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The Opportunities and Security Risks of Mobile Applications in the Context of Local Economic Development¹

Marco KOLLER² – Péter BÁNYÁSZ³

The spread of information and communication technologies has created an incredible level of dependency in societies nowadays. The efficient functioning of the State and the economy is now unthinkable without these tools. It is undeniable that the Internet and ICTs make a significant contribution to economic growth and play a vital role in all social subsystems. People expect technology to resolve the problems they face, most typically through an application for a smart mobile device. Whether it is elderly care, shopping, public transport, or government administration, mobile apps are the first choice for a growing percentage of users. As a result, they are also playing an increasingly important role in local economic development. In this paper, the authors examine the potential for using these applications and the associated risks.

Keywords: smart mobile device, application, economic development, cybersecurity

Introduction

In the context of globalisation and increasingly digital societies, the role of smart devices and applications are gaining ground, not only in the private sector but also in the public sector. This trend has been reinforced and intensified by the pandemic caused by Covid-19 and the closures related to its responses. On the one hand, “home office” has been enhanced, on the other hand, there is a need, both at the state and international level, to verify easily and quickly that a person has a specific trait or capability (vaccination). However, this increasing digitalisation creates various challenges. On the one hand, teleworking has, in many cases, made it unnecessary for a person not only to be at work but also to be in the country of work, which can affect the GDP of different countries, as people who work remotely to earn a living do not contribute even a tiny portion of their expenditures to the

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economy of the country where the company is headquartered.⁴ There is a tendency that the emergence of electronic services and their spread has also had to be considered by the states. These have given new types of security challenges (fraud, cybercrime, peer-to-peer encrypted electronic messaging applications, et cetera) and opportunities for the State to perform its core functions effectively (public services, law enforcement, health, economic development, et cetera). In particular, e-government and m-government are a way for the State to provide services to citizens or even third-country nationals that facilitate their administration. In the context of e-Government and m-Government, the question always arises as to which applications and procedures can be carried out remotely, even from the customer's home, with an appropriate computer and Internet environment. Some services can only be accessed after personal authentication, which is important to reduce fraud. However, remote authentication and the associated electronic procedures can facilitate central public or even local authorities and private companies, ultimately increasing their economic capabilities. For example, the hotel industry has been negatively affected by the pandemic and ongoing energy crises. Companies have needed to realise costs and modernise their energy management. In this context, an application on a smart mobile device could be a suitable solution, for example, to provide the above-mentioned personal authentication and identification.

In addition to the above, smart mobile device applications can contribute to local economic development in many ways, both in the public and private sectors. The link between local economic development based on public engagement and related applications will be demonstrated and proven in this context.

The aim of the research

This study aims to demonstrate the role of smart mobile device applications in local economic development and to show that e-government is a catalyst for economic development. The aim is to raise awareness that smart mobile device applications, including e-government/e-government supporting m-government/public administration, strengthen a country's economy and thus stimulate local economic development at the local level. Furthermore, we aim to present the general threats and potential challenges of applications for local economic development.

Hypotheses

In our research, we formulated the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: e-Government and m-Government contribute to (local) economic development.

Hypothesis 2: There are more opportunities than risks in mobile applications related to local economic development.

⁴ OECD 2020.

Research methodology

As regards Hypothesis 1, the main research methodology used is the analysis of statistical sources, specifically the Human Development Index (HDI), based on Eurostat's survey of the amount of GDP devoted to research and development, and innovation in each country and statistics on the GDP of each country measured in purchasing power parity. We analysed international statistical data to support the above hypotheses – interviews with experts in addition to the analysis of the literature test hypotheses 2 and 3. In addition to the international and national scientific literature and legislation, we interviewed experts based on the TAM2 (a technology acceptance model). In addition to the above, several case studies from studies on the African continent will further support this thesis.

The conceptual framework

In order to understand the topic, it is necessary to define the conceptual framework that arises and to define the main terms. The following main concepts are thus relevant and facilitate the interpretation of the following chapters: local economic development, mobile applications, smart city concept, e-government and m-government and HDI.

Local economic development

The dependence of local governments on outmoded paper-based procedures is exhausting limited resources and restricting their capacity to adequately serve the people in today's era of fast modernisation, heightened public expectations, diminishing budgets and unforeseen external disruption. Overall, local governments must embrace digital transformation and go paperless by installing a contemporary, cloud-based government administration platform. In essence, via digital transformation, local governments may genuinely drive local economic development. To begin with, digital revolution considerably enhances convenience. Consumers in modern culture are accustomed to buying, ordering food, booking travels, banking and other activities on their screens. They anticipate being able to conduct business online. Paperless procedures provide clients with on-demand access to applications, information and other services that would otherwise necessitate a trip to city hall. Municipalities may handle applications, requests and permit applications more effectively by digitising processes, resulting in increased voter satisfaction.

Local economic development can be viewed as a component of national and regional development, predicated on adopting best practices and the innovative and resourceful use of existing assets. Local economic development differs from general economic development not necessarily in its resources or instruments but in its methodology, which is based on local initiative, participation and control so that the local community is involved in both the planning and implementation processes. Local governments can thus be identified as the most significant stakeholders, interacting with the local populace and the federal government. Smart applications are considered an infrastructure tool for this

study; therefore, their introduction and development in local economic development must be coordinated with other factors (human and financial).⁵ For example, there are several forms of local economic development:

- promoting and selling local products
- promoting the consumption of local products
- local “money” – exchanges, money substitutes
- local alternative energy, autonomous small community energy supply
- micro, small and medium enterprise development⁶

Regulations and related facilitating applications to help local economic operators can also be included in promoting local products as a special infrastructure.

Smart mobile device apps and the smart city concept

A smart device is any device with extra convenience features compared to the original object (fridge, TV, et cetera) that can be implemented through a separate application(s) or connected to the internet. Applications are the software that runs on smart devices and complements their functionality. Applications can be differentiated according to their field of use and their tasks:

- “user applications: programs that make everyday tasks (such as note-taking, file sharing, messaging) easier for the user
- background applications: programs that help the mobile operating system work or extend its capabilities (e.g. scheduling tasks)”⁷

In addition, the smart city concept, whose methodology is defined in Government Decree 314/2012 (XI.9.), should be highlighted. “In its methodology, the concept refers to a methodology for the development of a municipality that improves its social, natural, and built environment, its digital infrastructure, the range, quality, and efficiency of public administration services, public services, utility services, municipal services, and private services, using modern technologies and methods, sustainably, with the increased involvement of the population and local social and economic partners.”⁸ Based on the above, the smart city concept and its development is a type of local economic development along the digitalisation and e-government.

⁵ KÁPOSZTA 2018: 62–69.

⁶ ÁLDORFAI 2022.

⁷ BELÁZ 2020: 38.

⁸ NYITRAI 2022.

E-Government and m-government

E-Government is an interdisciplinary field of study involving a wide variety of disciplines and is essentially a way of accessing public services. E-government is the electronic way of conducting administrative business, primarily through electronic, online services. Some researchers classify m-government under e-government, while others consider it a separate category because of the potential of applications and other features (e.g. SMS-based notifications).⁹ Of particular relevance to this study are application-based m-administration services. There are two broad categories of administrative mobile applications: informative and administrative applications.¹⁰ Both informative and administrative programs can be relevant for local economic development.

Human Development Index

The statistics consider the economic development of a country, the level of happiness of its population, and other relevant data from several perspectives. For example, GDP is measured in purchasing power parity. GDP is one of the most popular indicators of a country's economy and is well-weighted by purchasing power parity (PPP). However, each statistic may also measure other things that are relevant to a country's population. These include technological development, life expectancy, illiteracy levels, the budget allocated to research and development, et cetera. Taking several of these aspects into account, the statistic that best describes human development and living standards – and which nevertheless has many shortcomings – is the Human Development Index or HDI.

The HDI is a composite statistical indicator of life expectancy, educational attainment (average years of schooling and expected years of schooling at entry into the education system), and per capita income indicators that classify countries into four levels. Its value ranges between 0 and 1; the more developed a country is, the closer it is to 1. A country achieves a higher HDI if its life expectancy is longer, educational attainment is higher and the gross national income per capita is higher.¹¹

The potential and opportunities of applications in local economic development

Smart tools and related solutions can now help municipalities and businesses to operate, whether in local government (e.g. Customer Portal, document management), energy, transport, education, health, commerce, or agriculture.¹² Technology can make everyday operations more efficient, contributing to education, employment and health sectors.

⁹ BELÁZ 2020: 34.

¹⁰ BELÁZ 2020: 41.

¹¹ KSH 2008.

¹² BÁNYÁSZ 2019: 49–69.

It also has the potential to create a strong partnership between local people, civil society, local economic actors and various public administrations.¹³

The different applications can contribute to local economic development by promoting the product of the local business, which can reach people who were not aware of it, and by integrating services and putting them on one platform, the local service industry can be boosted, and in some cases, for example, creating a payment method, introducing discount applications can not only raise awareness but also stimulate consumption among residents and boost tourism revenues.

A few related statistics

As mentioned above, there are several ways of measuring the development of a country and its economy – one of the most common statistics is commonly referred to as gross domestic product or GDP. Table 1 below illustrates the top 10 states with the highest GDP (PPP) in 2021.¹⁴

Table 1: Top 10 states with the highest GDP at purchasing power parity per capita in 2021 (int. US\$)

Rank	Country	Value (int. US\$)
1.	Luxemburg	120,038.97
2.	Singapore	106,032.22
3.	Ireland	103,102.56
4.	Qatar	95,340.3
5.	Switzerland	70,764.02
6.	Macao SAR	64,739.16
7.	United Arab Emirates	64,697.99
8.	Norway	64,697.99
9.	United States of America	63,014.33
10.	Brunei	62,276.64

Source: Compiled by the author based on Statista 2021.

Remarkably, there is very little overlap between the top ten global HDI statistics and the below Table 2 (Norway, Switzerland, Ireland), despite the HDI being also based on per capita income.

¹³ ORBÓK 2020: 70.

¹⁴ Statista 2021.

Table 2: Top 10 states with the highest HDI in 2021

Rank	Country	Value
1.	Switzerland	0.962
2.	Norway	0.961
3.	Iceland	0.959
4.	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.952
5.	Australia	0.951
6.	Denmark	0.948
7.	Sweden	0.947
8.	Ireland	0.945
9.	Germany	0.942
10.	Netherlands	0.941

Source: Compiled by the author based on United Nations Development Programme 2021.

It is clear that although the country's income is an important consideration when looking at a combination of factors looking at other interests and values of citizens, the ranking can easily change. In the HDI rankings, Hungary was 46th in 2021, with a score of 0.846. The average world score is 0.721, which puts our country at the very high end of the scale.¹⁵

E-Government development

The so-called e-government development index (EGDI) is used to assess e-government development (see Table 3). It assesses countries using the online services index, the telecommunications infrastructure index and the human capital index.

According to the UN, e-government is a key factor in advancing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite some investment and development achievements, many countries still fail to take advantage of information and communication technology. These have a detrimental impact on the further development of e-government in low EGDI regions, such as Africa, as technological development accelerates.

Table 3: Top 10 states with highest EGDI in 2022

Rank	Country	Value
1.	Denmark	0.97
2.	South Korea	0.95
3.	Finland	0.94
4.	Estonia	0.94
5.	Netherlands	0.94
6.	New Zealand	0.94
7.	Sweden	0.94

¹⁵ United Nations Development Programme 2021.

Rank	Country	Value
8.	Australia	0.94
9.	Iceland	0.94
10.	United States of America	0.92

Source: Compiled by the author based on Statista 2022.

It can be seen that the present table no longer forms a common intersection with the common intersection of the two statistical sets discussed earlier. The HDI shows a very high overlap, with half of the top ten countries in the other list (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Iceland), (see Table 2 and Table 3) while the overlap between the previous table on GDP is very low (one country: the United States) (see Table 1 and Table 3).

Digital development and e-government are also measured by the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), but this is a regional statistic comparing 36 European countries (the last being Montenegro with 37%). This statistic measures e-government maturity by averaging scores on four dimensions: user-centricity, transparency, key drivers and cross-border services.¹⁶

Table 4: Top 10 European countries with the highest DESI in 2021

Rank	Country	Value
1.	Malta	96%
2.	Estonia	92%
3.	Denmark	85%
4.	Finland	85%
5.	Luxemburg	84%
6.	Austria	84%
7.	Iceland	84%
8.	Portugal	82%
9.	Netherlands	82%
10.	Latvia	82%

Source: Compiled by the author based on European Commission 2021.

Compared to the data in Table 1, we also have a narrow cross-section (one country: Luxembourg). Interestingly, the European countries in the joint cross-section of the HDI and EGDI are fully included in the list of the ten countries with the highest DESI values (see Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4). The overlap is even greater for the EGDI, where, as in the above comparison, there is a 50% match, even though this table only includes European countries (Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands) (see Table 3 and Table 4). Our country scores 63%, which is 22nd in this ranking. Although Hungary scored below the median compared to previous years, it should be stressed that this is a European statistic, not a global one, which makes it look like Hungary scored lower than before.¹⁷

¹⁶ Statista 2022.

¹⁷ European Commission 2021.

Based on Eurostat data (also not a global statistic, 30 countries surveyed, but no data available for Switzerland), we can see how GDP expenditure on research and development is currently correlated with the figures presented in the tables above, bearing in mind course and bearing in mind that the return on R&D expenditure is not immediate but much prolonged. For comparison, our country spent 1.65% of its GDP on research and development in 2021, while the EU average is 2.27% (see Table 5).

Table 5: European countries investing the most in research and development in 2021 (percentage of GDP)

Rank	Country	Value
1.	Sweden	3.35
2.	Austria	3.22
3.	Belgium	3.19
4.	Germany	3.13
5.	Finland	2.98
6.	Denmark	2.81
7.	Iceland	2.79
8.	Netherlands	2.25
9.	France	2.21
10.	Slovenia	2.15

Source: Compiled by the author based on Eurostat 2021.

There is no overlap between this data and Table 1, but there is an explicit overlap between Table 2 (HDI) and this statistic, as there is also a 50% overlap, as there has been in the past (Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands). There is also a 50% overlap in Table 3 (EGDI) (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands) and Table 4 (EGDI) (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands). Three countries are not included in Table 1, but all the others are (Denmark, Iceland and the Netherlands). Table 4 (DESI) (Austria, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands). The above shows that although government revenues play a decisive role in the development of a country and its overall standard of living and digitalisation, many other factors are just as important.

The following is a comparison of KSH data comparing regional GDP, poverty rate and Research and Innovation GDP as a proportion: Central Transdanubia (Fejér County, Komárom-Esztergom County, Veszprém County), Western Transdanubia (Győr-Moson-Sopron County, Vas County, Zala County), Southern Transdanubia (Baranya County, Somogy County, Tolna County), Northern Hungary (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád). The Central Hungary region was not utilised since it has not been included in all of the data tables published by KSH after 2018.

Table 6: Gross domestic product per capita, thousand HUF (regions of Hungary)

Regions	2018	2019	2020	2021
Budapest	8,989	10,177	10,313	11,812
Pest	3,501	3,862	3,966	4,623
Central Transdanubia	4,128	4,498	4,478	5,303
Western Transdanubia	4,537	4,731	4,685	5,158
Southern Transdanubia	3,074	3,312	3,372	3,876
Northern Hungary	3,056	3,233	3,357	3,936
Northern Great Plain	2,856	3,13	3,281	3,701
Southern Great Plain	3,042	3,288	3,431	3,904

Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH 2023a.

Based on the available statistics, the capital, or the Central Transdanubian area, stands out among the rural regions as the most developed “region” in terms of GDP. In reality, compared to 2018, Budapest grew 31%, Pest County 32%, Central Danube Region 28.5%, Western Transdanubia 13.7%, Southern Transdanubia 26%, Northern Hungary 28.8%, Northern Great Plain 29.6%, Southern Great Plain 28.3%. The data presented above is then examined in terms of the proportion invested in Research & Development activities, alongside its growth and correlation.

Table 7: R&D expenditure (in-wall) as a percentage of GDP (regions of Hungary)

Regions	2018	2019	2020	2021
Budapest	2.5	2.39	2.52	2.76
Pest	0.91	0.92	0.83	0.62
Central Transdanubia	1.31	1.04	1.77	1.26
Western Transdanubia	0.74	0.73	0.78	1.13
Southern Transdanubia	0.64	0.71	0.85	0.86
Northern Hungary	0.61	0.65	0.76	0.65
Northern Great Plain	0.95	0.94	0.92	0.96
Southern Great Plain	1.16	1.27	1.22	1.37

Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH 2023b.

It is apparent that Budapest succeeds in this area as well, and not simply in terms of GDP. The South Great Plain and the Central Transdanubian areas stand out in terms of GDP investment. Notwithstanding the fact that R&D expenditure in Northern Hungary and Southern Transdanubia is comparable in terms of GDP, it is obvious that Northern Hungary’s GDP growth was nearly double that of Southern Transdanubia. However, the growth in GDP is not completely attributable to R&D, but it is obvious that the region with the largest R&D investment has also been the capital city with the highest GDP throughout the four years under consideration.

Findings from the expert interviews

Our research involved face-to-face interviews with two nationally and internationally reputed experts in IT and e-Authentication. Áron Szabó is Vice President of MELASZ (Hungarian Association for Electronic Signature), and his main research topic is e-voting, direct democracy. Péter Máté Erdősi wrote his doctoral thesis on the measurability of electronic signatures, and he is currently a member of the Election and Representation Research Project at the University of Public Service, where he is investigating e-voting issues related to authentication.

The interviews were based on the TAM3, as mentioned earlier. The questions formulated in this way focused on the opportunities and challenges presented by smart mobile device applications, with a particular emphasis on the potential of m-government and e-governance in the context of local economic development.

According to the experts, the biggest problem is the disharmony between legal harmonisation and technological progress and development. The reason is that it is futile to develop an application method that can authenticate oneself remotely in municipal, public, or banking transactions if the necessary legal framework is not in place to allow its use (e.g. there is no lawful basis for processing the data to be requested). From a data protection point of view, they consider that one of the biggest risks is using biometric data, as the GDPR identifies it as a special category of personal data and its protection is crucial.¹⁸

They mentioned as an easy-to-use example the e-Identity model (DIGIDoc4) used in Estonia, which uses an electronic container and is authenticated by it, not the file itself. As a result, there was no need to deal with file authentication and digital signing on an extension-by-extension basis. The application is quick and easy to use, accessible to people with disabilities, and therefore, has a high level of social acceptance, and in Estonia, it is a generally accepted method, with the software provided free of charge by the State.

A risk that emerged during the expert interview was not only the interconnection of different profiles for service providers but also the risk that the different data handled could be passed on to whom. It is important to distinguish between legitimate and unauthorised data processing and bona fide and malicious data processing and to prioritise identifying unauthorised data processing. The experts agree that this can only be possible through a highly reinforced data protection authority.

The current German decentralised data protection has emerged as one of the best examples to follow, given that the individual provincial databases cannot be accessed by a competent authority in another province, making data processing more transparent and secure, but at the price of interoperability.

Concerning the social acceptance of e-signatures, the experts pointed out that the spread of e-signatures and the public trust in them cannot be increased unless they are part of a complex process (identification or authentication during a pre-contractual customer check). The experts considered that social acceptance is complicated because not only

¹⁸ ERDŐSI-KISS 2020: 214–248.

the lay public but also professionals often do not distinguish between the concepts of identification and authentication, which are often used synonymously in the vernacular.¹⁹

According to these experts, it is important to clarify the conceptual framework so that in a certain communication, a concept means the same thing, as confusion of concepts reduces knowledge of the subject, and many people are afraid of the unknown. In Estonia, the concept of e-signature and e-identification is gradually taught in secondary schools. In our country, e-signatures are not yet widespread, as the average user often does not understand the process that is carried out through them. The fight for awareness started in 2007, and it took five years of continuous communication and support from the minister responsible for the field to gain public acceptance of e-signatures.

The outbreak of the Russian–Ukrainian war on 24 February 2022 also highlighted the importance of smart mobile devices and their applications. One of these high-profile applications is a chatbot called eVorog, which allows Ukrainian residents to report Russian troop movements by providing real-time location data. In the early stages of the war, there were many reports in the international media that residents of Ukraine were sending geolocation data from their pictures and videos to attack Russian military forces with drones or artillery fire. However, this opens the possibility that the attackers could also upload disinformation to mislead Ukrainians or lead artillery fire on their forces. This is why it was important to develop eVorog to authenticate and identify the source of the reports and prevent botnets from overloading the system with images containing false information.

This also confirms that applications with real-time location data are gaining ground and are being used in more areas. One of the most important areas is geospatial information, where these applications can contribute to local economic development in several ways. One such area is the sale of real estate, the assessment of property values, and its role in local health applications, which is not a traditional economic development but a key factor in HDI.

According to the experts, New Hampshire is a good example to follow for the role of apps in local economic development.²⁰ In New Hampshire, there is no local tax on salaries or wages, and therefore no welfare – social safety net – but planned local developments are accounted for on a property tax basis, with the owners' views digitally sought, acting as a quasi-direct democracy locally. Experts believe that making e-voting (even at the local level above) reduces the ecological footprint of a community or country, so greener, more sustainable governance can be achieved; apps are an excellent way to support local referendums. It is interesting to point out that certain parts of the e-voting process could be implemented electronically even today, following the legislation: the anonymous step of collecting signatures in a referendum or election procedure (essentially equivalent to collecting signatures on petitions). According to the legislation, the signature collection

¹⁹ ERDŐSI 2019: 66–91.

²⁰ Overview of New Hampshire Taxes: New Hampshire has no income tax on wages and salaries. However, there is a 5% tax on interest and dividends. The state also has no sales tax. Homeowners in New Hampshire pay some of the highest average effective property tax rates in the country (further details at <https://smartasset.com/taxes/new-hampshire-tax-calculator#makDmI576B>).

sheet or recommendation form “shall be signed by the proposing voter in person” (see Act CCXXXVIII of 2013 and Act XXXVI of 2013), for which, since 27 May 2016, an ePassport and an NFC mobile phone are sufficient.

Experts believe that e-Authentication has many uses in local economic development. On the one hand, it can be used, for example, to speed up guest registration processes in the hotel industry, which can ultimately have a stimulating effect on the economy, not to mention reducing the workload of hotel staff and maximising their efficiency.

Case studies on the role of mobile applications in local economic development

The impact of smart mobile devices on the economy is not a new concept. Studies as far back as the early 2010s showed that the internet significantly contributes to economic growth.²¹ This includes revenues from advertising, e-commerce, and other transactions and economic activities that can be carried out over the internet, but also the growth of GDP due to the spread of the internet and even the speed of the connection itself.²² The growth of broadband internet penetration can significantly increase the productivity of an economy through, among other things, the spread of teleworking and flexible working and the expansion and efficiency of services. Some estimates support that a ten percentage point increase in broadband penetration boosts total domestic output by 1.1 percent and 1,000 new subscriptions create 80 new jobs.

The most striking examples of local economic development and related smart mobile device applications in the international scientific literature are from the African region.

Mobile applications in agriculture and rural development

Empirical studies show that mobile phones have the potential to contribute to the well-being of consumers and producers, as well as to broader economic development. Mobile phone use in sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly over the past decade and now covers 60% of the population. The study finds that the dynamic growth of mobile communications technology creates opportunities for economic growth, social empowerment and grassroots innovation in developing countries. One of the biggest potential impacts is the contribution of mobile applications to agricultural and rural development, providing millions of people with access to information, markets and services. Mobile applications differ significantly in developing countries, as they typically run on second-generation (2G) phones rather than smartphones, which are more common in developed countries.²³

²¹ McKinsey & Co. 2012.

²² Ericsson – Arthur D. Little – Chalmers University of Technology 2013.

²³ QIANG et al. 2012.

The socio-economic contribution of mobile apps in Africa: The impact of local mobile apps

The cited research analysed the contribution of locally developed mobile applications in Africa and attempted to determine their impact on the development of the African region. The authors of the study surveyed five selected African countries. Descriptive statistics from the study showed that more than 71% of all participants use mobile apps. More than 60% of all participants considered mobile apps good innovations that they believe can contribute significantly to Africa's development. Many mobile apps have been developed and are being used in Africa, including in the following areas: text messaging, social networking, commerce, health, education, politics, agriculture and entertainment. In addition to the above, the researchers concluded that the adoption and use of mobile apps are contributing to some extent to Africa's development as they are actively used in various socio-economic activities. One of the study's main findings was that mobile applications significantly improved the health system, education, social activities, financial services, politics and agriculture. Innovation in mobile applications, therefore, has a positive impact on the development of the African region.²⁴

Hungarian example: CityAPP

This is also a feature of the City of Kecskemét's CityAPP phone app. The free software allows users to explore restaurants, stores, current programs and events in the area, making it easier for locals and tourists to arrange their leisure time. The app also includes municipal and other local news, as well as the ability to hail cabs. Particularly appealing is the potential of learning about available parking spots in one of the city's squares, so that visitors arriving by automobile are not simply lucky if they locate a parking place. By simplifying and speeding up the search for parking places, this feature of the program not only saves time but also cuts air pollution. The software also displays the various destinations on a map. The disadvantage of the phone app is that it requires both mobile data traffic and location authorisation, so it is not fully free, and it also drains the battery. Yet, the live data connection and location information allow the user to search for different events and places, as well as information in general, more effectively.²⁵

The risks of smart mobile devices

The smart mobile devices and the applications developed for them can create several risks from a privacy and information security perspective. Mobile devices in use today are, and are used as, computers because of their performance and often their functionality. This implies a whole range of cybersecurity risks. The old saying goes that he who has

²⁴ CHINEDU et al. 2019: 191–198.

²⁵ NAGY 2019: 50.

a hammer in his hand sees everything as a nail, and as cybersecurity experts, this is particularly true. However, we believe it is important to differentiate between the general threats and the technological and human risks. In our opinion, whatever the technical device or application (including security solutions such as a password vault, antivirus, et cetera), the decision to use it should always be based on the results of an internal risk analysis.

Given the restricted scope, it is not feasible to discuss the complicated threats of smart mobile devices in depth, as we did in our previous study from 2016, but the primary risks will be briefly outlined in the parts that follow. However, it is important to see that while serious risks can be identified, most of them can be minimised with awareness and a high level of cyber hygiene skills. One such method is the internal risk analysis mentioned above, which should consider several aspects: for example, the type of application you are requesting permission for, how it is protected, how often it is updated, and how other users rate it. During use, you should keep a constant eye on strong password rules, the risk of Wi-Fi networks, keeping the application (and the device) up to date, et cetera.

The bottom line is that mitigating risks is a key responsibility of the application developers. In many cases, the risks of smart mobile devices can be traced back to applications designed specifically for phishing purposes. Obviously, these risks can be mitigated in a dedicated application supporting local economic development. A cybercriminal who develops a phishing application to steal our personal data, our financial data, access our content to blackmail us (e.g. by using a camera or microphone in hidden ways), et cetera, will not care that the application does not meet basic security requirements, does not implement GDPR standards. However, in the case of an official application, these should be given special attention, as the protection design should be continuous, closed, complete and proportionate to the risks. If the developer implements these, the risks from the application can be significantly reduced. In addition to developers, it is equally important to ensure that users are alert. It is important to recognise that there is no such thing as 100% security, but much can be done to minimise risks.

Essentially, the security of smart mobile devices may be viewed from numerous perspectives, one of the most basic of which is the source of the threat, which might be data transfer, software, hardware, or indeed the user.

- Data transmission is the movement of information from one location to another by wired or wireless means. Bluetooth, mobile internet, and Wi-Fi networks, among others, can be used for wireless data transfer. They can all be dangerous. The BlueBorne attack vector, which allows remote access to the device, is worth discussing in the context of Bluetooth vulnerability.
- The programs you have installed on your smartphone expose you to a wide range of dangers. Attackers frequently replicate popular programs, inserting harmful code or infecting the original apps. Ransomware infections, which encrypt the data of infected devices and demand money to unlock them, are also popular on cellphones. In case of an application containing our biometric identifiers, which effectively limits our access to a given sector of the public administration, our proclivity to pay potential extortion costs may grow.

- In the area of hardware hazards, I believe the primary classification foundation is whether or not the specific hardware issue that compromised the device was directly included. Backdoor: A mechanism incorporated into software or hardware that may be exploited to circumvent an entity's authentication measures. An example of an accidental hardware risk was uncovered in 2018 when it was discovered that Intel, ADM and ARM CPUs possessed highly significant vulnerabilities that could be exploited to obtain access to data stored in the devices' memory.
- The operational system (a particular framework that organises and regulates the hardware's resources) may have a variety of vulnerabilities, for which various manufacturers offer updates that exploit the flaws that develop. This is why the so-called zero-day vulnerability, a security risk in which attackers exploit a weakness in a computer system that the creators are unaware of, should not be neglected.
- It is nearly conventional, but it is true that even if an application, system, or technology has the highest physical and logical protection available, the human aspect may always be a weak point. The user may be addressed as a security element in two ways. First, when an attack on a particular device or system is the consequence of inattention by one or more users, i.e. indirect harm by a given individual. On the other side, it may also be caused intentionally (particularly in the case of multi-user systems, such as a global corporation's or a municipality's network). The first scenario could be the opening of an unsolicited e-mail and the simultaneous loading of malicious code, but it could also be so-called social engineering, in which attackers use psychological manipulation to obtain information from genuine collaborators with little or no knowledge of information security. The opposite scenario is when the user causes damage on purpose.²⁶

Summary

The data we have analysed shows that countries with higher GDPs also invest in technological development in areas where they are highly developed and where the digital literacy of their populations is high. There are many benefits of digitalisation for states, municipalities and companies. On the one hand, e-government and m-government can integrate knowledge that contributes to local economic development, and on the other hand, they can create the infrastructure that a well-developed e-government system can bring to a municipality to attract a large amount of investment. Although mobile applications may have many risks, they offer many more benefits. Distance personal authentication services can not only make eGovernment more popular but can also be used in other areas. Furthermore, most risks can be eliminated by raising user awareness; the first step is proper education at the right time.

The findings of our research are as follows:

Result 1: e-Government and m-Government contribute to (local) economic development.

²⁶ BÁNYÁSZ 2018: 360–377.

Statistical resource analysis has shown that the technological development of invested capital and the development of e-Government overlap more with the human development index, which represents the livability of a state.

Result 2: There is more opportunity than risk in mobile apps for local economic development.

In addition to the interviews with experts, results were supported by the analysis of national and international literature, which is particularly confirmed by the data for the African region.

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From Inactivity to Reactivity and Gut Proactivity: Review of Lebanon’s State Policies Towards Syrian Refugees (2011–2022)

Elias DAHROUGE¹ 

With an estimated 1.5 million, Lebanon is one of the most affected countries by the Syrian refugee crisis, making it the country with the highest rate of refugees per capita in the world. While praised in the early years for its hospitality, Lebanon’s policy response towards refugees became gradually more restrictive and repulsive. The following article gives a comprehensive review of Lebanon’s policies regarding Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2022. It argues that during this period, the state’s policy response can be divided into three major phases defined by the concepts of inactivity, reactivity and gut proactivity. Each of these phases comprise a multitude of different policies on the local, national and international levels, which are thoroughly examined and categorised. In addition, the article gives interpretations for the probable motives behind the various policies by linking them to the peculiarity of the Lebanese political system itself.

Keywords: *Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanon, policy response, policy of return, refugee studies, Middle East*

Introduction

The Syrian civil war that started in 2011 triggered one of the greatest humanitarian tragedies of the 21st century by displacing millions of Syrians both internally and internationally.² Neighbouring Lebanon is one of the most impacted countries by this refugee crisis. The country witnessed the influx of around 1.5 million of Syrian refugees, making it the second biggest recipient for Syrian refugees.³ In this respect, with a population of roughly 4.5 million, Lebanon became the country with the highest rate of refugees per capita in the world, making up around 30% of its total population according to the United Nations

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² Amnesty International 2015; United Nations 2018.

³ UNHCR 2019a.

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) itself.⁴ While praised in the early years for its generous hospitality, Lebanon saw a shift of its policy towards the Syrian refugee population. In this regard, authorities switched gradually from no-policy to policies of exclusion and policies of return. The aim of this analysis is to present a comprehensive review of Lebanon's policies regarding Syrian refugees from 2011 up until 2022. For that purpose, it reviews the three phases that it conceptualises as phases of *inactivity*, *reactivity* and *gut proactivity*. Afterwise, it examines the three phases' different policies that were undertaken on the local, national and international levels, and tries to interpret the various motives behind each of these measures. Nonetheless, the first step below is dedicated to the detailed presentation of the context in which these policies were adopted.

The context

Lebanese state policies towards Syrian refugees have to be understood in their proper context. Despite its complexity, this context has three main relevant dimensions that have to be taken into consideration for the following analysis. The first dimension can be qualified as structural, as it is related to the Lebanese political system's nature itself, its institutions, as well as to the different binding international regulations to which the country adheres. Understanding this structure is key for the interpretation of motives behind the different policies. The second dimension is temporal. It is related to the timeline of the Syrian refugees' influx in numbers and their evolution through years. They help us to establish correlations between fluctuations in refugee numbers and implemented public policies. The third dimension is conjunctural, as the Syrian refugee crisis coincides with the multileveled financial, socioeconomic and political crisis that Lebanon witnessed starting from 2019.

1. Regarding the structural background, Lebanon is known for its peculiar *consociational* political system based on consensual power-sharing between its various religious components guaranteed through mutual veto.⁵ Implications of this system are twofold: on the one hand, power is divided among sectarian political parties. But since each has its own interests and priorities, consensual power-sharing often results in a multi-cephalous executive which prevents unified decision-making.⁶ As a consequence, the Lebanese state policies are characterised by a high level of institutional ambiguity.⁷ Therefore, the system's structural dysfunctions reflect on a generalised systemic weakness that relativises any policy analysis. On the other hand, since the system grants each sect a proportional representation through quotas, the fragile sectarian status quo engages sects in a mutual "confidence game"⁸ in which each aims constantly at maintaining the sectarian demographic balance in order to avoid any questioning of the quotas'

⁴ It is important to note that in addition to Syrians, Lebanon hosts around half a million of Palestinian refugees who came after 1948 (UNHCR 2018).

⁵ MESSARRA 2003; MAALOUF MONNEAU 2015; SALLOUKH et al. 2015; CORM 2003.

⁶ SALLOUKH et al. 2015; FAKHOURY 2014.

⁷ NASSAR-STEL 2019.

⁸ SALIBI 1998: 38–56.

repartition.⁹ Thus, fear from demographic change is a key driver of actors' decisions and policy initiatives. The influx of Syrian refugees must be understood then as a perceived threat by many decision-makers. This context might also explain other structural elements like, for example, that Lebanon is not signatory of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.¹⁰ Yet, the government abides by the principle of non-refoulement.¹¹ This is also an important framing element for policy analysis.¹²

2. Regarding the second contextual dimension, Lebanon is one of the most impacted countries by the Syrian refugee crisis. Any attempt of understanding its state policy towards refugees must be put in the context of the evolution of the refugees' influx itself. With the absence of any reliable official census, the UNHCR's data provide a valid indicator of numbers and their trends. In this respect, after a consequent increase during the first years, the number of UNHCR-registered refugees reached a peak in spring 2015 with around 1.2 million.¹³ Later, the number dropped back below the one million, with around 919,000 registered for autumn 2019.¹⁴ Afterwise, numbers continued to decrease further slightly by reaching 814,715 by the end of 2022.¹⁵ This can be explained by a multitude of factors such as resettlement, return to Syria, and illegal migration towards Turkey and Europe induced by the worsening economic conditions as presented later. For instance, 100,000 refugees were resettled to third countries by June 2019.¹⁶ In the meantime, the Lebanese state continues to give the number of 1.5 million Syrian refugees as its official estimation.¹⁷ In consequence, the analysis of Lebanon's refugee-related policies has to be understood in the wake of these fluctuations through time.

3. Finally, regarding the conjectural context, since 2019 Lebanon has been facing a multitude of parallel and intertwined crises that are both affecting public opinion and the state's policy response in relation to Syrian refugees. In this respect, the worsening economic situation of the past years triggered a wave of mass protests starting of October 2019.¹⁸ The multileveled crisis had some dramatic consequences on the Lebanese population. In fact, annual inflation rates surpassed 150% for 2021 and 170% for 2022,¹⁹ while the Lebanese Pound's devaluation reached 95% by the end of 2022,²⁰ and the – once thriving – banking sector prevented access of depositors to their own savings.²¹ But the ruling class failed at providing adequate solutions, leading the World Bank (2022) of qualifying the crisis as deliberately-orchestrated by its elites and as one of the world's

⁹ FAOUR 2007.

¹⁰ JANMYR 2017; BRUN et al. 2021.

¹¹ KIKANO et al. 2021.

¹² BRUN et al. 2021.

¹³ UNHCR 2019b.

¹⁴ UNHCR 2019b.

¹⁵ UNHCR 2023.

¹⁶ IOM 2019.

¹⁷ This estimation is often shared by many other sources since many Syrians failed to register as refugees, especially after Lebanese authorities asked UNHCR to freeze registrations in 2015 as presented later in this analysis (UNHCR 2022; UNHCR 2023; UNHCR 2019a).

¹⁸ DAHROUGE et al. 2020.

¹⁹ DERHALLY 2023.

²⁰ BASSAM et al. 2022.

²¹ World Bank 2022: 67.

worst economic collapses since 1850.²² As a result, 80% of Lebanese were pushed into poverty by the end of 2022,²³ and thousands lost their jobs or were forced to emigrate to seek better opportunities.²⁴ Many politicians of the ruling elite were tempted at blaming refugees,²⁵ fuelling by that the overall resentment against them.²⁶

The different phases of Lebanon's refugee response

The Lebanese state's policy response towards the Syrian refugee crisis was already comprehensively and continuously analysed during the past years. Generally speaking, the state's undertaken policies can be categorised under three separate phases that evolved chronologically on the timeline. In fact, between 2011 and 2020, they shifted gradually from what we call here *inactivity* (2011–2014), to *reactivity* (2014–2016) and *gut proactivity* (2016–2022). The following few paragraphs give a summary of these main phases.

This first phase of *inactivity* was often described as a phase characterised by a “policy of no policy” or “ostrich policy”.²⁷ During this phase, borders remained open for Syrians, but they were denied any specific legal status.²⁸ Most of the time, the government was unable to explicitly formulate any refugee-related policy, and when it did, it failed in its implementation.²⁹ However, the only exception to the rule of no-policy was the strict and declared ban of camps.³⁰ Indeed, in contrast with Jordan for instance, Lebanon did not regulate or establish refugee camps. As a consequence, the uncontrolled flood of refugees had directly impacted municipalities. Soon, local authorities were left without any form of guidance from the government,³¹ leading to a multitude of ad-hoc decisions taken on the local level.³² In parallel, assistance was “outsourced” to various local or international governmental and non-governmental organisations.³³

The second phase of *reactivity* saw between 2015 and 2016 a shift towards the so-called “policies of exclusion”³⁴ through which the government tried to regulate the transborder movement of Syrians.³⁵ The turning point happened in late 2014 when the cabinet officially addressed the Syrian refugee crisis for the first time after three years of its beginning.³⁶

²² World Bank 2022: 65.

²³ Human Rights Watch 2023.

²⁴ LÓPEZ-TOMÁS 2023.

²⁵ BRUN-FAKIH 2022.

²⁶ ROSE 2019.

²⁷ “Policy of no policy” was first conceptualised by Karim El Mufti (2014), while “ostrich policy” by Saghieh and Frangieh (2014), as cited in KIKANO et al. 2021: 429. They both refer to the first years of the Syrian refugee crisis during which Lebanese authorities failed at taking any active measure.

²⁸ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017, 17.

²⁹ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

³⁰ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

³¹ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

³² HOCHBERG 2019.

³³ BRUN et al. 2021; KIKANO et al. 2021.

³⁴ BRUN et al. 2021.

³⁵ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

³⁶ KIKANO et al. 2021.

The declared rationale was articulated around the need to contain the influx through recording all entries at the borders.³⁷ This development is definitely linked to the context: as mentioned earlier, numbers of UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees reached 1.2 million in 2015. As a result, during the following few months, the General Security³⁸ (GS) applied restrictive visa and residency measures on Syrians³⁹ and the Lebanese authorities asked the UNHCR to stop new registrations, depriving by that many Syrians from both financial and in-kind aid provided for registered refugees.⁴⁰ It also pushed most of them into a status of illegal residency that put them at risk of vulnerability and exploitation.⁴¹

The third phase of *gut proactivity*⁴² comes in the light of Michel Aoun's election as President in late 2016. It is characterised by the rising advocacy and the gradual implementation of a soft plan for the return of Syrian refugees.⁴³ This move came in the context of a general consensus among Lebanese influential political actors on the necessity of the return of Syrian refugees after years of conflicting positions. But the multiplicity of initiatives coupled with fragmented decision-making processes make its tracing quite difficult.⁴⁴ These go from the creation of official bureaus at the General Security for receiving applications of voluntary returnees,⁴⁵ to the formation of other committees managed by non-state actors such as political parties who coordinate return directly with the General Security.⁴⁶ But as usual in the Lebanese *consociational* political system, there was no consensus among political parties on the return's modalities.⁴⁷ Details around these policies are tackled in the next parts.

Three levels of policy response

After the chronological approach that led us to identify the three main phases of Lebanon's policy response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the analysis needs to be completed by a detailed typology of the various policies implemented. For that, policies must be examined separately on their local, national and international levels.

³⁷ GHANEM 2015.

³⁸ The General Security is one of the Lebanese state's four security agencies. Its main tasks are border control, regulation and management of foreigners' residencies and counterterrorism.

³⁹ GHANEM 2015.

⁴⁰ KIKANO et al. 2021.

⁴¹ UNICEF–UNHCR–WFP 2018.

⁴² The usage of "gut" for describing "proactivity" is for underlining the emotional and instinctive character of the state's actions as interpreted here. In other words, the state's proactive measures are coming from the "stomachs" of the decision-makers rather than from rational thinking.

⁴³ FAVIER 2016: 1–6.

⁴⁴ FAKHOURY 2021.

⁴⁵ VOHRA 2019.

⁴⁶ FAKHOURY 2021.

⁴⁷ FAKHOURY 2021.

The local level

As mentioned earlier, on the local level, the state's inaction transferred the management of refugees to local authorities such as municipalities.⁴⁸ In other words, municipalities were kind of indirectly "sub-contracted" by the state. As a result, state *inactivity* turned soon into municipal *reactivity*. It gave local authorities complete freedom in adopting all kinds of ad hoc – and sometimes illegal – measures and regulations that ranged from restrictive to inclusive.⁴⁹ Their actions were inconsistent.⁵⁰ For example, many municipalities limited residing refugees to receive guests after specific hours, or forbade them to access public spaces.⁵¹ In some towns, Syrians were simply asked to leave, or were prohibited to access the area. In this regard, refugees faced eviction notices and mass expulsions in many regions.⁵² Other municipalities like Hadath for instance – a Christian town in the vicinity of Beirut's southern suburbs – simply banned Syrians from working within their territory.⁵³ Elsewhere, municipalities limited Syrians' movement after certain hours through curfews. For instance, within one year between 2014 and 2015, more than 45 municipalities were identified to have imposed curfews for unjustified motives, despite being forbidden in doing so.⁵⁴ The United Nations documented that, up until 2018, 14% of refugee households experienced imposed curfews in their areas of residency, varying from 1% in Beirut or Akkar in the North, up to 45% in some of South Lebanon's regions.⁵⁵ Curfews were issued by municipalities in 97% of the cases.⁵⁶ With the worsening economic and financial crisis that Lebanon started to experience in recent years, many municipalities began to tighten even more their restrictive measures against Syrian refugees.⁵⁷ Indeed, crises need scapegoats. It progressively pushed some municipalities to undertake populist measures against Syrians, such as setting daily wages caps for Syrian workers,⁵⁸ in order to ease Lebanese – and their resentment – who often perceive Syrians as stealing their jobs.⁵⁹

The national level

The national level is the core focus of this analysis. For a better understanding of the full picture, the analysis requires a thematic dissection of the various policies. In this respect, the meticulous review enables us to distinguish between 1. economy and labour policies;

⁴⁸ KIKANO et al. 2021.

⁴⁹ KIKANO et al. 2021.

⁵⁰ HOCHBERG 2019.

⁵¹ HOCHBERG 2019.

⁵² PRESTON 2017.

⁵³ Naharnet 2019.

⁵⁴ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

⁵⁵ UNICEF–UNHCR–WFP 2018.

⁵⁶ UNICEF–UNHCR–WFP 2018.

⁵⁷ HAYEK 2022.

⁵⁸ RAMADAN 2021.

⁵⁹ ROSE 2019.

2. identity-protecting policies; and finally, 3. an escalating policy of return. The first two categories are mainly *reactive* measures, while the third is *proactive*.

1. Economy and labour policies were one of the first *reactive* actions to be declared by the Lebanese Government. It started in 2013, when the Ministry of Labour intended at regulating the work of Syrians by confining them into specific restricted domains.⁶⁰ But the Council of the Ministers revoked this measure, in parallel with its decision to link United Nations aid and assistance's eligibility to unemployment status, according to which "displaced" would no-longer be considered as such if practicing a job.⁶¹ These first measures correlate with the rise of incoming Syrian refugees in 2013 and onwards as presented earlier. Later, the Ministry of Labour succeeded in limiting work permissions for low-skilled positions such as agriculture, cleaning and construction.⁶² If the regulation seemed to be relatively progressive, the practice revealed the policy's real intentions. In fact, the paperwork and regularisation demarches proved to be quasi-impossible to meet, since it required employers of proving that no Lebanese could fill the position of Syrian postulants, and that they would abide by a 9-to-1 quota of Lebanese versus Syrian employees.⁶³ Then, in 2015, Lebanese authorities imposed work permits on Syrian employees, and asked in parallel the UNHCR to remove employed Syrians from their list of aid beneficiaries.⁶⁴

2. The second category of policies include those *reactive* measures intended at protecting Lebanon from various threats to its national security. It includes policies and actions that prohibited the institutionalisation of organised camps, as well as those that tried to limit any form of long-term implantation of Syrians in the country. The formers are also referred to as the no-camp policy.⁶⁵ As previously explained, Lebanon prevented the elaboration of a camp policy for Syrian refugees.⁶⁶ This decision was most probably linked to the country's past experience with Palestinian refugees who settled in camps that are regulated by various Palestinian factions and remain out of direct state control.⁶⁷ Hezbollah – one of the most influential political actors on the Lebanese scene – expressed its fear of having potential security "pocket zones" that would soon fall out of control.⁶⁸ Indeed, many thought that these zones could witness the proliferation of Sunni extremist groups and eventually become a threat for state security.⁶⁹ The latter policies, those that intend at limiting long-term Syrian settlement, concretised through initiatives that prohibited Syrian refugees from building shelters out of hard or long-lasting construction material. In this regard, the Lebanese Supreme Defence Council ordered the demolition of all informal shelters identified as built of such material, which technically turned around

⁶⁰ BRUN et al. 2021.

⁶¹ BOU KHATER 2017.

⁶² BRUN et al. 2021.

⁶³ BRUN et al. 2021.

⁶⁴ BRUN et al. 2021.

⁶⁵ SANYAL 2017.

⁶⁶ TSOURAPAS 2019: 464–481.

⁶⁷ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

⁶⁸ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017: 19.

⁶⁹ FAKHOURY 2021.

3,500 Syrian families into homeless people in Aarsal alone.⁷⁰ In parallel, the Ministry of Social Affairs dispatched some watchdogs across the country to monitor and keep an eye on all Syrian refugee-related humanitarian activities, preventing any form of perennial improvements on refugee accommodations and constructions.⁷¹ In this respect, any other construction material than wood or plastic was destined to be demolished.⁷² On another note, these decisions had some dramatic consequences on refugees' safety. The sole use of light construction material put many settlements at high risk of fire hazards, like in 2020 in Minieh, North Lebanon,⁷³ or in Aarsal in the Beqaa,⁷⁴ leading often to many casualties.

3. The third category of policies regroup the state's instigation and progressive escalation of return initiatives that characterise the third phase that we named *gut proactivity*. As indicated by the appellation, this phase is defined by a switch from mere *reactive* measures to *proactive* procedures, albeit emotionally-driven as if coming from the *gut*. In this respect, the policy of return had to be first accepted, then planned and finally implemented. When it comes to the first step, political struggles between the pro-Western and anti-Syrian regime 14th of March coalition on the one hand, and the pro-Syrian regime 8th of March coalition on the other, – both included in consensual governments of national unity – made it difficult to agree on a unified vision about return. For example, parties could not agree over the question of safe zones within Syria.⁷⁵ But calls for the immediate return of refugees were gradually growing. The Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun went as far as proposing its implementation by force.⁷⁶ Hezbollah – the former's ally – was also holding similar positions.⁷⁷ In fact, when the Syrian conflict started to lose in intensity, the 8th of March coalition – namely Hezbollah and its allies (Amal and FPM) – adopted the Assad regime's narrative and claimed that Syrians were safe to return home, unlike the 14th of March coalition which declared the contrary.⁷⁸ This takes us to the next steps in which intentions were to be translated into concrete actions. One of these actions was implemented by the GS who started to relocate thousands of refugees based on their “voluntary” will to return to “safe zones” in Syria.⁷⁹ By the end of August 2019, the GS declared to have supervised the repatriation of around 2,700 Syrians in just three months, a step considered by Human Rights Watch as “placing them at risk of arbitrary detention and torture”.⁸⁰ Since then, the so-called voluntary return organised by the GS continued on a regular pace.⁸¹ But obviously, these initiatives were still perceived as shy by the government. In the decision-makers' perspective, return policies needed an upscale at the size of the crisis itself. Intentions for a comprehensive plan were translated

⁷⁰ BRUN et al. 2021.

⁷¹ KIKANO et al. 2021.

⁷² HOCHBERG 2019.

⁷³ HOUSSARI 2020.

⁷⁴ L'Orient Today 2022b.

⁷⁵ GEHA 2019.

⁷⁶ GEHA 2019.

⁷⁷ FAKHOURY 2021.

⁷⁸ GEHA 2019.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch 2020.

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch 2020.

⁸¹ Human Rights Watch 2021; Human Rights Watch 2020.

into the elaboration of a clear roadmap by the 2020 Hassan Diab Government for the safe return of Syrian refugees, and was based on the cooperation with the Syrian regime.⁸² Nevertheless, the cabinet's resignation following the deadly Beirut port blast of August 2020⁸³ diverted the focus of the caretaker government towards other priorities. The plan was to be reactivated under the Mikati Government of 2021, which upon its formation, issued a decision over the return question, followed by the appointment of a ministerial committee to deal with this folder.⁸⁴ This came along with a rising discourse that stressed on the inability of the country to cope with the crisis anymore.⁸⁵ It also led to some suspicious cases of what some organisations denounced as being arbitrary deportations.⁸⁶ The organisation of so-called mass voluntary returns was undertaken by the Minister of Displaced Issam Charafeddine. In July 2022, Charafeddine announced his plan to organise the safe return of 15,000 Syrians per month in collaboration with Damascus,⁸⁷ considering Syria a safe place,⁸⁸ and suggesting the deportation of dissident refugees to third countries.⁸⁹ Soon, and despite the objections of the UNHCR, President Aoun announced the launch of the minister's plan in October 2022.⁹⁰ By the end of October, the results remained far from the target, as only 751 persons were successfully repatriated,⁹¹ showing the limits of mass voluntary return policies. All in all, although being difficult to measure with exactitude, an estimated 76,000 Syrian refugees returned back home from Lebanon during the 2016–2022 period.⁹²

The international level

Lebanon's policy on the international level was previously conceptualised as a type of "refugee rentier state".⁹³ This appellation refers to states that use refugees as a mean to excerpt "refugee revenues" from donors in return for keeping them on their soil.⁹⁴ There are two types of refugee rentier state strategies: one uses blackmailing by threatening donor states with refugees like Turkey, while another uses softer back-scratching methods for its chantage, such as promising donors to keep refugees contained within their borders in return of cash assistance and aid.⁹⁵ In this respect, Lebanon's political elites are profiting from international aid allocated for hosting Syrians. In the past years, the state's

⁸² ASTIH 2020.

⁸³ BASSAM–CHMAYTELLI 2021.

⁸⁴ National News Agency 2022.

⁸⁵ The international dimension of this discursive "chantage" are addressed in the next paragraph (National News Agency 2022).

⁸⁶ SEWELL 2022.

⁸⁷ L'Orient Today 2022a.

⁸⁸ L'Orient Today 2022a.

⁸⁹ FAKIH 2022.

⁹⁰ HAMADI 2022.

⁹¹ LANGLOIS 2022.

⁹² Asharq Al-Awsat 2022.

⁹³ TSOURAPAS 2019: 464–481.

⁹⁴ TSOURAPAS 2019: 464–481.

⁹⁵ TSOURAPAS 2019: 464–481.

representatives used international donor conferences as platforms for their back-scratching discourses.⁹⁶ These strategies were also complemented by other behaviours in which the government tried to bargain donations in counterpart of incentives, such as for example the delivery of work permits to Syrian refugees, who happened to be already employed on the black market.⁹⁷

The different motives behind the policies

The policy analysis of the previous sections provides tangible evidence and hints about the probable underlying motives that drive the many actions and initiatives of the Lebanese state towards Syrian refugees. Regarding the phase of *inactivity*, it is undeniable that decision-makers and key actors have had some kind of humanitarian considerations. Hezbollah for instance had a previous debt towards Syrians when they welcomed Lebanese Shia from South Lebanon during the 2006 war with Israel.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, this explanation must be balanced with the structural realities of the Lebanese political system that cause deadlock and paralysis in decision-making:⁹⁹ a more logical explanation for the state's initial *inactivity*. Also, the inability to control the fluid Syrian–Lebanese borders discredits any argument that tries to claim that the open door policy was intentional.¹⁰⁰ When it comes to the phase of *reactivity*, the prior concerns of authorities were most probably of economic nature for the sake of protecting the domestic jobs market,¹⁰¹ while the no-camp policy was driven by security concerns linked to the Palestinian precedent.¹⁰² In addition, this phase can also be interpreted as a message from the government to the international community stressing on its refusal of becoming a country of asylum for millions.¹⁰³ Finally, the phase of *gut proactivity* – marked by the initiation of an upscaled return policy – engages the analysis in a multitude of subtle interpretations. While some might see it as a mere variant of state securitisation,¹⁰⁴ others interpret it as linked to the perception of fear from Syrian refugees as a threat to the country's sectarian demographic balance.¹⁰⁵ This is especially relevant for the non-Muslim Sunni religious groups, mainly Shia, Druze and Christians.

Conclusion

All in all, from an initial *inactive* phase marked by a policy of no-policy, the Lebanese state started to adopt more *reactive* policies of restriction and exclusion, before shifting

⁹⁶ TSOURAPAS 2019: 464–481.

⁹⁷ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

⁹⁸ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

⁹⁹ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

¹⁰⁰ KIKANO et al. 2021.

¹⁰¹ BRUN et al. 2021.

¹⁰² KIKANO et al. 2021.

¹⁰³ KIKANO et al. 2021.

¹⁰⁴ BRUN et al. 2021.

¹⁰⁵ ŞAHİN MENCUTEK 2017.

towards implementing a *proactive* policy of return. The first phase was defined by a context of general hospitality, while the second was triggered by the exponential growth of incoming refugees. Finally, the third phase was generated by the indefinite prolongation of the refugee crisis, coupled with the worsening economic crisis in Lebanon. Throughout the three phases, different policies were adopted on the local, national and international levels. On the local level, the state did not adopt any policy. Hence, municipalities and local communities had to deal with the crisis by their own. On the national level, the state implemented restrictive policies in many different sectors. Some of these were economy-related – such as the regulation of the Syrian labour force – while some others were security-related such as the no-camp policy. Later, the state started to push more aggressively towards organising mass voluntary return. On the international level, the Lebanese state acted as a rentier state by using chantage in order to attract international aid. While these policies were determined by a multitude of different security and economic motives, it is important to underline that their main driver might be linked to the fear that Syrian refugees generate a perceived threat to the country's fragile sectarian demographic balance. But this claim needs to be corroborated by further investigations.

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Constructing Collective Identities within European and Latin American Integration Frameworks

Maria Fernanda CAMACHO POSADA¹ 

This paper seeks to highlight the importance of creating a collective identity and strengthen the relationship between regional alliances and the civil society to achieve, not only economic, but political goals, concerning the implementation of effective national and international policies, and the influence of political leaders' positions on the resolution of contemporary crisis. Radical political discourses have gained strength through some of the most important social challenges nowadays such as pandemic, migration, armed conflicts and social inequality, among others. This has resulted in a global phenomenon of fragmentation and decline of regional powers. In a contrasting process, different nations have joint forces to prevent a social, economic and political collapse, and, in this framework, regional integration becomes a fundamental strategy to build international cooperation and stability.

Keywords: regional integration, collective identity, citizens participation, political discourse

Introduction

Historically, regional integration agreements have pursued economic goals focusing on trading and commercial initiatives. However, decision making and policy implementation are driven by members' political positions and interests. According to Page: "Trade may well be secondary to political or security objectives or constitute an instrument rather than an objective: it is difficult to find any group that has only a strictly commercial agenda."² In other words, regional integration is developed not only with financial purposes, but its success also resides in the consolidation of political ambitions, thus, politics plays a fundamental role in its development.

On the one hand, regional integration brings political outcomes that might have an impact on stability, for example the construction of peace and security. On the other hand, integration failures may lead to conflict and the fragmentation of relationships between the participants.

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² PAGE 2000.

The political scientist Alberto Van Klaveren presents the benefits of integration to promote economic, social and political growth. First, the success of regional integration cases such as East Asia and the Pacific regions, where intraregional trade and exports have significantly increased revenues, has influenced states' perceptions towards the importance of local alliances.³

Second, greater regional integration could drive policies that improve the quality of infrastructure and connectivity. For example, in the Middle East and North Africa logistics costs are among the highest in the world. Geographical obstacles make the region face higher costs than other regions. Regional efforts to guarantee the quality of transport routes lead to facilitate connectivity, to be more efficient and enhance mutual learning.⁴

The 2017 report by the World Bank *Better Neighbors: Towards a Renewal of Economic Integration in Latin America*⁵ establishes that the more diverse the countries that enter into trade agreements, the more they can complement each other and the greater the profits, either by buying or selling products that make up the same value chain or by exchanging technology, knowledge and talents. In this regard, deeper integration between small and large countries in regions such as the Americas would be much more beneficial.

Third, regional integration is crucial to global integration. A business strategy can make a region much more efficient and powerful; this allows to share knowledge; have more competitive rates among partners that lower the cost of products; generate more business; and, ultimately, be more competitive with the rest of the world.

This paper will take a theoretical approach looking at various aspects of collective identity construction, and its relationship to political actors' discourses, demand–supply interaction and policy areas dimensions.

Conceptualising regionalism

The theoretical framework as far as the external perspective is concerned, is found in the Great Transformation by Polanyi.⁶ Originally, integration theories were developed to explain the rise and fall of the market society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but are currently used to characterise changes in the current international political economy and are interpreted, consequently, as a great transformation.

The new regionalism understood as a political project would question the homogenising trend of contemporary globalisation by working in favour of a multicentre world order, with regions that are not tyrannical but central, each one originating in historical civilisations, but multicultural, similar to the historical empires that have offered humanity relevant organisational systems that coexist with a normative universe of convergent cosmopolitan values created through dialogue and understanding between the parties.⁷

³ VAN KLAVEREN 2017.

⁴ GANI 2017: 279–288.

⁵ BOWN et al. 2017.

⁶ POLANYI 1994.

⁷ HETTNE–SÖDERBAUM 2000: 457–472.

When academics and researchers compared the old and the new regionalism, the findings were theoretically significant for the development of the new regionalism approach. In the first place, findings highlighted a great variety of actors, beyond the state-centred approaches. Second, the existence of a real region by itself was underlined, rather than a formal one defined by the member states. Third, it was pointed out that the globalisation process concentrated on regional integration as a planned fusion of national economies through cooperation between a group of nation states.⁸

The point of view of the new regionalism tried to consider that the process of regionalisation itself is also different in developed and developing regions, thus it gives rise to numerous regionalisms. In addition, the processes of globalisation and regionalisation interact in areas with different characteristics, which is why various modalities of regionalisation appear. This is evident if the new regionalism is compared with the old, or if the new regionalism in Latin America is contrasted with that of Europe. Even in Latin America the regional dynamics of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur differ considerably.⁹ For this reason, it is important to analyse the internal and environmental conditions relevant to each case.

Challenges of regional cooperation

During times of crisis, Latin American and European regions have shown openness towards regional integration. However, current integration processes have had to face many global, regional and national challenges. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to worldwide economic issues and significant social changes which pose a series of questions regarding our way of living, health systems and governments' response to abrupt changes. All these realities bring with them political implications at local, national and international level. Moreover, consequences of the pandemic emergency are yet to be observed, political elites must re-think the way societies and all their institutions are structured, the "rules that govern behaviors"¹⁰ or the concrete design of organisations.¹¹

In the case of the European Union, the most efficient integration organisation so far, the implementation of restrictive measures such as the physical closure of borders has been criticised. On the one hand, for promoting the need for unified policies, and on the other, for showing incoherence between different responses by national governments of members states. In this context, benefits of being part of the union have been debated and, in some cases, the defence of domestic policies is seen as threatening the stability of the European integration.

Another obstacle of regional integration, for example, has been the lack of social and economic infrastructure; this is the case of Latin America. Due to the geographical location, Latin American countries are key to inter-American trade, however, some regions have

⁸ HETTNE-SÖDERBAUM 2000: 457–472.

⁹ PAGE 2000: 7.

¹⁰ NORTH 1990.

¹¹ SCOTT 2000.

poor road networks coverage and the inefficient levels of education reduce the possibilities to have personnel trained in border, port and customs operations.

At a national level, many countries in Europe and Latin America are experiencing political instability and polarisation in which radical discourses have emerged. In this regard, new strategies of communication have attracted part of the young vote and build opinion leaders with a strong presence in social networks. Thus, the discourses that associate political ideologies with the privileges of certain groups, for example, poor people who receive social plans, against a working class without social benefits, have been very effective to address people's demands.

Citizen engagement in integrated organisations might be considered challenging. Considering the European experience, assumptions are based on conventional views of civil participation, such as the role of formal debate for social and economic representation, and regional parliamentary structures. It also highlights some of the dilemmas involved in establishing bases for legitimacy of regional systems. Regional models and structures do not inherently have any greater merit than others, nor can particular structures of democratic government be drawn from national experience just by simply being transferred to regional level.¹²

According to Best,¹³ civil society engagement in regional cooperation becomes crucial to identify keystones such as the success and suitability of institutional structures in diverse national and international settings, consistent with fundamental principles of democratic actions and good governance which allows to assess the prospects and boundaries of high regional governance indicators.

Integration in Latin America and Europe

In the global scenario, examples of regional integration efforts are the Pacific Alliance and the Visegrád Group. On the one hand, the Pacific Alliance is a regional integration mechanism formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, with a population of 229,777,189 inhabitants, a total area of 5,144,603 km² and a GDP estimated in US \$18,818.23 per capita (2021 estimate). It was established in 2011 aiming to build an area of deep integration with free movement of goods, services, capital and people; to promote the growth, development and competitiveness of their economies to achieve greater well-being, overcome socioeconomic inequality and promote the social inclusion of their inhabitants; and to become a platform for political articulation, economic and commercial integration and projection to the world, with an emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁴

On the other hand, the Visegrád Group is a political and cultural alliance formed in 1991 by four Central European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all members of NATO and the European Union. It has a population of 64,301,710 inhabitants, with a GDP per capita of US \$26,502.48 (2021 estimate) and a total

¹² COOKE-KOTHARI 2001: 1–15.

¹³ BEST 2004.

¹⁴ For more information see <https://alianzapacifico.net/en/>

area of 533,615 km². Its main objectives are enabling, through integration and definition of common strategies, the insertion of member countries into the European community; the creation of mechanisms to enable economic cooperation among member states, with a view to economic development: establishment of strategies and actions aimed at cooperation in the energy field, and military and scientific cooperation between member countries.¹⁵

As it can be noted, both integration alliances have a strong focus on economic development, however, concerning the political sphere and society participation, there are significant differences. To understand citizens perceptions on Pacific Alliance, the Americas and the World project¹⁶ carried out a survey in 2014, seeking to answer the following questions: What do citizens know about the Pacific Alliance? How do people assess this cooperation? What is the social value of this integration? Interestingly, the results showed that more than half of the population in the four countries do not know or do not have an opinion about the Alliance, as Figure 1 illustrates.




Figure 1: Level of awareness regarding the Pacific Alliance (2014)

Source: Compiled by the author based on the Americas and the World data (2014).

Data suggests that there are variations in the level of awareness between countries. While in Colombia 47% of the population does know and expresses an opinion about the PA (similarly to the almost 46% of Chile), in Mexico only 30% of the population knows and is able to assess it. Peru shows a more favourable level of awareness among its population, with 40%.¹⁷ In principle, this implies an important challenge for the Alliance and its Member Countries, since there are relevant proportions of its societies for whom this mechanism is not yet part of their knowledge, within national and international contexts.

Behind the explanations, regarding the lack of awareness towards the PA, the survey showed that in the case of Chile, the greater the support of the free flow of goods, the more

¹⁵ For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about

¹⁶ For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/

¹⁷ For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/

likely people are to know about the PA; on the contrary, the greater the support for a Latin American regional currency, the lower the probability that people say they know about the Alliance. The case of Colombia shows peculiarities. It is the country where the highest percentage of the population know about the PA, and this seems to depend on the support for the free flow of investments. However, for female participants who support free market and are indifferent to the United States influence, it has a negative effect, meaning, it decreases the awareness level of the alliance.¹⁸

Mexico has also interesting results; in particular, it is the country where more factors can explain the degree of awareness. In addition to education and knowledge, international interest, evaluation of the economy and support of the free flow of investment and the regional currency have a positive effect. Finally, in Peru the only factor that determines awareness, seems to be the assessment of the economy. Based on the analysis of the data, it can be said that public opinion might become an obstacle to advancing the integration process within the PA as well as to the construction of a regional identity.¹⁹

As for the Visegrád Four countries, the most recent report on public opinion was in 2021.²⁰ The survey highlighted the highest level of awareness about the Visegrád integration in Hungary (69%), followed by Slovakia (65%), the Czech Republic (52%) and Poland (49%), as Figure 2 shows.




Figure 2: Level of awareness regarding the Visegrád Group (2021)

Source: Compiled by the author based on the International Visegrád Fund (IVF) 2021 data.

Data showed that in all four countries, people’s awareness of the V4 increased considerably, in comparison to data from 2001. Hungary had the most significant increase among the member states. According to V4 citizens, the most important area of cooperation is economy and trade, evidencing their focus on socio-economic issues. However,

¹⁸ For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/

¹⁹ MALDONADO 2012.

²⁰ For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about

priorities tend to differ slightly in the case of Slovak and Polish respondents who prefer the development of tourism, while the Czechs included security and defence within the alliance priorities. Overall, the report indicated that although there are different important areas of cooperation, society's views on priorities does not differ dramatically from one country to another.

Considering the PA and V4 data on public opinion, it can be noted that, in the first case, discourses of integration have not been as effective as in the European case, where seems to be a wide awareness of the cooperation and its advantages. This comparison highlights the importance of adopting an emphasis on political efforts to construct collective identities under discourses of belonging, leading to the consolidation and production of a new common sense that might be favourable to regional integration.

One of the events that promoted the construction of collective identities occurred during the crisis triggered by the two world wars, which made imperative for European individual and group ambitions to be reconfigured. Thus, with the end of the bipolar world order, in 1991, the V4 initiative meant both, a return to historical regional cooperation, and an attempt of a group of Eastern and Central European states to re-position themselves in a re-integrating Europe.²¹ Meanwhile, within Latin America's context, collective imaginary was not changed so abruptly at a specific point in time, as it was in Europe. Instead, Latin American countries have experienced their own national crises at different moments and in different circumstances, making it difficult for a solely discourse to find in regional integration a way to rewrite national and international identities.²²

Hence, integration discourses that emerge from damaging events have the capacity to connect the interests and identities of societies that could have been seen as rivals, fostering a feeling of acceptance and making individuals believe they have a common fate belonging to the union, which favours the idea of integration. To illustrate this, regardless of Germany and France wars, these nations constructed a new collective identity in which having united interests and identities was the basis of pro-regional integration policies.

In order to identify, locate, contextualise and map out the discursive strategies employed as collective identities and carry out a comparative analysis among successful regional integration groups, it is important to pay special attention to citizens' and leaders' positions, and the identification of discourses that are competing amongst themselves and resisting or facilitating the construction of a regional identity.

Political discourse seeks to persuade citizens in different ways, it cannot be understood without analysing the power of political concepts, the implicit agreements and the importance of how to produce a persuasive discourse.²³ In addition, due to the development and evolution of the media, it is fundamental to face the need to carry out an objective discursive analysis. Citizens are saturated with large amounts of information making it hard to identify facts and understand the content of news. Thus, today's society needs critical thinking tools that allow passive political actors to analyse in detail discourse changes and variations.

²¹ BRAUN 2020.

²² RAMANZINI 2017: 1506–1507.

²³ FROMKIN et al. 2007.

Taking into account Pacific Alliance and Visegrád Group characteristics and the benefits and challenges of international cooperation mentioned before, it is crucial to analyse the role of regional integration in the implementation of effective public policies, how current citizen's demands are addressed and how political actors' discourses shape the present and future of the two regional alliances.

Political actors within regional cooperation

The current health crisis has aggravated the lack of credibility and confidence in international and national organisations, and the complex context of communication has radically modified the notion of authority, a fundamental concept to understand the discursive and ideological relationships between the constructions of collective identities. In this scenario, political actors have profoundly transformed their communication strategies, in a process of hybridisation and convergence of discourse.

In addition, the electoral results of the last decade in Latin America and the European Union are evidence of major political shifts. Regional powers have adopted new communicative strategies to attract people's participation, however, in the last years, political discourses have been changing constantly.

On the other hand, the analysis of social and economic actors in the decision-making process will allow to identify the types of actors that participate in these processes, the positions they adopt towards integration negotiations and the impact of their communicative strategies.

According to Moravcsik,²⁴ social and economic actors do not participate directly in the decision-making process, however, they do participate indirectly through pressure they exert on their respective governments and considering that the only political actors to occupy a seat in the intergovernmental negotiation table are national governments, citizen participation is channelled through the organisations that represent it.

Historically, political leaders have played a leading role in nation building, however, at a regional level the role of heads of government might be overshadowed due to the nature of regional integration, which leaves no room for imposition of guidelines and times by one state over the others. As stated by Haas,²⁵ integration as an open process, is described by the spill-over from one area to another. Although the end point is supposedly open, "it is clear that it must be institutional".²⁶ This would involve technological and scientific changes which would lead to "political learning" from national bureaucracies, political leaders and international organisations.

Nevertheless, the spill-over process can be unpredictable. Consequently, Waltz began to emphasise the role of ideas and "consensual knowledge", paying greater attention to the relevance of political leaders and their objectives.²⁷ Therefore, the role that individuals

²⁴ MORAVCSIK 1993: 473–524.

²⁵ HAAS 1975.

²⁶ MUTIMER 1994.

²⁷ WALTZ 1991: 21–38.

can play in the international arena, and the institutional contexts that can provide incentives or restrictions for their actions, must be clarified as key elements of a more general development.

In the European case, supranational institutions and leaders have managed to generate positive effects on integration by demonstrating that the strength or weakness of the heads of government are the most important factor when it comes to explain the positive or negative results of the processes of regionalisation. Regarding Latin American intergovernmentalism, lack of objectivity has led to retreats from integration, as the Venezuelan case currently suggests.²⁸ Although these views may be considered negative, this paper does not intend to support such negative perspectives but contribute to avoiding them.

As introduced by Kitschelt, components of the political system, organised around fundamental issues (e.g. Sustainable Transport, Agriculture, Health, etc.), are known as policy areas classified within the following dimensions:²⁹

External boundary drawing: The exclusionary dimension

Kitschelt presents the notion of citizen taking into consideration a collective category. According to the American scholar: “Political systems erect boundaries between the in-group and the out-group on the basis of place of residence and/or biological descent.”³⁰ As pointed by De Vries and Marks,³¹ the exclusionary dimension involves particular subgroups of political issues such as multiculturalism, immigration, ethnicity, etc. Hence, it is likely to explain just a sphere of political positions, while the other areas are covered by other dimensions in the policy area, namely, the authoritarian and economic dimensions.

To illustrate this dimension, it is interesting to examine the positions taken by the Visegrád Group and the Pacific Alliance on an exclusionary issue such as migration. In the first case, Poland Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been known for its common stance in favour of a restrictive migration and asylum policy, which attracted the outrage of a large part of European public opinion during the 2015 refugee crisis. The Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, highlighted this same facet in his speech on the occasion of the alliance’s 30th anniversary: “The strength of the Visegrád Group is based today on the synergy of community action, a stronger negotiating position in the EU structures and the representation of our international strategic interests in the international arena.”³²

Hence, the Visegrád Group’s aims to renegotiate the hegemonic understanding of the European identity system from the position of peripheral states, seeking the acknowledgment of Brussels of the complex and contested nature of European identity construction. As stated by Maria Leek and Viacheslav Morozov: “This attempt to protest

²⁸ ELLNER 2001: 88–93.

²⁹ KITSCHELT 2007.

³⁰ KITSCHELT 2007: 1179.

³¹ DE VRIES – MARKS 2012: 185–193.

³² For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about

the current manifestation of the European Union can also be understood more broadly as the rejection of an entire European political system that organizes itself along complex practices of orientalism.”³³

Regarding the Latin American scenario, the tension generated by migration crisis occurs in the Americas, where due to the Venezuelan crisis, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have experienced constant flows of forced and violent migration, causing humanitarian problems and insecurity. In this context, the Pacific Alliance has aimed to promote political dialogue to address Venezuela’s economic, social and political challenges, by exercising leadership, promoting collective action and building strategies among the governments in power.

Socio-political governance: The authoritarian dimension

Concerning the modes chosen to make group decisions, the socio-political governance dimension must be introduced. It can be explained as the set of rules which drive behaviour in a community, and it manifests, as Kitschelt states: “The balance between compliance with a higher group authority versus members’ rights to choose their own lifestyles, express individual preferences, and make them heard in the formation of collective decisions.”³⁴ Thus, this balance involves the ideological elements recognised as the authoritarian dimension where issues such as law and order, traditionalism and social values, interact.

In this respect, the V4 nations have adopted more divergent views on governance, rule of law, the protection of the so-called liberal values and the European Union prospects. Most of the Western countries have condemned signs of illiberalism and have opposed the V4 unorthodox positions on migration, media independence and minorities, among others, as a threat to democracy and EU stability, deepening the division between west-east nations.³⁵

In his article, the director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Emil Brix proposed inverting the polarity and stopping seeing the Visegrád Group as an example of internal opposition to start considering it as an incentive to rethink the foundations of the European Union and adapt it to the new times.

As for Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has not been oblivious to the imbricated response to the liberal international order. During the second decade of the 2000s, more conservative governments detected echoes of the anti-globalisation, anti-political liberalism and anti-international institutions phenomena observed in Europe and the United States. For instance, one of the electoral campaign promises of Colombia’s former president, Iván Duque, was that his government would not sign free trade

³³ LEEK-MOROZOV 2018: 122–152.

³⁴ KITSCHOLT 2007: 1178.

³⁵ BRADY-MARTIN 2018.

agreements, and throughout his tenure there were multiple collisions with international organisations such as the United Nations.³⁶

Attitudes pertaining to distribution: The economic dimension

The third dimension, the economic one, refers to the distribution of resources and the political postures and discourses towards the question of readjustment versus spontaneous economic order.³⁷ Since the 20th century, economic issues such as market regulation, redistributions and protectionism, among others, have played a significant role in the political system formation.³⁸ In that matter, according to several political researchers,³⁹ the behaviour of integration cannot be addressed based just on one economic issue. Consequently, as pointed by De Vries and Marks: “In recent years, the debate on the economic dimensionality has intensified.”⁴⁰ In fact, different phenomena such as globalisation and the variations in citizens’ principles, have led to the idea that the debate on the state’s role in the economy is determined by rival ideologies.⁴¹

Despite the fact that V4 members are relatively small countries, its large population has an undeniable impact as a group. If economic figures are explored, the Visegrád Group is ranked as the fifth largest-economy in the European continent and number 12 worldwide. In terms of population, V4 represents the 22nd-largest in the world and 4th in Europe with around 64 million people.⁴²

Although Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic benefit from European Union funding, the V4 has opposed the EU’s relocation policy, disapproving the idea of a two-speed Europe, but also supporting cohesion policy conservation. The only Visegrád Group member that has adopted the euro is Slovakia, while the other members have no plans to join the Euro zone in the near future.⁴³

Despite divergent economic policies, the Visegrád nations have a key role within EU trade. In 2017, as a result of their incorporation into EU large supply chains, collectively, the alliance became Germany’s main trade partner surpassing China and the United States.⁴⁴ Currently, Germany remains the number one trade partner of the Visegrád countries.

Regarding the Pacific Alliance, Tremolada⁴⁵ affirms that the PA contributes to the fulfilment of a series of economic objectives at the national level, such as overcoming the lag that still persists compared to other economies in the region, increasing production based on the demands of export, find quality substitutes for products that previously came from the battered Venezuelan market, improve interest and investment by foreign

³⁶ SANAHUJA 2019: 59–94.

³⁷ KITSCHOLT–MCGANN 1997.

³⁸ LIPSET–ROKKAN 1967.

³⁹ BAKKER et al. 2012: 219–245.

⁴⁰ DE VRIES – MARKS 2012: 186.

⁴¹ DE VRIES – MARKS 2012.

⁴² MFA 2022.

⁴³ GOTEV 2022.

⁴⁴ TILFORD 2017.

⁴⁵ TREMOLADA 2014: 721–752.

economies and strengthen cooperation ties with the Asian continent. PA insertion strategy was used to project simultaneously towards several markets, including USA connections. In this line, the PA established as objectives the creation of an area of deep integration for moving progressively towards liberalisation of goods, services, capital and people.⁴⁶

More recently, the PA agreed on the need to face the economic impact of the Covid pandemic; however, the efforts of the alliance have not been successful due to social instability. Prior to the pandemic, citizen unrest was observed in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, a product of entrenched socio-economic inequality, corruption, violence and in some cases lack of basic resources. One of the most media covered cases was the social outbreak in Chile, in October 2019, in a country considered a “model” of successful development. Scandals between large companies and the illegal financing of politics have contributed to citizens’ dissatisfaction and discontent with government institutions.⁴⁷

Consequently, the development of alliances such as the V4 and PA might be quite effective to the extent that they are established as a way to support the institutionalisation of multilateral dialogues, which combine the ideas, knowledge and experience of the participating countries. Thus, cooperation can be reflected in a greater development of competitiveness and the economy, as well as in better bases and opportunities to combat the problems faced by the region at a social and security level.

Conclusion

As mentioned before, regional change might be influenced by the positions the government takes in formulating internal/external policies and deciding how they will be implemented. Thus, the success of regional integration groups such as the Pacific Alliance and the Visegrád Group will be largely down to the efficient implementation of domestic public policies, citizens’ participation, and political leaders’ roles.

To explore political positions towards national and international policies that have been taken by regional unions, there must be a focus on inner dynamics of cooperation in each organisation, discourse changes regarding public policies such as unemployment and refugees/migration, and world powers’ influence on global changes. This might be achieved by comparing state policies in light of the impact of the past five years in Latin America and Europe, examining people’s perceptions towards regional alliances, their role on each region and especially their influence on current peace processes, by promoting political, social and economic stability.

Finally, a fundamental element in the analysis of regional integration processes is the conceptualisation of crucial policy areas which poses different questions concerning the current worldwide social, economic and political crisis. Firstly, the relations among the different policy area issues and how their components interact. Secondly, the question of the effect of regional integration on policy areas involving external issues to examine its performance. This involves an examination of political actors, economic and political

⁴⁶ QUILICONI – SALGADO ESPINOZA 2017: 15–41.

⁴⁷ OYARZUN 2020: 578–590.

interests within integration organisations and towards third parties. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyse the importance of each policy dimension and assess whether there is a focus on a certain group of issues while ignoring others.

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The Role of the French Foreign Legion in Latin America in the Defence of the European Space Program¹

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Since its formation in 1831, the French Foreign Legion has traditionally defended French interests in the overseas regions. During its nearly two centuries of existence, it was primarily involved in the conquest and protection of colonial territories in Africa but was also deployed many times on the Asian and American continents. In the latter region, the Foreign Legion has been active since 1973, mainly in the European space centre in French Guyana, protected by the soldiers of the 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment. The Guyana Space Centre, currently the largest spaceport of the European Union, was established in 1964 in French Guyana near the city of Kourou, making it ideal for launching space rockets due to its proximity to the Equator. The space centre, originally run by the French state, has been shared with other European Space Agency countries since 1975, launching European satellites from an area more than 7,000 kilometers from Europe. Among other projects, they enable the operation of the Union's satellite navigation system, Galileo. For all these reasons, the protection of the space centre is a priority task, which the Foreign Legion has been effectively providing for almost 50 years with tools and methods that have been constantly renewed. The aim of this paper is to present this activity and its impact on the region and, more broadly, on the scientific and geopolitical situation in Europe.

Keywords: *European Space Agency, Guyana Space Centre, French Guyana, French Foreign Legion, military security*

Introduction

Thanks to its colonial past and its (changing) role in world politics, France has considerable experience of how to assert its interests in the most effective way, even in regions far from its own European centre of power. This advocacy has political, economic, cultural and military components. There are many forms of these eventual armed actions, but in

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these cases, France usually involves the French Foreign Legion, which has been a reliable defender of French interests everywhere since its creation.

Given that one of the most important links in the European space programme is the space centre in French Guyana, it is understandable that this military unit also plays a significant role in its protection. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of this specific and centuries-old cooperation, this paper will first review the main stages in the history of the French Foreign Legion, then the development of the French space programme and the creation of the Guyana Space Centre and their integration into the European space programme, and finally the military activities carried out by the legionary force stationed in Guyana to protect this high-priority project.

The French Foreign Legion

The use of foreign soldiers for French interests began long before the founding of the Foreign Legion, as the recruitment of warriors from other countries for the French army has a centuries-old tradition. Mercenaries from other countries were already used in the 12th century when Philip Augustus hired free companions instead of feudal troops. Given their effectiveness, the French sovereigns used the services of the Genevan crossbowmen and the Scottish archers during the Hundred Years' War. The Scottish troop existed until the Revolution of 1789, as did the Swiss Guards created in the 16th century who were massacred in defence of the Tuileries by the Parisian people on 10 August 1792.³ During the Ancien Régime, about a quarter of the royal army was made up of foreign soldiers, and on the eve of the Revolution, no less than 24 infantry regiments and 14 cavalry regiments were formed exclusively by foreign soldiers (Irish, Germans, Danes, Swedes, Italians, Hungarians, etc.). Despite the undeniable fighting value of these troops, the republicans were reticent about them, judging them to be too loyal to the monarchy, which is why most of them were disbanded in 1791–1792.⁴

However, due to the international nature of the revolution, foreign volunteers came forward in large numbers to support the French revolutionary army, and consequently several foreign legions formed by these recruits were created to fill the gaps in the ranks of the French troops. After the rise of Napoleon I, the number of these troops increased significantly. The emperor recognised the potential in foreign soldiers and established a number of military formations as early as 1802 to bring these volunteers together and exploit them. The latter came from all over Europe and formed about sixty units (for example the Hanoverian Legion or the Isembourg Regiment) until 1814.⁵ Their importance is proven by the fact that the Grand Army crossing the Niemen in 1812 included up to half of the soldiers of foreign origin.⁶ After the fall of the Empire, the new regime turned to

³ BERGOT 1972: 25.

⁴ PORCH 1994: 21–22.

⁵ MONTAGNON 1999: 12–13.

⁶ DE GMELINE 2016: 21.

the use of trained and available foreign troops and created the Royal Foreign Legion in 1815 which later became the Hohenloe Legion. The revolution of July 1830 changed this situation, as the revolutionaries intended to eliminate this formation, which was considered monarchist, and the foreign units were dissolved by order.⁷

Nevertheless, the French Government still needed proven soldiers capable of participating in the recently begun conquest of Algeria. Consequently, the absence of foreign troops lasted only for a brief time, as the royal decree of 9 March 1831 created a legion composed of foreigners which took the name of the Foreign Legion. This new formation formed by foreigners was intended above all to fight outside the territory of the metropolis. According to the ordinance, the Legion consisted of battalions identical to those of the line infantry, whose members wore the same uniform and received the same pay as those of other army units. To facilitate the command of these heterogeneous men, at the beginning, each battalion of the Legion grouped together one or two nationalities. Consequently, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions were reserved for the Swiss and Germans, while the 4th was for the Spanish and Portuguese, the 5th for the Italians, the 6th for the Belgians and Dutch and the 7th for the Polish. Foreign volunteers between the ages of 18 and 40 could sign a contract for a period of 3 to 5 years.⁸

These legionary battalions were immediately deployed to Algeria and Spain. During the fierce fighting, the Legion forged a solid reputation and settled on the African continent for more than a hundred years, taking up residence in Sidi Bel Abbès in Algeria. After the end of the long Algerian campaign, the legionnaires were used in conflicts on other continents. They participated in the conquest of new colonial areas such as Mexico, Tonkin, Madagascar, Morocco, Syria, etc. At the same time, they were present in European wars (in Crimea and Italy) and contributed to the defence of the national territory in difficult geopolitical situations (such as the Franco–Prussian War, the First and Second World Wars). From 1945 onwards, the Legion was forced to fight in the wars of independence in Indochina and Algeria, which ended in bitter failure. It then participated in peacekeeping operations in former colonial territories in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. As a regular corps of the French Army, it is currently based in Aubagne and nowadays also provides security in overseas regions (Guyana, Mayotte, etc.).⁹

Today, it counts one hundred and forty nationalities in its ranks. With the possibility of recruiting up to the age of forty, the Legion can also hire very experienced personnel. This broad capacity to recruit naturally allows for a quality selection. At present, it is estimated that out of eight candidates applying for a Foreign Legion information post only one volunteer will finally be retained after the selection tests. Benefiting from a quality recruitment, the Legion is a troop with a recognised efficiency. Consequently, it is used regularly in military missions all over the world.¹⁰

⁷ ASZÓDY 1977: 11–14.

⁸ COMOR 2013: 109–110.

⁹ See BLOND 2008.

¹⁰ O'MAHONEY 2010: 104–105.

The beginnings of the French space programme

The French space programme covers all French civil and military space activities. The origins of the French space programme go back to 1946 when the French Army created the Ballistics and Aerodynamics Research Laboratory (*Laboratoire de recherches balistiques et aérodynamiques*) with the hiring of German engineers who were experts in rocket technology. The first mission of the laboratory is the development of ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles and sounding rockets. However, the results of this work were modest, as most German specialists returned to Germany in the early 1950s.¹¹

The situation changed when President Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958. It was the return of Charles de Gaulle to power that gave a new impetus to scientific research, which led to structural changes and new developments. De Gaulle decided that France will autonomously develop a ballistic missile carrying nuclear weapons. As part of this ambition, the Space Research Committee (*Comité de recherches spatiales*) was created to study the role that France could play in this new field. On 2 August 1961, General de Gaulle decided to take advantage of the opportunity to build a low-cost satellite launcher: he gave the green light to the construction of the Diamant launcher. The Diamant rocket was to be based on the developments made for the strategic missile and was to enable a 50 to 80 kg satellite to be launched.¹²

At the same time, in order to carry out a real space programme, a coordination and animation institution was still missing. It was created on 19 December 1961 as a public establishment called the National Centre for Space Studies (*Centre national d'études spatiales*) and its first mission was to place France in the club of space powers alongside the USSR and the USA. From 1961 to 1981, CNES was the driving force behind the European space programme. During these years, the essential structures for a space programme were put in place: launchers, satellites, a set of launchers, operations centres and a network of control stations, laboratories, etc., while the other European States were very reluctant to commit themselves. At the same time, a competent and dynamic space industry was emerging in France.¹³

The first launch of the *Diamant* rocket, on 26 November 1965, was a success: it put the first French artificial satellite, named *Asterix*, into orbit. The rocket was launched from the Hammaguir site in Algeria which was chosen by military experts 20 years before. The French War Ministry took over studies of self-propelled projectiles in 1945 but needed a suitable site for the necessary tests. In 1946, a mission arrived in Colomb-Béchar in Algeria (located 1,150 km southwest of the Algerian capital) to study the possibilities of the site, which was finally found to be suitable. Two experimental sites were created: B0 the first block for missile testing, B1 for larger rockets. The two firing sites were not sufficient to launch larger missiles. In 1952, they decided to create another complex or polygon called B2 Hammaguir located 120 kilometres southwest of Colomb-Béchar. Four launch pads were created for the various missiles and rockets. The space biology tests at

¹¹ CARLIER 2010: 75–76.

¹² VARNOTEAUX 2003: 65.

¹³ LAMY 2011: 161–165.

Hammaguir were the first to be carried out for France, with the launch of living beings in a *Véronique* sounding rocket in 1961. The Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962 changed the situation, because according to the Évian Accords of 1962, France had to leave Algeria. However, the side clauses of the agreements allowed for a continued French presence at certain military sites for some years after independence. The rocket launch bases were parts of this, as were the nuclear test sites, as well. It was left at the disposal of the French authorities for a further five years in order to be able to continue the flight tests necessary for the development of the first ballistic missiles of the deterrent force and the *Diamant* space launcher. The base was evacuated in 1967 in accordance with the Évian Accords.¹⁴

The Guyana Space Centre

In this situation, CNES was obliged to look for a new launch base for its space programme. The CNES preliminary study identified no less than 14 sites that could host the new French launch pad. Teams from the French space agency then visited each of the sites to determine the most appropriate one, according to the selection criteria. These are as follows: the possibility of polar and equatorial launches, proximity to the equator, sufficient size to ensure the safety of launches, the existence of a deep-water port with sufficient handling facilities, the existence of an airfield capable of handling a long-haul aircraft (3,000 m runway), the shortest possible distance between the launch base and Europe, and political stability. The CNES report established a ranking of the various sites according to the selection criteria used. Five locations could be considered out of the fourteen sites examined, but French Guyana came out on top. The maritime façade also allows for satellite launches into a polar orbit under optimal conditions. All launch azimuths between -10.5° (polar or sun-synchronous orbits) and $+93.5^\circ$ (geostationary orbits) are possible. It is also important that the Kourou launch site is located 5.3° north of the equator, a position that allows the rockets to gain propulsion from the Earth's rotation (which means an extra 460 m/s, or 170 km/h) when launching eastwards, thus saving propellant. The low population density and the wide opening to the Atlantic Ocean reduce the risks in case of problems with the launcher. The surrounding hills allow trajectory radars and telemetry antennas to be installed with good visibility, existing infrastructure can be easily adapted, and the well-ventilated site makes the climate bearable despite its equatorial position. Furthermore, the area is not prone to earthquakes and cyclones. Furthermore, French Guyana, as part of the French territory, also has the advantage of political stability. As a result, the French Government decided to establish the new site of the space programme in French Guyana, more precisely in Kourou, in 1964.¹⁵

The first construction work began in September 1965, employing 2,500 people of eleven different nationalities. Firstly, they required the construction of infrastructure and basic housing and equipment, which are lacking due to the small population of French

¹⁴ NARDON 2007: 294.

¹⁵ THÉRY 2015: 224–225.

Guyana. At that time, even Kourou was only a village of 660 inhabitants.¹⁶ Infrastructure works included the construction of a major jetty to unload materials to and from Europe and the extension of the local airport's runway to allow for the arrival of long-haul jumbo jets. At the same time, a real town was built on the site of the village of Kourou. Three launch assemblies were built for sounding rockets, the French *Diamant* launcher and the European *Europa* rocket. The first set of completed launches is the sounding rockets and was inaugurated with the launch of a *Veronique* sounding rocket in April 1968.¹⁷

Thanks to continuous efforts, the Guyana Space Centre is today a launch base with three active launch complexes used for launching different types of rockets. With a surface area of 750 km², the site stretches along the coast over a length of about 50 km and a maximum depth of about 20 km. The town of Kourou, built to house CSG employees and with a population of around 25,000 in 2021, is surrounded by the CSG site. The Guyana Space Centre has many facilities that are necessary for the successful launch of rockets and satellites with a wide variety of characteristics: launch complexes each dedicated to a type of launcher, control centres, payload preparation centres, solid propellant manufacturing plants, test benches, production plants for liquid propellants and certain gases, technical centres, etc.¹⁸ The role of the Guyana Space Centre in the local economy is particularly important, as a quarter of French Guyana's GDP is produced by the space programme in Kourou.¹⁹

The European space programme

During the 1950s, France and Great Britain set up national space programmes, but the results of these remained modest because of their limited financial support. Therefore, European personalities from different fields were calling for the creation of a European scientific space programme. In 1960, 11 countries decided to set up such a body, which came into being as the European Space Research Organisation (*Conseil européen de recherches spatiales*) in 1964 with the participation of ten countries. Their aim was to pool their limited resources dedicated to the development of space research programmes, especially satellites and launchers. However, the organisation's participants struggled to achieve their objectives and the results were modest. To break this deadlock, it needed deeper cooperation in the space field. This cooperation was provided by a new organisation called the European Space Agency. Signed on 30 May 1975 by eleven European Member States, the European Space Agency Convention is de facto operational as of 31 May 1975 and has a legal existence as of 30 October 1980, the date when the ESA charter entered into force after its ratification by the eleven founding members (Belgium, Denmark, France,

¹⁶ CAMBRÉZY 2015: 199–201.

¹⁷ REDFIELD 1996: 260–262.

¹⁸ SAINT-CROIX 1995: 311–312; PIANTONI 2009: 208.

¹⁹ BERNAS 2020: 21.

Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).²⁰

ESA is responsible for the development of European launchers, the first result of which was *Ariane 1*. This was the first version of the *Ariane* family of rocket launchers capable of placing payloads (mainly satellites) into geostationary transfer orbit. Later, it was replaced by more powerful versions (*Ariane 2*, *Ariane 3*, *Ariane 4* and *Ariane 5*) better suited to the growing weight of telecommunications satellites.²¹

In 1985, ESA defined its scientific programme for 20 years, which was named Horizon 2000. The missions in this programme are intended to make considerable progress in scientific knowledge. The programme was followed by Horizon+ (2016–2015) and Cosmic Vision (2015–2025), which includes several missions of different sizes. The European Union has entrusted the European Space Agency with the development and maintenance of the space segment of the Galileo geopositioning programme, a civilian competitor to the American GPS.²² The programme has already achieved several successes and has ambitious plans for the future such as the development of new, more powerful launchers and the realisation of manned flights.

The European Space Agency has 22 member countries, three of which – Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland – are not members of the European Union. The other member countries of the Agency are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. As can be seen from this list, not all EU member states are members of ESA, and conversely, not all ESA member states are members of the EU. ESA is a fully independent organisation, although it has a close relationship with the EU under a framework agreement between the two organisations. ESA and the EU share a common European strategy for space and jointly develop a European space policy. ESA's headquarters are in Paris, so its policies and programmes are decided in Paris. However, ESA has centres in different European countries, each with specific responsibilities.²³

At the beginning of the European space programme, France offered to share Kourou with the new agency, which was accepted by the leaders of the Agency. As a result, ESA finances two thirds of the annual budget of the Kourou base, and, in most cases, European space missions are launched from Kourou. With its very high annual launch frequency (around ten) for all launchers, the Guyana Space Centre is one of the most active launch bases in the world. As a key element of European space policy, the Guyana Space Centre is a strategic site for international collaboration. It enables the launch of satellites from operators around the world for space applications that are essential to our daily lives.²⁴

²⁰ GAILLARD 2002: 107–111.

²¹ DELION–DURUPTY 2006: 374–375.

²² LAMY–SAINT-MARTIN 2013: 431–435.

²³ AUTRET 2007: 273.

²⁴ SARTORIUS 2012: 39–48.

The activities of the French Foreign Legion in Guyana

The 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment is the most decorated regiment of the Foreign Legion in the French Army. It was created in 1920 and is the heir of the marching regiment of the Foreign Legion.

After the outbreak of the First World War, with the help of a large number of foreign volunteers, four legionary marching regiments were formed and deployed in France in the autumn of 1914 against the German troops.²⁵ In November 1915, because of the heavy losses and the legionnaires' returning to the Allied forces entering the war, these units were disbanded and the available forces were used to create the Marching Regiment of the Foreign Legion, which was continuously engaged in combat until the end of the war and was considered one of the most successful units of the French army at the end of the conflict, thanks to its nine decorations.²⁶ However, this success came at a heavy price: 5,170 of the volunteers who enlisted were killed in action and 25,000 were wounded or missing, meaning that approximately 70 percent of the volunteers were on the casualty list.²⁷

In 1920, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was formed in Morocco from the remaining active members of the regiment that had fought in France during the Great War, and from newly recruited volunteers.²⁸ It actively participated in the pacification of the country and took part in the fighting in the Rif and in operations to reduce the dissidence.²⁹ The regiment only became directly involved in the Second World War in 1943 during the Tunisian campaign. It then participated in the liberation of France and the occupation of Germany in 1944–1945. The unit also took part in the Indochina War of Independence from 1946 to 1954, where it suffered heavy losses. From 1954, the regiment was in Algeria and took part in operations against the insurgents fighting for the country's independence.³⁰ From 1962 to 1973, the troop was stationed in Madagascar where it specialised in training for amphibious and tropical operations.³¹

In 1973, the regiment left Madagascar and moved to Camp Forget in Kourou, French Guyana. As soon as it arrived in French Guyana, the 3rd Regiment built the eastern road through the forest, intended to link Cayenne to the Brazilian border. The unit was also involved in the development of the Kourou space site and after the end of this work, it became an integral part of the armed security system of the space centre.³² Thanks to its experiences in a tropical environment, the troop participates in the elaboration of the rules of combat in the forest and offers different types of training courses for other military units coming from France or even from abroad.³³

²⁵ DOUMIC 1926: 3.

²⁶ BERGOT 1984: 98–100.

²⁷ MAHUAULT 2013: 205.

²⁸ MONTAGNON 1999: 182.

²⁹ AGERON et al. 2016: 205–206.

³⁰ COMOR 2013: 771–772.

³¹ DE GMELINE 2016: 523.

³² COMOR 2013: 772.

³³ LE TOURNEAU 2016.

The legionnaire unit has several missions in Guyana. From 2008 onwards, it has been taking part in Operation *Harpie*, the aim of which was to paralyse illegal gold-mining sites throughout French Guyana. The main focus of *Harpie* operations is the destruction of production sites and means of production. This objective is achieved through joint patrols, carried out mainly by the National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie nationale*) and the Armed Forces in French Guyana (*Forces armées en Guyane*). In the ranks of this latter, 2,300 people (military and civilian) serve, including 600 legionnaires of the 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment.³⁴

However, its most important mission since 1979 has been its involvement in the external protection of the Guyana Space Centre in Kourou as part of Operation Titan.³⁵ As Kourou is Europe's spaceport and therefore a strategic site, the primary mission of the armed forces in French Guyana is to protect Kourou in all dimensions (land, air, sea, space and cyber).³⁶ The ground protection of the site has been provided by legionnaires since the first launch of the *Ariane 1* rocket in 1979, but since October 2011, the date of the first launch of the Russian *Soyuz* launcher, the ground protection zone has been enlarged, requiring reinforcement provided by soldiers from the 9th Marine Infantry Regiment. The Armed Forces in Guyana permanently committed 25 men/day in the three environments of land, air and sea. Depending on the timing of rocket transfers and launches, the armed forces additionally deploy approximately 250 men for an average of 32 days per year. The Navy intervenes at each launch within a maritime exclusion zone, monitored by both a coastal maritime surveillance launch and a Guyana light patrol boat. For the air component, the two radars of the military control centre ensure permanent surveillance of the sky, so as to guarantee the air safety of the space centre.³⁷ The space and cyber security is ensured by special teams of civilian experts (engineers, computer scientists, technicians, etc.) who work in cooperation with the armed forces responsible for the security of the space centre.³⁸ TITAN deployments are a priority requirement. Commitment to other missions depends on TITAN. Depending on the level of threat and the criticality of the payload, external reinforcements from the mainland may be requested. The annual cost of this operation reaches 37 million euros.³⁹

Conclusion

The European space programme is a strategic priority for the European Union and for all European citizens. Through its space policy, the EU aims to contribute to solving the most pressing challenges of our time. Policy objectives include combating climate change, stimulating technological innovation and realising socio-economic benefits. Space technology, space data and space services have become indispensable in the lives

³⁴ Képi Blanc Opérations 2008: 20–21.

³⁵ THIBAUT 2010: 107.

³⁶ DUMAS 2021.

³⁷ JULIEN 2021: 18–19.

³⁸ LE CORRE 2017: 18.

³⁹ CAMBON et al. 2021: 5–6.

of Europeans. We need them to use mobile phones and car navigation systems, to watch satellite television, to withdraw money. Satellites also provide instant information about disasters such as earthquakes, forest fires or floods, which can help emergency services and rescue teams to coordinate their work.⁴⁰

Achieving these goals requires the safe and cost-effective launch of satellites, which can be best achieved with the help of the Guyana Space Centre. This partnership has been a success for more than forty years and has enabled the European Union to become a major player in the space industry. However, it is also a priority task to guarantee the safety of launches, in which many different military forces are involved. Among these, the 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment plays a prominent role, and its members have been actively involved in the construction, maintenance and protection of the Space Centre for several decades.

Given that, although officially a regular unit of the French Army, its ranks include members of all the nations of the European Union, its use is also symbolic in the defence of this multinational project.

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⁴⁰ European Commission: European Space Programme.

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The Neo-Methodist Warfare – Dawn of a New Age?

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With the re-escalated Russo–Ukrainian War, the modern world has met the conventional war again, however, the rapid technological development changed warfare since the Cold War. In this study the author will present similarities between the modern conventional war and the 18th century’s warfare (called the methodist warfare). The similarities are so widespread (both in the fields of security politics and tactical-level land warfare), that the modern conventional warfare in our age can be called neo-methodist warfare.

Keywords: sensors, Russia, Ukraine, methodist warfare, raid, Clausewitz, Mihály Lajos Jeney

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, most of the international organisations and most of the experts thought that the age of great wars was over and the small local wars were only minor but necessary “disorders” on the road, leading to ultimate world peace. This statement is true if one considers that World War III between NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not happen, only small wars became more common (e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.). After the beginning of the Russo–Ukrainian War in 2014, this theory proved to be wrong. Moreover, it proved to be even more inaccurate after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and with the escalation of the Russo–Ukrainian War on 24 February 2022. However, instead of returning to the “normal” era of wars, when countries fought each other with regular armies, warfare has developed to a whole other level. This new type of warfare is called hybrid war, or – after its Russian name – non-linear warfare.

Studying the military operations conducted on land in the Russo–Ukrainian War and the Nagorno-Karabakh War led the author to a new path. He discovered numerous similarities between the 18th century’s warfare and the warfare in the above-mentioned two recent wars. In this study, the author will try to prove that warfare today has a great amount of similarity with the 18th century’s methodist warfare, thus one can easily call it “neo-methodist” warfare.

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States' attitude to total war – Applying indirect methods other than war

Military historians call the era between the end of the Thirty Years' War and the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars the era of methodist warfare.² In this era, the European great powers which were predominantly absolute monarchies did not wage war in order to completely destroy each other. This is because the rulers of states considered their states to be their own property and as a property, they felt responsible for their own country or countries. The other, more practical reason is that the military systems were simply unable to sustain a prolonged war with huge armies that could have destroyed whole states.³

Moreover, the devastation and the almost unbearable cost of deploying mercenary armies in the Thirty Years' War had forced the heads of states to form a professional, well-disciplined and standing army that consisted of their own people and which stood in arms in peacetime, too. This army indeed proved to be more disciplined but the rapidly developing military technology required employing and learning new tactics, which were extremely sophisticated and complex according to the "zeitgeist" of the 18th century.

All of this resulted that the training of the army required even more time and the upkeep of this army had proved to be almost as expensive as the mercenary army's. Furthermore, in order to preserve the army's discipline, the states had to organise the supply of the army, which only could be organised by building huge warehouses in huge forts and continuously maintaining the level of supplies.⁴

This phenomenon had resulted that even if the states which would have had the intention to completely destroy each other had fought each other with armies that were extremely expensive to risk their destruction in a total war. Therefore, the wars became limited both in time and intensity, and most of the military actions consisted of manoeuvring, and trying to cut each other's connection with their strategic baseline between the army and its supply base. Decisive battles took place only when one of the armies found itself in an unfavourable situation and had to fight its way out of it.⁵

The interstate conflicts of this era could be decided by military force only extremely seldom. Because of this, the warring parties had to find alternative ways to force their will on the other. The early 18th century became the era when the rules of diplomacy were solidified and forming wide alliances became usual. With the help of these two political tools, the states tried to outmanoeuvre each other in the political sphere. Diplomatic manoeuvres, trade sanctions and offensive trade agreements became even more usual in order to weaken the opposing party.⁶ This time was the debut of the political caricature which can be considered to be the precursor of propaganda and as of this the precursor of information warfare.

In the 18th century, those countries started to employ indirect methods which did not have sufficient military power. In times of conflict, the belligerent that possessed a smaller

² SZENDY 2013: 111.

³ PERJÉS 1961: 526.

⁴ PERJÉS 1961: 524.

⁵ PERJÉS 1961: 527.

⁶ PERJÉS 1961: 519, 526.

military might have tried to weaken the enemy's economy and tried to involve more military power via alliances or – if existed – supporting tensions and uprisings in the enemy's territory. A good example for this was the French support for the American War of Independence or for the Rákóczi's War of Independence.

Nowadays, one can observe a similar phenomenon. Leaders of democratic states gain and lose power depending on the will of the population of their countries. In autocratic or even dictatorship states leaders also try to have the sympathy of the masses, therefore, keeping the power by force can consume lots of resources which can divert the resources from the outside enemies.

Just like in the 18th century, nowadays it is still very expensive to upkeep a modern and effective army. Furthermore, in the ranks of this army, the state's own people (and their loved ones) serve; therefore, suffering heavy casualties is unacceptable both politically and economically. Here one can see the dictatorship states as an exception but if we think about the Russian mercenaries in Syria or the Syrian mercenaries in the Nagorno-Karabakh War by Azerbaijan, we can easily see that sacrificing their own people is undesired in any political system.⁷ This phenomenon can be seen also in Russia as the first wave of "territorial volunteer battalions" were formed in non-ethnic Russian regions of the country and according to the local sources the urban, more sophisticated Western Russian regions were relieved in the first wave of mobilisation also.⁸

Because of all of this, nowadays the states have turned to alternative methods instead of waging a total, conventional war. Of course, one can argue the author that Russia has just launched one. But if one considers the original Russian attitude to this conflict, it is hardly likely that the Kremlin had planned the "Special Operation" to be turned out this way.

Furthermore, states and alliances are considering security as not just one (military) dimensional topic. According to Barry Buzan's classic, security has five main sectors: military, political, economic, social and ecologic.⁹ By the 2020s, these five sectors have been supplemented and reinterpreted, though all five sectors have a dimension in the information space and cyberspace also. Similarly to the absolute monarchies, nowadays also the weaker countries turn their focus to the alternative (non-military) sectors of security. Those non-military methods by which one side can force its will on its counterpart, the author calls indirect methods.

Russia, which had a smaller military and economic potential than the USA has intervened in the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016 via cyberspace.¹⁰ China also constantly employs alternative methods (jiggery-pokery with the airspace and naval rights, operations in the information space) against Taiwan.¹¹ Last but not least, it is important to mention those indirect methods which Russia implemented in the spring and summer of 2014, when they occupied Crimea and the Donbas, or which we saw at the end of 2021 at the Polish–Belorussian border or which one can think of the machination with

⁷ HAUER 2019; BUTLER 2020.

⁸ CANCIAN 2022.

⁹ GAZDAG–REMEK 2018: 20.

¹⁰ MTI 2019.

¹¹ KOCSI 2018: 91.

the gas supply. These alternative methods can also be used when a belligerent party does not want to take part in a conflict by military force. In this case, its only option is to employ alternative methods, the best example of which is the EU sanction policy against Russia after 24 February 2022.

In this regard, the author sees a well-established parallel between the 18th century and today when the opposing parties, instead of waging a full-scale war (or previous to waging a full-scale war), try to manoeuvre themselves into a favourable position by attacking the security of their enemies by using non-military means. In this way, they try to force their enemy into an intolerable situation in which they can easily force their will on their opponent.

The reasons for this phenomenon are the same as deploying an expensive army would cause unbearable damage both economically, morally and politically; therefore, they use the above-mentioned indirect methods.

The author wrote this article before the escalation of the Russo–Ukrainian war, and insists on that it is still true. It is enough if one considers the political and economic situation in which Russia found itself just after weeks the conflict started.

If one remembers the first weeks of 2022, one can see that everyone was afraid of a Russian invasion and its possible consequences. Most experts declared that the Russian armed forces will defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a matter of week(s).¹² Leading European politicians gave each other the doorknob in Moscow, trying to convince Putin not to commence an offensive. It is often forgotten that energy prices were rapidly rising since 2021 October resulting massive incomes to Russia. Parallel with this, the Zelensky Government's popularity was declining, the foreign investors were leaving Ukraine on a grand scale. All in all, one can easily see that Putin was in winning up until 24 February 2022.

The author is strongly convinced that if Moscow continues implying indirect methods (e.g. diplomatic manoeuvres, using the gas price advantage, appearing as an important depositary of the peace) they could have achieved a lot more favourable position than the one that they are in now.

Indirect methods employed by the military

Swift strikes with light troops

In the 18th century, armies, due to the limits of military technology and their limited numbers were unable to close whole strategic directions, even so, continents. This opened the possibility of deploying fast-moving, light troops. As a great example, the author has to highlight the raid on Berlin by András Hadik in 1757. It was one of (if not the) best-executed light units' operation and it was not just an anomaly. The deployment of light troops was a popular topic at all levels of the era's military science.¹³ Multiple memoirs

¹² VOROZHKO 2023.

¹³ PERJÉS 1961: 530.

and descriptions of a given operation had been written in comprehensive scientific papers. It is without exaggeration that one of the most outstanding scientific works on this topic is written by Mihály Lajos Jeney in 1759. The title of his work is *The Raider – Fighting the Small War with Success According to Our Age's Genius*.

In his study, Jeney thoroughly examines all aspects of deploying light troops (or as he called them, raiders) and he illustrates his examinations with examples of the recent wars of his age. He extensively writes about the possible operations of small troops both in offensive and defensive operations in the enemy's territory. He writes in detail about the optimal composition of a light troops' formation, the requirements for the commander, the issues of logistics, the decision-making process during the execution, and the tactical military methods executed in a light troops' operation.

In the author's point of view, nowadays, the regular armies are unable to close whole strategic directions just like in the 18th century. The reason for this is of course the number of soldiers in these armies hence, after the Cold War, the number of military personnel had radically decreased. Because of this, in times of war, modern states would be unable to close and monitor whole frontiers between the seas as they did in World War I and II.

The most spectacular example of this we could see in Eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014. Here took place the largest land military manoeuvre in modern history, which received the name "The Great Raid". It was executed by (at the time) Lt. Col. Mikhail Zabrodskiy between 13 July and 24 July 2014 by a brigade combat team (BCT) based on the 95th Air Assault Brigade. This brigade combat team consisted of approximately 800 personnel, 70 IFVs and APCs, and 50 MBTs and they executed a 470 km long raid behind their enemy's line. The primary purpose of this raid was to free the Ukrainian troops trapped along the "official" border and try to get access to the wrecks of the recently crashed Malaysian airliner. The latter could not be accomplished because after the first shock, the separatist forces (and their Russian "advisors") pulled themselves together and put up a fierce resistance which forced the raiding BCT out of their territory via the Luhansk airport.¹⁴

Just like in the 18th century, at this time, in Eastern Ukraine neither side had the appropriate number (the enormous amount) of troops to close down the whole frontline. The Ukrainian Army at that time simply did not have a sufficient number of troops such as the separatists, furthermore, the Russian regular forces were not yet involved in a great number. This resulted that the main forces gathering around Luhansk and Donetsk and the gaps had provided favourable conditions to execute such a bold operation just like Hadik's raid in 1757.

All in all, the author has to outline that both nowadays and in the 18th century, the regular armies are too expensive for a full-scale deployment and this leads to a situation where the warring parties cannot control huge frontlines. These frontlines have gaps and these gaps can provide favourable conditions to the deployment of fast-moving, light troops.

It is still true if we take a look at the ongoing war in Ukraine. In the first stage of the war (from 24 February to 7 April), when Russian forces attacked on a wide front from

¹⁴ TAKÁCS 2020: 24.

North of Kyiv down to Kherson, even the Russian Armed Forces did not have enough troops to control all their line of communications neither had a consistent FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops) and FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area). This led to ambushes and raids, executed by Ukrainian small units, which led to great losses that forced the Russian forces out from the Northern and Northeastern parts of Ukraine.¹⁵

After the Russians have restrained their focus on Eastern Ukraine, one can say that this situation is contradictory. But here the author has to explain why he still does not consider this to be a strategic level military operation. Decisive operations are only taking place on a 2 × 10 km wide front between Dibrovne and Mazanivka and between Dolyna and Bohorodychne (NE Slovyansk) and another 10 km wide front between Spirne and Vovchoyarivka.¹⁶

According to all relevant Western and Eastern military manuals, a 10 km width of attack is an offensive task of 2–4 brigades (depending on territory, enemy, task, etc.). Therefore, these operations cannot be considered at a strategic level, only operational level military operations.

Examining the Ukrainian offensive of September 2022, it can be seen that the inadequate number of Russian troops led to the Ukrainian success.¹⁷ Not only the low number of troops, but without the thinly held Russian lines, the Ukrainians could not have achieved this level of success.

Therefore, the author's previous statements regarding the insufficient number of troops are proved again. Furthermore, the warring parties do not even have sufficient forces (and leadership and supply capabilities, but this is another topic) to execute decisive operations larger than operational level.

The two reasons for the non-consistent frontline

Examining 18th-century warfare, one can ask, where are the huge warehouses in spectacular fortresses today? Nowadays, modern armies proclaim that they are capable of sustaining themselves and supplying the manoeuvre units in times of war. At least they claimed to be able to do this until the escalation of the Russo–Ukrainian War. In a full-scale war, high operational tempo and high-intensity operations consume an enormous amount of war material (ammunition, fuel, healthcare products, etc.). Furthermore, in an operation with a high operational tempo, it is even more difficult to organise the supply of the manoeuvre forces, even if a sufficient amount of supplies are miraculously available.

Furthermore, on the battlefields of the 21st century, even a mechanised infantry company has a great amount of destructive power, which makes the continuous supply of a given unit unnecessary. This is because in a high-intensity, conventional war a unit achieves victory in a few days or it will suffer heavy casualties which force its superior

¹⁵ For more information see <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7>

¹⁶ For more information see www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27

¹⁷ TAKÁCS 2023.

to withdraw this unit from combat. That is why it became usual that an independently deployable battalion-sized battlegroup has only three days of supplies and can require resupply only ammunition and fuel depending on its operational tasks.

This operational freedom and the small armies (explained in the previous paragraph) are one of the reasons why the author thinks that in future wars there will be no continuous frontlines formed by divisions, corps and field armies facing each other. However, the author wrote this statement before the re-escalation of the Russo–Ukrainian War. One can easily think that the current events (grinder for Bakhmut, mobilisation at both sides) disprove this statement. However, if one thinks about the original plans of this war (according to both the Russian generals and the bulk of international experts), one will find that almost nobody expected this WWI-style warfare to happen.

One can question the freedom of operation thanks to the logistics, if one thinks about the severe logistic problems of the Russian Armed Forces. But before jumping to a superficial judgement, it must be mentioned that the bulk of the logistical problems of the Russian forces is not in the nature of war, but the corruption and poor organisation. Of course, in a high-tempo operation, the expenditure on ammunition and other war materials is extremely high, and in the chaos of war, it is extremely difficult to replenish the frontline forces (i.e. 90th Guards Tank Division [GTD] in Brovary, or even the whole Battle of Kyiv).¹⁸ But the author also has to underline that before suffering defeat, the 90th GTD performed a swift offensive manoeuvre from Konotop all the way down to the Eastern suburbs of Kyiv.¹⁹ This underlines the statement that a properly trained, equipped and supplied unit can freely execute long manoeuvres thanks to the gaps in the frontline and the freedom from logistics.

The other reason why the author thinks that the characteristics of the frontline must change is newer but more significant. Even in the summer of 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, experts had examined the increase of precision artillery strikes supported by fire observer drones, and parallel with that the decrease in the lifespan of units exposed on the frontline.²⁰ This resulted that after the end of large-scale operations (after spring 2015), the belligerent forces started to man checkpoints all along the Line of Contact (LoC) and they have withdrawn their main forces from the effective range of the enemy's artillery. The question may arise whether this was the result of the changing nature of war, but it was the result of the Minsk Agreements. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the escalated Russo–Ukrainian war have dispersed all these questions.

The most recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia started on 27 September 2020 and finished with an Azeri victory on 9 November 2020. In this war, Azeri drones destroyed Armenian armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, command posts and supply depots in a large number. And if those types were unable to carry weapons, they were used as artillery observers to enhance precision artillery strikes. Military units in the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) or the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA) are extremely

¹⁸ For more information see www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1

¹⁹ KRAMER 2022.

²⁰ KARBBER 2015: 17.

vulnerable to the strikes of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and precision artillery strikes helped by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) observers. It is proved to be true even if the defender is in perfectly fortified battle positions. The Armenian air defence was not prepared for fighting against relatively small, hence difficult-to-detect drones, and this has led to heavy losses.²¹

These two wars are the finished ones; the still ongoing Russo–Ukrainian war is the most recent one fought by modern armies. In these wars, both armies deployed modern sensors on a large scale.²² The electronic warfare (EW) subunits can discover tactical radios from a long distance. Tactical information systems can be paralysed by cyber strikes. Ground radars can discover units and vehicles from more than 10 km. Drones can provide real-time reconnaissance to the leaders from small unit level to strategic level both day and night.²³

Because of all this, the battlefield became “naked”. If modern armies face each other, anyone who tries to carry out a manoeuvre will be discovered and the defender will carry out a strike probably before crossing the frontline.

On the theory of the escalation of violence

Nowadays, both military theorists and strategists of NATO countries agree that the future war will not be a joint forces war, but rather a wider scale, so-called multi-domain conflict. Briefly, it means, that the warring parties will fight each other not just in the “traditional” land, sea and air dimensions, but in space and cyberspace, too.²⁴

According to the author’s opinion, this is a straight consequence of the phenomenon, which is experienced by researchers of security studies, and the broadening of the concept of security. The opposing states and alliances have discovered that they can force their will on their enemy by gaining the upper hand in an alternative, non-military sector of their enemies’ security. This trend has been helped by the circumstances I have mentioned in the first paragraph:

- the will of avoiding heavy losses
- strikes that can be more easily explained to the public
- actions that can be more easily denied to the international public

The author firmly thinks that multi-domain warfare and the usage of non-military aspects of security have already led us to a new era, but it will develop even further. In this era, the opposing parties will attack each other’s cyber and information systems as the first mean of attack. The main goal of these strikes is to decrease the population’s trust in their own government and at the same time to promote the attacker’s goals and political vision as

²¹ WATLING 2020.

²² MASUHR 2019: 2.

²³ KARBER 2015: 14.

²⁴ New America s. a.

acceptable. Of course, apart from this, cyberspace is perfectly fit for gathering information and destroying the enemy's critical information infrastructure which can be found in and targeted from cyberspace. If one side is successfully using these methods, it can force its will on its enemy because it had destroyed the enemy's informational system, and totally controls cyberspace. If decisive success could not be achieved, the disadvantaged party can decide to accept defeat and accept the terms of its counterpart, or can ignore this situation and "raise the bet" by spreading the operations to another domain. Of course, this spread can be done before either side would achieve success in the first (mainly cyber and informational) stage of the conflict in order to resolve the stalemate.

If one side decides to escalate, it can do this in several other domains. There is a wide variety of economic sanctions or economic operations against goods (buying up raw materials, attacking the financial system, etc.) which are important for the enemy. It is also possible to form alliances which can result in an unfavourable situation for the enemy. In this stage of the conflict, there is only a very small chance for armed hostilities to break out (but in the communication it is highly likely that one or each side will threaten the other with "serious consequences"). If in this domain, victory cannot be achieved as the opposing parties will try to find new methods to attack each other. Just like at the previous level of the conflict, if one side does not accept defeat, the hostilities will escalate to another level.

In this new (third) level one can observe offensive diplomatic manoeuvres (expulsions, diplomatic protests, etc.), and also it is likely that the parties will support their enemy's enemies by concrete means (see proxy conflicts) if something like this can be found. Just like before, the conflict will widen and the deployment of armed forces will become unavoidable. This has two cases:

1. one side finds itself in an extremely unfavourable situation and it sees the armed violence as the only way out (see cornered dog effect)
2. the opposing parties cannot find a solution to their conflict and one side will deploy its military (possibly the one which has a more powerful military) trying to achieve a swift victory

At this stage one can rightfully say that what the author has written in this part of the study is hybrid war itself. The author agrees with this opinion: the stages of hybrid warfare before the military escalation can be found in the neo-methodist warfare. Furthermore, if one examines the theory of hybrid warfare, one can clearly see that the goal of the hybrid warfare is to avoid full-scale armed conflict by employing hybrid methods (which are largely similar to the indirect methods of the neo-methodist warfare). However, the real difference immediately emerges because, in the author's opinion, according to the theory of the neo-methodist warfare, at the end of the escalation ladder there is the full-scale conventional military conflict.

Thus, mainly because of the rapid development of military technology, the subsequent part of this study will present the main characteristics of a near-future neo-methodist war.

Warfare in the age of neo-methodism

In the previous section, the author briefly described the escalation of violence that can lead to the outbreak of a multi-domain armed conflict. In this paragraph, he will describe the nature of a multi-domain armed conflict.

The available time for mobilisation depends on the speed of escalation before the war. In the time of escalation, it is highly likely that the mobilisation, the structure of forces, and the order of battle will be discovered by the opposing side. Precisely, this is why a mobilisation and the deployment of troops to the borders should be done in a way to have a deterrent effect. Reservists should be called into service, and they have to be trained and forged into whole units. At the same time, their morale needs to be defended against the enemy's informational operations (of course, this is true of the morale of the professional soldiers).

The opposing parties will conduct reconnaissance against each other well before the commencement of the armed clashes. Reconnaissance will be done in all domains, such as real-time satellite images, cyberspace operations, multispectral ground-based sensors, and of course the binocular of the reconnaissance soldier. In the potential conflict zone, modern sensors will see and hear everything. If one side positions its forces within the range of the enemy's artillery (either traditional or missile) with a goal of deterrence or because of a mere mistake, these forces will face the risk of destruction. A spectacular example of this is when the Ukrainians had ill-positioned one of their battalions, and the whole battalion had been wiped out by a Russian MLRS (Multiple Launched Rocket System) strike.²⁵ Of course, one can see multiple examples of exposed forces and command posts destroyed by long-range artillery strikes in the ongoing war mainly by U.S. supplied Ukrainian HIMARS system helped by U.S.-gathered reconnaissance data.

Because all of these – according to the author's opinion – in future armed conflicts between modern states with modern armies, the FLOT and FEBA will not consist of the battle positions of the mobilised forces that are fighting shoulder to shoulder. Instead of this, the FLOT and FEBA will be a chain of sensor groups and their close protection forces. This will minimise the exploitation of its own forces and maximise the possibilities of monitoring the enemy's activities.

If the opposing parties will not make an agreement, the last step of the escalation will be the deployment of military power, or in other words, to wage war (in this article, I will not talk about the nuclear option, because it will terminate all discussions within ours). The only way to achieve decisive military victory is offense. With offense, the army will try to capture territory and destroy the enemy's armed forces in accordance with the state's political will in order to force its will on the enemy.

In a future war, the way to achieve success is to break through the chain of sensors. This can be achieved via the destruction (or jamming) of these sensors. This can be done by strikes of EW weapons, conventional artillery and/or air strikes, and of course with the strike of the manoeuvre forces. Since manoeuvre forces will be discovered way before crossing their own FEBA, the first three methods will be more common.

²⁵ TAKÁCS 2020: 23.

After punching through the line of sensors – if the political goal will make it necessary, or the attacked side will not call for an armistice instantly – there is a possibility to deploy large manoeuvre forces. These forces have (from the size of a battalion battlegroup to a combined arms army) to be:

- well-trained, equipped with the most modern arms
- capable of executing tasks independently
- have to be capable of reckoning the enemy's remaining sensors and the incoming strikes or the counterattacking manoeuvre forces
- have to be capable of defending itself from all types of strikes (armoured counterattacks, air attacks, counter-attacks, obstacles, IEDs, cyberattacks against the battlefield computer systems, EW strikes against sensors and communication systems) coming from all domains

Only a force like this can carry out a strike that can help reach the political goals of the state.

Of course, a manoeuvre force like this needs to be supported in all domains. This support can be executed by diversionary attacks, further information and cyber operations. The author finds the name “multi-domain operational battlegroup” fit to this further formation.

At this part, the reader can rightfully ask, what does this so-called multi-domain operational battlegroup have to do with neo-methodism. The author states that it is obvious that a military fielding multi-domain operational battlegroups is extremely costly to build up and maintain. Therefore, the warring parties will take care of this military as they can. This is the reason of the possible employment of indirect methods presented in the third section of this study.

However, if war breaks out, the militaries will probably not go head-to-head against each other. Instead, they will employ indirect (most of the time, non-kinetic) means to overcome each other. They will try to destroy targets used in a certain domain by strikes coming from a different domain. The other indirect method can be the more classical: manoeuvre. Execute a lot of probing attacks, feints, evasive manoeuvres, etc.

Briefly, the author thinks that the features described in this paragraph will be the main features of a future neo-methodist war.

The ongoing Russo–Ukrainian War and neo-methodism

By the time the reader reaches this part of the study, he/she can raise multiple questions. It is crystal clear that the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian war does not look like the one the author has just described.

However, at this point, the author must call the reader's attention that before 24 February 2022 multiple indirect means were employed both by Russia and the Western organisations and countries. The information space was filled with narratives and comments on those narratives. There were diplomatic manoeuvres: heads of states visiting each other, ultimatums, treaty offers, etc.

After 24 February 2022, mainly because of the rapid advance of the inadequate number of Russian troops, there were no coherent FEBA. It had given the opportunity to the Ukrainian defenders to employ tactical indirect means. These were the ambushes, raids, small counterattacks and operational-level delaying action executed against the Russian armoured onslaught. The Ukrainians' goal was to evade the Russian strikes (both by troops and fire) in order to preserve their precious forces. This is clearly a neo-methodist feature of this war. The other clearly indirect method is the aforementioned deployment of long-range rocket artillery to sever the logistics of the Russian forces.

Later the Ukrainians have suffered enormous casualties in the summer of 2022 and in the Battle of Bakhmut where they were trying to hold territory, which shows how difficult it is to evade the Russians' strikes.

In this war, the Russians had employed indirect means also, but on a smaller scale. Of course, the Russian onslaught in the informational space was overwhelming and is still significant. However, on the battlefield they tend to use more traditional, direct methods. The only significant indirect method they used were the strikes against the Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Of course, there is the battle for Bakhmut which turned out to be a “blood pump”. At the time the text was finalised, the author could not decide whether the meatgrinder for Bakhmut serves the strategic goal of draining the offensive power of Russia as an indirect tool. On the other side, the battle for Bakhmut can be a “failure in the system” resulted by stubborn political will. Only time will tell the truth.

Finally, the author must highlight, that the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian War is not purely neo-methodist; however, the escalation spiral leading to it was something that the author described in the third section. The theory of neo-methodist warfare is based on a near-future near-peer conflict where countries and/or alliances are facing each other using the most recent methods and equipment in order to achieve their goals. However, because the ongoing war turned out to be much longer than expected, the most modern equipment is clearly out of stock, therefore, the warring parties must employ older (even out of date) technology. Of course, with this outdated equipment, the most modern methods are more difficult to execute.

Finally, the author must underline here that the theory of neo-methodist war is a theory and as such it cannot perfectly predict the future but it can provide a theoretical background for understanding the complex process of international struggle.

Assessing the reason behind the name neo-methodism

According to the author, the above-described era could be called the age of neo-methodist warfare.

First of all, states, just like in the 18th century are not interested in the total physical destruction of each other. They want to reach their political goals without sacrificing a large number of casualties and without losing a large number of other resources. This is also true if we think about the reluctant Putin regarding mobilisation. That is why the

deployment of the armed forces can be seen only as a last resort. In this regard, there is a similarity with the fact that decisive battles in both ages can take place after one side finds itself in an extremely unfavourable condition after indirect manoeuvres.

Exactly like in the 18th century, when armies tried to cut their enemy from their strategic baseline, nowadays the opposing sides try to cut the ties between the army and the population and critical infrastructure. Furthermore, in case of all-out war, long-range precision strikes are carried out to cut the enemy's army from its strategic baseline.

If a military is deployed, it will likely not have sufficient force to fully close whole strategic frontlines with military forces, and because of technological advances, it is not necessary anymore. There will be a possibility, and a need to carry out long-range strikes of autonomous, swift-moving forces in order to achieve strategic goals. These forces can be special operations forces or a manoeuvre force that carries out decisive strikes. All of these have a huge similarity with the operations of the 18th century's raiding forces (or as Clausewitz called them a bit later, the armies fighting "small war").²⁶

Considering all of these factors, I firmly think that because of the significant similarities between today's (and probably the near future's) warfare and that of the 18th century, we can call our age the age of neo-methodist warfare. To support this statement, the author made the below chart. The first four lines will present the similarities and the last one will present the difference.

Table 1: Comparative chart between today's armed conflicts and that of the 18th century

18th century	Comparative aspect	Nowadays
Rather be avoided, because the state is the property of the ruler and he is responsible for his property.	<i>States' attitude to total war</i>	Rather be avoided because the government is responsible for the voters (in autocracy, responsible for the masses).
Sanctions, economic operations (protectionism), the advent of propaganda, and supporting the enemy's enemies.	<i>Employing indirect methods</i>	Sanctions, embargos, information operations, using proxy forces.
The ranks are filled with citizens, expensive to train and upkeep. Regular, disciplined army.	<i>General condition of the armies</i>	The ranks are filled with citizens, expensive to train and upkeep. Regular, disciplined army.
No sufficient force, leading to gaps. Deployment of light forces to cover gaps and flanks.	<i>FLOT and FEBA</i>	Main forces are not exposed to the first lines. The frontline is controlled by sensors.
<i>Supplementary directions to help the main force to achieve strategic goals.</i>	<i>Deployment of swift-moving manoeuvre forces</i>	<i>After destroying the chain of sensors, deploying as decisive force to achieve strategic goals.</i>

Source: Compiled by the author.

²⁶ CLAUSEWITZ 2015: 21.

Conclusion

In this short study, the author did not have the option to thoroughly examine all aspects of interstate and inter-alliance conflicts. Instead, he relied on axioms, widely accepted in military science and sciences of security politics. After that, he added the results he gained after examining the military operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Of course, the author is ready to accept if someone refutes his statements based on firmer knowledge of international security and military politics. Nevertheless, it is without a doubt that during an armed conflict the factors described in the fourth section of this study will be authentic. The topic of a further study is in what circumstances soldiers will need to fight the mechanised infantry units of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the near future, and what changes need to be done in order to meet these challenges. Because the author firmly thinks that the ultimate defence of a state's sovereignty is a competent and effective armed force.

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Citizen Soldiers in Ethiopia: The Experience and Legal Frameworks of Reserve Force, Conscription and Militia System

Kaleab T. SIGATU¹

This paper aims to offer a historical overview, legal framework and analysis of the reserve force, conscription or compulsory military service, and militia systems in Ethiopia from the period of Emperor Haile Selassie to the present. Methodologically, it employs an empirical examination of literature and legal documents on the reserve force, conscription and the militia. There is an inadequacy of literature on the three major citizen soldier defence institutions in Ethiopia, and this paper is a partial attempt to fill the knowledge gap. The paper discusses the legal framework of the Emperor's effort to create a reserve force named Territorial Army, which more or less met its objective, even though the effort to start national military service failed. The military government's vicious mobilisation of militia and heavy recruitment of the youth for national military service resulted from the extended civil war that ended with the liberation of Eritrea and the toppling of the government. Currently, the government is planning to start national military service; on the other hand, a nominal reserve force exists, and the mostly rural institution of the militia plays an important citizen soldier role.

Keywords: Ethiopia, reserve force, conscription, militia, Emperor Haile Selassie, Derg, ENDF

Introduction

The tradition that citizens have a civic responsibility and a moral obligation to arm and organise themselves to protect their local community and the country temporarily when foreign invaders and internal threats occur is the foundation of the citizen soldier concept

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in many literatures such as Chambers,² Doubler,³ Cohen,⁴ Huntington,⁵ Cohen⁶ and Klay.⁷ Citizen soldiers have been playing an important role in Ethiopian military history for centuries. On occasion, peasants left their farm and family when the emperor or regional nobility called them to take up arms against a local or foreign enemy, complete their duty, and then go back to civilian life. This was the norm.

In the modern history of Ethiopia, the battle of Adwa was fought between well-armed Italian troops and the Ethiopian peasant army.⁸ Such traditions also continued during the military government. Bezabih⁹ and Henze¹⁰ described that the Ethiopian workers, led by the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) and the All Ethiopian Trade Unions (AETU), organised under workers militia, fought alongside the Revolutionary Ethiopian Army and the Cuban troops in the second Ethio–Somali war from 1977 to 1978. Recently, the *Fano* militia, an informal armed group, fought alongside the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and other regional government forces against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which was fighting an 18-month-long civil war against the federal government.

Throughout recorded history, the need for military manpower has challenged states and transformed societies.¹¹ The advent of a professional standing army composed of full-time soldiers, either career soldiers or conscripts alleviated the burden of national defence from the rest of the citizenry. However, in contemporary times, national defence relied not only on a standing army but also on organised citizen soldier systems of reserve forces, conscription and militia systems to meet the necessary demand for military manpower alongside the regular army.¹²

Aside from the full-time, professional army, the three major modern methods of recruitment for military forces or for mobilising citizen soldiers are conscription, reserve forces and militia systems. Conscription or national service means compulsory or voluntary enrolment in military service recruited for a period through the universal service of all citizens. In Africa, countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria and Eritrea have made national service compulsory. Countries such as Kenya, Senegal and South Africa have made the service voluntary. Møller has argued that conscripted armies served as “melting pots”, bringing diverse strands of the population together and thus furthering a sense of community.¹³ For instance, the Eritrean national service has indeed served to promote an enhanced level of national identity and helped to bridge ethnic and religious differences within a country with nine distinct ethnic groups roughly divided equally

² CHAMBERS 1999.

³ DOUBLER 2008.

⁴ COHEN 2015.

⁵ HUNTINGTON 1967.

⁶ COHEN 2001: 23–28.

⁷ KLAY 2016.

⁸ CAULK 1978: 457–493.

⁹ BEZABIH 2022.

¹⁰ HENZE 2000.

¹¹ MJØSET – VAN HOLDE 2002a.

¹² MATTILA et al. 2017: 359–378.

¹³ MØLLER 2002: 277–305.

between Christians and Muslims.¹⁴ However, Kibreab argues that “it has degenerated into indefinite forced labor or a modern form of slavery”.¹⁵ “During the Cold War, the basis for developing military power in most European countries was conscription. Governments made efforts to militarize the whole society, maintain the readiness of various institutions for warfighting, and keep defense expenditures high.”¹⁶

The reserve force, also known as the territorial army or auxiliary force, is an army that stands outside the regular force but is mobilised for routine assignments or activated in times of crisis.¹⁷ Winston Churchill has a famous quote: “The reservist is twice the citizen”¹⁸ referring to the fact that reservists have a civilian career and military occupation. Connelly¹⁹ and Walker²⁰ argue that the recent pandemic and the increasing frequency and larger-scale natural disasters associated with climate change have further highlighted the significance of developing a reservist mass in response to a crisis in many states.

In German military tradition, it is considered that “the lieutenant moved through the world as a young god and the civilian reserve lieutenant as a demigod”.²¹ The reserve system was also considered a retirement scheme in the United States, in which the Congress, convinced of the necessity of cleaning out the upper ranks of the Navy, created a “reserved list” for officers incapable of duty.²² Currently in the United States, as part of the Total Force concept, military reserves are participating in active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.²³ Reservists still comprise the bulk of Israel’s military, whose use (like Finland, Taiwan, or South Korea) is aimed at solving the manpower problems of a relatively small population facing a situation of protracted conflict along its borders.²⁴ In the Hungarian territorial defence reserve system, there are volunteer defence reserves, volunteer operational reserves, trained reserves, and potential reserve systems based on their military background, readiness and deployment.²⁵

The third type of citizen soldier system is the militia. The term militia is used in two ways in literature and in the news media. According to Kurian²⁶ and Tresch,²⁷ in the positive sense, it designates an organisation of citizens whose task is to protect society, the political system, the territory and property; on the other hand, in a negative connotation, it refers to forces that are beyond the government’s control, such as the militias of warlords, better described as terrorist or insurgent in nature.

¹⁴ CLAPHAM 2017.

¹⁵ KIBREAB 2017.

¹⁶ SZÉKELY–Ujházy 2017: 94–101.

¹⁷ SPOHR READMAN 2004.

¹⁸ CURRIE–CROSSLAND 1984.

¹⁹ CONNELLY–BEN-ARI 2023: 7.

²⁰ WALKER 1992: 303–322.

²¹ HUNTINGTON 1967.

²² HUNTINGTON 1967.

²³ BEN-ARI–LOMSKY–FEDER 2011: 361–371.

²⁴ BEN-ARI–LOMSKY–FEDER 2011: 361–371.

²⁵ UJHÁZY 2017: 88.

²⁶ KURIAN 2011.

²⁷ TRESCH 2011: 239–260.

The militia system can be defined as a military organisation of citizens with limited military training, which is available for emergency service, usually for local defence.²⁸ Customary definitions of the term militia typically describe an armed force composed of nonprofessional soldiers tasked with protecting a community during times of crisis.²⁹

Militias serve part time commonly with only a few weeks of drill and training, and generally are fully mobilised only in response to specific emergencies; also, their standards of discipline and expertise are relatively low, and militias are rarely if ever deployed far from home.³⁰ The militia also embodied the democratic principle that defence of the nation was the responsibility of every citizen.³¹

For instance, the militia among the Romans was frequently called Agrarian soldiers.³² Similarly, in Ethiopian modern military tradition, the militia force is a civil defence paramilitary force, which is a largely rural organisation, under the direction of the local government, intended to be a regional force to assist in auxiliary police duties. The most obvious strategic advantage of a militia system is that it allows for the mobilisation of a very large part of the population, which may be relevant in cases of national defence against large-scale invasion.³³

The Ethiopian Army

In the ancient culture of Ethiopian warriorhood, except for monks, priests, merchants and judges, most rural men trained themselves as warriors.³⁴ Military defence was the responsibility of every citizen, not delegated to a small exclusive group. Tsehai Berhane-Selassie states: “Traditionally the soldiers did not constitute a separate section of the population, but were ordinary citizens mobilized by their rulers in time of need.”³⁵ Tsehai uses the term *chewa* in Amharic language as ‘militia’ or ‘citizen soldiery’ or sometimes referring to it as *neftegna* (literally ‘gunmen’), meaning an army, made up of those who self-train.³⁶ “Members of the ancient warrior category known as *chewa* bore personal responsibility for defending land and society in Ethiopia.”³⁷

One of the landmarks in military history of Ethiopia, the First Ethiopia–Italian War, which was concluded at the battle of Adwa in 1896, can be described as a war of citizen soldiers against the standing armies and mercenaries of King Umberto I of Italy. The Ethiopian emperor Menilik II was able to mobilise 100,000 troops from all the regions of

²⁸ Britannica 2022.

²⁹ KURIAN 2011.

³⁰ MJØSET – VAN HOLDE 2002b: 9.

³¹ HUNTINGTON 1967.

³² DUANE 1810.

³³ MØLLER 2002: 277–305.

³⁴ BERHANE-SELASSIE 2018.

³⁵ PANKHURST 1967.

³⁶ BERHANE-SELASSIE 2018.

³⁷ BERHANE-SELASSIE 2018.

Ethiopia, including the newly incorporated southern regions.³⁸ Before going to battle to northern Ethiopia, Menilik sent the following mobilisation decree:

God, in his kindness, has so far destroyed the enemy and expanded the country for me; So far, I have ruled by the grace of God. [...] Now an enemy has come that destroys our country, and changes our religion, across the sea that God has given for us. [...] Now, with God's help, I will not surrender my country. [...] Those who are strong, help me with your strength. Those who are weak, for the sake of your son, your wife, your religion, help me in your prayer. If you fail to help for any reason, you will wrangle with me. I will not forgive you, in the name of Mary!³⁹

The emperor's call was a campaign call that shows duty of the citizens, and when a country is invaded, everyone was asked to march or support as much as possible. This shows a perennial individual sense of responsibility for a country, religion and monarch.

The idea of modern military formation in Ethiopia begins with Emperor Tewodros II (ruled 1855–1868), but it matured in the days of Emperor Menelik II (ruled 1889–1913), and laid the ground for modernity by creating a ministry of defence called Ministry of War.⁴⁰ Emperor Tewodros II made a start towards the creation of a national army whose units comprised of soldiers from different provinces, serving under crown appointees and receiving salaries from the imperial treasury.⁴¹ Probably the most remarkable aspect of Tewodros's military reform was his determination to produce modern weapons locally.⁴²

However, the first modern army can only be mentioned from 1919, when Teferi Mekonne formed the Imperial Bodyguard as a regular standing force, who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I (ruled 1931–1974) and later in 1935, Ethiopia opened the first military officer's training academy. The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but tirelessly tries to improve himself in the management of violence.⁴³ Thus, this period lay ground for the formation of professional and standing army in Ethiopian history. Consequently, Erlich (1983) states that Haile Selassie's modernisation and centralisation of the army transferred Ethiopia from a country that can mobilise over 200,000 citizen soldiers from various provincial feudal armies to a Western-trained, centralised army of 45,000 through the disarmament of rural Ethiopia.⁴⁴

In 1974, a Marxist military government, the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC) (Derg) under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam (ruled 1974–1991) seized power. Mengistu in 1987 with a new constitution continued his leadership as a civilian president of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

³⁸ ZEWUDE 2002.

³⁹ MEKURYA 1991 (translated from Amharic by the author).

⁴⁰ ZEWUDE 2002.

⁴¹ MARKAKIS 1975: 20.

⁴² AYELE 2014.

⁴³ HUNTINGTON 1967.

⁴⁴ ERLICH 1983: 455–481.

(PDRE). According to Bezabih⁴⁵ and de Waal⁴⁶ soon after the military took power mass mobilisation began in 1976, for the “Peasants’ March”, a military operation against the separatists in Eritrea and in 1977, the “Call of the Motherland” to raise recruits for the peasants’ militia or workers’ militia, to face the irredentist Somali army in the Ogaden. During this time, the government was able to build up an estimated number of 100,000 regulars and 150,000 combat-ready militiamen.⁴⁷ According to Lt. Colonel Mengistu, there were 300,000 men aged 18–40 in the people’s militia force.⁴⁸ In the end, between 1974 and 1991, the Ethiopian army grew from about 46,000 to nearly 500,000.⁴⁹ However, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a separatist group managed to overthrow the Derg government in 1991.

In 1991, the EPRDF demobilised 455,000 soldiers of the Revolutionary army and after 1995, under a new constitution, a new national army, the ENDF was established in 1996 with 50,000 troops.⁵⁰ However, the ENDF numbered 350,000 in 1998–1999 due to the Ethiopia–Eritrea war and “stabilized at 135,000 men following demobilization due to the ‘neither peace nor war’ situation between the two states”.⁵¹

The Ethiopian modern experience of reserve force, conscription and militia system

During Emperor Haile Selassie I (1931–1974)

It was Emperor Haile Selassie I who established a modern and centralised army that was under the leadership of the emperor himself and his defence minister. According to Erlich,⁵² Abate⁵³ and Tamrat,⁵⁴ before that, the national army was in practice an amalgam of the armies of the provinces or provincial governors who were expected to contribute fighters voluntarily whenever needed or required according to the 1955 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia:

The emperor reserves the right, with the advice and consent of Parliament, to declare war. He, further, reserves the right to decide what armed forces shall be maintained both in time of peace and in time of war. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, He has the right to organize and commend the said Forces; to commission and to confer military rank upon the officers of the said Forces; and to promote, transfer, or dismiss any of the said officers. He has, further, the right to declare a state of siege, martial law, or a national emergency, and to take such measures

⁴⁵ BEZABIH 2022.

⁴⁶ DE WAAL 1991.

⁴⁷ ERLICH 1983: 455–481.

⁴⁸ WOLDE 2012 (translated from Amharic by the author).

⁴⁹ AYELE 2014.

⁵⁰ FERRAS 2022.

⁵¹ FERRAS 2022: 204–206.

⁵² ERLICH 1983: 455–481.

⁵³ ABATE 1984: 380–400.

⁵⁴ TAMRAT 1968.

as are necessary to meet a threat to the defense or integrity of the Empire and to assure its defense and integrity (Article 29).

Everyone in the Empire has the duty to respect and obey the Constitution, laws, decrees, orders or regulations of the Empire. Ethiopian subjects, in addition, owe loyalty to the Emperor and the Empire, and have the duty of defending the Emperor and the Empire against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to perform public services, including military service, when called upon to do so; and to exercise the right of suffrage, which is conferred upon them by the Constitution (Article 64).⁵⁵

These two articles clearly show that as an absolute monarch and commander in chief of the army, Haile Selassie has the power to organise the armed forces as he wishes and to call for military service.

The Imperial Territorial Army

The Imperial Territorial Army was created by the emperor's order in 1958 by Tsehafe Tazaz Aklilu AbteWold, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Pen.⁵⁶ These auxiliary armed forces were established to provide additional military strength in times of war and to assist in ensuring the internal security of the Ethiopian Empire in times of peace. However, the other motive was also to disarm the numerous guerrilla bands that were roving the countryside after the Italian invasion (1936–1940) and engaging in banditry. Many bandits were recruited into the Territorial Army, provided they brought their weapons with them.⁵⁷

The Imperial Territorial Army was established in all provinces. At the time, Ethiopia was divided into 12 *Taklai Ghizat* (Provinces) and the Eritrean Federation, which joined Ethiopia in 1952. The Imperial Territorial Army was comprised of persons who are holders of *Maderia* land. *Maderia* is a land state retained control over that were given, in lieu of salary, for the maintenance of officials in its service. The officials enjoyed rights over such land only during their period in office. Later, there was a possibility for *Maderia* landholders to convert part of their holdings to permanent possession.⁵⁸ Even in the earlier history of Ethiopia, military service was also closely related to the system of land tenure; anyone who held land would provide service to their master in time of war or other emergency.⁵⁹

However, persons who have agreed to serve in the Territorial Army on behalf of the holders of *Mederia* land and persons who have volunteered for service and have been accepted for service by the Governor General of the Province may be accepted if they are between the ages of 18 and 25 years. For their service, the compensation can be in land,

⁵⁵ SIGATU 2019a.

⁵⁶ Order No. 21 of 1958, Imperial Territorial Army Order, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah Haile Selassie I, Elect of God and Emperor of Ethiopia. The Negarit Gazette.

⁵⁷ OFCANSKY–BERRY 1991.

⁵⁸ MARKAKIS 1975.

⁵⁹ PANKHURST 2001: 69.

in cash, or a combination of both. However, according to Gebru Tareke and Fantahun Ayele, the Territorial Army was poorly trained, poorly armed, poorly paid⁶⁰ and ill-disciplined.⁶¹

The Imperial Territorial Army was under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior, which supervises not only security and police but also all provincial administration.⁶² The Chief of the General Staff, who holds the title of *Ras* or *Dejazmatch*, (*Ras* means General or, when the Emperor is in the field, Lt. General, *Dedjazmatch* means Lt. General) who is appointed by the Emperor, commanded the Imperial Territorial Army.

Each Provincial Territorial Army was commanded by the Governor-General of the province and discharge his duties pursuant to instructions of the Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Territorial Army. The Governor-General with the approval of the Minister of the Interior, can mobilise all or part of the Provincial Territorial Army under his command.

The Governors of *awrajas* (local government under *Taklai Ghizat* or Province) were also responsible for carrying out the instructions of the Governor-General of the province concerned with respect to the enlistment of personnel of the Provincial Territorial Army and the organisation, administration and disposition of the Provincial Territorial Army.

It is the Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Territorial Army, that organises each Provincial Territorial Army, in units of squads, platoons, companies and other army units. For the purpose of rank, the personnel of the Imperial Territorial Army were classified as privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The personnel of the Imperial Territorial Army held titles following the Ethiopian ancient tradition, according to their rank, as follows: *Ras* (General or when the Emperor is in the field, Lt. General), *Dedjazmatch* (Lt. General), *Fitaurari* (Major General), *Kegnazmatch* (Brigadier General—line or literally, commander of the right wing), *Grazmatch* (Brigadier General—staff or literally means commander of the left wing of an army), *Balambaras* (Lieutenant Colonel), *Meto-Aleka* (Captain), *Amsa-Aleka* (Lieutenant) and *Asir-Aleka* (Sergeant).⁶³

In time of peace, the Imperial Territorial Army rendered services in ensuring the internal security of the Empire, and when called by the Governor-General assisted the police forces in the performance of their duties; it undergoes courses of instruction and training as prescribed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Territorial Army.

In time of war, its duties were to guard stores of war material, magazines, communication lines and similar installations, to report on landings of enemy paratroopers, to minimise the enemy's fighting power, to carry out guerrilla activities behind enemy frontlines and generally to make the most effective contribution to the defence of the Ethiopian Empire.

Persons who were rendering services in the Imperial Territorial Army as volunteers shall upon the completion of their initial intensive course of instruction and training, be recalled during the period of their enlistment for additional training periods of not more than 2 months per year. Persons rendering services in the Imperial Territorial Army in discharge of military service obligations imposed by the holding of lands shall be called to

⁶⁰ TAREKE 2016.

⁶¹ AYELE 2014.

⁶² HABTE SELASSIE 1966: 74–91.

⁶³ The Crown Council of Ethiopia s. a.

active duty each year for a period of not more than two months, to render services, which shall consist only for the performance of guard duties and similar auxiliary activities.

National Military Service and Reserve Force

The National Military Service launched in 1973, under the rationale of “in order to perpetuate this rich heritage of our forefathers and to enable our country to help preserve world peace, it is necessary that every citizen be steeped in military education”.⁶⁴ Those who were required to give military service are all male citizens between 20 and 21 years old and prior to that, a citizen who has attained the age of 19 years has to register at time and place, determined by the Ministry of National Defence (MoND). Those who passed their medical checkup and standard criteria assigned to the Armed Forces or with the consent of the public authorities or agencies concerned, assigned to fulfil economic and social services in other ministries or governmental agencies.

All those who completed their services in the active duty (full time service in the armed forces) and the ready reserve duty (available for call-up to active duty or to ready reserve training duty) of national military service transferred to the ready reserve and to the reserves (availability for call-up to active duty), respectively.

The service year in the national military service is 24 months on active duty and three consecutive years on ready reserve duty until attaining the age of 45 years. For those on ready reserve duty there was not more than 15 days refresher training each year. Employers were obligated to release an employee who is serving in the national military service or performing ready reserve training duty and to reinstate in his place of employment upon completion.

Public servants and employees of private organisations undergoing ready reserve refresher training continue to receive their salaries and those not employed were entitled to receive pocket money for the duration of the training. Finally, any person who fails to perform national military service duty will be punished with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding Ethiopian Birr 2,000 or by both.

In November 1973, by the order of the establishment of the National Military Service Board, a Coordinating Board was established to formulate and execute the overall plans for the National Military Service in the field of economic and social development and fix the number of inductees to be assigned in the various types of social service and development programs.⁶⁵ The board was chaired by the MoND and the Minister of National Community Development and Social Affairs, the Minister of Education and Fine Arts, the Minister of Public Works and Water Resources, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of the Interior and the Head of Planning Commission Office were members.

⁶⁴ Proclamation No. 322 of 1973, National Military Service Proclamation. Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah Haile Selassie I, Elect of God and Emperor of Ethiopia. *The Negarit Gazette*.

⁶⁵ Order No. 87 of 1973, National Military Service Coordinating Board, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah Haile Selassie I, Elect of God and Emperor of Ethiopia. *The Negarit Gazette*.

The order also authorises the MoND to establish one Induction and Assignment Appeal Board in the capital each *Teklay Ghizat*, *awraja* administration and at Ethiopian embassies abroad. The *Enderasye* (deputy) of the *Teklay Ghizat* chaired the board with the representative of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, the Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Agriculture, the Commissioner of Police for the *Teklay Ghizat* and the Induction Officer of the *Teklay Ghizat* as members. The Induction and Assignment Board of *awraja* was composed of the *awraja* Administrator as Chairman, a representative of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, two persons designated by the *awraja* Administrator or, where the *awraja* has local self-administration, two representatives of the *awraja* Council, a public health officer or physician, representing the Ministry of Public Health, and the Induction Officer of the *awraja* as members.

The main functions of the board was to implement the instructions of the MoND regarding National Military Service. It registered all young male Ethiopians who were 19 years old; deferred the period of service of registration according to the regulation of the MoND; dispatched the inductees to military training centres; and kept record of those transferred to ready reserve duty after two years of active duty and of those transferred to reserve duty.

The National Military Service Regulation, which was issued by Lt. General Kebede Guebre, Minister of MoND, described terms and guidelines for the service.⁶⁶ The Office of Induction and Assignment Board assign the registrants for combat services, for service in economic and development projects and social services and determine others as unfit for service according to their health conditions.

Inductees during their military service classified as enlisted men; however, after special training they could be classified as commissioned or non-commissioned officers. Economic and social services in public authorities or agencies and service in the university were also considered military service. Pocket money during the period of service was given and persons on ready reserve and reserve duty who are called to active in time of declared war or state of emergency are entitled to the same salary and other benefits as the regular forces with similar positions and rank.

However, with all their details, the regulations of the national military service, ready reserve and reserve force were not implemented. Since 1973, the imperial government has been challenged by internal and external economic and political pressures and has faced protests from the military and civilian populations; it was too weak to implement this ambitious plan. Finally, in the November 1974 revolution, Haile Selassie I, “Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God and Emperor of Ethiopia”, became the last of the Solomonic dynasty, an imperial dynasty of Ethiopia that began in 1270.

⁶⁶ Regulation No. 444 of 1973, National Military Service, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah Haile Selassie I, Elect of God and Emperor of Ethiopia. The Negarit Gazette.

During the Provisional Military Administrative Council (Derg) and the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) (1974–1991)

The PDRE constitution states the following concerning national defence and national military service:

- (1) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall strengthen the country's defense capability.
- (2) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall promote the working people's spirit of patriotism and revolutionary valor, and when necessary, mobilize the entire working people for the defense of the country and the protection of the people and the revolution.
- (3) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall foster the spirit of socialist patriotism of the youth and implement the National Military Service.
- (4) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall organize civil defense to withstand natural and man-made calamities (Article 26).⁶⁷

Even though the constitution became active in 1987, as stated above, militia mobilisation started in the early days of the government due to the invasion of Somalia, and national military service was declared early in 1983 because of the civil war in northern Ethiopia. Nevertheless, even before national military service was launched officially, the *Derg* declared "Development through Cooperation, Enlightenment, and Work Campaign", or "*Zemecha*" as soon as it took power on 25 November 1974. It was a non-military national service focusing on educating mostly rural society.

Development through Cooperation, Enlightenment and Work Campaign (Zemecha)

Soon after the *Derg* took power from the emperor, the Development through Cooperation, Enlightenment and Work Campaign (Zemecha) was declared in November 1974.⁶⁸ One of the main objectives of the Zemecha was to enable the people grasp the philosophy of "Ethiopia Tikdem" (Ethiopia First), which means Hibretesebawinet or Ethiopian Socialism: equality; self-reliance; the dignity of labour; the supremacy of the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian unity.⁶⁹ During this time, the *Derg* paraded itself to the outside world as the champion of Marxism–Leninism in Africa,⁷⁰ and also it revealed the government was guided by the Ethiopian Socialism which is inspired by the Tanzanian model of African Socialism.⁷¹

Another important objective was to conduct literacy programs in basic education. Moreover, provide basic agricultural, health, technical and other social work education for the masses; teach about the equality of citizens regardless of ethnicity, wealth, authority, or

⁶⁷ SIGATU 2019a.

⁶⁸ Proclamation No. 11 of 1974, Development through Cooperation, Enlightenment and Work Campaign. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁶⁹ Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) 1974: 8.

⁷⁰ CHEGE 1979: 359-380.

⁷¹ DESTA 2016 (translated from Amharic by the author).

education; participate in the relief and prevention of famine in drought-stricken areas; and conduct research and collect data to utilise it for the maximum utilisation of the nation's manpower and natural resources. Most importantly, it indicated the problem of existing land tenures and the new-fangled "Public Ownership of Rural Lands" proclamation, through which the government nationalised all rural land and abolished tenancy.⁷²

The campaign participants were high school, technical schools and university students and teachers. It was decreed that, if anyone fails to fulfil this obligation, was not to be permitted to attend any school or cannot be employed in any government or private organisation, and leave the country. The campaign was up to September 1975. However, in August 1975, the government extended it until July 1976.⁷³ For the reason of requests from the citizens for the continuation of the service of the campaign and because there was a need to continue implementation of the new proclamation of Public Ownership of Rural Lands and the Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses.⁷⁴ Around 60,000 students participated in the *Zemecha*.⁷⁵ The alphabetisation program (teaching how to read and write) was the most important single project of the campaign, teaching over 350,000 peasants.⁷⁶

National Military Service

As discussed above, in the second half of the 1970s, the northern civil war and the Ethio–Somalia war demanded any able man that could fight other than the regular army. Also in the 1980s, in the towns and villages of Ethiopia, the talk was about who had been taken for the national military service.⁷⁷ The reason was that the war with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was getting worse costing many human lives.

In 1983, national military service was declared on the rationale that "every Ethiopian citizen shall have the opportunity to serve and thus, renew his glorious, patriotic heritage in the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, laying down a strong and durable basis for the strengthening of the Revolutionary Armed Forces to safeguard the Revolution, defend the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Revolutionary Motherland".⁷⁸ The proclamation obliged any Ethiopian from 18 to 50 years of age to serve in the National Military Service, and any Ethiopian from 18 to 30 years of age was obliged

⁷² Proclamation No. 31 of 1975, Public Ownership of Rural Lands. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁷³ Proclamation No. 48 of 1975, Developing through Cooperation Enlightenment and work Campaign Extension. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁷⁴ Proclamation No. 47 of 1975, Public Ownership of Rural Lands and the Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁷⁵ WOLDE GIORGIS 1989.

⁷⁶ MILKIAS 1980: 19–30.

⁷⁷ DE WAAL 1991.

⁷⁸ Proclamation No. 238 of 1983, National Military Service Proclamation. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette. Article 12.

to be inducted for active military service. Also prior to this, any Ethiopian who is between 16 and 30 years of age must register for pre-induction military training, and periodic general military education is given while carrying out his regular activity. The inductee will take military training for a period of not less than 6 months. Upon completion of the training, the inductee will render active military service in the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Police, or the Revolutionary Border Guard for 24 consecutive months. The induction can be postponed in the case of a person who is in the graduating class of a vocational school or higher education institution and is temporarily incapacitated due to health issues.

An inductee who was an employee of any government office, mass or private organisation, on the day of induction has the right to be re-employed therein upon completion of active military service. Moreover, they will get priority in areas such as educational opportunities in national or foreign institutions, medical services, employment, housing, transportation and bank loans.

Eight months after the national military service program was decreed, the then Minister of National Defence Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebrekidan declared the national military service regulation on 10 January 1984.⁷⁹ The regulation focuses on details of registration, induction, pre-induction military training, training and service, discharge and extension of service, and reserve military service.

According to the regulation, all Ethiopian nationals between the ages of 16 and 30 and those subject to reserve military service must register at their respective *weredas* (districts) of permanent residence. The notice of registration was issued by the Minister of the Interior. The registration offices were in every peasant and urban dweller's *kebele* (urban neighbourhood or the smallest administrative unit in towns) association. The offices were composed of the chair of the *kebele* association, the secretary of the *kebele* association, the chair of the *kebele* Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA), and the chairlady of the *kebele* Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association (REWA). The registration offices were accountable to the military commissar of the *wereda*. These offices were responsible for taking legal measures against those who did not respond to call-up notice, deciding cases of postponement of induction, and other related tasks.

All the *weredas*, *awrajas* and provinces have their own induction committees, under the chair of the military commissar, with representatives of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE), the Ministry of Education, the public safety and security chief, mass organisations, the health officer and the police. The accountability goes from the lower level of administration to the higher level of the province, and the provincial induction committee was accountable to the Chief of the Military Commissariat.

Those inductees who have passed the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate examination (graduate high school) or who have achieved higher levels of education can be selected for a reserve officers training course, and those who complete the course shall

⁷⁹ Regulation No. 82 of 1984, National Military Service. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

be conferred the rank of Second Lieutenant and shall serve the remainder of their active military service as officers. The period of training and active military service did not exceed 30 consecutive months, with the exception of the time of mobilisation or war. On the application, the military service term can be extended up to two years but not beyond the age of 45. An inductee who has completed at least 8 months of active military service and shows a higher degree of leadership quality and discipline and better performance of duties can be promoted to the rank of Lance Corporal. Higher ranks following Lance Corporal can be awarded every six months.

Reserve military duty

The reserve military duty is also required of any person who has completed his active military service, until he is 50 years of age. An Ethiopian who is between the ages of 30 and 50 after the effective date of the proclamation and any retired member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Police, or the Revolutionary Boarder Guard, until he attains 50 years of age. Thus, any person who has reserve military duties will be given refresher military training. The employment of any person undergoing training or performing reserve military service will not be affected, including the salary payment.

There was also an opportunity for an inductee who had completed his training to enrol in a military academy. Then after, to serve as an officer of the Reserve Military Service or to serve as an officer of the standing Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Police, or the Revolutionary Boarder Guard, where he has the necessary military inclinations and outstanding qualities.

According to the 1984 Regulation on Military Service and Reserve Force, persons discharged from active national military service have to register within 30 days at the Commissariat of their respective *wereda* of permanent residence for the reserve military service. In this regard, members of the standing army of the rank of colonel and below who are discharged under the age of 55 years and general officers who are discharged under the age of 60 years have a duty for reserve military service.

Anyone who gave active military service was called for training for a different duration according to his age, length of service, or whether he took part in battles or not. Government and private offices, mass organisations and cooperative societies have an obligation to their employees and members to duly register for national military service, including reserve military duty and undergo induction. In addition, they have to pay their employees' wages until they are sent to the training centre if they are inductees, and their salary, transportation and peridorm for those who are selected to serve as members of induction committees or staffs.

The Peasant Defence Squads, the Revolutionary Defence Committee and the Territorial People's Militia

During the *Derg* regime, the most prominent militia system is called the Territorial People's Militia, which was created in May 1983. Even though in the second half of the 1970s, the "peasants' militia" or "workers' militia" were mobilised against the Somalia invasion, it is during this time the word Militia was officially used in the government Gazette. However, it is important to note that soon after the *Derg* took power it created rural armed units called "Peasant Defence Squads".⁸⁰ Local self-government was granted to peasant associations in rural areas and the associations established judicial tribunals to deal with certain criminal and civil cases, in which the peasant defence squads enforced decisions. In addition, the peasant defence squads safeguard forests, mines, bridges, crops and other such properties, which need safeguarding from time to time.

The Defence Squad had a leader of the squad who is elected by the general assembly of the peasant association and who shall be a member of the executive committee, and other members were elected by the executive committee and the same committee can decide their numbers. The term of service was for two years. The criteria for membership in the Defence Squad were: someone from the broad masses of peasants who stands for their interest; in good health; not addicted to alcohol or other dangerous drugs; esteemed for his wisdom by the local people; not convicted for theft; and over 21 years old.

In May 1982, the government consolidated the powers of peasant associations in the country and established the *kebele* Peasant Association, and Provincial, *awraja* and *wereda* Peasant Associations.⁸¹ It also established an umbrella organisation known as, All-Ethiopia Peasant Association (AEPA), to give central guidance to all Ethiopian peasants and peasant associations as the only national peasant association in the country. Every Peasant Association's Executive Committee had Revolution Defence Committees under them, in all levels of administration. There were Revolution Defence Committees of *kebele* Peasant Associations and *wereda*, *awraja*, Provincial level and there was the AEPA Revolution Defence Committee. All Revolution Defence Committees guide and coordinate the activities in their respective areas and were elected for a two year term.

The members of the Revolutionary Defence Committee did most of the regular security activities. Some of the duties were:

- to follow-up and notify the executive committee of any conspiracies plotted against the revolution, unity and independence of Ethiopia
- where he finds a person in *flagrante delicto* in connection with such an offense, arrest and hand him over to the nearest police station
- to produce any wanted person in accordance with an order legally given by the executive committee or judicial tribunal of a peasant association

⁸⁰ Proclamation No. 71 of 1975, Peasant Association's Organization and Consolidation. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁸¹ Proclamation No. 223 of 1983, Peasant Association's Consolidation Proclamation. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

- to enforce decisions and orders given by the judicial tribunal
- and to protect forests, mines, bridges, crops, or other such public or government property

It was after a few days of the establishment of the national military service program in 1983 that “the Military Commissariat and the Territorial People’s Militia” was declared.⁸² The rationale for the establishment of the two institutions was to make urban dwellers, peasants, professional, women and youth associations and cooperative societies more effective, and enable them defend the country, revolution, and their lives and property. The purposes of the Territorial People’s Militia was “to protect and safeguard the Revolution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the county, to fight against internal and external enemies, defend the broad masses government and public property from man-made and natural disasters”.⁸³

The duties and responsibilities of the militia were limited locally on its established *wereda*, *awraja*, province, or urban centre. The following were stated duties and responsibilities: to defend against any external attacks and aggressions; to defend against internal anti-revolutionary and anti-unity elements; to participate in the defence of the broad masses, government and public property from man-made and natural disasters; and to engage in economic and social activities in the area of deployment.

Unlike the Territorial Army of the previous imperial government, the Militia can be deployed outside of its administrative units of establishment. Moreover, the regular army and the militia can be jointly deployed, and in this case, the command and supervision was made by the regular army.

The most important institution in regards to the national military service and militia was the Military Commissariat.⁸⁴ The Chief Military Commissariat was established within the Ministry of the Interior with the rank of vice minister. The Chief Military Commissar had the duties of proposing the recruitment criteria, the formation, training, deployment, command of the Militia. Also, follow up the implementation of the national military service program and its mobilisation. Likewise respective provincial, *awraja*, *wereda* and Urban Centre military commissariats, which were established in the particular administration offices, with same duties.

Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention that mass involuntary conscription campaigns of the *Derg* backfired through a growing alienation of the public from the government: “Not only were large numbers of young men taken from their homes and farms to serve in the army, but the fear of conscription forced them to be in a state of readiness to flee to the hills at any sign of soldiers or government officials.”⁸⁵ This was one of the factors that accelerated the speedy disbanding of the government in 1991.

⁸² Proclamation No. 239 of 1983, Establishment of the Military Commissariat and the Territorial People’s Militia. The Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Negarit Gazette.

⁸³ Proclamation No. 239 of 1983. Article 21.

⁸⁴ TECHANE 2014 (translated from Amharic by the author).

⁸⁵ DE WAAL 1991.

Reserve Force and Militia System under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1991–)

The ENDF established in 1996⁸⁶ incorporated some members of the previous government's Revolutionary Army. All security and defence apparatus of the *Derg* government were demobilised. It was in April 2003 that the National Reserve Force was established. On the other hand, in post-1991 Ethiopia, the militia system continued mostly in rural areas after the indoctrination of the new government's ideology to the rural masses especially after the new constitution of 1995.

National Reserve Force of the FDRE

There are three objectives for the establishment of the National Reserve Force (NRF): to safeguard the country's sovereignty and to protect vigilantly the constitutional order; to be deployed together with the ENDF at times of war and state of emergency; and to reach promptly at any sight and assist wherever human or natural disaster occurs.⁸⁷ On the ground, the major reason to form a reserve force was the Ethiopian government's need for a fighting force, since the Ethiopia–Eritrea stalemate⁸⁸ continued with Ethiopian occupation of disputed territories and the border town of Badme. Moreover, the reserve force became a mechanism to keep round the demobilised Revolutionary Army forces of the previous government, which it recalled since the beginning of the war in 1998. The unique feature of the NRF was unlike the previous government or as commonly used in other states, reserves were not retired soldiers of the regular army or those who completed the national service program.

The National Reserve Force Organization and Coordination Bureau (NRFOCB) is the main office established under the MoND to coordinate and administer as superior authority the work of the NRF. The reserve forces are organised in all federal states and liaison offices are established in all zonal administrations (formerly *awraja*) of the regional states (formerly provinces). Even though by law reserve forces have to be organised at the *woreda* level, in government offices, private or government institutions or public associations, currently the NRF is organised only at zonal level, and also no liaison offices exist in government offices, private or government institutions or public associations.

In regards to the recruitment of the reserve force, it is mostly done from all regional states except the two city administrations, the capital Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Farmers who live in rural regions make up almost all the reserve forces. Except for the age limit, the other criteria for recruitment for the reserve force are the same as for the regular force. For the reserve, those from 18 to 30 years old can serve, but for the regular force,

⁸⁶ Proclamation No. 27 of 1996, Proclamation on the Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Federal Negarit Gazette.

⁸⁷ Proclamation No. 327 of 2003, Establishment of the National Reserve Force of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The Federal Negarit Gazette.

⁸⁸ SIGATU 2019b: 79–91.

only those from 18 to 22. The service year for a reserve is seven but does not go beyond 38 years old.

Recruits are given basic military training, and during the training, they are entitled to free rations, lodging, clothing, pocket money, medical care and training aids. There is also a probability to have training and practice with ENDF every year. During the military stalemate with Eritrean forces at the northern border many members of the reserve forces stayed up to six months at the front. However, last reserve force training took place in 2010.

By law, the NRF is enlisted in the ground force or the air force. However, the reserve forces are serving only in the ground force, and there is no recruitment system for the air force. As mentioned above, most of the members of the reserve force are mostly farmers from the countryside. In 2019, the ENDF, in addition to ground and air forces, it added naval force, special operation force and space and cyber forces if necessary, and each force may have reserve forces.⁸⁹ Still, a militia-like reserve force is in practice.

The term of service in the NRF is seven years. There is a possibility to extend service period in mutual consent or during the time of mobilisation and times of war, but not beyond the age of 38. A member of the NRF in time of active service is entitled rations, uniform, transportation, lodging, medical care free of charge and salary. Ranks may be given for the command-and-control positions at *woreda* and *kebele* levels but still there are no directives about it, therefore, reserve forces have no rank neither a system of promotion in ranks.

The main reason for the weakness of the reserve system in Ethiopia emanates from the military doctrine of the EPRDF government (ruled 1991–2018); moreover, as it is mentioned above, the reserve force was a cautionary measure to keep the demobilised forces in the loop. The book entitled *Building an Army in a Revolutionary Democracy* commonly known as the “Red Book” assumed to be written by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenaw (ruled 1991–2012) which was both a military doctrine and a political foundation of the ENDF under the EPRDF government was critical concerning the reserve force.

According to the Red Book, the reason reserve forces were usually limited to infantry units is because it cannot be permanently trained and therefore, it is impossible to make the force to have a high military competence.⁹⁰ It also argues that it takes much time to mobilise reserve forces in less developed states with large geographical size and limited transportation system in sudden emergencies.⁹¹ The doctrine preferred a militia system to either national military service or reserve force.

On the other hand, the new military doctrine, which came out in 2018, after the reform of government in which the EPRDF changed to Prosperity Party (PP) under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, it endorse both national military service and a reserve force system as follows:

⁸⁹ Proclamation No. 1100 of 2019, A Proclamation on the Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Federal Negarit Gazette.

⁹⁰ Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2001 (translated from Amharic by the author).

⁹¹ Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2001 (translated from Amharic by the author).

A reserve force is a component that can organize manpower with qualified combat skills without compromising the nation's economic potential. Reserve forces enhance our ability to avoid war at a low-cost during peacetime. The reserve force plays an important role in strengthening the manpower capacity of the regular defense forces during wartime. During an emergency, it performs disaster prevention and security duties in place of the regular army. This allows the regular army to focus on critical missions. Therefore, the training and organization of the reserve force will be strengthened in a manner that takes into account current and recent sources of threats.⁹²

Besides, in November 2022, a draft for the amended ENDF bill submitted to the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR) contains a provision that allows youths who have completed secondary or tertiary education to undergo voluntary military training in the national defence forces. Article 6/4 of the draft proclamation states as follows:

The Ministry may enlist high school or university graduates willing to serve in the armed forces, as a national service, for two years after completing the required military training. After completing their service, and if they choose to serve in the National Reserve Force, they will be entitled to specific rights and benefits. The details will be provided in a subsequent guideline.⁹³

The Militia System

In 1991, militias that were serving under the military government were replaced by armed community volunteers, many of whom were remnants of guerrilla groups that were fighting the *Derg*. Mainly, their duties were to fulfil policing duties, while the *Derg*'s police and militia were either dismissed or retrained.⁹⁴ In the words of Jackson et al., "militia are effectively a politicised paramilitary comprising armed volunteers, frequently from the ethno-nationalist militia that opposed the *Derg*".⁹⁵ As in the previous government, the militia continue to be an important security apparatus usually mount community patrols which operate checkpoints on major roads. Moreover, in most of the federal states, they outnumber the police, and is seen as a political wing of the government.⁹⁶ For instance in Amhara regional state there are approximately 128,000 militias.⁹⁷ Therefore, militias are much more accessible than the police as a source of protection and safety.⁹⁸

In post 1991 Ethiopia, the militia service is under the regional states; it has offices in all regional, zonal, *woreda* and *kebele* levels. The latest regulation on militia describes it as "an armed force of civilians who does not receive any salary, while not detached from

⁹² Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2020.

⁹³ Draft Proclamation on the Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2022.

⁹⁴ DENNEY-KASSAYE 2013.

⁹⁵ JACKSON et al. 2018.

⁹⁶ JACKSON et al. 2018.

⁹⁷ DENNEY-KASSAYE 2013.

⁹⁸ JACKSON et al. 2018.

their regular production activities, engaged in their own personal business for income and elected by the people to do the local security activities”.⁹⁹

The members of the militia are elected by the people in the local area based on the following criteria: being older than 18 years and not more than 50 years, having a strong conviction to the basic principles of the regional state’s constitution, being known for his good manners, having a fixed subsistence income, having no criminal record, being willing to attend the militia training and being physically fit for military action.

The militia forces are given training for a short period of time that are focused on the relevant judicial systems to increase their legal awareness, on the main areas of crime prevention, community policing, protection of human and democratic rights, military education in theory and practice, and information management and communication skills.

The main duties and responsibilities of militia members include: protecting the country’s sovereignty and constitutional system from any internal and external attacks; respecting and upholding the human and democratic rights of citizens guaranteed by the constitution; when receiving information that endangers the security of the local people, immediately transmitting it to the higher authority; being at the forefront of the development activities carried out by the people in their area; working in coordination with the police and the national defence forces in collecting necessary information and forwarding it to the relevant militia office; and arresting individuals found committing crimes and presenting them to the police.

The militia members have the right to carry arms, not to be held legally responsible for the damage caused while performing a major operation, and to get uniforms according to the need and capacity of the society in their local area. Regarding operation and deployment, the militia forces are only deployed when there are security threats in their local area to missions that should not harm the lives, livelihoods, or farming activities of the militias. The principal deployment area of the militia is his own *kebele*, unless there is a security threat against the sovereignty of the state.

According to the Red Book, the militia system gives a better opportunity to strengthen the political loyalty of the national army by choosing from the militia members who will join the army based on their individual character or their social class.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, it argues that in the absence of the military, the militia force can execute security duties along with its regular everyday life, and because it is organised and controlled by every local government, it is easier to give continuous training and ensure that it is ready to mobilise.¹⁰¹ The most important argument in the Red Book after comparing the reserve force, conscription and militia systems is the following:

Taking all options into consideration, the militia system has multiple advantages. To start with, it enables us to use our standby force whenever and wherever we want. It gives us better control over mobilization. While providing continuous training, we can engage the same force for environmental protection and community development services. Not

⁹⁹ Regulation No. 28 of 2005, A Regulation of Militia Management and Organization System of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. Debub Negarit Gazeta of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State.

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2001 (translated from Amharic by the author).

¹⁰¹ Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2001 (translated from Amharic by the author).

to mention it would be much easier to mobilize if need be. Given that the revolutionary democracy ideology has not penetrated and is far from being the dominant factor, and that the army's political indoctrination is not at the level it needs to be, nothing matches the use of the militia system in the context we are in now. Due to historical experience, the attitude towards national military service is by and large negative and would not be any easier to reintroduce. [...] However, the militia system is more or less a practice that has been there for some time and is widely accepted.¹⁰²

Even though the Red Book is no longer a military doctrine, the militia system is still the most important security institution, mostly because more than 80% of Ethiopians live in rural areas as peasants, their livelihood based on farming or cattle herding.¹⁰³ Therefore, the militia system is still a viable system of recruiting citizen soldiers.

Finally, it is also worth mentioning that regional states in Ethiopia have other security establishments than the police, called special police, semi-armed force, which created security pluralism and created a security challenge.¹⁰⁴ Particularly, due to the Tigray conflict (2020–2022), the federal government was hesitant about the toughening of regional forces or other irregular forces as long as they support the ENDF against the TPLF. This later resulted in the confrontation of these groups with the federal government.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

Since the formation of a professional army in Ethiopia, the four governments of Ethiopia have practised a modern citizen soldier system of reserve force, national military service and militia system in different ways based on the security context of their time and their military doctrine and political ideology.

The Territorial Army of Emperor Haile Selassie's government was the first significant experiment in organising citizen soldiers in a formal reserve force manner for the first time in the country's military history. Armed bands, who have been fighting the Italians in the second Italy–Ethiopia war in various parts of the country, came under state control with their arms. On the other hand, the 1973 national military service, even though it was well organised and planned on paper, never saw the light of day because it was too late for an already too weak imperial government to implement it.

Nevertheless, the military government (1974–1991) was able to build a strong army, both regular and citizen soldier armies, which resulted in the loss of many young lives by immersing the country in the endless civil war. Which also leads to the abhorrence of the military profession and citizen soldiership by the public.

The current reserve force system exists only in name, and if it does, it does so in a militia form without a strong relationship with the ENDF and without unified periodic exercises. Most of the reserve forces also serve with the local militias of their areas. The

¹⁰² Ministry of National Defence (MoND) 2001 (translated from Amharic by the author).

¹⁰³ SIGATU 2018.

¹⁰⁴ FISEHA 2022: 96–130.

¹⁰⁵ The Guardian 2022.

NRFOCB is engaged in setting up the regular army. Most importantly, the militia continue their local security role as the government's wing of security in the absence of police and the army in rural areas. Thus, the need for recruiting for the NRF is almost zero, mainly because of the military doctrine of the government. In addition to this, the security pluralism of several informal and formal militias and different types of police forces also minimises the importance of the NRF.

The newly planned national military service looks better from the outside; however, implementing it might be difficult in a country like Ethiopia, where polarised political and ethnic tensions are present. Thus, it is important for the current government to work toward a national political consensus, which is a key factor in mobilising and arming its citizens. It is also important to learn the lessons of past citizen soldier systems.

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Armed Conflict and Agreement with the FARC: The Role of the Colombian Air Force – FAC

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This paper aims to describe the operational transformation of the Colombian army since the 1990s. Special emphasis is placed on the role of the Fuerza Aerea Colombiana – FAC (Colombian Air Force) in the development of the armed conflict and the strategy against drug trafficking that took place in South America. Between 1999 and 2006, the most important and significant air operations in the country’s history took place, developing an offensive strategy that guaranteed a greater capacity for effective control of the regions. This prevented illegal groups from consolidating themselves on the basis of a “war of movements” that would have allowed them to take control of vast areas of the territory. Partly thanks to these operational results, sufficient incentives and pressure were generated as a result of which, before its demobilisation, the guerrilla group with the greatest impact in the country (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC) moved towards a political agreement with Juan Manuel Santos’s government. Finally, taking into account the current challenges, such as the ongoing post-agreement in Colombia, this paper reflects on the need for a transition in the army from a counterinsurgency force to a multi-mission force that considers the implementation of Human Security as a complement to traditional security.

Keywords: Air Force, armed conflict, national security, Human Security

Introduction

According to Article 217 of the 1991 Political Constitution of Colombia, the primary purpose of the military institution is to defend the sovereignty, independence, integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order.² This mandate was constantly put to the test due to the internal armed conflict that has plagued the country since the 1960s. This conflict involved multiple actors who, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, called into question the legitimacy and sovereign power of the State. The 1990s and 2000s were characterised by the development of military intelligence and technological development

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² Constitución Política de Colombia 1991.

to confront illegal armed groups, as well as counter-guerrilla military training and a securitarian political stance on the part of central governments. These factors had a direct impact on the generation of capacities to transform the dynamics of the conflict, which translated into operational successes and changes in security dynamics.³

Such transformative initiatives of military strengthening, which produced strategic results in weakening the FARC, the guerrilla group with the greatest impact prior to the 2016 Peace Accords, were motivated by a sense of emergency generated after the frustrated negotiations during the government of Andrés Pastrana with this guerrilla group.⁴ These negotiations included the clearance of part of the national territory (Distension Zones) for the FARC to settle (later considered a sort of failed state within the national territory where the fundamental rights of the region's inhabitants were violated. There were reports of raids, undue detentions of people, cattle rustling, extortions, kidnappings and murders).⁵ This failure preceded a hardening of the National Defence and Security perspective, as well as changes in the way the Military Forces and in particular the Colombian Air Force operated.⁶

The invigoration of the armed forces was reflected in their capacity to influence the dynamics of the conflict in operational contexts (such as Operation Angel Flight or Operation Colombia) in which air power was especially decisive. The National Government's strengthening of the armed forces, providing resources, infrastructure, modernisation of technical equipment and actively seeking international cooperation, especially from the United States, meant prioritising a perspective that understands security from an offensive strategic position as a State problem that, according to this perspective, could not depend on the diagnosis and posture of the governments in power.⁷

In the following, the emergence of insurgent groups and drug trafficking as threats to state security will be mentioned, as well as the different transformations experienced by the Colombian Armed Forces (especially the Air Forces) to combat them. Finally, for discussion, reference will be made to Human Security as an effective tool against emerging threats beyond the military. It is a concept from which it is possible to think of an army multimission focused on the need to protect people and not only state sovereignty, and which includes aspects of security that are not limited to military confrontation, related to generating conditions in which communities scourged by decades of violence and State neglect can live in dignity.

Overall, the questions that arise and are addressed in this text are, on the one hand, to what extent the strengthening of military forces, and in particular the air power, can be considered a decisive factor in the disarmament of the former FARC, as well as the future prospects for the role that the army could play in the post-conflict period. The methodology used to address this problem was the compilation, review and analysis of documents in order to contextualise the questions, as well as a search of the written press, data and

³ RÍOS 2018: 479.

⁴ RÍOS 2018: 481.

⁵ ARIZA 2014.

⁶ ECHEVERRY 2019: 88.

⁷ MALAGÓN 2019: 177.

reports issued by both civilian and military organisations, with the aim of carrying out a balanced analysis of the issue that includes different sectors.

Context: Colombia's armed conflict and the rise of drug trafficking

Outlaw groups, drug trafficking and illegal air movement

When what is now known as Colombia's internal armed conflict broke out in 1961, the country was struggling to overcome another conflict in which the traditional two-party system was the main actor that dominated the country's history between 1946 and 1953, a period characterised by armed confrontations between supporters of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.⁸ Then, in the 1960s, on the one hand, a group of peasants who were making social demands (they denounced the State's abandonment, instability, violence and political exclusion) and, on the other hand, in the 1970s, a group of students and political activists decided to arm themselves with the aim of rising to power. This led to the creation of outlaw groups known as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), ELN (National Liberation Army), EPL (Popular Liberation Army) and M-19 (19th of April Movement) guerrillas, which began to launch attacks against the Colombian State.⁹

With respect to the FARC (the guerrilla with the greatest impact), they established contacts with organised crime that gave it access to the clandestine arms trade, for example, drug-for-arms exchanges (such exchanges probably explain why the FARC sent representatives to Mexico in 2000 to make contact with the "Tijuana cartel"). They also have links with Venezuelan arms dealers who supplied them with small arms and large quantities of ammunition. Historically, it is possible to point to relations (for supply and training) with revolutionary groups established during the Cold War, such as the Salvadoran Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Japanese Red Army (ERJ) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In addition, the subversive group found sources of arms supplies through a global network that uses the countries surrounding Colombia (Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela) as transit points.¹⁰

During the 1990s, there were various military onslaughts, especially by the FARC. At that time, the State had problems maintaining its legitimate monopoly on violence. The illegal groups understood the strategic need to control the territories and carried out different attacks, especially in the south of the country. These attacks had a common factor: they were prolonged confrontations with heavy weaponry (artillery), and the military objectives were strategic. In addition, also in the 1990s, the illegal organisation in question operated under the "war of movements" strategy of the Prolonged People's War (GPP), which allowed them to group together and attack specialised military units. The

⁸ ÁLVAREZ 2013: 8.

⁹ M. A. BARÓN 2019: 203.

¹⁰ ORTIZ 2002: 138.

attacks on Las Delicias, El Billar, Miraflores and Mitú show that the guerrillas wanted to control these territories in order to create and maintain a corridor of mobility towards the borders of Venezuela and Brazil.¹¹

The seizure of Mitú (in 1998) was of great strategic value because it was a departmental capital in a key area that would allow the FARC to strengthen their political position at the negotiating table with the Pastrana Government, as well as to demonstrate to the State and the Armed Forces their military capacity and territorial control. By controlling the territory, they would show the international community their military capacity with the aim of obtaining belligerent status. The illegal organisation was wearing down the State by carrying out attacks throughout the national territory, and in this sense, with the capture of Mitú they were sending a political message (indication that they were in the whole territory), unlike the State, whose presence in several zones was questionable.¹²

But the insurgent group's presence in the territories was quite complex and not limited to military presence. In order to explain the relations between civilians and the FARC, it is necessary to highlight the process of flexibilisation that this group was forced to undergo after the end of the Cold War. In 1992, the signing of peace with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador can be seen as an event that marked the conclusion of the Cold War in Latin America. This demobilisation of what was then considered the strongest insurgent force on the continent was seen as a sign that indicated the definitive death of guerrilla movements in the region. However, the FARC, far from weakening, quickly adapted to the new strategic scenario, taking advantage of the opportunities created by the emerging post-war international arena.¹³

In this transition, the group in question abandoned many of the characteristics associated with traditional Latin American armed organisations. For example, from an ideological point of view, the vast majority of these organisations defined themselves as followers of some variant of communism. However, the FARC gradually abandoned Marxist–Leninist orthodoxy and replaced it with a less rigid ideological package, moving from criticising the legitimacy of the State's origin to questioning its functional legitimacy. This allowed them to dissociate themselves from the communist crisis, as their new political agenda did not propose the transformation of the State according to ideological principles, but the construction of a new, more efficient one. In this sense, they began to present and configure themselves as a parallel State, a provider of social services, which gave them some community support.¹⁴

In terms of access to weapons, Latin American guerrillas had to rely on governments with similar ideologies for logistical support. In late 1989, the United States pressured the USSR to reduce the flow of weapons to insurgents' groups. In this respect, the FARC's strategic transition allowed it to gain autonomy in decisive areas that have provided it with a logistical chain free of dependency, especially to develop heavy weaponry without the need for substantial foreign State sponsorship. To this end, they managed to achieve a state

¹¹ M. A. BARÓN 2019: 203.

¹² M. A. BARÓN 2019: 203.

¹³ ORTIZ 2002: 127.

¹⁴ ORTIZ 2002: 131.

of total self-financing mainly through their links with drug trafficking. It should be made clear that in general terms, the insurgents had been less involved in the sale of narcotics, this phase of the drug business have been mainly in the hands of specialised criminal groups. Instead, they were in charge of providing peasants and traffickers (in return for “taxes” paid) with services such as justice, maintenance of public order and defence against army and police operations.¹⁵ The guerrillas’ links with drug trafficking have not only provided them with important economic benefits, but have also ensured significant support from sectors of the peasant population dedicated to coca leaf cultivation. The latter, given that in areas far from the centres of power where the state’s presence is not felt, coca becomes the only product in sufficient demand for buyers to come directly to collect it. The unpaved roads in coca-growing areas mean that farmers are unable to transport other products to the nearest cities, which are many hours away, so they see coca cultivation as the only viable way to survive.¹⁶

Now then, drug trafficking is part of a chain that involves not only guerrillas but also counter-guerrilla or self-defence groups, organised crime (drug cartels and Organised Armed Groups) and even army members and regional political clans.¹⁷ It began with the marimba bonanza in the Guajira region (the northernmost department of the country) in the 1970s.¹⁸ This phenomenon shifted from the production of coca leaf to the production of coca paste and cocaine hydrochloride and exponentially increasing the profits. The illegal economies have taken advantage of the facilities generated by air movement and the existing weaknesses in the control by the authorities.¹⁹ Those involved in the drug trafficking business have designed different manoeuvres to move their merchandise to strategic distribution and commercialisation points. In the 1980s (at the beginning of the drug trafficking boom), the most common means of transport was by land, but due to the excessive time required for mobilisation and the fact that it was the most controlled by the public forces, drug traffickers used maritime and aerial means to carry out their illegal movements, the latter being the fastest and with the greatest coverage.²⁰

Regarding the situation of illegal flights in Colombia, in 2003 there were an average of almost two flights per day in which drugs were trafficked to bordering countries. Including air transport alone, it can be inferred that 639 tons were transported during that year.²¹ The income of the cartels was substantial and allowed them, through the same routes, to move narcotics to the U.S. and to bring weapons and money on the return trip, thus completing the commercial cycle. In 2003, the illegal organisations received 16.87% of Colombia’s GDP, which shows that the capacity of the State was at risk, especially in terms of its legitimacy and performance in society.²²

¹⁵ ORTIZ 2002: 137.

¹⁶ GONZALEZ 2017: 46.

¹⁷ GUTIÉRREZ-CIRO 2022.

¹⁸ BARRIOS 2020: 152.

¹⁹ KAUTILYA 2008.

²⁰ DEVIA-FERREIRA 2015: 3.

²¹ U.S. Department of State 2004.

²² BARRIOS 2020: 101.

The role of the Air Force in the course of the armed conflict

Development and innovation

In the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Hemisphere, the United States emerged as the victorious superpower in the international system supported by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries. The giant of the North saw the need to rethink its military strategy from the first decade of the 21st century, deepening the reforming wave of its Armed Forces with attention to the new “threats”, standing out, in terms of security and defence, drug trafficking and “terrorism”.²³

In this context, on 13 June 2000, *Plan Colombia* entered the scene as a law sanctioned by former U.S. President Bill Clinton to provide support, especially in the military field, to the South American nation in the context of the internal armed conflict and drug trafficking. This plan was totally in line with former President Alvaro Uribe’s policy of weakening “terrorist” organisations through military operations. The U.S. Government was emphatic in the imperative need to double military expenditures by the Colombian State in order to achieve a better development of the joint strategy. During the two Uribe Administrations, indeed, the military percentage of GDP increased considerably, to the point of being able to use the term “militarised budget”. Military expenditures between 2002 and 2010 went from 11,003 billion to 23,065 billion, an annual growth of 4.76%. Between 2002 and 2010, Colombia had the highest military spending figures in the South American continent.²⁴

Thus, three new divisions were established (VI Division, VII Division and VIII Division), as well as six High Mountain Battalions, sixty Counter-Guerrilla Battalions, eleven groups of urban anti-terrorist Special Forces, nine regular battalions, fourteen service and combat support companies and new National Police garrisons. As for the Colombian Air Force – FAC, its operational capacity was expanded due to the acquisition of aircraft and helicopters, including twenty-five Brazilian A-292 and thirteen Israeli Kfir.²⁵ In addition, in 2011, the FAC surpassed several indicators of the previous decade, such as the number of hours flown (87,692), aircraft readiness (73.5%, being the world average 70%) and the largest fleet size (319 aircraft) achieved by the country. It also included the adoption of night vision systems and Super Tucano aircraft, as well as laser-guided bombs.²⁶

Another essential aspect in the strengthening of the institution was to implement the air power principle of “centralised control and decentralised execution”. This system integrated all intelligence, planning, execution and operational control activities, as well as the technological elements of communications, information technologies, radar signals, sensors and intelligence platforms, under the Air Force Command and Control Center and its subordinate organisations. This allowed the commander to have control of all

²³ GONZÁLEZ–BETANCOURT 2018: 74.

²⁴ TAMAYO 2015.

²⁵ SCHULTZE-KRAFT 2012: 411.

²⁶ TRIANA 2019: 60.

operations, to properly exploit the flexibility, speed, precision and versatility of air power and to incorporate International Humanitarian Law throughout the operational structure. The latter facilitated the use of force within the constitutional and legal framework by defining the rules of engagement, mission accomplished reports, closed control of drug interdiction operations and the operational information system.²⁷

Fighting the guerrilla

The process of transformation and modernisation during the 1990s and 2000s, mentioned in the previous section, made it possible for the Colombian Air Force to develop air operations that allowed the deactivation of the territorial strategies of the illegal armed groups, leading to the demobilisation of the armed structures of the FARC and the strategic weakening of other organisations.²⁸ Of particular note is the demobilisation of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia – AUC, paramilitary groups which were built as an illegal counter-insurgency response, with the complicity and support of ranchers, local political elites and members of the army,²⁹ and that have been the most lethal actors in the conflict in terms of massacres of the civilian population.³⁰

Back to the guerrillas, Air power made it possible to overcome the irregular practice developed by FARC of using explosive devices to prevent ground troops from advancing rapidly along different corridors of the country. The articulation and coordination between the Forces was fundamental because it facilitated the triangulation and complementation of available intelligence information, making it increasingly clear the locations of the leaders and key men of the FARC fronts, as well as the plans and purposes of the organisation, which was fundamental for striking the hardest military blows.³¹ In this regard, it is worth highlighting the coordination between the Air Force and the National Police, which achieved the sequential neutralisation of 88 FARC leaders, 50 ELN leaders and 123 organised crime leaders between 2006 and 2017.³²

Operation Colombia in 1990 is considered by the Military Forces to be one of the most important historical milestones in the country's armed conflict. The National Army troops attacked an area covering a large region of the department of Meta to dismantle the FARC's General Staff and Secretariat. The pilots faced multiple challenges to operate in an environment where topographical conditions and the guerrilla group's own response made any attempt by an aircraft to enter the area extremely difficult.³³ Although the operation did not achieve any convincing blow against the organisation (and even dispersed the guerrillas throughout the national territory), the operation showed the capacity of the pilots who, from military planes and Air Force helicopters, allowed the Army to reach one

²⁷ A BARZÚA 2014: 55–63.

²⁸ ECHEVERRY 2019: 89.

²⁹ GARCÍA 2005.

³⁰ Historical Memory Group 2016: 42.

³¹ MALAGÓN 2019: 177.

³² Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2018: 62.

³³ L. I. BARÓN 2019: 103.

of the FARC's most emblematic points, managing to erase this guerrilla sanctuary from the map.³⁴

In 1998, Operation Angel's Flight, launched by the Colombian Air Force to retake Mitú, turned out to have a key role, since thanks to the use of aerospace instruments it was possible to alter the armed group's asymmetries. In this operation, the latest technology incorporated by the Air Force was used and tested, such as night vision goggles (NVG), the FLIR system (Forward Looking Infrared), *perifoneo* and precision shooters from aircraft (Teplas).³⁵ The operation also succeeded in changing the guerrillas' military strategy. Mitú was the last town that the FARC tried to hold and remain. As they realised that being grouped together exposed them to air power, they had to change the strategy of war of movement to return to ambushes and other tactics typical of guerrilla warfare in order to be able to carry out attacks against the State.³⁶ It is not a coincidence that the percentage of municipalities attacked by illegal groups increased in 2012 and 2013 by 8%.³⁷

On the other hand, in 2002, precision bombing allowed to recover the clearance zone in a short time, and since 2007 it has made it possible to weaken the illegal group in successive operations. The Air Force guaranteed superiority by carrying out attack and aerial intelligence, command and control missions, among others.³⁸ The decreasing trend of the numbers, from 33 to only 2 or 0 operations, showed that the Air Force contributed not only to decimate such groups in each event but also to progressively deter other attacks on populations.³⁹ This downward trend made it possible to adjust the means to intensify strategic attacks between 2006 and 2007. Since 2007, precision bombing has been used against the leaders and regularly against the illegal groups' camps and infrastructure. More recently, in 2015, bombings against factions of the group in Cauca and Chocó neutralised 54 of their troops.⁴⁰

When announcing the beginning of the peace talks in 2012, the government argued that they were an effect of the decisive operations of the security forces during the previous decade. In February of the same year, the *Espada de Honor* (Sword of Honour) war plan began to be implemented, the initial objective of which was to dismantle the armed groups and their base areas; in other words, the missions would not only focus on the leaders but especially on the structures and their support networks.⁴¹ During that year, only 41% of these structures were able to carry out any armed action.⁴² The illegal groups, reduced in numbers and initiative, withdrew to small areas of refuge.⁴³

The conduct of close air support operations, characteristic of the typical ground counter-power mission, is also noteworthy. As such, air support offered protection and

³⁴ Infobae 2020.

³⁵ LESMES 2019: 114.

³⁶ M. A. BARÓN 2019: 204.

³⁷ Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2015.

³⁸ TRIANA 2019: 63.

³⁹ Colombian Air Force – FAC 2008.

⁴⁰ TRIANA 2019: 61.

⁴¹ Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2018: 76–79.

⁴² Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2013: 14.

⁴³ Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2018: 76–79.

tactical advantage to ground troops in combat;⁴⁴ which means that the Air Force has been essential in the operations of the Army, the Marines and the Police. Between 2011 and 2012, it had to intensify such support either in the campaign against drug trafficking or within the *Espada de Honor* Plan.⁴⁵ These advances between national institutions were coupled with intelligence cooperation between the United States and the Colombian Government, managed by a CIA program.⁴⁶ Although as early as 1984, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs denounced the nexus between illegal armed groups and drug trafficking, it was only in November 2002 that the Bush Administration authorised U.S. assistance against drug trafficking in Colombia to be used against the insurgency as well.⁴⁷ The influx of information, coupled with the political will of both nations due to shared security interests, was crucial to hit the FARC in previously inaccessible areas.⁴⁸

In short, it was demonstrated that air capabilities allowed the military forces to have an effective presence and control not only in the airspace but also in the national territory, which led to the privileging and strengthening of air power in the Colombian internal armed conflict.⁴⁹ The strategic power of this force has been recognised by the National Center of Historical Memory: “A fundamental measure to contain the guerrilla advance was the strengthening of air power. [...] Air power became for the FFMM (Military Forces) a tactical advantage that transformed the correlation of forces between the State and the guerrillas.”⁵⁰

Control of drug trafficking

The Colombian Air Force is in charge of keeping under control that illegal flights do not take place in the National Airspace. The fight against drug trafficking by air began with the first activities in 1990 with the full support of the U.S. Government, whose interest, to keep its territory free of the scourge of drugs, led it to work with non-adjacent countries to establish direct action on an activity that “affects” its security and in which no third states intervened. That could serve as a buffer area to try to control the entry of narcotics, since the practice at the time consisted of dumping drug shipments at sea or in unpopulated areas of the territory to be recovered by the outlawed organisations.⁵¹

As part of the efforts to take the necessary actions at the national level, the competent agencies that could assist in interdiction were involved. Service agreements were established with entities such as the Anti-Narcotics Police, the Civil Aviation Control Group, the Attorney General’s Office and the Special Administrative Unit of Civil Aeronautics. Routes, illegal runways and aircraft were prioritised, establishing patterns

⁴⁴ Colombian Air Force – FAC 2020: 6.

⁴⁵ TRIANA 2019: 63.

⁴⁶ RIASCOS 2019: 274.

⁴⁷ TRIANA 2019: 64.

⁴⁸ RIASCOS 2019: 274.

⁴⁹ LESMES 2019: 115.

⁵⁰ Historical Memory Group 2017: 102.

⁵¹ BARRIOS 2020: 96.

of conduct that allowed to increase the effectiveness of interdiction. This made it easier to take the first steps towards a strategy that would guarantee the control of airspace, initially at the national level and later establishing alliances, not only with neighbouring countries but also with countries with non-adjacent borders. With the latter, procedures were standardised and communication channels were established that made it possible to have an impact on illegal air movement.⁵²

In this context, overflights by USAF AWAC, P-3B and USCUSTOMS C-550 aircraft, with Colombian, Peruvian and Ecuadorian Air Defence operators on board, were undertaken in an effort to achieve synergy in the interdiction of aircraft and vessels crossing the Wider Caribbean northbound. However, this effort fell far short of the surveillance and monitoring needs of that area.⁵³ During 2003, the U.S. loaned Colombia 3 Cessna Citation 560 aircraft, platforms to track illegal and drug trafficking aircraft. The areas of this aerial control included the borders with Brazil, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, and the Caribbean Sea. The Air Force managed to reduce illegal flights using Colombian airspace from 639 suspicious traces detected in 2003 to 6 in 2014,⁵⁴ from 2003 to 2013 there was a 96.8% reduction in illegal air movements.⁵⁵

Similarly, at the same time that illegal flights were reduced, the Air Force increased its effectiveness against the means used by drug traffickers. It went from immobilising 12 aircraft (2005) to 113 (2013) and from disabling 7 (2005) to 43 (2013) aircraft. Since 2007, the interdiction programme has been extended to maritime means, increasing security in the country's oceans in partnership with the National Navy. Air and maritime interdiction against drug trafficking reduced the financial and smuggling flows of illegal groups in Colombia, (although these are also financed by illegal mining). The decisive role of the Air Force in controlling Colombia's airspace contributed to the shift of drug trafficking flows to other countries in the region. For this reason, the Air Force assumed the establishment of agreements and interdiction procedures with countries such as: the United States, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Paraguay, as well as reinforced interdiction in the Caribbean Sea.⁵⁶

Despite joint efforts in the fight against drug trafficking, it cannot be ignored that, according to a 2023 report⁵⁷ published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), global cocaine production has skyrocketed dramatically. Strong growth in supply has been accompanied by a similar increase in demand, and many regions have seen a steady rise in cocaine users over the past decade. The cocaine market remains fairly concentrated in the Americas. The demobilisation of FARC fighters, who until then controlled many of the country's coca-growing regions, opened the way for other local actors or even foreign groups from Mexico and Europe. Colombia continues to dominate trafficking routes to North America, where most of the cocaine is Colombian. However, routes to Europe have evolved. The dominant role of Colombia's ports as a departure

⁵² BARRIOS 2020: 102.

⁵³ BARRIOS 2020: 96.

⁵⁴ TRIANA 2019: 27–75.

⁵⁵ BARRIOS 2020: 102.

⁵⁶ TRIANA 2019: 65.

⁵⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC 2023: 12.

point appears to be diminishing, and traffickers increasingly transit their product through Central and other South American countries. Cocaine from Bolivia and Peru is increasingly transported via the Southern Cone route through Paraguay and the Paraná–Paraguay waterway. Criminal groups, often from Brazil, use planes to cross the border and then boats across the river to the Atlantic.

New possibilities: From classical security to Human Security and multi-tasking Army

In the Cold War period, at the height of the atomic age, international security was considered from the military agenda of the states. The end of the Cold War marked a time of transformation and change in the international system. The triumph of Western democratic ideas encouraged the rise of liberal values.⁵⁸ Thus, the classic doctrine of national security focused on the protection of the State has gradually given way to Human Security, an expression that considers that the individual should be the object of protection. The 1994, the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its second chapter, *New Dimensions of Human Security*, incorporated the need to broaden the notion of security into the academic debate and introduced the concept of Human Security. According to the UNDP, Human Security “is not a concern for weapons: it is a concern for human life and dignity [...] expressed in a child who does not die, a disease that does not spread, a job that is not eliminated, an ethnic tension that does not explode into violence, a dissident who is not silenced”.⁵⁹ This approach therefore includes aspects of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

The military forces, in the process of transformation towards the Army of the Future 2030,⁶⁰ incorporate principles of the expanded security approach in the *Damascus Doctrine*,⁶¹ without leaving behind the fundamental constitutional principle of ensuring the survival and sovereignty of the national State.⁶² Following the above, the idea of a multi-mission Army becomes important as a multi-purpose Force in charge of diversifying the response to threats not only to national security but also to human beings and communities. Hence the need to institutionalise non-lethal operations and support to civilian authorities whose purpose is people. This in order to save lives, improve the quality of life, protect property (public and private) and support the social recovery of the territory, always safeguarding the rights and guarantees of the civilian population. In other words, it is about guaranteeing humanitarian conditions, human rights, public order and security from broader aspects than the purely military factor.⁶³

⁵⁸ GONZÁLEZ–BETANCOURT 2018: 77.

⁵⁹ United Nations Development Programme – UNDP 1994: 25.

⁶⁰ Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2016.

⁶¹ ROJAS 2017: 95–119.

⁶² GONZÁLEZ–BETANCOURT 2018: 77.

⁶³ GONZÁLEZ–BETANCOURT 2018: 80.

The Policy on Security, Defence and Citizen Coexistence 2022–2026 (based on a human security approach) emphasises that it is necessary to demilitarise relations between civil society and the military in order to avoid excesses in the exercise of force.⁶⁴ In this respect, the actions of the military forces in extrajudicial executions (false positives) committed in the context of the armed conflict by members of the Colombian army who passed off civilians as members of guerrillas in order to show results, have been questioned by organisations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). In a ceremony convened in April 2022 by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional court that investigates the armed conflict, a group of retired officers acknowledged to the victims that they had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was the first time that former officers of the Armed Forces explicitly and in detail admitted to one of the most traumatic operations of the war in Colombia. One that, according to the JEP itself, left at least 6,402 civilians dead. The ghost of false positives returned to the centre of public debate just after an army operation in Putumayo department, in the south of the country, left 11 dead, including three civilians who were initially declared combatants.⁶⁵

The peace agreement reached in 2016 between the government and the FARC makes it possible to produce changes in the Colombian Armed Forces, making them fundamental to generate development and progress in the most remote and inhospitable areas of the country, where other state institutions have not been able to reach.⁶⁶ For example, Apiay is a military unit with an important potential to promote social and economic development in the Colombian Orinoquia, the region called to be the main agricultural pantry of the country. It is an area that generates hydrocarbons and sustainable demographic development.⁶⁷ It also highlights the articulation of the Colombian Air Force with the National System of Science, Technology and Innovation – *Colciencias* in the implementation of an open innovation model. This initiative seeks to reduce weaknesses and increase capacities, applying the concept of intelligent networks. The idea is to strengthen the articulation in high performance teams of the entities of the triad University–Enterprise–State, with the generation of new knowledge and obtaining R + D + I products with value creation, which could contribute directly to the construction of the national economic and social fabric.⁶⁸

On the other hand, the military participates in regional and international scenarios by offering training to foreign security forces to confront transnational crime (e.g. drug and arms trafficking). The effort to internationalise the Colombian military's expertise and to create links with the international community has also reached multilateral organisations.⁶⁹ In December 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accepted Colombia's request to establish a bilateral dialogue to sign a cooperation agreement for the exchange

⁶⁴ Ministry of National Defence – Mindefensa 2023: 13.

⁶⁵ PARDO 2022.

⁶⁶ DURÁN 2019: 248.

⁶⁷ DURÁN 2019: 249.

⁶⁸ PARADA 2019: 258.

⁶⁹ RIASCOS 2019: 275.

of information and the fight against organised crime.⁷⁰ Likewise, it opens the possibility for the Military Forces to participate in Peace Operations abroad.⁷¹

Conclusions and discussion

In this paper the transformations in the field of security that Colombia experienced have been analysed, especially in the 1990s and in the first years of the new century. Emphasis has been placed on the evolution of the Air Force as a military organisation to face the different threats and violence suffered by three generations of Colombians. One of the aspects addressed is the role played by this military entity in the culmination of the internal armed conflict, especially from the nineties of the last century to the present. In this sense, it was emphasised that the Armed Forces realised that the tactical and strategic advantage of air power could be key to produce an asymmetry that would allow them to win battles.

In fact, air power was configured as a military tool for the State in its struggle to recover the legitimate monopoly of violence and change the balance of the internal conflict, helping the military defeat of the FARC. This factor prompted a political settlement in the Havana negotiations (2012–2016), avoiding another frustration like that of the Distension Zones during the Pastrana Administration. All this was possible thanks to doctrinal changes that boosted a more effective planning and execution of operations, supported by a more offensive and mobile concept; as well as by the improvement of intelligence, technology, communications and better command and control structures. Another area in which the Air Force has been important is the fight against drug trafficking. To this end, the integration of different units not only within the Colombian Air Force but also within the country and involving the air forces of other countries has been key factors.

Three administrations have integrated civilian and military efforts to address security issues. However, future short- and medium-term strategies should place more emphasis on social and economic development. While military efforts are essential to provide the security environment and support the rule of law and governance, current challenges involving aspects of security that go beyond the military require innovation in other non-arms domains to sustain long-term social projects. In this sense, the Colombian Armed Forces have the multiple challenges of combating organised crime while supporting isolated communities. In other words, it is called upon to protect natural resources, build infrastructure, decontaminate territories from landmines, and provide humanitarian support in case of natural disasters. This call shows the importance of the doctrinal articulation of international approaches, such as Human Security, the protection of human rights and freedoms in all areas of security.

⁷⁰ OTAN 2021.

⁷¹ SAUMETH 2016.

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