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CONTENTS



The Prince of Wales in Hungary

Notes on Matters of Theory Connected with
the Saar Plebiscite *Dr. Ernest Flachbarth*

Czech and Yugoslav Claims to Austrian
Territory

Little Entente Allies "At Home"

Fierce Agitation in Rumanian Press
Against Hungarian Minority

English-Hungarian Connections during
the Reign of Sigismund King of Hungary *Dr. Alexander Fest*

Political Mosaic

How Minorities Live

Political Economy

Sports

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THE PRINCE OF WALES IN HUNGARY

Originally intended to be a mere sojourn of two days, the visit of the Prince of Wales was extended to almost a week. Surely a great compliment to the attractions of the Hungarian Capital. To the inhabitants of Budapest this visit will remain an unforgettable experience. The Prince won the hearts of all classes alike; the charm of his personality, the geniality of his converse and the ease with which he acclimatised himself and made himself at home in the Hungarian atmosphere, endeared him at once to all Hungarians.

It was a great compliment to Hungary that the Prince should have learned to dance the national dance of the Hungarian people; and it thrilled every Hungarian heart to read of the zest with which he threw himself into the spirit of Hungarian life.

Wherever he went, the Prince was followed by a crowd which did its best to mask its obtrusiveness. He understood that it was all intended to express respect and homage.

From his rooms overlooking the Danube the Prince commanded a fine view of the surrounding country and of that superb panorama which has earned for Budapest the title of "Queen of the Danube". Perhaps he thought of that day some nine hundred years ago when the Atheling came to the Hungarian Court and settled in the country which was to be the home of the Princess Margaret of blessed memory who later became Malcolm's consort? Or maybe he dreamed of the glamour which a little more than four centuries and a half ago had encircled the royal castle in Buda and had made that city the meeting-place of the flower of European chivalry and European art?

However that may be, the Prince of Wales has left behind him memories which will always bring his legendary figure within reach of all Hungarians. His visit to Hungary has made the ties of sentiment connecting the peoples of the two countries stronger and closer than ever: it has made those ties personal and direct by contact with the Prince who in his person symbolises the qualities that have always figured as the birthright of the Britisher.

And we recall the fact that Hungarian blood too is running in the Prince's veins; that his maternal greatgrandmother was a Hungarian Countess, Claudia Rhédey; and that he can claim descent also from St. Margaret of Scotland, whose daughter Matilda wedded Henry I. of England.

No doubt the Prince — unconsciously, perhaps — was drawn to Hungarian life and Hungarian art by the spell which that life and that art never fail to cast over strangers visiting the country. But in his case we would fain believe that the cause of the sympathy lies deeper still. A something in the soul which defies definition.

However that may be, we feel and know that Hungary and the Hungarians are fully conscious that, though outwardly a stranger, the Prince was inwardly at home among a people who have never ceased to regard the Englishman as the incarnation of ideals which they themselves would follow and realise.

NOTES ON MATTERS OF THEORY CONNECTED WITH THE SAAR PLEBISCITE

by

Dr. Ernest Flachbarth

The result of the Saar plebiscite, which in principle and practice was so splendidly conducted, has again raised the question whether it would not be expedient to hold a plebiscite, in order to settle the Hungarian problem. This question is being discussed with animation, not only in Hungarian, but also in British circles (see report on Colonel Moore's lecture in the last number of our Review). From a theoretical as well as a practical point of view the idea deserves careful consideration on the part of those who will have to answer to history for the future of Europe and the maintenance of peace.

Plebiscites are an institution of international law, and are based on the principles of self-determination and nationality.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE

The principle of the self-determination of the peoples was not invented by Wilson: it has its roots in centuries long past. Johannet, that excellent French theoretician, who was an authority on the nationality principle, records that, when in 1526 Francis I of France ceded *Burgundy* to the Emperor Charles V under the Treaty of Madrid, the Estates of Burgundy at Dijon protested energetically against Burgundy's being severed from France. At the time of the conflict Francis made the following statement: — "It lies in the nature of law that neither towns nor provinces may be annexed against the will of the inhabitants and citizens, *but only with their express consent*".

When Henry II of France, in answer to the appeal of the German Protestant princes, first occupied, then took possession of, the territories belonging to the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, Robert de Lenoncour, Bishop of Metz, addressed the following plea to the King: — "The King has come as a deliverer. Then let him treat the population as good French citizens, and, abstaining from the use of all coercive measures, let him call them to a free plebiscite".¹

These instances taken from the history of France show how even centuries ago public opinion felt that to traffic in territory was an injustice, unless the consent of the population had been asked and given. This view taken by public opinion was upheld by *Grotius*, the great jurist of the XVII century, in his book "*De jure belli ac pacis*". In volume II, chapter VI, he propounds the thesis that the consent of the population of a territory is necessary to its incorporation in another State.²

¹ „La principe des nationalités“ Paris 1918.

² „In partis alienatione aliud insuper requiritur, ut etiam pars, de qua alienda agitur, consentiat.“

The *French Revolution*, starting from the principle of the liberty of the nations, arrived at the idea of self-determination. According to its tenets nations were free, and a war of conquest was an attack upon the liberty of other nations. Consequently the annexation of territory by any State was justified only in so far as the population of that territory was willing to accept the change. Acting on this principle the *Constituente*, on September 14th, 1791, annexed the provinces of Avignon and Venaissin (which till then had belonged to the Pontifical State), on the ground that the majority of the population — 59 parishes out of 98 — had decided in favour of union with France. In the same manner, in accordance with the wishes of the population (583 villages and towns out of 658), the Convent annexed Savoy and Nice (Alpes Maritimes), as well as Mulhouse and several towns in the Rhineland and Belgium.³

At the Vienna Congress *Alexander I*, Czar of Russia, expressed the view that nationalities cannot be driven from one State into another like flocks of sheep.⁴ The same opinion was voiced by Woodrow Wilson, President of the U. S. A., in his speeches made on February 11th and July 4th, 1918, when he said that peoples and provinces should not be transferred from sovereignty to sovereignty, as if they were mere chattels or pawns. We know that when the Central Powers laid down their arms they had pinned their faith on Wilson's Points, particularly on the principle of self-determination, and that the Entente itself, in a Note to the Government of the U. S. A. dated November 5th, 1918, undertook to conclude peace with Germany on the basis of the principles contained in Wilson's speech to the Peace Conference on January 6th 1918 (the famous 14 Points) and in conformity with other principles set forth by him in statements made later on.

POST-WAR PLEBISCITES

And yet, with the exception of certain parts of East and West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Schleswig, the peace concluded with Germany made no provision for an immediate plebiscite. The so-called "*consultation populaire*" which took place in the district of Eupen and Malmédy cannot be regarded as a real plebiscite, for the voting was not secret — open lists protesting against the surrender of

³ „Plebiscite and Referendum.“ Handbook prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office. No. 159. London 1920. cf. Johannet op. cit. and Felix Freudenthal's „Die Volksabstimmung bei Gebietabtretungen und Eroberungen“ Erlangen 1891.

⁴ See Jacques Fouques-Duparc: "La protection des minorités de race, de langue et de religion": Paris 1922, p. 141.

the territory to Belgium being signed in the presence of the authorities. The plebiscite in the Saar District, which took place on January 13th last, was based upon the Treaty of Versailles. Still less account was taken of the principle of self-determination where the rest of the defeated countries were in question. The treaty with Austria ordained only one plebiscite, in *South Carinthia*; while the *Treaty of Trianon concluded with Hungary did not incorporate a plebiscite at all*. The plebiscite held in the town of Sopron and its environs in the December of 1921 was not provided for by the Trianon Treaty, but was the consequence of the *Austro-Hungarian Convention* concluded in Venice on October 13th 1921, with Italy as intermediary. The treaty signed by *Bulgaria* similarly makes no mention of settlement by way of a plebiscite. The *Treaty of Sévres*, on the other hand, which was concluded with *Turkey*, but was never ratified, stipulated that if the *Kurdish* population applied to the League of Nations within six months of the coming into force of the treaty with proofs that the majority of the population desired to be independent of Turkey, and if the League considered them capable of an independent existence, they should be allowed to form an independent State. (Article 66.)

Besides, this treaty guaranteed to the local diet in *Smyrna*, which had been left under Turkish sovereignty, but under Greek administration, the right to submit to the League of Nations, within five years from the date when the treaty became valid, a request that the population be attached to Greece, in which case the League was to order a plebiscite and determine the conditions under which it should be held. In both of these instances a plebiscite would have been against the interests of the defeated State. It is interesting to note that in terms of the resolution taken by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, a plebiscite was to have been held in the district of *Teschén*, about the possession of which the *Czechs and Poles could not agree*, and in a comparatively small part of the counties of *Árva* and *Szepes* which had been taken from Hungary and allotted to the *Czechs*; the Spaa Conference of Ambassadors, however (July 21st 1921), acting as arbitrary tribunal, ordered the latter territory to be divided between the two contestants.

CHARACTERISTIC ERROR OF PEACE CONFERENCE

We see then that the Paris Peace Conference never contemplated the idea of a plebiscite in connection with Hungary or Bulgaria. The preamble to the minority treaty concluded with Czecho-Slovakia on September 10th 1919 at Saint-Germain, in which the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was definitively confirmed, lays stress upon asserting that the population of Slovakia had entered into partnership with Bohemia of their own free will, and that Ruthenia had joined that country of her own accord. According to the preamble to the Yugoslav minority treaty, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes too had united in one State by common consent. These statements are an attempt to create the impression that Slovakia and Ruthenia were annexed to Czecho-Slovakia, Croatia and the Slovene districts to Yugoslavia, on the principle of self-

determination. Even before the Peace Conference closed it was evident that these allegations — at any rate so far as the Czechs and the Slovaks were concerned — were a misrepresentation of the facts. As early as February 20th, 1920, the Hungarian delegation, when presenting their memorandum, subjoined a document containing information sent by Srobár, Czecho-Slovak Minister, to the Slovak League (*Slovenská Liga*) in America. In that paper Šrobár marshalled the following arguments in support of his objection to fulfilling the agreement concluded between the leaders of the Czech and Slovak associations in America at Pittsburgh on May 31st 1918, and signed also by Masaryk, who afterwards became President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In terms of this agreement Slovakia was to have been given a separate national assembly.

His arguments were:

"In accordance with the Convention of Pittsburg Slovakia ought to be given a legislature of its own. Let us consider this soberly. Slovakia has about 3 million inhabitants, of which 1,600,000 are Slovaks, 250,000 Jews, 500,000 Ruthenians, 155,000 Germans and more than 500,000 Magyars. If the Slovak legislature had 300 members, 22 would be Jews, 50 Ruthenians, 15 Germans and 53 Magyars, so that 140 non-Slovaks would be opposed to 160 Slovaks. But the majority of these latter would consist of the so called "Slovak Octobrists". The Slovaks would have a majority of 20, but this would not be a majority with which government could be carried on even for four-and-twenty hours. Let us not forget the large number of the Hungarian intelligent classes; nor that Slovakia is overrun with Magyars, and "Magyarons". Can we suppose that not a single Slovak elector will vote for a Magyar or "Magyaron?" Would this be possible at the present day? Has the Slovak nation awakened in these eight months to the fact that it must vote only for Slovaks?! Do our people know who is a Slovak and who has gone over to the other side? There are counties (*Bars*, *Hont*, *Nógrád*, *Abauj*, *Zemplén*, *Szepes*, *Sáros* etc) in which there is not one loyal Slovak whom we could entrust with the leadership of the people. Imagine a Slovak National Assembly where no Slovak member may miss one sitting! And imagine one with an opposition of 140 members! — not a Slovak opposition, but one composed of alien members. Could this be called a Slovak National Assembly? It would rather resemble a pot-house in which the guests are quarelling over their cups."⁵

This clearly proves that the Czecho-Slovak Government mistrusted not only the Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians and Jews, but also the Slovaks. There is no doubt that had the Peace Conference been aware of the real state of things before the signing of the Czecho-Slovak minority treaty on September 10th 1919, no mention would have been made in the preamble about the Slovaks having joined Bohemia of their own free will.

This one single example is enough to show how diametrically opposed to the principle of self-

⁵ "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations", Budapest 1922. Vol. II., p. 129.

determination was the cutting off of two-thirds of Hungary's territory. And what has happened to the Slovaks and a section of the Ruthenians, who, because of their pro-Hungarian feelings, have been dubbed "Magyarons" by the Czechs, has happened also to the Croats and perhaps even to a considerable proportion of the Transylvanian Rumanians. Had they been asked their opinion and allowed to express it freely, the Slovaks and Ruthenians would never have voted for political union with the Czechs, nor would the Croats and Transylvanian Rumanians have expressed any desire to unite with Yugoslavia or Rumania respectively. And surely no manner of doubt can be entertained concerning the wishes of the Magyars, Germans, Vends, etc. severed from Hungary.

The principle of self-determination cannot be enforced except by asking the nationalities that have been torn away from their old sovereignties and attached to alien States, whether they are content that it should be so; and the only way to obtain an answer to that question is by means of plebiscites. Failing this, the section of the population which is opposed to the annexation of the territory in question will always feel that an injustice has been done. They will never acquiesce in the change, and, asserting that they represent the majority, will continue to fan the flames of irredentism against the State in which they have been incorporated. It is therefore in the interests of the victor State just as much as of the defeated State to ascertain by plebiscite the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants; for then the party thus outvoted is not entitled to claim that it is the real expression of the opinion of the population.

CONCERNING THE "NATIONALITY" PRINCIPLE

The justifiability of the postulate of a plebiscite is supported also by the nationality principle. This principle, first proclaimed in science, in his inaugural lecture "Della nazionalità come fondamento del dritto delle genti" delivered at the University of Turin in 1851, by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, the eminent Italian authority on international law, means — as is well known — that the persons belonging to one and the same nation should form one State. This thesis — the fundamental conception underlying the creation of most of the States established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries — is based upon the perfectly correct consideration that the ethical foundations of the State must be supplied by the force of union inherent in national feeling. But there is one great disadvantage about the thesis, — the fact, namely, that the idea of "nation" is not uniform in the case of all the various peoples of Europe, for which reason those various peoples have multifarious conceptions of the manner in which the nationality principle can be realised.

According to the idea in force in the West, by "nation" we mean the whole body of nationals (in the political sense of the word.) This was the conception in force at all times in Hungary too, as may be seen from the Preamble to the 1868 Nationality Act, which declares that the Hungarian nation embraces all Hungarian nationals (citizens of the Hungarian State). As contrasted with this legal interpretation of the term "nation", which has really not always been quite in

place in Central and Eastern Europe, where several peoples, themselves once state-builders, lived under the rule of a foreign people and indeed regarded themselves as distinct from that people, the Italians, Germans and Slavs — under the influence of their efforts to obtain independence or to create a United State — developed a different conception of "nation", which has always regarded the nation as an ethnic formation, — a conception losing sight of the fact that with these peoples too the ultimate aim of national union is after all the formation of a State, thus being of a political character. Attempts have been made to determine the meaning of the term "nation" by objective criteria, defining it as a racial, religious, linguistic, cultural, historical, geographical etc. community. However, seeing that not one of these criteria is to be found without exception in every community which undoubtedly believes itself to be a nation, and seeing that these criteria must be in evidence in multifarious combinations in the several peoples, the objective definition has proved a failure, for which reason — especially in German science — the tendency now prevailing is that which finds the real meaning of "nation" to be the collective desire for symbiosis, — the so-called "national consciousness" —, and determines the national status of the individual according to which nation he desires to belong to or which nation he desires to opt for. This conception may be traced back to the famous definition of Renan — "la nation est un plébiscite de tous les jours" — meaning that the circle of individuals forming the nation changes and fluctuates from day to day. This so-called "subjective" theory runs counter to the fact of common experience that the several individuals do after all derive their profession of membership of a particular nation from certain material causes (e. g. birth, language, history, etc.); while recently the so-called "combination" theory is beginning to take root, this theory being to the effect that, though national status is closely dependent upon objective characteristics, — seeing that in the several individuals these causes may be of varying nature and may appear in various combinations —, here too the decisive factor in determining to which nation a person belongs, is that person's own will.

It would be a far cry to subject all these theories to critical analysis. The only reason why we thought it necessary to mention them is that they show clearly the hybrid and uncertain character of the ethnic conception of a nation. Nevertheless, the treaties of peace concluded after the end of the Great War, wherever they applied the nationality principle at all, took as their basis the ethnic conception of the nation, — and that too in a form which makes "ethnic" mean simply language or race. Thus, the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia was effected on the ground that the Slovaks and the Czechs combined constitute a "Czecho-Slovak" and the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes a "Yugoslav" nation. Both fictions are equally absurd and untenable. The Slovaks constitute a nation differing from the Czechs; not only because they have a literary language of their own which has nothing in common with that of the Czechs, but also because they have developed an independent political consciousness of their own due alike to their deep religious feelings and to the fact that their history — centuries spent in community

with another country (Hungary) — and consequently their traditions and views of life, differ from those of the Czechs, while — last, not least, — a role of no less significance is played also by the force of separation latent in the geographical situation of their country and the dividing line of the Carpathians. Although the literary language of the Croats is almost identical with that of the Serbians, in their case too a different political consciousness has been developed owing to their using the Latin alphabet as against the Cyril alphabet used by the Serbians, while they are Roman Catholics and the Serbians are members of the Orthodox (Greek Oriental) Church, and for 500 years they enjoyed an autonomy of their own as part of the Hungarian Kingdom.

Nor can a nation be regarded as simply a linguistic community. A hundred years ago there were very few persons already who knew Celtic; but then too the Irish question was the cause of the greatest anxiety to the British Government. The majority of the inhabitants of the United States of North America speak the same language as that used in Great Britain; nevertheless, it would be a bold thing to assert that the British and the Americans constitute a single nation. It is only in recent decenniums that the literary language of Norway has shown a tendency to become differentiated from Danish; yet the Norwegians have always been a different nation. This differentiation between language and nation was illustrated in an interesting manner by certain plebiscites held since the Great War. In Upper Silesia there were many cases of persons speaking in their homes Polish — or a dialect very like Polish — having voted for Germany. The majority obtained by Austria in the plebiscite in South Carinthia was due solely to a section of the inhabitants of Slovene nationality having voted for that country. The reason why the Hungarian national idea won the day in the plebiscite held in Sopron and environs was due to a considerable proportion of the inhabitants whose mother tongue is German voting for incorporation in Hungary. The most serious errors may arise from a territory being annexed to a particular State simply because the majority of its inhabitants happen to speak the same language as the people ruling in that State.

Consequently, the nationality principle cannot be carried into effect — even in its ethnic interpretation — unless a plebiscite is held to decide whether the inhabitants of the territory in question really regard themselves in feeling too as belonging to the nation which speaks the same or a similar language. It is no mere coincidence that the pioneers of the nationality principle should have been decidedly in favour of the principle of plebiscites too. When "Italia Unita" was established, the Italian Government ordained plebiscites everywhere for the purpose of proving the justifiability of incorporating in the Kingdom of Italy all the miniature States which had previously possessed an independent existence. In 1860 Italy surrendered Savoy and Nizza to France only on condition of a plebiscite being held (the plebiscite resulted in France obtaining a large majority). After the Austro-Prussian War Napoleon III., who acted as mediator and was himself one of the most typical champions of the nationality principle, did all in his power to secure the ultimate fate of Schleswig being decided by a plebiscite. Therefore, the provisional

Treaty of Nikolsburg and the Treaty of Prague (August 23rd., 1866) both provided that North Schleswig was to be surrendered to Denmark, should its inhabitants by free suffrage express a wish to be incorporated in that country. However, Prussia — or rather the German Empire — unfortunately failed to carry into effect the pertinent provision (Article V.) of the Treaty. After the victory won by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War 1871, as contrasted with the German Treitschke a large number of eminent French scientists — appealing to the nationality principle — demanded that the population of Alsace-Lorraine should be put to the vote. One of the main causes of the Great War might have been eliminated as far back as 1871, had the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine been asked to vote on the question whether they regarded themselves as belonging rather to the German nation to which they were linguistically and racially akin or to the French nation which had been their political rulers for 150 years and had transformed them "in their own image". Nor would the Schleswig question have embittered relations between Germany and Denmark — indeed, it might have been eliminated fifty years prior to the Treaty of Versailles —, if Bismarck had fulfilled the obligations undertaken by Germany under the Treaty of Prague and had put the question as provided to the inhabitants of North Schleswig.

CREATION OF SUCCESSION STATES NOT BASED ON PRINCIPLES

The political distribution of the Danube Valley in force today is fraught with danger simply because the Paris treaty-makers ignored all questions of principle and thought they could settle the problems that had arisen by edict. From this point of view too the case of Czecho-Slovakia is extremely instructive. This State was created under the nationality principle, on the strength of which that State is really entitled to claim the territories of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia inhabited by Czechs. The German inhabitants of these provinces were incorporated in the new State on the plea of a historical right, seeing that the provinces had been possessions of the Czech Crown until the Battle of Weissberg (1621). But the latter principle was not enforced in the case of Hungary, who was deprived of Slovakia and Ruthenia, though she had a historical right to these territories which was much stronger than that of the Czechs to the territory inhabited by the Sudete Germans, seeing that those territories had belonged to the Crown of St. Stephen from the eleventh century until 1918. The districts of Slovakia inhabited by Slovaks were claimed by the Czechs on the absurd plea that the Slovaks and the Czechs form a single nation — the so-called "Czecho-Slovak" nation — thus once more returning to the nationality principle; while when annexing the territories of Ruthenia inhabited by Ruthenians reference was made to "voluntary adherence" — that meaning an application of the principle of self-determination. However, the Czechs did not shrink even from laying hands also on the southern sections of Slovakia and Ruthenia inhabited by pure Magyars; in that case pleading strategical reasons, seeing that no arguments could possibly be adduced by resort even to an absolutely arbitrary explanation of the principles of self-deter-

mination and nationality. This all reminds us vividly of Phaedrus's fable about the king of animals in default of any other argument carrying off his booty simply because he was a lion. The Czechs shrunk instinctively from the idea of a plebiscite; and when, early in 1919, Thomas Masaryk was asked whether there would be a plebiscite in Slovakia, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic answered with a straight "no", saying that the Hungarians had so completely oppressed the Slovaks that they had never had an opportunity to think politically and were therefore unable to decide their own fate.⁶ But surely in the case of a people which has been oppressed the "liberators" would have no reason to fear that people voting for the "oppressors" and not for the "liberators", — even though that people has not studied political science. Only in one place — in their dispute with Poland — were the Czechs ready to submit the question to a plebiscite; though later on they thought it better after all to come to an agreement with the Poles and to divide the territory in dispute without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants of Silesia concerned.

THE HUNGARIAN THESIS

Historical right, self-determination, the nationality principle, geographical, economic and strategical postulates — were all alike arguments in the intellectual armoury of the creators of Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania to be dragged out at random to suit the exigences of the particular given case. As a consequence the creation of these States was not based upon principle. The Hungarian position, on the other hand, is simple and clear as daylight. We do not talk of historical rights, — do not put forward geographical or economic arguments or refer to any military moments, although a history of a thousand years, the ideal geographical, economic and strategical unity of pre-War Hungary, the impossibility of defending Hungary's present frontiers, and — last, not least — the economic misery today ruling in the territories severed from Hungary, — arguments which are all in our favour; we merely demand the enforcement of the principles of self-determination and nationality. Should the enforcement of these principles made such a procedure necessary, we are prepared to agree to a plebiscite and accept in advance the decision of the inhabitants of the severed territories, — naturally presuming that the same measures to safeguard the justice and impartiality of such a plebiscite would be taken as were in force recently during the plebiscite in the Saar District. So far as concerns the Magyar territories severed from the mother country inhabited by Magyars living in compact masses along the frontiers of Hungary, we believe that it would be superfluous to put the same to the vote, seeing that there can be no question of those persons, despite the persecution to which they are being subjected under a foreign rule, not desiring to be re-incorporated in Hungary. However, should the definitive decision of the fate of the whole territory severed from Hungary require to be taken by putting the whole population to the vote, no objection would be raised to such a procedure either. We could not, however, agree to the present political position of certain

territories severed from Hungary being regarded as definitive simply because official statistics would fain make the populations of those territories seem to be non-Magyar in tongue. For, apart from being unable to accept as trustworthy the statistics of the Succession States, the mere fact that a person is registered as a Ruthenian by tongue does not by any means prove that the said person is unable to be heart and soul a real Hungarian. Only a secret plebiscite, when the person in question is at liberty to express his national conviction freely without any pressure from without, is likely to show clearly and definitively the real nationality conditions in force. But Hungary, who for many centuries was the home also of many non-Magyar nationalities, feels a duty towards these peoples impelling her to demand on their behalf too that the principle of self-determination should be enforced. So the peoples should decide for themselves whether they wish to remain under the sovereignty of their present rulers or whether they desire to form an independent State or — finally — whether they desire to be re-incorporated in Hungary? If the Succession States have a clear conscience, they must also consent to an appeal to the judgment of the peoples and must make it possible to have these questions settled once for all in this manner, thus preparing the way for an era of peace and quiet work to ensue at last in the Danube.

Objective foreign observers would be justified in pointing out that the Little Entente States should be the last to shrink from a plebiscite, seeing that they have had plenty of opportunities during the last fifteen years to influence the peoples severed from Hungary and to convince them of the superiority of their governments. Then why are the "liberators" afraid that the long-persecuted "oppressed" will vote for the "oppressors" and not for the "liberators?"

The sense of responsibility of the Powers concerned afforded the inhabitants of the Saar District an opportunity to return to their own country. The time has come for an opportunity to be given in the Danube Valley too to as many people as possible to belong to the country which they regard as their own. The best solution would appear to be for the Little Entente States also to agree to this solution and to conclude treaties for that purpose with Hungary direct. The General Assembly of the League of Nations has it in its power to accelerate such a solution by issuing — under Article 19 of the Covenant — a manifest relating to the revision of the Treaty of Trianon addressed to the Members concerned, pointing out also the fundamental principles which it thinks expedient to enforce in connection with the plebiscite of the interested inhabitants. By its work in preparation for and in execution of the plebiscite in the Saar District the League certainly enhanced its authority. How much greater would its prestige be if it could by the application of the same methods succeed in eliminating the burning problems of the Danube Valley. It would seem that the Rome and London agreements are to be followed by serious negotiations for the purpose of settling those problems. We must realise that no solution of these problems is conceivable which is based upon any principles differing from those dealt with above.

⁶ Masaryk: "Cesta democracie". Praha 1933. Vol. I, p 471.

CZECH AND YUGOSLAV CLAIMS TO AUSTRIAN TERRITORY

The independence of Austria, repeatedly guaranteed by Great Britain, France and Italy, is menaced by dangers, not only from a Germany anxious to carry through an "Anschluss", but also from Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. We believe it will be opportune to deal briefly — on the basis of a work ("die tschechische Irredenta in Deutschösterreich": Graz, 1928) by Günther Berka — with the ambitions of the Czechs and the Yugoslavs in respect of Austria.

As far back as 1900 Rašin, later Czecho-Slovak Minister of Finance, told his friends that the Czech State to be eventually created must be given access to the sea through Lower Austria.

In Vienna, at the end of 1918, the "Vienna Czech Heart" ("České srdce vídeňské") issued a booklet entitled "Česká Videaň" containing, among other things, the text of an address delivered in Prague and other Czech towns in August, 1918, by *Jetel František*, leader of the Vienna Czechs. The concluding passage of this address ran as follows:

"The Czech State must take possession of the section of Lower Austria lying to the north of the Danube and of Vienna, thus becoming the immediate neighbour of the Southern Slav State. The Czechs of Vienna constitute an economic and cultural bridge between the Slav North and the Slav South joining together the Slavs from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic".

The same demand was formulated in the same booklet by *Hrdina*, head of the Vienna branch of the Zivnostenská Banka.

On November 20th., 1918, at a meeting of the Minorities Commission of the "Národní Vybor" (National Council), E. Chalupny submitted a motion to the effect that *Vienna and a part of Lower Austria should be incorporated in the Czech State, this involving the frontiers of that State running from the southern corner of Bohemia towards Krems and then along the Danube as far as Tulln and thence through the Wiener Wald as far as Baden and Lake Fertő, that in its turn offering a possibility for union with the Southern Slav State.*

The same conception inspired the notorious work ("Nás stát a svetovy mir" = Our State and World Peace) of *Hanuš Kuffner*, which was handed to the Entente Governments as far back as 1917 and was in 1919 submitted to the Paris Peace Conference by the Czech Peace Delegation. This memorandum suggested the demarcation of the Czech frontiers in a manner providing for the *southern boundary of Czecho-Slovakia reaching to the Danube, the northern frontier of the Southern Slav State to extend to the*

northern boundary of Styria. All that would be left of Austria would be a narrow strip of territory — the "Central Country" ("Stredomezi"), — which would be under joint Czech-Yugoslav administration, to be populated by the Slav inhabitants of Vienna and the Czechs and Slovenes migrating back to the country.

At a meeting of Czechs of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, held in the People's Hall of the Vienna Town Hall on January 22nd., 1922, *Zahradnik*, former Czecho-Slovak Minister, made the following statement:

"In view of the high valuation of the Czech currency, the time has come for omissions to be made good and for a beginning to be made in Austria with Czech settlements on a large scale. We must build a Slav corridor from Prague to Trieste".

In 1925, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Vienna "Beseda" (Association), the "Vidensky Dennik", the organ of the Vienna Czech National Democrats, expressed the hope that the day was not far off when the Slav brethren had joined hands on the banks of the Danube. And in its January 23, 1926, issue the same journal — when welcoming the new Czech Minister in Vienna — stated that the Czechs of Austria constituted a part of the corridor connecting Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia.

"We desire to be" — these were the actual words of the writer — "the outpost on the Danube of our Republic".

The Slovenes also adopted a similar attitude in the question of a corridor. In articles dealing with the solution of the Austrian question which appeared in Nos. 1 and 2 of the 1925/26 volume of the "Cas", the periodical of the Ljubljana Leo Society, *Janko Brejto*, the first Yugoslav Governor of Slovenia, demanded the partition of the whole of Austria, Italy to receive West Carinthia as far as Spittal, together with the Tauern Railway, the rest of Carinthia being allotted to Yugoslavia, together with the Lungau district of Salzburg and the whole of Styria, Germany being given the other districts of Salzburg, as also Upper Austria and the Enns Valley in Styria, and *Czecho-Slovakia receiving Vienna and Lower Austria.* Should it be impossible to realise this solution, it would be necessary to create a buffer state (*état tampon*) out of Vienna, Lower Austria, Styria and East Carinthia, — the territories still remaining to Austria after the surrender of the parts to be allotted to Italy and Yugoslavia —, which

would have Vienna as its centre and would once for all renounce all political ambitions and base its future primarily on economic endeavours. The Governor thought it only natural that the Slav minorities of Austria living along the Czech frontier should be incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia.

According to a report in the January 26, 1927, issue of the "Vidensky Tydennik", the "Ruch", a periodical appearing in Brünn, published an article containing the following statements:

"The day may come when the annexation of Austria to the German Empire will be imminent and when Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia will have a powerful trump card to play — to demand that in the event of an Anschluss Austria should be first divided up, the Slav districts being allotted to the Slav neighbours". In a work published at Cili in 1927 and entitled "Czecho-Slovakia's Historical Claim to a Restoration of the Alpine Provinces wrested from King Ottocar II.

by Rudolph Habsburg, King of Germany, by force and unlawfully", Lilek, Slovene director (headmaster) of a secondary school, expressed the opinion that *the claim of the Czechs to Austria, Styria and Carinthia was an imprescriptible right* similar in character to that by virtue of which the Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians and Italians too had shaken off the Turkish and Austrian yoke respectively in the Balkan Peninsula and in Toscana, Lombardy and Venice respectively.

From what has been said it may be seen that the idea of a Czech-Yugoslav corridor was mooted at the end of the Great War by the leaders of the Vienna Czech minority, was taken over by the responsible statesmen of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and then made a pivot of Slav policy by Czech and Slovene politicians. The conception of Slav imperialism is ever-present in the minds of the Czechs and the Southern Slavs, who will never forget it.

LITTLE ENTENTE ALLIES "AT HOME"

Messrs. Beneš and Titulescu consistently endeavour to discredit and to thwart the Hungarian revisionist movement by means of the catchword that revision in any case means war. Yet the public opinion of the world is already fully convinced that the Hungarian revisionist programme does not involve any desire of conquest such as that which characterised the policy of the Little Entente during the Great War and has characterised that policy also since the end of the Great War; as also that the Hungarian revisionist movement aims solely and exclusively at a reparation of the injustices committed under the Treaty of Trianon — a reparation to be effected in keeping with the international principles of nationality and self-determination. The demand for a revision is not a question of prestige; for it is the natural consequence of the instinctive conviction (and indeed knowledge) that a dismembered country cannot continue for ever — with open frontiers on all sides and in a state of utter defencelessness which is a direct challenge to its would-be assailants — to hold its own in the iron ring surrounding it formed by neighbours covetous of further expansion. Consequently, the revision thus demanded is simply a matter of life and death for Hungary and at the same time a *sine qua non* of the restoration of the equilibrium of Europe which has been so completely upset.

On the other hand, those who would divert the attention of foreign countries from the excessive character of their armaments, which point to intentions of a by no means peaceful nature, as also from the internal crises prevailing in their countries, by continually bringing charges against Hungary, — while at the same time attempting to frustrate the revision movement by specious catchwords about

the "spiritualisation" of frontiers —, are engaged in making preparations of which they no longer make a secret for the purpose of achieving further conquests.

In our issue for March, 1934, we published a short report on a military manual written by a Serbian staff officer (Lieut-Colonel Kostitch) which contained a veritable "register" of Yugoslavia's territorial claims as against *all* the neighbouring States. The most striking point in this scheme of expansion is undoubtedly the fact that it includes claims also against Rumania, Yugoslavia's ally, from whom the Serbians would take the Rumanian part of the Banate — as far as Arad — on the first opportunity that offers.

Intimation of a fresh — and equally characteristic — manifestation of the imperialistic endeavours of the pan-Serbians is afforded by an article from Prague contained in the January 18th. issue of the Rumanian paper "Vestul", which deals exhaustively with the Rumanian-Yugoslav alliance. It speaks of the Serbians as being unreliable and as enemies of Rumania; for they would actually assail the territorial integrity of their neighbouring ally. In proof of this statement the paper publishes a *Yugoslav map* showing the Yugoslav frontiers advanced far into the territories of Italy, Austria, Greece and Bulgaria; *from Rumania this map annexes the whole Banate as far as Arad, from Hungary trans-Danubia as far as Sopron, the north-eastern section of the Drave District and the region between the Danube and the Tisza in a straight line as far as Arad.* The map bears the following inscription: — "Render unto God the things that are God's and unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and render unto us the things that are ours". Below the map is a notice calling upon everyone to join

the Yugoslav Association, which desires to unite all Yugoslavs within the frontiers of a single country. According to the article in question, this map is to be seen in all Serbian schools and barracks. The writer of the article notes further that the readers used in the elementary schools speak abusively of the Rumanians as having behaved like cowards during the Great War and having hidden themselves like so many "vermin". The article attacks the Government for defending the Serbians even against legitimate

Hungary, but also as against the Yugoslav allies of Rumania, as is proved by the map (of which we publish a reproduction) annexed to a thick volume called "The Rumanian Warrior's Manual" ("Manualul ostasului roman") written by a Rumanian staff-officer, Lieut.-Colonel Jordachescu, and issued in 1922 by the Rumanian War Ministry. This map is notorious for showing the territories on the left shore of the Tisza now forming part of Hungary and Yugoslavia respectively as constituent parts



This Map, annexed to the "Manualul ostasului roman", a military text-book published by the Royal Rumanian Ministry of War (thus being an official edition), pretends the following territories to be integral parts of Romania Mare (Greater-Rumania), the territories extending to the Tisza, i. e. Hungarian territories as well as those parts of the Banat which are annexed to Yugoslavia. The dotted line shows the present frontier of Rumania, the perpendicular lines the territory which the writer thinks should be severed from Hungary, and the horizontal lines the territory which he would claim from Yugoslavia.

criticism, while the Serbians show their gratitude by attacking Rumania from behind.

This remarkably curious manifestation of allied loyalty and reliability must cause justifiable misgivings in the public opinion of Rumania, though — apart from a serious doubt as to the value of such an alliance — the latter country is not really entitled to show any special indignation with the desire of the Yugoslav ally to expand at the expense of Rumanian territory. Particularly in view of the fact that the same desire of conquest is in evidence among the Rumanians too — not only as against

of Greater Rumania (Romania Mare), — that being in keeping with the ambitions and endeavours of the Rumanian people. The speakers at the anti-revision mass meetings arranged by the "Universul" went even further — as did also certain writers in the Rumanian papers —, actually demanding no less than that the whole of Hungary should be divided up and that country wiped definitively off the map of Europe.

This is how the oft-stressed love of peace, allied loyalty and friendship of the Little Entente really looks in practice!!

FIERCE AGITATION IN RUMANIAN PRESS AGAINST HUNGARIAN MINORITY

While the Rumanian Foreign Minister keeps speaking before international forums about the "spiritualisation" of frontiers, and statements made by him to representatives of the foreign press tell us of the absolute equality of rights of the minorities living in Rumania, the Rumanian press — irrespective of party — is engaged in carrying on a ruthless war and campaign of calumny against the minorities (and in particular against the Hungarian minority), assailing the latter with peculiar bitterness in connection with the fight against revision. The articles dealing with this subject are allowed by the Censor to appear unhindered; nor does the Public Prosecutor take any proceedings whatsoever against the Rumanian papers guilty of incitement; though at the same time libel suits are being instituted *en masse* and a whole series of severe sentences passed against the Hungarian journalists.

To give an instance, the "*Chemarea Românilor*", a Rumanian weekly appearing in Kolozsvár, called upon the Rumanians to *forcibly remove all the broadcasting stations belonging to Hungarians* and to forbid Hungarians having broadcasting apparatuses at all! ("*Brassói Lapok*", No. 51, March 4th., 1934). An article by Jon Agerbiceanu *complaining of the tolerance shown towards the Hungarian minority* has been published on the front page by the Kolozsvár organ of the National Peasant Party. ("*Ellenzék*", No. 76, April 4th., 1934). The "*Țara Noastră*", Octavian Goga's organ, in connection with the National Labour Protection Act bitterly attacked the minorities, inventing a new category of citizens called the caste of "foreigners of Rumanian nationality" ("*Aradi Közlöny*", No. 145, July 5th., 1934).

However, the ringleaders in the campaign for infuriating Rumanian public opinion are the two biggest Bucharest papers — the "*Universul*" and the "*Curentul*" — which are closely connected with Titulescu. The "*Curentul*" publishes anti-minority articles practically every day, violently attacking also the few sober-minded Rumanian politicians who have a word to say for the Hungarian minority. Not a day passes without articles appearing in the "*Universul*" abusing and calumniating the Hun-

garian minority, its institutions, schools and churches etc., each of these articles demanding in a tone of infatuated chavinism that members of the Hungarian minority should be dismissed from office at once. According to the "*Universul*" that *minority are pariahs not deserving equality who must be deprived of their schools and their culture, of their freedom of movement and means of earning a living, and plunged once more into that primitive state in which they were when they "brought over the Verecke Pass irredentism softened under their saddles and anti-State revolt jauping in their noggins"*.

In the "*Curentul*", a Bucharest daily edited by Pamfil Șeicaru, since March, 1934, there has been a special column headed "Plebiscite" in which whole pages appear containing answers sent in by Rumanian men and women of every class of society in reply to circulars distributed by the hundred thousand all over Rumania and containing six questions.

Apart from a very few exceptions, these answers teem with charges — chiefly of an economic nature — brought against the minorities, and are calculated to propagate hatred of the minorities. We naturally ask ourselves the question whether — as the "*Curentul*" supposes — it is possible that a majority people numbering fourteen million souls could ever be reduced to a position of inferiority as against a combination of minorities aggregating altogether only four millions? Such a supposition is against all logic and sober reason. The real object of this action is to enable the Rumanian element to secure the hegemony in every relation of public and private life alike. In order to further the attainment of this object, all "plebiscitists" alike — apart from very slight deviations — suggest recourse being had to the same methods; the only differences being in respect of degree (e. g. whereas one of the writers demands the settlement of Rumanians in districts inhabited by minorities, another would have the work of "expropriation" extended to house property, factories and undertakings too). Practically all the writers demand the exclusion of the minorities from the army and public offices. They would also deprive the minorities of all means of earning a living by ostracising them from the commercial and industrial

professions too. The crowning piece of the whole scheme would be the application of a "numerus clausus" in secondary schools and at universities and colleges. The writers all agree in saying that the Rumanian element is in a grave position placing it in intolerable inferiority as contrasted with the non-Rumanian minorities. But they are unable to point out exactly where the dangerous "predominance" of the minorities is in evidence.

We give below a few answers for the purpose of affording our readers an opportunity to convince themselves of the mentality prevailing today in Rumania in respect of persons belonging to the non-Rumanian minorities.

George Brătianu, the well-known leading Rumanian politician, suggests that the Rumanians living abroad should be brought back to Rumania and settled in the more "dangerous" regions of the country. The same idea is suggested by *General Michael Olteanu*. The Greek Catholic Bishop of Lugos, *Nicolescu Alexandru*, proposes the adoption of a "numerus clausus" as against the minorities. In his opinion, important posts in the public administration can only be filled by Rumanians (as if there were any minority officials at all left in such positions today!!). All institutions organically connected with the protection of the State — post office service, railways, armament factories — must be rumanianised.

A student of the Polytechnic College at Jassy of the name of *Leonida* demands that all minority elements be removed from the civil service and the army, that all Jews be driven out of Rumania, and that in the future (among other things) no persons belonging to the minorities be allowed to enter the teaching profession, while the Rumanians living in the territories annexed to the country (in particular in Bessarabia) should be subjected to the strictest selection. *Mitescu*, a Galaş advocate, demands the rumanianisation of all public authorities and the gradual removal from all public offices of all persons belonging to the minorities. In his opinion only merchants and craftsmen belonging to the Orthodox Church must be supported or aided, and the means of credit employed must be exclusively Rumanian: and in conclusion he would apply the quota principle in all professions and trades. As the future solution of the problem he would suggest that Rumanian girls should receive dowries from the State to encourage them to wed persons belonging to minorities and to rumanianise their children. Indeed, he would have the younger generations of Rumanian men also specially prepared to wed women belonging to minorities.

Ioan Ursu, Deputy Mayor of Szatmár, would

have all officials belonging to minorities transferred to the central part of the country, — as also those Rumanian officials who are married to Hungarian women. As against the opinion of *Mitescu* referred to above, a parish clerk from Szilágy County would have a law passed forbidding Rumanian men to wed women belonging to minorities. A clergyman of the name of *Josif Musatescu* proposes to close the frontiers and refuse to allow foreigners to enter the country. Foreigners he takes to include the minorities; and — among other things — he suggests that no children of minority parents should be admitted to State schools. A woman teacher from *Suceava* believes that an effectual means of protection against the minorities would be to make minority pupils attending schools pay higher fees than those paid by Rumanians. *Simon Gocan*, master at the "Gojdu" Lyceum in Nagyvárad, proposes that Government should suspend the autonomy of the frontier towns for a period of ten years, should rumanianise the frontiers and remove all Hungarian officials from the frontiers. Mr. Gocan's wish was realised long ago; for between 1919 and 1926 the towns in Rumania were administered by officially appointed councils or boards, that period being followed by the era of "interimar" commissions, — the time in question being therefore well in excess of the period of 10 years suggested by him. A Craiova merchant of the name of *Nicolae Popescu* demands the rumanianisation of commerce and trade by means of special laws decreeing that no persons belonging to minorities may carry on trade or industry except after the expiration of a certain "year of candidature", provision being made at the same time to impose double taxes on all persons not belonging to the Rumanian majority. *Gheorghe Bărdas*, elementary school teacher in Szeben County, proposes — among other things — that only Rumanians should be eligible for public contracts. Only such persons belonging to minorities should be eligible for employment as have studied at State schools. The "nostrification" (incorporation) of foreign diplomas should be prohibited. *Gheorghe Coman*, theological student from Bukovina, actually goes so far as to propose that persons who during hours of service presume to speak any other language than that of the State should be liable to immediate dismissal. *Aurelius Tamasoiu*, articulated solicitor's clerk, of Szászváros, urges the settlement of Rumanians in the frontier regions and desires that a special law should decree that only Rumanians by birth should be employed as civil servants in the frontier towns. He would forbid military officers to marry women of non-Rumanian origin. *S. Tomescu*, retired captain (Bucharest), demands an immediate amendment of the Constitution forbidding any person of foreign blood, even if a Rumanian national, to take part in the government of the State; and though possessing the right to vote, such persons should not be eligible.

Shal we continue? We believe we have quoted sufficient to enable our readers to convince themselves that the Rumanian press is not utilising the power of the printed letter to form public opinion for the purpose of reconciliation, but rather for that of estrangement.

ENGLISH - HUNGARIAN CONNECTIONS DURING THE REIGN OF SIGISMUND KING OF HUNGARY

The interesting article written by Dr. Éva Róna in the last number (January, 1935) of the "Danubian Review" was, I am sure, very welcome to those who have set themselves to look for hitherto unknown connections between England and Hungary; for the article refers to a period which was rich in political and spiritual connections between the two countries. We may say that the reign of Sigismund, King of Hungary and Emperor of Germany (1387—1487), was, chronologically speaking, the third period when political connections between England and our country gave rise also to spiritual influence. It is generally known that the first close contact had taken place in the XIth century when Eadward, the younger son of Edmund Ironside, had spent nearly forty years in Hungary before being able to finally return to England in the year 1057. The second contact was also a dynastic one; it took place at the end of the XIIth century, and was connected with the marriage of Béla III, King of Hungary, with Margaret, the "younger English queen" (1186—96). Later on these connections had, as everybody knows, a fairly important effect on the development of our constitution.

Sigismund's political connections with England do not begin with Henry V. but go back to his father, Henry IV, then only Bolingbroke. In 1392 Bolingbroke on his way back from his second Lithuanian expedition, came to visit Sigismund, King of Hungary ("Nam de Prusia versus Hungarian, per Poloniam aliasque provincias diversas, pertransiuit, ubi, a rege Hungarorum honorabiliter receptus, magnis muneribus decoratus est." Capgrave: De illustr. Henricis. Ad an. 1392.) In the battle of Nikápoly (25 Sept. 1396) fought for the whole of Christendom, Henry supported Sigismund with 10,000 soldiers (Hóman—Szekfü: Magyar történet. III, 197). It is very likely that he was accompanied by John Beaufort, Count of Somerset, Henry's half-brother (cf. Dict. of Nat. Biogr.), who, after the fatal defeat, escaped on board a Venetian galley. Thus we see that there were political connections already between Sigismund and the father of Henry V.

The fact that Hungary was not unknown to the England of Henry IV is corroborated by a historical datum referring to the great celebration which Sigismund organised in the spring of the year 1412. Many foreign guests came from remote countries to the celebration which followed the peace with the King of Poland, so that in Buda seventeen different languages — and English was naturally one of them — could be heard at the same time ("Item von sunst Mechtig poten von Engellant von Frankreich und von andern Kunygen und steten." M. Wertner: Die Ofener Gaste von 1412. p. 12.)

Sigismund's memorable visit to England and his sojourn of four months are known to students of history, although scientific research has still to find out whether this visit had any deeper influence on the history of our country.

The keen eyes of Sigismund recognised at once the paramount importance of Calais and Dover from the point of view of a future world-power:

"And to the Kynge thus he seyde, 'My brothere',
Whan he perceyved too townes Calys and Doveve,
"Of alle youre townes to chese of one and othere,
To keepe the see and some to come overe
To werre oughtwardes and youre regne to recovere,
*Kepe these too townes, sire, and your magesté,
As youre tweyne eyne to kepe the narowe see.*"

(Political Poems and Songs. Script. Rer. Brit. 14. II, 158.)

As to the economic connections between England and our country, I think that they began already before Sigismund's time. We know that in the second half of the XIIth century the Transylvanian Saxons (often called "Flandrenses") settled in Hungary. These Saxons had very lively commercial connections, especially in the XIVth century, during the reign of Lewis the Great. At the same time Edward III was reigning in England; and he is known to have contributed largely to the development of English wool trade. It was during his reign that Flemish weavers settled in England. Flanders became the centre of the English wool trade. It was through Flanders that the Saxons of Transylvania entered into commercial contact with England; and it was, of course, through the same medium that Hungarian merchants bought wool for their country.

Hector Boece writes as follows: of Alexander, Earl of Mar, son of the illegitimate son of Robert, King of Scotland:

"This nobill erle, as my author dois wryte,
Of policie in peax wes rycht perfyte,
And richt expert wes than in orbanitie,
With greit fredome and liberalitie.
He wes the first that evir brocht into Mar
Hors of greit Kynd fra Hungarie rycht far,
Quhilk plesand war and of ane large stature,
And ay sensyne tha haif keptit that nature . . ."

(Boece: The Buik of the Croniclis of Scotland. Script. Rer. Brit. 6. III, 550.)

It is with these minor details that I have tried to supplement the interesting article I have mentioned, although, as I have already observed, a study of the historical background will probably discover further results of Sigismund's English connections.

Budapest, February 16, 1935.

Dr. Alexander Fest.

P O L I T I C A L M O S A I C

LONDON AND ROME

Although in the nature of things the Italian-French agreement concluded in Rome far more directly concerns Hungary than the British-French Air Convention made in London, nevertheless the latter is also of a certain importance to our country, for there can be no doubt that in the long run it will secure Germany international equality and thereby facilitate the return of that country to the League of Nations.

We are fully aware that there can be no sincere reconciliation either of Europe as a whole or in particular of the peoples of the Danube Valley except as the result of a long process of development which in its turn cannot ensue except through the disinterested co-operation of the great nations and as a consequence of serious determination on the part of those nations. We are equally convinced that, if the smaller nations realise that *an agreement of the kind has been concluded between the Great Powers providing for those Powers working in complete harmony and understanding towards a gradual establishment of a juster and more lasting peace, then despite existing antagonisms there must ensue a gradual alleviation of the difficulties impeding relations between the smaller peoples, who will be driven to accommodate themselves to the fundamental principles of general import, which cannot be postulated or their observance controlled except by the Great Powers.*

There can be no doubt that *Hungary will be the first to accept the consequences of a common determination*; for she is well aware that it is only from a serious and courageous peaceful co-operation of the kind that the Great Powers can expect a better understanding of their vital interests to ensue.

The first step in this direction was the creation of a co-operation between France and Italy; and the second corner-stone was laid recently in London by the British and French statesmen — a step which is most gratifying. However, in the course of the further progress of the action we cannot but desire that *Germany too should adhere to both the Rome and the London Convention*, for that would probably induce a serious relief in the whole political atmosphere of Europe calculated to encourage the brightest and most sanguine hopes. This is particularly desirable in view of it being quite evident that the Danube Basin questions — those, namely, which most immediately affect the interests of Hungary — can never be settled without the benevolent co-operation of Germany, all solutions ignoring these considerations being bound sooner or later to sow the seeds of extremely grave antagonisms. Germany is herself a Danubian State; political connections centuries old, together with economic interests of constantly increasing importance, bind her very closely to this territory; and these interests are at least as important as those of account to Italy or France. For that reason, then, we cannot but wish, — alike in our own interests and in those of Europe generally and of a permanent peace —, that Germany should adhere to the Rome Convention.

We would note that, so far as we can see, there

is not a single serious reason or impediment why that should not be the case; for the Rome agreements, supplemented by the London Convention, would in that event be able to serve as real foundations of serious peace, not only in the Danube Basin, but also in the whole of Europe, whereas otherwise those agreements might possibly be utilised as a means of further isolating Germany. And in any case we are fully convinced that *today nothing is farther from the intentions of Signor Mussolini and the responsible political leaders of Great Britain, or for the matter of that of the French statesmen themselves. And Hungary too, ready as she is disinterestedly to co-operate for the furtherance of peace in the Danube Basin, would never adhere to international agreements having for their object the isolation of Germany.*

We regard the Rome Convention as the first step towards a wider and more extensive co-operation of the Great Powers (*inclusive of Germany and Poland too*) and cannot but welcome the same. We believe that developments will justify this hope. These developments may be expected to lead to a renewal of the *Four-Power Treaty*, though this treaty would have to be expanded into a *Five-Power Treaty* with Poland as the fifth Great Power; and the primary aim of such a treaty would have to be the solution of the Danube Basin problems and the ensurance of peace.

Vital economic and political interests make it imperative for Hungary that the Rome agreements should be carried into effect honestly and disinterestedly: but it is equally important for our whole future and for our national security and national sovereignty that the London agreements *should not fail to stipulate the military equality of Hungary*. This is just as important a criterion in principle of the stability of the European balance of power and of European peace as the Danube Valley agreement itself. After all it is absurd that Hungary should be surrounded by neighbours armed to the teeth, while the treaties of peace deny her even the most elementary military means of defence. And that fifteen years after the conclusion of peace!

Therefore, equality of rights is one of the *sine qua non*s of our adherence to the agreements. However, it is essential that on the other side *the Little Entente States should be just as ready as we are to discuss matters honestly and disinterestedly*. We believe and trust that this will be the case; but we shall not be in a position to ascertain the fact until the negotiations to be opened are in full swing. In any case we must convince ourselves whether the Little Entente is not again merely anxious to get us to sign a meaningless formula? for in that event we would rather have everything remain as it is. We must find out *whether the Little Entente desires on the present occasion too to interfere in our domestic affairs by keeping us in the state of military subjection in which we have been for the past fifteen years, — whether it desires to be able to continue to treat the Hungarian*

minorities ruled by it as hostages, endeavouring to utilise the system of persecution employed against them as a means of foisting its own will upon us? or whether it is prepared to comply with all the conditions

referred to and thereby to contribute to the creation of a more serious and better atmosphere than that prevailing hitherto? And of course the Little Entente must in addition admit the possibility of a peaceful revision.

CONCLUSION OF ITALIAN-HUNGARIAN CULTURAL CONVENTION

On February 16th., in the World Chart Room of the Palazzo Venezia, Signor Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy, and Dr Hóman, Hungarian Minister of Education, signed the Italian-Hungarian Cultural Convention.

The Convention contains 20 articles. In terms of the Convention the Hungarian Institute in Rome will continue to be maintained for the purposes of research into and of the development of the scientific, literary and artistic connections between Italy and Hungary.

The Italian Government is to establish in Budapest an Italian Institute for the purposes of research into and of the development of the scientific, literary and artistic connections between Hungary and Italy.

The Hungarian and Italian Governments are to increase the number of scholarships (fellowships) from 4 to not fewer than 6. In addition, the Italian Government will continue to grant exhibitions to deserving Hungarian students entered in Italian universities or colleges, at all times with due consideration for the nominations of the Hungarian Government.

The Hungarian Government is to use every available means to ensure facilities enabling as many university and college students and graduates as possible to attend the holiday courses arranged by Italian universities. The Italian Government will also on its part use every means within its power to enable as many Italian university students and graduates as possible to attend the summer courses held at Hungarian universities.

The Hungarian Government undertakes to fill a chair in the Budapest Peter Pázmány University of Sciences to be designated by reciprocal agreement, by the appointment to the same under contract of an Italian scholar, while on the other hand the Italian Government will continue to maintain in the Rome Royal University of Sciences the Chair of Hungarian History and Hungarian Literature held by a Hungarian scholar.

The Hungarian Government will continue to maintain in the Budapest Peter Pázmány University of Sciences and in the Pécs Elizabeth University of Sciences Chairs of Italian Language and Literature, as also to provide for the adequate teaching of the Italian language and literature in the Debrecen Stephen Tisza and the Szeged Francis Joseph Universities of Sciences.

The two Governments undertake to organise an exchange of university and college professors — for the present one professor at least on either side to give a series of lectures every year.

The two Governments undertake to investigate the question as to how the period of work of the exchange professors could be extended to a whole academic year.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM

On the occasion of the recent visit to London of M. Flandin, French Prime Minister, and M. Laval, French Foreign Minister, the "Daily Mail", Lord Rothermere's organ, wrote as follows:

"Although everybody in this country has the warmest feelings towards France, M. Flandin and M. Laval are not able to express the real French view. They are bound to express the view of the Little Entente.

"The British people are not interested in that combination of minor Powers. They are certainly not going to have their foreign policy dictated from Prague, Belgrade, or Bucharest, or embroil themselves in any such combi-

The Hungarian Government is to devote increased attention to the work of teaching the Italian language in Hungarian secondary schools, in grammar-schools (gymnasiums) and higher commercial schools.

As soon as feasible, the Italian Government is to organise a secondary school with Italian as language of instruction to be established in Budapest.

The two Governments are periodically to exchange lists of those scientific and literary publications the translation of which they may consider particularly desirable.

The two Governments will — for the purpose of further developing the cultural connections — encourage the reciprocal performance and production respectively in the other country of theatrical works and films.

The Hungarian Government undertakes to encourage the travel of Hungarian parties in Italy for the purpose of studying Italian art memorials and Italian art monuments generally.

The Italian Government also undertakes on its part to encourage the travel to Hungary for the same purpose of parties of Italians.

The two Governments undertake reciprocally to encourage the arrangement of Italian art exhibitions in Hungary and of Hungarian art exhibitions in Italy respectively.

The two Governments are to encourage the reciprocal relaying of programmes by the broadcasting stations of the two countries. Provision shall also be made for the respective broadcasting stations to give addresses on the history, literature, art, music, popular customs, tourist traffic etc. of the other country.

The Convention is to come into force on the thirtieth day following the exchange of the deeds of ratification.

This Convention is one of the corollaries of the Rome Protocol and a renewed expression of the close friendship uniting Italy and Hungary. Hungarian public opinion was delighted to read of the cordial reception accorded to the Hungarian Minister of Education by Italian official circles and by the inhabitants of Rome; the culminating event being the conversation between the Duce and Dr Hóman.

We would note in passing that in all probability the Hungarian-Austrian Cultural Convention will be signed on March 2nd. On the day on which the act of signing takes place the Hungarian Minister of Education is to attend the opening of the exhibition of Hungarian Popular Art arranged by the Vienna Cultural Association.

nation. In France's foreign policy it is the Little Entente which at present calls the tune.

"As *The Daily Mail* has for years pointed out, the Little Entente, by its adamant attitude in regard to any changes in the Treaty of Trianon, has made a conflict certain sooner or later in Central Europe. How, then, can any British Government enter into any kind of agreement when it knows that there is the risk that one or other of these smaller Powers might involve France in war, and thus possibly drag us in?"

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A few days later the "Daily Mail" published the following article:

"One point must be emphasised. In any agreement regarding the future of Europe it would be madness for Great Britain to associate herself with a country such as Czecho-Slovakia, which has as Foreign Secretary a firebrand like M. Beneš. Czecho-Slovakia is a creation of the Treaty of Versailles. In defiance of the spirit of that treaty, from the date of her birth as a State she has devoted her energy to the creation of armaments which are pronounced by impartial authorities to be the largest in Europe in proportion to her population.

"She has ill-treated the Germans, Hungarians, Slovenes and Ruthenes in her territory, which is a fresh offence against the treaty that brought her into existence. Her capital, Prague, is at the moment a centre of violent propaganda against Germany. That fact in itself is calculated to bring her sooner or later into collision with the new Germany, which is the most formidable Power on the Continent.

"Czecho-Slovakia and the other States of the Little Entente should be left to their own devices so far as Great Britain is concerned. Their future is no business of ours. Free from entanglements with them, a defensive alliance between Great Britain and France on the lines suggested above would be far preferable to the nebulous Pact of Locarno, full of dangerous implications as that document is."

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The following report of a lecture on the Hungarian Question delivered by Mr. F. Noel Palmer, M. P., before the Guildford Natural History and Literary Society and Guildford Institute, was published in the "Surrey Advertiser and County Times:

"The people of Europe must organise opinion for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, not only for the sake of the Hungarians, but because there is a very actual danger of war", said Mr. F. Noel Palmer, of Normandy, National Labour Member of Parliament for South Tottenham, in a lecture on "Europe's danger spot—Hungary", to members of the Guildford Natural History and Literary Society at Guildford Institute on Thursday.

"Introducing the lecturer, the Mayor (Ald. W. G. L. Sheppard), who presided, said he had known Mr. Palmer for some time, and he was sure he would do justice to an interesting subject. The papers, with their different angles, seemed to say what they wanted people to believe, and it was like a breath of fresh air when someone who had actually been to Hungary came back and told them about it.

"Mr. Palmer said his lecture was the outcome of a visit of inspection to Hungary at the invitation of its Government, and every facility had been granted to inspect wherever the visitors wished. They discussed the problem with many prominent people in Hungary and the adjoining State of Austria. They came away from these countries with the impression of two peoples crucified to satisfy the greed for power of statesmen of other nations. In Western Europe people were learning that the Treaty

of Versailles — a dictated peace — was no peace at all, but a breeding place for future wars. *But the evils and weaknesses of the Treaty of Versailles were insignificant beside those of the Treaty of Trianon.* He thought they were entitled to ask themselves, "Was the position carefully considered by those who held the destinies of the millions of the Danube Valley in their hands?" They had to say "No." *Five gentlemen dismembered Hungary without, apparently, seeming conscious of their responsibility. In an afternoon spent by five tired, over-worked statesmen, Hungary lost three-quarters of her population, and boundaries which had been hers for a thousand years, and for which she had fought against many enemies, vanished away as it they had been a dream. What had been an economic unit became an economic jig-saw puzzle.*

"These treaties cannot stand", continued Mr. Palmer, "If we fail to get a peaceful revision, wars, sooner or later, will come. That stern oppression cannot go on, and permanent peace and stability cannot be built on an injustice".

"There was no justice in the formation of Czecho-Slovakia. The Czechs and the Slovaks were in no way related to each other. The pledge of autonomy and control of internal affairs given to the Slovaks had never materialised. Hungary, being a wheat growing country, would always be able to feed herself to a certain extent, but Austria was not so certain of that. With her industries declining, she would have to go to other nations for loans. All this was because of the Treaty of Trianon.

All the Hungarians asked was that those people on their boundaries who belonged to them and who spoke their language, should be re-united to their own country. It was quite a possibility that it could be carried through without any danger of war, because Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia had minorities of which they might be glad to be rid.

"The treatment meted out to Hungary was totally different from that meted out to the other Central Powers. *Germany lost ten per cent. of population, Bulgaria eight per cent. and Hungary 64 per cent.* Everybody in the country had the one idea of a re-united Hungary.

"Mr. Palmer showed slides of the architectural beauties of Hungary, and said his hearers could imagine what was felt by persons who built such beautiful cities when they were put under peoples of a lower standard of culture. The Hungarians looked to England as a basis for the commonwealth of peoples, and we should do something to right their wrongs.

"In answer to a question by Mr. H. E. Lee, Mr. Palmer said *Article 19 of the League Covenant* provided for treaty revision, and that was one reason why they wanted a stronger League of Nations. "I want to see a League of Nations strong enough to set right this trouble", he said.

"A vote of thanks to Mr. Palmer was proposed by the Mayor and seconded by Mr. F. H. Elsley, who also thanked the Mayor for presiding." (—y)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF FRENCH CHAMBER MISINTERPRETS TREATY OF TRIANON

On the motion of Longuet, Socialist Deputy, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber declared that the criminal trial of Matthias Rákosi, one of the People's Commissaries in the Soviet Government of Béla Kun of ill-omened memory, — in which the Budapest Court of Law as court of first instance sentenced the accused to penal servitude for life —, was a breach of Article 76 of the Treaty of Trianon, seeing that the trial was connected with political events that had happened prior to the ratification of the Treaty.

We must confess that this resolution of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber caused no little indignation in Hungary, — not only in political circles, but also among members of the legal profession. For Article 76 of the Treaty of Trianon runs as follows:

"No inhabitant of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be disturbed or molested on account either of his political attitude between July 28, 1914, and the definitive settlement of the sovereignty over these territories, or of the deter-

mination of his nationality effected by the present Treaty”.

As already shown convincingly by *Emil Nagy*, former Minister of Justice, in the Hungarian press, Article 76 speaks of “these territories” referred to already in the previous Article as those to which Hungary had to renounce “all rights and title”. Moreover, Article 76 aims only at precluding disturbance or molestation on account of any political attitude prior to the definitive settlement of the sovereignty of these territories, that in its turn making it impossible that the passage in question should refer to the present-day territory of Dismembered Hungary, seeing that Hungary was a sovereign State also prior to June 28, 1914, so that there could be no question of a definitive settlement of the sovereignty of that territory, the only territories the sovereignty of which required to be definitively settled being those severed from Hungary and incorporated in the Succession States. It appears, therefore, that the only political actions not punishable under Article 76 are those which were committed between July 28, 1914, and the day on which the Treaty of Trianon was ratified, in the territories formerly belonging to Hungary which have been incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Austria.

In answer to a question in the British House of Commons Mr. Eden, Lord Privy Seal, stated that in the opinion of Hungarians Article 76 of the Treaty of Trianon did not apply to political crimes committed during the Soviet régime. If we wish to clear up the situation, we must try to reconstruct in imagination the intentions guiding the drafters of the Article in question. What the drafters of the Treaty of Trianon desired to prevent by Article 76 was the possibility of calling to account before a Hungarian

court of law persons guilty of political actions directed against the territorial integrity of Hungary. This Article was therefore designed to protect against persecution those Czech, Slovak, Rumanian etc. agitators who during the Great War and until the putting into force of the new settlement displayed an activity hostile to the Hungarian State. The intentions of the drafters of the treaty cannot possibly be brought into connection with the communists, if only because in 1919 France and her Allies were prepared to employ even military measures to overthrow the communist régime in power in Hungary. Although the text of the Article in question is rather ambiguous, the intention underlying the Article is evident enough, as is also the fact that the French drafters of Article 76 did not propose at all to offer protection to the persons guilty of communist crimes.

If we apply the explanation of the treaty put forward by Mr. Eden to the concrete case under discussion, we find that Article 76 cannot be applied to Rákosi's attitude. However, for the sake of absolute precision it should be added that in our opinion the said Article is not applicable either to any other political crimes committed in the territory of Dismembered Hungary, because the sovereignty of the Hungarian State in respect of this territory was not “definitively settled” by the Peace Conference, seeing that Hungary was a sovereign member of the family of nations — of the international community — also prior to the Great War. Consequently, the explanation of Article 76 given by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber is wrong; while the conclusions drawn from this mistaken interpretation are such as must be considered unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Hungary.

PLEBISCITE DEMANDED BY POLES IN SILEŚIA

In its January 26 issue the semi-official “Polska Zachodnia” published in Kattowitz reported that the Polish National District Labour Union had held a congress at Polish-Teschen at which 216 delegates were present. The Labour Union, the strongest party on the Government side, passed a resolution comprising four points recording (1—2) the oppression of the Polish minority in Czech-Teschen and approving of the activity of the Polish Consul in Mährisch-Ostrau, Malhomme, who was being continuously attacked by the Czechs, while in the fourth point it called upon the competent factors to take the necessary measures to ensure the ordaining of a plebiscite in Teschen-Silesia, seeing that Poland had never acknowledged the legality of the division into two parts of the Teschen District.

A great stir was created in Czecho-Slovakia too by the book by the Polish professor *V. Studnicki*

entitled “*System polityczny Europy i Polska*”, which advocates the partition of Czecho-Slovakia between Poland, Hungary and Germany. And the address given at Warsaw by Stephen Swedowski on the subject of “Our possessions in Czecho-Slovakia” also offended the Czechs, for the lecturer demanded the incorporation in Poland — as unredeemed minority — of the Poles of Silesia. The Czech Press replied to these Polish opinions by saying that the Russian Soviet claimed the Novogrodek, Lemberg, Tarnopol and Stanislavov Departments of Poland which are inhabited by White Russians and Ukrainians; adding that by the loss of these territories Poland would be deprived of almost the half of her area, whereas Czecho-Slovakia would become the immediate neighbour of Soviet Russia. This was the gist also of an article in the February 9th. evening edition of the “*Česke Slovo*”, the organ of the Czech National Socialist Party of Foreign Minister Benes.

DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The dissolution of the Skupstina was not a surprise to those who had followed developments in connection with the formation of the Yeffitch Government. If Yeffitch really desires to introduce legal order in the strictest European sense of the term and to put an end to internal dissension by complying with the legitimate

demands of the peoples of the historical provinces on the basis of absolute equality of rights, then he had no other alternative than to effect the immediate dissolution of the Skupstina, the majority of the Members of which body were in favour of the most rigid conservatism. The essential point in the election speech made by

Yeftitch — which may be regarded practically as his political platform — was that he refused to allow any infraction of the principle of Yugoslav national unity laid down in the 1931 Constitution, — that meaning that *the Opposition cannot make an election slogan of the Croatian or Slovene question*. In a statement made to the Zagreb correspondent of the "*Courrier de Genève*" Maček described the idea of Yugoslav national unity as a dream and declared that in the opinion of the Croatian nation the only possible form of yugoslavism was a federation of the Southern Slav nations on the basis of *absolute equality*. Croatia would not under any circumstances renounce the exercise in her own national State of the rights which she enjoyed as a dominion forming a constituent part of the Kingdom of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. Of exceptional importance for the issue of the elections is also the resolution passed on February 15th. by the Yugoslav National Party to the effect that it will not file a separate list of its own — that meaning the absolute defeat of Uzunovitch, the former Premier, and his adherents.

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Dr. Vlatko Maček, the Croatian popular leader recently set at liberty by the Yeftitch Government, told a representative of "*The Times*" that, while acknowledging the unity of the Yugoslav State, he must persist in demanding the administrative independence of Croatia as Member of that State and was only prepared to accept

as "common" institutions the army (war department), foreign affairs, public finances and foreign trade. So the new programme here defined involves an insistence — with slight deviations from the well-known "Zagreb Points" — on the original Croatian federal scheme.

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The senator elections ordained under the law passed by the dictatorship were held on February 3rd. The 926 senator-electors of the Danube Banate possessing the right to vote (the national assembly deputies elected in the territory of the Banate, the officially appointed members of the Banate Council, the officially appointed mayors of the towns, and the parish presidents) — there being no opposition list — elected 3 senators, including the Prime Minister Bogoljub Yeftitch too. In illustration of the equality of rights ruling in Yugoslavia, as of also the treatment meted out to the minorities, we would note that the "Bunyevác" people numbering barely 70,000 souls were on this occasion too allotted 1 senator, while the Magyars of the Danube Banate (some 400,000 strong) — as also the German minority of almost equal numerical strength — were not represented by a single senator (or even a deputy senator) on the official list.

GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN BULGARIA

As is well known, after the resignation of the Georgiev Government General Zlatev, who had previously been War Minister, formed a new Cabinet. The change must not be attributed to causes connected with the international political situation. The introduction of a whole series of radical reforms and the proclamation of further reforms paralysed the economic life of the country; and Georgiev had to take the consequences. What the new Government has to do — apart from carrying into effect those reforms which are really of an opportune character — is to restore or rather develop the economic circulation of the country. The suppositions voiced abroad to the effect that there were reasons for the change also connected with the international situation, are groundless. The Foreign Minister of the new Government, Batalov, was a confidential adviser and Paris Minister of the Mushanov Cabinet and later Foreign Minister in the Georgiev Government. And indeed the very geographical situation of Bulgaria precludes the possibility of any other policy than that of a free hand. The creation of strong ties binding Bulgaria closely to either of her neighbours might lead to the Balkan equilibrium being upset and to a conflagration. And Bulgaria is not likely to risk another war. This does not of course preclude the possibility of dismembered Bulgaria seeking a *rap-prochement* with all her neighbours for the purpose of ensuring her vitality and endeavouring to bring about normal conditions by a peaceful settlement of disputed questions. This endeavour is in harmony also with the interests of Bulgaria's neighbours. Today Bulgaria is playing the part of a buffer State as between the countries belonging to the Balkan Block, for which reason the existence of Bulgaria as an independent State is of vital

importance to them too; for such a Bulgaria is a guarantee of the balance of power and is in the way of any attempt to secure the hegemony of the Balkans. Now the real object of the Balkan Pact was to enable the signatories to bind one another's hands in respect of any possible disturbance of the equilibrium and thus indirectly to guarantee Bulgaria's frontiers. It is therefore of vital importance to the several States belonging to the Balkan Block to facilitate the independent existence of Bulgaria and to strengthen the vitality of that country. And the only alternative open to the persons responsible for the foreign policy of Bulgaria is to continue to show her goodwill towards her neighbours, to convince the world in general of the peaceful character of her intentions, and to wait patiently until the injustices committed against her are repaired peacefully on the basis of the principles laid down in the treaties of peace. And this is the foreign policy of the present Bulgarian Government, as it has been that of every Bulgarian Government in power since the end of the Great War. There have certainly been tendencies in evidence in the country making for the establishment of a closer co-operation with certain of the country's neighbours, — a circumstance to be attributed to the internal troubles created by the treaties of peace and to the endeavour to escape from the difficulties resulting. Although the Governments have so far succeeded in keeping the official policy of the country free from tendencies of the kind, their very existence is in itself a warning to all Bulgaria's neighbours and to the other European States too, showing them that the only way to solve the Bulgarian problem is to place the foundations of Bulgaria's independence on a sound basis.

(-ev.)

HOW MINORITIES LIVE

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS

On February 6th. Charles Sidor, Editor-in-chief of the "Slovák", the leading organ of Monsignor Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, began the term of two months' imprisonment to which he had been sentenced for a speech delivered at a revisionist meeting and an article published in a Czech Opposition daily appearing in Prague. Before entering the prison he was fêted in Pozsony (Bratislava) by the leaders of his party and the members of the editorial staff, who took solemn leave of him and then accompanied him to the station. On his arrival at Rózsahegy (Ružomberok), where he is to serve his term, he was met at the station by a deputation headed by Hlinka himself, being then accompanied to the prison by the Monsignor. — The Nagytapolcsány Secretary of the Hlinka Party, Michael Branikovič, has been sentenced by the Nyitra District Court to one month's imprisonment for anti-State agitation. — A similar sentence has been passed on Nicholas Hraný, a labourer from Nagylapás, for having sung a parody of the Czech national anthem.

SCHOOL STRIKE

At Léva, one of the most important towns in Southern Slovakia, parents are unwilling to allow their children to attend the State Slovak school until the authorities promise to have a new school built without delay — of possible, before the opening of the next school year. In consequence, for some time past there has not been any teaching in the Slovak school.

RUMANIA

"NUMERUS VALACHICUS"

Alexander Vaida-Voivod, former Prime Minister, who signed the Paris Minority Treaty on behalf of Rumania, at a political meeting of the National Peasant Party convened for the purpose of drafting a political programme, moved the introduction of a "numerus clausus" scheme as against the minorities. This system — called by Vaida "numerus vlachicus" — is intended to provide that in every field of the public life of Rumania from the secondary schools upwards (in higher education, in commerce and industry, in the public services and among the employees of private enterprise, as also in the professions) the quota of persons belonging to minorities shall not exceed 25% of the Rumanians in the respective branches of public life. This means, in other words, that persons belonging to minorities are to be excluded from occupations or professions where their quota is in excess of 25%. After a speech by Julius Maniu the executive committee of the Party rejected Vaida-Voivod's motion; but the latter noted that he would bring the question before the general meeting of the National Peasant Party. So the matter is by no means closed.

CULTURAL CLOSING OF FRONTIERS

As is well known, a Rumanian professor in the University of Kolozsvár recently addressed to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences a letter asking for the verses of Horace set to music. The Hungarian Academy complied with the request and sent the verses in question, which were however — as reported by the "Hiradó" agency —

returned by the Rumanian Post Office unopened. Albert Berzeviczy, President of the Hungarian Academy, has stated that cases of the kind have already repeatedly occurred, and that the intervention of the competent factors had always proved of no avail. The President of the Academy believes that negotiations will be reopened shortly with the co-operation of delegates of the League of Nations and of representatives of the countries concerned. These negotiations will be carried on in Vienna.

NAGYVÁRAD TOWN LIBRARY TO BE CLOSED

The Nagyvárad Town Library, which comprises some 40.000 volumes representing a value of nearly 10,000.000 lei, is to be closed by the present Mayor, *Tiberius Moşciu*, on the ground that the bulk of the material contained in the library is Hungarian. The "Brassói Lapok" (January 16th., 1935) is justified in speaking of this scheme as a "cultural scandal" and in asking for the protection of the enlightened public opinion of Rumania and of the Minister of Education.

USE OF HUNGARIAN (MAGYAR) PLACE-NAMES FORBIDDEN

All the papers appearing in Kolozsvár have received from the Censor's Office an ordinance in terms of which in the future the names of towns and villages, street-names and the names of counties must not be written in Hungarian, only their Rumanian names being allowed. The ordinance in question also requires all printing establishments to use on all printed matter of every kind only the Rumanian place- and street-names. This measure is particularly surprising in view of the fact that on more than one occasion the findings of the courts of law have decided in favour of the use of the Hungarian place-names. The Magyar Party is doing all in its power through its parliamentary representatives to secure the invalidation of the ordinance, which is injurious to the position of the Hungarian minority. ("Keleti Ujság", Vol. XVIII., No. 26, February 2nd., 1935).

NO HUNGARIAN MAY BE EVEN A POSTMAN

On December 1st., 1934, the Postmaster-General dismissed from active service — without granting them even a composition — all the postmasters belonging to minorities. The "Brassói Lapok" (No. 21, February 1st., 1935) reports that by circular ordinance No. 1017/93 based upon decrees of the Postmaster-General Nos. 236.824 and 262.854/Ptt. S. *Nastasescu*, Csikszereda District Inspector of Post Offices, required all the postmasters within his district (then, of course, all non-minority officials) to exchange all the minority employees under their jurisdiction still in active service for persons of Rumanian nationality, the work to be effected before April 30th., 1935. Until this measure has been carried into effect the said postmasters are to be personally responsible for every step taken by minority employees and are required to strictly control their activity. Thus, after April 30th. the postal service refuses to tolerate the presence of a single village clerk, postman or messenger not belonging to the Rumanian majority, — even if the person in question happens to be a postmaster or to be paid by the village (township) where he is employed.

GENDARME BRUTALITIES AGAIN

Recently, in the County of Csik, a young farmer from Csikcsatószege named Joseph Incze (25 years of age) was so brutally lashed with a rope steeped in water by the non-com. in command of the gendarmerie station there that he suffered a rupture and even in the event of his surviving the injury will always be partly disabled (40%) — ("Népujság", January 31st., 1935). At Bikafalva in the County of Udvarhely a Szekler farmer of high standing named Albert Bedő has for no reason whatever been beaten black and blue by a gendarme "Keleti Ujság", January 28th., 1935).

YUGOSLAVIA

FIRST SERB GRAMMAR-SCHOOL (GYMNASIUM) 125 YEARS OLD

On January 27th., St. Save's Day, there were great doings in Novisad (Ujvidék) in celebration of the hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Serb grammar-school there. This educational institute was created in Hungary at a time when the Serbians living in the territory of present-day Serbia were still under Turkish rule and the idea of a Serb grammar-school was at best a dream; and it functioned without interruption during the Hungarian régime as the *alma mater* of Serb culture and a stronghold of Serbian national feeling, though at the same time striking evidence of the tolerance and liberalism of the Hungarians. As contrasted with this striking example of liberal treatment, as things stand at present, the Hungarian minority living in Yugoslavia — some half million souls — do not possess a single secondary school.

STATISTICS OF DECEMBER EXPULSIONS

As is well known, in connection with the attempt at Marseilles the Yugoslav Government expelled large numbers of persons who are now residing in Hungary. The data relating to these persons will be found in the statistics given below:

1. *Total number of persons expelled from Yugoslavia* 3304, bread-winners 1402, dependants 1902.
2. *Their distribution by nationality.*
Hungarians, 1191: breadwinners 577, dependants 614;
"Homeless", 400: bread-winners 138, dependants 262;
Doubtful, 1703: bread-winners 681, dependants 1022;
Yugoslavs 8: bread-winners 5, dependants 3;
Others, 2: bread-winner 1, dependant 1.
3. *Their distribution by race.*
Magyars, 2373: bread-winners 995, dependants 1378;
Serbians, 95: bread-winners 46, dependants 49;
Croats, 40: bread-winners 14, dependants 26;
Germans, 766: bread-winners 301, dependants 465;
Others, 30: bread-winners 14, dependants 16.
4. *Domiciled in Yugoslavia before 1910*, 933; bread-winners 354, dependants 579; *between 1910 and July 26th 1921*, 1850; bread-winners 751, dependants 1099, *since July 26th 1911*, 521: bread-winners 267, dependants 254.

5. *Possessing real estate in Yugoslavia:* 470.
6. *Served in the army in Yugoslavia:* 105. With soldiers' certificates: 11. Under military oath: 1. Examined by the military authorities: 44.
7. *Desirous of returning:* 1948; bread-winners 756, dependants 1152.
8. *Unwilling to return:* 1356: bread-winners 606, dependants 750.
9. *Occupations:* Supported 2045 (bread-winners 143, dependants 1902.) House-owners 389, Landowners 129, Owners of factories 11, Nuns ..., Pensioners 16, Industrial workers 151, Shop assistants 27, Day labourers 138, Master craftsmen 72, Shopkeepers 22, Engineers and technical employees 4, Private Enterprise Employees 23, Domestic servants 50, Gardeners and peasants 144, Other professional classes 35, Other nonprofessional classes 48.
10. *Their distribution in Hungary.*
In Budapest 865; bread-winners 364, dependants 501;
In provincial towns 1115; bread-winners 463, dependants 652;
In other places 1324: bread-winners 496, dependants 828.
11. *Assets left behind in Yugoslavia.*
Houses 398,
Land, 1818 cadastral yokes,
Works 54,
Shops 32,
Pieces of furniture 1893,
Money (dinars) 786.700.

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In answer to a question respecting the expulsions asked by Mr. Rhys Davies, M. P., Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary is reported by the papers to have said that the British Government had repeatedly expressed its misgivings in the matter of the deportations. In respect of the nationality of the deportees, he thought the legal situation rather complicated; but it would seem that these events had not augmented the number of persons of no nationality. The question of nationality depended upon the relevant provisions of the treaties of peace, not upon the recent procedure of the Yugoslav Government. However, the trouble was just the fact that the Yugoslav Government was not carrying into effect the provisions of Article 3 of the Minority Treaty of Saint-Germain and of Article 62 of the Treaty of Trianon, under which that Government is required to acknowledge as nationals of the Yugoslav State all persons who acquired rights of citizenship in the territory of present-day Yugoslavia prior to January 1st., 1910. A considerable number of the "homeless" and 1703 "doubtful nationality" persons shown in column 2. of the above statistics have been denied Yugoslav citizenship in direct defiance of the treaties of peace; as may be seen also from the fact that of that number 933 were resident in Yugoslavia prior to January 1st., 1910, so that there can be no question as to their being Yugoslav citizens (nationals) as provided in the treaties of peace. It is equally characteristic that of the persons deported 105 were such as had served in the Yugoslav army, having therefore complied with their duties as citizens and being thus undoubtedly entitled to the rights attaching to Yugoslav citizenship. So the question arises as to when Yugoslavia proposes to allow the return home of the deportees and in particular of those deportees whose Yugoslav citizenship is undoubted. Among civilised nations it is not usual for a State to deport its own nationals; nor is the deportation *en masse* even of foreign nationals in keeping with the present development of international law.

P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

A U S T R I A

ESTIMATES FOR THE YEAR 1935

A Federal Law supplementing the 1935 Appropriations Act makes the following provisions for Austria's extraordinary budget. For the purposes of investments and sundry other extraordinary expenditure of the kind, the sum of 100 million schillings; out of which sum the amount of 66 millions is to be secured by credits, the remaining 34 millions to be supplied out of the treasury funds mortgaged for the service of the League of Nations loan which become available as a result of the conversion of this loan. Pending the effectuation of this credit transaction the Minister of Finance is authorised to issue six months' Exchequer Bills for an amount not to exceed 25 million schillings, the amount subscribed to be repaid out of the yield of the credit transaction. The surplus amounts remaining out of the expenditure granted under the 1934 extraordinary budget not utilised during the said year may be employed at any time before the end of 1935. The Law is to be in force retroactively as from January 1st., 1935.

B U L G A R I A

PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT IN RE PAYMENT OF FOREIGN DEBTS

The Delegate of the League of Nations, *M. Cheysson*, having proposed to the Bulgarian Government that the pourparlers relating to the debts due to foreign countries should be resumed, the negotiations were opened on December 21st. last and led to the conclusion of an agreement relating to the payments to be effected by Bulgaria in the first quarter of the year 1935; under this agreement the Bulgarian Government ordained that 15% of the payments due in the month of January shall be paid in foreign exchanges (as against the quota of 32½% fixed under the agreement made in May, 1934). According to a statement made by the Bulgarian Premier, a Bulgarian delegation is to go to London at the end of February for the purpose of continuing the negotiations.

C Z E C H O - S L O V A K I A

EFFECT OF LAST YEAR'S DEPRECIATION OF NO ACCOUNT

(First Anniversary of Official Depreciation of Czech Crown.) In illustration of the effect of the depreciation policy the "*Národní Politika*" writes as follows: — "Today, after the lapse of a year, it is no easy matter to prove that the policy of depreciation has been a success, and still more difficult to show that the results achieved are in proportion to the hopes entertained by competent factors in respect of the probable consequences of this far-reaching action. There is no denying that there was a certain recovery in evidence a few months after the carrying into effect of the process of depreciation; but, seeing that no adequate measures of commercial policy followed that recovery, the influence of the injection was reduced to a minimum. Even if the foreign trade balance shows a numerical improvement, that does not mean an improvement in the inland situation, for the constant increase in the number of unemployed is a strikingly eloquent proof that there has not been the slightest improvement in the situation. It is nonsense to talk of the depreciation having lightened the charges devolving on debtors; for even after the

depreciation had been effected the amount of money placed at the disposal of the general public did not increase in volume, and credit did not become either cheaper or more accessible. Perhaps the only gain to the money market was the fact that monies previously in foreign countries were brought home; but that does not mean that our last reserves hitherto invested abroad have been exhausted. The first year of depreciation has shown that the crisis cannot be solved or shelved by a policy of intervention for the control of the currency".

CLOSING DOWN OF FACTORIES

Between the end of April, when the Order in Council relating to the closing down of establishments was issued, and the end of October, 1934, the number of factories announcing their intention to suspend operations for more than three months was 91, the number of workers affected being 12,132. 67 establishments employing altogether 6,072 workers were permitted to close down. Most of the permits issued were granted to establishments belonging to the wood, earthenware and ceramic, glass and textile industries.

"HORRIBLE MISERY IN SLOVAKIA"

In an article dated from Trenčín bearing the above title and published on January 20th. in the evening edition of the "*Právo Lidu*", the organ of the Czech Social-Democrat Party (one of the parties represented in the Government), it is admitted that the economic crisis is far more serious in character in Slovakia than in the western part of the Republic. In some villages the misery of the Slovak workers is simply horrible. A poor itinerant tinker told someone in Prague that in his village "the only people who ever eat enough are the priest, the innkeeper and the Jewish general dealer". The people at large have not even the most essential articles of food. The people live on potatoes; but often there are not even potatoes to be had. As a consequence of the measures for the protection of labour markets the possibilities of earning a livelihood abroad are things of the past. A large proportion of the factories in the Highlands are not in working; there is no means of earning a living; there is no money; and the children — and even the grown-up persons — walk about in the snow bare-footed and clothed in rags. It is impossible to get loans, for every article of any value has long found its way into the hands of the general dealer or of the innkeeper. It is quite a common thing to see even the pots standing in old biggins with labels marking them as "attached". There are no matches either; the embers needed to light a fire are carried on tin plates from one cottage to the other. The village authorities have asked for a supply of cheap potatoes to relieve the misery — at a price not exceeding 10 Czech crowns a metric quintal; but even these potatoes have to be sold to the people on credit, for the people have no money at all. The terrible economic crisis raging in the territories of Slovakia and Ruthenia severed from Hungary has become a household word in the valley of the Danube. The admission of the "*Právo Lidu*" shows foreign readers too the correctness of the statements referring thereto made by Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians. There can be no doubt that the long years of economic crisis have enhanced the misery of the inhabitants of these territories; yet the real cause of the misery is not the crisis, but the separation from Hungary and also the economic policy of the Prague Government, which is dictated on-sidedly by a desire to serve exclusively the interests of Czech manufacturing industry and aims at ruining the native industries of Slovakia and Ruthenia.

HUNGARY

TRADE BALANCE FOR 1934

In the year 1934 Hungary's imports aggregated a value of 344.8 million pengő as against 312.6 million pengő in the year 1933, the value of her exports rising from 391.3 million pengő in 1933 to 405.3 million pengő in 1934. This shows a decline of the excess of exports from 78.7 million to 60.5 million pengő. According to the monthly returns of the National Bank of Hungary, the quotas of the total amount of imports falling to the shares of the respective categories of goods were as follows: — coal, wood and raw oils, 68.4 million pengő (as against 52.4 million pengő in 1933); raw metals and half-finished metals, 16.9 million pengő (11.6 million pengő) half-finished textiles, 23.4 (25) million pengő; textile manufactures, 12.1 (10.7) million pengő; machines, 17.8 (12.2) million pengő; while the quotas of our exports recorded under the various categories were as follows: — live stock and animal products, 139.6 (134.3) million pengő; wheat, rye and flour, 69.6 (60.6) million pengő; maize, 2.4 (14.7) million pengő; sugar, 3.6 (2.3) million pengő.

RUMANIA

LATEST REPORT OF AUBOIN, REPRESENTATIVE OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS

As is well known, some years ago, in order to protect the valuation of the leu, Rumania's foreign creditors delegated a representative to act as financial technical adviser to the National Bank of Rumania. Roger Auboin's term of office has expired; and the Rumanian Government has succeeded in persuading Paris to waive the appointment of a foreign financial supervisor. This result the Tatarescu Government would book as a triumph, although it is well known that it was the favourable tenor of Auboin's reports that bolstered up the foreign valuation of the Rumanian leu. Now that he is compelled to give up office, in his last report Auboin deals ruthlessly and openly with the real financial situation of Rumania, which he exposes frankly, — a frankness of criticism which has impelled the Censor to permit the publication only of extracts from the report, a procedure criticised by Gafencu, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a question asked by him at a meeting of the Senate.

The part of Auboin's report for 1934 passed by the Censor begins by stating that the principal source of the Rumanian financial difficulties is the continuous deficit shown by the State Budget. The excess of expenditure over revenue shown by the State Budget is generally speaking 20%; and the deficits were still in evidence even after the foreign creditors had reduced their claims from 6000 to 1500 million lei. On the other hand, the Government increased the expenditure of the inland administration by exactly the same amount as that saved on the service of foreign debts. The report establishes the fact that this increase in expenditure was the result of the foolish and irrational increase of the number of public employees. At the same time the Government completely ignored the advice of the foreign experts concerning the manner of achieving an advance in the public receipts. This then led to the expenditure exceeding 21.000 millions, the revenue in no single year reaching the amount of even 18.000 millions, the deficit of 3000 millions thus becoming practically a permanency. According to the "Argus", a financial journal appearing in Bucharest, during the last 7 years Rumania has succeeded in aggregating a budgetary deficit amounting altogether to 40.000 million lei.

M. Auboin's report protests against the enormous volume of the note circulation, which is an excessively

heavy charge also on the country's trade balance. According to the report, in the course of the year 1934 the balance of trade deteriorated considerably, — not so much on account of the decline of exports, which only showed a decrease from 14.100 to 13.600 million lei, as in consequence of the advance in the volume of imports, which owing to the effect of the compensation trade system increased from 11.700 to 12.900 millions. The report further establishes the fact that the advice given by Professor Rist — M. Auboin's predecessor as financial adviser — was (except for the experiments made in 1932 and 1933) never followed or accepted by the Rumanian Governments. The conclusions arrived at three years ago by Professor Charles Rist — conclusions which then caused the fall of the Jorga Government — are just as true today; and the advice given by him is more to the point than ever. According to the report, owing to the revival of inland agrarian production it is much easier today to apply the conclusions arrived at by Professor Rist. On the other hand, however, the report urges that the economic restrictions in force at present should be removed as soon as possible, and demands the restoration of unrestricted trade. It notes further that the primary *sine qua non* of an improvement of the economic situation in Rumania is the re-construction of the country's finances and the protection of the currency. However, the putting into force of the re-construction measures cannot be long delayed; and before the end of the present month (February) all the steps calculated to improve the public finances and the position of the currency must be taken. Any delay — so the report affirms — may ruin the prospects of re-construction.

NEW FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM

The resignation of Slavescu, Minister of Finance, with which we dealt in our last number, was the consequence of the Cabinet Council presided over by the King approving the plan put forward by Manulescu-Strunga, Minister of Commerce. The fundamental principles underlying the new foreign trade system are as follows: the only article to be included in the future in the first category of export goods serving exclusively to secure the foreign exchanges required by the National Bank is to be petroleum, the quota to be surrendered to the National Bank at the official rate of exchange being raised to 60%. Of the yield of all other articles — inclusive of corn and wood — 20% is to be surrendered to the National Bank at the official rate of exchange. The rest of the yield of the export trade is to be placed at the disposal of the importers by the permits issued for the use of importers being realisable without restriction. However, the payment of imports originating from countries with which clearing agreements have been made that are still in force is to be effected as provided in these agreements and not by way of import permits. At the same time it is desired to encourage compensation transactions for the purpose of further enhancing the export trade, the ratio of imports and exports respectively to be determined according to the character of the respective article separately in each individual case.

BULK OF YIELD OF DOMESTIC LOAN TO BE APPROPRIATED FOR THE ARMY

Late in January the Minister of Finance presented to Parliament a proposal that the yield of the 1934 four-and-a-half per cent, inland loan should be divided as follows between the various departments: — Army (War Department), 2000 millions; Agriculture, 340 millions; Education, 210 millions; Public Health, 100 millions; for the protection of the currency, 250 millions. The expenses connected with the marketing of the loan amounted to roughly 40 million lei.

YUGOSLAVIA

A FEW FIGURES OF THE 1934 BALANCE OF TRADE

The quotas of the various countries figuring on the imports side were as follows: — Germany, 13.92%; Austria, 12.37%; Czecho-Slovakia, 11.68%; Great Britain, 9.27%; United States of North America, 6.43%. The quotas of the several countries figuring on the exports side were: — Italy, 20.57%; Austria, 16.36%; Germany,

15.42%; Czecho-Slovakia, 11.28%; Great Britain, 4.66%. It is a striking circumstance that the two other Little Entente States do but little trade with Yugoslavia.

AGRARIAN MORATORIUM

In terms of an Order in Council issued at the end of January the Government has granted farmers a moratorium for the payment of their debts until September 1st, 1935. The rates of interest payable on these debts have been reduced from 6% to 4½% on loans due to banks and from 3½% to 1% on loans due to other creditors.

S P O R T S

Great Britain being the original home of sports, it goes without saying that the leading events of British sport are always followed with the greatest interest all over the world — and of course in Hungary in particular. The interest shown in Hungary this year is exceptionally great, seeing that we may regard it as quite certain that Hungarians too will compete in many branches. The first Hungarians to compete this year in Great Britain were the table-tennis players, who quite recently figured eminently in the international championships in London. The next Hungarian competitors to visit Great Britain will be the athletes, of whom a team of veritably Olympic dimensions is to take part in the English athletic championship meeting. And probably towards the end of the year we shall have a return match between the association football teams representing England and Hungary; last year the Hungarian team succeeded in beating the English team in Budapest.

ICE HOCKEY (CURLING)

At the international championship meeting in Switzerland the Hungarian team failed to achieve any noteworthy results. Nevertheless, during the course of the meeting it beat Holland (6—0) and drew with England and Switzerland (European champion team), thus showing a form belying its low place on the final list.

Far more successful was the role played by the Hungarian universities team during the international winter university games at St. Moritz. The team representing the Hungarian universities — after a long and bitter struggle — succeeded in beating Switzerland in the final, thereby winning the international university ice hockey (curling) championship for Hungary.

SKIING

The great event of the Hungarian skiing world was the appearance of the three Norwegian champions, Birger, Sørensen and Andersen. The three world-famed Norwegian skiers naturally finished far ahead of their Hungarian rivals, who joined the public — present in unprecedented numbers — in sincere admiration of the great achievements of the Norwegian champions.

TABLE TENNIS (PING-PONG)

This is one of those sports in which Hungarians have for years past proved invincible. Wherever they appear, the Hungarian table-tennis players score victory after

victory and win glory for the Hungarian tricolor. That was the case recently in America too, where the two Hungarian champions, Victor Barna and Alexander Glanz, won easy victories over the best representatives of the States. No more striking proof of the success of their tour in America could be cited than that offered by their election as honorary members of the American Table Tennis Association, — an appreciation of their merits of particular significance in view of the fact that the Association had never previously conferred that distinction on anyone.

After their success in America the Hungarian champions went to England, where they took part in the London international championship meeting. In the team competition on February 12th. the Hungarian team won the Swiss Cup for the ninth time. The final match was against Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary winning by 5 to 3.

FENCING

The San Remo fencing academy, which has already become a tradition, every year gathers together the best fencers in Europe: this year it gave three young representatives of the Hungarian colours an opportunity to show that the superiority of Hungarian sword fencing is still as great as ever. The best Italian fencers were matched against them; and the final result — 6 to 3 in favour of Hungary — does not convey an absolutely faithful idea of the actual measure of superiority of the Hungarian fencers; for Nedo Nadi himself — who is responsible for the work of preparing the Italian fencers for the Olympic Games — declared that all three Hungarians — Kovács, Maszlay and Rasztovcics — were better than any of the Italians. The value of the victory is enhanced by the fact that the young fencers from Hungary who appeared at San Remo had not previously represented the Hungarian tricolor at any important meeting.

SCOUTING

Hungarian representatives were also present at the Pacific Jamboree held outside Melbourne (Australia). The Jamboree was opened formally by Sir Isaac Isaacs, Governor of Australia. Before making his opening speech the Governor read the Rescript of King George despatched specially for the occasion, then welcoming cordially the boy scouts who were present and speaking in most appreciative terms of the great success of the World Jamboree held in Hungary two years ago.