



LUDOVIKA  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

# AARMS

ACADEMIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH IN MILITARY  
AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Volume 20 (2021)  
Issue 3

ISSN 2498-5392 (print)  
ISSN 2786-0744 (online)

**AARMS** is a peer-reviewed international scientific journal devoted to reporting original research articles and comprehensive reviews within its scope that encompasses the military, political, economic, environmental and social dimensions of security and public management.

**AARMS** is published in one volume of three issues per year by the University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, under the auspices of the Rector of the University.

Articles and other text material published in the journal represent the opinion of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Editors, the Editorial Board, or the Publisher.

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AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Volume 20  
Issue 3  
2021

An International Journal of Security, Strategy, Defence Studies,  
Military Technology and Public Management

Published by the University of Public Service

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University of Public Service, Ludovika University Publishing House  
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Typeset and print by University of Public Service

ISSN 2498-5392 (print)

ISSN 2786-0744 (online)



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# The Borderline between Private and Public Security

Zsolt LIPPAI<sup>1</sup> – Zágón CSABA<sup>2</sup>

*A few years ago, a White Paper was published by the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) with the collaboration of the Institut National des Hautes Études de Sécurité (INHES) on the security market of the European Union. The authors identified several reasons why public and private security providers in the member states share the market and why they are bound to cooperate for the public good, that is, the security itself. However, the states' law enforcement capacities cannot cover all security demands of the public due to the finite (mainly budgetary) resources that always set capacity limits hence congestions in the assignments of police services occur from time to time. Private security operatives fill into the supply gaps occurring in a fragmented security landscape in Europe. Due to the variables in the market share, countries made their patterns in public and private security components, the statutory frameworks, and the traditions concerning the role played by the commercial security sector in overall security provisions. Here a typology may be formed from the clusters of countries following alternative approaches, respectively. There is a border zone between the two sectors. The exclusive public security domain gives way to areas of common interest and moves on to where private security takes precedence, and public actors only play a supervisory role. This article examines the boundary zone in multiple approaches, attempting to stipulate the red line between the two security elements.*

**Keywords:** *private security, public security, law enforcement, armed security guard*

## Introduction

Based on the findings of a volume of studies on the rise of private security in the European Union (EU), the authors intend to analyse the borders between private and public security and their possible intersections. They seek to answer how far private security goes and

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where the bearing point comes, and the area of public security begins. Is it possible to define where precisely this line separates these two seemingly distinct territories, or are there somewhat borderline issues that, under certain conditions, belong either here or there, or can even be considered the overlapping responsibilities on security for both entities? The analysis draws on eminent thinkers' research findings and a series of study examples of domestic private and public security. This paper intends to stimulate further research into the fundamental structures of policing to contribute to the development of policing studies.

## Safety as a cooperative product

The right to security has a constitutional basis<sup>3</sup> for the functioning of the state, and its institutional guarantees are an objective obligation of the state. Its primary function is to protect and promote shared values and legitimate interests of the enforcement.<sup>4</sup> According to Géza Finszter, law enforcement in the modern state is an administrative activity whose social function is to avert the dangers of unlawful human behaviour,<sup>5</sup> that is, to create security. To ensure a state is free from threats, policing has emerged as the first form of modern public administration.<sup>6</sup> Public order and public safety were the first social needs that the state had a duty to meet. As a result of the differentiation and historical separation of public and private property, the need for private security has also arisen. There is no doubt that private security forms a *raison d'être* in our societies.<sup>7</sup>

Law enforcement is part of the public administration,<sup>8</sup> its mission is to maintain internal order and public order and security, to protect the members of society and the fundamental values of the law by preventing, averting and disrupting acts that violate or endanger them. As a last resort, even force may be used for these purposes as specified by József Pallo while identifying it as a compulsory element of policing.<sup>9</sup> In the modern European view, public security is the collective social product of the activities of individuals and their communities, the actions of public authorities, the self-defence capacity of citizens as well as the services provided by the business market.<sup>10</sup> The significant realisation that the sheer magnitude of crime in our societies prevents the criminal justice system from

<sup>3</sup> In Hungary, for instance, the right to security is stipulated in the first entry of Article IV of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (issued on 25 April 2011). Please note that all national legislation cited in this article was born in Hungary if otherwise indicated.

<sup>4</sup> István Kovács, 'Magyarország határain átnyúló szervezett bűnözés és prostitúciós bűncselekmények a schengeni térségben, különös tekintettel a SOCTA és EUROSTAT értékelésére', *Határrendészeti Tanulmányok* 14, no 4 (2017), 82–161.

<sup>5</sup> Géza Finszter, *A rendészet elmélete és rendészeti eszközrendszer* (Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó, 2013), 16.

<sup>6</sup> Géza Finszter, 'A változó rendészet és a rendészettudomány', *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények* 14 (2013), 5–12.

<sup>7</sup> Géza Finszter, *Rendészettan* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019), 63.

<sup>8</sup> Zoltán Balla, *A rendészet alapjai és egyes ágazatai* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017), 26.

<sup>9</sup> József Pallo, 'Gondolatok a rendészet fogalmi és alkalmazási kérdéseiről', *Börtönügyi Szemle* 7, no 2 (2000), 33–40.

<sup>10</sup> Resolution No. 115 of 2003 (X.28.) on the national strategy of societal crime prevention of the Parliament.

adequately controlling or preventing crime<sup>11</sup> ensures that a collective effort is needed to counter threats effectively. Public security is, therefore, a cooperative product.<sup>12</sup>

## Blurring the lines between public and private security (security market size and the strategies of the countries)

The state starts from the premise that public order is a fundamental value for the nation's advancement. To achieve the state's objectives in public security, it has declared that cooperation with persons (bodies) performing law enforcement functions, as regulated by law, is essential to maintain public order and security.<sup>13</sup> The legislation stipulates armed security guards, bodyguards and property guards, nature conservation guards, forestry guards, mountain guards, professional hunters, forestry staff with law enforcement duties, state and professional fish guards, land wardens, municipal nature conservation guards and field guards. It establishes a legal framework for protecting private and public property by extending the constitutional protection of property, using the means of personal and property protection.

At the same time, it is quite difficult to separate private and public security providers based on their activity itself. Both sides provide guarding and patrolling functions; therefore, it is not always differentiating. However, key distinction factors could be the possession and exercise of police powers. Furthermore, private security functions are essentially client-oriented, while public law enforcement functions are society- or community-oriented efforts.<sup>14</sup>

In 2008, the CoESS, a European employers' organisation representative of the private security services in cooperation with the French INHES university, published a White Paper on the private sector security and its role in European security. The study paper identified public and private security territories with four strategies among the EU member states based on a detailed analysis of statistical figures of 2004 and 2005.<sup>15</sup> In six countries, mainly but not exceptionally from the eastern part of the EU, the number of private security agents are far more than public security officers. Three countries have more or less identical numbers in the public and private security sectors. Twelve countries

<sup>11</sup> Robert J. Fischer et al., *Introduction to Security*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013), 12.

<sup>12</sup> Géza Finszter, 'Közbiztonság és jogállam', *Jog, Állam, Politika* 1, no 3 (2009), 173–196.

<sup>13</sup> Act CXX of 2012 on the activities of certain law enforcement officials and amendments to certain acts ensuring action against school evasion.

<sup>14</sup> Fischer et al., *Introduction to Security*, 32; Nigel D. White et al., 'Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia: Corporate Interests and Human Rights in a Fragile Environment', *Netherlands International Law Review* 65, no 2 (2018), 217–252.

<sup>15</sup> Similar analyses have been carried out, for instance, for the Czech Republic and Finland, and a comparing study of private security characteristics of two countries, Hungary and Slovenia. Cf. Oldřich Bureš, 'Private Security Companies in the Czech Republic: An Exploratory Analysis', *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 6, no 2 (2012), 41–60; Teemu Santonen and Jyri Paasonen, 'Evaluating the adequacy of private security industry regulation in Finland', *Security Journal* 30, no 2 (2017), 585–604; László Christián and Andrej Sotlar, 'Private Security Regulation in Hungary and Slovenia – A Comparative Study Based on Legislation and Societal Foundations', *Varstvoslovje* 20, no 2 (2018), 143–162.

have half as many private agents as public officers, and just four have marginal private workforces compared to the public security sector.<sup>16</sup>

Three categories may be identified if we consider the size of the security market compared with the number of inhabitants. Seven hundred or more public and private security workforce per 100,000 inhabitants existed in seven EU members, where the peak figure had Hungary with 1,083. This figure shows that about 1 per cent of the population works in the security sector in these countries. Four of these countries invest more in private security (Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Luxembourg), two invest more in public security (Cyprus and Portugal), and the Czech Republic supports equally in both. At the other end of the figure, distribution are five countries with less than 420 workforces per 100,000 inhabitants. Austria has marginalised its private forces, while the Netherlands has lower public police forces, and the Scandinavian countries have low levels of investment in both. The remaining thirteen countries have accumulated between 500 and 700 security professionals per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>17</sup>

These strategic patterns led to the fundamental questions: what size the security market should be, and who pays the bill?

## Drivers to increase the private security share in the markets

The appearance of new forms of property and consumption creates mass private properties such as market halls, leisure parks, sporting and cultural arenas and similar spaces. Despite the fact that they are under private ownership, they are open to the public. The emergence of privately owned public spaces has created the opportunity for owners to tailor the security of such facilities to their own and their customers' needs. This does not mean that in these areas, they rely only on their private security service operators or those provided by other companies or security contractors, but they primarily provide their security. They cooperate with the public police services and, if necessary, call them to act on private community spaces.

In line with the White Paper mentioned above, other researchers agree that police services are often congested by their increasing burdens, while they are facing difficulties in funding and ensuring their resources. Due to the sluggish capability of changing character, law enforcement agencies often cannot follow highly volatile policing needs with their capacity developments. Finszter, Newburn and Ratcliffe observe<sup>18</sup> the opening demand gap between police expenditures, indicating in broader terms the slowly increasing tendencies in capabilities of the police services and the swift changes in the recorded crime that outlines their assignments.

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<sup>16</sup> CoESS and INHES, *White Paper – Private Security and Its Role in European Security* (2008), 26–30.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 30.

<sup>18</sup> Compare: Géza Finszter, 'Közbiztonság és közbátorság', in *Írások Tauber István emlékére*, ed. by Zsolt Németh (Budapest: ELTE Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Magyar Kriminológiai Társaság és Rendőrtiszti Főiskola, 2009), 66–83; Tim Newburn, *Crime and Criminal Justice Policy* (London: Longman, 1995), 61–64; Jerry H. Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-Led Policing* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008), 18–20.

Despite their steady growth, both in costs and numbers of personnel, public law enforcement agencies have increasingly been compelled to remain reactive instead of acting proactively, and they concentrate more on the maintenance of public order and the apprehension of criminals. Most policing models depend on a cooperative approach to law enforcement because public law enforcement personnel cannot possibly protect all those who need it.<sup>19</sup>

The finite financial resources of the law enforcement sector could be a possible reason for the rise of private security. Furthermore, taxpayers' money could be spent legally less flexible, whereas private companies can do their financial resources as their business requires because they are not bound to strict public procurement regulations.

According to the White Paper, the financial resources available to maintain public safety in a complete state monopoly cannot be guaranteed, which would make it easy to conclude that a significant part of the policing tasks will be shifted to private security service providers and companies<sup>20</sup> because of the ideology of their 'higher degree of cost effectiveness'.

However, the overall picture is much more complex because, in creating public security as a cooperative product, the boundaries between private and public security also seem to be blurred. This is particularly the case in those areas of law enforcement where public control is not visibly compromised, even when market actors are involved in creating security as a public good. An example of this is the protection of persons, where the state while maintaining its exclusivity (compare: protection of persons of particular importance), recognises the need (or necessity) for individual security and allows such services to be provided or used on a market basis.<sup>21</sup>

An example of the apparent blurring of boundaries is the existence of several policing functions that are reserved for the state police. However, even in these areas, some privatisation can be observed. Numerous functions that were traditionally performed by bodies and employees of the state, such as the running of prisons, prisoner escort and protection services, guarding facilities of the state inter alia, but not exceptionally military ones are outsourced to private companies.<sup>22</sup> The legal regulation of private investigative activities is also aligned here.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, it became difficult to label some type of conduct as an 'act of state' for which the government is legally responsible. Different degrees of outsourcing are reflective of what is achievable politically and ideologically, rather than what is legally or ethically acceptable. In effect, outsourcing is a redrawing of what constitutes inherent state functions or at least a blurring. In areas in which outsourcing is deeply entrenched, the government is no longer in effective control of the conduct of

<sup>19</sup> Fischer et al., *Introduction to Security*, 12.

<sup>20</sup> CoESS and INHES, *White Paper – Private Security and Its Role in European Security*, 32.

<sup>21</sup> Tamás Nagy and Zsolt Lukács, 'A személyvédelem rendészeti jellemzői és magánbiztonsági szerepe' in *Biztonsági vezetői kézikönyv*, ed. by László Christián et al. (Budapest: Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó, 2019), 168–169.

<sup>22</sup> White et al., 'Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia', 223–224.

<sup>23</sup> Bence Mészáros, 'A magánnyomozói tevékenység szabályozásának aktuális kérdései', in *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XI. Tanulmányok a „Quo vadis rendvédelem? Szabadságjogok, társadalmi kötelezettségek és a biztonság” című tudományos konferenciáról*, ed. by Gyula Gaál and Zoltán Hautzinger (Pécs: Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoport, 2010), 285–294.

private companies. It could also correspond to an increase of corporate influence on some governments. In some cases, this might extend to a ‘corporate capture’ situation whereby an economic elite could undermine the public trust in the police and ruin the realisation of human rights by exerting undue influence over decision-makers and public institutions.<sup>24</sup> It becomes very difficult to label some type of conduct as an ‘act of state’ for which the government is legally responsible although the government must ensure access to effective judicial remedy for human rights abuses. Business enterprises should establish effective grievance mechanisms for adversely impacted individuals and communities.<sup>25</sup>

Staying at the private investigations, one of the fundamental issues is the legislator’s confidence in the legality and objectivity of information-gathering activities for financial gain and the financially motivated or potential interest in concealing the truth. Another distinctly public law enforcement privilege is that of the police in the context of their team-based service, many of whose crowd management tasks also have private security implications. As the scope of the private security sector has expanded, the person and property guards are now not only able to check the legality of entry to and exit from the event site, often on private property, but to ensure that the rules of the event are observed but are also actively involved in the various stages of event security. They are involved in the process of risk classification of sporting events, escorting and transporting groups of supporters, detaining supporters after sporting events, organising music festivals that attract large crowds and so on.

The National Police issue the licences necessary for the pursuit of activities in the field of the protection of persons and property and the required licences for the pursuit of activities by natural persons. They keep a public register of these licences and carry out the tasks of weapons licensing and other administrative police tasks.<sup>26</sup> Police supervise licenced activities from such as the administrative and on-the-spot checks and are also actively involved in the training and examination of person and property guards.<sup>27</sup> An essential element of this activity is that the private security company provides the service to the private sector. Its content is laid down in a contract governed by private law within a relatively broad framework. The range of the contract is characterised by the freedom of form and the juxtaposition of equal parties. The means of protection available to the private security provider are the same as those available to the property owner. The effectiveness of the safety of persons and property, which can be seen as an ‘extension of the client’s hand’, can be significantly enhanced by using high-quality technical equipment and trained staff.

The concept of critical infrastructure protection originated in the United States in the 1990s, where the issue was already being addressed as a scientific problem. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 brought about a paradigm shift in thinking about security and gave impetus to several research activities, including critical infrastructure protection.

<sup>24</sup> White et al., ‘Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia’, 224; Bureš, ‘Private Security Companies in the Czech Republic’, 50–55.

<sup>25</sup> White et al., ‘Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia’, 223–224.

<sup>26</sup> Act CXXXIII of 2005 on the rules of personal and property protection and private investigation.

<sup>27</sup> Decree of the Minister of the Interior 68/2012 (XII.14.) on the training and examination of persons performing law enforcement duties, assistant supervisors, and personal and property guards.

Critical or vital infrastructure is defined as infrastructure, or infrastructure elements, interconnected or networked and interacting with other infrastructure. If disrupted, lost or rendered inaccessible would cause severe damage. It is difficult to define the precise threshold at which damage is considered extreme, but this should be considered in terms of the system's operation against which the criticality of the infrastructure is assessed.<sup>28</sup> For example, this could be the EU, Hungary, a specific municipality or organisation, or even an individual.

The EU decided at the end of 2008 to identify and designate the critical infrastructures in Europe and to improve their protection. The EU Directive on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the need to improve their protection was adopted.<sup>29</sup> Subsequently, the law on identifying and designating critical systems and installations and their protection was created in the Member States, including Hungary.<sup>30</sup>

The law has been used to define the scope of vital systems and installations and decide which organisations are responsible for critical infrastructure protection, including security services, law enforcement agencies such as the police and disaster management organisation, and the ASG, all with their specific areas of responsibility. The ASG is responsible for protecting activities, facilities and cargo that are of paramount importance for the operation of the state or the supply of the inhabitants, if the Hungarian Defence Forces, law enforcement agencies, the Parliamentary Guard or the National Tax and Customs Administration are not legally obliged to provide such protection, but the guarding is justified in the interests of public security or the safety of the national property.<sup>31</sup> ASG has been authorised to use more effective powers of action than the person and property protection guards. In Hungary, the police monitor compliance with the provisions of the decision establishing the body, and they issue, withdraw, temporarily withdraw and register the service card of the armed security guard at the expense of the debtor or the organisation operating the body. The police shall also approve of the rules of guarding and guard instruction and shall carry out supervisory checks on the performance of the service. The police initiate the temporary restriction or confirmation of guard duty, check the data required to assess the suitability of the ASG, and take part in the theoretical and practical training and examination of the staff.

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<sup>28</sup> István Bukovics and Antal Vavrik, 'Infrastrukturák kockázata és biztonsága: Kritikai problémaelemzés', *Hadmérnök* 1, no 3 (2006), 32–40; György Potóczki, 'Áttekintés a kritikus infrastruktúra védelem jelen helyzetéről, a továbblépést nehezítő tényezők elemzése útján', *Hadmérnök* 5, no 2 (2010), 203–218.

<sup>29</sup> See details in Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.

<sup>30</sup> The respective legislation is Act CLXVI of 2012 on the identification, designation and protection of critical systems and installations.

<sup>31</sup> See Article 1 of Act CLIX of 1997 on the Armed Security Guard, Nature Protection and Field Guard Service.

## Armed security guards at the border zone between private and public security

Before the First World War, the Hungarian Government had the good sense to recognise the need to increase the number of police officers and create temporary police organisations to maintain public order and security. There was a need for an armed corps that was not part of the central authority but still operated under state control. On 14 September 1914, the Minister of the Interior issued a decree on the organisation of civil guards. Based on a uniform code of organisation and procedure throughout the country, the Civil Guard, without official authority, was charged with protecting citizens and their property, and thus indirectly with the protection of the state, as ordered by the police authorities. Their actions had to be in line with the law, the regulations and the instructions they received, and they could only take action by force in urgent cases, pending action by the police authorities.<sup>32</sup> A study by Károly Óry reveals a striking similarity between the activities of the now-defunct civil guards, which were auxiliary to the police service but lacked individual police authority, and the current statutory role of the ASG.

Looking for such similarities and differences, it could be helpful to review the activities of armed guards of property and persons covered by the Protection of Persons and Property Act and the activities of the ASG personnel covered by the ASG Act.<sup>33</sup> Armed guards may, for example, act as cash escorts or bank security guards. At the same time, ASG performs its tasks as a designated organisation for the protection of activities, installations, cargo or critical infrastructure of primary importance for the functioning of the State or the supply of the population, in cases where the State-owned law enforcement agencies or the national defence forces are not explicitly required to do so – as mentioned above.<sup>34</sup>

The activities of the ASG are mainly assessed within the framework of private security, which in our view, is far from being so clearly defined. Critical infrastructure and its designated elements may be subject to both publicly and non-publicly owned properties and even under mixed ownership, operation and management. It has been defined as a legal obligation to establish an ASG body and to operate it in a detailed manner, financed by the obligor. This raises the question of whether the ASG protects private or public property or, if it does both, has any of them a priority;<sup>35</sup> and whether it is possible to identify the precise boundary between private and public security? The question is further complicated in the case of ASGs established in the police, the armed forces, the penitentiary services or civilian national security services. We can find ASG guards at our nuclear facilities, at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant or the Central Institute for Physical Research, where an experimental nuclear reactor is operating, as well as at our low and medium-level

<sup>32</sup> Károly Óry, 'A rendvédelmi szervek az első világháború, az őszirozás forradalom és a proletárdiktatúra időszakában', *Rendvédelem-történeti füzetek* 3, no 5 (1993), 42–54.

<sup>33</sup> Stipulated in Act CLIX of 1997 on the Armed Security Guard, Nature Protection and Field Guard Service.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. See further details at Balázs Bognár et al., 'A létfontosságú rendszerek és létesítmények védelméről szóló szabályozás végrehajtása Magyarországon', *Bolyai Szemle* 23, no 2 (2014), 105–111.

<sup>35</sup> From the perspective of addressing the threat to the country, László Botz considers that public and property security and protection are inseparable and interdependent areas, yet he proposes prioritising public security over private security. László Botz, 'Hazánk biztonsági rendszerének és elemeinek helyzete és felkészültsége a várható fenyegetések elhárítása', *Felderítő Szemle* 6, no 1 (2007), 15–34.

radioactive waste storage facilities, or at our priority energy facilities, such as the Mátra Power Plant or the MOL Plc's Danube Refinery in Százhalombatta, which are undoubtedly part of Hungary's vital infrastructure.

When looking at the activities of the ASG guarding police premises, it is necessary to start with the premises to be protected, where the outsourcing of guarding tasks from the police organisation's area of responsibility, as mentioned above, has already been accomplished. According to the National Police Headquarters commander, the crime situation in the 1990s justified the need for professional police officers to carry out the organisation's essential tasks and devote as little human resources as possible to tasks not closely related to the organisation as guarding objects. The savings in the workforce and working time ensured that the police could increase their presence on the streets and in public places, thus improving their sense of security. The ASG took over guarding the premises with the right to use legitimate force. The guards may, under certain conditions, use coercive means such as physical force, tear gas, handcuffs and, in the last resort, even firearms to maintain order and security in the premises.<sup>36</sup>

At the same time, the guards are present in the so-called guarded accommodation linked to the police's tasks in the field of aliens policing and also patrol the temporary security border crossing for border surveillance purposes. By performing their duties in border security, the ASG must pay particular attention to avoiding all forms of xenophobia.<sup>37</sup>

A similar diversity of tasks as mentioned before can be observed when examining the ASG's key role in protecting the privately-owned Budapest Liszt Ferenc International Airport operated by Budapest Airport Plc. and which is also part of the critical infrastructure. The airport operator has delegated the maintenance of the internal order of the facility, including the guarding tasks related to the protection of critical infrastructure and the control of passenger security, to the ASG.

The police previously carried out the passenger safety audit supervised by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology's Transport Authority and approved under an administrative procedure. Transferring this task to private security providers can also be considered outsourcing, as it was not part of the police's core tasks. The delegation of this task was accepted by the international experts who regularly audit the airport's security, as it is in line with national and international standards and does not compromise security.

Also related to airport security is the status classification of regulated suppliers, regulated agents, known consignors,<sup>38</sup> which is carried out by the Aviation Risk Assessment Authority of the Transport Authority and is also related to private security. By establishing a legislative environment for ratings, the legislator has laid the foundations for a uniform set of requirements and measures to address dangerous and unlawful acts from the point of view of civil aviation safety and has formulated a framework for action.

<sup>36</sup> In cases of guarding facilities of vital importance. See details in Act CLIX of 1997.

<sup>37</sup> See details in Krisztina Görbe Attiláné Zán, '„Mi” és „ők”. Migráció és idegenellenesség a társadalmi megítélés tükrében', in *Szakmaiság, szerénység, szorgalom: Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Boda József tiszteletére*, ed. by Imre Dobák and Zoltán Hautzinger (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2018), 241–251.

<sup>38</sup> See details at points 26–27, Article 3 of the Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002.

One of the most significant aviation security risks can be posed by unchecked baggage in air transport, whether on passenger or cargo aircraft. Adopting the opinion of István Németh,<sup>39</sup> the issuing of the certificates is a crucial step forward from the authorities' side. A strict system of security measures and institutions practised and maintained exclusively by the authorities has now been extended to the civil security sector.<sup>40</sup> It is recognised for the well-trained, experienced and security-conscious professionals working in the industry. This is about developing and operating cost- and time-effective, standardised, documented and verifiable processes that meet the legislation and security plan requirements. In private security companies, these processes are under the direct control of the company's top management, but the responsibility for organising them lies with the security officers. To this end, non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology and technical means must be used, which do not require damage to the packaging or the goods or baggage during the examination.

In the case of damaged packaging, whether due to accidental damage or deliberate tampering during transportation or in the case of a risk identified during the non-intrusive inspection, a thorough examination of the package shall be carried out, in all other cases, security staff shall carry out random checks.

## Public good, common cause

According to Hungary's crime prevention strategy: "Public safety is part of the quality of life of society, a collective product of value, the creation and preservation of which is a common concern."<sup>41</sup> Article 46(1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary defines the protection of public order and public security as a fundamental task of the police, but this does not mean that the police are the only state body dealing with this task. All three concepts of policing, as used in the Lexicon of Law Enforcement Science, consider policing to be a state task, the main element of which is the maintenance of public order and public safety, but which is not only carried out by the police but also by law enforcement and administrative bodies (practically state and municipal law enforcement) jointly on behalf of the state.<sup>42</sup> Béla Galántai and other researchers draw attention to the fact that, although the police, and in some countries police forces, are essentially responsible for ensuring public order and security, they do not have the capacity or the powers to prevent or deter all illegal actions that threaten security.<sup>43</sup> Although they play a crucial role, police authorities can only provide part of public safety as a service.

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<sup>39</sup> István Németh is the CEO of IBM DSS IT Kft.

<sup>40</sup> Supply Chain Monitor, 'Ismert szállító, meghatalmazott ügynök', 01 May 2013.

<sup>41</sup> Conceptual background of crime prevention. See at point 2.2. Government Decision 1744/2013 (X.17.) on the National Crime Prevention Strategy (2013–2023).

<sup>42</sup> Policing, law enforcement. Cf. József Boda (ed.), *Rendészettudományi szakklexikon* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019), 461.

<sup>43</sup> Béla Galántai, 'A magánbiztonsági szolgáltatás közbiztonsági aspektusairól' in *Publikációk, szakdolgozatok* (Személy-, Vagyonvédelmi és Magánnyomozói Szakmai Kamara, s. a.).

In parallel with the development of police science and the evolution of law enforcement, private security organisations have shifted their focus from law enforcement and criminal investigation to crime prevention. This has led to increasing demand for security services from the public and private sectors to protect property and maintain order. Today, private security service providers far outnumber public law enforcement agencies, and private security has become an essential element of security as a public good.<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, public security is affected by cooperation between public law enforcement organisations and collaboration with private security providers. Because of this, the authors of this article do not argue that the state is responsible for policing. They do, however, contest the approach taken in the Dictionary of Police Science glossary. State bodies do not have exclusive powers to safeguard public order and public safety, which are closely linked to the internal order of the state.

This activity (i.e. the sum of measures to protect) is the essence of policing and is intended to achieve the primary objective of policing: security. In reality, however, this is not achieved by the state alone but by the joint efforts of the state and local authorities responsible for policing, private security companies, civil society organisations and individual citizens.

The authors, therefore, propose to emphasise the corporative nature of policing, with the need for cooperation between state bodies and between state and non-state actors in the new definition of policing.

In our opinion, policing is, therefore, an activity under the responsibility of the state (or of the local government acting on behalf of the community), which means the legally regulated protection of public order and public safety in cooperation between the authorities of the state, the local government and other actors performing law enforcement functions. The state (or the local government) is responsible for policing directly or through law enforcement agencies.

## Fundamentals of law enforcement concepts to be revised

László Korinek writes that “... the dysfunctions of law enforcement have already become apparent in everyday life. [...] the basic structures of law enforcement are in need of renewal, therefore a scientific analysis of them cannot be postponed any longer”.<sup>45</sup> Law enforcement and the organisations involved need continuous renewal and adaptation to change the circumstances.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Fischer et al., *Introduction to Security*, 18–19; László Christián and Zsolt Lippai, ‘Kakukktójás vagy új rendészeti alappillér’ in *Tehetség, szorgalom, hivatás. Tanulmánykötet*, ed. by Zágon Csaba and Ágnes Zsámbokiné Ficskovszky (Budapest: Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság Vám- és Pénzügyőri Tagozat, 2021), 17–30.

<sup>45</sup> László Korinek, ‘Út a statisztikától a rendészet elméletéig’, *JURA* 14, no. 1 (2008), 69–94.

<sup>46</sup> József Czilják, ‘Magánbiztonsági szervezetek és a rendvédelem’ in *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XII. Tanulmányok a „Rendészeti kutatások – A rendvédelem fejlesztése” című tudományos konferenciáról*, ed. by Gyula Gaál and Zoltán Hautzinger (Pécs: Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoport, 2011), 363–368.

Our research indicates that public order and security may not be achieved by state-owned law enforcement alone. As we have seen, there are significant areas of policing where security as a public good can only be achieved in cooperation with non-state actors.

The authors argue that the resources of the state enforcement sector are considered finite at a given point in time. Their capability development goes relatively slowly and reaches expectations in longer terms. Regardless of these, we have seen the growth of the total capabilities as a trend but the intensity of the developments is unequal. Non-state actors in policing are well adapted to changes in crime as a phenomenon. They are not bound by the funding and other operational rules specified for the public sector. The private security sector's close relationship with the security beneficiaries gives them flexibility in providing their services. This statement is true for both private security providers and civilian volunteer self-defence organisations. However, governments must ensure access to effective judicial remedy for human rights abuses.

Ideally, complementary activities between the private and public security sectors can create mutually reinforcing synergies. The boundary line between the labour, the responsibility and the competency distinction of the two sectors are not always clearly delineated. These ideas and patterns of cooperation can be seen in the law enforcement strategies and strategic decision-making in different countries.

The scientific need for conceptual improvements and the combination of dogmatics and practice was the focus of the Third Faculty Day of Law Enforcement at the University of Public Service.<sup>47</sup> During the event, Zoltán Balla presented his article entitled 'Ockham's Razor and Law Enforcement',<sup>48</sup> explained the need for change respectively.

Examining the relatively narrow domestic literature on private security reveals that it is a controversial area in many aspects, requiring further research and academic rigour. Private security is covered by a larger academic law enforcement science unit,<sup>49</sup> which raises several questions to be answered. It is a relatively young discipline that has been at the centre of academic interest in Hungary since the regime change. Perhaps therefore, the theoretical foundations of the domain are still fresh, and specific questions have yet to be answered. The authors of this study have tried to contribute to this, even if only modestly, by pointing out what they consider to be one of the most exciting questions. In other words, whether private security is to be understood as part of public security or as a concept juxtaposed to public security<sup>50</sup> and, as we have seen in the study, closely interacting with it and challenging to separate from it. If we accept the latter as a basic premise, this must be reflected both in our scientific thinking and in the conceptual framework of police science.

<sup>47</sup> József Deák, 'A jövőformáló rendészettudomány – Kari Nap online konferenciával', *RTK Hírek*, 23 November 2020.

<sup>48</sup> Zoltán Balla, 'Ockham borotvája és a rendészet', *Magyar Rendészet* 20, no 3 (2020), 15–26.

<sup>49</sup> According to the nomenclature of disciplines published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2016, police science as a discipline is a component of the discipline of Law and Political Sciences within the discipline of Economics and Law. See details in Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 'Ki hová tartozik? Elkészült az új tudományági besorolás', *MTA*, 12 September 2016.

<sup>50</sup> László Christián, 'Két új ág a rendészettudomány fáján', in *Rendészettudományi gondolatok: Írások a Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság megalapításának egy évtizedes jubileuma alkalmából*, ed. by Gyula Gaál and Zoltán Hautzinger (Budapest: Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, 2014), 85–91.

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# Climate Adaptation in Terms of Water Security in the Danube Countries<sup>1</sup>

Réka Magdolna KIROVNÉ RÁCZ<sup>2</sup>

*In my article, I examine the characteristics of the Danube countries' adaptation to climate change in terms of water security. Among the international strategic documents, I examine the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000), the Danube River Protection Convention, and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR, 2019). It is a European ambition to create adequate levels of drinking water, outdoor bathing water, and aquatic ecosystem security in EU member states by the end of 2027. Therefore, in my article I examine water safety, not only in terms of drinking water supply security, but also in terms of aquatic ecosystem security for the Danube countries. Based on the examples of recent years in Hungary, I present the damage events caused by high rainfall intensity fluctuations, which occurred from both excess and scarcity of water. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, as Hungary is a downstream country, upstream interventions can cause more sudden flooding and subsidence in our area on the Danube.*

**Keywords:** climate adaption, water security, Danube

## The importance of adaptation to climate change in terms of water security

The average temperature of the Earth's surface has increased by almost 1.0°C<sup>3</sup> over the last 150 years, which, according to scientific opinions, is caused by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions typical of the period following the Industrial Revolution. Given that greenhouse gas emissions continue to the present day, depending on the rapidity, this rate will increase by as much as 2–5°C<sup>4</sup> by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Many uncertainties hinder the accurate predictability of the extent and characteristics of climate change. Climate and hydrological models have a limited ability to describe real processes, as several uncertainties play a role in the study of the hydrological effects of

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<sup>1</sup> The work was implemented in the framework of project No. TKP2020-NKA-09, financed by the Thematic Excellence Program 2020 from the National Research Development and Innovation Fund.

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<sup>3</sup> Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Magyarország vízgazdálkodása: helyzetkép és stratégiai feladatok* [Water Management in Hungary: Situation Report and Related Strategic Tasks] (Budapest, 2011), 85.

<sup>4</sup> Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Magyarország vízgazdálkodása*, 86.

climate change like expected output growth related to socio-economic growth; forecasts of climate models – global, regional, hydrological.

Nevertheless, previous experiences have shown that our waters are sensitive to the climate –depending on the type of water, to varying degrees – especially to changes in the characteristics of temperature and precipitation.

As a result of climate change, in the context of global warming, declining rainfall has been predicted for decades by researchers. Nowadays, the process has already begun, and today the global problem is the declining quantity and deterioration of the quality of available water resources.<sup>5</sup>

The global challenge also threatens Europe, thus increases Hungary's vulnerability from the aspect of water security.

In 2019, the main topic of the Budapest Water Summit was the prevention of the water crisis and the promotion of adaptation to the effects, which also indicates the severity of the issue.

As a segment of adaptation to the effects of climate change, such as an increase in the frequency and intensity of droughts, everyone has a role, a right and a responsibility, from citizens, to professional disaster management bodies, to those involved in home security.

There is a tendency for the extremity of precipitation to increase. Precipitation is either too much or too little, which can cause both inland water and drought in the same area, in the same year. One reason for this is extreme intensity precipitation, the other is the moderate useful water storage capacity and underutilisation of the soil.

According to domestic climate change experts, in parallel with the decrease in precipitation, it will be typical that the extremity of precipitation will continue to increase, so the frequency of floods, lightning floods, inland waters and droughts is also expected to increase.

From an environmental safety point of view, it must also be emphasised that fresh water will be a critical area for the future<sup>6</sup> in the context of droughts, as its volume is declining rapidly and its value is rising dramatically.

Atmospheric processes greatly influence the *hydrological processes* taking place in the waters on Earth.

Changes in the state of the atmosphere and the development of the weather directly affect the amount of water flowing from the area, the *water level and discharge of watercourses, the water level of lakes, and the changes in the water level of the soil.*

The *water cycle* is most affected by the evolution in precipitation and temperature over time, as the amount of water flowing from the area rises with increasing precipitation, while it decreases with rising temperature, due to increased evaporation.

Extremely high rainfall causes *inland waters* in the areas and *floods* in watercourses, while extremely low rainfall coupled with high temperatures, results in a decrease in runoff or sometimes a complete absence of it. In the case of a *hydrological drought*, the

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<sup>5</sup> László Halász, László Földi and József Padányi, 'Climate change and CBRN defense', *Hadmérnök* 7, no 3 (2012), 42–49.

<sup>6</sup> József Padányi, 'Éghajlatváltozás és a biztonság összefüggései' [Correlations between Climate Change and Security], *Hadtudomány* 1–2 (2009), 33–46.

moisture content of the soil, the groundwater level and the amount of water transported in the rivers decrease.

The *runoff* is usually closely related to the weather, while the annual characteristics of the runoff, such as the average annual runoff, the variability of the annual runoff, or the course of the annual runoff within a year are related to the climate.

The runoff fluctuates significantly around the average each year to varying degrees per watercourse. In the Danube region, the minimum annual runoff is 15–75%, the largest is 150–370% of the average, and the ratio between the extremes of the annual runoff reaches 1:10 to 1:15.<sup>7</sup>

Accumulated snow in winter melts and stretches on the watercourses in the late winter–spring months, so the largest monthly runoff is typical for these months. Then the monthly runoff continues to decrease until the autumn months.

In the case of the Danube, the values are different, as the value of the largest monthly runoff occurs in June or July, while the low-water period shifts to November. This is because the melting in the thousands of meters high mountainous part provides a continuous supply for the river, and the feeding resulting from this melting meets the rainfall in June.

Global warming may have an impact on the climate of Hungary and the local catchments of watercourses. Territorial change in climate is reflected in the territorial variability of the average annual runoff of surface waters, and the runoff factor itself is climate-dependent, too.<sup>8</sup>

The statistical analysis shows a decreasing tendency in rainfall in the Carpathian Basin in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, for almost every month and the winter and summer semester and year.<sup>9</sup> Within rainy days, the number and proportion of snowy days decreased, as did the number of snow-covered days.

According to forecasts, decrease in precipitation and increase in temperature will continue in the coming decades.

If global warming does not reach 1°C by 2035 compared to the current one, mostly in the winter semester<sup>10</sup> twice the temperature rising is expected in these two areas, according to a study done in the Small Hungarian Plain and the Southern Great Hungarian Plain region. It is expected that summer precipitation will decrease, while the amount of precipitation will increase in the winter semester.

Based on the results of the study, warming will be typical also in the cross-border Danube River basins, in both the summer and winter semesters. Regarding precipitation, the expected changes can only be estimated with uncertainty.

<sup>7</sup> Imre Radochay, *Egy éghajlati forgatókönyv hidrológiai hatásának vizsgálata a Dunán, különös tekintettel a kisvízi időszakokra* [Investigation of the Hydrological Impact of a Climatic Scenario on the Danube, with Special Reference to Low Water Periods] (Eötvös Loránd University, Department of Meteorology, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Béla Nováky, 'Az éghajlatváltozás vízgazdálkodási hatásai' [Water Management Impacts of Climate Change], *Vízügyi Közlemények* 82, 3–4 (2000), 419–448.

<sup>9</sup> János Mika, Péter Ambrózy, Judit Bartholy, Csaba Nemes and Tamás Pálvölgyi, 'Az Alföld éghajlatának időbeli változékonysága és változásai a hazai szakirodalom tükrében' [The Temporal Variability and Changes of the Climate of the Great Plain in the Light of the Hungarian Literature], *Vízügyi Közlemények* 77, 3–4 (1995), 261–268.

<sup>10</sup> Nováky, 'Az éghajlatváltozás vízgazdálkodási hatásai', 423.

No significant change in precipitation is expected in the Danube River basins in Germany and the Czech Republic, but higher precipitation is possible in the Austrian river basin. Thus, except the Austrian river basin, winter precipitation is declining in the Danube River basins.<sup>11</sup>

Climate impact studies show that as a result of the expected climate changes, hydrological characteristics are also changing in Hungary and its cross-border river basins. More water is likely to flow down in the winter semester than in the summer semester compared to the previous water volumes.

As the temperature of the winter semester rises, both the amount of falling snow and the amount of accumulating snow decreases, so the melting of the snow cover occurs earlier. However, in higher catchment areas with cooler climates, warming has less of an effect on melting, so even in the case of increasing warming, melting may be delayed in time, in these areas.

As a result of climate change, it is expected that the mass and peak discharge of the first melting flood wave will rise. Decreasing annual runoff is expected in the period between 2000 and 2030.<sup>12</sup>

As a result of warming, water supplies are declining obviously. This includes stored water supplies. In addition, the supply that is crucial for recovery is also declining.

Due to the expected higher evaporation, both surface runoff and infiltration into groundwater will decrease to a greater extent.

The water use and consumption of the population and the economy will increase significantly if the temperature rises. In the summer period, water consumption will increase by 3–4% in the range of 20–25°C within 1°C rising in temperature.<sup>13</sup>

The temperature-related change in the drinking water demand of the animals shows a similar picture. The average annual water demand of plants is particularly sensitive to the average median temperature of the summer semester (May–October): under current climatic conditions, a 1°C regional variation in temperature causes a 19–89 mm difference in water demand, depending on the plant species.<sup>14</sup> The increase in the frequency of *flash floods* can be significantly facilitated by high-intensity precipitation falling on a small catchment area. Intense rainfall can also increase erosion, so maintenance works should be increased. The expected effects of climate change in our waters can be grouped and summarised as follows:<sup>15</sup>

- with regards to the fact that warming and drought are becoming dominant, the annual runoff may decrease (it can reach up to 30% in Hungary<sup>16</sup>)
- the rate of infiltration into groundwater may decrease, the water intake of the lakes may decrease (thus, the water balance of the lakes is expected to deteriorate, their surface area may decrease, some may even dry out)

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 424.

<sup>12</sup> Nováky, 'Az éghajlatváltozás vízgazdálkodási hatásai', 424.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 430.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 430.

<sup>15</sup> Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Magyarország vízgazdálkodása*, 86.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

- changes in precipitation characteristics expected in the Danube catchment area (Germany) – decreasing of small waters in homeland river sections during the summer period, and in winter due to increasing rainfall, extended length of winter period is expected
- greater seasonal fluctuations in groundwater levels are expected
- the risk of flash floods increases due to the intensity and frequency of heavy rainfall
- it is likely to occur that rain caused flood waves will become more frequent in the winter semester
- the general warming of the winter months is expected to reduce the risk of icy floods formation
- due to the warming of winter months, an increase in evaporation and a decrease in the number of frosty days may reduce the risk of inland water formation

The above forecasts were formulated in a strategic programme developed by the Section of Engineering Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on water management in Hungary, the situation report and related strategic tasks (MTA) study, published in 2011. If we look back at the hydrological characteristics of Hungary in recent years as a kind of success analysis of these forecasts, it can be seen that the forecasts at that time were largely confirmed.

For example in May and June from 2018 every year, at the national level, lots of damage occurred, which was caused by extreme rainfall (flash floods, water flooded part of villages, dilapidations and glissade of flood protection build-ups).

Likewise, from July to November there was such a lack of rainfall that the water level of the Danube was record low.

## Challenges of dryness and drought

Climate change is characterised by global warming. Extremely hot periods with higher temperatures, summer heat waves and declining rainfall, such as increasing the length of dry periods, are projected to increase the likelihood of droughts due to the effects of climate change. Drought due to water scarcity and desertification are less of a “spectacular” disaster than damage caused by excess water. They are slow-moving, however, they can cause significant damage and affect the functioning of society in many areas.

In addition to crop production and agriculture, the consequences of drought negatively affect all living organisms, from flora, fauna to humans. As a result of drought impact, the damages hit the natural environment directly and also society and the economy indirectly.

In a kind of disaster categorisation, we distinguish natural and civilisation-related disasters according to their origin. Natural disasters can be further split into meteorological, hydrological, geological and biological damage events.

In my opinion, drought can be approached in several ways in this categorisation and can be assigned into several groups.

If interpreted as a disaster resulting from a lack of extreme rainfall, it is of meteorological origin. If we consider drought as the opposite of disasters caused by excess water (flood,

inland water), as a disaster caused by water scarcity, then it is of hydrological origin. While if we look at this damage in terms of the extreme drought of the soil, the earth, it is of geological origin.

Drought differs from other natural disasters in several ways:

- it develops slowly (in Hungary it takes several months to develop)
- neither its exact beginning nor its end, nor its spatial extent are known
- it is more difficult to estimate the extent of the damage caused by drought than in the case of other disasters
- its effects do not cease immediately
- its impact occurs in all areas of life (the load on the human body increases, it causes one of the greatest damages in agriculture, its aspects of water management, transport, industry, water supply and tourism are diverse)

The concept of drought and water scarcity is defined in the 2007 EU Drought Strategy Paper as: “Drought means a temporary reduction in available water resources, for example due to a lack of rain, water scarcity means that water demand exceeds sustainably usable water resources.”

To clarify the concept of drought, the 2012 Drought Strategy distinguishes between meteorological, agricultural, hydrological and socio-economic droughts.

Extremely hot periods with higher temperatures, summer heat waves and declining rainfall, such as increasing the length of dry periods, are projected to increase the likelihood of droughts due to the effects of climate change.

As a result of climate change, summer is characterised by extremely high temperatures and extremely little rainfall.

Territorial differences can be observed in the development of drought in our country. Conditions are favourable for the development of the drought in 90% of the territory of Hungary, primarily in the Great Plain, while in the area of the Sand Ridge between the Danube and the Tisza, signs of desertification have already appeared.

Most drought indicators work with meteorological and hydrological data, e.g. precipitation, river water yield, soil moisture content, reservoir status and groundwater level. Water scarcity indicators most often compare water use with available water resources. Nowadays, it is becoming increasingly important to develop vulnerability indicators for water-related impacts for different climate change and socio-economic scenarios and to assess measures to address possible water scarcity and droughts.

The decrease in precipitation has a negative effect on water resources, so there will be less usable water, which will increase Hungary’s vulnerability and dependence on neighbouring upstream countries in terms of water security. Declining water is in many cases accompanied by a deterioration in water quality.

Climate change is also affecting groundwater resources. Warming can reduce the infiltration that feeds groundwater, especially when warming is accompanied by a decrease in precipitation. As a result, a decrease in groundwater levels as well as greater seasonal fluctuations are likely to occur.

The decrease of the groundwater level has a negative effect on the living organisms and ecosystems living there, and may even cause the dehydration of the vegetation. The

level of aquifers and the stratum pressure conditions are significantly affected by the longer dry periods.

Droughts can cause significant damage and affect the functioning of society in many areas (in agriculture, livestock, forestry, tourism, water management, etc.).

Forests play an essential role in the global ecosystem, so the damage caused by drought in the forests is dangerous and serious. A prolonged drought period can cause severe damage to the forest ecosystem. The leaves of trees may fall prematurely, their canopies may deform, their yields may decrease, and pests and infections may multiply in the trees. The risk of wildfires increases during dry, droughty periods. These fires cause serious ecological damages.<sup>17</sup>

## Transboundary disasters caused by excess water in Europe

In terms of water management, the biggest challenge in the European Union is preparing for climate change. Since 1998, floods have killed hundreds of people and caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in Europe. In the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, flood events causing severe damage throughout Europe drew attention to changes in hydrological conditions and shortcomings in existing protection systems. As a result of this, the European Parliament has created a Directive on the assessment and management of flood risks (2007/60/EC) to complement the EU Floods Directive and made its implementation obligatory for all Member States.<sup>18</sup> The aim of the measure is to develop a unified approach to flood risk management for transboundary river basins in the European Union.<sup>19</sup>

Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks requires Member States to assess if all water courses and coast lines are at risk from flooding, to map the flood and to take adequate and coordinated measures to reduce this flood risk. With this, the Directive focuses on risk management.

With the help of risk maps, it becomes possible to see which geographical areas can be flooded by water due to low-, medium- and high-probability floods. It shows the number of citizens concerned and the economic activities affected by the flood.

With the help of these maps, Member States can establish their flood management plans.

The Directive calls for joint planning, rather than separating specific measures, as the risk of floods varies considerably from one river basin to another. These plans should provide assurance that Member States will be prepared for floods in order to protect human lives, ecosystems, cultural heritage and economic activities.

As a result of urbanisation and the intensity of agricultural activity and deforestation, the risk of floods is increasing in many European countries.

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<sup>17</sup> *Nemzeti Aszálystratégia tervezet* [Hungarian National Drought Strategy Plan], s. a.

<sup>18</sup> Directive 2007/60/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks.

<sup>19</sup> Ildikó Lázár, *Vízrajzi fogalomtár* [Hydrographic Glossary], 2013.

Sustainable flood protection methods intend to use natural and cost-effective tools to reduce risks. Examples include the restoration of mountain forests and wetlands or the restoration of natural river bends. River bends can slow down the flow of water and thus reduce the amount of water that drains from the flood. These methods are also beneficial in other ways, as they also restore natural habitats and biodiversity.

60% of European rivers have *transboundary river basins*.<sup>20</sup> For this reason, EU Member States must draw up a joint plan for international river basins by involving other countries if necessary. Under the Directive, Member States must carry out a public consultation when drawing up flood risk management plans, as it is important for success to raise public awareness of floods and their management.

Mechanisms have been set up in the EU to help take joint action in the event of a disaster.

The Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Centre coordinates the *rapid response* to disasters and also the *training*.<sup>21</sup>

Another tool to support disaster response activities is the *European Union Solidarity Fund*.

In 2013, a massive flood devastated Central Europe, causing huge damages in the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria and Hungary.<sup>22</sup>

A recent report from the European Environment Agency highlighted that two-thirds of *all disaster damage in Europe consist of floods, cloudburst and other hydrometeorological events*. According to the report, this is due to a kind of land use change in which the population is growing in flood-prone areas.

The report finds a correlation between the annual European average median temperature rise and the intensification of the hydrological cycle, which could lead to more frequent and intense floods.<sup>23</sup>

Hungary has assumed a coordinating role with Slovakia in the area of action entitled *Protection and Conservation of Water Quality*. Hungary has also committed to coordinating the *Natural Disaster Management* area with Romania. In the field of water management and flood protection, there is a long tradition of cooperation between Hungary and its neighbouring countries. Demand for clean drinking water, the risk of flooding, water scarcity, or the risk of industrial pollution are frequent problems that affect the lives of citizens in the region.

According to Article 7 of the EU Water Framework Directive, changes in the environment, such as climate change, which is considered to be a relatively new factor, will pose a challenge to water management throughout the European Union in the future.

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<sup>20</sup> WISE (Water Information System Europe), 'Vízügyi jegyzetek a Víz Keretirányelv végrehajtásáról. 10. vízügyi jegyzet: Éghajlatváltozás: Az árvizeket, az aszályokat és a változó vízi ökoszisztémákat célzó intézkedések' [Climate Change: Measures for Floods, Droughts and Changing Aquatic Ecosystems. Water Notes 10], December 2008.

<sup>21</sup> István Simicskó, *Az országvédelem és országmozgósítás szervezeti, hatásköri, irányítási rendszere minősített időszakokban* [Organisation, Authorisation and Command System of the Country's Defence and Mobilisation in Exceptional Periods of Time] (PhD dissertation, Budapest: ZMNE, 2008).

<sup>22</sup> National Geographic Hungary, 'Növekvő árvízi kockázatok' [Emerging Flood Risks], 18 June 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

The European Commission's 2007 Communication on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts management establish that the implementation of the Water Framework Directive is a key component.

The *possible consequences of climate change* are assumed by the Water Framework Directive as follows:

- less rain and higher temperatures in the south, which means an increased load on resources
- more rain and increased flood risk in the north

Floods have become more frequent recently. Since 1990, 259 significant river floods have been reported, of which 165 have occurred since 2000.<sup>24</sup>

In the framework of *Directive 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks*, Member States were obliged to carry out preliminary flood risk management assessments for all river basins by 2011 and to complete them with flood risk maps by 2013.

Member States were required to put in place flood risk management plans by 2015.




Figure 1: Frequency of floods in Europe

Source: [www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/freshwater\\_europe/images/europe\\_flood\\_fr.jpg](http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/freshwater_europe/images/europe_flood_fr.jpg)

<sup>24</sup> European Union Water Framework Directive, 2000.

The Framework Directive states that public involvement will be a key element in achieving the objectives of both the Water Framework Directive and the Flood Risk Assessment and Management Directive. *At the same time, it draws attention to the fact that a significant proportion of European citizens are unaware that they can express an opinion on the future of water. The Directive emphasises the importance of drawing attention to the fact that every effort will help to make progress.*

## Flood vulnerability in Hungary

The rivers of the Alps and the Carpathian Mountains flow into the country's two great rivers, the Danube and the Tisza. As a result of this, sudden snowmelt or higher amounts of downpour rushing down the two mountains mentioned above can cause flooding in the country. This is dangerous mostly for the Upper Tisza and its tributaries, as well as for the Körös because there the water level can rise up to 10 meters within 28–36 hours after the rainfall. In addition, flood waves can also be of mixed (combined) origin – as a combined consequence of snowmelt and precipitation. The amount and proportion of precipitation – the runoff factor – can be increased by the following *factors*:

- saturated soil
- frozen soil
- sloping surface of the catchment area
- lack of vegetation cover or sparse vegetation cover
- cool weather which reduces evaporation
- humid air

The following *types* of flood waves can be distinguished on the Danube:<sup>25</sup>

- mutually reinforcing flood waves resulting from precipitation or snowmelt
- cumulative floods of main rivers and tributaries resulting from precipitation or snowmelt
- floods caused by backwater resulting from ice dam
- other floods resulting from backwater
- floods resulting from the effects of artificial interventions

Depending on the hydrographic features of the river basin, two types of floods can occur on the Hungarian section of the Danube. One is the result of snowmelt that occurs in late winter or early spring, and the other is summer flooding caused by extensive, high-intensity precipitation in the highlands of the Alps.

In terms of discharge, summer floods are more dangerous.

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<sup>25</sup> Réka Palásty, *Tisza 1970–2000. Rendkívüli árvizek* [Tisza 1970–2000. Extraordinary Floods]. Budapest: BME, 2000.

## The Danube as a vital system element in Hungary

The vast majority of the rivers in Hungary – apart from a few small watercourses – originate abroad, so the water cycle of our rivers is basically shaped and influenced not by the waters generated in the catchment area of Hungary, but in other countries. The quantity and quality of water resources are highly dependent on interventions conducted in upstream countries.

The watercourses of Hungary can be divided into the water system of the Danube and the Tisza.

Several of our rivers are accompanied by a detached or cut dead channel, oxbow lake. The number of reservoir lakes is also significant: Lake Tisza, Rakaca and Zámoly reservoirs. The Danube is the main river in the Carpathian Basin (Poprad leads the water to the Baltic Sea via the Dunajec and the Vistula). It is 2,848 km long, making it the longest river in Central Europe. It originates in the Black Forest in Germany and drains into the Black Sea. It crosses 10 countries, making it the “most international” river in the world. There are several major cities along its shores, including 4 capitals – Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest and Belgrade. There are 27 settlements in Hungary on the banks of the Danube River.<sup>26</sup>

The tributaries of the Danube, which flow directly into it: Lajta, Rába, Rábca, Cuha, Sió, Dráva, Ipoly.

Its tributaries, which flow indirectly into it: Répce, which continues in Rábca; Marcal, which flows into the Rába; Koppány, which flows into Kapos, and which flows into Sió; Mura, which flows into the Dráva.

The Hungarian section of the Danube is 417 km and it is a border river in one section. It has a fluctuating water flow. Its flow direction is relatively straight.

The Danube, which crosses Central and Southeastern Europe, is the twenty-first longest river on Earth and the second most water abundant river in Europe. Its average annual discharge is 6,855 m<sup>3</sup>/s.

The highest point of its watershed is Piz Bernina, which rises 4,052 m.

The river basin is divided into three main parts, which can be characterised by different hydrographic and geographical features:

- the Upper Danube region from the Black Forest source region to the Dévény gate
- the Middle Danube region to the Iron Gate
- the Lower Danube region to the Danube Delta of the Black Sea

The water of the Danube, the river bed, the surface of the water, the backwaters and the floodplains provide very favourable living conditions for many living creatures.

Backwaters and slower rivers are rich in phytoplankton and seaweeds like floating fern, duckweeds, water lily, water chestnut and wolffia. The shores are characterised by reeds as well as cattails and other sedge species.

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<sup>26</sup> Győr, Gönyű, Komárom, Esztergom, Szob, Visegrád, Nagymaros, Kismaros, Verőce, Vác, Göd, Dunakeszi, Szentendre, Budakalász, Budapest, Szigetszentmiklós, Százhalombatta, Ercsi, Dunaharaszti, Ráckeve, Dunaújváros, Dunaföldvár, Solt, Paks, Kalocsa, Baja, Mohács.

In the faster sections, the willow and shrub parts are typical along the river, and further in the groves, white willow and white and black cottonwood are native. It is typical of the Danube that “gallery forests” are created in drier, but water supplied areas. English oak, swamp Spanish oak, elm and ash trees, as well as several creeper plants can be found over here.

In the backwaters, bog forests are forming where the alder is the most characteristic tree and in the undergrowth mosses and bogs can be found. The nettle, which is a protected plant species, is native to the backwaters of the Danube.

The fish stock of the Danube is relatively poor, fifty-two fish species of the Danube are known.<sup>27</sup> Typical fish species are sterlet, carp, pike, catfish, barbel, bream, crucian carp, European bitterling, perch and pikeperch. The Danube salmon and the striped ruffe are unique fish species of the Danube.

The Danube floodplain is home to a wide variety of bird and mammal species. The most typical bird species are the black-headed gull, the mallard, the wild goose, the cormorant, the lapwing, the grey heron, the red heron, the night heron, the great bittern and the European penduline tit. Rose pelicans are inhabitants only of the Danube Delta.

Among the mammals, the most common in the floodplains are the water shrew, the water vole, the harvest mouse, the otter and the beaver. Among predators, foxes and the European polecat live in this area.

*In my opinion, critical infrastructure can be interpreted “not only” as one of the living conditions of human society. Even natural habitats that are the living conditions of animals and flora, our environment like the water, floodplain, etc. of the Danube in this article, are considered critical infrastructure. Its absence or the resulting domino-like consequences can also result in basic malfunctions making life impossible for the animals and plants living there. Changes in biodiversity have an impact, directly or indirectly, on people’s daily lives.*<sup>28</sup>

One of the typical services of Danube tourism is the offer of event boats on the Danube. In addition to the boats used to host various events, sightseeing cruises and other boat tours also add colour to the tourist programs.

Certain sections of the Danube are suitable for various forms of water tourism. These are spa tourism, water sports, adventure tourism and fishing.

*In my opinion, if we define tourism as one of the possibilities for people to relax, rest and recharge, it can be interpreted as critical infrastructure as its absence can cause psychological stress for a wide range of people, which can generate increased problems in society at an individual level.*<sup>29</sup>

The importance of Danube shipping and ports also deserve special attention from the topic point of view.

The Danube ports in Hungary are as follows: Port of Csepel, ÁTI DEPO Port in Baja, OKK RO-RO Port in Baja, Dunaferri Port, Port of Dunavecse, Port in Fadd-Dombori,

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<sup>27</sup> *A Duna sokszínű élővilága* [The Varied Ecosystem of the Danube], s. a.

<sup>28</sup> Réka Magdolna Kirovné Rác, ‘Magyarország folyói – különös tekintettel a Dunára – mint kritikus infrastruktúra vagy létfontosságú rendszer elem’ [Rivers of Hungary – with Special Regard to the Danube – as Elements of Critical Infrastructure or Vital Systems], *Hadtudományi Szemle* 10, no 2 (2017), 437–446.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 440.

FERROPORT, Port of Győr–Gönyű, Port of Hárós, Port of Mohács, Port of Paks, Port of Százhalombatta, Vigadó Square ship station, Port for small pleasure boats at Kvassay flood gate.

The general characteristics of water transport can be summarised as follows:

- it is suitable for heavy goods transport
- it provides indirect access to the goods
- it has slow transport speed
- it is strongly weather dependent
- it has a high level of transport safety
- it is relatively cheap
- it has relatively gentle environmental effects

*If we define the Danube as a shipping route, it can be interpreted as such a “thing” whose destruction, reduced level of operation or services, or its inaccessibility to the water transport process would have a clear negative effect. So it can be considered critical infrastructure. And the Danube ports are essential elements of this critical infrastructure.<sup>30</sup>*

## **The Danube River Basin as a vital component of the European Union**

The availability and good quality of fresh water is vital for living creatures. The 800,000 km<sup>2</sup> area of the Danube River Basin covers 19 countries. The Danube River Protection Convention (DRPC) has been signed by 14 of these countries. The Danube catchment area is also affected by the Alps and the Carpathians. As the river knows no boundaries, water management requires serious international cooperation. Regarding the Danube, this coordination is supported, for example, by the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR). (The countries of the tributaries have also established close international cooperation, e.g. the International Sava River Basin Commission [ISRBC]).

The analyses of the ICPDR<sup>31</sup> provide a complete picture of the water quality and water management situation in the Danube River Basin. These are included in the Danube River Management Plan (DRMP). This document points to significant problems in the catchment area (organic pollution, nutrient pollution – eutrophication, pollution by hazardous substances, hydromorphological changes). These problems are linked to an important issue that the protection of the quality of water flowing into the Black Sea means. The above problems suggest that a significant part of the pollutants flowing into the Black Sea originates from the Danube. Therefore, all efforts aiming to improve the water quality of the Danube will have a positive impact on the Black Sea and its environment.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 442.

<sup>31</sup> International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River – ICPDR, *Ministerial Meeting 2010: Shared waters – joint responsibilities*.

## The national aspirations of the Danube countries

The Action Plan of the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (Brussels, 8.12.2010 SEC (2010) 1489 final)<sup>32</sup> contains the aspirations and pillars related to environmental protection in the Danube region. The proposals set out in the document will help to achieve the objectives of ensuring sustainable development by resolving the climate change-related problems, and ensuring the sustainability of resources. By doing so, they will contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy, the implementation of the EU's 2050 biodiversity strategy. Restoring and maintaining water quality is one of the pillars to which the proposals apply. Other EU programs also help and support this pillar. In the water sector, for example, to improve the water quality of the Danube River Basin. Wastewater treatment or drinking water-related projects have received financial and technical support.

Water management in the EU must be carried out in accordance with very strict legal requirements, to which national regulations and concrete actions are necessary. They aim to preserve and improve water quality and at the same time help to achieve the objectives of the Water Framework Directive, the Urban Waste Water Treatment (UWWT) Directive and the Nitrates Directive, i.e. to improve water quality. The other pillar is the prevention of natural or civilisation-related disasters on the Danube and preparing for them. Damage to water quality caused by floods or pollutants has a negative impact not only on biodiversity but also on the built environment and endangers people's lives and physical integrity. The countries of the Danube agree – on the basis of water management cooperation – that flood protection is a priority, continuous task, and it cannot be a short-term activity. For this purpose, flood risk management plans are being prepared at a national level. In addition to floods, droughts are also a significant challenge. Water scarcity affects 11% of the European population and 17% of Europe's territory.<sup>33</sup>

Water scarcity is an increasing challenge both in Hungary and in Europe. Domestic strategies on climate change, such as the River Basin Management Plan (2015) or the draft National Drought Strategy (2012), draw attention to the fact of extreme hydrological damage events (e.g. floods, inland water, lightning, frequency and intensity of drought).

The appearance of drought in Hungarian water policy documents – unlike flood – is less pronounced. A separate strategic plan was prepared in 2012 (National Drought Strategy), but was not adopted, 1432/2012 (X.9). The draft drought strategy had to be integrated into the national water strategy.

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<sup>32</sup> European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Document: Action plan accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for Danube Region*, 13 December 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

## Summary

In my article, I examined the Danube countries' situation of adaptation to climate change, primarily in terms of water security, and I also pointed out the challenges affecting the aquatic ecosystem security. Based on the relevant hydrological impacts of climate change, I have demonstrated that adaptation to climate change is of unquestionable importance for water security. I presented the challenges of water scarcity, such as dryness and drought, and the problems of excess water in Europe and Hungary. I summarised the national aspirations of the Danube countries through analysis of international conventions and strategies.

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# Putin and Erdoğan – A “Beautiful Friendship” of Illiberal Presidents

Şeref TÜRKMEN<sup>1</sup>

*Putin and Erdoğan’s “beautiful friendship” has been defining Russian–Turkish political, diplomatic and economic relations on the one hand, and the handling of many conflicts, including the Syrian civil war, for nearly two decades on the other. It can be said that in many cases, when the interests of the Russian and Turkish states clash with each other or there are conflicts of principle and values, it is the two presidents who, because of their similar habitus and political character, find solutions to the problems. One thing is for sure: without the personalities of Erdoğan and Putin, the recent history of the two nations would not be so diverse and full of twists and turns.*

*This article would like to give an analytical journey into the common history of the Turkish and Russian nations, as well as to the souls of the two politicians to look at the reasons and motivations behind the often contradictory political moves.*

*As relatively little work has been done on the topic in Turkish, but more in English, the study is based on scientific papers and Internet publications written in the latter language. It aims at disclosing the role of the two regional powers in a global framework.*

**Keywords:** *bilateral relations, illiberal democracy, Putin, Erdoğan*

## Introduction

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are often likened in their political character, views habits and behavior but their actual relationship is far from being ideal and harmonious. In fact, the diplomatic and political ties between Turkey and Russia have survived various modifications during the last decade and each shift and turn was provoked by different conflicts and tensions in the Mediterranean, the Caucasus region or the Middle East. This basically interest driven political game can be seen as a continuous variation of periods of collision and rapprochement. Nevertheless, Putin and Erdoğan, Russia and Turkey influence each other in many ways, and start to depend on each other more and more over time. The Turkish–Russian relations in the 21<sup>st</sup>

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century is not a regional set of conflicts and cooperation, it is a key element in understanding global politics and its local implications.

The premise of this article is that the ever-changing system of relations between Putin and Erdoğan, as well as between Turkey and Russia, despite its conflicts, points to ever closer cooperation, which in global politics may counterbalance certain Western attempts to gain influence, but neither Turkey nor Russia becomes a superpower on the world-wide level. In other words, these two interdependent countries become unavoidable in world politics, but they, alone or even together, are weak enough to control all the processes that take place in their respective regions.

## Leadership styles and personalities

In an accurate understanding of the Turkish–Russian relationship, it is extremely important to examine the personalities of the two leaders from the simple fact that both Putin and Erdoğan are strong individuals and make their mark on their country’s domestic and foreign policies. The authoritarian political regimes they administer cannot be separated from the traits that make the two presidents such a prominent figure that they are so fond of and so feared.

For some political analysts, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are like political twins who are always ready to cooperate and rival each other depending on how the situation develops. They are the ones who are honest enough with each other and in many cases motivated by the same thing: to defend the honor of their homeland and to openly oppose the West. They are brought to life by a sincere struggle, a struggle in which they are sometimes able to hit each other.

In examining the Putin–Erdoğan system of relations, it is not a negligible factor that Russian President Vladimir Putin is very fond of building personal friendships with the world’s leading politicians. This is not necessarily about Putin looking only for the company of those who think and behave similarly in world politics, but about putting more emphasis on personal aspects than other politicians. Thus, among Putin’s friends we find such convinced European Democrats as the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Erdoğan is similarly an open and friendly type, so with enough criticism, in essence, he reciprocated and reciprocates Putin’s interest.<sup>2</sup>

Putin and Erdoğan can be described as “active–negative” leaders based on their political careers. This is true of their background, their studies, their ascension and the political methodology by which they came to power and consolidated their own position at the head of the country. Putin ran a typical post-Soviet career. He was a staunch agent of the KGB, the Soviet secret service, but he was also popular with the average Russian citizen as a successful athlete and had great results in judo. Building on this image, he concretised himself into power. Erdoğan took a similar path. He, too, was able to credibly play the role of the “simple child of the people” for a long time, as he really fought his

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<sup>2</sup> Murat Ulgul, ‘Erdoğan’s Personal Diplomacy and Turkish Foreign Policy’, *Insight Turkey* 21, no 4 (2019), 171.

way to the top of the political elite with hard work and diligence by the late 1990s, when he even was imprisoned for his political views. By 2010, however, by the time of the constitutional referendum, he had already reached the point where it was not the service of the people that was his first interest, but the convulsive clinging to power.<sup>3</sup>

It is true of both politicians, but Putin in particular, that stability is at the heart of their policies. There are several reasons for this, but one essential element is that the two presidents strongly believe that rules and laws should govern human life in general, and this is especially true of human societies. For them, stability is synonymous with order. They expect themselves and their environment to be orderly and think orderly. The other reason Putin and Erdoğan appear explicitly as partisan politicians in domestic and foreign policy is that they are convinced that only stability and political certainty will provide a sufficient basis for looking to the future. Erdoğan and Putin do not think in the present, but have large-scale plans that require everything to work well in the present. In fact, they see the present as the given, the safe foundation on which to build their grandiose plans.<sup>4</sup>

In Putin and Erdoğan’s interpretation, this order and stability is threatened by “anarchists” and they brand as an anarchist anyone who is seen to have the potential to bring about radical change in society. An excellent example of this is, when protesters came up with demands that they wanted to radically change the whole of society during the Gezi Park event, Erdoğan said he would not give up his long-term plans because of three or five bandits (*uc-bes capulcu*). In this case, Erdoğan not only downplayed the demonstrators against him, but – by using this term – also called them enemies of his system. At that time, 2013, Erdoğan was politically strong enough and with so many supporters behind him that it was not a serious challenge for him to crack down on these protesters at that time.<sup>5</sup>

What Putin and Erdoğan have in common in their political characterisation is that both are in many cases critical of globalisation itself and do not hide that they are disturbed by the fact that the word of Western powers is decisive in world politics. As Erdoğan’s system of relations changes dynamically with Putin, similar processes can be observed with respect to Erdoğan and the West. In relation to Turkish immigrant communities and other affairs, Erdoğan became embroiled in a sharp conflict with Germany and the Netherlands, and in America, the brutality of his bodyguards caused a serious uproar. However, he has remained a loyal partner of the West and NATO in several global games, such as intervening in Afghanistan or dealing with the refugee crisis. Similarly, Putin regularly whips the West and tries to put it in a difficult position, as he does now with regard to Europe’s gas supply, but there are also cases where he shows a more cooperative attitude.<sup>6</sup>

Putin and Erdoğan and their political allies play well on the fears of the average person and appeal well to their desire for the Russian and Turkish nations to finally regain their long-lost historical lustre. Erdoğan’s foreign policy ambitions have benefited from the former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s innovative foreign policy view, the Neo

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<sup>3</sup> Abdulmelik Alkan, ‘Barber’s Typological Analysis of President Erdoğan and President Putin’, *Psychology and Education* 58, no 4 (2021), 1029.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 1028.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 1028.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 1028.

Ottoman mindset, which has shone a hope in the Turkish people that even if their country is unable to regain the territories it had dominated for centuries, serious influence in the leadership of the countries operating there today is still possible. The relative failure of the Syrian intervention has shown that it is not so simple, but it has also reinforced the fears of the Turkish people, as the Syrian civil war, the escalating terrorist activities by various factions such as Kurdish separatists or Islamists, and the influx of refugees together are still a major source of uncertainty in Turkish political life.<sup>7</sup>

Both Putin and Erdoğan, after consolidating their power and naturalising an authoritarian leadership style, began to take on the role of a father in a psychological sense. This has a long tradition in both Russia and Turkey in terms of the country’s leaders. Suffice it to say that the Russian ruler was referred to by the people as “Tsar Father”, while the founder of the modern Turkish Republic also took the name Atatürk, meaning “Father of the Turks”, when he made it obligatory for everyone to have a surname. The paternalism of Putin and Erdoğan is not just a role with historical roots, but also an opportunistic political stance. These two father figures masterfully exploit people’s easily controllable emotions: admiration and fear. Putin and Erdoğan are the traditional father who rewards and punishes at the same time, and is unpredictable enough in terms of reward and punishment.<sup>8</sup> Putin and Erdoğan are not only paternalistic figures, but in different political contexts, they represent a strong nationalist position, and this nationalism noticeably strengthens their masculine traits.<sup>9</sup> The right-wing populism of the two presidents also introduces a kind of masculine leadership style in their countries, which goes beyond putting men in a position and giving women less room, and in many cases also conflicts with democracy. Putin and Erdoğan’s paternalism and male chauvinism thus not only marginalise women, but also destabilise democracy in the Western sense, which is slowly being replaced by an illiberal democracy in Russia and Turkey.<sup>10</sup>

These similarities contribute in many ways to the fact that the relationship between Putin and Erdoğan is not always hassle-free, as they are both hopeful partners and rivals. The following chapters attempt to show the depths and opportunities of this Turkish–Russian partnership and rivalry, as well as the significance of this system of relations for world politics and the world economy.

## Turkish–Russian partnership

It has already been said that Turkish–Russian diplomatic and political cooperation is in many cases determined by common interests. These interests are mostly of a geopolitical nature and relate to one or another conflict zone, and sometimes change over time. Analysts tend to believe that common geopolitical interests are also reflected in economic cooperation, whereas the objective observer finds that the volume of Russian–Turkish

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 1030.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 1030.

<sup>9</sup> Betül Eksi and Elizabeth A. Wood, ‘Right-wing populism as gendered performance: Janus-faced masculinity in the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Recep T. Erdoğan’, *Theory and Society* 48 (2019), 734.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 737.

trade in the world economy is small and barely growing. Although Putin and Erdoğan have set a target of \$100 billion in foreign trade for the two countries in the early 2020s, the reality is less than a quarter of that, Russian exports are \$17.7 billion and Turkish exports are less than \$4 billion. These numbers have risen by only 2.5% in recent years. It is true that the coronavirus epidemic has severely slowed economic development around the world, but this relative failure goes beyond the recent global difficulties and reveals the weaknesses of Russian–Turkish economic relations.<sup>11</sup>

Incidentally, geopolitical considerations do not spare the economy either. For a long time, Russia was Turkey’s most important gas supplier, and by 2017, Gazprom had given more than half of Turkey’s gas needs, quite exactly 52%. This cooperation seemed so strong that the two countries even agreed to build another gas pipeline called Turk Stream to guarantee the security of gas supply. In 2019, however, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to turn his back on Putin in this regard and do business with Azerbaijan. Today, the Muslim-majority and Turkic-speaking Caucasian state is the main supplier to the Turks, while Russian imports account for only a third of the gas coming to Turkey.<sup>12</sup> This move also demonstrates that Erdoğan is able to take surprising economic steps at the expense of its potential partner if geopolitical objectives conflict with economic interests. The escalating situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent Azerbaijani–Armenian war forced Turkey to take a clear position. Erdoğan simply could not let down the closest relatives of the Turkish people, the Azeris, who were not only supported during the fighting but also offered economic benefits to them. In this case, at the expense of Russia.

Despite the relatively low volume of Turkish–Russian foreign trade, it can be said that Turkey is heavily dependent on Russia economically. A good example of this was the impact on the Turkish economy of the Russian sanctions imposed after the shooting of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015. Among other things, Russian travel agencies were banned from organising trips to Turkey, and Turkish companies with a similar profile were excluded from the Russian market for 2016. All this was an invaluable blow to Turkish Mediterranean resorts, where by 2015 the majority of foreign guests had arrived from Russia. The suspension of charter flights has also had a significant impact on the transport sector.<sup>13</sup>

## Geopolitical conflicts between Turkey and Russia

Russia and Turkey do not have common land borders, the only point where the two countries come into contact with each other under international law is the Black Sea, under which gas pipelines are the main link. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and especially after Putin came to power, the Black Sea region has been appreciated by the Russians, it became a natural arena for Russian expansion where Russian and Turkish interests do not necessarily coincide. This process began with Russia interfering in the

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<sup>11</sup> Pavel Baev, ‘Russia and Turkey. Strategic Partners and Rivals’, *Russie.Nei.Reports*, no 35, Ifri, (2021), 8.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 9.

<sup>13</sup> Moira Goff-Taylor, ‘Why Turkey Needs Russia’, *Wilson Center Viewpoints*, no 113 (2017), 1.

internal affairs of Moldova, which had just become independent, back in the 1990s. At that time, there were even common interests, as this intervention contributed, among other things, to the territorial autonomy of the Turkish-speaking Gagauz people. However, the fighting in Georgia in 2008 and eastern Ukraine in 2015, as well as the annexation of the Crimea, came close enough to Turkey for Erdoğan to start worrying, too. Russia has essentially reached the maximum extent of its southern expansion that the Turkish side can still tolerate, or is forced to tolerate, in the hope of successfully cooperating with the Russians in other zones and areas of interest.<sup>14</sup>

Russia’s growing influence in the Black Sea region has also been helped by the fact that, although economically and politically the country lags behind the West, its military strength remains significant. The Turkish side was particularly concerned that the Russians began to reconstruct and modernise the old Soviet military bases immediately after the annexation of the Crimea, which shortly led to the militarisation of the area, to which the Turks had no immediate response. However, Turkey did not even want to get involved in an open conflict with the Russians at that time, in 2014. It did so despite NATO’s encouragement to the Turks and its deployment of weapons in Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>15</sup>

While Russia is pursuing a well-perceived aggressive southern policy under Putin, Erdoğan has not given up on doing the same towards the north. This duality is best seen in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As early as 2016, the Azeris carried out a test attack against this territory that belongs to Azerbaijan under international law but is still partially under Armenian occupation. This offensive was enough for the East Caucasus state to assess what reactions Ankara, Moscow, and the international public could give, and what military and logistical background was needed to conduct a successful campaign. When the Azerbaijani army actually launched the attack in 2020, global opinion leaders were surprised to see that while Russia is essentially incapable of acting, Turkey hardly disguised its full-scale assistance to the Azeris.<sup>16</sup>

## The November 2015 downing of a Russian bomber in Syria

When this article connects the identities of the two leaders, Putin and Erdoğan, in examining Turkish–Russian relations, it is not only because a relationship between countries is easier to imagine if it is personified, but also because the characters themselves have sometimes personal ties and conflicts. This was most noticeable during the November 2015 crisis; when the Turkish air defence shot down a Su-24M fighter aircraft over Syrian territory, Putin felt Erdoğan flooded him. The Russian president has openly stated that his Turkish colleague stabbed him in the back. Putin infused Erdoğan’s personal involvement, and the Russian propaganda machine embarked on a global action to end not only Turkey but also the Erdoğan family. The not-necessarily-true assumption that ISIS Islamist terrorists are

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<sup>14</sup> Baev, ‘Russia and Turkey’, 18.

<sup>15</sup> Pavel Baev and Kemal Kirişçi, ‘An ambiguous partnership: The serpentine trajectory of Turkish–Russian relations in the era of Erdoğan and Putin’, *Turkey Project Policy Paper*, no 17 (2017), 8.

<sup>16</sup> Baev, ‘Russia and Turkey’, 22.

funded by Erdoğan himself and his relatives is still alive in some parts of global public opinion. The shooting of the bomber in November 2015 resulted in a multi-level crisis that pitted not only Russian and Turkish interests against each other, but also Erdoğan with Putin.<sup>17</sup> The Russian media deliberately used some information already circulating in the global press before 2015 to amplify the uncertainty that the U.S. Congress itself commemorated in April 2015 in a report. Russian propagandists assumed that Turkey was not transparent enough, did not see what it was doing to stop the passage of Muslim radicals on its territory. Nor was it possible to know exactly how the Turkish Government was trying to curb the financial transactions through which Turkish financial institutions had enriched terrorists. It has also been suggested that oil enters the world market from ISIS-dominated areas via Turkey. There may have been half-truths in these allegations and accusations, but an extensive network of false news operated by the Russian state has successfully magnified these uncontrolled crumbs of information.<sup>18</sup>

A direct consequence of Putin’s sentiment against Erdoğan and the Turkish state was that in 2016, anti-Turkish sentiment among Russian public was palpable. According to a poll conducted in mid-2016, 29% of those surveyed said Turkey was one of 5 countries destabilising world peace.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, at the time of the above-mentioned research, easing had already begun between Turkey and Russia, Erdoğan and Putin. This was triggered by two events. On the one hand, the fact that in April 2016, the Russians decided to withdraw a significant part of their troops from Syria, which increased confidence in their direction on the part of the Turkish side. Turkey subsequently embarked on a counter-terrorism operation in northern Syria, not only displacing Islamists from the border area, but also proving that they are fighting ISIS and not supporting its rise. This point is also relevant to Erdoğan and Putin’s personal relationship, as Putin sensed that Erdoğan had tacitly apologised for shooting the fighter jet. Perhaps Putin would have been better off if Erdoğan had said that more openly, there could have been Turkish domestic political reasons for the lack of apology. After the coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016, it was suggested that the organisers of the coup might have been behind the shooting of the plane, although no precise evidence was found.<sup>20</sup> Later, more precisely on 27 July 2016, Erdoğan stated in a letter to Putin that they were sorry for the plane shooting, but commentators agree that this is not a formal apology from the Turkish state to the Russian leadership, rather, it is Erdoğan’s personal condolence to the family of a Russian pilot who lost his life in the incident.<sup>21</sup> An important circumstance is that the Russian pilot did not die during the landing, only after he reached the ground and got involved in an armed battle with the Syrian insurgents. The grimace of fate is that the Russian soldier was eventually killed by a bullet from Alparslan Celik, a Turkish citizen fighting on the side of the Syrian rebels.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Katherine Costello, *Russia’s Use of Media and Information Operations in Turkey. Implications for the United States*, 2018, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Baev and Kirişci, ‘An ambiguous partnership’, 9.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 10

<sup>21</sup> Emre Ersen, ‘Suriye sorunu golgesinde Türkiye–Rusya ilişkilerinde normalleşme süreci’, *Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no 2 (2016), 160.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 90.

In other words, it cannot be excluded that Turkey had a double responsibility for this case, which is why it is not surprising that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, albeit rather curtly and strangely, ultimately expressed his condolences.

While it is not really possible to know whether there is a connection between the shooting of the Russian plane and the coup attempt half a year later, it seems clear that Putin saw an opportunity to link the two events. The Russian president was already able to forgive Erdoğan when he began his campaign against ISIS in the vicinity of the Euphrates, but after 15 July, he was definitely seen as a partner again by his Russian counterpart. Putin believed that if they forget the November 2015 incident and anti-Turkish sanctions and accept the harsh interpretation of the coup attempt by Ankara, he could play Turkey against the United States, where Fetullah Gulen, who Erdoğan sees as the inventor of the coup, is hiding. Putin realised with a good psychological sense that with this move, Turkey would be both his friend and a critic of the West and the U.S. Incidentally, Putin was driven not only by geopolitical and strategic considerations, but also by the fact that the coup attempt created a good position to negotiate significant arms sales with Erdoğan. In 2016, in St. Petersburg, the two heads of state agreed that the Turks would buy from the Russians their air defence missile system called the S-400.<sup>23</sup>

The shooting of the Russian fighter jet not only provoked harsh responses from the Russian side, including sanctions against Turkish government figures and businessmen, but the Turkish public was also sharply divided by the case. It was not necessarily the people who formed an opinion according to who was pro-government and who was opposed, but on the one side were those, led by Erdoğan, who saw the situation as legitimate self-defence. Representatives of the other side, on the other hand, believed that the government was engaging in unnecessary conflicts over Syria and that Turkey should in no way start a fight with the Russians.<sup>24</sup>

## Dichotomy of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts

It can be very well observed that in the various armed conflicts in which Turkey and Russia are both involved, more intense and peaceful periods follow one another. This also characterises the situation in Syria since the shooting of the Russian fighter jet. It is true that Putin forgave Erdoğan and took advantage of Erdoğan’s distressed situation after the coup attempt, but all this does not mean that the Russian–Turkish relationship has become problem-free since then. One thing can be said: if the relationship between the two nations breaks down, the two leaders will restore it. A good example of this is what happened on 28 February 2020 in Idlib. A total of 36 Turkish soldiers were killed in an attack in which Russian-backed Syrian military units raided Turkish government troops. Huge outrage followed the incident in Turkey, where those who sharply condemn Turkey’s involvement in Syria also became louder. There was a noticeable anti-Russian sentiment throughout

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<sup>23</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Erdoğan Will Play Biden, But Stick to Putin*, 09 December 2020, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Didem Buhari-Gulmez, *The clash between Putin and Erdoğan represents a turning point in Russian–Turkish relations*, 2015, 2.

Turkey. At the same time, thanks to their personal relationship, Erdoğan and Putin were able to settle the situation smoothly and restore Turkish–Russian relations. This is what can be called the “ceasefire” politicisation of the two heads of state. They are the ones who cool the mood in both countries after an incident.<sup>25</sup>

Putin and Erdoğan’s policy of de-escalation becomes a reality through ad hoc agreements. This was also the case in the aforementioned Idlib crisis, where Erdoğan would have preferred to support local Islamists in order to prevent another wave of refugees from leaving the area, while Putin originally wanted Assad’s troops to take control of the city. Prior to this, the Sochi Convention of 2019, in which the two countries decided the fate of a part of Northern Syria bypassing the Kurdish insurgents, fits into this logic. This agreement also made it possible for the Russians and Turks to patrol the region together. This, like other conventions by Putin and Erdoğan, contributes greatly to confidence-building between the two nations.<sup>26</sup>

Two geopolitical and geostrategic ideas were and remain an obstacle to the calming of the international and personal conflict caused by the differing views on the Syrian civil war. In other words, there are two irreconcilable differences between Russia and Turkey, Putin and Erdoğan. One is that while Putin is doing everything he can to keep Bashar Al-Assad in power in Syria, Erdoğan rejects any solution that would give Assad a role in leading the Middle Eastern Arab state. This is all the more interesting and strange since Assad and Erdoğan had a very good relationship before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. This was so true that the citizens of the two countries were able to travel visa-free and also mutually eased customs duties were practiced. The other difference of opinion stems from giving the Kurds partial and regional power, which Erdoğan cannot accept because the Kurdish separatist PKK has been waging war against the Turkish state and Turkish civilians in the southeast part of Turkey for more than four decades.<sup>27</sup>

The dynamics of the dichotomy of conflicts and reconciliations between the two parties, Turkey and Russia, Erdoğan and Putin, are sometimes influenced by external factors as well. Such was the 2017 Astana Summit, where Iran emerged as a regional power factor. Turkey and Russia were forced to include the Shiite country in the agreement, which brought a visible turn in the direction of Turkish foreign policy. As long as they stubbornly refused to see Assad as a partner, the Turkish position eased, which contributed to the normalisation of Russian–Turkish relations on the one hand, and continued to hold the hard-handed Syrian president in power on the other.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, it is also worth seeing that the so-called Astana process could not end the Syrian civil war either. This is best measured by the fate of the town of Idlib, which is close to Turkey. While the Turks, in support of the de-escalation, called for the status quo to be maintained in the city, citing the Astana Agreement, the Russians branded the gunmen who controlled Idlib as

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<sup>25</sup> Galip Dalay, ‘Turkish–Russian Relations in Light of Recent Conflicts. Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh’, *SWP Research Paper*, no 5 (2021), 10.

<sup>26</sup> Remi Daniel, ‘Turkish–Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East’, *Turkeyscope – Insights in Turkish Affairs* 5, no 3 (2021), 3.

<sup>27</sup> William Hale, ‘Turkey, the U.S., Russia, and the Syrian Civil War’, *Insight Turkey* 21, no 4 (2019), 31.

<sup>28</sup> Hasan Selim Ozertem, ‘Turkey and Russia: A Fragile Friendship’, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15, no 4 (2017), 129.

terrorists and the Russian foreign minister Lavrov told his Turkish colleague in 2018 that this hub of resistance must be eliminated. This is the reason behind the already mentioned 2020 Idlib incident, during which local militants, also supported by the Russians, killed 36 Turkish government soldiers.<sup>29</sup>

## Personal differences between Putin and Erdoğan

The crisis of November 2015, caused by the Turkish air defence shooting down a Russian fighter jet over Syria, did not come out of nowhere, only amplified the theoretical and systemic differences between Putin and Erdoğan. Although there are serious similarities between Putin and Erdoğan’s past and career, and they try to operate their authoritarian systems in roughly the same ways, there are significant differences on several points, which give rise to mutual misunderstandings between the two parties.

The first such difference is that Putin and Erdoğan approach the world of multiparty democracy differently. Putin is pushing the opposition into the background in no doubt, not even allowing them a slight success. In contrast, in 2019, Erdoğan did not prevent the opposition from taking control of the largest Turkish city, Istanbul. All that was left of Erdoğan was to invalidate the result of the original election. At the same time, Turkish ruling party candidate Binali Yildirim suffered an even greater and even more humiliating defeat in the repeated vote. Putin expressed his confusion at the sight of his Turkish colleague’s “excessive liberalism” by letting his opposition win in such a crucial city.<sup>30</sup>

The second difference in principle between Putin and Erdoğan can be seen in the perception of Islam and political Islam. While Putin acknowledges that Islam is intertwined with Russian history and, in addition to Orthodox Christianity, it is one of Russia’s identity-forming religions, he is doing everything he can to repress radicals. In contrast, Putin sees Erdoğan as flirting with radical Islam, and the framework of the Turkish secular state is also strained by the Muslim activism that he believes characterises Erdoğan. While Erdoğan constantly and sharply criticises French President Macron for his campaign against Muslim extremists, Putin usually voices his agreement with his French counterpart.<sup>31</sup> The differing views on Islam and political Islam do not prevent Putin and Erdoğan from sometimes using Islam to build bridges between their countries. This was also the case in 2015, when the Turkish president visited Moscow, where he attended the opening of one of Europe’s largest mosques. This visit also provided an opportunity for the two leaders to discuss geopolitical issues and bring their positions on Syria closer.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Inan Ruma and Mithat Celikpala, ‘Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater’, *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no 62 (2019), 82.

<sup>30</sup> Baev, ‘Russia and Turkey’, 13.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ersen, ‘Suriye sorunu’, 155.

## Conclusion

Putin and Erdoğan met on several war scenes in different roles. Thus, they intervened in Syria or Libya, sometimes against each other or in support of each other, and as proxy actors in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time, it is clear that the Putin–Erdoğan relationship system is asymmetric, always Putin is the initiator and always Erdoğan is the one who reacts to it. Nonetheless, this situation benefits Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as Erdoğan sees Putin as a kind of defender. After the coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish leader needed some sort of loyalty, and Putin plays exactly that role on the stage of world politics. Erdoğan is not the first to defend, as he has done the same with Assad and Maduro.<sup>33</sup>

Of course, it would be wrong to believe that Putin and Erdoğan’s relationship works on a superiority basis. Rather, it is about mutual respect and recognition behind the fact that they meet and talk a lot and can resolve many conflicts together. In 2018 alone, the two presidents held 13 face-to-face meetings and 8 longer telephone conversations, after which Putin once put it in 2019 that they could only resolve a certain issue because Erdoğan had outstanding work ethic and worked very hard on the matter.<sup>34</sup> In other words, Putin not only defends Erdoğan, but also acknowledges that in many cases he sees him as a truly equal partner.

Putin and Erdoğan’s “beautiful” friendship, despite all criticism, acts as a relative stabilising factor in areas where the two countries are trying to act as regional powers. Although they are unable to reach the level of influence that the West has, together they have become an unavoidable duo. The question, of course, is when will this fragile relationship end, for example, when will the two politicians be played off against each other by the West they curse on a regular basis.

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<sup>33</sup> Cagaptay, *Erdoğan Will Play Biden*, 4.

<sup>34</sup> Ulgul, ‘Erdoğan’s Personal Diplomacy’, 177.

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# Understanding Contemporary Populism Through the Latin American Experience

Elena COSSU<sup>1</sup> 

*This paper discusses how the Latin American experience can help us understand contemporary populism and its management. This topic starts from the assumption that structural change and social contexts help us explain the evolution of populism in the same way they helped explain the evolution of violence and management. To do so, we look at the state of the literature on populism, its relation to the Latin American experience, the evolution of the approach to populism, and the conclusions we can draw from these different perspectives. We conclude that contemporary populism is also limited in the same way the contextual approach to Latin American populism was limited. This also helps us understand why we still do not have a shared definition of populism. Overall, we lack the balance between generalisable and local definitions to help leaders manage the contemporary violence of populism.*

**Keywords:** populism, Latin America, management, institutions

## Introduction

One of the main lines of research related to violence and management is concerned with the difference between old and new patterns of violence.<sup>2</sup> However, not much has been said about an equally important topic, which is the relation between the old and new patterns of populism. The lack of research on this topic is one of the two main reasons why it is worth exploring it. The second one is because violence, management and populism are strictly connected in Latin America. Therefore, talking about the evolution of one of these three elements can help us shed some light on their relation today.

The reason for the lack of scientific interest in this context is that populism today is mainly defined as a “thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”, as expressed by Cas Mudde.<sup>3</sup> This became the mainstream definition

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<sup>2</sup> Carlos Vilalta, ‘Violence in Latin America: An Overview of Research and Issues’, *Annual Review of Sociology* 46 (2020), 693–706.

<sup>3</sup> Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, *Government and Opposition* 39, no 4 (2004), 543.

because of its capacity to encompass very different manifestations of populism across the world. This in turn led researchers to focus more on what makes voters attracted to populist parties rather than on populist leaders in power.<sup>4</sup>

The fact that the literature focuses more on what causes populism rather than its consequences also created a paradoxical problem. Because of the lack of a framework to study a variety of manifestations across the planet, we have less research about whether the policies implemented by populist leaders can have negative effects on the policymaking of the countries where they are in power. Paradoxically, this is a global problem as well.<sup>5</sup> Bolsonaro, the leader of Brazil since 2019, is a notable example.<sup>6</sup> Likewise in Hungary and Poland, which are defined as “on the brink of sliding back into authoritarian rule” by Egorov et al. in *The Political Economics of Non-Democracy*,<sup>7</sup> it is of fundamental importance to discuss the consequences of populism and the characteristics of populist leaders in power.

Of course, some attempts have been made to try to close this gap.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, this paper specifically aims at overviewing the research on Latin American populism in relation to the recent literature. To do so, we organise the paper in four major sections. First, we overview the contemporary concept of populism. We summarise the evolution of the literature regarding populism and all the related conceptual approaches, taking mainly into consideration that the Latin American concept has always been at the forefront of this phenomenon. Second, we review the concept of populism considering the Latin American experience. We dig more into the economic understanding of populism, the one focused on the consequences of populism, and the Latin American experience. Third, we look at the relation and evolution between different theories for analysing social phenomena and populism. In other words, we conceptualise the external and internal influences that shaped this understanding, and how to discern the context from the substance. Last, we look at how these different perspectives help us analyse populism today and the way we can understand it in relation to violence and public management. We show how this insight regarding populism can help us understand the policymaking of contemporary populist countries. We elaborate on the main theories that originated from the Latin American experience, as a background for the ones that still apply to populism today. Last, we conclude by summarising what still applies to contemporary experiences of populism around the world.

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<sup>4</sup> Luigi Guiso et al., *Populism: Demand and Supply* (Rochester, New York: Social Science Research Network, 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Anibal Quijano, ‘Paradoxes of modernity in Latin America’, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 3, no 2 (1989), 147–177.

<sup>6</sup> Jordan Kyle and Limor Gultchin, *Populists in Power Around the World* (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2018).

<sup>7</sup> Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin, ‘The Political Economics of Non-Democracy’, *NBER Working Paper*, no 27949, October 2020, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Paul Taggart, ‘Dealing with Populists in Government: A Framework for Analysis’, *Democratization* 23, no 2 (2016), 201–220.

## A critical overview of the concept of populism

If right now we wanted to describe a person, what would be his or her most relevant dimension? Would it be the cultural, economic, ideological or political one? Or maybe they would all be relevant according to the context? This example summarises the debates over populism as they are presented in the current literature. Even if the concept consists of different aspects, several authors have been trying to argue that only one of these truly represents populism. In contrast, this work believes that populism is a complex phenomenon that can be understood differently according to the purpose. Within this mindset, it will be argued that it is still relevant to talk about political and economic populism. Similarly, it is important to summarise what the political, discursive, and economic dimensions of populism bring to the current understanding of the concept. So that we can better understand why today's scholars "avoid to specify their own understanding of populism".<sup>9</sup> First, the paper will briefly outline the evolution of the concept. It is important to know the main milestones of the history of populism because there is still no final agreement over the concept itself. Also, this summary gives this work the ground for arguing the best definition to use in the following chapters. To keep it short, the concept of populism can be summarised in six main historical phases.

*Nineteenth Century.* The term populism was first used in the United States at the beginning of this century. The interesting thing is that the concept was born at the same time of the concept of 'sovereign people'. From this century on we will have a new source perceived as the political authority: "A unified entity able to act and to retrieve power from government officials: the sovereign people."<sup>10</sup> 'The people' are not only supposed to keep the source of power in check, but they also assume that they could get back that power in case the source in question would do something that goes 'against them'. The legal implications of such claim are equally fascinating and outside the scope of this work. What matters is that such assumption becomes so implicitly valid that it quickly spreads across the world, from Russia to France. These two countries are also the first two notable examples of populist movements after the United States. Second interesting thing: in all three countries the sources of power were widening the already existing and topical rural–urban divide. As history shows, the transition towards an urban society was inevitable at all three places.

*Early Twentieth Century.* Populism flourishes in Latin America in a first wave (1920–1925), and then in a 'classic' wave (1940–1950). There is a "wide consensus that with the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Latin America underwent a period of significant economic decline that sparked a legitimacy crisis and demands for political incorporation",<sup>11</sup> which led to iconic leaders such as Perón, Vargas and de la Torre. Some<sup>12</sup> even argue that populism happened because of the sudden modernisation process experienced by these countries.

<sup>9</sup> Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 30.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 18.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Gino Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1978).

*During the 1960s.* The phenomenon is so widespread in Latin America that two very interesting things happen. First, during this time we have a boom of famous political economy theories (contractionary evaluation theory, dependency theory, and import-substitution strategy among others). Second, the academia tried for the first time to reflect on the concept of populism per se.<sup>13</sup> After all, populism does seem to exist, and political economy can help explain its dynamics.

*1970s.* Ideologies start to die in mainstream western politics, and economic determinism dies with them. Not by chance Ernesto Laclau publishes his book *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism and Populism* in 1977. The book harshly criticises Marxism and economic determinism while paving a way for understanding the world in a confrontational and discursive manner.

*1990s.* The literature on populism explodes and when everything seemed sorted out, populism changes face. As always, Latin America is first in line for this new turn. Now leaders like Menem and Fujimori advocate for neoliberal policies, and the literature starts to debate whether populism is threatening democracy.

*Since the 2000s.* Populism reappears again in its left forms both in Latin America and Europe. Some of the discussed possible causes for this change are the silent revolution (or the advance of post-material values), identity politics and the loss of post-war settlements. Some say there is a new political cleavage based on culture at the horizon, while others argue with remarkable success that populism is simply a new 'layer' that can be both left and right.<sup>14</sup> The literature on populism is now mainstream and everything and nothing is populist at the same time.

This summary brings us to the present day and the most used definitions on populism. Today, there are four main ways of conceptualising populism.<sup>15</sup> The most mentioned definition is known as populism as an ideology, and it states that populism is a "thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people".<sup>16</sup> Ideology is here defined as a bundle of loosely interrelated ideas or as an interpretive framework that emerges because of the practice of putting ideas to work in language as concepts.<sup>17</sup> This definition is famous because it accepts its historical and ideological variations: populism can change according to the socio-political context where it appears, the cultural resources in each population and the culture of common sense. In practical terms, if populism is a bundle of ideas, it then means that scholars need to find and analyse the main ideas expressed by their leaders. However, as we discuss later, this definition

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<sup>13</sup> Ghița Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (eds.), *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

<sup>14</sup> Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist'; Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, *Derechas y ultraderechas en el mundo* (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 2004), 248.

<sup>15</sup> Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, 'Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda', *Weatherhead Working Paper Series*, no 13-0004, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', 543.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Freedon, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3.

also suffers of the main problems of conceptual stretching, and it does not do justice to the understanding of specific spatial and temporal characteristics.

The second definition, populism as a discursive style, sees populism as a rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy.<sup>18</sup> In this case and the previous one, populism is a costume that can be worn whenever appropriate in a classical right–left ideological divide. Third, populism is defined as a form of political strategy, mainly focused on Latin America. This definition has three main components: policy choices, political organisation and forms of mobilisation. This includes forms of economic policies: “Populist policies thus emerge as a way for politicians to signal that they will choose future policies in line with the interests of the median voter.”<sup>19</sup> This definition mainly accounts for the relationship between the actors and the constituents, or between the leader and the follower. Its main critique is that it does not account for historical variation. This is because its further elaborations are clearly but not explicitly focused on Latin America (e.g. consolidation of strong labour unions, partisan structures, etc.). Last, in the socio-cultural approach, populism is defined as the flaunting of the low.<sup>20</sup> Populism is a two-way relationship between the leader and the supporters, where the former creates content about identities rather than world views. The definition is fascinating in the way it can put populism in two antagonist perspectives for what concerns Europe and the Americas: while in the former it is considered a completely undesired phenomenon; it is perceived as a good one in the latter. This view was later taken over by Rodrik as well, when saying that an unconventional measure like Roosevelt’s New Deal might be considered both populist and desirable.<sup>21</sup>

As we can see, the four definitions influenced each other and have some points in common. All these things considered, we can now understand why Mudde’s definition is the most popular, as it made it possible to coherently bridge the gap between the different historical contexts and their variations. However, understanding populism is about “how culture and context shape politics and how populism in turn affects political change”.<sup>22</sup> Conversely, the ideological and discursive definitions are way too silent on the second part, while populism as a political strategy is too much focused on the first one. However, these areas of study sometimes tend to forget that the main point about the study of populism is the understanding of reality in all its aspects. For this reason, in the next section this work will further explore populism in Latin America, as it is the main example in the literature where these links between aspects have been explored. In fact, *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* deliberately excluded the economic definition of populism and the ones focused on Latin America. The handbook states that the economic understanding of populism “does not provide clear criteria for conceptualizing populism as such” and that “this type

<sup>18</sup> Carlos de la Torre, ‘Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador’, *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no 3 (1997), 12–24.

<sup>19</sup> Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin, ‘A Political Theory of Populism’, *NBER Working Paper*, no 17306, August 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Pierre Ostiguy, ‘The High–Low Divide: Rethinking Populism and Anti-Populism’, November 2009.

<sup>21</sup> Dani Rodrik, ‘Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?’, *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 108 (2018), 196–199.

<sup>22</sup> Gidron and Bonikowski, ‘Varieties of Populism’, 3.

of definition limits populism to leftist or inclusionary forms”.<sup>23</sup> In the following sections we argue that the first is not true when we understand the context of Latin America, and that the second could also change when we consider these elements.

## Latin America and populism

The study of Latin America is not at the centre stage of the current academic debates. However, whenever a researcher pays his or her attention to it for a moment, he or she discovers that it is not only an extremely fascinating area but also the laboratory for many of today’s political economy theories and phenomena. This section will study the reasons behind exploring Latin America’s theories connected to populism.

To elaborate on the first point, it is better to repeat something again and again: this work believes that the connections between ideology, discourse and political strategy should be highlighted, especially to understand an elusive concept like populism.<sup>24</sup> In this context, understanding what happened in Latin America is almost obligatory because most of the interdisciplinary definitions of populism are based on this continent. These definitions are indeed mainly focused on inclusionary forms of populism (e.g. consolidation of strong labour unions, partisan structures, etc.) but this, as this and the last section will argue, does not limit the current understanding of populism. The articles mentioned in this section describe how social characteristics in Latin America contribute to the pressure for certain macroeconomic policies. They also usually demonstrate how some policies are doomed to have the opposite intended effect based on standard economics, which is also the reason why these works are often neglected in the literature. However, the main reasons why it is important to look at Latin America is mainly methodological. The works based on this topic are exceptional in identifying the chain of causation, connect the main elements of the context (socio-cultural and historical), and then make it a valid theory. Also, Latin America is the only place where multiple populists came to power and completed their political trajectory, therefore providing us a way to understand the consequences of populism, given the necessary context adaptations.

But how did these leaders come to power? Latin America (here defined as the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries of the American continent, except for the Caribbean ones) is in the common conception a peripheral part of the world with an explicable long tradition of economic crisis and irrational political decisions. In reality, it is “a laboratory of competing strategies for promoting growth and development”.<sup>25</sup> The instability of such laboratory is given by its history and its contingent circumstances. If we briefly elaborate on those, it becomes clear what is the lowest common denominator between Latin America’s and contemporary populism. To sum it up, Latin America’s socio-economic and populist misadventures started in the 1920s. During this time, the continent underwent a massive

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<sup>23</sup> Rovira Kaltwasser et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 38.

<sup>24</sup> Dani Filc, *The Political Right in Israel. Different Faces of Jewish Populism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).

<sup>25</sup> Peter Kingstone, *The Political Economy of Latin America. Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development after the Commodity Boom* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 16.

number of abrupt changes, including the end of colonialism, massive industrialisation, and dealing with the changes in prices of commodities in the world market. These changes provoked a nationalist and populist backlash, also known as ‘the first wave of populism’. With the Great Depression we arrive to the ‘classical wave’ in the 1930s. The policies implemented by these leaders (e.g. Perón, Allende, Sarney and Alan García) are so similar, repetitively bad, and ‘fake inclusionary’ that at the end of the century they led to two interesting reactions. On the one hand, we started to see the first examples of ‘neoliberal’ populism (e.g. Fujimori). On the other hand, the rising debt and the desperate situation brought the infamous Washington Consensus. The logic behind it was very simple: if a state-led economic model is so bad, then a very theoretical and “economists approved” one should solve all the problems. It did not happen. Saying that the results of the Washington Consensus are debated is an extreme oversimplification. Despite the good intentions, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank programs known as “Washington Consensus” did not solve the situation. On the contrary, the Washington consensus is often quoted as one of the main causes of the resurgence of populism in the continent at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>26</sup> Between the 1990s and the early 2000s, in fact, eleven countries in Latin America turned again to the left. This change of course is also known as the ‘Pink Tide’ (pink because it was portrayed as a lighter version of socialism, which is often associated with the colour red). Five among these nations have been led by populist leaders and showed authoritarian tendencies (namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela). In the mid-2010s the authoritarian and populist element reappeared in a new form, the blue tide, which revived the same elements under a conservative layer in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru.

## Discerning the context from the substance

All of this helps us understand how authoritarian and populist tendencies in the contemporary world are not that unique. As mentioned by Rodrik,<sup>27</sup> we should rather look at the internal and external constraints that a country might experience to understand its policy outcomes. In the case of Latin America, looking at the institutions could be a potential way to understand why economic populism usually equals to disaster. When we look at the history of the continent, in fact, we usually have a sense that its uncertainty for the future leads to the “take it all and leave” attitude. In the Latin America example, and to expand the usual definition, economic populism is usually a way to captivate the masses and to promise modifications to cushion the shocks of growth.<sup>28</sup> It is a promise to address popular grievances and to build social solidarity in the continent extremely heterogeneous in terms of income and lifestyle. If you must address an urban and poly class society, you will “flatten” your message by using popular culture and charisma. They were not

<sup>26</sup> Sebastian Edwards, *Left Behind. Latin America and the False Promise of Populism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> Rodrik, ‘Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?’

<sup>28</sup> Paul W. Drake, ‘Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?’, in *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Michael L. Conniff (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982).

only seeking national integration through state activism and redistributive measures (as mentioned for the ‘classic wave’ and the ‘Pink Tide’), but also measures concerned with social welfare and distribution rather than simply economic growth. The problem was not the aim of the policies but the way they were implemented. Such irresponsibility has only two possible origins. First, that the different leaders in question did not have any person with an average understanding of economics around them or did not want to believe them and, therefore, they were just unaware of the unsustainability of their choices. The second option is that they were conscious of the consequences of what they were doing, but they just did it anyway. Considering the average length of the average political mandate and the widespread ‘take it all’ attitude, the second option is much more likely.

The lesson learned is that theories that consider the specificity of the context and the generalisable elements of populism are useful for research purposes. Here are the main theories that are useful to keep in mind also for the contemporary world.

*Structuralism.* Even if it is often omitted, populism was first defined in structuralist terms in mainstream academia.<sup>29</sup> Even if the definition has been completely discarded because of its low generalisation potential and its very specific setting, it is interesting to see where it comes from. Structuralism is a sociological theory that implies that social phenomena can be understood mainly by their context and structure. Like all the following theories, structuralism has been discarded in the study of populism because it makes it hard to understand populism besides the specific Latin American instances.

*Dependency Theory.* As we can guess by the title of the book *Dependency and Development in Latin America*,<sup>30</sup> there is often an implied link between economic dependency theory and the rise of populism. It was born specifically to understand the governments of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil,<sup>31</sup> and it defines populism as “a specific regime type controlled by strong leaders who build heterogeneous class alliances favouring excluding sectors through the implementation of a state-led economic model”.<sup>32</sup> The economic version of the dependency theory, or Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis,<sup>33</sup> states that manufactured-goods economies are better off in the long-term than commodity-based economies, and that you should prefer policies that consolidate the domestic market and industrialise. It therefore implies that it is impossible for developing economies highly dependent on commodities (such as the ones in Latin America) to “catch up” with developed countries. Even if the theory has some statistical underpinning,<sup>34</sup> it has a neo-Marxist and post-colonialist foundation and it can be linked to the import substitution model as its practical application, as described in the next section.

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<sup>29</sup> Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America’, *NBER Working Paper*, no 2897, March 1989, 137–169.

<sup>30</sup> Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. by Marjory Mattingly Urquidí (University of California Press, 1979).

<sup>31</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective*, trans. by James McGuire in coll. with Rae Flory (University of California Press, 1988).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* 80.

<sup>33</sup> Rabah Arezki, Kaddour Hadri, Prakash Loungani and Yao Rao, ‘Testing the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis since 1650: Evidence from Panel Techniques that Allow for Multiple Breaks’, *IMF Working Papers*, no 13/180, August 2013.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

This approach can also be linked to the fact that the convergence between CEE and the rest of Europe is slowing down,<sup>35</sup> while populism is on the rise. Even if this link has not been empirically tested, it is important to acknowledge that there are some similarities between the development dependence in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.

*Economic determinism.* This theory has the post-Marxist coating par excellence. It states that economic relationships are the basis upon which all other societal characteristics depend. Argentina's Juan Perón system, based on "economic growth and social justice" is the perfect example of how populism can be understood this way.<sup>36</sup> Even today, saying that the substrate you are born into influences your life is a common conception. As I will explain later, economic growth theories sometime apply some sort of economic determinism in stating that part of the 'unexplainable' factor behind a country's economic growth might be its location or its luck.

*Contractionary devaluation.* A devaluation is the downward adjustment of a currency. In a fixed exchange rate regime, it can as well be used as a political tool. The contractionary devaluation of the definition comes from the fact that in the cases it has been used in Latin America it often resulted in a slow export response, a credit crunch, and a contraction of the output. More generally, it refers to the frequent manipulation of the continent's currencies and foreign reserves (e.g. the Argentinian crisis). Even if their long-term effects are debated,<sup>37</sup> it is also important for Europe to note the use of monetary policy as a political tool in the populist framework.

*Import substitution strategy.* The strategy is also known as the Import Substitution Model or ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation). It provides the rationale for the change of a country's import and export structure to foster its industrialisation. It was of course developed in the context of structuralism, and it aims at looking at a country's specific characteristics to build internal industries rather and foster development. In theory, the model was a way to prevent the infant industry problem in a continent that just ended colonisation, had no high wages or labour specialisation, and was too dependent on the prices of commodities. In practice, it has been used as an excuse to implement unreasonable protectionism, subsidies, and to give populists a framework to temporarily fulfil the demands of their electorate. All the countries that undertook the ISI model grew exponentially, but also none of them remained democratic for the entire period. On a side note, it is important to notice the theoretical origins of the model. The ISI model was an economic model based on state-induced economic development, like the Soviet one and many others that took place around the world almost at the same time. However, the Latin American one is the only one that failed so astoundingly, mainly for the unsustainability of the implemented policies. The way it has been implemented is the reason why it ended that way. In this framework, the Dornbusch and Edwards definition is the modelling of a state-induced model based on the Latin America characteristics.

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<sup>35</sup> Cristina Batog et al., 'Demographic Headwinds in Central and Eastern Europe', *IMF Departmental Paper*, no 19/12, July 2019.

<sup>36</sup> Michael L. Conniff, 'Introduction', in *Populism in Latin America* (Tuscaloosa–London: The University of Alabama Press, 1999).

<sup>37</sup> Edwards, *Left Behind*.

*The Populist Policy Cycle.* When we look at the economic theories of populism born in Latin America, two authors were able to create an interesting generalisation inside this case specific approach. Both Sachs<sup>38</sup> and Dornbusch and Edwards<sup>39</sup> detach themselves from the other authors by describing a more generic populist cycle. The first step in this “detachment” is the one from Sachs.<sup>40</sup> The author’s model is quite simple. Let us hypothesise a model with only an export-based and a labour-based sector. Let us also assume fixed exchange rates and capital controls. With a monetary expansion, families now have more money, and the interest rates drop. There is now a higher demand for non-tradable goods and consequently higher demand for labour. The nominal wages increase. The prices of everything now increase and the exchange rate appreciates. Exports become more expensive and therefore decline. It looks like a happy ending (you now have higher wages and “punished” the natural resources oligarchs), but it is not the end of the story. The trade deficit increases, and it must be financed by a loss of foreign exchange reserves and/or a higher foreign debt. To prevent the devaluation of the currency (the model has fixed exchange rates) the country now runs out of reserves (people sell their currency and the country decides to buy the extra currency on the market) or runs out of borrowing capacity (foreign creditors are not willing to make new loans). The exchange rate collapses (you now have floating exchange rates) and the natural resources become cheaper. The country is back to the starting point and now the local currency is worth less (because you must go back to trade balance without being able to make new loans). Also, the wages are now lower than the starting point. If the government does not reverse your initial policies, the country will end up with floating exchange rates and an expansive fiscal policy, which will bring inflation as well. If the government gets stubborn and gets out of control, it will get a black market, too.

*Macroeconomic Populism.* In a similar way to the populist policy cycle, Dornbusch and Edwards define economic populism as “an approach to economics that emphasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints, and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-market policies”.<sup>41</sup> The authors focus mainly on the macroeconomic elements of populism as its main and recurrent elements (divided into the categories “initial conditions”, “no constraints” and “policy prescriptions”). They also generalise that the fundamental elements triggering these policies (the initial conditions) are a persistent dissatisfaction with the economy’s performance or moderate growth, stagnation or depression and uneven income redistribution. For what concern the policy prescriptions, a populist leader usually embarks on policies with popular support but that ultimately hurt the population by ignoring the existence of any constraint (no constraints and policy prescriptions). This system is summarised by the “Reactivation, Redistribution and Restructure” approach, which usually implies some of the following: higher real wages with no higher prices, focus on growth and redistribution, disregard of inflation, deficit finance, expansive fiscal and

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<sup>38</sup> Sachs, ‘Social Conflict and Populist Policies’.

<sup>39</sup> Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

<sup>40</sup> Sachs, ‘Social Conflict and Populist Policies’.

<sup>41</sup> Dornbusch and Edwards, *The Macroeconomics of Populism*, 6.

credit policies, and an overvalued currency. In general, the policies ignore the existence of any constraint, both domestic and foreign. The consequences are quite straightforward. According to the authors, we can always find three phases: an initial phase of euphoria (where the outcomes are positive and there are growth and redistribution), a bottleneck phase, and finally the economic and political collapse of the system (including high inflation, stagnation of growth and exports, capital flight and political polarisation). The authors focus only on Allende's Chile and García's Peru, instead of Perón, Allende, Sarney and García like Sachs.<sup>42</sup> Through their macroeconomic indicators, the authors clearly show a typical Latin American import substitution model policy cycle, mixed with some populist elements.

## Affinities between Latin American and contemporary populism

Once we dissected the theories and history of Latin American populism, what is left for the rest of the world? As Weyland<sup>43</sup> said, "the growing divergence of populist political strategies and the socioeconomic characteristics of classical populism called into question the prevailing cumulative definitions".<sup>44</sup> However, even if Latin America's history and the connected theories show us that structuralism is dead for this same reason, it might be useful to temporally resurrect it with the necessary precautions to understand contemporary populism. In general, structuralism is an example of how case-based research on populism still has a reason to exist, despite its historical limitations. In a historical moment where the trend in populist research is to look at the micro level (or at how people think, act and perceive the phenomenon), structuralism helps us understand that such decisions do not happen in a vacuum, but they are mediated by institutions and other constraints, which are worth generalising, as well.

Also, the Latin American experience teaches us the importance of the puzzle between social conflict, institutions and economic performance in other parts of the world. Such puzzle is not new: it has already been applied to the understanding of the European economic growth in the 1970s and it already inspired the whole literature on Latin America just summarised.<sup>45</sup> The continent's experience shows us that the topic of populism often gets politically charged because of its complicated and relevant nature. Reiterate and being aware of such point is what distinguish excellent political scientists and economists from the rest. Unfortunately, these ideas have often been neglected, probably because of the political science's monopoly in the discipline, even if this section's main contribution ironically proves that you cannot (and should not) treat populism only in its political dimension. In fact, the same way the literature on Latin American populism was inspired by the economic puzzle of Europe in the 1970s, it could now inspire a new puzzle for Europe today. Even if the reasons for the formulation of the chain of causation

<sup>42</sup> Sachs, 'Social Conflict and Populist Policies'.

<sup>43</sup> Kurt Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics', *Comparative Politics* 34, no 1 (2001), 1–22.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 3.

<sup>45</sup> Sachs, 'Social Conflict and Populist Policies'.

could be clearer, it is central to explore the puzzle between social conflict, institutions and economic performance in Europe. Overall, the Latin American experience helps us understand how the global focus on populism has shifted from the violence characterised by local problems, ideological fights and dictatorships to democratisation problems and the associated non-state actors.<sup>46</sup> Some example of these can be seen in the indicators in Table 1.

*Table 1: Estimates of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for Latin American countries, oldest and most recent year*

	Voice and accountability		Political stability and no violence		Government effectiveness		Regulatory quality		Rule of law		Control of corruption	
	1996	2020	1996	2020	1996	2020	1996	2020	1996	2020	1996	2020
Argentina	0.39	0.59	0.11	0.04	0.17	-0.22	0.52	-0.57	0.08	-0.47	-0.10	-0.12
Belize	0.82	0.53	0.56	0.51	0.39	-0.65	0.14	-0.54	0.08	-0.76	-0.03	-0.19
Bolivia	0.16	-0.07	-0.13	-0.47	-0.17	-0.56	0.00	-1.02	-0.26	-1.15	-0.82	-0.76
Brazil	0.24	0.26	-0.22	-0.42	-0.14	-0.45	0.30	-0.16	-0.22	-0.18	-0.02	-0.34
Colombia	-0.51	0.15	-1.64	-0.67	-0.46	0.04	-0.11	0.32	-0.75	-0.49	-0.51	-0.18
Costa Rica	1.08	1.14	0.75	0.76	0.47	0.36	0.55	0.45	0.62	0.57	0.70	0.78
Ecuador	0.01	0.02	-0.77	-0.36	-0.48	-0.44	-0.31	-0.89	-0.45	-0.55	-0.68	-0.54
Guatemala	-0.24	-0.39	-1.01	-0.43	-0.45	-0.69	-0.31	-0.17	-1.13	-1.05	-0.86	-1.10
French Guiana	0.52	1.29	0.04	0.33	0.90	1.32	1.03	1.19	0.96	1.20	0.87	0.93
Guyana	0.25	0.21	-0.27	-0.15	-0.38	-0.44	-0.17	-0.55	-0.20	-0.43	-0.14	-0.15
Honduras	-0.22	-0.60	-0.47	-0.54	-0.74	-0.60	-0.69	-0.50	-0.93	-0.96	-1.08	-0.86
Nicaragua	0.05	-1.10	-0.52	-0.65	-0.57	-0.71	-0.44	-0.66	-0.52	-1.22	-0.56	-1.25
Panama	0.13	0.57	0.12	0.23	0.22	0.07	0.65	0.32	-0.17	-0.21	-0.20	-0.51
Peru	-0.53	0.22	-1.06	-0.29	0.03	-0.24	0.49	0.53	-0.70	-0.34	-0.40	-0.49
Paraguay	-0.12	0.07	-0.46	0.02	-0.91	-0.47	-0.49	-0.20	-0.66	-0.42	-1.17	-0.87
El Salvador	-0.10	0.04	-0.21	-0.02	-0.69	-0.36	-0.19	-0.02	-0.87	-0.76	-0.87	-0.59
Suriname	-0.09	0.42	0.44	0.42	-0.69	-0.54	-0.54	-0.77	-0.08	-0.11	0.19	-0.43
Venezuela, RB	-0.09	-1.51	-0.58	-1.52	-0.54	-1.78	-0.31	-2.23	-0.75	-2.35	-0.86	-1.56

Source: Compiled by the author

Note: The range goes from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) for all indicators.

## Conclusion

The current understanding of populism could learn a great deal from the first context, from the times when it was first studied in late 20<sup>th</sup> century Latin America. More specifically, the current understanding of populism is flawed in two ways. The first way regards concept formation. In fact, contrary to the current understanding of populism, understanding something in the way it manifests itself can still be a valid way to understand it. All social

<sup>46</sup> Jenny Pearce, 'Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America', *Democratization* 17, no 2 (2010), 286–306.

sciences, together with other ones such as cosmology and theoretical physics, deduce the existence of a phenomenon from some manifestations of it a posteriori that goes beyond our control. The second way regards concept stretching. Excluding political economic definitions because based on the Latin American experience, which is erroneously believed to be only leftist, is simply wrong. The economic definition of populism simply does not include only leftist or inclusionary forms.<sup>47</sup>

This paper also stresses the often-dismissed importance of structural change and social contexts to explain national and subnational variations in violence in understanding populism.<sup>48</sup> In fact, the literature has taught us that this is the case, yet we can learn from the Latin American experience that things can be generalised only to a certain extent. Last, the discipline not only still lacks a shared definition, but also intellectual honesty to admit that the study of the field, especially in terms of helping public management and reducing any form of violence, is still at the beginning.

In general, the study of only some specific dimensions of populism shows us the limitations of some social sciences disciplines that can be hurtful for understanding contemporary important phenomenon such as populism. In other words,<sup>49</sup> “economists are an arrogant bunch, with very little to be arrogant about”. The real question then becomes the following: are the pictures portrayed by different European leaders matching the best possible economic performance? Most importantly: are we dealing with these perceived problems in a reasonable way? If we cannot answer this question for sure, then we cannot know if populist leaders are exploiting paranoia, or they are simply articulating an unmet need in society.<sup>50</sup> If we assume that the previous non-populist leaders of a current populist-led country in charge of these questions did not want or were not able to deal with these problems (it does not matter which one is true). Would the unorthodox positions of populist leaders be able to solve these problems? So far, the literature focused much more on what causes populism rather than its consequences. This work, on the other hand, believes that the Latin American study of the phenomenon teaches us to understand more critically which actions bring which results.

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<sup>48</sup> Timothy Patrick Moran, ‘More Money, More Crime: Prosperity and Rising Crime in Latin America’, *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 49, no 2 (2020), 139–140.

<sup>49</sup> Dani Rodrik, *One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 5.

<sup>50</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *For a Left Populism* (Verso, 2019).

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# Comparing the U.S.–Colombia Partnership to the U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship<sup>1</sup>

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*This article characterises the US–Colombia Partnership (USCP) by comparing it to the U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship (USUKSR). For this purpose, both dyads are graded within Lake’s typology of international hierarchies. Then Xu’s three minimum criteria for SRs – and a fourth criterion derived from Harnisch – are applied to the USCP, with references to the USUKSR. In the security dimension, the USCP could be graded as a weak (soft) protectorate under Plan Colombia, and it might be still today. The USUKSR is seen heading toward a weak protectorate due to Britain’s even closer post-Brexit alignment to the U.S. (by launching an Indo-Pacific tilt, clinching the AUKUS pact, and helping to broker a broader anti-China coalition, while remaining the staunchest NATO ally). In the economic dimension, the USUKSR until recently could be rated as market exchange, but now it has been approaching an economic zone (as Britain is courting America for more trade and investment, while shedding Huawei, shelving a bilateral FTA with China, and seeking CPTPP accession). The USCP classifies as an economic zone, since the U.S. is still Colombia’s largest export market and preferred investor, and Colombia has been very cautious with China (refraining from an FTA, and from joining the BRI). The USCP (by combining a weak protectorate with an economic zone) is rated as an informal empire, while the USUKSR may be close to it. The USCP is unlikely to become an SR, because U.S. substituted Colombian governance functions are focused on domestic security, and the U.S. public does not judge Colombia positively, and is far from regarding it as an ally. The paper ends with a note on the dominant partner.*

**Keywords:** *international hierarchy, special relationship, weak protectorate, economic zone, informal empire, substitution of partner’s governance functions*

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## Introduction

This article characterises the U.S.–Colombia Partnership (USCP) by comparing it to the U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship (USUKSR). First, Lake's<sup>3</sup> typology of international hierarchies is outlined, and both dyads are placed into its framework. Then Xu's<sup>4</sup> three basic criteria for SRs – and a fourth criterion derived from Harnisch<sup>5</sup> – are applied to the USCP, with references to the USUKSR. Conclusions include: differentiating between U.S. substituted British and Colombian governance functions; grading the two dyads with Lake's categories; explaining why the USCP is unlikely to become an SR; and commenting on the dominant partner's current shape.

## Lake's typology

Lake conceives the international system as a set of dyadic relationships ranging from pure anarchy<sup>6</sup> to pure hierarchy,<sup>7</sup> with various forms in between, and dissects America's rapports of diverse hierarchy throughout the world.<sup>8</sup> Since SRs are dyadic and hierarchical, Lake's U.S. focused typology offers a logical basis for a USCP–USUKSR comparison.<sup>9</sup>

Lake places anarchy in the origin, from where it traces two axes of increasing hierarchy. The horizontal axis marks the security dimension: diplomacy (anarchic origin), sphere of influence, weak (soft) protectorate and protectorate (hierarchical end). The vertical axis marks the economic dimension: market exchange (anarchic origin), economic zone, weak dependency, dependency (hierarchical end).<sup>10</sup>

From these relationships between anarchy and hierarchy, this paper selects four to grade the USCP and the USUKSR.

### Security dimension:

- sphere of influence (where the dominant state – A – possesses the authority only to limit a subordinate's – B's – cooperation with third parties)
- weak protectorate (where A exercises substantial, though limited, control over B's foreign and defence policies)

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<sup>3</sup> David Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Ruike Xu, *Alliance Persistence within the Anglo–American Special Relationship. The Post-Cold War Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Sebastian Hamisch, 'Special Relationships in Foreign Policy'. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2017).

<sup>6</sup> As in some great power relations (U.S.–URSS/Russia, U.S.–China).

<sup>7</sup> As in the classic overseas empires.

<sup>8</sup> David Lake, 'International Legitimacy Lost? Rule and Resistance when America is First', *Perspectives on Politics* 16 no 1 (2018), 6–21.

<sup>9</sup> Haugevik suggests Lake's typology as a starting point to apply SRs as an analytical category. Kristin Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2018), 27.

<sup>10</sup> Lake, *Hierarchy*, 52.

Economic dimension:

- market exchange (where parties choose to trade, invest or otherwise engage in economic interactions while retaining full authority over their actions)
- economic zone (where B is restricted from giving market privileges to third parties or entering into economic transactions that give others influence over its affairs)<sup>11</sup>

Security dimension – Hosting U.S. military personnel, sharing alliances

Lake captures security hierarchy with the presence of A's military personnel in B's territory, and with the number of B's independent alliances (without A).<sup>12</sup> Both the U.K. and Colombia permanently host U.S. service members in their territory, and currently both share all their key alliances with the U.S., accepting its hierarchy as legitimate.

The presence of American air bases in the U.K. was institutionalised by a number of U.S.–U.K. agreements/arrangements signed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although some of these bases were closed after the Cold War, there are still five in England, and they still matter in U.S. global strategic planning.<sup>13</sup> Each sits on property leased from the British Ministry of Defence, each has Royal Air Force status, and together they employ nearly 10,000 U.S. service personnel.<sup>14</sup> During the Cold War, the U.K. hosted U.S. strategic bombers and nuclear submarines.<sup>15</sup> Overseas, the closed island Diego Garcia – part of the British Indian Ocean Territory defying international law, and leased to the U.S. until 2036 – has remained a U.S. naval and air base, key to Middle East operations.

More modestly, Colombia has housed a few hundred U.S. service members at bases without formal leases, relying on tacit understandings and broad interpretations of other agreements.<sup>16</sup> Although a second best solution, these “quasibases” have allowed the U.S. to conduct drug interdiction, surveillance and other operations relevant to its strategic objectives in the region.<sup>17</sup> The limits on U.S. personnel in Colombia were set within Plan Colombia, rising to 800 soldiers and 600 contractors in 2004,<sup>18</sup> and remaining so for

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 53–56.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 68–69.

<sup>13</sup> Xu, *Alliance Persistence*, 138–139.

<sup>14</sup> Trudy Brunot, ‘US Military Bases in the United Kingdom’, Classroom, 29 September 2017.

<sup>15</sup> From 1948, Britain provided essential bases for U.S. B-29s. In 1960, PM Macmillan agreed that the U.S. could establish a Polaris submarine base at Holy Loch on the Clyde. David Reynolds, ‘A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, *International Affairs* 62, no 1 (1985), 8, 12.

<sup>16</sup> In 2009, the Uribe Government tried to formalise U.S. access to seven Colombian bases in a Defence cooperation agreement (ACD) signed under presidential authority to expand previous bilateral treaties. But the Constitutional Court declared the ACD void without congressional approval, since it created new obligations (such as granting immunity to U.S. personnel in Colombia and allowing for permanent U.S. presence). Uribe's successor, Santos let the ACD perish, and convinced the U.S. that a formal agreement was not indispensable. Tom Long et al., ‘Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy’, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 39 no 4 (2020), 472–473.

<sup>17</sup> Sebastián Bitar, *La presencia militar de Estados Unidos en América Latina. Bases y cuasibases* (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2017), 8, 168.

<sup>18</sup> Semana, ‘Militares gringos en Colombia: así han hecho presencia durante 20 años’, 29 January 2019, cites Bitar's figures.

subsequent years. Anyway, the real U.S. presence has been lower than the established. Plan Colombia (2000–2015) was a multibillion-dollar USCP effort to stabilise Colombia and fight the intertwined drug and guerrilla war.<sup>19</sup>

While in the European Union (EU),<sup>20</sup> the U.K. largely obstructed initiatives toward intra-EU defence cooperation-integration, except for a brief period between 1998 and 2003 (from the Saint-Malo declaration to the Iraq War) when it “paid lip service” to Europe having a “capacity for autonomous action [...] to respond to international crises.”<sup>21</sup> Post-Brexit “Global Britain” (with its imperial reflexes resurfaced, and even more relied on the USUKSR after relinquishing the EU path to influence)<sup>22</sup> continued positioning itself as “the leading European ally in NATO”,<sup>23</sup> while also launched a complex “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”,<sup>24</sup> where it sent its new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. Then came the AUKUS defence pact to supply Australia with eight nuclear-propelled submarines with U.S. and British technology. Furthermore, PM Johnson – as G7 chair in 2021 – hosted the “First Summit of the anti-China coalition”, extended to India, Australia, South Korea and South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

Colombia – a loyal U.S. partner within the Inter-American System (the OAS<sup>26</sup> and the Rio Treaty<sup>27</sup>) – restrained its participation in the South American Defence Council (a cooperative security project of UNASUR) even under the liberal Santos presidency, which saw the country accepted by NATO as its partner in Latin America. The ensuing (neoconservative) Duque Government quickly left UNASUR as a gesture to the U.S. and the OAS. It also championed close coordination with the Trump Administration (by the Lima Group and within the revived Rio Treaty framework) as it tried to lead efforts to change Venezuela’s Bolivarian regime, which is supported by Russia and China.

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<sup>19</sup> Although the U.S. Congress approved Plan Colombia as an enhanced antidrug effort, the neoconservative Bush–Uribe duo transformed it – within the global war on terror – into a massive joint operation against FARC guerrillas: to weaken their military capabilities, cut drug trafficking as their funding source, and undermine their social and political basis. Plan Colombia was never submitted to the Colombian Congress. FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Diana Marcela Rojas, ‘Estados Unidos en la construcción de la paz en Colombia’, *Análisis Político* 30, no 91 (2017), 38; Adam Isacson, ‘It’s Not Too Late for the Land of Mercenaries’, *The New York Times*, 05August 2021; Rodrigo Pardo, ‘Un acuerdo inocuo’. Preface in *Relaciones militares Colombia–Estados Unidos*, by Martha Lucía Ramírez and Jorge Robledo (Bogotá: Norma, 2011), XIII–XXII.

<sup>20</sup> Earlier European (Economic) Community (EC).

<sup>21</sup> Frédéric Mauro, ‘European defence: Mourning England’, *Tribune, IRIS France*, 22 January 2020; *Joint Declaration on European Defence, issued at the British–French Summit Saint-Malo*, 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Vladislav Zubok, ‘Comments in *Международное обозрение*’ [International Review], *Россия 24 TV* [Russia 24 TV], anchor Fyodor Lukyanov, 02 July 2021.

<sup>23</sup> HM Government, *Global Britain in a competitive age. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* (March 2021), 20.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 60, 66.

<sup>25</sup> Heribert Dieter, ‘Der erste Gipfel der Anti-China-Koalition’, *SWP-Aktuell* no 4 (2021), 1–2, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Organization of American States, 1948, collective security.

<sup>27</sup> Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947, collective defence (and beyond).

## Economic dimension – The China problem

Lake's indicators for economic hierarchy are: the junior partner's trade diversification/dependency (its trade with the U.S. compared to its trade with all the other permanent members of the UN Security Council combined) and its exchange rate system (floating, flexible or rigid dollar peg, dollarisation).<sup>28</sup>

Within British foreign trade, the shares corresponding to the U.S. and to all the other permanent UNSC members (France, China, Russia) combined were almost equal and rather modest, at around 15 per cent in 2019.<sup>29</sup>

Within Colombia's imports, the shares of the U.S. and of all the other permanent UNSC members were also similar, but higher (both close to 25 per cent). However, the U.S. absorbed twice as many Colombian exports as China, France, Britain and Russia combined (25 per cent versus 12 per cent).<sup>30</sup>

Both the U.K. and Colombia have their currencies floating. London has remained a global financial hub. The U.K. and the U.S. are each other's largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). The U.S. is the largest single investor in Colombia.<sup>31</sup>

## Trade trends

Lake found a pattern of particular openness to trade within dyads between U.S. subordinates.<sup>32</sup> In addition to the U.S. itself, Colombia has been implementing FTAs with (other) U.S. allies/partners, such as the EU, Canada, Korea or those of the Pacific Alliance.

In contrast, Colombia has shown strong wariness of China: although attracted by the Chinese market and financing opportunities, it refrained from negotiating a bilateral FTA,<sup>33</sup> or from joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). President Duque – after securing avocado and banana export quotas on a visit to China in 2019,<sup>34</sup> recently has courted Washington for “nearshoring” (to Colombia U.S. production to be withdrawn from China).

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<sup>28</sup> Lake, *Hierarchy*, 75, 73.

<sup>29</sup> Office for National Statistics, ‘UK Balance of Payments’, 31 October 2019, 9, 16.

<sup>30</sup> Departamento Nacional de Estadística, ‘Importaciones de Colombia según países de origen 1980–2019’; ‘Exportaciones de Colombia según países de destino 1970–2019’, *Series históricas*, 2019.

<sup>31</sup> While the U.S. is the largest origin country, the largest contributors to FDI in Colombia are Panama and Caribbean tax havens. From Colombia's total inward FDI between 1994 and 2020, 20.3 per cent came from the U.S., 12.2 per cent from Panama, 11.3 per cent from Spain, 10.7 per cent from England, and a sizable share from British Overseas Territories (4.2 per cent only from Bermuda). Colombia Reports, ‘Foreign investment in Colombia’, 08 March 2021.

<sup>32</sup> Lake, *Hierarchy*, 99.

<sup>33</sup> President Santos favoured an FTA with China, but its political costs were deemed as too high, as it faced fierce opposition from domestic industries, and likely U.S. disapproval (still milder under President Obama than his successors in the White House). Thus, Santos (whose priority was the peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla) reverted to ratification of a Sino–Colombian investment treaty.

<sup>34</sup> Duque did not relaunch the FTA idea, despite his China visit. Eduardo Velosa, ‘China: Atrapada en la Política Exterior de Colombia’, *Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Santiago de Chile*, 03 August 2020.

Anyway, China became Colombia's second trading partner, and Chinese consortia won two big pre-Covid tenders in infrastructure,<sup>35</sup> a vital sector neglected by U.S. investors.

Disengaging from the EU, the U.K. signed only a thin trade agreement with its nearest and biggest market (46 per cent of British exports) in late 2020, while it quickly concluded over sixty “continuity” trade agreements with non-EU partners (11 per cent of exports in 2019).<sup>36</sup> The U.K. hailed the U.S. as its “biggest single bilateral trading partner”, accounting for almost 20 per cent of exports in 2019.<sup>37</sup> But FTA negotiations conducted under Trump were paused since the Biden Administration lost fast track authority. Britain signed its first brand new FTA with Australia in late 2021.

The U.K. made a volte-face in its China policy in 2019. Back in 2015, Britain joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank despite U.S. criticism. Boris Johnson even as PM repeatedly called for a Sino–British FTA. But after the Hong Kong demonstrations and the adoption of a tough security law in mid-2020 (breaching the autonomy accorded to the former British colony in the Sino–British Treaty of 1984), London not only protested, but offered all Hong Kong residents with British National (Overseas) Passports to settle in Britain.<sup>38</sup> Then it decided to exclude Chinese TC giant Huawei from its 5G networks (under pressure from the U.S.–U.K. defence establishment).<sup>39</sup>

Domestic pressures seemed to block a British FTA with China for some time.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the U.K. applied for accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. CPTPP accession would make a real difference to the EU, adding a trade policy component to the Indo-Pacific tilt framework.<sup>41</sup> Anyway, China turned into Britain's top import source in goods by Q3 2021, ahead of Germany and the U.S.

## Symbolic obeisance

Another behavioural pattern revealed by Lake among U.S. subordinates has been to perform acts of symbolic obeisance,<sup>42</sup> such as following the ruler into war. The U.K. sent troops to Korea, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq to fight in U.S. led coalitions (providing the second largest contingents).

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<sup>35</sup> Namely to build the Bogota metro and a commuter train linking the Colombian capital to several nearby municipalities.

<sup>36</sup> These (short term) deals have largely replicated what the U.K. had as an EU member state, and their impact is paltry compared to the negative impact of new barriers to trade with its largest partner. Anand Menon, ‘What does Global Britain mean in practice?’, *Conservative Home*, 03 March 2021.

<sup>37</sup> HM Government, *Global Britain in a competitive age*, 60.

<sup>38</sup> Dieter, ‘Der erste Gipfel’, 2.

<sup>39</sup> David Green, ‘The UK's Incoherent China Strategy’, *World Politics Review*, 29 January 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Menon, ‘What does Global Britain mean?’.

<sup>41</sup> HM Government, *Global Britain in a competitive age*, 67; Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza, ‘Die EU und Global Britain: So nah, so fern’, *SWP-Aktuell* no 35 (2021), 2–3.

<sup>42</sup> These acts are costly, and do not involve direct fulfilment of (the dominant state's) mandates. They rather constitute public, and often collective displays of submission, recognising and affirming the authority of the ruler. Lake, *Hierarchy*, 165.

Battalion Colombia's sacrifices in the Korean War (where it fought as part of a U.S. regiment) constituted a remarkable act of symbolic obeisance, crediting Colombia as the privileged U.S. partner in Latin America for many years.<sup>43</sup> Yet after the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. redirected military cooperation in the region to domestic security.<sup>44</sup>

### *Criteria for special relationships*

#### Xu's three minimum criteria

Xu specifies three minimum criteria for an SR:<sup>45</sup> 1. Long-term security cooperation. 2. Exclusive cooperation in certain areas of security.<sup>46</sup> 3. Constant positive judgment between the two partners, regarding each other as a very reliable and trustworthy ally.

#### *Long-term security cooperation*

Although the USUKSR stands out by its highly institutionalised military cooperation, the USCP has also reached solid institutionalisation in this field. According to a report sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command, U.S.–Colombian military cooperation is one of the closest in the hemisphere, if not the closest. The complex multilevel interaction between the two military hierarchies will persist, based on institutional relationships, personal ties and shared visions of strategies and roles.<sup>47</sup> Path dependency, praised by Xu as a key factor of persistence in the USUKSR, also applies to the USCP in this regard.<sup>48</sup>

#### *Exclusive cooperation in certain areas of security*

Although less impressive than the U.S.–U.K. nuclear or intelligence cooperation, U.S.–Colombian collaboration in confronting transnational crime related to drug trafficking can also be seen as exclusive. Colombia became a security provider since its military had gained expertise under Plan Colombia in fighting domestic guerrillas with U.S. techniques.<sup>49</sup> The triangular schemes to export such Colombian expertise to Central

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<sup>43</sup> President Uribe's public support for the Iraq War can be seen as symbolic obeisance "light", since it did not mean sending Colombian troops overseas (but inviting U.S. service members instead).

<sup>44</sup> Washington requested Latin American governments and their armed forces to protect their own territories from Soviet influenced internal enemies. Saúl Rodríguez, *La Influencia de los Estados Unidos en el Ejército Colombiano, 1951–1959* (Medellín: La Carreta Editores, 2006), 108.

<sup>45</sup> Xu, *Alliance Persistence*, 5–6.

<sup>46</sup> This is one among a series of special qualities that make an SR endure, if both states possess them. Other alternatives can be: similar language, shared culture, common values or close ethnic bonds. *Ibid.* 5.

<sup>47</sup> Global Americans, *The Future of U.S.–Colombian Relations* (Florida International University, 04 July 2019).

<sup>48</sup> Xu, *Alliance Persistence*.

<sup>49</sup> Natalia Arbeláez, 'Con Duque hay un retorno a posiciones de mayor sumisión que con Trump son muy arriesgadas'. Interview with Arlene Tickner. *La Silla Vacía*, 26 April 2019.

America with U.S. co-financing and supervision received the blessing of President Obama at the Cartagena Summit of the Americas.<sup>50</sup>

### *Mutual positive judgment and trust as allies*

The third criterion – mutual positive judgment and trust as reliable allies – implies a dose of collective identity.<sup>51</sup> The American public, however, is mostly lacking these positive feelings towards Colombia.

Recent U.S. administrations referred to Colombia as one of their closest partners or even allies in the hemisphere and even beyond, although President Biden was more restrained, acknowledging only the “enduring partnership”.<sup>52</sup> The USCP was obviously affected by Colombian neoconservative lawmakers’ advisory role in Trump’s 2020 re-election campaign, which painted Biden as a “socialist”,<sup>53</sup> but it recovered soon.

Among U.S. officers praising their Colombian colleagues was General Kelly who even penned an op-ed backing a U.S.–Colombian SR when he led the Southern Command.<sup>54</sup> Pro-Americanism has been traditionally high among Colombian elites, perfectly coupled to their U.S. peers, and the U.S. is quite popular among ordinary Colombians as well.<sup>55</sup>

The American public, however, does not judge Colombia favourably, nor does it perceive the country as a U.S. ally. Gallup polls, conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2003 found – for each favourable opinion about Colombia – two unfavourable ones.<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, Americans placed Colombia in the no man’s land between “ally” and “enemy” in two polls, in 2014 and 2017. Among 144 countries ranked along the ally–enemy continuum, Colombia was 93<sup>rd</sup> in 2014 and 108<sup>th</sup> in 2017, while the U.K. was ally No. 1 and No. 2 in the same polls.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Eduardo Pastrana and Diego Vera, ‘Colombia y su agenda de seguridad. Del gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos al gobierno de Iván Duque’, in *La región frente a los cambios globales en materia de seguridad*, ed. by Sandra Namihas (Lima: Equis Equis, 2019), 49.

<sup>51</sup> Although not necessarily comparable to the cherished Anglo–American “we-ness” – as conceived, for example, by Janice Bially Mattern, ‘The Power Politics of Identity’, *European Journal of International Relations* 7 no 3 (2001).

<sup>52</sup> The White House, ‘Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Ivan Duque of Colombia’, *Statements and Releases*, 28 June 2021.

<sup>53</sup> El Tiempo, ‘Intervención de congresistas del CD en EEUU sí hizo daño’, 01 June 2021.

<sup>54</sup> John Kelly, ‘Colombia’s resolve merits support’, *Miami Herald*, 03 May 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Nearly seven-in-ten Colombians (69 per cent) with higher incomes say they favour the U.S., while 55 per cent with lower incomes agree. Kat Devlin, ‘Obama to meet Latin American leaders amid positive views of U.S. in the region’, *Pew Research Center*, 07 April 2015.

<sup>56</sup> Jeffrey Jones, ‘Americans Rate Iran Most Negatively of 22 Countries. Canada, Great Britain viewed most favorably’, *Gallup*, 23 February 2006.

<sup>57</sup> Josh Katz and Kevin Quealy, ‘Which Country Is America’s Strongest Ally?’ *The New York Times*, 03 February 2017.

A fourth criterion: Substitution for partner’s governance functions should be moderate

Harnisch identifies SRs as “based on regular entanglement of some (external) governance functions”, and as “a moderate form of international hierarchy, in which one of the partners is substituting for some governance functions of the other”.<sup>58</sup> Hence, in an SR, entangled governance functions should be external, and substitution should not be excessive.

Within the USUKSR, the U.S. substituted for important (external) governance functions of the U.K. in defence by complementing its capabilities, so that it could still play a global role. The British gave up their own ballistic missile production and equipped their nuclear submarines with U.S. made Polaris and then Trident missiles, for which they developed their nuclear warheads. Moreover, in the Five Eyes community they receive intelligence from the Americans, without which they would be “half-deaf and completely blind”.<sup>59</sup>

Within the USCP, Plan Colombia – a deep “intervention by invitation”<sup>60</sup> – involved U.S. substitution for multiple Colombian (domestic) governance functions.<sup>61</sup> This substitution decreased during the Santos presidency, when Plan Colombia was largely nationalised.<sup>62</sup> But it increased again under the (conspicuously patron–client) Trump–Duque couple, mainly due to a renewed emphasis on counter-narcotics, particularly on forced coca eradication, with more U.S. advisers on the ground.<sup>63</sup> Encouragingly, the Biden Administration started a “holistic” approach (based on shared responsibility and alternative crops).<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> As well as “a consensual form of limited hierarchical governance based on multiple functions”. Harnisch, ‘Special Relationships’, 1, 3.

<sup>59</sup> Mauro, ‘European defence’. Britain – which plans to replace its four Vanguard Class nuclear submarines with Dreadnought Class ones beginning in the early 2030s, as well as to develop a new nuclear warhead – pledges to continue working closely with the U.S. to ensure that the (British) warhead remains compatible with the (American) Trident Strategic Weapon System. HM Government, *Global Britain in a competitive age*, 77–78.

<sup>60</sup> Arlene Tickner, ‘Intervención por invitación. Claves de la política exterior colombiana y de sus debilidades principales’, *Colombia Internacional* no 65, (2007), 90–111; Álvaro Méndez, *Colombian Agency and the Making of US Foreign Policy. Intervention by Invitation* (London: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>61</sup> The anti-guerrilla war was waged with sophisticated intelligence provided by the Americans. Moreover, many public officials from multiple Colombian institutions travelled each month to Washington to submit to debates and decisions crucial aspects of domestic politics. Tickner, ‘Intervención’, 107. The U.S. embassy in Bogota functioned as “an alternate seat of government” during Uribe’s second term, according to Wikileaks cables. Diana Marcela Rojas, ‘Las relaciones Colombia – Estados Unidos en el Gobierno Santos: ¿Llegó la hora del post conflicto?’ *Análisis Político* 26 no 79 (2013), 121–138.

<sup>62</sup> Pastrana and Vera, ‘Colombia y su agenda’, 49. U.S. military, antidrug and intelligence assistance has dropped to a small percentage of Colombia’s overall defence budget (2.8 per cent in 2017). Global Americans, *The Future of U.S.–Colombian Relations*, 8–9. Triangular cooperation also meant Colombia substituting for some U.S. (external) security functions elsewhere.

<sup>63</sup> Infobae, ‘Gobierno colombiano defiende ayuda de EEUU contra el narco’, 08 June 2020.

<sup>64</sup> Noticias Caracol, ‘¿Por qué Joe Biden no había hablado con Iván Duque antes?: asesor de la Casa Blanca responde’. Interview with Juan González, 28 June 2021.

## *Conclusions and a final note*

### Similarities and differences

In the security dimension, both the U.K. and Colombia have demonstrated symbolic obeisance to America, both continue hosting its military personnel, and both share all their key alliances with it.<sup>65</sup>

U.S. substituted British and Colombian governance functions differ on one major point: in the British case they centre on (external) defence, while in the Colombian case they concern primarily domestic security, being more intrusive. Nevertheless, both substitutions give the U.S. ample influence over its partner's foreign policy (FP).

Without U.S. approval, the U.K. cannot pledge its nuclear and intelligence capabilities to third parties, because they are inseparably tied into America's superior capabilities.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, post-Brexit British FP has become once again dominated by the USUKSR, as in the Cold War era (before EC accession), when its success was judged by how close could the U.K. nuzzle up to the U.S., harnessing its intelligence, military, industrial and technological power.<sup>67</sup>

Colombia – due to America's "high economic, military, judicial, and political support in the hybrid war against drug trafficking, insurgency, and terrorism – has entrusted much of its domestic and foreign agendas to understandings with the White House, Congress, and U.S. security agencies."<sup>68</sup> In short, Colombia submitted to U.S. approval a substantial part of its state policy.

### Grading

The USCP could clearly be graded as a weak protectorate under Plan Colombia, and that might still be the case. The USUKSR (well beyond a sphere of influence) now can be seen heading towards a weak protectorate, due to added U.S. hierarchy derived from even closer post-Brexit British alignment, despite all "Global Britain" euphoria.

In the economic dimension, the USUKSR until recently could be rated as market exchange, but now it is approaching an economic zone, with Britain joining the U.S. sponsored China-isolation drive, and looking to the U.S. (even to selected U.S. states) for more trade and investment.

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<sup>65</sup> The U.K. as an ally certainly delivers more value to the U.S. than Colombia, and arguably more than any other state.

<sup>66</sup> This security embeddedness is recognised in the previous review of British strategy: "The unparalleled extent of UK–US cooperation on nuclear, intelligence, diplomacy, technology and military capabilities plays a major role in guaranteeing our national security. Our ability to operate together in future is at the heart of our planning." *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, 2015, Chapter 5. Project Our Global Influence, 51, § 5.31.

<sup>67</sup> Zubok, 'Comments'.

<sup>68</sup> Pastrana and Vera, 'Colombia y su agenda', 42.

The USCP classifies as an economic zone, since the U.S. is still Colombia's largest export market and preferred investor, and efforts to deepen trade relations with China have been “caught up” in Colombian FP.<sup>69</sup>

In Lake, a dyad combining intermediate levels of both security and economic hierarchy (with B ceding substantial but not all authority to A in both arenas) yields an informal empire.<sup>70</sup>

The USCP (combining a weak protectorate with an economic zone) is rated as an informal empire. The USUKSR (combining a near weak protectorate with a near economic zone) is on the verge of being classified as an informal empire.

### Why the USCP is unlikely to become an SR

The two obstacles in the way of the USCP to be rated as an SR – that is, Colombia's rather negative image in the U.S. general public, and the domestic security focus of U.S. substituted Colombian governance functions – are not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future.

### *Unfavourable image*

The 2017 U.S. poll (with the U.S. public taking even more distance from Colombia than before) might have been influenced by a shortly earlier plebiscite, where Colombians rejected the original peace agreement, despite its overwhelming international support.

Colombia's image abroad was further damaged by repercussions of the “false positives” scandal;<sup>71</sup> the murder of hundreds of social leaders and ex guerrillas by militias fighting for the control of vacated FARC areas; the militarised repression of massive anti-government protests, sparked by inequities hopelessly exacerbated through Covid paralyse; and the involvement of retired Colombian soldiers in the assassination of Haitian President Moïse, dealing a severe blow to the narrative about Colombia's conversion from a quasi-failed state into a security provider.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> For clarity, Velosa adds: “Colombia's interaction with other international actors, including China, is subordinate to its special relationship with the US.” Velosa, ‘China: Atrapada’.

<sup>70</sup> Lake, *Hierarchy*, 58.

<sup>71</sup> Colombian soldiers murdered over six thousand mostly poor, young civilians between 2002 and 2008, and registered them as guerrillas killed in combat to receive rewards. Al Jazeera, ‘Former Colombian leader asks pardon for army killings of civilians’, 21 June 2021.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. trained Colombian veterans have been legally working as contractors in Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, or illegally training drug cartels in Mexico. The Haitian incident revealed the difference between their meagre pensions and the high market value of their lethal skills. Joshua Collins and Parker Asmann, ‘The Colombian War Machine Has Gone Global’, *World Politics Review*, 19 July 2021.

### *Invited interventions*

Colombian governments have traditionally invited U.S. intervention into their domestic sphere, and U.S. administrations have repeatedly intervened: from the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty<sup>73</sup> to Plan Colombia;<sup>74</sup> and from U.S. backed civic-military counterinsurgency schemes in the 1960s<sup>75</sup> to U.S. help in chasing drug barons especially in the 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>76</sup> Thus, U.S. administrations and security forces became complicit in the development of a “paramilitary culture” in Colombian society, and they have become inextricably involved in its never ending armed conflicts.

### A note on America as dominant partner

Britain’s and Colombia’s reliance to the U.S. has increased in a desperately uncertain world, but their dominant partner is not in good shape either.

The U.K. – after exiting its EU power base – was left with virtually no other option but to play the role of an agile, avant-garde U.S. junior partner.<sup>77</sup> The Colombian state – with a peace agreement half-heartedly implemented, militias of all stripes thriving on coca production, and overwhelming social conflicts – is anxious for U.S. support.

The U.S., however – seen as a semi-global empire in retreat for decades<sup>78</sup> – is now cutting back its ambition of worldwide democracy extension, and is switching to a pragmatic, openly egocentric policy. To this respect, Biden follows Trump’s line, despite vilifying him so much, notes a Russian political scientist.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> This treaty guaranteed the U.S. free transit across Panama, then a province of New Granada (Colombia after 1863). It also committed the U.S. to assure New Granada’s sovereignty over the isthmus as well as to maintain its neutrality. With a railroad built across the isthmus, the U.S. was responsible for protecting the route. So the U.S. found itself embroiled in Colombian political disputes, and intervened militarily in Panama seven times in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, the Colombian province became a U.S. protectorate (before secession in 1903). Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat. The Past, Present, and Future of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 60–61.

<sup>74</sup> Colombia became the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region and the showcase of a state rebuilding intervention. Colombian armed forces accessed U.S. technology, weaponry, intelligence information and on-the-ground advice, and a covert CIA action program (with NSA spying assistance and satellite-guided smart bombs) allowed them to kill more than twenty rebel leaders. Rojas, ‘Estados Unidos’, 38–39.

<sup>75</sup> Bradley Lynn Coleman, *Colombia and the United States. The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2008), 199. After visiting Colombia in 1962, General Yarborough, commander of the Pentagon’s Special Warfare Center, proposed the creation of armed civilian units to “execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known Communist proponents”. Human Rights Watch, ‘Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States’, 01 November 1996, no 2033.

<sup>76</sup> Members of the Pentagon’s elite Joint Special Operations Command aided on the ground the Colombian Government’s search for drug lord Pablo Escobar, who was shot dead in Medellín in late 1993. Ryan Devereaux, ‘Colombian Mercenaries and the Assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse’, *The Intercept*, 26 July 2021.

<sup>77</sup> Zubok, ‘Comments’.

<sup>78</sup> Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat*.

<sup>79</sup> Fyodor Lukyanov, ‘Прощание с гегемонией’ [Farewell to Hegemony], *Россия в глобальной политике* [Russia in Global Affairs], 20 August 2021.

The U.S. abandoned Afghanistan in disarray after 20 years of futile state-building efforts, which began with devastating bombings in the wake of 9/11. America's abrupt withdrawal, and the immediate collapse of its local client government sent a sign of caution to allies and partners alike.

U.S. claims to lead a global coalition of democracies (opposed to autocracies) sound hollow. Today's America cannot exercise authority<sup>80</sup> even nearly as legitimate as it could vis-à-vis Britain<sup>81</sup> and other core countries in the post-WWII Western order. U.S. hierarchy over Colombia never really had broad-based legitimacy, despite attempts to widen this base from the Alliance for Progress to Peace Colombia.

The U.S. (now the most unequal among the industrialised countries) is an imperial system that can no longer ensure a rising standard of living even for many of its own citizens.<sup>82</sup> America's striking economic polarisation, prolonged post-9/11 democratic regression, and advanced social disintegration have been aggravated by Covid-justified authoritarian (if not totalitarian) style controls.

The moral for Britain and Colombia is obviously not to put all their eggs into one single nest.

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<sup>80</sup> A kind of power, where subordinates follow the mandates of the ruler, because they find them legitimate. Lake, 'International Legitimacy Lost?', 8.

<sup>81</sup> The U.K. was the largest single Marshall aid recipient.

<sup>82</sup> Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat*, 276.

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# Imperial Historicism: An Example of Scientific Justification of Foreign Policy and Warfare in the 19–20<sup>th</sup> Centuries in Hungary<sup>1</sup>

Mihály BODA<sup>2</sup> 

*The 19<sup>th</sup> century saw the modern development of nation states and the early development of human sciences. These progresses linked up with the ideologies of nation-building. Some European states having long history and imperial traditions applied the study of their own history to support their national political purposes. The new political ideology was historicism used for imperial purposes, imperial historicism. With the help of imperial historicism, 19<sup>th</sup> century thinkers and statesmen identifying themselves and their community with the historical forms of their community attempted to build or uphold their empire. Hungary, or at least some Hungarian thinkers and statesmen, was one of those states which used imperial historicism to define their foreign policy and internal political purposes. Examining political thinking of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century Hungary one can find several forms of imperial historicism and historical self-identification. This paper presents imperial historicism and its Hungarian forms.*

**Keywords:** warfare ideology, imperial historicism, nationalism, Arnold Ipolyi, Gusztáv Beksics, János Asbóth

## Introduction

The end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the modern heyday of Hungarian imperial thinking. At that time Hungary constituted the biggest part of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. After the defeat of Austria by Prussia (1866) the foreign policy of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy turned to the Balkan Peninsula. Hence, Hungary was not only the biggest part of the empire, but it was closer to the economically and politically desired surrounding territories and states than other parts of the Monarchy were. The political situation, however, was complex and challenging. On the one hand, after Prussia defeated Austria in

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<sup>1</sup> Supported by the ÚNKP-20-5-NKE-25 new national excellence program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the source of the national research, development and innovation fund.

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1866 (and France in 1870–1871), it established the German Empire on the Western borders of the Monarchy. On the other hand, the Russian Empire used the ideology of Pan-Slavism to affect the Slavs of the Monarchy and the Balkan Peninsula. Hence, the Monarchy (and the Hungarians in it) found itself between these two dangerous empires and tried to lead its own foreign policy. In this effort, among others, the study of history came to the help of Hungary.

Harnessing the study of history for political purposes was a common practice in Europe at that time, we can find efforts in Great Britain, France and Germany as well. In Great Britain legendary historical persons (like King Arthur and Robin Hood) were used for strengthening the Saxon-related identity of Great Britain and securing the Saxon rule over the Celts (e.g. Welsh people).<sup>3</sup> In France Vercingetorix, the Gallic hero, was raised in order to emphasise the Gallic identity of post-revolution France, and under Bonaparte to create a justification for conquering the territories of Europe where previously the Gauls had lived.<sup>4</sup> Finally, in Germany the examples of the Antique Germanic peoples and the heroes of *The Song of the Nibelungs* (e.g. Siegfried) were emphasised with the main purpose of uniting German states and principalities, then of supporting the political claims of the Prussian–German Empire.<sup>5</sup>

The main purpose of all European efforts, including Hungary, to harness history was to create (in the case of Germany), and maintain a national empire by exercising the roles of an empire. These roles include securing political liberty, peace and defence inside the empire and spreading its own national civilisation inside and outside of the empire (in this period in exchange for natural resources and the possibility of capital export).<sup>6</sup> This is the reason why this ideology of the 19<sup>th</sup> century can be named imperial historicism.

In the following, first the increasing significance of the developing sciences in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the relationship between nationalism and the early development of history studies will be mentioned and then, the imperial historicism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Hungary will be detailed.

## Development of sciences, nationalism and the study of history

The 19<sup>th</sup> century is the age of nationalism when developing sciences earned a prominent role – beside/instead of religion – in the justification of politics.<sup>7</sup> European states tried

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<sup>3</sup> Stephanie Barczewski, ‘“Nations Make Their Own Gods and Heroes”: Robin Hood, King Arthur and the development of racialism in nineteenth-century Britain’, *Journal of Victorian Culture* 2, no 2 (1997), 179–207.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Dietler, ‘“Our Ancestors the Gauls”: Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity in Modern Europe’, *American Anthropologist* 96, no 3 (1994), 584–605.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher B. Krebs, *A Most Dangerous Book – Tacitus’s Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich* (New York – London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); Hans Kohn, ‘Romanticism and the Rise of German Nationalism’, *The Review of Politics* 12, no 4 (1950), 443–472.

<sup>6</sup> Herfried Münkler, *Empires. The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 80–107.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. George Markus, ‘Changing Images of Science’, *Thesis Eleven* 33, no 1 (1992), 24; Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 6; Daniel Woolf, *A Concise History of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 160–165.

sciences to strengthen their self-consciousness and identity, and to justify their wars and foreign policies.

Sciences in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were in the early stage of their development. Scholars at that time rarely thought science should be value-free and must be outside politics.<sup>8</sup> Science and politics stood in close relation and had mutual effects on each other. Some examples of the effects were the demands which were addressed to the political life of a country and statesmen by scholars. They took philosophy (as the systematising science), history, law of nations, economics, geography and biology to promote political conceptions. In this paper the focus is put on the content of the claims of Hungarian historians in connection with Hungarian foreign politics and warfare.<sup>9</sup>

The modern study of history was born in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the theories of history of the Enlightenment (which researched the common and purposeful human history with an abstract and universal method) gave place to the modern study of history step by step. The birth was not a single event, but it was a development process. The first step was romanticism, which got rid of the universal method of natural sciences and popularised the special historical understanding of the individual past events (in the form of studying the deeds and life of great men of the past). This created the possibility of the individual 'past'-s. Another step was historicism, which stretched historical understanding to the study of nations; particularly to the character traits and values of nations that the nations were showing through their lifelong history. This led to the possibility of evolving national histories. Finally, positivism came by emphasising the importance of criticising historical sources and adding the modern scientific method to the previous stages of the development.<sup>10</sup> Without the final stage, the study of history was only a form of collective memory, with every potential distortion of it. Collective memory is an important part of the life of a community which can strengthen the self-consciousness and collective identity of the community, but to be a modern science, it should be criticised and weeded out by positivists.

The importance of historicism is greatly emphasised in this paper. Historicism focusing on communal past events, was not a wholly new method of the study of the past. Historicism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however, had a more universal scope.<sup>11</sup> This broadly understood that historicism denied the exclusive relevance of the universal human reason at least in three fields.<sup>12</sup> In the field of cognition, where historicism claimed that empathy and other non-conceptual forms of cognition (and not just the rational and cognitive methods) have significance in studying the past, and generally the social and cultural phenomena; in the field of the theory of state, where historicism proposed the claim that states are important not only as means for the happiness of their citizens, but for their own right;<sup>13</sup> and finally

<sup>8</sup> Max Weber famously criticised this attitude: Max Weber, 'Science as Vocation', in *The Vocation Lectures*, by Max Weber (Indianapolis–Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 19–20.

<sup>9</sup> For philosophy-based warfare ideologies in the 19<sup>th</sup> century see Mihály Boda, 'A háború tudományos igazolása a 19–20. század fordulóján Európában és Magyarországon: a filozófiai militarizmus', *Hadtudomány* 31, E-issue (2021).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Woolf, *A Concise History of History*, 157–178.

<sup>11</sup> Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, 29–30.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 7–13.

<sup>13</sup> Boda, 'A háború tudományos igazolása'.

in the field of value theory, where historicism held that historically developed character traits and values are more important than universal human features.<sup>14</sup> The representatives of historicism relying on the new value theory and the unique values allegedly featured a particular national history concluded to contemporary political statements.

One of the early representatives of this sort of historicism was the German philosopher, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who influenced European nationalist thinkers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Herder held that the basic unit of history is not humanity but nations which all have their distinctive features. In his *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* he wrote: ‘Thus nations modify themselves, according to time, place, and their internal character: each bears in itself the standard of its perfection, totally independent of all comparison with that of others’. At the same time, he thought the history of humanity had significance as well, because ‘the more pure and fine the maximum on which a people hit, the more useful the objects to which it applied the exertions of its nobler powers, and, lastly, the more firm and exact the bond of union which most intimately connected all the members of the state and guided them to this good end, the more liable was the nation itself and the more brilliant the figure it made in history’.<sup>15</sup>

## Imperial historicism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Hungary

Herder’s theory of nation and historicism appeared in Hungary in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and it gave the foundation of the backward-looking imperial historicism. Imperial historicism in Hungary had been developing in three forms by the end of the century, among which the intension of self-identification with the past constituted the difference. The ethnical theory of self-identification emphasised the partly common but partly changeable character traits of the past and present Hungarians; the institutional theory of self-identification claimed that there are common institutions, among them the Idea of the Holy Crown; and finally, the political theory of self-identification demanded a whole political and social identification between a special political formation of the Hungarian past and the present.

### *Ethnical self-identification with the past*

Herder’s theory of the internal character of nations could be observed as early as the Hungarian Reform Era, particularly in the cultural-ethnical theory of nation of István Széchenyi.<sup>16</sup>

In his book, *Kelet népe* [People of the East], Széchenyi claimed that every people has a ‘genius’ which is accompanying the people through its history and brings about the

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<sup>14</sup> Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago–London: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 9–34.

<sup>15</sup> Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* (Ebook: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), book 15, III.

<sup>16</sup> János Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok* (Budapest: Osiris, 2007), 46.

rise of the people. The absence of the 'genius' causes stagnation in the life of people. The Hungarian 'genius' is 'constitutional liberty' and relating to this 'uplifted ethnicity'. The root of 'constitutional liberty' is the partly Eastern origin of Hungarians, which gave Hungarians the constitutors of their 'genius': unlimited fever ('korlátlan tűz'), pure strength ('vas erő'), and destructive devotion ('romboló ittasság'). According to Széchenyi, however, these character traits should be changed to bring out the rise of the Hungarians: fever should turn into noble zeal ('nemes hév'), strength into courage ('bajnoki bátorság'), and devotion into magnanimity ('nagylelkűség').<sup>17</sup>

'Constitutional liberty' and these character traits do not stand in and for themselves. Széchenyi claimed that every human nation is the result of God's creation, however, Hungarians can rise over the others by their developed character traits. By uplifting, Hungarians can get closer to God in their humanity, than the other nations could who are without constitution. These further nations are 'mixed' ('zagyvalék') nations, who are satisfied without constitution. The risen people, like Hungarians, should consolidate their risen morality inside their borders and should spread their risen humanity (for example language) among the 'mixed' peoples. Risen peoples should assimilate 'mixed' peoples. The proper way for assimilation is to become an 'ideal' for them in the development in humanity and to get closer to God. The violent spread of ethnicity is improper, because mixed peoples are also the creatures of God.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Institutional self-identification with the past: The Doctrine of the Holy Crown***

The Idea of the Holy Crown was born in the Hungarian Middle Ages.<sup>19</sup> Reference to this Idea in the 19<sup>th</sup> century included at least two claims, which could be connected to the Idea independently. One of these claims focused on the function of the Idea of the Holy Crown without the reference (or only with marginal reference) to the Holy Crown. The other claim referred to the unique legal institution of the Holy Crown connected to the same function. The function in question was that the Hungarians and their state have the historical mission of integrating the peoples living in the Carpathian Basin and so, securing peace, defence and civilisation for them. The expression of the legal institution of the Idea in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was called the Doctrine of the Holy Crown which is the legally detailed version of the Idea.

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<sup>17</sup> István Széchenyi, *A kelet népe* (Pozsony: Wigan Károly Fridrik, 1841), 9–17.

<sup>18</sup> Ernő Fábrián, 'Széchenyi István szabadelvű politikai modellje', *Erdélyi Múzeum* 54, no 14 (1992), 19–20; Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok*, 50.

<sup>19</sup> Mihály Boda, 'The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crown', *Journal of Military Ethics* 20, no 3–4 (2021).

## The historic mission of the Hungarians: integrating different peoples living in the Carpathian Basin

The description of the Hungarian historic mission of integrating different peoples living in the Carpathian Basin was considered of importance generally by Hungarian historians in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. These historians did not refer to the Idea of the Holy Crown or the Idea was not in the centre of their thinking. An early representative of this sort of thinking, however, was not a historian, but a politician, Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894).

Kossuth was formulating a historical-political theory of the nation in the columns of the newspaper *Pesti Hírlap* during the 1840s. The historic Hungarian mission was an important part of this theory. The content of the mission was, according to Kossuth, that Hungarian people should represent Hungarian liberty, so it must liberate itself (from the Habsburg rule), must protect its liberty and should gift peoples living in the Carpathian Basin with this liberty.<sup>20</sup> Hence, Kossuth thought too peoples have uniqueness which had been developing and strengthening during the history of peoples. The uniqueness of the Hungarians is the desire of liberty, which is expressed by the language, the constitution, the common sentiments, and the common historical rights.<sup>21</sup> This uniqueness should be preserved, cultivated and completed, and by implication the Hungarians should build national unity in the Carpathian Basin.<sup>22</sup> Kossuth thought that some nations could be exemptions from Hungarian national unity, those which have their own national history (e.g. the Croatians). These peoples should take the Hungarian language in their public administration only (displacing Latin language with it), but their territory should not be a real province of Hungary, only an attached province.<sup>23</sup>

In the second half of the century, two historians, Mihály Horváth (1809–1878) and Arnold Ipolyi (1823–1886), emphasised the importance of the Hungarian ability of liberty-giving. The foundation of Horváth's works was that the final aim of human history is the final development of the citizens' world when the whole humanity will be joining in liberty and equality.<sup>24</sup> The Hungarians excel in this history with their 'flaming love of liberty', which appeared previously in their brotherly and comradely relations to other peoples of the Carpathian Basin.<sup>25</sup> Ipolyi's theory followed a similar track:

'When the Hungarians were conquering the country, they did not discriminate between the conquerors and the captives as different nations. They demanded neither hegemony nor privileges nor separate rights for the ruling ethnicity. They did not build walls amidst the ethnicities and did not create casts. They did not have damned fellowmen as the French has, oppressed class as the English has, or helots as the free and literate people of Hellas had, or slaves like the Negros and outlaw Indians of the free American republic. [...] Every

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<sup>20</sup> Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok*, 30–31.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 39.

<sup>22</sup> Domokos Kosáry, 'A Pesti Hírlap nacionalizmusa 1841–1844', *Századok* 75, no 7–10 (1943), 376, 408, 412.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 387; Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok*, 40.

<sup>24</sup> Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében* (Budapest: Osiris, 2011), 86.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted by: *Ibid.* 126.

person with any language and nationality who became the member of the Hungarian crown received its every liberty and became the member of the ruling nation'.<sup>26</sup>

Hence, the history of the non-Hungarian peoples of the Carpathian Basin connected them to the Hungarians. History did not bring them subjection but constitution-based liberty, a particular relationship which, according to Ipolyi, results in historical rights and duties for their own time. Hence, the historian is the person who – as a judge – could make a decision on such rights and duties because he knows the past. The conclusion Ipolyi draws is that the Hungarian nation has a right for the Hungarian state language, and because of its higher spiritual abilities, the Hungarian nation has the duty to impinge to the less developed peoples. The common good of the country could be secured in such a way only. The consequence of such historical rights and duties is the occurrence of so called 'mixed peoples' ('vegynépek') (empires contained many less developed peoples led by a more highly developed people), which are superior to peoples including just a single nation ('fajtisza nép').<sup>27</sup>

Analysing history, Ipolyi draws attention to many special Hungarian social institutions with the help of which Hungarians were able to realise their historical mission. Such institutions were the (mythical) blood oath (at the beginning of the *Honfoglalás* [The Hungarian Conquest of the Carpathian Basin]), the Apostolic Hungarian Kingdom (in the Middle Ages), and the Idea of the Holy Crown by István Werbőczy (in the early modern period).<sup>28</sup>

### The role of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown in imperial historicism

During the formation of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown a historian of law, Imre Hajnik (1840–1902) studied the development of the Hungarian medieval social institutions in his book written on the legal history of Hungary (*Magyarország az Árpád-királyoktól az ősiségnek megállapításáig és a hűbéri Európa* [History of Hungary from the Age of the House of the Árpád Kings to the Statement of Primordality]). According to Hajnik, Hungarian institutions feature exclusively the Hungarian legal development and distinguish it from European legal history. The distinctive elements of the European legal development are central control (coming from ancient Rome and medieval Catholic Church), and individual liberty and absolute loyalty (coming from the ancient Germans). These features were compounded by the Carolingian Empire, and the Ottonian Holy Roman Empire, which resulted in the feudal social system of the Middle Ages.<sup>29</sup>

Contrary to the European development, Hajnik took the Hungarian progression as marked by the 'national common spirit', 'which was shown by our ancestors from their first

<sup>26</sup> Arnold Ipolyi, 'A magyar nemzetegység és államnyelv történeti alakulása', in *Egyház, műveltség, történetírás*, ed. by Flóris Rómer, Arnold Ipolyi and Vilmos Fraknoi (Budapest: Gondolat, 1981), 102.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 108–113.

<sup>28</sup> Ipolyi, 'A magyar nemzetegység és államnyelv történeti alakulása', 102–103.

<sup>29</sup> Imre Hajnik, *Magyarország az Árpád-királyoktól az ősiségnek megállapításáig és a hűbéri Európa* (Pest: Heckenast Gusztáv, 1867), 1–7.

appearance'.<sup>30</sup> Hajnik listed several institutions which express 'national common spirit'. So, the blood oath was not Árpád's own initiative but the nation's, and the nation chose Árpád to be the leader of the conquest of the Carpathian Basin (at end of the 9<sup>th</sup> century). Similarly, the members of the nation took part on King Stephen I's lawgiving days (in the first half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century). And again, the rights of the members were secured in the Golden Bull under King Andrew II (at the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> century). The land properties were particularly secured by the right of the primordality (landed properties of the nobility are inalienable and in case of dying out they escheat) under the Anjou kings (in the 14<sup>th</sup> century), which were expressed in the Idea of the Holy Crown of István Werbőczy (at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century). According to the Idea, the rightholders are the members of the Holy Crown because of their landed property.<sup>31</sup> Another historian of law, Emil Récsi (1822–1864) continued shaping the Doctrine of the Holy Crown by adding items to the list of public law institutions. These items included several acts of the 17–19<sup>th</sup> centuries, among them the *Pragmatica Sanctio* (1723) and Article X of the Act of 1790/92 which secured the succession of the Habsburg kings (and queens) and prescribed the respect of the peculiar tradition of Hungary in the Habsburg Empire, respectively.<sup>32</sup>

The most important part of the Hungarian 'national public spirit' is supposedly the 'wisdom of organising the state', according to the jurist Károly Kmety (1863–1929). This wisdom contained liberty-loving, by which the Hungarian nation 'was able to create, accept and love constitutional state only, in which authority belonged to and was practiced by the allness. [...] The nation itself was the state'.<sup>33</sup>

The concept of 'wisdom of organising the state', the political liberty, and Hungarian 'allness' had significance at least in three aspects in the 19<sup>th</sup> century: in the relationship of the Hungarian nation and other nations in the Carpathian Basin (ruled by the Hungarians at that time); in the relationship of the Hungarian nation and the Habsburg king; and finally in the relationship of the Hungarian nation and the territories and states formerly ruled by Hungarians before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first of these is an issue of internal politics, which is not of importance here.<sup>34</sup> The two others, however, are in close connection with the Hungarian ideologies of foreign policy and warfare.

In the question of the relationship between the Hungarian nation and the Habsburg king, the Doctrine of the Holy Crown strengthened the position that political authority in Hungary derives from the Holy Crown and is wielded by the king and the nation together. Béla Szabó, a legal expert in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, expressed this claim by stating that 'Hungarian royal prerogative is put down in the crown; [...] the Hungarian king is not the owner of Hungarian sovereignty but the holder of it [...] he does not rule, and he is not a dominator (*dominateur, Herrscher*), because domination is corollary of ownership. The king reigns (*regnat, il regne, regiert*) [...] and neither the Hungarian nation nor any

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 14, 27, 99–100, 101–102.

<sup>32</sup> Emil Récsi, *Magyarország közjoga amint 1848-ig s 1848-ban fennállott* (Budapest: Pfeifer Ferdinánd, 1861), 116–120.

<sup>33</sup> Károly Kmety, *A magyar közjog tankönyve* (Budapest: Politzer Zsigmond és Fia Kiadása, 1902), ix–x.

<sup>34</sup> See Tomasz Kamusella, *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 456–472.

of its members are subjects (*subditi, sujet, Unterhanen*) of the Hungarian king'.<sup>35</sup> Hence, Hungary differs from other parts of the Habsburg Empire, which are subjugated to the ruling (and not just reigning) king as fiefdom or real province. For this reason, according to Szabó, the existing Habsburg Empire does not have a legal unity, only a political one, which *status quo* should be terminated 'with respect to the Hungarian countries'.<sup>36</sup> For this reason the National Assembly ('országgyűlés') should legally initiate the recognition of the legal status of Hungary as reigned (but not ruled) by the king, and the reintegration of those territories and countries into Hungary which had belonged to Hungary during its history but then got separated and became parts of the Habsburg Empire only. The legal foundation of these claims is the *Pragmatica Sanctio* (1723) and Article X of the Act of 1790/91, according to which Hungary with its attached countries is an independent country with separate constitution.<sup>37</sup> Szabó offered his suggestion as a middle position between two extremes (unification in every respect, and independence in every respect), which was suitable for the justification of the revolution in 1848 (but not the war for independence in 1849).

In respect to those parts of Hungary which were outside not only of Hungary but of the Habsburg Empire as well, the Doctrine of the Holy Crown would have justified their recapturing. According to Emil Récsi the Holy Crown has rights over the historical Hungarian territories. Although these territories could be divided into territories of the motherland (where the authority of the Holy Crown prevailed) and the adjunct territories (where the authority of the Holy Crown did not prevail, only the rights),<sup>38</sup> these territories 'constitute the unified body of the country' for the reason of the unified nature of the Crown.<sup>39</sup> The adjunct territories include those territories which are inside the Habsburg Empire (Dalmatia, Galitia, Lodomeria, Bukovina), and those which are outside the Empire (Slavonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Moldova, Romania). Hungarian kings did not renounce the rights for the latter territories but tried to uphold them. Récsi grounded this claim by referring to the so-called 'reannexation clause' of the inaugural diploma (issued by Hungarian kings at their enthronement in order to secure their respect for Hungarian political traditions) which had been in the diploma since the liberation wars (1687). According to the clause, 'every part of this country or its attached provinces which had been recovered by that time or would be reclaimed thereafter with the help of God [...] should have been integrated into the mentioned country'.<sup>40</sup>

This place of the diploma, however, was not unambiguous. Récsi added a footnote to the above citation, in which he substituted his opinion. He stated that the 'reannexation clause' does not justify an offensive war of the king purposing to recover a previously lost territory if the loss was legalised by a peace treaty. The clause hence should be interpreted as saying if somehow previously lost territories came back to the Habsburg Empire then

<sup>35</sup> Béla Szabó, *A' Magyar Korona országainak státuszjogi és monarchiai állása a' Pragmatica Sanctio szerint* (Pozsony: Az Író Sajtója, 1848), 81–83.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* 52.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* 88–92.

<sup>38</sup> Récsi, *Magyarország közjoga amint 1848-ig s 1848-ban fennállott*, 29–30.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* 73–74.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* 77–78.

they should be integrated into Hungary.<sup>41</sup> According to Récsi, the Hungarian claims for the previously lost territories are historical and legal in character, which had political significance but not legal.<sup>42</sup>

### ***Political self-identification with the past***

The third form of the Hungarian self-identification with past is the self-identification with past empires by setting them examples for the Hungarian foreign policy at the turn of 19–20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Suggestions included reference to the empire of king Anjou Louis I, or Louis the Great and of King Matthias I.

#### Empire of the Danube Valley: Empire of King Matthias I

Gusztáv Beksics (1846–1906), a publicist and representative in the National Assembly, in his book entitled *Mátyás király birodalma és Magyarország jövője* [King Matthias's Empire and the Future of Hungary] took the historical example of the Hungarian kings and drafted his own theory of foreign policy based on these examples. According to Beksics, Hungarian history was featured by 'firmness and constancy' in many periods,<sup>43</sup> like under the rule of the Árpád dynasty, and for the last time under the rule of King Matthias I. The turning point of the Hungarian history was the lost battle of Mohács (1526). The previous period – King Matthias's rule – was the 'great' time of the Hungarian history,<sup>44</sup> the following periods, however, were the periods of 'vegetation' of the alliances with Austria. Matthias's great empire was based on the necessities of his era, the danger posed to Hungary both by the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. 'Matthias, to save his country, made it great'.<sup>45</sup>

According to Beksics, the situation at the turn of the 19–20<sup>th</sup> centuries is similar to the period of Matthias:

'The problem of the Hungarians and Hungary before Mohács was whether they were able to establish a great state between the German Empire and the Turkish Empire. [...] Matthias solved this task.

[...] Now and in the future, we are talking about this state, adopting to the changing conditions, would come about again, naturally in a long and hard struggle and in a wholly different shape.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 73–77. Cf. László Buza, 'A magyar Szent Korona igényei a volt mellékországokra', *Budapesti Szemle* 167, no 3 (1916), 398–399.

<sup>42</sup> According to another approach, if capturing is sponsored and performed by the king then it is not recapturing at all but a new conquest. Only a third approach, which is based on the natural right, could justify the recapturing of the previously lost territories. This position, however, is contrary to historicism. Cf. László Buza, 'A magyar Szent Korona igényei', 415–416, 402.

<sup>43</sup> Gusztáv Beksics, *Mátyás király birodalma és Magyarország jövője* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1905), 5.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. 7.

The place of the Ottoman Empire has been taken over by the Slav Empire, however in different geographical positions. Living between the huge German and Slav masses, the Hungarians should not only secure their life conditions but should also organise their balancing mission between these world powers'.<sup>46</sup>

In order to establish the empire, Matthias conquered and became the 'natural leader' of the surrounding peoples. According to Beksics, that is just what is needed at the turn of the 19–20<sup>th</sup> centuries: the re-establishment of the historical Hungarian state. For doing this 'Matthias's empire is the ideal',<sup>47</sup> so Hungary should pursue 'national unity' inside the country,<sup>48</sup> and 'great unfolding of the Hungarian species' and acquisition of hegemony and influence outside. However, in contrast to Matthias, Hungarians should direct their initiatives in the direction of the Balkans only and not towards the Austrian provinces. Influence should be figured out as 'constitutional leadership', to help the surrounding peoples in reaching their national independence and in their constitutional development to which Hungary's 'thousand years old' constitution should be an ideal. By such development, these peoples would be able to resist the Russian and Pan-Slav intrusion, because the Russian political system is despotic, absolutistic, and violent; the Slavs themselves are in turn an eccentric and disjointed people, unable to establish their constitutional independence by themselves.<sup>49</sup> As a result, according to Beksics, a Danube Valley Empire could be established, which includes Austria and the Balkan peoples and countries apart from Hungary.

### The 'Greater Hungarian' Empire

János Asbóth (1845–1911), a politician, argued for the necessity of a Hungarian empire in his work *Eszmék a magyar faj hivatásáról* [Ideas on the Mission of the Hungarian Species]. Asbóth started from the definition of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, which is according to him 'the constant association of two unified states by a treaty between the states'.<sup>50</sup> Asbóth, however, accepted neither part of this definition, because he thought only Hungary was unified and Austria was not (it did not exist before the 1860s); these states entered into the association by necessity and not by a treaty; and this association is not constant because an essential feature of the Hungarian nation was that it was developing constantly reflecting to European necessities. The next stage of this development would be establishing a Hungarian empire led by a Habsburg king:

'A great empire should be coalesced around Hungary. [...] The mission of the Hungarian species in turn is to establish, consolidate, and maintain this empire. By this it satisfies its own necessity, the necessity of the minor species, and the European necessity. The Hungarian species was always pursuing this, it started that when it settled down after the

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. 138.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 179.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 158.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 144–152.

<sup>50</sup> János Asbóth, 'Eszmék a magyar faj hivatásáról', in *Jellemrajzok és tanulmányok korunk történetéhez*, by Asbóth János (Budapest: Az „Athenaeum” R. Társulat Kiadása, 1892), 25.

migration, it established that under Louis the Great and Matthias, [...] it will venture that for the third time'.<sup>51</sup>

However, according to Asbóth, necessity was not and is not enough to establish the empire, but the Hungarian character traits are essential as well. These are: the pride which could be achieved by risk-taking and firm spirit, the feeling of the call to do something great, and the demand of leadership, which was completed by the caution: 'we are not created to be small: Hungarians have a Roman feature as well'. This Hungarian character meets the multiple, geographically determined and historically revealed necessities. These are: the European balance of power which should be maintained between a German and an Eastern (this time Russian) empire; and at same time Hungarian and the surrounding peoples' independence should be secured.<sup>52</sup>

The resulting Hungarian empire would include Austria (which detached from Germany after the establishment of the Prussian led Germany), and those territories and political entities which were in the history under Hungarian rule for some time, and 'gravitate in direction of Hungary': Bukovina, Moldova, Romania, Galicia, Lodomeria, Bohemia, the German Alpine provinces, Dalmatia, the provinces by the Lower Danube, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia.<sup>53</sup> Asbóth hence imagined an empire which included all the historical Hungarian conquests and acquisitions, so this empire can be called 'Greater Hungarian' Empire.<sup>54</sup>

In practice, however, Asbóth connected the establishment of the Hungarian empire to the weakening and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, from his list he would have attached only those territories to Hungary which had been under Turkish rule, and from where the Ottoman Empire had withdrew. Until this time the duty of Hungary is to prevent these territories from getting into the sphere of interest of other great powers. Asbóth had no doubt about the success because he thought that the Hungarian species has a 'great expansive force'. The territory of Hungary had been broadening very much from the 17<sup>th</sup> century (when it was only a narrow lobe at the borders of the Austrian and Bohemian provinces) till the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Hungary recovered those territories which had been lost because of the Turkish conquest step by step. According to Asbóth, this process does not have an end and continues with the further weakening of the Turkish rule.<sup>55</sup>

## Summary

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, political ideologies of foreign policy were mostly linked to the development of the modern European nation states. 'Nation' is such a unity of individuals that nevertheless has a meaning beyond the allness of the individuals. A nation can survive generations of individuals and governments and is

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid. 26.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 26–27, 31–33.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. 33–42.

<sup>54</sup> István Hajnal uses the expression of 'Greater Hungarian empire' in a different sense. See István Hajnal, *A Batthyány-kormány külpolitikája* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 33.

<sup>55</sup> Asbóth, 'Eszmék a magyar faj hivatásáról', 44–45.

authorised to reinforce or reject the laws and general policies of the individuals living on a particular territory. In that age, some nation states that had a long history stretching back in time, attempted to find the fundament of their ideology in history. Imperial historicism, which pursued deducing historical rights and duties from historical facts and to support the policy of the nation state, was the suitable ideology for these states. The deduction was theoretically possible because the representatives of the nation states (or at least who accepted the theoretical position of historicism) identified their community with the historical antecedent forms of the community.

For doing this, they applied the study of history which was at an early stage of its development.

Similar deduction would be more difficult on the strength of the fully evolved study of history.

In Hungary one can observe three forms of self-identification with the past, which differs in intensity of the self-identification. These forms are the ethnical self-identification (Széchenyi), the institutional self-identification (Ipolyi, Szabó), and the political self-identification (Beksics, Asbóth). These forms prevailed independently, however, the representatives of the more intense forms revised the content of the less intense forms in light of their own ideology.

Other 19<sup>th</sup> century nation states, which did not have a long history, attempted to support their political purposes (above all their political independence) with the help of another science of that age, the science of the laws of nations based on natural law. This idea was important in Hungary too in the Reform Period; however, after the Compromise (1867), historicism and the study of history came into prominence instead. In Western Europe, natural law thinking, however, did not disappear wholly, but by the Great War it had come into the limelight again. In Hungary the thinking of imperial historicism still ruled political ideologies, which was not applied to offensive aims at that time, but mainly to defensive aims, to argue for upholding the unity of the country. In the spring of 1917, István Bethlen (1874–1946) argued in the National Assembly that while Woodrow Wilson and the Triple Entente were supporting the ‘principle of nationality’, according to which peace should be promoted by respecting the national sovereignty, it was out of accord with the existence of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. ‘[T]he existence of the Monarchy, however, was not in contrast with the interest of humanity and progress, on the contrary, the existence of the Monarchy and the independence of Hungary are necessary to maintain peace and secure the possibility of progress for the interests of humanity in that part of Europe where we live (*general approval*)’.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> István Bethlen, ‘A háború esetére szóló kivételes hatalomról. (A monarchia jövő külpolitikája)’, in *Bethlen István gróf beszédei és írásai. Első kötet* (Budapest: Genius Könyvkiadó, 1933), 122.

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# The Internationalisation of the Conflict in Libya

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*Libya has been characterised by instability since the Arab Spring. In 2011, Western powers decided to intervene. In spite of stated goals, this violent dispute has been ongoing ever since. In this paper, we seek to answer the following research question: why do certain internationalised violent disputes, specifically new civil wars, remain violent even when the actors involved seek a cessation of hostilities? We utilise a single-outcome case study<sup>6</sup> research design and we compare and contrast the involvement of great powers, European leading powers and regional powers. We highlight the use of soft and/or hard foreign policy tools. We distinguish between policy goals and policy tools. We find that the essential interests and policy goals of the analysed powers will unlikely change, but change in the use of their foreign policy tools will likely be a shift towards harder tools, which will exacerbate further the Libyan stabilisation process. Even a coincidence of the stated policy goals of external actors, namely a cessation of hostilities is insufficient to end a new civil war. As long as the policy tools themselves remain un-coordinated between the actors, they counteract one another, and the conflict continues to remain violent.*

**Keywords:** *Libya, internationalisation, new civil war, conflict, foreign policy*

## Introduction

Libya has been characterised by instability since the protests of the Arab Spring broke out in February 2011. When protests against the Gaddafi regime were brutally repressed by the Libyan Government, Western powers decided to intervene. The international community strongly condemned the repression of peaceful demonstrators, and the adoption of UNSCR

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<sup>6</sup> John Gerring, 'Single-Outcome Studies: A Methodological Primer', *International Sociology* 21, no 5 (2006), 707–734.

1973 sealed the fate of Gaddafi's regime. *Operation Odyssey Dawn* was launched, and after an agreement between NATO member states, NATO took the lead in the intervention under the name of *Operation Unified Protector*. However, the successful military intervention was not followed by adequate democracy and state building processes, and this resulted in political turmoil in Libya.

Prior to this intervention, Libya was characterised by 40 years of turbulent statelessness and authoritarian leadership, which was challenged in 2011 by rising notions of civil society and democracy.<sup>7</sup> Domestic economic, cultural and political factors contributed to failure and difficulties of democracy and state building process and to the fragmentation of post-Gaddafi Libya's security order.<sup>8</sup> In this paper, we analyse the international influence and its effects on the conflict. We classify this conflict building on Kaldor's work on distinguishing between new and old wars<sup>9</sup> as a "new civil war". We elaborate on this concept later.

Although the General National Congress (GNC) more or less managed to exercise authority over Libya from 2012 to 2014, since the second Libyan civil war broke out in 2014, no central authority was able to exercise power over the whole country. The increasing polarisation of the Libyan factions resulted into widespread outbreaks of violence across the country. Libya split into three parts, similar to the era before the official unification of the state: Tripolitania (the Western part), Cyrenaica (the Eastern part) and Fezzan (Southern territories). The three parts functioned almost as independent entities. Several Eastern and Western groups have been fighting for power, and since foreign actors started to support them, the domestic conflict has become international. The internationalisation of the conflict<sup>10</sup> became apparent when Khalifa Haftar launched his attack against Tripoli in April 2019 and a new civil war began.

As a case study, this paper aims to understand the connection between domestic conflict and international security questions. We seek to contribute to the literature of the internationalisation of "new civil wars" by underlining the importance of regional and international political factors in explaining why the conflict in Libya has not been resolved and continues to remain violent.<sup>11</sup> We analyse three levels of internationalisation: the involvement of great powers (the United States, Russia, China), European leading powers (France, Italy, Germany) and regional powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey) in the Libyan crisis. The main features of their Libyan involvement are synthetised, while the use of soft and/or hard foreign policy tools is highlighted. Our

<sup>7</sup> Emanuela Paoletti, 'Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict', *Mediterranean Politics* 16 no 2, (2011) 313–319.

<sup>8</sup> Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, 'The Deep Roots of Libya's Security Fragmentation', *Middle Eastern Studies* 55 no 2 (2019), 200–224.

<sup>9</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> About Libya see Youssef Mohammad Sawani, 'Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future', *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5, no 1 (2012), 1–26; Roberto Aliboni et al., *Conflict in Libya: A Multidimensional Crisis. State of Play and Paths towards a Sustainable Peace* (IEMed, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017); Mikael Eriksson, 'A Fratricidal Libya: Making Sense of a Conflict Complex', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no 5 (2016), 817–836; George Joffé, 'Where does Libya go now?', *The Journal of North African Studies* 25, no 1 (2020), 1–7.

<sup>11</sup> Amy L. Freedman and Sarah Davies Murray, 'Explaining the Internationalization of Insurgencies', in *The Internationalization of Internal Conflicts. Threatening the State*, ed. by Amy L. Freedman (London – New York: Routledge, 2014), 1–2.

analysis centres on how the conflict is internationalised until 2019 and seeks to answer why the conflict has continued to remain violent in spite of the actors' coinciding goal of a cessation of hostilities.

## Conceptual background

The research question we ask is the following: why does an internationalised violent dispute, specifically a “new civil war”, continue to remain violent when the actors involved seek a cessation of hostilities? Alternatively, why is there a policy failure even when the goals of the actors involved are aligned? Our hypothesis is that for a detracted internationalised violent dispute, a new civil war, to end hostilities, the mere confluence of goals by the participating actors is insufficient. The methods and policy choices themselves chosen by the actors must also achieve a sufficient critical mass to result in a cessation of hostilities. When the policy choices are conflicting, they off-set each other resulting in a continuation of hostilities and the persistence of a new civil war.

The conflict in Libya post-2011 until 2019 has been chosen to test this hypothesis. The case selection for this research is a single-outcome case study, borrowing from Gerring's design.<sup>12</sup> Single-outcome studies, and ours in particular, are apt in investigating a negative response as well. The lack of the cessation of hostilities is the negative outcome in our case study. The continuation of the new civil war, proxied through the continuation of hostilities, is what we are looking to examine. The selection for the case study is in accordance with what Seawright and Gerring suggest: a most likely case, which represents a cross-case relationship well.<sup>13</sup>

The Libyan conflict is such a case, where we witness a continuation of a new type of civil war that began in 2011. There are numerous actors involved with differing goals, namely: the United States, Russia, China, France, Italy, Germany, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, making the conflict international. Further, there is a large variety in geographic location of actors involved and between their aggregate power and military capabilities. Further, as we demonstrate, despite this large variety, the specific goal for almost all actors involved was to cease hostilities and to end the Libyan conflict.

But if their goals coincide, namely that the conflict should end, then why do hostilities persist? Our hypothesis is that a mere policy goal confluence of end-state is not a sufficient cause to stop hostilities. Instead, the policies themselves must not be, at the least, off-setting. If they are, which is what we demonstrate here, then the hostilities will continue.

In our analysis, we find it important to distinguish between policy outcomes and policy outputs, or tools employed. For each of the eleven external actors involved, we examine their desired end-state as a policy goal, but also their chosen policy output or tool. After

<sup>12</sup> Gerring, ‘Single-Outcome Studies’.

<sup>13</sup> Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no 2 (2008), 299.

this analysis, we will demonstrate how the policy outputs off-set each other, resulting in the continuation of the new civil war.

## New civil wars: A brief introduction

Since the end of the bipolar era, the nature of conflicts has undergone significant changes. These changes have prompted the academic world to rethink how we understand different types of conflicts, and the way we interpret the connection between domestic conflict and international relations. The research on the internationalisation of internal conflicts has been given an impetus in the last couple of years, as many current civil wars have undergone a turn towards internationalisation due to foreign actors' interventions.

As Freeman argues, civil wars cannot be understood anymore as being entirely different from international conflicts. Further, a number of scholars – based mainly on the argument of Mary Kaldor – describe a new sort of war which is neither a classic civil war, nor a classic international war. This category is labelled as “new civil wars”. New civil wars are characterised by a multiplicity of types of fighting units both public and private, state and non-state, or some kind of mixture.<sup>14</sup> However, the relevance of the new civil wars thesis is highly debated, its most important criticism is that not the warfare itself changed, but the way we analyse it. The same debate was visible with Kaldor's original distinction between new and old wars. We do not wish to cast judgment on the debate, but merely employ “new civil wars” as a useful analytical framework to study the Libyan crisis.

New civil wars usually raise the issue of state legitimacy and state weakness, as they can relate to larger regional security issues, and involve ethno-religious or communal differences. According to Lobell and Mauceri, as state institutions weaken, particularly if it results in the undermining of pre-existing ethnic power balance, there is a greater likelihood that the conflict can either be diffused to neighbouring states or escalate within the state, thus weak state capacity provides a site of opportunity for internationalisation.<sup>15</sup> As Bennett and Levy lays out, weak rulers often seek international support or cooperation to deal with local security, political or economic problem which leads almost directly to internationalisation.<sup>16</sup> Once an internal conflict draws in external actors, or spreads to neighbouring states (or both), the conflict often becomes more violent, and harder to control and resolve.<sup>17</sup> This applies squarely and is readily observable in the case of Libya, as well.

<sup>14</sup> Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 92.

<sup>15</sup> Steven E. Lobell and Philip P. Mauceri (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

<sup>16</sup> Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, 'Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt 1962–1973', *International Organization* 45, no 3 (1991), 369–395.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 26; William Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts', in *Evasive Peace*, ed. by William Zartman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 4.

Freeman's edited book is a fundamental work examining the internalisation of civil wars. The employed typology of interfering actors is closely connected with conflict internationalisation. In our study we accept the definitions introduced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program which divides actors based on the level of their involvement and their way of interfering in the armed conflict.<sup>18</sup> The main division is between primary parties – directly involved in the conflicts and having formed the incompatibility of warring parties' interests – and secondary parties which are subdivided into further categories. Secondary warring parties support actively one side of the conflict – usually with troops – while secondary non-warring parties (i.e. secondary supporting parties) provide support to the primary party, thus affecting the development of the conflict in a more indirect way than secondary warring parties. Based on this categorisation, external actors can be labelled as either primary or secondary parties in the internationalisation process.

In the case of Libya, we identify three levels of actors participating in some form in the conflict. The conflict *prima facie* has been fought by primary actors with numerous non-state actors, but both secondary warring parties (e.g. Turkey from 2020), and secondary non-warring parties are also present. Further, three levels of internationalisation can be distinguished as well: the interference of great powers, regional/local powers and European powers. The paper focuses on the involvement of states, while the role of international organisations present in Libya is not discussed.<sup>19</sup>

In our analysis, we understood internationalisation as the process of involvement of international actors at any stage of a domestic conflict. As from the end of the NATO-led military intervention up until the beginning of 2020 – until Turkey's decision to send troops to Libya – the international actors acted as secondary non-warring parties in our work we analyse their involvement. Within the secondary non-warring parties, we introduce subcategories based on the foreign policy tools (hard–soft) used by external actors. When examining the role of the above-mentioned countries in the ongoing Libyan crisis, Khalifa Haftar's operation against Tripoli (launched in April 2019) has not been concluded by the time our analysis was submitted and as such, we only draw conclusions from before this. Haftar's operation further complicates Libyan domestic politics.

In our analysis, hard foreign policy tools are mainly and primarily a military presence, including the presence of military advisors and Special Forces. We consider economic sanctions as another, more sophisticated form of hard foreign policy tools, while economic aid is characterised as a soft tool. Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power in international relations in the early 1990s. According to this theory, soft power is the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power – the ability to coerce – stems out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from the perceived attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world

<sup>18</sup> Uppsala Universitet, *Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Definitions*, s. a.

<sup>19</sup> About the role and activities of international organisations in the post-Ghaddafi era see Anna Molnár et al., 'Security sector reform by intergovernmental organizations in Libya', *Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies* 14, no 1 (2021), 7–48.

of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence.<sup>20</sup>

It is important to note that hard and soft foreign policy tools are at times used in parallel, since they complement each other, and as such, one may at times not exist efficiently without the other. Despite this, we attempt to display the dominant features of the above-mentioned countries' foreign policy tools in Libya. We demonstrate that there is a considerable variety in the policy tools used. Some states use hard foreign policy tools, some soft, and some a combination of both. The policy tools are at times uncoordinated and off-set each other, which hinders the possible cessation of hostilities. In addition to national actors, international organisations also play an important role, but for reasons of brevity this analysis does not examine the role of the European Union and other relevant international organisations.

## Great powers

### *The United States – not leading from behind anymore*

The United States has been actively involved in the conflict since its outset, and President Barack Obama described the strategy of the U.S. regarding the Libyan intervention as “leading from behind”.<sup>21</sup> After the Obama Administration voted to pass UNSCR 1973, the U.S. Air Force participated actively in the ousting of the Gaddafi regime. Later on, however, Barack Obama stated that the intervention in Libya was the worst mistake of his presidency.<sup>22</sup> Obama bemoaned the fact that instead of turning into a democracy, the Libyan state's functionality is currently fragile, and the country is close to becoming a failed state. The U.S. policy ever since has been defined by efforts to contain and mitigate the negative effects of state collapse, support transition efforts and resolve conflict, however, the level and extent of U.S. involvement has varied with the use of soft and hard foreign policy tools.<sup>23</sup>

Libya will most likely never be one of the top priorities of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, as Libya's geographic position is not particularly important in Washington's geopolitical views, since the U.S. imports only a minor share of Libya's oil. These factors are important primarily for Europeans, and the point of view of the U.S. is that the conflict requires European solution.<sup>24</sup> However, Libya remains important for American interests in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. A more stable Libya would enhance the position of the U.S.'s European allies, since the migration crisis could be mitigated, and the risks of jihadist criminal groups infiltrating the continent may be lower. However,

<sup>20</sup> Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

<sup>21</sup> Kedar Pavgi, 'Barack Obama's Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy*, 17 November 2011.

<sup>22</sup> Dominic Tierney, 'The Legacy of Obama's 'Worst Mistake'', *The Atlantic*, 15 April 2016.

<sup>23</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, 'Libya: Conflict, Transition, and U.S. Policy', *Congressional Research Service*, 2020.

<sup>24</sup> Hafed Al-Ghwel, 'The United States Should Not Get Involved in Libya's Civil War', *Atlantic Council*, 14 November 2018.

on their own, Washington's European allies are neither strong, nor united enough to guide developments in Libya, particularly as their attention is centred on the future of the European Union and on Russian influence on NATO's borders.<sup>25</sup> A stable Libya is important from the regional allies' (Tunisia, Egypt) point of view, as well. When analysing U.S. involvement in Libya, it is important to note that neither is it in the interest of the U.S. to participate in another armed conflict in the MENA region, nor does it have enough power (capital) to reconcile all stakeholders.<sup>26</sup>

The U.S. Libya-policy can be divided into five different phases from the beginning of the Arab Spring until 2019 based on the intensity of American involvement. In the first phase – from February to October 2011 – it played a fundamental role in supporting Libyan demonstrators and in the overthrowing of the regime, which was significantly facilitated by the military intervention. The second phase started when the NATO operation terminated after the death of Gaddafi. During this period, the U.S. reinstated its diplomatic presence in Libya and supported the interim authorities. Ambassador Chris Stevens's murder marks the end of this period. The shock caused by his death characterises the third chapter of U.S.–Libya relations between September 2012 and July 2014. This phase ended when the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi was evacuated as a consequence of the outburst of violence in the second Libyan civil war. From July 2014 to January 2017 – the fourth phase – the U.S. supported UN efforts to stabilise Libya, then supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) which was created in accordance with the Libyan Political Agreement. In this period the U.S. carried out airstrikes against ISIS strongholds near Sirte. The ongoing fifth phase started in January 2017 and is characterised by the nearly complete disinterest in Libya apart from counterterrorist and counter-insurgency efforts.<sup>27</sup> The use of hard foreign policy tools prevailed mostly in the first and the second phases and to a smaller extent during the antiterrorist airstrikes against ISIS strongholds. Every other phase was dominated by soft foreign policy tools. The generalised term of 'a more stable Libya' can be considered a policy outcome for the United States but the wavering use of soft and hard foreign policy tools do not show a consistent line of action. This periodisation of the American involvement reflects not only an incoherent use of policy outputs but also the lack of clear strategic visions of the Obama and Trump administrations.

Starting with his election in 2016, the Trump Administration faced two options: the complete withdrawal from Libya, leaving the stabilisation to other international actors, or the strengthening of its Libyan presence and undertaking of a leading role in the stabilisation process. In the spirit of Trump's non-interventionist "America first!" slogan, from the end of 2017 until August 2019, the Trump Administration did not have an accredited U.S.

<sup>25</sup> Ben Fishman, 'The Trump Administration and Libya. The Necessity for Engagement', *The Washington Institute for Near East Policies*, 24 May 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Al-Ghwell, 'The United States'.

<sup>27</sup> Ben Fishman, 'United States: Reluctant Engagement', in *Foreign Actors in Libya's Crisis*, ed. by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (Milano: Atlantic Council, Edizione LediPublishing, 2017), 92; Joffé, 'Where does Libya go now?', 4.

Ambassador to Libya.<sup>28</sup> The airstrikes against ISIS and the capture of a militant accused of playing an instrumental role in the attack against the Embassy in Benghazi that led to the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens<sup>29</sup> were the most visible moments of U.S. involvement in Libya. Apart from these, President Trump has not opted to play a more active role in the Libyan stabilisation. He summarised the standpoint of the U.S. on Libya in an April 2017 press conference with then Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni: “I do not see a role in Libya. I think the United States has, right now, enough roles”. During the press conference, he expressed that except in the counterterrorism arena, the United States will play less of a role in Libya than it did during the Obama Administration.<sup>30</sup>

The fact that the U.S. has not sought contacts with the dynamically changing Libyan power centres and is still supporting the UN-made GNA reflects the desire of the U.S. Government to limit American involvement. In the meanwhile, other international actors maintained diversified relations with the Libyan fractions. The Serraj Government has the support of the Trump Administration, and Prime Minister Serraj has made several official visits to the U.S. Khalifa Haftar seems to be held at a distance, in spite of their former – alleged – relations. However, in 2018, Washington realised the adverse consequences of its complete withdrawal from Libya. This withdrawal from Libya provided Haftar and Russia an opportunity to assert their influence in the whole country and in consequence rudimentary steps were taken to balance relations with rival power fractions.

It is worth noting that Haftar had close relations with the CIA. An increase of terrorism may force the Trump Administration to deepen its involvement in Libya. If Russia undertakes a more active role in Libya – for example, violating the arms embargo – it can have the same effect on U.S. foreign policy. In this case, Trump has to decide whether to leave Libya – at least partially – to Russia, or to prevent this scenario by taking more responsibility.<sup>31</sup>

In line with Trump’s non-involvement policy, the U.S. withdrew its small diplomatic and anti-terrorist military contingent from Libya after Haftar started his operation against Tripoli in April 2019. However, Trump’s phone call to Haftar not only contradicted Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement, but even his own previous Libya policy of backing the GNA. Trump recognised “Field-Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources” while they “discussed a shared vision for Libya’s transition to a stable, democratic political system”.<sup>32</sup> The first part could be

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<sup>28</sup> Donald J. Trump, ‘Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats’, *The White House*, 24 September 2017; Josh Gerstein and Jeremy C. F. Lin, ‘Why these 7 countries are listed on Trump’s travel ban’, *Politico*, 26 June 2018.

<sup>29</sup> ABC News, ‘Benghazi: US Navy SEALs capture man suspected over fatal attack on diplomatic post in Libya’, 31 October 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Fishman, ‘The Trump Administration’.

<sup>31</sup> Fishman, ‘United States’, 94.

<sup>32</sup> Steve Holland, ‘White House says Trump spoke to Libyan commander Haftar on Monday’, *Reuters*, 19 April 2019.

interpreted as an endorsement of Haftar’s military offensive against Tripoli.<sup>33</sup> When Trump was elected president, many Libya policy analysts assumed that he would prefer Haftar to the GNA, if for no other reason than to contradict Obama’s policy. Trump’s affinity for autocratic strongmen and the coincidence of Haftar’s strong anti-Islamist rhetoric with Trump’s declaration of fighting ISIS and privileging counterterrorism also strengthened these views;<sup>34</sup> however, within the timeframe of our analysis very little has changed in the U.S. Libya policy compared with the Obama era.

As airstrikes against ISIS strongholds near Sirte and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces demonstrate, the U.S. has been using hard foreign policy tools in Libya, however, the use of soft tools – as a sign of its disinterest – is also present.

These trends continue more or less unchanged; however, the role of the U.S. in Libya is far from determined. It is important to note here that the most powerful actor has not clearly coordinated its policy tools with the other actors, resorting to policies increasingly in a unilateral manner, and continuing to state that the conflict requires European solutions.<sup>35</sup>

### ***People’s Republic of China – The economic actor***

The second major global power and a rising regional hegemon, the People’s Republic of China aimed to be a determinant economic actor in Gaddafi’s Libya. It focused primarily on oil extraction, but Gaddafi tried to keep China away from this sector. At the same time, the Chinese presence in the building industry was significant, and infrastructural and telecommunication investments flowed to the country. Estimates indicate that the events of the Arab Spring caused a cc. 20 billion USD loss to the Chinese economy in 2011. Several billion USD contracts signed by *China Railway* (transport sector), *Sinohydro* and *China State Construction Engineering* (real estate investments) were annulled.<sup>36</sup>

If we examine Beijing’s behaviour during the escalation of the Libyan crisis from a political point of view, a decisive foreign policy shift can be observed. China acted as a responsible great power, demonstrated by its focus on the evacuation of Chinese guest workers (approximately 35,000 people together with other foreign nationals), or through its pragmatist attitude in the UN Security Council. For example, China voted for UNSCR 1970 about the embargo and contributed to the international military intervention by abstaining from the vote about UNSCR 1973. These contradicted sharply with the principle of non-interference, a staple policy supported by China. But the People’s Republic of China is risk averse: relations with the new Libyan leaders and fractions have been established pragmatically, in line with China’s economic interests. According to Parello-Plesner and

<sup>33</sup> Samer Al-Atrush et al., ‘Trump Backed Libyan Strongman’s Attack on Tripoli, US Officials Say’, *Bloomberg*, 24 April 2019.

<sup>34</sup> Mieczysław P. Boduszynski, *US Democracy Promotion in the Arab World. Beyond Interests vs. Ideals* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019).

<sup>35</sup> Al-Ghwell, ‘The United States’.

<sup>36</sup> Máté Szakáli, ‘Szafarin a Sárkány: Kína befektetései Afrikában’, *Külgügyi Szemle* 3, (2015), 85–86.

Mathieu Duchâtel, the interventionist approach in Chinese foreign policy is more an adjustment to events than the consolidated result of a designed grand strategy.<sup>37</sup>

Despite its appeal for national unity and its rhetorical support of UN mediation, China has not been proactive within Libya. Instead, China's behaviour has been rather reactive, as is evidenced in August 2014 when Beijing responded to the events in Libya with evacuating 900 Chinese nationals.<sup>38</sup>

It is possible to consider Beijing's major policy outcome the need of stability, characterised by an adequate public security and predictability in Libya in order to foster its economic interests. Figuratively, for the Chinese administration sustaining Libya's integrity is important on both due to its own Taiwan policy, and due to discourage intra-PRC separatist aspirations from their ethnic territories. China uses its economic power to create policy output in the Libyan new civil war context; in July 2018, at the China – Arab States Cooperation Forum President Xi Jinping announced a 20 billion USD loan for the reconstruction of infrastructures.<sup>39</sup> However, we predict that Chinese investments/loans will arrive to Libya only after a new, functioning national government is formed after general elections were held in the country under UN supervision.

China's efforts are sufficient by themselves to examine this set of the events, even if after the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, Foreign Minister Vang Ji talked with President Serraj about the possibility of largescale Chinese investments. The investments would be realised in the framework of the *One Belt One Road Initiative* (OBOR), and in the summer of 2018, a memorandum of understanding was signed by which Libya would join OBOR. Libyan ports will be of primary importance for the PRC either for the Chinese Silk Road or for the economic control over the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>40</sup>

China's post-2011 economic Libyan presence is built upon the experiences acquired during the Arab Spring. If necessary, China will protect its facilities and guest workers by arms – there is a reason that a bilateral security package was developed parallel to OBOR. In the summer of 2018, China organised the 1<sup>st</sup> China–Africa Defence and Security Forum with the participation of the African Union and 49 African states. It seems probable that besides its economic involvement in Africa, China will participate in international military and police cooperation as well, even after the civil war ended. Taking into consideration the fast modernisation of the Chinese Navy and the creation of a military base in Djibouti, there is a possibility that China will aspire to build similar presence and influence over the Mediterranean Sea.

<sup>37</sup> Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, 'International rescue: Beijing's mass evacuation from Libya', *Adelphi Series* 54, no 451 (2014), 107; Anastasia Shesterinina, 'Evolving norms of protection: China, Libya and the problem of intervention in armed conflict', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no 3 (2016), 812.

<sup>38</sup> Guy Burton, 'Chinese Conflict Management in Libya, Syria and Yemen after the Arab Uprisings', *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 13, no 1 (2019), 24.

<sup>39</sup> China Daily, 'Highlights of Xi's speech at China–Arab forum', 10 July 2018; Giorgio Cuscito, 'La Cina tornerà in Libia', *Limes Online*, 27 July 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Lorenzo Lamperti, 'Cina pronta a investire in Libia. Così Pechino può salvare Africa (ed Europa)', *Affari Italiani*, 18 February 2019; Safa Alharathy, 'Libya joins China's Belt and Road Initiative', *The Libya Observer*, 13 July 2018.

In spite of its official support for the GNA, through investments (e.g. construction of infrastructure, housing, hospitals, etc.) China has provided indirect support for Haftar, as well, thus its economic interest arguably contributed to the undermining of any political resolution of the crisis; as a consequence amongst scholars, its role within the Libyan crisis is rather ambiguous. The Chinese policy outcome could be multilateral peace initiatives in which framework Beijing would not have a leading role but in the meantime could ensure enough stability for economic investments in the country. It can be observed that China has not concretised any tangible support in hard power outputs for the GNA.

The 2011 ‘withdrawal’ of the U.S. and Europe from the region created a power vacuum that China tries to fill with increasing efforts. China’s geopolitical interests require the PRC to intervene in Libyan domestic politics firmly; however, primarily with the use of soft foreign policy tools.<sup>41</sup> Regarding Haftar’s April offensive, China is playing a waiting game, insisting that the signed business agreements cannot be endangered. All the while Beijing takes considerable steps in reaching its policy outcome by getting closer to Europe through its deepening involvement in Africa and in the WANA region (West Asia and North Africa). Thus, its products gain access to European markets more easily (if the products arrive directly from Chinese factories in Africa) and a bigger share of energy sector, investments, commerce and market could be realised in a region which traditionally used to be the sphere of influence of European middle powers.

The PRC’s involvement, to secure its own national interests, is unilateral in choice of policy tools. The increased economic involvement is done on a bilateral China–Libya basis, excluding the other actors. For example, the OBOR–Libya Memorandum of Understanding would not have been unanimously supported by the other actors involved in the conflict. This, while resulting in quite possibly better economic terms for the PRC, results in no coordination between the actors and the continuation of hostilities in spite of a confluence of stated policy outcomes.

## **Russia**

Russia was a key partner of Libya before the Arab Spring, but it has gradually lost its key position in the region. The Libyan crisis gave opportunity to restore Russia to its previous role, with a stated geopolitical aim to reach a “Warm Sea” port and to obtain military bases in the Mediterranean region. During the Cold War and later between 2004 and 2011, the relationship between Russia and Libya was determined mainly by arms and energy issues.<sup>42</sup>

Russia was one of the sharpest critics of the 2011 NATO intervention, even though Moscow did not veto UNSCR 1973, the resolution that constituted the legal basis of the intervention. Although Russian authorities did not support the Gaddafi regime in Libya

<sup>41</sup> See also Jian Junbo and Álvaro Méndez, ‘Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy: China’s Engagement in the Libyan Civil War as a Case Study’, *LSE Global South Unit Working Paper Series*, no 5 (2015).

<sup>42</sup> Andrea Beccaro, ‘Russia: Looking for a Warm Sea’, in *Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis*, ed. by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (Milano: Atlantic Council, Edizione LediPublishing, 2017), 91–111.

in 2011 and President Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Gaddafi lost its legitimacy, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin compared the NATO's intervention to a medieval crusade.<sup>43</sup> Russia considered the chaos provoked by the NATO intervention a perfect example of the instability generated by U.S.-led interventions. Using this opportunity, Russia tried to convey the image "that what the US breaks, Russia can fix" and promoted this image in and out of Russia as well.<sup>44</sup>

Russia did not react immediately to the Libyan protests. The National Transitional Council (NTC) was recognised by Moscow only after it announced that every contract signed under the Gaddafi era will be respected. However, after the revolution, when it seemed that pro-Western powers might come into power, the Kremlin changed its Libya strategy. Russia's Libya policy differed from their Syria policy, since Russian national interests were more in line with the interests of the international community. As such, cooperation was dominant with other international actors, but this cooperation was only surface-deep. Despite this cooperation, the possibility that Russia might obtain ports and military bases in Libya worried the West. According to Andrea Beccaro, Moscow was encouraged "to implement a more active foreign policy in the region based on military, diplomatic, and economic means in order to counterbalance Western influence".<sup>45</sup>

Within the timeframe of our analysis, Moscow officially recognised and supported the UN-brokered GNA in Tripoli, and the idea of a unified Libyan state, but did not reopen its embassy in the country. Even so, it remains one of the main supporters of General Haftar and Tobruk. Haftar regularly visits Russia, where he is received as a foreign leader already in office, and where he meets with high-ranking Russian officials.<sup>46</sup> In 2016, Russia not only printed about cc. 3 billion USD for the pro-Haftar Central Bank of Libya in Bayda,<sup>47</sup> but through its military advisors, Russia actively participates in the modernisation of the Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA). As an example of said participation, some LNA officers are regularly trained in Russia. In return, Haftar promised to create two Russian military bases in Tobruk and in Benghazi.<sup>48</sup> In 2017, Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov hosted Haftar close to the Libyan coast. However, under formal diplomatic rules, Russia is committed to observing the rule of equal treatment of both parties.

There is evidence that Russia uses hard foreign policy tools in Libya economically and militarily as well. According to British and American sources, Russia has been supplying weapons to Haftar through Egypt and the UAE, and since the end of 2015, Russian PMCs are protecting factories near Bengasi and providing demining equipment to Haftar's forces.

According to certain reports, mercenaries of the Russian Wagner Group have been backing the LNA from 2018.<sup>49</sup> Despite its substantial backing of the LNA, Moscow has

<sup>43</sup> Yulia Krylova, 'Lock-in effect in the Russian–Libyan economic relations in the post-Arab Spring period', *The Journal of North African Studies* 22, no 4 (2017), 579.

<sup>44</sup> Lincoln Pigman and Kyle Orton, 'Inside Putin's Libyan Power Play', *Foreign Policy*, 14 September 2017.

<sup>45</sup> Beccaro, 'Russia'.

<sup>46</sup> Anna Maria Dynner, 'Russia's Libya Policy', *PISM Bulletin*, 6 (1252) 15 January 2019.

<sup>47</sup> Aidan Lewis, 'Separate banknotes symbols of Libyan disunity, financial disarray', *Reuters*, 03 June 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Dynner, 'Russia's Libya Policy', 2.

<sup>49</sup> The Libya Observer, '300 Russian mercenaries fighting for warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya, western news reports say', 04 March 2019.

avoided expressing full and open support for Haftar's army, hoping instead to perform the role of a mediator and gain substantial advantages from all parties to the conflict.

In order to keep its options open, Russia has started to support Gaddafi's most reformist living son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Aref Ali Nayed.<sup>50</sup> Nayed is close to Haftar and both of them envision an important role for Russia in case they come to power.

Haftar's significant, but not exclusive support is vital for Russia from economic, military and international political points of view as well. Firstly, if Haftar seized power, revenues from the contracts with his regime could cover the losses sustained during the Arab Spring.<sup>51</sup> Secondly, supporting Haftar enables Russia to strengthen its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea. This would result in Russian power projection capabilities being closer to Europe, to the Middle East and North Africa. Back in 2008, Russia planned on opening a naval base in Gaddafi's Libya, but that project did not come to fruition.<sup>52</sup> In case Russia had another opportunity to open a naval base in Libya, Moscow could expand its influence over the region, further increasing Western worries. Although the Russian foreign policy is dominated by hard foreign policy tools, Russia uses soft foreign policy tools as well. For example, Gazprom would like to regain its previous position in Libya, and talks with the Libyan National Oil Company started in 2018. The competition with Western (mainly European) companies is also predictable in this field.<sup>53</sup> Russia supports not only Haftar, but the GNA and Misratan militias as well, since Haftar's future role is far from being certain. Cooperation with the EU regarding Libya enables Russia to exploit the existing disagreements amongst EU member states and to map the balance of power amongst them regarding foreign policy issues. This strategy enables Russia to choose "weaker" member states and test them as regards much pressure they are willing to exert on Russia regarding the Ukraine crisis.<sup>54</sup> By backing Haftar, Moscow also hopes to seize control over a critical refugee transit route to Europe. Moscow's eventual stronghold in Libya may fulfil an important goal in its European disintegration and destabilisation policy.<sup>55</sup> Expanding Russian influence within the region, dividing Europeans through involvement in Libya are important policy outcomes for Moscow that have a significance beyond its strict sense Libyan interest.

At the Palermo Conference in November 2018, it became explicitly clear that Russia regained its previous influence in Libya and played an important role to convince General Haftar to participate in the conference.<sup>56</sup> It also became evident for Western powers that Russia wants to play a significant role in the Libyan stabilisation process and it is

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<sup>50</sup> Henry Meyer, 'Russia Supports Political Role for Qaddafi's Wanted Son in Libya', *Bloomberg*, 24 December 2018; Maxim Suchkov, 'Analysis: Reports on Russian troops in Libya spark controversy', *Al-Monitor*, 12 October 2018.

<sup>51</sup> Pigman and Orton, 'Inside Putin's Libyan Power Play'.

<sup>52</sup> Tom Parfitt, 'Gadafy offers Russia a naval base in Libya', *The Guardian*, 01 November 2008.

<sup>53</sup> Dyner, 'Russia's Libya Policy', 2.

<sup>54</sup> Nikolay Kozhanov, 'Moscow's Presence in Libya Is a New Challenge for the West', *Chatham House*, 30 May 2017.

<sup>55</sup> Warsaw Institute, 'Civil War in Libya. Russian Goals and Foreign Policy', 30 April 2019.

<sup>56</sup> Nona Mikhelidze, 'Italy Sidelined As Russia Consolidates Position in Libya', *IAI Commentaries*, 25 June 2019.

impossible to make decisions without Russia's participation. In order to fulfil this role, Russia has been willing to invest economically and financially as well.

On the whole, Moscow is able to influence the Libyan situation and has a wide range of opportunity in Libya, ranging from mediating amongst rival fractions to the deepening of the military crises. From Moscow's point of view, the optimal solution would be if a functioning coalition government was created. This coalition government could then guarantee the stabilisation needed to secure Russian long-term investments and military facilities which we consider the main Russian policy outcome regarding strictly Libya. Russia is officially open to establishing contact with any Libyan fractions that are involved to ensure a stronger position for Moscow, regardless the outcome of the stabilisation process, thus all players are equal, but some are more equal than others.<sup>57</sup> This policy of pseudo-neutrality can be observed in the Russian reactions given to Haftar's operation in April 2019, when, according to several diplomatic sources, Russian aircraft have been observed in Bengasi. At the same time Russia did not support the UNSCR draft that blamed Haftar for the new flare-up in violence. Further, Russia officially announced that it did not support Haftar's offensive.<sup>58</sup>

The policies above are evidence that lend credence to Andrei Chuprygin's argument that Russia – as opposed to the United States – was not party to a significant portion of the policy action and event in the MENA region between 2001 and 2014. This, however, resulted in Russia not being a party to the diplomatic and military mistakes that the U.S. committed, either. Moscow is now using this fact to its advantage by emphasising the inadequacy of the Western community's policy in the region. Without the liberal proliferation doctrine of the Western community, Russia hopes that it can be a preferred partner to the regimes of the MENA region. While the offer may be credible from Russia's standpoint, Moscow can only offer the MENA regimes limited economic support.

Russian policy outcomes and tools use more nuanced soft policy tools, coupled with a fair amount of diplomatic rhetoric. Despite its neutral rhetoric hard foreign policy tools are mainly used to support Haftar and his army. The policy tools are uncoordinated with the rest of the international community, mainly due to the fact that Russia was noticeably quasi-absent between 2001 and 2014 from the region. The desired end-state is more complicated for Moscow, as it has to weigh the potential politico-military gains of warm sea ports and bases with the possible losses on the economic front a protracted conflict brings. Succeeding in Libya would not only secure long-term investments for Russia, but it also provides opportunity to divide Europeans and to raise its profile in the region, thus the stakes (policy outcomes) are high for Moscow.

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<sup>57</sup> Maxim Suchkov, 'Moscow cultivates neutral image as Libya quakes', *Eurasian Strategies*, 10 April 2019.

<sup>58</sup> Michelle Nichols, 'U.S., Russia say cannot support a U.N. call for Libya truce: diplomats', *Reuters*, 19 April 2019; Middle East Monitor, 'Russia disowns Libya's General Haftar', 06 April 2019.

## European states

### France

Perhaps the most interested European party, France followed the 2011 Libyan crisis and the ensuing international responses with a keen interest. Firstly, then President Nicolas Sarkozy saw an opportunity to improve his weak foreign policy balance before the upcoming presidential elections.<sup>59</sup> France aimed to expand its influence over the North African region. And finally, on the economic front, since Libyan export amounted to 18% French crude oil import (in 2010), Sarkozy aimed to obtain a larger share of Libyan oil.<sup>60</sup> As such, the Libyan crisis was a significant opportunity for France to re-evaluate its military policies across the globe, and it is important to note that many times the covert military presence prevailed.

Attempting to maximise the potential gains from the situation, France and the United Kingdom supported the drafting of UNSCR 1973, and the resolution was approved on 17 March 2011. It is important to note that France was the first country to initiate a military intervention.<sup>61</sup> On 18 March, French President Nicolas Sarkozy authorised unilateral French strikes against Gaddafi's forces. The resulting new civil war thus can be seen as a 'war born in Paris'.<sup>62</sup>

On 10 March 2011, France was the first state to recognise the newly created National Transitional Council. The recognition came prior to the European Council summit about the Libyan crisis, and the timing of the French recognition was another stain on French foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> *Operation Southern Mistral*, initially conceived as a war game, was carried out between 21 to 25 March 2011 under French–British cooperation. Due to the escalation of the Libyan crisis, the operation was carried out as part of the NATO intervention, not as a war game.<sup>64</sup> The coalition intervention was led by France at the beginning. This was later followed by *Operation Unified Protector* which also had a significant contribution from France. The operation is known to the French public as *Opération Harmattan*.<sup>65</sup> The results of the French participation were two-fold: politically Paris made efforts to preserve its influence within Libya, and diplomatic relations were continuous even during the most turbulent moments of the crisis. (Currently this stability seems to have come to an end. In April 2019, the UN backed GNA suspended cooperation with France, accusing Paris of

<sup>59</sup> Jolyon Howorth, '“Opération Harmattan” in Libya: a paradigm shift in French, European and transatlantic security arrangements?', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 12, no 4 (2014), 409.

<sup>60</sup> House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 'Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options', 14 September 2016, 10–11; OEC, 'Where does France import Crude Petroleum from?', 27 September 2010.

<sup>61</sup> Jason W. Davidson, 'France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no 2 (2013), 315.

<sup>62</sup> Howorth, 'Opération Harmattan', 409.

<sup>63</sup> Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, 'Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya', 17 October 2012.

<sup>64</sup> Michel Chossudovsky, 'When War Games Go Live: “Staging” a “Humanitarian War” against “SOUTHLAND”', *Global Research*, 16 April 2011.

<sup>65</sup> Ministère des Armées, 'L'opération Harmattan', 27 September 2011.

backing Haftar's rebel forces).<sup>66</sup> France's economic objectives were not achieved, as the dominance of the Libyan oil market by France was not realised. In fact, on the contrary, French crude oil imports from Libya decreased by a third by 2017, never reaching its pre-crisis level.<sup>67</sup> France's Libya policy has not changed in any significant manner since 2011. Three major policies form France's over-arching strategy: 1. a strategy based on respecting UN decisions; 2. a strategy based on the use of hard foreign policy tools, projecting the country's Sahel–Sahara strategy to Libya (counterterrorism, preventing the spread of radicalisation, ensuring primacy for France in this region); and 3. a strategy safeguarding French economic interests.<sup>68</sup>

France has recognised the UN-brokered GNA and participated in the UN-led mediation process to stabilise Libya. As a part of this process, Paris hosted a highly visible conference on Libya in 2017 without inviting Italy, its most important European partner in that country,<sup>69</sup> evidence of the fact that open rivalry between these two European powers has been increasing. Even so France has been covertly backing Khalifa Haftar since 2015, and France's support for the GNA is hardly genuine. Haftar's covert support became evident when Paris was forced to acknowledge the presence of its Special Forces in Libya after a helicopter-crash in Bengasi.<sup>70</sup> This meant that the visible soft diplomatic tools (e.g. Libya conference) are significantly accompanied by covert hard foreign policy tools.

A French aircraft operation was launched in the Northern regions of Chad in April 2019, exactly at the time when Haftar started his operation in southwest Libya and took control over the major oil production wells.<sup>71</sup> This area is close to the Northern borders of Chad and Niger, where French troops are stationed within the framework of Operation Barkan. This means that a large number of French troops are present in the immediate vicinity of Libya, probably not officially on Libyan territory.

French Libya policy is certainly pro-peace, yet this conceptually is best understood as France's desire for a stable Libya with strong French relations, and not as necessarily democratic outcome for Libya. This concept was embodied by General Haftar, who controls the majority of the oil production and accepts Paris's help. Libya's economic relations with France could be strengthened if the general will be pursued and be successful in his operation against Tripoli. This would mean that France would be able to achieve its ultimate goal in Libya: being a more influential ally to the Libyan power than Italy or any other international actor. Currently France is in a delicate situation: by backing Haftar its positive image has been eroded within the GNA, so Paris is no longer interested in the long-term survival of the Serraj Government. If the GNA survives Haftar's attack and

<sup>66</sup> Alice Tidey, 'Libya's UN-backed government suspends cooperation with France, accuses it of backing rebel forces', *Euronews*, 19 April 2019.

<sup>67</sup> OEC, 'Where does France import Crude Petroleum from?', 27 September 2017.

<sup>68</sup> Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 'France, committed to assisting the countries of the Sahel', 25 November 2015; Malek Bachir, 'Les «trois politiques» de la France en Libye', *Middle East Eye*, 25 July 2017.

<sup>69</sup> Paul Taylor, 'France's double game in Libya', *Politico*, 17 April 2019.

<sup>70</sup> World Bulletin, 'French special forces withdraw from Libya's Benghazi', 11 August 2016.

<sup>71</sup> Alcyone Wemaëre, 'L'intervention militaire française au nord du Tchad pose question', *France 24*, 07 February 2019.

remains in power, France's chances to achieve its political and economic objectives will be reduced significantly.<sup>72</sup>

### *Italy – A traditional player in Libya*

Rivalry among certain European powers – Italy, France, the United Kingdom – had been present in Libyan territory since the colonial era, but it ended after Gaddafi came into power and his regime became isolated internationally. In the 1990s, Italy gained a relative advantage in diplomatic and economic relations, which peaked in 2008, when the Bengasi Treaty (Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation) was signed. The treaty created 'privileged relations' between the two countries, and one of its main objectives was to stop illegal migration<sup>73</sup> which still constitutes the base for bilateral relations.

In spite of its initial political hesitation, Italy participated in the military intervention of 2011 from the beginning. Strong economic relations, obligations deriving from the Bengasi Treaty and good personal relations between Gaddafi and then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi all contributed to Italy's initial hesitation. At the end of April, after heated political discussions, the Berlusconi Government announced its direct participation in the bombings.<sup>74</sup> As the British and French influence grew in Libya, Italian – primarily economic – interests were damaged, and the Italian policy output was declared: Rome has been trying to restore its leading role with both soft and hard foreign policy tools.

After the Gaddafi regime was ousted, Italy's main concern was halting the irregular migration flow from Libya. Berlusconi's government was followed by Mario Monti's technocrat government which quickly signed an agreement with the new Libyan 'government' to stop irregular migration – together with other international actors.

The Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013 led the government to launch the *Mare Nostrum* humanitarian-military mission.<sup>75</sup> Since Italy was unable to handle the crises at its own, Rome was interested in strengthening European instruments. It advocated the launch of FRONTEX operation TRITON from the beginning, then the launch of EUNAVFORMED Sophia (an EU CSDP operation) which expanded its mandate to train and equip the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>76</sup>

In recent years Italy has been backing the reinforcement of the internationally recognised Libyan Government (i.e. the GNA) with every soft and hard foreign policy

<sup>72</sup> Taylor, 'France's double game'.

<sup>73</sup> Legge 6 febbraio 2009, n. 7. Ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra la Repubblica italiana e la Grande Giamahiria araba libica popolare socialista, fatto a Bengasi il 30 agosto 2008. *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, no 40, 18 February 2009.

<sup>74</sup> Ben Lombardi, 'The Berlusconi Government and Intervention in Libya', *The International Spectator, Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 46, no 4 (2011), 31–44; Osvaldo Croci and Marco Valigi, 'Continuity and change in Italian foreign policy: the case of the international intervention in Libya', *Contemporary Italian Politics* 5, no 1 (2013), 38–54.

<sup>75</sup> Ministero della Difesa, 'Mare Nostrum', s. a.

<sup>76</sup> Anna Molnár, 'Az EUNAVFOR MED Sophia művelet', in *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata. Párbeszéd és konfliktusok* ed. by Anna Molnár and Orsolya Komlósi (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019), 95–123.

tools at its disposal. On a Libyan request, in September 2016 Rome established a 300 men military hospital (Operation Hippocrates) in Misurata in order to support forces fighting against ISIS, while Italian Special Forces have been present in Libya since 2016.<sup>77</sup> The fact that irregular migration flows are deeply intertwined with new and old Italian organised crime groups poses a significant challenge to the government, thus in August 2017 Italy decided to directly support the Libyan Coast Guard with two ships of its own Navy. Further, in September a military mission with cc. 100 Italian civil guards (*carabinieri*) was decided to be deployed to the Southern borders of Libya.

In addition to European, bilateral and international instruments have been used by the Italian Government. When the UNHCR announced its return to Libya and its will to establish new refugee camps, Italy wasted no time to announce its support. It is important to note that in February 2017 Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA regarding migration.<sup>78</sup> These efforts can succeed in the long term only if Libya is unified again under a functioning central government – with the help of international actors, and the current complicated power relations would settle and the security environment would stabilise.

Economic relations with Libya have remained decisive in bilateral relations in spite of the deteriorating security environment. In 2017 Libya was the 5<sup>th</sup> trade partner of Italy amongst African states. ENI – which has been present in Libyan since 1959 – has been a dominant actor in the Libyan energy sector.<sup>79</sup>

Italy organised an international Libya conference (*For Libya With Libya*) which took place on 12–13 November 2018, in Palermo. Although Italy made great efforts to organise the conference, great powers were not represented at the highest level, only ministerial delegations were sent to Sicily, however, the most important Libyan leaders (Fayez el-Serraj, Agilah Saleh, Khaled al-Misri and Khalifa Haftar) were present, thus bi- and multilateral talks were held with their participation. The participants agreed to hold another conference to prepare for next year's Libyan elections. Even though the majority of experts praised its diplomatic importance, the Palermo conference failed to fulfil expectations: in April 2019 a civil war situation emerged in Libya again.<sup>80</sup>

From the beginning of the crisis, Italy has been actively using a combination of soft and hard foreign policy tools, including military ones. Its principal foreign policy interest is the stabilisation of the Libyan domestic and security policy environment. In order to achieve this objective, Italy needs European and transatlantic partners, since Rome is not able to settle the Libyan situation on its own. However, currently the United States is not willing to use military forces. Further, France's Libyan interests are mainly opposite to Italian ones. The already strained Italo–French relations were exacerbated by the fact that since September 2018 the Italian Government have been openly blaming French President

<sup>77</sup> Esercito, 'Operazione Ippocrate, Schieramento di un ospedale da campo in Libia,' 2017; Sergio Rame, 'Forze speciali italiane in Libia: ecco il documento top secret', *Il Giornale*, 10 August 2016.

<sup>78</sup> La Repubblica, 'Migranti: accordo Italia–Libia, il testo del memorandum', 02 February 2017.

<sup>79</sup> Ambasciata D'Italia Tripoli, 'Relazioni economiche Italia–Libia', s. a.

<sup>80</sup> Arturo Varvelli, 'Libia: conferenza di Palermo, il bilancio dell'Italia', *Affari Internazionali*, 12 December 2018.

Emmanuel Macron for the deterioration of the Libyan situation, claiming that Haftar gained power due to significant French support.<sup>81</sup>

After Haftar launched his operation in April 2019, Italy preferred to find a diplomatic solution, rather than military one. In order to achieve this, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte held telephone conversations with the Russian and the Tunisian presidents. According to experts, the improvement of Italian–Russian relations during the first Conte Government may contribute to the further increase of Russian influence in the region.<sup>82</sup> Even though Rome aimed to take a leading role in the settlement of the Libyan crisis, this would be impossible without French cooperation. In this regard, the fact that French and Italian foreign ministers issued a joint statement about the need for an immediate ceasefire and resuming peace talks within the framework of the UN-led process is a progress.<sup>83</sup> In September 2019, the second Conte Government was sworn in, and despite the composition of the new government (Lega was replaced by the leftist Democratic Party), Italian foreign policy became less militant rhetorically and the main features of its Libya policy remained constant: Italy is still campaigning for a political solution. While more and more secondary non-warring parties begin to use increasingly harder foreign policy tools or became secondary-warring party, Italy continues to employ to mainly soft foreign policy tools. As a consequence, at the beginning of 2020 Italy is losing ground in Libya and its once significant influence over its ex-colony is fading. As we note here, the soft foreign policy tools were again not coordinated with the other international actors, as the economic relations are on significantly bilateral level, and the domestic political Italo–French debate precludes further alignment of policies. A stable, united and secure Libya can be considered a policy outcome of Italy in Libya.

### *Germany – The donor country*

The German foreign policy is rather different from the above mentioned French and Italian policies, as it follows a decisive pro-soft-power, non-militaristic approach. This is due in no small part to Germany's role in World War I and II. Since the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy behaviour has been challenged on numerous fronts and Germany was obliged to participate more actively in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.<sup>84</sup>

In sharp contrast to its traditional allies, Germany did not vote for UNSCR 1970 about the no-fly zone. Instead, by abstaining, it found itself in the company of China and Russia. Since decision making was soon moved from the European Council to NATO, Germany

<sup>81</sup> La Repubblica, 'Libia, Conte e Salvini: "No a interventi militari"', 03 September 2018.

<sup>82</sup> Maria Grazia Rutigliano, 'Conte: Italia, Russia e Tunisia respingono una soluzione militare in Libia', *LUISS*, 02 May 2019.

<sup>83</sup> Ministero degli Affari esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 'Dichiarazione congiunta del Ministro dell'Europa e degli affari esteri, Jean-Yves Le Drian, e del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale, Enzo Moavero Milanesi', 13 May 2019.

<sup>84</sup> Jessica Bucher et al., 'Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya', *Europea Security* 22, no 4 (2013), 528.

could not participate in the settling of the Libyan conflict with negotiations and non-military coercive measures which have been its preferred foreign policy tools since the unification.<sup>85</sup> The abstention from the vote – and from the military intervention – protected Germany's credibility in the eyes of the Libyans. Unlike the intervening countries, and since Germany does not have particular interests in the Libyan energy sector, Berlin could act as an independent mediator more credibly than others.<sup>86</sup> When Haftar launched its attack against Tripoli in April 2019, Germany was chairing the Security Council and convoked an emergency session immediately. Yet Germany's reactions carry much less weight when compared to the other analysed countries. This does not come as a surprise: Berlin consistently has been using soft foreign policy tools since the crisis broke out. Further, Germany has been backing the GNA since it was created in the framework of the UN-led stabilisation process, German diplomatic efforts do not vary with the changing Libyan power relations. We have to highlight the fact that the UN-led stabilisation process was chaired by German diplomat Martin Koebbler. Unlike France and Italy, Berlin is not trying to negotiate neither with Haftar, nor with the militias, its only Libyan interlocutor is the GNA.

Even though politically Germany was not a relevant actor in Libya, it played a significant role as a donor country. The majority (cc. 200 million EUR) of its 233 million EUR donation to Libya in 2017 was envisioned for handling migration, including the settling of Libyan internally displaced persons.<sup>87</sup> Since neutrality is the guiding principle of German donations, the whole Libyan territory is receiving support, no matter which group rules them. In addition, donations arrive directly to local communities. Since Germany has no colonial history with the Maghreb region, its foreign policy relies mostly on its rather limited economic relations.<sup>88</sup>

Apart from economic donations, Germany's most important policy output to the current Libyan situation has been its mediation activities, also a soft tool. Berlin does not mediate between the warring domestic groups in Libya but their foreign backers. The German Government is widely seen as the perfect arbiter in the conflict, given its neutrality, its relatively good relationships with all the secondary parties involved in Libya, its status as the leading donor in Libya, and its prominence in European politics.<sup>89</sup>

On the whole, Germany does not participate actively in the political dialogue about Libya's future. German policy is that Libyans have to decide their own future. In the meanwhile, Germany supports the Libyan stabilisation with mainly soft, economic tools. A stable and secure Libya can be considered a German policy outcome of the Libyan

<sup>85</sup> Inez von Weitershausen et al., 'A 'Primus Inter Pares' in EU Foreign Policy? – German Leadership in the European Council during the Libyan and Ukrainian Crises', *German Politics*, 29, no 1 (2020), 42–58.

<sup>86</sup> Thomas Paulsen (ed.), *The Berlin Pulse. German Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung, 2017), 27.

<sup>87</sup> Michael Cousins, 'Germany continues to lead foreign financial support for Libya', *Libya Herald*, 03 January 2018.

<sup>88</sup> Bucher et al. 'Domestic politics', 528.

<sup>89</sup> René Wildanger and Tarek Megerisi, 'Germany's quiet leadership on the Libyan war', *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 November 2019.

crisis, since 80–90% of irregular migrants arriving to Europe through Libya aim to reach Germany as final destination.<sup>90</sup>

### *Egypt – An eternal supporter of the Eastern part*

The only country of our study with a contiguous land boundary with Libya is Egypt. For Egypt, the stabilisation of Libya is a primary objective of its foreign policy, as Egyptian security is challenged by the post-intervention situation. Egypt underwent the events of the Arab Spring much like Libya, but the events after the revolts drove the two countries in different directions. However, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's geopolitical visions go beyond creating a secure border zone: Egypt is trying to balance amongst American, Chinese and Russian influence. Sisi's Nasser-like political actions<sup>91</sup> are developing relations with great powers in line with Egyptian interests and the maintenance of independent Egyptian geopolitics. The stability in Cairo – even at the expense of authoritarianism – currently matches the interests of the great powers and the European Union. Egypt uses a dual framing regarding the Libyan problem: on the one hand, it considers the current situation a consequence of an unfinished Responsibility to Protect UN intervention, but on the other hand, it considers it a part of a regional war against Islamist terrorism.<sup>92</sup>

Cairo has been a firm supporter of Khalifa Haftar for a long time. Ambiguous is the support of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (the youngest living son of the late Muammar Gaddafi); several sources consider him a covert Egyptian advocate who will probably run in the upcoming elections, while his unofficial Russian support is also probable.<sup>93</sup> Egypt's Libya policy is influenced significantly both by al-Sisi's domestic policy objectives and by Egypt's foreign policy manoeuvrability. With the support of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Egypt's goal is to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from power, not only in Egypt, but in the neighbouring Libya as well. This is the reason why Haftar, with his strong anti-Islamist rhetoric, has been benefitting from Cairo's support. In spite of the international arms embargo, Egypt and Russia have been backing Haftar's forces with arms, soldiers, intelligence information and logistics. The Egyptian policy output is clear and declared. In fact, Libya was the first foreign theatre where Egyptian troops were deployed after the Gulf War.<sup>94</sup> Egypt accused Qatar and Turkey of arming Haftar and of deepening the already complex crisis. Haftar met al-Sisi in Cairo only a week after Haftar had launched its offensive against Tripoli.<sup>95</sup>

Its policy outcome could be defined to be Libya's stabilisation, territorial unity and its public security (at least in the Eastern part of the country) which would have significant

<sup>90</sup> Cousins, 'Germany continues'.

<sup>91</sup> Amy Hawthorne and Andrew Miller, 'Worse Than Mubarak', *Foreign Policy*, 27 February 2019.

<sup>92</sup> Wolfgang Mühlberger, 'Egypt's Foreign and Security Policy in Post-R2P Libya', *The International Spectator* 51, no 2 (2016), 99–112.

<sup>93</sup> Middle East Monitor, 'Video shows Egypt soldiers fighting in Libya's Derna', 19 February 2019.

<sup>94</sup> Daniela Musina, 'The Egyptian Security Complex and Libya's slow pace transition', *Mediterranean Affairs*, 04 October 2016.

<sup>95</sup> Patrick Wintour, 'Libya crisis: Egypt's Sisi backs Haftar assault on Tripoli', *The Guardian*, 14 April 2019.

economic and security benefits for Egypt. In the meantime, this goal is not exactly to be reached by the same tools as the Western participants want to. The Eastern part of Libya (Cirenaica) and the 1,200 kilometres long border is the stronghold of corruption, drug and arms trafficking which keeps alive Egyptian black market and corruption. Fighters of ISIS and other terrorist organisations, members of Salafist groups move freely from Libya to Egypt and backwards; from a security point of view this is the result of the fact that Egypt is stuck between the civil war-torn Libya and the Islamist terror-torn Sinai Peninsula. Haftar promised to restore public security and to eliminate Islamist hotbeds in exchange for Egyptian support.<sup>96</sup>

A clear sign of Russia and Egypt inching closer in policy to each other and of the joint support of Haftar is that Russian aircraft are allowed to use Egyptian airports, even the one as close as 60 miles from the Libyan–Egyptian border.<sup>97</sup> On behalf of the Eastern Libyan authorities the construction of a border wall started in January 2019 in order to handle security problems and to ensure border surveillance. It is worth mentioning that in 2016 even Algeria announced to build a 350 km long border wall on the Libyan border. The Egyptian army exercises greater control on the road between Musaid (one of the biggest border crossing points only 150 km East to Tobruk) and Sallum; however, its costs are getting harder to bear alone. One of the biggest military bases of the Middle East was opened in this region, and a part of the Egyptian rapid reaction forces is stationed here.<sup>98</sup>

Egypt, as the biggest African export partner of Libya, has been importing increasing amounts of oil and natural gas from Libya since the Gulf War.<sup>99</sup> Even though its energy dependence can be partly reduced by the construction of a nuclear power plant – built with Russian help – and by the exploitation of the newly discovered Egyptian natural gas field, only cheap oil and gas import from Libya can meet the demands of the growing Egyptian economy in the short and the long term. Under the Gaddafi regime, about 1.5 million Egyptian guest workers lived in Libya.<sup>100</sup> By today, half of them returned to Egypt due to the civil war and the expansion of ISIS. The lost remittances have a catastrophic effect on Egyptian economy and increase further the already high Egyptian unemployment rate. Egypt's goal is first of all to ensure its own political and economic stability and growth, then as an essential part of it to enforce internal security and eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood. Cairo's intention is to continue and maintain the Libyan conflict until the realisation of their policy outcome.

In sum, Egypt is an indispensable participant of international forums on Libya mainly due to its influence on Haftar. Stabilising the Libyan security situation and helping a pro-Egyptian leadership to gain power are key elements for al-Sisi's power base. Besides strengthening economic and energetic relations with Libya, al-Sisi's political interest is to stop the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood and to prevent terror attacks. By securing Libyan and Egyptian stability and internal security, al-Sisi can expand its foreign policy manoeuvrability in line with his geopolitical interests. Thus this regional actor is intent on

<sup>96</sup> Mustafa Fetouri, 'Does Libya have its own Al-Sisi in the making?', *Middle East Monitor*, 24 January 2019.

<sup>97</sup> Steven A. Cook, 'Putin Is Sneaking Up on Europe From the South', *Foreign Policy*, 31 August 2018.

<sup>98</sup> Ahmed Megahid, 'Scepticism abounds over Egypt–Libya border wall', *The Arab Weekly*, 03 February 2019.

<sup>99</sup> CIA, 'The World Factbook. Libya', s. a.

<sup>100</sup> Giuseppe Dentice, 'Egypt's Security and Haftar: al-Sisi's strategy in Libya', *IPSI*, 02 February 2017.

a policy outcome of stability, which is by definition a cessation of hostilities, but the policy tools it uses run counter to what the Western powers are implanting.

### ***Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates***

The three Gulf States are regional actors who are also involved in the conflict. We analyse the three in one take as they share a regional separation from the conflict but are effected nonetheless. Qatar's decision to intervene on NATO's side surprised experts, even though Doha's decision was heavily influenced by the emerging international consensus. As a consequence, Qatar was the first Arab country to recognise the National Transitional Council and it offered fighter-bombers to the NATO operations. Security assurances and military assets, such as a U.S. air base at al-Udeid or as-Sajlija military camp (the biggest American forward base outside the U.S.), combined with support from France and the United Kingdom, all played an important role in Qatar's decision to join the NATO operation.

Besides chartering fighter-bombers, Qatar was also shipping armaments, providing material and training assistance to the new government. It also sold oil on Libyan behalf in order to avoid sanctions. Doha's objective was to re-position itself on the international stage, as it wanted to appear as a connecting link between East and West, an actor who can fill the space between the West and the reformed Islamist jihadists.<sup>101</sup> However, not every Arab country welcomed Doha's decision, since it also backed Islamist groups in Libya, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This adversely affected the interests of the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who consider the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups able to question the legitimacy of their regimes. With its insistence on intervening in Libyan domestic policy, Qatar lost the support of the Libyan population, meanwhile an increasing number of people started to accuse Doha of aiding terrorist organisations.<sup>102</sup> Growing tensions peaked in 2017 when Bahrein, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced that they were breaking off diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed economic sanctions against the country. Doha demanded an arms embargo<sup>103</sup> against Haftar and the LNA after the strongman launched his offensive against Tripoli in April this year which further increased tensions with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia can be considered a new actor in the Libyan conflict, despite the fact that it did intervene in 2011 due to hostile relations and backed the rebels. The Kingdom established diplomatic relations with the new regime in 2012 which soon paid off economically: in 2013 Riyadh signed an agreement on investing in the Libyan oil sector. Through the intervention, Saudi Arabia wanted to increasingly solidify its U.S. alliance

<sup>101</sup> David Roberts, 'Behind Qatar's Intervention In Libya', *Foreign Affairs*, 28 September 2011.

<sup>102</sup> Jamestown Foundation, 'Qatar's Role in the Libyan Conflict: Who's on the Lists of Terrorists and Why', 14 July 2017; Erzsébet N. Rózsa et al., *Az Iszlám Állam kalifátusa* (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó – Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, 2016).

<sup>103</sup> Reuters, 'Qatar calls for arms embargo against Libya's Haftar', 16 April 2019.

but only with limited resources. This objective was fulfilled at the minimum level through shipping military equipment.<sup>104</sup>

The Saudi activity in Libya intensified in parallel with the expansion of ISIS in 2016. International actors trusted that as a regional power Saudi Arabia would be able to control the Arab states. However, the above-mentioned Qatari strategy did not favour the peace process which led Riyadh to impose an economic blockade against Qatar in 2017.

One of Riyadh's most successful tools – that has been used in Libya as well – is Madkhali-Salafism, a conservative Islamic movement, which was created as the antipode of the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement has been gathering followers in Libya since 2011 and most experts consider the movement the most effective Saudi tool to influence Libyan public mood.<sup>105</sup> According to reports, Haftar's idea of attacking Tripoli was brought up during his visit to Riyadh on March 27 this year. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates supposedly supported Haftar's operation both rhetorically and materially.<sup>106</sup>

The other Arab participant of the 2011 NATO intervention was the United Arab Emirates. The Arab Spring altered the balance of power in the region, encouraging Saudi Arabia and the UAE to seize the initiative. The UAE at first offered only humanitarian assistance; however, after seeing that Qatar was participating militarily more actively, the Emirates offered its fighter jets as well. The fact that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE represented successfully 'the Libyan case' on Arab and Islamic forums contributed greatly to the international consensus in 2011. However, the initial consensus was rather an amalgamation of these countries' joint hatred for the Gaddafi regime and not a by-product of a larger political cooperation. As such, it is hardly surprising that the consensus terminated soon due to the anti-terrorist and anti-Muslim Brotherhood policy of the Emirates. Further cooperation amongst the states became impossible in 2014 when Khalifa Haftar launched his anti-terrorist operation against Bengasi. The UAE provided logistical and military assistance (mostly airstrikes) to the Haftar-led LNA, moreover, in 2016, it established a military base in Al-Khadim, 105 km East to Bengasi,<sup>107</sup> whose development continues ever since.

According to a 2017 UN report the UAE has been backing Haftar's forces with air and material support since 2014, violating the UN embargo.<sup>108</sup> Although theoretically the UAE supports the UN peace process, until the end of 2018 its external assistance to the LNA has been increasing.<sup>109</sup> As a clear sign, the Emirates offered the GNA's military leaders in the south rewards if they served in Haftar's forces<sup>110</sup> hoping that it can precipitate Haftar's offensive in Southern Libya. At the same time, the UAE aims to strengthen its relations with the GNA as well, in order to achieve its strategic interest. In this spirit in the end of

<sup>104</sup> Sherif Elashmawy, 'The foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar towards the Arab Uprisings', *ECPR*, August 2014.

<sup>105</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Addressing the Rise of Libya's Madkhali-Salafis', *ICG Report*, 25 April 2019, 27–29.

<sup>106</sup> Washington Post, 'Saudi Arabia's reckless prince fuels yet another civil war', 15 April 2019.

<sup>107</sup> Aidan Lewis, 'Covert Emirati support gave East Libyan air power key boost: U.N. report', *Reuters*, 09 June 2017.

<sup>108</sup> Lewis, 'Covert Emirati support'.

<sup>109</sup> Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, 'The Wrong Way to Fix Libya', *Foreign Affairs*, 19 June 2018.

<sup>110</sup> Middle East Monitor, 'Egypt, UAE send military support to Libya's Haftar', 22 June 2019.

2018 rumours spread about Emirati ambitions to build relations with persons loyal to the GNA in Tripoli.<sup>111</sup> That said, in 2019 it is likely that stronger relations still prevail within UAE and the LNA. Today, arms shipments to the LNA are still causing problems not only to the international community, but to the GNA as well.<sup>112</sup>

For these actors, the policy tools are at best coordinated on an ad hoc manner. While all three actors are using both soft and hard tools in Libya, Qatar and the UAE were more active in the conflict than Saudi Arabia. All three countries are using Libya as a field to strengthen their status quo in the Gulf, with little genuine interest in the peace process. The fact, that Libya is also a country with hefty reserves of crude oil and natural gas, makes it a rival on the market. Thus, it is likely, that Gulf countries either would prefer a government on which they have influence, or persistent turmoil. The involvement of Riyadh is also deeply affected by the Turkish activities in Libya, since there is an existing and growing competition between the two for regional predominance.

## Turkey

Turkish policy outcomes can be divided into two distinct areas. The first area is based on the intention to gain fast economic results in the short run, for example in Libyan building industry. The second political goal is interpretable in the neo-Ottoman foreign policy framework characterised by the former minister Davutoğlu.<sup>113</sup> It is a long-term strategic vision that means a strong political influence in the MENA region, support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and a significant economic presence. The recently found new gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean could diminish the importance of Turkey in the energy market, thus it is its evident goal to acquire more territory in the Mediterranean Sea in order to explore new fields, to extract gas and to maintain its important role in each pipeline project.<sup>114</sup>

Turkey was severely affected by the 2011 events in Libya, most notably on the economic front. In its last years, the Gaddafi regime hosted about 20,000 Turkish guest workers and cc. 15 billion USD Turkish investments flowed mainly to the Libyan construction industry.<sup>115</sup> The events of the Arab Spring caught Turkey off guard, but Turkey quickly seized the opportunity to expand its influence in the region by embarking on a path of foreign policy involvement. However, the situation soon became increasingly turbulent.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Frederic Wehrey and Jalel Harchaoui, 'Is Libya Finally Ready for Peace?', *Foreign Affairs*, 30 November 2019.

<sup>112</sup> Wintour, 'Libya crisis'.

<sup>113</sup> Ömer Taşpınar, 'Turkey's Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism', *Carnegie Papers*, no 10 (2008), 3; Alexander Murinson, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Neo-Ottomanism and the Strategic Depth Doctrine* (London – New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

<sup>114</sup> Zoltán Egeresi, 'Kelet-mediterráneumi gázkincs: a ciprusi válság új dimenzióban', *Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóintézet Elemzések*, 2019/16.

<sup>115</sup> Reuters, 'Turkey says offered Gaddafi "guarantee" to quit Libya', 10 June 2011; Péter Tálás et al., 'A líbiai beavatkozás motivációi és nemzetközi megítélése', *Nemzet és Biztonság* 4, no 3 (2011), 81.

<sup>116</sup> Bilgin Ayata, 'Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor?', *Journal of European Integration* 37, no 1 (2015), 95–96.

During the escalation of the crisis, Ankara tried to mediate between the opposing parties with the use of soft foreign policy tools, and in this vein Turkey built its relations with the opposition quite early.

Ankara's initial reactions to the protests were similar to the Western allies, but in Libya, Turkey strongly opposed both sanctions and military intervention. Even so, in spite of this strong anti-interventionist rhetoric, Turkey continues to allow NATO to use the airbase in Izmir. (Until mid-2012, it seemed that Turkey could be an effective mediator and a model of democratisation, as it deployed a range of soft power instruments (e.g. financial assistance, technical expertise, civil society support), but after that its policies took a pro-military turn.<sup>117</sup>

One of the main features of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's foreign policy is the active involvement in the Libyan conflict. But due to Turkey's NATO membership and to the fact that local Turkish interests are contradicting partially Russian interests, this policy has a limited opportunity to become fully adopted. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the determining fracture line among the international actors of the Libyan war. General Haftar accuses Ankara of backing radical Islamist groups, and Haftar even ordered Qatari and Turkish nationals to leave Eastern Libya in 2014.<sup>118</sup>

Ankara is a committed supporter of the Serraj Administration. Haftar blamed Turkey several times for shipping ammunition and small arms to Tripoli, violating the UN embargo. In December 2018, two Turkish shipments carrying various types of rifles and munitions were seized, which Haftar argued were meant to support central government forces and militias.<sup>119</sup> After this scandal, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) initiated an investigation, and Prime Minister Serraj and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu were forced to announce a joint investigation.

Turkey is an essential actor in the Libyan consolidation process. During the Palermo Conference in November 2018, the Turkish vision of the future Libya became evident when the Turkish delegation decided to abruptly leave the conference when Haftar showed up. In the weeks before the conference, the Turkish Minister of Defence made an official visit to Libya and Serraj was welcomed by President Erdoğan in Ankara. Scheduled air services are operating between Libya and Turkey, and economic relations have been recovering. Ankara expressed its deep concerns about Haftar's offensive against Tripoli, while the deepening civil war prevents Libyan stability and hampers economic cooperation between the two countries. Turkey has a strong and clear output in order to support the GNA since the beginning of 2019. Turkish participation has been increased alongside the GNA, by the direct military involvement and installation of efficient technology of drones and anti-aircraft defence system. Thus, Haftar lost its advantage in the fight for Tripoli.

From the Turkish point of view, the worst-case scenario in the eastern Mediterranean is a possible agreement between Greek Cypriots and Greece on sharing of naval sovereignty areas; therefore, Ankara reached a deal with Tripoli about coastal sharing. Analysing the

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. 100–102, 97.

<sup>118</sup> Lorenzo Sigillino, 'Libya: the theatre of Turkish isolation', *Mediterranean Affairs*, 21 May 2015.

<sup>119</sup> The Arab Weekly, 'Haftar accuses Turkey of violating arms embargo on Libya', 21 December 2018.

actual political framework, Libya seems to be the only possible ally for Turkey in the MENA region.

Ankara's advocacy in the Libyan new civil war is based on ideology in addition to a strong geostrategic necessity. It remains to be seen how specifically Ankara will balance between supporting the 'Islamist' government of Tripoli and following the logic of economical-political pragmatism, as an independent Turkish foreign policy regarding Libya will be limited by contrasting Turkish–Russian relations. In the light of developments, Turkey is expected to fuel the conflict until it almost reaches its goals.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, our analysis demonstrates that although rhetorically the majority of the international actors supports the territorial unity and political stability of Libya, their diverging political, economic and security interests hinder its realisation. We analysed great powers, European powers and regional powers, and found our original hypothesis broadly supported by the data. We showed that almost all of the actors involved are interested in the cessation of hostilities in the Libyan conflict but even when the policy goals of the actors involved do convalesce, this is insufficient to end hostilities. The fact that the policy tools themselves and the methods employed, the hard and soft policy tools used by the actors are not coordinated between the actors remains a significant block to the end of hostilities and the end of this new civil war. These policy tools produce counter-acting effects and off-set each other, resulting in hindering the desired cessation from occurring.

The actors we examined in this case study were the great powers, the European powers and regional powers. As to the great powers, the vacuum caused by the lack of active U.S. involvement opened the way for other great and middle powers to influence the Libyan situation with their soft and hard foreign policy tools on the basis of their own interests. China is enhancing its efforts to fill the above-mentioned power vacuum, and its geopolitical interests require to intervene softly, but firmly in Libyan domestic policy. Russia is backing not only Haftar, but the Tripoli Government and Misratan militias as well, and since Haftar's role in the future Libya is far from certain, Russia cannot allow itself to back *only* him. The fact that Moscow has built relations with the major Libyan parties enables it to be the mediator which can influence its negotiations with the EU on several matters.

Among EU member states, Italy and France are the most important actors in Libya. These two states are able to influence Libya's future either with soft or with hard foreign policy tools. Italy can be considered a traditional player in Libya due to its colonial past, while France has been reacting more quickly and more firmly to the events of the Arab Spring, and as a consequence, its influence in the region has been increasing. Both countries aspire to a leading role in the stabilisation process. By contrast Germany, as the biggest donor country, is using only soft tools. Although it was not subject to our analysis we have to mention that the United Kingdom is using the majority of its resources to manage Brexit; as a consequence it has lost almost all ground in Libya.

Regarding regional powers, Egypt is using hard tools in Libya the most decisively; however, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are all using hard tools to a minor extent. It must be noted that Saudi Arabia and Turkey are using the Libyan civil war to extend their power struggle for regional supremacy.

As a consequence of the international involvement, the Libyan stabilisation is getting further and further away. Conflicts of interest amongst great powers, regional powers and even EU member states are increasingly evident and increasingly grave (e.g. the deterioration of Italo–French bilateral relations) as Khalifa Haftar launched its operation against Tripoli in April 2019. This operation has been near openly backed by two permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Russia) who are officially supporting the Serraj Government. The United States – apart from President Trump’s phone call with Khalifa Haftar – Italy and the United Kingdom have been consistently highlighting the need for a political solution, however, this is impossible without a consensus amongst great powers and without mediation between the major Libyan political and military power groups and without coordinated policy tools and responses.

As we argued, the conflict now is best characterised as a new type of civil war, where external actors play an outsized role in determining the possible cessation of hostilities. The fact that the opposing Libyan parties are backed by different international actors may lead to a Syria-like proxy war that can severely endanger European security. In short, without coordination between the policy tools themselves, where the individual external actors choose their type of policy tool through at least partial consultation with each other, the hostilities will likely continue. A sufficient critical mass of coordinated actors’ policy tools is needed for the conflict to possibly end. While the findings of the single-outcome case study may not be necessarily generalisable to all such cases, we hope that this argument can complement and inform the future study of new civil wars in a meaningful way.

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# Public Administration Reform

## The Case of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Muratova ZHANSULU<sup>1</sup>

*The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the countries of Central Asia which is actively working to improve the apparatus of public administration. The formation of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state, the ongoing socio-economic reforms in the country and market relations have necessitated a transition to a new administrative mechanism. The meaning of the new mechanism means eradicating bureaucracy and corruption, increasing the level of people's trust in the state bodies and provision of quality public services.*

*The Republic of Kazakhstan has made considerable progress in reforming its public administration. The country continues to modernise this process. The primary purpose of the present paper is to review one of the public administration reforms in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Specifically, the article aims to present a reform such as creating the Population Service Centre (PSC) and the e-government project to provide public services to the citizens in the Republic of Kazakhstan and its results. What is more, the paper seeks to introduce the new upcoming reforms in public administration because the country has encountered serious riots in January that consequently requires changes in the system of public administration. Thus, the aims of the complex reformation of public administration which the President of Kazakhstan Kassym Jomart Tokayev has set will be presented in this paper.*

*The approach that has been used in this paper was descriptive and relied on analysing the secondary data, including various journal articles, reports, and national and state programs.*

**Keywords:** *public administration, digital technology, reform, PSC, e-Government, Republic of Kazakhstan*

## Introduction

Public administration plays a significant role since its high and qualitative level ensures the country's development and strengthens its competitiveness in the world arena. Public administration, in its general understanding, represents activities of state bodies and their

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officials that have to put the plan into practice to benefit society. In this regard, states annually produce funding for this area and strive to implement effective reforms. The Republic of Kazakhstan is no exception.

The Republic of Kazakhstan has been improving the system of state and local administration for 30 years. The leadership of the country, considering the main principles of public administration, namely the legal, the political and the organisational one, always attempt to bring and insert the best practices into its own system. Namely, the state takes into account the values of the rule of law and the protection of citizens' rights in the framework of the legal approach. Under the political one, the main objective of public administration in Kazakhstan is to implement the people's will as best as possible. Within the last approach, the organisational one, the government attempts to efficiency and effectiveness of its regulation.

Thus, at the dawn of its independence, the Republic of Kazakhstan, from 1991 to 1994, established a legislative and regulatory framework. According to paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The fundamental principles of the activity of the Republic are public concord and political stability; economic development for the benefit of all the nation; Kazakhstani patriotism and resolution of the most critical issues of state affairs by democratic methods including voting by national referendum or in Parliament."<sup>2</sup> Thus, the Republic of Kazakhstan has enshrined norms in the Constitution to fulfil obligations by democratic means through state bodies.

Bespalov argues that the reformation of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan was necessitated due to global trends and the importance of implementation of state-building in those states after the disintegration of the USSR.<sup>3</sup>

The country has also adopted several state documents and strategies to reform public administration. For example, the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in his address *Growing Welfare of Kazakh Citizens: Increase in Income and Quality of Life*, noted that a compact and efficient state machinery should play a huge role in the implementation of any reforms, which should consider all its actions through the prism of improving the welfare of the people.<sup>4</sup> Based on the above, the document was adopted and approved by the Presidential Decree of 26 February this year, aiming to improve the efficiency of the state apparatus. This document is the concept of the development of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030 that will be considered below in the paper.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The Constitution, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, s. a.

<sup>3</sup> S. Bespalov, 'Reforming Civil Service in Kazakhstan', *Russian Journal of Education and Psychology* 11, no 55 (2015), 131–148.

<sup>4</sup> State of the Nation Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, 05 October 2018, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018.

<sup>5</sup> The concept of the development of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030, 2021.

## The general characteristics of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its structure of public administration

The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the largest countries in the Central Asian region that has borders with the Russian Federation, China, and the other Central Asian states such as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The Republic of Kazakhstan declared itself a democratic, legal, unitary state with a clear government structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union and gaining its independence. The Republic of Kazakhstan's form is reflected in the country's leading law, the Constitution. Under Article 3, "the state power in the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be unified and executed based on the Constitution and laws following the principle of its division into the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and a system of checks and balances, which governs their interaction".<sup>6</sup>

The Parliament represents legislative power in the Republic of two chambers: upper (Senate) and lower (Majilis). The executive branch includes the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Supreme Court exercises judicial power in the country. Also, the Constitutional Council plays a unique role in the structure of state administration.<sup>7</sup>




Figure 1: The centre of government in Kazakhstan

Source: OECD, 'Reforming Kazakhstan: Progress, Challenges and Opportunities', s. a.

<sup>6</sup> The Constitution, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, s. a.

<sup>7</sup> The Republic of Kazakhstan, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, s. a.

It is argued that governance in the Republic of Kazakhstan is characterised as hierarchical and highly centralised. Indeed, it is the Soviet legacy that has been left from the dissolution of the USSR. Thus, the article ‘Decentralization of power as a factor in increasing the efficiency of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ indicates that this is the result of the fact that Kazakhstan, like other post-Soviet states, inherited from the former Soviet Union a centralised system of government, economy and society.<sup>8</sup> The high centralisation of political processes in Kazakhstan is annually mentioned in the reports and ratings of international independent organisations and agencies. For example, one of those institutions is the organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD). According to one of the organisation’s reports, it is claimed that certain state bodies, such as the Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of National Economy, have more influence on decision-making despite extensive decentralisation reforms. Besides, the powers of the President are very extensive.<sup>9</sup>

The work “‘Mainstream’ of the past: How did the decentralization reform take place in Kazakhstan’ notes that the enormous territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan with a quite small population and the effective provision of public services necessitated the adoption of certain elements of the decentralisation type.<sup>10</sup> Some points of decentralisation of public administration will be presented in more detail in the next paragraph of this paper.

## **The process of the decentralisation of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan**

The importance of the decentralisation of public administration has been highlighted in two Presidential Addresses to the people of Kazakhstan: the Address of Kazakhstan–2030, *Prosperity, Security and Improving the Welfare of All Kazakhstanis*, and the Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Leader of the Nation Nursultan Nazarbayev to the people of the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, *A New Political Course of the Established State*.<sup>11</sup>

So in the Kazakhstan–2030 Address, *Prosperity, Security and Improving the Welfare of All Kazakhstanis*, the president highlighted long-term priorities, one of them being the reorganisation and improvement of the state apparatus. The President noted that the reform should be based on and consists of the following:

- a compact and professional government focused on only a few of the most critical functions
- strategy-driven programs of action
- established inter-agency coordination

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<sup>8</sup> S. Khalikova, ‘Decentralization of power as a factor of improving of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, *KazNU Bulletin. Philosophy series. Cultural science series. Political science series* (2013), 118–125.

<sup>9</sup> OECD, ‘Reforming Kazakhstan: Progress, Challenges and Opportunities’, s. a.

<sup>10</sup> A. Umarov, “‘Mainstream’ of the Past: How Did the Decentralization Reform Take Place in Kazakhstan?”, *CABAR*, 24 July 2020.

<sup>11</sup> Strategies and programs, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, s. a.

- increased authority and responsibility of ministers, their accountability and strategic control over their activities
- decentralisation within ministries, from the centre to the regions and from the state to the private sector
- a resolute and relentless fight against corruption
- improvement of the system of recruitment, training and promotion of human resources<sup>12</sup>

The above points target different types of decentralisation, such as administrative and political. For instance, political decentralisation, which aims at giving more power to citizens and their elected representatives in decision-making and public administration. Also, administrative decentralisation aims at redistributing powers, responsibilities and financial resources to provide public services between different levels of government. Financial decentralisation, which means a series of policies aimed at increasing the financial autonomy of sub-national governments.<sup>13</sup>

The acute need for all types of decentralisation in the country was also noted in the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, *A New Political Course of the Established State*. The principal idea of decentralisation is to provide rights and important resources for making decisions from the centre to regional state bodies.<sup>14</sup> As it is indicated in the document, decentralisation is an effective change in the system of public administration.

The realisation of the aims mentioned above is conducted in the framework of the development of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030, building a “people-centred” model – “People First”.

The concept of the development of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030 includes forming a new “people-centred” model of public administration. According to the document, the new model of public administration should be based on five primary principles. Thus, these are “hearing”, effective, professional, pragmatic and accountable.

Following the first one, namely the “hearing” principle, the state politics must be obeyed to the crucial fact: “People First”. Therefore, people will be able to make their voices heard and choose the decisions that are important to them, which in turn will increase trust in the state and create a “people-centred” state. Under the second one, the critical factor of the development of any state and improvement of people’s quality of lives depends on the effectiveness of public administration. Thus, the principle is based on achieving the goals and objectives with the most efficient use of the state’s available resources. The principle of a pragmatic state is enclosed in the idea that all decisions of the state bodies must be taken considering the needs of future generations. Also, the formation and the realisation of state policy and reform must be planned for the long- term.

<sup>12</sup> S. Miroshnikova, *Decentralization of Public Administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan* (North Kazakhstan State University, 2012, 304–308).

<sup>13</sup> A. Ozmen, ‘Notes to the concept of decentralization’, *European Scientific Journal* 10, no 10 (2014), 415–424.

<sup>14</sup> Mark Otto, ‘Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy’, s. a.

Another significant characteristic of state has been indicated in the concept. It is the principle of the professional state. It is known that in order to transform public administration into a service-oriented model, competence and human resource capacity that meet high standards are required. Apart from it, state public bodies always have to find new innovative ways to resolve problems and use modern technologies while providing public services. From my point of view, the final principle that is significant in the concept of the development of public administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan is the principle of an accountable state. It includes the following: information openness, accessibility, public accountability. The importance of this relies on the following fact: nowadays, the whole world is switching its traditional way of providing public services to distance one. In other words, the digitalisation of public administration is widely seen since most countries in the world link their development to digitalisation. Therefore, modern information technology and new means of communication should be used in interaction with citizens in Kazakhstan as well.<sup>15</sup>

It is worth mentioning that the complete digitalisation is being considered a massive challenge for both government officials and the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The reason for that is being experiencing issues with computer literacy and so-called digital divide or absence of types of equipment (computers, laptops and smartphones) and adequate Internet connectivity.

## **The provision of public services through modern technologies in the Republic of Kazakhstan**

The effective change of public administration in many developed states happens with the use of modern technologies. The Republic of Kazakhstan also puts much effort in providing quality and fast public services using modern technologies. It is worth mentioning that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as other post-Soviet Union states, began the integration of mechanisms of interrelation between their citizens and public administration bodies through informational technologies. In other words, the e-government and various portals of delivering public services were presented. Thus, for instance, it is the Public Services Portal in the Russian Federation, the ASAN service centre in Azerbaijan, and the Population Service centre in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Mentioning the Republic of Kazakhstan, firstly, the idea of creating an e-Government was born. The formation and establishment of e-government is conditionally divided into four stages. The main aim of planning was to increase the quality and effectiveness of public administration and public services. The e-Government aims to automate the activities of state agencies, which could allow citizens to use highly demanded e-services more effectively.<sup>16</sup> As noted in the scientific and practical recommendation 'Improvement of the

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<sup>15</sup> A. R. Utegenova, 'Kazakhstan's 2030 Development Strategy, Significance and Results', 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Y. Amanbek et al., 'Adoption of e-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan', *Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity* 6, no 3 (2020).

quality assessment system of public services based on Canada's practical experience', the citizens of Kazakhstan have the opportunity to receive 865 interactive and transactional services. In addition, citizens can perform other operations, such as paying state fees and duties, paying taxes, utilities and fines.<sup>17</sup>

Also, a particular body (PSC) began to function in the cities of Kazakhstan. The Population Service Centre (PSC) is a state body designed to provide various public services through a single-window system. This institution was created to implement the Head of State Address mentioned above, by the Government Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 05 January 2007 "On the Establishment of State Institutions, the Population Service Centres of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan".<sup>18</sup>

Population service centres currently operate in all regions and major cities of Kazakhstan. There are 313 Population Service Centres in the Republic, which provide 332 public services.<sup>19</sup> This unique state agency currently provides services to several state agencies at once. They are illustrated in the diagram below:




Figure 2: The public services of the Population Service Centre

Source: Compiled by the author.

<sup>17</sup> For scientific and practical recommendations on 'Improving the quality assessment system of public services based on the practical experience of Canada' see [www.vko.apa.kz](http://www.vko.apa.kz)

<sup>18</sup> On the Establishment of State Institutions, the Population Service Centres of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, IPS "Әділет", 2007.

<sup>19</sup> NITEC, 'National Information Technologies', s. a.

According to Figure 2, the citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan can receive various public services of the following agencies: the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Committee or Land Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and Science, as well as other ministries and agencies of the country through Population Service Centres.

As it was noted in Dzhanenova's analytical study, Population Service Centres on the principle of "single window": from "citizens for government to government for citizens" formation of population service centres (PSC) also occurred in four stages.<sup>20</sup> The first stage (pilot) was from 2005 to 2006. The second stage (resistance stage) took three years in total. From 2007 to 2010, the political, organisational, technological problems were solved. The third stage is characterised as innovative. At this stage from 2011 to 2015, there was integration with the system of "e-government", the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On public services" was adopted, the range of public services was expanded. Currently, public services are provided by personal contact through the offices of PSC and online through the portal of e-government. The main result of this was the reduction of customer service time, the introduction of a quality assessment system of the centre's staff, and the possibility of booking a visit to the centre through the portal of e-government. At the final stage (integration) from 2016 to 2020, the creation and development of "government for citizens" took place. Thus, the evolution of the development of a particular government agency dates back to 2005. As the author notes, PSCs are assigned the role of a "panacea" for an inefficient, sluggish and corrupt state apparatus.<sup>21</sup>

## Results of reform

Since the beginning of the reform of public administration, namely the creation of a special body PSC and the introduction of e-government, there has been a positive trend in meeting the requests of citizens to receive public services. It is primarily due to work done to integrate information systems and databases of state bodies and automate public services. Thus, according to the Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry for 2019, about 82% of public services were automated under the state program Digital Kazakhstan.<sup>22</sup>

In my point of view, a tremendous amount of work has been and continues to be done in the country. One of the main priorities set for 2020 was the continuation of the automation of public services and the achievement of 90%. It is owing to the modern technologies used in providing public services, many advantages have been achieved in the country as a result of the reform of public administration and the transition to an electronic format for

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<sup>20</sup> S. Dzhanenova, 'Analytical study of One Stop Shop Service Centres: From Citizens for Government to Government for Citizens?', 2018.

<sup>21</sup> S. Dzhanenova and I. Esdauletov, 'Innovative reforms in public service delivery: What can Kazakhstan learn from the Canadian experience?', *International Journal of Civil Service Reform and Practice* 2, no 1 (2017), 1–8.

<sup>22</sup> Zerde, "'Digital Kazakhstan' state program', s. a.

the provision of public services. First of all, this is transparency, openness and reduction of corruption in obtaining certificates.

Despite the achievements mentioned above, the state public bodies were criticised by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kassym Jomart Tokayev at the plenary meeting at the lower house of the Parliament (Majilis) this year. Specifically, the President mentioned that “despite integrating key information systems, state bodies are still producing waste paper and meaningless correspondence”.<sup>23</sup> He called for complete digitalisation of public services and their practical function without paper-based confirmation. Apart from it, he has pointed out the other steps to reform the current system of public administration that will be shown in the next part of the paper.

## **New upcoming reforms in public administration**

The Republic of Kazakhstan has always been an example of political and economic stability in the Central Asian region. This paper has already mentioned that the country achieved various positive outcomes in its formation and reformation of the public administration field during the 30 years of independence. However, one unfortunate fact has to be taken into account. The serious unrest that occurred in the country at the beginning of January 2022.

The above-mentioned unprecedented event has necessitated rethinking of the model of relation of authority and the people. In other words, more new reforms in public administration were needed. The president has marked that the current public administration system needs complete reformation due to the following reasons: formalism, the high rate of corruption, the low level of human resource capacity and its high staff turnover.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, taking into consideration all the existed issues, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kassym Jomart Tokayev has proposed the following measures:

- Improvement of the system of selection for public administration service, namely remove barriers to entry.
- The principle of meritocracy should be the main principle used during the recruitment and promotion of public servants.
- The civil service should be open to any Kazakhstani citizen.
- The procedure of leaving the public service should also be simplified.
- An absolute and reasonable approach should be chosen while selecting a candidate for public service.
- A young, ambitious, and perspective generation of public servants is appreciated. There is a social lift for such people to formulate new thinking and introduce new approaches in the work of public administration apparatus within the Presidential Youth Talent Pool project. This practice will continue in the future as well.

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<sup>23</sup> Akorda, ‘Президент Касым-Жомарт Токаев принял участие в пленарном заседании Мажилиса Парламента’, 11 January 2022.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

- The size of the public administration apparatus should be fixed. It is important to note that 15% of the public servants have been cut in the previous year by the president's directive. The size of the state apparatus will gradually diminish.
- Heads of state bodies must interact with the citizens by conducting regular meetings in each city and village.
- The majority of meetings must be held online.

As it is seen from the proposals of the president, a complete reorganisation of public administration is expected in Kazakhstan.

## Conclusion

The article addressed the issue of public administration reform in the Republic of Kazakhstan. This topic nowadays is being very relevant for the country. As noted, the improvement of public administration begins with establishing appropriate regulatory and legal documents, national and state programs.

It should be marked that the Republic of Kazakhstan has achieved success in the establishment and reformation of its public administration. Many innovative ideas were implemented into the system during a short period of time. For instance, the country's leadership correctly noted the need to transform public administration using modern technology. As a result, the modernisation of public administration with the introduction of e-government was carried out. Apart from it, a specialised body such as the Population Service Centre was created to allow citizens to receive several types of public services at one place. Moreover, this unique centre grants equal access to all and excludes direct contact between document executors and citizens.

In my point of view, the innovations mentioned above have already had an enormous impact on the whole system of providing public services to the population of the country. Due to the limitations of this paper, the detailed outcomes may be the subject of further research. However, much work has to be done in the field of public administration in order to improve it. Therefore, this paper also enlists the specific tasks that have to be accomplished in the nearest future.

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