

URBAN IDENTITIES: RENEWAL AND HERITAGE (PART I)

CENTRAL EUROPEAN HORIZONS

Veronika Szeghy-Gayer

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info@horizontok.hu

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1920 in the Memory of Central Europeans: A Regional Panorama

Veronika Szeghy-Gayer, Csaba Zahorán, Miklós Mitrovits, György Lukács B.

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Institute of Central European Studies, University of Public Service

Abstract

The year 1920 plays key a role in memory politics in East-Central European countries, too. Reconstruction had already been under way at some places and in newly annexed areas new authorities began to establish themselves. Elsewhere, for instance in Polish, Ukrainian and Belarussian areas, military operations had yet to end. Moreover, the border between Poland and Lithuania, as well as Poland and Germany (in Eastern Prussia) were uncertain, while Silesia (Śląsk in Polish and Schlesien in German) was in upheaval and the future of Fiume had yet not to be settled. Thus, it is not surprising that the events that took place a hundred years ago are among the most salient questions for historical research and memory politics. In this paper, we survey these in the form of brief, country-specific summaries.

Keywords

memory politics, Central Europe, year 1920, Word War I

“Czechoslovakians” and the Memory of “Year 0”

28 October, the day of the declaration of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague was a national holiday of Slovaks during the interwar period. Following the fall of state socialism and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993, for nearly three decades, it was only the Czechs who officially celebrated it. We shall mention that, starting from the 1990s, there were members of the Slovakian political elite who kept proposing that it should also become a national holiday in Slovakia. Although the place of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia is often the matter of debate, the most relevant arguments for seeing 28 October as a turning point in Slovak national history are the following: Slovaks became a constitutive nation of a state in October 1918. This was the first time that its boundaries had been marked. Moreover, the Czechoslovak state was the one that made it possible to lay the foundations of the economic, social and cultural modernity of today’s Slovakia. November 2020 brought about a major change in this debate: the Slovak Parliament voted in favour of adding 28 October to the list of national days even though it did not become a holiday.



Banner of the Republic of Czechoslovakia with the script “truth shall be victorious”

It is widely known that 1918 was a turning point in the history of the Czech nation as it was no less than the renewal of Czech statehood. Czechoslovakia was one of the most democratic political systems of the Central European region at the time. This also means that for the Czech society and political elite the jubilee in 2018 had major importance, while the 100th anniversary of the Trianon Treaty caused less excitement among academics and in public life. In Slovakia, the situation was quite different.

There, the frame within which Slovaks interpreted the Trianon question shifted as a result of a large event on 2 June 2020 when Prime Minister Igor Matovič received a hundred ethnically Hungarian public figures of Slovakia at the castle of Bratislava. It was for the first time that a Prime Minister of Slovakia declared that historic Hungary was part of the common past and that he understood why Trianon hurt Hungarians. This indicated that Slovak politicians were willing to make the link between Trianon and the long-term survival of the Hungarian minority. It had not been the case earlier. If the question occurred in public politics at all, Trianon meant the departure of Slovaks from Hungary, thus it was framed as a success story, just the opposite of the trauma that Hungarians associated with it.



Slovak historian Roman Holec and Hungarian historian László Szarka in the programme called *Do kríža*. Source: facebook.com/dokriza

Various Slovak media channels asked several intellectuals and public figures about the topic. TV channels broadcasted interviews and talks on Trianon and about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Slovak authors published new books among which we shall primarily mention Roman Holec's book *Trianon, diadal és katasztrófa* [*Trianon, victory and catastrophe*] written in a reader friendly style and Ondrej Ficeri's *A Trianon utáni Kassa* [*Kosice after Trianon*]. This interest reached so far that an academic research group started working on the Trianon Treaty under the leadership of a professor of legal history Erik Štenpien at the Department of Law of the Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice.

Outstanding experts, such as László Szarka, László Vörös and Štefan Šutaj, whose work cannot be labelled ethno-centric or nationalist, had the opportunity to talk of Trianon in prime time on television. On 3 June, the Slovak state television broadcast the discussion programme called *Do križa*, then hosted by Štefan Chrappa and Jaroslav Daniška, in which László Szarka and Roman Holec debated about currently relevant aspects of the Trianon phenomenon. Importantly, Roman Holec mentioned that he believed the Trianon treaty was unjust.

Of course, in 2020 there were also some who remembered Trianon as a positive thing for Slovaks. For example, despite the erstwhile cultural association, Matica Slovenská announced that the anniversary could be an occasion for learning about each other, several of their local branches organized festive events on 4 June. Moreover, one could also encounter explicitly anti-Hungarian interpretations and publications, such as Edita Tarabčáková's work bearing the curious title *Sérelem érte a magyarokat? A valódi igazság Trianonról* [*Were there real injustice against Hungarians? The truth about Trianon*], for example. Overall, the events reflected that Trianon has not become an issue of primary importance for the majority society of Slovakia, yet it is also clear that there is a growing number of Slovaks who understand the sensitivity of Hungarians (both of those who live in Slovakia and of Hungarians in Hungary).

Veronika Szeghy-Gayer

Romania – Yet Another Centenary

2020 featured a new experience for the Romanian historical consciousness that explicitly related to Hungarians. The centenary celebrations of the Great Union in 2018 blended into the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty.

The symbolic year of Greater Romania was 1918. That was the year when Romania was granted Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania and it actually took hold of these territories in the following year. By 1920, only the international sanctioning of state succession had been pending, and the integration of these newly acquired regions had already been under way. It was a sign of the pace of the integration process that temporary governing bodies, including the Consiliul Dirigent of Transylvania formed in December 1918, were dissolved on 4 April 1920. However, the signing of the Treaty was clearly the culmination of this. Yet, for a long time, the anniversary of “Trianon” had only an indirect presence in the Romanian historical consciousness. In the traditional narrative on territorial expansion, independent achievements of the Romanians occupied the central stage. In this interpretation, Greater Romania was the outcome of the Romanian efforts, chiefly the participation of the army and the self-governance of the Romanian communities in Transylvania, as well as Bukovina and Bessarabia. International constellations and support further facilitated this process. The Treaty of Trianon and the other Paris Peace Treaties after World War I sanctioned these outcomes and achievements, thus, memory politics had hardly paid any attention to these documents and negotiations. At the same time, the anniversary of the assembly at Alba Iulia gained so much importance that it became the national holiday of Romania in 1990.

Thus, Romanian memory politics chiefly focused on the Great Union Day. The homogenizing historical discourse of the Romanian nationalism of the post-World War II period reaffirmed this orientation. However, the year 2020 brought about some changes in this regard. Additional elements were added to the themes of the 2018 centenary celebrations – namely, the Great Union Day, the assessment of the past century of Romania, and the possibility that the Republic of Moldova might (re)join Romania. In 2020 a shift occurred in this regard: the Romanian public paid more attention to Hungary, consequently, Trianon became part of the Romanian memory politics.



Souvenir with portraits of the Romanian signatories of the Peace Treaty

It seems that although the events of the centenary in Hungary played some role in this shift, the decisive factor was the domestic politics in Romania. The journals and published conference papers hardly ever influenced the wider public and the legislative bodies. However, this issue has been on the agenda of the Romanian politics for quite some time: Titus Corlățeian, currently a senator representing the Social Democrats as well as a former minister for foreign affairs, and some other members of the Senate submitted a legislative proposal in 2015 that would have designated the anniversary of Trianon as the day of remembrance. However, the proposal was withdrawn in the same year. Subsequently, an independent (formerly social democrat) representative, Bogdan Diaconu, also tried pushing through a proposal titled as “The day of Trianon and the struggle against the Hungarian oppression”, which was rejected by the parliament. However, by the autumn of 2019, developments – that included changes in the position of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians and the mobilization of the Romanian nationalist voters – led to a situation where it seemed feasible for Corlățeian to submit his proposal again. In the spring of 2020, President Klaus Iohannis also brought the issue to the agenda in an anti-Social Democrat and anti-Hungarian exclamation that received wider publicity.

The so-called “Trianon-Law” passed as a result of this patriotic bidding. Subsequent efforts of the president to prevent it caused only little delay and the law eventually came into force. The two chambers of the Romanian Parliament voted on it in the autumn of 2020, which meant the only spectacular



The celebration held by the Calea Neamului Association at Sfântu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy) on 4 June 2020 (Photo: Csaba János Pozsony)

event that took place on the 100th anniversary. A chauvinist organization *Asociația Calea Neamului* had also organized the occupation of the cemetery in Úzválygy and celebrated the signing of the Treaty in Sepsiszentgyörgy, one of the centres of Szeklerland region mostly inhabited by Hungarians. Notably, they refrained from showing or chanting anti-Hungarian slogans. The Hungarian government did not provoke Romanian chauvinists even though the Romanian minister for foreign affairs expressed that he was not happy for the Hungarian parliament to have nominated 2020 as the year of national togetherness. Budapest and the organizations of minority Hungarians in Transylvania commemorated the event, which had tragic consequences for Hungary and the Hungarian nation-building in a moderate way.

Romanian historians and the Romanian Academy of Sciences facilitated the institutionalization of the Trianon issue. In fact, a large proportion of Romanian historians and the Academy of Sciences are committed to Romanian nation-building. This was apparent on a number of occasions around the centenary of the birth of Greater Romania when the Academy opposed the idea that ethnic minorities should have autonomy and objected all interpretations that criticized the Romanian national narrative on the Great Union Day.

To illustrate this role, we shall briefly look at the related activities of Io-

an-Aurel Pop, a renowned Transylvanian historian of the early period. As the rector of the Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, and as the president of the Romanian Academy of Sciences (since spring 2018) he spoke about the Romanian centenary, 1 December and Trianon on several occasions. He also published a number of opinion papers. In one of his talks given in 2017 he stated that the Trianon 100 Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences had been an anti-Romanian propaganda office. This statement was much talked about in Romanian media.



The cover of the special issue of the journal *Historia*

Apart from academic texts, TV programmes and popular literature, a number of public monuments recall the birth of Greater Romania. In recent years, these have been installed or reinstalled to commemorate those personalities who played a key role in the events between 1918 and 1920. The list includes the bust and equestrian statue of King Ferdinand, "the Unifier" inaugurated

in Carei (Nagykároly, 2015) and Oradea (Nagyvárad, 2019), respectively; the head of the wartime French military mission to Romania, General Henri Mathias Berthelot erected in Bucharest in 2018, and the busts of the “two friends of Romanians” Woodrow Wilson the President of the USA, and Emmanuel de Martonne the French geographer who supported the arguments that Romanians brought up in Alba Iulia (2018); another monument for de Martonne in Oradea (2019) and the statue of General Gheorghe Mărdărescu who commanded the Romanian army that occupied Budapest in 1919 - erected in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) in 2019. In the autumn of 2020, a series of postal stamps commemorated the treaties of Paris, including the Trianon Treaty. The Romanian National Bank also issued several memorial coins on the occasion of the centenary of the Great War and the Great Union Day. Notably, the Trianon Treaty is not among the events specifically recalled.

The nationalist interpretation of Trianon was the logical consequence of the triumphalist approach of the national discourse about the Great Union. The outcome of the memory politics and events of the year was the link between Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár) and Trianon, which had been understated until present day, became fixed in public perception in Romania, too. Advocates of Romanian nation-building probably hoped by making 4 June a celebrated anniversary they will have one more occasion to stress the importance of the post-World War I status quo apart from the national holiday celebrated on 1 December each year. This is a message that addresses all citizens of Romania (both the majority and minority groups) as well as Hungarians living in Hungary or elsewhere.

Csaba Zahorán

The Year of the Miracle Along the River Vistula

At the end of World War I, on 11 November 1911, an independent and sovereign Polish state was created again, for the first time in 123 years. Thus, in the interwar period and after the systemic change of 1989, the most important national holiday in Poland was 11 November. The other national holiday of similar importance falls on 15 August. The latter day has multiple meanings: on the one hand, Roman Catholics celebrate the day as the Assumption of Mary, thus it was generally considered as anti-regime manifestation. On

these days, tens of thousands of people gathered at the square in front of the monastery of the Order of Saint Paul at Częstochowa or at the Benedictine Monastery of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska near Krakow. After the systemic change, 15 August became an official holiday to celebrate. Since 1992 this has also been the day of the Polish Army since the Polish army defeated the Red Army near Warsaw this day in 1920. Considering the circumstances of the battle, no surprise that the religious event and the battle of historic importance have been intertwined. The stake at the battle of Warsaw was no less than the survival of the hardly two-year-old state and the Red Army outnumbered the Poles, thus victory was a miracle. In Polish memory politics the battle appears as the “Miracle at the Vistula” that saved Poland and Europe from the Bolshevik army. This is the event that Poland commemorated on 15 August 2020.



Take up arms! Join the voluntary army!

Propaganda poster from the period of the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920

The Polish nation celebrated the end of World War I as a victory. Thus, preserving the status quo was a top priority for the political elite. Moreover, after having defeated and pushed back the Bolsheviks as well as acquiring

territories in the West (Greater Poland) and in the South (Silesia [in Polish: Śląsk] and the Zips [in Polish: Spisz]), this elite had regional ambitions. During 1920, Marshall Józef Piłsudski the “father of independence” defined his policy to preserve the sovereignty, as well as independence and integrity. The central element was the way to ensure that the two neighbouring powers, Germany and Russia, would never be able to divide Poland among themselves. Piłsudski’s response was a plan for a Central European federation that, in his concept, would be the cooperation of nations that had lived in the former territory of the Jagellonian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Republic against Bolshevik Russia.

The Polish statesman believed that the interests of Poles, Ukrainians, Belarussians and Lithuanians were common. The federative structure that they imagined would have included Poles, Lithuanians and Belarussians (i.e. the former Lithuanian Grand Duchy) in the same state and a federation with an independent Ukraine, which was in the making. According to Piłsudski, this could have been realized exactly in the year 1920. However ambitious his plans were, he missed taking the Lithuanian national awakening and its anti-Polish content into consideration, and he also disregarded the fragility of the Ukrainian national consciousness as well as that Ukrainians did not perceive the Bolshevik threat as a fatal danger. At the same time, we shall recognize that if Piłsudski’s plan had been realized, there would have been a buffer zone set between Poland and the Soviet Union which came into existence soon thereafter. Eventually, the Peace Treaty signed in Riga on 18 March 1921 created another framework. The buffer zone was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union and the Lithuanians, Belarussians and Ukrainians who landed on the Polish side, thus failed to receive autonomy. Therefore, when Piłsudski apologized for the Treaty to the Ukrainian units that fought along with him, it was not a gesture out of proportions.

Yet, Piłsudski’s concept remained the baseline of the Polish foreign policy after 1989. The goal was to create or maintain a clear division between Russia and the nations mentioned above in political, economic and cultural terms. The Russian annexation of Crimea increased the level of Polish anxiety to a level not seen in the last 100 years. Thus, in the course of the centenary celebrations of 2020, memory politics focused on the Polish-Ukrainian alliance and the anti-Russian elements of their common history.



The statues of Charles de Gaulle, Józef Piłsudski, Pál Teleki and Simon Petljura in Skierniewice

The way the Hungarians' role came to the foreground was an interesting sidestory of the memory politics of this alliance. It was for Pál Teleki's first government that provided munitions' supply to the Polish army, which proved decisive during the battle of Warsaw. In the past decades, a number of Polish settlements have inaugurated memorials to recall this support. Among these, one stands in front of the railway station of Skierniewice, where the cargo of arms reached. The plaquettes in the city of Warsaw and in Ossów commemorate the event, too. In 2020, new monuments were erected. First, the statue of Pál Teleki was unveiled in Krakow, then a new plaquette was presented in the small town of Brok, finally, a group of statues, that of Charles de Gaulle, Pál Teleki, Simon Petljura and Józef Piłsudski were erected in Skierniewice. The statues represent the group of politicians who provided real aid to Poland in the fight against the Bolsheviks. This was quite a unique contextualization of the post-Trianon Hungarian politics – this is a novelty in terms of the international context and not only if we juxtapose it with how Hungarians tend to perceive this history.

The events of 1918 and 1920 are the foundations of the current Polish memory politics. They are the symbols of realizing and securing independence. Most importantly, those events are not only commemorated and celebrated, but also they serve the essence of their content resurface in the current domestic and foreign policy.

Miklós Mitrovits

Referendum in Carinthia – A Major Trauma for Slovenes?

Slovenia commemorated 10 October 2020 as the day of the 100th anniversary of the Carinthian plebiscite. For Slovenes, the referendum was a traumatic event as a result of which some areas, with a Slovenian majority were annexed to the new Republic of Austria. Consequently, the idea of uniting all Slovenes in one state, a goal defined in 1848, was not be realized after World War I. We may add that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could not prevent Italy from taking the Western strip of the area that Slovenes inhabited, and there were villages with Slovenian population in the territory of post-Trianon Hungary, too. However, the Slovenian public considered Carinthia as the most important loss. The memory of this event is particularly bitter because many Slovenes voted against joining the Kingdom of Serbs, the Croats and Slovenes, thus, against uniting with their fellow nationals.

After World War I, Slovenian General Rudolf Maister took Maribor and the part of Styria that lays between River Drava and Mur by force. This move played a key role in granting the Southern Slavic state sovereignty over territories of Prekmurje that used to belong to the Hungarian Kingdom. However, military intervention came too late in Carinthia. Great Powers ruled that there had to be a referendum in the greater part of the region where Slovenians were in majority. For this purpose, the area was divided into Zone A and Zone B. In the much larger Zone A, 59% of the voters preferred Austria with an exceptionally high, 95%, turnout. Since 70% of the inhabitants were Slovenes, at least one third of them must have also voted for joining Austria. Although doubts about the fairness of the referendum arose in several places, the Yugoslav government recognized that the result was too clear for repeating the vote. According to the terms agreed prior to the vote, in the northern Zone B, the referendum was not held.



The areas of Carinthia indicated with brown were annexed by Austria. The darker parts designate the areas where the majority voted for joining Yugoslavia.

In Slovenia, the centenary of the referendum was a major issue in public media and in the press in general. Experts of the events shared the results of their research in programmes and articles that attracted much attention. The representatives of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia had the opportunity to talk of the events of 1920, their current position and prospects. They highlighted the symbolic importance of the celebrations at Klagenfurt (Celovec). At that event, the Austrian president delivered his speech partly in Slovenian language. Although he mentioned that many Slovenes voted for joining Austria, he publicly apologized for the fact that Austria was late to act upon the constitutional rights theoretically granted to the Slovenian minority. This was the first instance of such a public declaration.

Due to measures that were in place in order to prevent the spread of the pandemic, most conferences that would have discussed the referendum were cancelled or postponed. However, a series of monographic studies and papers appeared shedding light on many aspects that have not been analysed earlier. Among other things, these works detail the preparations regarding Carinthia during the Paris Peace Treaty negotiations and the importance of economic and infrastructural considerations in these. We also have a clear-

er picture about the role of the Italian representatives and that there was a strong link between the case of Carinthia and South Tyrol. Recent research has foregrounded the decisive role of the Austrian representatives' convincing arguments that led to President Woodrow Wilson's support for the referendum.



Contemporary Austrian propaganda brochure

Authors who talked of the Germanization efforts also contributed to a better understanding of the circumstances of the referendum. These works highlighted the differences among Slovenian elites of the former provinces of Austria emphasizing that the Karavankas had not only been physical but also mental barriers among the Slovenes of Carinthia, Carniola and Styria. For decades, historians have been debating the weight of the application of military force in the outcome of the referendum. According to Slovenian historians, the key factors were Germanization, economic interests, and the successful Austrian propaganda – mostly carried out in Slovenian language – that intended to scare Slovenians with the prospect of being enlisted to the Yugoslav army, and entice them with stressing the importance of regional identity.

Slovenes believe that Carinthia was the birthplace of the Slovenian people. The image of early Medieval Carinthia as a mythical state of Slavs has been at the centre of historical consciousness since the 19th century. As part of Tito's Yugoslavia, Slovenia annexed sizeable territories with a majority Slovenian population West of the pre-World War II borders, however, after World War II, Great Powers decided to keep the Austrian border unaltered. For Slovenians, this made the loss more painful and that is how it became the most significant historical trauma for them. Commemorative events reflected this. At the same time, we shall not forget that one tenth of historic Carinthia became part of Slovenia without any referendum.

György Lukács B.



Contemporary Yugoslav propaganda brochure

Translated by Róbert Balogh

Introduction

Urban Identities: Renewal and Heritage

Traditionally, social, ethnic and religious diversity characterized Central European towns. It applied to urban settings regardless of their size and was equally true of capitals and small towns. This organic diversity has been their natural and self-evident feature for centuries. One may even say that it was an important part of their identity. Although, as far as social structure is concerned, the population of towns is still differentiated, heterogeneity has declined in ethnic and religious terms. One may only discover traces of past diversity in some places. The root causes of this are the large-scale changes that have impacted the region in the modern age. Regardless of whether these unfolded gradually or in a dramatic manner, political, social, and economic processes drastically transformed the patterns of the urban realms of the region in the 20th century. Changes include the composition and structure of the population, built environment and urban–rural relations, etc. The disintegration of empires, the changes of international boundaries, the destruction following the wars, furthermore, the forced and insensitive development projects, ethnic cleansing, deportations, annihilation or expulsion of communities are part of the history of nearly all Central European cities. Also, there were more peaceful demographic processes that brought about changes in the same locations. In some fortunate cases, continuity is still detectable, while in other places history has resulted in fragmentation. There are towns that one may consider as cases for a complete break with the past, either due to a completely new built environment or the change of population. Accordingly, grasping the current identity of cities is a difficult task. It is not only an open-ended process but it could also be interpreted in many ways, depending on the perspective and the focus.

This thematic issue of the Central European Horizons intends to examine the 20th century history of urban centres of Central Europe – an area ranging from the Baltic zone to Serbia – specifically, how the changes that impacted the region influenced individual towns. What are the elements that have disappeared, what has remained, and how current inhabitants relate to these

changes? How the memories of past epochs live on? What the identity of cities comprises of? The authors who answered our call for articles approached these issues in many ways. Our first thematic issue starts with the study of Veronika Szeghy-Gayer on politics of memory and the local identity of today's Košice/Kassa. Gruia Bădescu's paper deals with the changes in the built environment of Fiume/Rijeka after World War II, while Péter Bedők focuses on changes and the political contexts of the demographic patterns and the related violence in the region of Vilnius/Wilno during World War II. The last paper of this issue, by Csaba Zahorán, discusses the Hungarian perception of the changes of Transylvanian towns in the interwar period.

Csaba Zahorán



Kolozsvár/Cluj, 1934 (detail, Azopan.ro / Attila Horváth's family)



Politics of Memory in Post-Socialist Košice and the Márai-Project

Veronika Szeghy-Gayer

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szeghy@saske.sk

Institute of Social Sciences, Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences of SAS, Košice, Slovak Republic

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to present and analyse the local politics of memory in post-1989 Slovakia with special attention to Košice, situated in the Eastern part of the Slovak Republic. In this study, local politics of memory is memory politics that the Slovak city leaders, the minority communities and the local civil society practices. The paper will address politics of memory by elaborating on what a currently mono-ethnic Slovak city does with its remarkably rich Hungarian, German or Jewish heritage. The first part of the paper will discuss theoretical issues. The second part analyses the battle for the public space in the city after 1989. For doing so, it is necessary to outline the significance and the place of Košice in the Slovak and Hungarian collective historical memories. The focus of analysis will be on the memory sites inaugurated by the Slovak city leaders and the Hungarian community, as well as the local policy of the civil society in promoting the heritage of the city. The third section will discuss the shifting place of Sándor Márai, an internationally renowned Košice-born writer, in the way this heritage is represented.

Keywords

Memory policy, Kassa, Košice, Márai, post-1989 Slovakia, Hungarian-Slovak relations

Introduction

In 2011, as a student of the Summer School of Slovak Language, I visited the city of Košice that is situated in the Eastern part of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak language instructors who accompanied the group of international students could not provide relevant information on the cultural heritage of the city. At the beginning of our sightseeing, a well-known local tour guide, Milan Kolcun, posed the question who we thought to have been the most famous person from Košice. Utterly astonished as I was to learn as he told us that considering Sándor Márai - as the Hungarian students answered, - proved to be wrong because in fact the Swiss professional tennis player Martina Hingisová who was born in the city should be regarded so. Eight years later, the same Kolcun suggested that the Košice Airport should be named after Sándor Márai. He cited the example of the Lyon Airport that bears the name of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry. Kolcun even argued that Márai's wife, Lola, deserved a street to be named after her.¹ How could the perception of Márai change so dramatically in less than a decade?

Košice (in German Kaschau, in Hungarian Kassa), together with Marseilles, held the title of the European Capital of Culture in 2013. The city used the personality and work of Sándor Márai,² an internationally renowned Hungarian writer who was born in the city in 1900, to promote and represent the events and programmes of the season. Thus, the title was also a good occasion for Slovaks to become familiar with Márai's writings and personality. In fact, until 1989, the writer was "a stranger in his hometown,"³ and also in Hungary.

1 *Monika Kacejová*: Ulic so ženskými nazvami je v našom meste poskromne. Košice: Dnes https://kosicednes.sk/zaujímavosti/ulic-so-zenskymi-nazvami-je-v-nasom-meste-poskromne/?fbclid=IwAR3wrmtfLdqmAJn0DFMqbcdb1XCi-gWs1CrvSVKsH2c0P-Jruh_4raqIDpc (Last downloaded on 20 November 2020)

2 The programs of the Košice European Capital of Culture project focused on four personalities who are related to the city: Sándor Márai, Lajos Oelschläger-Öry, Juraj Jakubisko and Fernando Fallik.

3 *Louise Ostermann Twardowski*: Sandor Marai and the memory of exile. Kafkadesk <https://kafkadesk.org/2019/10/08/sandor-marai-and-the-memory-of-exile/> (last downloaded on 14 November 2020); See also: *Saša Petrášová*: He knew Košice, but Košice never knew him. The Slovak Spectator. <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20017067/he-knew-kosice-but-kosice-never-knew-him.html> (last downloaded on 14 November 2020); Peter Getting: Slovaks never heard of their own world-famous writer. The Slovak Spectator <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22060873/marai-sandor-writer-famous-kosice-slovakia.html> (Last downloaded on 14 November 2020)

His perception was controversial among Slovak intellectuals, since for them, Košice was an unquestionably Hungarian city and the bastion of the Hungarian culture. Indeed, the aftermath of the programmes reflects the longevity of this ambiguous attitude. As we shall see, after the European Capital of Culture season had ended, the Slovakian representatives and leaders of the city did not support the idea that a permanent exhibition dedicated to Márai should be established, although the demand for such a museum was clearly present: thousands of tourists visit the city and the local Hungarian elite kept pressing for it.

What does a currently mono-ethnic Slovakian city do with its remarkably rich non-Slovakian heritage? Who was Sándor Márai and how he is perceived in contemporary Slovakian society and in today's Košice? Is a Hungarian writer able to represent a "Slovakian city" at the beginning of the 21st century? Based on contemporary media publications, promotional brochures, guidebooks and the analysis of the most important memory sites in the city, this paper aims to answer these questions and to provide an overview of the local politics of memory in post-1989 Košice with special attention to the European Capital of Culture season in 2013 and the so-called Márai project.

The first part of this paper addresses theoretical issues. The second part analyses the battle for public spaces in the city after 1989. Within this latter theme, it will be necessary to outline the place of Košice in the Slovak and Hungarian collective historical memory. The focus of analysis will be on the memory sites inaugurated by the Slovak city leaders. And finally, in the third part of the paper an examination of the so-called Márai project will be given. A brief biography of Sándor Márai explores how he represented Košice in his writings and I also investigate how the Slovak intellectuals view and evaluate his work today.

Košice's multiethnic past and cultural heritage has recently attracted the attention of German, Slovak and Hungarian scholars,⁴ although with the exception of Vanda Vitti, who is dealing with Jewish cultural heritage of post-1989 Slovakia,⁵ none of them have researched the local politics of memory taking shape after 1989.

4 See for example: *Remembering the City. A Guide Through the Past of Košice*. Eds. Gayer Veronika – Slavka Otčenašová – Zahorán Csaba. Bp–Košice 2013.; *Frank Henschel: »Das Fluidum der Stadt ...« Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Košice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867–1918*. Göttingen 2017.; *Ondrej Ficeri: Potrianské Košice. Premeny etnických identít obyvateľov Košíc v medzivojnovom Československu*. Bratislava 2019.

5 *Vanda Vitti: (Trans-)Formationen jüdischer Lebenswelten nach 1989. Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowakischen Städten*. Bielefeld 2015.



View from the Cathedral of Košice. Photo by Csaba Zahorán, 2005

Terminology and Methodology

First of all, it is necessary to explain some of my terminological choices: what do I mean by politics of memory and identity of a city? Under local politics of memory, I mean decisions that the Slovakian city leaders and the representatives of the Hungarian minority community make regarding sites of memory. On the one hand, politics of memory are “methods of management or coming to terms with the past through acts of retroactive justice, historical-political trials, commemorative instaurations, dates and places, symbolical appropriations of different nature.”⁶ In this paper, the identity of a town is understood as “a concept which forms through the time and includes physical, natural, historical and socio-cultural characteristics of a particular town. Therefore, in any particular town, understanding and appreciating the local identity becomes an important issue in the conservation of its character.”⁷ In the case of Košice, the local identity is closely tied to the Main

⁶ *Nora Rabotnikof*: Memoria y política a 30 años del golpe. In: Argentina, 1976. Estudios en torno al golpe de estado. Comps. Clara Lida – Horacio Crespo – Pablo Yankelevich. México 2007. 261.

⁷ *Mert Nezih Rifaioglu – Neriman Şahin Güçhan*: The Concept of Identity and Its Iden-

Street. That is the area where important historical events took place, where architectural sights are situated, and most of the memorials (statues, plaques etc.) are related to this space too, thus it has a central part in this analysis too.

Furthermore, the notion of lieux de mémoire, places or sites of memory, is used according to the interpretation of Pierre Nora.⁸ Since its publication in 1984, the concept of lieux de mémoire, elaborated by the French historian, has been used often to describe national places of remembrance.⁹ In the past three decades, beyond the initial French project, places of German, Austrian, Dutch, Spanish memory (or rather, memories) have been collected and analysed. As most European countries initiated such projects, the original idea seems to have reached its limits. The transnational perspective, the aim of creating transnational memory sites, is a quite new initiative in Europe and it adds a new dimension to the notion and theory of lieux de mémoire. Shared but divisive sites of memory do not inevitably have to be antagonistic, yet they can contribute to overcoming inherent contradictions.

Košice through the Stormy 20th Century

Since its foundation, Košice had been one of the most important regional centres of the Hungarian Kingdom and it developed as a multi-ethnic space inhabited by Slavs, later Slovaks, Hungarians and Germans. Ethnicity, language and communal affiliations remained a complex matrix in the 19th and 20th centuries. Settlement of the Jewish population was a gradual process that began in the 1840s. During the second half of the 19th century, every fifth person in the city was Jewish. While according to the census in 1850/51, the Slovak inhabitants formed a relative majority in the city,¹⁰ by 1910, the Hun-

tification Process in Urban Conservation Projects. Conference Paper presented at the event "Regional Architecture and Identity in the Age of Globalization" organized by the Center for the Study of Architecture in the Arab Region (CSAAR) Tunis 2007. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284038848_The_Concept_of_Identity_and_Its_Identification_Process_in_Urban_Conservation_Projects (last downloaded on 14 November 2020)

8 *Pierre Nora*: Entre Mémoire et Histoire. La problématique des lieux. In: Les lieux de mémoire. Première partie: la République. Dir. Pierre Nora. Paris 1984. XXXIV-XXXV.

9 *Pim den Boer*: Lieux de mémoire in comparative perspective. In: Loci memoriae Hungaricae I: The theoretical foundations of Hungarian 'Lieux de mémoire' studies Eds. S. Varga Pál - Karl Katschtaler- Donald E. Morse – Takács Miklós Debrecen 2013. 44.

10 *Czoch Gábor*: A nemzetiségi megoszlás kérdései és társadalmi dimenziói Kassán az

garian-speaking population represented 75.43% of the population. During this period, though, most city dwellers remained bi- or trilingual.¹¹

At the end of WWI, Košice became part of the first Czechoslovak Republic, then following the first Vienna Award in November 1938, Hungary annexed this territory. Thus, the city was under Hungarian administration during WWII and the Holocaust.¹² By the end of the war, Košice became part of the restored Czechoslovakia. During the final year of the war, Košice lost most of its Jewish inhabitants to the Holocaust. In subsequent years, due to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian population exchange and re-Slovakization, it lost a good part of the Hungarian population, too.¹³

In February 1948, after the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Košice became part of the Eastern Bloc. A well-known local anecdote, mentioned in the work of the Slovak art theorist Tomáš Štrauss, summarizes the rapid change of borders and regimes in the first half of the 20th century also the difficulty of drawing clear boundaries between communities:

*“...one man from Košice tells another: Imagine, I had such a great dream last night! I dreamt that all Hungarians left Košice... Then all Slovaks followed them... Only we, the local people remained...”*¹⁴

The construction and expansion of the East Slovakian Ironworks caused the city's population to grow from 62,465 in 1950 to 235,000 in 1991. This de-

1850/51-es összeírás alapján. In: Czoch Gábor: „A városok szíverek.” Tanulmányok Kaszáról és a reformkori városokról. Pozsony 2009. 155.

11 *Juliane Brandt*: Mehrsprachigkeit – ein Weg, verkehrsfähig zu sein. Die Stadtbevölkerung von Kaschau/Kassa/Košice und ihre Sprachen um 1900. Spiegelungen 8. (2013) 1. 52–67.

12 *Michal Potemna*: Židovská otázka v Košiciach v rokoch 1938–1944. In: Eds. Anna Jurová – Pavol Šalamon. Košice a deportácie Židov v roku 1944: zborník príspevkov z odborného seminára k 50. výročiu deportácií z Košíc. Košice 1994. 48.

13 In the course of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian population exchange, 1507 Hungarians were forced to leave the city. Over 12,000 ethnic Hungarians were “re-Slovakised”, which meant signing an application form to request Slovak nationality. See *Vadkerty Katalin*: A kitelepítéstől a reszlovakizációig 1945–1948. Trilógia a csehszlovákiai magyarság 1945–1948 közötti történetéről. Pozsony 2007. 282, 349.

14 *Tomáš Štrauss*: Moje Košice. Bratislava 2012. 52.

mographic growth was a major factor in the Slovakization of Košice.¹⁵ Following the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993, Košice as the second largest city in Slovakia, became the seat of the Slovakian Constitutional Court.

Košice lost its multi-ethnic character because of the war, forced migrations, urbanization and assimilation in the 20th century. Today, Košice has 240,433 inhabitants and the vast majority of them are Slovaks. According to the official census of 2011 73.8% of the population declared to be Slovak, 2.65% Hungarian and 2% Romani. However, we need to keep in mind that, as a reflection of the complex story of communal boundaries outlined above, 19% (45 972) of the population did not declare their ethnic affiliation.¹⁶



The statue of the municipal coat of arms of Košice inaugurated in 2002. Photo by the author

¹⁵ *Adriána Priatková – Ján Sekán – Tamáska Máté: The Urban Planning of Košice and the Development of a 20th Century Avenue. Architektura & Urbanizmus. LIV. (2020) 1-2. 80.*

¹⁶ *Ivana Juhaščíková – Pavol Škápik – Zuzana Štukovská: Základné údaje zo Sčítania obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2011. Bratislava 2012. 12.*

Košice in the Conflict between the Hungarian and the Slovak Collective Memory

Košice played a prominent role in Hungarian history, literature and culture, thus, it has a much more important place in the Hungarian collective historical memory than in the Slovak one. The most significant Hungarian memory site is the tomb of Francis II Rákóczi, the aristocrat who led the Hungarian uprising against the Habsburgs at the beginning of the 18th century. After his reburial in Košice in 1906, the city became the center of the Rákóczi cult and Hungarian literary works began to refer to Košice as *Rákóczi's town*. The thousands of Hungarian tourists who visit Košice mainly come to see his tomb at Saint Elizabeth's Cathedral, which is located in the central part of the Main Street. For Hungarians, Rákóczi represents the Hungarian character of the city.

On the other hand, however, Košice's place in the Slovak history and historical remembrance is insignificant. In fact, in promotional brochures published for Slovaks, in guide books and even in academic works of Slovakian authors and in school textbooks, the city appears as the "Capital of East Slovakia" or "the second largest city of Slovakia."¹⁷ This is to say that unlike Bratislava, Nitra, Banská Bystrica or other towns of Northern Slovakia, Košice cannot be linked to any specific important Slovak historical event or Slovak historical personality.¹⁸ The only exception is the Košice Government Program, which was the basic document of the restored Czechoslovakia after WWII and was issued in Košice on 5 April 1945 by the new Czechoslovak Government. Chapter VIII of the program announced the equality of Czechs and Slovaks and declared the collective guilt of Germans and Hungarians. The so-called Beneš decrees confirmed these points. The palace that today hosts the East-Slovak Gallery in the city center was renamed because of its link to these events during the Czechoslovak period. Until 1990 it served as a Czechoslovak memorial place known as the House of the Košice Govern-

¹⁷ Vitajte v Košiciach. Oficiálny spiervodca mestom. Slovenská agentúra pre cestovný ruch, Bratislava v spolupráci s KOŠICE – Turizmus. 2011. 2.

¹⁸ Because of its multiethnic character, Košice has never become an important place of memory in nation-building and forming narratives presented in Slovak and Hungarian history school textbooks unlike, for example, Buda, Debrecen, Martin or Nitra. See Lásd *Slávka Otčenášová*: Košice ako symbol národnej identity v slovenských a maďarských učebniciach dejepisu po roku 1918. In: Košice a dejiny – dejiny Košic. Ed. Štefan Šutaj. Košice 2011. 130–134.

ment Program. This building was the most important tourist attraction during the socialist period in Košice where expositions about “the most important event in the history of Czechs and Slovaks” were on display.¹⁹ In 2007, the Slovak parliament confirmed the Beneš decrees, as they are an integral part of the Slovak constitution. This move triggered outrage among the Hungarian population in Slovakia, as well as in Hungary. The Hungarian minority community in Slovakia today considers the mass deportation and the forced re-Slovakization of the Hungarian population after WWII as their greatest traumatizing experience.²⁰ As a consequence, for them, the Košice Government Program memorial building could not become an acceptable site of memory.

However, it is important to note here that this historical event did not play an important role in shaping the new Slovak identity of Košice after 1993, even if today a housing estate still bears the name of this government program. What were the constituents of post-1993 memory, then? This is the question that the next section turns to.



Hand sanitezer on Tram no. 7 of Košice. Photo by the author, 2020

¹⁹ *Alexander Frický*: Košice kultúrne pamiatky. Vydalo Východoslovenké vydavateľstvo v Košiciach pre Mestskú správu pamiatok v Košiciach. 1974. 17.

²⁰ *Štefan Šutaj*: Trianon v historickej pamäti na Slovensku. In: Rozpad Uhorska a Trianonská mierová zmluva. K politikám pamäti na Slovensku a v Maďarsku. Eds. Miroslav Michela – Ladislav Vörös. Bratislava 2013. 97–114.

Shaping Local Identity after 1989

After the fall of communism, almost every city in Central and Eastern Europe was in search of its own local, national and European identity. Since 1989, the inhabitants of these cities have experienced rapid geopolitical and economic transformations. Consequently, new territorial identities and new senses of place have emerged. Notably, the basis of these were often the old traditions. Post-socialist cities had to redefine their relationship to the nation, reshape their own identity and meet the expectations of the European Union and globalization at the same time. In the book entitled *Cities After The Fall of Communism: Reshaping Cultural Landscapes and European Identity* we can follow this transformation process through the example of eleven cities. “The residents of post-socialist cities project their future through history as much as they project their future against history.”²¹ In fact, history and its local interpretation, as well as myths and mythmaking played an important role in the post-1989 development of such cities. Editors of the mentioned volume emphasize that new historical narratives have developed. A particular example for this is the policy that overwhelmingly mono-ethnic cities – such as L’viv or Wrocław – follow: discovering, celebrating and even promoting their historic and bygone diversity.²²

Like in many Central European cities, we might observe the spectacular process of self-rediscovery after 1989 in Košice, too. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the reconstruction and renovation of the historical old town played a decisive role in the politics of strengthening the local identity of the city. As a result, the Main Street regained its central role in the life of the city and became the natural reference point where the most emblematic buildings of Košice stand, such as the Saint Elizabeth Cathedral, the building of the State Theatre, the medieval House of Levoča, the historical town hall and several other palaces built between the 13th and 20th century.

In 2002, in order to strengthen local traditions, the coat-of-arms of the city was chosen as the symbol to stand in one of the most emblematic places of the city, at the southern tip of the Main Street, which were a scene in the battle for the public memory in Hungarian, then Czechoslovak, and later Czecho-

²¹ *Cities After The Fall of Communism. Reshaping Cultural Landscapes and European Identity*. Eds. John J. Czaplicka – Nida Glazis – Blair A. Ruble. Baltimore 2009. 3.

²² *Ibid.* 3-4.

slovak communist nation-building throughout the 20th century. This decision sounded especially reasonable since Košice has the oldest municipal coat-of-arms in Europe, the first that a king awarded to a city, dating back to 1369. The monument of the coat-of-arms has its own history.²³ Since 1994 Košice has celebrated the City Day around 7th May, the day when Emperor Louis the Great awarded the coat-of-arms to the city. In December 2002, then mayor Zdenko Trebuľa and Rudolf Schuster, at that time President of the Republic and a former mayor of Košice (in 1983–1986, 1994–1999) and a main promoter of local traditions after 1989, inaugurated the statue representing the coat-of-arms. In their speeches, they outlined that the coat-of-arms was „a symbol of the independence, originality and determination of the people of Košice to make decisions in the interests of the city, together.“²⁴ During the 20th century, the site where the monument of the coat-of-arms stands today was home to many important monuments. The Statue of the Hungarian Soldier stood there for more than a decade (1906–1919), then, it hosted the statue of M. R. Štefánik, the Slovakian national hero between 1929 and 1938, and again from 1945 until 1952. Subsequently, the monument of the Holy Crown of Hungary (1938–45), the statue of Stalin (in 1949 for a short period of time) and of Klement Gottwald, the first communist president (erected in 1975 and removed in 1990) followed each other in succession.²⁵ Against this backdrop, we may posit that the embodiment of the coat-of-arms in the infrastructure and its role in representing the city reflect and shape the efforts to legitimize the city's own modern political and cultural identity. The mayor currently in office, Jaroslav Polaček, also stressed the importance of the coat-of-arms of Košice by placing a new memorial plaque depicting the coat-of-arms on the historical town hall's wall in 2019.²⁶

The use of medieval traditions and symbols to legitimize the aspirations of cities is a European-wide phenomenon. It suffices to mention the politics of memory in the cities of the former Hanseatic League²⁷ or refer to the

23 *Jozef Kirst*: The oldest Coat of Arms in Europe awarded to a city. In: *Košice in the Coordinated of European History*. Eds. Mária Hajduová – Martin Bartoš. Košice 2013. 66–73.

24 *Plastika erbu Košic zdobi centrum mesta*. *Korzár*. Vol. 5. 12 December 2002. 3.

25 *Juraj Bauer*: És múltak a századok... Emléktáblák és feliratok, címerek, szobrok, monogramok, jelek a házakon. Košice-Kassa 2008. 13–17.

26 *Výročie udelenia erbu*. Košice:Dnes. 9 May 2019. 6.

27 For more on the topic of the medieval city as modern political symbol see: *Nicolai N. Petro*: The Novgorod Model: Creating a European Past in Russia. In *Cities After The Fall of Communism*. Eds. Czaplicka, J. et al. 58.; *Olga Sezneva*: Locating Kaliningrad/Königs-

so-called Pentapolitana project in Slovakia that intends to revive the cooperation of five towns – Košice, Levoča, Bardejov, Prešov and Sabinov – that were allies in the Middle Ages. These towns use their former importance as members of leagues to establish their new identity.²⁸



The Statue of Sándor Márai. Photo by the author 2013

berg on the Map of Europe: "A Russia in Europe" or a "A Europe in Russia". In: *Cities After The Fall of Communism* Eds. Czaplicka, J. et al. 195–215.

28 <http://www.kosice2013.sk/projekty/pentapolitana/> (last downloaded on 3 December 2020)

“Košice’s Franz Kafka”

Although Sándor Márai (1900-1989) published some papers in the communist *Vörös Újság* [Red Journal] in 1919, he consciously kept himself away from politics through his adult life.²⁹ He started his studies and literary work in Germany and France in the 1920s. One of his most important novels, entitled *Confessions of a Bourgeois*, was published in 1934. In interwar Hungary, many believed that he was the most influential literary representative of the middle-class. However, in one of his unedited manuscripts entitled *Hallgatni akartam* [I wanted to be quiet], which was published in 2013, he strongly criticized both the authoritarian Horthy regime and the behaviour of the Hungarian upper-class for their attitude and actions between the two world wars and during the Holocaust.³⁰ He lived through WWII in Budapest, where he was hiding his Jewish wife. His father-in-law, Samuel Matzner became a victim of Holocaust.³¹ In 1948, he left Hungary as a staunch anti-communist, refusing to permit his works to be published while Soviets dictated in Hungary. Márai eventually committed suicide in self-imposed exile in San Diego in 1989, shortly before the fall of communism. After the political changes, Márai became the symbol of the new and democratic Hungary. Today, his popularity is due to his work but also to his life in exile that mirrored Hungary's misfortunes in the 20th century.³²

After 1989, the Hungarian minority community in Slovakia and in his hometown, Košice also rediscovered his personality and works, gradually. In 1991, a memorial plaque was placed on the house where his family used to live in Košice. In 2000, the Hungarian Secondary School in Košice was renamed in his honor, and in 2002, the Studio of the Thalia Theatre also took up his name. Then, a statue of him, Péter Gáspár's work of art, was inaugurated on 11 December 2004. In those years, the political leaders of the city did not support the cause: the Hungarian minority community had to rent the venue for the statue from the city until 2007. Eventually, a shift occurred and during the European Capital of Culture season in 2013, office bearers of the

29 *Fried István*: A politikus író Márai Sándor. In: *Fried István*: „Ne az író történjen meg, hanem a műve”. A politikus és az irodalmi író Márai Sándor. Budapest 2002. 174–188.

30 *Márai Sándor*: *Hallgatni akartam*. Budapest 2013. In 2019 it was translated into Czech language: *Chtěl jsem mlčet*. Praha 2019.

31 *Ötvös Anna*: *Lola* könyve. Kassától Márai Sándorig. Budapest 2017. 97.

32 *Tibor Fischer*: The alchemist in exile. The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/jan/05/fiction.reviews1> (last downloaded on 4 December 2020)

city participated in renaming the square in Márai's memory and symbolically approved of the existence of the memorial through an official inauguration ceremony which was held on 19 January 2013. How can we explain the initial reluctance and what caused the change?

While Hungarians rediscovered Sándor Márai as a middle-class writer who is both anti-communist and anti-fascist, in the collective remembrance of the Slovaks Márai was a rather different image. Ethnic Slovaks tend to find it unacceptable that Márai zealously welcomed the First Vienna Award in November 1938, when his hometown was annexed (returned) to Hungary³³ and that he wrote about Košice as an Upper-Hungarian city. As a result, Slovak media often depicted him as a chauvinist, or even fascist Hungarian writer who was a supporter of the authoritarian Horthy regime, in spite of the fact that he had opposed all totalitarian regimes. Although it was an academic, Ján Doruľa, an emeritus professor at the Jan Stanislav Institute of Slavistics at the Slovak Academy of Sciences who gave voice to the sharpest criticism of this kind³⁴ Slovak journalists and bloggers criticizing Márai's work through short articles tended to be more aggressive. Their pieces often contained factual errors and had no knowledge of Márai's oeuvre as a whole.³⁵

³³ The First Vienna Award was the outcome of the First Vienna Arbitration, which took place at Vienna's Belvedere Palace on 2 November 1938, following the Munich Agreement. The decision separated the areas with Hungarian majority population in Southern Slovakia, including Košice and Southern Carpathian Rus, from Czechoslovakia and awarded these to Hungary.

³⁴ Ján Doruľa: Hornouhorskokošický Uhromadžar Sándor Márai v osídlach karpatsko-uhorskej slovansko-slovenskej traumy. Slavica Slovaca 46. (2011) 2. 97–142.

³⁵ Svätoboj Clementis: Košické prelúdiu maďarského šovinizmu. <http://www.prop.wz.cz/kosicke.htm> (last downloaded on 18 November); Jarmila Durániková: Sándor Márai: Mýtus a pravda. <http://duranikova.blog.sme.sk/c/322787/Sandor-Marai-Mytus-a-pravda.html> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020); Pavol Ičo: Sándor Márai. Šovinista, ktorý velebil maďarskú okupáciu Košíc. Slovenské Hnutie Obrody. <https://sho.sk/sandor-marai-sovinista-ktory-velebil-madarsku-okupaciju-kosic/> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020); Moreover, Milan Lasica, the well-known Slovak humorist described Márai as a chauvinist although Lasica appreciated Márai's literary talent and novels. See: <http://www.divadelni-noviny.cz/milan-lasica-rozhovor> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)



Sándor Márai Square. Photo by the author, 2013

Within professional literary circles, Slovak critics, usually gave a more nuanced picture of his work and offer a deeper analysis of his writings.³⁶ For example, Zuzana Demjánová, a Slovak literary translator argued that although Márai had a certain dislike towards Slovak statehood as a Hungarian writer, he was of German origin, as well as he had a Jewish wife and was not actively or rhetorically fascist and thus might be considered an excellent European writer.³⁷ Similarly, Lukáš Krivošík, analyzing one of his novels pointed out that Márai “reveals the traumas of the Hungarians,”³⁸ while, a Slovak literary

36 Gabriela Rakúsová: Nedovolili mu slobodne mlčať. Impulz. 3. (2011) <http://www.impulzrevue.sk/article.php?736> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

37 Zuzana Demjánová: Z väčšej časti génius, z menšej šovinista. http://www.inaque.sk/sk/clanky/books/non_fiction/z_vacsej_casti_genius_z_mensej_sovinista (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

38 Lukáš Krivošík: Horthy v Košiciach a smutný Sándor Márai. Konzervatívny Denník Postoj. <https://www.postoj.sk/44006/knihomolov-zapisnik-kosican-marai-odhaluje-traumy-madarov> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

historian, Tibor Kočík, called him “the sworn enemy of dictatorships.”³⁹ In a convincing study, another Slovak literary scholar, Radoslav Passia, also argued that Márai had become a point of reference in Slovak literature, too.⁴⁰

In 2013, there was a practical reason for choosing Márai as part of the city’s “branding” despite the differences in Márai’s Slovak perceptions: he remains the most famous person from Košice, at least at the European scene. His writings have been translated into multiple languages, his novels are particularly popular in Italy, France and Poland. This explains why Márai, a Hungarian writer, was a suitable representative of a Slovak city. The main purpose of the official programs related to him was to present and popularize the life and work of the writer in Slovakia.⁴¹ Translating several of his novels into Slovak language for the first time was part of the project. This gave the opportunity to Slovak readers to make themselves aware of Márai’s ideological orientation and his perceptions of Košice. Given the European dimension of the project, Márai’s Europeaness was also an aspect that was at the forefront. To express his importance ads and brochures referred to him as Franz Kafka’s incarnation in Košice⁴² and as the greatest “Košičan” (the local demonym) writer. Slovak theatre performances and expositions popularized Márai’s lifeworks during the 2013 and in the subsequent years.

In 1998, the former house of Márai’s parents on the Mäsiarska Street was transformed into a modest memorial room, which became the seat of the Club for National Minorities.⁴³ Then, within the framework of the European Capital of Culture project, a new Memorial Room opened as a result of co-operation with the Petöfi Literary Museum of Budapest, the custodian of Márai’s legacy. The primary target group of the project were tourist from

³⁹ Tibor Kočík: Praha má Franza Kafku – Košice Sándora Máraia. Zajtrajšie Noviny. <http://zajtrajsienoviny.sk/2013/02/praha-ma-franza-kafku-kosice-sandora-maraia/> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020); See also: Peter Juščák: Košický Franz Kafka. Šándor Márai, zaprisahaný nepriateľ diktatúr. https://www.czsk.net/zrkadlenie/jesen_2004/juscak.html (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

⁴⁰ Radoslav Passia: Márai Kassája a mai Košice jelentésrendszerében. Magyar Lettre Internationale 94/2014. 28–30.

⁴¹ The official website is no longer available: <http://sandormarai.eu/>; Instead, one may refer to a new brochure that the publishing house Helikon published especially for the European Capital of Culture project. See : Régi Kassa, álom. Budapest 2013.

⁴² Jana Ogurčáková: Šándor Márai sa má stáť košickým Kafkom. Korzár Košice <https://kosice.korzar.sme.sk/c/5740763/sandor-marai-sa-ma-stat-kosickym-kafkom.html> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

⁴³ <https://www.kosice.sk/mesto/klub-narodnostnych-mensin> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

Europe who visited the city.⁴⁴ After the European project ended, the local tourism board called *Visit Košice* was supposed to take care of the memorial room. However, the board was unable to provide a permanent staff member who could have guided the tourists around the exhibition. Although the city administration undertook to pay the overhead of the premises for a few years, remained uninterested in resolving this problem. The local Hungarian political elite also failed to propose a viable solution with or without the cooperation of the city. Finally, it was the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that decided to financially back the Hungarian organization called Csemadok,⁴⁵ so that the NGO could purchase the exhibition rooms and open a new Sándor Márai Memorial Exhibition there. In addition, the Minority Cultural Fund of Slovakia also contributed to the furnishing of the exhibition. Subsequently, during 2018, the Slovak National Museum undertook that they would provide the professional and personal conditions for the operation of the memorial exhibition. After such successful interventions of Bratislava and Budapest, the opening ceremony took place in January 2019. During 2019, the exhibition received more than 5 000 visitors from 30 countries, and it can be assumed that in the future it will play a major role in informing Slovaks about Márai's legacy.

⁴⁴ *Marsovszky Miklós*: Ismét látogatható a kassai Márai Emlékszoba. Új Szó Online. <https://ujsozso.com/kozelet/ismet-latogathato-a-kassai-marai-emlekszoba> (last downloaded on 18 November 2020)

⁴⁵ Csemadok is a cultural society of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia founded in 1949.



The building of the Sándor Márai Memorial Exhibition in Košice.

Photo by the author, 2020

Conclusions

Cities in Central Europe, including contemporary Slovakia, have undergone radical changes in the 20th century. The most traumatic events were the extermination of its Jewish population, forced emigration of Hungarians and Germans, and the efforts of the communist regime to homogenize the population in terms of ethnicity and culture. After 1993, when Slovakia became an independent state, a process of self-rediscovery began. Košice, which is perceived quite differently in Slovak and Hungarian collective memory, finds itself instrumentalized in different ways in the respective representations of these neighbouring nations. Remembrance of the past is contingent upon cultural frames, moral sensibilities, demands of the present and the will of both the local and national political elites in the two countries.

The post-socialist modernization process, including different urban design projects, the renovation of the historical old town and the Košice European Capital of Culture 2013 project provided the possibility to reshape the historical memory of the city in a new European context. Initially it was the Hungarian community that kept Márai's local memory, largely with the support of the Hungarian state. The political leaders of the city decided to make Márai's a flagship project by highlighting the European dimension of his oeuvre and personality during the European Capital of Culture project in 2013. For a Slovak city that is in search of its own identity, Márai, as a Hungarian writer could become a modern brand only in this European perspective.

Translated by Erika Gazdag



The Sándor Márai Memorial Exhibition in Košice. Photo by the author, 2020

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Architectural Reconfigurations and Urban Remaking After Ruptures: Interrogating Frontier Urbanism in Rijeka/Fiume

Gruia Bădescu

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gruia.badescu@uni-konstanz.de

University of Konstanz

Abstract

The city of Rijeka/Fiume underwent an array of transitions in the long twentieth century, from the port of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy to a free city, to D'Annunzio's Italian Regency of Carnaro, annexation by Italy, incorporation into Yugoslavia, and eventually the independence of Croatia. The article examines the processes of urban reconstruction and architectural reconfigurations in the city as "frontier urbanism", building on Wendy Pullan's (2011) discussion of how various actors employ architectural and place-making practices to secure the state in contested urban space. The article traces Rijeka/Fiume's urban development as a window of fixating state identities in the built environment throughout the century, focusing on the aftermath of the Second World War. It examines the urban transformations of the city as the demographic landscape was reshaped after the departure of the local Italian-speaking majority and the arrival of workers from various parts of Yugoslavia, but also from Italy. By analysing decisions to rebuild or not buildings damaged by war, as well as the demolition of the 1943-built votive temple in Mlaka, the article inquires how reconstruction and urban planning became avenues to secure the state at its new frontiers.

Keywords

Rijeka, Fiume, Yugoslavia, urban reconstruction, frontier urbanism

Introduction¹

In 1949, the authorities of the Yugoslav city of Rijeka decided to remove two material markers of the past. On January 20th, they took down the eagle statue that was topping the Old Town clock tower, decried as a symbol of both Habsburg imperial rule and the Italian takeover of the city in the inter-war period. In November, they decided to demolish a structure built just a few years before, under fascist Italian rule: the Votive Temple of Christ the Most Holy Redeemer. Rijeka witnessed such acts of symbolic destruction while it faced the great challenge of post-war reconstruction. After significant damage during the Second World War, its port area, industrial facilities, as well as segments of its housing stock were devastated. A vast reconstruction process occurred as the city became a new part of the Yugoslav state, while still standing past structures were removed. These reconfigurations of the built environment occurred as Rijeka, also known by the name Fiume,² was experiencing multiple processes of change. First, it was incorporated in a new state, Yugoslavia, after having belonged in the interwar times to Italy. Second, it saw a change of political system, with a socialist federation replacing the Italian fascist state and the two-year German occupation during the war. Finally, with the departure of the majority of the city's Italians and the arrival of workers from different parts of Yugoslavia and from Italy its population makeup changed fundamentally. Within this context, removing the heritage of past regimes, older or newer, marked the transition of power.

The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed such symbolic makeovers during reconstruction in cities which experienced border change, as research on the new territories of Poland and the Soviet Union has shown.³ Yet while

1 This article stems from research supported by the project "Rijeka in Flux: Borders and Urban Change after World War II", funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as by AFF funding from the University of Konstanz. The author is grateful to the Rijeka in Flux wider team for the wonderful intellectual exchange and camaraderie.

2 The city's name in all its variants- Rijeka in standard Croatian, Reka in one of the local Croatian dialects and in Slovene, and Fiume in Italian and local Romance dialects, means "River". In this article, I use the name of the city as corresponding to the name used officially in the period to which I refer: thus, Fiume under Hungarian, Italian, and Free State rule, and Rijeka after 1945.

3 *Jan Musekamp*: Zwischen Stettin Und Szczecin: Metamorphosen Einer Stadt von 1945 Bis 2005. Vol. 27. Wiesbaden 2010.; *Gregor Thum*: Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions Princeton 2011.; *Olga Sezneva*: Architecture of De-

many of these cities experienced an array of changes in sovereignty during the twentieth century, Rijeka/Fiume's transformation brings in a multiplicity of threads and a conjunction of cultural imaginaries and experiences. As Vanni D'Alessio pointed out, "Rijeka/Fiume presents itself as a mixed conundrum of Central European, Balkan and Mediterranean European histories"⁴. The city underwent a remarkable array of such transitions in the long twentieth century: from the port of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy (up to 1918), to a contested territory, to D'Annunzio's Italian Regency of Carnaro (1919-1920), the Free State of Fiume (1920-1924), annexation by Italy (1924-1943), occupation by Germany (1943-1945), incorporation into Yugoslavia (1945/1947-1991), and eventually the independence of Croatia (after 1991). In Rijeka/Fiume, the changes in the built environment occurred within a constellation of imaginaries, narratives and iconographies corresponding to a canvas of often shifting identities and allegiances,⁵ including cosmopolitanism and autonomism on the one side and Italian vs Croatian nationalism, on the other, with a Hungarian imperial touch. The urban imaginary of Rijeka/Fiume as constructed by its own city elites through various media has been one of a cosmopolitan city,⁶ one proud of its autonomist drive.⁷ From the outside, it was often portrayed as a city enveloped by avant-garde and revolutionary fever (due to the brief, but incendiary takeover by Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio in the aftermath of the First World War),⁸ or a "city of passions".⁹ For Hungarians, Fiume is the port that had connected Hungary to the world, for Italians it is largely associated with the D'Annunzio escapade, with irredentism and later with exile, while for Croats, Rijeka is the industrial gritty port that is somehow always different than the rest and has kept voting red since 1945.

scent: Historical Reconstructions and the Politics of Belonging in Kaliningrad, the Former Königsberg. *Journal of Urban History* 39. (2013): 767–787.

4 Vanni D' Alessio: *Divided Legacies, Iconoclasm and Shared Cultures in Contested Rijeka/Fiume*. In: *Borderlands of Memory: Adriatic and Central European Perspectives*. Ed. Borut Klabjan. Oxford. Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, New York, Wien 2019. 90.

5 D' Alessio, V. 2019.

6 Milou van Hout: *Rediscovering Cityness in the Adriatic Borderland: Imagining Cultural Citizenship in Rijeka and Trieste Across the Long Twentieth Century*. PhD Thesis. Amsterdam 2020.

7 Ivan Jeličić: *Nell'ombra dell'autonomismo. Il Movimento Socialista a Fiume, 1901-1921*. PhD Thesis. Trieste 2017.

8 Claudia Salaris: *Alla Festa della Rivoluzione: Artisti e Libertari Con D'Annunzio a Fiume*. Bologna 2002.

9 Raoul Pupo: *Fiume Città di Passione*. Roma 2018.

In this eventful century, when it was not run as an incarnation of a city state, Rijeka/ Fiume had been on the frontier of most countries it belonged to: Hungary's only access to the sea, Italy's redeemed city at the periphery, and, after 1945, part of Yugoslavia's new Western territories. While geographically it was a periphery, the city was lavished with attention and development. In the Hungarian and the Yugoslav period, the importance of its port and industry made Fiume/Rijeka a dynamic and important economic hub. Under Italy, the attention came on symbolic grounds, connected to the representation of Fiume in interwar Italy as a city redeemed against all odds.

How can we make sense of Rijeka/Fiume's urban transformation with regards to its geographical condition of a borderland and experience of state change in much of the twentieth century? Roger Zetter and Brad K. Blitz argue that while borderlands are usually neglected by state development, their symbolic role in a post-conflict state often brings them more attention after a war, which leads to increased investment.¹⁰ Moreover, according to James Ron, in border areas of nationalizing states, practices of nation-building – which include securitization as well as a reshaping of landscapes – occur with a particular intensity: “nationalist states tend to be most radical at their margins, not their core”¹¹ The margins of states can be thus understood as a frontier: beyond the linear understanding of *borders* and the neutral territorial depiction of a *borderland*, the frontier is an area at the margin that is often contested, serves as a buffer, or is a shifting territory as states undergo expansion.¹² Cities become an important arena of such nation-building prac-

¹⁰ Roger Zetter and Brad K. Blitz: *Contestation and Reconstruction: Natural Capital and Post-Conflict Development in Borderland Regions*, Stability. International Journal of Security & Development 3. (2014) 1–18. The experience in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War contradicts the assumptions about post-war borderlands as sites of privileged development. See for example the comparative marginalization of border areas like the Partium in Romania. Gábor Egry discussed the specific case of Maramureș and the Banat in *Gábor Egry: Unruly Borderlands: Border-Making, Peripheralization and Layered Regionalism in Post-First World War Maramureș and the Banat*. European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire 27. (2020) 709–731. One possible explanation is the great scale of territorial after the First World War in the region, with countries either emerging or greatly enlarged, gaining area from different Empires. The scale of change made state consolidation involve a larger geographical scale than just borderlands.

¹¹ James Ron: *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*. Berkeley 2003. xv.

¹² See Steven G. Ellis and Rainard Esser: *Frontiers and the Writing of History, 1500–1850*. Hannover-Laatzten 2006.; James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd: *Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance*. Regional Studies 33. (1999) 593–604.

tices.¹³ Wendy Pullan defines the actions of states in contested urban spaces as frontier urbanism.¹⁴ She discusses two dimensions of frontier urbanism: first, the settlement of civilians to fixate the state's claim over an area, and second, architectural and urban makeovers in contested urban space to promote state power. In this article, while touching on the first, I focus on the second dimension, scrutinizing the place-making practices that secure the state.

Fiume in Hungary, as Rijeka after 1954 in socialist Yugoslavia, were solid parts of the respective country's economy, imaginary, and flows. I argue that it is during the volatile transition times when frontier urbanism practices come into play. According to ontological security scholars, state decisions across scales can be explained by perceptions of how secure political actors consider the state to be.¹⁵ As such, the frontier condition in the sense of a fleeting spatio-temporality, of insecurity of borders, but also sense of unbridled expansion, could be identified particularly in the transition times of ruptures. This article examines how changes in the urban environment sustain practices of frontier urbanism, related to a shifting ontological security of states. It inquires how reconstruction and urban planning became avenues to secure the state at its new frontiers. An attention to the built environment is not only useful to understand the entangled threads of Rijeka's past¹⁶, but can be also an important lens to see the city's remaking after ruptures, on which this article focuses. It examines the urban transformations of Rijeka in particular after 1945, when its demographic landscape was reshaped. While it focuses on the 1940s, it also briefly traces Rijeka/Fiume's urban development as a window of fixating state identities in the built environment throughout the century. After a quick overview of Fiume/Rijeka before 1945, the article will discuss how the city's reconfiguration after the Second World War reflects practices of frontier urbanism.

13 Vjeran Pavlaković and Gruia Bădescu: Urban Monuments and the Spatialization of National Ideologies, in *The Routledge Companion to Urban Media and Communication*. Eds. Zlatan Krajina and Deborah Stevenson Abingdon 2019.

14 Wendy Pullan: Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities. *The Journal of Architecture* 16. (2011) 15–35.

15 This emerging school of thought focuses on relations between states See: Brent J. Steele: *Ontological security in international relations: self-identity and the IR State*. London 2008.; Jelena Subotić: Narrative, ontological security, and foreign policy change. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12. (2016) 610-627., but has been also employed to examine the built environment and more domestic state politics. For instance, see Filip Ejdus: 'Not a Heap of Stones': Material Environments and Ontological Security in International Relation'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 30. (2017.) 23-43.

16 Radmila Matejčić: *Kako Čitati Grad: Rijeka Jučer, Danas*. Rijeka 1988.

20th century Fiume/Rijeka Before Yugoslavia*Fiume in Hungary*

Fiume was the site of intensive urban development before the First World War as the port of Hungary within the Dualist Monarchy. It corresponded to the role of Trieste for the Austrian economy,¹⁷ and embodied Kossuth's call: "Hungarians, at sea!".¹⁸ The only access of Hungary to sea trade, and the seat of its Navy, Fiume was a place of intensive economic exchange and the gateway to Budapest. Beyond its small medieval old town, the architecture of the turn of the century expansion echoed fashions in the Austro - Hungarian monarchy, with local historian Edoardo Susmel underlining how Hungarian rule shaped the city's urban design and character.¹⁹ From the grand structures erected at the sea front, the Riva, to the Governor's Palace overlooking the old town, these were the echoes the Andrassy út in Budapest on the Adriatic, blending a Hungarian, Central European visual identity on the existing Mediterranean cityscape. The Palace was designed by prolific architect Alajos Hauszmann, who authored buildings from Budapest to Nagyvárad and Kolozsvár in Transylvania. However, residential architecture in neighbourhoods like Belvedere mirrored Northern Italian styles, signalling the circulation of architectural fashions across borders. Moreover, Croatian cultural institutions were built, particularly, in the adjacent town of Sušak, including Central European fashions such as Sezession, and connecting it with trends existing in the development of Zagreb. These architectural repertoires mirrored the city's situation as ruled directly from Budapest, while inhabited mostly by a mix of speakers of Italian and Croatian dialects.²⁰

17 Daniele Andreozzi: *Lives, Mercantilism and Nations in the Growth of Multi-Ethnic Trieste (18th–20th Centuries)* In: *Controversial Heritage and Divided Memories from the Nineteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries. Multi-Ethnic Cities in the Mediterranean World 2*. Eds.: Marco Folin, Heleni Porfyriou. New York 2020. 83-95. 92.

18 *van Hout, M.* 2020.

19 *Edoardo Susmel*: *Disegno storico della città di Fiume* (Stab. tipo-litografico di E. Mohovich (IS), 1917). In: *van Hout, M.* 2020.

20 The 1911 census indicated that 46.9% of the population spoke primarily Italian, 31.7% Croatian, 7.9% Slovenian, and 7.3% Hungarian.




Fiume/Rijeka's waterfront, with the Adria palace, seat of the first Hungarian shipping company founded in 1882, in the left hand side.²¹

Fiume's architectural change can be seen as a form of a frontier urbanism in the sense of fixating the outpost of the state, the window to the world, the frontier in the sense of the open horizon of growth, rather than the contested space to be secured. The allegiance of the local elites to the Hungarian crown was increasingly connected to the recognition of local autonomy, as opposed to platforms to incorporate the city into a wider Italy and, particularly, Croatia of which the city was treated distinctively, with a status of a *corpus separatum* of Hungary beyond Zagreb's rule. A famous quote of mayor Maylender in 1897 indicated "Fiume's Hungarian patriotism cannot be imagined without its autonomy".²² However, the city was also emblematic for both Southern Slavic and Italian narratives of the modern nation. On the one side, the Rijeka Resolution of 1905 created a Serb-Croat coalition within Austria-Hungarian politics. On the other, the wide circulation of poet Gabriele D'Annunzio's 1919 *Pentecoste d'Italia* essay and tumultuous events after the First World War in Fiume projected the "redeemed city" as an important element in the imaginari of Italianness.

²¹ Fiume waterfront, "Views of the Austro-Hungarian Empire," Detroit Publishing Company, public domain, Wikimedia Commons.

²² Cited in van Hout, M. 2020. 113.



The Governor's Palace²³

Divided City

The presence of such clashing imaginaries and aspirations and the array of changes in the status of the city led to a different articulation of city-making in the borderlands after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. While the city experienced contestations and multiple changes in sovereignty (including the D'Annunzio episode), it also witnessed a recontextualization of practices and spaces that reflects significant continuities, including at the urban scale.²⁴ Moreover, a commitment to the local character recognizing the multinational nature of the city was mobilized both by the autonomist and by the workers' socialist movements²⁵. The treaty of Rapallo (November 1920) made the city of Fiume independent, initially run by the Autonomist Party, but in 1924, the Treaty of Rome between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slo-

²³ Magyar Királyság, Fiume. Edoardo Schambik fényképész. Public domain, Wikimedia Commons.

²⁴ *Dominique Kirchner Reill: The Fiume Crisis.* Cambridge MA. 2020.

²⁵ *Ivan Jeličić: Uz stogodišnjicu riječkog Radničkog vijeća. Klasna alternativa nacionalnim državama na sutonu Monarhije [With the centenary of the Workers' Council in Rijeka. Class alternative to national states at the eve of Monarchy]. Časopis za povijest Zapadne Hrvatske 12. (2017) 63-84.*

venes gave Fiume to the first and Sušak to the latter, with the river that gave its name to the city becoming the state border.



The border between Italy (Fiume) and Yugoslavia (Sušak), 1937.²⁶

From the sole port of an otherwise landlocked Hungary, Fiume was reduced to a peripheral port in a country with abundant sea access. While it lost its economic hinterland, it held the status of a Free Port. Moreover, Fiume received financial support from the Italian state. In the aftermath of D'Annunzio's campaign, Fiume had an almost sacred status in the Italian imaginary.²⁷ That accounted to subsidies, tax reductions and investments supporting the redeemed city. It also connected to an intensive Italianization of public spaces, as well as the population. Interwar Italian modernism embodied in elegant new apartment buildings, as well as in emblematic structures such as the church dedicated to Saint Romuald and All Saints, also known as the Votive Temple, and the ossuary on Cosala (Kozala).²⁸ The fascist period led to

26 Rijeka State Archives [hence: DARI], Zbirka Razglednice, 173.

27 *Milou van Hout*: In Search of the Nation in Fiume: Irredentism, Cultural Nationalism, Borderlands. *Nations and Nationalism* 26. (2019). 660-676.

28 *Daina Glavočić*: Monumental Cemetery Kozala. *Architettura e Arte a Fiume e Trieste Tra '800 e '900/Arhitektura i Umjetnost u Rijeci i Trstu Krajem XIX. i Početkom XX. Stoljeća*, 2011. Paper presentation.

the increase in the number of people declaring themselves Italian, including also new arrivals from other parts of Italy, as well as people from mixed or Croatian-speaking family backgrounds who took on the Italian identity in a period where Slavic culture was being marginalized. In 1936, 72% of people in Fiume declared themselves Italians.



Border crossing at the bridge over the Eneo/Rječina river. Source: Fortepan 28798

On the other side of the river, Sušak was one of the most dynamic cities in interwar Yugoslavia. Its economic growth was boosted by its location at the border, becoming a shop window of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes called Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929. As such, its urban development reflected, like in Hungarian times, the sense of frontier as expansion of horizons, but also the contestation and competition with nearby Fiume. Architectural projects were connected to the border condition of the two cities. For instance, after the construction of the modern Croatian Cultural House and skyscraper in Sušak, intended to display the progress of Yugoslavia, a Fiume skyscraper appeared in a key location: at the end of the Corso, in the Italian modern style of the fascist 1930s.

Yet the two cities were not only very visible to each other, but also connect-

ed through a border bridge. Here, movement of people – unrestricted for residents from both sides–, continuous trade and exchange made this what in studies of borders is called a “thin border”, one that is easily permeable.²⁹ As such, urban space constituted both a sense of competition and border-making, as well as circulation, flows and continuity.

Reconstructing Post-War Rijeka

Border Change and Demographic Shifts

Controlled by Nazi Germany as part of the Operation Zone of the Adriatic Littoral from September 1943 to May 1945, Fiume was bombed by Allied forces for its industry, which included shipyards, the torpedo factory and an oil refinery, as well as for its port infrastructure. The devastated city experienced reconstruction as part of a different country. It would be only with the treaty of Paris of February 10th 1947 that Rijeka officially became a part of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It was, however, de facto administered by the Yugoslav state through the National Liberation Committee of Rijeka since May 1945.³⁰ The two years were marked by continuity and rupture. In particular, the population profile changed with the arrival of Yugoslav citizens in the devastated city as a call to participate in its industrialization drive and its reincorporation into Croatia.³¹ At the same time, a majority of the Italian speakers fled the city, a process which was discussed by many historians of both Italy and the former Yugoslavia.³² The termino-

29 *Gabriel Popescu*: *Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-First Century: Understanding Borders*. Lanham. 2011.

30 *Andrea Roknić Bežanić*: *Rijeka Od Oslobođenja 1945. Do Pariškog Mirovnog Ugovora 1947*. Godine [Rijeka from the 1945 Liberation to the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947] PhD Thesis. Zagreb 2012.

31 See *Francesca Rolandi*: *Došao Sam u Grad Iz Pasivnog Kraja*. Domestic Migration, Social Differentiations and Housing in Post-WW2 Rijeka. forthcoming.

32 *Pamela Ballinger*: *History in Exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans*. Princeton 2003. *Franko Dota*: *Zaraćeno Poraće: Konflikti i Konkurentski Narativi o Stradanju i Iseljavanju Talijana Istre*, 2010; *Katja Hrobat Virloget*, *Catherine Gousseff*, and *Gustavo Corni*: *At Home but Foreigners. Population Transfers in 20th Century Istria*. Koper 2015; *Mila Orlić*: *L'esodo Degli Italiani Dall'Istria e l'insediamento Nella Provincia Di Modena*, *Quaderni Centro Di Ricerche Storiche Rovigno* 18. (2007) 33–68.; *Mila*

logy used focuses on the issue of choice: the Italian usage of *esuli* frames the migration as forced, as an undesired rupture caused by irruptions of violence and the climate of fear among Italian speaking communities. In contrast, the usage of *optanti*, preferred in the Yugoslav historiography, highlights that the Italians made the choice to leave, while they could have stayed - as some indeed have - and build socialism together with the South Slavs in a regionally reinterpreted “brotherhood and unity” as a wider umbrella.³³ Moreover, some 2000 Italian workers even joined the building of socialist Rijeka from industrial Montfalcone. By 1953, there were 7770 people declaring themselves Italian in Rijeka.³⁴

Already before the actual incorporation into Yugoslavia in 1947, the local administration was preparing new urban planning documents that were focused on integrating Rijeka from a territorial-functional perspective in the state. One key move was the shaping of a unified regulatory plan for Rijeka and Sušak. While the latter already had a freshly approved plan in 1938, one which responded to its condition as a border town, the new consensus was that the situation was so radically different, that a new, integrated plan had to be thought. The new plan had to treat the two towns as “a whole to build”.³⁵

The unification of the two cities was seen as a repair of an artificial separation.³⁶ General Major Veceslav Holjevc decried this “unnatural border, which came even from the old Austria-Hungary”.³⁷ Minister Karl Mrazović-Gaspar underlined that it was not only the Italian authorities, but also the Austro-Hungarians who imposed this separation: “švapsko-madžarski političari wanted to leave our land in desolation”.³⁸ This fed to the Croatian perception

Orlić: “Italians or “Foreigners”? The Multilayered Memories of Istrian Refugees in Italy. *Borderlands of Memory. Adriatic and Central European Perspectives* 2018. 255–272; Raoul Pupo: *Il Lungo Esodo*. Milano 2006.

33 Marco Abram: *Integrating Rijeka into Socialist Yugoslavia: The Politics of National Identity and the New City’s Image (1947–1955)*. *Nationalities Papers* 46. (2018) 69–85.; Hrobat Virloget, Gousseff, and Corni, 2015.

34 Abram, M. 2018. 72.

35 “Radi se na izradi jedinstvenog regulatornog plana za Sušak i Rijeku” [Work is underway to develop a single regulatory plan for Sušak and Rijeka], PK, 29-9-1946, nr. 362, p. 2.

36 “Završeno je djelo spajanja Rijeke i Sušaka” [The work of connecting Rijeka and Sušak has been completed], PK, 23-10-1946, nr. 372, p. 1

37 “Završeno je djelo spajanja Rijeke i Sušaka” [The work of connecting Rijeka and Sušak has been completed]

38 “Svapsko” has a slightly pejorative note. “Završeno je djelo spajanja Rijeke i Sušaka” [The work of connecting Rijeka and Sušak has been completed]

of the unjust separation of Rijeka from Croatia as the *corpus separatum*. The new regulatory plan for Rijeka was seen as a great opportunity to repair the urban planning mistakes of the past, associated with past rulers:

“And those ...Hungarian ... and the ... the Italian (in fact, a reduced Hungarian plan) did not take much account or, more importantly, did not take into consideration the position of the industry, the resolution of the question of the railroad, the more dense city center, the old city”³⁹

One key integrative project was the public space replacing the old border between Rijeka and Sušak, over the river. During Tito's 1946 visit after the takeover of Rijeka, he gave a speech calling for the abolition of the border. A monument with the engraving of this call was placed on the bridge, making this public space the symbolic place of the erasure of the border.

The Old Town

In January 1950, concerned about the fate of his apartment in the old town centre Franjo Jelovčić wrote a letter to the Rijeka authorities. He owned of a third-floor apartment in Calle Isolani, in a building that he described as “old and dilapidated, but not in ruins”. The city had launched a demolition campaign in the old town, to clear the ruins of the war bombings. Jelovčić insisted that the apartment looked the same even twenty years before, when he had bought it. A manual laborer at the Brušić wood company, he was still living in his “small house with only a ground floor” on Ragusa street, and he rented his flat in the old town. “I consider the house is not ruined”, he argued, mentioning how he had invested 25000 lira for repair. He demanded a flat in equally good conditions in case the authorities insisted on demolishing the building.⁴⁰ Several owners of old town property wrote such letters. In

39 “Priprema se regulacioni plan za Rijeku, Sušak i okolicu. Projekt novog plano predvida jedinstvenost citavog predjela od Mošćenica do Kraljevice. Autor: Ing. Z Kolacio” [A regulatory plan is being prepared for Rijeka, Sušak and its surroundings. The project of the new plan envisages the cohesion of the entire area from Mošćenice to Kraljevica. Author: Ing. Z Kolacio], 12-01-1947, PK, nr. 406, p. 2.

40 DARI 86 JU 16 Gradjevinski Odjel. Rušenje zgrada GNO RI, 387-1950, Zapisnik 31. I 1950. Pristupa Jelovčić Franjo od Ivana, vlasnik III kate lijevo stan, Calle Isolani 1 Rijeka

some cases, the author of these missives were renters since owners had fled to Italy. Many were working class people living modestly in the old housing stock of Rijeka's historic core. They were trying to make a case for either not demolishing the buildings or receiving compensation, in reaction to the municipality's plans for the old town.

The old town center of Rijeka was partially destroyed in the bombings, yet it in the post-war reconstruction efforts, it played a marginal role. The post-war authorities were focused on building workers houses in other areas of the city, and the old town was also used for such housing. Nevertheless, the old town was seen both by the city's population, old and new, as well as by planners, as undesirable.⁴¹ Some people ascribed the ruined state of several buildings in the old town to war destruction.⁴² Nevertheless, the squalid conditions in the entire area also showed continuity, as the "slum conditions" of the area existed in the interwar times as well. In the reconstruction, the old town was treated as a problematic, unsanitary ground, in need of clearing. Lacking a specific vision for the entire district, most interventions included the occasional clearing of ruins and even of undamaged existing buildings. It was only a decade later that local architect Igor Emili turned his attention towards the old town, interested in its modernization and reactivation. In his capacity as a planner of the Urban Institute for Istria and the Croatian Littoral, he drafted a plan for the regeneration of the old town. Later, in the 1970s, practicing as an architect, he designed modern interventions in the bombed out or cleared sites.

For many of the Fiumans who left to Italy, the old town was an important part of the city's Italian identity- for instance, Marisa Madieri recalled in her autobiographic novel "the center with its dark buildings" as her quintessential Fiume.⁴³ The demolitions in the area, particularly of buildings owned by Italians who had left, could have then been seen as part and parcel of the erasure of the Italian presence in the city. Nevertheless, the clearing of ruined buildings and those which were considered as unsanitary was a common practice throughout Europe at that time- in Germany, for instance, the operations of *Sanierung*, were a common feature of post-war urban reconstruction.⁴⁴ Moreover, the reports on the demolitions and the letters from

41 Stari Grad Moje Mladosti (Vremeplov 50-lh Godina) - Rijeka. Rijeka 1998.

42 Stari Grad Moje Mladosti, 1998.

43 van Hout 2020. op.cit. *Marisa Madieri*: Verde Acqua. Torino 1987.

44 Jeffrey M. Diefendorf: In the Wake of War the Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II. New York 1993.

residents, as well as from conservationists, also support the interpretation that clearings had to do with the generic technical views of the time, of a slum that needed redevelopment: residents and former residents with often Italian names merely asked for compensation, while planners and conservationists, after 1947 mostly with Croatian names, advocated either for the rehabilitation (*sanacija*) of the area or for the safeguarding of what seen as important built heritage.⁴⁵ For instance, in the case of Calle della Nave, from where most pre-war inhabitants had already left to Italy,⁴⁶ reports assessed its buildings as “unhygienic”, “in danger of collapse”, “abandoned and ruined”, “uninhabitable”, “prone to infectious diseases”, “must be demolished”.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the Conservation Institute, the institution dealing with heritage matters in Rijeka, opposed the demolition of several buildings in the street, as they reflected “the architectural image, of one part of the old town”, yet did not consider the entire segment as an urban ensemble. In a later letter from March 1950, conservator Aleksandar Perc, the Institute’s representative, pointed out that these buildings were the goods of the people, framing heritage as a common good, a “common national good “according to the legislation of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and fitting the socialist tenets.”⁴⁸ The arguments of both proponents of destruction and of protection were framed in technical frames corresponding to the generic professional opinions at the time in Europe- an urban planning practice that looked at reconstruction as an opportunity to modernize and to move beyond the unsanitary old urban fabric, and a conservation approach still hesitant to consider entire ensembles and focusing on select objects. The stated intention thus matches professional frames.

45 DARI 86 JU 16 Gradjevinski Odjel. Rušenje zgrada GNO RI 1948-49. Rušenje starih zgrada u starom gradu. Zapisnik 17 III 1950 [Demolition of old buildings in the old town]

46 DARI 86 JU 16 Gradjevinski Odjel. Rušenje zgrada GNO RI 1948-49. Rušenje starih zgrada u starom gradu. Letter 8.I.1950, Predmet: Rušenje objekata u starom gradu [Subject: Demolition of buildings in the old town]

47 DARI 86 JU 16 Gradjevinski Odjel. Rušenje zgrada GNO RI 1948-49. Rušenje starih zgrada u starom gradu., Pregled za rušenje u obzir dolazećih kuća u Calle della nave” [Overview for demolition of houses in Calle della nave”]

48 DARI 86 JU 16 Gradjevinski Odjel. Rušenje zgrada GNO RI, 387-1950 Predmet: Rušenje kuća u starom gradu



Street scene from the old town under the Roman gate.⁴⁹

An underlying assumption could be that with residents already gone, technical language could hide attempts to erasure. Then the question would be why were those very sections of the old town cleared, and not others- and why would some particular ensembles, described in contemporary accounts as slum-like, suggest more Italianness than others. Moreover, Belvedere, the nineteenth - earliest 20th century neighbourhood with an architecture resembling that in Northern Italian towns, was the main area associated with Italians.⁵⁰ As such, we cannot infer from the examined sources that the old town redevelopment can be connected to an intentionality of frontier urbanism practices related to nation-building. What the case of the old town reflects instead is how practices associated with urban redevelopment were framed as technical operations in the spirit of the times. Residents and owners, both those who left and those who stayed, did not have a say in the evolution of the area, but aimed at negotiating forms of compensation for the loss of the built environment.

⁴⁹ Photo courtesy of National Library, Zagreb, Zbirka Razglednice, topic: Rijeka.

⁵⁰ Marco Abram, personal communication



The Venetian Lion.⁵¹

Symbolic Makeovers

While the demolition of buildings in the old town were framed as a technical operation, other acts of removing buildings were directly connected to getting rid of the presence of Italian rule and can be seen as frontier urbanism. This included the removal of buildings considered symbolic to the fascist past, or selected markers of the Italian interwar rule in general.

One key symbol of the Italian rule over Rijeka had been already destroyed in 1945 by the German occupying forces. The Lion of San Marco, traditionally associated with Venice- which had in fact never ruled over Fiume/Rijeka- had been built in 1926 on a prominent location on the Riva. Dedicated to Italian army volunteers of the First World War, it featured a *fascio littorio* on the side.⁵² As such, it blended the Venetian reference to the contemporary Italian polity. It acted as a new landmark of the city, bringing forward a narrative of a Venetian, then Italian, Adriatic, into a key public space.⁵³ In the

51 DARI, Zbirka Razglednice, "Monumento ai Caduti", RI 33.

52 Ivan Jeličić: "Venetian Lion", Rijeka/Fiume [Mobile app]. 2020, Google Play. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.rijekafiume.ca&hl=en_US&gl=US

53 Abram, M. 2018.

interwar period, the promenade dock was itself renamed San Marco, shifting the symbolic geography from the local toponymic Adamich, referring to an important Rijeka family, to Venice. Nevertheless, after its destruction in war, its debris was used for the reconstruction of the dock, renamed Riva Boduli.⁵⁴

The emblematic eagle on top of the City Clock Tower did not have such straightforward connotations as the Lion. The decision to remove it in 1949 was described as a removal of a symbol of both fascist and imperial rule, incompatible with the new socialist city.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, its connection with fascism was rather tortuous. A double-headed eagle, with heads facing the same direction, had been a feature of the city's official seal since 1659, when Habsburg Emperor Leopold I assigned it to the city. The City Clock Tower was adorned with sculptures of both the Rijeka eagle and the Habsburg eagle, which was also double-headed, with heads facing opposite directions.⁵⁶ An eagle statue was placed on top of the tower from the middle of 18th century, but that was removed in 1890 with the construction of a new cupola. Tensions emerged between those who wanted the cupola to be adorned with the Hungarian flag – on the eve of Hungary's grand Millennium celebrations, a key event of nation-building –, and those who wanted a local Rijeka flag.⁵⁷ In 1906, a group of women, close to the autonomist movement, paid for a metal sculpture of a double-headed eagle which topped the cupola. However, during D'Annunzio's occupation of Fiume, as the eagle was seen as connected to the Habsburgs, two arditi – Italian soldiers- climbed the tower and cut off one head, thus leaving a single-headed eagle, like the Roman bird. During the interwar, the bird indeed signified a reconquered Italianness, which the 1949 decision was based on. However, the history of the troubled bird reflects the multiple threads of Rijeka's history: between a local and often autonomist identity and conflicting imperial visions- Habsburg – the usual suspect of Empire, but also Hungarian and Italian nation-building projects, which can themselves be understood as imperial projects.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Jeličić, I. 2020.

⁵⁵ Igor Žic: *A Short Story of the City of Rijeka*. Rijeka 2007. 168.

⁵⁶ Ivan Jeličić - Vjeran Pavlaković: "The double headed eagle", Rijeka/Fiume [Mobile app]. 2020, Google Play. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.rijekafiume.ca&hl=en_US&gl=US

⁵⁷ Jeličić -Pavlaković 2020.

⁵⁸ Pieter M. Judson: *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*. Cambridge MA 2016.; Paul Miller and Claire Morelon: *Embers of Empire: Continuity and Rupture in the Habsburg Successor States After 1918*. Oxford and New York 2018.



The Clock Tower without the eagle statue during the socialist Yugoslav period.⁵⁹


Also in 1949, the local council decided to remove also a much newer feature, connected more directly and explicitly to a past that was to be removed. The Temple of the Most Holy Redeemer was erected during the last years of Italian rule as a marker of the redemption of the Italian nation. It was placed on the Southern corner of the park in Mlaka, intended to mark the place where Italian land troops first entered the city on November 17th 1918. Its location marked what was seen as the liberation of the city, with the square named XVII Novembre, and the street Santa Entrata – the Holy Entrance. The temple replaced a small old church of St Andrew, removed through the Regulatory Plan of 1938, which made place for this symbolic new structure. The vision was to shape new civic center for Fiume, bringing together the profane and the sacred in a new, representative public space and expression of Italianness in Fiume.⁶⁰ The temple was built with the help of money

⁵⁹ Croatian State Archives (hence: HDA), AG FOTO fond HR-HDA-1422

⁶⁰ *Julija Lozzi Barković*: Medjuratna Arhitektura Rijeke i Sušaka-Usporedba i Europsko

raised during a collection which started in 1941.⁶¹

The competition for the design of the votive church and the ossuary was won by the architect Virgilio Vallot. The Venetian architect was known as the author of the new train station in Venice and he won the competition against three other competitors. As the Venezia Santa Lucia station, his project for Fiume was a modernist building. However, it included elements of the early Christian and Romanesque tradition including a mosaic inspired by those in the Venetian island of Torcello, with the representation of Christ the Redeemer on the throne. Vallot declared that the church would embody the “new dignity of contemporary Italian architecture”.⁶²



Plan of the Temple of the Most Holy Redeemer⁶³

Construction began at the end of 1942. Because of high costs, the difficulty in procuring materials, and the lack of workforce, by the time it was inaugurated in March 1944, only the nave and the altar were completed. From the original plan, the high bell tower and the entrance were missing, as well as the marbles and mosaics. It was already used for service in 1945 and

Okruženje [Interwar Architecture of Rijeka and Sušak-Comparison and European Environment] Rijeka 2015. 365.

61 Il tempio del Redentore si sta realizzando al voto dei Fiumani [The Temple of the Redeemer is being realized by the vow of Fiumians]. La vedetta d'Italia. Br. 9. Fiume. 10.1.1944.2.

62 Lozzi Barković 2015. 366.

63 DARI 57- kut 85/4-0/1 Chiesa Giardini Publici

remained opened until 1949.⁶⁴ It was demolished on November 4, 1949, because city politicians thought it was a symbol of fascism, with its “lictor style”. Moreover, the church impeded the construction of the new avenue connecting the center with the Kantrida quarter.

The Highway as the Yugoslav Project

The National Front Highway⁶⁵ was the ultimate urban project to fixate the new socialist identity of Rijeka. Finalized in November 1949, the almost two kilometer avenue linked Mlaka, the gateway to the city center, with Kantrida. As a road connecting more directly the center of Rijeka to the shipyard and onward to the Opatija coast, it marked a renewed connection. As an infrastructure project, it showed the technical progress of modernity that the socialist project would come to embody. As a project conducted by brigades of volunteers, it was meant to represent the allegiance of people to the new system, the work of solidarity and the abnegation of Rijekans to build a new society. The official press assiduously reported on the project all throughout 1949, boasting the large numbers of volunteers – in his overarching history of Rijeka, Igor Žic qualified them as people who “more or less” volunteered.⁶⁶ The press highlighted the thousands of people and hundreds of thousands of hours spent on this project, with a report in July 1949 showing that 9749 volunteers from the first rayon of Rijeka, 7965 from the second, and 9244 from the third volunteered for the highway.⁶⁷ The newspapers praised the efforts of the volunteers and also invited others to join. Nevertheless, they also mentioned how an important contribution to the construction was given by the military, underlying that the volunteer effort wasn’t enough.⁶⁸

64 DARI 57, kut 85/4-0/1 Chiesa Giardini Publici

65 The road was later called Marx and Engels street, and is today Zvonimirova street.

66 Žic: 2007. 169.

67 I frontisti della città di Fiume hanno dato 596208 ore di lavoro volontario [The frontists of the city of Fiume gave 596,208 hours of voluntary work], Giovedì, 14 luglio VI 165.

68 Ultimato l’80 per cento dei lavori sull’Autostrada [80 percent of the work on the highway completed]. La Voce, 16 July 1949.



Volunteers building the National Front Highway (later Marx and Engels highway).⁶⁹

At the completion of the project, the press declared the success of the highway construction as the proof of the importance and popularity of the socialist idea. A first page title boasted that the work of the highway was a response to the “calumnious campaign of detractors”, the enemies of socialism.⁷⁰ The road thus became an iconic project for the new state, and the erasure of the Votive Temple at its Eastern end reflected how the elements of the old fascist rule were replaced by socialism as a world of the future. Just as the redevelopment of the old town echoed the transnational practice of post-war ruin clearing in the name of *Sanierung*, the highway represented the transnational socialist project, fixating the state presence in its frontier to the capitalist world.

⁶⁹ DARI 1171-3-25.

⁷⁰ Dopršenje Austrotrade “Narodnog fronta” bit će još jedna velika radna pobjeda frontovaca Rijeke [Completion of the “People’s Front” highway will be another great working victory for the Rijeka front] I Rijecki List, 4 Nov 1949.

Conclusion

We have seen how the transformations of the built environment in Rijeka/Fiume in the twentieth century mirrored broader European trends in urban planning and architecture- the popularity of historicism before 1914 and of modernism in both the interwar and the post-war period, the urban decay of old city centres and their representations as “slums” in need of clearance for *Sanierung* and redevelopment. On the other hand, particular reconfigurations highlighted the political transitions that the city has experienced: monuments erected and demolished, including building-monuments such as the Votive Temple, projects that show the triumph of a new system such as the highway constructed through volunteer work. These fixated the political identity of the city and secured the new states in urban space, thus reflecting practices of frontier urbanism. However, as the discussion of the old town underlined, even if a narrative frame can portray an urban planning act as motivated by a nation-building agenda, the intentionality of urban planning can be also connected to mere technical arguments within a profession. As such, reading the transformation of urban space solely through a political lens of states securing their ontological security has its limits.

In April 2017, a two-headed eagle statue was placed again on the dome of the City Clock Tower in Rijeka. In the eve of the city becoming the 2020 European Capital of Culture⁷¹, the cityscape received this reference to a symbol of the city’s past that connected it with the Habsburg era once again. Discussions of a cosmopolitanism connected with imperial nostalgia are abundant in Central Europe, but in the case of Rijeka with its multi-layered threads and interpretation of the past, this can be seen in a multitude of ways- from a nod to the past autonomy, of Empire, a cancellation of both the Italian beheading and the socialist one. It can also signal a city in search of its past. The opening celebrations of the European Capital of Culture in 2020, however, despite under the slogan of A port of Diversity, focused on the recent past of a thriving industrial port, while references to Italians or Hungarians were reduced to a minimum. While for many of the new arrivals in Rijeka after 1945 and their descendants, the memory of Rijeka was one of a city functioning mostly in one dominant language, the built environment attested to the layers of a multifaceted past. Yet, reading such cues in the built environment is not

⁷¹ Together with Galway in Ireland.

direct and immediate. Acts such as the new street signs in the old town indicating past names, or public history projects such as the Rijeka/Fiume app⁷², can contribute to an awareness of these layers.

72 Rijeka/Fiume [Mobile app]. 2020, Google Play. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.rijekafiume.ca&hl=en_US&gl=US

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Fiume (Rijeka). Source: Fortepan / Ebner, 1938



The City Left Behind: Changes in the Ethnic Composition of Vilnius During and After World War II

Péter Bedők

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bedok.peter@gmail.com

Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Abstract

The population of Wilno/Vilnius numbered over 200 000 people when the Second World War broke out. The city found itself at the crossroads of Polish, Lithuanian and belated Belarusian nation building efforts. In the first phase of the war, the multi-ethnic city which was also a centre of a voivodship and where Poles were the majority community, came under Lithuanian authority. The Soviet military and diplomatic actions played a key role in this change. The arrival of the Soviet troops halted the extensive “Lithuanianization” process that had begun. As a result, tensions between the Polish community and the Lithuanian state eased. The Extermination of the Jewish population the city commenced with the German invasion on 24 June 1941. Before the Soviet troops reached the Vilnius Region, the Polish Home Army (AK) gained control over the rural areas. Despite the Polish plans, Vilnius was liberated with the help of the Soviet Red Army on 13 July 1944. The relationship between the Polish and the Soviet army quickly turned hostile. Moreover, violence continued to accompany population movement. Even though the Old Town remained largely intact, the demographic profile of Vilnius altered dramatically. First, it became a Russian dominated space. Following the collectivization, as a result of the influx of the Lithuanians intensified and they gradually became the majority in the city.

Keywords

Wilno/Vilnius, Polish-Lithuanian relations, Soviet occupation, World War II

Introduction

The years of World War II and the subsequent Sovietization are the most tragic and traumatic periods in the history of Vilnius. In 1939, the population of the city chiefly consisted of Poles and Jews. A decade later, it was no longer the case. At the same time, Vilnius became the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.¹ Wartime destruction, the Holocaust and the repatriation of Poles (that took place between 1944 and 1947) dramatically changed the ethnic relations. Just like it happened to other cities that the Soviet Union annexed (Lwów, Chişinău), the ethnic Russian and immigrants from other republics of the Soviet Union took the vacated place of the former inhabitants in Vilnius, too. This also meant a new context for the urban structure - including built environment - which had been in the making for generations. A new milieu came about in a very short period of time in Vilnius, the same way as in Lwów and Wrocław.²

While for the Polish society, Wilno was an important regional centre,³ (similarly to Lwów or Poznań), the Lithuanians saw the city as their past and future capital. From the point of Belarusians, Vilna should have been part of their country since the town played a key role in forming the Belarusian literary language and a sizeable Belarusian community in the city that was even larger than the Lithuanians'.⁴ After World War I, the Poles and the Lithuanians came into conflict over the city. Eventually, General Lucjan

1 *Theodore R. Weeks*: A Multi-ethnic City in Transition: Vilnius's Stormy Decade, 1939–1949. *Eurasian Geopgraphy and Economics* 47. (2006) 2. 153–175.

2 *Violeta Davoliūtė*: The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania. Memory and modernity in the wake of war. London–New York, 2013. 7.

3 The city had a major impact on the neighbouring areas as well. In fact, the geographical name “Region of Vilnius” (*Wileńszczyzna*, *Vilniaus kraštas*) has multiple meanings. From historical perspective, it refers to the agglomeration that Vilnius dominated, thus it includes areas that are in North-western Belarus today. (Hrodna/Grodno, Lida, Ashmyany/Oszmiana) and Southwestern Lithuania. In the present study, we apply the term for the area that was annexed to Lithuania between October 1939 until November 1940. The area of this region was 9527 km². *Mariusz Kowalski*: *Wileńszczyzna jako problem geopolityczyny*. In: *Problematyka geopolityczna ziem polskich*. Red. Piotr Eberhardt. *Prace Geograficzne* nr. 218. Warszawa 2008. 267–268.

4 The Lithuanians also maintained a network of cultural institutions in Vilnius during the interwar period. They were the majority community in the villages of the northern part of the region. *Timothy Snyder*: *The Reconstruction of Nations*. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. New Haven–London 2003. 53–54.

Żeligowski secured the area for Poland by declaring independence for Central-Lithuania on 12 October 1920. The Lithuanians vehemently opposed this move. The tense relationship between the Poles and the Lithuanians had an impact on the way World War II unfolded in the region.⁵



Inhabitants of Vilnius during World War I, app. 1915–1916. Source: wikipedia

For Poland, the salience of the Lithuanian question waned when the Council of Ambassadors sanctioned the border on 15 March 1923, however, it was difficult to integrate the eastern borderlands (*kresy*) as like the Vilnius Region to Poland. Wilno, as one of the Polish provincial centres, became more of a cultural than actual economic and industrial centre since it had lost its former markets that remained in interwar Lithuania and in the Soviet Union (in the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic).⁶ The Voivodship of Wilno constituted a security threat for Poland due to the revisionist efforts of Lithuania and because of the high proportion of Belarusians living in the area.

Based on the census of 1931, in terms of ethnicity, notable differences were

⁵ *Krzysztof Buchowski*: Litwomani i polonizatorzy, Mity, wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy w stosunkach polsko-litewskich w pierwszej połowie XX wieku. Białystok 2006. 8–22.

⁶ *Weeks, T. R.*: A Multi-ethnic City in Transition. 155.


seen between urban Vilnius and rural areas of the Voivodship of Wilno: for Poles it was 65.93% and 58.57%, for Belarussians 0.89 and 26.63%, for those of the Jewish faith 27.98% and 5.01% and Lithuanians 0.8% versus 6.03%, respectively. Regarding the demography of Christian Churches, Catholics constituted 60-65% in both urban and rural setting, while 29.18% of the rural population belonged to the Orthodox Church based on the same data. As it was seen, this latter figure was close to the weight of the Israelites in Vilnius.⁷

The closed border between Poland and Lithuania, the tense international relations and the frequent armed incidents along the demarcation line made life more difficult in the multi-ethnic voivodship. As a result, Poland and Lithuania established diplomatic relations as late as on 19 March 1938, after Poland had issued an ultimatum.⁸ Thus, hardly any time left for reconciliation or at least for identifying common interests before the Second World War.⁹

7 According to the census of 1931, the Voivodhsip of Vilnius (excluding Vilnius) had a population of 1 080 868 people. In terms of the number of native speakers, the proportions were the following: 633 095 Polish (58.57%), 287 938 Belarussian (26.63%), 65 259 Lithuanian (6.03%), 54 232 Hebrew (5.01%), 37 109 Russian (3.43%), and 3253 other (0.29%). Confessions showed the following patterns: 671 484 Roman Catholic (62.12%), 315 417 Orthodox (29.18%), 55 790 Israelite (5.16%) and 3.54% followed further faiths. *Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności z dn. 9. XII 1931 r. mieszkania i gospodarstwa domowe, ludność, stosunki zawodowe : województwo wileńskie., bez miasta Wilna. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Warszawa 1936.* 10. At the same time, the total population of Wilno was 195 071, out of which 128 628 were Polish (65.93%), 54 596 Jews (27.98%), 7442 Russian (3.81%), 1579 Lithuanian (0.80%), and 1089 other (0.55%). In the city, the religious landscape looked as follows: 125 999 Roman Catholic (64.59%), 55 006 Israelite (28.19%), 9321 Orthodox (4.77%), and 4745 people (2.43%) belonged to other churches. *Powszechny Spis Ludności z dn. 9. XII 1931 r. mieszkania i gospodarstwa domowe, ludność, stosunki zawodowe: Miasto Wilno. Warszawa 1937.* 11.

8 *Artur Ochal: Na litewskiej rubieży, Brygada KOP „Grodno” (1929–1939). Warszawa 2017.* 605.

9 *Piotr Łossowski: Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1921–1939. Warszawa 1997.* 309–352.



Ethnic patterns of Polish areas. Red represents Polish, yellow means areas where Lithuanians lived.¹⁰

The Period of Lithuanian Authority and Soviet Occupation

Although, according to the Secret Clause of the German–Soviet Pact of non-aggression signed on 23 August 1939 (known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact), Lithuania was supposed to be part of the German sphere of interest, in the sense of the German-Soviet negotiations of 28 September, the territory went to the Soviet Union in exchange for the area around Lublin.¹¹ The Parties agreed that Lithuania annex Vilnius. The Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic also made a claim for Vilnius, Stalin, for strategic reasons, favoured Lithuania in this regard. Negotiations about handing over Vilnius began 3 October 1939. These were formally based on the Lithuanian-Soviet

¹⁰ Edward Maliszewski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Biura Pracy Społecznej, Wykonano w Lit. W. Główny, 1919.

¹¹ Bojtár Endre: Európa megrablása. A balti államok bekebelezésének története dokumentumok tükrében 1939–1989. Budapest 1989. 29–30.

Treaty of 1920.¹² Eventually, Lithuania received only 6656 km², the northern belt of the Voivodship of Wilno with Vilnius as its centre. Since 20 000 Soviet troops coming to be stationed in Lithuania, although Soviets hardly ever left the Vilnius District and the cost of annexing Vilnius was independence.

In September 1939, the Lithuanian leadership refused to satisfy Hitler's demand that Lithuania join the campaign against Poland.¹³ At the same time, the state opened its borders for the refugees and 9500 Polish soldiers arrived right in the first month. The Lithuanian government ordered their arms to withdraw and be interned. The Soviet troops occupied Vilnius on 18 September 1939. In September 1939, the Polish civilian refugees from the Central and Western parts of Poland began to pour into Vilnius. This caused a shift in the ethnic patterns of the city as the number of Poles soared. Until February 1940, more than 30 000 refugees had arrived in Vilnius including more than 11 000 Jews and 3700 Lithuanians. They had to face an increasingly difficult situation as securing supplies and housing were a constant issues.¹⁴

According to the Soviet-Lithuanian Pact of 10 October 1939, 549 000 people became denizens of Lithuania. In terms of ethnicity, 59% of them were Poles, 19% were Jewish, 6% Lithuanian, 14% Belarusian and 2% Russian. In November 1940, an additional 2647 km² were annexed (Święciany/Švenčionys, Druskienniki/Druskininkai and Dziewieniszki/Dieveniškės had formerly been part of the Belarussian SSR), thus, by 1940, the Lithuanian SSR had gained 9527 km².¹⁵ In 1937, Vilnius had a population of 210 000. Throughout the war and in the post-war period, this figure continued to be volatile due to the extermination of the local Jewish population, the influx of the refugees and the waves of expulsion that occurred after the war.¹⁶

¹² Snyder, T.: *The Reconstruction of Nations*. 79–83.

¹³ Since, as a result of an ultimatum issued on 20 March 1939, Lithuania was forced to cede the vicinity of Klaipėda (Memel Territory), the relations between Germany and Lithuania were tense in 1939. The region around the port of Klaipėda was one of the most advanced areas of Lithuania.

¹⁴ The influx of Polish people contributed to the severity of post-war deportation/repatriation of Poles. *Tomas Bakelis*: *War, Ethnic Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in Lithuania, 1939–1940*. *Contemporary European History* 4. (2007) 16. 463–465.

¹⁵ *Piotr Łossowski*: *Litwa a sprawy polskie 1939–1940*. Warszawa 1982. 56–57.

¹⁶ *Bakelis, T.*: *War, Ethnic Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in Lithuania, 1939–1940* i. m. 464.; *Lagzi Gábor*: *Városok a határon*. Wrocław, L'viv és Vilnius multikulturalizmus a múltban és a jelenben. Budapest 2016. 72.



Celebrations of Vilnius return to Lithuania near Vilnius Cathedral in 1939. Source: wikipedia

The Polish Government-in-exile that initially had its seat in Paris protested against the annexation and halted the diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania, yet again.¹⁷ Although in Paris negotiations proceeded between the Parties regarding interned Polish soldiers and civilians, these negotiations meant no progress for the status of Vilnius. The Polish Government-in-exile hoped that it would be able to take the Eastern territories back with the support of Western allies. However, this proved to be an illusion. Allies did not keep their word regarding Vilnius and Lwów and let the Soviet Union decide on the affiliation of these areas.¹⁸ Fake news contributed to the deterioration of Polish-Lithuanian relations during the war. Furthermore, the lack of the Lithuanian emigré government that could have negotiated on Vilnius exacerbated the problems.

The Polish refugees did not welcome the Lithuanian troops marching into the region of Vilnius on 28 October 1939. They perceived the developments as a

¹⁷ *Krzysztof Tarka*: *Konfrontacja czy współpraca? Litwa w polityce Rządu Polskiego na uchodźstwie 1939–1945*. Opole 1998. 20.; *Łossowski, P.*: *Litwa a sprawy polskie 1939–1940*. 53.

¹⁸ *Norman Davies*: *Rising '44. The Battle of Warsaw*. London 2004. 42–45.

temporary invasion. However, we shall not forget that the region of Vilnius remained a kind of “Polish island” that fell outside the German and the Soviet zones of occupation. Thus, many saw the city as the centre of Polish efforts break away. The current conspiracies and the activities of the Union of Armed Struggle (*Związek Walki Zbrojnej, Okręg Wileński*), the predecessor of the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa - AK*) fuelled this belief.¹⁹

On the whole, in Vilnius, the tensions between the Poles and the Lithuanians were on the rise during the months of the Lithuanian occupation (that lasted from 28 October to 15 June 1940). The reasons behind this were the Lithuanization of the educational institutions as well as the social care, and the closure of the Stefan Batory University, among other things. These moves contributed to the increase of unemployment in the city. The Lithuanian intellectuals, workers and employees replaced the Polish'. Moreover, the regulations excluded the Polish settlers from the Lithuanian citizenship. At the same time, the Lithuanian government tried to persuade the Holy See to replace the Archbishop of Vilnius, Romuald Jałbrzykowski, who tried protecting the interests of the Polish people in the region and on the territories that belonged to the diocese. This were further triggered the uproar among the Poles.²⁰ The fact that the actual capital was still Kaunas and the head of state did not move to Vilnius reflect reflected on the seriousness of the situation.²¹

Lithuania had to secure supplies for 30 000 Polish civilians and soldiers. Despite some help from abroad, this caused a humanitarian crisis in the country and it remained a major issue up to the Soviet takeover. The Lithuanian government was not prepared for receiving so many refugees when it wished to integrate with the annexed territories.²² The Lithuanian leadership wished to distinguish between the loyal Poles from “strangers” (*ateiviai*).²³ Accord-

19 Piotr Niwiński: *Okręg Wileński AK w latach 1944–1948*. Warszawa–Kraków 2014.

25. *Login Tomaszewski: Wileńszczyzna lat wojny i okupacji 1939–1945*. Warszawa 1999. 279.

20 Kazimierz Michalkiewicz vice-bishop of Vilnius passed away on 16 February 1940. The Santa Sede appointed the former bishop of Vilkauskis, Mečislovas Reinys for his replacement. Reinys was of Lithuanian origin.

21 *Dangiras Mačiulis, Darius Staliūnas: Lithuanian Nationalism and the Vilnius Question 1883–1940*. Marburg 2015. 193–199.

22 As a result, a number of offices and departments of the government moved to Vilnius and so did the state owned companies of the food processing industry (*Maistas, Pieno centras*). *Bakelis, T.: War, Ethnic Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in Lithuania, 1939–1940*. 464.

23 *Kowalski, M.: Wileńszczyzna jako problem geopolityczyny, ibid., 269–274.; Piotr*

ing to the Act of 20 March 1940, the government denied citizenship to app. 83 000 Poles living in Vilnius and further tens of thousands that stayed in the region, altogether 150 000 people who arrived between 1920 and 1939. The ideology behind the Lithuanization of the Vilnius region was that the Polish-Belarusian population should turn back to their Lithuanian roots so that local population might be "re-Lithuanized".²⁴


On 15 June 1940, the Soviet Red Army occupied the entire area of Lithuania. Following a fraud election, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet accepted the request of the People's Government of Lithuania to join the Soviet Union. In the region of Vilnius, the occupation also meant that the conflict between Lithuanians and Poles halted and that the political-economic-cultural integration of the region to Lithuania slowed down. The head of state, Antanas Smetona and the Lithuanian political elite took refuge in Western Europe. Deportations and arrests during the autumn of 1940 took a heavy toll among the Poles and the Lithuanians of Vilnius.²⁵ The Polish associations, including the charity organization called *Komitet Polski* were banned.²⁶

Łossowski: Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie, 1883–1939. Warszawa 1985. 5–8.

24 *Bakelis, T.*: War, Ethnic Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in Lithuania, 1939–1940, *ibid.*, 463–469.

25 Between 14 and 18 June 1941 34 260 people were deported from Lithuania to the Interior of the Soviet Union. *Georg von Rauch*: A balti államok története. Budapest 2000. 197.

26 *Piotr Niwiński*: Okręg Wileński AK w latach 1944–1948. 2014. 28.



Area annexed to Lithuania between 10 October 1939 and November 1939.

The stripes indicate the area that belonged to Lithuania according to the Lithuanian-Soviet Agreement on 12 July 1920, while the dotted area is the territory that the Soviets actually handed over.²⁷

German Occupation

In consequence of the mass deportations and the cruelty suffered at the hands of the Soviet authorities, inhabitants of Vilnius welcomed the German troops as liberators, initially. The Lithuanian rebels took over on 23 June 1941 in Kaunas and Vilnius and both cities awaited the arrival of the German troops with open gates. Although a provisory government formed with the leadership of the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) but the Germans dissolved it in August 1941.²⁸ The Nazi Germany refused to recognize the independent

²⁷ Kőztes-Európa 1763–1993 (A collection of maps). Compiled by Pándi, Lajos. Osiris-Századvég, Budapest 1995. 673.

²⁸ Rauch, G.: A balti államok története. 200–201.

status of Lithuania and introduced a regime of military occupation. Lithuania belonged to the Eastern Governorate (*Reichskommissariat Ostland*) that held a subsidiary Lithuanian governorate (*Generalkommissariat Litauen*).²⁹ The administrative center and the seat of the general governor Theodor Adrian von Renteln (1897-1946?) [who played a key role in the deportation of 20 000 Jews from Vilnius - translator's note] was in Kaunas, and the Lithuanian governorate was divided into four districts. The district of Vilnius (*Gebiet Wilna – Land*) comprised 15840 km² and 600 000 inhabitants after two Belarussian districts had been added to it.³⁰

The occupying army tried to control the local level administration and used it to achieve their own objectives. Since the Germans lacked the capacity to overtake this level, Lithuanians were in control of these. They introduced Lithuanian street names, and, besides German, the use of Lithuanian language was also allowed in offices. At the same time, there were efforts to side-line the Polish language. Schools, where Polish was the medium of education, had to close and the same applied for theatres and movie theatres. Yet, the Lithuanian administration had no leverage over the decisions of the German command. Hardly had the Poles any civilian or military organizations that could have stood up in defence of their interests despite the fact that the majority of employees were still Polish. When a local census proved the Polish majority in the city, it became possible to employ more of them.³¹ The Germans were not interested in reinforcing the ethnic rivalry and tried to ensure that employment patterns were to reflect the ethnic proportion at the lower level of administration. This policy intended to ensure that the Germans could exploit the resources of the hinterland. When the Germans realized that Lithuanians wanted more freedom, they did not hesitate to uti-

29 *Login Tomaszewski*: Kronika Wileńska 1941–1945. Z dziejów polskiego państwa podziemnego. Warszawa 1992. 16.

30 *Arūnas Bubnys*: Stosunki międzyetniczne na Wileńszczyźnie w latach okupacji niemieckiej (1941–1944). *Studia Podlaskie* 17. (2007/2008) 134.

31 The census of 1942 showed a very different picture since a large part of the Jewish population was exterminated in 1941 and the number of the Lithuanians grew. In the six districts that belonged to Vilnius (Vilnius, Trakai/Troki, Eišiškės/Ejszyszki, Ashmyany/Oszmiana, Svir/Świr, Švenčionys/Święciany) according to the census that German authorities carried out, Lithuanians became the major community (58.8%), the proportion of the Poles was 36.9%, and that of the Belarussians 12.9 %, while the ratio of the Russians was 2.9%. In Vilnius itself, Poles formed the majority with 71.9%, while the proportion of Lithuanians was 20.5%. The number of the Russians equalled to 4.1% in proportional terms, while the Belarussians reached 2.1%. There were 15-17 000 Jews in the ghetto of Vilnius. *Bubnys A.*: Stosunki międzyetniczne. 134.

lize the Polish population against them, thus preventing harsher anti-Polish administrative measures. As an integrated part of this policy, announcements were issued in four languages.³²

The exclusion of the Jewish communities had begun before the German occupation. The Lithuanian authorities mainly referred to the cooperation with the communists as pretext for the measures. The Lithuanian police and the Lithuanian Shooters' Association (*Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga*) also took part in the extermination of Jews. The Gestapo involved units that they called *Sonderkommando* for the execution of the Jews. The bloodiest massacres of the Vilnius region took place near Ponary (Paneriai), 7 kms to the southwest of the city.³³ Until the end of 1941, these organizations murdered 33-35 000 people, which were more than half of the 58 000-strong Jewish community of Vilnius.³⁴ On 4 September 1941, the Germans left it for the Lithuanian authorities to set up the ghetto of Vilnius and to down the Jewish population. The 17 000 survivors of the first wave of genocide lived in the ghetto. Eventually, in September 1943, the ghettos of Vilnius and Świeciany/Švenčionys were liquidated and the surviving Jews transported to Estonia, Latvia and to various parts of the Governorate. Overall, only two-three thousand Jews of Vilnius survived the war. The district that included the ghetto became practically unpopulated.³⁵ The fate of the Yiddish Scientific Institute (Yidisher Visenshaftlekher Institut, YIVO), founded in 1925, reflects the history of the Jewish cultural heritage. YIVO played an active part in exploring the Ashkenazi in the interwar period. Moreover, one shall credit this institute with standardizing the Yiddish script and its transcription. A special German "kulturkommando" [Culture Commando] managed to take away part of its archive but the American troops took hold of it and this material made it possible to take up the work in New York that had begun in Wilno.³⁶

Since the Lithuanians participated in the massacres of 1941, during the Nazi occupation, the relationship between Poles and Lithuanians deterio-

³² *Bubnys A.*: Stosunki międzyetniczne. 137.

³³ *Theodore R. Weeks*: Vilnius between Nations 1795–2000. DeKalb. 2015. 182–183.

³⁴ At the same time, in late 1939, the Jewish population of Vilnius grew larger as a result of the arrival of refugees. In the first half of 1940, their number might have reached 80 000. *Andrzej Żbikowski*: Poles and Jews in Vilnius Region 1939–1941. *Darbai ir dienos* 67. (2017) 154.

³⁵ *Bubnys A.*: Stosunki międzyetniczne. 140–141. *Arūnas Bubnys*: Eksterminacja żydów wileńskich i dzieje getta wileńskiego (1941–1944). *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2. (2010) 229–236.

³⁶ *Lagzi G.*: Városok a határon. 81–85.

rated further. The Polish partisans became active in the spring and summer of 1944. At that time, the Wilno Regiment of the Polish Home Army was 23 000-strong. As the Germans began to retreat, they became interested in fuelling the interethnic tension. They hoped that partisans would turn against the Lithuanian police. The Germans used the Lithuanian police and self-defence units to crush the Polish uprising and to maintain their control over the population. However, by the summer of 1944, the Germans controlled only Vilnius and the district centres.³⁷

The Final Days of the German Occupation and the Worst Period of Polish-Lithuanian Relations

The struggle of the Polish Home Army against the German forces of occupation went hand in hand with the liquidation of the Lithuanian police and the administrative units that cooperated with the Germans. These operations were particularly successful against the Local Lithuanian Units (*Lietuvos vietinė rinktinė* – LVR) that fought on Germans' side. Both sides committed atrocities against civilians and both parties were guilty of war crimes. The Lithuanians killed the Polish villagers and members of the Home Army killed the Lithuanian civilians who allegedly collaborated with the Germans. In the last weeks of the German occupation, in June 1944, the conflict escalated and the Lithuanians and the Polish engaged in the ethnic cleansing near the area that used to be the Polish-Lithuanian borderland (at the settlements called Podbrzezie/Paberžė and Dubingiai/Dubniki).³⁸ When the Polish AK became the strongest force in the rural areas of the Vilnius region, they started fighting against the Soviet partisans.³⁹

In the summer of 1944, the The Polish Government-in-exile launched the

³⁷ Germans also tried using the weaker Belarussian nationalism against Lithuanians and Poles. They tried to form a pro-German group among Belarussians and allowed them to broadcast radio programmes in Belarussian language from Vilnius besides having their own newspaper, high school and national committee. They could also take part in local public administration. *Bubnys A.*: Stosunki międzyetniczne. 139-140.

³⁸ *Paweł Rokicki*: Głinciszki i Dubniki. Zbrodnie wojenne na Wileńszczyźnie w połowie 1944 roku i ich konsekwencje w współczesnych relacjach polsko-litewskich. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Warszawa 2015. 336.

³⁹ *Niwiński, P.*: Okręg Wileński. 30.

operation Storm (*Operacja Burza*) with the objective of securing Vilnius.⁴⁰ One of the tactical moves (*Operacja Ostra Brama*) was to liberate Wilno with the help of the Home Army in order that they could be in a good position by the time the Soviet troops reached. However, the Home Army began the siege too late and they could only take Vilnius from the Germans with the help of the Red Army.⁴¹ Despite this initial friendliness, the Soviet troops soon began liquidating AK units - not only in the region of Vilnius but also in Volhynia and around Lwów. These developments projected the re-Sovietisation of the territory and influenced preparations for the battle for Warsaw.⁴²



Member of the Polish Home Army and Soviet soldiers during the liberation of Vilnius. Source: wikipedia.

Third (Final) Soviet Occupation and Deportations and Displacements

On 22 September 1944, the Polish government of Lublin signed an agreement about population exchange with Soviet Lithuania. According to the agreement 20 thousand Lithuanians transferred from the Voivodship of Bi-

⁴⁰ Niwiński, P.: Okręg Wileński. 30.

⁴¹ Niwiński, P.: Okręg Wileński. 33.

⁴² Davies, N.: Rising '44. The Battle of Warsaw.

ąłystok and other territories of Poland. At the same time, Poles from the Vilnius region and other areas of Lithuania were also forced to migrate. Between 1945 and 1947, 171 158 left for Poland, more than 50% of them were from Vilnius. A mass population movement continued and a total of 213 934 persons resettled in Poland until April 1959.⁴³ The deportations mostly concerned urban Vilnius since authorities allowed the Polish rural population to stay in order to prevent depopulation. While less than 20 000 Lithuanians resettled to Lithuania from Poland, the Polish minority in the Lithuanian SSR suffered severe losses since intellectuals were not only deported from Vilnius but also rural areas.⁴⁴

In the immediate post-World War II period, Vilnius, by having lost half of its population, became a Soviet city. It was the official capital of the Lithuanian SSR where temporarily Russian became the desired medium of communication. According to census data from 1959, native Russian speakers formed the relative majority (37%), Lithuanian speakers came second (33.4%), while 19.4% claimed they were native Polish, following by 4.8% Jews, 3.1% Belarussians, 1.3% Ukrainians, and 0.7% fell in other categories. However, ethnically the Lithuanians were the most numerous 33.6%, then came the ethnic Russians (29.4%) and the Poles (20%), while the proportion of Jews fell to 6.9% and that of the Belarussians increased to 6.2%. Ukrainians made up 2.8% of the population and 1% related to others.⁴⁵ The Polish immigrants came from nearby villages and the Poles remained the majority in the district called Nowa Wilejka.⁴⁶

The Polish who went to Poland from Wilno and its surroundings tried to keep the memory of their homeland: they left songs, paintings and poems be-

43 *Irena Miklaszewicz*: Brzemie polskości. Odniesienie do Polski jako czynnika obciążającego katolików i duchowieństwo polskie w litewskiej części archidiecezji wileńskiej w materiałach sowieckich służb represyjnych. In: *Od Maximis undique pressi do Totus Tuus Poloniae populus. Metropolie mohylewska i wileńska w latach 1798–1992*. Red. Jarosław Wasilewski. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Białystok–Warszawa 2019. 188.

44 *Kowalski, M.*: Wileńszczyzna jako problem geopolityczny. 279.

45 *Kowalski, M.*: Wileńszczyzna jako problem geopolityczny. 283.; *Piotr Eberhardt*: Przemiany narodowościowe na Litwie w XX wieku. *Przegląd Wschodni* 3.1 (1991) 1. 474–475.

46 Polish kept migrating from Lithuania during the mid-1950s. According to the census of 1959, 230 000 Polish remained in Lithuania that was 8,5% of the total population (2 711 400). Their number was equal to that of the ethnic Russians at that time. Subsequently, the Russians overtook the Poles in terms of number. In Vilnius, the proportion of the Lithuanians rose above 50% only in 1989. *Eberhardt, P.*: Przemiany narodowościowe na Litwie. *ibid.*, 473–480.

hind, along with memoirs and books about the Home Army.⁴⁷ The members of staff of the Stefan Batory University gained employment at the Nikolaus Kopernikus University of Toruń (Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika) that was founded in 1945. They tried to follow the traditions of their previous institution. In the autumn of 1944, Soviets forced the university to break with its past and take up Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas's name (1880–1935) who was a Lithuanian communist and member of the Comintern.⁴⁸

Formally, the Lithuanian SSR was indebted to the Soviet Union since the earlier Lithuanian states were unable to hold Klaipėda, the important port town, and Vilnius at the same time. Despite the devastation that the war, the Holocaust and the deportation of Poles brought about, Vilnius and its region could preserve a multi-ethnic character.⁴⁹ The Lithuanian writer Tomas Venclova wrote the following about post-war Vilnius: "For many years after the Second World War, the Jewish quarter was a town of ghosts. All the quarters of the Old Town including the university, the Christian churches (with the exception of St. Catherine's that suffered minor damages) were miraculously intact. Only the Jewish quarter was hopelessly destroyed."⁵⁰ Although there were plans to radically alter the city, these were yet to realize and the historic townscape was preserved. Yet, one can still observe the impact of wartime damage, for example the uncertain fate of the Jewish built heritage that has become a domestic tourist attraction. The Polish-Lithuanian relations have been improving and this facilitates the academic study of the previous conflicts, which, in turn, is indispensable for reaching a social consensus about these.

47 Jarosław Krasnodębski: *Z Wilna nad Wilią do „Wilna nad Wisłą”. Ekspatriacja i osiedlenie się mieszkańców Wileńszczyzny w Toruniu (1944–1948)*. Toruń 2019. 9–16.; *Vita-lija Stravinskienė: Między ojcowizną a ojczyzną. Przymusowa migracja Polaków z Wilna do Polski w latach 1944–1947*. In: *Pamięć kresów – kresy w pamięci*, szerk. Bogusław Tracz. Muzeum w Gliwicach. Katowice–Gliwice–Warszawa 2019. 67–86.

48 Lagzi G.: *Városok a határon*. 90.

49 According to the census of 2011, the Lithuanians were 84.2% of the population, the Poles were yet again in second position with 6.6% (200 300 people), while the proportion of the Russians fell to 5.8% (176 900) and there were 36 200 Belarussians. This set of data shows that there were only 2852 Jews in Lithuania, 2012 of them lived in Vilnius. In the same year, the population of the capital was 524 406, out of which 63.6% were Lithuanian, 16.4% Polish, 11.9% Russian, 3.4% Belarussian and 4.7% belonged to other ethnic categories. *Gyventojai pagal tautybę, gimtąją kalbą ir tikybę. Lietuvos Respublikos 2011 metų visuotinio gyventojų ir būstų surašymo rezultatai*. Lietuvos Statistikos Departamentas. Vilnius 2013. 1–2.

50 *Tomas Venclova: Vilnius. Egy város Európában*. Budapest 2009. 114.

Summary

Apart from killings due to wartime violence and deportations in June 1941, the annihilation of the Jewish community – the murder of 33-35 000 people until the end of 1941 – of Vilnius constituted the most severe loss for the city. The discord between the Polish and the Lithuanian community also took the form of armed conflicts during the years of the war. Between the Soviet invasion of 1944 and 1947, 89 000 Poles left Vilnius.⁵¹ A third of the buildings suffered irreparable damage during the war, even though the Old Town retained its original outlook.⁵²

In fact, as a result of the deportations and the Holocaust Vilnius became an empty space. By 1945, the number of inhabitants dropped to 110 000 that was just half of the pre-war figure.⁵³ This “emptiness” made the influx of a new possible population rise and this led to the emergence of a “Soviet city” in place of the Polish-Jewish town that Vilnius had been. There were many Polish among the new settlers, but they also differed from the previous “repatriated” inhabitants, in social terms. The demographic collapse that the war caused made it necessary to attract newcomers from surrounding rural areas. As a result of the influx of non-Lithuanians, 75% of the inhabitants represented other ethnic groups in 1951. From that time, the number of the Lithuanians gradually rose and they eventually formed a majority.⁵⁴ After the collectivization, many Lithuanians embarked on a “new life” in the new capital.⁵⁵ In fact, it was a conscious policy that Sovietization and urbanization should go hand in hand. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Vilnius became a real Lithuanian city, but preserved some multiethnic characters also.


⁵¹ *Lagzi G.*: Városok a határon. 87.

⁵² The Jewish quarter suffered the most damage and the Great Synagogue of Vilnius was finally demolished in 1949.

⁵³ *Davoliūtė, V.*: The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania, *ibid.*, 2–3.; Theodore R. Weeks: Remembering and Forgetting: Creating a Soviet Lithuanian Capital. Vilnius 1944–1949. *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39. (2008) 4. 517–533.

⁵⁴ *Vitalija Stravinskienė*: Vilniaus miesto etninė-demografinė padėtis: 1944–1951 metai. *Istorija. Lietuvos aukštųjų mokyklų mokslo darbai* 95. (2014) 3. 52.

⁵⁵ According to Violeta Davoliūtė, the rapid repopulation and reconstruction of Vilnius by ethnically Lithuanian (and Polish) population from the surrounding countryside would turn postwar Vilnius into a „peasant metropolis”, because the vast majority of the the population had recently arrived from the village. *Davoliūtė, V.*: The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania. 2.



Ludomir Sleńdziński (1889–1980): Oratorium. Withdrawal from Wilno, 1944

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Oradea (Nagyvárad). Photo by Csaba Zahorán, 2005.



“Towns in captivity”. Transformation of the Towns of Transylvania in the Interwar Period: the Hungarian Point of View

Csaba Zahorán

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Zahoran.Csaba@uni-nke.hu

Institute of Central European Studies Eötvös József Research Centre University of Public Service

Abstract

In this paper I look at the Hungarian representation of the way towns in Transylvania changed after these had become part of Romania after World War I. While, according to the census of 1910, Hungarians made up a third of the total population of Transylvania, their share was about 60% in urban contexts. Besides the place urban spaces occupied in Hungarian historical consciousness, this factor determined the way Hungarian commentators interpreted the “loss” of Transylvanian towns. The idea that the “loss of Hungarian towns” changed the formerly Hungarian character of the towns, and their “Balkanization” were central motifs of Hungarian discourse in the interwar period. Some of these elements are present even today. Although the texts I investigate are part of the Hungarian discourse of resentment, I argue that they offer some insight into the changes in the “identity of the city”: the urban world which belonged to Central-Europe shifted to another cultural context, to that of Southeastern Europe. Moreover, I will show that these texts also reveal the process of nationalisation of towns, which became an important goal for the national elites since the 19th century within the project of building the modern national state.

Keywords

Transylvania, historical consciousness, identity, nation building, Hungarian-Romanian relations

Introduction: the Birth of a Discourse

After the signing of the Trianon Treaty on 4 June 1920, the document that sanctioned the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the disintegration of historic Hungary, Hungarians kept paying attention to the lost territories. This interest was the outcome of the combination of several factors. It was partly due to the ties that hundreds of thousands of Hungarians that – voluntarily or involuntarily – migrated to Hungary maintained.¹ The effort of the Hungarian government to have the boundaries revised was the other key factor. In Hungary, emotions also had a profound impact on the attitudes towards the new regional establishment. Anger, resentment and bitterness characterized accounts and complaints that refugees, and their organizations submitted. The same may be said of government propaganda. With the passage of time, longing for the lost motherland, nostalgia and sadness added to this mix of emotions.

Beyond the feeling of loss, there was one more important element in the discourse on territories that formerly constituted Eastern Hungary. Hungarian elites had a share of the prestige of Austria-Hungary and in the position of power that Hungary used to hold in the region. In the 19th century, references to “civilizing acts” of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom in South-eastern Europe and the trope that Medieval Hungary protected this part of the continent from “barbarians” served to reinforce efforts to promote Hungarian identity at the expense of other ethnic identities.² This image could also build on inequality between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania. Hungarian elites were in a better political, economic, social and cultural position. Vis-à-vis Romania, a condescending attitude towards a “small state in the Balkans” was also part of the mix even as the fear of Romanian irredentism was also tangible.³

Dominant Hungarian elites internalized this point of view to an extent that the Hungarian delegation to the peace treaty negotiations still felt it evident

1 For more on this see: *Ablonczy Balázs*: Ismeretlen Trianon. Az összeomlás és a békeszerződés története, 1918–1921. Budapest 2020. 183–204.

2 For more on this see *Romsics Ignác*: A magyar birodalmi gondolat. In *Id.*: Múltról a mának. Tanulmányok, esszék a magyar történelemről. Budapest 2004. 121–148., and *Gyurgyák János*: Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története. Budapest 2007., especially 90–130.

3 For more on Romanian irredentism, see *Jancsó Benedek*: A román irredentista mozgalmak története. Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő 2004.

that the supremacy of Hungarians and the civilizing role of the Hungarian state should be used as arguments for keeping the territorial integrity of Hungary.⁴ Hence, the fact that Romania received the sanction of the powers for occupying Transylvania and the Hungarian sense of mission triggered cognitive dissonance between the image of Romanians and the Hungarian sense of mission. This led to a discourse which centred on the paradox between the position for which Hungarians should be “entitled to” and the actual situation. The contradiction between the actual position and the “rightful place” of Hungarians in Transylvania became one of the key elements of the new discourse on Transylvania that emerged in the Hungarian public sphere and that flourished in the interwar period. Topoi that we would call elements of identity politics today, emphasizing that in a minority position all-national solidarity and holding on to the Hungarian national belonging were essential, were also important. Since this discourse, implicitly or explicitly, saw the remedy in revising the Trianon Treaty, it suited the context of contemporary revisionism.



The centre of Timișoara (Temesvár, Temeswar) with the Orthodox Cathedral (from the second half of the 1930s) and the replica of the Capitoline Wolf statue.

Photo by the author, 2008.

⁴ See *Gerő András* (összeáll.): *Sorsdöntések. A kiegyezés – 1867, A trianoni béke – 1920, A párizsi béke – 1947.* Budapest 1989. 156–157., 159.

Although, the intensity of attention that Hungarian public paid to Transylvania and to other lost territories was volatile, and – due to wear and the emergence of new issues – it became less enthusiastic as time passed by, the government and interested groups tried to maintain it. They believed that it would be possible to revise the unjust and unacceptable treaty when circumstances turned favourable and, thus, Hungary would be able to take back at least some of the lost territories. Although, following the ratification of the treaty, the revisionist discourse was contained for years, it gained space in public discourse when the international context changed in the late 1920s.⁵ This discourse integrated a broad range of contemporary works about Hungarians living on the other side of the border including those of propagandistic tone, nostalgic travel writings and academic texts.

The language and perspective of this discourse was biased in many ways. It encapsulated a number of stereotypes and prejudice about Romanians. This was in line with the views that Central and Western European travellers expressed about the Balkans and the Southeastern area of the continent.⁶ At the same time, this picture was not entirely fabricated as it contained several elements of truth. This latter feature explains its persistent nature of the discourse that survived the catastrophic outcome of revisionism and the decades of state socialism and that their various versions still appear in Hungary and in Romania.⁷

⁵ Bővebben lásd *Zeidler Miklós*: A revíziós gondolat. Pozsony, 2009.

⁶ For more on this see: *Maria Todorova*: Balcanii și balcanismul. Humanitas, București, 2000. This phenomena is multidirectional as one may identify several prejudices about Hungarians.

⁷ In current public discourse see for example *Horváth-Kovács Szilárd*: Hogyan tapasztaltuk meg az autentikus „balkánt” Dobrudzsában. Transindex 2019. november 19. <https://multikult.transindex.ro/?cikk=27962> (last downloaded on 19 November 2020). The issue also appears in academic discourse, Gusztáv Molnár's paper triggered much controversy. *Molnár Gusztáv*: Az erdélyi kérdés. Magyar Kisebbség 1997/3–4. and Magyar Kisebbség 1998/1.3–101. Regarding the development of Romanian nationhood see: *Borsi-Kálmán Béla*: Nemzetstratégiák. Politológiai és társadalom-lélektani esszék, tanulmányok a román–magyar (francia), a szlovák (cseh)–magyar, a francia–amerikai és a német–francia viszony történetéből. Budapest 2013.

The Texts

In this study, in order to illuminate this discourse, I take some texts produced about those towns in Transylvania that landed on the Romanian side after the Trianon Treaty but were still considered Hungarian. The position and function of towns in 19-20th century Transylvania is a large topic in itself.⁸ The key notion that influenced attitudes towards urban centres in Transylvania before and after Trianon was that these were pillars of modernization and that as hubs of Magyarization⁹, were also pillars of the Hungarian nation state.¹⁰ Thus, the transformation of the urban milieu harmed the Hungarian elites.¹¹ The authors of the texts I will look at are Hungarian intellectuals that continued to live in Transylvania or left the region. They saw the then current patterns of Transylvanian towns through such a lense.

I will discuss how these authors presented the new condition of urban centres and how this perception shaped the discourse on civilizing mission. In 1930, in its yearbook, the nationalist daily *Magyarság* [Hungarians] published a 16-page-long section, a series of richly illustrated sketches, about the towns that Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Southern Slavic state annexed.¹² The title “Hungarian towns in captivity” tells much about these short texts the authors of which evaluated the situation “through Hungarian eyes”. It is worth citing a longer section from the introduction because, as it was published in Hungary, it could freely express essential aspects of views that the Hungarian discourse on Transylvania contained.

8 *Pomogáts Béla*: Erdélyi magyar városok. In: *Id.*: Változó Erdély. Tanulmányok Erdélyről. Budapest 2001. 61–86.

9 *Varga E. Árpád*: Erdély magyar népessége 1870–1995 között. Magyar Kisebbség 1998/3–4. 366.

10 See, for example, *Beksics Gusztáv*: Magyarosodás és magyarosítás. Különös tekintettel városainkra. Budapest 1883. 59–66., illetve A népszámlálás súlypontja. Budapesti Hírlap 22 January 1911, 31.

11 For the arguments that the Hungarian delegation put forward in 1920, see A magyar békedelegáció II. jegyzékének összefoglaló kivonata (Neuilly, 14 January 1920). In: Trianon. Szerk. *Zeidler Miklós*. Budapest 2003. 118.

12 Magyar városok idegen rabságban. A Magyarság jubileumi évkönyve 1920–1930. 67–82. (Hence: Magyar városok...)

*“Kolozsvár, Kassa, Pozsony, Arad, Szabadka, Nagyvárad, Marosvásárhely, Brassó and other historical towns of the old Hungary have been drifting away from Hungarians of the truncated country and continues to live only in the realm of memory. On the occasion of the jubilee of Hungarians, we feel obliged to bring back these towns closer to our readers. These towns contain the treasures and beauty of a thousand years of Hungarian history that Hungarian art carved into stone, wood, gold and silver. All the manifestations of the constructive spirit remained on the other side of the border, there is hardly anything in towns of the truncated country.”*¹³

Among the towns of Transylvania, the publication provided snapshots about Cluj/Kolozsvár, Oradea/Nagyvárad, Arad and Braşov/Brassó/Kronstadt. The names of authors were not disclosed except for the one who wrote about Arad (“Spectator” that is Miklós Krenner) but their knowledge and emotional style tells that state succession must have personally concerned them.

In 1935, *Magyarok Romániában* [Hungarians in Romania] one of László Németh’s [1901-1975, one of the outstanding figures of 20th century Hungarian literature] most influential essays appeared in issue number 3-4 of Tanú, the journal he edited.¹⁴ In the same year, Németh travelled to Romania and spent about two weeks there. He reached Transylvania via Giurgiu, a town along the Danube, and Bucharest.¹⁵ It is not only his engaging style that distinguishes Németh’s travelogue. He was committed to the idea of “Central European milk-brotherhood” and the so-called Danube-idea.¹⁶ (It is due to these unorthodox views that his essay triggered a serious controversy in Hungary and in Transylvania. So much so, that in Budapest some considered that formal criminal charges should be brought against him.)¹⁷

¹³ Magyar városok...67.

¹⁴ The edition I used contains the debate. *Németh László: Magyarok Romániában. Az útirajz és a vita.* Mentor Kiadó, Marosvásárhely, 2001. (Hence: Magyarok...)

¹⁵ Nagy Pál: Előszó. In Magyarok... 5–15.

¹⁶ Although László Németh was born in Nagybánya [Baia Mare] in 1901, he had spent his childhood and adulthood within the Trianon borders. [That peoples of Central Europe have fundamental common interests and peoples along the Danube should unite – translator’s note.]

¹⁷ Magyarok...11. About the travelogue and its context see *Borsi-Kálmán Béla: Hasonló-*

In 1936, a publishing house in Budapest called Révai and another one of Kolozsvár called Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh published a collection of essays titled *Erdélyi városképek [Transylvanian townscapes]*.¹⁸ The volume included writings about five towns of Transylvania – Cluj, Aiud/Nagyenyed, Oradea, Târgu-Mureş/Marosvásárhely, Braşov. Some of these had already appeared in a journal published in Kolozsvár called Erdélyi Helikon during the 1930s.¹⁹ These texts are relatively lengthy, have a subjective tone and sometimes mix objective analysis with nostalgic style. They offer a detailed picture about the towns they look at. The authors were renowned writers, journalists or other public figures: Károly Kós, Géza Tabéry, Károly Molter és Ferenc Szemlér. Count István Bethlen, the former prime minister of Hungary, wrote the preface that he dedicated to Kolozsvár. He felt it important to emphasize that,

*“The most important duty of those involved in public life is to remind the young generations that their three and a half million Hungarian sisters and brothers fight for their survival and that they can only succeed if they feel that the other nine million are behind them in solidarity.”*²⁰

The volume titled *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae. Országgrészünk átalakulása 1918–1936 [Transformation of our region 1918–1936]* was published in 1937 and the texts it includes differ from the ones mentioned above.²¹ The title of the publication refers to the classic work of Péter Apor (1676–1752), the 18th century administrator and historian. The first part of the volume gives an overview of the changes that occurred in the political, public, social, cultural and economic life of the region after Trianon, while the second part talks of seven towns located in Transylvania and in the Banat (naming these only in Romanian - in accordance with contemporary regulation as Cluj, Oradea, Arad, Timişoara, Braşov, Târgumures, Satumare) and of minor

ságok és különbségek – és tanulságok I-II. Korunk 2008/1. 15–24. és 2008/2. 50–59.

18 *Pomogáts Béla*: Bevezetés. Erdélyi városképek. Madách-Posonium–Magyarok Világszövetsége, Pozsony, 1994. 13. (Hence: Erdélyi városképek...)

19 The edition I used did not contain the essay on Nagyenyed [Aiud].

20 Erdélyi városképek.... 15–16.

21 *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae. Országgrészünk átalakulása 1918–1936*. Szerk. Győri Illés István. Cluj, 1937. (Hence: Metamorphosis...)

towns. The writers of these pieces are “native journalists”. The editor gives his reasons for choosing such a method²²:

*“the contours of this great transformation are clearest in these towns. Villagers quickly put up with what cannot be changed and found their fulfilment in the fruits of the land they cultivated. As ethnic differences waned shortly due to the peace-loving attitude of the inhabitants and because the state focused Romanianization efforts on the towns and paid less attention to villagers, the transformation is most volatile in towns of Transylvania.”*²³



The cover of the volume titled *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae 1918–1936*.

²² Metamorphosis...121.

²³ Metamorphosis...121.

Romanian censors approved of the book. Presumably, some of the texts were modified to this end and the work generally presented a much more complex picture than the yearbook of Magyarság. In the introduction, the editor said that

*“the only thought that animated the authors: that after such great errors in the past, a frank rapprochement should become possible between Hungarians and Romanians. Hence, readers shall not expect biased political arguments from us, rather, they should satisfy themselves with the objective presentation of facts and events. At any rate, knowledge is the shortest route to truth.”*²⁴

Sándor Püski’s publishing house called Magyar Élet [Hungarian Life] published Gyula Zathureczky’s work entitled *Erdély. Amióta másképp hívják*²⁵ [Transylvania. Since it has a different name] in Hungary in 1939. At that time, the treaties of Versailles were already trembling. The author hailed from the Banat but carried out his activities in Hungary. His objective was to present interwar Romania with special focus on Transylvania since – as he put it in the introduction:

*“The ignorance and lack of care accompanied by the sense of supremacy with which our neo-Baroque society treated the problem of Transylvania dumbfound and saddened me as I crossed the border from Transylvania to Hungary more than a decade ago. Since then, the situation has changed for the better (...) Yet, I felt that people are only aware of bits and pieces of the issues that Hungarians face on the other side of the borders...”*²⁶

The volume did not intend to be an academic text. It summarized current conditions of Romania in 16 chapters, “placing the issue of Hungarians at

²⁴ Metamorphosis... 5.

²⁵ Zathureczky Gyula: *Erdély. Amióta másképp hívják*. Pomáz, 2004. (Hence: *Amióta...*)

²⁶ Zathureczky Gyula: *Amióta...* 5.

centre stage”²⁷: it discusses the Hungarian schools in Transylvania, social organization, Romanian political scene, the Iron Guard movement, Jews, the area of the Old Kingdom and Bucharest and, of course, talks about the realm of Transylvanian villages and towns.

The volume called *Erdély* [Transylvania] was a monumental venture that sprang from the idea of Count Pál Teleki, prime minister and geographer. A historian, József Deér, led the editorial team and they completed their work by the summer of 1940. The book was eventually published after the second Vienna Award.²⁸ Although, due to its timing, it could not play part in justifying Hungarian claims on Transylvania, its content makes it a relevant set of texts. The studies on ethnography, history and culture in Transylvania and the impact of the Romanian rule that comprised it were the outcome of serious professional efforts. The fact that they intended to serve a cause does not eliminate its value even if this is a context that should be taken into consideration. As the preface says:

*“In the wake of a just rearrangement of Europe it is time to draw the arms of justice and support the rights that Hungarians gained by shedding blood and manifesting knowledge and their efforts that its history justified with spelling out natural and historical truth. This is the objective of the Hungarian Historical Society as it publishes this volume.”*²⁹

We have to add that the lines that follow make an equally strong statement:

*“Those academics that honoured this volume by submitting their studies know nothing of propaganda methods. They are not willing to bend or adorn their findings, not even in the service of great national goals and efforts.”*³⁰

²⁷ Zathureczky Gyula: Amióta... 6.

²⁸ Barcsa Dániel: Az Erdély sorsa – Erdély sorsa. Erdély. A Magyar Történelmi Társulat szerkesztése alapján. Pomáz, 2011. 443. (Hence: Erdély...)

²⁹ Erdély... 7.

³⁰ Erdély...7.

Part 5 of the volume (Transylvania under Romanian rule) discusses the state succession, demography, economic, social and cultural life. Indeed, the authors were renowned experts: András Rónai, Alajos Kovács, Sándor Makkai and László Makkai.

In the sections that follow, I will make an attempt to grasp how the works mentioned above presented the current status of towns in Transylvania and how they enriched the Hungarian discourse on Transylvania, especially the narrative about the alleged civilizing role of Hungarians. Among the many possible lines of inquiry, I will focus on how they assessed the changes, what they believed social transformation entailed, how they thought of modernity and how they represented the West-East slope.



Street view from Cluj (Kolozsvár) with the Orthodox Cathedral constructed during the 1920s and 1930s and the National Theatre. Source: Fortepan/László Lajtai, 1934.

Change and Continuity

Each text highlighted the links that particular towns had to Hungary and to Hungarians. This was also true of narratives that talked of towns that had a German majority or were mixed in terms of ethnicity.

Among the texts considered here, some of the essays in the volume bearing the title “Erdélyi városképek” feature overviews of the history and cultural history of the locations stress this aspect, while other texts contain such references scattered throughout them. The act of mentioning the struggle against Tartars (Mongols) and Turks references the role of Hungarians and of the Hungarian state in defending (Western) Christian civilization and also remind the reader that not long ago the East-West boundary ran along the Carpathians. Another feature of the texts is the emphasis on the Hungarian or German traditions of the centres, hence of their non-Romanian nature. This is to deny that Greater Romania is the nation state of the Romanians. This way, the texts demonstrated that the treaty of Trianon violated the principle of national self-determination, thus, that it was unjust.

It was Count István Bethlen, who was by the then a former prime minister of Hungary and also a person that left Transylvania, who wrote the introduction to the volume “Erdélyi városképek”. He put the key concerns mentioned above in the following way:

“The towns of Transylvania are Hungarian towns: they carry the legacy of a glorious past, they are made of stones that talk of the dream of the thousand year that is now past, of struggles, fights, glory and they are monuments of the fulfilment of the national tragedy.”³¹

When speaking of the years that had passed since 1918, the majority of authors mentioned significant changes in the towns that were not in line with their historical legacy. For example, in one of the texts that talks of Oradea we read that: *“The twelve years of occupation have left heavy marks on this busy, lively and beautiful town.”³²* Regarding Târgu-Mureş we hear that:

³¹ Erdélyi városképek...15.

³² Magyar városok...75.

“Slow, but systemic change of the cityscape took place around that time.”³³

Timișoara/Temesvár/Temeswar stood out with its rapid development³⁴ and the outlook of Satu Mare/Szatmárnémeti changed, too, *“not only in the inside but on the outside as well.”³⁵*

At the same time, in a number of texts, these phenomena appear only as the surface beyond which the Hungarian or German essence prevails. The author of the introduction to one of the volumes argues that even as *“the ten-year-long occupation coated many things with a foreign glaze”*, and that those that visit the city *“find a strange world”*, *“Hungarians are there below the outer glaze.”³⁶*

As Count Bethlen said: *“The light of a thousand-year Hungarian idea still looms in them. They are still Hungarian at the core because violence cannot destroy the spirit of centuries in a day.”³⁷* Others confirmed this observation stating, for example, that even if Brașov *“underwent significant change [...] it kept its Saxon essence throughout its sweeping development.”³⁸*

We learn that Arad had hardly changed despite its new position on the Romanian side of the border.³⁹

“Sepsiszentgyörgy and Udvarhely still stand unaltered and the northernmost citadels of Szeklers: Marosvásárhely, Szatmár, Nagyvárad, Máramarossziget have hardly changed.”⁴⁰

Gyula Zathureczky’s concluding thoughts are in line with Bethlen’s:

“It is certain that people that live in towns have changed but it is also certain that towns themselves and the tradition that em-

33 Benczel Béla: Targu-Mures metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...172.

34 Kalotai Gábor: Timișoara metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...144., 147–148., 150.

35 Baradlai László: Satumare metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...183.

36 Városok idegen... 67.


37 Erdélyi városképek...15.

38 Pogány Marcel: Brasov metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 164, 167.

39 Károly Sándor: Arad metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 153.

40 Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. Amióta...53.

anates from their stones, which is the tradition of Transylvania, did not change.”⁴¹



Ethnic composition of the largest towns of Transylvania 1880-1930. Source: Kovács, Lajos: Erdély népesedési viszonyai [Demographic patterns of Transylvania]

In: Erdély. Budapest 1940. ([digital edition](#))

Reshuffling of Roles

The way texts talked of the shift in ethnic proportions and of the reshuffling of social roles sheds light on the actual change that towns of Transylvania went through. Authors approached these two problems in different ways and tackled various phenomena but drew largely similar conclusions. For example, Sándor Makkai emphasized that

⁴¹ Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. Amióta...54.

“Before the world war, towns of Transylvania had a dominantly Hungarian character. Out of the 49 towns in 32 Hungarians were in absolute majority, only 9 were a German character and in 8 of them there was Romanian majority. The towns that belonged to this latter group were small. After 1918, fundamental changes occurred in the character of towns. It was not only due to the departure of Hungarian officials but also because the new rule captured Hungarian state institutions and they began to serve this. County halls town halls, courtrooms, schools, theatres and museums, various office buildings, barracks etc. became venues vehicles and propagators of the life of Romanians. This immediately altered the outlook of towns. As the Romanian state settled and social life developed, banks, shops, factories and the mushrooming rows of private houses also adapted this character. [...] Today, 27 of the 49 towns have Hungarian majority in them, in four Germans are still the majority and 18 has Romanian majority.”⁴²

Some authors quoted exact figures but, in many cases, they only reported impressions about ethnic composition. Regarding Cluj, one author notes that *“as against speaking one language in the pre-war times the city has become bilingual.”*⁴³

At the same time, another author drew parallel with conditions in Switzerland and thus, the natural trilingualism.⁴⁴ Károly Kós made the following observation about the “population exchange” that took place in Cluj:

*“Since the time of state succession, it was the community of citizens of Kolozsvár that has undergone the most change. Immediately before the war it had 60 000 inhabitants while today there are 100 000. Eventually, all that happened is that the city grew larger.”*⁴⁵

⁴² Erdély...423–424.

⁴³ Szász Endre: Cluj metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...126.

⁴⁴ Szemlér Ferenc: Brassó. In: Erdélyi városképek...197–198.

⁴⁵ Kós Károly: Kolozsvár. In Erdélyi városképek...71.

From these texts, we can clearly see a situation where Hungarians lost political, economic and social status and career prospects compared to their previously held dominance. *“From one day to the other, from a member of majority, millennial Hungarian...we turned into minority persons without any intermediate stage”*. The author who wrote this that this situation carries the possibility of national-social renewal.⁴⁶

These texts paint a dark picture about the difficulties that Hungarians living in towns in Transylvania faced and argue that as a result of these, cultural and economic conditions of Hungarians began to deteriorate and stagnated at best. Of all possible situations, Hungarian intellectuals that lived in small towns fared the worst: they either retired or migrated. This, in turn, increased their greyness of local public life.⁴⁷ The authors concluded that without the support of the state, which was Romanian by then, the bases of survival of Hungarian culture (ethno-cultural reproduction of the community) in Transylvania was at risk.

*“Hungarians have lost wealth in Kolozsvár, just like everywhere else in Transylvania.”*⁴⁸

*“The decline in terms of economy and national cultural life has more weight than the numerical disadvantage compared to Romanians.”*⁴⁹

*“Hungarians that might have number 28 000 have become impoverished and live in an inward-looking life.”*⁵⁰

Some of the texts clearly stated that social advance of Romanians was not a spontaneous development but that there was a conscious state policy behind it.

“(Especially today) Romanians act in accordance with the slogan they have openly voiced: the city has to be Romanianized! First, they needed to numerically overcome Hungarians at the county

⁴⁶ Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. Amióta...15.

⁴⁷ Gárdos Sándor: A kisvárosok metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...194.

⁴⁸ Maksay Albert: Kolozsvár. In: Erdélyi városképek... 53.

⁴⁹ Tabéry Géza: Oradea metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...133.

⁵⁰ Kalotay Gábor: Timișoara metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...148.

level. [...] This was more difficult to carry out in the city. First, it required an artificially triggered large-scale immigration. Romanians from the region of Mezőség were recruited for each smaller or more important, vacant and vacated positions. [...] Official statistics does not include Hungarian-speaking Jews as Hungarians. It also helped to increase the proportion of Romanians to at least 20% that an outskirt called Remeteszeg became officially part of the city. Politicians say it is even more than 20% but I have not seen precise statistical data. When they unveiled the statue of Avram Jancu at the market square with great nationalist celebration we could see how successful Romanianization efforts have been...”⁵¹

Recurring waves of nationalism made it difficult to live together. Although the tolerant atmosphere of some places did not change, in many towns, inter-ethnic relations became tense and distance between ethnic communities increased.⁵² Arad is a typical example of this with some nostalgia, Miklós Krenner recalled that interethnic relations were calm in pre-war times:

*“Understanding between different nationalities, with the exception of some stormy periods of the 19th century, have been firm in Arad. This was even if the power and efforts of outstanding members of the Serbian community were obvious and that the city was the Betlehem of Romanian national movements. In terms of linkages among families and social interaction, there were cordial relations between Hungarians and Serbs and less cordial ones between Hungarians and Romanians. This was a reasonable equilibrium. This of course changed when the world war ended. Now, ten years on, we shall again believe that solidarity among nationalities will return. [...] The Hungarians are not the culprits in the fluctuation of human understanding.”*⁵³

51 Molter Károly: Marosvásárhely. In: Erdélyi városképek... 141.

52 Szemlér Ferenc: Brassó. In: Erdélyi városképek... 198–199., and Szász Endre: Cluj metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis...126., Kalotai Gábor: Timișoara metamorfózisa. Loc. cit., 148., 149.

53 Krenner Miklós: Arad. In Erdélyi városképek...253–254.

The author expresses his optimism, too: “*It is the calling of Arad the set the standards for understanding among nationalities.*”⁵⁴



The banks of River Mureș in Arad (Arad) with the Palace of Culture and the rowing club in the background. Source: Fortepan/Judit Hegedűs, 1935.

Talking of Cluj, one author posits that “*due to improvements in public life, public administration and economy*” Romanians living in the town had advanced in terms of cultural activities: there was serious work at the university (taken from Hungarians), and public life and public education were lively. The press has gained vitality, and this is true of literary life and theatre, too.⁵⁵ The national mission of the Romanian Churches contributed to these developments. In Brașov, Hungarians “*were swept away from county administration by the changes*” and Hungarians “*remained without a head*” just like the monument to Millennial Hungary on Mount Cen.⁵⁶ Yet, the main discourse about Brașov revolved around the way Saxons kept losing ground.

54 Krenner Miklós: Arad. In Erdélyi városképek...253–254.

55 Maksay Albert: Kolozsvár. In: Erdélyi városképek...51.

56 Szemlér Ferenc: Brassó. In: Erdélyi városképek 202.

“Saxons that used to feel they ruled the entire Barcaság⁵⁷ is losing ground incessantly. [...] At the same time, the number of Romanians has been increasing at an accelerating pace. County Braşov [...] is slowly but surely becoming Romanian [...] The towns itself is a bit different but the number of Saxons is falling there, too. Today, they make up 24% of the 60 000-strong crowd that calls itself citizen of Braşov. However, this is not actually decrease but stagnation that brings about relative decline compared to the other two communities.”⁵⁸

However, László Németh saw the future of the “German ghetto” a bit differently:

„The character of Braşov is Saxon and this will continue to be the case even if the proportion of rich Saxons that follow a single-child policy drops from one third to one tenth. Travelers will always stop in the city regardless of villas and the flats of the proletariat in the outskirts. And the city centre is Saxon.”⁵⁹

Symbolic acts expressed the swapping of hierarchies within urban societies in a spectacular way: Romanians of Bolgárszeg (Schei in Romanian, Belgerei in Schwabian dialect) marched to the main square on horsebacks every year since 1919. This was to say that Romanians occupied the city.⁶⁰ The Hungarian theatre was forced out of the ornate building in the city centre and had to move into the building of Színkör that used to be a scene of light summertime entertainment.⁶¹ At Târgu-Mureş, “since Romanian and Jews also fry meat, the importance of public fried meat fell.”⁶² and in Satu Mare/Szatmárnémeti/Sathmar/סאטמאר smuggling became a new industry that partially compensated for the economic consequences of state succession.⁶³

57 The region around Braşov, called Burzenland in German and Țara Bârsei in Romanian.

58 *Szemlér Ferenc*: Brassó. In: Erdélyi városképek...215-216.

59 *Magyarok Romániában*...61.

60 *Magyarok Romániában*... 61.

61 *Szemlér Ferenc*: Brassó. In: Erdélyi városképek...193.

62 *Molter Károly*: Marosvásárhely. In: *Metamorphosis*...157.

63 *Baradlay László*: Satumare metamorfózisa. In: *Metamorphosis*...184.

Ambivalence of Modernization

Hungarian authors are similarly ambivalent about the changes in economic development and the built environment. They juxtapose the condition of their times and the situation within a relatively stable and developing Austria-Hungary. In their writings, this and the decline of Hungarians becomes intertwined with emotions that the transformation of the old and familiar realm and the sense of dwindling familiarity triggered. Moreover, we also see that authors evaluate the development of Greater Romania, which was rich in periods of crisis. Thus, compared to the representation that prevails about the period in Romanian public opinion, Hungarian contemporaries painted a negative or at least contradictory picture regarding the modernization of towns in Transylvania.⁶⁴

Besides the decline of small towns and Arad and the “methodical wasting” of Tîrgu-Mureş, there are counterexamples in the texts, such as Oradea and Satu Mare profiting from transit trade and improvements in commerce in Cluj and the industry of Braşov and Timisoara. Authors also take notice of the latter becoming a university town.

“Economic life, industry and commerce are miserable. In these areas the town lags behind to an alarming extent. And in this case, it is the minority that suffers because this decline causes their capital to wane.”⁶⁵

Oradea was struggling, too.⁶⁶

“Târgumures has had to account for enormous losses in terms of economy since state succession. This Szekler town used to flourish but now is at the stage of such a systemic decline where only the flexibility of actors that prevents total collapse.”⁶⁷

64 For example, see: Ioan Scurtu: Cuvânt Înainte. In: Ioan Scurtu (coord.): Istoria Românilor. Vol. VIII. România întregită (1918 1940). Bucureşti 2003. IX–X.

65 Károly Sándor: Arad. In: Metamorphosis... 158. and Gárdos Sándor: A kisvárosok metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 193–194.

66 Tabéry Géza: Oradea metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 136.

67 Benczel Béla: Targu-Mures metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 177.

“In economic terms, Timisoara, which is called the capital of Banat, is leading among towns of the region. [...] Timisoara is the largest industrial town of the whole of Romania.”⁶⁸

One author compared the potential of Greater Romania and actual economic activities concluded that

“there is something fundamentally wrong in terms of economic structure and organization. Seeing these, we should not be surprised that internal turmoil and unrest has bothered this country for twenty years ...we often witness transition from one day to the next”⁶⁹

Most of the authors of the texts discussed here are critical about the rapid growth of the cities. They highlight the difference between the construction frenzy of the outskirts and the slow development of city centres.⁷⁰ Many authors take notice of the symbolic acts of spatial politics that included Romanians taking over buildings and monuments.

The authors often assessed the spatial gains of Romanians – some used a rather passionate tone while other remained more distanced. For example, Géza Tabéry talked of the transformation of Oradea in the following way:

“The small flats that grow among the public buildings of various styles that Baroque style construction projects of the Church and the rapid development of pre-war decades left behind, on the other hand, there were the overly decorated Old Romanian style houses with their arches and arcades.”⁷¹ “Touched on the architectural characteristics of the so-called Old Romanian.”⁷²

68 Kalotai Gábor: Timișoara metamorfózisa. In Metamorphosis... 150.

69 Erdély...419–420.

70 Szász Endre: Cluj metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 125.

71 Tabéry Géza: Nagyvárad. In Erdélyi városképek... 115–116.

72 The name of this architectural style is actually “Neoroman” or “new-Brâncoveanu-type” (“stilul neoromânesc/neobrâncovenesc”).

According to Ferenc Szemlér a palace built in a new style, or, even worse, without any style, Byzantine or Baroque style bank buildings and condominiums that already looked old pushed their way

*“among the old houses of the main square” and “they looked down upon the buzzing market square with pride typical of upstarts.”*⁷³

Several texts made a comparison between the pre- and post-Trianon periods. Endre Szász described the new “Romanian” centre of Cluj/Kolozsvár as sterile compared to traditional main square:

*“The city council can only boast about is that they tidied the main square and that the square in front of the Greek Catholic Church shed its Cinderella costume and turned into a well-dressed noble lady from. However, this lady is distant and cold as it has no admirer. This is the least populated quarter of the city centre.”*⁷⁴

Another author who returned to Cluj talked of similar impressions:

*“...when we reached the theatre and the Greek Catholic cathedral that had been in the making for long, my former classmate (a Romanian military officer) said to me: <You see, that church has been under construction for years and only God can tell when it will be completed. I often wonder if it will not be you to finish it. [...] during the construction many millions of lei have been wasted. This is the case with everything we start. Money is misappropriated, there is no other outcome. We have not created anything except for the statue of Romulus and Remus with the wolf. Even that is so far from the statue of King Matthias!>”*⁷⁵

⁷³ Szemlér Ferenc: Brassó. In Erdélyi városképek...188.

⁷⁴ Szász Endre: Cluj metamorfózisa. In Metamorphosis... 125.

⁷⁵ Magyar városok... ibid., 74.



The old City Hall in the main square of Braşov (Brassó, Kronstadt) in 1920. Source: Fortepan/Balázs Boda

Talking of Târgu-Mureș, “the capital of Szeklers”, László Németh says that

*“the town is a proof that we can build towns without the Saxons. [...] although Romanians rule the city there too, life carries on without major break. I would not be surprised if some of the Romanians were assimilated. Although they put their own stereotypical prayer box below the noble church that was built during the time of the Árpád-dynasty and that had walls around it (an old woman cried about losing the small well as a consequence) but they only ridiculed themselves by doing so.”*⁷⁶

In his piece about Târgu-Mureș, Károly Molter, also compared Romanian rule to the period when György Bernády was the mayor in the early 20th century:

*“That is why the Romanians too embarked on construction projects: with building the Orthodox and Greek Catholic cathedrals, the statue of Avram Iancu and that of the “Unknown Soldier” that replaced the relief of Petőfi⁷⁷ [...] This construction project suffers from lack of resources as the city and the state have little money but most of all because of the lack public enthusiasm. Romanian political parties are unhappy about the efforts of the other.”*⁷⁸

On the other hand, Béla Benczel recognized the achievements of the first significant Romanian mayor of Târgu-Mureș, Emil Dandea:

“the city is in order, the streets are clean and finally the two Romanian churches have their roofs. Even if it harms the [budget] of the city, the new Romanian hostel for apprentices is under

⁷⁶ Magyarok Romániában... ibid., 71.

⁷⁷ Sándor Petőfi: one of the major poets of 19th century Hungarian literature and a national hero.

⁷⁸ Molter Károly: Marosvásárhely. In Erdélyi városképek... 163.

construction and so is the new hospital and the county hall. The headquarters of the social security institution will be ready by the spring.”⁷⁹

László Baradlai talked of development regarding Satu Mare too:

*“In the inner part of the Piata Unirii, in place of the neglected marketplace, there is now a beautiful park. The city hall will move to a new building that required enormous expenses. Behind the theatre, the boulevard named after minister Valér Pop⁸⁰ is in the making. The Regina Maria Street is also being turned into a park. [...] The open-air bath is one of the notable sights of the city. [...] the new sports ground is now completed.”*⁸¹

Sándor Károly recognized the removal of statues that referred to the Hungarian national canon and signs written in Hungarian reluctantly⁸², while another author put a lot more emotions into describing such changes of public spaces:

*“The destruction that the new “masters” carried out among Hungarians is beyond measure. One would have difficulty pointing out any new creation that tells their glory. [...] The St. László Square is dead since it had been prettified. [...] the old castle is falling apart. [...] rubbish is accumulating on the banks of River Körös and dangerous nests of rats appear below the balconies. [...] The surface of roads is torn: not because it is under reconstruction but simply because time had consumed it.”*⁸³

⁷⁹ Benczel Béla: Targu-Mures metamorfózisa. In: Metamorphosis... 176.

⁸⁰ Valer (Valeriu) Pop: Romanian minister in several liberal governments in 1930s

⁸¹ Baradlai László: Satumare metamorfózisa. In Metamorphosis... 183–184.

⁸² Károly Sándor: Arad metamorfózisa. 153–154.

⁸³ Magyar városok...75–76.

We find a similar style in the description about Braşov:

“The row of villas at the foot of the hill is called “thiefs’ alley” in popular parlance. Romanians engaged in corruption live there. [...] The statue of O. Josif, the poet⁸⁴, is the only work of art that Romanians have made. [...] Romanians blew up the Millenial Monument on [Hill] Cenk in 1916.”⁸⁵

Expanding Orient

The texts above present a heterogenous picture but it is evident that dark shades dominate. Hungarian authors associate the position of cities with the circumstances of Hungarian inhabitants (or even the fate of the Hungarian society in Transylvania) and it mostly becomes the story of decline. Apart from factual references we may identify an orientalist mode of speaking. We encounter the idea of the West-East slope: a relatively developed Central European Hungarian (Hungarian/Jewish/German) urban realm that followed Western examples, started to slide down towards the Balkans during the rule of Romanians. Due to censorship, this view could only surface in a subtle way in texts published in Romania but was rather explicit in publications that appeared in Hungary. The Hungarian universe associated with the orderly outlook of civilized West becomes juxtaposed with the ambivalent, often disorganized Eastern type Romanian realm. Within this frame, neglect becomes one of the features of Romanian culture in a matter of course manner. In this discourse, under the rule of Bucharest Transylvania is becoming more and more distanced and alienated from the West.

Although this is not the central theme of the texts I looked at, we can see this aspect in nearly all of them. Apart from signs of economic decline and laments over how Transylvania used to be the last bastion of the West, we can see many other examples when authors stare at the “other” or at “signs of the exotic East” that Romanians embody:

⁸⁴ Ştefan Octavian Iosif (1875-1913). The statue is in Parcul Nicolae Titulescu.

⁸⁵ Magyar városok...79. (In fact, the monument was already in ruins by the time Romanian troops reached the town in 1916. An attempt to demolish it and a winter storm destroyed it in 1913 - translator's note)



The building of the prefect's office in Satu Mare (Szatmárnémeti) completed in 1936. Today it hosts the County Museum of Satu Mare. In the background we see the Orthodox Cathedral built in 1937-1938. Photo by the author, 2009.



Inauguration ceremony of the “monument of Latinity” (replica of the Capitoline Wolf statue in Rome) in Târgu Mureș (Marosvásárhely), 1924. Source: wikipedia.ro

*“A darker patch appears among Romanians of the plains with increasing frequency: an oriental face with eyes black like coal and oil-brown coloured skin and wavy hair resembling the Levant. Then, gypsy and Albanian. Sometimes we see a round Slavic head. We feel that we are at the gate of the Orient.”*⁸⁶

Gyula Zathureczky summarized his impressions as follows:

*“Suntem in Romania Mare” – we are in Greater Romania – as they say to foreigners and they might believe it since the county is red-yellow-blue from Oradea to Tighinăig, and from Chernowitz to–Turnu Severin and Sulina to Timesoara, signs are uniform and the waves that have been flowing from Bucharest for two decades permeate everything. This is a particular mix of perfume and dirt, loud voice, disorder, the latest fashion and misery wrapped into rugs that in they in the distant West say is the Balkans and Byzantinism.”*⁸⁷

Although talking of Bucharest Zathureczky noted the controversial Westernness, parvenu elegance and classiness with surprise,⁸⁸ when he talked of the Old Kingdom he took up the Orientalist narrative:

*“the urban inhabitants are mostly Greeks, Jews or other strangers. These cities have an Oriental face. They have large churches and some dirty public buildings, and small Turkish-looking or Greek-style houses surround their small park. There is an infinite number of shops...”*⁸⁹

The author that talks of Oradea also interprets developments as the expansion of the Balkans in Transylvania:

⁸⁶ Krenner Miklós: Arad. In Erdélyi városképek...254–255.

⁸⁷ Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. Amióta...11.

⁸⁸ Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. 55 – 61.

⁸⁹ Zathureczky Gyula: Erdély. 63–64.

“...on the Rákóczi Street one takes their eyes away from the reddish skinned policeman that wears brown uniform, a fur cap and carries a baton. He represents the Orient in the busy streets. [...] the uniform of the Romanian army and the Balkanized women that float on the arms of the face-powdered officers and carry a heavy scent after themselves are dominant motives in the colourful promenade [...] Eyes cannot take pleasure in the shop windows since each of them display poverty, lifelessness, moreover, they are a collection bad taste. They need to serve those that rule Oradea today and the taste of these rulers are so-so far away from those old and real gentlemen.”⁹⁰

The idea that Romanians are Orientals while Hungarians are Western also appeared in the way authors talked about Jews and Romanians.

“[Among Jews of Tîrgu-Mureş] while among the fathers’ generation gratitude linked them to Hungarians, sons only cling on to the more Western European culture.”⁹¹

We may see the way this view surfaced regarding cleavage between Romanians of Transylvania and Romanians of the Old Kingdom in the following passage:

“Even the most inattentive observer would see that Romanians of Transylvania compare positively to those of the Old Kingdom. While the first stands on an ancient land of culture, the latter is on the road of the great migration of peoples. There they have Byzant, here there is Western Christianity, and there Turks while here Hungarian and Saxons used to teach them.”⁹²

⁹⁰ Magyar városok...75–76.

⁹¹ Molter Károly: Marosvásárhely. In Erdélyi városképek...167.

⁹² Magyarok Romániában... 62.

Also:

“...those of the Old Kingdom ridicule the Ardeleans telling them that they are under Hungarian influence. In fact, few things apply: climatic difference, difference of caste, a Western style propensity to keep their word and less Oriental ways of living. In terms of chauvinism there is no difference.”⁹³

Conclusion

The real question behind discourses and representations detailed above regards the mid- and long-term consequences of the annexation of Transylvania (and its inhabitants) to Romania. What is it that Transylvania and its multi-ethnic population gained and lost as a consequence of state succession? Putting it differently: “what have the Romanians ever done for Transylvania?” (Of course, one might also ask: what have the Hungarians and Austrians ever done for Transylvania?)

This is not a question that one might answer based on the texts I studied. Only comparative research into economic history will take us closer to conclusions.⁹⁴ The texts themselves reveal that the situation was more complex than what emerges from the discourse on levels of civilization, which tends to totalize the arguments. We may juxtapose decline identified in the case of some towns and regions, such as Satu Mare, with actual development of Braşov or Timişoara that Romanian policies and the continuity of elites explain, among other factors.⁹⁵ The ethno-centric point of view and emotions that the forced retreat of Hungarian realm triggered often clouded actual achievements in terms of modernization. In cases where development was absent or unnoticed, tensions arising from Romanian dominance reinforced

⁹³ Molter Károly: Marosvásárhely. In Erdélyi városképek... 171.

⁹⁴ See for example: Anders E. B. Blomqvist: Economic Nationalizing in the Ethnic Borderlands of Hungary and Romania Inclusion, Exclusion and Annihilation in Szatmár/Satu-Mare 1867–1944. Stockholm, 2014., and the work of the research group that Gábor Egry leads: NEPOSTRANS ERC-project: <https://1918local.eu/>

⁹⁵ The conference Beyond Trianon? Exit from the War in Danubian Europe 1918–1924, held between 29 and 31 October 2020 in Budapest discussed, this aspect in detail <http://trianon100.hu/cikk/trianonon-tul-nemzetkozi-konferencia>

Orientalist views and discourse. This proved durable: neither had the efforts to achieve uniformity in the second half of the 20th century nor the globalization erased it.

Translated by Róbert Balogh



The building of the Cercul Militar (Club of Army Officers) in Braşov constructed cc. 1930s and 1940s. Photo by the author, 2009

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