

„In a state of grace ...
truth be served by us.”⁽¹⁾

Ákos Péter Nagy:

**The Activities of Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies (subsequent: PSLEA)
between 2000 and 2010 in virtue of the Legal Background and the Philosophy of
Function**

Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies

The struggle for independence in Middle and Eastern Europe lasted for decades and became consummate through the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 leading to the transformation of society and the rise of democratic states founded on the rule of law in the whole area.

As a result, not only the armed forces and bodies, but also the organs of the defence of order were thoroughly reorganized.

Before 1971 the group II/1. of the Ministry of the Interior, and then, after the reorganization in 1971, the department of the internal defence of this same ministry, and finally, after the separation of the spheres of authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the state security and the police, the major department of security within the National Police Headquarters used to carry out some of the today's duties of PSLEA in our native country.^(2, 3)

Regarding the fact how society was conceptualized in Kádár's Hungary, the Helsinki Final Act (1975), which envisaged both the making good of human rights and the furtherance of democracy, could no longer be neglected if one meant to bring about wholly new arrangements in it.

During the political transformation of 1989-90 in Hungary a great number of measures were taken, governmental regulations were passed, and fundamental as well as interim laws were enacted in the long process of the disjunction of the branches of power and the creation of the constitutional control which had an effect on the different professional fields. In the course of

all these events the operation of the Ministry of the Interior was also made to rest on a foundation of the rule of law, and this entailed the detachment of its scope of authority from those of the state security and the police, with the governmental regulation No. 147 of November 17⁽⁴⁾, 1994 and the law No. XXXIV. of 1994 being outstanding factors that helped to achieve it.^(5,6)

Being public and easily accessible to all taking interest, also, declared in *Hungarian Gazette*, the official journal of the Republic of Hungary, the governmental regulation No. 49 of May 4., 1995, which set up PSLEA, brought along an essential change, because in a very intelligible manner it made rules for both the basic activities and the province of authority of the institution in terms of its personnel and in terms of what it was authorized to do, while containing a list of the methods that one was permitted to use.⁽⁷⁾

The drafting, passing and the enforcement of the various laws postulated experiences gained in stable democracies, a different generation and thus, a different way of looking at things as well as an exacting kind of creative power and the absolute independence from current politics.⁽⁸⁾

From its formation until the end of 2010 when it was virtually transformed into a wholly different organization, PSLEA was successively headed by five major personalities of service whose views and personae branded the philosophy of the operation of it.⁽⁹⁾ And, as far as I can judge it, thanks to the performances of its two pre-eminent leaders, Dr. László Bene on the one hand, and Dr. Ferenc Frankberger on the other, could PSLEA meet with real recognition and international success.

Facts in history show that the institution was not equably operated at all times. First, the given leaders in office were constantly forced to contend against the various conceptions of the many departmental ministers and under-secretaries of the different governments elected in order to make the organization independent and lay down the route on the basis of which it was to be set up and to operate, also in the long run. Secondly, in this period PSLEA succeeded in forming far-reaching and fruitful connections with special committees of the European Union having jurisdiction and with fellow-organs of some important countries, too, all holding the Agency in high esteem, as it is proven by two facts: on the one hand, the Agency has been given the mentor's duties from the middle of the decade to establish similar agencies in Middle and Eastern Europe as well as in the Western Balcan states, and, on the

other, general Ferenc Frankberger was asked to direct EPAC,⁽¹⁰⁾ which resulted in Hungary hosting many international conferences.⁽¹¹⁾

Yet the appreciation on the part of several nations could not dispel the mystery that surrounded the Agency here in Hungary, as at the beginning of the second millennium the Hungarians, even if they perhaps knew of its existence, were neither conscious of what the Agency was authorized to do, nor were they able to distinguish it from the secret service. And, while reading the documents, one could also see that top figures in the government were unaware of the exact operation of the body.

Just to give an example I wish to remind the reader of an incident at this place: at a time the national budget was drawn up, austerity measures were set store by in such a degree that a proposal submitted by the Ministry of Finance nearly led to the abolishment of PSLEA, because as a result of the unconsciousness of a great number of important things in connection with it, PSLEA was meant to merge into the Office of National Security. And, this very proposal becomes highly interesting if the main force behind the event is revealed: those namely who were responsible thought of a merger only, because the Office of National Security suggested it, although fundamental differences could be discerned if one examined the tasks, the authorization by law, the working practices and the personnel of the two agencies. The tasks previously done by the Office of National Security became completely outdated. The duties listed by the law No. CXXV. of 1995⁽¹²⁾ reduced the number of possibilities allowing the Office of National Security to operate, hence in order to make the organ despite this survive, this law simultaneously gave new tasks to it, like some completed by the police, i. e. tasks that were completely incompatible with the body.

The question of the regulation by law

The service, established in 1995, was still - even at the beginning of 2000 - operated upon regulations of some paragraphs of the *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act), the 49/1995 Government Regulation as well as ministerial instructions, although when completing jobs, it has turned out in several cases that there is detailed legal delegation needed in order to be effective.

The importance of solving this problem can be represented by the examples below: The newspaper article which was published about the operation of the service was followed by a judicial process. At the trial the judge declared that no crime had been committed, nevertheless the writer of the article committed the breach of state secrets, however by the time he did so, the case had not formally been a state secret any more. As the explanation said, the material was labelled a state secret by the head of an organisation that had not even exist by law. There was a service called Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies, but according to the legal norm there should only have been a Prevention Agency. ⁽¹³⁾ The problem was that such Agency did not exist. The Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies did exist but there was no law saying that the two agencies were the same. ⁽¹⁴⁾

In order to be able to develop the operation of the organisation its legal basis had to be consolidated. Some negative changes in social matters, such as higher proportion of corruption in daily life of the Defence Police Forces, the increasing level of racketeering and the increasingly widespread white-collar crime also showed that the consolidation was badly needed.

According to the general opinion, public life had gone more and more dishonest and this was not only a problem of defence police forces but that of also every single level of administration and politics.

The submission of the first version of law Nr. LXXXV of 1999⁽¹⁵⁾ wished to change the incoherent regulation of the *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act). Based on Nr. 1/1999 (II. 24) AB decision of the Constitutional Court⁽¹⁶⁾ special competences regarding the Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies were overruled. However discrepancy of the responsibilities and competences of PSLEA as well as their law regulation was not solved, but got even larger.

Meanwhile competences of the organisation were broadened further on by law Nr. LIV of 2002. ⁽¹⁷⁾ According to this law PSLEA was also made responsible for carrying out crime prevention, detection and defence services for state and professional fire departments of local governments, for investigation authorities of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (*APEH*) which are whiles operating under the Police, such as for organisations of ministries completing the supervision of defence police forces. Although the scope of responsibilities and competences of PSLEA considerably widened, due to the contents of its operation and the type of its direction it got more and more diverged from the police.

Still the appropriate law regulation to enable its proper function was not made and this is something the Constitutional Court also prudently pointed out in its adjudication. ⁽¹⁸⁾ On the other hand the same adjudication particularly refers to the interdiction of evasion of the two-third law in case of legal regulation of PSLEA. ⁽¹⁹⁾ The cause of investigations of the Constitutional Court was the exceptional legalism given by the Constitution.

This point of view is supported by the adjudication Nr. 31/2001. (VII. 11) AB⁽²⁰⁾ which states as fundamental that the structural regulation of *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act) operates only the police and points out that the rules of paragraph Nr. VII of the adjudication are part of the operation of the police.

The commissioner of data safety had already declared, that ‘the data administration which is needed to complete the operation of PSLEA was regulated by the law and standards of legal force highly contradictory, leaving matters of data safety and constitutional requirements in several points out of consideration.’ ⁽²¹⁾ All things considered and summarizing the facts above, the diversity and importance of the tasks of PSLEA, its enlarged scope of duties and authority – regarding the constitutional objections of the legal basis of its function – makes it necessary to incorporate the legal status, the scope of duties and authority as well as the basic rules of the operation of the organisation into a two-third law.

Justification of the regulation by law:

- When establishing the *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act), the predecessor-organisation of PSLEA, the Security Department of the National Police Headquarters (ORFK) was still part of the police, so the recent regulation is highly out of date.
- Based on the Constitution⁽²²⁾, as well as on the law of the adoption of statute⁽²³⁾, the rules of natural rights and responsibilities can exclusively be defined in a law. ^(24, 25)
- The intelligence character of the function of PSLEA furthermore the high priority of the essential collection of classified information justify the necessity of the regulation by a two-third parliamentary decision.
- The operation of the Service covers several organisations of defence police forces under a few ministries/departments meanwhile the assignments of the Service also affect the constitutional rights of the persons within the staff of these organisations
- The rules of collection of classified information – including the order of economy – must be specifically defined regarding the Service.

- The data administration of the Service is based on the authorization decree written in §75 of the *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act), which can possibly cause constitutional concerns when differently interpreted.
- The regulation by law would quasi empower the Service an investigation authority, as in some cases either prosecutorial instruction is needed in order to enable carrying investigatory actions into effect without loss of time and starting criminal procedures effectively, or prosecutorial instruction after criminal procedure is required to complete the collection of classified information whereas the collection of classified data requires leave of court.
- The scope of organisations and people within the crime preventive and investigational jurisdiction of the Service is due to be extended. ⁽²⁶⁾
- In order to develop international relations and co-operation with foreign and international partner institutions/organisations having partly or fully the same responsibilities and being the same level.

Dr. László Bene police major-general asked the Human Resources Department of the Home Office – regarding the considerable changes in the staff file – to reverse regulation Nr. 2/2000 (BK.3) of the Home Office instead of modifying it again and again and to draw up a new regulation based on the submitted proposal. ⁽²⁷⁾

In 2003 it was not only about drawing up a completely new regulation instead of the recent one, but also about modifying the Government Regulation Nr. 49/1995 or – as some concerns about the government regulation occurred in connection with data security – passing a brand new law determining the legal status and the function of PSLEA. ⁽²⁸⁾

At a meeting in February 2003 where the operation of the Service in the year 2002 was evaluated, the Home Secretary⁽²⁹⁾ assigned a duty to the management of the Service to maintain the legitimacy of the Service because of the above mentioned reasons.

While the bill was drafted – in 2003 based on the submitted proposal - the Disputed Claims Department of the Home Office drafted the new Government Regulation about the Service. The management of the PSLEA could not agree with the version of the Disputed Claims Department, as this did not take regulation requirements of the Service – the majority of which fell exclusively under the head of regulation by law –into account. ⁽³⁰⁾

In February 2004, at the meeting where the fulfilment of the tasks of the previous year was evaluated, the Home Secretary also ordered to draw a bill of the Service. The task was listed in the operational schedule for 2004 of the Service, and besides there were some other alternatives of several sub-level regulations to establish. ^(31, 32)

The legislative bill was finally introduced at the Disputed Claims Department of the Home Office in October 2004. As regarding the Government Regulation, they only succeeded in completing the preparation tasks, because they had to do not only an awful lot of arrangements to other statutes, but also to fulfil their daily requirements. The draft was sent to the organisations involved in the regulation, such as the Public Law and Codification Department of the Attorney General, the Supervision and Inspectorial Department of the Home Office, to the Department of Investigational Supervision and Preparation of Prosecution of the Supreme Public Prosecutions, to the Human Resources Department of the Home Office, to the Ministry of Finance, to the Commissioner of Data Safety as well as to the Defence Office of Classified Information of the Home office in order to have their opinion. The majority of the above mentioned organisations considered the regulation by law to be necessary.

In 2005 the draft was subject of a interior administrative negotiation. ⁽³³⁾ In March 2005 the Home Secretary submitted his presentation of the new Government Regulation of PSLEA to the Government.

Regarding the fact, that the FIDESZ (*Hungarian Civic Union*) – at that point of time in opposition – did not support any kind of bills submitted by the Socialists, the matter of the draft was finally dropped. ⁽³⁴⁾

It turned out to be clear that there was no chance to have a two-third law passed, so the Home Secretary asked the Service to work out another Government Regulation so that any gaps in the law could be removed.

In November 2005 the Department of Administration and Data Security of the Home Office reported to the Manager of the Legal Department Group that the data management within the main activities of PSLEA determined in 75. §. of the *Rtv* (Police Law/Constable Act). The PSLEA can complete it's internal crime prevention and investigation tasks by proceeding covert information gathering regulated in the 7th chapter of the *Rtv* (Police Law / Constable Act).

Operating its scope of authority the regulation stated in paragraph VII is authoritative. As concerning the PSLEA this is the one and only authorization to build a legal basis how to manage personal and special data of the protected staff. According to paragraph (1) of law Nr. LXIII. tv⁽³⁵⁾3.§. 1992 of legal force of that time, for lack of permission of the affected person management of personal data required legal authorization. Taken paragraph (3) of §3 into account, in case of obligatory personal data management the appropriate law should define purpose and conditions of data management, the scope of data to be managed, the level of insight, the duration of data management as well as the person carrying out data management. Such a law does in connection with PSLEA not exist and the modification of the Government Regulation would not solve the problem, either. In addition, in several items of the law of data management (e.g. § 202) there are detailed lists, where PSLEA itself is missing, so they are not entitled to carry out data management.⁽³⁶⁾

After the 2006 elections Home Office and the Attorney General's Department were consolidated, the management of the Service got from the former Home Office to the Attorney General's Department and Ministry of Defence.

During the period from 2007 to 2009 it has turned out to be obvious, that the bill can only be passed after the next elections and change of the government.

The police law was time to time modified, but the legal status of PSLEA remained unchanged. In the Government Regulation Nr. 49/1995. (V. 4) there were altogether 8 minimal modifications during the period under review (2000-2010), but these alterations were rather formal and did not refer to substantial changes.

Operational frames of PSLEA are given by the articles of organisation of the Home Office or those of one of their successors, all the relevant changes in these articles are defined in ministerial instructions. According to these the PSLEA was a subordinate body of the minister and was directly supervised by him, keeping contacts was carried out via Human Resources Department and the Under-Secretary of Administration.

The inside operation of the Service was defined in its – constantly renewed – organisational and operational articles which had to be approved of by the supervising ministry and a copy of which had to be sent to the Under-Secretary of Administration. The organisational and operational articles included the entire scope of operation of the PSLEA, its legal status, the

appointment of the head of the Service, organisational structure, (staff file) ... etc. were defined by the given legal authorizations.

Unfortunately professional intention to strengthen the rule of law and political intention did not meet, although the appropriate regulation by law could have given the legitimacy to the organisation to make it well-organized, structured and – having well-founded functional frames –last but not least self-confident.

The new operational philosophy of PSLEA

When being established, it was among the first questions how open the organisation of PSLEA should be. If it had been too closed or had operated too secretly, it would only have got similar to its predecessor-organisations in concern of its relationship to the public. A kind of totally opened way of operation, on the other hand, would have endangered its success and efficiency. ⁽³⁷⁾In addition, because of the special operation of the Service, as it was dealing with crime prevention, crime investigation and criminal prosecution of the Defence Police Forces, it could not be unlimited open to the mass media.

Essential requirement of the successful operation is the appropriate relationship to and communication with protected organisations, as well as the involvement of these organisations into the fight against corruption. ⁽³⁸⁾

By the beginning of 2000 because of secret operations, the old-school preconceptions and false information the Service became more and more estranged from the staff to be protected, it got practically undesirable, while crime in society became more and more widespread and this – of course – did not leave defence police forces untouched.

A negative attitude like this can mean the end for an investigation organisation, as it cannot fulfil its basic task without the necessary communication and information. A combination of open and operative information is needed in order to have a picture of an event – without any kind of communication, based only on the operative data it is unthinkable to reach the same goal.

‘The real danger of the corruption in defence police forces is not the number of the cases, but the damaging effect on the image and social status of the staff and the body of the organisation, and the fact that these acts are gradually weakening the trust of the public in the

operation of defence police forces and people are more and more losing faith in the honour of these forces.’⁽³⁹⁾

Main characteristics of criminal prosecution is that it directly meets the world of crime and offences, and this on a wide range. It is important to mention, that because of rising crime levels, since 1990 defence police forces have had to confront a definitely larger number of crimes that have been more dangerous than ever before – it goes without saying that all this has considerably increased the hazard of criminality and corruption.

Intelligence service methods that are based on delusion and mockery are too confidential to have effective outside feedback. Although legal regulation and outside supervision – such as the prosecutor or the investigation judge – can reduce the chance of abuse, but cannot entirely have the control over the power, means, methods and motives of the collection of classified information.

This is a field that gives the opportunity to serious abuses, time to time cases of organisations that were corrupted by politics get revealed.

The management of the PSLEA was aware of the severity of the problem, that is why in 2005 a new philosophy was established by dr. László Bene, head of Service. Basis to the new idea was still investigation, but its main keystones were prevention and defence.

PSLEA new goals: drawing up a new professional moral philosophy and having it accepted. It is an exceptionally remarkable challenge, as we all know that the crisis and uncertainty of values weakens the basis of the whole society and its relationship to crime. In case of the defence police forces it is not only the uncertainty of values that makes moral fundamental crackle, but also the lack of their social, moral and financial appreciation.

Under these circumstances the PSLEA needs to find the balance and operate successfully and effectively and be able to get itself accepted and appreciated by the staff of defence police forces at the same time, without destroying the image of defence police forces in public opinion. A change of paradigm is obvious regarding PSLEA. As a proof it has initiated and worked out the frames of its legal necessity and has also completed drawing up the law. The Service has contributed to a change of the attitude to its specialists and has set a good example in the international field. At the same time there are still some statistics to complete and some questions to answer in order to find out how effective was the operation of the defence police forces related to how efficient it’s activity was, considering the Police corporation’s work.

It is well known that the establishment of democratic law and the system of its institutions as well as the defence police legislation is a task to do for a long term. How European democratic norms can fit into Hungarian jurisdiction during this legislation period, is still a question. Where did heads of PSLEA and their colleagues who prepared all the tasks of drawing up the bill have their ideas? In what way did they trust their personal relationships or official connections? Has there been a good example set somewhere abroad that could be adopted?

As far as I am concerned, these factors have all played very little part. It seems to be a main principle – of course – that in the legislation of a democratic state jurisdiction and legal regulations have to be transparent and harmonize with other laws at the same time. All the facts show that the EU considers the efforts of the specialists of PSLEA to be efficient and regarding this question. The result, that the EU appointed the Service the mentor of the neighbouring states is one of the biggest achievements of the diversified international co-operation. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Summary

At the daybreak of the change of the political system there was an idea of establishing democracy and working out the frames of constitutionality to that end.

Fundamentally revising the conception of law enforcement organisation belongs to this image of society so that defence police forces were radically revolutionized and cardinal laws were passed.

It was a long and troublesome process the implementation of which did not only require general social agreement but also the agreement of the parties in parliament. The opening that followed the change of the political system forced the stability of moral values but made real values turn to relative and was followed by some values lost. Meanwhile it has become obvious, that in order to improve the system of brakes and counterbalances besides cardinal laws some new fundamental laws should be passed, but in the world of polarization, which was typical of Hungary in the first decade of the 21 century, all this was almost impossible to complete.

In the field of defence police they did not succeed in regulating the legal status of the Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies in this period, either. The uncertainty was reflected in the daily work of the Agency and in my personal opinion it did not serve the efficiency and success of the staff which was a huge contrast compared to their professional

skills. At the same time, the period in question shows, that by the second part of the decade the Agency managed to be internationally acknowledged and appreciated without all these. In order for our public life to be cleaner and more honest it is useful to listen to some advice of other philosophers: ‘Clear and detailed formulation of essential goals, values and principles, their implementation in the living and operating system, and in the long run, signing the so called social contract is more urgent and more important than any other seemingly more urgent and more important task to do in these societies. Not written on paper, nor on clay- or stone tablets, but in the conscience of people.’⁽⁴¹⁾

List of abbreviations:

RSZVSZ (Rendvédelmi Szervek Védelmi Szolgálat)	PSLEA, Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies
ORFK (Országos Rendőr-főkapitányság)	National Police Headquarters
EPAC (Európai Korrupcióellenes Kapcsolattartói Hálózat)	European Partners Against Corruption
Rtv (Rendőrségi törvény)	Police Law/Constable Act
AB (Alkotmánybíróság)	Constitutional Court
APEH (Adó – és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal)	Commissioners of Inland Revenue
BM (Belügyminisztérium)	Human Resources Department of the Home Office
FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége)	Hungarian Civic Union
EU (Európai Unió)	European Union

Notes:

1. Romans, the Bible – With notes to explain it, Budapest 2007
2. It was within the competence of the Police

3. Earlier the following adjectives such as 'safety' and 'internal security' were among the names. It is no accident after all internal averting of the defence units was called in this way all over the world. Leaving out of the adjective was necessary because during the changing of the political system the press was naming the Management of BM III/3 Internal Averting or 'Department of Internal Security' and it was better to get rid of this unfavourable association.
4. Government Regulation 147/1994 (XI 17) about Minister of the Interior's exercise power and competence
5. Act of the Police XXXIV in 1994
6. Establishment and forming the activity of the Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies during the changing of the political system by Ákos Péter Nagy, p 2
7. An interview with P. Col. Csaba Szabó about PSLEA, manuscript January, 2012
8. Establishment and forming the activity of PSLEA during the changing of the political system by Ákos Péter Nagy, p 14
9. Gyula Dezső 1995-1998, Brigade General Péter Szabó 1998-2001, Police Col. Pál Egressy 2001-2002, Police Lt-Gen. László Bene 2002-2004, Brigade General Ferenc Frankenberger 2005-2010
10. EUROPEAN PARTNERS AGAINST CORRUPTION, National Police Oversight Bodies and Anti-Corruption Authorities of EU Member States and Council of Europe Member Countries, www.epac.at
11. Among the general goals of EPAC there are the changing of the experience and the best practises gained during the activity of the anticorruption organizations of the EU members and deepening on the cooperation of the above mentioned organizations. Lately RSZVSZ paid emphasized attention for adapting the anticorruption experience

and directives drafted into the earlier conferences. ('Contact and Communication' 6th conference of the organizations for controlling and checking the police and the anticorruption organs in the EU, opening speech of Brigade General Ferenc Frankenberger, p 10, IRM RSZVSZ 22-24 November, 2006, Budapest, Hungary)

12. Act of National Security Services CXXV in 1995

13. Police Act paragraph (1) 94 §

14. An interview with P. Col. Csaba Szabó about RSZVSZ, manuscript January, 2012

15. Act for regulation of organized crime and the phenomena in connection with it and modifying laws related with it LXXXV in 1999

16. AB Decision 1/1999 (II 24) Act of Mafia

17. Act LIV in 2002 about the international cooperation of the organization against crime

18. AB Decision 1/1999 (II 24) Act of Mafia

19. The Government Regulation 49/1995 (V 4) 'copies' the secret rules for getting information and administration, which stated in the Police Act, to the structure that cannot be a police organ but it is inconsistent with the draft in the paragraph 40/A § (2) of the Constitution

20. According to the motion being aimed at the post-controlling whether the AB Decision 31/2001 (VII 11) is unconstitutional

http://www.jogtar.mtaki.hu/jogszabalyok/Roma_Jogtar_Pdf/Romakat_erinto_AB_hatarozatok/31.2001. VII.11. AB_hatarozat.pdf

21. Standpoint of the ombudsman about the legal establishment of the function of RSZVSZ 2000
<http://adatvedelmibiztos.hu/abi/index.php?menu=beszamolok/2000/III/1/1/1>
22. Act XX in 1949, the Constitution
23. Act XI 2 § c/, the referenced part of the Act of making law
24. Act XX in 1949, the Constitution
25. Act XI in 1989 of making law
26. Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Data Processing, Registering and Election Office, Registration Offices and the people who do not belong to the staff of the protected organ but they commit a crime with the members of these organs together or with the help of them
27. The later leaders of the Service was continuously pressing for this request, eg. Police Col. Béla Balla, Brigade General Ferenc Frankenberger from 2005
28. Official Communication Nr 25-265/1/2005 from Europol Office for Data Protecting to the Legal Main Group Management of Internal Ministry
29. Internal Minister Mónika Lamperth (2002-2006)
30. Provisions to restrict the data administration and the basic rights
31. Government Decree, Order of Internal Ministry

32. The Act would have been a significant step for PSLEA because it would have had cardinal changes such as PSLEA had 'quasi' jurisdiction of the authorities investigating in a criminal case
33. The Main Group management of the Human Resources, the Office of Public Administration and Public Service, the Economic Major Department of Internal Ministry, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Coordinating Major Department of NATO and the EU, National Authority of Catastrophe Protection, Central Data Processing Registering and Election Office, Central Police Station, the Cabinet Ministers and Supervisory and Safety Major Department of the Internal Ministry took part in the discussion.
34. On the other hand today it is obvious that FIDESZ, which was an opposition party then, did not have fundamental objection to the draft of a new law and it was turned out when FIDESZ became the governing party. On the basis of these there was agreement in the stabilizing of the democratic law and order in Hungary for nothing. The stabilizing of the democratic law and order was visibly and noticeably held back by the game of the political parties.
35. Act LXIII in 1992 about the protection of the personal data and the publicity of the public data
36. Official Communication 40-16-147/395-3/2005, Managing and Data Protecting Major Department of Internal Ministry
37. '... If it is very open, it will be at the expense of operation, the everyday work will suffer if everybody can see what you do. If an organization is closed, the press will not be able to treat with it, get to it, just a little news will leak out then it will be a mystified organization. If it is very open, while it can get a point of attack.' An interview with P. Col. Csaba Szabó about PSLEA, manuscript January, 2012

38. 'Contact and Communication' 6th conference of the organizations for controlling and checking the police and the anticorruption organs in the EU, opening speech of Brigade General Ferenc Frankenger, p 10, IRM RSZVSZ 22-24 November, 2006, Budapest, Hungary
39. Methodological directives for researching police corruption by Géza Finszter, 2000/11 'Belügyi Szemle'
40. 'For example the Romanians were not allowed to access the EU until their internal organ doing this kind of activity belonged to the Secret Agency. Ferenc Frankenger had to go to Bucharest some times to explain them how to do this regulation. And they were doing! According to our proposals. Then the organization was the model of the other services because of the method. There were some precedents for it that foreign colleagues had been here to learn even for weeks.' An interview with P. Col. Csaba Szabó about RSZVSZ, manuscript January, 2012
41. Social traps by Elemér Hankiss, p 137

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