothesis 1.

3.2.2 Rival Security Forces

In addition to the defense budget change variable, the idea of whether spoilers and privileges make armed forces more likely to stay loyal is also tested by the examination of the rivalry between different branches of security, as outlined in Hypothesis 2. Only 12 cases were found, where there was straightforward evidence of the existence of such rival force.

Figure 3: The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Militaries With and Without Rivals




Figure 3 shows that the presence of a favored rival makes the armed forces somewhat more prone to disloyalty, the odds of disloyalty are four times higher than without such a rival force when no other variables are controlled for. The graph makes it clear that although not having a rival is not a decisive factor concerning loyalty or disloyalty, having one seems to have an important negative effect on loyalty.


73 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011* (April 17, 2012), <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press-release-translations-2012/milexbgeng.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).

The presence of a rival force was already found influential in the overall model, and the finding was reinforced by the more detailed analysis. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 found confirmation. All in all, it is intriguing to note that a budget increase does not have a provable effect on disloyalty as compared to the privileged position of the armed forces relative to other security forces. These findings invite researchers to consider non-material spoiler mechanisms or loyalty creating procedures more influential than financial benefits.

3.2.3 Recruitment

Recruitment was found highly influential in the overall model. Figure 8 depicts the distribution of loyal and disloyal armed forces according to recruitment type.

Figure 4: The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Conscript and Volunteer Armies



The graph provides an intriguing result: although conscript armies seem to be just a little more likely to defect, voluntary armies are much more likely to remain loyal. Cases of defection are almost only accounted for by conscripted forces, disloyalty only appeared in 33% of the volunteer forces. Therefore, conscription appears to be an important condition for disloyalty whereas, although voluntary recruitment does not explain loyal behavior alone, it can be considered a significant factor. All in all, the recruitment mechanisms confirm the predictions of Hypothesis 3.

3.2.4 Selective Recruitment and Officer Selection

Based on the collected evidence, general discriminative recruitment applied to the rank and file appears to be quite rare in the dataset, there were only 17 cases

marked as "selective". Accordingly, the variable was not significant in the overall model.

Table 4: The Odds of Disloyalty


Disloyalty in...	Odds Ratios	Constant
Selectively Recruited Armies	2.23 (0.62)	0.55 (0.51)
Armies with Selective and Unspecified Officer Selection	2.77* (0.60)	0.56 (0.41)

N = 48

Statistical significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01

The binary regression in Table 4 shows that the odds of the selectively recruited forces to become loyal or disloyal are not significant if we do not control for other variables, either. This result is, again, in line with the overall model. As for the selection of officers, the results are significant when only one variable is considered. The sample of officer selection contains 25 cases of selective promotion versus 23 cases of unspecified promotion. At the same time, the armies with rationally selected officers are 2.8 times more likely to defect than their peers with rational selection. Figure 5 illustrates the discrepancy between the two types of armies.

Figure 5: The Distribution of Loyal and Disloyal Armed Forces with Respect to Officer Selection



All in all, Hypothesis 3 stated that armies whose selection mechanisms kept the army distant from society were less likely to be disloyal. This hypothesis was tested through three variables: the type of recruitment, selection mechanisms for the rank and file and for the officer corps. As for the type of recruitment, the tests showed

that conscript armies were more prone to defections, but what was even more striking is that volunteer forces were especially unlikely to defect. The results of the variables examining the selection mechanisms when recruiting the armed forces and promoting the officers were less straightforward. The results from the rank and file selection were quite ambiguous and signaled the necessity to reconsider the variable. At the same time, the selection of the officer corps was both statistically and substantially significant. All in all, Hypothesis No. 3 could not be rejected.

Based on the collected evidence, armed forces of privileged situation with selection mechanisms keeping them distant from society can be mostly predicted to remain loyal to the regime. Furthermore, large mass movements should also have a significant effect on the decision of soldiers to defect or remain loyal.

Conclusions

The study has embarked on explaining loyalty shifts within the armed forces during popular uprisings for regime change. First of all, the loyalty of the armed forces to the governance was put under the magnifying glass. Following Wintrobe it was proposed, that although in a principle-agent relationship control and enforcement mechanisms ensure the compliance of the agents, the creation of loyalty is usually of paramount importance for the autocrats as loyalty decreases the costs of control mechanisms.⁷⁴ One of the methods used to create loyalty is through spoiler mechanisms. It was proposed that increasing defense budgets signal the will of the regime to satisfy the needs of the armed forces and to keep them loyal by rents. Furthermore, it was claimed that the privileged position of the armed forces as compared to other coercive bodies had to be primary, otherwise rivalry and ambitions might lead to disloyalty. Statistics confirmed that armed forces without significant rivals remained loyal: the regimes of Bahrain, Thailand, Belarus, Nepal or Zambia applied this method of loyalty seeking, either consciously or unconsciously. However, failing to follow this tactic might be fatal for the regime: it is remarkable that 75% of all the armed forces with rivals became disloyal.

As opposed to the expectations, statistics showed that decreasing budgets did not affect loyalty shifts. While looking for possible explanations for the counterintuitive results it was proposed that in states with inefficient or unfair redistribution defense budgets may not realistically reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. Furthermore, the most significant economic benefits of the armed forces are often not included in the defense budget: for instance, the revenues from the economic activities of the armed forces, (mostly the military industry) might yield significantly more than the incomes from the state budget (for example in Egypt).

74 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, 33.

The second proposition concerned the importance of the maintenance of the vertical and in-group loyalties as compared to horizontal or external influences. In case of mass mobilization, class, ethnic, religious and geographic loyalties might overrun institutional and vertical loyalties, which are likely to result in loyalty shifts within the armed forces. It was anticipated that the governance can prevent such developments and ensure loyalty by selective recruitment and promotion mechanisms based on the previously listed identities and by the introduction of voluntary recruitment, through which they can strengthen the in-group loyalty of the individuals. No wonder that 74% of all disloyalty cases occurred in conscripted armies. The size of the membership of the campaigns also had an effect on the overall outcome: large campaigns seemed to support network formation and thereby revitalized loyalties to external groups.

Although discriminative selection mechanisms in the rank and file did not contribute to loyalty, according to the third foundation of the theory, the officer corps had to be examined separately. The intuition was confirmed by the analysis: the discriminative selection procedures had an especially strong explanatory value in case of officer selection. Whereas 64% of all loyalty cases came from armed forces with discriminatively selected officers, 61% of all disloyal cases came from militaries with 'fairly' selected officers.

Syria and Bahrain from the time of the Arab Spring were perfect examples of the discriminative selection mechanisms. However, the fact that Syria only applied these selection mechanisms to the officers and not to the conscripted rank and file might explain the different outcome of the events: in Bahrain the whole body of the military remained loyal, whereas in Syria defections occurred among the rank and file. The Egyptian case also supports the argument that, in cases of popular movements and when violence is used to put down protests, the conscripted soldiers are a dangerous factor for the regime.

The study pointed out certain trends to be considered when thinking about loyalty shifts. The results have important implications for opposition movements and for professionals involved in democratization projects both on the expert and the political level. The conclusions one can draw for opposition activists is that the creation of loyalty shifts is very much dependent on the size of the movement. Furthermore, in order to create loyalty shifts, they have to target the proper level of the armed forces with the proper methods.

What the experts of democratization can use from the results is the fact that significant attention has to be paid to the selection and promotion mechanisms in the armed forces. Although the global trend is that conscripted forces are becoming obsolete in the dynamically changing security environment and in light of the societal demands, therefore, they give place to voluntary armies. Although this is a

reasonable process due to the increasing demand for the professionalization of the armed forces, the hidden discriminative selection procedures should be monitored and sanctioned.

Finally, a few words have to be devoted to the limitations of the study. Firstly, the examination of more cases from a wider time-frame should be carried out in order to provide the statistical results with more significance. Secondly, the variables included in the study already show the limitations in time, resources and language barriers. Therefore, in the following lines a series of ideas will be proposed for further research.

It was stated previously that institutional privileges have a significant effect on military loyalty, such as the role of the armed forces in the economy (defense industry, other enterprises), in the executive power, legislature and the jurisdiction.⁷⁵ These areas should also be examined concerning military loyalty. Furthermore, it has been established that the preservation of the privileges is of paramount importance for the armed forces. If that is true, then the chance of the upcoming forces to achieve loyalty shifts will depend on their capacity to show the soldiers a more promising alternative.⁷⁶ However, this chance also depends on the volatility of these privileges. Therefore, it is important to establish how institutionalized the privileges are: the interests of an institutionalized military will be more independent of the political regime and the state.⁷⁷ Collecting a sample concerning institutionalized and non-institutionalized military prerogatives and privileges could shed further light on the dynamics behind military defections and loyalty.

Despite the limitations of this study, it provides the foundations for further research and shows that the organization of the military and the loyalty creating efforts of the autocrats have a significant effect on loyalty shifts. With this study I also intend to raise awareness to the problem that civil-military relations are getting less and less attention among the scholars: one must never forget that although the “West” might downsize the armed forces and keep them under civil control, in the developing world the armed forces continue to play an extremely important role in governing states. Several states seem to be stuck in the viscous circle of uprisings, concessions and repression, in which the armed forces are often a significant player. Understanding the rationale behind loyalty shifts in the supporting organizations of autocracies, most importantly in the armed forces should be further studied by scholars.

75 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 94.

76 *Ibid.*, 10.

77 Bellin, *Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders*, 29., and Lutterbeck, 18.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Peo Hansen and Sandy Brian Hager, *The Politics of European Citizenship: Deepening Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012)

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What is the social purpose of citizenship, and how has this evolved over time in the European Union? Contrary to the received knowledge that assumes EU citizenship is a relatively new concept inaugurated by the Maastricht Treaty, Sandy Brian Hager and Peo Hansen assert that conceptions of European citizenship were both implicitly and explicitly present from the earliest developments of the European Community. How these conceptions have evolved depends on the product of historically contingent struggles between a constellation of institutions and actors as they grapple with how to undergird the tenuous European project with a sense of legitimacy.

Departing from a critical theory approach, Hansen and Hager seek to excavate, by an exhaustive analysis of documents originating from European institutions, the evolution of the relationship between citizenship and the capitalist market economy as it structures the form of the European Community, then the European Union. Beginning from the earliest formation of the European Community, member states promoted an idea of dualized citizenship that bestowed rights of free movement and internal mobility on their national citizens as opposed to third country nationals. Considering the drive to promote labor mobility at the time, purely economic reasoning could have led member states to extend these rights to TCNs. Therefore, the authors argue that excluding TCNs from rights of free movement had an indirect consequence of promoting a de facto version of European citizenship tied to member state nationality and culture. More explicitly, the concept of “special rights” for European citizens as opposed to TCNs was promoted by the Council of Ministers and the Commission in the 1970s. Thus, the origins of EU citizenship as it is articulated today can be found in this early iteration of what the authors term “the political economy of free movement.”

Later, a conception of European citizenship played a central role in the launch of the Single European Act and the re-commitment to pursue European integration. Hansen and Hager underline the ways in which citizenship was conceived as a way to shore up the legitimacy of what they term “negative integration”: the process by which increasing market integration was accompanied by a simultaneous absence of European-level initiatives to integrate social and welfare policies. As in the case of earlier articulations of European citizenship, membership in a nation state remained

an essential component as member states rejected Delors' vision of a "social Europe" which would have required the transfer of social policies to the European scale. Far from being bullied by the member states, however, European institutions also sought to promote a conception of citizenship that was readily adaptable to a neoliberal market economy, emphasizing flexibility and mobility, reflecting what the authors term the "discursive redefinition and ultimate subordination of traditional social democratic ideals" (p. 122). Once again, however, the right to take advantage of flexibility and mobility was limited to member state citizens, a group increasingly defined not only by their geographic origins, but by their ethno-cultural ties to a specific European and Christian heritage.

Against the backdrop of an ascending "neoliberal communitarian citizenship", migration politics became a prominent site where the tension between market liberalization and popular legitimacy plays out, as the second part of Hansen and Hager's book examines. Recognizing the need for continued extra-European labor immigration, both member states and European officials sought to promote policies which accepted new immigrants but tried to ensure their integration through what the authors call "neo-assimilationist" policies in which immigrants accepted their personal responsibilities to adopt European values. At the same time, external migration policies at the EU level aimed at toughening border control and entry, and linking illegal migration to crime and terrorism, became a feature of EU Programmes such as Tampere and Hague. These latter initiatives are often discussed in terms of their benefits to European citizens "welfare and security," marking the latest iteration of a hegemonic discourse that defines the rights of EU citizens against those of third country nationals.

One of the strengths of Hansen and Hager's argument is the demonstration that EU institutions and policies often have potentially conflicting or contradictory logics. The authors point out that anti-discrimination and integration initiatives, of which the EU and in particular the Commission has championed, cannot fully combat the precariousness of many third country nationals, especially those who are in Europe in a situation of legal irregularity (whether they enter without papers or overstay visas). Thus, the authors highlight an emergent contradiction in which certain immigrant groups are seen as rights-holders protected by the EU, while others, such as asylum-seekers, are subject to a potential loss of rights as the EU seeks to externalize asylum policy to third countries and border zones. Another example of a contradiction within EU migration policy highlighted by the authors is that a directive focused on the promotion of flexible, temporary labor migration limited to only a few years as in the case of the Blue Card directive seems directly at odds with the notion that immigrants should be able to adopt the culture and values of the society in which they live and work. However, these contradictions lead the reader to question whether a neoliberal vision of citizenship and the actors which promote it are as hegemonic as indicated by the authors. A presumption of the power of the

European Round Table of Industrialists in shaping the entire direction of the character and content of EU citizenship, for example, largely neglects explaining how or why this single actor would become decisive. Despite this minor weakness, the authors do an excellent job overall of tracing the rise of neoliberal economic policies in the EU and a matching focus on a “socially thin” version of citizenship.

The most compelling part of Hansen and Hager’s work is that it provides a solid historical and empirical foundation for analyzing the positions of EU institutions and member states as the current economic crisis unfolds, a task which they tackle in an afterword in the new paperback edition. Given Hansen and Hager’s arguments, it is not surprising to see an ongoing clash between neoliberal/austerity policy prescriptions on one hand and a backlash often couched in nationalistic terms on the other. The debate over the future direction of the European Union, as the authors point out, cuts across a simplistic intergovernmental versus supranational theoretical divide precisely because nation states themselves, in addition to EU institutions, have been participants in the construction and legitimation of policies that are ever more sharply revealing the EU’s “democratic deficit”. Nor should it be surprising, after reading Hansen and Hager’s account of the intense historical interconnection between citizenship and migration policies that during times of economic crisis in which the neoliberal policies of the EU may be called into question, migration and asylum issues resurge as a salient policy axis. Hansen and Hager therefore move beyond a simplistic argument that blames xenophobia and the resurgence of the far right purely on chauvinistic national sentiments, but instead must be connected to the contradictory ways in which EU institutions and documents refer to migrants as a welcome source of labor, an object of humanitarian aid and the extension of European values and rights, on one hand, and as an inassimilable threat to culture, security, and the maintenance of national welfare policies on the other. Academics and policy makers alike who have an interest in exploring the complex interrelations between economic and migration policy and popular legitimacy as they play out both in historical and contemporary European politics will find this book a provocative source of both empirical information and critique.

Jeff Kingston (ed.), *Nuclear Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan* (London: Routledge 2012)

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Japan’s nuclear crisis has provoked profound unease about the danger of radiation dispersion, especially in the northern Tohoku region most affected by last year’s triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami and large scale nuclear contamination. As the

initial dramatic phase of the nuclear crisis has evolved into long-term concern about the effects of radiation on public health, citizen groups, NGOs, and members of the scientific community have stepped up efforts to supplement the government's assessments. This anthology, edited by Jeff Kingston, brings together a group of mostly foreign social scientists who are teaching at Japanese universities or about Japan in institutions abroad. The collection of essays and articles is notable in bringing attention to the government's response to the nuclear crisis. It further addresses the extent and impact of the disaster in terms of damage assessment and most importantly what lessons can be drawn. In this respect, many of the authors agree that optimism may not be warranted for the future (p. 187). Following the unusual shut down of all the nation's 54 nuclear plants for safety inspections, there have been increasing controversies surrounding the highly contentious issue of nuclear energy, as some citizen activists have been seeking alternatives to the government's policies and even been filing a criminal liability complaint against Tokyo Electric Power Company and the government's controversial Nuclear Safety Commission.

The study approaches its subject from three main perspectives: the ambivalent role of social media, the military and civil society in rescue and reconstruction operations, the role of the so-called "nuclear village" (p. 190), a tight lobby of pro-nuclear lobbyists in government, media, academia and business associations who had taken the lead in shaping Japan's nuclear energy policy since the 1960s and in the efforts that are now being undertaken to rebuild the region and make it more resilient for the future. Part one of the book offers personal testimonies of the hardships the people in Tohoku have been going through. Long-term Tohoku resident and eyewitness John Morris describes how his family experienced the unfolding crisis. He distances himself from the victim role imposed upon him from outside, takes a critical look at the self-proclaimed savior role of certain NGOs and reports how his wife set up a child friendly space in evacuation centers designed for old people. In part two, the study focuses on volunteerism and social media. Regarding the latter, anthropologist David Slater describes how new social media were not only instrumental in organizing and streamlining relief and rescue operations but also in developing new forms of political protest. Twitter feeds and tweeting have become symbols of this new form of political activism. Part three deals with the nuclear energy policy and future energy options. Daniel Aldrich from Purdue University, Andrew de Witt from Rikkyo University and Iida Tetsunari, Director of the anti-nuclear Sustainable Energy Policy Institute (ISEP) explain why the nuclear industry has been so successful in pushing through their agenda without meeting resistance from civil society. Despite noting public discontent with governmental energy policy choices, the authors remain pessimistic about prospects for a shift from nuclear energy towards renewable energies. As of today it is unlikely that Japan will follow into the footsteps of Germany and rid itself of nuclear power entirely.

Part four highlights the historic dimension of disaster experiences. Peter Duus, a professor emeritus from Stanford University, describes the patterns of human reaction to disasters from putting the blame on evil forces, coping with disasters, and finally forgetting what happened. The contribution from Chris and Yuiko Ames discusses the unprecedented, close cooperation of Japanese and US military forces in coordinating rescue and emergency operations in Tohoku. It is salient that the US marines involved in the rescue operations are based in Okinawa prefecture, which has been in the news for blatantly resisting joint efforts of the central Japanese and US governments to relocate a military US base within the prefecture. The last part takes a critical look at the reconstruction efforts undertaken by the central and local governments. The architect and city planner Ricardo Tossani presents a compelling case study on urban planning for rebuilding a tsunami demolished coastal town in Tohoku. His findings suggest that urban planners do not have the required skills and expertise to design and build the vital “complex human organism we call a town” (p. 270).

Due to space limitations only a few points can be highlighted here for critical discussion. First it would have been desirable to explore some of the key issues and topics in more detail. For example no author has deemed it necessary to analyze food radiation in-depth, to evaluate the ecological impact of the tons of cesium contaminated cooling water discharged by Tokyo Electric Power Company into the Pacific Ocean, or to document the huge undertaking of collecting and disposing of millions of tons of partially radioactive debris and wreckage scattered around Tohoku or floating in the oceans. The book has also missed the opportunity to document the treatment of subcontracted workers in the Fukushima plant from the perspective of minimum legal safety protection standards. Another weak point of the study are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory statements about the function of civil society in a democratic state: on one side it is asserted that civil society achieved much more than petty party politics (p. 9) but on the other side civil society is portrayed as a weak, powerless movement that is partially to blame for the Fukushima accident (p. 82). Either view might at the end reflect an extreme oversimplification that misses the main point. As Morris points out the simple truth is that “NGOs that are achieving things are doing it because they have succeeded in establishing a productive relationship with a local community” (p. 47). In other words without commitment from the local recipients external NGOs may eventually be perceived as intruders and ineffective helpers.

Lastly, the editor argues in the introduction that “the major lesson policymakers can draw is that nations can act to improve disaster preparedness” (p. 8) and restates his point again by referring to “disaster reduction” and “disaster resilient nation” (p. 203). There is no doubt that the natural disaster has left a lasting impression and many of the contributions refer to the devastating impact of the tsunamis that struck

the region. However, from a social science perspective one would have wished for at least one central contribution with an original thesis on tsunami disaster management. An original article could have, for example, explored the pitfalls of modern risk societies or elaborate on the overall risk assessment done and from there the overall plan for how to reduce deaths and injuries from a tsunami. Similarly, one could have compared the 'protection versus evacuation' principles that underlie modern disaster management or investigate why some local governments did better than others in terms of evacuation, tsunami education or effective disaster preparedness. The frictions and discrepancies between centrally driven disaster management and local autonomy initiatives offer in this regard avenues for future research. Despite several inconsistencies and shortcomings, this book should be read by all concerned with Japan or caring for the future of the disaster ridden region in Tohoku.

Ronald Dworkin, *Justice for Hedgehogs* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011)

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In his closing remarks (pp. 419-423), Ronald Dworkin makes a call for seeking the "unity of value." In this appeal to remedy the "grave injustice" in the Western societies (the split between the affluent and extremely poor), he refused to employ the metrics of wealth which leads to a "macabre dance of greed and delusion" (p. 422). Instead, Dworkin seeks a solution though governments treating their subjects with equal concern and respect. Justice, according to Dworkin, is based in dignity and its sole purpose is a maximisation of dignity.

The book is divided into five parts, on independence, interpretation, ethics, morality and politics. In this compendium, Dworkin charts his course from the very beginning with a question: what do people think is good and what then ought they to do to others? He passes the straits of free will (the "so called problem of free will," p. 219 ff.) and examines one's own responsibility as the source of understanding the free will as a force to motivate a moral action. Morality is for Dworkin a term applied to behaviour of others while ethics is one's own. A thought, argues Dworkin, is a judgement, not a motive (p. 26).

Dworkin argues that a just and legitimate government needs to show an equal concern for every person, and to respect personal responsibility and the right to decide how to live a personally satisfactory life. This however excludes the situation when people are held accountable for contingencies in their lives. These findings are perhaps unsurprising as Dworkin draws on John Rawls and David Hume. But

Dworkin is also critical of Hume. He argues that it is not enough to be sensitive to needs of others to resolve moral and ethical questions by relying on natural inclinations of the beholder (p. 194). Dworkin does not want this Hume's argument to become a general utilitarian principle, either.

Dworkin dedicated a substantial part of his book to the problem of interpretation (part two, p. 99 ff.). With his legal background, he found the term "interpretation" as most fitting, but this problem of hermeneutics may also be described as a problem of perceptions and contexts of communication. In interpretation, Dworkin is interested in genuine disagreements. By genuine disagreements he means situations when opposing parties disagree on a substance, but do not talk over each other's head. In this process, the parties may identify typical examples on which they can agree and delineate the borderline of their opposing convictions. Sharing a concept is to agree that there is a value in the concept, a value for both parties. The challenge is to determine exactly what is that value. Then, the nature of the disagreement is a disagreement of what the value means for each of the party. When, Dworkin argues, political morality is dependent on interpretation and interpretation depends on values held, then the ultimate ethical value is living well, in dignity and with self-respect.

Dworkin proposes that all values are linked and explained by each other. He finds it "obviously true" (p. 44) that no proposition about the world is grounded in that world without a value judgement. There are no moral truths outside of man. Now, Dworkin argues that the interpretative process differs from scientific investigation. There is still a reason as to why a value judgement is true, though. And, Dworkin finds the truth in the virtue of a case (p. 116). Interpretations consist of identifying their modes (comprehensible style or form), purposes and implications. Interpretations are even used to justify goals of scientific research. But these goals have "nothing to do with truth" (p. 153). Dworkin concludes that "a true interpretative fact is true because the reasons for accepting it are better than the reasons for accepting any rival interpretative claim" (p. 154).

Dworkin then argues that what is true in science is not always useful (p. 178). Rather than dipping in science to find a meaning to life, Dworkin explores a distinction between "living well," that is trying to create a good life, and having a good life (p. 165). Dworkin argues that people seem to have a responsibility to live well because they are self-conscious (p. 196). I suppose that he means that self-consciousness requires protection and strives to perpetuate itself, to keep being self-conscious. Then death is an end of this self-consciousness; for Dworkin, life is "an achievement complete in itself" (p. 199).

In the political dimension (Part Five), Dworkin examines political obligations among fellows active in a political body. Dworkin is interested in obligations to others as

individuals, and then he finds “political rights” to be a more suitable concept within political morality than an individual responsibility which pertains to individual ethics. Rights, according to Dworkin, require “equal concern and respect” (p. 330). He goes on to develop this right to equal respect in the context of various concrete understandings of rights which are often in conflict. According to Dworkin, a human has a “right to be treated as a human being whose dignity fundamentally matters” (p. 335). This leads Dworkin to re-interpret the concepts of liberty, equality and democracy. Dworkin calls this project “a better programme” (p. 349), and in it he is trying to develop the three concepts as mutually supportive and not conflicting. This programme is in an opposition to equality of opportunity which he finds unguided. His is a “hypothetical insurance device” which collects premium on the true opportunity costs of individual choices, and from this he can extrapolate e.g. just taxation and the necessary extent of welfare services to be provided by the government.

Referring to Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin claims that hedgehogs think there is one united system of political values which connects what is beautiful, just and what is liberty, for example. The fox knows there are conflicting choices in human lives and that people have to choose between various goods while they think that they cannot achieve them all. Dworkin wrote his book in defence of these “hedgehogs” which is contrary to the contemporary fashion of understanding ethics and political morals as a trade-off. The benefit of Dworkin’s approach is that he argues against moral relativism or nihilism without a reference to an a-priori moral metaphysical anchor or a divine entity.

Dworkin wants the reader to think twice about values which are commonly labelled, such as liberty or equality. When we argue against governmental interference in an individual’s freedom, we still expect the government to limit the liberty of criminals. Dworkin argues that this conflict in understanding of liberty indicates that we need a more sophisticated approach to liberty than a plain trade-off scheme or a sum of its utility or even expediency. Dworkin claims that arguing for invading someone’s liberty is not permissible unless we realise what the invasion denies an opportunity to pursue an otherwise rightful course of action of an individual. Exploring what lies behind such values can thus connect liberty to justice, for example.

In his book, Dworkin has revived a classical Greek moral premise that when one examines claims justifying all particular values, the end-result propositions are similar. He implies that all values, even political, are interrelated. And, this strategy helps Dworkin explore ways to treat people with dignity in the existing economic system. I find this a very astute and necessary project when considering for example the 2011 occupy movement’s inability to voice a coherent and united political doctrine. Dworkin’s analytical method gives hope in this age of diverse calls for justice, for considerate treatment of the disadvantaged, for insulation against

hardships created by the greedy, and in this world wrecked by populist politicians and irresponsible fiscal policy.

Jeffrey Reiman, *As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012)

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Jeffrey Reiman, professor at the American University in Washington D.C. became known in the mid-1980s for his polemic with John Roemer and for his “force-based” conception of exploitation. He defended this view in several works.¹ His latest book, *As Free and As Just as Possible*, takes up his previous notion of structural force and incorporates it in a full-fledged theory of justice entitled Marxian Liberalism. Reiman’s main aim in the book is to expound and defend a theory which bridges the gap between socialists and liberals. He builds an eclectic conception which combines elements from Marx, from Rawls and from the latest wave of literature on Rawlsian just institutions (the property-owning democracy). The book is divided in seven chapters, each dedicated to one aspect of the argument.

While the first chapter presents Reiman’s overview of the whole argument, the second summarizes certain concepts from Rawls and from Marx. Reiman selects and recapitulates ideas such as Marx’s theory of ideology (a very abridged form), Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness and Rawls’ critique of Marx. Finally, Reiman only alludes to the philosophical controversy over whether Marx has a conception of justice.

The third chapter begins laying the groundwork for the theory. Reiman establishes as his first premise the claim that people have a natural interest in liberty, due to their equality and independence. Reiman takes this account from Locke’s conception of the state of nature. In Rawls’ philosophy (which on this point of view is more akin to Rousseau’s), individuals come to the original position without any pre-political interests. In the deliberations of the original position, everything is “up for grabs.” Unlike in Rawls, in Reiman’s Marxian Liberalism, liberty is a pre-political interest. Parties come already at the deliberations which establish the social contract already endowed with this natural interest.

¹ Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism: Thoughts on Roemer and Cohen” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), Jeffrey H. Reiman “Why worry about how exploitation is defined?: Reply to John Roemer”, *Social Theory and Practice* 16 (1):101-113 (1990), Kai Nielsen, and Robert Ware (eds.) *Analyzing Marxism : New Essays On Analytical Marxism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Supplementary Volume*, (Calgary: Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1989).

The fourth and fifth chapters are dedicated to presenting and arguing for Reiman's conceptual linchpin: the concept of structural coercion through private property. In the fourth chapter Reiman argues that private property is coercive, in the sense that it offers some the opportunity to coerce others into doing their bidding. In Reiman's theory, private property is coercive for those who do not own it. Non-owners are forced to work for the owners on terms offered by the latter. Reiman believes this is an appropriate interpretation of Marx's theory of exploitation.

The fifth chapter builds on the fourth and analyzes Rawls' difference principle through the lens of Marx's labor theory of value. Reiman interprets economic exchanges in a society as a form of entitlement each person has to each other's labor. This allows him to offer a "labor theory of the difference principle", in which society limits the amount of labor time the talented individuals can demand of the less endowed in exchange for higher productivity. Reiman calls this the fungibility of material and social subjugation. Social subjugation occurs when people trade unequal amounts of labor while material subjugation is caused by a lack of access to material resources. In Reiman's view, they can be interchanged. Rawls' difference principle is, in Reiman's view, the solution to the problem of limiting unequal exchanges of labor to the minimum necessary required to elicit the highest material productivity and, therefore, the least material subjugation

In the sixth and seventh chapters, Reiman brings the disparate elements together and presents his theory of Marxian Liberalism. Reiman constructs a "Marxian-Liberal original position" in which parties are aware of both the natural interest in liberty and of the coerciveness of private property. In this situation, parties aim to minimize social and material subjugation. This is done by agreeing to Rawls' difference principle as the limit of inequalities. In Reiman's view, parties in this original position would agree to three principles: one of equal liberties guaranteed at their fair value, one which limits material inequalities by the "difference principle understood in terms of the moral version of the labor theory of value" and a last principle prohibiting coercion beyond that necessary for implementing the two previous principles (p.182). Finally, according to Reiman, the three principles would be consistent with a regime of property owning democracy, but with the proviso of a right to workplace democracy.

Despite Reiman's best intentions, his project is flawed for several reasons. Firstly, his eclectic theory combines elements from philosophers with widely different world-views (Locke, Rawls and Marx). Selecting elements from incompatible writers can only have deleterious consequences for a theory. For example, to make the Marxian and the Lockean aspects consistent, Reiman claims that Marx believes that people have a strong interest in liberty and absence of coercion. He goes as far as to argue that Marx's theory of ideology means that ideological conceptions conceal (only) the coerciveness of capitalism. This conveniently excludes other aspects of the

Marxist criticism of capitalism such as the inequality of exchange between worker and capitalist. Moreover, Reiman argues that negative rights are a fundamental part of Marx. Unfortunately, this glides over Marx' criticism of negative rights far too easily.

Secondly, the force-based conception of exploitation and capitalism which underscores all of Reiman's work is radically incomplete without a theory of moral ownership. What is morally wrong in capitalism, one might ask? The fact that the system of ownership allows capitalists to coerce workers or the fact that what capitalists coerce out of workers morally belongs to the latter? One might employ force to take back something that is rightfully his. If one threatens a thief with a gun and demands nothing more than to receive back what the thief has stolen, is he committing an injustice? Unless an independent principle establishes how something is morally owned, there is nothing in force itself to ground injustice.

Reiman comes extremely close to condoning a theory of limited self-ownership, without, however, accepting this final step. He argues that, when all systems of property are subjected to moral evaluation, the basic unit of comparison is labor exhausted. Reiman offers a thought experiment which shows that he believes in self-ownership at least over the energy expended in one's work, if not one's talents. He beckons the reader to imagine three situations. In one, person A enslaves B and C, who are of similar talents and makes B work twice as much as C. In the second, A makes B work the same amount of time, but twice as intense as C. Finally, in the third, B is twice as talented as C and is made to work the same amount of time at the same intensity. Reiman leads us to conclude that B is wronged twice as badly as C in the first two situations, while only similarly bad in the third.

The volume is mostly aimed at professional philosophers with a good knowledge of the theories of Rawls, Locke and Marx, and Reiman's previous work. The book represents an attempt to fuse elements from these authors together in a single theory. Unfortunately for Reiman, the attempt is bound to fail due to the incompatibility of the wider world views these writers share.

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Gary B. Cohen, Ben W. Ansell, Robert Henry Cox and Jane Gingrich (eds.), *Social Policy in the Smaller European Union States* (New York and London: Berghahn Books, 2012)

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The contemporary focus of European politics is firmly located at the international level. Concerns about sovereign debt in peripheral countries such as Greece and the fate of the region's common currency dominate political debate and the front pages of the press across the continent. With so much depending on the solvency of the periphery and the survival of the Euro, it seems to have been almost forgotten that outcomes in both of these areas will depend not only on the willingness of the 'troika' and larger European states to provide financial assistance. The ability of smaller states to adhere to the fiscal conditions placed upon them by the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF will depend to a large extent on their own capacity to make meaningful domestic policy reforms which reduce their deficits and promote economic growth.

In this context, the volume *Social Policy in the Smaller European Union States* appears as a timely addition to our understanding of how social policy reform have been carried out since the 1980s in the EU's states outside of the 'big four' of Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. Two key points are advanced in the book. First, social policy reforms in smaller European states can be divided into two strands: 'market liberalization' reforms, which extend markets into the public sector itself; and 'social investment' reforms which create an active role for the state in supporting individuals in entering and succeeding in the private sector (p. 6). A stark contrast can be drawn between reforms of this type and the 'decommodification' model of welfare states depicted by Esping-Andersen (1990), under which the state sought to insulate the individual from the dehumanizing and harmful vagaries of the market. However, given the fiscal constraints under which southern EU states are currently pursuing reform, it would seem that these two modes are more achievable than those following a vastly more expensive decommodification model. Second, the success of reforms of either type in these states depends on three main factors: ideas which serve as 'coordination points' for discussions and agreements around reform; political support coalitions which advocate and guide reform from inception to implementation; and the institutional and historical legacies of countries, which must be amenable to the types of reforms proposed. These three aspects of social policy reform provide a theoretical starting point which would also serve well for analysts of reforms in the 'crisis states' of the EU.

The ten chapters included from authors from both the United States and Europe originated as presentations at a conference organized by the University of

Minnesota's Center for Austrian Studies in 2008. In this volume they are organized into three sections: 'The Social Investment Agenda: From Ideas to Policy?', 'Interest Coalitions, Ideas and Social Reform', and 'Diverging Institutional Legacies, Ideas and Social Reform'.

In Section I, Robert Henry Cox points directly to parties as the drivers of the 'newest politics of the welfare state' (p. 21). He sees successful changes in the Netherlands and Denmark stemming from the Social Democratic parties' ability to embrace reforms which increased the ability of individuals to be productive in the labor market. The relative lack of successful reform in Belgium is put down to an 'unreconstructed' Social Democratic movement which could not warm to a 'grand narrative of reform' in that country (pp. 27-28). Robyn Stryker, Scott R. Eliason, Eric Tranby and William Hamilton estimate the effects of female education levels on female labor force participation in fourteen countries, and find positive aggregate effects of increased female education levels on labor force participation rates. Juho Saari contributes a particularly informative analysis of welfare state reform in Finland in the wake of its recession in 1991-93. Reflecting on the case's contemporary relevance in light of the 2008 financial crisis and its European consequences, Saari notes that "Finland has already experienced such a collapse". From the 'primeval soup' of policy ideas on the table during the crisis of the early 1990s, Finland selected policies which were in line with pre-existing priorities in policy areas such as competitiveness and employment. Jorma Sipilä analyzes social expenditure data from twenty-four countries for the last thirty years to test whether a shift from 'social consumption' to 'social investment' has taken place which reflects the shift in policy objectives noted by previous scholars. He finds that there has been no secular move from 'decommodification' to 'commodification' in the OECD. Nordic states, the UK and Ireland can be considered 'social investment states', spending more on families and education than old age, but other countries such as Canada and Japan have moved further away from this model.

In Section II, Jane Gingrich makes an innovative move, problematizing a monolithic conception of market-based social welfare reforms by noting that although all include some form of competitive incentives "there is no single set of competitive incentives" applied in all cases (p. 109). Instead, parties of the Left and Right introduce diverse types of markets as tools to achieve both ideological and electoral goals. In the case of Swedish health care reform, this resulted in the Left promoting patient choice within a public health system, while the Right supported private health care without strong state control. Reinhard Heinisch shows that from 1987-2006 the Austrian corporatist social partnership was able to maintain the character of the country's welfare state due to an institutional and normative bias towards consensualism, despite international economic integration and domestic political changes. Sara Watson's fascinating comparison of Spain and Portugal shows that differences in pre-reform institutions and bargaining positions between labor and

employers explain the divergent outcomes of labor market reforms in the two countries.

In Section III, Kieke G.H. Okma *et al.* give short qualitative descriptions of health care reforms in seven small countries during the last thirty years. Ben Ansell applies a model of higher education policy and reform to explain developments in Germany, Austria and Switzerland since World War Two. Countries align with one of three ideal types of higher education system: partially private, mass public or elite. Austria is transitioning from an elite to a mass partially private system, while Germany and Switzerland remain elite systems. Paulette Kurzer, like any visitor to Vienna's famous coffee houses, notes Austria's stubborn refusal to impose restrictions on smoking in public places, which stands in contrast to the vast majority of EU countries' policies. She explains this policy outcome, in a comparison to the country's relatively strong measures against genetically modified crops, by a combination of national attitudes towards different policy areas (strict health policies are regarded as 'fascist' due to their use by the Nazi regime) and strong lobbying interests.

A critique which can be leveled at parts of the volume is a lack of substantive focus on small EU member states as promised in the book's title. In fact, the countries which count as "the smaller European Union states" are not listed in a concise and non-contradictory manner (see, for example, pp. 2-3). When, in addition, many of the chapters include analysis of – or are even focused on – countries as diverse as Germany and Taiwan, the main premise of the book as stated in the introduction is somewhat undermined. However, although the volume at times does not deliver on its promise to focus on the smaller EU states, the chapters included are, on the whole, of a high standard and will be read with great interest by scholars of social policy in Europe and elsewhere.

Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

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In his 1999 review of the second edition of Sidney G. Tarrow's *Power in Movement*, William A. Gamson predicted the publication of a third edition of the book within a half-dozen years. Although it took a little longer, he was right. Students of social movements and contentious politics are now reading a "fresh from the oven" edition of what almost two decades ago became an "instant classic". The revised and updated edition of this theoretically and conceptually rich piece is informed by the major recent developments in the field and illustrated by up-to-date empirical

cases. Moreover, the third edition of *Power in Movement* responds to the main lacunae identified in previous editions and reflects the intellectual trajectories of its author, a “recovering structuralist”. In the review that follows I will present what I consider to be three of the most important messages of this new edition and then I will briefly discuss the opportunities it opens for the study of civil wars as contentious politics.

Political opportunities and constraints (Chapter 8) are still the key analytical device in Tarrow’s attempt to address the macro-level question of when it is that people band together and engage in contentious politics. His master argument is in keeping with previous editions: “it is changes in public political opportunities and constraints that create the most important incentive for triggering new phases of contention for people with collective claims” (p. 13). However, in this new edition, Tarrow makes it clearer than ever that these opportunities and constraints are not categorically “objective” and, thus, they do not automatically trigger/halt episodes of contention. For contentious collective action to happen, actors need to be emotionally engaged by their claims; and for opportunities to become the source of mobilization, they need to be perceived, attributed and framed. Moreover, in this process, some actors can demonstrate the availability of opportunities to other actors and trigger cycles of contention (Chapter 10). In elaborating these arguments, Tarrow incorporates the role of perception, emotion, and framing (Chapter 7), thereby welcoming some of the major insights from the cultural tradition into social movement research.

The first message of *Power in Movement*, then, is blunt: if we are to really profit from the “cultural turn” in the study of contention, its major concepts need to be linked to the political process, moving away from the erroneous idea that its inclusion represents a zero-sum game.

In this new edition, readers also see how the study of collective contention goes beyond social movements and how contentious politics can take place in settings that differ noticeably from the one that gave rise to the bulk of social movements (Introduction & Chapter 1). The empirical cases with which Tarrow illustrates his claims and the ways in which he integrates new scholarly initiatives and findings into his work reflect a sharp departure from the earlier too narrow focus on Western European and North American reform movements. Through this broader lens we see the social movement canon both enriched and challenged by more violent forms of contention and informed by episodes arising in places like Gaza, India, and the former Soviet Union. Thus, Tarrow’s second message is also straightforward: the narrow framework of social movements should not tie down students of the burgeoning and broader field of contentious politics.

The mechanism-and-process approach to contentious politics developed and fostered by Tarrow over the last decade, alone and in collaboration with Charles Tilly and Doug McAdam, is fully integrated into an almost completely re-written third part of the book. In the systematic search for mechanisms and processes across different forms of contention (Chapter 9), the “powers in movement” Tarrow has presented us with since the first edition of *Power in Movement* acquire a clearer dynamic, relational, and interactive fashion. Moreover, in a convincing and methodologically sound manner, the author shows that a mechanistic approach to explanation can contribute to the advancement of the analysis of the “how” of contentious politics. The book’s third message is therefore both methodologically useful and epistemologically controversial: causal arguments do not only depend on measuring causal effects and determining the strength of correlations between variables, but also on the identification of pathways between inputs and outputs.

As we might expect, introducing several contexts into the same framework has important repercussions that should not be overlooked. The study of civil war as contentious politics, especially if we take civilian agency seriously, is a case in point. At least two key implications should be considered.

First, if we aim to specify the mechanisms and processes underlying combatants’ and civilians’ collective behavior and if we are to improve the quality of the data with which we analyze episodes of contention in the midst of a civil war, we need to scale down to the subnational level. The micro foundations of civil war dynamics are hardly captured from a national perspective and present considerable within-nation variation. Therefore, if we are to integrate the regime type analysis that has been a central component in studies of contentious politics, we need to identify ways to assess and characterize the forms that the regime take at the local level in the middle of a civil wars. When both space and sovereignty are fragmented and actors different from the state have control over parts of the territory and influence a wide range of civilian affairs, we should expect the dynamics of collective action at the local level to be largely independent from the general character of the regime at the national level.

Second, if we are to recognize and truly address the de facto control and authority that different warring parties have over local territories and populations, we need to relativize the centrality of the government in our definition of what counts as contentious politics and what does not. Illegal armed groups, such as guerrillas and paramilitaries, may control substantial coercive means, enjoy priority in the use of such means over governmental organizations, and influence a wide range of civilian affairs within delimited local territories. Therefore, many collective interactions in a civil war context, especially those involving civilian behavior towards armed actors, might be both political and contentious even if they hardly bring the government in as mediator, target, or claimant.

In sum, this new edition of *Power in Movement*, like the previous ones, is a must read for students of collective action and social movements and, more broadly, for those working in the fields of comparative politics and political sociology. Moreover, due to its geographically and thematically expanded scope, it also emerges as a book that offers valuable insight for any student looking at multiple forms of contention and in distinct settings. I am confident that this book will help build much needed bridges between thematic literatures that more often than not advance in “cordial indifference” to each other’s findings.

Thayer Scudder, *Global Threats, Global Futures: Living with Declining Living Standards* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

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Indisputably, global threats have become *the* topical agenda of both the last and this century, both in national and international fora. Irrespective of their geopolitical aspects, individual states and institutions have made efforts to address them; nevertheless, poverty, unemployment, pollution, environmental degradation, fundamentalism and other threats around the globe are surging substantially. Scudder’s book, *Global Threats, Global Futures: Living with Declining Living Standards*, provides a detailed account of three among the many global threats: poverty, fundamentalism and environmental degradation. The title further establishes the links between these threats and the general decline in the living standards for humankind globally.

The main theme of the volume can be described in two ways:. The first is the interconnectivity of the global threats to people’s living standards in terms of better social services, housing, nutrition, and the general wellbeing. It is argued that poverty, environmental degradation and fundamentalism have and continue to adversely impact on the lives of the great majority of mankind across the entire globe. Hunger, civil wars, insecurity, economic crisis and diseases are said to be fundamentally the result of these threats. Secondly, the author hypothesizes the unsatisfactory role that individual states and multilateral efforts and policies play in respect to combating the threats. He contends that, to a large extent, national and international policies have been antithetical to combating the threats and hence contribute to the sustenance and sharpening of these threats. The author argues that the policies that are put in place to control the threats have in fact exacerbated both the threats and the decline in living standards of the global community. For instance, the author is critical of the growth driven policies of the international financial institutions as being drivers of income inequalities amongst the

communities and hence increase in relative poverty. The author is also critical of individual state actions, particularly those of the United States and China, for not playing their roles and taking the actions necessary to combat the threats.

Methodologically, the title has benefited from the rich expertise, long research experience, and the diverse geographical coverage of the information that the author pulls together to argue his case. Such a diverse combination of settings present the different status of actors involved in the issue of global threats. The book's organization into seven chapters is chronologically and sequentially logical to enable the reader to grasp the presented stuff. The first three chapters discuss each of the three threats using empirical cases as diverse as the Tamil speaking Hindu in Sri Lanka to the Dinka community and Gwembe Tonga community in Southern Sudan and Zambia, respectively. The subsequent three chapters draw empirical cases from the United States, China and Zambia as cases of how national policies have contributed to the anchoring of the global threats and, subsequently, declining living standards. Chapter seven proposes the ideal future global societies if the threats are to be contained. The all around empirical experiences that the author uses to amplify his key argument elevates the book to a global explanatory framework and reflects its title.

Unimpeded global threats, sometimes supported by the governments as is the case with fundamentalism in Sri Lanka and the United States of America. Despite many efforts against the threats, both national and international, yet there is less indication that the human community will soon be released from their captivity. Environmental degradation is surging, poverty is much worse than it used to be, religious and economic fundamentalism is burgeoning and the terrorist groups are reigning in many parts of the world. Notwithstanding the positive declarations of economic growth in different countries, the living standards of people are miserable. The fundamentalist policies of the governments and of the international financial institutions – politically and economically – have significantly contributed to declining living standards. Still worse, this is coupled with an apparent lack of commitment by governments and institutions to redress the situation.

The author has articulated the threats to the extent of providing a theoretical footing in terms of how they relate to the living standards. The causal link that is established between variables provides both empirical and theoretical explanations of the problem. For instance, the fact that the author links relative poverty to civil wars, absolute poverty to people's insensitivity, and moderate poverty to rebels' recruitment make for fascinating causal-relationships. The different forms of fundamentalism and their inflexibility to transform is shown to be an inhibiting factor to better living standards, generally a theory that is being advanced is that fundamentalism is inimical to better living standards. As an example, the author shows how political and religious fundamentalism have adversely impacted on the

living standards of the Tamil speaking Hindus in Sri Lanka, but also the economic and political fundamentalism of the United State and the way it has impacted on the USA itself and the Arab world at large.

Notwithstanding the plausibility of the arguments advanced in the book, the book does not seem to be guided nor informed by any clear theoretical roots. While noting that the scholarly background of the author is anthropology, the book would have been much better if it would be informed by international political economy theories such as the liberalism, neo-liberalism or realism. Had any of these theories been applied, issues like the Washington based policies, economic fundamentalism and environmental issues would have been depicted differently. The author confuses the reader when he insists on poverty alleviation yet remains scared of the consequential overconsumption threat which could be explained by Marxism theory.

Secondly, despite the fact that the author has brilliantly presented and argued his case, too few alternatives have been provided to the different puzzles that were raised in the book. While the author criticizes the growth oriented development policies of the IFIs by labeling it 'growth without development', he does not provide a substantial recommendation as to the reforms of these institutions. Ending by proposing an external oversight board to such seriously "interest driven" entities as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is much the same as ridiculing them. Scudder talks of sustainable development without providing a way forward, he only ends with simplistic sentences like, "[b]ut, at the same time, the consumption threat posed by success needs to be anticipated and addressed" (p. 31), leaving the readers puzzled with a genuinely perceived threat but without an escape route.

On the whole, I commend the title as a piece which has, to a great extent, managed to address and highlight the key challenges that the globe faces with respect to poverty, fundamentalism and environmental degradation. In that regards, the book stands out as one of the most plausible global handbooks for national and international policy makers, political practitioners, academics and the general public altogether.

A P J Abdul Kalam and Srijan Pal Singh, *Target 3 Billion, PURA: Innovative Solutions towards Sustainable Development* (Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2011)

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The quest for an equitable, just and peaceful society has been a subject of intellectual enquiry since antiquity. Human civilization has witnessed several social, economic and political upheavals in search of reasons and virtues of knowledge as the foundation of polity and construction of society. History says that political systems perished and social systems crumbled when they failed to cope with challenges of their age. When threats of climate change looms large, the global economy is yet to completely recover from the economic recession, and a huge sections of global society that numbers more than 1.5 billion suffer from violence, conflict and are deprived of basic facilities for a decent life, achieving environmentally compatible high economic growth for welfare of people is a daunting challenge of our times. Pessimistic opinions, although perhaps exaggerated, put human survival at stake. These challenges are further aggravated for the developing and least developed countries as they have large numbers of poor and hungry people and have been severely hit by both climate change and economic downturn.

In an interconnected world, public goods, fundamental human rights, sustainable development, peace, only a few to name, should not be analyzed in isolation; rather they should be viewed as global public goods and as the responsibility of the entire world community. Several soft security threats emanates from the denial of basic rights to people in terms of political, economic and social development across the world, and they have implications for the entire world community. In such a global context, former President of India, A P J Abdul Kalam, along with Srijan Pal Singh, envision a peaceful and prosperous world through scientific and socially compatible innovative solutions for ensuring sustainable development. They perceive sustainable development as 'fundamental ingredient in the evolution of happy, peaceful and prosperous nations and societies'(p.vii). Being a scientist, President Kalam and his collaborator Singh obviously emphasized technological intervention for promoting sustainable development and uplifting of the downtrodden in societies across the world. Yet, interestingly, they have also called for various social and religious norms to be mainstreamed into scientific methods for inclusive and eco-friendly development. Their urge for the primacy of logic and the virtues of science for social empowerment and economic development is amply evident in their book. It has taken a critical account of social, political, economic problems across the world and calls for scientific solutions and innovations for provide basic services for a establishing a peaceful and prosperous society.

The last two centuries have witnessed a fundamental transformation of world. The authors have acknowledged that the transformative impacts of science and technology, economics, politics and religion are tangible across the world. But the advancement of science and technology and scale of production and manufacturing have not trickled down to the bottom level of the society. Highlighting the gap

between the rich and the poor as well as among the nations, and contradictions in development trajectories, the authors have noted that “the top fifth of the world’s population in the wealthiest nations benefits from 82 percent of the expanding export trade and 68 percent of foreign direct investment while the bottom fifth, in terms of wealth, is left with around 1 percent of each” (p.3). They further note, “the ratio of the 20 percent of the people living in the richest nations to the 20 percent in the poorest nations, stood at about seventy-two times” (p.4). While discussing global disparity, authors have also highlighted the prevailing equality and social and economic challenges in India, particularly in rural India. Despite the immense potential, agriculture’s contribution is less than one fifth of GDP. To bring sustainability and vibrancy to agriculture efforts should be made in production, processing and marketing. They attempt to broaden the concept of sustainable development of the Brundtland Commission, which had primarily taken an anthropological approach to sustainability. They have included technological, value, learning and adaptability in addition to the traditional elements of the economy, society and the environment.

The authors noted that old age observation of the father of the Indian nation, Mahatma Gandhi, holds much water: that India lives in its villages and the real urge and potential of development lies with them. Today it is more than obvious that rural India is still deprived of basic infrastructure, including roads, schools, power supply, and hospitals. Around two-thirds of Indians still live in villages but they accounts for merely 20 per cent of the economy. To put rural India in a global perspective, the authors have discussed the various social and economic development and environmental indicators, including agro-production, literacy level, sanitation, access to public health, GHGs emission, energy, renewable energy, and enterprise development, and compared India with African, Asian and European countries. In many cases, the book serves as an eye opener for policy makers as the country lags African and war ravaged countries in various health and social development indicators. Trickle down effects of a high economic growth rate, the boom in IT sector, and a soaring stock market are yet to be realized in rural areas. The largest number of malnourished children, conspicuously high level of poverty, one of most adverse sex ratios, energy poverty, only to name a few, are a matter of great concern for the country. To affect social transformation, the authors argue for a multi-prong approach that consists of access to basic amenities, IT and financial services and societal harmony.

Energy is integral to every development model. Now potential threats of carbon based development have endangered our planet. There is an urgent need to harness renewable sources of energy for social and economic development, as well as for containing GHG emissions. Recognizing the significance of modern energy services for sustainable development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations declared 2012 as the “International Year of Sustainable Energy for

All". Therefore, President Kalam's and Srijan Pal Singh's call for harnessing renewable sources of clean energy and exploring possibilities for generating energy from municipal waste is most apt. The perils of a top-down approach for development undermines the prospects for popular participation. The realization in full of local enterprises and popular participation in the planning, execution, sustenance and growth at the local level are essential for sustainable development.

The uniqueness of the book lies in its problem-solving and solution-oriented approach. A comprehensive approach that provides a fine blend of scientific and social innovations is required to intervene in rural areas to provide basic facilities for a decent life and to provide their due in the development process. They call for harnessing natural resources with help of innovation without tempering the social values and virtues of nature. A great deal of information has been assembled and a number of case studies are cited in a systematic and theoretical framework. Explanation through sustainable development models for agriculture, community participation or eco-friendly sustainable development can be curious cases for implementation in developing countries across the world. This book, more appropriately called a visionary document for the developing world and for India, is excellent and compulsory reading for development professionals, planners, and decisions makers so that a vision for a more equitable and peaceful world can be realized.

Rainer Eisfeld, *Radical Approaches to Political Science: Roads Less Traveled* (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2012)

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As suggested in the title of this volume, Rainer Eisfeld, Professor emeritus of Political Science at Osnabrück University, pursues paths that others rarely have; in so doing, he uproots conventional thinking in areas involving salient contemporary issues and their proximal orbits within the political science constellation. Serving as an unorthodox agent of this field, Eisfeld covers a wide range of conceptions and attitudes throughout the book. His work on the nature of political science and its function as an academic discipline is one of the most recent and most unique contributions to this budding collection of work within the field.

Eisfeld's ambitious engagement with the subject matter casts light upon new and alternative approaches in terms of reshaping political science with 21st century relevance, the creation of a discipline with a heightened regional scope, and the adoption of flexible new frameworks that are of service to pluralism and the changing nature of democratic governance. Inherent within the chapters are chords

of critical political theory, factors of diversity and convergence, private and public interest amid an environment of anti-democratic thought, ideological dimensions of violence within culture, frontier myth, as well as transitions toward democracy within the Western Europe sphere. As such, the volume features a rich blend of traditional practices and perceptions, radical interpretation, historical dynamism, societal conflict, and power relations that cut across conventional boundaries from being both interdisciplinary and anti-disciplinary in critical thought and expression.

Among the five chapters that comprise this volume, the first is a critical assessment of the potential corrosion that has taken place within the field, highlighting the view that political science has recently been seen as a “largely useless science that does not supply knowledge” (p. 13). Responding to the sentiment, Eisfeld calls attention to the idea that bringing “pressing regional and global challenges closer to their solution is a political project that involves many years (history), levels (structure), and players (agency)” (p. 15). That is, a democratic environment is absolutely vital to the breeding of a discipline that is equipped with the emancipated acuties to support and strengthen that environment, and one must question the environment for which the discipline has evolved and come to indulge. “Political science,” it is therefore contended in this opening section, should “(re-) define itself as a science of democracy, as it did with particular emphasis subsequent to the Great Depression and World War II, to Fascism and Stalinism” (p. 15).

Eisfeld shifts the level of analysis to East-Central Europe, where he addresses the impact of politics, factors of diversity, and forces of convergence. Embracing hybrid regimes amid the backdrop of political science traditionally being viewed as a “moral” discipline fulfills operational and qualitative requirements to present a powerful narrative, which the author states that, “political scientists may find helpful in cases where the discipline’s institutionalization meets with resistance” (p. 75). Research within this chapter intersects with democracy and democratization, and what is referred to as “authoritarian temptations” so as to flesh out the “gray zone” in which we find functioning hybrid regimes. Eisfeld uses cases found within East-Central Europe, and Eastern Europe more generally, to properly explore regime hybridization and ideological continuities within political science. The cases presented assist in the establishment of a hypothesized relationship between external factors as political events and the impingement upon the evolution of political science as an academic discipline.

Narrowing his analytical focus, Eisfeld examines Germany as a case in which events of the 20th century have “repeatedly produced drastic changes in social structure, ideological orientation, political behavior, and governmental set-up” (p. 105). The essence of Eisfeld’s exploration within the third chapter is the idea that a lack of institutional immunity to authoritarianism existed during the course of the transitional period between the end of the First World War and the ascendance of

National Socialism in Germany in 1933. Forging the argument that political science was reduced to an instrument of Nazism, Eisfeld subsequently explores a host of factors behind the political science communities' heterogeneity and the manner in which various branches of the discipline differed in their resistance to or "immunity" to antidemocratic temptations of the era. Whereas the discipline appeared inherently subservient to the forces of authoritarianism within Hitlerite Germany, following the catastrophic downfall of the Third Reich, the paradigmatic reorientation of political education took place so as to effectively provide new and positive democratic structures and processes of democratization (p. 107).

A natural progression follows as resistance and collusion of the academic discipline and institution presented in the third chapter bleed into the strange relationship between political science and ideology found within the penultimate chapter. What Eisfeld refers to as the "myths and realities of the frontier of violence," provides the groundwork for delving into the landscapes of human imagination and "frontier experience" (p. 169). Here, the author utilizes the myth as well as the factual life of an archetypical gunfighter as found in America's formative years of development throughout the Wild West. This critical analysis contributes to understanding stages of national development in the American context for its linking of the legitimization of violence to historical narratives. Attaching historical "sense" to the ideology of violence produces a powerful epic narrative, the "fatal continuity," of which, "indeed permits, as suggested by Richard Slotkin, to speak of a 'gunfighter nation' with regard to patterns of attitude and behavior unchangingly extolled by books, film, even encyclopaediae" (p. 182).

The final chapter interrogates and problematizes the relationship that Portugal shares with Western Europe, and explains a critical period in the European Union's (EU) formation and history. According to Eisfeld, the "constraints of Portugal's persisting political and economic imbalances might overwhelm the advantages of EC [European Community] entry" (p. 207). Despite an overwhelming wave of effort within Portuguese society, the advent of what is referred to as a rash of development, which in turn fostered new transnational and traditional international agents, has funneled total diplomacy. Permeating domestic politics, these forces are shown to become acceptable instruments of local governments influencing domestic and foreign policies that might not have otherwise been observed. The idea of penetration and manipulation are central themes within the Portugal case, and are applicable to other reaches across the European map and further abroad.

The Frankfurt tradition is everywhere evident in Eisfeld's writing, and the marked pluralism applied to the variety of cases and scenarios included throughout this book may act as instruments with which additional analyses elsewhere in the social sciences may be launched. Indeed, the multidisciplinary approach featured in this work is a praiseworthy application of many years' experience, interest, and expertise

within the field of comparative history and the popular arts, among others. Reinforcing the value of a multidisciplinary methodology in the social sciences, Einfeld's writing is festooned with a valuable qualitative and context-specific approach. Drawing upon the foundational logic of competing and complimentary rationalities and synthesizing their various strands aptly supports the notion that Einfeld's highly-liberal work in political science may well be the incarnation of the Habermasian, Adornoian, and Horkheimer foundations associated with social intersubjectivity and emancipation for audiences and actors of political science of the contemporary period.

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