

# MILITARY DISLOYALTY AND REGIME CHANGE

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## Abstract

*The study examines the dynamics behind the disloyal behavior of the armed forces in cases of the formation of social movements for regime change. The study adopts a theoretical framework and applies statistical analysis on a dataset from 1990 to 2012 to examine the projected dynamics at work. The proposition is that autocrats create loyalty through financial benefits and the privileged position of the armed forces, which is strengthened by the selection procedures that keep the armed forces distant from society, including the creation of voluntary forces and the application of discriminative selection procedures to both the rank and file and the officer corps.*

**Keywords:** authoritarianism, military disloyalty, social movements, revolutions

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Mass protests on the streets demanding regime change are unquestionably extraordinary times in the history of a state. Nevertheless, they are quite frequent phenomena in world history; therefore, the narratives on why certain social movements or revolutionary attempts succeed or fail are countless. The role of the armed forces in determining the outcome of these attempts has received varying attention during the so-called “third wave of democratization”.<sup>2</sup> During the transitions in Latin America the influence of the military was considered to be a significant factor, as the states of the region were widely impregnated with military power. However, the effect of the military on the outcome of regime change efforts has been somewhat reduced in the literature and the academic discourse following the transitions in East Central Europe, where the armed forces played a relatively minor role in the process. The uprisings in the Middle East beginning in 2010 have, however, raised awareness again about the importance of coercive institutions with regards to the final outcome of the social movements. The result of the protests and revolts of the Middle East demanding democratic reforms and regime change during the Arab Spring seemed to be very much influenced by the position the military took. One could even have made the superficial statement that the military’s position was almost decisive. In Egypt and Tunisia the military sided with

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1 I would like to express my gratitude to Carsten Q. Schneider for his invaluable guidance for my thesis on which this study was based, furthermore, to Eszter Tímár for all her advice on academic writing.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization In the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

popular demands and forced autocrats to exit power, whereas in Syria and Bahrain civil society was nearly helpless against the regime, the power of which was supported by the majority of the armed forces. Yet the question as to whether the circumstances influencing the loyalty shifts within the military in each of these cases were systematic or *sui generis*, remained largely unanswered.

The observation that the military has the ability to preserve the regime should not come as a surprise. The armies of the Middle East had played a significant role ever since the formation of the states in the region (for example in Syria, Egypt and Iraq).<sup>3</sup> These armies were generally inward-looking, aimed at the repression of the opposition, whether it was under the rule of a colonial power, or a non-democratic government.<sup>4</sup> The same can be said of Latin America. Interestingly, despite the central role of the armed forces in the maintenance of internal order, in a significant number of cases the armed forces were in favor of transition and liberalization.<sup>5</sup> Another set of examples, the Color Revolutions, show that weak relations between the regime and the military were conducive to the success of social movements. In Beissinger's study on the Color Revolutions the analysis of structural factors suggests that in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia, the states with successful social movements, the relationship between the armed forces and the regime were troubled, whereas in case of the unsuccessful ones (Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan) these ties were rather strong.<sup>6</sup>

According to the empirical evidence, military loyalty or disloyalty to the regime is an important factor to consider for social movements and for authoritarian regimes who seek survival all over the globe. If we take a closer look at the literature of transition, democratization and revolution, the role of coercive mechanisms was seriously considered by prominent scholars, such as Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, Diana E. H. Russell and Theda Skocpol. The question, however, remains: why remain loyal or why choose to be disloyal? This puzzle has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. Most of the studies that consider military loyalty as an important factor for regime survival usually do not go beyond the scope of small-N

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3 Nicola Pratt, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World* (London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2007), 38.

4 Bruce W. Farcau, "Lessons from Latin America for the Muslim World," in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 142.

5 Felipe Agüero, "The Military And The Limits To Democratization," in *Issues In Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies In a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 166.

6 Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Exemplar in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives On Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 2. (2007), 272.

comparative case studies, or they enumerate influential variables for only one historical era and geographic area. On the one hand, comparative case studies are useful to create fine-grained arguments, to understand small differences and the dynamics of certain events. On the other hand, if scholars apply different variables across different studies, the results will not bring political scientists closer to a general understanding of loyalty and disloyalty, not to mention that they might make contradictory conclusions about the same variable for different cases. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a general theory and determine a series of influential variables to complement the case studies. The aim of this article is to embark on a road towards understanding how these dynamics universally work. This article will seek to build a framework to explain the loyalty shifts within the armed forces that occur during a popular attempt to change the regime.

The proposition herein is that autocrats have two fundamental methods to control the population and institutions: loyalty creation (through ideology and rents) and repression.<sup>7</sup> Those autocrats that manage to distribute rents and those that make efforts to control the armed forces by keeping them distant from society are more likely to survive the storm of an attempted regime change. Based on these background ideas, a series of variables were identified that predict the functioning or the break-down of the loyalty creating mechanisms. The variables include financial benefits, the privileged position of the armed forces as compared to other coercive institutions, specific recruitment methods and the selection of the leadership of the armed forces from a specific group of society in order to keep the army distant from the rest of the population.

Statistical analyses provide evidence for this hypothesis on a cross section of regime change movements throughout the world. The study, therefore, embarks on a road taken by few: to approach civil-military relations from a theoretical point of view and test the theories on a representative sample.

In the first section the theory of military disloyalty and the hypotheses will be established. In the second section the concept of disloyalty and the possible structural variables will be advanced that might influence military loyalty, such as privileges, rivalry and the distance of the armed forces from society. In the third section of the article the variables will be operationalized and the dataset will be introduced. In the last section the effect of the variables on military loyalty will be tested by a series of statistical analyses, with special attention to the influence of budget change, the presence of rival security forces, type of recruitment and discriminative selection mechanisms.

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7 Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33, 36.

## 2. The Theory of Military Disloyalty

The research on why military loyalty is essential for regime survival is quite extensive. Skocpol points out that a successful revolution is impossible without the break-down of the state, which is marked by the inability of the central administration to maintain its control over the coercive institutions.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, successful uprisings can only be carried out by armed forces abandoning their loyalty towards the regime. Similarly, Stepan claimed that an authoritarian regime can preserve its position if (1) it can maintain its support network including the “unity” of the coercive institutions and (2) its power can be measured against the opposition’s ability to present itself as a compelling option to align to.<sup>9</sup>

Russell examined the potential effect of military loyalty concerning the outcome of rebellions in a comparative framework.<sup>10</sup> She showed that the military and the police had to be coherent and they had to be effectively used in order to make revolutionary aims unsuccessful.<sup>11</sup> She did not, however, examine what determined loyalty or the lack of loyalty towards the regime.

Considering the theories, it is difficult to foresee when the armed forces can be expected to break ties with a regime. As Stepan noted,

any large complex organization has some institutional interests of its own and prerogatives its members seek to advance, as well as some changes or outcomes in the overall political system that it, more than other organizations, particularly fears and resists. Complex organizations thus have interests and capacities to advance their interests.<sup>12</sup>

Clearly, the military is one of these institutions. At the cross-section of the interests of the armed forces and the will of the governance to exercise control over the military stands the effort of the governance to build a network of support in the institutions, especially in coercive bodies. In the *Political Economy of a Dictatorship* Wintrobe put forward a theory on the institutions of autocracies, claiming that institutions are merely the tools of the regime to redistribute spoils among its supporters and eliminate its enemies, thus serving as a complementary tool to

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8 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.

9 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 55.

10 Diane, E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force* (London: Academic Press, 1974).

11 Jack A. Goldstone, “Theories Of Revolution: The Third Generation,” *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (1980), 436.

12 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 10.

repression.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, regimes combine loyalty and repression in order to be able to remain in office. Accordingly, gaining loyalty among the members of the armed forces would be a result of the combination of personal, institutional and economic benefits.

Bellin reached similar conclusions, when examining why a regime would lose its means of coercion. She enumerated the following factors: disloyalty is caused by (1) fiscal problems where the state is unable to maintain the means of coercion, (2) when the regime loses its international legitimacy, (3) when there is a large mobilization against the regime, and (4) when there is a high level of institutionalization in the coercive apparatus.<sup>14</sup> Bellin put emphasis on the resources, claiming that the financial difficulties of the autocracies trickle down to the coercive apparatus, thereby making it hard for the government to maintain their military. A case in point is the Middle East, where regimes continued to maintain or even increase the defense budget despite the economic problems they faced.<sup>15</sup>

However, it is important to point out that beside to the distribution of spoils, control mechanisms cannot be spared. The control within the military is fundamentally exercised through a "principal-agent" relationship. Feaver proposed that military obedience should not be treated as default but is a result of the threat of civilians (or the superiors) to detect military "shirking".<sup>16</sup> The assumption behind principal-agent relationships is that the agents act on behalf of and in accordance with the will of the principal. However, autocracies often lack formal control mechanisms, which are essential for the systematic control against shirking.<sup>17</sup>

Even worse (for an autocrat) is that although the primary route of enforcement functions through the hierarchical chain, it would be an over-simplification to claim that hierarchy is the only influential relation. Wintrobe and Breton analyzed hierarchical organizations where they found that there are fundamentally two directions where trust or loyalty can work: either horizontally or vertically.<sup>18</sup> Vertical loyalty functions when trade occurs between the subordinates and superiors, whereas horizontal loyalty networks mark exchanges between subordinates.

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13 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 4.

14 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36. No. 2. (January 2004): 144.

15 Eva Bellin, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32.

16 Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 14.

17 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 27.

18 Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, "The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 94.No. 5. (October 1986): 910.

Consequently, although the operation of hierarchical organizations is primarily rooted in vertical loyalty, horizontal relations have to be taken into account, as well. When horizontal loyalty takes primacy, efficiency is reduced and vertical loyalties will be damaged.<sup>19</sup>

Mapping the importance of horizontal relations in a large and socially diverse institution is a difficult, nearly impossible task. When there is a popular challenge to a regime the reactions on the individual level are nearly impossible to forecast. What follows from the theories outlined above is that disloyalty can be the result of three, non-exclusive mechanisms:

- (1) the failure of vertical enforcement and spoiler mechanisms,
- (2) the emerging primacy of the horizontal relations,
- (3) external influences.

In the previous paragraphs the first reason has been already identified. However, the second and third mechanisms need further clarification. When a mass movement challenges the regime, it is hard to avoid taking sides. The question of who is a potentially disloyal soldier or officer is unforeseeable to the outside observer. It is very similar to the "identification problem" raised by Kalyvas in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.<sup>20</sup> The identification problem reflects on the issue that it is often hard to grasp for the environment what side the individual takes in case of a crisis. Kalyvas points out that when violence occurs, "preference formation" can be based on grievances, economic considerations, fear of violence, ethnic, religious, class and other ties.<sup>21</sup> This should be no difference when a regime cracks down on its own citizens.

The identification issue and the preference issue are highly connected to the horizontal loyalty and to external influences. It is logical to assume that when the soldier identifies himself with the opponents of the regime, because of external influences and interests (e.g. grievances, family), or because of horizontal loyalties come into the foreground (e.g. ethnicity), the likelihood of disloyalty will be bigger.

The aim of this study is not to examine individual-level data but to focus on structural variables, certain identifiable mechanisms within the armed forces that raise the probability of the identification problem and raise the odds of disloyalty. Such mechanisms are likely to cause loyalty towards the leadership to be secondary as compared to the external or horizontal influences. An umbrella concept for

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19 Ibid.

20 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89.

21 Ibid., 94-104.

these external and horizontal influences is the distance from society. Chenoweth and Stephan used the term “social distance”<sup>22</sup> to explain why some coercive institutions are more useful for maintaining repression than others: when the coercive institutions are distant from society, the probability that networks exist between its members and the protestors is smaller, therefore making disloyalty less probable (e.g. the soldiers are recruited from a different country, or they are a member of a special, advantaged group).<sup>23</sup>

An example of the measurement of the distance from society is the recruitment of the army: conscription does not entail long-term loyalty-creating mechanisms as compared to voluntary affiliation.<sup>24</sup> The conscripts are part of the armed forces for a couple of months and, in most cases, the service does not lead to a career; in comparison, the volunteers, for whom being a member of the armed forces entails long-term interests such as livelihood and career, are likely to demonstrate more loyalty. Another example might be a state where the majority of the population is ruled and disadvantaged by a minority ethnicity. When popular mobilization occurs, defection will be more likely to happen, as the networks between the members of the armed forces and the protestors, or horizontal loyalty between the members of the military coming from the same disadvantaged ethnicity might gain priority over institutional or vertical loyalty.

Before establishing the hypotheses, let us summarize the most important assumptions of this theoretical section. The first assumption claimed that rents and privileges are likely to contribute to the conservation of the loyalty of the armed forces. The second assumption proposed that vertical loyalty has to enjoy primacy over horizontal loyalty in order to maintain the chain of command and the institutional efficiency. When horizontal loyalties or external influences come in the foreground, vertical loyalty becomes endangered. Based on these assumptions the following hypotheses can be formulated:

Hypothesis 1: Armies that continue to receive generous economic benefits are less likely to be disloyal.

Hypothesis 2: Armies whose influence remains primary compared to other coercive institutions (paramilitary forces, police) are less likely to be disloyal.

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22 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 189.

23 Ibid., 46.

24 Derek Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*, (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), available at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Arab-Uprisings-and-Armed-Forces-Between-Openness-and-Resistance> (accessed January 10, 2012), 15.

Hypothesis 3: Armies whose selection mechanisms keep the army distant from society are less likely to be disloyal.

Before beginning the hypothesis testing, the following section will elaborate on the conceptual background of the study and the potentially influential variables.

## 2.1 *The Concept of Disloyalty*

Loyalty, in the context of this study should not only be understood as a motive that necessarily includes emotional attachment, but rather as the acknowledgement of the special relationship between the military and the governance: in theory, the military is a tool of coercion in the hands of the government, therefore, departure from this relationship must entail special considerations.<sup>25</sup> Defection, in this case, should be understood as a form of lack of loyalty.

Kalyvas conceptualized defection in the context of civil wars. Although the focuses of the two researches are rather different, there are some concepts that are worth considering for military defection, as well. Firstly, Kalyvas divided defection into "public" and "private", regarding the domain which is affected by the action.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, he disaggregated defection into three subgroups: "noncompliance", "informing" and "switching sides".<sup>27</sup>

Figure 1 shows the disaggregation of the concept of disloyalty applied by this study. At the "softest" end, disloyalty means "noncompliance"<sup>28</sup>, when the disloyal member does not actively seek to support the contesting power or diminish the power of the regime, but refuse to carry out commands, or refuse to transmit the orders of the government to the troops. This can happen privately and publicly. Private noncompliance causes damage to the extent which the disloyal individual is replaceable. A more active form of noncompliance is when it happens publicly; at the extreme it contains an assurance towards the public and the protestors that they are safe from military intervention. This case is already bordering on defection.


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25 Simon Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-23.

26 Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 104.

27 Ibid., 105.

28 Ibid.

**Figure 1: The Disaggregation of the Concept of Disloyalty**

Defection<sup>29</sup> entails the active sabotage of orders, with the inclusion of desertion from the military. The division of defection into private and public is possible, although less straightforward. Desertion from the armed forces might be an example of a private defection. When defection is public (e.g. threatening the police with intervention in case of violence), it is very close to the extreme form of disloyalty, sedition, proving, that sedition and defection are close concepts. Sedition is a legal category, including acts of disloyalty with the sole purpose to bring down a government, usually using violence. Sedition, therefore, is the most extreme form of disloyalty. Although the immense difference between noncompliance and sedition must be acknowledged, the study is restricted to the use of the umbrella concept of disloyalty during the statistical tests. The reason is that the measurement of disloyalty in each case would require sources that are rarely available about military organizations. Still, using the concept of disloyalty is unlikely to distort the results of the tests: the point of the examination is to find variables that make armed forces more likely to abandon loyalty, whatever form that may take.

29 The words "disloyalty" and "defection" are not synonyms, still they are often used synonymously throughout the study. The difference is the degree to which the armed forces or the members of the armed forces become disloyal. Disloyalty is essentially the umbrella concept.

## 2.2 Finances and Privileges

As the members of the military are just as much connected to the regime through the chain of command and loyalty as to society through horizontal connections, in times of a popular revolt they are exposed to the difficult question whether to stay loyal to the *ancien régime*. The decision to remain loyal can be (partly) the result of interest calculation, as Wintrobe,<sup>30</sup> Stepan<sup>31</sup> or Bellin<sup>32</sup> anticipated. According to this understanding the military appears as a “budget-maximizing” group.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the well-being of the military would make the members more likely to remain loyal to the regime and assumedly, whereas the loss of these financial privileges aggravated by a popular uprising would be quite likely to produce disloyalty.

Naturally, both individual and institutional interests go beyond finances. There are several privileges that might not be on par with the direct financial benefits, but provide the armed forces with influence and power, for example the right to determine the structure, mission and control of the military; constitutional privileges; an authority over or an income from the defense sector and state enterprises; or a role in the executive power, in the legislature and in the jurisdiction.<sup>34</sup>

However, even privileges are two-edged swords: they might conserve loyalty, but it is also possible that the will to conserve the prerogatives lead to a military takeover. In addition, the overtly privileged armed forces themselves can serve as a reason for social upheaval, thereby making it problematic for the officers to support such claims.

All in all, privileges are assumed to have a loyalty-creating effect. Although the importance of all different kinds of privileges are acknowledged by this study, due to the lack of data on all the aspects of this issue, financial privileges will be in the focus of the dataset.

## 2.3 Rivalry

If one assumes some sort of rationality on behalf of the members of the armed forces when they weigh the pros and cons of defection, it is quite an intuitive idea that the existence of rival forces is a drive for disloyalty. The rivalry is possible

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30 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 341.

31 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 68.

32 Bellin, 32.

33 Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship*, 341.

34 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 68, 94.

between the armed forces and the police, the paramilitary forces or those alternative armies that are usually created by autocratic regimes to balance out the army and prevent a coup. Therefore, these “alternative forces” are often indoctrinated and their existence is dependent on the regime alone; consequently their loyalty is nearly unshakable.<sup>35</sup> However, regarding the loyalty of the regular army, the creation of a rival force is a two-edged sword: a competition between the security forces is likely to emerge, primarily if the members of the regular army feel relegated in the hierarchy, whether a loss of prestige or a financial loss. Furthermore, it is significantly harder to keep the different branches together and to keep them loyal without a unified leadership.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, dividing the armed forces may be an effective protection against military coups, but in the case of a popular uprising it may complicate the task of controlling the different branches and enforcing loyalty.

The rivalry, however, can also emerge between the armed forces and the police. For example, one could explain the lack of loyalty of the Tunisian Armed Forces in 2011 partly by the relatively disadvantaged situation of the armed forces as compared to the police, both in its relation to the regime and in financial terms.<sup>37</sup> Also, in Libya, the army was quite underprivileged compared to other security forces, but primarily to the rival paramilitary force.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, rivalry both within the armed forces and within the coercive institutions must be examined.

#### *2.4 Distance from Society*

Chenoweth and Stephan proposed the intuitive idea that the probability of network-formation between the soldiers and protestors has a strong explanatory value concerning the outcome of social movements. In *Why Civil Resistance Works* the dynamics of violent and nonviolent campaigns were examined and their potential to produce success, showing that the number of participants in the movements had a positive effect on the likelihood of considerable defections in the coercive institutions.<sup>39</sup> This is what made nonviolent campaigns more successful: they generally attracted more participants and supporters after which there was a chance that a significant part of the members of the armed forces would be affected

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35 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115.No. 1. (2000): 68.

36 Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2011), 11; Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22. No. 4. (October 2011), 29.

37 Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts”, 27.

38 Ibid., 30.

39 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 48.

by it through their social ties.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, the distance of the armed forces from the social movements could be determined by the approximate number of participants in the movement.

From a different perspective, the closeness of the soldiers to society in general has to be measured, as well. This variable can be approximated as the function of the selection procedures of the army, for example conscription and the connection of forces to certain social groups.<sup>41</sup>

The first distinction to be made is between voluntary and conscripted armies. Generally speaking, conscripted armies are closer to society than voluntary armies, as the interest of the rank and file and their prospects within the organization are temporary.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, horizontal loyalties easily form between the conscripted members of the rank and file which are detached from the professional members of the institution, and their external loyalties remain important in comparison to their temporary and enforced vertical loyalties. Voluntary armies, in this respect, should be treated differently, as the interests of the members are strongly tied to the institution.

An example of the unstable loyalty of conscripts is Egypt in 2011, where soldiers (the conscripted rank-and-file) were fraternizing with the protestors demanding regime change. The Egyptian army alone had 280 000 -340 000 conscripts<sup>43</sup> and the military affected 12.3% of the young male population yearly.<sup>44</sup> This is quite a significant number, considering that most of the protesting opposition came from the same age group, raising the odds of the formation of linkages between the rank and file and the members of the uprising.

It is also logical to relate the distance of the soldiers from society by differentiating the rank and file from the officers.<sup>45</sup> In a dictatorship winning the loyalty and preventing the shirking of the officer corps is relatively simple compared to the lower segments of the armed forces. The high-ranking members of the military can be assumed to have a long-term vested interest in the institution, as compared to a conscripted soldier, or a member of the rank and file. In order to further ensure

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40 Ibid., 46.

41 Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces*, 18.

42 Ibid., 16.

43 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge, 2011), 306.

44 Stephen H. Gotowicki, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (1995), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/egypt/egypt.htm> (accessed March 20, 2012).

45 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 193.

loyalty, clientelistic relations may also underpin the loyalty of the military beside to the economic interests, privileges and a feeling of attachment to the organization.

In order to strengthen attachment to the regime and distance the armed forces from society, a part or the whole body of the military is often selected from a distinct class of society, or a specific ethnic, religious group. This usually happens in states where definite ethnic or religious affiliations dominate the governance, or where certain groups have a notable role in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. A special case of this relation is where a minority group dominates over the majority. The survival of the government in these cases may be more assured by an officer corps that is selected from the group that the regime represents.<sup>46</sup> If abundant resources are at hand, the maintenance of loyalty is assumed to be even more likely if the rank and file is also selected from the preferred group.<sup>47</sup> The situation may be confusing in cases, where the selection mechanisms are only applied to the officers and the rank and file is randomly selected, *horrible dictum*, the mass of the military is randomly selected and conscripted (for example, Syria).

Kyrgyzstan is an example where, despite the fragmented ethnic composition of the country, the dominant ethnic group - the Kyrgyz - dominates the military.<sup>48</sup> An example of maximized loyalty seeking according to this model is Bahrain, where the Sunni royal family created a mercenary army of foreigner Sunni soldiers (mostly from Pakistan, Syria and Jordan) to keep order in the Shiite-majority society.<sup>49</sup>

All in all, the distance of the armed forces from society in general or from the social movements in particular is essentially determined by four factors: (1) the size of the popular movement, (2) the recruitment of the armed forces, (3) the selection mechanisms of the rank and file (4) and the officers. In the following chapter these variables will be examined throughout a wider cross-section of cases.

### 3. Explaining Disloyalty

#### 3.1 The Dataset and Variable Operationalization

The cases were selected from the universe of social movements in non-democratic countries in the timeframe between 1990 and 2012 where the declared aim of the

46 Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts", 31.

47 Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces*, 18.

48 Erica Marat, "Kyrgyzstan's Fragmented Police and Armed Forces," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 11. (2010), <http://pipss.revues.org/3803#ftn10> (accessed March 15, 2012).

49 Faisal Husain, "Terror in the Dark," *Yale Daily News* (January 12, 2012), <http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2012/jan/19/husain-terror-in-the-dark/?print> (May 12, 2012).

social movement was transition or regime change. The argument for the selected time frame is that the end of the Cold War brought about changes, following from which regime change were less and less determined by the external dynamics of the bipolar world; furthermore, democracy seemed to triumph over autocracy, creating a more unified positive normative evaluation of democratic regimes in the public opinion throughout the world.

The purpose of the social movement in question had to be regime change in order to qualify as a case in this study. Therefore, an event where the movement did not want to get rid of the autocrat but only, for instance, the ministers, would not be selected. The reason is that without the application of strict selection criteria it would be hard to draw the line between the different shades of democratization efforts which often claim only governmental changes, or the expansion of rights, but not straightforward regime change.<sup>50</sup>

The data was carefully filtered in order to exclude states where military regimes governed and in which these regimes were the object of the regime change attempt.<sup>51</sup> Cases were also excluded where the country was involved in a civil war during the social movement. Data from the post-Communist transition process from the end of the Cold War was disqualified, as well. Lastly, cases where the military initiated the movement for regime change and wherein, therefore, defection was not the effect of popular movements, were excluded (for example, East Timor and Burkina Faso).

Forty-eight cases fulfilled the criteria described above. Among others, the cases include the campaigns of the Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and cases from Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1990's. The small number of cases can be attributed to the strict case selection described above. Furthermore, although avoiding endogeneity in this case is nearly impossible, each country was allowed to be represented in the dataset only if there was a change in the examined variables

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50 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 14.

51 Samuel Huntington differentiated three types of possible relationships between the military and the regime in autocracies. The first type is the *military regime*, where absolutely no civil control can be detected and the military engages itself in a series of activities traditionally not related to military functions and missions. The second type is where the military is controlled by the people of the dictator's confidence, using the *divide et impera* principle to exercise close control. The third type is when the military is treated as an *instrument* of the regime, where officers have to be loyal to the regime (and not to the state). Regimes of the first type are excluded from the study. (Samuel P Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4.)

between the cases, be they dependent or independent. The remaining cases were eliminated.<sup>52</sup>

The gathered data was complemented and cross-checked by the dataset of Chenoweth and Stephan compiled for their book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.<sup>53</sup> The data collection was performed with the help of the following sources: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program<sup>54</sup>, the Global Nonviolent Action Database<sup>55</sup>, Military Balance<sup>56</sup>, the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database<sup>57</sup>, the Military Recruitment Data Set<sup>58</sup>, the CIA Factbook<sup>59</sup>, Jane's World Armies<sup>60</sup>, the reports of Human Rights Watch<sup>61</sup>, the International Crisis Group<sup>62</sup> and Amnesty International<sup>63</sup>, the Coup d'Etat database of the Center for Systemic Peace<sup>64</sup>, the Minorities at Risk Project of the UNHCR<sup>65</sup>, the publications of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)<sup>66</sup>,

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52 For example, Egypt was represented twice in the dataset, once as a case of defection and once as a case of loyalty. Madagascar was present three times in the dataset, once as a case of disloyalty and twice as loyalty. However, in case of the two cases with identical outcomes (end year 1993 and 2003) there was no difference in either recruitment, structure, peak membership, the method of the campaign, and so on. Therefore, the case of 1993 was eliminated. The last example is Thailand, where there are two cases of loyalty (1992, 2011). The reason to include both of them was because conscription was abolished in 1997.

53 Dataset available <http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/wcrw/> (accessed February 13, 2012).

54 *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php> (accessed February 15, 2012).

55 The *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/> (accessed February 16, 2012).

56 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance* 1994-2011, (London: Routledge).

57 *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed February 15, 2012).

58 Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

59 *CIA Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed May 20, 2012).

60 *Jane's World Armies*, <http://jwar.janes.com/public/jwar/index.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2012).

61 *Human Rights Watch*, <http://www.hrw.org/> (accessed April 20, 2012).

62 *International Crisis Group*, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed March 15, 2012).

63 *Amnesty International*, <http://www.amnesty.org/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

64 Center for Systemic Peace, *Coup d'état Database*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (accessed March 10, 2012).

65 UNHCR, *Minorities at Risk Project*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/MARP.html> (accessed May 10, 2012).

news reports and articles from CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera and qualitative academic studies on a case-by case basis.

In order to test the ideas outlined above, disloyalty was coded as a dichotomous dependent variable. The response variable was always determined based on the behavior of the regular military forces. Any significant disloyalty, being where troops, a mass of soldiers, or officers have physically defected from the army, or where at least a declaration of disloyalty or non-compliance with the regime occurred, was coded as disloyalty. 25 of the 48 cases were coded as loyalty and 23 as disloyalty.

The first explanatory variable was budget change, representing the relative economic well-being of the military. In each case the defense budget of the armed forces was calculated, with the possible exclusion of the budget of the paramilitary forces, other irregular forces and the police. As this condition was not met by any single database, the data was calculated from the SIPRI Database and Military Balance judging the values on a case-by-case basis. The budget of the year before the campaigns was compared to the average of the previous five years.<sup>67</sup>

The second explanatory variable marks the existence of a rival security force. This dichotomous variable was coded as '1' if a coercive body existed, which was preferred by the regime as compared to the armed forces, let that be an indoctrinated paramilitary, a mercenary army, or even when the police was given primacy over the armed forces concerning their treatment, and '0' when there was no evidence of the existence of such force.

The following explanatory variable was the type of recruitment in the army. The armed forces were coded as voluntary or conscript army, based on the records of Military Balance and the *Military Recruitment Data Set*<sup>68</sup> and qualitative studies in debatable cases.

The selective recruitment of the army was categorized as 'unspecified' when the armed forces were mostly representative of the population in general, or at least no specific rules of selection were in place. The variable was coded as 'selective' when minorities or the majority was excluded from the armed forces. Minority in this case should not be only understood along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, but

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66 Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), <http://www.iss.co.za/> (accessed March 28, 2012).

67 If the budget of all the five years were not available, the data available from the same timeframe was used, but always at least the average of three years.

68 Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

geographic lines, as well. The variable officer selection was coded along the same lines, with the extension that it was also coded as 'selective' when the officer corps or commanders were selected from the kin or the family of the autocrat.

A dichotomous control variable was applied marking the cases when there was evidence that the army was deployed or requested to restore order during the popular protest. Another control variable estimated the membership of the movement in question. The method of Chenoweth and Stephan was applied and the variable was approximated by the number of participants on the largest protest.<sup>69</sup> The final control variable represented the method of the campaign, more precisely, whether it was a violent or a nonviolent movement. Physical destruction of property and people were coded as violent campaigns, and the use of economic, social and psychological techniques were coded as nonviolent campaigns.<sup>70</sup>

### 3.2 Testing the Theory

Before testing the assumptions outlined above, it needs to be established whether some of the independent variables correlate with each other. The suspicion that there might be a correlation is well-founded: for instance, the officer selection and the rank and file selection variable are tightly connected: in all seventeen cases, where the rank and file was selectively recruited, logically the officers were also discriminatively appointed. Furthermore, the discriminative rank and file selection procedures are more realistic in case of volunteer armies than in conscripted forces. Lastly, it is logical to assume that when the governance denoted resources to apply selective or discriminative selection mechanism for the recruitment of the armed forces and the promotion of officers, they would be more likely to deploy that army to restore internal order.

Table 1 illustrates that there is a strong significant correlation between the discriminative rank and file selection and officer selection procedures. Therefore, these two variables had to be separated during the regression. The table also shows evidence that there is a correlation between deployment and discriminative selection procedures (both for the officer corps and the rank and file), furthermore, between army deployment and nonviolent campaigns and although the correlation is statistically significant, it is weak at most.

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69 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 31.

70 *Ibid.*, 12-13.

**Table 1: The Correlation of the Independent Variables**

	Army Deployment	Recruitment	Rank & File Selection	Officer Selection	Rival Security Force
<b>Army Deployment</b>	0.01	0.33**	0.34**	0.07	0.32**
<b>Recruitment</b>		0.15	0.14	-0.15	0.15
<b>Rank &amp; File Selection</b>			0.71***	-0.12	-0.03
<b>Officer Selection</b>				-0.03	-0.20
<b>Rival Security Force</b>					-0.22

Statistical significance: \* 0.1; \*\* 0.05; \*\*\* 0.01

Table 2 shows the overall significance of each independent variable on disloyalty. The effect of the variables tends to confirm the theoretical propositions of the study. Large campaigns, army deployment, conscription and the presence of a favored rival have a significant effect on disloyalty. The strongest effect can be observed in case of the recruitment variable, which shows that conscript armies are significantly more prone to disloyalty than volunteer one. The other variable with strong explanatory value is the favored rival, which shows that rivalry makes the armed forces significantly more likely to be disloyal.

**Table 2: Testing the Effect of the Independent Variables on Disloyalty**

	Odds Ratios	
	Model 1	Model 2
<b>Budget change</b>	0.98 (0.03)	0.98 (0.03)
<b>Rival force (yes)</b>	23.13** (1.67)	23.26** (1.69)
<b>Recruitment (conscript)</b>	30.25** (1.96)	25.61** (1.90)
<b>Officer selection (unspecified)</b>	2.85 (1.18)	-
<b>Rank &amp; file selection (unspecified)</b>	-	4.24 (1.16)
<b>Army deployment (yes)</b>	6.27 (1.40)	8.23 (1.42)
<b>Campaign Membership</b>	1.00** (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
<b>Nonviolent (yes)</b>	1.56 (1.26)	2.26 (1.36)
<b>Constant</b>	0.00** (3.05)	0.00* (3.12)

Statistical significance: \* 0.1; \*\* 0.05; \*\*\* 0.01

The non-discriminative rank and file and officer selection also have a positive effect on disloyalty, whereas increasing budgets have an inverse effect, decreasing the odds of disloyalty. These latter two variables are, however, not statistically significant. As for now, the preliminary results show that *Hypothesis 1*, reflecting on the negative effect of financial well-being on the likelihood of military disloyalty is unconfirmed, whereas *Hypothesis 2* and *Hypothesis 3* concerning the negative

effect of an army distant from society and having primacy over other security institutions on military disloyalty has found some support. In the following sections variable will be examined in detail.

### 3.2.1 Budget change

Since the binary logistic regression tests have raised doubts about the significance of the effect of budget increase on disloyalty, it is necessary to examine the effect of budget change on loyalty versus disloyalty without controlling for other variables.

**Table 3: The Comparison of the Means of Budget Change in Loyal and Disloyal Militaries**


	Defection	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Budget Change	Loyalty	24	28.08 *	64.75
	Defection	20	2.35 **	11.82

Statistical significance: \* 0.1; \*\* 0.05; \*\*\* 0.01

Table 3 shows that if nothing else is controlled, the budgets of disloyal armed forces are increasing more slowly than that of loyal forces. The budgets of loyal forces were increasing 28% faster on average compared to previous years, whereas the budget of defecting armies was increasing by only around 2% on average. What is even more interesting is that defection is not caused by a real decrease in economic benefits; on the contrary, a slight increase is still insufficient to keep some armies loyal to the regime. These results would confirm the economic account on the loyalty of the armed forces, claiming that forces treated well are more likely to be loyal. However, the standard deviation show that the values are probably spread out and the significance of the results can be attributed to a couple of the outliers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the cases in each sample according to budget change.

Figure 2 sheds light on the reason why the results concerning budget change are somewhat ambivalent. There are some outliers for both loyalty and disloyalty but the bulk of the disloyalty values are distributed around -10 and 8%, whereas the majority of loyalty cases are spread out around 8 and 15%. The reason why the averages are so different is probably due to the outliers. The outliers, however, are often misleading: for instance, one of the outliers among the loyalty cases is Chad from 1990, where the 21% relative decrease in the defense budget should not be attributed to a political decision rather than a natural process of post-war budget decrease.

**Figure 2: The Distribution of Cases According to Budget Change and Loyalty<sup>71</sup>**



Overall, there is some evidence that budget increases makes the armed forces somewhat more likely to remain loyal; however, the results are ambiguous mostly because of the outliers. The statistical tests and the graph showed that the expected relationship between defense budget increase and loyalty prognosticated by Hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed.

Therefore, budget increase as an indicator should be reconsidered. It is likely that in failing states, and states with inefficient or unfair redistribution of resources, defense budgets may not even reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. A good example is Burkina Faso (not included in the sample) where, although the defense budget has risen by 28% compared to the average of the past five years, in 2011 the soldiers rebelled against the government because of economic reasons and unacceptable working and living conditions.<sup>72</sup>

Furthermore, budget increases and decreases might be affected by several external factors, such as security considerations, economic crisis, post-war and post-Cold War decreases. This decrease in the budget is not automatic and, indeed, for a while it was firmly believed that not all states adapted their defense budgets to the changes in the economy of the country. However, the most recent data shows that due to the current economic crisis defense budgets are shrinking all over the

71 The case of Georgia from 2007 is not depicted in the graph, as it is an extreme outlier with 317% change in the defense budget and would have hindered the effective demonstration of data.

72 Burkina Faso: Mutiny at President Compaore Barracks, *BBC* (April 15, 2011), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090094> (accessed March 3, 2012).

world.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, we can conclude, that there is no proof of a relationship between decreasing defense budgets and military disloyalty; therefore, we can reject Hypothesis 1.

### 3.2.2 Rival Security Forces

In addition to the defense budget change variable, the idea of whether spoilers and privileges make armed forces more likely to stay loyal is also tested by the examination of the rivalry between different branches of security, as outlined in Hypothesis 2. Only 12 cases were found, where there was straightforward evidence of the existence of such rival force.

**Figure 3: The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Militaries With and Without Rivals**




Figure 3 shows that the presence of a favored rival makes the armed forces somewhat more prone to disloyalty, the odds of disloyalty are four times higher than without such a rival force when no other variables are controlled for. The graph makes it clear that although not having a rival is not a decisive factor concerning loyalty or disloyalty, having one seems to have an important negative effect on loyalty.


73 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011* (April 17, 2012), <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press-release-translations-2012/milexbgeng.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).

The presence of a rival force was already found influential in the overall model, and the finding was reinforced by the more detailed analysis. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 found confirmation. All in all, it is intriguing to note that a budget increase does not have a provable effect on disloyalty as compared to the privileged position of the armed forces relative to other security forces. These findings invite researchers to consider non-material spoiler mechanisms or loyalty creating procedures more influential than financial benefits.

### 3.2.3 Recruitment

Recruitment was found highly influential in the overall model. Figure 8 depicts the distribution of loyal and disloyal armed forces according to recruitment type.

**Figure 4: The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Conscript and Volunteer Armies**



The graph provides an intriguing result: although conscript armies seem to be just a little more likely to defect, voluntary armies are much more likely to remain loyal. Cases of defection are almost only accounted for by conscripted forces, disloyalty only appeared in 33% of the volunteer forces. Therefore, conscription appears to be an important condition for disloyalty whereas, although voluntary recruitment does not explain loyal behavior alone, it can be considered a significant factor. All in all, the recruitment mechanisms confirm the predictions of Hypothesis 3.

### 3.2.4 Selective Recruitment and Officer Selection

Based on the collected evidence, general discriminative recruitment applied to the rank and file appears to be quite rare in the dataset, there were only 17 cases

marked as "selective". Accordingly, the variable was not significant in the overall model.

**Table 4: The Odds of Disloyalty**


Disloyalty in...	Odds Ratios	Constant
Selectively Recruited Armies	2.23 (0.62)	0.55 (0.51)
Armies with Selective and Unspecified Officer Selection	2.77* (0.60)	0.56 (0.41)

N = 48

Statistical significance: \* 0.1; \*\* 0.05; \*\*\* 0.01

The binary regression in Table 4 shows that the odds of the selectively recruited forces to become loyal or disloyal are not significant if we do not control for other variables, either. This result is, again, in line with the overall model. As for the selection of officers, the results are significant when only one variable is considered. The sample of officer selection contains 25 cases of selective promotion versus 23 cases of unspecified promotion. At the same time, the armies with rationally selected officers are 2.8 times more likely to defect than their peers with rational selection. Figure 5 illustrates the discrepancy between the two types of armies.

**Figure 5: The Distribution of Loyal and Disloyal Armed Forces with Respect to Officer Selection**



All in all, Hypothesis 3 stated that armies whose selection mechanisms kept the army distant from society were less likely to be disloyal. This hypothesis was tested through three variables: the type of recruitment, selection mechanisms for the rank and file and for the officer corps. As for the type of recruitment, the tests showed

that conscript armies were more prone to defections, but what was even more striking is that volunteer forces were especially unlikely to defect. The results of the variables examining the selection mechanisms when recruiting the armed forces and promoting the officers were less straightforward. The results from the rank and file selection were quite ambiguous and signaled the necessity to reconsider the variable. At the same time, the selection of the officer corps was both statistically and substantially significant. All in all, Hypothesis No. 3 could not be rejected.

Based on the collected evidence, armed forces of privileged situation with selection mechanisms keeping them distant from society can be mostly predicted to remain loyal to the regime. Furthermore, large mass movements should also have a significant effect on the decision of soldiers to defect or remain loyal.

### Conclusions

The study has embarked on explaining loyalty shifts within the armed forces during popular uprisings for regime change. First of all, the loyalty of the armed forces to the governance was put under the magnifying glass. Following Wintrobe it was proposed, that although in a principle-agent relationship control and enforcement mechanisms ensure the compliance of the agents, the creation of loyalty is usually of paramount importance for the autocrats as loyalty decreases the costs of control mechanisms.<sup>74</sup> One of the methods used to create loyalty is through spoiler mechanisms. It was proposed that increasing defense budgets signal the will of the regime to satisfy the needs of the armed forces and to keep them loyal by rents. Furthermore, it was claimed that the privileged position of the armed forces as compared to other coercive bodies had to be primary, otherwise rivalry and ambitions might lead to disloyalty. Statistics confirmed that armed forces without significant rivals remained loyal: the regimes of Bahrain, Thailand, Belarus, Nepal or Zambia applied this method of loyalty seeking, either consciously or unconsciously. However, failing to follow this tactic might be fatal for the regime: it is remarkable that 75% of all the armed forces with rivals became disloyal.

As opposed to the expectations, statistics showed that decreasing budgets did not affect loyalty shifts. While looking for possible explanations for the counterintuitive results it was proposed that in states with inefficient or unfair redistribution defense budgets may not realistically reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. Furthermore, the most significant economic benefits of the armed forces are often not included in the defense budget: for instance, the revenues from the economic activities of the armed forces, (mostly the military industry) might yield significantly more than the incomes from the state budget (for example in Egypt).

The second proposition concerned the importance of the maintenance of the vertical and in-group loyalties as compared to horizontal or external influences. In case of mass mobilization, class, ethnic, religious and geographic loyalties might overrun institutional and vertical loyalties, which are likely to result in loyalty shifts within the armed forces. It was anticipated that the governance can prevent such developments and ensure loyalty by selective recruitment and promotion mechanisms based on the previously listed identities and by the introduction of voluntary recruitment, through which they can strengthen the in-group loyalty of the individuals. No wonder that 74% of all disloyalty cases occurred in conscripted armies. The size of the membership of the campaigns also had an effect on the overall outcome: large campaigns seemed to support network formation and thereby revitalized loyalties to external groups.

Although discriminative selection mechanisms in the rank and file did not contribute to loyalty, according to the third foundation of the theory, the officer corps had to be examined separately. The intuition was confirmed by the analysis: the discriminative selection procedures had an especially strong explanatory value in case of officer selection. Whereas 64% of all loyalty cases came from armed forces with discriminatively selected officers, 61% of all disloyal cases came from militaries with 'fairly' selected officers.

Syria and Bahrain from the time of the Arab Spring were perfect examples of the discriminative selection mechanisms. However, the fact that Syria only applied these selection mechanisms to the officers and not to the conscripted rank and file might explain the different outcome of the events: in Bahrain the whole body of the military remained loyal, whereas in Syria defections occurred among the rank and file. The Egyptian case also supports the argument that, in cases of popular movements and when violence is used to put down protests, the conscripted soldiers are a dangerous factor for the regime.

The study pointed out certain trends to be considered when thinking about loyalty shifts. The results have important implications for opposition movements and for professionals involved in democratization projects both on the expert and the political level. The conclusions one can draw for opposition activists is that the creation of loyalty shifts is very much dependent on the size of the movement. Furthermore, in order to create loyalty shifts, they have to target the proper level of the armed forces with the proper methods.

What the experts of democratization can use from the results is the fact that significant attention has to be paid to the selection and promotion mechanisms in the armed forces. Although the global trend is that conscripted forces are becoming obsolete in the dynamically changing security environment and in light of the societal demands, therefore, they give place to voluntary armies. Although this is a

reasonable process due to the increasing demand for the professionalization of the armed forces, the hidden discriminative selection procedures should be monitored and sanctioned.

Finally, a few words have to be devoted to the limitations of the study. Firstly, the examination of more cases from a wider time-frame should be carried out in order to provide the statistical results with more significance. Secondly, the variables included in the study already show the limitations in time, resources and language barriers. Therefore, in the following lines a series of ideas will be proposed for further research.

It was stated previously that institutional privileges have a significant effect on military loyalty, such as the role of the armed forces in the economy (defense industry, other enterprises), in the executive power, legislature and the jurisdiction.<sup>75</sup> These areas should also be examined concerning military loyalty. Furthermore, it has been established that the preservation of the privileges is of paramount importance for the armed forces. If that is true, then the chance of the upcoming forces to achieve loyalty shifts will depend on their capacity to show the soldiers a more promising alternative.<sup>76</sup> However, this chance also depends on the volatility of these privileges. Therefore, it is important to establish how institutionalized the privileges are: the interests of an institutionalized military will be more independent of the political regime and the state.<sup>77</sup> Collecting a sample concerning institutionalized and non-institutionalized military prerogatives and privileges could shed further light on the dynamics behind military defections and loyalty.

Despite the limitations of this study, it provides the foundations for further research and shows that the organization of the military and the loyalty creating efforts of the autocrats have a significant effect on loyalty shifts. With this study I also intend to raise awareness to the problem that civil-military relations are getting less and less attention among the scholars: one must never forget that although the “West” might downsize the armed forces and keep them under civil control, in the developing world the armed forces continue to play an extremely important role in governing states. Several states seem to be stuck in the viscous circle of uprisings, concessions and repression, in which the armed forces are often a significant player. Understanding the rationale behind loyalty shifts in the supporting organizations of autocracies, most importantly in the armed forces should be further studied by scholars.

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75 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 94.

76 *Ibid.*, 10.

77 Bellin, *Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders*, 29., and Lutterbeck, 18.

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