





THE

Hungarian Historical Review

NEW SERIES OF ACTA HISTORICA
ACADEMIÆ SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICÆ
Forms of Early Modern Diplomacy

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Forms of Early Modern Diplomacy

Veronika Ciegerné Novák and András Vadas
Special Editors of the Thematic Issue

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The Integration of Bohemian and Hungarian Aristocrats into the Spanish Habsburg System via Diplomatic Encounters, Cultural Exchange, and News Management (1608–1655)*

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The composite state of the Spanish Habsburgs had a fading military, financial and diplomatic predominance in Central Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Bohemian and Hungarian aristocracy was, to varying extents, integrated into the Spanish Habsburg system. This article presents three forms of integration and diplomatic relationship. First, it examines diplomatic and political encounters in the main governmental bodies and diets advising the emperor in decision-making, or more specifically, in the Imperial Privy Council in Vienna and during the diets of the kingdom of Hungary. Spanish Habsburg politicians and diplomats acted in many powerful ways to establish connections with Bohemian and Hungarian aristocrats so that they follow and adjust to their political agenda. Bohemian families (Slavata, Martiniz) had close relations and alliances with Spanish councilors in Vienna (who acted as ambassadors of the Spanish king), and several Hungarian aristocrats had interactions with them during the diets in order to secure the long-term interests of the dynasty in the Kingdom of Hungary. Second, the exchange, purchase, and influence of cultural goods and objects (e.g., books and gifts) and the ways in which these cultural goods were put to use, as well as the migration of people, show that the relationship went well beyond power politics and formal diplomatic relations. Personal and cultural influence and even early signs of acculturation can be clearly detected in several Bohemian and Hungarian families (e.g., the Forgách, Pázmány, and Zrínyi families), who ordered and read hundreds of books from Spanish Habsburg authors (including several books from Spanish Habsburg diplomats) and cities and exchanged diplomatic gifts with their Spanish counterparts. People, including influential figures (soldiers and nobles), also moved among Habsburg political centers, prompted by diplomatic or family relations between Spanish Habsburg politicians and Bohemian or Hungarian families. Third, information gathered in Vienna radiated to all Spanish Habsburg states in different layers of granularity, density, and confidentiality. Top Spanish diplomats could access and transmit classified documents and the texts of international contracts obtained from Central European aristocrats and events. They also sent thousands of reports to their superiors about general news in

* In this essay, I make use of several sources that I consulted during my stay at the Collegium Hungaricum, Vienna, funded by the Tempus Public Foundation. Contract nr.: CoHu 2022–23 – 175382.

Bohemia and Hungary. At the same time, lower-ranking nobles often struggled to keep up with and understand international events and trends and failed to get information about the key results of wars and imperial diets, since they lacked access to the network and the seniority to exert adequate influence.

Keywords: Spanish Monarchy, early modern diplomacy, Habsburg Studies, Central European aristocracy, early modern Hungary, early modern Bohemia

Introduction

Scholars have made efforts to define the nature of the Spanish Habsburg Empire (as that of any other global empire) and its importance in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Is it best understood, they have asked, as a form of imperialism, a network, or a system?¹ The smaller, Central European branch of the dynasty has been treated as something resembling a satellite of Madrid or a little brother.² The intensity of relations between the center and this periphery gradually grew (though in a very uneven fashion and with setbacks) throughout the sixteenth century, reaching its peak during the Thirty Years' War, after which it gradually faded. There is growing evidence in recent Hungarian secondary literature that the kingdom of Hungary became a substantial element of the Spanish Habsburg system to a different extent in some areas: either in diplomacy, world trade, warfare, or European power politics in general or in more than one of these.³

Much has been written about the interactions between the two main branches of the Habsburg dynasty (the Spanish Monarchy and the Central European Habsburg Monarchy) in general and in the first half of the seventeenth century in particular.⁴ Relations between Madrid and the Kingdom of Bohemia and Hungary, respectively, have also been the subject of inquiry,⁵ including, specifically, case studies on diplomatic relations.⁶ However, historians have not

1 On imperialism, see Parker, *The Army*, 287; Bérenger, *Histoire*, 291, 307. On networks, see Edelmayer, “Die Spanische Monarchie.” On systems, see Brightwell, “The Spanish System”; Stradling, *Europe*; Muto, “The Spanish System.”

2 Bérenger, *Histoire*, 236, 251.

3 Monostori, “Hungaria Hispanica.”

4 Ernst, *Madrid und Wien*, 1991; Edelmayer, “Die Spanische Monarchie”; González Cuerva, “La mediación”; Tercero Casado, “Infelix Austria.”

5 On Bohemia e.g., Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle*; on Hungary e.g., Martí and Quirós Rosado, “Dynastic links.”

6 On Bohemia: Marek, “Die Rolle”; Marek, “La red”; Marek, *La Embajada*. On Hungary: Martí and Monostori, “Oliveres”; Martí, “Datos.”

yet compared the impact of the global empire on the two states. What were the main differences and similarities? This is important, since if we look at hard metrics and the quantity and quality of relations and interactions, we can draw meaningful conclusions concerning cultural and diplomatic history. More precisely, historical patterns and human and social strategies can be detected and analyzed, as can the role and significance that the Bohemian and Hungarian aristocracy played in the Spanish Habsburg courts in Europe.

In the discussion below, I present three points. I offer a detailed comparison (the first to my knowledge in the secondary literature) of the two kingdoms when it comes to their general and diplomatic relations with the Spanish Monarchy, both in a quantitative and a qualitative fashion. I then examine the unique and *different* ways in which Bohemian and Hungarian aristocrats were integrated into the Spanish Habsburg system in diplomacy. Finally, I identify *similar* or *identical* patterns in the behaviors of the ruling elites of both lands. I put particular focus on diplomatic encounters, cultural exchange, and news management. I offer several cases in the course of this investigative journey based on archival sources or printed material, devoting somewhat more attention to cases from Hungary.

I selected the chronological scope of the essay for several reasons. In 1608, Guillén de San Clemente, who had served as the Spanish ambassador at the imperial court since 1581, died, and his successors witnessed a gradually growing, then fading intensity in the intra-dynastic relations after a relatively less eventful stage during the reign of Emperor Rudolf II (1576–1612). The most important and influential ambassadors were Baltasar de Zúñiga y Fonseca (1608–17), Iñigo Vélez de Guevara, Count of Oñate (1617–24), Francisco de Moncada, Count of Osoña, Marquess of Aytona (1624–29), Sancho de Monroy y Zúñiga, Marquess of Castañeda (1633–40), and Francisco de Moura Corterreal, Marquess of Castel Rodrigo and Count of Lumières (1648–1656). At the same time, news about the conflicts and compromise between the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungarian estates started to spread across the lands of the Spanish Monarchy.

On the other hand, 1655 was the last year in which Spanish Habsburg diplomacy made an effort to have a real, tangible, and decisive influence on a kingdom-wide political and diplomatic event: the election and coronation of the new king of Hungary, Leopold I (1657–1705), and the new palatine of Hungary, Ferenc Wesselényi (1605–67), during the Hungarian diet organized in Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava.

The Case of Bohemia: Integration and the Early Stages of Acculturation

The multidimensional relationship of the Bohemian and Hungarian aristocracy and nobility with the Spanish Monarchy was defined first and foremost by their geopolitical situation and their material and human resources.

Bohemia was in a unique position. Its kings were prince-electors of the Holy Roman Empire. Their votes were essential to elect the King of the Romans, who became *de facto* Holy Roman Emperor. For the rulers of the Spanish Monarchy after the reign of Charles V (1519–56), keeping that title in the hands of the Central European branch was of the utmost importance. At the same time, the capital of the Bohemian lands hosted the imperial court between 1578 and 1618, before its move to Vienna. These facts had several consequences.

First, Bohemian magnates were eligible for the most prestigious imperial councilor roles on the Imperial Privy Council or the War Council. In those political positions, they interacted with Spanish Habsburg envoys in a business-as-usual fashion. Vilém Slavata of Chlum and Georg Adam Martinitz, for instance, were among the privy councilors (in 1637–52 and 1638–51, respectively),⁷ and Václav Eusebius František, prince of Lobkowitz, held the presidency of the Imperial War Council (1652–65). They established intense relations with the representatives of the Spanish Embassy in Vienna when it came to joint decision-making between the two Habsburg branches. In addition, the Spanish ambassadors were councilors of state themselves, too, in Spain, and they were regularly invited to the sessions of the Imperial Privy Council. The Bohemian magnates attended most sessions during their membership. In contrast, no Hungarian aristocrat was granted such a significant role until 1646, when Pál Pálffy (1592–1653), future palatine of Hungary (1649–53), became privy councilor. That said, neither he nor his Hungarian successors enjoyed actual and regular influence on this political body advising the emperor in imperial decision-making since they lived far from the imperial court.

Second, the presence of people of Spanish origin and, in general, the Spanish cultural milieu were much more tangible and quantifiable in Bohemia than in Hungary. When the Spanish Monarchy intervened in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and the anti-Habsburg alliance of Protestant princes (which included Bohemian magnates) was defeated in 1620 (the Battle of White

⁷ Schwarz, *The Imperial Privy Council*, 299, 343. See also the database at <https://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/> (Last accessed on August 8, 2023).

Mountain), many of their confiscated lands in Bohemia were given *de iure* to nobles and military commanders from Spain or from the Spanish Netherlands. Baltasar de Marradas y Vic, for instance, received Hluboká and Vltavou. Charles Bonaventure de Longueval, Count of Buquoy, was given the lands of Nové Hradý, Rožmberk, and Vltavou. Martin de Höef Huerta was granted Velhartice. Guillermo Verdugo received Doupov. Nothing comparable happened in Hungary in these decades.⁸

Marriages also made the bonds between the Spanish and the Bohemian nobility closer. Members of the Pernstein, Dietrichstein, and Popel de Lobkowicz families married Spanish *damas*, and their descendants maintained strong relations with Spanish diplomats. In 1603, the High Chancellor of Bohemia, Zdenko Adalbert Popel de Lobkowitz (1568–1628),⁹ married Polisená, the daughter of Vratislav Pernstein (1530–82, High Chancellor of Bohemia from 1567 until his death) and María Manrique de Lara (1538–1608), a Spanish noblewoman. Zdenko Adalbert had a close friendship with Ambassador Zúñiga. His palace and that of the Pernstein family were social and political centers of the Spanish imperial party or faction¹⁰ in Bohemia, lasting well into the 1620s. Spanish ambassadors sometimes visited Hungarian aristocrats in Hungary. The marquess of Castañeda traveled to visit Palatine Miklós Esterházy (1583–1645) in person, for instance, in the 1630s. But these kinds of excursions were rare and individual cases.

Third, the methods with which information was gathered and shared between Bohemian aristocrats and Spanish diplomatic envoys were also more direct and thorough, with many connections to the Spanish Habsburg information centers worldwide. After Cardinal Francis of Dietrichstein (1570–1636), who was born in Madrid and served as imperial privy councilor, returned to Moravia in the Bohemian lands, he maintained his wide network with Spain and the Spanish Netherlands through agents across Europe.¹¹ Other Bohemian-Spanish nobles held correspondence with members of the Spanish Habsburg courts. No similar case is known for Hungary, except for Martin Somogyi, whose role I discuss later.

Fourth, Bohemian aristocrats, with the indispensable support of Spanish envoys, applied for and were granted the honor of becoming members of the Spanish military and religious orders. Several members of the Kolowrat,

8 Marek, *La Embajada*, 42.

9 Marek, “Sdenco Adalberto.”

10 On the Spanish faction at the imperial court, see Gonzalez Cuerva and Tercero Casado, “The Imperial court.”

11 Luska, *Las redes*. On the Dietrichstein family in general, see Badura, *La casa de Dietrichstein*.

Beřkovský de Šebířov, Pruskovský de Pruskov, and Popel de Lobkowitz families received the order of Santiago, including the aforementioned Georg Adam Martinitz and Joachim Slavata, the son of Vilém Slavata of Chlum. Ulrich Franz Libsteinský de Kolowrat received the order of Calatrava.¹² No Hungarian nobleman received this honor.

Fifth and last, many aristocrats and their family members were “hispaniolized.” They learned and used the Spanish language,¹³ and they deliberately dressed in Spanish clothing.¹⁴ Also, many books were printed in Spanish in Bohemian cities.¹⁵ Bohemian noblewomen entered the households of the queen consorts of Spanish origin at the imperial court.¹⁶ In Hungary, these ties were much less present, if at all. With very few exceptions (like that of Cardinal Péter Pázmány, archbishop of Esztergom¹⁷) the aristocrats did not speak, write, read, or understand Spanish.

In summary, the Bohemian aristocracy was tightly integrated into the Spanish Habsburg political and sociocultural system. Several family members born in Bohemia were partially assimilated. This was a significant change compared to the reign of Ferdinand I (1526–1664) when one in 14 members of the court came from the Spanish Habsburg lands.¹⁸ That is, imperial courtiers of Spanish Habsburg origins disappeared (except, of course, for the court of the Habsburg

12 Mur i Raurell, “La mancha roja.”

13 Binková, “Spanish in the Czech Lands”; Marek, “Las cartas españolas.”

14 In 1640, Pedro de Villa, a Spanish agent at the imperial court, described the privy councilor Vilem Slavata as an ardent hispanophile who had always dressed in Spanish clothing, following the fashion in the time of Philip II, king of Spain (1558–1598): “el conde Slavata, [...] Gran Canciller de Bohemia, hombre ya viejo, muy bien opinado de todos, que ha servido en puestos eminentes cuatro emperadores. Es uno de los echados de la ventana del Palacio de Praga cuando la rebelión del Palatino, tan celoso de todas las cosas de España que toda su vida no ha querido vestirse si no es al modo que se usaba en España y tiempo de Felipe Segundo.” The text makes a reference to the Defenestration of Prague, when one of the Bohemian magnates thrown out of the window was Slavata. AGRB, Secrétairerie d’État et de Guerre, 641. fol. 310r-311v, here: 311r. Spanish fashions reached the Hungarian nobility as well. See Tompos, “Magyar és spanyol” and Hajná, “Moda al servicio.”

15 Archer et al., *Bohemia Hispánica*.

16 Marek, “Las damas.”

17 Jacques Bruneau, Spanish envoy in Vienna sent a letter in Spanish to Péter Pázmány, Vienna, November 22, 1632. PLE, Archivum Ecclesiasticum Vetus 169, fol 7r-8v. They knew each other personally, and Bruneau was one of the diplomats who prepared the famous mission of Pázmány to Rome in 1631 and 1632. The letter contained information about a Spanish pension payment to the cardinal and news from Europe.

18 Laferl, *Die Kultur*, 281–87.

Empresses born in Spain). Instead, some members of the Central European aristocracy represented the interests of the Catholic King.

The Case of Hungary 1: Ottoman Wars and International Trade

In recent decades, historians have tended to take for granted that, compared to the Bohemian (and Polish) aristocracy, Hungary's relations with the Spanish monarchy were more sporadic and accidental.¹⁹ In reality, these relations were also strong and pointed to equally important and substantial connections and structures, even if they were expressed more indirectly, many times via the imperial court or in other fields of diplomatic activities.

The Kingdom of Hungary held a unique position from the perspective of Madrid. As an *antemurale Christianitatis*, it constituted a bastion against the Ottoman Empire. It possessed large Protestant lands and estates, which, together with the power politics of the Principality of Transylvania, led to delicate political negotiations between the dynasty and the Hungarian aristocracy throughout the seventeenth century. In addition, Hungary had plenty of material and human resources, including copper, slaves, horses, cattle, and light cavalry units (hussars). These facts also had several consequences.

First, Madrid needed to take the Hungarian front against the Ottomans into consideration when the court designed the yearly military strategy in the Netherlands or against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. If needed, they sent soldiers (thousands from the Spanish Netherlands during the Long Turkish War between 1591 and 1606).²⁰ Dozens of military engineers (many of them chief engineers) came from Spanish Italy (Milan and Naples) to be employed by the Habsburg Monarchy to strengthen the defense system. As stated constantly in the diplomatic reports in the Austrian State Archives and in the Simancas General Archives in Spain, the political situation in the east was a recurring subject. In 1639, the Marquess of Castañeda sent his language secretary, Marcos Putz, to

19 *De la Monarquía Universal*. The volume includes chapters dealing with relations between Central European states and the Spanish monarchy during the Thirty Years' War (including the Austrian lands, Bohemia, and Poland). Hungary is missing. On the other hand, the impact of the Spanish Monarchy on Hungary is also missing from most histories of Hungary.

20 Bagi, "Una carrera." During the reign of Charles V, there were much more: between 1526 and 1533, between 10,000 and 12,000 soldiers arrived from Spanish Habsburg lands to Hungary. Over the course of the following decades, in multiple waves, several thousand soldiers were sent there (in 1538, 1541, 1545, and 1548–52). Historiography knows more than 230 Spanish soldiers in Hungary by name. Korpás, *V. Károly*, 219–27, 264–95.

meet with Miklós Esterházy and get the latest updates on the Ottoman Empire and Transylvania. The palatine granted him a long audience.²¹

Second, Spain strategically needed material and human resources. The Spanish diplomatic corps was actively involved in speeding up and facilitating international and intra-dynastic trade. More than once, the ambassador Count of Oñate intervened in the exportation of Hungarian copper, a strategic resource for the military organization of the Spanish Monarchy. Copper was a vital material in the foundries of the Spanish Monarchy for the production of bronze cannons for the navy.²² It is clear from the data from multiple European archives that at least 30 percent of copper exports from Hungary went to the Spanish Monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1622, the Count of Oñate described in detail the possible commercial routes, the status of the negotiations between the imperial court and the German merchants, and the payment alternatives.²³

Galley slaves were also in high demand, and the Spanish navy needed them in significant numbers. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, Spanish diplomats facilitated the transfer of slaves captured at the Ottoman-Hungarian border towards Italy²⁴ with the help of Hungarian aristocrats, such as Pál Pálffy.²⁵ On the other hand, Hungarian galley slaves (captured by Ottoman troops) also filled the Mediterranean. One of them, Ferenc Egri (Francisco Egri in the Spanish sources), managed to escape and spent decades in the Spanish military service in Naples. Once he had returned to Central Europe from Naples, Pálffy helped get him a yearly pension from the emperor. His papers and biography were read by several imperial privy councilors in Vienna.²⁶

The latter magnate, who was described and praised by Castel Rodrigo after his election to the role of palatine in 1649 as “very biased” towards both Austrian and Spanish services,²⁷ maintained excellent relations with multiple Spanish statesmen, such as Miguel de Salamanca, secretary of state in the Spanish

21 Martí and Monostori, “A Spanyol Monarchia.”

22 Monostori, “A besztercebányai réz.”

23 The Count of Oñate to Philip IV. Vienna, 22 Sep 1622. AGS, Est. leg. 2507/76. sf

24 *Botschafter di Santo Clemente, für Augustinus Zozius aus Genua um ca. 300 türkische Sklaven für den König, 1605.* ÖStA, HHStA, Reichshofrat, Passbriefe 7-2-30.

25 Tercero Casado, “Infelix Austria,” 57.

26 Monostori, “Eger várából.”

27 “muy austriaco y parzialísimo del servicio del Rey nro. Sr.” Tercero Casado, “Infelix Austria,” 56, n. 134.

Netherlands in 1647.²⁸ One decade earlier, the Count of Oñate had paid Pálffy 50,000 forints for 3,000 oxen for military purposes at the request of Heinrich von Schlick, president of the Imperial War Council.²⁹

In the 1630s, both Oñate and the Marquess of Castañeda held multiple talks in imperial circles (including with Miklós Esterházy) about the recruitment and regular payment of several thousand Croatian-Hungarian soldiers. The Spanish Embassy in Vienna paid for these troops and managed the end-to-end financial cash flow as well, including the negotiations with Spanish and Italian *asentistas* and bankers. It was Castañeda who in 1637 contracted Colonel Péter Forgách and his 1,100 hussars, who moved to the Spanish Netherlands and entered Spanish service. A Croatian-Hungarian unit (after many changes) remained there for the next few decades.³⁰

Hungarian horses were bought in significant quantities on the horse markets of Vienna and Raab/Győr in Hungary by Spanish diplomats, both for symbolic purposes as a sign of strength and for military purposes. In 1616, 30 horses were transferred to Brussels, 24 of which were for Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands (1598–1621).³¹ In 1634, at least 14 were purchased for the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV.³²

The Case of Hungary 2: News Management and Political Micromanagement

The strategic importance of the Ottoman wars and the exotic nature of the Ottoman Empire as subject filled the works of art and the regular news in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands.³³ In the diplomatic corps, special focus needed to be

28 AHN, Est. libro 983, *passim*.

29 “En 19 de mayo de 1637 se libraron al conde Paolo Palfi, nombrado por el conde Schlick, presidente de guerra, para la compra de tres mil bueyes para los carros de la provianda del ejército en esta campaña, cinquenta mil florines.” ÖStA, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Spanien, Varia, Kart. 9., fol. 4v.

30 Monostori, “Egy magyar arisztokrata.”

31 AGRB, Secrétairerie d’État et de Guerre, 518/3, sd, sf.

32 Among the diplomatic letters of the Count of Oñate, sent from Vienna in 1634. AGRB, Secrétairerie d’État et de Guerre, 332, *passim*.

33 There were many reasons for this hunger for news from Hungary and the Ottoman lands: the concept of the *Antemurale Christianitatis*, that is, the notion of a land that was a bastion in the fight against the common enemy, the Ottoman Empire, the exotic nature of the different (from a Spanish and Catholic point of view) “heretic” religions in Transylvania, and the medieval history of Hungary in general. Lope de Vega, an illustrious writer of the Spanish Golden Age and author of many works with themes from Hungarian history, was an eager reader of Antonio Bonfini’s *Decades*, a major book on Hungary in the early modern age in Europe. Korpás, “Húgaros”; González Cuerva, “El prodigioso príncipe.”

put on the translations, since the texts of international treaties and alliances and the intercepted enemy letters had to be translated too.

It is not a coincidence that the aforementioned Jacques Bruneau, who at the beginning of the 1620s served as Archduke Albert's diplomatic envoy in Vienna, sent to Brussels a copy of two Central European treaties and detailed some of their linguistic aspects. Both the Peace of Nikolsburg, between the prince of Transylvania, Gábor Bethlen (1613–29), and Emperor Ferdinand II (1619–37), and the Treaty of Khotyn, between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, were signed at the end of 1621.

Brussels and the ruling elite of the Spanish Netherlands had been eager to receive news from the eastern branch of the dynasty since the Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the Dutch United Provinces had expired in April 1621, and the parties resumed hostilities at full speed. The emperor's willingness to assist the Spanish Netherlands depended heavily on whether he remained engaged in war with the prince of Transylvania. Bruneau, like others in the Spanish Habsburg diplomatic corps, started his career as a translator (*secretario de lenguas*)³⁴ and then moved up the ladder and held many prestigious positions. Since the translation activities in Brussels were less structured and sophisticated than in Madrid, he wanted to make sure that the secretariat in Brussels did not spend time unnecessarily translating texts. He sent the first text in Spanish (translated from the original Latin by the Count of Oñate), but he kept the original version in Latin to avoid any misunderstandings. Bruneau sent the text of the second treaty in Italian a bit later since the councilor of the emperor who possessed it was absent.³⁵

Envío los artículos de la paz en Hungría así los que tocan a los estados del reino en general, como al Betlen Gabor en particular. El señor conde de Oñate los ha hecho traducir en español, [...] pienso convenir tenerlos también en latín como originalmente se han concebido y concluido. Falta en ellos la entrada y remate, que el embajador mismo no los ha alcanzado de otra manera. [...] Y también espero de tener los de la paz de Polonia con el Turco, y un consejero del emperador que los tiene está ausente algunos días ha.³⁶

34 Reiter, "In Habsburgs sprachlichem," 172–73.

35 AGRB, Secrétairerie d'Etat Allemand, 430, fol. 234r.

36 Bruneau to Antonio Suárez de Arguello, Secretary of State, Vienna, Jan. 12, 1622. AGRB, Secrétairerie d'Etat Allemand 430, fol. 193rv.

In the kingdom of Bohemia, the local elite corresponded frequently in German with the emperor and his councilors and oftentimes in Spanish with the actors of the Catholic monarchy. In contrast, in Hungary, aristocrats like Palatine Miklós Esterházy exchanged letters in Latin with the Spanish ambassadors in Vienna³⁷ and with imperial politicians and councilors.³⁸

Even further to the east, knowledge of Latin remained crucial in relations with the Ottoman Empire. It is not a coincidence that the most formal translation service in Vienna belonged to the Imperial War Council and was responsible for the relationship with Constantinople (*Hofkriegsratsdolmetscher*).³⁹ Often, double translations were needed, as was the case with a letter, a copy of which is kept in Brussels, the former capital of the Spanish Netherlands, sent by a diplomatic envoy to the archdukes, signed by the Ottoman governor of Budin (Buda), Karakaş Mehmed Pasha, to Gábor Bethlen, prince of Transylvania in 1620. It was translated first from “Turkish” into Hungarian and then from Hungarian into Latin, word for word: “ex Turcico in Ungaricum, et ex Ungarico in Latinum, de verbo ad verbum translata.”⁴⁰

In 1644, the Spanish ambassador reported to his king that the archbishop of Esztergom, György Lippay (1600–1666, who served as archbishop in 1642–66) had brought some intercepted letters to Vienna which shed light on the diplomatic activities of France in Constantinople. The French, he claimed, aimed to convince the Ottomans to give license to the prince of Transylvania to attack the lands of the emperor:

Estos días ha venido aquí el arzobispo de Estrigonia con algunos otros cavalleros úngaros sin el palatino [Miklós Esterházy] por su poca salud haciendo gran ruido de que Rákóczi armaba y se entendía con Torstenson comprobándose esto con cartas intercetas deste en que ofrecia facilitar la licencia del Turco para acometer los Estados del Emperador por medio de los ministros de Francia que están en aquella Corte.⁴¹

37 Hiller, *Palatin Nikolaus*, passim.

38 Between 1625 and 1627, with the Count of Collalto (Janáček et al, *Documenta Bobemica*, vol. 4, 46) and between 1627 and 1631, with Francis von Dietrichstein (ibid., 175).

39 Reiter, “In Habsburgs sprachlichem,” 179.

40 Buda, July 18, 1620. AGRB, Secrétairerie d’Etat Allemand 433, fols. 252r–253r.

41 The Marquess of Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV. Vienna, Jan. 24, 1644. AGS, Estado, leg. 2345, s.f. It should be noted that this Marquess (II) of Castel Rodrigo was the father of the Marquess (III) of Castel Rodrigo, who served in Vienna from 1648.

These letters were probably the ones that another Spanish diplomat used in an anti-French pamphlet in Münster during the Westphalian peace congress the same year.⁴²

Hungarian diets and internal politics constituted a much more complex political environment than those of Bohemia (after 1620). Both the election and coronation of the new Hungarian king and the faction politics were closely monitored by the Spanish Embassy.⁴³

Several archival sources from Spain, Hungary, and Vienna show that a light form of political and diplomatic micromanagement on behalf of the representatives of the Catholic king still existed in 1655.

Over the course of 1654 and 1655, the Marquess of Castel Rodrigo focused on the election of the new Hungarian king, Leopold I, and the election of the new palatine. Though the secondary literature does not yet offer a nuanced picture of the full scope of his activities in Pozsony, it is evident from the sources that he made an effort to intervene decisively in the outcomes of the diet. The variety of sources across Europe also shows the nature of such interventions and the ways in which the study of the primary sources can shed light on the motivations of the principal actors from a Spanish Habsburg perspective.

Prince of Auersperg Johann Weikhard (1615–1677) was one of the most influential politicians of Leopold I. Once a privy councilor and the grand steward of the emperor and also a holder of the Order of the Golden Fleece (the most prestigious Habsburg chivalric order, granted by the king of Spain), he fell from grace in 1669. That year, he wrote an essay against the Marquess of Castel Rodrigo, his archenemy.⁴⁴ He listed several points against the Spanish ambassador, starting with his aggressive interventions in Hungarian politics. Castel Rodrigo wanted Ban of Croatia Miklós Zrínyi (1620–64) to be the palatine:

Als er arbitrium in Hungaricis rebus agiren wollen, und procuriert, dass Nicolaus Sarinius Palatinus in Ungarn werden solle, da doch schon damahls suspectus de infidelitate gewest ist,⁴⁵ [...] [and when he learned that Ferenc Wesselényi was elected palatine of Hungary, it caused him great pain:], sumo dolore illius.

42 Monostori, “Transilvania,” 361–62.

43 For 1625, the most important sources have recently been edited: Martí, “Az 1625. évi.”

44 Brief an den Kaiser, “Die wahren Ursachen, warum und wie mich Castel Rodrigo verfolgt hat, bis in seinen Tod, kürzlichen.” ÖStA, HHStA, Sonderbestände, Auersperg I-A-21-5a-9, s.f. 1669. I would like to thank the Auersperg family for granting me the permission to read this document.

45 Reference to the Magnate Conspiracy of 1664 in Hungary (alternative names: Zrinski-Frankopan or Wesselényi conspiracy).

While laying the groundwork for his presence at the Hungarian diet in Pozsony, Castel Rodrigo wrote letters to Hungarian magnates⁴⁶ and spent significant amounts of money on buying weapons to strengthen his household on his journey to the diet.⁴⁷ He also requested and received from the Spanish Council of State around 20 thousand *escudos* for his extraordinary costs,⁴⁸ and he wrote multiple letters and treatises about Hungarian politics, e.g., about György Lippay.⁴⁹ Castel Rodrigo often played the mediator role between the Hungarian magnates and the imperial ministers to decrease the number of political and confessional conflicts at a time when Madrid desperately needed a peaceful and stable Vienna during the last years of the Spanish-French War (1635–59).

In summary, in Hungary, for geopolitical reasons, the aristocrats were physically less integrated into the Spanish Habsburg circle of news and the Spanish cultural milieu, which meant that they had less access to political favors, patronage, and political sponsorship. In other areas, however, cooperation was equally important or sometimes more important from the perspective of Spanish Habsburg strategical goals, even if this cooperation was less interpersonal and relied less on physical presence. These goals included the assurance of accessible material and human resources, reliable political allies and diplomatic contacts in the ongoing fight against the Ottoman Empire, and reliable ties to figures with influence in the Hungarian diets.

Common Patterns: Representation, Legal Matters, and Book Culture

Alongside the substantial differences between the two kingdoms in terms of their relationship with the Spanish monarchy in diplomacy, however, many common patterns can also be seen. In these cases, the ruling elites of both states performed similar activities and were engaged in these endeavors in a similar fashion.

While Hungarian noblemen did not enjoy the benefits of most of the Spanish military orders, the most influential aristocrats received yearly pensions (Péter Pázmány and members of the Forgách family, for instance), and several

46 See e.g., his letter to Count Ádám Forgách, captain of Kassa/Košice. Vienna, January 10, 1655. MNL OL P 287, Fasc. CC/6, fol. 17rv.

47 AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3a época, 3148 (Cuentas de Nicolás Vicente Escorza, pagador general de Alemania, años 1643–1656), s.f.

48 See, AGS, Est. 2363 passim.

49 AGS, Est. 2362 and 2363, passim. See also Tercero Casado, “Infelix Austria,” 57.

of them were members of the most prestigious Habsburg order, the Order of the Golden Fleece. Miklós Esterházy (1628) and Pál Pálffy (1650), for instance, were granted this honor, as was Miklós Zrínyi (though after the timeframe of the present essay, in 1664). In comparison, between 1608 and 1655, six Bohemian noblemen received it: two members of the Lobkowitz and the Dietrichstein families, one member of the Martinitz family, and one of the Slavata family.

Coronations and rights to the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns constituted common subjects. The most outstanding case was that of the Oñate treaty (1617), signed by both branches of the dynasty. By signing this document, the Spanish king waived his right to inherit the kingdom of Hungary and Bohemia in a political situation when he could have argued that (due to the childless status of several Austrian heirs) it would be logical and even beneficial if the Spanish monarch were to take over these kingdoms. The feasibility of such a claim would nevertheless have been questionable, since it failed to consider, for example, the Kingdom of Hungary's status as an elective monarchy.⁵⁰ Also, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, several Spanish princes and princesses waived their rights formally, in writing, to the line of succession of Hungary. These events show and highlight the dynastic unity of the Habsburg family and testify to the fact that, theoretically, there was always a possibility for a reunion of all Habsburg territories under one dynastic ruler.

In several instances, the fate of Bohemian and Hungarian aristocrats and nobles intersected. Margarita de Cardona, the confidante of Empress and Queen Consort Maria (1528–1603), daughter of Charles V, forged a strong relationship with Martin Somogyi, a to-be *gentilhomme* in the court in Brussels.⁵¹ An orphan, Martin got into the household of the Dietrichstein family in Moravia, and he moved to Brussels as a page in the 1590s, where he started his career as the vice-captain of the bodyguard of the governors of the Spanish Netherlands (Archduke Albert and his wife, the Spanish *infanta* Isabel). Cardona (the wife of Adam von Dietrichstein and the mother of Franzis von Dietrichstein) even requested a Spanish knighthood for Somogyi, a request Archduke Albert repeated some years later, though without success. Instead, Somogyi continued to build his career in the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands. He undertook diplomatic missions and remained in close touch with Franz von Dietrichstein,

50 Sánchez, "A House Divided."

51 AGRB, Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre 533, fols. 137r–156v, *passim*. After the death of Archduke Ernest (the former governor), Cardona pushed him into Albert's household: AGRB, Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre, 687, unfol., *Memoria de los criados del serenísimo archiduque Ernesto*, Brussels, Mar. 5, 1595.

and he became one of his principal informers from Brussels⁵² In 1620, he became a baron.⁵³ By the 1630s, he had become a landlord (of Bothey in the province of Namur in the Spanish Netherlands and of Štáblovice in Opava/Troppau/Opawa in Moravia) and a tenant of a castle (Vichenet in Namur). Martin Somogyi made several contributions to cultural relations. In 1620, he sent a copy of the second part of Cervantes' *Don Quixote* from Brussels to Franz von Dietrichstein.⁵⁴ A few years later, Diego Muxet de Solís, a local writer in the Spanish Netherlands, dedicated his plays and poems to Dietrichstein at Somogyi's suggestion.⁵⁵

Instances of cooperation between Bohemian and Hungarian magnates occurred, naturally, among the Catholic prelates during the Catholic revival. As has been noted in the secondary literature in Hungarian, Philip IV and his ministers kept an eye on Péter Pázmány, archbishop of Esztergom, and later paid even more attention when Pázmány became cardinal. The literature has dealt extensively with the history of Pázmány's most important diplomatic mission to Rome in 1632 (which has most recently been strongly linked to the Spanish Cardinal Borja's famous protest the same year).⁵⁶ New sources revealed that the aim of the Pázmány's travels, which was to advance the establishment of a league between the Spanish king, the emperor, and the Catholic estates of the Holy Roman Empire, was a cornerstone in the foreign policy of the Count-Duke of Olivares. In 1629, Spanish Habsburg diplomacy conducted in Vienna by the Count of Castro, the Duke of Tursi, Jacques Bruneau, and the Marquis of Cadereyta had begun carefully to pave the way for the mission.⁵⁷

Although no thorough comparison of Bohemian and Hungarian aristocratic libraries has been conducted yet, the first results show clearly that both groups of magnates wanted to equip themselves with knowledge of the best of Spanish Habsburg culture.

The libraries of Hungarian Catholic aristocrats were full of *hispanica*, mostly in Italian and Latin translations.⁵⁸ In 1614, Cardinal Ferenc Forgách ordered and received 206 books from Frankfurt, 30 percent of which were by Spanish

52 For Somogyi's letters from Brussels to Franzis von Dietrichstein in 1617–31, see MZA, Rodinný Archiv Ditrichštejnů (Dietrichstein Family Archive), 1909.

53 ÖStA, Allgemeine Verwaltungsgeschichte, Reichsadelsakten 398.32

54 Polišínský, "Hispania de 1614."

55 Muxet de Solís, *Comedias humanas*.

56 Becker and Tusor, "Negozio."

57 Martí and Monostori, "Olivares."

58 Monostori, "Az aranykori," 425–32.

authors or writers from the Spanish Monarchy.⁵⁹ In Pázmány's private library, a similar proportion of books by Spanish authors can be found.⁶⁰ The book catalogue of the Zrínyi family in 1662 included at least 91 items in the same category (out of 731).⁶¹

Studies of the Bohemian libraries have been more thorough.⁶² A logical next step in the research in both countries might be to attempt to grasp the influence that the wide variety of military, scientific, ecclesiastical, legal, historical, etc. treatises had on the readers and their political and private activities.

Although the interests of Bohemian and Hungarian aristocrats seemed to differ (e.g., the former group included more volumes for pure entertainment in their libraries), the most popular authors were present in the book collections of both territories: Pedro de Mejía, Luis de Granada, Antonio de Guevara, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (a diplomat himself who spent several months in Vienna between 1634 and 1641), Juan Antonio de Vera y Figueroa (the count of La Roca, ambassador of Madrid in Venice between 1632 and 1642, and author of the famous 1620 treatise *The Ambassador*), and many others. One might reasonably assume that when Bohemian and Hungarian magnates discussed their lectures, actual political events, or their encounters with Spanish culture and persons, they could easily refer to a similar corpus of experiences and perceptions.

In conclusion, from the perspective of Hungary's relevance to the Spanish Habsburg system, money and strategic geopolitical interests were the primary factors. Hungary was important for the Spanish Empire because of its material and human resources (copper, horses, slaves, and soldiers). As a consequence, a peace between the Ottoman Empire, the Principality of Transylvania, and the Central European branch of the dynasty helped Madrid focus on its fight against France and the Netherlands and strengthen the position of Catholicism.

59 The catalogue can be found in *Magyarországi magánkönyvtárak*, 96–101. The authors were Luis de Granada, Domingo de Soto, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Jean de la Haye, Jerónimo Osório da Fonseca, Luca Pinelli, Jean-Baptiste Gramaye, Aubert Le Mire, Antonio de Guevara, Johannes Goropius Becanus, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitoria, Francesco Maurolico, Giambattista della Porta, among many others.

60 Martín Doyza, Diego de la Vega, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Erycius Puteanus, Daniele Fedele, among others.

61 *A Bibliotheca Zriniana*. The *hispanica* included works by humanists (Pedro Mexía, Antonio de Nebrija), cartographers (Abraham Ortelius, Cornelius Wytfliet), diplomats and politicians (Baltasar Álamos de Barrientos, the Count of La Roca), and a poet (Giambattista Marino), as well as military treatises (Francisco de Valdés, Diego Ufano, Luis Collado) and textbooks on rhetoric and grammar (Cipriano Suárez, Manuel Álvares).

62 Eg., Polišínský, "Hispania de 1614"; Zbudilová, *La literatura española*; Archer et al., *Bohemia Hispanica*.

Since Hungary was not part of the Holy Roman Empire and the integration of Hungary's aristocracy into the Habsburg central government organs and councils was far less advanced than in Bohemia, Spanish diplomacy made fewer efforts to build more meaningful and deep connections and interactions with them through, for instance, marriages, the migration of Hungarian noblemen to the Spanish Netherlands or Spain, or the granting of memberships in religious and military orders. Patronage, favors, and political sponsorship, as a consequence, played a smaller role. Spanish Habsburg diplomats in Prague and Vienna were well aware of the details of all these connections, and they made decisions, intervened, or facilitated solutions whenever necessary.

In contrast, Bohemia constituted a strategic land for Madrid for different reasons. As part of the Holy Roman Empire and as a territory that was historically more integrated into the Central European Habsburg lands, Bohemia needed to be more closely linked to the Spanish Habsburg system of diplomacy and favors. In addition, the 'Thirty Years' War created a very specific opportunity for the Spanish Habsburg elite. The defeat of the Protestant nobility in Bohemia freed up a huge amount of land for the Catholic aristocracy, and the emperor distributed some of these lands to Spanish noblemen who were fighting and living in Central Europe. Cultural assimilation, family ties (including marriages), and joint political decision-making in the central government organs in Vienna made relations between Madrid, Spanish Habsburg diplomats, and the Bohemian elite much closer in these areas than Spanish Habsburg relations with the Hungarian aristocracy.

As Bohemia and Hungary were neighboring lands with shared interests and common goals, many similar patterns can be detected as well, however, first and foremost in matters of cultural assimilation (book culture and cooperation in the Catholic revival) and questions of dynastic inheritance (coronations and the rights to the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns).

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“Secret Correspondence” in Habsburg–Ottoman Communication in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century*

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For the Habsburg Monarchy in the seventeenth century, it was very important to collect, send to Vienna, and evaluate up-to-date information on the Ottoman Empire. Following the Long Turkish War (1591/1593–1606), it was necessary in the 1620s to organize, alongside couriers and other channels of correspondence (e. g. the Venetian post), a cost-effective and sustainable system with which to transmit news and, in part, intelligence. In this essay, I present the historiography of the “institution” known as the “Secret Correspondence” and the history of the organization and reorganizations of the system. I also establish a typology of the people involved in the correspondence, namely 1) letter forwarders, 2) letter forwarders who also wrote secret reports, and 3) spies who wrote secret reports regardless of their location (in this case, the person was more important than the information). In the first half of the seventeenth century (1624 to 1658), the system of “Secret Correspondence” had to be reorganized several times (mostly due to lack of funds). In each case, the main challenge was to find and continuously employ the right people, so the role of the recruiter was also important. The political situation in the abovementioned period had an obvious impact on the functioning of the system, too. My research is based on documents from the Viennese archives (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv; Kriegsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv), which have helped me to offer a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the “Secret Correspondence” than found in the existing secondary literature.

Keywords: Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy, intelligence, flow of information, information channels, typology of the informants

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Introduction

Interest among scholars in Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy has increased in recent decades. The peaceful period of the first half of the seventeenth century (1606–1663) is of particularly strong interest.¹ In this essay, I investigate a vital channel of communication between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, namely the institution known as the “Secret Correspondence” (*Gebeime Korrespondenz*). The continuity of the correspondence between Vienna and Constantinople had a great impact on relations between the two empires. It was of primary importance for the Habsburgs mostly, as it helped them closely monitor the policies of the Ottoman Empire and have direct and prompt access to the relevant pieces of news and information with which to shape their European policy, especially during and after the Thirty Years’ War. In the discussion below, I look at the secondary literature on this “Secret Correspondence,” outline the history of its establishment in the first half of the seventeenth century (1623–1658), look at the historical and political context, and introduce the diplomats involved in its organization. Moreover, I examine the parallel information channels and establish a typology of those involved in the transmission of letters and intelligence. I also describe the roles of these actors in the network’s operation and offer some examples of how their activity as letter forwarders or spies impacted their careers. My intention is to offer a more nuanced understanding of how the Habsburg communications and intelligence system functioned in the Ottoman Empire and to demonstrate that the “Secret Correspondence” was primarily used as a form of infrastructure, which, of course, also made espionage more effective.

1 For a select list of recent publications, see: Ágoston, “Information,” 84–92, 100–2; Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 188–228, 265–333, 365–51, passim; Brandl et al., “Kommunikation und Nachrichtenaustausch,” 113–140; Brandl and Szabados, “A Janus-arcú diplomata,” 85–102; Brandl and Szabados, “The Burden of Authority,” 63–85; Brunner, *Habsburgisch-osmanisches Konfliktmanagement*; Cevrioglu, “The Peace Treaties,” 67–86; Cziráki, “Zur Person,” 157–64; Cziráki, “Mein gueter...,” 42–83; Cziráki, “Ambassador or Rogue?,” 125–50; Huemer, “Copy & Paste,” 84–112; Juhász, “On the Margins,” 87–106; Kármán, “Grand Dragoman,” 5–29; Kerekes, *Diplomaták*, 81–234; Papp, “Osmanische Funktionäre,” 24–41; Strohmeyer, “Die habsburgisch-osmanische Freundschaft,” 223–38; Strohmeyer, *Trendek és perspektívák*, 177–98; Szabados, “Habsburg–Ottoman Communication,” 119–40; Würflinger, “Der Balkan,” 63–74.

Historical and Political Context

The Battle of Mohács in 1526 determined the politics of the following decades, as the Habsburg Monarchy became a direct neighbor of the Ottoman Empire, which was expanding through the Kingdom of Hungary. The longer period of peace after 1568 provided an opportunity for secret diplomacy to develop,² but the Long Turkish War at the end of the century (1591–1606) interrupted this process. The Peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606 provided a new possibility to resume peaceful diplomatic relations, especially during the ‘Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648).³ Both empires were already entangled in conflicts in various theaters of war and were forced to maintain peace with each other, though this peace was fragile and had to be affirmed on several occasions (1615/1616, 1618, 1625, 1627, and 1642). After the ‘Thirty Years’ War, the two empires did not start a new war with each other but rather extended the peace again in 1649.⁴ Each peace treaty was accompanied by a solemn grand embassy, but these embassies were not necessarily sent only on the occasion of a new affirmation of peace.⁵ The envoys (with the rank of ambassador or *internuncius*) also played a role in the organization and operation of the “Secret Correspondence,” but the actual operation was the responsibility of the “experts” in charge of the Aulic War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*) and the resident ambassadors in Constantinople. Nevertheless, for various reasons (for instance, the death of a member or changes in the underlying political situation), it became necessary to reorganize the system several times by the mid-seventeenth century (until 1658).

The Revolution of Communication in the Early Modern Period

The early modern period saw a revolution in communication that had less to do with the invention of printing and more with changes in infrastructure.⁶ The postal system developed rapidly, and this contributed to better and faster correspondence. In the Holy Roman Empire, the Thurn und Taxis family owned the post office as a fief. In the Hereditary Lands of the Habsburgs, the postal

2 See: Pálffy, “Hírszerzés és hírközlés,” 40–47.

3 On the backdrop during the Thirty Years’ War, see: Hiller, *Palatin Nikolans Esterházy*, 22–93.

4 For a database of seventeenth-century peace treaties, see: Papp, “Az Oszmán Birodalom,” 95–99.

5 An example is the embassy of Johann Rudolf Puchheim. Cf. Cevrioglu, “Sultan Murad,” *passim*; Szabados, “The Habsburg,” 736–37.

6 On the importance and changes in early modern communication, see: Behringer, *Im Zeichen*, 9–25; Bethencourt and Egmond, *Cultural Exchange*, vol. 3.

service belonged to the Paar family, although the institution of postmaster existed for a time in the Kingdom of Hungary as well.⁷ This system, with its very well-functioning infrastructure, enabled faster and easier communication, which also had a positive effect on European societies and cultures.⁸ Parallel to the official correspondence, there existed an unofficial form of communication, mostly conducted in ciphers (i.e., secret writings of various kinds) which was used to transmit important and non-public information.⁹ There is a very substantial literature on early modern intelligence.¹⁰ With regard to the Ottoman Empire, two works are worth highlighting. John-Paul Ghobrial has examined the complex flow of information in Constantinople, London, and Paris in the late seventeenth century,¹¹ and Ioanna Iordanou has offered a thorough analysis of the extensive European and non-European (i.e. Ottoman Empire) intelligence network of Venice.¹²

In the discussion below, I examine another form of communication that was specifically established between Vienna, Constantinople, and most of the European areas of the Ottoman Empire, namely the so-called “Secret Correspondence.” Since a comprehensive reform of the postal system took place in the 1620s, it is reasonable to assume that the founding of the “Secret Correspondence” was also connected with this reform, though no sources have yet been found providing clear confirmation of this. One document makes clear the relevance of communication during the legation of envoy (*internuncius*) Johann Jakob Kurz von Senftenau (1623–1624), as Ferdinand II ordered the restoration of the post office in Altenburg/Mosonmagyaróvár, Raab/Győr, and Komorn/Komárom and Révkomárom/Komárno in the autumn of 1623.¹³ It must be added, however, that in the case of the Imperial Post and the Post of the Hereditary Lands of the Habsburgs, they were official and public structures.

7 On the history of the Thurn und Taxis family and the development of the postal system of the Holy Roman Empire, see: Behringer, *Thurn und Taxis*; On the history of the postal system in the Habsburg Monarchy, see Winkelbauer, “Postwesen,” 69–80.

8 Behringer, *Im Zeichen*, 51–688.

9 For the secret scripts of early modern Europe, see the following volume: Rous and Mulsow, *Geheime Post*.

10 For other relevant works, see: Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 23–29.

11 Ghobrial, *The Whispers*, passim.

12 Iordanou, *Venice's Secret Service*, 28–227.

13 “Quam necessarium sit, ut postae ordinariae maxime hoc tempore bellico et oratore nostro regio Constantinopoli existente ad varia incommoda avertenda, Ouarimo versus Jaurium et Comorrhham restaurentur et redintegrentur, hoc nos ipsi facili coniectura assequi potestis.” Ferdinand II to the Hungarian Chamber. Vienna, October 17, 1623. ÖStA FHK A SUS APA Kt. 6. fol. 156.

In contrast, the “Secret Correspondence” was in principle an unofficial channel of communication.

The Secondary Literature on and Terminology Concerning the “Secret Correspondence”

In contrast to what has been stated in the secondary literature, in my view, the network of “Secret Correspondence” *primarily* provided an infrastructure for more fluid communication between Vienna and Constantinople, and this infrastructure was always dynamically adapted to the circumstances. Some elements of the system have been addressed in the scholarship, but the mechanisms of its operation in the first half of the seventeenth century have not yet been explored in detail, and this has led to misunderstandings in the interpretation of certain sources. The system of “Secret Correspondence” was already known to scholars in the early twentieth century. Numismatist Carl von Peez drew attention to the work of correspondents in Buda, Belgrade, and Sofia who were active after 1665, but he did not systematically explore the function of the system in the second half of the seventeenth century.¹⁴ This applies to the earliest Hungarian scholars on the subject. Sándor Takáts and Gyula Erdélyi mentioned the actors in the system by name in their essays, and they emphasized that the appearance of foreign (i.e., non-Hungarian) participants crowded Hungarians out of the intelligence system.¹⁵ Peter Meienberger also devoted a few pages in his book to the “Secret Correspondence,” and he made important observations about the operation of the system and treated it separately from the intelligence service.¹⁶ The establishment of the system was first outlined by István Hiller, who based his conclusions on the mission of the aforementioned Johann Jakob Kurz von Senftenau. Hiller interpreted the “Secret Correspondence” as an intelligence system, but his findings prompted certain points that need further clarification, including, for instance, the function(s) of this system.¹⁷ Dóra Kerekes examined in more detail the correspondents of the second half of the seventeenth century, focusing on the role of the *Orientalische Handelskompanie* (Oriental Trade Company) in the “Secret Correspondence.”¹⁸ She also explored the activities

14 Peez, “Die kleineren Angestellten,” 5–11, 16.

15 Takáts, “Kalauzok és kémek,” 167–68; Erdélyi, “A magyar hírszerző-szolgálat,” 51.

16 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 83–86.

17 Hiller, “A ’Titkos Levelezők’,” 208–15; Hiller, “A Habsburg informátorhálózat,” 157–69.

18 Kerekes, “A Keleti,” 295–97.

of the interpreters (in her terminology, the “Secret Correspondents”) who resided in Constantinople during the Great Turkish War (1683–1699), from where they wrote and sent secret reports.¹⁹ On the basis of her research on the abovementioned period, Kerekes concluded that the “Secret Correspondence” could be regarded as an intelligence system in the modern sense.²⁰ However, the system of “Secret Correspondence” seems to have been more complex than mere espionage and can be seen rather as an intelligence *and* messaging system. I will explore this in more detail below.

The Reasons for Organizing the System and the Manner in which it was Implemented

During the second campaign (1623–1624) of Transylvanian prince Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629), which he launched against the Habsburgs in the Kingdom of Hungary five years after the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War,²¹ Johan Jakob Kurz von Senftenau, Habsburg envoy to the Ottoman Porte, was commissioned with the establishment of a new system of communication. The aim was pragmatic: to replace the flow of information, which had been weakened by Bethlen’s attacks, with a financially more optimal system of mail transmission (which could be maintained between Belgrade and Constantinople for less than 500 talers a year) that would be less dependent on Venice.²² In accordance with his instructions, the diplomat recruited suitable people, primarily merchants in Buda, Belgrade, and Sofia. They were contracted to forward letters between Vienna and Constantinople twelve times a year for a certain sum. This solution was indeed more affordable since it cost 240 talers per occasion to send couriers.²³ On his return journey from Constantinople, Kurz recruited people whom he thought qualified for the task and who were willing to undertake it. Thus, Hironimo/Girolammeo Grassi (240 talers)²⁴ in Sofia, Matteo Sturani²⁵

19 Kerekes, “A császári tolmácsok,” 1202–18; Kerekes, “Kémeek Konstantinápolyban,” 1227–57.

20 Kerekes, “Titkosszolgálat,” 105–28.

21 B. Szabó, “Gábor Bethlen’s,” 72–76.

22 His instructions included the following: “Doch aber daß die besoldung auf bayden örthern [viz. Belgrade and Sofia] sich nit höher in allem, dan zumaist auff 500 Rtl. erströckhe.” ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 109. Konv. 1. fol. 58. Ferdinand II to Kurz. s. l. (Vienna?), s. d. (1624?).

23 Hiller, “A ’Titkos Levelezők,” 211.

24 Girolammeo Grassi should not be confused with Francesco Crasso/Crassi/Grassi, who later became a spy as a doctor. On Dr. Grassi cf. footnote 48.

25 On Sturani cf. footnotes 90 and 91.

(240 thalers) in Belgrade, and Giovanni Pellegrini (160 talers) in Buda took on the task of forwarding the letters, and thus the costs in Belgrade and Sofia were kept below the prescribed 500 thalers.²⁶ They were merchants from Ragusa (see table), and Grassi and Sturani had provided their services to the Habsburgs before.²⁷ The operation of that newly established correspondence was presumably the responsibility of war councilor Count Michael Adolf Althan,²⁸ secretary of the Aulic War Council and later also a war councilor Gerhard von Questenberg,²⁹ and resident ambassador of Constantinople Sebastian Lustrier (1623–1629).³⁰

Typology of Members of the “Secret Correspondence”

Before presenting the functioning of the system, I offer first an outline of the terms used to refer to participants in the system. My intention is to clarify the roles these actors played, at least to the extent possible on the basis of the sources. The meaning of the term “correspondent” as used in the sources seems problematic. It may have referred to someone who was both a “correspondent” or “spy” and a “letter forwarder.”³¹ Indeed, within the system, several functions can be clearly distinguished, even if some of terms sometimes seem ambiguous. Accordingly, for those who merely forwarded letters, I suggest the term letter forwarder. Those who primarily reported on important events should be called spies. The last category, and the most difficult to define, is those who forwarded letters and wrote spy reports. In their case, two subcategories can be distinguished, namely people who primarily spied and sometimes also forwarded letters and people who were contracted primarily to forward letters, but in some cases wrote secret reports as well. These people also received a salary from the Court Chamber, unlike, for example, Marino Tudisi, who was recruited as a private servant of Count Althan.³²

26 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 109. Konv. 3. fol. 41–43. Kurz’ Final Report to Ferdinand II. s. l. (Vienna?), s. d. (1624?).

27 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 109. Konv. 3. fol. 41–42. Kurz’ Final Report to Ferdinand II. s. l. (Vienna?), s. d. (1624?).

28 After the outbreak of the Long Turkish War, Althan became an active participant in Habsburg–Ottoman diplomatic relations. Hiller, *Palatin Nikolaus Esterházy*, 23, 26, 36; Molnár, “Végvár és rekatolizáció,” 142–46.

29 Brandl et al., “Kommunikation,” 126–27

30 Ibid., 129–30.

31 Tamás Kruppa also drew my attention to the problem. Cf. Kruppa, “Velence információs csatornái,” 97.

32 Brandl and Szabados, “A Janus-arcú diplomata,” 85–92, 94–102.

Attempts at Reorganization between 1628 and 1658

The “Secret Correspondence” needed to be reorganized several times in the first half of the seventeenth century. Lustrier, the Habsburg resident ambassador at the Porte who was most interested in uninterrupted communication between the two powers, frequently used the new channel, but he also warned the court of the shortage of funds due to the war.³³ By the end of the 1620s, after the negotiators of the two empires had successfully agreed to extend the peace in Szőny, the system was in dire need of reorganization.³⁴ The task of dispatching the ratification to Constantinople was entrusted to Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, a recent convert to Catholicism, who entered the Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy as a *homo novus*.³⁵ He was also instructed, however, to reorganize the “Secret Correspondence.”³⁶ He was prepared for his journey by Michael Starzer (1610–1622), the former agent at the Porte, and Johann Rudolf Schmid (1629–1643), a former Ottoman captive and the next resident ambassador.³⁷ However, due to the lack of a suitable “specialist,” only the aforementioned Marino Tudisi accompanied him as an expert.³⁸ Presumably because of his earlier studies in Italy, Kuefstein preferred the Ragusan citizens as future letter forwarders, too. He enlisted the help of Tudisi on his way to the Sublime Porte. In Belgrade, he recruited Tomaso Orsini for Buda, Francesco Vlachy/Vlatky for Belgrade, and Marco Cavalcanti for Sofia.³⁹ During his stay in Constantinople, however, Kuefstein preferred sending letters through his courier, Wolf Leuthkauff, which obviously had an impact on the frequency of

33 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 110. Konv. 3. fol. 15. Lustrier to Ferdinand II, Constantinople, January 10, 1626.

34 Brandl et al., “Kommunikation,” 119–21.

35 For Kuefstein, see: Brandl and Szabados, “The Burden of Authority,” 63–80.

36 Kuefstein was authorized to reorganize the system by the president of the Aulic War Council, Rambaldo Collalto (1624–1630). Cf. ELTE EKL G4 Tom. IV. fol. 188. Schmid to Kuefstein, Prague, March 11, 1628.

37 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 101–13; Cziráki, “Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister?,” passim.; Starzer only had the title of an agent. Cf. Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 42.

38 Brandl and Szabados, “The Burden of Authority,” 77.

39 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 112. Konv. Varia 1629–1630. fol. 30, 31, 32. Contracts with Vlachy/Vlatky, Cavalcanti and Orsini. Belgrade, October 17, 1628.

the correspondence.⁴⁰ Orsini, for example, proved unreliable,⁴¹ thus Kuefstein had to use other channels and modify previous arrangements on the return journey. As a result, he first made an agreement in Sofia with a person called Stefano Vukovicz (Vuković).⁴² Nevertheless, in Belgrade the aforementioned Vlachy/Vlatky then undertook to organize the entire correspondence between Constantinople and Komárom, and he himself proved ready to write secret reports. This is probably why he received the rather high sum of 700 thalers.⁴³ In Komárom, Kuefstein entered into a contract with János Papp to transmit letters for 100 thalers a year.⁴⁴ Thus, Kuefstein succeeded in his mission to reorganize the “Secret Correspondence.”

In the years that followed, the new resident ambassador Schmid was responsible for controlling the system, which he did together with the imperial interpreter in Vienna, Michel d’Asquier (1625–1664).⁴⁵ Schmid also made use of the “Secret Correspondence,” but he sometimes bribed couriers *en route* to Buda and used the Transylvanian and Venetian postal services as well.⁴⁶ Little is known about the identity of the letter forwarders from this period (see table). Since pieces of news from the Middle East were very important for the court because of the Thirty Years’ War, Schmid also recruited Francesco Crasso/Grassi, a doctor who had previously worked in Buda and was also of Ragusan origin.

40 Some letters came into Kuefstein’s possession months after they were written. This reveals how slow the process of delivering the letters had become. ELTE EKL G4 Tom. V. pag. 975–78, 981–86, 987–1001. Miklós Esterházy to Kuefstein. Kismarton (Eisenstadt, Austria), January 31, 1629, Ferdinand II to Kuefstein. Vienna, April 20, 1629, Péter Koháry to Ferdinand II, s. l. s. d. (1629). According to Kuefstein’s notes, these letters came into his possession at the end of May.

41 For Orsini, see Brandl and Szabados, “A Janus-arcú diplomata,” 91.

42 ELTE EKL G4 Tom V. pag. 1343, 1345. Contract with Vukovicz (Vuković). s. l. (Sofia), September 10, 1629, Kuefstein to Schmid, Sofia, September 10, 1629.

43 “das dieser Mann [d. h. Vlachy] nicht allein zu fortbringung der brieff tauglich, sondern viel mehr wegen großer devotion gegen Eure Kaiserliche Majestät unnd dero Höchloblichen Hause guete vernunftt wissenschaftt des Türckischen Reichs unndt ansehen bey der Ragubischen Nation gehaimbe avisi zu geben, unndt khünfftig Eure Kaiserliche Majestät zu einem turggen krieg sich resolviren sollten, mit haimblichen machinationibus, unnd dergleichen nuzbahre servitiae laisten, auch viel andere darzue bewegen khönte unnd würde.” ÖStA FHKA SUS RA Kt. 302 (Fasz. 185A) fol. 305. Kuefstein to Ferdinand II, s. l. (Vienna?/Komárom?), s. d. (1629). This case was thus an exception rather than the type described by István Hiller. Cf. Hiller, “A ”Titkos Levelezők,” 210–11.

44 János Papp to Ferdinand II. Komárom, s. d. (1630) ÖStA FHKA HFU Kt. 339. fol. 245, 247.

45 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 80–82; Hamilton, “Michel d’Asquier,” 237–40.

46 ÖStA FHKA SUS RA Kt. 314 (Fasz. 186) fol. 266–69. Schmid’s expert opinion about the “Secret Correspondence.” Vienna, s. d. (1646). About the route via Transylvania, see “*Unter datum 23. und letzten jüngst verwichnen Maii durch Siebenbürgen...*” ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 115. Konv. 2. fol. 69. Schmid to Ferdinand II. Constantinople, June 5, 1641.

Dr. Grassi was primarily an intelligence agent (spy), and not only for the Habsburgs, of course.⁴⁷ Schmid also relied on the services of Andrea Scogardi (originally Johann Andersen Skovgaard), also a doctor, who, after his resettlement, kept the resident ambassador regularly informed about Moldavian and Transylvanian affairs.⁴⁸ Johann Rudolf Puchheim, the grand ambassador assigned to the Porte in 1634, also tried to recruit new people, but there are no relevant data on the long-term impact of this.⁴⁹ Because of financial problems, when they submitted a report to the emperor, Schmid and d’Asquier tried to get the impression that running the network was of primary importance.⁵⁰ However, by the 1640s, the system was on the verge of collapse, since there were not enough resources to run it because of the costs of the Thirty Years’ War.

After Schmid’s return from Constantinople in 1643, the task of rebuilding was inherited by his successor, Alexander Greiffenklau (1643–1648). The court was preoccupied at the time with a series of attacks (1644, 1645)⁵¹ by the Prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi I (1630–1648), against the Kingdom of Hungary. These attacks also impeded communication between Vienna and Constantinople. Moreover, the Ottoman war against Venice for the possession of Crete (1645–1669)⁵² virtually eliminated the possibility of using the Venetian post service, though that passage had been favored by Greiffenklau. Since the resident ambassador was unable to relaunch the “Secret Correspondence,” Hermann Czernin von Chudenitz, the grand ambassador assigned to the Porte in 1644, was charged with the task. However, it seems that this effort was not successful either. Both Czernin and Greiffenklau endeavored to get their letters to Vienna by all possible means, mainly through couriers, embassy secretaries, the Ottoman postal service, and sometimes even through Poland. The temporary disappearance of the “Secret Correspondence” was not necessarily their fault. Indeed, the political situation at the time had a strong impact on communication

47 István Hiller confused Francesco Grassi with Grirolammeo Grassi, but the two were not the same person. According to the secondary literature, Francesco Crasso, of Ragusan origin, was the same person as Dr. Grassi, who was recruited by Schmid. Cf. Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 88–89; Hiller, “A ’Titkos Levelezők,” 211–12; Molnár, “Egy katolikus misszionárius,” 249; Molnár, *Katolikus missziók*, 189, 275, 278; Rota, “The Death,” 58–63.

48 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 186, 188; Hiller, “A ’Titkos Levelezők,” 212.

49 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 65.

50 Hiller, “Javaslat,” 183–84.

51 Czigány, “The 1644–1645 Campaign,” 87–111.

52 Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien*, 17–48; Setton, *Venice, Austria*, 104–36.

and determined the options available, namely that diplomats were forced to rely on trusted confidants.⁵³

After the campaigns, the system was revived once again. Greiffenklau was commissioned with the reorganization for the second time. However, despite the efforts of imperial courier Johann Dietz, the reorganization did not succeed because of the war against the Venetians.⁵⁴ After the resident's involvement in a political assassination, the situation was further complicated, because it had some diplomatic consequences.⁵⁵ As for the intelligence, Greiffenklau primarily relied on the Hungarian-born renegade, the grand dragoman of the Sublime Porte (1629–1657), Zülfikâr Ağa.⁵⁶ The unexpected death of Greiffenklau in 1648 again offered Schmid new opportunities. In 1647, he had already suggested using the services of the German-born renegade interpreter, Hüseyin Çavuş, who went by the pseudonym Hans Caspar and who subsequently became an important spy in the intelligence network of the Habsburg–Ottoman frontier.⁵⁷

In 1649, Schmid was sent to the Porte as a member of the Aulic War Council to negotiate to extend the peace.⁵⁸ He introduced there the new resident ambassador, Simon Reniger,⁵⁹ and he reorganized the “Secret Correspondence.” During Schmid's diplomatic mission, he recruited competent agents in Buda, Belgrade, and Sofia who were suitable as actors who would forward letters (cf. table), and after some bargaining, he was able to agree on their remuneration.⁶⁰ In his secret report, he emphasized the importance of regular payments in the future to keep the system running.⁶¹ At the same time, he tried to set up the forwarding of letters via Transylvania, which seemed to be the shortest route.⁶² Communication channels were thus re-established for a while.

53 On his subject see Würflinger, “Der Balkan,” 69–74.

54 Würflinger, “Der Balkan,” 73.

55 See Cziráki, “Ambassador or Rogue,” 128–45.

56 Kármán, “Grand Dragoman,” 11, 18.

57 Szabados, “A 17. századi Habsburg-hírszerzés,” 81–89; Szabados, “A Rákócziak Erdélye,” 784–85, 787–809; *Die Karriere*, 35–143 passim.

58 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 117–21; Cziráki, “Making Decisions,” 92–93; Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán,” 847–66.

59 Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán,” 856–71.

60 Schmid's final report about his mission. Vienna, October 24, 1649. Brunner, Würflinger, “Die Internuntiatür.”

61 Schmid's final report about his mission. Vienna, October 11, 1649. Brunner, Würflinger, “Die Internuntiatür.”

62 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 121. Konv. 1. fol. 58–59. Schmid to Ferdinand III. Constantinople, April 30, 1649; See: Fundárková, *Ein ungarischer Aristokrat*, LXIV; Szabados, Habsburg–Ottoman,” 130, 132; Kármán, *Confession and Politics*, 192.

In 1650, Johann Rudolf Schmid again (as a baron and grand ambassador) took the ratified document of the peace treaty to Constantinople.⁶³ According to the references, during his embassy, he regularly used the “Secret Correspondence” network, and he tried to replace the lost links (e.g. in Sofia) and provide the actors in the system with adequate payment for the future, thus making Reniger’s work easier.⁶⁴ In his secret report, he emphasized again that salaries were to be paid regularly to facilitate the rapid flow of information. His suggestions were no doubt inspired by his previous bad experiences.⁶⁵

From that point on, communication between Vienna and Constantinople seemed relatively stable. The main channels were couriers, correspondence via Transylvania, Ottoman chiaus (çavuş), and the “Secret Correspondence.” Obviously, extraordinary events could cause disruptions. The death of imperial courier Johann Dietz during his mission in the autumn of 1651 led to a serious delay of several months, as all channels were simultaneously interrupted for various reasons.⁶⁶ However, the increasing number of excursions on the frontier made it essential to get the letters to their destinations as quickly as possible, and usually at least one channel was used to get the information to the right destination. In the autumn of 1652, the death of the letter forwarder of Belgrade (Baggio, recruited by Schmid) caused a further slowdown, and the position in Belgrade remained precarious for the rest of the year.⁶⁷ According to one of Reniger’s reports to Schmid, between December 1653 and 1654, he sent only one letter out of nine through the “Secret Correspondence” network. This mere fact offers an indication of the seriousness of the problems outlined.⁶⁸ In 1653, the death of Hungarian palatine Pál Pálffy (1649–1653) caused a disruption on the Transylvanian route, but this was soon resolved diplomatically, although the election of Ferenc Wesselényi as palatine in 1655 caused further interference.⁶⁹

63 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 121–29.

64 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 124. Konv. 3. fol. 7, 20, 24, 91v. Schmid’s final report. Vienna, June 10, 1651.

65 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 124. Konv. 4. fol. 12–13. Schmid’s expert opinion. Vienna, June 8, 1651.

66 Szabados, “Habsburg–Ottoman,” 129–34.

67 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 92.

68 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 126. Konv. 3. fol. 65. Reniger to Schmid. Constantinople, April 9, 1654.

69 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 93–94; Kármán, *Confession and Politics*, 192–93.

The main source of information in Constantinople in the early 1650s was Dr. Scogardi, who regularly reported to Schmid,⁷⁰ and in Buda, mainly during the time of Kara Murad Pasha (1650–1653),⁷¹ the German renegade Hans Caspar.⁷²

In the mid-1650s, the “Secret Correspondence” and the whole communication and intelligence network entered a difficult phase. The new pasha of Buda, Sari Kenan (1653–1655),⁷³ took a dim view of the secret transmission of information and assaulted the judge of Óbuda, who was then acting as a letter forwarder. Even the other letter forwarder in Buda, Vuichich/Vuičić (see table), did not dare carry out his duties, and consequently a general atmosphere of fear prevailed in that period.⁷⁴ Since the sending of letters via Transylvania also seemed uncertain at the time, communication between Reniger and the Viennese court took place via Poland for a few months.⁷⁵ Finally, the imperial courier Natal de Paulo, also of Ragusan origin, managed to restore the system by filling in the missing links. Furthermore, Hans Caspar found himself in a difficult situation during the time of Sari Kenan, and this was reflected in the low number of reports written by him.⁷⁶

A completely new situation was brought about by the campaign of Prince of Transylvania György Rákóczi II (1648–1660) against Poland in 1657.⁷⁷ The channels of communication were entirely changed by the absence of Leopold I (who traveled to Prague and then to Frankfurt), the campaigns, and the move of the Sultan’s court to Adrianople.⁷⁸ From the available correspondence it seems that the difficulties of “Secret Correspondence” were not fully overcome in 1656, as no suitable persons could be found in Buda or Belgrade. Only the mission of the courier Natal and secretary of the Aulic War Council Peter Franz Hoffmann was crowned with success, and after that, the secret channel of communication was again in operation in 1657.⁷⁹ Reniger had to follow the Sultan’s court to Adrianople at the end of 1657, and this brought about a dramatic change in the

70 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 126. Konv. 1. fol. 17–18, 136–43, 194–95. Scogardi to Schmid, Constantinople, February 10, June 1, and June 26, 1653.

71 Gévay, *A budai pasák*, 40.

72 Szabados, “A 17. századi Habsburg-hírszerzés,” 85–87; Szabados, “A Rákócziak Erdélye,” 791–96.

73 Gévay, *A budai pasák*, 41.

74 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 106.

75 *Ibid.*, 105–6.

76 *Ibid.*, 108–12.

77 B. Szabó, *Erdély tragédiája*, 51–243; Kolçak, “A Transylvanian Ruler.”

78 On the circumstances and consequences, see Szabados, “...egyiket megsértvén...” 1, 259–76 *passim*, 2, 571–87 *passim*.

79 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 129–31.

conditions of the channels of communication, because someone else had to be left in Constantinople. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.⁸⁰ In terms of gathering or passing on intelligence, Hans Caspar was less active than he had been in the early 1650s, and the war had a strong impact on his circumstances and his work as a spy.⁸¹

Thus, although the operation of the “Secret Correspondence” was impeded by numerous financial and personal obstacles between 1624 and 1657, efforts were made to restore this important channel of information for Vienna as soon as logistical, financial, and infrastructural circumstances allowed.

Motivation(s), Opportunities, and Risks

If one looks at the members of the system based on the typology outlined above (see table), some conclusions can be drawn about the motivations and risks of being part of the “Secret Correspondence.” As early as the 1630s, the letter forwarders were aware of the importance of their activities and tried to take advantage of them, and they sometimes blackmailed the diplomats.⁸² Schmid seems initially to have been rather distrustful of the Ragusans, who at that time enjoyed the support of Count Althan, as the case of the so-called “interpreter trial” shows.⁸³ Later, Schmid changed his mind on that matter.

As the letter forwarders were mainly merchants, their main task was to forward letters from both directions (i.e., between Vienna and Constantinople). In their case, therefore, the emphasis was on the task itself rather than the person who executed it. Therefore, letter-forwarding can be regarded as a more easily replaceable function than spying. Their activities were not without risk, however. The sources reveal that in some cases they put their lives at risk. This is also indicated by the fact that Johann Rudolf Puchheim wrote the name of one of the letter forwarders in cipher in his report.⁸⁴ Greiffenklau in 1645⁸⁵

80 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 129. Konv. 1. fol. 1. Reniger to Leopold I. Constantinople, January 1, 1658; On difficulties in communication, see Szabados, “...egyiket megsértvén...” 2, 571–87 passim.

81 Szabados, “A 17. századi Habsburg-hírszerzés,” 88–89; Szabados, “A Rákócziak Erdélye,” 801–9.

82 Once, Antonio Schumizza, who was in charge of organizing the forwarding of letters, simply stated that he would deliver the documents to Venice if he did not receive his regular payment. ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 112. Konv. 6. fol. 57. Schmid to the Aulic War Council. Constantinople, April 30, 1633.

83 Hiller, “A tolmácsper.” 147–54; Presumably, he was distrustful of Tudisi, too. Cf. Brandl and Szabados, “A Janus-arcú diplomata,” 91–92.

84 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 113. Bd. 2. fol. 352–353. Puchheim to Schmid. Buda(?), s. d. 1634.

85 Würflinger, “Der Balkan,” 72–73.

and, later, Schmid in his 1649 mission pointed out that, due to the Ottoman war against Venice, it seemed difficult to find people among the Ragusans for the task. They were generally on good terms with Venice but were Ottoman vassals as well.⁸⁶ It was thus necessary to agree on the abovementioned punctual and regular payment.⁸⁷ A similar example can be found during Schmid's mission as ambassador when he authorized Baggio, the letter forwarder in Belgrade, to trade in Moravia on behalf of the emperor to ensure the smooth flow of correspondence.⁸⁸ This means, therefore, that certain letter forwarders had enough bargaining power in matters affecting their own livelihoods, although Baggio could not benefit for long from the opportunity he had won. Nevertheless, even before his death, the Belgrade transporter complained about the lack of payment and obstructed the forwarding of letters.⁸⁹ The death of the aforementioned courier Dietz illustrates how the loss of a single key person could paralyze the communication system since he was also the one who would have delivered the payment to the letter forwarders. In the mid-1650s, because of the risks, the Ragusan merchant colony in Belgrade forbade their members to participate in the "Secret Correspondence." This offered Baggio's successor (Giorgio Cortey) the possibility of bargaining again. In the end, they solved the problem by depositing the letters from Constantinople in a certain house, where Cortey could later pick them up.⁹⁰ In 1655, the magistrate of Óbuda, who had also been involved in the forwarding of letters, was badly beaten and imprisoned. This was presumably done as a warning to the Ragusans in Buda. That is why the letter forwarder in Buda (Peter Vuichich/Vuičić) decided to move to Belgrade.⁹¹ Lazaro, the letter forwarder in Belgrade, was also arrested in 1656, for which he was later compensated by the Habsburg court, as was the magistrate of Óbuda.⁹²

According to the available data (see table), almost all the Balkan letter forwarders were Ragusans, so in their case, there was no ethnic or religious

86 For the status and diplomatic role of Ragusa, see: Kunčević, "Janus-faced Sovereignty," 92–121.

87 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 82–84.

88 "Dem Bagio di Simone handelßman von Ragusa zu Griechischen Weissenburg wanhaftt einen freyen paß 100 seck wohl herauf zu bringen, außfertigen lassen." ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Bd. 304. 1651. Reg. fol.

89. Nr. 24. HKR to the Court Chamber. Vienna, 12 June 1651.

90 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 92.

91 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 126. Konv. 1. fol. 162. Reniger to Ferdinand III. Constantinople, June 8, 1653.; ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 126. Konv. 2. fol. 3. Reniger to Schmid. Constantinople, July 12, 1653.

92 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 106.

92 ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Bd. 313. 1656. Anw. Exp. fol. 518. Nr. 105. Privy and Deputy Councilors in Vienna to HKR. Vienna, 16 September 1656; ÖStA FHKA SUS RA Kt. 305. (Fasz. 187A) fol. 199. HKR to Court Chamber. Vienna, February 9, 1657.

diversity. It was certainly no coincidence that the imperial couriers who recruited Balkan letter forwarders in the 1650s (Natal and Michel de Paulo) were most probably also of Ragusan origin. They were presumably more able to contact the merchants. This also confirms that the Viennese court was aware of the importance of the “Secret Correspondence.”

However, the circumstances of the spies differed from those of the letter forwarders. In their case, not only was the function they played important. The identity of the person himself and his position (e.g., physician) also mattered. Dr. Grassi seemed to be useful for intelligence purposes in Buda (in the 1630s), Constantinople (in the late 1630s), and later the Middle East during the campaign of Murad IV against the Safavids.⁹³ The other doctor, Andrea Scogardi, also reported from both Constantinople and Iași.⁹⁴ In both cases, there is evidence that they provided intelligence not only for the Habsburgs but Ragusa and/or Venice also enlisted their services (Scogardi was also involved in political assassinations), which offers a clear indication of their significance.⁹⁵ They were also primarily engaged in their profession, so as spies, they were news sources and were not involved in the forwarding of letters. They obviously put themselves at considerable risk by engaging in espionage activities, but as they were doctors, it was quite difficult to replace them, so they did not have to fear strong reprisals. As a group, the spies were more ethnically diverse. Grassi was Ragusan, while Scogardi had been born in Denmark. As for religion, the latter had protestant (Lutheran) roots, but he converted to Catholicism during his studies in Italy.⁹⁶

The situation of people belonging to the third category was also different from that of ordinary letter forwarders. In their case, the identity of the person in question and his position again played a key role. Matteo Sturani, also of Ragusan origin, was recruited as a letter forwarder in Belgrade in 1624, and he wrote secret reports from Poland in the 1630s.⁹⁷ After the death of Alexander Greiffenklau, he seemed a potential candidate for the post of resident

93 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 88–89; Molnár, *Katolikus missziók*, 189, 205; Miović, “Diplomatic Relations,” 192.

94 Hiller, “A ’Títkos Levelezők,” 212.

95 Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, 186, 188; Rota, “The Death,” 57–63; Luca, “The Professional Elite,” 148–56.

96 Luca, “The Professional Elite,” 150.

97 Sturani visited Rome in 1626. He later became a spy commissioned with forwarding letters, and in the 1630s he continued his intelligence activity from Kraków. Molnár, *Katolikus missziók*, 213; ÖStA HHStA Polen I. Kt. 57. Konv. V, VI passim, Kt. 58. Konv. VII, VIII passim. Reports of Sturani an Arnoldius. Kraków, May, June, July, August 1635.

ambassador, but because of his Ragusan origins and his age, he was eventually dismissed, and Simon Reniger was chosen instead.⁹⁸ One of the reasons why Simon Reniger was considered more suitable for the post was that, unlike his predecessor, he had followed Schmid's advice.⁹⁹ Francesco Vlachy/Vlatky also reported regularly, but later he proved more unreliable, since he did not receive his regular salary.¹⁰⁰ Thus, despite his claims to the contrary, he does not seem to have taken on the risky task out of conviction, but rather for money.

Hans Caspar in Buda was not only useful for espionage, but he also forwarded letters on several occasions. For example, he sometimes copied and forwarded letters to Vienna sent by Reniger, which had been unsealed by the Pasha of Buda. Moreover, he regularly forwarded letters sent by Ottoman chiaususes.¹⁰¹ Later, because of the events in Transylvania, Hans Caspar had to leave Buda and those lost access to the infrastructure that had previously enabled him to transmit the information he had acquired. This event proved to be a decisive factor in his later life.¹⁰² Nevertheless, Caspar was still seen as a potential spy, as evidenced by diplomatic reports, for example, when he tried to blackmail Dr. Johann Friedrich Metzger, who had been sent to the camp of the Pasha of Buda (Gürcü Kenan), because the Pasha was ordered to move against György Rákóczi II.¹⁰³ In this third and last group of the "Secret Correspondence," therefore, both the functions of the individuals involved and the ethnic composition of the group seem to be mixed, but at the same time, the careers of these people can be traced.

98 Cziráki, "Making Decisions," 94–97; Cziráki, "Habsburg–oszmán," 851–66.

99 Cziráki, "Mein gueter...," 69–72.

100 Michel d'Asquier to the Aulic War Council. s. l. (Vienna?), s. d. (1632?). ÖStA FHK A RA Kt. 302 (Fasz. 185A) fol. 389.

101 Szabados, *Die Karriere*, 95–103, esp. 108–9.

102 Szabados, "A Rákócziak Erdélye," 805–9.

103 Szabados, "A 17. századi Habsburg-hírszerzés," 88; Hans Caspar explained to Dr. Metzger that Rákóczi had offered him the sum of 1,000 thalers, but he had refused to accept it. "Zum beschluß soll Eurer Fürstlichen Gnade ich unangezeigter nit laßen, daß der Hussein cziauss sich sehr beclagt und khein lust mehr habe, ichtes zu aviern, weil man ihme schon so lange zeit nichts geschickht. Der Ragozi habe ihm 1.000 tl. versprochen, mit ihme zu correspondiren. Er habe es aber nit annemen wollen." Dr. Metzger to Annibale Gonzaga. Túrisszakállas (Sokolce, present-day Slovakia), July 16, 1658. Szabados, "Adalélok," 309.

Conclusions

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, the Christian vassals facilitated the flow of information between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Ragusa, through its merchants, played an important role in the communication and intelligence system built up by the Habsburgs in the first half of the seventeenth century, known as the “Secret Correspondence.” However, when they had the opportunity, the Habsburgs also used Transylvanian couriers to transmit letters. Second, the functions of acquisition and transmission of information are clearly distinct, so the term “Secret Correspondence” should be understood as referring to the infrastructure itself. Within this system, reports written by spies were also transmitted. Third, it follows that the role of the letter forwarders was merely to transmit information (hence the function itself), and the actual identity of the person who did this was almost immaterial, whereas in the case of the spies, the identity of the individuals in question was a key factor. Fourth, it is also clear from the cases presented that, although the intelligence officers were sometimes able to bargain, the spies and letter forwarder spies were better embedded in the system because of their position and therefore were less likely to rotate. Fifth, the organization of the system shows that the experience gained over the decades was accumulated and put to good use. This is illustrated by the fact that Johann Rudolf Schmid tried to offer Simon Reniger, his successor, the best conditions for the transmission of letters. Thus, Reniger, unlike his predecessor Greiffenklau, regarded Schmid as his master, who introduced him to the mysteries of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy. Sixth, personal skills were essential to the organization and operation of the system, as diplomats could use their Italian language skills to liaise with transporters and spies. Likewise, couriers responsible for recruiting new transporters had to rely on their personal talents and language skills to a great extent, too. In sum, talent, professionalism, and a personal network of contacts were key factors in facilitating Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy in the first half of the seventeenth century.

Table 1. Letter forwarders and Spies in the Service of the Habsburgs between 1624 and 1658

Resident ambassadors in Constantinople	Letter forwarders, their citizenship, and religion	Letter forwarder spies, the ircitizenship and religion	Spies, the ircitizenship and religion	Citizenship (total)	Religion (total)
Sebastian Lustrier (1623–1629)	Buda Giovanni Pellegrini (1624–1627?), Ragusan, Catholic Tomaso Orosini (Oct 1628–Jan 1629), Ragusan, Catholic	Buda –	Hans Caspar(?), Ottoman Empire, Islam (orig. Catholic)	Ragusa: 2 Ottoman Empire: 1	Catholic: 2(3) Islam: 1
	Belgrade –	Belgrade Matteo Sturani (1624–1626?), Ragusan, Catholic	Belgrade –	Ragusa: 1	Catholic: 1
	Sofia –	Sofia Girolamco Grassi (1624–?) Mario Cavalcaniti (17. Oktober 1628–10. September 1629?), both Ragusan and Catholic	Sofia –	Ragusa: 2	Catholic: 2
Johann Rudolf Schmid (1629–1643)	Buda (from 1634), Ragusan, Catholic	Buda Lupo Lupino (appr. pseudonym), Ragusan, Catholic A noble Turk (appr. Hans Caspar), Ottoman Empire, Islam	Buda –	Ragusa: 2 Ottoman Empire: 1	Catholic: 1 Islam: 1
	Belgrade –	Belgrade Francesco Vlatky/Vlatky (1628–1632?), Michael Medani (1633?) Both Ragusan and Catholic	Belgrade –	Ragusa: 2	Catholic: 2
	Sofia Stefano Vukovich (Vuković), Ragusan and Catholic	Sofia –	Sofia –	Ragusa: 1	Catholic: 1

Resident ambassadors in Constantinople	Letter forwarders, their citizenship, and religion)	Letter forwarder spies, the irtizenship and religion	Spies, the irtizenship and religion	Citizenship (total)	Religion (total)
Alexander Greiffenklau (1643–1648)	Iași –	Iași –	Iași Dr. Hans Andersen Skovgaard/ Andrea Scogardi (1641–1643?), orig. Denmark and Lutheran, later Catholic	Denmark: 1	orig. Lutheran, converted to Catholic faith: 1
	Persia –	Persia –	Persia Dr. Francesco Grasso/Grassi (1637–1638), Ragusan, Catholic	Ragusa: 1	Catholic: 1
	Constantinople –	Constantinople –	Constantinople Dr. Francesco Grasso/Grassi (1640–1642), Ragusan, Catholic Zülfikâr Ağa (1629–1643), Ottoman Empire, Islam	Ragusa: 1 Ottoman Empire: 1	Catholic: 1 unknown
	Buda Peter Vuichich (Vučić) (ab 1646?), Ragusan, Catholic	Buda –	Buda Hans Caspar, Ottoman Empire, Islam	Ragusa: 1 Ottoman Empire: 1	Catholic: 1 Islam: 1
	Belgrade A person who sent some letters back for fear in 1645	Belgrade –	Belgrade	Ragusa: 1	Catholic(?): 1
	Sofia –	Sofia –	Sofia –	–	–
	Constantinople	Constantinople	Constantinople Dr. Johann Hans Andersen Skovgaard/Giovanni Andrea Scogardi (1644–1645), orig. Denmark and Lutheran, later Catholic Zülfikâr Ağa (1643–1647), Ottoman Empire, Islam	Denmark: 1 Ottoman Empire: 1	orig. Lutheran, converted to Catholic faith: 1 Islam: 1

Resident ambassadors in Constantinople	Letter forwarders, their citizenship, and religion)	Letter forwarder spies, the citizenship and religion	Spies, the citizenship and religion	Citizenship (total)	Religion (total)
Simon Reniger (1649–1665) between 1649 and 1658	Buda Peter Vuichich (Vučić) (1649–1655) Marco Vuichich (Vučić) appr. brother of Peter (1655) Elias Luschick (Lušić) (1656?), all of them Ragusan and Catholic	Buda Hans Caspar, Judge of Óbuda (Iános Baán?), Ottoman Empire, unknown	Buda –	Ragusa: 3 Ottoman Empire: 1	Catholic(?): 3 –
	Belgrade Bagio di Simme/Drasili(?) (1649–1653) Giorgio Lamberto di Corti/Cortey/Cortrai (1653–1655) Lazaro Ginreta (1655–1657?), all of them Ragusan and Catholic	Belgrade –	Belgrade –	Ragusa: 3	Catholic: 3
	Sofia unknown Constantinople	Sofia Constantinople	Sofia Constantinople Dr. Johann Andersen Skovgaard / Giovanni Andrea Scogardi (1653–1656), orig. Denmark and Lutheran, later Catholic Nikusios Panatotes (Panajoti) (1649–1665), Ottoman Empire, Orthodox Zülfikâr Ağa (1649–1657), Ottoman Empire, Islam	Ragusa(?): 1 Denmark: 1 Ottoman Empire: 2	Catholic(?): 1 orig. Lutheran, converted to Catholic faith: 1 Orthodox: 1 Islam: 1

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A Special Form of Diplomatic Encounter: Negotiations in Constantinople (1625–1626)*

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In this article, I present a case study of a special form of diplomatic encounter that took place as secret negotiations between the resident ambassadors of France, England, Holland, and Venice and the Transylvanian envoys in Constantinople in 1625–1626 about a prospective alliance between Prince Gábor Bethlen and the anti-Habsburg powers during the Danish phase of the Thirty Years' War. My analysis of this special form of negotiation offers a comprehensive overview of the practices deriving from the most characteristic circumstances and setbacks of diplomatic activity in Constantinople, i.e., what solutions (if any) were found to resolve problems of precedence, information brokerage, poor economic conditions, and bribery and corruption. I address, furthermore, the private interests of the participating Transylvanian diplomats and consider the extent to which these interests corresponded to the interests of their sending polity and especially of Gábor Bethlen. My discussion sheds light on the ways in which, in general, everyday challenges and networks of relations in Constantinople influenced the diplomacy of small states in the Ottoman orbit, specifically Transylvania in this case, when entering into an alliance with major powers outside the bonds of their Ottoman tributary status.

Keywords: diplomacy, Constantinople, Gábor Bethlen, Principality of Transylvania, Ottoman Empire

An Ottoman Tributary State in the Thirty Years' War

The princes of Transylvania participated¹ in the Thirty Years' War on four occasions, belonging to different anti-Habsburg coalitions. Three of these interventions came about under the reign of Prince Gábor Bethlen (1580–1629, ruled from 1613), who from the first moment engaged in the conflict on the side

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1 On the different aspects, see the articles in the volume edited by Gábor Kármán, *The Princes of Transylvania*.

of the Winter King, Frederick of the Palatinate.² In his first military campaign, he entered the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary in September 1619, and in November, he participated in the unsuccessful siege of Vienna. By January 1620, the estates of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia had entered into an alliance with those of Austria. Bethlen was elected king of Hungary in August 1620, but due to his allies' defeat at the Battle of White Mountain in November of the same year, he started negotiations with Ferdinand II and concluded peace by January 1622, renouncing his royal title. His second intervention was of a much smaller scale: although he constantly negotiated with Frederick through emigrants from the Palatinate, it was not possible to join his army with those of Frederick's generals after he reached as far as Moravia during his second military campaign of autumn 1623. Therefore, in May 1624, he concluded peace with Ferdinand II again.

His last effort to join an anti-Habsburg coalition was made in 1626, and this time the preparations seemed more fruitful than they had been three years earlier. An international coalition of Protestant powers to help the Winter King regain his throne and title was created in the form of the League of The Hague in December 1625 with the participation of England, Denmark, and Holland. The participants invited other interested states to join their coalition, such as the Principality of Transylvania and France. As for Transylvania, Prince Gábor Bethlen made a great step to become a member of the anti-Habsburg league by marrying Catherine, sister of the Elector of Brandenburg, in the spring of 1626.³ He started military maneuvers against Ferdinand II shortly afterward, in the summer of 1626, but joined the alliance officially only later, between November 1626 and February 1627 by the signature of the Treaty of Westminster and its ratification by Holland and Denmark.⁴ By this time, however, much to the disdain of his new allies, he had already concluded the peace of Pozsony/Bratislava with the emperor. As for France, despite the support it gave in the form of indirect warfare against the Habsburgs and the dynastic connection with England,⁵ both

2 On the history of the Rhine Palatinate at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, see Wiczorek, "Europäische Allianzen und pfälzische Katastrophen."

3 Deák, "The wedding festivities"; Kármán, "Bajor követ."

4 The texts of The Hague and Westminster treaties are found in Szilágyi, *Adalékok*, 78–83.

5 The overture with Protestant German princes was originally suggested by the superintendent of finances, the Marquis Charles de La Vieuville, and taken up by Cardinal Richelieu after his fall from grace, see Petitfils, *Louis XIII*, 352–69. The army of Frederick of the Palatinate, led by Ernst von Mansfeld, was financed together with England for a short period at the turn of 1624 and 1625, following from the marriage of Charles I to the sister of Louis XIII. Krüssmann, *Ernst von Mansfeld*, 542–44, 559–70.

confessional and internal political tensions, which reached their climax with the Huguenot uprising starting in 1625, prevented its adherence to the League of The Hague.⁶

Direct contacts between Transylvania and interested parties such as England, France, Venice, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark were maintained during the 1620s through formal and informal channels with the help of public and secret envoys. However, the Principality of Transylvania as a small state in the Ottoman orbit was not able to build anything resembling the networks of permanent embassies throughout Europe that the main players in international diplomacy had started to build. The only exception was Constantinople where, following from Transylvania's status as an Ottoman tributary, a resident envoy called a *kapitiba* was always present beside the occasional, more solemn embassies discussing current affairs or bringing the yearly tribute to the Porte.⁷ Constantinople had a special status in European and Transylvanian diplomacy as a center for information exchange,⁸ which in practice meant the permanent diplomatic presence of all major and minor powers. It is thus hardly surprising that, from the middle of the sixteenth century, negotiations at the Porte played a crucial role in maintaining contacts between the Western states and Transylvania.⁹ From the perspective of the historian, this means that, in contrast with the negotiations conducted sporadically through direct contacts, the practices and methods used during these negotiations and the personal interests of the individuals and polities involved can be more easily reconstructed and analyzed, since the negotiations themselves were continuous and some of the parties left behind a well-preserved corpus of diplomatic correspondence.

6 Sources concerning the reservations of Richelieu and French foreign policy towards the Protestant cause are published in Avenel, *Lettres*, 41, 49, 148–49, 198–99, 250–52. For a short summary of French foreign politics of the same period see Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, 63–64, 69–76; Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years' War*, 63–64.

7 On Transylvania's representation in Constantinople in general, see Bíró, *Erdély követei*; Kármán, "Sovereignty and Representation."

8 In this respect, see Hiller, "Feind im Frieden."

9 Hungarian historiography traditionally focused on the details of Transylvanian contacts with England and the role played by English ambassadors at the Porte in their formation. On the period of the Long Ottoman War see Várkonyi, "Edward Barton." For a general overview, see Angyal, *Erdély*. On the era of Gábor Bethlen's rule, see Zarnóczy, "Anglia"; Kellner, "A tökéletes követ"; Kellner, "Interested affections." On the French contacts of Gábor Bethlen, see the works of Dénes Harai and Zsuzsanna Hámori Nagy.

Negotiating in Constantinople: Challenges and Solutions

Constantinople was the primary scene to reach one of Gábor Bethlen's main foreign political goals in the mid-1620s: the granting of permission by his Ottoman overlord to enter an alliance with anti-Habsburg European partners and engage in military actions within these frames. The resident ambassadors at the Porte were Philippe de Harlay, count of Césy¹⁰ of France, Sir Thomas Roe¹¹ of England, Cornelis Haga¹² of Holland, Zorzi Giustiniani¹³ of Venice, and László Balásházy¹⁴ of Transylvania. They worked together closely to this end in the summer of 1625. The participants worked diligently at the requests of their sovereigns, whose political interests happened to coincide with those of the prince of Transylvania for a short time. However, their collaboration was made difficult by problems of diplomatic precedence and questions of bribery and treason, and they ended with dubious results.

An investigation of the first factor (disputes over precedence and especially the competition between the French and English resident ambassadors) prompts reconsideration of the widely accepted view in the Hungarian secondary literature concerning the primary role of Thomas Roe in supporting Bethlen's efforts at the Porte. As it is well known, in addition to the diplomatic ranks of different envoys, the order in which Western powers established diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Empire also had an informal impact on encounters among diplomats in Constantinople.¹⁵ It was the task of the permanent French ambassador to guard his own declared precedence, which was constantly challenged by the others. Césy was accused by his successor at the post of resident ambassador, Henry de Gournay, Count of Marcheville, of having allowed the Venetian *bailo* to proceed at his right and having let the ambassador of Holland to represent Transylvanian, Moldavian, Wallachian, Swedish, and Polish interests.¹⁶ On the eve of the negotiations with the Transylvanian resident, Césy was outraged by

10 Flament, "Philippe de Harlay"; Tongas, *Les relations*.

11 Richardson, *The Negotiations*.

12 Groot, *The Ottoman Empire*; Van der Sloot, *Cornelis Haga*

13 Óváry, *Oklevéltár*.

14 Bíró, *Erdély követei*, 121.

15 Venice and Genoa maintained commercial relationships with Constantinople from Byzantine times, whereas the official contracts regulating commerce with the Ottoman Empire were signed only later with France (1536), England (1580), Holland (1612). Charrière, *Négociations*; Testa, *Recueil*; Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, 264–73; Groot, "7. The Dutch Capitulation of 1612. Translation and Text."

16 "Mémoire sur l'ambassade de France à Constantinople en 1634." Ad, 133CP4, Fol. 239.

the cooperation never seen before of the Venetian bailo and Thomas Roe in some ecclesiastical appointments, which caused further disappointment when Giustiniani was not willing to pay him a visit together with the newly arrived Venetian ambassador, Simone Contarini, in April 1625.¹⁷

Temporary enmities and conflicts of interest gave rise to short-lived coalitions among the diplomatic players in Constantinople, while political confrontation was sometimes overridden by confessional interests. One of the most typical dividing lines was of a denominational nature. Over the course of the 1620s and 1630s, the opposing parties formed by the French and Habsburg resident ambassadors against those of England and Holland were trying to outbid one another in their negotiations with the Ottoman authorities in order to remove or keep in position the Greek patriarch of Constantinople, who was known to have accepted Protestant doctrines.¹⁸ In contrast, the long-lasting conflict between French and Habsburg interests on the European political scene made the ambassadors of the rival powers enemies, a situation in which English support was not always provided to the French despite the dynastic ties formed in 1625. Thomas Roe was equally missing personally from the coalition of the French, Venetian, and Dutch ambassadors, who conspired against the Spanish agent arriving at the Porte in the summer of 1625, as well as from their conferences with the Transylvanian resident during the same period.¹⁹ Roe's personal absence was not the consequence of the plague raging in Constantinople that summer but rather was part of a practice he followed to avoid Césy and thus answer the problem of rivalry. Césy also adopted this practice from the very beginning of Roe's mission: although he ordered twelve torchbearers to accompany Roe when entering Constantinople, they both avoided public encounters and met only on private occasions.²⁰

This throws into question Roe's primary role in the negotiations of 1625, which he contended was "the main motive and actor of the present affair."²¹ While Roe was constantly informed through the other residents' letters and acted

17 Césy to Ville-aux-Clercs, 10 April 1625. Ad, 133CP3, Fol. 138-139.

18 Harai, "Une chaire" ; Tongas, *Les relations*, 130–35 ; Van der Sloot, *Cornelis Haga*, 196–200.

19 Césy to Ville-aux-Clercs and to Louis XIII. 13 July and 10 August 1625. BnF, Ms. fr. 16150, Fol. 416 and 421. Roe was ordered to oppose the Spanish-Ottoman treaty in November 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 461–62.

20 Flament, "Philippe de Harlay," 242.

21 Roe complained about the consecutive visits of the Transylvanian agent Bornemisza at Césy's, as he believed that it was the French ambassador who first got to know the aim of the Transylvanian mission. Ambassador János Gáspár, however, denied the allegations and contended that Bornemisza and Césy were

in Bethlen's favor separately from the others, it is important to note that Césy was also frequently absent due to illness in the summer of 1625. For the most part, it was Haga, Giustiniani, and Balásházy, together with different interpreters (more on them later), who were present at the negotiations. Gábor Bethlen had already asked Ottoman permission to seek protection from the friends of the Porte and ally with them against the Habsburgs, but this first license was given only "by word of mouth."²² The aim of the meetings of summer 1625 was to redact the text of a document granting this permission in line with the interests of the involved parties, who insisted that their sovereigns could not be explicitly named therein. Balásházy showed the others a draft that would have licensed Bethlen's alliance with them, encouraged him to wage war on the emperor, and offered military aid for such an enterprise.²³ The final draft was redacted by the bailo of Venice.²⁴ Despite the joint efforts, all the resident ambassadors were left dissatisfied, as the document that was sent to the prince of Transylvania mentioned the kings of France and England, the Republic of Venice, and the Netherlands as friends of the Porte with whom the prince of Transylvania was allowed to unite, but it made no reference to him waging war on the emperor.²⁵

The solution to this failure lay in the combination of two characteristics of Ottoman diplomacy. The first was the prevalent tendency for the Ottoman power to include something different in the documents it issued than had been previously agreed on. The second can simply be called the practice of bribery when it came to any political decision in Constantinople, which meant various

long-time friends. Their friendship is analyzed later in the essay, but Bornemisza condemned Roe for his "superfluous ambition." Bornemisza to Césy, end of April 1628 [1625]. Harai, *Gabriel Bethlen*, 249–50.

22 Roe to Conway, 28 May 1625, Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 400–1; Césy to Louis XIII, 22 June 1625. BnF, Ms fr. 16150, Fol. 408r.

23 Césy to Louis XIII and to Ville-aux-Clercs. 10 and 26 August 1625. BnF, Ms. fr. 16150, Fol. 421–426. Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate. 27 August 1625. Óváry, *Oklevéltár*, 586–87.

24 "The letter to Gabor from the Grand Signor required to license his Union with the princes of Christendom, corrected and sent by the Venetian ambassador." August 27, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 434–35. This version is mistaken for the final by Angyal, *Erdély politikai érintkezése*, 56–57. A comparison of Roe's and Giustiniani's correspondence reveals that the final document redacted by the Ottoman chancellery dates September 4, 1625. Roe to Conway, September 24, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 439. Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate. September 7, 1625. Óváry *Oklevéltár*, 590.

25 Ibid., 591. Italian translation of the sultan's letter to Gábor Bethlen, March 1, 1625. Ibid., 593–94. In order not to raise suspicion if intercepted, the letter written in September was deliberately dated earlier than the peace of Gyarmat concluded by the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in May 1625 (but never ratified by the Ottoman party).

sums of money and gifts²⁶ for officeholders of every rank, from interpreters to scribes at the chancellery. In the particular case of Bethlen's license, the meaning was not lost in translation, but the ambassadors' refusal to pay the sums demanded by the Ottoman interpreter and head of scribes for the correct formulation of the text might have contributed to the problem. The direct approach of the chancellery would not necessarily have resulted in the right formulation of any document, however. For example, bribes paid to scribes resulted in only slight changes in the text of the *'ablname* sent from the Porte to Poland in October 1623.²⁷ No less could have been expected in the much smaller case of redacting a letter of permission, even if the sums requested had been paid.

When discussing the details of the text of the license, the resident ambassadors could count on their interpreters and to some extent themselves. Césy was sometimes represented by an interpreter named Olivier.²⁸ Balásházy, who spoke Latin (and probably Italian as well) translated some letters himself. Indeed, he considered it a dire mistake that Cornelis Haga “involved those beys” whose ignorance he blamed for the questionable outcome.²⁹ He must have been referring to Grand Dragoman Zülfikâr Ağa,³⁰ the Hungarian-born Ottoman interpreter employed by the Transylvanian embassy permanently during the first half of the seventeenth century, and Yusuf Ağa,³¹ who as *chiaux* served as an intermediary between Transylvania and the Porte. It was the *kaymakam* who ordered Zülfikâr to translate all documents brought by the Transylvanian envoy³² and thus it seems that the dragoman's presence in Transylvanian affairs could not be ignored in this case, as he emerged as some kind of expert on the region at the Porte.³³ Haga wrote to Roe upon first hearing Bethlen's demand about the license

26 On the different types of gifts that were not considered bribes see Papp, “Corruption, Bribe, or just Presents?”

27 The Ottoman practice of changing the text of the agreed *'abdnames*, with reference to the connection with the Habsburgs are described through the example of Polish ambassadors to the Porte Krzysztof Zbaraski and Krzysztof Serebkowicz in 1622–1623. Grygorieva, “Performative Practice,” 236–40.

28 Most probably a member of the dragoman family Olivieri who worked for both the French and the Venetian embassy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rothman, *The Dragoman Renaissance*, 32.

29 Balásházy to Roe, September 17, 1625. TNA, SP 97/11, Fol. 81. I would like to thank Gábor Kármán for providing me with the photographs taken of the letters kept at the National Archives and found on the basis of research by Áron Zarnóczki.

30 The famous case related to the difference between the Ottoman and Latin versions of the peace of Zsitvatorok (1606) can also be connected to him. Kármán, “Grand Dragoman.”

31 B. Szabó, “A hatalom csúcsain,” 27.

32 János Gáspár arrived in April 1625.

33 On this and on his becoming an expert on the northeastern regions of the Ottoman Empire, see Kármán, “Grand Dragoman.”

that the three of them (himself, Giustiniani, and Césy) thought it appropriate to entrust Zülfikâr with the negotiations concerning the license and gave their word to pay him one hundred thalers each if the business was finished according to the expectations of the prince. Still, they did not find him trustworthy. Balásházy, however, convinced them that Bethlen had already rewarded him with a carriage and horses for his services.³⁴ After the fiasco, by emphasizing Haga's role in requesting Zülfikâr's help, Balásházy, as a representative of the Transylvanian embassy, probably wanted to dilute the blame for the disastrous outcome, which he saw as a consequence of having involved the grand dragoman.

Further complications arose from the fact that Zülfikâr and Yusuf, with Olivier as a witness, promised the head of scribes (*reisulkuttab*), who was acquaintance of theirs, another four hundred thalers in August 1625 when visiting him at his house. Balásházy offered to pay this latter sum in the name of his master, with the ambassadors paying their share of the other four hundred.³⁵ However, the Venetian and Dutch ambassadors informed Roe about their decision that they would only pay Zülfikâr once the business of the permission had been completed to their satisfaction. They explained their refusal with the contention that they had not been authorized by their sovereigns to make such payments.³⁶ The resident ambassadors do not seem to have had much faith in Zülfikâr's good intentions concerning the second four hundred thalers either, and they seem to have thought that he wanted it for himself. Sooner or later, however, and against their better judgment,³⁷ they all paid their original share of one hundred each in exchange for what they called the services of Zülfikâr in general.³⁸ The first one to pay was Roe, and Balásházy was clever enough to play on the sentiments of competition among the ambassadors when praising him as the one who "not only superseded but defeated the others." Upon hearing of Roe's contribution, the others also started to pay, first, some smaller portions

34 Balásházy argued that they could make use of Zülfikâr even against the Spanish treaty. Haga to Roe, August 3, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 46.

35 Balásházy to Roe, TNA SP 97/11, Fol 59v.

36 Giustiniani and Haga to Roe, August 23 and 29, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 66–67, 72–73.

37 "I cannot reasonably refuse, if you have already either acquainted him [Zülfikâr], or the Agent [Balásházy], with your purpose" versus "such small sums are cast away." Roe the Unknown, July 26, 1625. TNA SP 97/11, Fol. 47. "Havendo io consentito, quasi contra la mia intenzione di dar [...] Cente piastre" versus "non havendo nissun ordine di spender un aspro." Césy to Roe, 5 August 1625. TNA SP 97/11, Fol. 59r.

38 Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, 1 December 1625. Óváry *Oklevéltár*, 607.

to Zülfikâr, and some money was even offered to Yusuf to compensate for his journey to present the letter of license to the prince.³⁹

As noted above, Haga, Giustiniani, and Césy originally insisted on waiting until the business had been successfully conducted in a manner that would meet the expectations of the prince of Transylvania before making any payments. Ultimately, the matter was indeed resolved and met the prince's expectations. No matter how much the ambassadors complained that the finalized document lacked any encouragement to Bethlen to wage war on the emperor but mentioned their masters,⁴⁰ Balásházy argued that Gábor Bethlen was pleased with the letter of license. All the more so, as he indicated that Bethlen had not made the request for permission “out of necessity but for his wellbeing,”⁴¹ which corresponded to his original request mentioning “security and caution.”⁴² It can also be said that the original draft was provided by Bethlen to Balásházy, and the Ottoman chancellery returned to this version from the one that the ambassadors presented.⁴³ This suggests that the aim of Bethlen in the summer of 1625 was to be permitted by his Ottoman overlord to adhere to the League of The Hague in formation, without actually starting any military maneuvers yet, for which he first needed to have his conditions fulfilled by his future allies.

Without elaborating on the details of the preliminaries of such a treaty, it is clear that they were discussed primarily by envoys who were sent directly to the involved parties, of which the ambassadors at the Porte knew very little. In this respect, Constantinople was a scene of secondary importance, as none of the resident ambassadors at the Porte had received any authorization to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Transylvanian envoys. Although Bethlen informed his emissaries in Constantinople about the preliminaries and sent them copies of his main stipulations to be discussed with the representatives of the anti-Habsburg party, several factors hindered the development of such negotiations at the

39 Balásházy to Roe, September 23 and 28, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 84 and 86. See also: Angyal, *Erdély politikai érintkezései*, 56–57. Haga to Roe, October 10 and 19, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 103 and 108.

40 Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate. September 7, 1625. Óváry *Oklevéltár*, 591. “That his majestie is therein named, is against my will, and the like error against all the other ambassadors.” Roe to Conway, September 19, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 437. Roe's complaints to Balásházy, September 6, 1625, TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 74.

41 “Nam Serenissimus Princeps noster voluit habere illas literas ab Imperatore non de necesse sed tantum de bene esse. Sua Serenitas illis est contenta [...]” Balásházy to Roe, September 17, 1625, TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 81. Quoted by Roe to Conway, September 24, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 439.

42 “Sua sicurta e cautione.” Haga to Roe, August 3, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 46.

43 Roe to Conway, September 19, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 437.

Porte. Apart from the great distances to be covered and the slow pace at which anything could be delivered using postal services (of which the ambassadors continuously complained), the presence of a traitor among the members of the Transylvanian delegation also caused many a problem during the crucial year of 1625.

The suspicion that there was a traitor in their midst arose first among the envoys in March 1625, when Césy, Roe, and Haga noticed the close contact between Balásházy and the imperial resident. Roe suspected that Balásházy was influenced in this not by any duplicity on Bethlen's part, but rather because of his own status as a member of the Catholic fold. They also heard rumors according to which Balásházy had displeased his lord and would be replaced. To answer the challenge of possible information leakage, they decided to write separately to the prince and forwarded the copy of the sultan's letter written to him by their own secret courier.⁴⁴ At the beginning of 1626, Césy wrote about Balásházy's treason as a fact and used it as a pretext to send his other interpreter, Tomaso Fornetti,⁴⁵ to Transylvania with instructions he believed to be in accordance with the direction of French foreign politics. I discuss this in more detail later in the essay, but is worth quoting Césy's complaint that he could not communicate with the ambassador of the prince without the resident being present; and when he was not there, the ambassador, who spoke neither Latin nor Italian, turned for help to the kaymakam's domestic interpreters, which had even more disastrous consequences from the point of view of information leakage.⁴⁶ Roe had a more balanced opinion and admitted that he had not managed, with his inquiries, to discover the identity of the traitor. Indeed, he stood by Balásházy, saying that he "hath suffered much affliction," but nothing had been proven against him, and he might well have been wrongly accused.⁴⁷

44 Césy to Ville-aux-Clercs, March 4, 1625. BnF, Ms fr 16150, Fol. 379. Roe to Conway, March 1, 1624 [1625]. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 356.

45 Member of the dragoman family Fornetti of Genoese origin, who were employed by the French embassy during the early modern era. Rothman, *The Dragoman Renaissance*, 53–54.

46 The mentioning of Latin and Italian in the context of the resident implies that Balásházy spoke both languages. Césy's detailed account of the circumstances of his negotiations with the Transylvanian envoys is contained in his letter to Louis XIII, January 12, 1626. Ad, 133CP3, Fol. 193–194. The Transylvanian ambassador mentioned in Césy's account was Pál Keresztesi, who delivered the annual tribute to the Porte. Szilágyi, *Levelek és acták*, 436–37, 633.

47 Roe to Bethlen, December 27, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 170. Published in Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 478–79. See also Szilágyi, *Erdélyország története*, 154.

Balásházy's perspective can be reconstructed with the help of his letters. In August 1625, the ambassadors confronted him with their finding that either he or the interpreter of the Transylvanian embassy was a traitor, as one of them had passed on all the secrets to the imperial party. In order to prove that he always spoke the truth, Balásházy offered to have Olivier translate all the documents that the prince had recently sent to the Porte and that had been read to the kaymakam, as well as the reply that was going to be sent in a few days. He also offered to investigate the possibility that perhaps a domestic servant or the interpreter was the traitor.⁴⁸ It is worth considering who this interpreter (not to be confused with the Dragoman Zülfikâr) might have been. The sources reveal that he was a man by the name of István Futó (referred to as "Stephanus alumnus" by Balásházy), who had studied at Bethlen's expense in Constantinople to become a Turkish scribe. Although there exists no information concerning when he entered into service, he might have taken up some tasks of interpretation during the pourparlers of the resident ambassadors. Habsburg diplomatic correspondence reveals that Futó was able to transfer information about Transylvanian affairs to the Habsburg embassy for years before 1626 when he finally left the Porte.⁴⁹

It is hard to determine the extent to which Balásházy was involved in this affair, but his silence could be interpreted as telling. There is no sign of any further mention of the issue of treason or of any investigation in his letters for about half a year, which suggests that he did not really launch any inquisitions or if he did, he concealed the findings. By December 1625, it was too late. He had lost all credit in the eyes of the resident ambassadors except for Roe, whose trust he especially held dear. A letter written to Roe reveals that both of them considered Yusuf Ağa the source of rumors concerning Balásházy's treason. When the resident confronted him with this in the presence of the Transylvanian ambassador Pál Keresztesi and the agent Bornemisza, Yusuf denied ever having said anything against him, but he said he had heard talk of István Futó having given Transylvanian letters to the Habsburg resident.⁵⁰ After this letter was written to Roe, Balásházy disappeared almost entirely from the sources, but he remained for eight more months at the Porte, probably hiding in shame. It was only in June 1626 that the prince appointed Tamás Borsos as a new

48 Balásházy to Roe, August 28, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 78.

49 On the profession of Turkish scribes in Transylvanian service and with reference to Futó see Kármán, "Translation" 262.

50 Balásházy to Roe, December 13, 1625. TNA SP 97/11 Fol. 162.

resident and dismissed Balásházy for “certain reasons.”⁵¹ For the last time, Roe stood by his colleague (or possibly friend) when he wrote a letter of testimony to Gábor Bethlen calling Balásházy the prince’s “true and faythfull servant,” whose abilities he found exceptional. Roe’s letter also reveals that the suspicions that fell on Balásházy “proceeded from an enemye” and that “Stephano” finally fled, for which Balásházy accused himself.⁵²

Contrary to Roe’s testimony, Borsos, Balásházy’s successor at the post of resident, reported that Balásházy, who had been condemned by everyone, “was not His Highness’ orator but that of the German emperor.” Furthermore, against Balásházy’s objections, he was only willing to take over the building of the Transylvanian embassy with an inventory, as he claimed to have found at least two hundred thalers worth of damage caused by his predecessor.⁵³ Balásházy was indeed imprisoned in the summer of 1627, and the amounts of money promised by him to several officers (including one hundred thalers for the head of scribes and a carriage to someone unknown) were ordered by the prince to be paid from his own holdings.⁵⁴ Incidents of residents at the Porte going bankrupt were not uncommon. Césy was also accused by his successor, Marcheville, of causing damage to the building of the ambassadorial residence,⁵⁵ and when Marcheville himself went into bankruptcy and fell into disgrace, Césy was still present in Constantinople and ready to continue his mission as resident ambassador, as he had not been able to leave the city between 1631 and 1634 because of his unpaid debts.⁵⁶

Harsh financial conditions, accumulation of debts, and unpaid salaries in the middle of the monetary crisis of the era affected larger and smaller players alike,⁵⁷ while definitely posing greater problems for such minor characters as Balásházy or even the Turkish scribe Futó. One cannot help but suspect this

51 Szilágyi, “Levelek és acták,” 656.

52 Roe to Bethlen, August 17, 1626. TNA SP 97/12 Fol. 153.

53 Borsos to István Bethlen, Gábor Bethlen’s brother, August 18, 1626. Gergely, “Adalék ‘Bethlen Gábor és a Porta’ című közleményhez. Harmadik és befejező közlemény,” 610–11.

54 Gábor Bethlen to Borsos, July 7, 1627. Szilágyi, *Bethlen Gábor fejedelem kiadatlan politikai levelei*, 445.

55 “Mémoire sur l’ambassade de France à Constantinople en 1634.” Ad, 133CP4, Fol. 239.

56 Hamilton, “To Divest the East.” Their intrigues are mentioned in the French traveler Jean-Baptist Tavernier’s travelogue. Everling and Máté, “*Úton Konstantinápolyba*,” 307.

57 For a comparative overview of the financial conditions and salaries of ambassadors in Constantinople based on the example of Césy and Balásházy, see Hámori Nagy, “A konstantinápolyi követek megélhetése.” On everyday life in Constantinople, see Mantran, *La vie quotidienne*. On the mid-1620s financial crisis and Bethlen’s solution, see Zimányi, “Bethlen Gábor gazdaságpolitikája”; Buza, “Pénzforgalom és árszabályozás.”

is what may have driven them to sell the property of the embassy or even some precious information. In a letter written by Futó in 1624, he desperately begged for money from his relative, the secretary of the prince, as he had none left. He was afraid of an approaching peril and said that if he did not get help soon, his soul would be corrupted.⁵⁸ This suggests a connection between his financial crisis and his passing on diplomatic documents to the imperial resident, which started in late 1624 or early 1625. As for Balásházy, no indications of any such correlation have been found in the sources so far, but he also might have been involved in the scheme to some extent. He otherwise seems to have been a talented diplomat who spoke languages, could argue convincingly, and navigated comfortably among the authorities and officials at the Porte, but his last effort to defend himself from the charges he faced was unsuccessful. In the long run, however, this incident did not break his career as a diplomat entirely, as he represented Prince György Rákóczi I as a member of his delegation at the negotiations concerning the Treaty of Eperjes/Prešov with Ferdinand II in 1633.⁵⁹

The Impact of Networks of Relations on Negotiating in Constantinople

The discussion so far has touched on several practices used in negotiations in Constantinople and the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. In the last section of this essay, I concentrate on how the resident ambassadors at the Porte reflected on the fact that the negotiations of a treaty of alliance with the prince of Transylvania were basically impossible in Constantinople. I also consider why, if they were aware of this fact, some of them still pursued these efforts without any authorization from home. As I will show, apart from practical reasons, this might have been due to interpersonal relationships similar to the apparent friendship between Roe and Balásházy. Césy's friendship with the Transylvanian nobleman Ferenc Bornemisza, Bethlen's agent at the Porte accompanying Transylvanian ambassadors to Constantinople three times in 1625–1626, can also be traced as a factor in the background.

There is a difference between the opinions of the representatives of the two greatest powers involved, that is the resident ambassadors of England and France, about maintaining contacts with Bethlen through Constantinople.

58 Futó to Péter Sári, October 28, 1624. Gergely, "Adalék 'Bethlen Gábor és a Porta' című közleményhez. Első közlemény," 467.

59 Frankl, "Az eperjesi béke," 195.

Roe, though having spent less time in Constantinople than Césy, warned the Transylvanian ambassador János Gáspár in May 1625 that a treaty should not be concluded at the Porte, as the sole ambassador of England or France could not take upon himself the diverse interests of so many contracting parties, while the grand signor himself might have wanted to be admitted to such a league.⁶⁰ He also sensed that Bethlen “did only enterteine us, and that his resolutions depended upon some other place.”⁶¹ Nevertheless, he was well aware of the significance of Bethlen’s prospective joining the anti-Habsburg coalition with respect to Frederick of the Palatinate and his wife, Elisabeth Stuart, so he related everything in connection with his moves and underlined the importance of winning him for the common cause. Both James I and Charles I were, however, unwilling to take up diplomatic relationships with the prince of Transylvania directly before the end of 1625, when the English party, partly at Roe’s urging, ultimately considered Constantinople quite a detour for correspondence with the prince.⁶²

As for Césy, a change of attitude can be noticed when considering his negotiations with Transylvanian envoys about the preliminaries of a future treaty. When giving an audience to Gáspár in May 1625, he showed a reserve similar to Roe’s and suggested that these matters should directly be discussed with the French court through the envoy who had already visited the prince.⁶³ The ambiguity of his instructions of October 1625, together with the delay caused by slow delivery by the post services and the information leakage to the Habsburg resident, however, pushed Césy to get in touch with Bethlen directly through his interpreter. In a letter of October 5 which Césy received in early 1626, Louis XIII wanted a confident person, i.e., Césy, to communicate his intentions regarding the preliminaries with the Transylvanian resident at the Porte. On October 30, he warned his ambassador to accept all propositions of a league from the other interested parties or from the Transylvanian resident but only to inform the sovereign and give an opinion about it.⁶⁴ By the time this

60 Roe to Conway, May 5, 1625. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 391–92.

61 Roe to Conway, June 8, 1625. *Ibid.*, 400.

62 On the changes in the English attitude towards Bethlen and Roe’s efforts to bring the two parties closer, see Zarnóczki, “Anglia és Bethlen Gábor,” 144–47; Kellner, “A tökéletes követ,” 105–12; Kellner, “Affectionate interests,” 165–82. See also Angyal, *Erdély politikai*, 39–40, 52–53.

63 Césy to Louis XIII, 5 June 1625. BnF, Ms. fr. 16150, Fol. 404. The French agent called Sebastien de Breyant de Montalto reached the princely court of Transylvania at the turn of 1624 and 1625. Hámori Nagy, “Francia követ,” 70.

64 Louis XIII to Césy, October 5 and 30, 1625. BnF, Ms fr 16156, Fol. 541 and 558.

latter message reached Césy at the beginning of February 1626, he had already sent Fornetti to Transylvania with the king's propositions, as he did not dare share them either with the resident Balásházy or the ambassador Keresztesi in December 1625, as the imperial party had already learned of some of the details.

As mentioned in his letter to Louis XIII, Césy's other reason for sending his own courier to Transylvania was his close connection with his friend and confidant Ferenc Bornemisza who, according to his instructions given to Fornetti, was the only person the interpreter should open up to when arriving at the princely court. Césy told Fornetti to let Bornemisza and Bornemisza only translate his instructions and to deal with Bethlen secretly, solely in Bornemisza's presence.⁶⁵ Ferenc, the Francophile scion of the wealthy Bornemisza family of Kolozsvár/Cluj most probably stayed for some time in France after studying in Olmütz/Olomouc and Freiburg. He and his brother László were employed in diplomatic missions under the reign of Gábor Bethlen, and they both traveled to the Porte several times, László in the 1610s and Ferenc in the 1620s.⁶⁶ Ferenc Bornemisza stayed by the side of János Gáspár in April–June 1625, when Bethlen's demands concerning the letter of permission and the first version of the preliminaries were declared to the resident ambassadors.⁶⁷ He is also mentioned together with Keresztesi in Balásházy's letter to Roe about Yusuf's allegations, which suggests that he was also present at the Porte in December 1625.⁶⁸ He returned as Bethlen's special emissary in May–June 1626 with the prince's approval of the conditions sent by Césy through Fornetti.⁶⁹

This last mission means that Bethlen granted what Césy had requested through Fornetti. Conforming to his demand, he delegated Bornemisza with credentials to the Porte to address the preliminaries of the treaty. The prince did so even though he had reservations about and expressed his distrust in Bornemisza

65 Fornetti's instructions, Szilágyi, "Levelek és acták," 644–47.

66 Dáné, "Egy cubicularius klán," 81, 88. Harai, "A francia–erdélyi," 43.

67 Bethlen to Césy, March 30, 1625. Szilágyi, "Levelek és acták," 628–29. Bornemisza's letters written to Césy during this journey and in Constantinople are mistakenly bound with Césy's correspondence of 1628, but the events referred to in Bornemisza's letters (such as setting the Transylvanian tribute to a lower amount) prove that they were written in 1625. Bornemisza to Césy, April 8 and 20 and late April 1628 [1625]. BnF, Ms fr. 15584, 72–74. Published with the wrong date by both Harai, *Gabriel Bethlen*, 247–50 and Hudița, *Recueil*, 48.

68 Although Césy does not mention him there, he might have been the special emissary to the Porte mentioned by Keresztesi during his audience with Césy. Césy to Ville-aux-Clercs, December 2, 1625. BnF, Ms Fr 16150, Fol. 443.

69 Césy to Louis XIII, May 18, 1626. BnF, Ms fr 16150, Fol. 508–11.

to the ambassador of Brandenburg present at his court in April 1626.⁷⁰ The reasons behind Bethlen's distrust are yet unknown. He may have thought that Bornemisza was involved in the scandalous case of Futó and Balásházy, who were still at the Porte at the time. In any case, by assigning Bornemisza the task of negotiating in Constantinople, Bethlen was able to remove someone he did not trust from his court. All the more so, as the Porte was a scene of only secondary importance with regard to the preliminaries of an anti-Habsburg treaty, and the prince continued to discuss the details through agents sent directly to the powers involved. When the direct negotiations reached a dead end with France in the middle of 1626 (just before Bethlen entered into war against Ferdinand II), Bornemisza was withdrawn from Constantinople. This, together with the news that Bethlen had directly sent his courier to France without informing his emissary in Constantinople earlier,⁷¹ was as much of a surprise for Bornemisza as for Césy and Fornetti, and it must have contributed to the development of feelings of mutual dissatisfaction. The Bornemisza family's hatred of Bethlen culminated in 1629 when they "no longer wanted the race of the prince."⁷² Still, their real loss of influence came about under the reign of György Rákóczi I, as a result of which Ferenc moved from Transylvania to the Kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the 1630s.⁷³ As for the relationship between the Bornemiszas and the dragoman family Fornetti, it survived until at least 1629, when Francesco Fornetti was involved in the correspondence and financial transactions between the Transylvanian brothers and the merchant Jean Scaich of Galata.⁷⁴

After Fornetti's fruitless mission in Transylvania in the spring of 1626, Césy also felt deceived and frustrated to see that the negotiations of a treaty of alliance were going on, but not through his mediation, and his role had been limited to that of an informant.⁷⁵ The fact that he had been personally misled probably contributed to his loss of faith in Bethlen's good will. When he learned of the instructions of the direct envoy sent by Bethlen to France, Césy considered some of the points lies. Furthermore, by judging the permission acquired in 1625 as

70 "1626. Conferenz mit dem Herzog von Siebenbürgen wegen vor seyender Confoederation im Haag" Marczali, "Újabb regesták," 794; Szabó, "Bethlen Gábor házassága," 645.

71 See Hámori Nagy, "Transylvania and France," 212–13.

72 Extraict d'une lettre du Sieur de Bornemisse à l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople. September 17, 1629. Published by Hudíța, *Recueil*, 47.

73 Dáné, "Egy cubicularius," 88.

74 Scaich to one of the Bornemiszas, June 15, 1629. Archivele Naționale ale României, Direcția Județeană Cluj, Colecția Sándor Mike, No. 435.

75 Césy to Louis XIII, June 2, 1626. BnF, Ms fr 16150, Fol. 508–11, 516.

adequate, he was willing to obtain Bethlen's next license of summer 1626 to wage war on the emperor only half-heartedly, as he did not trust that Bethlen really wanted to attack Ferdinand II.⁷⁶ This time it was indeed Thomas Roe who played the primary role in convincing Ottoman dignitaries to give Bethlen permission to enter into war and in appointing auxiliary troops for him.⁷⁷ From the perspective of French diplomacy, it was right before the beginning of the military campaign of the prince of Transylvania that the court also questioned Bethlen's sincerity, but Louis XIII insisted that Césy continue to keep in touch with him in the most polite way.⁷⁸

Conclusions

As a comparison of the relevant diplomatic correspondence reveals, the negotiations over procurement from the Ottomans of permission for Gábor Bethlen to join the anti-Habsburg powers and the preliminary discussions of the details of a future treaty were marked by unique collaboration among otherwise unfriendly participants. This comparison also reveals, however, that this initially fruitful collaboration, which essentially resulted from a temporary overlap of the political interest of the participating powers, was limited by several down-to-earth factors, such as the sums demanded by the Ottoman interpreter and head of scribes and the information leakage to the Habsburg resident. European ambassadors in Constantinople relied mainly on information coming from the prince of Transylvania when intervening on his behalf at the Porte. This is probably why Gábor Bethlen was content with the resulting document of license, even though the resident ambassadors who had worked to obtain it were not, as their rulers were mentioned in the text redacted in the autumn of 1625. French diplomatic circles became definitively estranged from Transylvania by the summer of 1626 because of the recurring question of the permission given by the Ottomans, which, however, did not mean the end of collaboration with the English and Dutch resident ambassadors.

From the perspective of Transylvanian diplomacy, Constantinople was a scene of primary importance concerning issues related to its status as an Ottoman tributary state, which in this case was the question of obtaining the aforementioned permission. Although the resident ambassadors tried to help

76 Césy to Louis XIII, July 12 and 26, 1626. BnF, Ms. fr. 16150, Fol. 534–35, 547–48.

77 Roe to Conway, July 31, 1626. Richardson, *The Negotiations*, 536–38; Angyal, *Erdély politikai*, 62.

78 Louis XIII to Césy, 14 May 1627. Published by Hámori Nagy, "Francia követ," 82–83.

get such documents, they were mostly unaware of their real importance from the point of view of Bethlen as vassal of the sultan. As a scene of secondary importance, the Porte emerged merely as a place to exchange information on the preliminaries of a future treaty of alliance, but one that made it impossible to conclude anything due to the lack of detailed instructions and the information leakage to the imperial party. While negotiating his joining the anti-Habsburg coalition created in the form of the League of the Hague in December 1625, Gábor Bethlen paid attention and formally demanded the permission of his Ottoman overlord. His rhetoric during the Constantinople negotiations presented him as an influential player in international politics but also made it quite clear that his wellbeing depended upon the permission of his Ottoman suzerain. It was partly this ambiguity that can be blamed for the loss of trust among French diplomats in the Transylvanian prince's goodwill and the termination of their negotiations. Finally, this was complemented by the fact that the personal initiatives of the resident ambassadors, which were in part responses to practical challenges and derived in part from their rivalry, their sense of self-importance, and their personal relationships, were doomed to fail, which might have also contributed to their loss of faith in Bethlen's sincerity regarding his proposed aims.

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A Professor as Diplomat: Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld and the Foreign Policy of the Principality of Transylvania, 1638–1643

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The paper addresses a unique phenomenon, the prominent role played by Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld, a German professor at the academy of Gyulafehérvár Alba Iulia/Weissenburg in the foreign policy of György Rákóczi I, prince of Transylvania during the 1630s and 1640s. Having accepted a mission to Western European courts in 1638–1639, where Bisterfeld’s academic activities served as an excellent camouflage for the professor’s secret diplomatic negotiations, the professor maintained a leading role in keeping contact with the representatives of the Swedish and French Crowns also in the period after his return to the principality. As an “alternative correspondent” to the prince, he proved very useful in creating the treaties of Gyulafehérvár (1643) and Munkács (1645), and he played an outstanding role also in keeping the spirits of the prince high not to give up his plans to join the anti-Habsburg side of the Thirty Years’ War. Building upon the ideas Bisterfeld inherited from his tutor and father-in-law, Johann Heinrich Alsted, the German professor treated his pansophistic ideas and faith in the continuing Reformation as well as his political activities as different parts of the same endeavor as long as Calvinist believers were facing political repression in the Holy Roman Empire.

Keywords: diplomacy, Transylvania, international Calvinism, Gyulafehérvár academy, pansophia

“Mister Bisterfeld showed such benevolence towards the allied lords and specifically towards Your Excellency in promoting the negotiations and assisted us to such a degree that I cannot give ample praise for his good will towards the common cause and his loyal services.”¹ With these words, Colonel Lieutenant Jacob Rebenstock, the representative of the Swedish Crown at the Transylvanian court, summarized his impressions to his superior, Lennart Torstensson, the chief commander of the Swedish armies in the Holy Roman

1 Jacob Rebenstock to Lennart Torstensson (Gyulafehérvár, November 8/18, 1643) RA Transylvania vol. 1. no. 132. The translations from primary sources are mine. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Swedish administration continued to use the Julian calendar, which often produced this kind of double dating in the correspondence with its agents in the southern parts of Europe. In this paper, I am using the Gregorian dating, adding it in brackets where necessary in the letters cited.

Empire. Rebenstock was writing about the services provided by Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld, a professor at the Gyulafehérvár academy, in the creation of the freshly concluded treaty of alliance. The surviving documentation indeed shows that Bisterfeld not only helped Prince György Rákóczi I from the background with good advice but also had been in fervent correspondence with prominent personalities of the anti-Habsburg side of the Thirty Years' War for years, thus apparently masterminding a much wider network in the principality's western sphere of contacts than the prince himself. As has been noted in several recent monographs, in the seventeenth century, a network of pastors and scholars, often labelled "international Calvinism," attempted to influence high politics between courts.² Nevertheless, in the early modern period, it was still rare at best for diplomats, who officially represented various rulers, to have regarded a theologian as a negotiating partner for a longer period. Suffice it to quote the reaction of a clergyman, István Tolnai, the parson of Sárospatak in Hungary, to the news that, in the summer of 1637, Heinrich Meerbott, a churchman from Hanau, was heading for the court of György Rákóczi I allegedly as a representative of various German princes. "I am surprised," Tolnai wrote, "that those princes (if this is indeed the case) trusted the embassy to a preacher."³

Although Bisterfeld kept his role as a political advisor at the side of György Rákóczi I and, later, his son, György Rákóczi II, for a long time, he held such a key position in Transylvanian diplomacy only between 1638 (his mission to Western Europe) and 1643 (the conclusion of the Gyulafehérvár [Alba Iulia/Weissenburg] agreement). In a recent study, I examined the negotiations leading to Transylvania's reentry into the Thirty Years' War in the 1640s, but I had occasion to make only cursory remarks on the special position Bisterfeld enjoyed in covering the thousands of kilometers between the principality and its potential allies. In this paper, I focus my attention on why the Gyulafehérvár professor seemed to offer a solution to the practical problems of Transylvanian diplomacy in the first half of the seventeenth century and how his political role interfered with his other ambitions as a scholar. The analysis I offer of the overlaps between the two sides in Bisterfeld's biography furthers a more nuanced understanding of the workings of "international Calvinism," and in particular of the group from Johann Heinrich Alsted to Jan Amos Comenius which aimed at continuing Reformation, uniting the knowledge on the universe

2 Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen*, 100–9; Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism*, 1–24.

3 István Tolnai to György Rákóczi I (Sárospatak, August 13, 1637) Szilágyi, "I. Rákóczy György," 1222.

and making the world a better place through learning – but repeatedly had to face serious political repressions.⁴

Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld's Mission in Western Europe, 1638–1639

Bisterfeld became a professor at the Academy of Gyulafehérvár at the end of 1629.⁵ He came to Transylvania with two elder colleagues, Johann Heinrich Alsted and Philipp Ludwig Piscator, at the invitation of Gábor Bethlen, but he arrived only after the death of this prince, who had set up an ambitious plan to provide the Reformed college in his capital with the higher classes of philosophy and theology. By this time, Alsted had already become a renowned scholar whose name was widely known due to his program, which relied on faith in pansophia and a commitment to continuing the Reformation, as well as his encyclopedia, which was built on the same principles.⁶ He probably would not have left his cathedra at the University of Herborn in Nassau had the Restitutionsedikt, issued by Emperor Ferdinand II in 1629, not made the position of the Calvinist confession extremely vulnerable in the Holy Roman Empire. The imperial edict, however, seemed to have finally brought to an end the debate whether the stipulations of the Peace of Augsburg related to the rights for religious practices concerned only the Lutheran confession (which was explicitly mentioned by the document) or also the Reformed one (with the argument that their faith was based on a modified version of the same creed). This loophole had been maintained with the active support of prominent political actors in the Empire, and by closing it, the edict forced many important personalities in Calvinist higher education in Germany to leave the empire. Alsted received an invitation from Deventer, but he chose Gábor Bethlen's offer instead. In this, he was certainly motivated – apart from the salary he was offered, which was decent even by Western European standards – by a certain sense of mission and the opportunity to bring his knowledge to faraway lands.⁷

4 See Hotson, “A Generall Reformation of Common Learning”; Hotson, *The Reformation*.

5 Bisterfeld's classic biography is Kvačala, “Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld.” It has been recently updated with fresh research by Viskolcz, “Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld.” On his theological writings and their impact, see Antognazza, “Bisterfeld and *immediatio*”; Antognazza, “‘Immediatio’ and ‘emperichoresis’”; Antognazza, “*Debilissimae Entitates*?”

6 Hotson, *Johann Heinrich Alsted*. On the Academy of Gyulafehérvár, see Péter, “Das Kollegium von Weissenburg.” Murdock, *Calvinism*, 77–82.

7 Menk, “Das Restitutionsedikt;” Szentpéteri, *Egyetemes tudomány*, 15–34. On the stipulations of the *Restitutionsedikt* concerning Calvinism, see Frisch, *Das Restitutionsedikt*, 53–60. On the salary, see Herepei, “Adatok,” 268–69; Szentpéteri, *Egyetemes tudomány*, 33.

There is virtually no secondary literature on the role of Johann Heinrich Alsted as Prince György Rákóczi's political advisor. Limited but relevant evidence shows that Alsted was not only active as a scholar in Gyulafehérvár but also interfered in questions of the prince's foreign policy. A statement made by an unknown correspondent from Rákóczi's court, according to which the prince discussed each issue of importance with Alsted, finds confirmation in other sources. It was not just that the prince seems to have turned to Alsted for help with newsletters in German in order to receive clarification and guidance on news from the Western part of Europe, but the professor himself also maintained some channels of communication with political relevance.⁸ In 1637, when trying to convince Wilhelm V, landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, of the potential of cooperation with Transylvania, Heinrich Meerbott referred to his correspondence with Alsted, and we also know that in 1638 the Gyulafehérvár professor contacted Cornelis Haga, the ambassador of the United Provinces in Constantinople, to whom he sent letters with the princely couriers, presumably to mediate in the conflict between the two political actors.⁹ Since such activities are not known from Alsted's earlier career, he must have been motivated to accept the role of a political advisor by Rákóczi's openness to counsel offered by his well-versed guests as well as the radical changes in his living conditions due to political repression. His experience of being exiled from his earlier home was made more severe by the fact that a significant share of the three theologians' belongings, which had been deposited in Regensburg during their journey, was confiscated by the emperor's administration. In 1635, György Rákóczi I tried to recover these belongings, but even he labored in vain.¹⁰

In the early 1630s Bisterfeld's career was closely connected to Alsted's: he was the professor's faithful disciple and also his son-in-law. When Gábor Bethlen's invitation reached Alsted, Bisterfeld was working as a tutor in Grave (Brabant). It must have been at the invitation of his father-in-law that he came to Herborn, where he taught a course in the spring of 1629 and left with the two others late that summer. Bisterfeld, who was only twenty-four years old at the time, had

8 "Principis Transylvaniae moderna conditio in quo sit" PL AS AR Cl. V. no. 102.; Alsted to György Rákóczi I (Gyulafehérvár, 22 December 1637) KH G 015 no. 4142.

9 The fact that the prince knew about Alsted's letter suggests this interpretation. See István Réthy to György Rákóczi I (Constantinople, September 6, 1638) Szilágyi, ed., *Levelek*, 390. See also Meerbott's speech in front of Wilhelm V ([March 1637]) HStAM Rep. 4f Siebenbürgen nr. 1. (in Hungarian translation: Báthory et al., eds., *Források*, 231).

10 Rákóczi to István Sennyey (Kolozsvár, December 18, 1634) MNL OL X 1904 11696. t.; György Chernel to Rákóczi (Sárospatak, 5 March 1635) MNL OL E 190 7. d. no. 1434.

to refuse an invitation from Groningen (which admittedly seemed somewhat uncertain). Some sources suggest that in 1631 he was not planning to remain in Transylvania for long.¹¹ It is hardly surprising that the young theologian, who at the time had nothing resembling the reputation or network that Alsted had managed to gain, was not terribly motivated to spend his most active years in a land far away from the center of European scholarly life in an environment which must have been quite foreign to him. Also, the year following their arrival proved extremely chaotic in Transylvanian politics. Catherine of Brandenburg, Bethlen's widow and successor, secretly converted to Catholicism and then resigned. She was replaced first by her brother-in-law, István Bethlen, and then by Rákóczi, one of the mightiest landowners in eastern Hungary and someone who had been a staunch follower of Gábor Bethlen's policies in the previous decade. These troubles must have added to the fact that Gyulafehérvár hardly offered a comparably lively intellectual life or the proximity of fellow-minded scholars that a Dutch university could have provided for Bisterfeld.¹² He clearly had good reasons to agree to a visit to Western Europe, where he was entrusted with the task of using his scholarly activities as a disguise for political negotiations in the service of his prince.

Since the early years of the Thirty Years' War, the Principality of Transylvania recurrently participated in the endeavors of the party opposing the Habsburgs. Gábor Bethlen was allied to Friedrich of the Palatinate, and he was later accepted as a member of the League of The Hague between the United Provinces, as well as the kings of Denmark and England. He led three campaigns to Hungary (in 1619–1621, 1623–1624, and 1626), and in the consecutive peace treaties he secured substantial gains with respect to territory and prestige.¹³ Shortly after having secured his throne, György Rákóczi I continued Bethlen's policies and sought contact with Gustav II Adolph, who had just accomplished the first successes of his German campaign. The Swedish king, however, found the costs of Transylvanian intervention too high, and communication problems made it difficult for the two parties to reach any sort of compromise. Although in 1632–1633 there was even a Swedish resident by the name of Paul Strassburg

11 Menk, *Das Restitutionsedikt*, 57–62.

12 On Bisterfeld's concerns, see his later letter, written to Andreas Rivetus in 1637, cited by Miklós, "Bisterfeld," 16. Bisterfeld, however, was not forgotten by his colleagues in the Netherlands: in 1634 he was among the candidates for a teaching position in the newly opened *gymnasium illustre* in Utrecht. Hotson, *The Reformation*, 87.

13 See the most recent research results in Kármán, ed., *The Princes of Transylvania*.

at the Transylvanian court, for over a year he received no instructions from his king, and thus his presence did little more than create more tension for the Transylvanian prince.¹⁴

When György Rákóczi I signed the Peace of Eperjes/Prešov/Eperies on September 28, 1633 with Emperor Ferdinand II, many observers concluded that, by doing so, he had abandoned any plan for cooperation with Sweden. This was not the case, however. Transylvanian envoys traveled to meet Axel Oxenstierna on various occasions over the course of the next two years, but they failed to attract the attention of the head of the Swedish Regency Government. In 1637, then, the aforementioned Heinrich Meerbott took the initiative to motivate the Transylvanian prince to take action again. He was sent to Stockholm in secret, but this insistence on the secrecy of the mission backfired. It was very important to Rákóczi that the plans for an anti-Habsburg alliance not be revealed too early. This, however, meant that he had to come up with creative ways to ensure that his envoy would secure accreditation, and the methods that were devised proved so unusual that they ultimately hindered the creation of any political alliance. The members of the Swedish State Council were presented with a letter in which Rákóczi entrusted Meerbott with the task of recruiting artisans (“*artifices mechanici*”), as well as a ciphered note which presented the prince’s proposal and reached Danzig/Gdańsk hidden in a pistol barrel, on a route separate from the pastor’s. Meerbott explained that the “*artifices*” the prince was looking for were actually parties in the intrigue (“*artificium*”), i.e. the kings of France and Sweden, as well as the landgrave of Hessen. However, after giving the proposal short consideration, the Swedish government decided not to sign anything at the exhortation of someone who lacked clear proof of having been granted plenipotentiary powers.¹⁵

Meerbott’s account of the developments did not survive, but it must have reached Transylvania, because the next envoy, Bisterfeld, received credentials which seem to have followed the Swedish State Council’s suggestion to speak in general terms but be addressed to a specific person in the court. The addressees were not the royal persons but the leading policymakers of the Swedish and French court, Cardinal Richelieu and Axel Oxenstierna, and the credentials did not include Bisterfeld’s name.¹⁶ It seems that they must have been penned only

14 See the detailed description of the events in Kármán, “Thorny Path,” 155–74.

15 On Meerbott’s mission, see Kármán, “Thorny Path,” 174–77.

16 Rákóczi to Richelieu (Gyulafehérvár, April 16, 1638) Gergely, “I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény,” 686. With the same date and mutatis mutandis same text to Axel Oxenstierna: RA Oxenstiernasamlingen E 692.

after Bisterfeld's departure from Transylvania in mid-April 1638, and they were surely given to him at a later point of time, thus ensuring that the true nature of the professor's journey could not be revealed as long as he was passing through the Habsburg-friendly territories of Hungary and Poland.¹⁷

Although the credentials only revealed that the envoy was supposed to discuss "certain issues" with the addressees, this proved enough for Richelieu and his administration to enter into a serious conversation with Bisterfeld. After having met Karl Ludwig, the heir of Friedrich of the Palatinate, in The Hague, Bisterfeld reached Paris on July 10, where he was welcomed with enthusiasm according to the account of Hugo Grotius, who was serving there as a Swedish resident envoy.¹⁸ The administration of Louis XIII almost immediately sent forth the king's own envoy to Transylvania (using the sea route through the Mediterranean), and in November, Charles du Bois, Baron of Avaugour, agreed with Rákóczi that he would soon return with full credentials to conclude their alliance (though this never actually happened).¹⁹

While d'Avaugour traveled across half of Europe (eventually arriving in Danzig, where he remained as one of the most important points of contact for Transylvanian foreign policy over the course of the next few years), Bisterfeld also reached his new station, Hamburg. The central location of this harbor city and its professed neutrality had made it an important diplomatic hub as early as the first half of the 1630s, but from 1638 on, it is legitimate to speak of a diplomatic congress of the powers interested in the developments in Germany there. Negotiations concerning the possibilities for peacemaking between the Swedish and imperial envoys were running parallel to parleys among the ambassadors of the Danish, English, and French kings, as well as the United Provinces about creating an anti-Habsburg alliance. The representatives of Swedish and French foreign policy were the same persons who would later act as head commissioners at the Westphalian peace congress: Johan Salvius and

17 According to the account book of the town clerk at Kolozsvár, Bisterfeld arrived in the town on April 14, and on April 23, he had already left Sárospatak. Herepei, "Adatok," 402; Tolnai to Rákóczi (Sárospatak, April 23, 1638) Szilágyi, "I. Rákóczy György," 1348–49. This means that he could not have been in Gyulafehérvár on April 16, when his credentials were penned.

18 Karl Ludwig to Rákóczi (The Hague, June 9, 1638) Szilágyi, ed., *Okirattár*, 129–30; Hugo Grotius to Ludwig Camerarius (Paris, July 10 and 31, 1638), to Axel Oxenstierna (*Ibid.*, July 10 and 24, 1638), and to Queen Christina (Paris, August 21, 1638) Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 9, 439, 490; 440, 473, and 535–36.

19 On d'Avaugour's mission, see Kármán, "Thorny Path," 177–78.

Claude de Mesmes, Count of Avaux.²⁰ It seemed obvious that Bisterfeld would join this “congress,” even if he arrived somewhat late, because by this time the high spirits caused by the Anglo–French and Swedish–French treaties of February 1637 and February 1638 as potential foundations for an anti-Habsburg alliance had already dissipated.

In Hamburg, Bisterfeld met Sir Thomas Roe, one of the most experienced English diplomats, who was happy to hear the Transylvanian offer (which was similar to offers he had often received from Gábor Bethlen in the 1620s as his ruler’s representative in Constantinople). Roe informed Bisterfeld, however, that it would be futile for him to travel to England, since it had become clear by that time that King Charles I did not have the financial means necessary to join the coalition.²¹ It also turned out that the Dutch were not ready to give up their neutrality towards the emperor, and although Johann Joachim Rusdorf, the diplomat of the exiled Palatinate court (and also Bethlen’s correspondent from the previous decade) was enthusiastic to have met Bisterfeld, it was Salvius who became his most important negotiating partner.²²

On his way to Paris, Bisterfeld also informed the Swedish government about his mission. Axel Oxenstierna and his colleagues were eager to bring him to Stockholm.²³ Bisterfeld declined the offer, most probably because, in Hamburg he was closest to each potential negotiation partner and also to prominent members of the European academic network. He nevertheless informed Salvius about the developments and suggested that if the Swedish resident envoy received plenipotentiary powers, he would also make sure that his prince would

20 On the central position of Hamburg in diplomacy, see Tham, *Den svenska utrikenspolitikens historia*, 281–82. On Salvius, see Droste, “Ein Diplomat.” On d’Avaux, see Croxton and Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia*, 21–22.

21 Sir Thomas Roe to Rákóczi (Hamburg, October 11, 1638) Szilágyi, ed., *Okirattár*, 130–31; d’Avaux to Claude de Salles, baron de Rorté, the French resident envoy in Stockholm (Hamburg, October 16, 1638) Hudița, ed., *Recueil*, 61. After having met Bisterfeld, Roe stayed more than a year in Hamburg, but upon his return he regarded the 21 months spent there as entirely useless and felt that they had worn him down more than 21 years of earlier service. See Beller, “The Mission;” Tham, *Den svenska utrikenspolitikens historia*, 299–300. On Roe’s contacts with Bethlen, see Kellner, “Strife for a Dream”, as well as Zsuzsanna Hámori Nagy’s contribution to this issue.

22 On the Dutch attitude, see Chavigny to d’Avaux (Ruelle, November 14, 1638) Hudița, ed., *Recueil*, 62. On the Palatinate connection, see Rusdorf and Karl Ludwig to Rákóczi (Hamburg, February 14, 1639, and The Hague, April 12, 1639) Szilágyi, ed., *Okirattár*, 135–38, and 138.

23 Bisterfeld to Oxenstierna (Helsingör, May 9/19, 1638) Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 9, 807–8; d’Avaux to Rorté (Hamburg, October 16, 1638) Hudița, ed., *Recueil*, 61; Anders Gyldenklou to Salvius (Stockholm, October 6/[16], 1638) RA E 5262 Salvius samling vol. 10.

send him one so that the parleys on the details could start.²⁴ In early January 1639, the Swedish *plenipotencia* to Salvius was sent from Stockholm, but a letter by György Rákóczi I reached Hamburg at the same time in which he ordered Bisterfeld to return to Gyulafehérvár. The prince also wrote letters to the French and Swedish diplomats in which he did not even mention the planned alliance and only asked for their support in finding a successor to Alsted, who died on November 9, 1638.²⁵

This unexpected development, which seems to have seriously damaged Rákóczi's credibility among his potential allies, was the result of the problems of communication and the Transylvanian prince's efforts to secure the secrecy of his negotiations. As Bisterfeld explained to Salvius in a note, György Rákóczi I was expecting d'Avaugour to return to his court with the necessary accreditation by April 1639, so he did not need to risk the potential discovery of his intentions were his correspondence to fall into the wrong hands. As the prince expected the final parleys to take place at his court, there was no need to mention the issue to the diplomats in Hamburg, and Bisterfeld's further stay in the western part of Europe also seemed unnecessary. On the other hand, Bisterfeld's request for plenipotentiary powers to be sent to Hamburg did not reach György Rákóczi I in time. For the sake of secrecy, the German scholar did not correspond directly with the prince, but rather sent his messages to Alsted – but since the elder professor was dying, Bisterfeld's messages were only forwarded with delays, and Rákóczi acted before having received the most recent news from Hamburg.²⁶

The professor listened to the prince's summon, but he clearly was not in a hurry. In late March 1639, Grotius already knew that Bisterfeld was going to go to Paris again, but it was early May when the professor actually arrived. In the meantime, he visited the United Provinces again: in March he sent a letter to Rákóczi from Amsterdam, and in April he met Karl Ludwig in The

24 Bisterfeld's note to Salvius (Hamburg, October 27 [November 7], 1638) RA E 5277 Salvius samling vol. 25. nr. 1.

25 The Swedish Regency Government's *plenipotencia* to Salvius (Stockholm, December 1/[11], 1638) Szilágyi, ed., *Okirattár*, 131–32 Rákóczi to d'Avaux and Salvius (with the same text *mutatis mutandis*) (Kolozsvár, December 4, 1638) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény," 686–87, and RA E 5270 Salvius samling vol. 18. On the arrival of the prince's letters and Bisterfeld's recalling, see Georg Müller to Grotius (Hamburg, January, 15/[25] 1639) Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 10, 58.

26 According to Bisterfeld's own account, he requested plenipotentiary powers from the prince on October 21, but this request could not have reached Rákóczi until November 26, when the prince wrote his letters to Hamburg. See Bisterfeld's note to Salvius (Hamburg, October 27 [November 7], 1638) RA E 5277 Salvius samling vol. 25. nr. 1.

Hague.²⁷ When already in Paris, he had long conversations with Jean de la Barde, a secretary of the Chancellery, and he had the impression that the French court was still ready to conclude the alliance, although, rather surprisingly he did not reflect on why d’Avaugour never returned to Transylvania.²⁸ He also made sure to keep the interest of Swedish diplomacy alive, and he shared the contents of his parleys with Grotius, and also, by letter, with Ludwig Camerarius, the Swedish resident envoy in The Hague, whom he must have met during one of his stays in the Dutch capital.²⁹ Bisterfeld then returned to Transylvania across the Mediterranean. In mid-July, he was already in Venice, but we do not know exactly when he arrived in the principality. Rákóczi’s envoys in Constantinople were still forwarding his letters to Transylvania in late August. He put his final report for the prince on paper November 1639 in Medgyes/Mediaş/Mediasch.³⁰

Bisterfeld as a Diplomatic Correspondent

Bisterfeld and György Rákóczi I’s expectations were proven overly optimistic in the months and years to come. The professor’s impressions in Paris did not deceive him: the French were positive about the chances of cooperation with the Transylvanians, d’Avaux received an order to discuss the articles of the future treaty with Salvius, and a *plenipotencia* was signed for Louis Fleutot, the envoy to be sent to the principality.³¹ Rákóczi was already exchanging messages with d’Avaugour about the best possible route for Fleutot, and he started laying the ground at the Sublime Porte to gain the sultan’s consent for his campaign in Hungary. During the summer and autumn of 1639, Transylvanian ambassadors

27 Grotius to Camerarius (Paris, March 16/26, 1639). Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 10, 198; Louis XIII to d’Avaux (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, May 9, 1639) Gergely, “I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény,” 692; Rákóczi to d’Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, June 24, 1639) *ibid.*, 695; Karl Ludwig to Rákóczi (The Hague, April 12, 1639) Szilágyi, ed., *Okirattár*, 138.

28 Bisterfeld’s account of his parleys with de la Barde (Medgyes, November 7, 1639) Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 32–33.

29 Grotius to Oxenstierna (Paris, May 4/14, 1639) Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 10, 326; Bisterfeld to Camerarius (Paris, May 12/22, 1639) BSB Clm 10359. fol. 243. On Camerarius as a representative of the Swedish crown, see Schubert, *Ludwig Camerarius*.

30 Rákóczi to d’Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, July 17, 1639) Gergely, “I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény,” 702; Mihály Tholdalagi and István Kőrössi to Rákóczi (Constantinople, August 30, 1639) Szilágyi, ed., *Leveleke*, 592; Bisterfeld’s account on his parleys with de la Barde (Medgyes, November 7, 1639) Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 32–33.

31 Louis XIII to d’Avaux (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, May 9, 1639) Gergely, “I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény,” 692–694; the king’s *plenipotencia* to Louis Fleutot (*Ibid.*, May 10, 1639) Hudíță, ed., *Répertoire*, 62–63.

visited Constantinople and consulted frequently with the French ambassador there about the possible ways to win the support of the sultanic administration. Their preliminary inquiries with the Ottoman dignitaries yielded no success, but this was not the primary reason why there was no Transylvanian intervention in the Thirty Years' War immediately after Bisterfeld's journey in Western Europe.³²

Contrary to the French court, the Swedish administration lost all interest in any kind of cooperation with György Rákóczi I. In March 1639, shortly after having received the news that Bisterfeld had been summoned back to Gyulafehérvár, the State Council announced that in the future it would not take the Transylvanians seriously, and no further development could move them from this position.³³ Neither the repeated inquiries of the French diplomats nor the incoming messages from Transylvania could convince Axel Oxenstierna to dedicate attention to the issue again, and even the complaints of Johan Banér, the chief commander of the Swedish army in Germany, fell on deaf ears. Salvius dropped various remarks in his letters to the Regency Government according to which the involvement of more allies in the war, such as the prince of Transylvania, would further Swedish success, but to no avail. The Swedish government's reaction, which involved several irrational elements, did not change. Even when Banér's successor, Lennart Torstensson took matters into his own hands and arranged a treaty of alliance with György Rákóczi I (the agreement of Gyulafehérvár, signed on November 16, 1643), Axel Oxenstierna's government refused to ratify it. They rightfully pointed out the formal shortcomings of the text, but did nothing to address them, and thus the Swedish–Transylvanian cooperation in 1644–1645 was never formalized by a fully legitimate international treaty.³⁴

The tension due to the Swedish reluctance eventually poisoned Rákóczi's contacts with the leaders of French diplomacy as well. In d'Avaux's correspondence with his colleagues in 1640 we find a growing number of ironic and, later, sarcastic remarks on the Transylvanian prince, and after a while, Rákóczi also did not conceal his frustration that the promises he had been made were not kept. The prince stopped answering the letters from Jean de la Haye, the representative of the French Crown at the Sublime Porte, and he told

32 See Kármán, "Thorny Path," 180–181.

33 Minutes of the meeting of the Swedish State Council (February 19 [March 1], 1639) Bergh, ed. *Svenska riksrådets protokoll*, 460.

34 On the details of the developments and the possible interpretations of the Swedish attitude, see Kármán, "Thorny Path," 186–97; Kármán, *Confession and Politics*, 54–65.

Bisterfeld to ask d'Avaugour whether the French considered the Hungarians simpletons who would not start to wonder after such a long time whether they were merely being mocked by their partners.³⁵ This formulation, which is so foreign to Bisterfeld's usually moderate style and suggests the direct interference of the prince in composition of his letters, directs our attention to the latter's function as a mediator between the Transylvanian court and its potential allies.

Bisterfeld was a good choice to serve as the bearer of György Rákóczi I's message to the court of his potential allies, as only rarely in the seventeenth century was a political mission entrusted to scholars of his kind. Some surviving letters prove that Rákóczi's adversaries knew about Bisterfeld's journey, and it clearly raised suspicion among them, but none of these sources suggest that the Catholic elite of the Kingdom of Hungary would have come to any direct conclusions concerning the politics of the Transylvanian prince based upon the fact that Bisterfeld, a professor from the Gyulafehérvár academy, was traveling to Western Europe.³⁶ Bisterfeld's academic activities during the journey (to which I will return) seem to have served as an excellent pretext. As noted before, the secrecy of the mission was also secured by the fact that Bisterfeld sent his letters to Alsted, thus creating an illusion of a politically neutral (or at least politically irrelevant) exchange between scholars.³⁷

Of course, after his return to Transylvania, Bisterfeld's position as a scholar ceased to be an asset for political communication. If any of his letters had fallen into enemy hands, the adversaries of the Transylvanian prince would have been just as eager to know why a professor from Gyulafehérvár was sending ciphered messages to French and Swedish diplomats as they would have been in the case of any other person. In this period, Bisterfeld's involvement had other advantages. For György Rákóczi I, the developments caused serious embarrassment. It was humiliating that he was bombarding his potential allies with new offers, to which they replied with little more than noncommittal words. After a while, it would have been an immense loss of prestige for him to continue knocking on their doors with further suggestions, especially seeing as how d'Avaugour, d'Avaux, and Salvius were not his equals in the seventeenth-century "society of princes."

35 Bisterfeld to d'Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, July 10, 1640) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Befejező közlemény," 59. For a detailed account on the developments, see Kármán, "Thorny Path," 181–185.

36 György Madarász to Rákóczi (Sárospatak, June 16, 1638) MNL OL E 190 10. d. nr. 2255. Cf. MNL OL A 98 9. cs. 11/b. fasc.

37 Bisterfeld's note to Salvius (Hamburg, October 27 [November 7], 1638) RA E 5277 Salvius samling vol. 25. nr. 1; Tamás Debreczeni to Rákóczi (Sárospatak, December 26, 1638) MNL OL E 190 10. d. nr. 2313.

It would have been unbecoming for him as a prince to refer again and again to how long he had been waiting for a definite answer and to mention how much frustration this had caused for him. As a princely counselor, Bisterfeld did not need to have such scruples, and in his accounts, he could paint the fury of György Rákóczi I in dark colors, much as he could also claim that, if the prince did not soon receive a positive answer to his proposals, he would give up his heroic plan to assist the common cause.³⁸ Before Bisterfeld's return to Transylvania, János Kemény, another personality from the prince's court, had already served this function of an "alternative correspondent," since he had acted as d'Avaugour's guide during the French diplomat's stay in the principality. Bisterfeld's reputation as a professor, however, made him better fit for the task than the young Transylvanian aristocrat. Also, he personally knew many more of the diplomats involved.³⁹

For a while, the prince and the professor maintained a parallel correspondence with the French and Swedish diplomats. In the letters addressed to d'Avaugour during the winter of 1639, however, we can already trace a duality. György Rákóczi I limited his messages to news, whereas it fell upon Bisterfeld to urge the figures of French diplomacy to continue negotiations.⁴⁰ Then, in 1640, the prince stopped writing to d'Avaugour and the envoys in Hamburg. The entire correspondence with d'Avaux and Salvius went through the Gyulafehérvár professor, who could be regarded being of the same rank as they were. In February 1640, Jean de la Haye wrote to Bisterfeld from Constantinople (parallel to his letter to György Rákóczi I), but we do not have any further evidence that they established a more or less continuous correspondence in the same manner as the diplomats in Hamburg did. The resident embassy of the prince in Constantinople could take care of this connection (whenever Rákóczi was ready to communicate), and since the French diplomat and Bisterfeld were not personally acquainted, maintaining contact with the professor would not have

38 See for instance Bisterfeld to d'Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, December 27, 1639 and July 10, 1640) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény," 706; Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Befejező közlemény," 59.

39 Kemény to d'Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, May 1, 1639) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény," 690–91. On the relationship between Kemény and the French diplomat, see also Kemény, *Önéletírása*, 193.

40 Bisterfeld, and Rákóczi to d'Avaugour (Gyulafehérvár, December 27 and 29, 1639) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Első közlemény," 706.

brought any specific advantages.⁴¹ In any case, in the autumn of 1643, we again have evidence that De la Haye sent news to Bisterfeld from the Sublime Porte.⁴²

After György Rákóczi I's decision to abandon the diplomatic exchange with the French and Swedish representatives, he was involved again only when a new correspondent appeared on the horizon. In the summer of 1641, when Count Zdenko von Hoditz, a Bohemian exile and colonel in Swedish service, contacted him, Rákóczi answered the letter in his own name, as he did again when Lennart Torstensson initiated contact in July 1642.⁴³ The Swedish field marshall maintained parallel correspondence with the prince and the professor during the negotiations leading to the agreement of Gyulafehérvár, and the separate contact with Bisterfeld also proved useful in this. The French disapproved of two points in the agreement of Gyulafehérvár (which theoretically bound them as well). They therefore sent their plenipotentiary to sign a separate treaty with György Rákóczi I (the so-called treaty of Munkács/Mukačevo on April 22, 1645). It would have been beneath the prince's dignity to ask directly for Torstensson's approval for this move, but this could be easily arranged by having Bisterfeld write to the field marshall about Rákóczi's concerns, even if it only took place after the treaty had been signed.⁴⁴

Upon his return to Transylvania, the professor requested the cipher which had been in use during earlier Swedish-Transylvanian contacts and also a list of the people to whom he should write.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, as one would have expected, he did not write anything he wanted. The sources suggest that Rákóczi controlled the content of the letters that Bisterfeld sent to the diplomats in his own name. Some of the drafts which survived were written in the professor's hand, but they have a number of corrections by the prince.⁴⁶ At the same time, it would be a mistake to see Bisterfeld only as a medium through which György Rákóczi I could express his wishes. The prince counted on the professor's expertise and

41 De la Haye to Bisterfeld (Pera, February 27, 1640) Szilády and Szilágyi, eds., *Török-magyarokori állam-okmánytár*, 57. The relationship with De la Haye seems to have been reestablished through Rákóczi's diplomats to the Sublime Porte in the spring of 1643. See de la Haye to Rákóczi (Pera, April 19, 1643) Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 46.

42 Réthy to Rákóczi (Constantinople, October 18, 1643) Szilágyi, ed., *Levelek*, 727.

43 Rákóczi to Hoditz (Dés, July 27, 1641) Wibling, "Magyarország," 472–473; Rákóczi to Torstensson (Gyulafehérvár, September 7, 1642) RA Oxenstiernasamlingen E 1023 fasc. 1642. fol. 137r. On Hoditz's attempt to establish contact, see Kármán, "Thorny Path," 181–182.

44 Bisterfeld to Torstensson (Munkács, April 24, 1645) Wibling, "Magyarország," 622–623.

45 Bisterfeld's memorial, drafted after his return to Transylvania ANR DJS Colectia de Acte Fasciculare F 46 fol. 7v–8r.

46 E.g., Bisterfeld to Torstensson (Gyulafehérvár, May 3, 1643) Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 48–50.

judgment. Bisterfeld played an important role during the negotiations directly preceding the conclusion of the agreement of Gyulafehérvár and the treaty of Munkács. He himself drafted several of the articles, and he also made corrections to the text in the final round of revisions.⁴⁷

Although we do not know of any opinion papers from Bisterfeld in which he would have given direct advice to the prince on political issues, the lines penned by Jacob Rebenstock, quoted in the introduction to this essay, testify that the professor (who seems to have befriended the lieutenant colonel representing the Swedish Crown at the Transylvanian court) was one of the most important lobbyists in support of a united stand for the Protestant cause in Rákóczi's circles.⁴⁸ In all likelihood, it was Bisterfeld who helped the prince keep his spirits high and convinced him that he should keep the importance of the task in the forefront of his mind instead of the recurrent frustrations he faced when offering his services to the Protestant cause. Shortly before making the final decision, Rákóczi had serious doubts as to whether he indeed had a divine calling to take up arms and thus serve the confessional cause. It was again Bisterfeld who assisted him and counterbalanced the counsel of István Kassai, the prince's other intimate advisor, who was urging the prince to pursue peace instead.⁴⁹

Last but not least, Bisterfeld not only provided services for the prince himself. He also mobilized some family connections. Several people maintained contacts between the court at Gyulafehérvár and d'Avaugour's residence in Danzig at the turn of the 1640s. Prominent among them was a young Scot, Andrew Gawdy, who later had a spectacular career as a high-ranking officer in the Transylvanian army (and thus is known in the secondary literature in Hungarian as András Gaudi). Gawdy helped transmit Bisterfeld's letters in 1639, 1641, and 1643, whereas in 1639 and 1640, this role was played by Pál Göcs and Ferenc Jármí, Rákóczi's Transylvanian clients, who had good connections in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Jármí later was also the envoy of his prince at the congress of Westphalia).⁵⁰ In the late summer of 1642, however, a new person knocked on d'Avagour's door. Peter Wiederstein, who had brought

47 Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 263, 285–87.

48 The only surviving opinion papers from this period that were signed by Bisterfeld were penned by István Geleji Katona, the Reformed bishop of Transylvania. They also bear the signature of Pál Medgyesi, Rákóczi's court preacher. Báthory et al, eds., *Források*, 245–48, 251–54.

49 Kemény, *Önéletírás*, 190–191; Rebenstock to Torstensson (Gyulafehérvár, November 8/18, 1643) RA Transylvanica vol. 1. nr. 132.

50 On Göcs, see Gebei, “Lengyel protestánsok,” 16–17; on Jármí, see Kármán, “Erdélyi követek,” 210–213; on Gaudi, see B. Szabó and Kármán, “Külföldi zsoldosok,” 792–96.

the professor's letters this time, was Bisterfeld's nephew (the son of his half-brother). He had settled in Transylvania, and he later inherited his uncle's house and part of his library.⁵¹ His involvement in Bisterfeld's political endeavors can be seen as a logical extension of his uncle's position and further proof that the illusion of scholars being relatively harmless in the field of power politics could prove both convincing and useful in these turbulent years.

Political Role and Academic Career

Even before his mission to Western Europe, Bisterfeld was involved in parleys concerning György Rákóczi I's potential involvement in the 'Thirty Years' War. A letter from November 1637 testifies that he maintained a network of correspondents and supplied the prince with current news concerning developments in the German theaters of war and the related Protestant courts.⁵² Heinrich Meerbott told the Swedish State Council in the autumn of 1637 that his mission was so secret that, apart from the prince, only Alsted "and another theologian" knew about it.⁵³ On the basis of Bisterfeld's letter to the prince, it is easy to identify this other person as Alsted's son-in-law and faithful follower.

Bisterfeld was unquestionably eager to accept the 1638 mission, which made it possible for him to travel as far as Paris. As noted earlier, at that time, he did not yet have anything comparable to Alsted's network or reputation, and while he was waiting for answers from the various courts, he was able to visit many of his fellow scholars and make acquaintances with useful contacts. In a friendly letter written in the early phase of the mission to Samuel Hartlib, who was one of the most important figures in the international Protestant network, Bisterfeld expressed his joy over the possibility to meet a number of great scholars if, as he hoped, he would be able to travel to England.⁵⁴ Although he had visited Britain in the 1620s, the connection to Hartlib's circle was most likely made during John Dury's journey to Transylvania. Bisterfeld was one of the signees of the position

51 Bisterfeld to d'Avaujour (Gyulafehérvár, August 18, 1642) Wibling, "Magyarország," 596. On Wiederstein, see Viskolcz, *Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld*, 39.

52 Bisterfeld to György Rákóczi I (Gyulafehérvár, November 6, 1637) KH G 015 no. 4165.

53 Minutes of the Swedish State Council's meeting (October 24 November 3], 1637) Bergh, *Svenska riksrådets protokoll*, 107.

54 Bisterfeld to Hartlib ([autumn 1638]) Kvačala, ed., *Korrespondence*, 37. On Hartlib, see Turnbull, *Hartlib*; Greengrass, Leslie and Raylor, eds., *Samuel Hartlib*; Hotson, *The Reformation*, 203–23.

paper on the union of Protestant churches compiled by prominent Transylvanian church authorities at the request of the Scottish irenicist theologian in 1634.⁵⁵

As mentioned earlier, Sir Thomas Roe dampened Bisterfeld's enthusiasm when he declared the journey to England pointless from a political perspective, and thus the German theologian had no excuse to cross the Channel. He nonetheless remained active as a scholar. While making arrangements regarding the creation of an anti-Habsburg coalition in the interest of the Protestant cause, he also defended his church on another battlefield. As a response to the Antitrinitarian treatise of Johann Crell, published in Raków (Poland) in 1631, he published his *De uno Deo ... mysterium pietatis* in Leiden, with the renowned Elsevier publishing house. The work was a logical link in the chain of theological attacks upon the Transylvanian Anti-Trinitarians (who, known as Unitarians, were one of the four accepted confessional groups in the principality) in the second half of the 1630s. The *Mysterium pietatis* was a success (it was rereleased three times), and Bisterfeld made important contacts in Hamburg and the Netherlands which he later maintained. In the long run, Andreas Rivetus and Johann Rulitius proved his most important correspondents, but he also established (or renewed) contact with Johann Adolf Tassius, Joachim Jungius, Gisbert Voetius, Johann Moriaen, and Marin Mersenne.⁵⁶ Hugo Grotius, who often complained about being overburdened by his tasks as a Swedish resident envoy in Paris instead of being able to dedicate himself to his research on the law of nations, wrote with noticeable envy in April 1639 that, according to news he had heard, Bisterfeld was trying to secure a tranquil academic position for himself.⁵⁷ As noted before, this accusation was quite unjust. While the publication of his book and his introduction to the scholarly networks unquestionably furthered Bisterfeld's career ambitions, they also served the interests of Rákóczi's foreign policy by providing credible camouflage for political negotiations.

Bisterfeld made a very good impression in the Western European Calvinist academic world. At the recommendation of Rivetus, in 1639 he received an offer from Leiden University to serve as a substitute for a regular professor and teach for a semester, and in May 1640 the curators invited him to take over the

55 Kvačala, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 44, 50–52. On Bisterfeld's connections to the Hartlib circle, see also Viskolcz, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 207–8; Hotson, *The Reformation*, 206–10.

56 Kvačala, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 46–47; Viskolcz, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 207–13; Monok, "Johannes Heinricus Bisterfeld." On the attacks against the Antitrinitarians, see Murdock, *Calvinism*, 120–26; Keul, *Early Modern Religious Communities*, 196–201; Szentpéteri, *Egyetemes tudomány*, 34; Szentpéteri and Viskolcz, "Egy református–unitárius hitvita;" Szabó, "A dési per."

57 Grotius to Müller (Paris, April 9, 1639) Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling*, vol. 10, 327.

position of Antonius Walaeus, a professor of theology who had passed away the previous year. The invitation letter also noted that another professor, Antonius Thysius, was mortally ill (he died a year later), thus it is clear that Bisterfeld would have been very welcome in Leiden if he had decided to leave Transylvania.⁵⁸ This widely respected institution of higher education (which a Hungarian visiting student, Márton Szepsi Csombor, had labeled “Paradisus terrestris” only a few years earlier) clearly would have opened an entirely different career path for Bisterfeld than what awaited him in Transylvania, even if his salary would have been smaller.⁵⁹ In addition to Leiden’s prominent rank in the academic world, the work environment offered by the university also made it an attractive option. Suffice it to mention the famous library, in contrast to all the problems and enormous costs Bisterfeld had to face when trying to transport the books he had purchased during the 1638–1639 mission to Transylvania.⁶⁰ Furthermore, István Geleji Katona, the Reformed bishop of Transylvania, informed György Rákóczi I that Bisterfeld was not only attracted by Leiden’s prestige but also by other motivations: the professor had been recently widowed, and he was planning to marry the daughter of Ludwig Camerarius. The bishop feared that the ambitious plans concerning the Gyulafehérvár academy were collapsing, and he left no stone unturned to please Bisterfeld and Piscator (who had just recovered from a serious illness) while at the same time making scathing remarks and insisting that Bisterfeld and Piscator start meeting the obligations of their office in more than just name only.⁶¹

In the spring of 1641, it seemed that the endeavors of Geleji Katona were bound to fail and that Bisterfeld was going to return to Western Europe; he even informed Salvius of his plan. However, during the summer the letter by Count Hoditz arrived in Transylvania, and with new hopes on the horizon concerning military assistance for the Protestant cause, György Rákóczi I

58 Curators of Leiden University to Rákóczi (Leiden, May 25, 1640) ANR DJS *Colecția de documente medievale* V. 2265. See also Miklós, “Bisterfeld,” 16.

59 Geleji Katona to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, September 26, 1640) Ötvös, “Geleji Katona István,” 218; Szepsi Csombor, *Europica varietas*, 171.

60 Debreczeni to Rákóczi (Sárospatak, October 19 and December 18, 1639) MNL OL E 204 Fasc. 14. fol. 44v and 60v. On Leiden University Library in the seventeenth century, see Berkvens-Stevelinck, *Magna Commoditas*, 11–30.

61 Geleji Katona to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, September 21 and October 8, 1640) Ötvös, “Geleji Katona István,” 211–212, 220–223. On Piscator’s illness, see Geleji Katona to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, December 2, 1638) Beke, “Geleji Katona István,” 337.

managed to convince the professor to stay.⁶² The prince also informed the curators in Leiden that the Gyulafehérvár academy needed Bisterfeld's services.⁶³ Nevertheless, in 1642 the issue of the invitation from Leiden was still on the table. Furthermore, Jan Amos Comenius thought that Bisterfeld had already arrived in the Netherlands, and he was looking forward to meeting him there.⁶⁴ The Leiden curators eventually became frustrated with the long delay of the project, and they blamed György Rákóczi I for hindering communication. As the prince seems already to have given permission for Bisterfeld to leave in the previous year, however, it is more likely that the Gyulafehérvár professor gave up his plans concerning the position in the Netherlands because of the new wave of negotiations, initiated by Torstensson that year.⁶⁵

Bisterfeld's plans to reestablish his family with an offspring of a prominent member of the international Calvinist network also failed. The forty-one-year-old Anna Katherina Camerarius married none other than Paul Strassburg, the former resident envoy of Gustav Adolph II in Transylvania.⁶⁶ All in all, we can say that the German professor paid a huge price for the position he acquired among the prince's political counselors. His marriage to Anna Stenczel, a Saxon burgher's daughter from Kolozsvár/Cluj/Klausenburg, in June 1643 offers a fairly clear indication that he had finally resolved to remain in Transylvania. He and his wife acquired land and a mansion in Tövis/Teiuş Alba/Dreikirchennot far from Gyulafehérvár, and in 1644, they bought a house in Nagyszeben/Sibiu/Hermannstadt, the center of the Saxon communities of Transylvania.⁶⁷ His decision to settle in the principality for good, however, must have left a bad taste in Bisterfeld's mouth. Otherwise, he hardly would have told Comenius (whom he finally met in the early 1650s) that "scholars and artisans summoned to Hungary receive an invitation to perpetual imprisonment."⁶⁸

62 Bisterfeld to Salvius (Gyulafehérvár, April 28 [1641]) RA Transylvanica vol. 1. nr. 30; Rákóczi to d'Avaux (Dés, 27 June 1641) Wibling, "Magyarország," 471–72. The edition identifies the addressee as Hoditz, but this is clearly a mistake, since the text refers to Hoditz in the third-person singular.

63 Miklós, "Bisterfeld," 18.

64 Comenius to Goddofred Hotton (London, March 4/14, 1642) Patera, ed., *Jana Aмоса Komenského correspondence*, 50.

65 On the correspondence with regards to this issue, see Kvačala, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 176; Miklós, "Bisterfeld," 19–20; Monok, "Johannes Henricus Bisterfeld," 324–25.

66 Since Camerarius himself had also recently been widowed and had renounced his position as Swedish resident envoy in The Hague, the family moved to Groningen. Schubert, *Ludwig Camerarius*, 410–11; Mörner, "Paul Straßburg," 355–56.

67 Gyulai, "Bisterfeld özvegye," 78–80.

68 Comenius to Hartlib (Leszno, July 19/29, 1654) Blekastad, *Unbekannte Briefe*, 114.

Various factors contributed to Bisterfeld's decision to stay in Transylvania. The salary may have played a part, albeit not a prominent one. Although the sum (500 talers annually) was competitive on an international level, payment was often delayed. Geleji Katona mentioned such problems as early as 1640, and in 1649, the Transylvanian treasury already owed the professor 600 talers.⁶⁹ Bisterfeld's fellow scholars in Western Europe believed that György Rákóczi I simply refused to let him go. This interpretation, however, seems unconvincing for two reasons. First, in 1641, Bisterfeld was already preparing to depart with the prince's knowledge. Second, had Rákóczi been exerting pressure to limit his mobility, Bisterfeld hardly would have pursued work in his field of expertise with the fervor that he showed in the 1640s. He continued, for instance, to nurture Alsted's legacy, even at the expense of his own research. In 1641, he published an index for the late professor's magnum opus, the *Prodomus religionis triumphantis*, which was published in Transylvania. Over the course of the following years, he fulfilled the wishes of István Geleji Katona and served as a professor not only in name. He continued the program of publishing new schoolbooks, which had been launched by the three Herborn scholars in the previous decade to elevate the educational standards of the Gyulafehérvár academy.⁷⁰ His achievements were praiseworthy and not at all obvious: his fellow professor, the aforementioned Philipp Ludwig Piscator, could not boast half as many publications. For Bisterfeld, who remained a dedicated supporter of the idea of continuing Reformation, the move to Gyulafehérvár was a sacred mission (as he put it in one of his letters when he accepted the Transylvanian invitation),⁷¹ and he tried to live up to his commitment to this mission to the best of his abilities.

It would be quite logical to think of the role Bisterfeld played in Transylvanian foreign policy as a part of this program. We find relatively few references to the fight against the Antichrist in his accounts of current political events (especially if we compare these to Meerbott's), but these accounts nevertheless show that he was influenced by Alsted's attempt to unite the Ramist encyclopedist approach with Millenarist thought. He was, after all, one of the contributors to his master's *Diatrise de mille annis apocalypticis*, a rational attempt to interpret the Bible's account

69 Geleji Katona to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, October 8, 1640) Ötvös, "Geleji Katona István," 221; Gyulai, "Bisterfeld özvegye," 80. A register of salaries survived from 1630. At this time, the first professor received 500 Talers (and it is likely to have been Bisterfeld's position as well in the 1640s) and the second received 350 Talers. Herepei, "Adatok," 269.

70 Viskolcz, *Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld*, 32–42; Viskolcz, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld és a gyulafehérvári tankönyvkiadás;" Szentpéteri, *Egyetemes tudomány*, 15–16.

71 Kvačala, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 48.

of the Apocalypse and calculate the end of times.⁷² Everything was in place, therefore, for Bisterfeld to feel that serving the fight against the Antichrist and assisting the cause of the empire's German Protestants in distress was a personal duty; back in 1629, he had presided over several disputations in Herborn on the right of resistance.⁷³ This attitude also explains why Bisterfeld was not satisfied when György Rákóczi I concluded the Peace of Linz in the summer of 1645. Although the documents secured the liberty to practice religion in Hungary with unprecedented precision, they did not fulfil the professor's expectations, whose aim was to assist Protestantism in a much wider circle. Of course, in his letters to the Catholic d'Avaux and Abel Servien, the other representative of the French Crown at the peace congress of Westphalia, Bisterfeld did not refer to the fight against the Antichrist, but he did give voice to his fear that the Peace of Linz might become a hotbed for even worse conflicts.⁷⁴

Bisterfeld's understanding of his task as a multi-faceted sacred mission must have played an important role in his decision in the early 1640s to forfeit the offer of a professor's position at a renowned Western university and a wife who, through her family and her family's connections, would place him in the center of the international Calvinist network. He did not have many opportunities to formulate his stance clearly in writing, but the few occasions when he did are revealing. In a letter to Cardinal Mazarin after the conclusion of the Treaty of Munkács in 1645, he made only a modest remark on how God had called him to the light of public service from the tranquility of the school,⁷⁵ but to Lennart Torstensson he had more to say. Having read the aforementioned lines penned by Jacob Rebenstock, the Swedish Field Marshall assured the professor of his gratitude for his earlier deeds, at which Bisterfeld wrote the following: "Although I am unworthy of the great praise Your Excellence showers on me so graciously, I can state as much with good conscience that I am almost a martyr of the

72 Kvačala, "Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld," 44. See also Hotson, *Paradise Postponed*, 69. One example of an evocation of the interpretative framework of Salvation History: "Modo Sueci hac hyeme in Caesaris ditionibus hybernare possint, videbimus metamorphosin hostibus horrendam, nobis jucundissimam. Ruet Antichristus, regnabit Christus..." Bisterfeld to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, January 7, 1645) Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár*, 230. It is quite characteristic that Bisterfeld specified in his will that if his daughter were to choose a "Papist or an Arian [that is, Antitrinitarian]" husband, she would not receive the annuities anymore, and the same procedure should be followed in the case of each relative listed in the document if they were to choose to leave the Reformed faith. Zimmermann, "Bisterfeld végrendelete," 172–73.

73 Menk, "Restitutionen," 129, note 102.

74 Bisterfeld to d'Avaux and Servien (Fogarás, 22 February 1646) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Befejező közlemény," 76.

75 Bisterfeld to Mazarin (Sárospatak, May 6, 1645) Gergely, "I. Rákóczy György ... Befejező közlemény," 74.

common cause. It is not only our enemies who want to destroy me, but also those who place their private interest before the public good and the welfare of the motherland. But even so, I am faithfully serving God, all of Christianity, my gracious lord, Hungary, and Transylvania.⁷⁶

The mention of martyrdom in the passage cited above was not a general reference to Bisterfeld's willingness to make sacrifices. It was, rather, a hint at a direct threat upon his life. Other evidence also suggests that Bisterfeld felt that several people around him were reacting with malice to his involvement in the world of politics, and he was afraid that he might be assassinated. He was especially suspicious of the reactions of the Catholic members of the Transylvanian elite.⁷⁷ We do not know whether these fears were well-founded, but Bisterfeld's role in the principality's political decision-making network was unquestionably unique, even compared to the prominent personalities of the Transylvanian Calvinist church. In the early autumn of 1643, when György Rákóczi I sought counsel as to whether the planned war followed divine will, Bishop István Geleji Katona and Pál Medgyesi, his court preacher, noted in their opinion (signed together with Bisterfeld) that, unlike the professor, they had very little knowledge of the diplomatic backdrop. The position paper mirrored a very cautious position, and although (in line with the prince's wishes) it proclaimed the planned military intervention a heroic deed which served God's plan, it repeatedly called Rákóczi's attention to the contention that it was not the duty of members of the clergy to make such political decisions, and from a tactical perspective it was even unfortunate to ask them to do so.⁷⁸

Bisterfeld's involvement in Transylvanian politics made him stand out not only among the leading personalities of the local church but also among most of the intellectuals from the west who stayed in the principality for a time. Martin Opitz, one of the most important poets of German Baroque literature, who had taught in Transylvania for a short while in 1622 at the invitation of Gábor Bethlen, informed Axel Oxenstierna from Danzig in the 1630s about developments in the principality. According to his letters, he continued to maintain contacts with Transylvanians, but there is no evidence that he ever would have tried to influence

76 Bisterfeld to Torstensson (Makovica, 13 March 1645) RA Transylvania vol. 1. nr. 39.

77 See the excerpt from Johann Rulitius' letter, which refers to another letter received from Bisterfeld (Amsterdam, February 12/22, 1644) The Hartlib Papers 43/21A; Geleji Katona to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, September 26, 1640) Ötvös, "Geleji Katona," 218–19.

78 Geleji Katona, Medgyesi and Bisterfeld to Rákóczi (Gyulafehérvár, August 29 and September 1, 1643) Báthory et al, eds., *Források*, 245–48, 251–54.

György Rákóczi I's foreign policy.⁷⁹ Similarly, one finds no indication in the sources that Philipp Ludwig Piscator made any effort to influence Transylvanian foreign policy, and the same is true of Isaac Basire, who as an exiled Anglican pastor spent some time at the Gyulafehérvár academy before it was destroyed by the invading Tatar armies in 1658.⁸⁰ It was only Comenius, who tried to convince the Rákóczi family of the need to assist the international Protestant cause by political and even military means, but his plans, supported with contemporary prophecies, fell upon deaf ears. The dynasty turned to Bisterfeld for advice, and it was the Gyulafehérvár professor, who deemed it unlikely that the visions were of divine origin (much to the disappointment of his Moravian colleague).⁸¹

This development in the 1650s may seem to be in direct contradiction with Bisterfeld's earlier attitude. However, if the professor's radical program of military intervention indeed had its foundations in the dire position of Calvinism in the Holy Roman Empire, this changed with the Peace of Westphalia. It is easy to imagine that, after the Reformed creed had secured recognition in German territories, Bisterfeld – who had settled in Transylvania in the meantime and enjoyed a prestigious reputation among the members of the ruling family – had no desire to see more decades of bloodshed. Comenius' position was profoundly different, since as bishop of the Bohemian Brethren, he saw with despair that the peace treaties signed in Münster and Osnabrück delegated the treatment of religious issues in his homeland to the hands of the Habsburg dynasty.⁸² Although his opinion on various political questions was still sought (such as the choice of Zsigmond Rákóczi's bride in 1649 and the Cossack request for support against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1651), Bisterfeld's position in the Rákóczi family's foreign policy changed after 1648. As a teacher, he was still an ardent supporter of the idea of the continuing Reformation, and the princes could make use of his network of correspondents (which no longer seems to have included the Swedish and French diplomats) in the pursuit of

79 Opitz to Oxenstierna (Danzig, August 12, September 30, 1637, as well as February 17 and June 10, 1638) Reifferscheid, ed., *Briefe*, 564, 565, 577 and 572. On Opitz's stay in Transylvania, see recently Maner, "Martin Opitz."

80 On Basire, see Kármán, "Isaac Basire Erdélyben."

81 Rácz, *Comenius Sárospatakon*, 167–70; Kármán, *Confession and Politics*, 224–36. The political ideas of Comenius inspired the journey of Bengt Skytte, a member of the Swedish State Council, to Transylvania. The Rákóczis showed interest in him due to his high rank, but the endeavor did not yield any long-term results. Runeby, "Bengt Skytte;" Kármán, "Kísérlet."

82 Kumpera, "Die Entwicklung;" Pánek, "Jan Amos Comenius;" Hroch and Barteček, "Die böhmische Frage."

their diplomatic aims, but there is no indication in any of the sources that he was still playing a role as someone who initiated policies.⁸³ His unique, prominent role in György Rákóczi I's diplomatic efforts, which parallelly assisted the policy-making of the prince with advice and masterminding the communication, was no longer necessary after the Peace of Westphalia.

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83 On Bisterfeld's role as an advisor in the 1650s, see Kármán, *Confession and Politics*, 175–77, 182–84. On his network, see Viskolcz, *Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld*, 24–27, 88. In 1649, Bisterfeld received another invitation to Leiden, but the details of this arrangement are unknown, see Miklós, “Bisterfeld,” 20.

Oxenstiernasamlingen
Salvius samling

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The Instrumentalization of Courtly Privacy in the Context of the Wedding Celebrations of Emperor Leopold I in 1676

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According to the wishes of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi and his representative at the imperial court, Francesco Buonvisi (1675–1689), Leopold I married the candidate they favored: Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg. The emperor's third wedding and the subsequent wedding festivities were held in Passau on December 14, 1676 in an absolutely private manner and without the intervention of the secular diplomats or the apostolic nuncio. The private staging of the *sposalizio* contrasts not only with the norms of the traditions of the imperial court with regards to ceremony, but also with the public staging of the emperor's two previous weddings. Against this background, this article considers the possible functions that can be attributed to the private in this context and how the preferential treatment of the house of "Pfalz-Neuburg" can be interpreted in relation to the ceremonial norms of the imperial court. In this regard, the nunciature's correspondence and their manifold interconnections thus represent essential sources which shed light on the mechanisms of "privacy" in diplomacy, as well as the shifting importance and meanings of the ceremonial norms of the imperial court.

Keywords: Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi, Francesco Buonvisi, Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg, Apostolic Nunciature of Vienna, imperial court, Leopold I, marriage in early modern period, privacy

Introduction

"[...] ammettendo la scusa che lo sposalizio habbia da esser totalmente privato."¹ On November 1, 1676, Francesco Buonvisi (1626–1700),² the apostolic nuncio at the imperial court,³ wrote a letter to Pope Innocent XI Odescal-

1 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 1, 1676, f. 515r-v, here f. 515v.

2 On the Cardinal Nuncio Buonvisi, see most recently Boccolini, *Un lucchese al servizio*, and Curcuruto, "Francesco Buonvisi and Opizio Pallavicini."

3 An overview of the papal legation system is provided by Walf, *Entwicklung des päpstlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*; as well as Gatz, "Gesandtschaftswesen, Päpstliches." In addition to being the seat of the emperor and a central location of the Holy Roman Empire, the court in Vienna was also of particular importance. See the latest information and further references in Wührer, "Haus ohne Fundment"; Hengerer, *Kaiserhof und*

chi's⁴ cardinal secretary of the state,⁵ Alderano Cybo (1613–1700),⁶ about the planned private wedding celebrations of Emperor Leopold I⁷ to Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg⁸ in Passau in December 1676.⁹ Privacy became the subject of argumentative directives during this dynastic feast at the Viennese imperial court, and the participation of resident diplomats, including the papal nuncio, became a question of diplomatic-ceremonial action. Why was the wedding kept private? Why could the representatives of the crowns, princes, and republics not attend the celebrations? What did the actors understand by “privacy” in the context of wedding ceremonies in 1676, and how was the concept of “privacy” instrumentalized by the actors in this context? What strategies did Buonvisi, in particular, develop to counteract his “exclusion” from the wedding ceremony in Passau?

The matter of the emperor's wedding (and his choice of bride)¹⁰ represented a political issue of the first rank. After the death of Claudia Felicitas of Tyrol (1653–1676),¹¹ Leopold I's second wife, on April 8, 1676, tough marriage negotiations took place between April and October 1676 for the speedy remarriage of the 36-year-old sovereign. His first two marriages had been childless, so marriage negotiations were initiated after the death of Claudia

Adek, Pečar, *Ökonomie der Ehre*. On the Viennese Court at the time of Leopold I, see Siennell, “Die Wiener Hofstaate.”

4 On the pontificate of Innocent XI with the anthology, see Bösel et al, *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi*. On the Pontifex, see also the article by Menniti Ippolito, “Innocenzo XI, papa.”

5 On the function of the cardinal secretary of the state, see Emich, “Karriere des Staatssekretärs.”

6 On Alderano Cybo, see Stumpo, “Cibo, Alderano.”

7 A satisfactory biography of Leopold I does not yet exist. To date, only Bérenger has written a comprehensive monograph and biography of Leopold I, see Bérenger, *Léopold Ier*; Spielman, *Leopold I*. The emperor's personality is still best captured in Heigel's essay, “Zur Charakteristik Kaiser Leopolds.”

8 On Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg, see most recently Schmid, “Eleonore Magdalena von der Pfalz.”

9 The (festive) culture of the courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is mentioned in particular in Berns, “Die Festkultur der deutschen Höfe”; Berns and Rann, *Zeremoniell als höfische Ästhetik*; Buck et al., *Europäische Hofkultur*; Daniel, “Überlegungen zum höfischen Fest der Barockzeit”; Dfez Borque and Rudolf, *Barroco español y austriaco*; Ragotzky and Wenzel, *Höfische Repräsentation*. On the Passau wedding of 1676, see Schmidt, “Zur Vorgeschichte”; Oswald, “Kaiser Leopold I. und seine Passauer Hochzeit”; Schmidmaier-Kathke, “Die Glückliche Vermählung”; Kastner, “Schloß Neuburg und die Kaiserhofzeit”; Oswald, “Die denkwürdige Kaiserhochzeit.” For general information on public celebrations at the imperial court, see most recently Hrbek, “Öffentliche Feiern.”

10 On the marriage policy of the Habsburgs, see Debris, “*Tu, felix Austria, nube*,” in particular 324–30, and Sommer-Mathis, *Tu felix Austria nube*.

11 See Hye, “Claudia Felicitas,” 72.

Felicitas to secure a successor and the property of the *Casa d'Austria*.¹² In addition to the 21-year-old Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg (whom Leopold I ultimately chose as his new bride), the Protestant princess Ulrike Eleonore of Denmark (1656–1693), daughter of the Danish king Frederick III and later wife of Charles XI (1655–1697) and from 1680 queen of Sweden, was one of the favorites.¹³ On October 4, 1676, the emperor decided in favor of Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg.¹⁴ His decision was influenced in no small part by the insistence of the negotiators representing Rome,¹⁵ as Pope Innocent XI reminded Emperor Leopold in his congratulatory letter of December 1, 1676.¹⁶ On December 14, 1676, the wedding between Emperor Leopold I and the Neuburg princess was celebrated in Passau by the arch- and prince-bishop of Passau Sebastian von Pötting (1673–1689).¹⁷ In general, these

12 Leopold I had contracted his first marriage in Vienna in 1666 with Margarita Teresa de Austria (1651–1673), daughter of the Spanish king Philip IV, who was only 15 years old at the time. Her death was followed by his second marriage, this time to Claudia Felicitas of Tyrol. The wedding was held in Graz on October 15, 1673, see Oswald, “Kaiser Leopold I. und seine Passauer Hochzeit,” 24.

13 Buonvisi had received explicit instructions from Rome to promote the marriage negotiations in favor of the Palatinate-Neuburg princess, not least as a result of the conversion of the Danish princess, who was one of the favorites to the very end, see AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 198, Dechiffret of Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome, October 17, 1676, f. 3r-3v; original cipher in: ASL, Archivio Buonvisi II/30, n. 177.

14 The marriage contracts were signed by both sides on November 24, 1676, see Oswald, “Kaiser Leopold I. und seine Passauer Hochzeit,” 24. The processes which led to the marriage are described in Schmidt, “Zur Vorgeschichte der Heirat,” 259–302.

15 By the end of May 1676, Buonvisi Leopold had convincingly summarized the advantages of the Neuburg: no. 1 – “l'indennità della religione cattolica”, no. 2 – “la probabile fecondità” and no. 3 – “gl'interessi di stato, che obligano a cavar qualche utile dal matrimonio.” This short formula apparently worked, as Buonvisi wrote to Rome: “[...] e stimo che questa generalità gli [Emperor Leopold] giovi” (AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 195, Cipher of Francesco Buonvisi to Paluzzi Altieri (cardinal secretary of the state under Pope Clement X), Vienna, May 24, 1676, deciphered on June 10, f. 617r-618r, here 617v). On the “Palatinate-Neuburg” family and its importance for Europe, see Schmid, “Eleonore Magdalena von der Pfalz,” 159–61, 195.

16 Innocent XI to Leopold I, Rome, 1 December 1676, in: Berthier, *Innocentii PP. XI epistolae ad principes*, no. 72, 23.

17 A detailed account of the Passau wedding with exact details of time and place is preserved in the ceremonial protocol of the Viennese imperial court, see HHStA, OMeA ZA-Protokoll 3 (1671–1681), f. 74r-99v, as well as “Vermählung und Beylager,” in the Older Ceremonial Files, see *ibid.*, OMeA ÄZA 10, fasc. 24, f. 14r-17v. For the series of older ceremonial records and ceremonial protocols, see Hengerer, “Zeremonialprotokolle,” and Pangerl et al., *Der Wiener Hof im Spiegel*. In 1677, a festive publication in Italian about the Passau imperial wedding was published, see Gentilotti, *Passavia in feste*. There is a German-language illustrated description of the wedding festivities by Johann Martin Lerch, see Lerch, *Die Glückliche Vermählung*. See on this text genre Wagenknecht, “Die Beschreibung höfischer Feste,” and Rahn, *Festbeschreibung*.

central events in the early modern period were always a public act and were not considered private affairs or private celebrations of the *Casa d’Austria*. With the wedding in Passau in 1676, however, there was an extraordinary fusion of the public sphere and the private sphere on the part of the Austrian Habsburgs,¹⁸ as I show in the discussion below.

Courtly Privacy and Incognito as New Categories of Diplomatic-Ceremonial Practice in the Early Modern Period

This particular Passau event of 1676 marked a decisive *turn* in the *Theatrum caeremoniale*¹⁹ and initiated a trend for future celebrations at the Viennese imperial court, where the complex categories of private and incognito were to play an increasingly important role in ceremonial activities from 1676 onwards. Following Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger’s studies on “Ceremonial as Political Procedure,” I understand ceremonial action as a larger category of social acts that are precisely standardized in their external form, that depict a social order, and that are therefore always related to participants and/or spectators who perceive and understand these signs.²⁰

According to this definition, ceremonial action is part of the public activity of ruler and court and is directed equally at both participants and spectators, who had to perceive and interpret a given act and communicate its message further, for instance as envoys. The court ceremonial²¹ as a system of norms binding on all participants is related to the ranks of the persons involved and made visible and recognizable for all participants.²² What happens when the public activities of the imperial dynasty are shifted to the private sphere? First, the imperial court

18 See Scheutz, “Hof und Stadt bei den Fronleichnamsprozessionen,” 53.

19 See Lünig, *Theatrum Caeremoniale*. In this regard it is also worth mentioning the essay by Sommer-Mathis, “Theatrum und Caeremoniale,” here in particular 523–25. A small compilation can be found by Kirchner, “Theaterbegriff des Barock,” 131–40, and Vec, *Zeremonialwissenschaft*, 170–74.

20 See Stollberg-Rilinger, “Zeremoniell als Verfahren,” 94–95.

21 Karl Möseneder defines the ceremonial as “eine Sichtbarmachung eines inneren Verhältnisses zu einer Instanz mittels äußerer Zeichen; zugleich ein Bild, fähig zur Belehrung und Erinnerung an eine Verpflichtung” (Möseneder, *Zeremoniell*, 77). Ceremonial therefore communicated the maintenance of order, expressing a hierarchically structured world order imagined as unchangeable, which referred directly to God by means of the person of the king. Any change in the ceremonial was therefore extremely delicate, because in the early modern period ceremony had a legitimizing function (see Barth, *Incognito*, 11, 102). Once applied, it enabled various courts to refer to it, to apply it themselves, and to demand its application to them (Barth, *Incognito*, 171).

22 Pečar, *Hofzeremoniell*, 384–85.

instrumentalized the categories of “courtly privacy,” and second, the apostolic nuncio introduced the field of action of “incognito” in the events in Passau in 1676, both in order to avoid ceremonial-diplomatic conflicts between the resident envoys at the imperial court and the father of the bride, Philip William, count of Palatinate-Neuburg.²³

The words “private” and “court” in the conceptual pair of “courtly privacy” represent a counter-pair of privacy and publicity,²⁴ which, however, are not separable for the early modern period and especially for the court.²⁵ It can thus be stated that the dialectical quality of the conceptual pair was not to be adhered to, but rather, as inseparable categories at court, a more or less limited public sphere to be defined stabilized from case to case or a performance of the private occurred in a public setting. The people involved thus organized a supposed privacy while at the same time maintaining publicity by excluding diplomats to avoid conflict at the wedding ceremony and the subsequent banquet through the instrumentalization of courtly privacy.

Thus, in this context, courtly privacy means the claim to be protected from unwanted diplomatic-ceremonial conflicts in decisions and actions in representations and enactments of the private in public space and the claim to be protected from the entry of others into spaces and areas. The representation of the private creates forms of expression that transform existing spaces in the public sphere. Processes of dissolving the boundaries of the public in private

23 Philip William of Palatinate-Neuburg (1615–1690) was count Palatine of Neuburg from 1653 to 1690, duke of Jülich and Berg from 1653 to 1690 and since 1685 also elector of the Palatine, for further information, see Fuchs, “Philipp Wilhelm,” and Jaitner, “Reichskirchenpolitik.”

24 On the concepts of public and private, see Gehlen, “Die Öffentlichkeit und ihr Gegenteil,” 336–47; Geuss, *Privatheit*; Hansson, *The Private Sphere*; Jünger, *Unklare Öffentlichkeit*; McDougall, “Privacy,” 1899–1907; Moore, *Privacy*. Gehlen and Moore consider the private and the public, respectively, as anthropological constants. Moos, “Das Öffentliche und das Private im Mittelalter,” 29, on the other hand, takes the position, “daß wir keine anthropologische Konstanz der Antithese ‚öffentlich/privat‘ voraussetzen können,” postuliert aber ein menschliches “Abgrenzungsbedürfnis.” See also Moos, “*Öffentlich und ‘privat’ im Mittelalter*,” 32–35. See the overview by Hofmann, “öffentlich/privat,” coll. 1131–34.

25 Private (from Latin *privatus*) refers to a sphere that is personal, informal, confidential, and under the control and management of an individual or private group. Privacy is a central category that determines the reality of people’s lives, both culturally and legally. It stands in contrast to the public sphere, which stands for something visible or known and administered and controlled by mostly higher authorities or accessible to and concerning the general public. In the sense of a “great dichotomy” (Bobbio, “The Great Dichotomy,” 1), privacy has always been conceived of as a complementary concept to the non-private, which is mostly the public. Rather, the boundaries are fluid, since the public is also shaped, produced, and given meaning in the private sphere. On the relationship between private and public, see here with further information Neighbors, *Beyond the Public/Private Divide*.

staging modify the traditional role model and require differentiated approaches to solutions, such as the use of the concept of incognito on the ceremonial level.²⁶ It should be emphasized, however, that the situational character of the events in the diplomatic-political ceremonial was always preserved, in which the category “private” is not to be regarded as a stable continuum, but was subject to the fluctuations of the actors involved in this complex relational dynamic and was subject to practices at the Viennese court that were always open to being redefined.

The meaning of the term incognito, usually understood to mean “unknown” to a particular person or several persons until the mid-sixteenth century, changed as the term came instead to be understood as “unknown” to the people involved in a ceremonial practice. Following Volker Barth, incognito is a practice that indicates the temporary relinquishment of ceremonial duties, that is, a temporary change of identity. This change of identity, which is as temporary as it is specifically individual, is carried out publicly and, for example, helped “make interaction possible” at conflict-laden meetings of high-ranking personalities without the ceremonial aspects of the meeting being suspended. In this way, forms of incognito emerged that shaped the court culture of the early modern period.²⁷

The introduction of courtly privacy and the practice of going incognito opened up (new) possibilities for action in diplomacy and new ways of taking part in ceremonies for the actors involved in these processes, and this had an impact on subsequent events at the imperial court (including, for example, the introduction of a “private chapel” for the empress dowager Eleonora of Gonzaga-Nevers²⁸ and the [private] wedding celebrations that took place in 1678).²⁹ However, by shifting the “public” to a “private” setting, the apostolic nuncio created a novel situation in which he now could take part incognito.

This is precisely where the great potential for conflict lies: the required absence from the wedding celebrations in Passau in 1676 because of the demand for privacy, and the disputes that were going on over ceremony and rank, in which the nuncio insisted on his claim also to the ecclesiastical functions as

26 This relationship between hospitality and diplomacy is considered in Stephen Griffin’s article, “Between Public and Private Spaces: Jacobite Diplomacy in Vienna, 1725–1742,” which examines the interplay and complexities between the public and private in diplomacy and politics.

27 See Barth, *Inkognito*, 27, 94–95, 101.

28 On the empress in general, see Schnitzer-Becker, *Eleonora Gonzaga Nevers*.

29 See further on in this essay.

papal representative. This established an “invented tradition”³⁰ in the ceremonial practices of the Viennese imperial court and was ultimately noticed at other courts in Europe. We are thus speaking, in this case, of a tradition that was formally established with great speed. Moreover, the notion of “invented tradition” encompasses a set of practices, usually based on openly or tacitly accepted rules, which have a ritual or symbolic character and aim to transmit certain values and norms of behavior through repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.³¹ The essence and function of traditions, even invented ones, is invariance.³² The invention of traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process of formalization and ritualization characterized by reference to the past, even if only through the imposition of repetition.³³ Accordingly, the possibilities for action by the actors could become visible via the invented tradition, that is, via the instrumentalization of the private in a public event.

In this discussion, I focus on how the Apostolic Nuncio Francesco Buonvisi operated in the spheres of public and private and how his ability to act was demonstrated in the ceremonial performance of the wedding celebrations in Passau in 1676. In his regular correspondence with the Secretariat of the State Buonvisi drew a detailed picture of the emperor’s marriage negotiations, and his daily reports to Rome prove an important source of information and knowledge³⁴ in this context. The nunciature’s correspondence³⁵ reveals that the

30 With reference to the conflict, it seems useful to use the concept of “invention of tradition” introduced by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger.

31 See especially in this context Barth, *Inkognito*.

32 Francesco Buonvisi later called this “avoidance”, see AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 22, 1676, f. 556r.

33 See Hobsbawm, “The Invention of Tradition,” 1–4.

34 For the connection between space and the ceremonial see Karner, “Raum und Zeremoniell,” 55–78. On the concept of the nunciature as an important knowledge and information resource, see Curcuruto, “Die Wiener Nuntiatur,” 303–25.

35 As the graphic illustration in the appendix to this paper shows, epistolary exchanges between Rome and Vienna usually consisted of weekly postal parcels, with the Secretary of State’s instructions arriving from Rome always issued on a Saturday, while the nuncio Buonvisi’s “writing day” was Sunday. This suggests that the courier (*ordinario*) was dispatched on this day of the week. As a result of a well-functioning postal transport connection, postal parcels could be transported via two routes between Vienna and Rome: with the ordinary post via Venice, where the nuncio or his representative took care of forwarding to Rome, and the relay connection (express post) via Ferrara, from where postal traffic with Rome was organized at closer intervals. In general, the transport of the *dispacci* was quite reliable and brought the items to their destination in about 15 days. See Waquet, “Verhandeln in der Frühen Neuzeit,” 113, and generally on the correspondence of the apostolic nuncios Dörrer, “Schriftverkehr”, 114 and 202.

private was also possible in the courtly public domain.³⁶ As the example I offer shows, considerable political tensions between the courts of Europe could be mollified by limiting ceremonies performed in the public sphere and preferring instead the private sphere. Participation by the public meant pre-programmed conflicts of precedence³⁷ as a result of the “incompatibility of divergent status hierarchies”³⁸ and the claimed “plurality of ceremonial claims,” as can be demonstrated in the conflict between the Nuncio Buonvisi and the count of Palatinate-Neuburg. In this regard, there is an important area of research which, as noted by Elisabeth Garms-Cornides in her discussion of the role of apostolic nuncio in ceremonial events, “can by no means yet be considered to have been adequately dealt with in recent historiography.”³⁹

Basic Constants of the Passau Wedding of Emperor Leopold I to Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg in 1676: Context

The wedding celebrations for Emperor Leopold I and Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg deviated significantly from the customary. First, the ceremony did not take place in Vienna but was held in Passau on December 14, 1676. Second, the usual *per procuram* wedding ceremony was dispensed with in advance. Third, the Advent season was not (and is not) traditionally a time for weddings. What motivated the Viennese court to make these changes remains an open question. That they wanted to avoid excessive splendor in view of the ongoing year of mourning was understandable, but why the diplomats residing at the Viennese imperial court and even the papal nuncio, Francesco Buonvisi,

36 Thus, Volker Bauer defines the orders of courtly public spheres as constructed by the participants in events at court or by the media disseminating information from or concerning the court. According to Bauer, the epitome of interactions at court was the ceremonial as a “präsenzmedialer Mechanismus” (or “Präsenzmedialität”), see Bauer, “Strukturwandel,” 589–90.

37 See Krischer, “Souveränität,” 8, 15–17.

38 The consequence of accepting equality with the Elector would be that the princes of the Italian peninsula would follow this example of *uguaglianza*, resulting in “Rang- und Titelinflation,” Schnettger, “Rang, Zeremoniell, Lehnssysteme,” 184.

39 Garms-Cornides, “Liturgie und Diplomatie,” 125. For more information on the current secondary literature concerning the ceremonial of the Viennese imperial court in general, see Garms-Cornides, “Liturgie und Diplomatie,” esp. the research overview on pages 125–28, and on the nuncio in the ceremonial literature on pages 128–30. On the position of the nuncio in the imperial court liturgy, see Garms-Cornides, “Per sostenere il decoro,” esp. 100–10. On the reduction of ecclesiastical ceremonial in the Theresian-Josephinian period, see Kovács, “Kirchliches Zeremoniell am Wiener Hof,” and Dörner, “Zeremoniell, Alte Praxis.”

who had played a major role in the establishment of the alliance, were explicitly excluded was less so. These conspicuous features appear all the more strange against the background of the public staging of the Habsburg emperor's two previous weddings.⁴⁰ While Leopold's first two brides had experienced all the pomp and splendor of publicly staged weddings, Eleonora Magdalena had to content herself with a poem of praise, *Il Giudice di Paride*,⁴¹ and a "private" staging of her wedding festivities.

Buonvisi did not attend the events as a private individual. As "servants of the pope," the apostolic nuncios were representatives of the head of the Catholic Church and princes of the Papal States, far superior in rank to a simple duke or count. Furthermore, at the beginning of the reign of Emperor Leopold I, the ceremonial-liturgical role of the nuncio at the imperial court⁴² was laid down in detail. The nuncios seem already to have consolidated their ceremonial and liturgical positions at the court, so they were able to invoke deftly acquired ancient privileges. The privileges and functions of the papal minister included, for example, access to all gala days and events of festivals, as well as private chamber comedies. At the same time, the nuncio held supreme jurisdiction over court liturgies (baptisms, confirmation, the churching of the empress and weddings) and events at which the queen's presence was guaranteed (solemn *cappella*, hereditary coronations, coronations and wedding banquets).⁴³ Other prominent occasions on which the nuncio was at the center of liturgical events were the Maundy Thursday services in the Augustinian church, at which the imperial family and court publicly received communion from the hands of the nuncio, or processions of various kinds, especially processions held on the occasion of *Corpus Christi*,⁴⁴ the laying of foundation stones, and the dedication of newly built churches. The numerous *cappellae* and the public services that the papal representative and the other diplomats had to attend were added to the

40 See Schmid, "Eleonore Magdalena von der Pfalz," 159–61.

41 *Il Giudice di Paride* [...], ovvero il Pomo Imperiale (Passau 1676), see Schmid, "Eleonore Magdalena von der Pfalz," 163, note 48.

42 The apostolic nuncio had a dual role to fulfil as the representative of the power that was the first to perfect the hierarchical order in both the spiritual and secular spheres, see Rousset, *Cérémonial diplomatique*, vol. 1, 477–685, here 682. On the dual nature of the apostolic nuncios, see the unpublished master's thesis by Claudia Curcuruto, "Delegatus Apotolicus," and on the dual nature of the popes see Prodi, *Il Sovrano Pontefice*.

43 See Garms-Cornides, "Liturgie und Zeremoniell," 136–39.

44 On *Corpus Christi* processions in early modern Vienna, see Scheutz, "Hof und Stadt bei den Fronleichnamsprozessionen," 174–204.

many occasions on which the nuncio was liturgically active. Francesco Buonvisi was definitely of great importance in the court ceremonies of the Viennese imperial court, but in his daily life as nuncio, he had to grapple with disputes over rank with regard to the German imperial princes,⁴⁵ and this caused the pope's representative incessant discomfort precisely because of his special privileges in the liturgy.⁴⁶ While Buonvisi had been prominently involved in the ceremonies surrounding the death and funeral of Empress Claudia, the ambassadors and thus also the nuncio were excluded from the wedding of the emperor to the Palatine princess in Passau. Clearly, the court preferred a private wedding ceremony,⁴⁷ since one had to fear conflicts of precedence with the bride's family. The wedding ceremony was performed by the bishop of Vienna and the archbishop of Gran/Esztergom respectively specifically to avoid ceremonial disputes at the table. The choice of venue was due to the ceremonial problems that arose between the diplomatic representatives of royal powers and the German princes. Instead, the diplomats were assured that they would not be expected to make the long journey. In an analogous way, the concept of courtly privacy was also applied to the two Habsburg weddings in 1678. Much as in the case of the emperor's wedding to Eleonora of Palatinate-Neuburg (1676), which was held in Passau in a private manner, in 1678 the wedding of Eleonora Maria Josefa, the widowed queen of Poland and half-sister of the emperor to the duke of Lorraine and the wedding of Archduchess Maria Anna Josepha to the count of Palatinate-Neuburg, John William, were both held in Wiener Neustadt. Furthermore, both were considered private to avoid conflicts of precedence. Nevertheless, Buonvisi and his Venetian colleague paid a courtesy visit to the emperor's sister Eleonora, the widow of the Polish king, incognito, but not to her husband, the duke of Lorraine; this happens analogously also in the case of Eleonora's younger sister, Maria Anna. It can thus be stated that the Passau wedding can be regarded as a prime example of the introduction of courtly privacy and the concept of incognito, which also had its effects on subsequent weddings at the imperial court.⁴⁸

45 On the nuncio's everyday life at the Vienna nunciature, see Koller, "Nuntienalltag."

46 In addition, with Leopold von Kollonitsch, archbishop of Kalocsa and later of Gran, the court finally had a crown cardinal at its disposal again from 1686 to whom the nuncio had to give precedence on solemn occasions. See Garms-Cornides, "Per sostenere," 102.

47 For the two weddings in 1678, see the ceremonial records in HHStA, OMeA ÄZA 11, fasc. 7, Volume on the marriage of Eleonora to Charles of Lorraine (January 21–March 3, 1678).

48 On the weddings, see Garms-Cornides, "Abstellgleis," 45–46 and Bastl, "Hochzeiten in Wiener Neustadt," 7.

After Emperor Leopold decided on October 4, 1676 to marry Princess Eleonora Magdalena Theresia,⁴⁹ the daughter of Count Palatine Philip William,⁵⁰ the following became quite clear: fertility and health were the most important considerations in a princely marriage, as well as the propagation of the Catholic faith (which was not guaranteed despite the announced conversion of the Danish princess) and the securing of the dynasty through offspring.⁵¹ In fact, the 23-year-old Catholic Neuburg princess had a head start over all her competitors because of her mother's many children, which led to the conclusion, whether justified or not, that she too would prove fertile. After the choice was made, Rome congratulated the emperor on decision.⁵² The questions of the "provedimenti necessari" were still unresolved, above all the date of the wedding festivities, which at that time were to be held before the first Advent, and the place for the wedding, which was thought to be around Linz.⁵³ As of October 18, there was still no talk of possible conflicts or, better, disputes over precedence.⁵⁴ After the election of the future empress, correspondence between Rome and Vienna between October 18 and December 14 revolved around the celebration of the wedding and the avoidance of precedence disputes with Count Philip William of Palatinate-Neuburg. In a total of twelve letters and 5 notifications (*avvisi*), matters between Rome and Vienna were clarified.⁵⁵

49 On October 8, 1676, the envoys of the count of Palatinate-Neuburg, Stratmann and Schellerer, reported that on the last Sunday, i.e. on October 4, Leopold I had announced his decision, See as well Schmid, "Zur Vorgeschichte," 327–28.

50 On Philip William of Palatinate-Neuburg, see Schmidt, *Philipp Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg*. See as well AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, October 18, 1676, f. 486r. Buonvisi already sent the corresponding congratulations to the count of Palatinate-Neuburg on October 15, 1676 (see the surviving minutes in the ASL, *Archivio Buonvisi* II/11, n. 155) and for the wedding on December 12, 1676 (see *ibid.*, n. 183).

51 See Oswald, "Kaiser Leopold I. und seine Passauer Hochzeit," 326–27.

52 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 36, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome, November 7, 1676, f. 8v-9r, orig. in ASL, *Archivio Buonvisi* II/30, n. 18.

53 *Ibid.*

54 "Con giubilo universale si è dichiarato il matrimonio dell'Imperatore con la Principessa di Neuburgo, et hora si fanno i preparamenti per vedere se dopo ottenuta la dispensa da Nostro Signore si potessero celebrar le nozze nel mese di Novembre, per non haverle a differire dopo l'avvento, ma pare che il tempo sia corto. Non si è stabilito il luogo, ma si crede, che sarà Lintz, per le commodità, che darebbe il Danubio, se si facessero prima che si gelasse" (*ibid.*, f. 494r).

55 An overview of the correspondence in the period can be found in the appendix of this paper.

The Incognito Project of the Papal Diplomat Buonvisi

After Buonvisi officially communicated the emperor's official announcement regarding his future empress in his letter to the secretary of state on October 18, Buonvisi wrote a ciphered letter to Alderano Cybo on October 25, 1676. In this ciphered letter the apostolic nuncio presented a project revolving around the possible wedding festivities in Passau. He reflected on one point in particular: the session disputes at the table between the envoys and Count Philip William of Palatinate-Neuburg. Were the wedding to be held in Linz, the ambassadors of the princes would follow the imperial court and subsequently claim to be admitted to his table on the first day, as had been the case at the weddings of the last two empresses. This would create a conflict between the representatives and the father of the bride, as they would not agree on precedence at the table and elsewhere. Buonvisi therefore proposed the following solution to the Court Chancellor Johann Paul Hoher⁵⁶ (which Buonvisi reported to Rome): Buonvisi thought of going to Linz at the beginning of December and then going "almost incognito" (*portarsi quasi incognito*) to Passau to visit the Madonna on her feast day. Subsequently, the *sposalizio* by Buonvisi should then take place privately ("per farvi privatamente lo sposalizio"). Under the excuse of an indisposition, Buonvisi then intended to leave immediately without taking part in the festivities after the blessing of the marriage in order to avoid disputes over the ceremony. For the secular envoys in general, the "lontananza del luogo, e dalla forma dell'andarvi, di dire a gl'Ambasciatori, che non lo seguitino"⁵⁷ was considered a decorative, not valid argument (*pretesto*). Thus, the diplomats were not to be expected to make the arduous journey and the wedding was to take place in a "private form." In this way, conflicts of precedence between the envoys and the count of Palatinate-Neuburg were to be circumvented.

Unlike his "collegi secolari," who somewhat regretted being prevented from attending the solemn occasion, the apostolic nuncio could not simply accept his absence: "ma io vi considero il pregiudizio della Nunziatura, se sotto qualsivoglia pretesto lo sposalizio si haverà da fare, o dal Vescovo di Passavia, o da altri."⁵⁸ Buonvisi considers exclusion from the celebration of the wedding or

56 On Johann Paul Freiherr Hoher von Hohenburg und Hohenkräen (1616–1683), see Wagner, "Hoher, Johann Paul," 287–88.

57 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, October 25, 1676, f. 504r-v, here f. 504r.

58 Ibid.

the wedding ceremony made private as damaging to the Apostolic Nunciature, especially if the wedding were to be performed under any pretext by the archbishop of Passau or by others. Buonvisi was concerned with safeguarding his prerogative (“il mio ius”) and his function of celebrating the *sposalizio* through the apostolic nuncio (“per conservare il possesso di fare lo sposalizio”). On the other hand, Buonvisi considered it very difficult to be present at the imperial table due to the disputes with the count. For this reason, Buonvisi proposed the following solution to Court Chancellor Hocher:

I did not want to disturb Your Majesty’s satisfaction, nor alter the enjoyment that you will have with your relatives, but that at the same time I would like to conserve my privilege, and that I could offer Your Majesty to take me incognito to the place of the wedding, I thought I could offer to take myself to the church at the time of the function, and leave immediately afterwards, but as I was alone without the others, it seemed to me that I could, without prejudice to our prerogatives, refrain from appearing at the other functions, especially as His Majesty wanted to hold them in an almost incognito form.⁵⁹

Buonvisi proposed the idea of going incognito⁶⁰ to the emperor at this point as the necessary solution. He thus believed that “aggiustamento” (agreement, rectification) could be reached by dissimulation rather than by approval (“dissimulando, che approvando”). Due to the positions Philip William of Palatinate-Neuburg and Charles V of Lorraine came to occupy within the hierarchy of rank and title in Europe, they were no longer willing to grant the apostolic nuncio the ceremonial precedence without objection from 1676 onwards. For Buonvisi, this ultimately meant coexistence, but without consent (“convivendo, e non consentendo”).⁶¹

59 “Io non volevo turbare le sodisfazioni di Sua Maestà, ne alterare il godimento, che haverà con i suoi parenti, ma che nell’istesso tempo vorrei conservare il mio ius, e che però mi pareva di poter offerire a Sua Maestà di portarmi incognito al luogo delle nozze, e trovarmi alla chiesa al tempo della funzione, e partirne subito doppo haverla fatta, mentre essendo solo senza gl’altri, mi pareva di poter senza pregiudizio delle nostre prerogative astenermi dal comparire all’altre funzioni, tanto più che Sua Maestà voleva farle in forma quasi incognita” (ibid).

60 Contrary to the colloquial meaning of the word, it did not aim to remain “unrecognized,” but meant “without ceremony.” Like other ceremonials, its application was situation-specific, practice-oriented, and function-related. For the concept and history of the “incognito”, see Barth, *Inkognito*, 10.

61 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 208, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 19, 1684, f. 908r. The ceremonial-political conflicts between the Apostolic Nuncio Buonvisi and the count Palatine of Neuburg, the duke of Lorraine and the Bavarian elector will be the subject of a separate publication.

Buonvisi therefore suggested that he might like to travel to Passau incognito and leave again after the marriage had been solemnized. Thus, according to Buonvisi, the nuncio's *ius* for the *sposalizio* would be preserved, and the emperor would be able to celebrate his wedding at the imperial table with joy and satisfaction without fear of a conflict of precedence.⁶² Hocher liked Buonvisi's proposal and wanted to report it to the emperor.⁶³ Buonvisi's incognito project was invented as a ceremonial mode, according to Rohr, "to avoid many a precedence dispute" ("zu Vermeidung mancherley Praecedenz-Streitigkeiten").⁶⁴ It was based on a separation of the person from his ceremonial function and created spaces for individual arrangements, which could be instrumentalized, especially by ruling monarchs, to avoid possible political complications specific to the situation. Once again, the act of going incognito opened a way out. In the incognito mode, it was possible to escape the invariable order of a ceremony, which ultimately created an architectural scenery of movable and immovable backdrops.

Once Buonvisi had been informed on October 25 about the location of the celebration,⁶⁵ he revised his submitted proposal on the same day. Since it was still unclear whether Buonvisi would celebrate the *sposalizio* and whether the envoys would attend the wedding, Buonvisi wanted to go to the court chancellor the next day, i.e. October 26, 1676, and find out more about "che cosa hanno risoluta in questa materia" and whether "se spediranno il corriere per

62 Also in an *avviso* of the same date, see AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, October 25, 1676, f. 506v–507r: "Per il matrimonio di Sua Maestà non è stato ancora destinato il luogo, ne il tempo, tuttavia si crede, che si farà il giorno della Madonna di Dicembre, e che Sua Maestà portatasi prima a Lintz, passerà con poca gente a visitare la Madonna di Passavia, et ivi farà privatamente le nozze."

63 Ibid., f. 504v. Buonvisi submitted to Alderano Cybo after the conversation with Hocher, especially if Innocent XI did not approve them and found out before the wedding, Buonvisi would pretend to be ill (*mi fingerei ammalato*) and he would leave the wedding service to someone else.

64 "Zu Vermeidung mancherley Praecedenz Streitigkeiten haben die grossen Herren ein Mittel gefunden, nemlich, unter einem angenommenen Charakter, oder incognito sich aufzuführen; jedoch wollen der Wohlstand, die Umstände und vorfallenden Begebenheiten nicht allemahl verstauen, sich solches Mittels zu bedienen, sondern es fügt sich gar oft, daß die Majestäten und ihnen gleichgeltenden Personen unter denen ihnen angestammten, oder durch andern aufgetragenen Charakter miteinander concurriren" (Rohr, *Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft der großen Herren*, 358).

65 Buonvisi wrote the first letter of October 25 probably in the week between October 18 and 25. When the announcement of the location of the celebration was made on October 25, Buonvisi wrote the second letter on the same day, revising his first project proposal.

domandare la dispensa.”⁶⁶ It is interesting that the *avviso* announces the form of the wedding in such an impressive way: “[...] e si crede che sarà in forma molto privata.” Previously, the same *avviso* alluded already to the private nature of the ceremony in a simpler form: “[...] et ivi farà privatamente le nozze.”⁶⁷ There is thus an increase in the emphasis on privacy in the celebration in Passau from “privatamente” to “molto private” due to the presence of new information.

On October 27, Buonvisi sent a letter by express post to Rome requesting a quick reply to the letters he had already sent (which he presented again as duplicates)⁶⁸ and asking for instructions on the *funzione dello spozalizio*. Since, as Buonvisi informed Cybo, Hocher had not yet been able to give him an answer as to who should hold it, he concluded “che habbino gran difficoltà a consentire alla mia proposizione.” Buonvisi therefore submitted a modified proposal to Cybo, which he communicated to him in his letter of October 27:

and perhaps it will be better for me to remain in Vienna with all the others, because it would be better not to go to Passau if not incognito, since some people might interpret that I have actually yielded to the pretended precedence; with all this I thought it best to do that reason for not yielding at all to my jurisdiction, since it is true that they will at least tell me that they are not prejudiced by this act.⁶⁹

Buonvisi thus considered it better to remain in Vienna with the other envoys during the wedding celebration. If the apostolic nuncio were to go to Passau, this could only be done if he traveled incognito. It might be interpreted by “some” (*alcuni*) that Buonvisi had indeed yielded to his “alleged” precedence (*alle pretese precedenzae*). Buonvisi did not give up “affatto” his *ius*, and so he asked for instructions.

66 Ibid., October 25, f. 505r. This is also followed by the *avviso* of the same day, see *ibid.*, f. 507r: “Hoggi è uscita la dichiarazione, che Sua Maestà farà lo spozalizio a Passavia alli 9. di Dicembre, ma non si sa con qual accompagnamento anderà e si crede che sarà in forma molto privata, e partirà di qua alli 20. di novembre per trattarsi qualche poco a Lintz.”

67 Ibid., f. 507r.

68 Ibid., Vienna October 27, 1676, f. 510r: “Col corriero, che si spedisce questa notte, mando a Vostra Eminenza il duplicato di due lettere, che l’inviai sabbato passato, sperando col ritorno dell’istesso di haver la risposta a ciò, che reverentemente li accenno circa la funzione dello spozalizio.”

69 “[...] e forse anche sarà meglio ch’io rimanga a Vienna con tutti gl’altri, perché sé bene non andarci a Passavia se non incognito, potrebbero alcuni interpretare che havessi effettivamente ceduto alle pretese precedenzae; con tutto ciò stimai bene di fare quel motivo per non cedere affatto alla mia giurisdizione, essendo verisimile, che almeno mi diranno non pregiudicarsi per questo volo atto” (*ibid.*).

While Buonvisi was still waiting for a reply to his letters of October 25 and 27, he reported new events to Rome on November 1.⁷⁰ Between October 27 and November 1, Hocher came to Buonvisi to inform him of the emperor's decision: "Sua Maestà gradiva molto la mia moderazione, ma che haverebbe havuto più proprio sarebbe il ritrovarsi a Lintz, al ritorno di Sua Maestà."⁷¹ Emperor Leopold I's order was unmistakable: Buonvisi should not celebrate the wedding and neither should he undertake the journey to Passau, not even incognito. The emperor considered it "more appropriate" for Buonvisi to wait in Linz for his return.

How did Buonvisi deal with this problem? In a case of conflict or precedence disputes, one could either not appear at all or go to Passau incognito. The emperor, however, had expressed his explicit objection to the latter. The idea of traveling incognito was ultimately discarded in order to prevent a possible prejudicial effect and to avoid, as it were, a ritualization of the conflicts through the practice of traveling incognito. If one did not want it to come to that, the only way was an explicit (public/private) protest against the "invented tradition" adopted in connection with the privately held wedding ceremony, or one demanded a reversal in written form. As a rule, Buonvisi had his reservation of rights explicitly specified and affirmed in the declaration in question in order to prevent any precedent-setting effect.⁷²

Buonvisi did not insist further on his incognito project, mainly because he had not yet received any instructions from Rome. Instead, he demanded from the court chancellor or Emperor Leopold "che si preservasse la prerogativa della Nunziatura, con qualche dichiarazione in scritto, che esprimesse toccare questa funzione al Nunzio, ma essersi intermessa senza pregiudicare, solo perché Sua Maestà ha desiderato di far la funzione privatamente, e senza l'intervento dei pubblici rappresentanti."⁷³

Buonvisi therefore demanded that his liturgical privileges as apostolic nuncio be set down in writing, which he wanted to see safeguarded.⁷⁴ Only in this case should his legal claim be suspended, because the emperor wanted to

70 Ibid., Vienna, November 1, 1676, f. 515r-v.

71 Ibid., f. 515r.

72 Stollberg-Rilinger, "Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren," 118–19, 125.

73 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 1, 1676, f. 515r.

74 HHStA, OMeA ÄZA 11, fasc. 18: Declaration of 1677 against the jurisdiction of the Viennese consistory over the *Burgkapelle*. Further binding declarations in: HHStA, OMeA ÄZA 11, fasc. 18, January 31, 1680 and April 22, 1681.

hold the function privately and without interference from public representatives. For Buonvisi, the documentation of this specific case and the affirmation in writing of his *ius praecedentiae* were decisive. Without this, the nunciature remained prejudiced. But due to the circumstances, the nuncio could not contradict the emperor without outraging him and without coming into conflict with the count of Palatinate-Neuburg. Buonvisi expressed his hope to the pope “that our Lord will approve of the reasons for having recalled the nunciature without then insisting on adhering to them, using the excuse that the wedding has to be totally private.”⁷⁵ The question of the nuncio’s privileges was thus closely intertwined with the problems of precedence regarding German princes. Hocher then promised to convey the demand to the emperor and to present this declaration to him as righteous (“di rappresentarli per giusta questa dichiarazione”). The codification of Buonvisi’s *ius* gained a new dimension of public recognition and survived for a comparatively long time. If he tolerated an infringement on his right, he could eventually lose this privilege.⁷⁶ As for Buonvisi’s request to be allowed to travel to Linz, the nuncio refused it. He considered this an escape from the dispute over precedence with the count of Palatinate-Neuburg (“mostrare di haver sfuggito la concorrenza”).

The Concept of “Private” in the Nunciature Correspondence

In the discussion below, I offer a detailed explanation of the meanings of the category of privacy. In Italian, the central term used by Buonvisi to designate the private is *privato*, in contrast to the category of the public (*pubblico*). In Italian, the adjective *privato* and the adverb *privatamente* are used primarily to characterize non-official, non-public places, persons, and acts. The reader comes across the term in correspondence mainly in adjectival form. In Buonvisi, one can observe two forms of use of the lexeme “privat.” Thus, we find the phrases such as “in forma privata/da esser totalmente privato” where the term is used as an adjective, or other sentences with “privatamente” as an adverb. In the difference between the public and the private, however, the imperial court valorized the concept

75 “che Nostro Signore approverà l’haver ricordato le ragioni della Nunziatura, senza poi ostinarsi in sostenerle, ammettendo la scusa che lo spozalizio habbia da esser totalmente privato” (AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 1, 1676, f. 515r). The Venetian envoy at the imperial court in Vienna, Francesco Micheli, expressed a similar opinion, speaking of any non-participation in the wedding ceremony, see Fiedler, *Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs*, 167–208, here 176–77.

76 Stollberg-Rilinger, “Zeremoniell als Verfahren,” 103.

of the private ceremonial sphere of action around the wedding ceremony. This instrumentalization of the private sphere was reported by the papal representative *in partibus* to the Cardinal Secretary of the State Alderano Cybo. He consistently alludes to the sphere of the “private” or the private form of the event. The concepts of rights form a frame of reference, and the associated field of words includes *ius*, *prerogativa*, *privilegio*, and *giusto*. Buonvisi attributes more influence to this frame of reference around his prerogatives than to any sense of regret over not being allowed to perform the liturgical celebration of the wedding in private. This makes it clear that an isolated consideration of the categories of public and private in the correspondence is not possible due to their discursive embedding. The private is bound to the public and vice versa, even if one or the other lexeme has not been explicitly nominated. This sheds light on the relationship between the public and private spheres of the wedding ceremony, which are always more or less clearly related to each other or reconciled and conceptually related.

On November 7, 1676, Pope Innocent XI and Alderano Cybo respectively replied to the Viennese nuncio via priority dispatch to his letters of 25 and 27 October 1676. The secretariat of the state gave Buonvisi the longed-for instructions concerning the *ius* of the nunciature and the function of the *sposalizio*:

Your Holiness, however, judges it right and proper that you should disengage yourself from the matter, as you yourself seem to have thought; since the wedding being celebrated privately, in a remote place, and far from the eyes of the ministers of the princes, it seems that no harm can be done to the dignity and prerogatives of the apostolic nuncio. [...] Nevertheless, for the greater caution of the future, Your Illustrious Lordship may leave a note in the registers of this Chancery of the reason why you have not been able to exercise this function this time, so that it may not be held up as an example in cases where [this function] may be exercised by the apostolic nuncio.⁷⁷

77 “Giudica però bene Sua Santità, che destramente se ne disimpegni, com’ella stessa mostra d’haver pensato; poichè celebrandosi le nozze privatamente, in paese rimoto, e lontano dagli occhi de’ Ministri de’ Principi, pare che non possa considerarsi alcun pregiudizio alla dignità, e alle prerogative del Nunzio Apostolico. [...] Nondimeno per maggior cautela dell’avvenire, potrebbe Vostra Signoria Illustrissima lasciar nota ne’ registri di cotesta Cancelleria, la cagione, per cui non ha ella potuto questa volta esercitare tal funzione accioché non sia tirato in esempio ne’ casi dove essa può praticarsi dal nunzio apostolico” (AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 36, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome, November 9, 1676, f. 10r-10v, original in ASL, Archivio Buonvisi II/30, n. 192).

Thus, Rome assured the papal representative residing in Vienna that with the wedding ceremony taking place privately in Passau there was no violation of the dignity (*dignità*) and prerogatives (*prerogative*) of the apostolic nuncio. As a matter of prudence, Buonvisi should describe the case in the registers of the chancery and explain why he was not in a position to exercise this *funzione dello sposalizio* in this specific case.⁷⁸ Rome also assured the nuncio that the function of the *sposalizio* “without doubt” (*indubitatamente*) fell to the Viennese nuncio and to no one else.⁷⁹ This concluded the case for Rome. In addition to the instructions, the extraordinary courier consignment contained the dispensation granted by Pope Innocent XI on account of consanguinity in the third degree, which was required by canon law for the marriage of Emperor Leopold to Eleonora,⁸⁰ and at the same time the marriage license for the bishop of Passau.⁸¹ Leopold I had requested both on October 27, 1676.⁸² The dispensation and license reached Nuncio Buonvisi in Vienna on November 22, 1676, and one day later, on November 23, 1676, the emperor set off from Vienna to Passau.⁸³

78 Ibid.

79 As was also made clear in the letter of December 5 and 12, see *ibid*, Rome, December 5, 1676, f. 18v-19r and original in ASI, Archivio Buonvisi II/30, n. 205.

80 The bride and groom had the same great-grandfather on their mother's side, namely Duke Wilhelm V of Bavaria, called the Pious (reigned from 1579 to 1597; died in 1626). The original of the dispensation from the degree of *consanguinitatis, et affinitatis in tertio gradu* is found in HHStA, UR FUK 1757, dated November 7, 1676.

81 The prerogative and permission to bless the imperial wedding was given to the bishop of Passau at imperial request. The papal breve for this was delivered to him by the Cardinal Protector Cardinal Pio. The Hungarian Court Chancellor Count Thomas Pálffy, bishop of Neutra, and the Provost of the Passau Cathedral Franz Anton Count von Losenstein, Passau official in Vienna, acted as witnesses. Obviously, the bishop of Passau had no problem surrendering his primacy to the count of Palatinate-Neuburg, as Buonvisi explicitly states in an *avviso*: “[...] e lo sposalizio si farà da quel Monsignor Vescovo, che si e contentato di cedere il luogo al Duca di Neuburgo per esser egli nel proprio territorio, e per le dispute delle precedenza non sarà Sua Maestà accompagnata da gl'ambasciatori” (AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 15, 1676, f. 544r).

82 In a letter written in Latin on October 27, 1676, the emperor had asked the pope personally for the dispensation and at the same time had requested that the bishop of Passau, Sebastian count von Pötting, be granted the marriage license, see Oswald, “Kaiser Leopold I. und seine Passauer Hochzeit,” 24.

83 According to the ceremony protocol (HHStA, OMeA ZA-Protokoll 3, f. 74r-99v, here f. 79r), December 7 was actually the day of arrival in Passau. Eleonora Magdalena reached Neuburg am Inn with her retinue on December 11. The next day, December 12, the bride and groom met for the first time in person. See Schmidmaier-Kathke, “Die Glückliche Vermählung,” 149–50.

Avoidance as a Diplomatic Solution to Conflicts of Precedence

Francesco Buonvisi, reassured of the correctness of his actions by Rome, justified himself once more to make clear the aim of his whole undertaking:

my purpose was only to show that I was responsible for this function, and that I was anxious to serve His Majesty in any way, but in the extreme, I thought it better to avoid it, and I was only determined to procure a declaration that would preserve the reasons for the Nunciature, and perhaps I would have obtained it by now, if Hocher had not fallen ill; However, I will not fail to procure it on the return of Your Majesty, and if I do not obtain it, I will put in the Registers of the Chancery a separate report of the causes for which you omitted to go, so that the memory of it may remain, in order to protect us from the injuries in the future, as I am commanded by Your Eminence.⁸⁴

“Avoidance” (*lo sfuggire*) and “excuse” (*ammettendo la scusa*) were two sides of the same coin in this process of avoiding disputes over precedence in ceremony. Buonvisi considered *lo sfuggire* more appropriate, while the imperial court advanced the *scusa* of not wanting the numerous envoys represented at the imperial court to make the long journey to Passau. It was obvious that the emperor’s third marriage was deliberately moved to Passau to spare the emperor unpleasant disputes over matters of ceremony. This in order to ensure that his new relatives would not suffer any insulting treatment at the hands of the diplomatic representatives at the imperial court during the ceremonial dinner where the newly wed emperor, his new wife and her parents (only counts) were supposed to sit at the same table as the diverse high ranking ambassadors,

...so that either the one or the other would have to leave the table, and the ambassadors (when they had moved from Vienna, and had not taken a seat at the table) would have been disgusted. In order to avoid such disconcert, it was arranged that the emperor let the ambassadors know that he was going to Passau to celebrate his wedding and that he

84 AAV, Segr. Stato, Germania 196, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna, November 22, 1676, f. 556r: “poiché il fine mio fu solo di mostrare, che a me si doveva quella funzione, e che havevo impazienza di servir Sua Maestà in qualsivoglia modo, ma in sustanza, stimavo meglio lo sfuggire, e solo mi sono fondato nel procurare una dichiarazione, che preservi le ragioni della Nunziatura, e forse a quest’hora l’haverci ottenuta, se l’Hochoer non si fosse ammalato; non lascierò però di procurarla al ritorno di Sua Maestà, e quando non la conseguisca, metterò ne registri della cancelleria distinta relazione delle cause per le quali si è tralasciato di andare, acciocché ne resti la memoria, per preservarsi nell’avvenire da i pregiudizii, come mi viene comandato da Vostra Eminenza.”

did not wish the ambassadors to be inconvenienced, but to remain in Vienna, where he would shortly return with his bride. The ambassadors were indeed displeased with this request, but considering that it could not be otherwise, they concurred in His Majesty's pleasure.⁸⁵

The conflict therefore arose not only in the religious celebration of the wedding but also in the subsequent order of sitting at the table. In order to preserve the positions of the count and the envoys and to avoid conflicts, all the diplomats were, so to speak, disinvented. But in addition to that, in the register of graces in the archive of the Vienna Nunciature during Buonvisi's term of office, there is no note of the substitution of the blessing of the marriage between Emperor Leopold I and Eleonora Magdalena of Palatinate-Neuburg with the archbishop and prince-bishop of Passau.⁸⁶ This is probably because the wedding was celebrated "privately" in Passau and, as Cybo himself wrote to Buonvisi, the *iuss* was not affected.⁸⁷ The affirmation of the *iuss* and prerogatives of the Apostolic Nunciature was a consequence in the avoidance of a precedent and the avoidance of a scandal in Europe over matters of ceremony and thus politics. The nuncio's prerogatives had not changed since Ferdinand II's accession to power.

85 "onde o l'uno, ò gli altro avrebbero dovuto essentarsi dalla tavola, e gli ambasciatori (quando si fossero mossi da Vienna, e non avessero avuto luogo in tavola) si sarebbero disgustati. Per evitare dunque tali sconceri, si prese per espediente, che l'Imperatore facesse sapere agli Ambasciatori, che andando egli a Passavia a celebrare le sue nozze, desiderava, che gli ambasciatori non s'incomodassero, ma restassero a Vienna, dove in breve sarebbe tornato con la sua sposa. Dispiacque in realtà questa intimazione agli ambasciatori, ma considerando, che non poteva essere altrimenti, concorsero nel gusto di Sua Maestà" (AAV, Arch. Nunz. Vienna 73, f. 213v-15r).

86 A register of the expedition of the matters of grace of the Vienna Nunciature were made according to the terms of office of the apostolic nuncios and records the registration of the various dispensations, licences, faculties, absolutions, etc. granted to various parties. For the time of Francesco Buonvisi, such a register exists with volume 550 (23 October 1675 to 14 February 1682) and volume 29 (17 February 1682 to 1 September 1689), cf. AAV, Arch. Nunz. Vienna 550, ff. 139r-201v and 29, ff. 73r-87r.

87 See the registration of this case in the abovementioned AAV, Arch. Nunz. Vienna 73, f. 200r-45v. An entry in the register of graces is found instead in the case of the weddings of the widowed queen of Poland, Eleonora, to the duke of Lorraine and of Archduchess Maria Anna to the count of Palatinate-Neuburg, both of whom celebrated their wedding in Wiener Neustadt in 1678. See *ibid.* 550, f. 177v-78r (January 14, 1678, "Substitutio pro benedicendi nuptiis Reginae Eleonorae et ducis Lotharingae") and *ibid.*, f. 185v-86r (October 21, 1678, "Substitutio pro benedicendi nuptiis Archiducinae Mariae Annae et Jo. Wilhelmi Comiti Palatini Rheni").

Conclusions

The emperor's wedding in Passau 1676 was only the beginning of further disputes over ceremony that sharpened the papal representative's sensitivity to potential threats to his ceremonial position. Thus, privacy and participating incognito in events became important forms of instrumentalization and offered a way to avoid conflicts over precedence in ceremony at the early modern imperial court. On the one hand, the categories should not be understood as referring to retreat from the public eye. Ceremony, rather, was given a performative flexibility and adaptability. On the other hand, strict adherence to established tradition was observable at the imperial court. Leopold I was not free in his definition of ceremonial behavior. Rather, he had to orchestrate his acts on the basis of ceremonial practices in use at other European courts. These imperial responses showed that in matters of ceremony, the emperor always decided according to custom, demonstrating a conservative approach to ceremonial norms, especially towards the numerous envoys represented at the imperial court. This in turn suggests that incognito participation and privacy offered a way out of the dilemma and were seen as suitable means to avoid conflicts around ceremonial performances at the imperial court. However, if the ceremonial really "does what it depicts,"⁸⁸ then incognito participation and privacy in the *Theatrum ceremoniale* constituted elements that were to be performed on stage, whereas the true reasons remained concealed behind the scenes.

88 Stollberg-Rilinger, "Zeremoniell als Verfahren," 96.

Table 1. Rhythm of communication between Francesco Buonvisi and Alderano Cybo (October 17 to December 20, 1676)

Postal consignment	Confirmation of the letters	Alderano Cybo to Buonvisi	Francesco Buonvisi to Cybo	Confirmation of the letters	Postal consignment
Ordinario	No arrival of letters	17.10. (Sa), Rome Ciffer			
			18.10. (Su), Vienna	3.10.	Ordinario
			18.10. (Su), Vienna		
		(24.10.)			
			25.10. (Su); Vienna	10.10.	Ordinario
			25.10. (Su); Vienna		
			25.10. (Su); Vienna (<i>Avviso</i>)		
			27.10. (Tu), Vienna		Staffetta, Extraordinary Shipping
		(31.10)			
			1.11. (Su); Vienna	17.10.	Ordinario
			1.11. (Su); Vienna (<i>Avviso</i>)		
Staffetta	18.10. 25.10. 27.10.	7.11. (Sa), Rome			
			(8.11.)		
		(9. 11.; 14.11.)			
			15.11. (Su); Vienna	31.10.	Ordinario
			15.11. (Su); Vienna (<i>Avviso</i>)		
		(21.11.)			
			22.11. (Su); Vienna	7.11.	Ordinario
			22.11. (Su); Vienna (<i>Avviso</i>)		
		(28.11.)			
			(29.11.)		
Ordinario	15.11.	5.12. (Sa), Rome			
			(6.12.)		
	22.11.	12.12. (Sa), Rome			
			(13.12.)		
		(19.12.)			
			20.12. (Su); Vienna (<i>Avviso</i>)	5.12.	Ordinario
		(26.12.)			
			(27.12.)		
		(2.1.1677)			
			(3.1.1677)		
		(9.01.)			

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Archivio di Stato di Lucca (ASL)

Archivio Buonvisi II/11; II/30

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (HHStA)

Obersthofmeisteramt, Zeremonielprotokolle (OMeAZA-Protokoll) 3

Obersthofmeisteramt, Ältere Zeremonialakten (OMeA ÄZA) 10, 11

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Changes in the Diplomatic Measures of the Russian Empire in the Balkans after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774)

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In the last third of the eighteenth century, the foreign policy of the Russian Empire was oriented towards the Ottoman Empire and, as part of it, towards the Balkans and the Black Sea region. The aspirations of Russian foreign policy under Catherine II were shaped not only by the weakening of the government in Constantinople and the acquisition of new territories, but also by the creation of Russian economic, cultural, and political presence in southeastern Europe. The creation of official diplomatic representations was one of the main tools used by Russia to establish its presence in the Balkans.

The establishment of permanent embassies and the creation of the necessary political and infrastructural background became a decisive segment in the development of European diplomacy from the Peace of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars. The steps taken by the government in St. Petersburg with the creation of permanent embassies in the leading European courts were in line with the abovementioned trend, but while this kind of “catching up” process gradually moved towards Central and Western Europe, Russia applied a completely different set of conditions to maintain diplomatic relations in the case of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman diplomacy operated as a “one-sided diplomatic relation”: there were permanent Russian envoys at the Constantinople court, but no representatives were delegated by the Porte to St. Petersburg. Russia had to adapt to this special situation in the eighteenth century. This closed system was broken by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, which closed the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 and included a clause according to which Russia had the right to establish consulates in the Ottoman Empire and thus in the Balkans, a key area.

The other key element of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was the right of the reigning Russian tsar to be the protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, which was also fixed in this agreement. The “authority” acquired at this time was not unprecedented, as the Porte had acceded to such requests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through capitulations with other states (such as France, Austria, or the Venetian Republic), thus establishing the “protégé” system. At the same time, the Russian government took the protection of Christians under the jurisdiction of the Porte to a new level and made it an integral part of its foreign policy. In my study, I examine how the Russian Empire applied the results of the Peace of Kuchuk Kainardji to diplomatic advocacy in the Balkans.

Keywords: Russian diplomacy, Ottoman Empire, eighteenth century, Balkan relations, Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, diplomatic service

In the history of Russian diplomacy, the eighteenth century brought several new elements which fundamentally determined the way in which the state operated in the field of foreign relations. European diplomatic trends served as a model for the development of Russia's foreign missions and, perhaps more importantly, its institutional system. In this, as in so many other things, the reign of Peter the Great was the starting point, with the adoption of Western (i.e. European) customs, rules of sending and receiving ambassadors,¹ protocols, and the abolition (or, more precisely, the transformation) of the *prikaz* system, which created a system of colleges within which foreign affairs functioned as a separate unit. Building up the institutional system, developing diplomatic practice in line with international trends, organizing the apparatus, and the coordination of all these segments was a difficult and complex process. As part of the latter, the Russian government also paid attention to building up its foreign representations. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), it became a priority for the European states to maintain constant communication with one another, obtain information more efficiently and monitor the internal and external activities of other (usually rival) countries, which also served to keep one another mutually under control.² The most effective way to do this was to establish permanent embassies, a process in which the Russian Empire was also involved, although at a somewhat slower pace. The measures adopted by the government in St. Petersburg to establish permanent embassies in the leading European courts were in line with the abovementioned policy. One of the first steps taken by Russia was to establish diplomatic connections with the courts of Central and Western Europe through its envoys delegated to London, Paris, and Vienna,³ though the geopolitical interests of the Russian Empire gradually shifted in the eighteenth century towards the eastern and southeastern regions of the continent.

The Balkan Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea region occupied a special place in Russian foreign political thinking, and several foreign policy concepts were formulated which made these territories (all of which were under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire) a specific target of Russian

1 Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*, 24–25.

2 Devetak et al., *An Introduction to International Relations*, 259.

Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 47; Schrek, "A modern diplomácia kialakulásának időszaka," 157–59.

3 Permanent diplomatic missions were established in London and Paris. Andrey Artamonovich Matveev arrived in England in 1707, and Johann C. von Schleinitz represented Russia at the French court from 1717. In the case of Austria, there was a regular Russian diplomatic presence from the early 1720s. Dixon, *Britain and Russia*, XXIII–XXIV. Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe*, 201.

expansion and influence gaining. These ambitions, motivated by economic and strategic considerations, placed the official relations with the Porte on a pedestal, together with the establishment and, if necessary, the strengthening of Russian ties with the Balkan peoples. But establishing a Russian diplomatic presence on the peninsula was far from easy. The process was slowed down (and heavily burdened) by a series of conflicts between St. Petersburg and Constantinople which flared up at times in the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century (1710–1711, 1736–1739, 1768–1774, and 1788–1792) and the peculiar and in many respects closed foreign political system that characterized the Ottoman Empire. St. Petersburg's efforts to build official relations with the Balkan provinces and the strategies adopted and tools used in the pursuit of this aim must be analyzed and interpreted in this context. Russia delegated envoys to the Ottoman capital as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, but the Ottomans had no official representatives in Russia until 1857.⁴

The question of Russian foreign policy and Russia's great power status is a popular topic among Hungarian and international historians of Russian studies, and the process of Russia's transformation into an empire has been studied from many perspectives in recent decades. Russian diplomacy, territorial expansion, and the aspiration to gain influence over specific regions (including the Balkans) are evident components of the works focusing on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Almost without exception, every work (whether at the level of mention or deeper analysis) devotes attention to the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, which is considered a starting point in the breakdown of parity between Russia and the Porte and also in the expansion of Russia's regional influence (whether in the Balkans or the Caucasus). The treaty signed on July 21, 1774 between Russia and the Porte after the war of 1768–1774 was literally a triumph of Russian diplomacy. The negotiations were led by Pyotr Alexandrovich Rumyantsev, and it took almost two years from the armistice for Russia and the Porte to reach a final agreement.⁵ The historiographical overview of the subject is a difficult task due to its complexity, since the topic of the peace itself and Russia's presence in the Balkans is mostly treated as one comprehensive thread, i.e. in the study of

4 The Ottoman Empire began to open up diplomatically to the European powers during the reign of Selim III. The first permanent Ottoman embassy was established in London in 1793 by Yusuf Aga Efendi, and others were opened in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. Hurewitz, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, 147–48; Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman Embassy*.

5 On the circumstances under which peace was established, see Дружинина, *Кючук-Кайнарджийский мир*; Davies, *The Russo-Turkish war*; Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 213–14; 226–36.

the history of the Eastern Question in general. In order to bypass this problem, I provide a narrow interpretation of the most significant literature directly related to the subject of this paper chronologically, thematically, and in terms of theoretical methodology.

One of the main directions of research concerning the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji is the traditional political history approach, which for decades has dominated the work of historians on the subject. Part of this is essentially the traditional historiographical approach, based on the thorough processing of archival sources, in which the representatives of Russian historiography have been at the forefront. The monograph by E. I. Druzhinina can be considered a basic work, as well as the works of diplomatic historians (including I. S. Dostyan, G. L. Arsh, V. N. Vinogradov, and V. V. Degoev) that focus on issues less partial than the former, dealing rather with the Eastern Question and the Balkans at the turn of the century and during the first half of the nineteenth century.⁶ Among the works with new perspectives on Russia's international relations, in addition to N. S. Kinyapina's *Russia's foreign policy in the first half of the 19th century*,⁷ I would also like to highlight O. V. Orlik's monographs, in which Orlik examines regional aspects of Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century.⁸ Most of these works do not deal specifically with the subject or the period covered here, but they typically present the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji as an important of reference point.

In Hungary, research on the historical background of the Eastern Question in the eighteenth century has been carried out by Erzsébet Bodnár, who in her monograph and numerous studies addresses the earliest issues of the Eastern Question (in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century). She has devoted particular attention to the study of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji and the Turkish straits.⁹

One finds the same trend in the Western historiography, which tends to interpret the 1774 treaty and Russia's Balkan expansion in a broader perspective, such as the context of great power rivalries (Anglo-Russian competition or the

6 Дружинина, *Кючук-Кайнарджийский мир*; Достян, *Россия и балканский вопрос*; Дегоев, *Внешняя политика России*; Арш, *Россия и борьба Греции*. Арш, Виноградов, Джападзе, Достян, *Международные отношения на Балканах*.

7 Киняпина, *Внешняя политика России*.

8 Орлик, *История внешней политики России*; Орлик, *История внешней политики России. Первая половина XIX века*; Орлик, *Россия в международных отношениях: 1815–1829*.

9 Bodnár, *A keleti kérdés és a Balkán*; Bodnár, "A keleti kérdés és a fekete-tengeri szorosok"; Bodnár, "Oroszország déli törekvései."

Crimean War for instance)¹⁰, rather than in terms of practical diplomacy or the tools of diplomacy. The main proponent of the geopolitical approach is John P. LeDonne, who has analyzed Russia's role as an international political factor, including economic and military aspects.¹¹ In some cases, the geopolitical perspective is combined with an economic approach, as in the publications of Vernon Puryear, and detailed diplomatic histories have also been published telling the story of an individual or a diplomatic mission.¹²

In addition, studies focusing on the impact of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji have tended to focus on the ideological and political background of the Orthodoxy and the Russian protectorate and its manifestations in a particular area. These include Viktor Taki's analysis of the Russian protectorate as a "soft power" and Endre Sashalmi's discussion of the religious roots and political culture of Russian politics in the Balkans, highlighting the importance of the peace that brought the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 to an end.¹³

As seen from the above, the historical literature on the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji and the subsequent period tends to focus on the territorial achievements and the rights acquired or the economic aspects, but no attention is paid to the specific changes that took place within practical diplomacy. At this point, it is important to make clear the main aspects and objectives of my inquiry. In any analysis and interpretation of large-scale political processes, it is important to map and present the less spectacular methods that are used on lower levels of diplomacy, such as the decade-long practice of establishing diplomatic representation and the instruments associated with it.

This, in my opinion, is the most important achievement of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji: the gradual transformation of the tools and methods used in Russian diplomacy until its emergence at the level of practical diplomacy, which would create the preconditions for Russian diplomatic representation in the Balkan provinces under Ottoman rule (which previously had not been possible).

I therefore do not aim in this essay to reassess the diplomatic history or geopolitical background of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. My main objective is to define and interpret, in the context of the new foreign policy perspectives

10 On the latter interpretation, Joseph L. Wiczynski wrote an introductory essay. See Wiczynski, "The Myth of Kuchuk-Kainardja."

11 LeDonne, *The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire*; LeDonne, "Russia's Ambitions in the Black Sea Basin."

12 Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*; Frary, "Russian Consuls"; Dvoichenko-Markov, "Russia and the First Accredited Diplomat."

13 Taki, "Limits of Protection"; Sashalmi, "Az orosz Balkán-politika vallási gyökereinek kérdéséhez."

offered by the peace treaty, the new methods and instruments used by Russian foreign policy in the Balkans, such as the diplomatic representation, the establishment of consulates, and the use of the protégé system. Furthermore, I present the mechanisms that were directly applied in everyday diplomatic practice.

The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji¹⁴ was significant for a number of reasons, but from the perspective of the discussion here, it was important because it offered an opportunity to change the diplomatic toolbox, and in the end, the Russian court took advantage of this opportunity. From a diplomatic point of view, in addition to providing Russia with a number of political advantages, the peace was a milestone in establishing formal (official) relations with the Balkan provinces and in raising diplomatic ties with the Ottoman Porte to a new level. The peace treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji resulted in significant achievements for Russia in three fields: 1) territorial; 2) economic; 3) political-diplomatic-cultural. In terms of territorial gains, Russia extended its borders to the Bug/Dnieper River.¹⁵ It finally acquired the fortress of Azov and strengthened its position in the North Caucasus. However, the second and third areas represented the real change in diplomatic terms, which were, to some extent, related to each other. A constant and key issue in the Russian concept of foreign policy was the economic consideration of more active involvement in maritime trade and thus in trade all over Europe, which would put the Eastern European state in a genuinely competitive position economically. The economic provisions of the treaty, which were advantageous for Russia and essentially opened the way for unrestricted Russian commercial shipping on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, were closely linked to the establishment of consulates and the development of a network of Russian agents.

As noted above, the peace of 1774 opened up a rather closed Ottoman system from a diplomatic point of view, and this allowed Russia to make three important advances. The first of these advances was the establishment, in accordance with Article 5, of a permanent embassy in the Ottoman capital. Diplomatic relations

14 Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 338–44. There are several variations on the source publications of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. The version of the treaty published by Gabriel Noradounghian does not cover all of the documents. A thematically arranged version of certain points of the treaty was published by A. Schopoff in his 1904 volume, which collected various firmans, documents, and conventions concerning the protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Article 14, which was missing from the Noradounghian edition, are found in the Schopff volume. The articles of the Russo-Turkish peace of 1774 can also be found here: Саконов, *Плод стгаем Росоу*, 78–92.

15 Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, 40.

with the Ottoman Empire were different from the traditional European model, and even in the eighteenth century, they were largely unilateral. This did not mean, of course, that the Porte did not maintain diplomatic relations with other states, but the difference can be grasped in the method according to which envoys were sent. The government of the Sultan received the representatives of other countries, as had been the case in previous periods, but the Porte did not delegate permanent envoys even to the main European courts. Hence, much of the mutual communication was conducted through the foreign envoys stationed in Constantinople.¹⁶ Representation in Constantinople had long been a priority for Russia, as is evidenced by the fact that, from Pyotr Tolstói's mission as resident ambassador in 1702 onwards, Russian representatives came to the Ottoman capital quite frequently, but they came as part of temporary missions and not as officials of permanent embassies with an uninterrupted presence. Sometimes there was a gap of several years before a new Russian envoy was sent, and their titles varied widely (*resident, envoy, charge d'affaire*).¹⁷ This was the period when Russian diplomacy and foreign affairs began to professionalize on the basis of European standards.¹⁸ Thus, the peace treaty confirmed something that had essentially been in existence for decades, and the significance of the relevant article lies rather in the fact that the provision precisely defines the rank of the Russian representative in Constantinople. In this respect, Russian diplomacy took a serious step forward, because from the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji onwards, the Russian government was represented at the Sublime Porte by an envoy who was “ranked second”:

the Imperial Court of Russia will always have with the Sublime Porte a Minister of the second order, that is to say an Envoy or a Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Sublime Porte will have for his character all

16 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe,” 117; Bóka, *Európa és az Oszmán Birodalom*, 109–10; Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy,” 131. In return, it was not until 1857 that the Porte established a permanent embassy in St. Petersburg, one of the main reasons being that the Constantinople government, following the reforms of Sultan Selim III, usually only sent ambassadors to states that were considered friendly, and the Sultan continued to maintain the reclamation of the Crimea as a long-term goal. See Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy,” 133–34, 137, 149; Naff, “Reform and Diplomacy,” 304. For the government and military reforms of Selim III, see Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 193–94.

17 See Amelicheva, *Russian Residency in Constantinople, 1700–1774*.

18 As a result of Peter's reforms, the Russian diplomatic machinery is restructured and permanent embassies are being established. In this respect, the primary targets of the Russian court were the high courts of Europe, such as Vienna, London, Paris, Berlin, etc. However, the first destinations included Constantinople as well. See Hennings, “Information and Confusion,” 1004.

the consideration and all the attentions that it has for the Ministers of the most distinguished Powers (...).¹⁹

It was an important condition that the Russian envoy would follow the Austrian imperial envoy in the diplomatic ranking.²⁰ This was linked to the fact that, under the same treaty, the Sultan recognized the Russian tsar as a padishah,²¹ and the Russian envoy was therefore to be treated with the utmost respect.²² The treaty was also clear on diplomatic protocol, and it regulated what was to be done if the Russian diplomat and the imperial envoy did not hold the same rank. In this case, “if this Minister of the Emperor has a different one, that is to say higher or lower, the minister or envoy of Russia will walk (...) after the ambassador of Holland, or, in his absence, after the ambassador of Venice.”²³

1774 was a turning point, but not only for Russian diplomacy. On the Ottoman side, it was also a stimulus for change in diplomacy, although this change was somewhat delayed. It was precisely this Russo-Turkish confrontation, i.e. the constant geopolitical threat from the tsarist court, that gave the incentive for the idea that the diplomatic behavior of the Porte had to change, and Constantinople had to find lasting allies to counter Russia.²⁴

At the same time, alongside the change in foreign political strategy, there were also tangible, almost modern elements of this shift: the establishment of the first permanent embassies (usually in exceptional cases and in the capitals of exceptionally friendly countries, for example London, Berlin, and Paris²⁵) and the associated restructuring of the internal Ottoman administrative system.²⁶

The second important advance for Russia in the field of diplomatic representation was found in provision 2), according to which the Russian envoy

19 Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 323.

20 Уляницкий, *Дарданеллы, Босфор*, 166.

21 Being recognized as a padishah was of great importance. The Sultan would only recognize the rulers of other states as equals in the most exceptional cases. For instance: Bóka, *Európa és az Oszmán Birodalom*, 109.

22 Yakushev, “Diplomatic Relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire,” 150.

23 Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 323.

24 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*, 61–62. In fact, Article 27 of the treaty was not limited to the establishment of a permanent embassy but obliged the Porte to exchange ambassadors, which took place in 1775–1776. Nikolai Vasilievich Renpin arrived in Constantinople on behalf of the Russian Empire, and Abd ül-Kerim Pasha in St. Petersburg. The details of the exchange of envoys have already been studied and addressed in the secondary literature. See Itzkowitz and Mote, *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors*.

25 Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy,” 147.

26 See Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 295–315.

could represent Moldavia and Wallachia (Article 12, point 10) at the Porte, which in practice meant that after 1774, the Russian envoy in Constantinople could officially represent the affairs of the Danubian Principalities in the negotiations with the Ottoman government.²⁷ This provision, in turn, created a kind of dependency between the Eastern Balkan provinces and Russia. Previously, the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia had had their own envoys in Constantinople, the so-called *capu-keibayas*, who were removed from their positions during the war. Pending the peace negotiations, Russia paid attention to this case and agreed with the Porte in the same passage of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji to reinstate the representatives of the hospodars.²⁸ This measure was provided for in point 9 of the same article of the treaty, which also indicates that the two issues (the representation of the affairs of the Danubian Principalities and the reinstatement of the provincial delegates) were treated by Russian diplomacy as an integrated whole. This custom continued, and the only change was the addition of Russian diplomatic representation in Constantinople.

And finally, the third significant advance for Russia was the newly acquired right to establish consulates in the Ottoman Empire (Article 11) and thus in the Balkan Peninsula, which was of particular importance to the government of St. Petersburg and which was an important milestone in the establishment of formal (official) diplomatic relations with the Balkan provinces. The provision reads as follows:

And as it is in every respect indispensable to establish consuls and vice-consuls in all places where the Russian Empire deems them necessary, they shall be regarded and respected in the same way as other consuls of friendly powers; these consuls and vice-consuls shall be allowed to retain dragomans by the name of Berath, that is to say, by granting them imperial patents, and by granting them the same privileges as other consuls in the service of England, France, and other nations.²⁹

This led to the establishment of consulates not only in the Balkans but also in the Danubian Principalities (Bucharest and Iași) and later on the Greek mainland and islands (Athens, Patras, and Thessaloniki), in the Belgrade Pashalik (Belgrade), in Montenegro (Kotor), and in several cities in the Middle East.³⁰

27 Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Romanian Principalities*, 75; Yakushev, “Diplomatic Relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire,” 150; Demeter, *Balkán kronológia*, vol. 1, 30.

28 Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Romanian Principalities*, 25, 75.

29 Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 323.

30 Prousis, “A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian Consuls,” 515.

The development of the Russian consular system in the Ottoman Empire, which meant the creation of a continuous Russian diplomatic presence in the Balkans, was by no means a rapid process, but rather a systematic one, which took roughly 20 to 30 years for the Russian foreign service, which gradually building this system up along the lines of its original objectives, but always in accordance with the political situation. This reflected in the fact that the first Russian consul started his work in the Danubian Principalities, which was the most important Balkan region for Russia at the time, after the Porte had affirmed Russia's right in this respect in an auxiliary treaty, in addition to the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji.³¹

The first Russian diplomat to arrive in this capacity was Sergei L. Lashkov, who served as consul in Bucharest between 1780 and 1782.³² Lashkov had previous diplomatic experience in Constantinople. He presumably learned the diplomatic service here and was chosen as the first Russian consul to the Danube Principalities on the basis of his experience in the Ottoman Empire.³³ After 1774, the Dniester River became the newly acquired natural border, and the Russian Empire became the immediate neighbor of the Moldavian Principality. From a geopolitical point of view, this implied a strong Russian presence. The acquired territory was of great importance for Russia's southwestern border defense, especially because of the frontier nature of the region.³⁴ The term *frontier* needs to be explained, as the legal status of the Danubian Principalities was completely settled during the period under study, and they were not part of the territories the status of which (i.e. to what state did they belong) was the subject of dispute. On the other hand, frontier areas are generally understood to be territories that act as intermediate areas or transitional zones,³⁵ which a neighboring state is unable to subordinate fully or integrate into its own territory.³⁶ But this was not, essentially, the case with the Danubian Principalities, as they were parts of the Ottoman Empire (as tributary states with their own internal policies),

31 Treaty of Aynalıkavak in 1779. See Сперанский, *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи XX*, 800–5.

32 Dvoichenko-Markov, "Russia and the First Accredited Diplomat," 201.

33 In the late 1780s and early 1790s, another Russian-Turkish war hit the Eastern Balkans, and since the Danubian Principalities were regularly the staging ground for the Russo-Turkish wars, the Bucharest consulate had to move to Iași during the conflict. See Dvoichenko-Markov, "Russia and the First Accredited Diplomat," 201.

34 According to Florescu, the area considered a "frontier" by Russian political thought at the time included Moldova and Wallachia as well. Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Romanian Principalities*, 75.

35 Капелер, "Южный и восточный фронт России," 64.

36 Khodarkovsky, *Russia Steppe Frontier*, 47, 185.

and there was no dispute between the Porte and Russia on this point. At the same time, the region met two criteria that nevertheless gave the Eastern Balkan principalities a kind of frontier character for Russia. The first of these two criteria was the cultural overlap and the second was the fact that Moldavia and Wallachia were usually used as military staging areas in Russo-Turkish conflicts. Thus, in essence, Russia's southern border zones or frontier zones included the Danubian Principalities³⁷ as well, and this geopolitical role also enhanced the diplomatic importance of Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Russian consulate was very effective through its many connections, but soon other states also began to show interest in the region.³⁸ In addition to Bucharest, a consulate was opened in Iași, followed by diplomatic missions to the Greek territories, with Russian consulates being established in Athens, Patras, Thessaloniki, Smyrna, and the Aegean islands.³⁹ This also shows that, regarding the Balkans, the Greek region was given high priority, alongside the Danubian Principalities. In contrast to Russian-Greek relations, Russian-Bulgarian connections remained stagnant in the period after 1774.

The large Greek and Slavic populations that had settled in Russia after the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774 and the already existing Russo-Greek connections played a decisive role. One of the most important bridgeheads of the St. Petersburg government in this area was the consulate in Thessaloniki, founded in 1785, which had a special role as one of the paramount ports in the Eastern Mediterranean area, which also served as an information-distribution center. Local connections and transit traffic provided valuable economic and military information for the Russian consuls, who forwarded this information in their reports to the relevant department of the College of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁰ In

37 Зеленева, *Геополитика и геостратегия России*, 77–78. Researchers studying the frontier zones of the Russian Empire interpret the Danube and Black Sea region as the western part of a so-called Eurasian frontier. See Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy”; McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier*, 2–14; Khodarkovsky, *Russia Steppe Frontier*. Indeed, this terminology was also adopted by Viktor Taki in his works (“Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principalities”; “Russia on the Danube”).

38 Austria opened a consulate in Bucharest in 1784. Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Romanian Principalities*, 77–78.

39 In March 1770, following the arrival of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the region, Russian agents roamed the Greek territories to incite the population and local leaders to join, which proved a partially successful Russian undertaking and which became known as the Orlov Uprising after Baron Alexei Grigorievich Orlov. Demeter, *Balkán kronológia*, vol. 1, 28; Frary, *Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity*, 21–22.

40 The organizational structure of the College of Foreign Affairs was as follows: reports from the Balkans and Greece were channeled to the Asia Department of the institution, which also coordinated matters relating to the Eastern Question. Prousis, “A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian Consuls,” 515.

addition, the consulate helped the Russian government strengthen the ties to the Orthodox through cooperation with the Greek community, which also ensuring that Christians could make pilgrimages to Mount Athos.⁴¹ Among the examples of effective consular activity in the region is the career of Angelo Mustoxidi, who was based in Thessaloniki for several decades, but Sergei Bogdanov⁴² in the Ionian Islands and Ioannis N. Vlassopoulos, who became consul in Preveza in 1804, were also prominent figures of the Russian diplomatic presence.⁴³ The functioning of the consulates, however, depended heavily on the political conditions in the region. In peacetime and in times of conflict, the role of the consulates was more appreciated, but there are also examples of the diplomatic presence being terminated due to tensions between the Sublime Porte and Russia or because of a war, for instance in 1821.⁴⁴

Consuls in the Russian service were mostly of Greek descent, sometimes with Phanariot roots. The Phanariotes, who were an influential elite, assisted the Russian government throughout the Balkans, but the Danubian Principalities and Greece were the main areas of cooperation. The Phanariotes had a special position within the Ottoman Empire. This social group of Greek origin, which had extensive international connections and generally excellent language skills, was characterized by a kind of duality. While they were strongly linked to the Ottoman political and administrative system, in which they played leading roles (for example in the leadership of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia),⁴⁵ they also developed deep ties with Russian political and cultural circles, thus predestinating the Orthodox-Russian orientation of the Greek elite, which the St. Petersburg cabinet sought to turn to its advantage.⁴⁶ In addition, the Russian

41 Frary, "Russian Interest," 17.

42 Frary, "Russian Consuls," 49.

43 Frary, "The Russian Consulate in the Morea," 59.

44 For example, the consulate in Thessaloniki temporarily ceased to operate during the Greek War of Independence. Frary, "Russian Interest," 19. And the Russian embassy in Constantinople was also suspended for similar reasons in July 1821 with the departure of Baron Stroganov from the Ottoman capital. Арш, Виноградов, Достян, *Международные отношения на Балканах 1815–1830*, 147.

45 There were usually four leading positions at the Ottoman imperial level. In addition to the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the offices of Imperial Dragoman and Naval Dragoman were also held by Phanariotes. At lower levels, the Greek-born elite was active in many other areas, for example in the economy or the Balkan Orthodox Church. Philliou, "Communities on the Verge," 155.

46 In the second half of the eighteenth century, parallel to the growth of Russian influence, another, contradictory process can be observed. During the same period in which the Phanariot elite became a partner in cooperating with the Russians, a process of integration took place that involved the Phanariotes even more intensively in the Ottoman state structure by appointing them to key positions. According

government also had ambitious plans to create an independent Greek state. The concept of Catherine the Great and Chancellor Bezborodko was based on the revival of the Byzantine Empire. This would have created a geopolitical entity in the eastern Mediterranean that would have been committed to Russia and could have provided new support for the Russian Empire. The draft also envisaged the partition of the Balkans, with Austria receiving parts of the western Balkans and Russia acquiring the eastern provinces of the peninsula.⁴⁷

Another important means of cooperation with the Greeks was their involvement in Russian economic activity. In addition to the obvious diplomatic representation of Russia, the consular posts established in the Greek territories were given commercial tasks as well. They were given the task of exploring and observing local social, political, and, last but not least, economic conditions.⁴⁸ The opening of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russian commercial shipping created new perspectives in the cooperation with the Greeks, who were experienced in Levantine trade and commerce. The use of the straits gave Russia a strategic advantage, as the Sublime Porte did not guarantee the freedom of navigation on the straits for all states. It was only a prerogative of the leading European powers (i.e. France and Great Britain). Through capitulations, countries with a permit of passage could allow merchants belonging to other nations to sail under their flags. This was the typical case in the Russian-Greek relationship, as the economic advantages that Russia had gained could be used in a spirit of mutual cooperation. It was a tool in the hands of Russian diplomacy that provided St. Petersburg a stable backdrop to shape the volume of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia considered the rights set out in article 11 of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji as obvious, but as a result of negotiations with the Porte, it requested the confirmation of these rights in two conventions over the years. The first such document was the Treaty of Aynalıkavak in 1779, which guaranteed free passage on the Black Sea and through the straits.⁴⁹ The other was a Russian-Turkish trade agreement in 1783, which guaranteed the unrestricted commercial use of the straits to the Russian

to Christine Philliou, however, this was an instinctive process, and not a consciously organized central integration policy on the part of the Porte. See Philliou, “Communities on the Verge,” 153–54.

47 Djuvara, *Türk İmparatorluğunun Paylaşılması*, 255–79.

48 Prousis, “A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian Consuls,” 515.

49 Сперанский, *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи XX*, 800–5; Санин, “Проблема Черноморских проливов,” 75–76.

Empire.⁵⁰ These two documents solidified the conditions of Russian trade in the Mediterranean and the results of the peace treaty of 1774. On this basis, it was common practice from the 1780s onwards for Greek merchant ships to transport their cargo under the Russian flag on the routes linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.⁵¹ Information on local conditions and economic developments was not only relayed by the consuls, but also by the embassy in Constantinople, which had its own department on trade.⁵² The Russian trade network built up in the Mediterranean through the involvement of people of Balkan origin (mostly Greeks) could not have functioned without the consular network.⁵³ This is where the importance of Russia's right to establish consulates throughout the Ottoman Empire comes into play, and alongside the Balkans and the Black Sea area, which were immensely important because of their geopolitical proximity, the Middle East (Alexandria, Beirut, Aleppo) also had a prominent place in this process. In economic terms, this Mediterranean network extended as far as Marseilles.⁵⁴ Russian diplomacy usually employed people who were fluent in the languages of the Mediterranean and well-versed in Ottoman social culture and the workings of Ottoman institutions.⁵⁵ This also led to closer relations between St. Petersburg and the Greeks.

The development of cultural and political ties with the Serbs, which had a tradition dating back to the decades before the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, was another key point in Russian-Balkan relations. Among the Balkan nations, the Serbs had the strongest connection to the Russians. This connection was based on common faith and their Slavic origins. In the 1790s, national resistance among the Serbs suggested to the Porte that there was a need to reform the internal relations of the Belgrade Pashalik. This growing attachment to notions of national independence among the Serbs led to the first Serbian uprising at the turn of the century as a result of the inaction (or rather inertia) of the

50 Harlaftis, "A History of Greek-Owned Shipping," 6; Kardasis, "Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea," 109. This put Russia in a privileged position compared to other states. A similar analytical work, but regarding Eurasia, is Romaniello's monograph, which provides an excellent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Anglo-Russian economic cooperation in which British diplomacy and business sought to use Russia's regional position and its relations with the surrounding nations and states to consolidate its own influence in the region. See Romaniello, *Enterprising Empires*.

51 Harlaftis, "A History of Greek-Owned Shipping," 27.

52 Prousis, "A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian Consuls," 515.

53 *Ibid.*, 516.

54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*

Ottoman central government. In this context, the attitude of Russian foreign policy is of great interest, as they maintained their commitment to the Serb cause in principle and their solidarity with the movement, but they refrained from providing any specific political or military support.⁵⁶ Russian foreign policy was strongly influenced by its involvement in the French Revolutionary Wars from 1798 (and the Napoleonic wars from 1800), and the method that was applied after 1774 changed in many respects. After the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, Russian foreign policy towards the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire was divided into two main strands, each of which had different objectives.

The aim of the first was to maximize territorial gains while increasing political and economic influence. This phase lasted until 1774–1792, when the Treaty of Iași ended the Second Turkish War of Catherine II. From this point onwards, the original objective (rational but intensive expansion) was transformed, and the aim then was to consolidate the acquired positions and create stability there. Thus, after Iași, the Russian government concentrated on the pacification of the newly acquired territories and their incorporation into the empire. This Russian policy of consolidation was disrupted by the emergence of Girondian France in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, which posed a direct threat to Ottoman integrity and Russian influence in the area. This became especially clear after the invasion of the Ionian Islands and the advance of French forces into Montenegro. Hence, the role of Serbia and Montenegro increased greatly.

Regarding Serbian-Russian relations, the government of St. Petersburg sought to preserve good relations and avoid the French orientation of the Belgrade Pashalik, while it was unable to provide any genuine diplomatic or military support to the provisional government led by Karadjordje (George Petrović), since, precisely because of the French threat in the Balkans, Russia had to maintain peace with the Porte. As a result, Russian-Serbian relations were unstable in the late 1790s and early 1800s, and no permanent diplomatic presence was established. In Serbia, this happened much later, although it is true that the Russian protectorate in the strict political sense was guaranteed for St. Petersburg by the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), and the consulate was opened in Belgrade in 1838.⁵⁷

56 Bíró, “A modern szerb államiság,” 75. For Russian-Serbian relations, see Попов, *Россия и Сербия*.

57 Bataković, *The Foreign Policy of Serbia*, 91.

However, there were Russian missions and delegations to Serbia,⁵⁸ which temporarily fulfilled this role, and during the uprising, the Russian Foreign Ministry⁵⁹ received delegations representing the Serbian provisional government. Thus, official contacts between the two sides did exist, but there was no permanent Russian presence on Serbian territory during the period under examination. This may have been due to the fact that, economically, the Serbian region was a peripheral area compared to the Danubian Principalities and the Greek islands, and the use of periodic missions that had been customary in the past was sufficient for political contacts.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the lack of consular representation may also have been justified by the fact that, in the unstable European political climate, Russia did not want to make such a serious gesture to a Balkan province that had rebelled against the Porte, since it would be interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and could lead to an open confrontation between the governments of St. Petersburg and Constantinople (and even Vienna, which considered this region its own “frontier”) at a time when Russia’s main priority was to hold its ground on the European front.

The situation was different in Montenegro, where Russian foreign policy had other scopes and priorities. Relations with the Western Balkans were not particularly at the forefront of Russia’s concerns anyway, and Austria also had a strong influence in the region. On the whole, however, the Western Balkans were not excluded from the process of building a consular system, as Russia established a consulate in Kotor in 1804. Relations between Russia and Montenegro were complicated before 1774. The Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774 was also associated with the need for closer cooperation with Montenegro, which simultaneously created a curious situation between the current prince, Šćepan Mali, and the Russian government. The figure of Šćepan Mali was problematic for St. Petersburg, since he had managed to gain support in Montenegro by impersonating Peter III. Although the phenomenon of the “false tsar” was not uncommon in Russian history, it was a particularly sensitive moment for Catherine II, who had come to power through a palace revolution against her husband Peter III. At the same time, cooperation with Šćepan Mali could have provided a new ally in the war against the Porte, so the Russian

58 For example, the missions of Konstantin Rodofnikin or Filippo Paulucci. See Bíró, “A modern szerb államiság,” 76–77.

59 Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*, 24–25.

60 Арш, Виноградов, Джападзе, Достян, *Международные отношения*, 90.

government initiated negotiations headed by Prince Dolgoruki in Cetinje.⁶¹ Although there were uncertainties about Russian-Montenegrin relations in this period, Russian diplomacy viewed Montenegro as a serious strategic partner in the Western Balkans, capable of counterbalancing the power of Venice and the Ottoman Empire.⁶²

Even so, the Russian presence was more moderate here than in the Eastern Balkan provinces, although the St. Petersburg cabinet considered it important to establish its political and cultural influence in the region. Moreover, the attitude of the Principality of Montenegro towards the Russian Empire was basically positive (especially in the ecclesiastical sphere). There was always some form of contact between the two nations, and information on the situation in the Western Balkans was regularly received from Montenegro and used by Russian diplomacy.⁶³ Russia usually represented itself in the Principality through temporary diplomatic and military missions.⁶⁴ This was also true in the 1780s and 1800s, when the Adriatic coast underwent several changes as the region became the target of French foreign political ambitions. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792, Russia sent several envoys to the region to forge an anti-Turkish alliance between northern Albania and Montenegro to support the Austro-Russian alliance in the Balkans.⁶⁵ The situation was quite complex, since the principality itself was part of the Ottoman Empire, and the smaller coastal part (and the Bay of Kotor) was under the jurisdiction of the Venetian Republic. However, the French Revolutionary Wars led to a change of authority. Venetian power was replaced by Austria in 1797, while Russia began to attach greater importance to the Western Balkans, which by the early nineteenth century was considered part of the Mediterranean sphere of influence of the Russian Empire.⁶⁶ The Russian Foreign Ministry decided in this milieu to open a diplomatic mission in Kotor that year. However, there are some differences from previous consulate openings. The newest Balkan consulate, for example, was not opened in Ottoman territory. This was a distinctive situation because, as already noted, the Russian consuls adapted to the challenges of the Ottoman political and administrative system by involving and making use of the knowledge of the

61 *Recueil Consulaire Contenant les Rapports*, 171; Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, 210.

62 As Petrovich's work shows: Петровић, *Степан Малый – загадка истории*. For its part, Montenegro made serious efforts on Russia's side in the war. See Хитрова, "Черногорцы в России," 77–78.

63 Аншаков, "Российские эмиссары в Черногории," 3;

64 *Ibid.*, 4.

65 *Ibid.*, 10.

66 Schrek and Demeter, "Adam Czartoryski Balkán-koncepciói," 91.

local people. The same principle would of course have been justified in the case of Montenegro, but the city chosen for the consulate (the strategic and commercial importance of which was undeniable) was in Austrian hands after 1797 (the collapse of the Venetian rule), so it was not enough for Russian diplomacy to adapt to the Ottoman system of relations in the case of Montenegro. Russia also had to communicate with the Austrian Empire about the establishment of a diplomatic representation. Besides the special situation of Montenegro, it also had a strong leader, Petar Njegoš, who was able to build up his power partly with the help of Russian subsidies⁶⁷ and whose official approval was important for the opening of the Russian Consular Office. In May 1804, under the leadership of A. Mazurevsky, the diplomatic mission was finally opened.⁶⁸

Another key element of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was the right of the Russian tsar to protect the Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire, which was also laid down in this agreement. The “authority” acquired at this time was not unprecedented, as the Porte had already conceded to such requests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through capitulations concluded with other states,⁶⁹ thus allowing for the development of the so-called *protégé system*. At the same time, the Russian government took the protection of Christians under the jurisdiction of the Porte to a new level and made it an integral part of its foreign policy towards the Balkans.

During the eighteenth century, the *protégé system* became an integral part of the European diplomatic missions established in the Ottoman Empire. However, it is important to draw a distinction between the protection needs and rights that applied to individuals and communities. The representatives of the leading European states delegated to the Porte had diplomatic prerogatives granted by international law from the outset, which were supplemented over time in their dealings with the Porte by the privileges granted in the capitulations mentioned

67 Csaplár-Degovics, “Az albán nemzetállam,” 14.

68 Russia already had an active diplomatic presence in Kotor before the arrival of Mazurevsky, as the government of St. Petersburg had delegated Marcus Ivelich to Montenegro as part of a special mission, but his activities had a rather negative impact on Prince Petar Njegoš and his circle of supporters. See Распопович, “Российское консульство в Которе,” 5–8.

69 France was originally granted protectorate rights over Catholics in the Ottoman Empire in 1740, and, as a sign of reconciliation between the French and Ottoman governments, these rights were later reaffirmed during the Napoleonic Wars in 1802. Demeter, *Balkán kronológia*, vol. 1, 49; Shopoff, *Les réformes et la protection des chrétiens*, 5–8.

earlier.⁷⁰ Residents with a diverse local network of contacts and a wide range of language skills were given a prominent role in the activities of the missions, helping diplomats, consuls, and other Foreign Service representatives in other statuses. The diplomats could give local residents a mandate which allowed the transfer of privileges that came with the diplomatic service. In general, the persons concerned were non-Muslim residents of the Ottoman Empire who were also engaged in trade and were granted these privileges⁷¹ in the form of a specific type of document, the so-called *berat*.⁷² It is important, however, to clarify the definition with regard to the protégé system. A distinction must be drawn between the terms protégé and protectorate, which are similar and, in a sense, related but not entirely overlapping. In essence, the protection or rather the exceptional circumstances outlined above (as protégé) emerged at the level of practical diplomacy as a key instrument with which to gain local influence. Therefore, it is not the same as the ideological role of protection at the level of great politics. However, these concepts were not separable, since the protégé was an early, individualized and extended form of the protectorate, which did not think in terms of communities but in terms of protecting individuals. Of course, from a diplomatic point of view, the question of who was worthy of receiving a *berat* and what that person had to accomplish in order to get one from a foreign country was very subjective, and the individualized protégé system created many opportunities for misuse. In addition to diplomatic immunity, the persons who held the *berat* (the “*beratlı*”) also enjoyed customs exemptions, which again opened the door to misuse and corruption.⁷³ Most of the dragomans and agents employed by the consuls were engaged in commercial activities and bought the documents guaranteeing national tax exemption for large sums of money. These merchants carried out a significant part of the trade in the Mediterranean, and so the use of the protégé system was of particular importance for the great powers, including Russia, as it was the basis for the most important economic links of Russian diplomacy.⁷⁴ However,

70 For the capitulations of Austria and the privileges deriving from it, see Schopoff, *Les réformes et la protection des chrétiens*, 4; Thallóczy, *Utazás a Levántéban*, 93.

71 As citizens under foreign protection, they did not have to pay the internal customs in each province, which was a great advantage. They were also exempted from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman legal system.

72 Sonyel, “The Protégé System,” 57–58. Schopoff, *Les réformes et la protection des chrétiens*.

73 Sonyel, “The Protégé System,” 58. The diplomatic reforms of Selim III attempted to clarify the situation, which severely limited the number of *beratlı* officially employable by the consuls and regulated their operations. Naff, *Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy*, 301–2. However, it is another matter that the government’s efforts were largely unsuccessful.

74 Prousis, *British Consular Reports*, 18.

the method was not only important with regard to maritime and inland trade with the Middle East and Anatolia, but also for the Eastern Balkan region, as the use of *berats* was also common in the Danubian Principalities, although we have no information on the extent to which Russia used the method there.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, the claim of protection over individuals evolved into a right over collectives. Although Russia was not the only power to entertain this ambition, it was Russia that used the idea and “institution” of the protectorate most deliberately to shape its relations with the Ottoman Empire. A key rhetorical and political element of the rapprochement towards the nations in the Balkans was the emphasis on belonging together on the basis of denominational and cultural ties.⁷⁶ Peter the Great had already taken upon himself the role of defender of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans in the Russo-Turkish War (1710–1711), which was part of the Great Northern War (1700–1721). In April 1711, the tsar issued an appeal in which, based on the Orthodox religious community, he sought to establish cooperation with the nations in the Balkans, in this case the Danubian Principalities. But a similar methodology can also be observed in the same period in the case of the Western Balkan province of Montenegro, where a Russian delegation arrived in July 1711 in the hopes of organizing joint action against the Ottomans.⁷⁷ The two appeals were successful, yet both ended in failure against the Ottoman army. Nevertheless, the use of this method was an important element in relations between the Balkan nations and Russia, as it essentially set a precedent in the methodology of building alliances with the Balkans. The call on (Balkan) Christians in the Ottoman Empire for a joint action became a motif used frequently in the subsequent Russo-Turkish wars.⁷⁸ At the same time, in the conflicts between the two empires (Russia and the Porte), which were competing in a common geopolitical space, Russian diplomacy consistently sought to gain protectorate rights over the Christians.

75 There is controversial information in the literature on the number of *berats*. One reason for this is that the use of *berats* is commonly viewed from the perspective of Western European countries without Eastern European states. However, where Austria and Russia appear in the context of the protégé system, the number of issued *berats* is highly disputed. While France and Great Britain provided figures in the hundreds on the whole, Russia and Austria reported figures in the hundreds of thousands in the Danubian Principalities alone, which seems unrealistic. Thus, the number of *berats* issued for the Russian diplomatic service cannot really be quantified for sure. For instance: Prousis, *British Consular Reports*, 20; Artuç, “The Price of Legal Institutions,” 727; Naff, *Ottoman Diplomatic Relations*, 103.

76 Sashalmi, “Az orosz Balkán-politika vallási gyökereinek kérdéséhez,” 42–44.

77 Ibid., 45–46; Demeter, *Balkán kronológia*, vol. 1, 10.

78 Vovchenko, “Russian Messianism in the Christian East,” 40.

This was also the case during the Niš/Belgrade peace negotiations, which brought the Russo-Turkish War of 1736–1739 to a close and which were unsuccessful in this respect. The Russian government, which saw the end of the war as a failure, was unsatisfied with the results. The Porte had not given the tsar the authority he had aspired to establish, and the Habsburg Emperor was able to assume the role of protector of Christians (non-Orthodox Christians) in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹ Similar rights were also enjoyed by other European states in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century, but the other states were typically less likely to take advantage of this in practice.⁸⁰ Russia finally gained this right in 1774 and, combined with the right to build Orthodox churches, it resulted in a well-constructed cultural diplomacy.

The pursuit of a protective role, territorial gains, and the extension of power/political influence against the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea region (and the Balkan Peninsula, especially in the Eastern Balkans) became a permanent feature of Russian foreign policy. The Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, which in itself determined these Russian ambitions, also fit into this pattern. The emphasis on religious cooperation, solidarity, and protection was the foundation, in principle and in practice, of Russian foreign policy after 1774.

In conclusion, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was a real turning point in Russian foreign policy, providing the St. Petersburg government with several advantages in asserting its geopolitical interests in general. The treaty also introduced a new approach to diplomacy and, more importantly, to the practice of diplomacy, ushering in a new era in Russia's relations with the Porte and the Balkan provinces. I have highlighted in this essay the new measures that the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji provided for Russia. The establishment and development of foreign missions (i.e. official representations in Constantinople) and the formation of cooperation with the Balkan territories (i.e. consulates in the Ottoman provinces) were the most important part of the expansion of the diplomatic toolbox. A change in diplomatic protocol occurred in 1774 in the case of the Russian envoy in Constantinople, and the possibility of establishing a Russian consulate system in the Ottoman lands became a reality. The diplomatic

79 Demeter, *Balkán kronológia*, vol. 1, 21–22; Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 4.

80 The Porte itself did not completely abandon the demands of the protectorate by the Great Powers, which sought to influence the minorities within the Empire. On the contrary, the government in Constantinople also tried to form a counter-pole, although with less success, claiming similar rights over territories with mixed populations, such as the Muslim minorities belonging to the Russian Empire or the British Empire. Sonyel, "The Protégé System," 60–61.

networks established in the Balkans (especially in the Eastern Balkan region) and the opening of consulates in the Danubian Principalities and Greece were examples of this. The results of the formal diplomatic missions were slow and gradual, but their main significance lay in the fact that Russia was able to raise its political and cultural relations with the Balkan nations to a new (now official instead of informal) level. In the long term, this made it possible for Russia to integrate itself into the Mediterranean political and economic structure.

The so-called *protégé* system also played a decisive role in the transformation of Russian diplomatic practice, the main purpose of which was to provide a network of contacts to support the work of the diplomatic missions and to create a kind of information background through the diplomatic privileges granted to members of the local population by the *berats*. This was followed by the right of the Russian tsar to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Although the protectorate acquired in 1774 did not gain significance until the nineteenth century, when nationalist movements began to flourish in the Balkans, its acquisition was of the utmost importance, as it fulfilled an aspiration that Russian diplomacy had had since the early eighteenth century and provided a kind of continuity between the ideals and goals of Russian foreign policy before and after 1774. Indeed, the hitherto fervently-sought right of patronage became an effective diplomatic instrument after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, the value and importance of which are reflected in the new European order after the Congress of Vienna (1815), in an international system in which the Russian Empire repositioned itself as the leading power not only in Eastern and Southeastern Europe but on the entire continent.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ringen um den einen Gott. Eine politische Geschichte des Antitrinitarismus in Siebenbürgen im 16. Jahrhundert. By Edit Szegedi. Refo500 Academic Studies 95. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2023. 276 pp.

From the perspective of religion, early modern Transylvania was a diverse corner of Europe. Many of the most radical thinkers of the Reformation took refuge here for a time, and their ideas could be characterized as harbingers of some of the principles of the Enlightenment. It is therefore a bit surprising that no work has yet been written, in Hungarian or in any other language, that offers a comprehensive overview of the religious situation in early modern Transylvania. Comparatively detailed works have been written on the religious thought and debate in Transylvania in the 1560s and 1570s, however, at the moment there is nothing available that covers the whole period. The book under review here also does not promise anything this ambitious. Edit Szegedi (senior lecturer at the faculty of European Studies at Babeş-Bolyai University) is very clear about her intention. She has written a political history of early modern Transylvanian Antitrinitarianism, though admittedly what she means by this precisely remains a bit unclear throughout her discussion. The book is a compilation of essays that were written separately, but it is structured in thematically coherent chapters. The primary focus is the mutual relationship between the Antitrinitarians and the secular authorities and the church politics of the last four decades of the sixteenth century. Szegedi explores this relationship from a variety of perspectives, the most obvious of which is the relevant legal measures that were taken, but she also considers her subject from the viewpoints of urban history, and she includes biographical sections, discussion of theological issues, the history of certain trials, and issues involving church organization. She seems primarily interested in the impact of ideas and theological experimentation on social life, but she also touches on the paradoxes of the religious situation in Transylvania. She points out, for instance, that while the theological ideas espoused by the Transylvanian trinitarians completely upended the earlier traditions on which religious life rested and were more radical than the ideas put forward by Reformation thinkers in any other region of Europe, in everyday life, everything continued largely as usual, in the cities and in the villages. The religious changes brought about little in the way of visible change in people's lifestyles, and they did not subvert the social or

political order. The center of the Transylvanian Reformation, which was initially Brassó (or Kronstadt by its German name; today Braşov, Romania) and later became Kolozsvár (or Klausenburg by its German name; today Cluj-Napoca, Romania), was far from being a second Münster or even from being seen by later generations as a second Geneva. As one example of the adherence to old customs, one could mention the fact that witch trials continued uninterrupted even during the period when “rational theology” was in a position of power, a situation which seems paradoxical to Szegedi.

In the preface, Szegedi invites us to explore the world which has captured her interest, introducing us to the topic and unraveling her investigations.

The first chapter is a history of the Reformation from an urban history perspective. Szegedi guides her reader through the city of Brassó, explaining the power structures and the emergence and spread of Antitrinitarian ideas. She identifies the considerations and motives behind the arguably eclectic array of religious ideas that the Reformation brought to the city of Brassó and, more broadly, Transylvania. According to Szegedi, behind the delay in the emergence of distinct denominations lay an anxious desire to restore the unity of Christianity as a whole (and not just Western Christianity). The boundaries remained essentially undefined until the parties to the religious debate (of which the Antitrinitarians were the last) realized that denial of the Trinity was a red line that Trinitarian Christians would not cross in the interests of unity.

In the second chapter, Szegedi approaches the history of the Transylvanian Reformation through the life of a central figure, Ferenc Dávid. Dávid, who was the first bishop of the Antitrinitarians, was a believer in the notion of the continuous reform of the Church (or “*ecclesia semper reformanda*”). The theological changes and “innovations” that he introduced offer a kind of arc of the history of the Transylvanian Reformation. The perspective shifts over the course of the chapter, with the focus often changing from Dávid to Kolozsvár, which emerged as the new center of the Transylvanian Reformation, and the relationship among the Transylvanian nations (the Hungarian nobility, the Székelys, and the Saxons) in matters of church politics and power.

In the third chapter, Szegedi presents a more complex picture than those offered in the first two. She gives a sketch of the events that took place over the course of the two decades after Dávid’s death up to the turn of the century. The question she is addressing is the development or stagnation of Antitrinitarianism. Szegedi presents the relationship of the Antitrinitarian leaders to tradition, their view of history, and strategies they used in order to assert their legitimacy. She

also examines changes in the balance of power among the denominations and in the church policy of the court, and she considers the reasons for these changes until the return of the Jesuits to the stage of religious life in the region.

In the fourth chapter, Szegedi addresses the legal statuses of different denominations. She analyses the texts of the various resolutions of the Transylvanian Diet touching on religious matters between 1566 and 1595, and she considers not only the distinctive features of the wording but also the omissions and the failure to mention certain names. Building on this, she maps the place and legal weight of the unnamed and missing religious churches among the established churches in Transylvania. On the basis of her discussion of the sources, Szegedi concludes that the Antitrinitarians were not named or given the status of a “*recepta religio*” in the laws when they were at their strongest and had the most influence on the power in the principality, but rather precisely when they were suffering the most restrictive pressures (1594–95). She also explains that the familiar and often mentioned legislation of 1568–71 was not a celebration of diversity or was a proclamation of equality among the denominations. Rather, it was an attempt to create the necessary conditions for peaceful coexistence. This chapter is the second in the book which touches on the trial of Ferenc Dávid, not from a historical perspective, but rather with a detailed presentation of each side’s position. Szegedi notes that the outcome of the trial was not a favorable or desired outcome, neither for the prince nor for the Antitrinitarians who opposed Dávid. It was, rather, the result of the demands of the Calvinists in the region known as Partium, which lies roughly to the west of Transylvania. The prince, however, took advantage of the situation. In exchange for this gesture in support of the Calvinists and Dávid’s Antitrinitarian opponents, he invited the Jesuits to come to Transylvania.

The last chapter is also the epilogue of the book. In this chapter, Szegedi leaps roughly a decade forward and discusses church politics in Transylvania in the 1610s, focusing on the conflicts between Prince Gábor Báthory and the Antitrinitarian council of Kolozsvár. As in the first half of the book, she approaches the events from the perspective of urban history, and her research shows the connection between Báthory’s church politics and the ecclesiastical policies of the princes who followed him. Although Báthory failed in his efforts to limit the rights of the Antitrinitarians in Kolozsvár, he nonetheless offered a kind of a model for the princes who came in his wake. He showed how to dismantle religious order in Transylvania and how to use the accusation of Judaization as a means of suppressing the Antitrinitarians.

Regrettably, the book does not offer, as a conclusion, any summary of Szegedi's findings, much as it also does not offer any reflections concerning the research she has done or the questions answered or left open. Similarly, the book lacks structural and methodological coherence and consistency. It is not entirely clear, exactly how the chapters are intended to relate to one another, and in the individual chapters Szegedi alternates between descriptive and analytical approaches without much reflection on her methods. The Hungarian secondary literature on the history of ideas often interweaves historical narrative with biographical passages, textual analyses, urban history, and reflections on legal and theological issues. In the case of Szegedi's undertaking, this sometimes clouds her narrative and makes it difficult to follow the main question and line of argument.

One also cannot help but notice the lack of editing. I am thinking not of grammatical mistakes or stylistic issues, but rather of issues as mundane but significant as correcting typos and punctuation. More thorough editorial work should also have been done to address the inconsistencies in the uses of personal and place names. From a terminological point of view, Szegedi is cautious and reflective, but several important ambiguities remain unaddressed. What precisely does she mean, for instance, by the term "Protestant," and who belongs to this category? And why does she not consider the Sabbatarians to have been Antitrinitarians?

Szegedi has a thorough knowledge of the secondary literature, but she tends to rely on the works of older, more widely known authors and seems to be less familiar with or at least draws considerably less on the findings of more recent research (for example, she makes no mention of the works of Borbála Lovas or Dávid Molnár, and even Lech Szczucki, who represents the older generation on the international scene and wrote seminal works on the subject, is also missing from the bibliography).

These shortcomings, however, are outweighed by the book's many merits. Szegedi's academic interests (relations among national minorities and questions of identity construction) and her own cultural background as someone who arguably belongs to several minorities and has an intimate knowledge of several languages make her the perfect person to address this topic with adequate sensitivity and minimal bias. Her strengths as someone with the necessary linguistic and cultural knowledge is clear both in the superb use of language in the book and also, for instance, in her knowledge of the Romanian secondary literature and her decisions with regards to the language used in the case of

place names. Her insistence on subtle, penetrating reflection is also clear in her discussion of ecclesiastical issues, as she refuses merely to follow or echo the narrative of the Transylvanian Reformation as a history of salvation, which traces an allegedly “praiseworthy” path of ideological development and modernity from Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Antitrinitarianism to the Enlightenment. Her comments offer evidence of her impartiality. She notes, in the main text, that she supports neither the positions of the established churches, which condemned the “godless” heretics, nor the views of the opposing side, since both sides showed contempt and scorn for each other.

The book’s greatest merit is that it offers a highly readable presentation to an international readership of a topic on which there is relatively little secondary literature available in English or German. It clears up some of the confusion surrounding stereotypes that have lingered long in the public mind, such as notions of religious tolerance in Transylvania or ideas concerning the trial of Ferenc Dávid and draws attention to the findings in the secondary literature. Many sources are quoted at length and translated (except for those in Latin, which also should have been translated to ensure that the book remains accessible to the widest possible readership), thus helping historians and scholars who do not read Hungarian pursue further research.

Although Szegedi does not rely on her own primary research from a theological and intellectual-historical point of view, she is very much able to offer a long-term perspective and summarize the findings of the secondary literature. She is able to synthesize complex phenomena and connections without getting lost in the details. Moreover, with this book, she has shown that she is able to incorporate the results of her own primary research in the fields of church policy and law into the study of the religious situation in Transylvania and the history of Antitrinitarianism.

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Rendi ellenzék és kormánypárt az 1751. évi országgyűlésen
[The opposition and the governing party at the 1751 Diet]. By János Nagy. Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára–Mika Sándor Egyesület, 2020. 584 pp.

The history of the 1751 Diet is hardly one of the least researched or most neglected topics in Hungarian historiography, the new monograph by János Nagy is nonetheless a unique undertaking. It is the first historical work since János Rozgonyi's mini-monograph published in 1944 to focus specifically on the 1751 Diet, but more importantly, it adopts a complex approach to the subject. Nagy sets out to reinterpret the history of this important eighteenth-century Diet in the context of a joint intersection of several historical sub-disciplines, each of which is complete in itself. Overall, the main virtue of the work—in addition to the thoroughness of the analyses, the detailed presentation of the contexts, and the extensive use of sources—is the consistent, simultaneous application of three main analytical perspectives.

One of the main approaches used by Nagy is political historical analysis (p.11), which is not, however, merely a reconstruction of the course of the debates on the issues discussed during the diet. Although the book also includes numerous new findings on this latter subject, perhaps more important is the identification of regionally specific patterns of political behavior that can be discerned during the *tractatus diaetalis*, the political bargaining process between the ruler and the estates, and the resulting sketch of a kind of political map of the country (chief counties, pro-government counties, swing counties, and opposition counties). Equally important parts of the analysis include the discussion of the relationship between the county deputies and other parliamentary groups (upper house, clergy, absentee envoys).

Nagy focuses his analysis on the group of county deputies. This choice of focus is well founded in social history, since in recent decades the secondary literature (first and foremost and in the greatest depth István M. Szijártó) has thoroughly discussed the process that took place in the mid-eighteenth century, during which the prosperous landowning (*bene possessionatus*) gentry became a dominant power factor in the counties and then on the main stage of “national” politics, in the arena of the diet. In essence, this meant the emancipation of the lesser nobility from the aristocracy in the counties, i.e., the dissolution of the early modern system of patron-client relations and, within the institutional system of the diet, it resulted in the dominance of the lower house over the

upper house. Nagy's analysis convincingly demonstrates that these processes had already clearly determined the balance of political power in favor of the lower table and the prosperous landowning gentry by the diet of 1751.

The main thematic "densifications" of the diet, which are given particular attention (and in most cases a separate chapter) in the political historical sections of the volume, are the election of the palatine, the debates concerning the regulation of trade and customs, the question of taxation, the annexation of the new free royal cities, and the debate concerning the new indigenates. In reconstructing the history of the 1751 Diet and identifying the main stages, junctures, and turning points in the debates on these subjects, the volume presents a respectable body of research. Moreover, in several debates, Nagy succeeds in refining the findings in the literature to date by identifying the most active participants in the debates. This is a remarkable achievement, since the eighteenth-century parliamentary diaries are not, for the most part, verbatim records of the debates but rather only summaries of their contents, which rarely included the identity of the contributors.

Based on analyses of the history of the debates, Nagy modifies the findings of previous research in several cases. With regards to the debate on serfdom, Nagy corrects the narrative rooted in the literature according to which the demand for a general settlement of the serf question was almost exclusively linked to the government and its enlightened turn in the 1760s. As he shows, the issue of the *úrbér* had already been raised in the 1751 Diet, precisely by the opposition in the lower house, some of whom raised the possibility of a parliamentary settlement of the burdens of the serfs as a kind of "ultima ratio" in the debate on the tax increase in order to lighten the tax base, i.e., to make it easier to pay the higher taxes asked by the ruler (pp.158–160). In the case of other issues with modernizing aspects raised and/or supported at least partly by county deputies during the discussions at the Diet (such as river regulation, trade, and education), the analyses also illustrate that the rigid application of the binary model, which unilaterally links the conservative attitude to the estates and the modernizing attitude to the government, sometimes oversimplifies the real complexity and potential ambiguity of the past. Perhaps the most valuable parts of the volume in this regard are those that capture precisely this complexity through meticulous, "down-to-earth" analyses.

The other important approach of the book is a social-historical perspective. The chapters on typical trajectories and social strategies, which are representative of particular groups and individuals selected from the Diet, show that there

were long-term trends and patterns of public action not only at the regional and county levels, but also within the public action patterns of individual families and individuals.

Finally, the third approach, which is treated as equal to the others, is the discursive analysis of the parliamentary debates. By focusing on the use of concepts, modes of argumentation, and political languages, Nagy explores the linguistic-rhetorical toolbox used by the participants in the parliamentary debates. He shows that the main rhetorical weapon used by politicians linked to the government was the appeal to the common good and the needs of the ruler, while members of the opposition mainly used elements linked to classical republicanism and arguments of the rhetoric of grievances. He also places great emphasis on the analysis of the parliamentary pasquils, a group of sources that he uses primarily to reconstruct the self-image of the estates. In the course of his analyses, he also points out that political languages were usually used not in pure forms, but rather in mixed variants. In this respect, it should be noted that the metaphor of mixing, which is often used in recent Hungarian intellectual history in connection with the description of political languages and which can be traced back to John G. A. Pocock's methodological writings on political languages, is somewhat misleading, since it presupposes that the pure, consistent, therefore ideal forms of the political languages (primarily used by Pocock as heuristic tools of analysis) are observable on the level of real, existing political discourses.

The complex approach used in the book, i.e., the detailed examination of a given, well-defined "event" (in this case, the 1751 Diet) as an object of study from several perspectives, has the advantage of allowing the validation of several aspects at the same time, which gives us a complex picture of the object under study. This allows new contexts to emerge that have not been explored in previous research. Tangible examples of this can be found in the book, both at the level of the details and at the level of the overall picture and in terms of the interrelationships between aspects that have not been researched/discussed in such detail before. It is partly due to this complex approach that Nagy successfully carries out the task he undertook in his work, namely, to examine the diet not in its abstract institutional structure, but in operation, adopting the approach of István Szijártó's long-term project on the eighteenth-century history of the Diet.

In doing so, Nagy successfully eliminates the biases and normative elements of earlier interpretations and transcends traditional historical narratives built primarily on the national-independence *versus* Habsburg-imperial colonialism and privilege-fearing narrowness *versus* socially just, "progressivist" pairs of

opposites. Of course, this is obviously also possible because, first, he can build on the intellectual tools and findings of the more current research on the history of the diet (above all the research of István M. Szijártó) and, second, the issues related to the eighteenth-century diets and, more broadly, to the political struggles between the estates in Hungary and the Habsburg central power are no longer of direct relevance to the political and social debates of the present. This latter circumstance does not mean, however, that contemporary research on the early modern Diet is not at all motivated by tendencies in the present. One such international trend is to interpret early modern diets as the forerunners of modern parliamentarism and as the seeds of the modern representative system. János Nagy's monograph explicitly resonates with this trend, but at the same time, it seeks primarily to provide a picture of the parliament that is as close as possible to the interpretative framework of the contemporary actors and the interests and principles that drove them.

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Remarriage and Stepfamilies in East Central Europe, 1600–1900. Edited by Gabriella Erdélyi and András Péter Szabó. (Routledge Research in Early Modern History. New York, NY: Routledge, 2023. 364 pp.

The final volume of the project of the “Integrated Families” Research Group, which was established over the course of the past five years and has resulted in the creation of an international network linked institutionally to the Institute of History in Budapest, is partly a summary of the findings so far and partly a synthesis with a macro-regional ambition. The research group analyzes two specific sub-themes of family history, remarriage, and the functioning of stepfamilies in the period between 1600 and 1900. The East Central European region (i.e., the pre-partition Kingdom of Poland, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Hungary with Transylvania, and the Romanian principalities bordering the latter from the east, i.e., Moldova and the Lowlands of Havas) was chosen as the geographical framework of the investigation. The region is usually defined as a transitional space between Western Europe and the Eastern world, which is interesting for the community of historians in part because of its ethnic, linguistic, religious, social, and demographic features (especially in terms of early modern and modern immigration, emigration, and internal migration). With this in mind, the two editors, Gabriella Erdélyi and András Szabó, have made a claim for the international relevance of the volume, which consists of introductory essays and two case studies.

Gabriella Erdélyi’s introductory study provides a summary of the following chapters, highlighting the overlaps among the authors’ findings. Erdélyi also reflects on the dual nature of the volume. The first section uses the methods of historical demography and tackle broader structural questions. The second part focuses on historical anthropological issues and places much greater emphasis on the agency of individuals and small groups. Rather than expecting to find contradictions in this (p. 4), one can see a simple methodological peculiarity. The larger scale obscures subtle differences, i.e., transforms them into averages and thus “smooths” them out. Erdélyi’s introduction is obviously neither a conclusive nor an exhaustive synthesis, especially as the research team itself has also presented an array of findings and conclusions not cited in her summary. Since this volume is most likely to be read by researchers from a particular country, region, culture, ethnicity, etc., rather than offer a detailed description of each of the ten studies, I will summarize a few of the conclusions that I found

particularly fascinating, though obviously my choice of focus reflects my own interests.

The series of historical demographic studies opens with Alice Velková's "Inheritance and Stepfamilies in Bohemian Rural Society (1650–1800)." Velková draws on a database with information concerning 16,000 individuals compiled from records of parish registers. Her important findings point to both the elasticity of inheritance patterns and the higher proportion of stepchildren among landowning families. Underlying the demographic data, the family clearly functioned as an economic labor organization. It is thus no surprise that assets such as land and labor were, due to their limited nature, decisive in the family's considering cohabitation and inheritance, which were also structured by the larger economic framework in which they lived (in particular the organizational rules of manorial estates).

Marzena Liedke and Piotr Guzowski's study "Magnate and Noble Stepfamilies in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries" is a legal-historical and historical-demographic study. The data on the noble elite, compiled by genealogical processing, already places in the foreground the question (also raised in the introduction and later in the book) of the extent to which a stepparent's attitude towards a stepchild was (or was not) negative. Obviously, the functionality of the family structure, the efficiency of property management, the methods and aims of childrearing, and strategies of abandonment are not negligible issues when considering a family's approaches to defending its interests.

Árpád Tóth's study "Career Potentials of Stepchildren in the Lutheran Community of Pressburg (Bratislava, Slovakia) 1730–1850" focuses on how the limited resources available to the family were divided between stepchildren and non-stepchildren in a stepfamily. Tóth provides a tangible and measurable basis for differences in the ways in which children and stepchildren were treated, which may reflect different emotional aspects, while the different degrees of talent among the children in a family may also have been a factor, thus making it difficult to arrive at any general "rule." The study also shows that, even in the feudal world (with its many limitations on social mobility), there were families that, as ambitious, wealthy, well-educated elites, could pursue different career strategies.

Péter Őri's study "Orphans and Stepchildren: The Impact of Parental Loss and Parental Remarriage on Children's First Marriages in Zsámbék in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries" is one of the most complex analyses

of historical demographic studies in the volume, using the most curious methodological approach. Óri shows that there was a higher proportion of stepchildren among landowning families, a finding that can be linked to the fact that landowning families may have had an immediate need for stepchildren as a source of labor.

The study by Sándor Lakatos (“Marriage, Widowhood, and Remarriage in the Székely Land (1830–1939)”), which concludes the first section of the volume, is an important contribution to the previous studies but also to the previous research in that it examines the impact of divorce more closely and confirms that remarriage was motivated by both a desire to share the workload and a need to maintain socioeconomic status. Further research on the layers of family relations behind, underneath, or within these larger structures may yet shed light on attitudes towards the self and stepchildren.

In the second part of the volume, analyses on a smaller scale but with a greater density due to the use of ego-documents are presented. Gabriella Erdélyi’s “Mothering Half-Sisters: Maternal Love, Anger and Authority in Early Modern Hungary” explores the emotional games, manipulation, and love language within the family as defined in modern times through the correspondence of a noble woman with her two daughters. The analysis focuses on language, rhetoric, and prestige. The successful and failed attempts to use epistolary language to dominate another person makes this family story, which is almost four centuries old, unique and alive.

Ágnes Máté’s study “Remarriage and Stepfamilies among the Lutheran Urban Elite in Seventeenth-Century Hungary. Neo-Latin Wedding Poetry as Source” analyses the wedding poetry of German bourgeois families as one symptom of the deliberate social isolation of these communities and highlights the importance of keeping alive the memory of the former spouse after remarriage. The study, which is based on sources concerning three different urban communities in the Carpathian Basin (the cities of Lőcse, today Levoča, Brassó, today Braşov, and Sopron), examines the need to replace a lost spouse, while children from previous marriages were not mentioned. It was also a common practice that children from previous marriages did not wish their remarrying father to have children. This would presumably be perceived as an insincere gesture on their part.

András Péter Szabó’s study “Roads to Recomposed Families of the Nobility in Seventeenth-Century Transylvania” analyses widowhood and post-divorce remarriage strategies among the Transylvanian noble elite, a recurring theme in

the volume. On the one hand, the economic motive behind his conclusions is clearly evident: the wealth of someone who had been widowed was a far greater asset from the perspective of family and kinship interests than the (usually) comparatively limited wealth of a bride entering her first marriage.

Andrea Fehér's study "Stepfamily Relations in Autobiographical Writings in Eighteenth-Century Transylvania" counterbalances the more or less stereotypical image of the evil stepmother with the more aggressive, violent stepfather. Of course, the greater position of power may have given greater scope for abuse, but it may be worth considering that the narratives left by the people who wrote memoirs looked back on the whole of their own lives, since the image of the stepmother may have been influenced by self-rescue motives related to later problems in life.

In her study "Her Children to Have as Children of Ours": Stepfamilies in the Romanian Principalities in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," Constanța Vintilă builds on a varied and sizeable source material. In doing so, she introduces the reader to the world of the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and the Great Plain, administered by the Orthodox Church, in which stepfamilies of several social strata are examined. Her sources outline the greater attention paid to widows among the boyars, who had more family wealth. Her study of the normative and powerful role of the Orthodox Church in determining questions of custody of family members points to the narrow space for maneuver of widowed women, in which their modes of expression can be seen more as a survival strategy.

The micro-level studies in *Remarriage and Stepfamilies* explore the family life of culturally diverse peoples living in the Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Romanian states of Central and Eastern Europe, largely along the lines of their social and economic stratification. The many studies provide a nuanced and rich picture of the stepfamilies of the region, while at the same time raising a number of exciting research questions. The book's inclusion in the international family history literature is to be expected, if only because it opens an under-explored region to global historiography.

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Making Sense of Dictatorship: Domination and Everyday Life in East Central Europe after 1945. Edited by Celia Donert, Ana Kladnik, and Martin Sabrow. Budapest: CEU Press, 2022. 296 pp.

On the cover of the book under review here we see children's chalk drawings on Alexanderplatz, East Berlin. This iconic square would remind us of the demonstration of the November 4, 1989, the largest in the history of the GDR. But for the children, the square had a meaning as a large concrete surface to draw on. *Making Sense of Dictatorship: Domination and Everyday Life in East Central Europe after 1945* joins the growing tide of the corpus of works reflecting on the social and cultural history of socialism. The history of everyday life under dictatorships has been widely studied, mainly by Alf Lüdtke and the cohort of scholars following him. According to their approach, the socialist regimes set the general parameters of life, but the strategies developed in everyday life enabled Soviet citizens to get by. The mutual relationship between the rulers and the ruled and the negotiation nature of the dictatorship have become the subject of a burgeoning secondary literature. The novelty of this volume is that it seeks to understand the individual actions and attitudes from the perspective of their meanings: the *Sinnwelt*. The authors seek to answer questions concerning how the citizens of socialist countries, like the children on Alexanderplatz, looked for meanings in the world around them.

Seeking to achieve a deeper understanding of perceptions of everyday life, the authors direct our attention to the “conceptual worlds” or “mental worlds” that existed alongside the official ideology, but not in isolation from it and even in interaction with it. To provide insight into the complexity of *Sinnwelts*, they devote substantial attention to the field of “pre-political acceptance.” With this term, they refer to a zone in which historical actors (re-)constructed the meaning of the existing social order and its legitimacy in everyday life. This mental conception shaped a series of social practices that were not always politically motivated. The essays in the book offer insights into the ways in which the worlds of meanings were revealed in different situations. The 13 chapters assembled in this volume are divided into four sections. In the introductory chapters, Martin Sabrow and Thomas Lindenberg elaborate on the concept of *Sinnwelt*. To understand everyday life, we need to examine how socialism's representation of reality interacted with individuals' representations of reality. In his brief overview, Lindenberg points out that the finding that *Eigen-Sinn* exists is only the first step in the research on the behavior of people living under

dictatorships, not a final answer to a question, but rather a finding that leads to a series of follow-up questions.

Following the theoretically oriented chapters, in the second part (“Authorities and Domination”), these questions are posed from the perspective of those in power. Ciprian Cîrnială shows the professional life of a policeman in state-socialist Romania. He focuses not so much on policeman Nicolae’s life but rather on its reconstruction. A joint examination of the “world of meaning” of the police and a policeman reveals Nicolae’s power-legitimizing and delegitimizing character. The main tool with which the system was legitimized was the creation of loyal worlds of meaning, for which purpose a whole reporting machinery was constructed. As Hedwig Richter points out in the next chapter, the broader layers of society were involved in report writing in East Germany, which became a bureaucratic practice of imitation. However, the reporting machinery was not able to stabilize the system. Regarding the debates that started in the 1980s, we can see the dangers that emerge if the rulers’ perceptions of reality do not match society’s perceptions of reality. Michal Pullmann’s study points out how the vision of the late Czechoslovak communist elite failed in the face of alternative interpretations that were unfavorable to the party.

The third section (“Everyday Social Practices and *Sinnwelt*”) pays particular attention to the meanings of living standards. Ana Kladnik uncovers local practices of *Sinnwelts* in Velenje in the context of Yugoslav self-management. The autonomy and decision-making given to the local government and the voluntary work of the inhabitants not only led to the construction of a new city but also fostered solidarity among local urban and rural communities. It is a good example of *Eigen-Sinn* practices that do not evolve against the official will but in harmony with it. However, this does not mean small tactics were not developed in order to shape and navigate meanings within the spaces of everyday life. The legitimacy of the socialist project was based on improved living standards in post-1956 Hungary. The mechanization of households was implemented as an important measure in the modernization campaign. Annina Gagyiova explains that, due to centralized distribution and the shortage of goods, access to washing machines required women to develop individual tactics. In the reality of everyday household life, *Eigen-sinn* was mostly about finding loopholes.

We come closer to understanding everyday worlds not only by looking at what the official *Sinnwelt* contained but also by finding what is omitted. Barbara Klich-Kluczevska examines how non-married single mothers in the People’s Republic of Poland were excluded from the official discourse of the 1970s. The

indifference of the social network and the stigma of public opinion also strongly limited these women's social coping strategies. Like unmarried women, a small group of parents in the GDR did not fit into the vision of a socialist modern world. These residents established an unofficial kindergarten in East Berlin by implementing an alternative vision of raising future generations. The short-lived initiative, as Celia Donert explains, reveals several layers of *Sinnwelt*, including the overlaps and the incongruities between the *Sinnwelt* of dissidents and the *Sinnwelt* of the East German state.

In addition to the modernization of the household and the transformation of the ground floor of dwellings into kindergartens, various other ideas have been able to dislodge cities from their traditional places. In the fourth section ("Intellectual and Expert Worlds (and (De)Legitimization"), Matěj Spurný illustrates how the project of industrial modernity and the idea of demolishing the whole historical heritage of the town of Most (in northern Czechoslovakia) became a "crime against culture" in the changed perception of reality of the local people and urban development experts. It was not only the image of the city that changed in the context of a more sensitive, European-level thinking about the relationship between people and their environment, but also the image of authentic communities. The next chapter underpins this observation with the example of Orfeo. The art group, which was linked to the new left, built a commune to create a "socialist way of life". Péter Apor's study shows that the commune, like the performances, expressed a sharp social critique. In this context, the artists saw alienation not exclusively as a problem of capitalist consumer society but also as a problem of late socialist Hungary.

Alongside the creation of countercultural worlds, the preservation of these worlds is also part of the history of alternative perceptions of reality. Jonathan Larson argues that the political role of samizdats and their relationships to identity determine the kinds of Czech samizdat we find in collections today. This study, which would make a fitting conclusion to the volume, is followed by a final chapter: an analysis by Michal Kopeček of the discourse of legalism in Czechoslovak and Polish opposition. For the regime, the party was the basis of socialism's legitimation, not questions of legality. For the dissidents, in contrast, legalism was used as a political tool not to address questions concerning the existing regime but rather as a means of positing the expected and desired rule of law.

The major strengths of the book lie in its thematic diversity. The diversity of historical actors who parade across the pages of this book offers a glimpse into

various perspectives and experiences. To uncover the practices associated with meanings, scholars map the regions, towns, blocks, flats, and sometimes even bathrooms of socialist Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. The case studies draw upon a heterogeneous body of sources (party documents, interviews, printed publications, and samizdats). The systems and worlds of meaning discovered provide a tool with which we can examine the dynamics, practices, discourses, and memories unfolding in very different interactions and relationships. Despite the wide range of topics, one area is missing from the analysis. The inclusion of rural areas and the transformations they underwent as a theme would have been justified in terms of the *Sinnwelt*. For most of these countries, the creation of a so-called socialist society included a transformation from largely rural societies into increasingly urban societies. The world and its meanings changed profoundly for the people from the countryside who migrated to the cities and for those who remained in the villages alike. Furthermore, the editors have arranged the book to provide access to different perspectives on *Sinnwelt*. However, not all attempts to integrate the case studies into the *Sinnwelt* concept have been entirely successful. The chapters in which the authors have explain how they relate to the main idea of meaning-making strengthen the coherence of the volume.

A *Sinnwelt* is the world as perceived by the historical actors who inhabit it. For the children playing on Alexanderplatz, the huge concrete surface on which they could draw gave meaning and significance to the square. The world of meaning in socialist countries was every bit as colorful as these drawings. As tempting as it may have been in the past to divide the actors in these narratives into victims and perpetrators, this simplistic division hardly does justice to the complexity of the histories in question. Sometimes, an individual could be both victim and perpetrator at the same time. The volume will be thought-provoking for anyone interested in the history of Eastern Europe and everyday life under dictatorships, and it will be useful for historians, social scientists, and their students alike.

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A történeti tudás [Historical knowledge]. By Gábor Gyáni. Budapest: Osiris, 2020. 460 pp.

Two decades ago, when I was a university student, one of my professors said that it is not the historians' job to think and write about the theory or philosophy of history. Let's leave that to philosophers, he said, since our task is only to study what happened in the past and write down the historical reality. I think, or at least hope, that few historians today consider their task this simple or have any faith in the notion of studying and writing history without some philosophically, sociologically, and ideologically determined viewpoints. And yet, historians often write their narratives with few if any reflections on their theoretical framework, and theorists or philosophers of history usually only read and criticize historiographical works without actually practicing this science themselves.

Gábor Gyáni is one of the few historians who has been doing a lot to introduce the Hungarian readership to recent Western theories of history, interpreting them from the perspective of a researcher with broad interdisciplinary knowledge. In *Történelmi tudás*, he offers a comprehensive survey of central questions and viewpoints of some current philosophical and methodological trends in the study of history. Thus, this book can be seen not only as a reference work on some theoretical problems concerning history but also as Gyáni's interpretation of his own practice and an inquiry into the main components of the type of knowledge we call "historical."

Ten chapters of the book focus on specific problems or aspects of the concept of historical knowledge from varying perspectives. The first chapter touches on the very notion of historical fact and different interpretations concerning the notion of "being factual". The following essays analyze the debates in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of history in the 1960s and 1970s, which broached questions concerning historical explanation and the role of narrative language. Some of the chapters are more oriented around questions discussed in the French and German theoretical literature, such as concepts of structure oriented historical inquiries and long-durée, while others consider approaches that have appeared more recently, like historical experience and role of (personal and social) memory in historical writing. It seems natural to start with the concept of "fact," since professional historians and "outsiders" tend to view facts as the elementary components of history. Facts, however, do not speak for themselves, or more precisely, there are no pure facts. Rather, the viewpoint and interests

of the historian determine the kinds of past events that need to be considered as facts. Moreover, following Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, Gyáni points out that one can even consider facts as elementary units, not of the actual happenings but rather of the narrative construction created by the historian about these happenings. Thus, as the second chapter convincingly demonstrates, the notion of historical knowledge has been changed fundamentally by the approach introduced in the 1960s, when some theorists wanted to merge the explanatory method of analytical philosophy with a narrative model, and radicalized some years later with the application of structuralist narrative theory to historiography. Perhaps the narrative and linguistically determined character of historical writing are the central components of Gyáni's standpoint, signified by the fact that essays in his first theoretical book concentrated on problems of the narrative philosophy of history and its connection with collective memory theories.¹ He returned to the narrative construction of the past in the study of history in each of his books, or, more precisely, to the issue that the past can be mediated via narrative language.

The next chapter analyzes the relations between historical event and structure. According to Gyáni, a past occurrence is usually interpreted as an event due to its perceived or alleged consequences, which caused some change within a given structural system. His two examples are the siege of Bastille and the Hungarian revolution on March 15, 1848, since neither was understood as historically significant for the contemporary agents, but both became meaningful soon, because they set in motion another chain of events to transform the given structure. Thus, like facts, events are not given entities which the historian simply finds. They are, rather, construed later by culturally and socially defined actors.

The subsequent chapters study issues that are perhaps only rarely of interest to historians in their everyday work but which are nevertheless central to the historical approach as hidden preconceptions. Analyzing these themes, e. g. historical determination, the possibility of prediction, the various functions of time (for instance, the question of periodization, the use of grammatical verb tenses in writing about the past, and the temporality of any given viewpoint), and changes of scale in historiography, Gyáni not only summarizes the most influential recent theoretical debates but also specifies some significant factors with which historians have often been confronted (at times perhaps without

¹ *Emlékezés, emlékezet és a történelem elbeszélése* [Remembrance, memory, and the narration of history], (Budapest: Napvilág, 2000).

realizing it) in their research and, more importantly, in the writing process. Perhaps the topics of the following two chapters are more familiar and seem of more immediate relevance, at least for contemporary theory: the problem of historical experience and the relations between historiography and social memory. It is not easy to summarize the numerous questions raised in these chapters due to the diversity of approaches connected with the problem of historical experience, from the hermeneutic-oriented viewpoint of Wilhelm Dilthey through theory of historical experience according to the contemporary Dutch philosopher of history, Frank Ankersmit to some current problems, including the viewpoints (or specific experiences) of women and postcolonial experiences. Here and in the entire book, Gyáni's main aim was not to analyze each topic exhaustively but to give a comprehensive synthesis with a synoptic presentation of some major problems. On some questions, Gyáni has already written more essays or a whole book. For example, almost parallel with *Történelmi tudás*, he published a volume about women's perspectives and experiences in history.²

Another aspect of historical experience discussed by Gyáni connects this chapter with the next one, underlining some oft-returning questions in his theoretical studies. The problem of collective historical traumas, memories of these traumas, and adequate ways of transforming trauma into any representation (whether historical or otherwise) appeared in the field of historical theory in the mid-1980s and has become one of the subjects where the practice of professional historians can touch public interests and ideological debates most visibly. In Gyáni's view, there are three interconnected factors of collective trauma: a historical factor, touching upon the genealogy of trauma as a modern phenomenon; an aesthetic or poetic factor, focusing on the possibilities of its representation; and a cultural factor, reflecting on the aspect of collective memory of trauma and strategies of memorialization. Gyáni argues that the traumatic historical event is essentially modern not because catastrophic happenings of the distant past would not have been similarly terrible for a given community but since people in the distant past had some (mostly ritual and religion-based) methods of working through these events as soon as possible, and they found appropriate (or at least usefully applicable) interpretational patterns with which to understand them. The prototype of modern historical trauma is the Holocaust. However, as sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander has pointed out, it was

2 *A nő élete – történelmi perspektívában* [The lives of women in historical perspective], (Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2021).

not a par excellence traumatic event from the beginning, or, more precisely, it could be traumatic only for individual victim survivors, whereas the Holocaust as a collective trauma was constructed later as a consequence of historical processes.³ That drives us to the next question, the problems which inevitably arise when experience or “past” is transformed into narrative and, connected closely with these problems, the social and cultural roles of historical writing.

As the theoretical works which Gyáni has written over the course of the past two decades reveal, the roles and responsibilities of historians have been among his central topics since the 2010s, undoubtedly due to the present-day historical situation. One of the main goals of his theoretical approach seems to have been to make the profession more self-reflexive and to dislodge it from the naïve, positivistic kind of approach based on the optimistic notion that facts and sources speak for themselves, and the historian’s task is to present what happened in the past. In his earlier essays and books, Gyáni analyzes the history and genealogy of this viewpoint and the connections between the rise of the nation state and modern professional historiography. He argues convincingly that this nineteenth-century style history of writing is anachronistic, and he exhorts historians to reflect on the assumptions, methods, and roles of their discipline.⁴ Nowadays, however, the increasingly pressing problem is to clarify the relationship between the alleged relativism of postmodern theory and the new contemporary phenomena that emerged not from but in opposition to the science of history. From his earliest theoretical studies, Gyáni has constantly analyzed academic history in parallel with the structure and functioning of collective memory. Later, in his collections of essays,⁵ he added another central topic, the phenomenon of public history. The emergence and increasing popularity of this historical tendency can be challenging for the discipline, because public history mediates historical knowledge in more consumable and necessarily simplified ways. There are many forms and modes of public history, including historical documentaries and non-fictional books written by authors outside the academic sphere, historical reenactments, and semi-historical webpages and blogs. According to Gyáni, because public history is closely related to collective

3 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Holocaust and Trauma: Moral Universalism in the West,” in *Trauma: A Social Theory*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 31–96.

4 See, for example, essays in *Nép, nemzet, zsidó* [People, nation, Jew] (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2013) and *Nemzeti vagy transznacionális történelem* [National or transnational history] (Budapest: Pesti Kalligram, 2018).

5 *Az elveszített múlt* [The past that could be lost] (Budapest: Nyitott Könyvműhely, 2010); *A történelem mint emléke(mű)* [History as memory (and memorial)] (Budapest: Pesti Kalligram, 2016).

memory, its topics, attitudes to the past, and narratives serve the interests of the larger society and its need to construct an identity for itself.

In an essay about the connections between history and memory, Peter Burke called the historian a kind of “remembrancer,” a term which was used as a euphemism for debt collectors. The task of historians as remembrancers is “to remind people of what they would like to forget”: to find and present the metaphorical skeletons in closets and to establish and meet scientific standards for the revision of myths and legends on which collective memory often rests.⁶ From Gyáni’s viewpoint, the main problem is that it is more difficult for contemporary historians to be “remembrancers,” because the borders between scientific discourse and other kinds of discourses have been blurred in the eyes of the public. Some tendencies present at the moment, such as the idea of alternative facts and post-truth or populist political trends (which use their interpretations of history to underpin nationalist myths and legends), challenge the social role of history and historiography by giving simplified explanations which fit smoothly into the identity construction of a given community. According to Gyáni, the role of the historian is not just to correct the false narratives like a kind of “myth-buster” and to point out “what actually happened in the past.” This approach, after all, remains anchored in the notion of a clear opposition between fact versus fiction, which seems anachronistic now that philosophical studies have pointed out the narrative, rhetorical, and ideological implications of historical writing. Gyáni is not a radical constructivist propagating a postmodernist “anything goes” interpretation of history, as some of his conservative critics have claimed. As a historian, he wants to be a “remembrancer” of the historical discipline itself by detecting some preconceptions in the historiography, studying their roots and genealogy, and raising awareness of the significance of self-reflectiveness in the making of history.

This concept is expressed most spectacularly in the appendix of the book, which focuses on how the personality of the historian influences research. This should not be mistaken for some kind of psychological explanation of the historian’s persona. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the relevance, in the construction of any narrative of history, of the individual and social conditions that affected a given scholar and influenced his or her viewpoint. In the case studies, examining the careers of György Szabad and Iván T. Berend (two

6 Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” In: Burke: *Varieties of Cultural History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 59.

leading Hungarian historians in the second half of the twentieth century), Gyáni interprets their social backgrounds and ventures claims concerning the ways in which their personal historical experiences influenced their approaches to the past. Thus, to sum up again one of Gyáni's cardinal thesis statements, there is no objective historiography because the historical knowledge (or the historian's knowledge) is necessarily affected by personal aspects (the background, the life story, and experiences of the historian), the social and cultural circumstances surrounding the actual production of history as textual narrative, and, more generally, the poetic and rhetorical conventions of the given language. The impossibility of total objectivity does not mean that discipline of history would inevitably be subjective, of course, and nor does it imply that all historical interpretations are equally legitimate. Gyáni stands for a kind of history which openly addresses the circumstances of its own production as affected by the factors noted above but which still aims to give an original, verifiable, and authentic interpretation of the past.

It would be very interesting to read a detailed ego history of Gyáni's professional career and personal background, on which he touched in his answer to the question "How did I become a historian?" in the journal *Korall*.⁷ Perhaps another historian will someday write about the history of Hungarian historiography in the 2000s. This narrative would have to feature a chapter on the start of a more reflexive, philosophically well-informed trend in the discipline, in which Gyáni will be a central character. Drawing on his account of his career, so far, as a historian and on his oeuvre, one perhaps could venture a kind of commentary similar to the commentary he offered on the careers of Szabad and Berend. And, if this historical inquiry were to be written, *Történeti tudás* could be interpreted not just as a handbook reviewing theoretical and methodological questions in the recent historical science and as a summary of more than two decades of Gyáni's theoretical thinking but as an overview by a historian on how he himself has detected and diagnosed some disciplinary questions and challenges in his profession.

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7 Gyáni Gábor, "Utam a társadalomtörténehez" [My path to social history], *Korall* 21–22 (2005), 193–96.

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The Hungarian Historical Review is a peer-reviewed international journal of the social sciences and humanities with a focus on Hungarian history. The journal's geographical scope—Hungary and East-Central Europe—makes it unique: the Hungarian Historical Review explores historical events in Hungary, but also raises broader questions in a transnational context. The articles and book reviews cover topics regarding Hungarian and East-Central European History. The journal aims to stimulate dialogue on Hungarian and East-Central European History in a transnational context. The journal fills lacuna, as it provides a forum for articles and reviews in English on Hungarian and East-Central European history, making Hungarian historiography accessible to the international reading public and part of the larger international scholarly discourse.

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Forms of Early Modern Diplomacy

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