

Summaries

István Bárány: The transformation of the Homeric *psychē* in the *Phaedo*

My paper begins with Cebes' question to Socrates whether „the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some power and intelligence.” Cebes' remark and the vocabulary of dying in the dialogue recalls the Odyssey's *Nekyia* scene and hence reveals that the philosophical project to prove the immortality of the soul is also a critique of traditional Greek eschatology. While proving the immortality of the soul, Socrates rewrites the traditional picture of the *psychē* from three major aspects: (1) the soul preserves its power, its capacity and its wisdom after death, (2) there is no reason to fear death for it is the best that can happen to man, (3) whose real self is not his body, dead or alive, but his soul, which can be fully realized only in death.

Ágoston Guba: The problems of the inferior and superior soul in the *Enneads*

Concentrating on the individual soul in Plotinus, we are inclined to think that it only has aspects, and no consistent philosophical view can be found in his *Enneads*. This impression becomes particularly strong if we turn to the so-called inferior and superior soul in order to try to demarcate them. In my paper, I survey the greatest problems of the two souls and the main positions found in the literature. Then, I examine different texts with ethical or action-theoretical contexts which give a dynamical view on the soul. I will argue that these texts offer the proper criterion, the criterion of free choice, for harmonizing the various aspects of the soul and for solving the demarcation problem of the inferior and the superior souls. In the last part of my paper, I discuss the Epictetian background of the theory of desire in the *Enneads* and the differences rooted in the different metaphysical presuppositions.

Nikoletta Hendrik: The notion of the present moment in Marcus Aurelius

In my paper, I build on Pierre Hadot's claim that it is Marcus Aurelius' invention that the correct use of mental impressions can happen only in relation with *present* events and *present* impressions. My paper adds two aspects to his claim. I intend to prove that

Marcus Aurelius considers life as a series of present moments within the framework of the Stoic notion of time, and enrich Hadot's claim with two details, namely an analysis of the notion of the present moment (*παρὸν*) and the notion of now (*νῦν*), and I explain why it is necessary to tighten befitting actions to each other as closely as possible. The individual elements of Marcus Aurelius' philosophy are not revolutionary but their combination results in a new Stoic theory of action.

Péter Lautner: Simplicius on free choice and on what is up to us

The paper seeks to understand Simplicius' notion of the relation between opinion, desire, pursuit and aversion, all of which are said to be up to us, on the one hand and free choice (*προαίρεσις*) on the other. In commenting on passages in Epictetus' *Handbook*, the Neoplatonic philosopher explains it in terms of a causal relation where free choice is responsible for the arousal of these mental phenomena. Properly executed, opinion, desire, pursuit and aversion are manifestations of human autonomy. The root of human autonomy, however, is free choice, insofar as it is in line with nature as a normative criterion which gives rise to appropriate actions.

Attila Németh: The notion of moral conscience in Seneca's moral psychology

My paper investigates whether the Stoic Seneca attributed a new capacity to the commanding-faculty of the soul, the *hēgemonikon*. The concept of moral conscience (*conscientia*) often appears in Seneca's moral psychology as a linguistically complex, often symbolic-allegorical form of expression, which I first review in a historical context to analyse the specifics of its use. Next, I examine how Seneca's notion of *conscientia* fits into the context of earlier Stoic theories of the emotions, as a result of which moral conscience in Seneca appears as a new capacity of the soul.

Kosztasz Rosta: The test of persuasion in the *Phaedo*

The *Phaedo* is a peculiar dialogue, since the philosophical stake, i.e. the survival of Socrates, concerns the interlocutors deeply and personally. Therefore, I seek the answer to the question whether persuasion (*peithō*), the point of intersection between argumentation and dramaturgy tries to treat the emotions of Socrates' friends, and if so, what kind of problems, instruments and outcome of emotive persuasion unfold before

us. I argue against the intellectualist approaches that rational persuasion must always take the emotional obstacles into account, and to confirm this, I suggest that we read Socrates' efforts to soothe his friends from the theory of persuasion of the *Laws*.

Máté Veres: The outlines of Pyrrhonism in the testimony of Aristocles

The testimony of Aristocles (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIV. 18.1–4) allows for two different and incompatible interpretations of Pyrrho's philosophical stance. On the one hand, his claim for a happy life without opinions might result from his second-order endorsement of a thesis of metaphysical indeterminacy. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that he motivated suspension of judgement by pointing to the insufficiency of the human capacity for knowledge. In my paper, I give a brief overview of these two types of reading, their philosophical and textual merits, and their import for the question whether Pyrrho was a genuine forerunner of the later Pyrrhonist movement.