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Dear Readers,
Dear Fellow Scholars,

I welcome everyone to the publication of the fourth issue of the second year of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). This occasion is also a kind of reckoning for the paper, as it closes its second year of operation. In the past period, 70 scientific articles and 25 book reviews by 110 authors were published in our journal, which is gaining more and more attention not only in the Central and Eastern European region, but also internationally. This can be seen from the increasing number of articles we receive, the best of which we publish in the paper.

The current issue contains several articles of interest to our readers. The first study describes intercultural conflicts in Nigeria and makes recommendations for their management and control. The second one also deals with a Nigerian topic, namely the investigation of religious and sociocultural relations among the Yoruba people of South-West Nigeria. The next study examines the relationship between sport and communication through the example of the Somali National Bandy Team. In connection with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the fourth study examines how the press shapes people's opinions and pits African and Ukrainian migrants against each other. The next one is also related to migration, which examines the relationship between the African continent and migration from different aspects. The sixth study analyses the conflicts in Eastern Congo and their causes from a quite broad perspective. The seventh examines the relationship between the COVID-19 outbreak and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. The following study is also related to the COVID-19 epidemic, as it presents the activities of peacekeepers from Bosnia and Herzegovina serving on the African continent in relation to the epidemic. The ninth deals with human trafficking in the sub-Saharan region and the tools that can be used against it (Application of Resilience-based Approach). The last study deals with the impact and consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Africa as well as how the opposing parties are trying to bring the countries of the continent to their side. After the studies, there are four reviews, two of which deal with the North African region (the Western Sahara peace operation and Algeria), while the other two deal with the past colonisation of the African continent and its consequences that continue to this day.

We hope that all of our readers will find the study that suits their interest, just like in our previous issues.

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An Exigent Tool to Curb Intercultural Conflicts in Nigeria¹

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Abstract:

Communication is crucial to societal development and relationship building. In every developed country of the world, communication between the people is deemed a priority. However, effective communication in homogeneous states is easier compared to cultural diverse states. Nigeria is an African country famous for its fascinating cultural diversity, and has over 250 ethnic groups. However, this cultural diversity has led to unhealthy competition among the groups for superiority. The stereotypes created by the Nigerians about each other remains a major impediment to effective intercultural communication. The absence of mechanisms to control ethnocentrism reveals the low level of the Nigerian government's dedication towards nation building. Corruption and insecurity have fuelled over the past couple of years due to increase in intercultural conflicts. Communication should be substituted for violence in instances of rising tribal tensions. This study investigated the history of intercultural conflicts in Nigeria and its relationship with intercultural miscommunication. The research findings depict that Nigeria has a very weak foundation for inter-ethnic and interreligious co-existence. Nigeria must rebuild its foundation to ensure peaceful co-existence among the ethnic groups and religions in the country, and to facilitate development and security.

Keywords:

Intercultural communication; intertribal conflict; Nigeria; development; security.

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Introduction

Communication is an inevitable aspect of social relations. Communication is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “a process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or behavior” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022). Communication takes various forms, it can be expressive (verbal communication) or by conduct or implication (non-verbal and visual communication respectively). Communication defines relationships and interactions between humans. It enables humans co-exist and share a common goal. The primary purpose of communication is to express oneself and to gain knowledge. Communication is crucial for the effective development of the society. He further asserts that the absence of communication will lead to lack of understanding which can evolve to conflict and tensions. Where there is tension in communication, it can hinder peace and development. Dauda and Pate (2015) summarise the major causes of peacelessness into – poor understanding of individual and collective self-identities by the citizens, degeneration of individual and group values, poor/inadequate understanding and low respect for the human rights of citizens by individuals and the government *inter alia*. It can be deduced from his summary that communication is exigent in peace maintenance. This is so because there can be no understanding without communication. Communication is an important factor in conflict resolution, therefore, peaceful co-existence is not practicable in the absence of communication. It should be noted that intercultural communication cannot exist where there is ethnic tension or cultural discrimination.

In Africa generally, most countries that are or were categorized as underdeveloped are infested with ethnic and cultural conflicts. Excluding racial segregation which Africa faced during colonialism, another disaster has grown within Africa, and this disaster which is called “tribalism” has spread across Africa. Hoieb further states that tribalism is a major stumbling block that hinders development, and due to its abstract nature, it is cumbersome to address tribalism directly or dissolve it speedily. For instance, in Rwanda, the ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups escalated to a genocide that led to the death of over 800,000 persons (Britannica, 2020). Nevertheless, Rwanda has risen to be among the league of economically and politically stable countries in Africa, and it can be said that Rwanda’s new feat could have never been actualised if the people and the government did not make efforts to create stable and positive intercultural communications. In South Sudan, the Dinka and Nuer tribes are also at loggerheads which has led to the death of many from both tribes.

Nigeria is a home to hundreds of cultural groups and languages. As a matter of fact, Nigeria has been estimated to have over 250 ethnic groups. Intercultural communication which involves the communication of persons from different cultural groups is inevitable in Nigeria because the people of these multiple cultural groups have migrated to several areas in Nigeria and must communicate with the people in those areas. Prior to the coming of the colonial masters into Nigeria, the tribes and ethnic groups in Nigeria existed as different entities. Upon the arrival of the British colonial masters into Nigeria, the North and the South were

amalgamated to form one country called “Nigeria” – a name that was coined by Flora Shaw, the mistress of the then Colonial administrator of Nigeria; Sir Frederick Lugard.

Nigeria ceased to be a British colony on 1st October, 1960 and went further to become a Republic in 1963. However, upon independence, the flaws in the relationship between the cultures and tribes in Nigeria were brought to limelight. The tribal tensions and intolerance led to the abrupt end of the first republic. The first military revolution which was pioneered by three young soldiers named; Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and Major Adewale Ademoyega to bring an end to corruption in the government turned around to be the emergence of tribal conflict in Nigeria. The aftermath of the bloody coup still lingers in Nigeria and has left wounds that are almost impossible to heal.

Furthermore, the role of communication in conflict resolution and peace building cannot be undermined. As a matter of fact, in the forms of conflict resolution, communication is the centrepiece. In arbitration, negotiation and mediation, communication is used by both the aggrieved parties and the third party to reach a consensus

Intercultural Communication

The concept of intercultural communication is very broad. Literally, it simply entails communication between persons of different cultural backgrounds. Intercultural communication goes beyond mere language communication and extends to cultural origin and beliefs. Culture forms an integral part of a human and influences such person’s reactions and behavior. Intercultural communication is essential in societies of multi-cultural groups to help avoid conflict and misunderstandings. However, the greatest adversary of intercultural communication is “ethnocentrism”. Ethnocentrism entails glorifying one’s culture over another or judging other cultures through the scope of one’s culture. Ethnocentrism creates stereotypes that can destroy the image of other cultures. It involves the sentiment of superiority and inferiority. Once ethnocentrism creeps into a peaceful society, it is capable of bringing such society down to nothing. Nigeria is consistently facing ethnocentrism in religion, politics, and employment. Boris Bizumic (2018) avers that ethnocentrism is capable of causing genocide, ethnic cleansing, dehumanization, segregation, delegitimation, discrimination, ethnic wars and exclusion. Ethnocentrism has negative consequences when persons are highly ethnocentric. For instance, Adolph Hitler felt that the Jews were inferior to the Nazis and decided to wipe them off.

History of Intercultural Conflicts in Nigeria

As the world evolves, migration becomes inevitable. People from different cultural backgrounds move and settle in other places and must communicate. As migration from Nigeria becomes rampant, intercultural communication becomes fundamental to the



sustenance of these Nigerians abroad. In order to understand the exigence of intercultural communication in Nigeria, it is expedient to analyse the root of ethnic conflicts and cause of ethnic miscommunication in Nigeria.

Nigeria was seemingly a peaceful habitat where the people of different tribes and languages co-existed in harmony. However, in 1966, the peaceful co-existence came to an end. Prior to 1966, Nigeria was facing several political and ethnic crises, but they were basically intra-ethnic crises. For instance, the Western region election crisis of 1965 exposed the political rottenness and corruption in the Western Nigeria Region. Chief S.L. Akintola had a clash with the very famous Chief Sir Obafemi Awolowo in 1962, which led to the departure of the former from the Action Group political party. Akintola was appointed Premier by the Action Group leadership in 1959, and was reinstated by the then Prime Minister; Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa as the Premier of Western Region after the Declaration of State of Emergency. The 1965 election was due and Akintola desired to remain in power. Two radio stations; the National Broadcasting Corporation, which was controlled by the Federal Government and the Daily Sketch which was controlled by Akintola's party (NNDP) declared Akintola winner of the election, while the NCNC's West African Pilot and the UPGA-controlled radio station declared the UPGA winner. Finally, Akintola was generally declared winner and UPGA's Adegbenro was arrested alongside nine others and charged with 'illegally forming an executive council and false assumption of office' (Ojo, 2012).

Ethnic intolerance can be likened to a large stone surrounding Nigeria's neck, which makes it impossible for the nation to advance. Ethnic intolerance in Nigeria is impossible to eliminate without effective and deep communication between the people of the different ethnic groups. The daily struggle in Nigeria is either one ethnic group is trying to overshadow the others or one ethnic group has been purposely left out. This intolerance has been identified by the historical fathers of the nation. They have seen the incompatibility amongst the people. Chief Obafemi Awolowo lamented:

Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundary of Nigeria and those who do not (Nnamdi, 2020).

Writers and historians posit that Nigeria is ridden with conflict because it is a mistake *ab initio*. They claim that Nigeria should have not been amalgamated. It is easier to tackle cultural and ethnic differences only in the South and only in the North than to do so altogether. This is so because the people of Northern Nigeria are not entirely distinct from each other and share certain cultural values and even religion, while the people from the South are more alike. However, this does not imply that there is no tension in the South or North independently, it simply implies that the conflict in these regions are easier to handle than when they are merged. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who served as Nigeria's first Prime minister before his assassination in 1966, did not see Nigeria's existence as realistic. He

identified cultural and religious difference as the basic cause of disunity in the nation. According him:

Since 1914, the British has been trying to make into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religion beliefs and customs and do not show any sign of willingness to unite...Nigeria's unity is only a British intention for the country (Nnamdi, 2020).

This ethnic distrust delayed Nigeria's independence. Upon independence, it was required that the colonial masters would hand over power and government to the indigeneous people. However, the minority tribes and cultural groups in Nigeria feared that power would be handed over to the major cultural groups and they would be left out. Their fear was based on the political system in Nigeria at that period. Prior to independence, there were three major political parties that were capable of winning the 1959 election – they were; Northern Peoples Congress which was dominated by Northerners (Hausa-Fulani), the Action Group, which was dominated by the Westerners (Yoruba) and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens which was dominated by the Easterners (Igbo). This implied that they had no representation in politics and could be overlooked. The Northern minorities since the inception of Nigeria have protested against being domineered by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Okorie (2003) explains the constant rift between the Northern minorities and popular cultural groups below:

The minorities in the North as a matter of truth want to be identified as a separate entity whose contribution to the Nigerian State should be applauded. They are tired of the Hausa-Fulani dominance and the gradual phasing out of their socio-cultural trademarks. They are ready for the Nigerian unity and marriage if they become major stakeholders in the policy formulation and resource sharing of this country (:23)

The South-South minorities on the other hand are aggrieved that although they produce the bulk of natural resources (crude oil) in Nigeria, their region is still the most underdeveloped area in the country. Their protests which began all the way from Ken Saro Wiwa's lifetime has not ceased. Ken Saro Wiwa was a human rights activist who fought for the rights of Southern minorities in Nigeria. However, he was convicted and sentenced to death during the General Sani Abacha military regime. His death led to an outcry from international organisations and Nigeria was penalized. The disregard of the Southern minorities by the federal government regardless of their great contribution to Nigeria's economy led to illegal oil mining. The Southern minorities were left devastated by the state of their land and water after oil mining. The villages and communities which were affected were rarely compensated. The cases brought before courts and international tribunals lingered for such a long time that even the aggrieved persons died. Even when the cases were judged, the victims were rarely awarded damages. All these factors led to a rise in insecurity in the South-South. The people were in constant battle with the military and soon formed rebel groups which caused tension in the entire as country as the South is a home to Nigeria's wealth. They were granted amnesty during President Musa Yar'Adua's government. However, this has not brought an end to the bickering of the Southern minorities as they are still neglected.



The major ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are between the three major ethnic groups; Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani. It is literally taken that the Hausa and Igbo cultural groups are at the different ends of a rope while the Yoruba people dwindle on the rope. The major outbreak of ethnic conflict can be traced to the January 15, 1966 coup. As earlier stated, these three major ethnic groups in Nigeria had their political parties that were the major political parties then. This therefore led to unhealthy competition to be the ruling party among the tribes. Jordan (1978) in Nnamdi (2020) asserts that initially, the NCNC which was formerly the National Council of Nigerians and the Cameroons was a nationalist party that comprised of over forty cultural and social organisations, tribal and trade unions. However, because of its popularity and dominance, the Action Group and the Northern Peoples' Congress were formed to oust the NCNC from dominating their regions. The AG and NPC both emerged from tribal/ethnic groups. Since the AG became a Yoruba party and the NPC, an Hausa-Fulani party, the NCNC had no choice but to claim its leader's (Nnamdi Azikiwe) ethnic group (Igbo). However, the NCNC accommodated other ethnic minorities from the East, but it was majorly funded by Igbo personalities.

The result of the 1962 census heightened tribal tensions. The regions headed the major political parties; Northern region (NPC), Western region (AG), and Eastern region (NCNC), therefore, crisis at that period were deemed "regional" rather than tribal. It is noteworthy however that Nigeria was categorized into two geographical regions – Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, the latter of which the East and the West belong to. The 1962 census portrayed the Northern population to be twice the population of the South. The result was heavily criticized by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who argued that the South had more economic and social activities and could not be as scarcely populated as the census result had depicted. The Prime Minister; Alhaji Tafawa Balewa ordered for verification of the census result which was immediately verified. Nevertheless, the new result post-verification was not significantly different as the North was still far ahead of the South in population. The significance of the result was that the North would have half the seats in the Parliament and the South would be left with the other half. Southern and Northern regions blamed themselves for altering the census result and there were tensions between the public servants and political office holders of the both regions. Siollun (2009) elucidates that this rift between these two regions was as a result of fear. The South feared that the North would suppress and oppress them because of their large number, and the North feared that the South would submerge them because of their academic exposure. The central-point is that no region was willing to be subordinate to the other, and there was great inability to create a balance or equality amongst themselves.

Furthermore, these tensions lingered up till the 1965 general elections. As a matter of fact, the coalition the NCNC and NPC formed in 1959 was already torn apart. The NCNC then formed alliance with the AG to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) and the Nigerian National Democratic Party – NNDP (Nigeria's first political party formed by Herbert Macaulay) stayed with the NPC to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The separate ethnic parties had dissolved and merged, but they were desperate to win at all costs. The election was

heavily rigged by the almost all the parties involved, but the NNDP's rigging was extremely outrageous. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who was the outgoing President-General of Nigeria was overwhelmed by the fragility of the Nigerian republic and stated thus: "...if they decided to destroy our national unity...it is better for us and our many admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces" (Siollun, 2009:18).

Realizing that the civilian government could not curb the national outrage, some soldiers of the Nigerian Army decided to intervene. This intervention brought an end to the First Republic in bloodshed. Prior to the military intervention, the political strife was not basically hinged on ethnicity, but the military intervention itself was perceived to be ethnically motivated. Falola et al (1991) however argues that the military intervention was also triggered by ethnic tensions. He further stated that:

The government in the first republic could not solve it (ethnic rivalries). Each region was governed by a political party which represented a majority ethnic group. Each region also sent representatives to the Parliament. There were problems with this. First, the political party governed each region as if it was an autonomous country. This threatened the idea of a single nation. Secondly, regionalism encouraged rivalry. There was competition for the control of Parliament and Executive (:109).

Kaduna Nzeogwu, a primary executor of the January 1966 coup explained in his first broadcast after his takeover that the coup was triggered by corruption, tribalists and nepotists. As a matter of fact, Alexander Madiebo, an Igbo military officer in the North at that period corroborates Nzeogwu's claim where he gives a personal account of his meeting with Nzeogwu immediately after the coup. He explains that when he met Nzeogwu, Nzeogwu was bandaged and was escorted by Northern soldiers. He claims that Nzeogwu confided in him and explained how much he regretted using forceful means to eradicate corrupt leaders in Nigeria. Nzeogwu further explained to Madiebo that such would not have been necessary if Nigeria was capable of a free and fair election. He specifically stated that the goal of the coup was "to get rid of the corrupt and incorrigible politicians and have them replaced with true nationalists." (Madiebo, 1980:19). The primary officers in the execution of the January 1966 coup were; Major Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Major Adewale Ademoyega, Major Timothy Onwuatiegwu, Major Christian Anuforo, Major Donatus Okafor, Major Humphrey Iwuchukwu Chukwuka, and Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi. Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna was the initiator of the coup, and his plan was to make Chief Obafemi Awolowo President because he was the greatest opposition of the corrupt government. Ifeajuna made plans to fly from Lagos to Calabar to release him from prison in Calabar, but "if at the end he (Awolowo) refused, he was to be held and decrees were to be issued in his name" (Ezeani, 2013:28).

The heat of the coup was felt primarily in Ibadan (Western region), Lagos (Federal capital and Western region), and Kaduna (Northern region). Some of the soldiers (Northerners) involved were unaware of the plot until they got to the bush where Kaduna Nzeogwu relayed the details and gave them a chance to leave, but they stayed put. Nzeogwu headed to the



Sarduana of Sokoto's (Ahmadu Bello) residence – he instructed everyone in the house to come out and sit on the floor. Gidado Idris, the personal secretary to Ahmadu Bello explained in an interview he granted on his 80th birthday, that Nzeogwu had a hard time in recognizing Bello. A servant in the house indicated that he was Ahmadu Bello, but the soldiers refuted (Chima, 2017). They threatened to shoot everyone, but Bello stood up and identified himself as “the one they were looking for”. He was immediately shot dead by Kaduna Nzeogwu alongside his first wife who refused to leave his side. Other top political office holders like Remi Fani-Kayode and Sir Kashim Ibrahim were arrested.

In the Western Region, Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi killed S.L. Akintola who refused to surrender and began an open fire. Some accounts of the coup argue that Akintola would have survived had he surrendered. However, if the soldiers wanted him dead, they would not do so without torture. Major Ifeajuna who is deemed the most ruthless executed the coup in Lagos (the then Federal Capital). He headed for the Prime Minister's house where he was killed alongside Brigadier Maimalari. Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister was violently arrested by the soldiers. In general, a coup was planned in all the regions but failed totally in the Eastern region, and no Igbo soldier nor political office holder was killed except one Igbo soldier (Lt-Colonel Arthur Unegbu) who held the key to the ammunition room. Months after the coup, ethnic tensions heightened and Nigeria became lawless and a home of bloodshed.

The Igbo tribe was accused of attempting to takeover Nigeria. The prominent Nigerians killed in the January 1966 coup include:

Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa	Prime Minister
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello	Sarduana of Sokoto
Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun	Commander, 1 Brigade- Kaduna
Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari	Commander, 2 Brigade- Lagos
Colonel Ralph Shodeinde	Deputy-Commandant, Nigeria Defense Academy and Commandant, Nigerian Military Training College- Kaduna
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh	Finance Minister
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola	Premier of Western Region
Hafsatu Bello	A wife to Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello
Mrs. Latifat Ademulegu	Wife to Brigadier Ademulegun
Colonel Kur Mohammed	Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters
Lt-Colonel Abogo Largema	
Lt-Colonel Arthur Unegbu	

The Northerners analysed the list and were outraged that there was only one Igbo casualty and Azikiwe, alongside Michael Okpara, the Premier of Eastern Region who should have ordinarily been overthrown escaped the coup. Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was the General Officer Commanding in the East escaped assassination thrice,

The January 1966 coup was however followed by a counter-coup which was staged by both core Northern Nigerian soldiers and soldiers from the Middle-Belt. It was a retaliation for what

they deemed an “Igbo coup”. The July 1966 counter-coup resulted to the death of Aguiyi-Ironsi who was the Head of State, and other Igbo Military officers. However, the counter-coup extended beyond the Military zone and civilians were involved. Igbo civilians in the North were haunted and killed, and their shops, houses and churches were razed down. This led to a mass exodus of Igbo people from the North to the East. Yakubu Gowon was made Head of State and there was bitterness in the Army because Gowon was not the most senior Military officer. Odumegwu Ojukwu, an Igbo Military officer and Military Governor of the East, believed he was senior to Gowon and refused to submit to him. The Igbo people counted their loss and yearned for secession. Prior to the move for secession by the Easterners, Ojukwu and Gowon travelled to Aburi, Ghana to reach a peaceful consensus between the two tribes. The consensus which is known as the “Aburi Accord” was agreed by the both parties, and was believed to stabilize the tension between the Easterners and Northerners. However, Gowon failed in his own part of the accord, and Ojukwu gave in to the demand for secession. Gowon was not willing to watch Nigeria fall apart, so he began a battle with the secessionist Easterners called “Biafra” to reunite them with Nigeria. After a 30-month long war, Biafra surrendered and became a Nigerian territory yet again. Gowon initiated programmes to help the two tribes co-exist, but the hatred, distrust, anger and vengeance remains deep rooted within the tribes till date.

The period of 1965-1970 marked Nigeria’s landmark tribal tension moments which is unfortunately Nigeria’s post-independence foundation. There have been other inter-tribal feuds in Nigeria after the civil war, but not as pronounced and severe as the civil war. The tribal battle in Nigeria is beyond Hausa-Igbo feud, it extends to other tribes in all states in Nigeria.

Factors that Heighten Intercultural Conflicts in Nigeria

Intercultural feuds in Nigeria are triggered by several factors. Some of these factors are:

Farmer-herder struggle for land: Nigeria has a vast land mass of 923,770 km² (356,669 mi²). Nevertheless, there are hundreds of ethnic groups which share the land. Land struggle has led to both intra-ethnic conflict and inter-ethnic conflict. Land struggle usually happens along state boundaries and communal boundaries. However, the land struggle between the Fulani ethnic group and several regions in Nigeria has surpassed other land struggles in Nigeria. The Fulani ethnic group consists of herdsmen who are nomads. Their lifestyle birthed bloodshed in the Middle-Belt of Nigeria. However, in 2019, they began to advance downwards towards the South, East and West and it became a national crisis. Before their widespread popularity, their feuds in the Middle-Belt had already resulted to 10,000 casualties and over 100,000 displaced children (Borgen magazine, 2019). As stated by Borgen Magazine, the farmer-herder crisis in 2018 was reportedly six times deadlier than all of Boko Haram’s activity. The farmers are outraged that the herders allow their cattle consume their farm produce. However, the



herders are insistent on feeding their cattle. The tension is deadlier because the farmers in the Middle-Belt are majorly Christians, and the herders are Muslims.

Initially, the herders were only armed with machetes and cutlasses and were more violent in nature, nevertheless, when the farmers realized there was little help coming from the government, they formed vigilante groups which they armed with all manner of available weapons for their defence. Benue State was ravaged with this tension for several years. The Tiv and Fulani ethnic groups in Benue State are major parties in this feud. However, it extended to Taraba State, and they also adopted self-defence by creating some vigilante groups. The Police rarely intervenes in these conflicts, and when they do, the culprits are rarely prosecuted. The vigilante groups formed by the farmers have become the Police of the Middle-Belt. The farmers are unwilling to designate a part of their land to the Fulani freelance herders and upon the passing of anti-grazing laws, the violence has only exacerbated.

As a result of climate change, the Fulani herdsmen advanced southwards. Their former standpoint in the middle-Belt was declining, and the rainforest in the South became their destination. However, the strife for arable land in states like Benue, Plateau and Taraba among other has not ceased. In a 2018 attack in Plateau, farmers allegedly killed five herdsmen for trespassing on their farms and in retaliation, the herdsmen killed 86 and injured hundreds (World Report, 2019). Furthermore, the migration of Fulani herdsmen to the Southern part of Nigeria caused great enmity between the South and the herdsmen.

In Eastern Nigeria (Igboland), an outcry from Chief Emeka Diwe, the President of the Association of South East Town Unions (ASETU) enlightened the nation of the bloodshed committed by the Fulani herdsmen in the East. He explained that the feud had extended from a mere herder-farmer crisis to direct attacks on the community. He lamented that women were being raped and properties and houses were being destroyed. He complained of the reluctance of the government to come to the aid of the people. According to him:

Our people have died enough. We cried out when Ozuitem community in Bende area of Abia State was invaded and attacked by the herdsmen and nobody did anything. People were slaughtered and property destroyed. A month later, another community in the same Abia State, Ndi Okereke Abam in Arochukwu council, was equally attacked by the herdsmen. Nothing was done (Okoli et al, 2020).

In 2020, community chiefs also stated that they had received series of herdsmen complaints from the residents. The herdsmen freely savaged the crops of the farmers. In order to reach a consensus between the Igbo communities and the Fulani herdsmen, suggestions were made to create ranches in Local Governments, but such suggestion received heavy backlash. Land is the greatest treasure in Igboland, and since the ethnic group has a smaller land mass, such suggestion was not feasible. Furthermore, because of the dominating and aggressive nature of the Fulani herdsmen, the Igbo people feared that they would be overpowered. The clash between the Igbo farmers and herdsmen have extended to all the five states of the South Eastern region of Nigeria. As a matter of fact, in Awka North local

government of Anambra State, it was lamented by the people of ten communities that the destruction of their farmlands by the herdsmen has become a daily occurrence. In Ebonyi State, a committee was set up to ensure peace between the herdsmen and the farmers. A policy has been established in the State – if a farmer kills any cow belonging to a herder, such farmer would pay; and if a herder destroys the crops of any member of the committee, such herder would pay.

Yorubaland is not left out from this farmer-herder feud. As a matter of fact, there is hardly any region in Nigeria that is excluded from the farmer-herder crisis. The attack of a Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State, by alleged herdsmen is another reminder that this crisis has infiltrated every nook and cranny of Nigeria. Lives have been lost, alongside properties, crops and houses, and the intercultural hatred has continued to grow exceedingly.

Religion: Nigeria has three major religions; Christianity, Islam and traditional religion – of the three religions, Christianity and Islam are the most popular. Nigeria identifies as a secular state which respects diverse religious beliefs, however, this is far from reality. Religion since independence has been a major facilitator of conflict in Nigeria. The North has a vast majority of Muslims while the South has a greater population of Christians. Therefore, the major religious/ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are between Christians and Muslims. Religious violence are always triggered by fear of domination. For instance, the Kano riots of 1953 was triggered by the disagreement between the Southern and Northern delegates in Lagos. Anthony Enahoro from Southern Nigeria proposed independence, but the Northern delegates declined because they feared that since the Southerners were more educated and exposed than they were, they would dominate them. The Northern delegates were jeered out of the House of Parliament in Lagos. When they returned to the North, the people of Kano retaliated with protests and rioting. They targeted Southerners in the North and destroyed houses and properties. It can be contended that this riot is an ethnic riot and is void of religious sentiments, but it is very impossible to detach ethnic issues from religious issues in the North since their culture is governed by their religion.

Another landmark religious conflict in Nigeria is the 1966 Araba riots in Northern Nigeria. The riot was a retaliation to the January 1966 assassination of Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa and Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello who were both prominent religious and political figures in the North. They believed it was a coup executed to oust Northerners and to enforce Igbo dominance, hence they retaliated by killing Igbo people in the North. This riot spread to other prominent cities in the North like Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Kaduna and Zaria. The loss of lives and properties as a result of the riot so rampant that Madiebo (1980) argued that there was hardly any Igbo family in Nigeria who was not a victim or did not have a relative as a victim. As a matter of fact, the Araba riot till date remains the most outrageous ethnic/religion-triggered riot in Nigeria. The most vulnerable states to religious riots and tensions are states with equal or nearly equal population of both Christians and Muslims – states like Kaduna, Plateau, and Taraba among others.



Migration and Settlement: the Igbo ethnic group are the most mobile ethnic group in Nigeria. They are naturally business people and are in all states of Nigeria. The Igbo people have had major clashes with Northerners who believe that the Igbo people are in their land to dominate them. In an interview delivered by late Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (the then Sardauna of Sokoto) in 1964, he pointed out the dominating personality of the Igbo people. Their dominance spread in politics, and the Military particularly. According to him:

Well, the Igbo are more or less the type of people whose desire is mainly to dominate everybody. If you put them in a labour camp as a labourer, they will try to emerge as headman of that camp and so on.

His statement has been deemed a hate speech against the Igbo tribe which instigated and triggered the 1966 riots and 1967 civil war. This statement was made almost six decades ago, but it still subsists. The Igbo people returned to their homeland in the East during the civil war, but after the war, they began migrating to several parts of the nation in search of greener pastures. The Igbo people travelled in numbers to Lagos where they settled and began expanding. The Yoruba people who claim to be owners of the land do not find it comfortable that they are being dominated by the Igbo people in the business sector, in their own land. This has caused series of tensions, riots and large scale conflicts which has led to death and loss of properties. There are still recent small scale riots in the North concerning Igbo dominance. The Igbo people have countered the claim that they intend to dominate other ethnic groups, but the Hausa and Yoruba people who are indigenes of the lands the Igbo people migrate to are adamant and want the Igbo people to be sent back to their own lands. This ethnic intolerance has subsisted even prior to Nigeria's independence. The Igbo people are fond of migrating to famous and populous cities where they settle and expand – as a matter of fact, Lagos has become the bus stop of over hundreds of thousands of Igbo people. Nevertheless, despite the market ownership crisis among the Igbo and Yoruba people in Lagos, Lagos remains more receptive than Northern cities. Migration by other tribes and is still rampant in Nigeria, but the Igbo tribe is more popular for migration and settlement.

Struggle for Political Position: There is deep distrust among the ethnic groups in Nigeria. There is unwillingness to be under any person from a different ethnic group. Nigeria, unlike in its first post-independence years, has shifted from ethnic-triggered political parties. There are different political parties in Nigeria, and a majority of them do not identify with tribal roots. The major concern of Nigerians during presidential elections is “which tribe will the next president be from?” This has caused Nigerians to focus more on tribal relations than personality. As a matter of fact, Nigeria's destitute state can be traced to the desperation to have a tribesman preside over Nigeria rather than a sound and dignified personality. Usually, during elections, candidates use tribal and religious connections as a strength or to attack other candidates. For instance, Peter Obi, the Labour Party's presidential candidate has been accused of links with the secessionist group in the South East to deprive him of Northern votes because Northerners are desperate for “One Nigeria”.

The reluctance to identify the flaws of a president because of his ethnic ties is a scourge in Nigeria. In an interview conducted by one Richard Chilee during President Goodluck Jonathan's regime, a Rivers State resident when asked about Jonathan's administration, confessed that he was not satisfied, but wouldn't complain. It can be deduced that his refusal to complain is hinged on the fact that he belonged to same ethnic/regional ties as Jonathan (Chilee, 2013). This is a present problem in Nigeria. The feeling of loyalty to one's tribesman supersedes the desire for national development. Therefore, where the people ought to come together to protest against a problem for the betterment of the nation, persons belonging to the same tribe as the president withdraw. When a man belonging to a particular tribe becomes president, his people believe that he will grant them juicy positions and will grant them all their requests. A nation with multi-cultural groups can only survive when the people see themselves first as a member of such nation before being a member of their cultural groups. When the loyalty of a Nigerian is first to his tribe, he can destroy the nation to enrich his tribe.

Miscommunication: The major problem with Nigeria is exaggeration of events and intertwining facts sentiments with. When issues occur in Nigeria, people swiftly ascribe it to religious or ethnic sentiments. The inability of Nigerians to hold conversations devoid of ethnic or religious sentiment is a lingering problem. To understand Nigeria's miscommunication problem, it is important to understand how average Nigerians communicate. Normally, Nigerians see themselves firstly through the scope of their ethnicity or religion before their nation. The sense of brotherhood which Nigeria yearns for, cannot be achieved when there is no common goal. The loyalty of every Nigerian should be firstly to his/her nation before any other factor. Unfortunately, it is otherwise in Nigeria. Nigerians communicate from through the scope of their cultural beliefs and norms regardless of who the listener or recipient of such information is. The unwillingness on the path of Nigerians to appreciate the differences in tribe and religion makes communication even more difficult. Where every Nigerian believes that his tribe or religion is better than the other, a supposed co-existence becomes a race for power. The goal is not to make a tribe superior to others, but to enable Nigerians appreciate and understand the tribal and cultural differences. In Singapore for instance, there are three major ethnic/cultural groups; Malays, Indians and Chinese. These three major groups alongside other minorities have been able to live peacefully because the Singaporean government ensures that tribal/religious education of these groups are taught to the people – this primarily enables Singaporean citizens to understand the cultural/religious relations of other tribes. Ethnic/religious tolerance in Nigeria will remain fictitious until the citizens of the country are educated on the principles, communication skills, and views of the different cultures in Nigeria. The basic question is – how do you tolerate what you don't understand? Tolerance is dependent on understanding and knowledge – knowing a fact and understanding its nature makes tolerance a reality. Where this foundation has been laid, good communication becomes feasible – persons from different tribes can understand why someone from another tribe acted the way he/she did, and would know the perfect way to react.



Effects of Intercultural Conflicts on Nigeria's Development

The consequences of inter-cultural/tribal feuds on Nigeria's development cannot be overemphasized. It has permeated the education sector, labour sector, religious sector, business sector and even leadership sector.

Unqualified personnels: as earlier stated in this work, there is a struggle to have one's tribesman in power in Nigeria. The purpose is to get appointments and political offers. However, the problem emanating from this act is deeper than it seems. When persons from a tribe team up to ensure their tribesman becomes president, his qualification, passion, zeal or experience may not be considered, only their selfish desires. Peradventure their tribesman wins, he appoints them into high and delicate positions which they might not have the expertise to run and where there is no initiative mind in these positions, the economy could be crippled. In the state government level, it is an obvious and common practice that state governors usually award their election supporters with juicy positions as an appreciation. The primary problem is not the purpose for appointment, rather, the personality and expertise of the person holding the position.

For effective public administration and national development, persons in offices like commissioners, ministers, directors, judicial offices and executive offices among others, must be qualified for the job. Where the most qualified person is overlooked for tribal reasons, it is a disservice to the nation. It is noteworthy that Nigeria does not revolve around one particular tribe or a ruling party – it is a nation that embodies hundreds of ethnic groups and must serve all equally to maintain peace.

Insecurity: Besides corruption, insecurity is the biggest problem Nigeria is currently facing. Undoubtedly, other factors like unemployment, have triggered insecurity in the last couple of years, but inter-ethnic/inter-religious conflicts takes a stronghold on it. In Kaduna, there is an unending tension between Southern Kaduna and Northern Kaduna, and it has caused severe insecurity in Kaduna State and its environs. Insecurity is basically born out of the use of violence in the face of conflict. Where negotiation is adopted instead of violence, peace can be actualized.

The role of Agents of Socialization in Fueling Intercultural Conflicts

Family: The family is believed to be the “porter” of the child. The parents, siblings and relatives of a child, depending on the closeness shape the thoughts, character and beliefs of a child. Where a family talks bad about a particular tribe, such child is ordinarily supposed to grow to hate that tribe. Nigerian families are fond of castigating other tribes in the presence of their children, and some strictly ensure their children are never surrounded by persons of different tribes or religions. Unfortunately, the child might never reach the point where he/she realizes that those values inculcated in him/her are false or biased.

Religion: Nigeria is officially a secular nation, but very religious. Nigerians are easily triggered by religious sentiments, most times, faster than tribal sentiments. Religious teachers are oftentimes revered over political leaders and their words and teachings are listened to and appreciated over national laws. Undoubtedly, there is freedom of religion in Nigeria, but restrictions should be passed where such religion or faith-group incites its followers to infringe on the rights of others. Where Nigerians are extremely loyal to their religion, the focus should be shifted to the religious leaders to ensure that in their teachings, they do not downgrade, intimidate or act or speak in such a manner that could create enmity between a person of their religion and one from another religion. Religious tolerance is feasible only when the teachers are mindful in their reference to persons from other tribes or religions. Emphasis is laid more on the teachers here because they teach the religion to their followers and are highly respected.

Media: The media is the major source of information in Nigeria. Even before social media, the media has been the primary source of information in Nigeria. As a market strategy, media companies often mix factual news with religious or tribal sentiments. However, since Nigeria Nigerians are regularly incited by religious/tribal sentiments, they spread such news faster.

On the other hand, false news has become a tool used by conflict instigators to incite hatred among Nigerians – the emergence and widespread use of social media makes it easier to spread fake news. The government need not restrict freedom of speech/thought/expression, which has been guaranteed by Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution – citizens may make personal suggestions of information they hear, but such information must have been fact-checked. Extra restrictions should be placed on software applications to ensure that before anyone puts out an information or comments on an information regarding persons from different tribes or religions, such information or comment must be factual in its entirety.

School: The principles taught in school is a very primary factor that determines the character of a child. Education is both a tool of civilization and destruction – what determines either outcome is the procedure. Where a child is taught on wrong values, he/she will grow to believe and act on such. If a child is taught in school that his tribe is superior to others, when he/she grows, he/she will be spiteful when someone from another tribe is ahead of him/her or his/her tribesman. The spite could grow into more disastrous result, and such child might become a hoodlum in the society. The school should teach acceptance and accommodation. Unfortunately, some of these schools are in places occupied by a particular tribe and controlled by a particular tribe, which makes it difficult for supervision. For instance, a school in a village in the West might teach against Hausa people and have no sanction because it is controlled by Yoruba people who might not be exposed.

Culture: Culture is simply a way of life. It is the foundation of a person's habit. Where a person's culture degrades persons from other cultural backgrounds, a child who is being taught in such culture would grow up to see others as his slaves. Cultural education is like



religious education – they stick to a child and can rarely be totally eradicated from a person’s mind.

Measures to Enhance Intercultural Communication

To ensure peaceful co-existence of the numerous ethnic groups in Nigeria, the government must take strict measures to make the people accountable for every action they take. Strict laws and policies must be put in place to sanction anyone who makes any derogatory statement against a person from a different tribe. Nigeria must take steps to emulate Singapore’s inter-tribal unity. Lawrence Wong, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister has explained measures Singapore employs to battle intercultural conflicts. He identifies “strengthening human relationship and interactions” as a basic tool in controlling intercultural conflicts. Where the people are reluctant, the government can exercise mild compulsion – it can set up mandatory programmes where persons from different tribes are forced to communicate. Communication helps reveal the minds of people, and if the minds of people can be revealed, then understanding and co-existence becomes easier. Lawrence Wong identifies stereotype as another destructive tool in the society. He asserts that the practice of viewing people from a specific perspective destroys the unique diversity of humans. Generalizing one’s behavior will be detrimental to another with a different behavior. Because few persons from a particular tribe or religion are despicable in character, does not imply that everyone belonging to that religion or culture has a despicable character. Making assumptions or conclusions about a person without direct experience can hinder effective communication. The need to play the victim or to be viewed as the most aggrieved is another issue hindering peaceful co-existence. In a turbulent society like Nigeria, every tribe has had their fair share of chaos and unrest, therefore, downplaying the pains of the Yoruba tribe to glorify the pains of the Igbo tribe will only increase enmity. Cooperation should be the goal of Nigerians, and not competition. Nigerians do not only have to cooperate when facing other nations or in diaspora, cooperation within yields better result than cooperation outside.

Lawrence Wong strongly posits that to ensure national progress, citizens should be given equal chances. The feeling that a person got something at the expense of another destroys relationships. South-South minorities strongly believe that their natural resource (crude oil) is used to enrich the political elites while they suffer in penury. A person with such mindset, regardless of the truth in it, will find it extremely difficult to work with a political elite for the betterment of the nation. Every Nigerian, regardless of status, sex, religion, and tribe, should be given equal opportunity to survive. Lawrence Wong provides a last and crucial measure in handling intercultural conflicts; “fair and accountable government”. The government wields a great measure of power that can be used to enhance intercultural relations. As a matter of fact, the government is the major determinant of the state of intercultural relations in a country. Where the government is one-sided, that is, favours a particular tribe over the other, the people will react to such favouritism with riots and tensions. However, where the

government ensures that it establishes policies and bodies to enhance intercultural relations, the people will as well respond to such positively. Where the government makes appointments across the multiple tribes and religions of the country, and builds same infrastructures in every region, the feeling of deprivation or exclusion can be curtailed. The government however, cannot ensure absolute compliance, but when it plays its part in enhancing intercultural relations, it can pass laws or engage in compulsion to enforce a certain degree of compliance. The fact is that both the government and the people of Nigeria have failed to play their roles in establishing stable intercultural relations. Nevertheless, the government plays a larger role since it is at the helms of affairs. There are consistent tensions, riots, protests and severe insecurity in Nigeria because the people of Nigeria feel excluded and ignored – the sense of deprivation of their right to enjoy natural resources among others, has led to uproar and conflict between those feeling deprived and those believed to be the deprivers. To ensure national cooperation, effective intercultural communication and development in Nigeria, Lawrence Wong's statement below must be carefully scrutinized and followed:

If we uphold this idea - that being Singaporean is a matter of conviction and choice, and that it takes priority over our other identities and affiliations - that would give all of us one important commonality around which to build understanding and trust, negotiate our differences and find common ground on difficult issues, and then we can continually look for ways to move forward together (Lai, 2021).

To achieve intercultural peace and stability, the Nigerian government must communicate with bona fide representatives from each religion and ethnic group to understand their protests and complaints. These representatives must also communicate among themselves to destroy whatever negative stereotype that has been established about their ethnic groups or religions. The government must also ensure that whatever law that exacerbates tension among the tribes be scrutinized and scraped off. Hate speech against one's religion or tribe must be adequately sanctioned to dissuade people from verbally degrading others. It is also exigent to study other countries that have managed to curb intercultural conflicts and their methods of resolving them. To establish effective intercultural communication in Nigeria, all stereotypes that have been established over the years must be destroyed and Nigerians must start on a new foundation.

Conclusion

The root cause of tribal tensions can be traced to the sense of deprivation. As a matter of fact, the separatists in South-Eastern Nigeria re-emerged in the 21st century because they felt ignored and excluded from the affairs of Nigeria. The government must dialogue with each ethnic group to understand their needs and pains, after which it must devise solutions to adequately and reasonably appease the people. To establish good relationships between the different tribes in Nigeria, effective communication is crucial. The Igbo man should state his



concern and anger to the Hausa man, alongside all conflicting tribes. Where knowledge of the situation is understood, resolving it becomes a less tedious matter. Negotiations should be the first step Nigerians take in the presence of intercultural conflict rather than violence. If tribalism fails to be addressed in Nigeria, then Nigeria's progress remains impracticable. Nigeria already has a weak foundation for ethnic/religious tolerance, and to avoid the reoccurrence of gruesome historical events like the civil war, the Nigerian government must begin to reeducate the younger generation to eradicate tribal stereotypes and ethnocentrism.

When the people of Nigeria understand themselves and see themselves as uniquely different and equal people, there will be peaceful co-existence. As stated in this work, the major problem faced in Nigeria is the belief of "ethnic superiority" – if that can be substituted for ethnic equality regardless of population and land mass, peace can be actualized. Intercultural communication does not only enhance peace, but security and development. With the communal spirit achieved through effective communication, Nigerians can then work together to achieve one goal and rebrand Nigeria in the global sphere.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Investigating Religious Ethics and Sociocultural Relationships in-between Ifá and Ayò Ọlọ́pọ̀n among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria¹

A Critical Comparative Study

Oluwole Tẹwogboye Okewande²

Abstract:

In Africa, ethics are encapsulated their various religious and social activities. Among the Yoruba, ethnical codes are propagated in religious activities especially, Ifá and in socio-cultural activities such as ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n. Ifá, the springboard on which Yoruba culture rests have specialized formal and informal rules regulating its activities. This informs why violation of rules guiding Ifá profession is regarded as ethical misconduct; the punishment of which may attract severe spiritual and/or human sanctions. Likewise, ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n- indigenous Yoruba sociocultural board game have informal ethical rules. However, despite the national and international nomenclatures of Ifá and ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n, no study is known that undertakes ethical interrelationship between the two cultural elements together. Employing code- a semiotic element, a channel through which communication is encoded. Ethical code of Ifá is compared with ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n. It is found out that, there are affinities between operational rules guiding against Ifá divination profession and rules guiding against ayò game. This study concludes that, among the Yoruba, ethical codes of Ifá and ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n are activated for sustainability of peace and development. Ethics of Ifá and ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n are found related and therefore, ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n ethical code is an extension of Ifá ethical code.

Keywords:

Ifá; ayò ọlọ́pọ̀n; code; culture; ethics; semiotics.

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Introduction

Generally, “ethics is a component of philosophy which is committed to the study of the formulation of theories underlying our socially acceptable behaviour as human beings (Bamişaye, 2001). Among the Yoruba, there are formal and informal cultural ethics by which a society is governed or controlled.³ Formal or informal, ethics has to do with philosophy relating to ensuring good behaviours capable of propagating peace and development in a society. On the one hand, formal ethics are written constitutions and rules guiding the behaviours and practice of organization, group and profession. That is, they are sets of formal norms, also known as *mores* and *laws*. They are standard behaviours regarded to be important in any given society. Violation of such formal standard behaviour attracts a severe punishment or sanction. On the other hand, the informal ethics has to do with norms, customs, folkways and taboos realized as informal cultural ethics. That is, informal norms refer to standards of behaviours that are considered less important, but still influence how we behave in a society (Maciver&Page, 1950 and Alake, 2004). Meaning that, ethics has to do with morality and virtues that promote good behaviours. In the opinion of Ejizu, “morality derives directly from the Latin, *MOs mores*, which means custom or way of life of a people. It has its equivalent in Greek- *ethos* from which the English word ethics is derived” (2008, p. 4-6). In this study however, ethics covers more than morality, but includes code of conduct guiding operation in doing things or profession. That is, it goes far beyond religion but to socio-cultural life of people.

Etymology of the word- Ethics, is described to be rooted in “the formulation of such terms as *ethos*, *ethics* and *moral*. *Ethos* is defined as character, sentiment, or disposition of a community or people, considered as a natural endowment; the spirit which actuates manners and customs, ...*Ethos* is a Greek word corresponding roughly to “ethics.” Something is moral if it pertains to right rather than wrong and ethics is the study of moral issues” (Szucs, et al, 2012, p. 1499). Ethics is concerned with the science of morality. It involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of rights and wrong behaviour...This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or consequences of our behaviour on others. Generally, ethical code has been mostly used in religious context. However, while it is reasonable to associate ethics with religion, it is also logical and appropriate that some people and activities that are unrelated to religion also observe some ethical rules and codes such as undertaken in *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* in this study.

The informal cultural ethics is associated with some religion and socio-cultural activities such as *Ifá* and *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n*. Unlike is foreign recreational activities such as chess and *ludo* that are exclusively for relaxation and entertainment, recreation among the Yoruba encodes cultural values- virtues beyond entertainment and relaxation. That is, religious concepts are enshrines in other aspects of life. However, both formal and informal cultural ethics work towards the same goal- positive behavioral or moral code.

³ Ethnics is therefore not imported concept to Africa generally and among the Yoruba in particular.



It is pertinent to note that, African societies are being governed by the informal cultural ethical code enshrines in various oral genres such as proverbs, philosophy and aphorisms. In addition, “the foundation role of the inscription system in Ifá distinguishes it as a ‘literate’ learned means of inquiry – Ifá is commonly called *alákòwé*, the scribe or literate one... Ifá divination protocols are the closest an ‘oral’ society could devise to fulfil the requirement of genuinely divine writing and speaking” (Adeèkó, 2010, p. 288) This opinion establishes that, in orality, there is a form of learning process in form of symbols that communicate ideas and information. Orality is described as “means by which Africa made its existence, its history long before the colonial and imperial presence of the west manifested itself. In this sense, orality needs to be seen not simply as ‘the absence of literacy’ but as something self-constitutes *Sui generis*” (Gunner, 2007, p. 67). The implication of this opinion is that orality does not imply absence of literacy. African generally and Yoruba in particular have cultural or indigenous ethics – a set of moral principles or issues that govern a person’s behaviour or conduct of an activity.

Ethical code of *Ifá* is formal- learnable. It’s knowledge containing of “multiple components, including formal and informal systems. Formal systems are the tangible organizational elements pertaining to ethics that are purposefully designed and implemented (e.g., ethics programs), whereas informal systems are the unwritten policies, practices, and values that are relevant to ethics” (Casoliva-Cabana, 2019, p. 2). This opinion informs why every aspect of *Ifá’s* knowledge- philosophy, economic, social, religion, science etcetera is learnable. However, social activities such as *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* are complementary media of ensuring peaceful and sustainable environment. That is, informal cultural ethical code is as old as the African societies. Its existence predates the formal cultural ethical code that was introduced by the western nations. As a result, the study of African indigenous systems of living must be sustained and developed.

Eventhough, the general belief on *Ifá* is religious, however, it is erroneous to limit its scope to religion alone; because, *Ifá’s* knowledge in addition to religion encapsulates philosophy, medicine, science and technology, mythologies and history among others. However, the sociocultural influence of *Ifá*, as proposed in this study cannot also be an exemption; since *Ifá* is believed to be the Yoruba cultural convergent point for all cultural activities of the Yoruba. The prominence of *Ifá* is however not limited to the Yoruba nations alone, but, its nomenclature cut across nations of the world. The value of *Ifá* on human activities and life is recognized and appreciated. This prompted the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to proclaimed *Ifá* in 2005, as one of the 86 traditions of the world to be recognized as masterpieces of oral and intangible heritage of humanity. By this declaration, *Ifá* is regarded as one of human heritages requiring urgent preservation. *Ifá’s* heritage is enshrined in the “international law and policy. therefore, has a universal value in which everyone has a reasonable interest” (Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018, p. 2). The implication of this opinion is that, *Ifá* ethics have been formalized through various indigenous cultural activities.

Ayò ọlọpọ̀n is a Yoruba indigenous board game. Like *Ifá*, the international status of *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* is also not in doubt. Apart from its popularity among the Yorùbá people of Southwestern Nigeria, it is called *Gisoro* in Burundi, *Oware* in Ghana, *Achochodi* in Ivory Coast, *Adjito/Vadjito* in Benin, *Ayo Eleh* in Igbo and *Kalati* in Sweden. The prominence of *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* in socio-cultural life of the Yoruba people is demonstrated in various socio-religious activities such as festivals and the deployment by artists in drama for entertainments and propagation of some cultural values. It becomes more pertinent to re-examine the orientation of Yoruba people that *eré là á fọmọ ayò ẹ.* That is everything around *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* is fun, play or entertainment.

The Aim and Objectives

The main aim of this study is to establish the crisscrossing of ethical and moral code between *Ifá* and *ayò ọlọpọ̀n*. The objectives are to; establish *ayò* ethical and moral codes as extension of *Ifá* codes and to establish the intercultural confluence between the religious and social activities of the among the Yoruba.

Materials and Methods

Ethics and Culture: A Review

There are two forms of cultural relationship: the intercultural, which has to do with the relationship of one cultural element and another and intracultural, that is, cultural relationship within culture. An intercultural cultural relationships was undertaken by İbrahimoğlu, Çiğdem and Seyhan "to better understand the impact of cultural differences in perceptions of ethical attitudes of Turkish and Arab societies" (2014, p. 1). The work establishes relationship between the two cultures. In this case, the intercultural relationship is accounted for. Likewise, such ethical relationship may exist in form of cultural diffusion- a cultural spread from higher concentration to the lower concentration within culture, such as perceived with *Ifá* and *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* in this study. That is, the cultural spreads of the ethical code from *Ifá* to *ayò ọlọpọ̀n*. Cultural activities such as ethics influence the entire cultural system since all other cultural activities and institutions are undertaken by human-beings in a society.

Ifá, as a converging point of all Yoruba cultural activities have influence on the systems of living of the Yoruba people. This is done through socialization ethical and moral codes, activated in the religious and social life of the Yoruba people. This shows that "culture is an integrated system of learned behaviour" (Roy, 2003, p. 663). Socialization happens in a way that, "when an individual born in a society, he is automatically born into a culture. Although, the individual cannot perceive the culture directly, he is exposed to the social influences that play upon his physical and mental structure. Gradually, he adapts the pattern of behaviour sanctioned by the group; culture molds him as per the expectation of the society" (Roy, 2003,



p. 663). The implication of this opinion is that there are established cultural activities (formal or informal) through which ethics codes are enshrined. *Ifá* and *ayò ọlópọ̀n* are such cultural elements wherein ethical codes are encapsulated.

Ethics and moral codes remain critical and universal components of human culture that shape or mold human behaviours positively. Meaning that, ethical and moral codes “develop out of culture. The specific culture pattern helps an individual to build some moral principles, which are transmitted through various customs, norms values, prohibitions of the society. Thus different cultures produce different moral codes and so on the prevailing behaviour in one society may seem to be strange and even repellant to the other” (Roy, 2003, p. 502). A critical look at the cultural activities unfolds some latent ethical behaviours capable of sustainable peace and development.

Ethics, is mostly associated with behaviours, which is one of the major themes in *Ifá* corpus. This informs the importance Yorùbá people attached to behaviour. Ethics applies to all aspects of conduct of individuals, groups, and organizations or societies. The “concepts of ethics refer to classification such as good-bad, beautiful- ugly, true false which the community members within the same values to the human behaviour and relations have added. Ethics deals with human behaviour. Ethics can be thought of as also a framework covering philosophy, moral philosophy, moral problems and moral judgments” (Mehalu, 2011). In this context, ethics is a set of norms and values which have been improved to praise or criticize the behaviour of the individuals living in the same community (Jones & Kavanagh, 1996). A society is valued by the forms and influence of ethical elements available in culture.

Methods

Code, is one of the semiotic elements propounded by Peirce (1931) is adopted for this study. Other semiotic elements are symbol, icon and index. Code is adopted for this study; because “semiology has so far concerned itself with codes” (Barthes, 1964, p. 1). One of the concerns of semiotics is understanding the code with which signs are communicated. The signs and their meanings are made known by codes which is, “a means of conveying messages, a vehicle of communication” (Geoffery and Short, 1981, p. 124). In a cultural activity, there can be concurrent use of two codes. That is, there may be simultaneous occurrences of two or more codes in a cultural context or event. The connections of signs and their meanings are channeled by code. Codes help to simplify phenomena in order to make it easier to communicate ideas. Understanding codes requires cultural knowledge involving linking signs to the meaning.

Interpretation of codes or symbols is a major task for a semiotician because it is the main outcome of semiotics or semiosis. Interpretation of codes in a culture is important to the establishment of meanings of the codes. That is, interpretation of code is important in the understanding the meaning of a sign, symbol or text., because, a sign can create multiple

meanings, depending on the cultural context it exists. Understanding and application of the cultural element on human life largely depends on the knowledge or experience of individual in a culture.

In this study, ethical codes of *Ifá* are related to the ethical code of *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* to demonstrate that the ethnical code of *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* evolve from *Ifá*. This is done by establishing relationship between the two ethical cultural elements. Relating religious ethics in *Ifá* to *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* will increase the understanding that ethics go beyond religion as “religious ethics can as well be seen as comparative religious ethics which is an expression used to refer to the study of religious ethics when the study is not confined to a single religious tradition” (Nyoyoko, 2012, p. 69). Implication of this statement is that religious ethnics are validated in social ethnics. The Yorùbá adopts this consciousness of pairing two similar things that share related features, values and forms in common.

Results

Ethnical codes in religion are not only means of propagating virtues that are panacea for societal development but also encoded in social activities such as *ayò ọlọpọ̀n*. Ethics is one of the cultural elements that relates both *Ifá* and *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* together. The religious ethnics are encapsulated in Yoruba social activities such as *ayò ọlọpọ̀n*. The implication of this result is that, informal ethics are media through which peace is propagated and guaranteed in Yoruba societies. Yoruba society is regulated through formal and informal cultural ethics such as encapsulated in *Ifá* and *ayò ọlọpọ̀n*. Ethical code of *Ifá* is a proto, basic or primary code, while *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* is derived or secondary. That is, *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* - the sociocultural element of Yoruba culture, is dependent on the *Ifá* religion. *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* as an informal ethics is universal- not limited to a religious group. The ethical code of *ayò* establishes that, eventhough it is a sociocultural activity majorly for entertainment and relaxation its values, just like *Ifá*, is premised on sustainable development.

Discussion

Every profession, including cultural activities such as games, organization or group has ethics that guide the running and operation of different activities- in interpersonal relationship among members, rules of practice and code of conduct among others. This is also applicable to religious activities. *Ifá* as a religion, have its own ethical rules- both spiritual and physical that are codes of conduct of practice. That is, any unethical practice sometimes resorts to spiritual sanctions in addition to the *Ifá* practitioners’ sanction. It is a rule that *Ifá* priest must “adhere strictly to the ethics and secrets of his profession” (Abimbólá, 1977a, p. 13). There are ethical rules, requirements and behaviours that an individual must possess before one engages in *Ifá* profession to succeed. This is why *Ifá* corpus- *Arótẹ̀-à-n-sá*, prescribes that whoever will engage in the profession must be “*Babaláwo tó gbán sárására níi mofá.*” That is,



a very knowledgeable *Ifá* priest is proficient in *Ifá* divination. The corpus verse states the importance of knowledge in *Ifá* divination. This is not strange as *Ifá* is the divinity of wisdom; whoever will associate with it must be wise and knowledgeable.

To ensure that the ethical sanctity of *Ifá* profession is enforced, certain qualifications and requirements are prerequisites before initiation to *Ifá* profession cult is instituted. Prior to this, before an *Ifá* priest begins to practice, he must have been initiated into *Odù* cult: The *Ifá* code of communication. This is because *Ifá* symbols are coded in *Odù*, the knowledge of which must be understood by prospective *Ifá* practitioner. Identification, recognition, understanding and interpretation of *Odù* requires a very high intelligent quotient. That is, the prospective priest must have a high intelligent quotient (IQ). This is needful because, there are minimum numbers of *Odù* or *ẹsẹ-Ifá- Ifá* verse a trainee must be able to recite, along with the associated sacrifices.⁴ During these exercises, different codes of ethics of *Ifá* profession are thought, learned and performed by the would-be *Ifá* priest, through *Ifá* ethical codes, enshrines in various *Ifá* corpora. That is, "the thematic contents of Yorùbá Ethics are copiously revealed in several portions of *Ifá* Corpus...However, too, it is not possible to exhaust the list of themes making up *Ọ̀rúnmìlá's* Code of Ethics" (Akintola, 1999, p. 99).

Generally, skills acquisition has been associated with ethics, because, it focuses on "realizing good conduct, being an effective moral agent, and bringing values into one's work, all require skills in addition to a moral inclination. Studies have uncovered four skill sets that play a decisive role in the exercise of moral expertise" (Saucier, 2018, p. 2). In short, it is expected that, *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n* players possess some personal qualities that show his dexterities-skills, like *Ifá*. Eventhough in *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n*, the players are not initiated, because, while *Ifá* objects are sacred and spiritual, that of *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n*, is basically associated with social values. This is because, the game is not confines to a particular religion. It is a recreational activity that different people with different background involve in. As a result of the wide scope⁵ the game has over religion, there is no doubt the influence of socio-cultural ethics, such as coded in *ayò* can be underestimated. Imbibing and abiding by the *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n* ethical code provides a social institution through which some social vices such as selfishness and fraud among others are curtailed or checked.

To engage in *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n*, the players must be intelligent in calculating and moving seeds around the board to win. It had been established that mathematical knowledge of binary, permutation and combination, arithmetic progression, geometric progression are keenly involved in *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n*. One of the importance of *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n* is to display the competence and dexterity, that is intelligence of a player over another. Like in *Ifá* divination, in *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n*, before a player can be a master of *ayò* game, he must have acquired some informal skills over

⁴ For example, only initiated apprentices of *Ifá* are allowed into the guild to acquire the specialized knowledge associated with the training. And no one is given liberty to practice the acquired art until the final step is mastered! (Ilésanmí, 2004, p. 9). Figures 2¹⁰ (1024) and 2¹² (4096) are among "the various numbers of Odu claimed by different writers and *Ifá* priests" (McGEE, 1983, p. 111). That is, these figures mark the minimum and standard numbers of *ẹsẹ-Ifá* to be mastered by the prospective *Ifá* priest before initiation.

⁵ Different *ayò ọ̀lọ́pọ́n* players come from different religions.

a duration of time. Like other skills, players of *ayò* starts by watching of the game, during which he learnt a lots of the informal ethics guiding against the game.

In *Ifá* divination and *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* systems, the use of human skills, intelligent and wisdom come to play. Skill acquisition in *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* requires some level of intelligence, for it is a game that rests on knowledge. Even though, skills in *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* is informal, however, "the game is not easy" (Agbalajobi, Cooper and Ọ́nuga, n. d, p. 375), which makes the skill to be associated with high level of intelligence. Such training is invariably sustained by constant practice. The 'strategies' in the manipulation of *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* seeds, determine the level of skill of a player. In fact, the success of winning *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* is predicated on the skills of the player

Due to the limited human knowledge products- outcome of *Ifá* divination and *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* are unpredictable. The outcomes of *Ifá* divination through *ikin*⁶ or *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀*⁷ are only predicted after completion of the process of divination on the skills and knowledge of a diviner. However, while the training and knowledge of *Ifá* divination acquire both formal and informal rigorous training, that of *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* requires informal. However, both involve training. This is associated with perseverance "perseverance is the ability to decide on a moral plan of action and then to adapt to any barriers that arise in order to continue working toward that goal" (Clement, Vincent and Casanovas, 2012a, p. 2). That is, a competent *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* player must be a strategist as the "game requires deep thought and good strategy to move seeds with the ultimate aim to win" (Clement, Vincent and Casanovas 2012a, pp. 2-3). The application of the mental knowledge makes the process involved to be complex and as such, playing *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n*

should not however be easy, but should allow for considerable variation of expertise, which variation should be easily describable as a hierarchy of strength of performance. It is also desirable that there be many different strategies available to the player, so that the strategy adopted by the subject may be a reflection of his personality. If there are also a numbers of tactics to master, it will prove illuminating to observe how a novice subject learns to use them. The degree of outward manifestation of thought process behind a subject's performance is also an important parameter in the selection of a game. While protocols may be used to make performance more explicit, information derived from the performance itself is more reliable (Agbalajobi, Cooper and Ọ́nuga, n. d, p. 474).

Reliability of information from *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* is relative. That is, it derives this peculiarity or attribute from *Ifá*. As *Ifá* generally concerned with obtaining information on every practical problem of everyday life. The opinion above demonstrates that, eventhough, *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* in basically for recreation and entertainment, however, the game has complementary values that cannot be underestimated. The relative values of *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* to *Ifá* suggest that, both in *Ifá* and *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n*, like any other profession, the success depends on the personality of the *Ifá* priest and *ayò ọ́lọ́pọ́n* players- the level of his dexterity and acquisition of necessary skills.

⁶ Sacred *Ifá* palm-nuts, usually in sixteen

⁷ *Ifá* divination chain made of eight *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* seeds. It has two faces- concave and convex; making sixteen faces.



Generally, it has been observed that there are individual traits to ethnical understanding and "beside this individualistic conditions such as age, sex, religion, etc., also have an impact on ethical perceptions and attitudes" (Ibrahimoglu, Cigdem and Seyhan, 2014, p. 1). The individual traits are strictly guided by the ethical code so as to realize the socio-cultural and religious objectives. The more adherence to the ethical code, the more the desired results or goals are achieved. Since *Ifá* ethical code is associated with religion, the practice involves the interaction with spiritual agents, some ethical codes are not opened to the public, that is, they are cultic. This is why it is only an initiated *Ifá* priest that can interpret the language of *Ifá* oracle. This is why the training involves both formal and informal training. *Ifá* client is ignorant or novice about the outcome or results of the divination. Unlike in *Ifá* divination, however, *ayò ọlópọ̀n* ethical code is opened. All the activities of the game are conducted openly. The audience or spectators understand all the rules- except for those that are learning the game by watching. Since *Ifá* divination ethical code involves both formal (because whoever is not an initiated *Ifá* priest will be ignorant or novice of some *Ifá* ethical code) and informal, opened and closed, the informal ethical code is complemented by the *ayò ọlópọ̀n* ethical code.

Like in *Ifá*, performance in *ayò* revealed that, the system is regulated by scientific knowledge, especially, computer in relation to memory. It is an ethics in *ayò ọlópọ̀n*, that, "a player may count the seeds in his own holes by picking them up, but not those of his opponent, so that a memory component is introduced into the game. This may be assimilated on the computer builds up a large number of seeds in one hole the number displayed may be set to upper limit" (Agbalajobi, Cooper and Şonuga, n. d, p. 47). The game is more anchored on memory of the players. That is, ability to know the numbers of *ayò* seeds to his advantage and the ability to block any loop holes that the opponent may explore against him. The more he is able to calculate by using different mathematical methods such as addition, subtraction and multiplication, the more his chances or probability of winning more *ayò* seeds.

In *Ifá* divination, children are excluded, as the profession is associated with maturity coupled with high intelligence and memory which demands for memorization and calculation. This is why "many people start their training at early age, usually between ten and twelve, and they remain with their master or the next ten or fifteen years before the firm part of their training is completed" (Abimbola, 1977a, p. 12). That is, the core *Ifá* training starts at the age bracket of twenty-five years and above. Before this stage, a trainee will only be sent on some errand such as buying of some things and some domestic works unrelated with divination.

In *ayò ọlópọ̀n*, immature children rarely engage in the game. This is as a result of high memory impact and input such as calculations- addition, subtraction, division and multiplication involved in the game. Relating *ayò ọlópọ̀n*, to Morabaraba and Macala games⁸ as one of the precolonial African recreations, it is described as the game that its knowledge covering wide areas in mathematics such as algebra, geometry, theory of numbers, topology, combinatorics, graph theory, set theory symbolic logic as well as probability theory (Gerdes,

⁸ These are related to *ayò* game

1994). It has been established that, Mathematics concepts such as Geometrical shapes, Algebra, Ratio and Proportion, Symmentary, Logical reasoning, Counting, Combinational Game theory, Search Algorithms. Logical thinking and empirical and mental calculation” are also embedded in *ayò ọlọpọ́n* (Nleya and Ndlovu, 2020, p. 141). All these works on *ayò* evolved for problem solving using different scientific approaches. These scientific approaches remind us the basic function of *Ifá* divination- problem solving as earlier explained. *Ifá* is consulted to provide a way forward in times of trouble and proffer solutions through *Ifá* oracular order.

The attributes of human mental and cognition in *ayò ọlọpọ́n* is here believed to be as a result of the relationship the game has with *Ifá* as explained. As many adults engage in *Ifá* divination profession, likewise many adults are involved in *ayò ọlọpọ́n*. There is also no age limit to both. In fact, the game is medically recommended for the aged people who are suffering from dementia and sight. That is, the game is discovered to be memory enhancer. In the opinions of Oyeleke, Ige, Emuoyibofarhe, and Aworinde “acceptability by demented people and potential sufferers will not be an issue...These attributes we believe will help African sufferers to recover faster” (2014, p. 25).

Movement in the marking of *Odù-Ifá* and sowing of *ayò* seeds on the boards is another ethical code. Movement in sowing of *ayò* seeds is in an anticlockwise direction (Climent, Caanal and Casanovas, 2012). In process of sowing of *ayò* seeds, a hole on the board must not be skipped, unless if the ‘looping’ (the hole where the accumulation of *Odù* is taken) is created. Na’Allah gives hints further on this by saying, “some traditional games like the Yorùbá *ayò* involve some writing in the form of strokes or lines” (2010, p. 4). This right to left movement is also akin to the marking, reading and interpreting *Ifá* symbols. That is, “since both the divining chain and the printed marks are read from right to left, like Arabic, the pattern of the right-hand side are considered basic and it is upon them that the 16 basic patterns of the printed marks arranged in order of seniority” (Abimbola, 1977a, p. 16).

Furthermore, time of performance is another ethical rule that must be followed in *Ifá* divination and *ayò ọlọpọ́n*. Both *Ifá* divination and *ayò ọlọpọ́n* are rarely performed out in the night. This is because, night is traditionally devoted for other things, such as settlement of misunderstanding and domestic works. *Ifá* divination that requires information from the gods through *Odù* is usually performed during the day time, when the shadow of the divination tray will not be shown. On one hand, the *babaláwo* believe that, *Ọ̀rúnmilà* must have slept and, on the other hand, there are *Odù* that are recited along the use of blood- animals and snail-fluid and so on. It is usually difficult to get some of these items in the night. Likewise, *ayò ọlọpọ́n* is not played in the morning or at night. It is the common belief that, “bálẹ́ bá lẹ́, à fọmọ ayò fáyò” (Kòmọláfẹ́, 1978, p. 180). That is, when it is dark, we desist from playing with *ayò* seeds. The Yorùbá discourages one from playing *ayò ọlọpọ́n* in the morning; believing that, “Ọ̀rayè èniyàn ni ní tayò àárọ̀.” That is, it is an unintelligent that plays *ayò ọlọpọ́n* in the morning. This is to discourage people from indolence, since the game is not a profession. *Ayò* is played in the evening period as relaxation after the day’s job. Day time is devoted to work. However, development has overtaken this belief and practice as *ayò ọlọpọ́n* is played in the



morning, organized as a competition game in some cultural, religious and in drama and films. Likewise, the intelligent players are involved in the game. In *Ifá* divination, it is practiced in the morning and day time but not night. Perhaps, both *Ifá* and *ayò* game are performed with the day-light so as to guarantee transparencies in the processes of the performances. However, this is in addition to the spiritual and cultural rules that guide against their performances.

Another area of ethical relationship between *Ifá* and *ayò* game in the performance. The process of *Ifá* divination must be open and transparent; both the *babaláwo* and the client(s) must be actively involved in the process. Whether the client is able to read and interpret the message or not, the interactions of the divination objects are open and transparent to him or her. The divination board must be laid open because, it is ethical that, *Ifá's* profession be performed with truthfulness, honesty, and transparency. *Ifá* priest is under ethical oath that: "A kii şawo ká puró" (Adéèkó, 2010, p. 287). That is, the person sworn to the divination profession must not lie. The symbol of *Òrúnmilà*- the oracle of *Ifá* symbolizes truth, honesty and transparency. In order to ensure transparency in *ayò*, it is a rule that it be played in the open during the daylight period so as that both the players and the spectators can see or view clearly to comment on the activities of the player. Any player that tries to manipulate *ayò* seeds to his advantage is shouted at by the opponent payer and audience. This attitude is regarded as *òjóóró*- fraud. Whatever fraud hidden from the opponent player is exposed by the audience. This makes the game to be free from manipulation of all forms.

It is the ethics of the game, that a player with most of the seeds supplies the opponent for the objective and enjoyment of the game to be actualized. The ethics of *ayò olópoń* is that:

if all opponent pits are empty, the player must make a move that will give his opponent a move, this is called "Golden rule". If no such move can be made, the player captures all the remaining seeds on the board, ending the game. If no move is possible the winner is the person with greater number of captured seeds (n. a, n. d, p. 15).

The opinion above, coded through *ayò* ethical practice requires that, in real life application, the rich should supply or provide the poor where and when possible to do so; revealing that, life is interesting in communal sharing of benefits or things. Any *ayò* player that monopolizes the board by harvesting almost all the seeds is regarded as *anikànjoń*. Likewise, *Ifá* teaches that, those who are sufficient in some necessities of life such as money and food should supply to the needy ones. *Ìwòrì Wọ́fún* corpus states that:

Ká bu òkan mu, kí á bu èjì ko àgbà/To drink a cup and give two cups to an elder

Tí àgbà bá bojú wẹ̀yìn, kí á tún bu òkan mu/If an elder appreciates, one should drink a cup again

Kí ó wá bọ sí dọgba-n-dọgba/That it becomes equal

A dífá fún Pàràkòyí/Cast divination for Pàràkòyí (Odégbọla, 2014, p. 181).

The *Ifá* corpus above teaches that one must not be a miser, stingy or selfish but should share from whatever you have with those in needs. The *Ifá* states that *iwà imọ-tara-ẹni-nikan*

kò pé (Ọdégbọla, 2014, p. 181). That is, selfishness does not profit one. The Ifá-ayò ethical code teaches that society will experience peace and development. This is why Obineche “advocates that a synergy between religion and morality in Nigeria will create a peaceful and harmonious society and make the profession of every religion in Nigeria a meaningful reality” (2021, p. 13). However, as revealed in this study, ethical code is not novel to the Yoruba society. It had been instituted in various cultural and social activities capable of development and peaceful co-existence among the people. The relationships between *Ifá* and *ayò ọlọpọ̀n* ethical code demonstrate synergies between the two cultural elements.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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The Role of Communication in Sport Integration

The Case Study of the Somalia National Bandy Team in Sweden¹

Gábor Sinkó²

Abstract:

The study examines what role communication has played in the integration of Somalis into Swedish society by looking at sport as a tool for successful integration. It also explores how both the local and international image of the Somalia National Bandy Team has changed in light of communication about them in the media. I argue that communication has enabled the team to be able to garner financial support, attract international attention and overcome initial prejudice towards Somalis in Sweden. The research adopts a qualitative research approach and is based on the document content analysis of media articles, interviews and questionnaires with bandy players and Borlänge officials, and the documentary film *Trevligt Folk*. It contends that it can be successful to integrate migrants into a society with the help of sport, and that not only the image of sportspeople but of the general migrant community may improve, as illustrated by the case study of the Somalia National Bandy Team in Sweden.

Keywords:

Somalia National Bandy Team; Sweden; communication; integration; sport.

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Introduction

International migration can be considered an essential feature of today's globalizing world, and as such it is one of the most pressing matters for the international community. A number of European countries have been working towards creating favorable conditions facilitating the adaptation of migrants into their society, with Sweden being one of the most successful in this regard. For example, the Scandinavians were ranked the eighth most friendly country for immigrants in 2021 based on a variety of factors including income, education, wealth and work-life balance (Golden Capitalist, 2021). This finding coincides with the results of the 2020 Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index, placing Sweden the eighth most accepting country for migrants. The survey, in which the Scandinavian nation scored 7.92 out of 9, interviewed respondents in 145 countries, asking them how they would evaluate having migrants as fellow citizens, neighbors and family members (Esipova, Ray and Tsabutashvili, 2020).

Migration in Sweden is not a new phenomenon, and traces its history back a very long time. Since the 1850s, the country has been characterized by different waves of immigration and emigration. The most significant outflow, known as "the great emigration", occurred between the mid-19th century and the interwar period, when approximately 1.5 million people moved from the country. It peaked in 1887, when over 50.000 Swedes fled chiefly to the Americas and Australia (Statistics Sweden, 2013). There were various reasons that contributed to the emigration of Swedes, such as poverty, political constraints and religious persecution among others. As a result of the country's open door policy, the number of asylum seekers increased at the end of the 20th century with migrants arriving from Africa (Eritrea, Somalia), Asia (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey) and South America. The process reached its peak in 2015, when more than 160.000 people applied for asylum in Sweden (Swedish Institute, 2022). Following that, mainly due to the fact that the country's migration policy was modified, the number of applications started to decrease gradually. However, it can be seen that Somalia remains in the Top 10 countries with 443 applications for asylum in 2020. (Migrationsverket, 2021).

While integrating migrants into a society is definitely challenging, it also provides a host of benefits to the receiving country, including the improvement of its international image as a welfare state. With the intent of maintaining this status, many initiatives have been put forward to assist migrants wishing to integrate into Swedish society. Sport, for instance, is becoming a tool for integration as it may have the potential to overcome ethnical obstacles. Although I am aware that research has been done linking the integration of migrants to sport (Hertting and Karlefors, 2013; Smith, Spaaij and McDonald, 2018), I would like to analyze a more specific topic, namely the role of communication in the integration of Somalis into Swedish society through the case study of the Somalia National Bandy Team in Sweden.³

³ The connection between sport and communication has been stressed by one of the Somali bandy players, Mohamed Mire, who reasoned that sport is able to create common communication channels between Somalia and Sweden, and thus they can lead to the improvement of relationship between the countries. It includes showing the film *Trevligt Folk* to the Somali president and the general population as well as organizing workshops and promoting bandy in Somalia (Mire, 2019).

The research adopts a qualitative research approach and is based on the analysis of media articles, interviews and questionnaires with bandy players and officials in Borlänge, and the 2015 documentary film *Trevligt Folk* (translated as ‘Nice people’ in English). While the former can help us answer the question if and how communication can be used to change the image of migrants in a rather fact-based manner, the latter illustrates the Somali integration process, and the opinion and views of the players, management and locals in a more emotional way. The article is destined to enrich the growing literature on communication and sport integration in the Somali-Swedish context and this research is important, since there appears to be underestimation from the side of the Swedish government in terms of the power of sport as a potentially successful platform for integration.

The History of the Somalia National Bandy Team

Based on the 2015 data of the United Nations Population Division, Sweden houses one of the largest Somali diasporas globally, as the Scandinavian country was ranked ninth in the world and second in Europe with about 60.000 migrants (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). Since then this number has increased even further, contributing to the fact that there were more than 70.000 Somali people residing in Sweden in 2021 (Statista Research Department, 2022). The reasons for fleeing Somalia are multifaceted, but escaping from prolonged conflict, al-Shabaab terrorism, poverty as well as famines caused by droughts and floods can all be listed here (European Commission, 2022).

Sweden has 290 municipalities and about 3.200 Somalis live in Borlänge, a former industrial city with a population of 52.254 (Statistics Sweden, 2021). It means that every sixteenth person is a Somali in the municipality, and although Borlänge has witnessed an increase in IT, retail and education in recent years (Uplift, 2022), migrants’ integration into society coupled with the concerns of native Swedes posed a serious challenge to the town. Instead of social exclusion, however, business consultant and entrepreneur Patrik Andersson came up with the idea of integrating Somalis with the help of sport, hoping it would also pave the way for reducing unemployment and establishing new forums for communication between migrants and locals (Rolander, 2013).

Andersson was trying to find something capable of bringing people of different nationalities together. Sport is believed to have a unifying power and given football’s popularity among the Somalis, setting up FC Swesom, a municipality-founded football club in Borlänge, seemed to be the obvious choice. Nevertheless, the Swedish entrepreneur thought getting Somalis to play a local game would be a much better option, since if they proved successful, it would improve the international reputation of Sweden as a welfare state and spur integration and social change. And that is how the choice fell on bandy (Majendie, 2014).

While Sweden is undoubtedly most famous for football, bandy (together with the quite similar ice hockey) is a sport that is commonly played during the long winter months. Although

it is truly popular in the Scandinavian countries and Russia, it is far from being widely known. Bandy is a team sport played with eleven players on ice, which equals the size of a football pitch. It combines the elements of field- and ice hockey as well as football but instead of a puck, the players are working towards getting an orange ball into the net (Brodala, 2018). To the question 'Why bandy?' Andersson replied: "Because it is the most Swedish of all games. We want to use it as an example to demonstrate that skin colour doesn't matter. The important thing is that we live together and play together" (Zaytsev, 2014).

The Somalia National Bandy Team is the first of its kind, because no other African country is represented in the winter sport (O'Connor, 2013). It is hard to imagine Somalis – who are completely unaccustomed to winter weathers and freezing temperatures (Kiss, Besenyő and Resperger, 2014, pp. 14-17) – skating on ice competitively, but their ascent to both local and international fame might be the consequence of this implausibility. Their story has been compared to the Jamaica national bobsleigh team that participated in the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, and based on the film made of their debut the team was called 'Cool Runnings 2.0' (Shearlaw, 2016). Communication proved to be key in getting financial support, positioning the team in international limelight and battling early prejudice towards Somalis in Sweden, thus the study will analyze these elements separately.

The role of communication in garnering financial support

After the idea about creating a bandy team consisting exclusively of Somali people was lauded by his friends, Andersson began looking for financial support. With the help of Mursal Ismail, later chairman and politician with Somali and Swedish origins, and Hans Grandin, one of the managers of the local bandy team, the business consultant lobbied the initiative to Jan-Olof Lundberg, the person responsible for integration at Borlänge Municipality. The early general reaction of the project is mirrored by Andersson's comment: "People on the street said I was crazy, the manager said I was crazy, the people of Somalia asked if I was crazy, the national Bandy organization too" (Majendie, 2014). The initial shock, however, wore off and the city hall assured the entrepreneur that it would provide financial support to the Somalia National Bandy Team. It would be a mistake to think it was adequate on its own, since municipality funding was insignificant, covering only a part of marketing costs (Grandin, 2019).

Nonetheless, equipment, training and transport costs had to be covered if the team wanted to play international bandy. Besides the support acquired from the city hall, Andersson needed to get as many local and international sponsors as possible to invest in the Somalia National Bandy Team. The business consultant managed to win over Billy Tang, owner of two local restaurants in Borlänge, Golden Palace and *Engelska Puben* (translated as 'The English Pub' in English). He wished to be involved in the project on the basis of being a migrant himself and strived to set an example to Swedish people about immigrants contributing to society positively (Ewaldsson, 2019). Tang's honest, albeit sometimes very direct approach seemed to stun Andersson on several occasions. For instance, he is depicted as an impulsive person who



gets angry when the Somalis' shirts arrive and the logo of his restaurant is not placed where it has been promised (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015).

Andersson was also determined to try his luck at the Federation of International Bandy (FIB), primarily because they had common interests. While his aim was obviously to obtain possible support for the team, the federation wanted to popularize the sport as only the inclusion of additional countries may result in bandy to be officially played at the Olympics. When the idea of Somalis competing in bandy was first presented to him, FIB's secretary-general Bo Nyman thought it was 'a bit too fantastic', but he eventually agreed to help secure some funding for them. He even traveled to Montenegro in the summer of 2013 to get the Somalia National Bandy Team participating in the 2014 World Bandy Championships of Irkutsk in Russia (Rolander, 2013). To commemorate the event, the band Apocalyps even wrote a song called 'Gul gul gul Somalia' (which can be translated to "have success and win") as a motivation tool for the team.

One cannot help but discover that the Swedish government itself did not provide financial support to the team, and the idea of getting the Somalis play bandy in Siberia was funded on a municipal level supplemented by private investments. Although it is not impossible, it is quite rare for the government to support specific projects (Lundberg, 2019). Based on that, it could be argued that Sweden is yet to exploit the full potential of sport as an integration tool.⁴ However, it is important to point out that the government does not disregard sport as the annual investment in it amounted to SEK 2.25 billion (with an additional SEK 1.5 billion due to COVID-19) in 2020, which is over 364 million euros (Norberg, 2021). The fact that the Somalia National Bandy Team did not receive funds from the government can be justified by having no government agency responsible for the sport policy of the entire Scandinavian country (Stenling and Sam, 2017).

The role of communication in attracting international attention

Andersson was aware that it was necessary to attract international attention if the team was to qualify for the 2014 Bandy World Championship. With the purpose of securing financial support, the entrepreneur tried to build media hype around the Somalia National Bandy Team. It turned out to be successful, since media sources both locally and internationally contacted him to ask for interviews and write about the integration project. As illustrated in the film, Andersson was absolutely delighted, saying that the "CNN has been in touch. The BBC and Al-Jazeera have been in touch. And Wall Street Journal and Channel 4. Dutch media and newspapers have been here. Aftonbladet, Expressen, SVT and TV4, too. A Spanish radio

⁴ In the beginning of the 21st century, the Swedish government launched two specific projects to integrate children and young adults with migrant backgrounds into society with the help of sport. They are called *Handslaget* (translated as 'Handshake' in English) and *Idrottslyftet* (translated as 'Sport promotion' in English).

channel and, let's see... Who else? The Web of course" (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015).

A number of articles (Brodala, 2018; Julin, 2015; Majendie, 2014; O'Connor, 2013; Palme, 2014; Ramm, 2013; Rolander, 2013; Shearlaw, 2016; Zaytsev, 2014) have been written about the unique story of Somalis skating on ice, and according to Anwar Hared, one of the bandy players, they convey the same message, namely the potential of sport to bring people of various backgrounds together, bridging cultural differences and filling the void created by a lack of understanding about Somali migration into Sweden (Hared, 2019). Indeed, the Somalia National Bandy Team was primarily set up to facilitate integration and gain local acceptance, which is mirrored in international media sources too. While Andersson simply remarked "integration in sport was a good way to work" (Majendie, 2014), Mursal Ismail deemed it crucial "for Somalis to show themselves doing good things for their host country" (Shearlaw, 2016).

The power of media and the role of communication are clearly visible in how the image of bandy players has changed over time. From being on the brink of Swedish society, they have become "stars" and the people of Borlänge know who they are" (Lundberg, 2019). The Somalia National Bandy Team has gained international fame and has set an example for successful sport integration. People of different cultures go to their matches, rooting for the team⁵ and Somalis also enjoy the support of online communities. One of the players said they have lots of fans sending them "messages on social media [with the following texts:] "we are proud of you", "continue to train", "continue to compete"" (Hared, 2019). They definitely do so, since the players are aware that by improving their results they can remain in the international limelight.

Positive development took place not only on the international level, but locally too. Two of the most significant ones are the team becoming a role model for the migrants of the next generation⁶ and the changing attitudes of Swedes towards Somalis after the 2014 Bandy World Championship. While the former can be beneficial in terms of providing opportunities for the successful sport integration of migrants, the latter is even more important as it illustrates the ability of Swedish society to change. It is a two-way process because on the one hand it requires Swedes to be able to reflect on their culture, but on the other hand migrants need to expand their knowledge on how society where they live functions. Realizing they could not fit in as Somalis, they redefined their role and got into it as Somalia bandy players, which led to local acceptance. While sport is undoubtedly a key to integration, it is not sufficient in itself. It has to be coupled with effective communication; otherwise opportunities may not be seized, since "if you do not turn [the key] the door does not open (Hared, 2019).

⁵ There is a scene in *Trevligt Folk* when Russians are cheering for the Somali bandy players shouting "So-ma-li, So-ma-li!" (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015). People of various backgrounds come to their matches to support the Somali team and encourage them to always look ahead (Mire, 2019).

⁶ One of the players said that kids often visit their matches and compliment them or express their desire to play bandy competitively in the future (Hared, 2019).



The role of communication in overcoming initial prejudice

After the Somalis proved at the 2014 World Championship they could actually play bandy (which was growingly considered a national interest in Sweden), the locals started to be more welcoming towards them and “people in Borlänge seem[ed] to stand up for the team” (Grandin, 2019). However, it was not always the case. At the beginning of the documentary, several residents are interviewed to find out what the general opinion is about the bandy project. While the majority of people believe sport integration is a way forward, they do not have a high opinion of the Somalis, who seemingly do not want to be integrated, adjust and find a job. Conversations with Borlänge citizens revealed that they mostly had a negative image of the migrants, thinking all they were interested in was “throwing stones and causing havoc” or “hang[ing] around and steal[ing] bikes” (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015).

While the film would like to emphasize that these prejudices were far from being true and that residents should have nuanced their views of the Somalis, locals can also be somewhat understood. They had been experiencing an increasing number of foreigners of entirely different backgrounds, which had increased tensions throughout Sweden. Although they used to be deferential, they have become tired of and also a bit scared of the continuous tides of refugees. This mentality is mirrored by one of the respondents, who said “[t]here is too much black...Sometimes it feels like we’re being replaced. It’s gone too far” (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015). To counteract these prejudices, Mursal Ismail stressed that it was crucial for the Somalis to achieve some results in order to make the local community proud of them and earn their trust. He pointed out that if they failed to do that, they would remain only a burden.

According to Daqa Niamkey, a member of the Somali Olympic Committee, the bandy project is a great initiative as it provides “an opportunity to change the image of the country” (Somalia Bandy, 2013). The question, however, arises if it has to be altered so that refugees’ integration into society is facilitated or because Swedes have a negative image of Somalis on the whole, which is basically synonymous with racial prejudice (Palme, 2014). At the end of 2013, there was even a cultural debate in Sweden, exploring whether migrants’ integration must be attached to their positively contributing to society or the latter has a responsibility at all times to accept refugees even if they cost money to the country in the long run (Dagens Nyheter, 2013).

Among the OECD countries, Sweden is characterized by one of the biggest differences in the employment of natives and migrants (OECD and European Union, 2015) and Somalis can be victims of arson attacks or receive death threats (Shearlaw, 2016). In 2012, almost a third of the Somali community living in Forserum, Sweden was forced to leave as a result of having been physically and mentally abused⁷ (The Local Sweden, 2012). Racial discrimination was also present in Borlänge as recounted by Damayanthi Lundin, a mother with a migrant background.

⁷ They were occasionally beaten up or insulted verbally and the windows of their houses were smashed as well.

She told the story of taking her kids to swimming practice, when a native Swede walked up to them and “threw sand at [her] boys” (Hammar, Wikingsson, Af Klintberg and Helgeson, 2015). Based on this, it can be reasoned that Sweden must put an end to structural racism before attempting to integrate migrants into society.

Despite initial prejudice and the negative remarks of Borlänge residents at the beginning of the documentary, citizens’ approach markedly changed after the Somali National Bandy Team had qualified to represent the city internationally. Interestingly, locals appeared to be more welcoming towards not only the players, but other Somalis too. This clear example of sport integration shows that the team could manage to come up to expectations and inch a bit closer to Swedes, but it also illustrates that a society has the potential to change for the better. Unfortunately, the people who expressed criticism about the migrants are not interviewed again at the end of the film but in one of the concluding scenes we can see the city square crowded with Swedes and Somalis celebrating the success of the team together. Greeting and cheering the players upon arrival in Borlänge definitely made them feel more at home, which can be considered a prerequisite for their integration into the city (Ewaldsson, 2019).

Conclusion

Sport can prevent social discrimination (Peterson, 2004) and is an excellent way to create integration into a society. This thought may have been on Patrik Andersson’s mind when he came up with the idea of Somalis playing bandy, a sport which was incredibly popular in Sweden, but rather absurd and far from Somalis, who were not used to winter weathers and freezing temperatures and had never stood on ice before. Regardless, the integration project proved fruitful, which required the combination of garnering financial support, attracting media attention and probably most importantly, for Borlänge to overcome prejudice towards Somalis. Although each of these elements have been analyzed separately, it is important to see them in complexity and to emphasize that they have been present simultaneously in the Somali-Swedish setting.

It might be surprising that the international media was all of a sudden flooded with articles about bandy, a quite marginal sport outside the Scandinavian countries and Russia. However, if we take a step back and dive a bit deeper we may realize that the story about these Somalis is really heartwarming and its popularity is due to its uniqueness and depiction of people striving to accomplish their goal against all odds (Palme, 2014). On top of that, this objective had to be something extraordinary if – besides attracting international attention – they were to gain financial support and get as many sponsors as possible to their side. The Somalia National Bandy Team never hoped to emerge victorious in the 2014 World Championship; however, they still won, becoming the first African country ever represented in bandy.

It should not be forgotten that the true aim of Andersson's project was to integrate the Somalis into Swedish society, which is reflected in the message of *Trevligt Folk* too. It is about an open and tolerant society, where native Swedes and migrants create common meeting places that are beneficial for all the involved parties (Ewaldsson, 2019). The film fits very well into the line of documentaries, as it intends to create change, form opinion and inform audiences about societal and social problems. In the end, the Swedish initiative was a real success, because the bandy players have become role models of people of various backgrounds and are now supported both locally and internationally. Thus the film illustrates that Sweden is a country where Somalis are able to thrive while preserving their national identity.

It seems that before the bandy project began, Somali migrants had been treated in a rather negative and biased way, and were only seen as 'outsiders' and 'burdens' in Sweden. However, after their national bandy team was created and they qualified for the 2014 World Championship, the image of Somalis started to improve, which contributed positively to both the players' and other Somalis' integration into Borlänge. Despite the fact some of the locals expressed initial prejudice towards Somalis in Sweden; the majority of the population was supportive and welcoming from the very beginning (Shearlaw, 2016). Based on the studied media articles, interviews and the documentary, it can be concluded that Sweden was able to change for the better and to set a positive example to the world about the successful reception and integration of migrants.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Media Framing of Refugees

Juxtaposing Ukrainian and African Refugees in the Wake of Russia-Ukraine Conflict¹

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Abstract:

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The resulting conflict has led to approximately 14,059 civilian casualties of which roughly 5,767 people have died and a further 8,292 got injured as of October 2022. Seven million people are internally displaced. Europe, as of October 2022, was faced with the largest and fastest refugee movement since the end of the Second World War. Five million Ukrainians have been forced to seek asylum in the neighbouring states, the majority of whom have fled to Poland. In this context, this study focuses on media framing of Ukraine and African refugees destined for Europe in international media: Al Jazeera English, ABC News, CBS News, France 24, TRT World, BBC News, Sky News, CNN, and DW. The media were selected because of their wide coverage, reach, as well as time dedicated to reporting on the issues of immigrants and refugees. The authors took a constructivist approach in which Framing and Agenda Setting theories provided a framework for identifying and explicating frames. Two dominant frames emerged in the analysis of 23 video clips that covered Ukrainian and African refugees: the human-interest and the security frames. The human-interest frame is commonly used in news and it essentially serves the purpose of portraying the emotional angle to the presentation of an issue. The Ukrainian refugee crisis contrasted with the African refugee crisis through the human-interest frame, the former was portrayed as victims of the barbaric acts by Russia led by a merciless tyrant with imperialist and expansionist objectives. The second frame – the Security Frame – applied mostly to African refugees fleeing to Europe. The selected media outlets covered African refugees fleeing to Europe especially through Spain, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Italy through the security lens compared to the Ukrainian refugees.

Keywords:

Media frames; Africans; refugees; human-interest; security frame; Ukraine.

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Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine, marking the start of one of the major wars in Europe since World War Two. As of September 2022, there were an estimated 7,283,716 Ukrainian refugees recorded across Europe (UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2022). Ukraine's neighbouring states justifiably received the majority of these individuals. An estimated 1,194,642 million refugees and 1,412,425 million refugees were in Poland and Russia respectively, which are hosting the largest number of asylum seekers in the region. Other hosting states include Moldova (82,700), Romania (83,321), Slovakia (79,770), Hungary (25,800), and Belarus (9,820) (BBC News, 2022). The handling of refugees from Ukraine continues to shed light on the issue of Europe's migration policy, as the inequalities between the treatment of refugees resulting from the Ukraine-Russia crisis juxtaposed with the treatment of refugees from Syria and Africa, especially North Africa. Glaring differences in the reception of Ukrainian nationals fleeing Ukraine in comparison to foreign nationals fleeing Ukraine also emerged during this period.

According to Stanford's Immigration Policy Lab scholar, David Laitin, the rate at which Ukrainian refugees were fleeing Ukraine to the rest of Europe, was five times faster than the flow of refugees from Syria or North Africa. Despite this expedited rate, it was never expected that Ukrainian refugees would have to endure the same systemic failures in the European migration policy as their counterparts from Syria or North Africa, as witnessed in the 2014/2015 Refugee Crisis (De Witte, 2022). This is because, as the Ukraine-Russia crisis started, the European Union (EU) implemented the Temporary Protection Directive, which offered an expedited stay, residence, and work status for any Ukrainian citizens and eligible Ukrainian residents leaving Ukrainian (Fragomen, 2022). In contrast, the 2014/2015 refugees were afforded no such rights. For instance, they were not permitted to work until after their asylum applications were approved. This proved frustrating to the refugees as an increased application waiting time made it less likely for a person to secure a job (De Witte, 2022).

Secondly, when there was an influx of refugees from Syria and Africa into Europe during the 2014/2015 humanitarian crisis, the majority of them poured into Greece. Under the EU's Dublin Convention, it was expected that the first state to register an asylum seeker would both administer the application and provide housing (De Witte, 2022). Greece was largely unequipped to do so, thus, leading to a disorganized and desperate re-migration throughout Europe, with refugees under continued fear of being repatriated. Germany ended up taking responsibility for a significant number of refugees. Ukraine's neighbouring states on the other hand have taken initial responsibility for the Ukrainian refugees and working assiduously to register the incoming flow of people (Fragomen, 2022). Housing and ready entry into the European Labour Market are not the only benefits that have been afforded to the Ukrainian Refugees, the medical needs of these persons have also been addressed (NPR, 2022).

While the EU's Temporary Protection Directive is meant to ensure that asylum seekers have an easier time as they exit Ukraine, this treatment has not been universal. Before the directive



was agreed upon at the end of February 2022, reports of discrimination were documented as thousands of persons made their way out of Ukraine. Human Rights Watch highlighted that foreigners crossing borders out of Ukraine reported delays as they attempted to flee the war (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Many of those interviewed were foreign students, and a pattern of blocking or delaying foreigners from boarding trains and buses was noted, as well as the prioritization of Ukrainian women or children over foreign nationals. The treatment of African students and African long-term residents in Ukraine as they attempted to cross borders to safety drew international attention and resulted in a statement from the African Union (AU) (African Union, 2022). The statement outlined “that all people have the right to cross international borders during the conflict, and as such, should enjoy the same rights to cross to safety from the conflict in Ukraine, notwithstanding their nationality or racial identity” after which the AU concluded that it went against International Law to signal out any individuals.

Media Coverage of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

Media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has followed patterns and treatment similar to those of other major crises including the 2014 Ukraine crisis when Russia formally annexed Crimea. Major news outlets around the world have “embedded journalists in Ukraine to cover bombings and violence in hard-hit towns and cities across broadcast, digital, and print media” (Eddy & Fletcher, 2022, para. 1). Reporters, politicians, civilians, human rights organizations, and UN agencies also took to social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram to document the shocks of the war in real-time. The humanitarian crisis that unfolded in Ukraine, along with the scale of the Western response to Russia’s invasion, has had far-reaching political and economic effects.

However, unlike some of the media coverage of other crises (except the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia), media organizations, especially the Western media, were criticized by experts, analysts, and reporters alike as prejudiced, duplicitous, promoting their propaganda, and providing double standards compared to the coverage of invasions and wars in the Middle East and Africa. The use of phrases describing Ukrainians such as ‘middle class European’, ‘they are not like Iraq’, ‘Christian’, ‘blonde’, ‘civilized’, and ‘blue eyed’ had the implications that other conflicts in the post-World War Two were inconsequential and insignificant collocated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. *Al Jazeera* was forced to apologize for comments that Peter Dobbie, their journalist made on air when he described Ukrainians fleeing their country as ‘prosperous, middle-class people,’ ‘obviously’ not refugees fleeing the Middle East or North Africa: ‘They look like any European family that you’d live next door to’ (Pavlik, 2022). In yet another illustration of racism, Daniel Hannan, a journalist with *The Telegraph* (United Kingdom) was shocked to ‘discover’ that Ukrainian refugees resembled him using phrases like ‘seem so like us’ and ‘that is what makes it so shocking and that ‘Ukraine is a European country’ and ‘its people watch Netflix and have Instagram accounts, vote in free elections and read

uncensored newspapers. War is no longer something visited upon impoverished and remote populations' (Pavlik, 2022).

Research Questions

Media framing of conflicts especially major wars and attendant implications including the refugee crisis has a direct implication on how the general public, especially those entangled in the conflict, perceive the causes, consequences and importance of those conflicts. Media framing of such issues is manifested in the amount of media coverage dedicated to them and the phrases and words used to “describe the actors and events in that conflict. The type of framing employed determines whether the public will empathize with one of the sides involved or feel detached from events taking place far from them” (Evans, 2010, p.209). Indeed, audio-visuals shape people’s perceptions of the world and have the capacity to become political forces themselves. If news media are able to guide and shape public opinion through the framing present in news content, it is important to study the way stories about immigrants and refugees are presented to the public. In view of this conceptualization, media framing of refugees is critical in determining the political, social, and cultural perceptions of various ‘types’ of refugees regardless of circumstances. This study, therefore, sought to respond to the following two questions:

Research Question 1: What are the dominant media frames in the coverage of Ukrainian refugees following the Russia-Ukraine conflict in some of the world's leading television stations?

Research Question 2: How does the media coverage of Ukrainian refugees compare with African refugees seeking asylum in Europe in these media outlets?

Method

The broad objective of this study was to compare the dominant media frames in the media coverage of refugees as a result of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and those from Africa seeking asylum in Europe. Qualitative Content Analysis of news clips from select international media stations that have been covering the refugee crisis was conducted. Qualitative Content analysis is one of the most commonly used research methodologies in media and communication research. Wimmer and Dominick (2011) summarize the use of content analysis as a systematic, objective, quantitative overview of a body of news media content. A content analysis must systematically collect a sample of content for analysis from a larger population of content. All content in the sample selected must have an equal chance of being evaluated. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), the sampling process and analysis must be objective and free of the researcher’s personal biases. Therefore, in order to sufficiently respond to the research questions, a qualitative content analysis of news clips or



videos from Al Jazeera English, ABC News, CBS News, France 24, TRT World, BBC News, Sky News, CNN, and DW News was conducted.

Sample

23 news clips from the aforementioned leading television stations in the world were retrieved from online archives and analysed (media archives and YouTube). Some of the keywords and phrases used to mine these videos include European migrant crisis, 'Ukrainian refugees'; 'media coverage of Ukrainian refugees'; 'media coverage of African refugees'; 'African students leaving Ukraine'; 'Syrian refugees in Europe'; 'African refugees in Europe'; 'Refugees in the world'; 'how is Europe dealing with refugees?'; 'refugees in Europe'; 'African refugees in Morocco and Spain'; 'Ukrainian refugees in span, refugee crisis.' The researchers also visited the websites of these stations and obtained some of the videos.

The selection of these news videos was partly informed by their wide coverage, reach, as well as the time dedicated to reporting on the issues of refugees. The selection was also informed by the language of transmission (that is English), and the availability of these clips via online sources including the host stations' archives. It is also worth noting that all the identified television stations covered the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the ensuing refugee crisis and the African refugee crisis substantively. While other television stations not included in this analysis covered the above-mentioned topics of concern, their coverage was either not consistent or omitted one part of the analysis (either Ukrainian refugees or African refugees).

The time period of news clips or videos covering the Ukrainian refugee crisis was between February 2022, when the conflict began precipitating a refugee crisis and August 2022, at the time of this analysis. The news clips or videos covering the African refugee crisis stretch back five years – that is, 2018 - in order to obtain a sufficient number for comparison. Of note, there was a negligible number of new sources from these organizations covering African refugees between February 2022 and August 2022 thus making it difficult to make comparisons. Researchers are cognisant of various media biases in reporting certain news items including the refugee crisis across the world and the analysis was conducted with this and many other factors in consideration. The selection of the video data meets Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed four criteria for evaluating interpretive research work: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Coding Procedure

This study used inductive analysis where the researchers reviewed the 23 videos after which codes emerged vis a vis the dominant narratives in the treatment of refugees in the two scenarios Ukraine refugees and African refugees seeking asylum in Europe. The inductive analysis process uses inductive reasoning, by which themes and categories emerge from the data through the researcher's careful examination and constant comparison (Patton, 2002). This approach enabled the researchers to make meaning from the video data and develop appropriate themes and findings for analysis.

Results

Presentation of Ukrainian Refugees in Broadcast Media

More than half of the videos in this study utilized words and phrases indicative of a human-interest frame. For instance, a number of media houses were quoted describing the fleeing Ukrainians as *people like us, educated, intelligent, and culturally close*. One of the presenters in Al Jazeera argued: *"...we are playing the latest pictures of people who are trying to get to trains out of Ukraine...what is compelling is just looking at them, the way they are dressed, these are prosperous middleclass people. These are not obvious refugees trying to get away from areas in the Middle East in a big state of war or North Africa. They look like any European family that you would live next door to."*

The portrayal of Ukrainian refugees as inimitably different from any other, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, is an effort to implicitly infer that they are unique. Another journalist from CBC News said: *"Now with the Russians marching in, it has changed the calculus entirely. Tens of thousands of people are trying to flee the city; there will be many more. People are hiding out in bomb shelters. But this isn't a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan that has seen conflict raging for decades. These are relatively civilized, relatively European – I have to choose those words carefully too – city where you would not expect that, or hope that is going to happen. So, it is partly human nature, but they are not in denial."* The portrayal of Ukraine as a western country that has been pierced by the barbaric assault of the Russians has been a running thread in the media's framing of the war.

In a news clip by France 24, Ukrainian refugees are shown arriving in Paris and being welcomed by Red Cross where a reception area has been specially opened for these Ukrainian refugees. A government official says, *"At this stage, we can deal with refugees arriving from Ukraine. We will welcome them with dignity and ensure that all families have somewhere to stay."* In Lisbon, Portugal, Angelo Neto, Head of the Ukraine Refugees Association added that *"...as an association, we are going to the system at all levels: psychological, educational, food and medical support so that they can start to integrate into the society here in Portugal."* The clip also shows a minor who has already been integrated into an elementary school and appears to be comfortable while another one shows refugees disembarking from a plane with their luggage and being received by humanitarian organizations and law enforcement agencies.

In a BBC News clip in the formative days of the war, a commentator says that he is furious that European people with blue eyes and blond hair are being killed every day. Here is an excerpt: *"It is really emotional maybe because I see European people with blue eyes and blond hair and children being killed every day with Putin's missiles..."* In yet another clip by BBC, a child, about 10 years is shown crying while trying to hide behind a canvas in cold weather. It also shows a group of Ukrainian refugees on the Polish border lining up for either registration or relief food. A reporter says that she cannot film inside the building because she respects the privacy of the 'exhausted' Ukrainian refugees: *"We have been here and, in many places,*



and the dynamics are continuously changing. And there are people milling around and a lot of people arrived by buses. They have just come from the border and they have been led to a warehouse...and we are not filming inside because we respect the people privacy. They are exhausted and tired...but inside there are rows and rows and rows of canvas where people can sleep.”

In an ABC newscast, an anchor says that *“more than half of the 660,000 people fleeing Ukraine are children. It is a very tough reality at the Ukraine border...you know you have mentioned a number of times that story has impacted you not as a journalist but as a dad. Am curious, you have been there for a while now and you are interacting with these families, with these kids and you think of your own kids. Have you heard talked with your kids about this?”* The journalist says that he is empathetic with the situation. He further states that Polish citizens are open to Ukrainians because they are human and should be embraced given the tragic circumstances back at home. A journalist in the same news clip further says, *“Each refugee is unique. They all have their own experiences and some have nothing when they come to this country while others have family and friends. We spoke to one woman...she is here with her two kids. Her husband is in Ukraine to fight. Think about this, a week and a half weeks ago, she had a normal wonderful life but tonight, their life is in shambles.”* This same group of refugees were also pictured in warm clothing singing their national anthem while displaying their country’s colours. One of the Ukrainians interviewed is also shown crying interspersed with past pictures of their families happily married. In essence, the media station was trying to bring to the fore the human aspect of the crisis. The mayor of the unidentified town encourages the refugees: *“This is your second home. Treat us as your friends”* He further assured them that it is a safe place.

Depiction of African (including the Middle East) Refugees in Europe

On the other hand, in the analysis of media framing of African refugees fleeing to Europe, most news clips showed these refugees through a ‘security frame’. In an *Al Jazeera* interview, Marcin Przydacz, Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that Poland was refusing to admit refugees from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa fronting varied reasons in sharp contrast with the ‘warm embrace’ of Ukrainian refugees. The video shows refugees from North Africa and the Middle East fleeing conflict and other life-threatening circumstances being met with teargas, restrained with barbed wire, and forced to spend outside in extreme weather conditions. The video shows scores of refugees trying to breach a barricade with hundreds of police officers on standby to whip them back to the border. The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs contends that his country is trying to protect the European border and that those who want to enter should legally do it by obtaining a valid visa. He further argues that most of the refugees are actually invited by Belarusian president Lukashenko to be smuggled to the European Union to carry out Lukashenko’s political activities. In the same news clip, the news anchor poses a question about a Congolese family who was turned away from the Polish border even after pleading with the immigration officers to grant it asylum. In response, Mr.

Przydacz argues that if they allow them to get into Poland, it will be encouraging others to cross the border illegally and that they are regular migrants.

In yet another *Al Jazeera* news clip, there is a sharp departure in the usage of terminologies such as refugees, despite a clear indication that those fleeing from their countries have virtually the same reasons as Ukrainians – that is conflict or political persecution. In this clip, various military equipment can be seen on the coast of Spain ready to send back refugees trying to cross over to the country from Morocco. A journalist narrates the happenstances: *“A show of force with beach still littered with rubbish after 8,000 migrants arrived here this week. Mos swim from neighbouring Morocco. They record influx following days of detention and diplomacy between Spain and Morocco. On the Moroccan side of the border, security forces attempted to push back migrants on Wednesday.”* Sirens from ambulances and police vehicles can be heard with some of the refugees attempting to cross over to Spain. Throughout this news clip, there is a heavy presence of military forces. Africans can also be seen swimming dangerously across the sea and the journalist is reporting that some have died in this attempt.

On *ABC Newsline*, refugees from Africa, India, and the Middle East fleeing from Ukraine can be seen begging security and immigration officers from Poland to let them into the train saying: *“We don’t have arms. We are students. This is unfair. This is unfair”* Another black student says: *“When we reached the border just to get the exit stamp, we waited for many hours, while Ukrainians had the right to use buses we had to walk, we were really shocked...we didn’t come to Ukraine as asylum seekers, we came as foreign students. We paid money. We paid a lot of money.”* It is also worth noting that the video recording shown on *ABC Newsline* is an amateur video taken by a phone, most likely from one of the African students trapped in Ukraine. Again, juxtaposed with the high-quality professional videos featuring Ukrainian refugees in Poland and other countries, there is a significant difference in terms of framing.

On *TRT World*, a journalist features the plight of African and Middle Eastern refugees in Spain particularly from Afghanistan, Mali, Sudan, and Somalia. They show the palpable difference in the reception and treatment of Ukrainian refugees in Europe and the situation in Spain where 80,000 people have been waiting for a response on their refugee status for years. The video shows some of the refugees in a crowded makeshift camp near the sea in total disregard of hygiene and civility. This is contrasted with the situation in Ukraine where more than 17,000 Ukrainians have been given international protection. Jaume Dura from Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid had this to say: *“It is a completely different circumstance, because of the political will to articulate an EU directive which has not been done in other cases like the war and exodus of Syria, for example.”* The journalist continues to narrate that migrants and activists hope that the Ukrainian crisis will show European countries that things can be done differently and quickly. And that Ukrainians shouldn’t be an exception but the start of how Europe treats its refugees.

An *AL Jazeera Exclusive* also covers refugees fleeing Africa and the Middle East. It shows refugees hiding in cargo trucks and behind the wheels of big trucks with the intention of



crossing over to Europe. Once arrested, they are immediately handcuffed and bundled into a police truck for onward processing. The depiction of helpless refugees being violent arrested and mistreated by law enforcement agents is a sharp divergence in the treatment of Ukrainian refugees.

Discussion

This segment responds to the research questions: *What are the dominant media frames in the coverage of Ukrainian refugees following the Russia-Ukraine conflict in some of the world's leading television stations? How does the media coverage of Ukrainian refugees compare with African refugees seeking asylum in Europe in these stations?* In media framing studies, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) advance five news frames: attribution of responsibility, conflict, economics, human interest, and morality. A *conflict frame* reveals the “conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interests” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). A *responsibility frame* infers culpability for the matters' cause or solution, which often falls within the purview of governments, individuals, or communities (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96; Zhou, 2008). An *economic frame* places emphasis on the economic impact of the phenomenon on an individual, society, or nation (Luther & Zhou, 2005; Valkenburg et al., 1999). A *human-interest frame* focuses on narratives that evoke emotions in order to create an emotional reaction (Cho & Gower, 2006). A *morality frame* places a phenomenon within the context of ethical or social norms (Zhou, 2008). *Security frames*, which are not part of Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)'s dichotomy of frames, are used to describe refugees as potential threats to other countries and thus the justification (Esses et al., 2013).

In view of these frames and the analysis of the video data, three dominant frames emerge: *Human-Interest* and *Security Frames* emerge. Media often uses human-interest frames to attract and retain audience attention. These frames are also dominant in times of crisis, often with the intention of eliciting a public response (Cho & Gower, 2006). Cho and Gower (2006) explored the implications of a human-interest frame by exposing participants to news coverage of a crisis in either a human-interest frame or a non-human-interest frame. Results indicated participants exposed to human-interest frames were more likely to have an emotional response to the crisis and their emotional response was a “significant predictor of blame and responsibility in a transgression crisis” (p. 420).

Dissecting media coverage of the Ukrainian refugee crisis contrasted with the African refugee crisis through a human-interest frame, the former was portrayed as victims of the barbaric acts by Russia led by a merciless tyrant with imperialist and expansionist objectives. Virtually every media station made reference to the origin of the refugee crisis pointing at Russia as the source of the humanitarian crisis. Similarly, in line with the human-interest frame indicators, most of the media outlets mostly reported empathetically of the crisis utilizing words and phrases such as ‘*innocent children*’, ‘*family*’, ‘*helpless victims of war*’ among others.

The framing of the refugees was meant to invoke sympathy for victims of a manmade crisis by constructing around the depiction of suffering and misery that Ukrainian refugees were facing. This was done by demonstrating that the conflict has not only deprived Ukrainians of their survival right but have also caused extremely heavy civilian casualties and damage to property. One of the presenters in Al Jazeera aptly brings this to the fore “...we are playing the latest pictures of people who are trying to get to trains out of Ukraine...what is compelling is just looking at them, the way they are dressed, these are prosperous middle-class people. These are not obvious refugees trying to get away from areas in the Middle East in a big state of war or North Africa. They look like any European family that you would live next door to.” Deliberate or not, consciously or otherwise, the depiction of Ukrainian refugees in such light invoked emotions across the world in direct contrast with African refugees.

The news clips focusing on Ukrainian refugees were also inundated with images of destroyed buildings, military artillery, fleeing refugees, and the forlorn faces of the victims. Expectedly, the media portrayed the invasion as a terrible event which has caused a massive human tragedy with both immediate global consequences as well as unpredictable and potentially disastrous long-term implications. While the gravity of the conflict cannot be understated, the reporting, when contrasted with the coverage of the African or Middle Eastern refugees, does not draw similar imageries and metaphors from the media.

This finding mirrors other studies on the same subject. In a study on framing of refugees in German newspapers in which the researcher sought to establish the differences in the framing of the 2022 Ukrainian refugee movements in contrast to the Syrian refugee movements in 2015 in German popular media, Jäger (2022) found out that the human-interest frame was dominant across the selected papers: “...every newspaper used a positively connotated - “positive” and “willingness to help” - humanitarian frame at least six times” (p. 19). Liu (2019) used mixed methods following the framework of generic frames, diagnostic and prognostic frames to compare the news coverage of the Ukraine crisis in Russia and the UK from 30 November 2013 to 26 February 2014. Liu (2019) found that *The Guardian* applied more human interest and morality frames compared with the Russian media.

Media reporting indicates that the Ukraine-Russia conflict is the worst in years also flies in the face of peace and conflict experts and serves the purpose of heightening the importance of the conflict while minimising probably more severe ones. The use of the phrase ‘Europe’s first major land war in decades,’ often shows a sense of shock that something like this could happen in Europe, while implicitly signifying that conflicts usually happen in other countries ‘of a different sort.’ It is worth noting that there are other large and deadly conflicts, such as the civil war in Ethiopia which has been going on since late 2020 and has involved numerous atrocities, war crimes, famine, and displacement—all while garnering far less consistent media attention.

The second dominant frame that emerged from the analysis of the video data is the *Security Frame*. Videos from the selected media stations covering African refugees fleeing to Europe,



especially through Spain, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Italy revealed a starkly different picture when collocated with Ukrainian refugees. These videos depict African refugees from a security perspective where instead of being received with dignity and perhaps processed before determining their status, they are, from the outset, subjected to extreme ill-treatment by security agencies in the destination countries. The heavy presence of security forces along the coastline of Spain for example and related installations portray refugees as security threats and their deterrence is of priority for those countries.

In a *CNN* news clip, still images are shown of refugees – who are ostensibly referred to as ‘migrants’ – exhausted and sleeping in the streets of Budapest, Hungary. It is worth noting that in a different video showing Ukrainian refugees in Poland, a journalist restrains from showing inside the building where refugees were resting because she respects the privacy of the ‘exhausted’ Ukrainian refugees: *“We have been here and, in many places, and the dynamics are continuously changing. And there are people milling around and a lot of people arrived by buses. They have just come from the border and they have been led to a warehouse...and we are not filming inside because we respect the people privacy. They are exhausted and tired...but inside there are rows and rows and rows of canvas where people can sleep.”* It is inappropriate and inhumane to take pictures or film Ukrainian refugees resting following long trips in buses or trains but appropriate to film African refugees being beaten and harassed by security forces and being forced into overcrowded trucks and into unhygienic camps.

A *France24* news clip shows two asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone narrating the life-threatening and dreadful journey to Turkey and then Samos, Greece and how they have stayed in the camp for a long time waiting for feedback on their asylum status. Samos camp is a large-scale, isolated camp in Samos, Greece. The journalist describes the camp: *“Safe but also isolated from the rest of the world. The ultramodern centre is located in a deserted area northwest of Samos. Endless barbed wires, secured gates, x-ray scanners, the 360 refugees here are divided by origin and colour-coded by containers. They are not allowed to go out after 8:00pm. Greek authorities are aware that these restrictions are strict.”* The head of the Samos centre who is also featured in the news clip says: *“Security is essential for our residents because they claim to have left their country for security reasons. Greece is on the border between Europe and Asia and East in general. Their role is to protect European borders.”* The journalist further says that the centre cost 43 million Euros funded entirely by the European Union (EU). It has a unique monitoring system with cameras linked directly to the centre. They also show other security items such as an ultramodern drone fitted with a camera with a sound system that provides the agencies with footage. They also show augmented reality 3D glasses that are used to enhance security in and around the camp. The vivid description and depiction of the camp and security features put in place to ensure the refugees are contained within the prison-like camp are given priority over the lives of refugees.

A *DW News* video reveals the security frame in its coverage of Melilla massacre where African refugees were killed trying to cross to Spain. *DW News* shows footage of a stampede at Melilla where 23 African migrants were killed by Moroccan and Spanish forces while attempting to cross from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Melilla. The footage shows the two countries' border forces beating migrants who had been forced onto the ground. It is worth noting that international law provides for the right to move and seek asylum and states have a legal obligation to uphold that right. This trend reflects study findings on the securitization of refugees, especially those from Africa and the Middle East. Securitisation entails "repositioning of areas of regular politics into the realm of security by increasingly using narratives of threat and danger aimed at justifying the adoption of extraordinary measures. The last decade has seen a significant expansion of these narratives, backed by normalisation of measures, operations, laws and policies that were once regarded as extreme. Many continue to regard them as extreme, making the nexus between security and migrants/refugees highly contentious" (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019, para. 2). The current scale of the securitisation of mobility and displacement, particularly of vulnerable people in mixed flows or in refugee situations, is widespread and increasing (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study examined the media coverage of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Europe juxtaposed with the treatment of Africa refugees (in some instances, those from the Middle East) seeking asylum in Europe. It sought to answer two interlinked questions: *What are the dominant media frames in the coverage of Ukrainian refugees following the Russia-Ukraine conflict in some of the world leading television stations? How does the media coverage of Ukrainian refugees compare with Africa refugees seeking asylum in Europe in these stations?* In the wall-to-wall coverage of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, a certain pattern emerged that positioned Ukrainian refugees as different from other victims of conflict, especially Africans fleeing conflict and political persecution back at home. The way media talks about conflicts have the potential to impact those who are already most directly affected by war, refugees. Western media reacted emotionally and with empathy to the plight of citizens of Ukraine, and identified with Ukrainian defenders.

Two dominant frames emerged in the analysis of 23 video clips that covered Ukrainian and African refugees: the human-interest frame and the security frame. The *human-interest frame* is commonly used in news and it essentially serves the purpose of portraying the emotional angle to the presentation of an issue. The Ukrainian refugee crisis contrasted with the African refugee crisis through the human-interest frame, the former was portrayed as victims of the barbaric acts by Russia led by a merciless tyrant with imperialist and expansionist objectives. Similarly, in line with the human-interest frame indicators, most of the media outlets mostly reported empathetically of the crisis utilizing words and phrases such as '*innocent children*'.



'family', 'helpless victims of war' among others. The framing of the refugees was meant to invoke sympathy for victims of a manmade crisis by constructing around the depiction of suffering and misery that Ukrainian refugees were facing. This was done by demonstrating that the conflict has not only deprived Ukrainians of their survival right but have also caused extremely heavy civilian casualties and damage to property.

The second frame – *the Security Frame* – applied mostly to African refugees fleeing to Europe. The selected media outlets covered African refugees fleeing to Europe especially through Spain, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and Italy through the security lens compared to the Ukrainian refugees. The media depict African refugees from a security viewpoint where instead of being received with dignity and perhaps processed before determining their status, they are, from the outset, subjected to extreme ill-treatment by security agencies in the destination countries. The heavy presence of security forces along the coastline of Spain for example and related installations portray refugees as security threats and their deterrence is of priority for those countries. These findings lend themselves to an even bigger picture in the management of refugees in Europe where the securitization of refugees and migrants has increasingly gained traction.

Limitations and Future Research

The study findings relied on a relatively small sample of videos obtained manually through predetermined words and phrases. The inaccessibility of videos and institutional restrictions to their video data forced the researchers to rely on publicly available videos thus leaving out otherwise rich data. Consequently, future research should move beyond what is readily available on YouTube and individual media outlets' websites to purchase the necessary licences that could guarantee access to a larger corpus of news clips for a more detailed analysis. Additionally, researchers should move beyond broadcast media and examine media framing of the refugee and migrant crisis in Africa and Europe in print media outlets to collocate with findings on broadcast media.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Challenging the ‘Western’ Narrative¹

Africa and the Migration Crisis

Jimmy Hendry Nzally²

Abstract:

This article seeks to give a critical analysis on the ongoing migration discourse both from an academic and policy perspective. It provides a perspective of Africa’s long history of hosting migrants and refugees including Europeans. It therefore addresses the question as to whether African states have lived up to their refugee and migration protection commitment. By doing so, it also criticizes Europe’s unfair, aggressive, and inhumanly migration policy towards migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, particularly Africans. By analysing existing data on migration, this article debunks the notion that a migration crisis is by nature an African one as if Africans are the only ones entering Europe. This scapegoating of Africans by portraying the continent at disarray will be examined closely. In that light, the article employs an Africanist line of thinking to deconstruct this narrative. This includes referenced interviews offering perspectives on this subject matter. The key question asked is as to what extent the EU should be accountable for human rights’ violation in third countries? The focus is on European Externalization of its borders to third countries in particular North Africa. It takes as an example the 2022 Melilla massacre described by western authorities as a ‘stampede’ in which migrants and refugees were killed while trying to enter Spain. This massacre took place at the borders between Morocco and Spain.

Keywords:

Migration; stampede; democratization; externalization; human rights.

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Historical Background

Historically speaking, migration is as old as the human race. It is a known and established fact that human species started in Africa about 2.5 million years ago (See Rossi, 2013; Silberman & Bauer, 2012). We can trace this claim from the work of Charles Darwin 1871 book *The Descent of Man*. Africa has hence been established as the cradle of human civilization. Human migration started in Africa to the rest of the other spheres on earth. This is a known fact and has defined human civilization. One can therefore argue that the entire history of our planet somehow relates to migration.

With this background, it is important to have a holistic view of the migration history. This will help to understand and appreciate the migration discourse. The African continent's interaction with the world is largely coerced (Muehlbauer & Ulbrich, 2018), ample seen by slavery. Colonization is a major reference point. What is not talked about is the fact that over 60 million Europeans migrated overseas during the colonialization period from 16th to 20th century (see Mandal, 1981; Daggars, 2013). Colonialism led to mass and force enslavement of Africans to Europe, Americas, and other parts of the world. According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, 12.5 million Africans were forcefully taken to the New World between 1525 and 1866 alone. Out of these statistics only 10.7 million survived the dreaded Middle Passage Journey as they disembark to their respective destinations. What this tells us is the fact that Africa has been the main source of forced migrations in history.

Another important historical perspective to look into is the World Wars (I and II). Europe has long banked on Africa to fight its Wars mainly from 1914 to 1918 and 1939- 1945. Despite these wars being inherently European wars, Africans were forced to fight for their European masters at the time. Untold numbers of Africans were recruited and taken to fight these Europeans wars in various destinations around the world. Despite Africa's contributions through blood, sweat and sacrifice for the liberation of Europe's "free world" agenda, until now, Africa's contributions have often not even been mentioned, celebrated and/or properly documented by the same Westerners who they fought for and who are constantly preaching about human rights and justice for all. As observed by Mhango (2018) not even the numbers of those who died at these wars were accounted for, maybe, 'for fear of disclosing how Africa developed and saved Europe'. It is what led to estimate numbers by historians. There is however an attempt to come up with a rough estimate of over hundreds of thousands (ibid.) African combatants fought in the Second World War.

Post-second world war is another interesting era to analyze. It gave birth to the marshal plan because Europe's economy was destroyed after the Second World War (see Harrison, 1998). The Marshal plan was championed by the USA to save Europe's economies, thereby creating the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This period coincided with nationalism movements that led to the independence of African states by Africans. A reason was that the War made it difficult for colonial powers to maintain and to have firm grip over their colonies. Africans saw an opening after the War to amplify their independent ambition.



This is to say that the same places the colonialists had firmed control over, eventually turn against them. The price for freedom through liberation struggles began to take shape. Furthermore, the defeat of European forces all over Asia as well in Haiti the first successful black led freedom movement also contributed to destroying the myth of European power (Guardian, 2009).

Consequences of the War

Africa as Haven for Refugees

The African continent has long been a safe haven for refugees around the world (also see section on Africa Home of the Biggest Refugee Camps). During World War II, thousands of Europeans sought refuge in Africa while the entire Africa was still under colonial occupation as well as enforced white rule at the time. However, these European refugees were living in refugee camps hosted in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, (Lingelbach, 2020). One such group was the Polish: “Of the more 37, 000 civilians who managed to leave the USSR with the Polish army, more than a half found refuge in Africa” (Piotrowski, 2004: 137). It is ironical at the start of the Russia-Ukraine invasion in February 2022 that blacks Africans were denied entry into other European countries such as Poland and Hungary. Similarly, Jews were hosted in Africa during the holocaust period. It is an established fact that Jews have lived in Africa long before the holocaust. From the 15th century onwards to the outbreak of the World War II, Europe’s prosecuted Jews found refuge in Africa, particularly in East and West Africa (Kissi, 2020).

Europe’s Economic Downfall

In Europe the search for cheap labour intensified in order to rebuild their economics. It thus gave birth to a new ‘economic ambitions’ such as the Windrush movements and less strict visa regulations to attract cheap labor from former colonies such as the Commonwealth countries. Yet again, Africans and other Commonwealth countries in their large numbers came to Europe to help rebuilding their economies. But as UK’s aggressive policy towards migrants began taking shape in what became known as ‘Windrush Scandal’ in 2018 when they threatened to deport the Windrush generation. Despite “living and working in the UK for decades, many were told they were there illegally because of a lack of official paperwork” (BBC 2021). It is therefore evident that Africa and Africans have had long served as the backbone of European economies, security, and freedoms.

Contemporary Discourse

The so-called migration debate is very polarizing in Europe. There is an increasing sentiment that non-Europeans are taking over the EU and that 'white people' will become a 'minority' soon. This theory is well explained in Frey (2018) book *Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America*. The theory as he puts it "minority white" is derived from increasing demographic change for fear of change, losing their privilege status, and total in support of unwanted groups in their communities. Demographic change therefore comes with political and economic consequences. This reduced status or replacement theory is what is driving anti-migration rhetoric especially in conservative networks such as Fox News. One of its anchor Tucker Carlson is reported by the New York Times (May 30, 2022) to have promoted this idea more than 400 episodes in his program. It is not surprising that it is widely used to smear migrants and minority groups in Europe and America.

But is this sentiment true? According to EUROSTAT 2021, about 5 percent of people living in the EU are non-EU citizens. Out of these statistics 40 percent live in Europe because of employment, 28 percent for family reasons, 11 percent education and 21 percent others (including international protection such as asylum). Anything these statistics are showing is the fact that EU's population is still a high majority of native born contrary to how it sounds like that Europe's population is dominated by foreigners. Secondly, the majority of non-Europeans coming to Europe have valid reasons such as work, education etc. Again, it is contrary to what is a common narrative, namely that every immigrant is illegal and would be in Europe due to the migration crisis.

The other key issue is the question of Africans dominating Europe, especially amid the migration crisis. But are African migrants overwhelming Europe? There is no question that migration has risen across the globe. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) World Report 2022, international migrant in 2020 was estimated at 281 million people globally. The report goes further to state that: "The total estimated 281 million people living in a country other than their countries of birth in 2020 was 128 million more than in 1990 and over three times the estimated number in 1970". If anything, these statistics show is the fact that migration is real. In other words, Africa and Africans are not inherently the issue but rather they are used as scapegoating by Western press and politicians (see section on Media Cover up).

What is Africa's share of the global migration? According to Africa Europe Foundation report of 2020 (page 2): "Only 3.0% of the African population are living outside their home country in 2020 compared to 8.5% of the European population". The same report goes further to state the fact that intra-Africa migrations is the main source of migration in Africa: "Intra-African migrations since 2010 have increased by +43.6% compared to +26.0% for Africa-Europe migrations". As result of intra Africa migration many African countries have experienced significant population increase. According to the World Migration Report 2020 population increase is largely witnessed in smaller countries as opposed to big countries such

as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ethiopia which did not make it to the top of the 20 countries witnessing population increase.




Figure 1. Top 20 Countries with the Largest Proportional Change in Africa, 2009-2019. Source: UN DESA, 2019.

These statistics show the fact that Africans are largely migrating within Africa as opposed to the negative picture portraying its population to flee to Europe. Furthermore, African migrants constitute less than 15% of the total migrant population (see chart below) in all world regions other than Africa (Africa Europe Foundation Report, 2020). The same report indicates that out of this 15 percent 82.4 percent live in Africa, 12.7 percent live in Europe, 6.3 Oceania, 5.6 Northern America, 4.8 in Asia, and 0.3 in Latin America & the Caribbean population.

What is not most talked about is the fact Africa is hosting a high percentage of the world refugees. Africa's oldest and biggest refugee camp Dadaad was established in 1991 as a United Nations haven to shelter Somalis fleeing conflicts (Androff, 2022). The chart below shows the refugee population in Africa. It goes to debunk the notion that Africa is not affected by the migration crisis. For instance, Uganda hosted 1.5 million the largest number of refugees in Africa as of 2021. This followed by Sudan 1.1 million and Ethiopia hosted around 821,300 refugees. Thus, the East and Horn of Africa are hosting most refugees in the continent.




Figure 2. World Regions: Share of International Migration Stock. Source: AEFD, 2020.




Figure 3. Number of Refugees in Africa as of 2021, by Country of Asylum-Seeking. Source: Statista, 2022.

Africa's Home of the World's Biggest Refugee Camps

Africa has thus lived up to its refugee and migration protection commitment. In other words, migration and refugee situation has long been an issue which Africa has been grappling with. Not even the smallest countries like The Gambia have been spared. The Gambia is the smallest country in Mainland Africa. It has long fulfilled its refugee obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Convention on status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU - now renamed African Union) convention governing refugee protection in Africa (Koizumi & Hoffstaedter, 2015). Since 1980s the country has been a safe haven for refugees and a large number of them are from southern Senegal in Casamance battling to secede from Senegal. Thus, the country continues hosting thousands of refugees from the continent fleeing wars and conflicts. For instance, during the 1990s, “several thousand refugees fleeing civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone sought protection in the tiny country of the Gambia” (Zanker, 2018: 74). At the pick of the Myanmar conflict on Rohingyas fleeing prosecution in 2015, The Gambia government offered to take in refugees. This eventually led the course to take the Myanmar government to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Therefore, we are not only seeing Africans facing up to its migration and refugee challenge but they are also supporting and standing up for the prosecuted in other parts of the world. It is therefore unfair to sideline the immense contribution and long-standing commitment of African governments to refugee protections. But this truth about Africa is largely sidelined in the context of the migration crisis.

Challenges and Opportunities in Africa's Growing Population

What is not talked about is the fact that Africa is the continent of the future. It is important to acknowledge the fact that Africa has a fast-growing population. By 2050 Africa's population is projected to be 2.5 billion. This would mean that more than a quarter of the world's population would be in Africa. As reported by the Economists (March 26, 2020) “Sub-Saharan Africa's population is growing at 2.7% a year, which is more than twice as fast as South Asia (1.2%) and Latin America (0.9%)”. Between 2000 and 2021 it is reported by Statistic Research Department (July 15, 2022) that Africa's population has been growing from 811 million to 1.37 billion. The chart below by Statistic Research Department (ibid.) provides an overview of Africa's population from 2020 to 2050.




Figure 4. Forecast of the Total Population of Africa from 2020 to 2050. Source: Statista, 2022.

What does this mean for Africa and the world? Of course, it poses both a challenge and an opportunity. Europe is facing an aging population as the most aged continent (Walker, 2019). This comes with a huge challenge for Europe to maintain their welfare standards especially from an economic standpoint. As per Eurostat 2020 report indicated Europe's population would have 'shrunk' by half a million without migration, "given that 4.2 million children were born, and 4.7 million people died in the EU. In 2020, EU population shrunk by about 100 thousand people (from 447.3 million on 1 January 2020 to 447.2 million on 1 January 2021), due to a combination of less births, more deaths and less net migration".

Africa on the other hand will still be in a strong position as it is currently having 60 percent of its population considered younger than 25. Thus by 2030, it is estimated that 30 million youth will enter the labor market. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone 18 million jobs will be needed, but only 3 million are currently being created (Africa Europe Foundation Report, 2020, page 9). Clearly, there is a need to reflect on the pressing population explosion and the challenges it will pose for Africa and the rest of the world.

EU migration Cooperation with Third Countries: Why the EU must rethink its Migration Policy?

How should Europe cooperate with Africa considering the migration situation? Is externalization and anti-migrant rhetoric the solution? And should Europe and European Union face justice for their continues rights' violations meted on refugee and migrants? These questions must first be understood. Firstly, the argument that for Europe to stop the flow of refugees and migrants through security means is proofing to be inhumane, deadly and causing more problems than solutions. Speaking to an EU policy expert (name withheld) on Africa, he acknowledges this reality. The irony is that the same West that preaches about human rights' is failing to live up to its international obligations for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. It is now offshoring its responsibility to third countries after it has championed, signed and ratified 'global' instruments on human rights. Examples thereof are the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees "inherent dignity of all members of the human family" and as well as the 1951 Refugee Convention protects refugees as those people who live outside of their country of national for fear of prosecution base among others on race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

The simple question to asked is that how useful are those global instruments? Or is it that they only application to only to the West as seen in the context of the Russia-Ukraine invasion. An African Diplomat (name withheld) tweeted: "I would love to see a day when we can acknowledge that the Refugee convention is outdated, racist and discriminatory! No wonder it is protected by the mighty few who have no interest in redefining the scope and rights enshrined therein!". This twitter is loaded but also speaks of the frustration as well as the outcry for its inclusion to the present-day challenge facing refugees from other parts of the world.

The statistics speaks volume. Firstly, Europe share of refugees is just 0.6 percent (see Eurostat 2021). Secondly, we rather see the Western countries not owning up to the migration crisis that they caused themselves to a large extent, not least by the wars in Syria, Libya, and other part of the world (see section on Democratization). Thirdly, we see how the Western world was quick to receive and protect refugees from Ukraine as opposed to other refugees coming from war-torn countries. Fourthly, we see more and more unilateral decisions of the West to keep refugees at bay in third world countries, who suffer unimaginable human conditions. Therefore, the current migration tragedy brings to the fore what is described by an interviewed journalist as the Western "hypocrisy" in the context of the migration crisis. These migrants and refugees are treated differently, especially Africans. The chart below explains the number of refugees compared to total population. The share of refugees in the EU is 0.6% compared to its total population.




Figure 1. Number of Refugees Compared to Total Population. Source: UNHCR.

Challenges of Democratization and the Migration Crisis

Democracy is being challenged by the current migration crisis. Michael (2021) argues that the European democracy is being ‘redefined’ due to the migration crisis. It is influenced by socio-political trends to manage immigration, integration, and its growing fear of demographic changes. The West fears of migration associated with economic and demographic changes, so democracy is now seen to be under threat. As democracy Index 2021 states, less than half of the world lives in a democracy. It is thus fair to say that democracy is losing while autocracy is gaining grounds around the world. If anything, this report tells us is the fact that the fight for democracy is now more important to fight for. But the method as well as approach to use is important to avert mass migration.

For ÇOMAK et al (2021) Europe should ‘redesign’ its foreign policy. Instead of the West reneging on the ideals of democracy, it must instead rethink its foreign policy. Even though for long people living under autocratic regime look up to the West and indeed Western values. The Arab Spring in 2011 is a good example in which people revolt against their governments to end autocratic regime. Protest democracy (see Sadiki, 2015) as means to end regime change works in Tunisia and Egypt as opposed to Libya and Syria due to the international interventions. The issue here is not democracy but rather the consequences of international interventions destroyed the countries, thereby forcing people to flee. This is what had precipitated the migration crisis in recent times. It is therefore important that the West must therefore rethink about the use of force to effect democratic change.

The migration crisis brought about a serious debate as to what must have precipitated this migration phenomenon. In other words, should migration be in this way. The Libya case (2011 to date) is linked to democratization to oust a dictatorship. But the question to ask again is



what has become of this project of democratization? How does the willingness of extending democracy around the world affect the legitimacy of democracy? Why does the Libya case help us understand the migration crisis?

The wrong foreign policy of Europe, EU and America played in the current migration crisis. Before the Arab Spring, Libya served as a 'shield' (ÇOMAK et al, 2021) to protect Europe's borders from migrants coming from the Middle East and Africa. Since the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi (1969-2011) the flow of irregular migrations has captured global attention. Especially the years succeeding his fall and thus has reached its peak in 2015 to date. The EU saw an unprecedented flow of migrants reaching the shores of Europe through the Mediterranean seas. On the other hand, the fall of Ghaddafi created turmoil in Libya and rendered the country ungovernable due to rebel factions. It also "facilitated the circulation of weapons of all kinds in the Sahel regions of Niger, Mali and Chad, as well as armed incursions in the northern Nigeria and Cameroon" (Green 2019: 168). This led to migrants and asylum trapped into protracted conflict. The overthrow of Gaddafi country has led to violent chaos rendering migrants with little cash and with no papers vulnerable. In addition, vulnerable Africans were sold as slaves for 400 dollars as reported and documented by CNN (November 13, 2017).

Is Europe's Migration Policy with Third Countries Working?

To avert and to remedy this situation the EU and European countries has entered into migration control security pacts. Externalization of Europe's borders came about due to the migration crisis. As Carrera et al noted (2019), the migration crisis has provoked 'political and legitimization' division in the European Union. The lack of unity in response to the migration crisis brought an externalization approach to the migration. Simply put, externalizations are efforts by the EU/European countries to 'prevent' migrants reaching their borders through external cooperation with third countries. It resulted in extensive border patrol and the cooperation with third countries to keep migrants at bay as means of deterring them from coming to European. As stated on the website of the Commission for human Rights: "Migrants, including asylum seekers, who do manage to enter irregularly Council of Europe member states are often criminalised, locked up in prison-like conditions, and expelled as quickly as possible – even to countries where they risk persecution and torture". As stressed by an international human rights lawyer, this inhumane treatment of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees goes against international law.

For instance, the UK failed to reach an agreement with France to stop migrants from entering its shores. It has thus entered a shipping treaty through its Migration and Economic Development Partnership (announced on April 14, 2022) to send migrants and asylum seekers to Rwanda. This is a country known for its political instability post 1994 genocide (see Wrong, 2021) especially with its neighboring country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Rwanda is ruled by a dictatorship who has been in power since 1994. Paul Kagame has been killing and harassing opponents. As documented by Human Rights Watch (July 7, 2022):

“Between 2019 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented over 30 cases of opposition members, journalists, critics, and activists who have died, disappeared, or ended up in jail”. When he came into power in 1994, he was credited for economic and political transformation. But has still then ruled with an iron fist and changed the constitution which allows him to stay in power until 2034. It is largely argued that the 2003 constitution written under Kagame (Amutabi & Nasong’o, 2013) gave him absolute power to rule the country to date.

The UK’s basic argument is to serve as a deterrent for migrants not to come to Europe using the seas and tackling human traffickers. As the BBC reported (2022), however, a report by MPs from the Home Affairs Committee “has found no evidence that asylum seekers are being deterred by the policy, pointing to estimates that double the number of migrants will arrive in small boats in 2022, compared to the previous year”. The church of England leaders, including the Archbishop of York and Canterbury called this policy “immoral” and at best “shames Britain” and the rest of the world.

Since the announcement of this policy the UK government has been facing opposition as well as economic and legal challenges. “The government says the asylum system costs £1.5bn a year, with more than £4.7m a day spent on hotels to accommodate homeless migrants” (BBC 2022). The policy has been granted approval by the UK Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. However, the policy is on hold due to the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling. Even though UK is no longer a member of the EU but is still part of the Council of Europe. Thus, the judgement has triggered further legal challenges.

Does this treaty contravene with international migration and refugee treaties? But more boldly is the UK’s blatant advocate for deterrent policy. It was on October 15, 2014, in a written statement to Parliament, that Dyce Anelay, Minister of State for the Foreign Office, opposes any plans/support for search and rescue operations to save migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe. The argument is that such support will encourage more migrants to come to Europe. It is not surprising that UK continue to employ such aggressive policy to now deport refugees and migrants reaching their shores to Rwanda. This position goes against the Refugee Convention. Article 33: Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (‘refoulement’) states clearly: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.

Spain and Morocco Massacre on refugees a clear testament of failing “securitization” Policy?

Back to the first point on European Union externalization of its borders: What do we know about this securitization approach to curbing migration? It is anchored in the use of security through bilateral agreements with third countries, to stem the flow of migrants. In other words, cooperation on security - “securitization” – links organized crime and irregular migration as reported by Statewatch (April 28, 2022). It reported that this policy “is in fact



in line with European migration policies, which increasingly criminalise the migration process. Spain, for its part, continues to externalise its southern border in close collaboration with its Moroccan neighbour, thus consolidating an area of rights violations”.

What is the real story behind this inhuman act of humanly aggression towards these fellow human beings, particularly Africans? Firstly, Europe wants to and continues to close its borders by any means. In so doing they employ ‘European policies of externalization’ of the borders of the European Union. The recent developments in Morocco and Spain bring to light the plight of migrants in the context of European Union’s externalizations of its border to third countries. Does the EU externalization of its borders violate international law and human rights’ instruments? Should the EU take responsibility for the gross human rights’ violations meted on migrants and asylum seekers in third countries?

After the recent tragedy on the borders of Nador in Spain and Melilla, the example of Morocco brings to question EU’s migration policy and should awaken our collective human conscience. The videos and images are shocking to the core. One sees dead bodies piled up, the dead bodies still kicked, the wounded beaten, neglected shouted at. The Police and indeed security personnel watching those poor refugees (even if they are migrants) die. Clearly, “Europe is complacent and African blood is yet again in their hands”, an African activist pointed out. How long must we watch? These blatant human rights’ violations must not go unchecked. It is high time that migrants and refugee lives matter the activist relinquish. On the other hand, governments and host of these tragic events are quick to call it a “stampede”. What then is stampede? According to Meriam Webster online dictionary is: “to cause (a group or mass of people) to act on sudden or rash impulse”. The obvious question to ask is why and what causes this stampede?

Let us have a real sense of the situation as reported by EuroMed Rights one of the proactive networks of human rights organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region. As EuroMed Rights press release (June 27, 2022) has indicated that this tragedy has been announced for several weeks. In other words, the harbinger of this human tragedy can be associated with campaigns of arrests through routine riding of camps, which leads to force displacements targeting people migrating to Nador and its region. The press release went further to add that: “For more than a year and a half, people migrating to Nador have been deprived of access to medicine and healthcare, have seen their camps burnt and their property looted, their meager foodstuffs destroyed and even the little drinking water that is available to them in the camps, it is confiscated”. One tends to wonder why the plights of these are ignored for long.

Its failure has been predicted by human rights observers like Migreurop and EuroMed Rights, “lead to more rights violations at the borders”. This is what the world woke up to on June 24. Politico similarly criticizes this cooperation given that Morocco is known for its hardcore treatment of African migrants and refugees. Similarly, it uses its position to either pleased and/or appeased the EU. Thus, Morocco uses migrants to get it what wants from the EU. A case in point is May 2021 in which the Moroccan authorities were criticized by the EU

when 6, 000 people were reported to have entered into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. The question was as to why Morocco normally aggressive border patrols had left them to get through? And the answer was according to Politico (May 16, 2021), with Morocco, the European Union has granted “massive leverage to an unpredictable partner by striking a deal in which Morocco receives assistance in exchange for preventing refugees from travelling into Europe”.

Going by this evidence, it is fair to say that Morocco was acting tough this time to appease the EU. An activist described it as “a servant doing what the master wanted”. Again, it is fair to say that the EU rethink its migration policy based security as it is causing inhumane treatment of Migrants and refugees in third countries. The aim is to deter people from coming to the shores of Europe. How many more incidences and/or people have to die before Europe rethinks its policy? This policy is killing people and creating bitter divide between countries, in particular ports country like Morocco and her fellow Africans. In the same vein, it strains relations between Europe and Africa, and other parts of the world. This all happens at a time when Europe needs better relations with Africa, amid past colonial experience, growing rise of China, and Russia prominence.

Is the Western Media Covering Up?

The challenges of reporting news on migrants and refugees goes into question media coverage in the Western countries. A report by Cardiff School of Journalism (2016) explores media coverage of migrants in five different European countries: Spain, Italy, Germany and Sweden. The focus was between 2014 to 2015; this was at the peak of the migration crisis by compiling thousands of newspaper articles. The report found out that the Swedish press was the most positive and receptive towards refugees and migrants. On the other hand the United Kingdom was the most negative. This negative coverage continues to date.

There is little or no outcry in Europe as it relates to this incident and the many deadly stories about asylum seekers, refugees and migrants' treatment especially in third countries. As observed by an African media expert, while the “global media refuses to report extensively as they would have, had it been a terrorism case (even suspected terrorism). Rather one come across discriminatory headlines about African in particular each time there is a boat arriving in the shores of Europe”. The likes of Nigel Farage known for his far-right views will go to the extent of hosting Facebook live to ginger anti-migration sentiments. Is the media given a blanket cover up? Mainstream media reports are quick to blame to first “call them migrants instead of refugees - a way to scapegoat, and secondly blaming these fellow human beings for their own situation”, a western activist has echoed. As the Times UK reported (June 27, 2022), “deaths occurred when about 2, 000 migrants, some armed with staffs and stones, tried to rush the board”. The same report went further to add that “Some migrants, sub-Saharan Africans desperate to reach Europe, used a sledgehammer and a radial saw to smash and cut their way through the boarder fences and gates”. This kind of reporting said the western



activist “is laughable, racist, and purely aimed at dehumanizing non-white people as mentioned”.

This is typically media propaganda against these fellow human beings. There is couple of points here to note as well. Firstly, the media is quick to classify these fellow human beings as migrants. Secondly, the media will not tell nor share the inhumane conditions which have led to this incident. Thirdly, they as always try and to a large extend have succeeded in framing the African migrants and refugees as aggressive. Fourthly, they were quick to protect the police brutality meted on these fellow human beings. This is sad state of the world right now as interviewed source told me. Emphasis on this point, an EU-Africa policy expert said, “What the West and Western media continue to do is to dehumanize the non-white race”. This must be refuted and condemned in total.

Western double standards towards asylum seekers, refugees and migrants are out there to be seen? As cited by informants. This became clearer when the West, America and Canada decided to offer swift protection for Ukrainians, rightly so. Another interviewed source told, but the same Western states are silent about this tragic incident even during their NATO Summit in Spain, the country in which these fellow human beings were massacred at. They did not even an acknowledgment of the loss of lives. In a recent interview, the Hungarian Foreign in his interview on GB News (2022) with presenter Collin Brazier proudly defended his country’s policy against other races; that Ukrainians are welcomed but “those” other migrants are not, because they “are not like us” and we must keep “Hungary as Hungarian country”. Such blatant racism, open and proud discrimination contributes to the radicalization of the Rest of the World against the West. This happens at a critical junction in which Europe and America need allied outside the Western bubble. The UN vote against Russia shows it. For instance, the world biggest democratic countries outside of the West stayed neutral: Indonesia, India and South Africa.

It is very evident that hostility towards asylum seekers, refugees and migrants is the order of the day. The global impact of racialized border violence is evident across Europe and America and elsewhere. There is no regard for human rights and democracy. As the Guardian reported (2022) migrants were found dead in the back of a truck Scores in the USA. In the Spanish enclave of Melilla people were beaten by authorities and left dead. Similarly, in the Greek border the arrivals are coerced by police daily.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Jimmy Nzally holds a PhD in Political Science at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). He defended his work on democratic change in The Gambia in May 2022. His prior studies include a bachelor's degree in Development Studies (Honours) and a Master's in African History (Cum Laude), both of which were done at the University of The Gambia (UTG). Additionally, he has a second Masters in Linguistics and Literary Studies (Merit). Dr Nzally has multifaceted experiences working in Africa and Europe. He has worked for universities, media outlets, the UN Agencies, NGOs and EU institutions. Skilled at networking, writing projects, public relations and communications. He made media appearances on the BBC, Voice of America and SkyNews. Accolades include Belgium Student Ambassador, The Gambia Youth of Year Award, UNESCO Writing Award, KA107 Grants and twice won the US Federal Assistant Award. He met with world leaders including having a sparkling lunch with the King of Belgium. He is a Board Member of the Diaspora Advisory Board, International Organization for Migration Belgium and Luxembourg.

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Drivers of Chaos in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Warfare¹

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Abstract: Eastern DRC is seriously affected by a protracted warfare involving illicit exploitation of natural resources, corruption, humanitarian crisis and terrorism carried out by armed groups including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Movement of 23 March (M23). According to DRC government, M23 is a terrorist group supported by Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF). Invasion and terrorism drive the war and the chaos. For Rwanda, fighting and chaos derive from ethnic conflicts over land, citizenship, local political power, and state failures. To many observers, ongoing violence and fighting are driven by rent seeking by Congolese military commanders, lack of State authority, distorted rule of law at both national and local levels, the abuse of public office for private gain (corruption), failed defence/security and justice sector reforms, undisciplined civilian armed and unarmed combatants, warlords and opportunist warmongers. Overall, state failures combined with globalized war diseconomy as conducted by multinational companies, failed multiparty system regarding democratic governance system drive ongoing chaos and armed violence, beyond government control and defence capabilities, despite peace agreements and the involvement of international and regional peacekeeping initiatives. Our analysis suggests that the war strategy being used resembles to what McKew refers to as the Gerasimov Doctrine, a chaos theory of political warfare which is used by Russia in Ukraine war.

Keywords:

DRC; chaos; defence; security; Africa.

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With its size of 2,345,410 sq km, about that of Western Europe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The land is 2,267,600 sq km and its inland water occupies 77,810 sq km.

DRC is endowed with exceptional natural resources, including minerals such as cobalt and copper, cobalt, copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron ore, coal, hydropower potential, significant arable land, timber, immense biodiversity, and the world's second-largest rainforest.

The DRC accounts for around 17 percent of global production of rough diamonds. The copper belt running from Katanga to Zambia contains 34 percent of the world's cobalt and 10 percent of the world's copper. About 80 percent of global reserves of coltan, used in the manufacture of mobile phones, computers and other electronic equipment are found in North-Kivu and South Kivu. Mineral traceability schemes are a big problem. Instead of being free from conflicts and wars, mines are causing insecurity and violence. They must be completely demilitarized. Unfortunately, war economy does not allow such a change.

Most people in DRC have not benefited from this wealth. A long history of conflict, political upheaval and instability, and authoritarian rule have led to a grave, ongoing humanitarian crisis. In addition, there has been displacement of populations. These features have not changed significantly since the end of the Congo Wars in 2003.

The DRC is among the five poorest nations in the world. In 2018, about 73% of Congolese, about 60 million people, lived on less than \$1.90 a day. Despite its rich natural and mining resources, this country has one out of six people living in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

To defend the integrity of its immense territory, the government wants to keep a large army. The political objective is not compatible with the goals of the defence and security sector reform (DSR) and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program (DDR-P). Both DSR and DDR-P aim at reducing the size to facilitate management control, discipline, and professionalism. In addition, there is budgetary and monetary constraints. Keeping a larger army is not only costly but, above all, does not help in maintaining control, discipline, and decent conditions of service. Bad conditions of service have been responsible for desertion, looting, corruption and indiscipline among Congolese military and security people. Today, the size and scope of armed uncontrolled and undisciplined soldiers, policemen, intelligence agents, even senior officers, constitute a danger to civilian population. The phenomenon also plays a significant role in the disorganization of combat force and operations. This military disorganization fuels chaos, terrorism, corruption, and conflict escalation which are responsible for higher civilian deaths and casualties in mining zones as Joanna Davies (2021) demonstrates in the following graphs.

DRC conflict deaths and GDP




Table 1: Higher conflict deaths presented by Joanna Davis. Source: Joanna Davies, Senior Economist, Fathom Consulting, “The Resource Curse: Theory and evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 13 May 2021

DRC control of corruption




Table 2: DRC control of corruption as portrayed by Joanne Davis. Source: Joanna Davies, Senior Economist, Fathom Consulting, “The Resource Curse: Theory and evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 13 May 2021.

The scope of death toll, massacres, war crimes and violation of human rights makes Government describes violence armed groups activities to acts of terrorism.

Terrorism

The ADF comes on top of terrorist groups operating on the Congolese territory. 2021 was the group's most operationally transformative year since joining the Islamic State around 2017. The ADF was both pushing and being pulled toward adopting the norms and practices of its adopted parent organization. In addition to newly implementing the tactic of suicide bombings, the group exports its violence inside and outside the country and recruits foreign fighters. It clashes frequently with other armed groups within the country and publicly emphasizes horrific proselytization within the DRC by filming and releasing beheading videos. It specializes in fabricating and using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in order to spread fear by killing as many people as possible. Terror images and videos are broadcast through media to reach out to the Islamic State as propaganda strategy.

The Congolese branch of the Islamic State's Central Africa Province started as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda in the mid-1990s competing for leadership of the state-recognized authority governing Uganda's Muslim community. It was defeated by Ugandan security forces and ran away into Congo. Like other armed groups, it survives through the illegal economic activity and exploitation of natural resources that fuels conflict and violence.

Strong cooperation is needed among national and provincial authorities as well as with neighbouring countries and the International Community to fight armed groups and stop resource conflicts. Because of the ADF's foreign origin and the use of mass killing and tortures as war strategy, the Movement of 23 March (M23) is referred to as a terrorist movement.

The Movement of 23 March: M23

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) disagreed with the government about the report written by its team of international experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UNHRC A/HRC/51/60 (51 session, 12 September–7 October 2022) objects to the DRC government decision qualifying the M23 rebels as a terrorist group.

According to UN experts groups, there is no terrorism in the DR Congo since there is no evidence for any link to Islamic group. Yet DRC government calls the movement of 23 March (M23) a terrorist movement supported by the Rwandan government."

Yet government position can be justified considering a high-level definition of terrorism can be drawn from Resolution 1566 which points out 2 elements:

(a) An objective element: which is a "crime" of definable size and scale (this is considered to be the most uncontroversial element of the definition)

(b) A subjective element: which reflects a certain motivation or intention on the part of the perpetrators (this is an element that can be found in almost all definitions of terrorism used in national laws). Resolution 1566 singles out three major motivations namely: the will to create a state of terror; the will to intimidate a population; the will to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.



Why UNHR council DENIAL

There is fear that calling M23 terrorist will compromise efforts in favour of peace building policies in the Eastern Congo because:

- Linking M23 to the ADF and the Islamic State without factual evidences is likely to privilege a military solution at the expense of dialogue or more complex options such as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, and Reintegration program (DDRRR-P) deals with illegal foreign armed groups in the DR Congo, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and National Front for Liberation – Burundi (FNL). Because of higher conflict-related violence, the United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2612 (2021) mandated the DDRRR program with the charge of reducing community or mass violence (CVR). The Program is now defined as “DDR/RR-CVR”. The reality is that the comprehensive and voluntary Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups as well as the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups for the long-term stability and economic development of the DR Congo did not yield expected results in terms of peacebuilding and state building. The Rwandan armed group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) is still active too. Currently Rwanda uses the pretext of FDLR to back up the M23 agenda despite the fact that Rwandan Defence forces (RDF) were allowed to enter the DRC in order to fight FDLR rebels according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009).
- UNHR objection argues that calling M23 a terrorist group is likely to repeat the French mistakes in the Sahel or the American mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will be difficult to negotiate with terrorists. It also argues that the elimination of M23 does not guarantee that sustainable peace will be restored in the DRC since there are many other armed groups in the region (ADF-Nalu – to be distinguished from the ADF, Mai-Mai Simba, Mai-Mai Mazembe, Nduma Defence of Congo, Mai-Mai Kyandega), without excluding undisciplined elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).
- UNHR concludes that militaristic response to the M23 is likely to close all doors to political and diplomatic dialogue and even further into extremism or radicalism which is wrong because only a small minority of radicals among M23 use strategic violence.

Therefore, there is need to explore alternative explanations to failed peacebuilding and state building solutions responsible for the chaos and security dilemma affecting peace and reconstruction in the DRC.

The Security dilemma: all alternative solutions failed

T Neethling (2014) and many other analysts point out failures of all peace initiative in these terms: “Despite a commendable effort of the United Nations (UN) since 1999 to bring peace

and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the country continues to face several challenges that pose a constant threat to the fragile transition and consequently, undermine its security. Although the DRC is no longer involved in large-scale armed conflict, it remains a country and society in perpetual turmoil. In the DRC, there was simply too little progress for a truly transformative peace, particularly in the violent eastern parts. In other words, the ideal of a positive, sustainable (let alone perpetual) peace in the country has largely been a vision encapsulated in paper peace agreements but had not filtered down too many Congolese citizens' everyday life. Despite laudable progress in some areas of peacebuilding, the threat or potential outbreak of low-intensity conflict in the eastern DRC remains a reality". (Neethling, 2014)

Let us be straight: there is war in the DRC. Now there is a higher to have fully fledged war between DRC and Rwanda. UN Experts just confirmed Rwandan Invasion/aggression which the DRC government and people have claiming since the 1990s.

Managing the risk is the key question.

- The risk can be managed by controlling conflict resources occasioned the competition between armed groups, greedy foreign States and the Congolese State failures. In fact, control of strategic minerals, especially gold and coltan has been a major factor in the conflict in the east of the DRC. The self-financing nature of war helps both local and foreign armed belligerents to survive and fund war activities. It is up to the Congolese government to assess such risk and devise relevant policies and strategies to control adverse risks affecting the legal exploitation of resources.
- Managing the risk goes beyond a simple struggle over natural resources because of the complexity of the root causes of the conflict. The root causes include other factors such as inter-ethnic conflict over land, citizenship and local political power undermining national cohesion, state building and peacebuilding initiatives.
- Risk management may require to effectively address rent seeking by regular soldiers and commanders which compromises the defence and security sector reform or the building of a unified and disciplined army and thwarts economic reconstruction.
- Restoring State authority and the rule of law at national and local levels. Administrative control over mines, forests and other natural and strategic resources must be re-established at the level of local and national authorities.
- Seriously reducing the abuse of public office for private gain and unjust illicit enrichment.
- Reforming governance of the Defence and Security sector (including the army, police and justice system) is crucial and a priority. Cost-effective and efficient management of Security and defence resources is crucial to reduce dependency of the military on the local economy in general and on mining areas in particular because ongoing violence, armed conflict and wars go hand in hand with ongoing military occupation of mines and illicit exploitation of natural resources and illicit taxation in which soldiers, rebels, police, foreign, local and even civilian armed and unarmed combatants are all involved.



- Distinguishing disciplined civilian armed and unarmed combatants involved into resistance movements fighting against invaders and aggressors from opportunist criminals and warlords. Such distinction is justified by what is called today alternative governance system.
- Establishing Alternative Governance Systems (AGS) is becoming an important alternative/palliative solution to government failures in many developed and developing countries. While government refers to formal rules, governance refers to good order and working relations. More and more governments are unable or unwilling to establish good order and working relationships with their own citizens. Many communities lost trust in government and consider the state is as predator (only concerned with tax maximization). Consequently, there are diverse governance arrangements and new governing systems around the world, including the resurgence of “traditional” or customary forms of governance. Considering the diversity of governance structures existing outside of the formal systems of government may be an option that enable people to realize their goals provided that mechanisms of leveraging their governance capacity are also considered. State failures combined with market failures and party politics failures are developing and promoting community-based political, economic and security governance. This is why some armed groups in the DRC build their grievances on ethnicity, territoriality and secessionist federalism.

“If the state puts itself above the law out of an alleged need for self-preservation and inner peace, we have a serious problem. And the very existence or appearance of this state need constitutes a “state of emergency.” Therefore, the dictatorship of the state is a reflection of the internal problems and contradictions of democracy itself. A dictatorship of this kind is then not the opposite of democracy, even if the government has a strong, authoritative leader or a government, the ruling policy, capable of maintaining the unity of the state and order. The reason for this is that (or if) the state claims it temporarily suspends the “false democracy” with the aim of establishing a “true democracy,” i.e. with the aim of restoring constitutional order. Yet such a state, such a policy and such a government can in principle and theoretically be in good faith and have good intentions - with the people, with its people. But historical experience shows that this is usually not the case. Or rather, it never is [...] I believe that communitarianism can be a good political alternative. Understood as social liberalism and as a social democracy based on the rule of law, morally founded on social solidarity as a fundamental value... A strong and interventionist state is needed to realize the constitutional possibilities of a high-quality welfare state, effectively protected social rights, the realized social function of property and a society based on solidarity.” (Teršek, 2021, pp. 47-48)

Drivers of Chaos

Chaos in the Eastern DRC armed conflicts and warfare constitute a bigger challenge to defence and security management in the country. The Congolese government has been failing to adequately resource its security and defence sector despite various peace arrangements

including Security and Defence sector Reform, foreign military cooperation and assistance etc. Government provides the troops or funds necessary to the army (FARDC), the police (PNC), the intelligence (DEMIAP and ANR) to prevent or eradicate armed groups activities and invasion by the neighbouring countries but fighting and violence continue. It looks like troops are only deployed and operations are funded when war erupts. Even so available resources are not sufficient due to the fact that the success of the armed groups including the movement of the 23 March (M23) is essentially due to underfunding and mismanagement (corruption) in the defence and security sector governance. Brief funding is often mobilized when the country is already at or in war. Under such circumstances, defence and security failures are basically compounded by erratic programming and funding, and a total lack of effective control over spending and the contracting effort. This leads to massive waste, gross inflation of prices in conflict areas, a pervasive climate of corruption, and abuses by power brokers (public and private). This vastly increases the cost of the war, seriously hurts the regular Congolese economy, and damages the reputation of the Government in relation to defence budgeting and spending. Defence policy and budget are not cost-effective. Field operations do not yield expected results, do not produce peace, security and stability which are need for democratic governance and socioeconomic development.

Indeed, resource issues are a major problem. But the broader failures in war effort include MONUSCO failures, and unsuccessful political decisions to capitalize on peace agreements, peacebuilding and state building initiatives.

Today, the peace and democracy process did not stop warfare despite holding regular elections.

Serious efforts to resource defence and security sector arise when wars and violence erupt. War and violence in the DRC seem to be a wakeup call to the government. Yet, war is only one of several factors that are at work shaping the governance system and the lives of those who live at or in war. The other forces, economic power, political strength, social currents, religious belief, and the concern to ensure ethnic or cultural survival are all important. Arguably such results are only positive to peace efforts when power is widely distributed within national societies and the international community as a whole. Instead of waiting for war to start solving problems affecting peace and development of the country, policy makers need to understand that military success depends on preparation, quality of military force, political support at home, international legitimacy, avoidance of over-commitment to war economy, knowing the exit strategy when the war has started, and national economic capacity. Such expected peace and prosperity have only been a dream. Worse, cumulated failures to peace making and peace building especially failures to establishing credible defence and security system are resulted into driving chaos and despair among people, leaders and institutions.

For ECA, the recent war and armed conflicts in the DRC are driven by:



1. Past conflicts, not adequately addressed. The root causes should be analysed taking into account a historical perspective in the design of alternatives durable solutions and strategies.
2. Various interrelated factors including economic factors, institutional factors, regional factors and global geopolitical factors. The overall weak state of the economy is the main driver. Actually, the country was ripe for conflicts and political instability when the war against Mobutu's regime erupted. Key factors contributing to Mobutu regime collapse were the erosion of the overall macroeconomic environment, the mismanagement of the public sector, the deterioration of social conditions, severe youth unemployment, severely weaker capacity of the state to deliver basic needs (public services) including defence and security to the Congolese people. 32 years of Mobutu's rule created an environment favourable to the formation of grievance-induced and greed-driven violent contestation of state authority. The collapse of public service production, distribution and delivery is the main driver of ongoing armed conflicts and rebellion wars. Bad neighbours take advantage of deficits in the public service delivery and administration system. Restoring state and government authority implies fighting barriers to public service delivery and administration system performance. The defence and security sector reform is only part of that system.
3. Poor management of the natural resource sector and unequal distribution of the benefits from natural resource exploitation. Natural resources are not a direct cause of the conflicts which may be characterized as "distributional conflicts" occasioned by the failure to establish strong institutions and an effective regulatory framework to manage the natural resource sector.
4. Weaker institutions perpetuating conflicts through antagonisms around the control of the state and national resources. Most inter-regional and inter-ethnic conflicts are driven by these antagonisms. The political discourse and contention even in today's politics are still marked by political disputes around the configuration of the state: unitary versus federalist, centralized versus decentralized. Ideologically, liberal democracy is dominant yet most political parties including the ruling parties claim to promote social democracy. Antagonisms around the control of the state and national resources remain a fundamental constraint to the consolidation of the state in the DRC.
5. Politicization of ethnicity and Congolese identity and the political manipulation of citizenship and nationality laws. Ethnicity politics is a key factor not only in rebellion wars and armed conflicts but also in government failures.
6. Lack of transparency and equitable representation of all regions and segments of the population in political institutions.
7. Effects of chronic endless long-lived wars/conflicts since 1980s on the DRC's economy and the Great Lakes region. The conflicts increased macroeconomic instability and investment uncertainty, and they have deteriorated public finance in terms of both government fiscal balances and efficiency of public finance management. The effects of the conflicts have impacted the key drivers of economic growth notably industry,

manufacturing, agriculture, and human capital. They have reinforced the structural dependence of the economy on natural resources by undermining economic diversification. They have also increased the dependence on external financing by undermining domestic revenue mobilization, especially taxation in the natural resource sector. The overall macroeconomic environment is improving with a surge in growth and a reduction in inflation, but the aggregate picture masks structural problems at the sectoral level and deprivation at the individual and community levels.

8. The high death toll and population displacement, tremendous social and psychological trauma for women, young girls and boys who have been subject to physical and psychological atrocities including rape, torture, humiliation and alienation from their communities. Many individuals and communities marked by long-lasting scars of wars evoke physical and psychological atrocities as the main reason for joining and sustaining armed groups.
9. Erosion of cross-border trade, growth and regional integration. The wars have also corroded the environment for cooperation in the Great Lakes region, thus retarding the implementation of mutually beneficial regional integration programs.
10. Inability of the DRC to be a key role in the global fight against terrorism, regional integration and global economic growth because of the lack of the stability and the state's control over the territory. The DRC is also the epicentre of the global scramble for natural resources driven by the ever-rising demand for energy and industrial raw material.

All these failures at local, national, regional and international levels lead to a situation of chaos affecting the organization and the economy of the defence and security sector.

In our analysis, war strategy being used resembles to what Molly K McKew refers to as the Gerasimov Doctrine. Gerasimov doctrine is a new Russia's chaos theory of political warfare being used in Ukraine war. Rwanda seems to use the same strategy.

According to Molly K McKew, Gerasimov doctrine is a new theory of modern warfare that blends war tactics developed by the Soviets with strategic military thinking about total war. It consists of hacking an enemy's society and weakening the enemy rather than attacking or confronting it head-on. For Gerasimov, "The very 'rules of war' have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness ... All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character."

Russia's modern strategy is a vision of total warfare that places politics and war within the same spectrum of activities – philosophically, but also logistically. The approach is guerrilla and waged on all fronts with a range of actors and tools including hackers, media, businessmen, leaks, fake news, as well as conventional and asymmetric military means.

The Gerasimov Doctrine combines all these new tools within a framework to show that non-military tactics are not auxiliary to the use of force but the preferred way to win. Non-



military-tactics are the actual war based on chaos strategy that has not the objective of achieving an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within an enemy state. The objective is to weaken, tame, control, submit an enemy by influencing its domestic politics and security, sophisticating information warfare and creating a confusing environment in which nobody knows anybody's motives; nobody is hero. Russia weakens Ukraine by supporting extremists on both sides of the fight: pro-Russian forces and Ukrainian ultra-nationalists. The strategy helped Kremlin to fuel political and security conflicts within Ukraine. Such confusing environment enables Russia to seize Crimea and launch the war in eastern Ukraine through which it exerts control over Ukraine while defining the USA as his primary adversary.

Through the Gerasimov doctrine, Russia manages to create and use internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of Ukraine, the enemy state. The real power of the Gerasimov doctrine is the shadow war it wages.

Russian President Putin has outlined clear strategic and political objectives for his senior leadership in Ukraine as we can read through his “declaration of war” speech to the nation on February 24. Russian “special operation” aimed at striving for the “demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine” entailing decapitation of the Ukrainian political leadership, defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and the destruction of Ukraine as a functioning independent state. With reference to strategist Karl von Clausewitz, Russian special forces have been striving to “constantly seeking out the centre of Ukrainian power and defeat Ukrainian forces by daring all to win all using the immense power of Russian electronic intelligence to the defeat and destruction of his fighting force efforts and to penetrate the group of advisers closest to President Volodymyr Zelensky. These efforts did not succeed so far. The cause of this failure probably includes overconfidence, incompetence, and corruption. The other key strategic stand was the idea of employing impressive weapons systems to break the will of the people to resist and to accept total submission. Referendums results suggest that Russia has partly attain tis special operation objectives.

On the Congolese side, there is a need to devise adequate strategic responses to chaos games used by M23 rebels and bad neighbouring governments in order to make its own sustainable peace and security out this chaos system.

	Rwanda	DRC
<i>Military branches</i>	Rwanda defence Force (RDF): Army (land force), Air force, Reserve force (2021)	Armed of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC): Land force, Navy, Airforce, Republic Guard Note: the Republic Guard is under the direct control of the President.
<i>Military service age and obligation</i>	18 years of age for voluntary military service, no conscription, Rwandan citizenship is required, enlistment is either as contract (5years renewable twice or career (2019)	18-45 years of age for voluntary and compulsory military service (2019)

<p><i>Military expenditure % of GDP</i></p>	<p>1.2% of GDP (2019) 1.2% of GDP (2018) 1.2% of GDP (2017) 1.2% of GDP (2016) 1.2% of GDP (2015)</p>	<p>0.7% of GDP (2019 est) 0.7% of GDP (2018) 0.7% of GDP (2017) 1.3% of GDP (2016) 1.4% of GDP (2015)</p>
<p><i>Military and security service personnel strengths</i></p>	<p>The RDF has approximately 33,000 active personnel: 32,000 Army, 1,000 Airforce (2021)</p>	<p>Limited and widely varied information, approximately 100,000 active troops (mostly army but includes several thousand Navy and Airforce personnel as well as about 10,000 Republic Guard, note: Navy personnel include Naval infantry (2021)</p>
<p><i>Military equipment inventories acquisitions</i></p>	<p>The RDF’s inventory includes mostly soviet-era and older Western – mostly French and South African – equipment; Rwanda has received a limited supply of imports since 2010 from a variety of countries including China, Israel, Russia, and Turkey (2020)</p>	<p>The DRC is equipped mostly with a mix of second-hand Russia and Soviet weapons acquired from former Warsaw Pact nation, most equipment was acquired from 1970 and 2000; since 2010, Ukraine is the largest supplier arms to the FARDC (2020).</p>

SOURCE: *Indexmundi (n.d.)*

The above table raise three critical strategic concerns: comparative advantage due to lack of strategic defence initiative, the need for military industrial base and the strategic intelligence organization.

The DRC has not been reviewing his Strategic Defence plan regularly. The defence and security sector are one of the public sector components affected by political leaders immediately after Independence Day on 30 June 1960. Actually, the country just adopted its first strategic defence paper (“Loi de Programmation Militaire 2022-2025” adopted by the Parliament in June 2022).

This explains the parliamentary enactment of “Loi de Programmation Militaire 2022-2025” in June 2022. The expectation is that this strategic defence paper will enable the Congolese military and security forces and the intelligence services to deter ongoing armed conflicts and aggression wars affecting peace, security and development mainly in the Eastern provinces.

The law includes six programs addressing the following strategic concerns: rationalization of human resources management, military training and exercises, military equipment, military infrastructures, military operations and military production. Enactment of this law enabled both the Parliament and the Government to review the defence policy and to identify the challenges facing the Ministry of Defence, to introduce solutions, and to set necessary resources, priority directions, and due dates, as well as structural units of the Defence Ministry, the FARDC, the PNC and the DEMIAP who are responsible for its implementation.



Given the DRC military ranking worldwide, the comparative advantage affecting the FARDC performance is about the chaos used as strategy to disorganize military operations and administration. Chaos is the only reason that may explain Rwandan superiority in the Bunagana battlefield for instance. It is also clear that Rwandan military expenditures have been higher than the DRC defence spending since 2017. Since Rwandan spending has been constant, we can assume that DRC stock cannot justify Rwandan superiority from 2017 up to 2022 even though UN embargo on DRC certainly impacted on the military procurement negatively. Chaos strategy used by RDF including its military support to M23 seems to be the only credible explanation. It is thus important to discover how chaos strategy works in the DRC warfare situation. It is crucial to resolve the procurement and intelligence problems/challenges.

Understanding the Chaos Strategy

Chaos theory lends important insights for systems that exhibit significant non-linear tendencies. Congolese warfare seems to be one of the most nonlinear of war enterprises carried out by armed groups and rebels of AFDL, RDC, CNDP and M23 since 1996. It is a chaos situation but not in a sense of randomness and disorder but in the scientific definition of chaos as non-linear systems with defined characteristics. The Congo case is a non-linear undertaking that exhibits chaotic behaviour considering the following facts.

First, strategic decisions made by government have been found to be chaotic as the President himself noticed during his field visit in Ituri. Second, chaotic decisions are not only nonlinear but produce chaotic behaviour which are appeared to be a natural result of Clausewitzian friction. Third, all events and historical data related to wars and armed conflicts since 1997 demonstrated that warfare has been chaotic at the grand strategic, and operational levels.

Outcomes of the warfare chaotic behaviour are aggravated by failed state effects affecting both peacebuilding efforts and election-based political stability in the DRC.

There are clear evidences of failed state syndromes which are characterized by:

- Loss of control of its territory, or loss of the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force.
- Inability to provide public services.
- Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions.
- Limited ability to interact with other states as a full member of the world governance and organization system, so called the International Community.

To many security analysts, failed state concept refers to the capacity and effectiveness of the government system as a whole, the democratic character of a state's institutions, the legitimacy of the state, the nature of the state, the growth of criminal violence in a state, the

economic extractive institutions, the states' capacity to have full control of its territory. Any "implosion of the state" is an indicator of failed state.

Meaningful analysis of state failures should include three groupings of the 12 indicators as follows:

Concerns or issues	Indicators
Political and military	1) Public services
	2) State legitimacy
	3) Human rights and rule of law
	4) Security apparatus
	5) Factionalized elites
	6) External intervention
Economic	7) Poverty and economic decline
	8) Uneven economic development
Social	9) Group grievance
	10) Refugees or internally displaced persons
	11) Demographic pressures
	12) Human flight and brain drain

Source: adapted by the Fund for Peace, Indicators, fsi.fundforpeace.org, 2016

These indicators are useful for the following three reasons. First, the focus on institutions capacities to measure human aspects for development. Second, the fragility or vulnerability of states are measured according to the degree of economic underdevelopment of the states concerned. This is important because insecurity and violence are linked to poverty through vulnerability it creates.

Managing defence innovation/transformation

Since DRC has to absolutely engage with external sources of innovation in order to bring about any innovative change or transformation of its defence and security sector, it has to enhance the benefit and value of the higher education and research sector which is naturally involved with science and technology learning, research and development. It is therefore imperative that the DRC defence and security sector reform partner with universities and research institutions which also constitute important external sources of innovation. This option calls for a double challenge consisting of empowering and innovating the higher education and research sector in the first place, and transforming and innovating the defence and security sector by harnessing and absorbing innovation from actors of the academic and Research and Development sector in cooperation with their external partners involved in research investment in industrialized countries.

“Innovation can be understood broadly as the creation and application of new products, services and processes. It encompasses new technology as well as new ways of doing things.



While the term has become a widespread buzzword for the emergence of new ideas across diverse sectors, innovation is more than just the creation of novel concepts. Innovation includes the process of invention; however, it goes one step further to ‘make good ideas stick’ by ensuring that new ideas are applied to the benefit of end-users.”

Any innovation process begins with drivers which constitute the motivations enabling new products, services and processes to occur. The key drivers for innovation depend on the incentives and perceived benefits of new change. In the defence and security sector, drivers serve to enhance military capability especially combat and stability achievements. Hence innovation proceed from input resources required for the defence sector to innovate.

Jon Freeman and his fellow researchers (2015) identify the following defence drivers: knowledge assets, talent and capital. Defence innovators need knowledge to “discover the new ideas that spur innovation as well as to refine, catalyse, apply, share and market these ideas in a usable form”. They need “talent” to enhance “both the technical and managerial expertise necessary to support successful innovation processes”. Capital is needed not only “to fund the creation of ideas but also to effectively package and deliver this knowledge as an innovation”. (Freeman et al, 2015) For Freeman, defence infrastructure and networks and connections are also enabling resources. Defence infrastructure should enable the defence sector to bolster its knowledge assets, talent and capital through engagement with other actors. For Freeman, defence infrastructure includes facilities and research hubs that provide a physical space for innovation, such as universities, science parks and test facilities. And networks and connections facilitate “the exchange of knowledge, the mingling of talented individuals and the connection of suppliers to end users”. Culture and structure are two other important interdependent factors that influence the drivers and resources in the innovation process. Innovative culture must be open, trusting, and conducive to risk-taking and learning from failure. It is linked to leadership which is orientated to the future and to creative solutions. Structure includes organizational, management and bureaucratic structures and formal regulatory rules. Innovative structure and regulations involve bureaucracy and formal rules that do not constrain innovation by restricting knowledge exchange or productive partnerships.

To harness external innovation, the defence culture and structure into the working system should recognize and absorb innovation primarily. Therefore, the first step in improving the defence and security sector is to change the internal organization system and context. This requirement is a sine qua non condition of all other engagement reforms. Any successful external engagement depends on the innovativeness of internal priorities and processes.

To get internal priorities and processes right, it is essential that the president and the parliamentarians understand the military culture, values and people. The way the Congolese military especially rank soldiers complain about the conditions of service calls for particular attention.

The President does not need to be a military but he needs to understand the importance of key internal priorities and processes which affect the military organization and performance. For instance, it is important to know and control how the Congolese armed Forces are trained and prepared to respond to natural or human-made disasters, conflicts and wars in the country and the world. We earlier insisted on the need for the President to not forget that he is the commander in chief of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President be a military in order to be the Commander in chief of the armed forces. But the reality is that a civilian President without sufficient exposure nor knowledge of the military institution, culture, values, and people is limited in understanding military priorities and processes. Like Angela Halvorson (2015) rightly contends, “Few outside the military understand the culture, the values, or the people who make up the most powerful military force on earth... For civilians with little or no personal exposure to the military culture, the Armed Forces may seem overwhelming, incomprehensible, esoteric, or even anachronistic. However, to understand, work with, and help those who serve in the Armed Forces, it is necessary to have a general understanding of the institution”. (Halvorson, 2010, p.1)

Of interest to this study is the grievances of the active component of the FARDC and PNC about their conditions of service. These are full-time service individuals who wear the military uniform every day and who live with their families on or near military posts, barracks or bases and are expected to be deployed to war or conflict zones any time. During peacetime, they are expected to spend their days training for combat and for peace.

Training takes place at their home station or at any number of training locations around the world. It is not unusual for an active component member to spend only one or two weeks at home out of every six to eight weeks. Training cycles are determined by their unit's deployment cycle and deployment schedule. A closer look of the military barracks, bases or stations suggest that such norms need to be improved. Soldiers and officers seriously complained about their living and working conditions in barracks or bases which are supposed to be self-contained communities of uniformed people sharing common experiences and lifestyles. They are expected to have their own shops, food stores, restaurants, clinics, schools and other daily amenities. Military barracks should be the opportunity for soldiers and officers to develop “l'esprit de corps”, the feelings of pride, loyalty, confidence and discipline comfort of being a member of a group whose purpose all believe in. The discipline of rules thus begets the discipline of knowledge and institutes an ideology of creation and production that promote an esprit de corps, the expression of a strong community. The esprit de corps can only be achieved by good leadership, good guidance and understanding from those at the head of the force. (Pöcher, 2013) Active military families tend to generally stick together, drawn to one another by shared experiences and lifestyles.

Military rank and chain of command constitute another malaise among the Congolese military. Military rank is about leadership and responsibility. Grievances concern mainly arbitrariness and corruption and lack of meritocracy. The chain of command is based solely on the rank of the individual. As an individual meets certain benchmarks, including time in



service, time at the current rank, and military education requirements, he or she is promoted up the chain of command. With each promotion up through the ranks comes additional responsibilities and greater pay. Additional responsibilities usually include oversight of a greater number of lower-ranking service members and more equipment.

Each unit is clearly structured and organized based on accepted doctrine that is ingrained from the instant an individual first puts on the uniform. Individuals are immediately trained to operate within the chain of command. Each service member has a specific individual he or she reports to and who is responsible for addressing that individual's concerns or problems. "Jumping the chain of command" in most situations is strictly forbidden and may result in formal or informal disciplinary action.

Going above an immediate supervisor's head is acceptable only in situations in which the lower-ranking member does not believe his or her concerns are being addressed, or in cases where the problem is with the immediate supervisor.

The legitimacy of the chain of command is one of the most important characteristics of the military culture. Maintaining the integrity of the chain of command is critical to the effective functioning and mission success of the military unit. It is also designed to identify clear lines of authority and responsibility and to eliminate any confusion in the decision-making process. Living and working within the constraints of the unit chain of command dictate how an individual functions within the organization as well as how the unit functions as a whole. Those service members who are unable to work within the chain of command, who have problems with authority, or are incapable of following orders from superiors do not last long in military service and often find their time in service to be miserable and fraught with disciplinary actions.

Military Values

Honor and integrity are the core values of military service. These values define how each service member lives his or her life, approaches every duty, and succeeds at every mission. The military value system guides how each decision is made and how every operation is executed. It also distinguishes the military from its civilian counterpart and from the enemies.

Military Culture

The military culture is ingrained in military personnel from the beginning especially at the initial training. Initial training is so vital for integrating and learning about the military lifestyle, culture, history of a specific service, military customs and courtesies, proper wear of the uniform, military behaviour, values and ethics, and other information that make an individual being accepted and respected as a professional disciplined soldier or officer. Besides, initial training teaches discipline, focus, and control. Because of higher risk of being constantly exposed to uncertain and dangerous situations, it is vital that soldiers and officers learn not only to fire a weapon that also learn to stay focused, in control, and disciplined in all situations.

Armed Forces People

To better understand the military people, we need to understand the concept of “Unit cohesion”. Unit cohesion is “the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress” despite the fact they are geographically, demographically, and ethnically diverse. Sharing of a common set of values and beliefs is crucial to any military group or community. Unfortunately, chaos drivers are destroying the FARDC culture, people, and values. Ethnicity has been one of most destructive factors.

Consequently, the defence and security sector in the DRC has to reinvent itself. And innovation involves the creation and application of new products, services and processes. Since despite chaos effects, there is some degree of resilience. The DRC armed forces are still able to fight and defend the integrity of national territory and stabilize political and economic institutions. The country still enjoys some degree of relative peace and stability that evidence the level of resilience to warfare chaos. Reform should not involve the radical innovation or the ‘breakthrough’ of completely new products, services or processes. The transformation of the DRC army and security forces need an incremental innovation, involving the refinement over time of existing products, priorities and processes to provide gradual improvements in quality or value.

DRC defence planners and designers should learn from the existing chaos drivers to carry on required innovation process. These drivers should serve as an impetus, the motivations that will spur innovation to occur. The key driver for innovation is the need to respond to current defence and security issues as a key public challenge. This challenge should be understood by all stakeholders including internal stakeholders such as the President, the defence ministry, the ministry of interior and external stakeholders such MONUSCO etc. the President’s Office needs a particular attention in the case of DRC because the person of the President and Head of State is by itself an fully fledged institution responsible for defence, security and intelligence policy making and implementation as the commander in chief of the army and security forces.

Executive Presidential Leadership: Commander in chief of the Armed Forces

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a semi-presidential republic with a dual executive republic. The President rules alongside a prime minister and a government who are both responsible to a bicameral parliament of the state. The President is a popularly elected head of state. He is not a mere ceremonial figurehead. As the commander in chief of the armed forces, he is expected to exert executive control over the leadership and governance system of the defence and security sector. Since the 1990s, all reforms failed to yield expected defence innovation because of the lack of focus on cultural and structural barriers affecting the executive leadership and management of the armed forces’ organization and resources.



Presidents focused more on control over political institutions and the revenue system entrusted into the public administration management rather than control over the armed forces transformation and improvement. This is evidenced by the fact that political institutions consume over 80% of national budget and the administration of the revenue system (tax administration) constitutes the main driver of corruption and predation. Corruption and predation are due to the fact that public administration relies on the transfer of resources from private to public use. The production and the delivery of public services do not benefit from this transfer of revenues from the private sector to the public sector yet public administration agencies are actively involved into the processes of obtaining money from the revenue-raising activities. While the revenue sources including money creation, borrowing, sale of public services, intergovernmental aid and taxation have been multiplied, very little money has been used for increasing and improving public services to the people's basic needs including the need for housing, food, transport, communication, health, safety, security and protection from natural and non-natural disasters, armed conflicts, invasion etc. the irony is that political leaders want regime peace and stability in order to maintain themselves in power and control political institutions without investing into the defence and security sector. Defence economics is needed. DRC leaders should master the subject in order to address the security issues which impact negatively on socioeconomic development prospects.

Like Harald Pöcher (2013) contends "Conflicts and wars are like laws of nature an integral part of humankind. Since time immemorial there have been conflicts and wars in the world and thus military forces, their personnel and the demand for armament goods are an important object of national politics". (Sullivan&Karreth, 2019) As the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, the President should not lose focus on the executive leadership and management of the armed forces. The focus consists of acknowledging that: "Like civilian enterprises armed forces produce goods and services, but these goods and services differ from products and services of their civilian counterparts. The range of all goods and services produced by armed forces are wide and manifold, i.e. the output reaches from deterrence and dissuasion, military training and exercises, medical treatment, maintenance in a naval wharf, operations abroad, scientific research work and teaching at military universities to the paperwork of the Ministry of Defence. To produce all final and intermediate products armed forces use land, labour and capital as factors for production. In peace and in wartime the factors of production are scarce and therefore their supply and use in production is always a critical bottleneck for satisfying all the needs of military planners and leaders". Therefore, leadership and management of defence and security resources must observe the law of rational and efficient use of factors of production in order to be economically successful. This reality has been neglected yet the DRC needs a sound defence and security economics because of its immense natural wealth. Conflicts and wars are like laws of nature. Armed conflicts and violence in the Eastern provinces especially in the Kivu and Ituri provinces are economical. Given the cultural and structural dimensions of barriers to effective executive management of defence resources and the need for direct involvement of executive presidential leadership into this process, economical approach to managing chaos drivers of

the warfare in the Eastern DRC should include ethical dimensions too. This is important because the military culture and values have been seriously affected by the lack of focus on defence and security sector by top leaders especially the President as the Commander in chief of the armed forces. Ethical economy is also important to defence and security economics. Analysis of the impact of rules, virtues, and goods or values on economic action and management of drivers of warfare chaos will help us deal with the ethical preconditions of the war economy and the ethical foundations of resulting economic systems. Understanding of ethical preconditions and foundations will overcome cultural and structural barriers especially corruption, predation and discrimination, increase trust and reduce transaction costs in the management of defence and security resources. This is only possible if and only top leadership, this the President of the Republic in his capacity of the Commander in chief of armed forces, gets deeply involved.

Such demand is so vital in the Congolese case because the Congolese vision of government is still oriented towards reinforcing presidential executive powers. Both people and elite do not trouble themselves unduly with the concerns of excessive concentration of power. The current discussion over the role of the President on matters of national defence and security do not raise issues about the concentration of power. The President has well-nigh exclusive power in dealing with this defence and security issue. In general, the society believe that the Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) has no ability to restrict the President when it is a matter of defence and security. The belief is that the Constitution vests exclusive authority on defence, security and intelligence matters in the President as the head of the executive branch of government and as the commander in chief of the armed forces. The irony here is that the Constitution does not require the President to have any military skills and experiences because he is entitled on the strength of his “inherent power” to engage in these defence and security matters activities, with or without the authorization of Parliament when the Nation is in danger. When the Nation is in danger, it needs a strong executive with extra-legal powers such as commanding the military, carrying on foreign policy, making peace treaties, pardoning the convicted rebels, vetoing legislation. In a fragile country like the DRC, the need for the strong executive presidential power is justified by the fact that the President as the commander in chief must have the power to defend the country and manage wars efforts against a sudden attack and systematic armed conflicts and violence. People leaves to the Executive President the power to repel sudden attacks and fight rebellions. Logically, electoral criteria for presidential post should be reinforced in such a way that one has to have military skills and experiences to be a presidential candidate. Therefore, compulsory military service should be organized so that all citizens have equal opportunity. This will be one of the major innovations in defence and security sector. This innovation is driven by military demand as well as market context and relevant regulation of chronic warfare situation. This primary demand responds to the need of enhancing the Congolese operational military capability because most defence stakeholders emphasize the special influence and urgent operational implication of the Commander in chief of the armed forces when there is a pressing need to ensure superior operational effect, the speed of delivery and cost effectiveness in defence procurement.



The nature and scope of warfare in Eastern DRC requires presidential attention and inherent executive power *to take military action in response to the terrorist attacks, war powers resolution and protracted armed violence against civilian population. Presidential power is important not only to retaliate against any person, organization, or State suspected of involvement in destabilizing the country but also against foreign States suspected of harbouring or supporting such criminal and terrorist organizations such as the M23 movement. The President should be able to deploy military force pre-emptively against such enemy movements and unfriendly States that harbour or support them. The President should use the broad constitutional power to use military force and to retaliate against any person, organization, or State suspected of involvement in destabilizing attacks, even when a person, an organization or a State harbours, supports destabilizing forces or occasions grave national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks on the people and territory of the DRC.*

The country defence and security is likely to be enhanced when the President is conscious of his duty and responsibility to use his constitutional power to defend the country territory and the lives of its people since no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation. The authority to protect national security is consolidated with actions necessary for field victories over the enemy and the determination to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict and violence.

For all these reasons the President of the Republic must have not only the Constitution's power to ratify treaties but also the power to initiate defensive hostilities/wars and to control the escalation of conflict. Current security situation requires that the President directs military operations and commit the armed forces to combat as the Commander in Chief of armed forces.

Besides Presidential role in influencing the drivers and resources of the current warfare chaos in Eastern DRC, culture and structure of the Defence organization are important shaping factors.

Current organizational Culture in the Congolese defence sector needs significant innovation that succeeds in organizations with open, trusting, and encouraging environments. Ongoing armed conflicts and wars have also created significant distrust and disengagement between top defence leadership and command structure and local populations and ethnic groups. The latter tend to organize and arm their own self-defence units which confront any forces (governmental or non-governmental, foreign or local) perceived as enemy to their local peace and development. Hence the need for defence planners and designers to also focus on exploring ways of better management of ethnicity as one of the key drivers of chaos.

As Patricia Lynne Sullivan and Johannes Karreth (2019) argue “ethnicity is the key driver of armed conflicts in Eastern DRC”. The argument sustains that FARDC soldiers and officers are involved into war economy activities such as illicit exploitation and trafficking of mineral and natural resources because of dilemmas in engaging, professionally and militarily, local armed groups who are basically ethnic groups. Combatants and members of local ethnic groups

organized some kind of joint venture arrangements joining both party's resources to achieve a specific objective. Ongoing joint-venture activities involves two or more illicit businesses pooling their resources and expertise to achieve a particular goal: commodity funds, and share the risks and rewards linked to these joint-venture arrangements. Major rewards are more resources, greater capacity, increased technical expertise, access to established markets and distribution channels. In any case, the joint-venture practices in areas affected by armed conflicts between combatants and local groups in eastern DRC basically include the exchange of goods and services (trade and commerce) for monetary units. The value of the commodities (goods or services) has always been determined by the amount of money it is transacted for. These commodities have played a significant role in the continuous running of the trade and commerce cycle characterizing war economy in Eastern Congo and the Great Lakes region, thus generating finances and value for its participants. It is essential to understand what these commodities are and how do they function in helping to keep the trade cycle running, and most importantly, how do these commodities generate finances for the participants. They are traded in exchange for other products that may hold similar value for exchange. The participants are informed about the values of available commodities in the domestic and international markets. They are also aware that the commodities traded are subject to demand and the market prices that govern the trade of these commodities. Today they are aware of various commodities traded daily that are valued highly for their commercial value and consumer demand. These commodities traded in the domestic and international markets offer investors a chance to make investments in such commodities. Basic commodities involved are metals and physical assets like weapons and ammunitions, natural Resources such as minerals, precious stones, petroleum, oil, gold, silver, coltan, coffee, cocoa, cannabis etc. Investment in these commodities trade allow combatants and non-combatants an opportunity to earn returns based on the performance of these commodities in the market. The main question is how ethnicity is related to such illicit businesses and how such economy affects the defence management, sustainable peace and political stability.

Effects of ethnicity and territoriality

Territoriality plays a major role in linking ethnicity and environmental economy and politics. In fact, as economics is concerned with production, consumption, and the transfer of wealth, including allocation of scarce resources and market functions, politics deals with activities associated with governance, including the ability to create effective environmental policies and solutions. With regard to environmental leadership, both economics and politics are crucial for creating viable solutions to environmental problems including environmental injustice occasioned illegal extraction and trading of natural and mineral resources.

Territoriality is an important part of the way in which individuals and groups bring the environment under their control. (Gold, 2019) Territoriality involves the processes and mechanisms by which people establish, maintain, and exert control over bounded portions of



the territorial space or surface they occupy. The roots of territoriality stem from culture rather than instinct. Conflicts and inequality arise from the use of territoriality by dominant groups in society to exert control over others and surveys behavioural activities of inhabitants or residents in defence of their neighbourhoods. Once territoriality determines defensible space - borders and boundaries, territoriality becomes an intrinsically positive part of the reliable reference to everyday life and endows territorial space with symbolic meaning which enables inhabitants or residents to promote resilience, belonging and reinforcing identity. Territoriality is thus an important part of the social and spatial organization of human society which proceeds from the processes and the mechanisms by which people establish, maintain, and exert control over bounded portions of the territorial space or surface. It helps in considering that territories, boundaries and borders play a significant role in the organization of human life and society. In fact, many economic and political activities are organized territorially. Law enforcement and security and defence management work on the basis of the notion of territorial organization including a pattern of human behaviour characterized by aggressive defence or protection of an area, sphere of activity or influence etc.

Understanding factors leading to human territoriality, separate living, defensible space and resilience, identity and belonging may explain current ethnicity-driven economic armed conflicts in the eastern DRC.

a) Human territoriality

Human beings can simultaneously be members of several or many different groups that exercise control over bounded spaces of various sizes; territories to which they feel varying degrees of attachment, and which are governed by different jurisdictions and legislations. Conflicts in human society can arise over the material value of the land, or its emotional and symbolic value, or sometimes the conjunction of both. Human territoriality is often overlain by complex cultural constructions, such as property laws, which include the possibility of ownership by economic or political institutions and abstract rights of possession that need not even involve physical occupation. When unravelling this complexity, there are three ways of conceptualizing human territoriality. First, it is about power used as indispensable geographical strategy to control people and things by controlling area. Second, human territoriality serves to provide a secure, dependable and often unobtrusive platform that allows other forms of social behaviour to be enacted. Third, territoriality is a vital part of the dynamics of place-making, claiming ownership of space, promoting meaningful belonging and reinforcing identity. In the DRC case, Rwandophone and anti-Rwandophone groups are using the power of territoriality to either claim, own, defend or protect a portion of land or territory.

b) Living in isolation

Socio-spatial segregation has long been a feature of the residential geography of living habitat. Such partitioning is part of the abiding fluidity of housing or agglomerations, in which economic or ecological forces lead to distinct differentiation between areas

occupied by different groups in the social spectrum. Groups of a population are often segregated into their respective ecological niches. Fishers tend to live with fishers, breeders with breeders, farmers with farmers, warriors with warriors etc. Tutsi are breeders and Hutu are farmers. Each group want to constitute is village or agglomeration. Territorial division can also emanate from intergroup rivalries arising from the problems of population displacement and change associated with phenomenon like war or even innovation. Residents may turn to territorial tactics in order to ward off the advances of groups in adjacent areas by whom they feel threatened.

Territorial animosities shaping inter-group relations show the sharp cleavage between adjacent and mutually hostile ethnic groups conflicting over the historic and contemporary rivalries between Tutsi and Hutu, Bantu and Nilotic groups striving to avoid risks of living in hostile territory. It is clear that such territorial hostilities are perpetuated through socialization. Children of a particular ethnic group are taught to fear adjacent groups and to avoid entering their territory. Manifestations of aggressive defence of territoriality may well remain and people may still cluster together out of a sense of insecurity, but essentially do so to protect shared values or other cultural attributes. Both Tutsi and Hutu want an area to protect shared values and other cultural traits.

c) Defensible space and resilience

The concept of 'defensible space,' was born out of a response to the perceived failings of postwar public-sector social housing. 'Defensible space' concept was developed by the American architect Oscar Newman (1972) who argues that city criminality (hostilities) might be linked to the design of new housing estates. (Newman, 1972) Therefore, the design of new estates and the built environment should be done in a way that facilitates social cohesion amongst residents, thereby reducing opportunities for criminal activity.

Newman insisted on issues of territoriality. He argued that building design is associated with abnormally high crime rates especially when their layout and design denied residents the opportunity to exercise territorial control over the area around their dwellings in ways characteristic of traditional housing. For him, areas freely available to all, whether residents or outsiders, but not subject to control by any specific resident or group of residents constitute a security risks.

His findings would have identified denial of territoriality as an important contributory factor to urban crime and perhaps also other social pathologies.

The concept of defensible space linked ideas for territorial control, especially connected with 'target hardening' as developed by Newman (1972) and Coaffee, Murakami Wood and Rogers (2009) is used by the police and military for protection of areas felt under threat from terrorist attack. (Coaffee et al, 2009) This leads to some



kind of militarization of some territorial spaces, and creates defensive enclaves in areas felt particularly at risk. The strategy may help in aligning security planning with wider frameworks for village or city or agglomeration management and governance. As such, this trend might encourage policies that focus more clearly on the more positive features of territoriality, such as its cultural significance in terms of identity and belonging. It could work in the case of Bunagana. Protecting defensible space of Bunagana border town with combat and reconnaissance patrol on the basis of identity and belonging factors would be efficient for both peacebuilding and state building strategies.

d) Belonging and identity

The roots of the concept 'territoriality' are connoted with the feeling of fear and warning. Fear and warning call for territorial aspects of the dwelling. The dwelling supplies a retreat that meets our basic needs for shelter and security. It also engenders general feelings of well-being connected with ownership and possession, feeling of home. The dwelling-as-home occupies a central role in everyday life in the modern life. The dwelling serves as a physical framework for the spatial and temporal organization of domestic activities.

The dwelling clearly indicates the way that symbolism overlays physical delimitation and maintenance of territories. First, territoriality effectively served as a form of communication, with a distinct 'language of space' that was shared by the people living in their dwellings and townscape. Secondly, territoriality served as social memory. The community used the bounded places of home and neighbourhood in imaginative ways to recreate that which had been irrevocably lost. Finally, and related, territoriality was used to express difference and to celebrate their specific history and identity.

In the long run, the greater physical security enjoyed by the community, combined with recognition of the possible economic returns attainable from the marketability of ethnic or cultural diversity may create some security problems. For instance, processes of negotiation between neighbourhood, the city and commercial interests may lead to efforts to reinforce rather than eradicate the territorial distinctiveness of such neighbourhoods. We see in the case of Rwandaphones dwellers in DRC. The physical security of the Banyamulenge community has been linked to economic returns from the marketability of ethnic diversity (decent senior posts in government employment market, distributional and re-distributional policies in favour of ethnic minority etc). This policy has reinforced rather eradicated territorial distinctiveness to the extent that Rwandaphones feel safer and home only in homogenous neighbourhood. One of the critical political demands of the Tutsi-dwellers is to obtain a specific territorial space-home. Minembwe is the case. Yet the constitution of such 'ethnoscapes' arouses considerable controversy, with heavy debates framed around the future of ethnic neighbourhoods to all 450 ethnic groups that people the DRC.

In fact, ethnicity-based territoriality creates small states within the State in areas of limited statehood. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (2016) explain this phenomenon. According to Borzel and Risse, “Areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable spaces”. They are still governed by local people or local communities who establish an alternative governance system for their own survival. Consequently, Government provision of rules and regulations, as well as of public goods and services continue without having to necessarily depend on the existence of functioning state institutions. Alternatively, functional equivalents or substitutes to failed state institutions are replaced by informal institutions based on trust that are endogenous to areas of limited statehood. Local governance actors overcome collective action problems and enhance their legitimacy through organized through personalized trust among community members. Because social heterogeneity and deep social and cultural cleavages, the only major challenge in areas of limited statehood consists of striving to move to generalized trust beyond the local level and to “imagined communities among strangers”. Therefore, Börzel and Risse (2016) argue “the more group-based identities are constructed in inclusive ways and the more group identities are cross-cutting and overlapping, the more they lead to and maintain generalized trust”. In addition, they conclude, “Experiences with fair and impartial institutions and governance practices – irrespective of whether state or non-state – also lead to generalized trust beyond the local level and allow for the upscaling of governance”.

Accommodation of autonomous small states within the State creates two other major challenges: engaging and integrating non-state armed actors and creating territorial armies alongside the regular armies.

Engaging non-state actors for peacebuilding and state building purpose

Chronic armed conflicts in the DRC resulted in the emergence of several non-state armed actors and uncontrolled functioning small states within the State. Peacebuilding and state building processes cannot ignore or neglect the existence and the activities of non-state armed actors who have developed alternative governance and economic systems. Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener (2011), “non-state armed groups are defined as distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or Special Forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure”. Even though they are autonomous, they are often supported or instrumentalized by state actors secretly or openly. They may serve as militias, paramilitaries, mercenaries, or private military organizations to state actors. On the other hand, state officials or state agencies may cooperate directly or indirectly with non-state armed actors. This may be for ideological reasons or for personal, family, political and economic interests. But, despite close relationships with state actors, non-state actors avoid full control by state actors.



Peacebuilding and state building processes are challenged because they are meant to strengthen and reconstruct functioning state structures and institutions, eradicate any kind of violence and not to accommodate non-state actors and their structures. Peacebuilding and state building processes cannot be successful unless the issue of non-state armed actors is effectively addressed. The tendency is to disarm and dismantle non-state armed actors and their organizations, or to transform them into political forces or to integrate them into official state structures because most of them are criminals, mercenaries, or marauders who are handicap the reestablishment of the State's monopoly on the use of force. In such a context, non-state armed actors with their already established para-state structures by militias, warlords, rebels are part of the problem. Accommodating non-state armed actors become a building block for reconstructing statehood, and may undermine the process of establishing the state's monopoly on the use of force. Another tougher challenge is that granting privileges to non-state armed actors who have already benefited from war and shadow economies may become an incentive or trigger for warmongering and conflict entrepreneurs, unethical transnationals or multinationals involved in cross-border trafficking and illicit exploitation of mineral and natural resources.

Creating territorial armies

As the question of integrating non-state armed actors challenges peacebuilding and state building processes, the DRC government may think of transforming non-state forces into territorial armies. These are forces with almost no peacetime presence, dedicated entirely to the defence of home territory. Such forces are often considered technologically backward and militarily irrelevant, some kind of reserve forces. There is need for the government to evaluate the development and maintenance of Mai-Mai resistant combatants who believe to be not only territorial forces but also Special Forces who have been fighting and defeating invasion forces for decades.

Horst Mendershausen (1980) describes the characteristics of a territorial defence posture as follows:

- 1) "A manifestly defensive system; unsuited to attack across the country's borders, and unlikely to be perceived as a threat by other states;
- 2) A military system relying principally on latent rather standing forces, involving a broad spectrum of citizens, if not all, in preparations for military and civil defence tasks, and usually projecting a comprehensive or total response of the people to war,
- 3) A military system that relies on weapons and technologies different in type and composition from those of outward-reaching intervention and bombardment systems;
- 4) A system that relates the military resources of a society so closely to the defence of its own territory and institutions that it precludes or at least severely constrains the country's participation in an international military alliance; especially one that calls for integration of alliance forces."

Related to the Mai-Mai resistance phenomenon, the challenge consists of transforming the rudimentary territorial defence posture of the Mai-Mai resistant combatants into a hybrid defence system in which territorial defence plays a significant and dominant role like modern special forces, suitable to attacking invading forces, to achieve the mission of what the French call “Défense Oopérationnelle du Territoire” which includes latent and civil defence units, the gendarmerie, a police force. The Switzerland militia forces, the Norwegian Home Guard and the former Yugoslav Territorial Army play similar defence role.

This transformation may concern only what Robert Kogod Goldman (n.d.) calls “privileged or lawful combatants”. A combatant is a person who directly engages in hostilities, participates in an attack intended to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or objects. Such persons are referred to as belligerents and have been classified as either “privileged”, “lawful” or “unprivileged”, “unlawful” combatants. “Privileged” or “lawful” combatants are persons authorized by a party to an armed conflict to engage in hostilities. Therefore, they are entitled to the protections encompassed in the “combatant’s privilege” which is a licence to kill, wound or eliminate enemy combatants, destroy other enemy military objectives and cause incidental civilian casualties. Lawful combatants have the right or the privilege to be considered as prisoners of war and to have immunity from criminal prosecution. The argument is that their hostile acts that do not violate the laws and customs of war.

The theory of greed and grievance provides another argument in favour of privileged resistance combatants. (Mateos, 2010) Indeed, Mai-Mai combatants or groups are effectively involved into the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the diseconomy of war affecting peace and security in the eastern DRC just for the sake of acquiring rudimentary weapons to fight and defeat invading forces. Therefore, the theory of greed and grievance can hardly explain chaos drivers of the involvement of local armed groups. The violence in that part of the DRC is not a simple matter of scarce and strategic resources exploitation (coltan, gold, diamonds, timber, coffee, rubber, cacao, oil, gaz etc). While international actors’ interests are geared towards extracting and exporting scarce and strategic resources to sustain the economy of industrialized countries, local armed groups are primarily concerned with sustainable peace and security in their villages, communities and towns. (Kaldor, 1999 and Duffield, 2001)

Referring to migration theory, the causes of migration may help explaining how local groups’ interests differ from external actors’ concerns. Despite war devastation impact on local population living conditions, only a minority of locals migrate or run away from their villages and communities. The majority have demonstrated strong resilience to negative war factors (push factors). Their grievances are characterized by positive war factors (pull factors) rather than push factors. Push factors are political, social, economic and environmental reasons why people would want to leave their home country while *pull factors* are reasons why people would want to move into a new environment or place instead of abandoning their home villages or home countries. The modal tendency in the eastern DRC is to stay home while simultaneously asking for improvement and reinforcement of peace, security and



development in their immediate environment and communities. The Bunagana case just demonstrated this modal tendency. Bunagana people prefer to cross border to live temporarily in Uganda villages or towns closer to their home rather than migrating faraway or abroad. Alternative they move to Rutshuru and surrounding villages. They have declined all M23 incentives to change their migration decision.

Pull factors	Causes	Push factors
Stable population, positive demography, welfare state benefits, good schools and clinics, decent pensions	Demographic and social	Population and family pressures/charges, bad schools and healthcare, obsolete retirement schemes
Labour opportunities, decent wages, welfare, high consumption and living standard	Economic	Poverty, unemployment, low wages, scarcity of consumption and living goods and services
Peace, security, democracy, rule of law, political stability, pluralism, protection of civil and human rights, protection of minority interests	Political	Autocracy, pseudo democracy, bad governance, political revolts, civil war, terrorism, abuse of human rights, hegemony
Protection of natural and environmental resources, favorable environmental policy and spaces	Environmental	Natural disasters, drought, soil/land erosion, absence of environmental policy
Diaspora, media and information flows, ethnic community/solidarity	Migrant flows and stocks	Negative information flows, partisan media, dominant decisions of the family or ethnic community

NOTE: Ethnicity represents only 4.5% (1/22) variables of push and/or pull factors. Overall, all these variables have to do with the delivery of public services administration and management. Peace, security and defence by FARDC, PNC and DEMIAP are part of these public deliverables. Pull factors are the cause. Push factors are only the consequence, hence positive factors precede negative factor. First thing come first.

Peter Drucker's management principle of "First Things First" advises to always put the important things first and do only one thing at a time. To make a huge contribution to Defence and security sector reform and combat performance effectiveness, the DRC government needs a lot of time to improve positive factors first. It should concentrate on getting rid a past that is no longer valuable. Past successes and activities should be reviewed most of all in order to control the transformation and the development of the FARDC and other security organizations. What is needed for building a new innovative army, police and intelligence services and slowing down what can prevent the reform should be prioritized and any handicap, barriers or obstacles to such reform need to be ousted. Government should have the courage to focus on the future, not the past; to focus on opportunities, not just difficulties; to choose its own direction instead of following blindly past successes; to think highly and

innovatively of the best defence and security forces for the country rather than being guided by what is safer and convenient at the present. Yet the tendency has been to avoid offending former Mobutu's FAZ (Forces Armées Zairoises) and Kabila's FAC (Forces Armées Congolaises) senior officers (colonels and generals) for peace and reconciliation sake. The end-result of all Security Sector reforms since 2003 is dramatic, chaotic and highly counterproductive on the side of the actors involved in delivering defence and security services. There are many causes to this failure. First, reforms failed to capture the diversity of security actors. They focus on a narrow understanding of the conventional Western security actors (armed forces, police and intelligence services), while minimizing the need for transforming military organizations such as presidential guards and militia forces, 'private' security actors who emerged because of the collapse of state security structures which are also allowed to use force. There are several internal security forces linked to interior ministries, which compete with the military in terms of numbers, influence and resources and impact on the formulation and the management of security policy. National political, cultural and social circumstances have created significant informal norms and practices based on local, tribal and ethnic traditions, culture and beliefs which affect strategic thinking and planning of security and defence transformation. For instance, the DRC Government enacted the law of military programming (Loi de Programmation Militaire 2022-2025) in 2018. The law was recently published only in September 2022. The law does not take into account the dynamics of non-statutory security forces such liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private security companies; and political party militias. Yet, non-statutory security forces are still active and continue to influence the political, economic and security governance in the DRC and to play significant role because state capacity in the area of security and defence management is vulnerable and needs appropriate regulation. The activism of civil society and business sector actors in areas where Government established "the state of siege" plays a major role in security sector governance in terms of strategic intelligence and media, human rights violation, civil military relations (CMR). Their role is essential for change, political pressure and reform agendas setup. To be effective, the defence and security sector transformation needs to consider the role of non-statutory and non-state groups and actors. Since the administrative and legal framework of the defence and security sector is nascent and vulnerable to corruption, political and economic, Government needs to acknowledge the crucial role played by the security and defence sector to political power, regime stability, political control and revenue mobilization. Political institutions and administrative systems must learn to tie defence and security sector reform to domestic processes of political and social transformation. Such achievement is not easier when SSR is driven by external actors. In DRC external actors have their own objectives which mainly aimed at building a Congolese security sector by first managing the merging of the multiple armed factions into unified military and police structures. Overall SSR initiatives consisted of strengthening unit effectiveness through train-and-equip programs; implementing institutional reform, and building mechanisms for civilian accountability and oversight. All initiatives failed after fourteen years. Corruption, patronage, and impunity embedded in both the security sector and the political governance structures and practices



are the main reasons for failure. External actors avoid addressing the crucial issue of democratizing the political and security institutions to best protect the population. It is clear that external reformers focused on technical projects instead of bringing about political change.

These levels of pull factors and push factors are deeply rooted in the historical, social, economic and political context of the conflict and violence in the Great Lakes region. Indeed, Congolese armed conflicts are mainly internal or intrastate in the first place, localized violence affecting specific areas and specific local population, regionalized and internationalized impacting on the Great Lakes and global peace, security, development and politics. The dynamics of Congolese warfare involved several actors with different agendas and objectives including regional and international network of agents and organizations. Yet, sustainable solutions aimed at transforming the dynamics of war into the dynamics of peace and development should focus on primary actors who are directly engaged in armed violence. They should address the agenda and objectives of governments, armed groups or guerrillas, militias, paramilitary forces, warlords, organized criminal gangs, police forces, mercenaries, violent fundamentalist groups, regional armed groups, and regional troops, directly involved into the dynamics of war. In this perspective, it is not simply enough to equip and modernize the FARDC, PNC and DEMIAP. It is also vital to manage actors like MONUSCO and policy instruments like peace, defence and development accords and relations. Effective management of positive and direct factors, these are pull factors, are likely to impact on the control of negative and indirect factors which are push factors and culminate in the dynamics of peace. Indirect actors are needed when direct actors fail to achieve their agenda and goals. Indirect actors are widely interested in its continuation of war. Wars and violence attract criminal networks, regional governments, businessmen, local and regional traders, international governments, private security companies, business with interest in natural resources, arms industry. They also attract peace and development brokers such as the diaspora, civil society organizations, local and international mass media, regional and international governments, regional and international organizations, diplomatic organizations, international humanitarian organizations, multilateral organizations like MONUSCO and donor agencies. In this context, the globalized economy of war depends on external resources in a process that intends to incorporate the dynamics of war into the formal economy. Dependency on external resources is due to the fact that units of combat are basically mobilized and financed with the proceeds of looting, corruption in humanitarian aid governance, illegal arms deals, and natural resources exploitation are critical in the mobilization of resources. The dynamics of war is thus perpetuated through alliances or networks according to interests and agenda of indirect actors and factors.

With reference to Berdal and Malone (2000) and Francis (2006), a sound analysis of the drivers of chaos in the Eastern Congo should avoid some negative narrative stereotypes portraying Congolese armed conflicts as a matter of:

- 1) Chaotic and irrational confrontations driven by ethnicity and cultural differences exclusively.
- 2) Underdevelopment or poverty is the main cause of ongoing armed conflicts implying that armed conflicts would be prevented by increasing foreign donations and international cooperation as a priority in addressing conflict in the Eastern DRC.
- 3) The political economy of warfare is based on a crisis of accumulation and governance through which Congolese elites explore new sources of authority, legitimacy, wealth as the main cause of violence in the country, forgetting Clausewitz's argument stating that 'these civil wars could be better understood as the continuation of economics by other means'.

The need for self-defence and territorial defence against invading forces and for the emergence of autonomous small states due to State failures may explain some of the legitimate wars, armed conflicts, and sophisticated survival economies in eastern provinces of the DRC.

In any case, the Mai-Mai resistance combatants view themselves as a territorial self-defence force. Privileged Resistance armed groups asked Government to be given the opportunity to defeat invasion forces mainly the RDF in Bunagana. They argue that they have been carrying successful special military operations since the beginning of the war in 1995. They also argue that without their successful resistance operations, invading forces (Rwanda and Uganda) would have conquered Eastern DRC long time ago. Their argument tends to minimize the importance of military technology as the sole criterion to win or defeat enemy equipped with highly sophisticated modern weapons. They refer to recent Ukraine resistance and the embarrassing retreats of USA forces in Afghanistan etc.

Special Forces and special operations forces (SOF) are military units trained to conduct special operations. Special operations are "military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment". (NATO, 2013) Since World War II, all armies create formations devoted to special operations behind enemy lines. The FARDC may not have resources to create sophisticated special forces may perform modern higher technology-supported functions in modern airborne operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defence, covert ops, direct action, hostage rescue, high-value targets/manhunt, intelligence operations, mobility operations, and unconventional warfare. But they resort to any kind of Special Forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment to perform and attain the military objectives of a special operations unit. Mai Mai resistance combatants believe they have special operations force's capabilities which enabled them to stop Rwanda and Ugandan progress and agenda for overthrowing Kinshasa regime since President Laurent Kabila. Their fierce combats have demonstrated convincing degree of special forces capabilities such as Special reconnaissance and surveillance in hostile environments, involvement into training and development of other states' military and security forces, offensive action, support to counter-insurgency through population



engagement and support, Counter-terrorism operations, Sabotage and demolition, Hostage rescue, close personal protection etc. some groups compare themselves to Japanese “Ninja”; or Portuguese “Gerald the Fearless”. In any case, Mai-Mai combatants have played an important role through the history of warfare in Eastern DRC. They managed to achieve disruption by hit and run and sabotage operations. Their role in laying and conducting successful reconnaissance operations have been providing to conventional FARDC and MONUSCO with essential intelligence from near or among the enemy. In many circumstances, they camouflage themselves among local populations, to gather intelligence and launch raids and capture and destroy enemy. Cases of resistance combatants’ specialized role in reconnaissance, skirmishing and weakening conventional forces are many, without having the posture of modern conventional armed services using “the direct approach characterized by technologically enabled small-unit precision and digitally networked lethality, focused intelligence and indirect approach consisting of empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations.”

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, special forces have come to higher prominence, as governments have found objectives can sometimes be better achieved by a small team of anonymous specialists than a larger and much more politically controversial conventional deployment. Congolese Defence planner and designers need to understand this reality.

In fact, typically, guerrilla fighters would engage enemy soldiers and tanks causing them to move. Intelligence strategy of guerilla fighters involve women, youth and even smart children. It is well gendered and capitalizes on social intelligence rather than highly sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Information system (IS) technologies.

The necessity for focusing on social intelligence makes sense not only because of developing countries realities but also because of the nature of modern warfare in which AI and IST-based weapons do not guaranty military operations success (victory). Third-World realities reflect the fact that the existing information systems suffer from a range of problems which afflict all three main elements of information system. In fact, documentary services (libraries and information centres), statistical services, and management information systems (including records management and computerized systems) are weaker and inaccessible to all. As Paul Sturges (1999) contends, the need to rely on Grey literature is vital to each of these three systems, either as the partially processed product of the internal information-generating capacity of the country itself, or in the external scanning process. (Sturges, 1999)

If the DRC could afford equipping the FARDC with AI and IST-based weapons which the RDF-Backed M23 combatants are using, the technical problems of acquiring, listing, indexing, retrieving and alerting potential users to documents will create the need for training, mastering and managing such innovation effectively. This largely requires the capacity and propensity of the FARDC users to absorb information and apply it in the operations field. Certainly, they will face a range of structural and non-structural constraints on the absorption

of information, skills or competences/capabilities. So main challenge to the FARDC capabilities is more about a question of social intelligence and human force rather than an issue of acquiring AI and IST-based weaponry.

Social intelligence includes embraces a wide range of skills and personal characteristics. It refers to those interpersonal and intrapersonal skills that transcend specific areas of the previous knowledge such as intelligence and technical or professional skills. It embraces not only the cognitive aspect of performance but also the effect of emotional aspects. Social intelligence has been defined as the ability to establish relationship with others, intrapersonal knowledge, ability to judge about others' feelings, temperaments and incentives, effective social performance/function, ability to sympathize, and being skilled in decoding nonverbal signs. It reinforces human, force which is considered as the main source of every organization, the organizations should program to make optimal use of it. As a matter of fact, today those organizations are successful and can achieve their goals that have strong and committed human force, accentuate customer-guidance and profitability rise, and regularly improve their systems and processes (Hsien, 2008:525). Making optimal use of available human force is related to having aware, qualified and adroit/ skilled managers/commanders. The complicatedness of society process, increase of competition, advancement of science and technology and consequently the increase of demands and the development of organizations require that efficient and skilled manager/commander to be employed to manage/command military operations as organizations' affairs. After adequately combining and coordinating them, they achieve those goals via making optimal use of them. (Ebrahimpoor et al, 2013; Behestifar and Roasaei, 2012; Brown, 2005; Goleman, 1998a)

Based on Goleman's research findings on emotional intelligence of leaders (1998b), Paul Sturges (2013) defines social intelligence as "the ability to control emotions and feelings; therefore it can aid mental activities, decision making and communication.... those who have high social intelligence know how to control and channel their own and others' emotions and feelings... Social intelligence is one of the first choices in completing the traditional concepts of capability... Social intelligence indicates that to what extent managers possess capabilities like social skills, social information processing, social awareness, and social desirability. Hereupon, social intelligence contains four components: social skills, social information processing, social awareness, and social desirability. Implications to understanding Resistance fighters' intelligence strategy feature are as follows:

- 1) Social skills as key factors in recognition of points of strength and weakness. Resistance leaders, experts and commanders who use social intelligence and human force, have social skills which enable them to continuously looking for receiving feedback on their performance and learn from their failures.
- 2) Processing social information as the ability in regulating distressing emotions like anxiety or nervousness and managing such situations. Emotive reactions among resistance fighters are very rare.



- 3) Social awareness making an individual aware of others' feelings, tastes, and needs and enables him/her to identify the paradoxical situations, and to use this source of information to establish a good relationship with other team members and valuing them. Resistance commanders and fighters value and respect each other seriously and avoid any quarrels or divisions among them.
- 4) Social desirability as a self-control mechanism or ability of interacting with other individuals in the emotional situations in order to build interpersonal and intergroup relationships effectively needs to have the ability to distinguish, separate, and control their feelings. Social desirability provides superior social skills enabling the individuals to choose or select places or times to show one's emotions.

For the above reasons, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Information Technology-based weapon systems possessed by Rwandan army and the M23 do not impress nor discourage Resistance combatants and their leaders. Their determination to fight and defeat the Rwanda-backed M23 is built upon social intelligence and human force which prevent them from capitulating or fighting retreat.

Resistance combatants' may inspire the DRC government which needs to knowledge alternative ways of developing defence information technology. Information has always been an important ingredient of national security. It is also important for successful conduct of war.

For the DRC government and people, the M23 forces are supported by Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) which is backed up itself by Western powers politically and diplomatically and by the Multinational corporations financially. These financially rich and industrialized countries and business organizations provide Rwanda with a scarce military resource which is the sophisticated information technology. At this stage of Technology-based Information warfare paving the way to new weapon systems and military doctrines,

It is believed that Western States and multinationals more specifically American and British governments provide the RDF with a comparative/competitive advantage and information superiority in the battlefield. Information superiority is a critical success factor in peace and war time. Yet the DRC government needs to assure the security of its people. Both the President of the Republic and the Defence Ministry have the constitutional duty to also assure the victory of their armed forces in case of war and threat deterrence.

Resistance combatants' determination are not the only push factor in this area. In fact, government may refer resilience and victory of liberation struggle movements over colonial military forces in Africa to think of mechanism which may help boosting the capacity of armed forces to confront even defeat modern armies equipped with high-tech weapon systems. The technologies of information warfare offer such mechanisms. Certainly, defence forces with enhanced modern military technologies have the advantage of optimizing information-based operations, dominating battle in terms of speed, space and time, controlling battlefield with devastating lethality and superior survivability, winning decisive and quick victories with

minimum casualties, agility and speed of deployment, diverting tasks that inhibit the primary mission of the force etc.

Fortunately, Pathak A.K et al. (2014) rightly support that view according to even developing countries may acquire indigenous technologies in information warfare (IW) related systems. These weapons need to be low cost and must suit their requirement. He contends, “A useful strategic partnership with a selected country or selection of technology transfer/leapfrog/substitution model is of prime importance for the developing nations... There is a need to enhance R & D allocation in the field of IT in such a way that the means of generating wealth, preserving the environment and ensuring security of the people are similar or inter-changeable... Some very low cost and niche technologies such as the GPS need to be exploited. This is ideal equipment, which has tremendous ‘dual use potential’ at a marginal (if the cost of the satellite constellation is excluded). It is being used in artillery shells to make ‘stupid’ ordinance ‘intelligent’”. Pathak (2014) argumentation is supported by theories developed by Toffler and Toffler (1993), Sun Tzu (1996), and Handel (1986).

Economics suggests Offsetting as a useful tool that countries like DRC can apply to Pathak theory on indigenous technologies in information warfare in order to reduce its net position in defence investment to zero. For instance, risks exposed in defence procurement markets may be offset by opposite risks in establishing defence industrial base in order to remove or limit liabilities on imports. Government investments in the defence and security sector should learn to offset futures contracts and other investment positions in order to remove itself from any associated liabilities before the terms of the futures contract are accomplished or near the delivery term. The aim is optimizing the benefits of the futures contract. As futures related to stocks, defence investment department may use hedging to assume an opposing position to manage the risk associated with the defence futures contract. A defence futures contract can be defined as a legal agreement to buy or sell defence commodity assets at a predetermined price at a specified time in the future and for the same quality and quantity to facilitate. The DRC government needs to have an offset policy based on futures contract.

Conclusion

To defend the integrity of its immense territory, the DRC government wants to keep a large army. The political objective conflict with the goals of the defence and security sector reform (DSR) and the complex options such as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, and Reintegration program (DDRRR-P) which aims at reducing the size of the FARDC (DRC Armed Forces) in order to facilitate management control, discipline and professionalism. In addition, keeping a larger army is not only costly but, above all, does not help in maintaining control, discipline and decent conditions of service. Bad conditions of service have been responsible for desertion, looting, corruption and indiscipline among Congolese military and security people. Today, armed uncontrolled and undisciplined soldiers, policemen, intelligence agents, even senior officers, constitute a danger to civilian population. It also contributes to increasing



vulnerabilities which are used the invading forces from the neighbouring countries. The phenomenon coupled with bad conditions of service also plays a significant role in the disorganization of combat force and operations. This military disorganization fuels chaos, terrorism, corruption and conflict escalation which are responsible for higher civilian deaths and casualties in mining and conflict zones. Foreign forces and armed groups take advantage deficient pull factors (positive factors) to multiply push factors (negative factors) that drive chaos in the DRC warfare.

There has been resilience to warfare shocks and resistance to invading forces. These resilience and resistance constitute an opportunity for DRC government to learn from military operations and command failures to reorganize the defence and security sector. It is also an opportunity to capitalize on its war-driven procurement system to devise a sound offset policy. The offset policy and program may help setting up its defence industrial base for the production of information technology-based indigenous technologies in information warfare related systems/weapons at low cost. The challenge will consist of creating a useful strategic partnership with a selected friendly country and the selection of technology transfer/leapfrog/substitution model for implementing a defence offset policy and program. The DRC will have to also enhance R & D allocation in the field of IT in such a way that it acquires technological means of generating wealth, protecting its natural and mining resources and ensuring security of the people and controlling adverse risks of chaos drivers. The DRC has some research-based universities which may help the country develop very low cost and niche technologies such as the GPS need to be exploited by both the civilian and military organizations.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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COVID-19 Pandemic and Counter Insurgency (COIN)

Operations in the Northeast of Nigeria¹

Imperative of Technology

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Abstract:

Boko Haram insurgency brings with it unprecedented consequences, particularly in records of multiple deaths and devastating effects on socio-economic dynamics of the nation. Since no state would stay without responding to threats to its national security, the federal government of Nigeria adopted both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to counter the impact of terrorism on its shores. With several attacks from Boko Haram and the resultant consequences in terms of deaths, displacement and economic damages, the group has remained a potent force particularly in the Northeast and the Sahel region. In the midst of these contending realities is the Corona Virus Disease (COVID -19) that broke out from Wuhan, China in December 2019. Within the space of few months, the outbreak spiralled into a public health emergency and global pandemic; with rapid spread, high casualty rate and negative impacts on global health and economy. Accordingly, Nigeria like other nations was hit by the virus, causing disruption in its already fragile economy coupled with internal security threats. As a measure of containment, the global lockdown measures resulted in less economic patronage which translated into vulnerabilities like crime rate increase. While other countries were seeking answers to the question of health security, Nigeria was faced with the double tragedy of Boko Haram on one hand; and health insecurity on the other with attendant consequences. In this view, application of technology in combating insecurity as well as health emergencies will be the way to go, particularly, in a world that is technologically driven. This paper examines the imperative of technology in counter insurgency operations. It will adopt the historical approach in its analysis to build a pragmatic approach to reversing the trend.

Keywords:

COVID-19; Boko Haram; insurgency; Counter Insurgency Operation; health insecurity.

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Introduction

In an already fragile socio-economic order; the global pandemic caused by the outbreak of Covid-19 poses as a multiplier effect to the security challenge occasioned by Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Boko Haram has grown in sophistication in terms of the use of terror as a means to an end; it continues to gain prominence in the global terrorism ranking. Its transformation from an initial pacifist movement to a terror group with regional spread has questioned the invulnerability of state actors and their rights to the monopoly of the use of force (Wassel, 2012). With the increased rate in kidnappings, rapes, abduction, assassination, suicide bombing, calculated and strategic attacks by the Boko Haram terrorist group; and the global spread of Covid-19 pandemic, the sect grew in strength and used every opportunity at its disposal to instill more fear and terror on the state (Ossai, 2021; Iweze, 2020).

Nigeria, in recent times has become a hub of insecurity. There is currently an internal security operation in almost all the thirty-six states of the federation. Prominent in all the security challenges, is the Boko Haram induced crisis in the North East which has compounded the issues of displacements, poverty, inequality, infrastructural collapse including health facilities (Brookings Event, 2020). This has implications for the management of the Covid – 19 pandemic. With diverse view on the root causes of Boko Haram, it's continuous violence has resulted in an emergency humanitarian response. This does not only have effects on the survival of the state; but also on the citizenry (Mercy, Corps, 2020). Such precarious situation could be compounded in an event of a full-blown pandemic. Ossai (2021), Iweze (2020) opined that as distinctive level of cooperation and consultation between individuals and groups on immediate health response to Covid – 19 pandemic gains attention, counter-insurgency operations in the North East records low patronage and ineffectiveness, in terms of commitment by government, resulting in less success.

Rather than over-reliance on physical deployment for counter-insurgency operation (putting boots on the ground) to the region, technology could be leveraged upon using 4th industrial revolution (4IR). This is about the deployment of drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and ICT facilities to prosecute the war, since physical contact of people have proven to be effective in spreading Covid- 19. As it is in the changing world of globalization, the effectiveness of security architecture now depends on strong security governance system; constituted by defence mandate, security and intelligence institutions, thereby denying space for dominance of continued threat (Bala, 2020). The imperative for counter-insurgency operations; communication, coordination and cooperation that involves, intelligence and operational measures from security agencies of the nation should be further explored.

The quick response of the Federal Government of Nigeria in containing the spread of Covid-19 corresponds with the existential threat of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. The double tragedy of combating the Boko Haram terrorism on one hand, and the Covid-19 pandemic leaves much to be desired on the effectiveness and efficiency of the agencies responsible in countering such threats to deliver (Owonikoko, 2021). Given the consideration

for the application of the securitization theory as a framework of analysis for this study, this paper reveals the importance of emergency response to existential threats. In this light, it investigates the imperatives of technology in such containment strategies. The implication here is that technology serves as a good alternative to effective counter insurgency operations; most especially in the realities of the double-faced health and human insecurity quagmire. The paper utilises secondary method of data collection, to source and provide information that will add to the discourse on the importance of technology in the management of Covid-19 and counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

The two concepts in this paper Covid-19 and Counterinsurgency operations (COIN) will be conceptualised and operationalized for clarity and understanding.

COVID-19, derived from the word coronavirus disease 2019 is caused by the novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It belongs to a group of virus of the family of coronaviradae, which are zoonotic. Covid-19 sometimes causes mild disease or severe disease like (MERS) Middle East Respiratory Syndrome or (SARS) Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (WHO, 2020). The virus was declared a pandemic due to its rapid spread and casualty rate, it originated from Wuhan, a city in China, in late 2019. The first case of the virus in Nigeria was confirmed by the Federal Ministry of Health on 28 February, 2020 (FMOH, 2020). With palpable fear, due to its contagious nature, there was heightened insecurity for all; most especially workers who have daily routines that involves interactions. The effect on human existence and sustenance since it was first confirmed in Nigeria raised concerns and fear among the populace (Osah and Adewunmi, 2020).

The United Nations (2020) in its emergency response to the wide spread pandemic identified that the virus has taken hundreds of thousands of lives, infected millions and crumbled the global economy; thereby creating a bleak future for the existing and coming generations. The organization, through its agency, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has been rendering medical and humanitarian support to nations, particularly, the vulnerable groups. Providing logistics, common services and operational supports to all governments and its partners, it ensures that the crisis is attended to at the barest minimum. Much more than health crisis; security crisis, humanitarian crisis and human right crisis have become a major challenge to the world in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The SARS-CoV-2 infection can be asymptomatic and also has a wide spectrum of symptoms. It has left an impact on every generation including those yet to be born (United Nations, 2020). Accordingly, Wiersingia et al (2020) posits that the wide spread of Covid-19 infection has significantly increased hospitalizations of persons with pneumonia. As at July 1, 2020 it has affected almost all countries of the world and resulted in more than 10 million identified cases.



Coronavirus is identified to be large, enveloped and single handed; having RNA that can be found in humans and other mammals (Wiersingia et al, 2020).

Although there are a number of vaccines approved by the WHO and currently being administered on citizens, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (CDC, 2020) explains that Covid-19 has no specific treatment; but medical help can be sought to reduce the symptoms. The vaccines such as ... are basically build to help build human immune system to be able to respond against covid infections and symptoms. The virus spreads from person to person and recent data shows that even those that have fully vaccinated are still exposed to contacting the virus, though at a very minimal rate compare to the unvaccinated people. As the virus spreads from respiratory droplets, from touching surfaces or having contacts with an infected person; measures of containing its spread is being adopted. Social distancing, using nose masks, constant application of alcohol based sanitizers is advised to curb its spread.

Counter-insurgency Operations

Counter-insurgency operations are operations aimed at neutralizing the incursion of adversaries and prevent them from destabilizing the established governance structures. It follows the use of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in containing the threats. When it is heavily kinetic, it then becomes an action commonly engaged by skilled security personnel to rebuild an affected state through operations that counters the threats of the adversaries. (Charbonneau, 2021). COIN Operations; is a complex subset of warfare. It is an activity that involves the whole of society in an attempt to defeat insurgency (Field Manual Interim, 2009). This implies that as no state can be an island of its own; no counter-insurgency operation can be engaged in the absence of some specialized agencies. All parties to a constituted government must be effectively and efficiently engaged for successful operations. It is a process involving different activities by a legitimate government, where training to understudy the strength and limitations of all parties involved in the designated activity is important.

Notably, the action is a tactical effort, unique and innovative to guarantee successful operation against an existential threat(s). As successful operation becomes the goal of a proposed action, the environment and methods of planning, and executing such counter-insurgency operations are germane.

Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 2017) expanded the scope. It sees counter-insurgency operation as a comprehensive civilian and military effort, which is underlined by coordination and cooperation by different groups to defeat insurgents; while at the same time addressing its core grievances. Such operation is usually a long term activity to provide security for targeted population and change the behavior of the adversaries. It seeks to unravel the primary sources of unrest, determine and address the levels of dissatisfaction by the aggrieved group in an attempt to ensure lasting peace and security.

If insurgency is not curbed from the grassroots, it can lead to other forms of internal conflicts and crises. At the same time, the inability to maintain national security by a legitimate government brews continuous use of force by the insurgent group, thereby demeaning the capacity and legitimacy of the government (NATO, 2017). Similarly, Field Manual Interim describes insurgency as an organized movement that targets a constituted government, by subverting its leadership through violent methods, in order to achieve its inherent political goal(s). It is an internal struggle, emanating within a defined geopolitical space of a territory. This present the end goal of insurgency which is to dismantle existing political structure and take and possibly take over the governance of a particular political setting.

Metz and Millen in another view argue that counter-insurgency in the twenty-first century has become a dominant activity for states in the maintenance of peace and security. This is in support of the assertion that the dynamics of conflict and warfare in the 21st century has significantly changed, with more of asymmetric conflicts than inter-state. To respond to threats posed by insurgents, governments resort to mounting counter-insurgency operations that require specialized skills and training. Therefore, counter-insurgency operation encompasses effective local security, good intelligence, capacity and capability enhancement and development at all levels and with regional or international military partnership and cooperation.

Methodology

In order to attain the objectives, set out in this study, data collection and analysis followed a defined procedure. Thus, this section provides a description of this methodological approach. The data used in this study were derived largely from secondary materials such as published books on the broad theme of the research, journal articles, conference proceedings, government publications and internet resources. Data generated from these sources were analyzed qualitatively. The paper is limited to the challenges posed by terrorism in a period of health insecurity, while establishing a nexus between human and physical security.

Theoretical Framework

The paper is situated within the framework of securitization theory as a basis for analysis. Ole Waever popularized the theory. It sees security as a speech act. That is, the exact use of the word security makes it an urgent situation that requires immediate action or response. A security actor that specializes in the identification of a threat(s), takes an extraordinary measure to ensure survival. That is normal procedural politics can be substituted for an emergency political reaction. The very fact that it is a security issue creates a change from the democratic rules and regulations, to engage emergency responses that may hinder the free observation of the human rights of those involved (Taureck, 2006).



To avoid every other national concern(s) from becoming a security issue, the identified threat(s) must be successfully contained. Therefore, to label a situation a security threat which requires spontaneous response; must fulfill the criteria of identification of the source of the threat by a legitimate actor. An emergency action to contain the threat must be engaged; and there must be observable effects of the identified threat(s) on persons, units or state. Fulfilling these three criteria gives opportunity to break free from the already stated or guiding rules and regulations in a particular entity (Buzan et al, 1998).

Since the first criteria to a security concern is a securitization move, by a legitimate actor, who has social and political power and capability; then Boko Haram insurgency and the Covid-19 pandemic becomes an existential threat that requires emergency political decision to contain. Identifying these threats as a national threat concern which has the capability to threaten the survival of Nigeria and Nigerians makes it necessary for the state to respond appropriately by mounting a counter operation to end the threat and its negative impact. In this regard, the federal government is deploying a whole of society approach by applying both kinetic and non-kinetic means to counter the Boko Haram incursion in the north east Nigeria. Similarly, the Covid-19 health emergency constitute a serious threat to Nigeria and the global community. While the government is deploying humanitarian mission to support its citizens, security intervention was also required to curb any security breach.

Covid - 19 and Counter-insurgency Operations in the Northeast

Prior to the pandemic, counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram by the Government, has not satisfactorily restored peace. Pundits have blamed this on the heavy reliance on military dimension of operations, where it was noted that insurgency is hardly defeated by military operations alone. However, in spite of the increase in budget expenditure for security from USD 1.44 billion (about 4 trillion naira) allocated to the defense sector in 2009 (Iweze, 2020), to USD2.81 billion in 2018, yet, as at 2020, very little had been achieved in terms of ending the conflict. Military-led counter-insurgency operations in the North East still faces notable challenges (Onuoha, Nwangwu and Ikechukwu, 2020). This has resulted in security officials' mutiny, desertion from battle fronts and decline in fighter's morale. Thus, the group has remained active, growing in sophistication and increase in success rate. Iwere (2020), identified poor strategic planning, inadequate weapons and logistic supplies, poor welfare packages for personnel, allegation of corruption, poor security coordination and inadequate military operations as some of the factors contributing to the inability to effectively contain the menace of the group.

To complicate the already precarious security situation, Covid-19 struck with its attendant consequences including infectious spread, high causality rate, and economic depletion. The lock down and other preventive measures that was forced on nations, as well as a re-focus of attention from counter-insurgency to containment of the virus created gap in the management of Boko Haram induced crisis. The lockdown and other measures put in place to

contain the spread of the virus strengthened the activity and operations of the Boko Haram group. Attention was shifted from fighting Boko Haram to containing the spread of the virus through measures such as strict lockdown, avoidance of any sort of physical gathering and even scaling down medical services. One of the negative consequence of the enforcement of the lockdown in Nigeria was a noticeable re-direction of efforts from mounting robust internal security operations to a health emergency operation. While this was the case, Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and other criminal gangs in other parts of the country took advantage of the vulnerability to re-group. Hence, the shift from physical security to human security. Rather than deploying troops to the North East which, served as hub of the insurgent group; more actions were directed to preventing human physical contacts from social interactions in open spaces. Added to the new military duties is ensuring that medical equipment and supplies got to designated units at the expected time. Typically, attack on hard and soft targets increased, including attack on military formations, killing about 50 security forces in an ambush at Alagarno forest in Borno state (Iwere, 2020).

Similarly, in the event of emergency, certain human rights and freedom are set aside. To this end, some aspects of Nigeria's democratic practices were undermined while implementing measures to contain the spread of the virus. Accordingly, the outbreak of the virus disrupted humanitarian activities in the North East including peace building programmes that would have assisted the government to win the hearts and mind of the affected population. It again fueled geo-political tensions in the state and worsened civil unrests (Ossai, 2021). Ossai believes the virus was a multiplier effects to the already vulnerable situation of the country. As national and health security was important, counterinsurgency operations suffered a sort of neglect. In another perspective, the Covid-19 pandemic created an opportunity for peace in the country. This was because everything was at a kind of standstill.

Although the realities of Covid-19 became a major concern for the state, it had situational and relational dimensions to maintaining peace in Nigeria. In Nigeria, peace is a complex and multifaceted concept that is shaped by religion, politics, ethnicity, economic and other related spheres (Ossai, 2021). Owonikoko (2021) in his perspective explains that the Lake Chad region consist of fringe territories in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon which are fragile and highly unstable. Effectiveness in counter-insurgency operation in this region became counter-productive in the face of the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic. With the virus ravaging the world, and the fragile and highly unstable nature of the region, it became safe haven for Boko Haram and other criminal groups to build operational base in borders and countries of the region.

Weak government response in military counter terrorism operation, insufficient military personnel and the intensification of operations by the group aided the ineffective response to the insurgency. As a military security zone that depended largely on military operatives for stability, Covid-19 pandemic changed the wave of operations, as calculated and strategic attacks were orchestrated on security formations (Owonikoko, 2021). Related to this is Osah's and Adewunmi's (2020) argument that the security architecture of the Federal Government



of Nigeria in the period of Covid-19 pandemic was negatively affected. A strong connection was established to the security of the people in health-related matters and physical assurance of security in lives and properties.

Nexus between Health Insecurity and Internal Security Challenges

There is a thin line between health insecurity and national security threats. In recent years, national security of Nigeria has been largely threatened by a mirage of security challenges confronting the nation from different fronts. Monguno (2022) maintain that there is an internal security operation being mounted in almost all the states of the federation within the same period of time. This goes to show the severity of insecurity that manifest in different forms in Nigeria. For instance, there is Boko Haram terrorism operating in North East states, kidnaping for ransom in North West and other parts of the country, activities of ‘unknown gun men’ and secessionist agitation in the South East, oil piracy and bunkering in the South-South, kidnaping, ritual killing, internet fraud as well as armed banditry in the South-West among others. The escalation of Boko Haram terrorism in the northeast, beginning from 2009 changed the security landscape of the nation, with the introduction of what was hitherto uncommon including suicide bombing, mass killing, and kidnaping for ransom. While the government have battled to contain the threats posed by Boko Haram, other sources of insecurity grew in number and causality.

To corroborate this assertion, Monguno argued that the nation has been in its darkest moment owing to the increasing insecurity. He alluded that to address insecurity, military operations have been deployed to almost all the states of the federation. Although the Police is the lead agency in the maintenance of internal security, the magnitude of the threats has prompted the Government and the security actors to activate the Chapter 6 Section 217 Subsection (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) to allow for the deployment of the Armed Forces of Nigeria as well as other sister security agencies to mount a holistic operation to counter the threats. Specifically, Sub section (2) of the constitution says: “The Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of - (a) defending Nigeria from external aggression; (b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air; (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and (d) performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly” (Constitution of the FRN, 1999). In this regard, the involvement of the military and other security agencies in combating insecurity has the backing of the Constitution. However, even with the involvement of the Armed Forces, insecurity has remained a major challenge for the nation. Some scholars believe that tanks and boots is not

sufficient enough to address current challenges, since human security goes beyond maintenance of physical security.

Evidently, aside from physical injury, death, displacements and infrastructural collapse, insecurity has depleted the nation's national income thereby having a negative consequence on its development aspirations. While contending with that reality, Covid – 19 struck the world killing 6, 240,619 people between 2020 and May 2022, while there are about 511, 965,711 active cases globally (WHO, 2022). World Health Organisation (WHO) record shows the global break down of Covid active cases by region as follows: Europe 215,424,950, Americas 153,251,277, South-East Asia 57,882,962, Western Pacific 54,913,453, Eastern Mediterranean 21,702,163, and Africa 8,790,143. In Nigeria current record from the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) indicate that Nigeria currently has 255,753 confirmed covid cases, out of which 2,699 are active, 249,911 were treated and discharged, while 3,143 people have died as a result of complications from Covid infections since 2020 (NCDC Report, 2022). This figure suggests that Africa and Nigeria in particular has a marginally low rate of covid infection and complications. This is contrary to what was anticipated base on the poor state of health system and weak economies of most African states. In Nigeria, this is complicated by insecurity, particularly, terrorism that have since 2009 drained substantial resources that would have been channeled to develop the health and other critical sectors.

As a desperate measure to contain the spread of the virus, the WHO encouraged nations to introduce strict restriction of large gathering of people, and in most cases, a total lockdown. For Nigeria, a nation with existing precarious security situation, Covid – 19 induced lockdown and desperation to contain the spread of the virus, diverted Government's attention from focusing on combatting physical insecurity to fighting health insecurity. As the Government battled to save lives of those affected or at least, prevent more people from getting infected, crimes and criminality increased. While the terrorists were re-strategizing and refocusing on a new approach, other criminal activities equally increased. For instance, there were recorded increase in cases of gender base violence such as rape, human rights abuse, robbery, looting and even kidnapping for ransom. While records of some of the cases were reported, greater number of similar cases of violent crimes were not reported and no actions taken to seek redress. This could be attributed to the rarity of security personnel dedicated to fighting insecurity within the period under review, as well as non-availability of personnel of other institutions such as the judiciary, police, ombudsman and others that would play one role or the other in administering justice and protecting human rights of the citizens.

Infrastructure, including health facilities have always been a priority of every government in Nigeria since independence, at least, in principle. With recorded improvement in many sectors such as agriculture, railways infrastructure, democratic consolidation, local content development, mining among others, health infrastructure remains grossly under-developed and inadequate to cater for a large population of over 200 million people. This implies that mortality rate maintains a record high when compared with nations with similar economic strength. With the advent of Covid – 19 following the first index case in March 2020, and as



expected, the existing health infrastructure could not absorb the health emergencies from Covid 19 and other health complications. Even with the Armed Forces whose primary role is maintaining security, it became distracted, delivering health services, humanitarian intervention as well as the enforcement of Covid – 19 restriction orders. In all of these, it could be deduced that counter-insurgency and other counter operations in the country have been largely successful, at least, in limiting the spheres of influence of adversaries to secluded locations, at the same time insurgency and other related security challenges such as kidnapping, activities of ‘unknown gun men’, internet fraud, ritual killings, kidnapping and systemic corruption have persisted. As nations are gradually lifting Covid – 19 restrictions, more security challenges are exacerbating, hence the imperative of technology in addressing them.

Imperative of Technology in Combating National Security Threats in Nigeria

As identified earlier in this paper, Nigeria is currently being faced with diverse security challenges that have threatened its corporate survival. Most of these challenges require a re-focus of approaches to successfully combat them. In the age of globalization, characterized with innovations, inventions and deployment of technology to solve the problems of the universe and its inhabitants, technology has daily been deployed for both positive and negative reasons. For instance, one of the greatest fears being entertained by state actors, regions and even international community is that of non-state armed actors and irregular forces taking hold of weapon of mass destructions (WMD) such as biological, chemical or even nuclear weapons capability. State actors, by nature are said to be rational, (although it is still subject of contention and interpretation) and subjects of international law. By implications, their actions are largely regulated by the dictates and conduct of national as well as international legal frameworks. This is contrary to non-state armed actors that mostly act irrationally by deploying violence to achieve their objectives.

Paradoxically, irregular forces have increasingly mastered the use of technology to drive down their message even when it involves mass murder and violation of citizens’ fundamental rights. With its capacity in media warfare, it could just be a matter of time before this palpable fear becomes real. Boko Haram and its splinter groups such as Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) are effectively deploying technology, especially, the internet, in their operations. They use internet to recruit, train, sustain alliances, incite followers and sympathizers as well as communicate to the larger society,

With their nature and character, some of the existing world lethal weapons including chemical and biological weapons, if irrationally handled and deployed, of course, by armed groups, would spell doom for the world. Already the fourth-generation warfare has proven to be such that battle fronts have been eroded, while civilian objects are increasingly being targeted. Multiplicity of conflict actors are responsible for this. These actors target civilians and critical infrastructure using technologically driven weapons. Thus, in order to repel such

threats, they should be a dedicated training for personnel that would engage in counter warfare such as cyber operations. This is in addition to other non-military activities that are dedicated to winning the hearts and minds of the affected populace. Consequently, it is the position of this paper that in order to counter insurgency, and by extension, the fourth-generation warfare, deployment of technology is imperative. This could come in the form of investment in intelligence gathering infrastructure, deployment of high-tech equipment such as drones among others with high precision and less collateral damages. This will reduce the risk of physical deployment of troops and by extension limit casualty level.

Additionally, cyber security is now a top component of national security concerns. 21st century battle space has expanded to accord primacy to cyber warfare. Insurgents now seamlessly transmit information through the use of cyber space. Where there is problem of insurgency like Boko Haram in the North East Nigeria, there is usually the added fear of cyber-attack or hacking of security soft and hardware to immobilize its infrastructure in order to destabilize the enemy. This could pose a major threat to national security. Media have aided Boko Haram to receive or anticipate the nature of response from security forces and use such information to either engage the military and desolve within the populace, making it difficult for a successful counter operations and possible containment of the adversaries over the years. Government needs to effectively engage the media to counter the Boko Haram narratives. Engaging in media warfare, while in the longer term, deploy high tech military technology against them, would change the pace of the operation.

Similarly, with the coming of Ebola virus in 2015 and Covid – 19 pandemics in 2020 to Nigeria, and most likely there would still be an outbreak of more infectious diseases of international concern in the near future. Government needs to think along the use of technology in containing the spread of such diseases that are likely to pose or add to the security concern of the nation, as well as integrate such measure into policies and programmes that deal with the national security question. The inter-connectedness of health security with other elements of national security cannot be completely ignored, especially as all of these form part of human security which has been the focus of international community in the recent time. Human security involves freedom from hunger, diseases, poverty, feeling of insecurity and even guarantee and protection of rights, liberty and other privileges. Where there is no human security, the question of national security cannot be attained, it is therefore imperative to deploy technology to prevent the outbreak of diseases or, at least contain its spread to avoid the human casualty and economic consequences of it. This is most important, in a space and time where insecurity has significantly drained the nation's economic resources and caused serious fatalities in terms of number of people killed and displaced. It has equally disintegrated the political system because at the root of insecurity are critical unresolved political issues.



Major Findings

Arising from the discussion and analysis presented in this here, this paper submits as follows:

1. The paper established that there is a nexus between health insecurity (human security) and internal security challenges (physical security). - Evidently, aside from physical injury, death, displacements and infrastructural collapse, insecurity has depleted the nation's national income thereby having a negative consequence on its development aspirations, including building health infrastructure to manage health emergencies such as Covid – 19.
2. Over the years, Nigeria has made significant development strides, particularly, in the agricultural sector, railways infrastructure, democratic consolidation, local content development, mining among others, health infrastructure remains grossly under-developed.
3. Nigeria's internal security operations mounted to counter increasing insecurity in many parts of the country have been largely kinetic. However, inclusion on non-kinetic approaches, and particularly, the application of technology in combatting internal security threats would be far more effective than heavy reliance on deploying boots on the ground.
4. Humanitarian consequences of insecurity transcends beyond basic needs of victims to include health security, hence the need to factor health emergency needs in any conflict management approach of the government.
5. The intervention of the Armed Forces of Nigeria in the enforcement of covid - 19 restrictions, as well as humanitarian support during the covid era caused a disruption in their primary responsibility of safe guiding lives and property, especially, in a country that is faced with multiple threats from different fronts.
6. As nations are lifting Covid – 19 restrictions, more security challenges are most likely going to spring up in Nigeria, hence, the imperative of technology in addressing them. Technology enhanced security governance is imperative in addressing insecurity most especially counter insurgency when dealing with health emergencies like COVID 19.
7. Technology driven defence and security mandates improves intelligence operations most especially during health emergencies.
8. The security agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations must ensure effective collaboration, coordination and cooperation during health and humanitarian emergencies which can be enhanced by leveraging on technology.
9. Gender considerations in combating insecurity and health emergencies are essential for operational efficiency.
10. It is imperative to maintain inter-agency capacity building for planning and response to complex emergencies like COVID 19 for internal security operations.

Conclusion

The application of technology remains imperative in countering threats posed by Boko Haram insurgency as well as other security concerns. The need for deployment of technology in the management of both physical and health security concerns is made more pronounced following the recent outbreak of COVID - 19 pandemic and other related infectious diseases such as Ebola virus that affected many countries of West Africa. The outbreak of COVID - 19 and its rapid spread all over the world presents a new reality that the world would have to live with. Nigeria, having been battling with insecurity that manifest in terrorism, kidnapping for ransom, ethno religious tension, secessionist agitation, oil piracy, armed robbery among other criminal enterprises, was taken aback when health emergency of global concern struck and exposed her vulnerability and unpreparedness to manage such emergency, especially, in an already fragile state. In this context, deployment of technology such as drones, cyber space and investment in intelligence warfare would help in combatting insecurity, particularly, in a period of health pandemic. Similarly, technologically driven health infrastructure is imperative in the preparation and management of health emergency.

Accordingly, the paper established that there is a nexus between health insecurity and internal security challenges, while acknowledging the significant development strides made by the Government of Nigeria over the years particularly, in key sectors of the economy. In all of this, health infrastructural development remains grossly under-developed. It identified that over reliance on kinetic approach to countering insecurity has not yielded the needed result, hence the need for a whole of society approach. It further proposed the need to factor health emergency needs in any conflict management approach of the government.

Way Forward

In the light of the above, this paper recommends as follows:

- a) Nigerian State as well as countries with similar security challenges and response measure should re-focus their counter threats approaches and deploy a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic operation in countering insecurity. This will include the application of technology in fighting both internal security threats and health insecurity. States' actions are largely regulated by the dictates and conduct of international legal frameworks. Therefore, state actors could be trusted with the deployment of both technologies for warfare and for health emergencies.
- b) State actors should retain the monopoly of media and cyber space in order to counter the terrorists' narratives. Irregular forces have increasingly mastered the use of cyber space to drive down their message even when it involves mass murder and violation of citizens' rights. With its capacity in media warfare, BH has been launching a psychological warfare. Hence, the need to counter such narrative.



- c) With the dynamics and changing nature of conflict and warfare, Nigerian Government, regional and international community should encourage, develop and continually conduct dedicated and specialized training for personnel involve in conflict management and human and health security for enhanced counter operations. This is in addition to other non-military activities that are dedicated to winning the hearts and minds of the local populace
- d) Nigeria government should maintain a dedicated fund for upgrading of counter operation equipment and infrastructure. This could come in the form of investment in intelligence gathering infrastructure, deployment of high tech equipment such as drones among others with high precision and less collateral effect. This will reduce the risk of putting boots on ground and limit casualty level.
- e) Government of Nigeria need to think along the use of technology in containing the spread of such diseases that is of security concern to the nation, as well as integrate such measure into policies and programmes that deal with national security question. The inter-connectedness of health security with other elements of national security cannot be completely ignored, especially as all of these form part of human security which has been the focus of international community in the recent time.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina's Peacekeepers on African Soil during COVID-19 Procedures, Challenges, Lessons¹

Milica Sikimić², Bojan Vujanović³

Abstract:

Active United Nation missions on African soil are: MINURSO in Western Sahara, UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in Democratic Republic of the Congo, MINUSCA in Central African Republic and UNISFA in Abyei. Peacekeeping has always been highly dynamic and has evolved in the face of new issues. But, in addition to the challenges they face while assisting host countries on the difficult path from conflict to peace, peacekeepers have recently had to deal with procedures and obstacles caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of the article is to investigate the performance of everyday tasks in the COVID-19 era with an emphasis on issues related to the availability of basic supplies for UN peacekeepers, personal protective equipment, medical services, welfare, travel restrictions, and connections with the resident population in Africa. In this paper, we will present the results of qualitative research (in-depth interviews) on the experiences of UN staff from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) who served in the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), in the period 2020-2022. In anticipation of malaria, typhoid, hepatitis, salmonella, etc., the peacekeepers faced a new unknown disease, a shortage of medicines, they had no access to hospitals, and personal protective masks were made from their underwear. In some areas the local population believed that COVID19 was a “mysterious disease” brought and spread by peacekeepers and this fact shed new light on (non)cooperation with UN staff. Apart from the UN, the mission staff were (not) provided with support and assistance in various ways by the countries which they came from.

Keywords:

COVID-19; Africa; South Sudan; UN missions; peacekeepers; support.

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Introduction

Africa is a very challenging and demanding continent, offering the prospect for an end the proxy wars that had been fought across the length and breadth of the continent for decades. The continent therefore faces the double challenge of development and democratisation (Cilliers 2021).

From the other side, Europe is increasingly involved in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations all over the world. But, peacekeeping has always been highly dynamic and has evolved in the face of new issues (Apuuli 2020; Pushkina 2020; Walter et al. 2021). Indeed, geographic and climate features have a profound impact on operational preparation. Depending on the country where the staff are deployed, the health and sanitary rules are also quite different (Besenyő 2017). Furthermore, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned that the spread of the coronavirus in Africa poses a high risk, and officials claimed that Africa is clearly not ready to stop an epidemic caused by a coronavirus (Besenyő and Kármán 2020). Attention to the factors that impact the effectiveness and prospects for successful peacekeeping in Africa (Akonor 2017) was fullfield with COVID 19 awareness.

Police and military structures from BiH have been participating in peacekeeping missions and peace support operations since 2000. Police forces from BiH entered the African mainland for the first time in 2004, as part of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The mission was aimed at maintaining peace and strengthening the capacity of the local police in providing police service to citizens with an emphasis on vulnerable populations. According to the available data, 81 members of the police structures from BiH who stayed in Liberia were appointed to the positions of police advisors for criminal investigations, team leaders and deputy regional commanders (Sikimić 2021). Since 2011 the police staff from BiH have been participating in UNMISS. South Sudan is one of the most divided and unstable countries in the world and has become the scene of some of the worst human rights abuses on the African continent. When South Sudan became independent in 2011, a special peacekeeping mission was created specifically for the newly independent country (Zambakari et al. 2019).

UNMISS was established for one year on 9 July 2011, but with recommendation to renew it for subsequent periods. Now, UNMISS is authorized to use all necessary means to implement its mandate, which has been extended until March 15, 2023. In order to protect civilians and build lasting peace, almost 20,000 peacekeepers from 73 countries are serving in South Sudan. According to the available data as of November 2021, there were 13,254 troops, 222 experts in the mission, 1,411 police officers, 2,268 civilians, 425 staff officers and 402 UN volunteers on site in the mission. The approved budget for the period 07/2021-06/2022 was \$ 1,201,887,500 financed through a special account approved on an annual basis by the General Assembly. Civilian, military and police staff work daily with a focus on four main pillars, namely: protecting civilians, creating conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance,

supporting the implementation of the revitalized agreement and the peace process, and monitoring and investigating human rights (UNMISS, 2022; Roach and Hudson 2019).

Methodology

In order to explore the specific peacekeeping procedures, challenges and lessons from the COVID-19 era, we applied a qualitative method and obtained data using in-depth interviews. For this research, it was essential to gather information about participants of the mission, identify the problem based on their story, and determine the circumstances for which the qualitative exploratory research is the appropriate method. This method provides an opportunity for respondents to share their experience, opinions, and ideas, to improve the wider society's understanding of peacekeeping and provide valuable advice to future peacekeepers. Objective, independent results are not the main purpose of qualitative analysis, whereas experience, everyday practice and subjective reality of interviewees are at the service of better understanding of peacekeeping in the COVID era. In this way, the practical implications are of primary interest (Kelemen-Erdos and Meszaros 2021; Kelemen-Erdos 2019).

The interviews were conducted in the period from August 8, 2022 to September 9, 2022. The results shown in this paper are based on the answers of 7 respondents who were selected based on their experience, jobs, and tasks they perform on a professional or semi-professional basis in UN missions in Africa. More specifically, these include police officers from different police agencies in BiH, who were on a peacekeeping mission in South Sudan in the period from January 2020 to Jun 2021.⁴ Semi-structured guide was used to obtain accurate results, while the moderator let the conversation flow with some questions (Kelemen-Erdos and Molnár 2019).

Taking into consideration the information obtained from the type of an interview it was necessary to understand the common life conditions in the peacekeeping missions (which the first interviews emphasised) and to elaborate additional issues during COVID-19. Moreover, regarding the analysis of the gathered data, we used qualitative content analysis to discover the central issue, sub-issues, and specific circumstances in South Sudan during COVID-19.

The study focuses on the following research questions:

- Q1: When and how did the COVID-19 related concerns arise in UNMISS?
- Q2: What are the most serious obstacles and disadvantages during UNMISS, in the COVID-19 era?
- Q3: How are the UNMISS staff dealing with the issues of COVID-19 and what lessons have been learned?

⁴ Field Office (FO) Bentiu, FO Malakal, FO Wau and FO Juba.

Results

Basic supplies, personal protective equipment and connections with the resident population

Before the start of the mission and the outbreak of COVID-19, there was no mention of this disease for the BiH contingent. It was only after arriving at the mission in February 2020 that they encountered the first information about the new virus in the form of an additional mandatory online test that they had to take. The first month of service in South Sudan passed in line with expectations and they received pre-mission information regarding living and working conditions.



Republika Srpska police officer in South Sudan (Source: the photo obtained from the personal archive, November 2020)

In March 2020, there were restrictions on a wider scale. The measure that affected the peacekeepers most was related to restrictions on water consumption. An individual could take (receive) one package of 12 bottles (18 liters of water) on a weekly basis, that is, about 2.5 liters for one day. Since daytime temperatures in South Sudan go up to 50 degrees Celsius, and the staff patrol in the open, the amount of available liquid was, according to the interviewees' experience, absolutely insufficient. They tried to find alternative sources of drinking liquid, but at the same time all cafeterias in the camp stopped working. They found the solution in technical water, which they filtered before the use for personal hygiene and for food preparation, since even ready-made food delivery services were no longer available. Due to the fear of transmission of covid and the attacks on members of the UN, going to the local market or market area became strictly prohibited after the declaration of the pandemic and punishable by disciplinary action.

Since the borders of South Sudan were closed, there was also a shortage of personal hygiene products. There was no soap or toilet paper, and cleaning services were suspended (although the charge for that service was not suspended, \$3 per day). The staff did not have adequate accessories for cleaning their rooms. Hand sanitiser was available in 30 ml for 10 days, and the masks provided were cotton, handmade, and not suitable for that type of purpose.

Interviewee 2: Some countries (Sri Lanka, Norway, Canada) delivered packages with basic necessities (food, medicine, personal hygiene products, clothes, etc.) to their nationals on mission, including items sent by family. Nobody received even an email from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With the advent of COVID-19, there were drastic changes in the behavior of the resident population towards members of the UN. South Sudanese officials called the new virus a “mysterious disease”, and the population believed that the disease was brought by white people, primarily peacekeepers. At the end of March 2020, the local population became violent towards the UN staff, they threw stones at official vehicles, attacked individuals with machetes, knives and spears. Fortunately, no member of the mission was seriously injured in these attacks. Violence against UN staff was even openly promoted on social networks. It is important to point out that the president and vice president of South Sudan, as central figures, strongly condemned these attacks and announced harsh punishments against the perpetrators, after which the situation relatively calmed down.

In accordance with the changed circumstances caused by COVID, a decision was made to suspend regular patrolling in the protection of civilians site (PoC). Members of the mission entered the PoC only in the case of a large-scale violation of public order and peace, rape or murder, that is the most serious crimes. They maintained contact from the UN camp through mobile phones which they had procured - bought themselves, and delivered to the chiefs - leaders in the PoC. To enter the PoC as needed, permission from the mission headquarters was necessary, and upon returning, the members had to prepare a report with a detailed description of the actions and measures taken.

Interviewee 3: Jobs and tasks were increasingly demanding, and there was less and less communication which became exclusively online.



Field Office Bentiu during COVID-19 (Source: the photo obtained from the personal archive, September 2020)

In accordance with the recommendations of the World Health Organization, the UN headquarters also ordered physical distance measures (1.5-2m) and a limited number of people in closed rooms. This also applied to official vehicles, meaning that only two people (instead of 5) could go on assignments and to PoC. In the case of using a helicopter with a capacity of 20 people, only 8 to 10 could be boarded. The arrangement of accommodation and work schedule resulted in the quarantine of three people in the event that one person had contact with an infected person. This led to a significant lack of personnel and difficulties in organizing the minimum work process. Also, certain jobs and tasks were adapted to be performed by only one UN member, (e.g. only one duty officer in the office, instead of two as it was the case before the measures), then one duty officer at the entrance to the camp (previously there were 2 or 3 members), which represented an increased security risk.

The described situation lasted until the beginning of 2021, when the measures were relatively relaxed.

Medical services

In the UN camp in South Sudan, there were two clinics, Level 1 and Level 2. Level 1 is a regular clinic with working hours from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while Level 2 served as a COVID ward.

The mission staff, in case of need, contacted medics by telephone, who often prescribed quarantine and available therapy (limited number and type of drugs were available) without a direct personal examination or a detailed description of the indications.

Interviewee 4: *A colleague was diagnosed with COVID 19 for a painful hip and together with his contacts was ordered to self-isolate.*

To make matters worse, malaria did not let up, and in combination with COVID, death was the most certain outcome. The decision of the authorities was that there would be no burial for those who died of COVID-19, nor transport to the country of origin, and that they would be “buried” on the territory of South Sudan. Members of FO Bentiu received news that in case of death caused by COVID, the body will be “buried” in one of the largest swamps in the world, which is located near the camp. For other FOs, the practice was to isolate or bury the body somewhere outside the camp and village, but it was definitely not possible to send the body home, nor to keep it in the morgue in any hospital. The BiH contingent experienced the real drama which they do not like to recall, when a colleague suffered a stroke and was in a coma without adequate medical help and care. After extensive diplomatic interventions at the UN headquarters in New York and in the mission, the colleague was operated on in Uganda ten days after the stroke, survived and returned to BiH, but permanent consequences for his health were not avoided. The reason for the refusal to operate in the state hospital in Juba or to allow him to be medically evacuated to Uganda (MEDEVAC) was that the state institutions, as well as the surrounding African countries, completely locked down, without exception.

In May 2021, members of the mission were vaccinated against COVID-19 with the Astra Zenneca vaccine, and revaccinated two months later. Vaccination was recommended, but only voluntary.

Travel restrictions and welfare

The travel restriction hit the mission in two ways. The first was that at the time of the introduction of measures to combat the corona virus, part of the UN staff was on regular annual leave in their countries. Due to the ban on crossing national borders introduced by countries around the world, the peacekeepers could not return to South Sudan from their annual vacation and the UN terminated their contracts with them.

Another way the travel ban affected the mission was that none of the staff could leave the UN camp for a longer period of time. The peacekeepers could not visit their families for a whole year and this caused a feeling of powerlessness towards the family, anxiety, etc.

In addition to all the above, the ban on socializing between members of the mission had a special weight. It was strictly forbidden for them to socialize and stay in the same room or in the same area. In this way, it was impossible to celebrate birthdays, New Year, religious holidays, etc. People became alienated from each other and many members felt serious signs of depression and anxiety. In many field offices, gyms were closed entirely, or had limited opening hours with a limited number of members allowed to stay in the gym, up to a maximum of 60 minutes. The only thing that was allowed and encouraged by the mission, was running or walking within the camp, of course, not in groups but individually or with a



roommate from a room/container/accommodation. So those walks were the only *welfare* for a certain part of the time, that is several months.

Final remarks

During COVID-19, the entire world population was exposed to new living and working conditions. Numerous papers have been published on this topic, and with this work we intended to draw attention to additional aggravating circumstances in which members of the UN peacekeeping missions lived and worked. According to the testimonies of the BiH contingent in South Sudan, during their stay in the mission there was a lack of institutional support, both from the permanent mission of BiH to the UN in New York, and from the police agencies where they are permanently employed. The common conclusion of all respondents is that the most difficult thing for them was being separated from their family and not being able to help families who also faced COVID-19.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributors

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Significance of the Application of Resilience-based Approach in Human Trafficking at the Area of Sub-Saharan Africa¹

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Abstract:

It is beyond dispute that the effects of climate change can be experienced more frequently at all parts of the ecosystem. The current change of our environment contributes to unpredictable natural disasters, which results increased number of children victims by human trafficking in the devastated areas, that mostly affected the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. As the overwhelming natural disasters destroy the education system and other social services, human traffickers may take their victims easily for mainly sexual exploitation. The resilience-based methods can produce solutions to this global challenge and reduce vulnerability and risk concerning the orphaned by natural disasters who can easily become exploited persons by human traffickers. The aim of the study is introducing and analysing the Geneva Convention that should be the essential frame of the resilience-based approach of human trafficking.

Keywords:

Climate change; human trafficking; human rights; resilience; exploitation.

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Introduction

According to an analysis by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), population will grow to almost ten billion by 2050, which leads to intensified competition for resources and fuels inter-ethnic conflicts, too. As a result, the study says, 1.2 billion people will be forced to leave their homes. Researchers highlighted that in 2019 alone, some 30 million people left their homes in hopes of a better life. Mass emigration will lead to a larger wave of refugees, who can become a prey of human traffickers, which will have huge social and political implications, according to the founder of the IEP. The analysis highlights that even by 2050, even stable countries could become vulnerable, as climate change or perishable water supplies could affect all countries in the world in some form (IEP, 2020).

As the climate warms, droughts and floods will become more frequent and crops will be destroyed more and more often. Cattle get less food, less meat and milk. Furthermore, the moisture in the air and soil decreases, leaving less water for the plants. As a result, tens of millions of acres of arable land at some parts of Africa are becoming significantly drier. The pests that destroy the crop have already infected a larger area because they are facing more favorable conditions. The growing season will be shorter, with a warming of 4 degrees Celsius in most parts of Africa, or even more. As a result, tens of millions of acres of arable land at the affected areas that becoming significantly drier. The pests that destroy the crop have already infected a larger area because they are facing more favorable conditions. The growing season will be shorter, with a warming of 4 degrees Celsius in most parts of Africa, or even more (Chapman et al., 2020). For those who can already live, any such change will be a disaster. In the absence of a set-aside reserve, the crop is destroyed and the farmers concerned are unable to take more seed. And this factor implies the clear consequence that food prices will skyrocket for hundreds of millions due to climate change and soil erosion.

The increasing frequency of natural disasters in the coming years will definitely generate an increase in environmental migration, as there will be less and less access to arable land and food. Even more and more actors of environmental migration can become victims of human traffickers, of whom women and children are primarily sexually exploited, who needs urgent and essential protection by supporting their basic human rights (Wiederkehr et al., 2018).

Geneva Convention

Although the Geneva Convention does not specifically contain provisions for victims of human traffickers or even refugee children, as the primary refugee convention on the rights and protection of refugees, which has been enforced to this day, the content of the convention on refugees must be applied bindingly in the case of each victims of human traffickers and refugee child. The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol are the first international agreements aimed at solving the non-new problems arising from the refugee issue took place after the Second World War, when a unified position was finally reached with the Universal



Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/3/217A/1948) regarding the handling of the refugee issue. Previously, in the absence of the Convention, the situation was handled only on the basis of ad hoc international conventions, which, due to the lack of uniform specificity, only applied to a typical group of refugees. The situation was ripe for the period after the Second World War, when, due to the significant increase in the number of refugees, the uniform international convention clearly defined the concept of refugee status and the rights associated with it (Kamruzzaman & Shashi, 2016).

According to one of the most significant points of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), everyone has the right to seek asylum from persecution in another country and to enjoy the asylum granted by that other country; (UN/A/RES/3/217A/1948). The Geneva Convention created in 1951 strengthens and expands this position, and the Additional Protocol of 1967 formulates additional, detailed rights and their protection (UN/A/RES/2198(XXI)/1968).

The Convention (1951) does not reject the previous ad hoc legislation and the regulations related to them, it incorporates them and applies them with some modifications. During the Convention (1951), a unified concept of refugee status was finally defined, according to which anyone who, as a result of events that occurred before January 1, 1951, is free from persecution due to race, religion, nationality, belonging to a specific social group, or political beliefs is outside the country of his/her nationality due to well-founded fear and is unable or unwilling to use the protection of that country due to fear of persecution; or who, having no citizenship and staying outside their former habitual residence, cannot, or does not want to return there due to fear of persecution, as a result of such events (Article 1). It is important to note that the Protocol created later (1968) modifies the concept, i.e. the temporal definition is removed from the text.

Furthermore, it is worth noting the fact that joining and approving the Geneva Convention does not automatically mean acceptance of the Protocol, i.e. as a legal document independent of the Geneva Convention, it only applies to those member states that have ratified the content of the Protocol. Both international documents were signed by 142 countries, of which three countries (Madagascar, Saint Kitts and Nevis) only approved the Convention, and three additional countries (Cabo Verde, the United States of America and Venezuela) only approved the Protocol (UNHCR, 2015). There are states that have not ratified either the Geneva Convention or the Protocol. (India, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman, United Arab Emirates or Libya).

Criteria for refugee status

The Convention defines the concepts of refugee status and refugee person, and includes the distinguishing reasons and circumstances that determine the cases in which the given person cannot have refugee rights. If the requirements defined by the Convention are met, the given person is entitled to refugee status, regardless of whether his/her refugee status was confirmed by any formal decision. In a legal sense, this means that the definition of refugee status does not arise as a result of the official approval as a refugee, but that his/her status is recognized precisely because he/she is a refugee. Accordingly, the Convention defining refugee status can only be considered declarative (Iriye et al., 2012).

Regarding the definition of refugee status, the international treaty defines three conditions:

- well-founded fear of persecution
- the person with the given nationality resides outside his/her country, i.e. a stateless person resides outside his/her permanent place of residence
- the person cannot or does not even want to apply for the protection provided by his/her own country due to the fact of persecution (UNHCR, 1992).

The concept of persecution

One of the conditions for determining refugee status is the fact of a well-founded fear of persecution. Since fear is a subjective emotion that varies from individual to individual, the fear affecting the refugee becomes a well-founded fear in the sense of the law if the refugee can justify it with objective facts. A person is considered to have left his/her own country if there is a compelling reason for leaving, i.e. there is a well-founded fear of persecution. Of course, the well-founded reason for the refugee's fear of persecution must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Part of the investigation is an evidentiary phase, during which the given person must prove the fact and the reason for the fear of persecution, according to which it has become impossible for him/her to stay in his/her country of origin. Of course, it is not a criterion for refugee status that the given person is actually persecuted in his/her own country, the fact that he/she wants to save herself from the risk of persecution is sufficient (Irial, 2012, pp. 134-148). A significant shortcoming of the Convention is that it does not clearly define the concept of persecution. According to Article 31 of the Convention (1951), Member States shall not impose any criminal sanctions against refugees who have unlawfully entered or are present in the country's territory, if they come from a country where their life or liberty is in danger as defined in Article 1 of the Convention.

And according to Article 33, no member state may expel or send back the given person to the territory of a state where his/her life or freedom is at risk. Regardless of the facts, the refugee is entitled to mandatory protection, in the event that he/she comes from the territory of a country, or that they want to send him/her back or expel him/her, where his/her life or freedom is at risk. Under this, if a person's life or freedom is threatened due to race, religion,



nationality, belonging to a specific social group or political beliefs, it is considered persecution. In addition, serious violations of human rights resulting from these reasons can also provide a basis for establishing persecution (Article 33).

Furthermore, in connection with the definition of the concept of persecution, it is worth mentioning Article 3 of the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The article is worded similarly to the provisions of the Convention (1951), i.e. no member state may expel, deport or extradite a person to a state where there is a reasonable fear that the person may be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Pursuant to this, any case in which a person would be exposed to the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in the third country to which they are expelled or returned must be considered as persecution (Article 3).

Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment is only one of the reasons for determining refugee status, and according to the Convention (1951), discrimination can also be a reason for persecution. According to the correct interpretation of the article, discrimination can be considered a reason for persecution if the discrimination reaches such a level that life becomes unbearable for the individual (Article 3). If the discrimination has reasons related to gender identity, as a result of which life becomes unbearable for the person in his/her own country, or even in the most extreme case same-sex relationships are sanctioned at the level of criminal law in that country, we are clearly talking about a situation of persecution. When investigating and proving this kind of persecution, the social, cultural and religious aspects of discrimination must also be examined. Similar to the Convention (1951), the European Union defines persecution as a situation which, due to its repeated characteristics, clearly creates such a serious situation that it violates basic human rights, or consists of a combination of different measures which so seriously violate human rights, that they affect the situation of the person concerned in a similar way as those mentioned above (2011/95/EU).

Pursuant to the facts formulated by the European Union, we can define the following actions as the concept of persecution:

- use of physical or psychological violence;
- legal, regulatory, administrative, police or judicial measures that have discriminatory characteristics or are applied in a discriminatory manner;
- disproportionalities or discrimination applied during criminal proceedings, disproportionate or discriminatory punishment;
- refusal of legal protection in court, if all this entails a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment;
- criminal proceedings or punishment for refusing military service in a conflict situation, if the performance of military service would involve the commission of a crime or certain extremely serious crimes;
- harmful acts committed on the basis of gender or against children (2011/95/EU).

So, the reasons for persecution can be defined as race, religion, nationality, political belief or belonging to a specific social group.

In many cases, it is difficult to establish the original cause of the persecution, as these causes and facts are difficult to separate from each other, as they are overlapping and extremely similar reasons. A good example of this is the case where political conviction and belonging to a specific social group overlap each other, and in many cases national and religious affiliation cannot be clearly separated. According to the directive of the European Union formulated in 2011, there must be a causal correlation between the causes of persecution, the acts of persecution, and the lack of protection against acts of persecution. Based on the European Union rules, when determining the well-founded fear of persecution, it is not important whether the reasons underlying the persecution actually exist in relation to the refugee, it is only sufficient if the persecutor sees it as such. According to this, the fugitive's fear of persecution can be considered well-founded (Chetail, 2014, p. 543).

The Convention (1951) mentions as the last criterion the circumstances created by civil war or other situations of unrest, during which the refugee cannot, or for fear of persecution, does not wish to avail himself of the protection of the country of his own nationality or habitual residence (Article 98). In these circumstances, thanks to the crisis situation, the refugees are unable to use the protection of their country. Most of the cases are typical when the refugees, due to a lack of trust in the state and a well-founded fear of persecution, do not want to use the protection of the country in question.

Terminating reasons

The contract's article discussing the conditions for establishing a person who can be recognized as a refugee also covers the reasons for possible termination of refugee status. Based on this, the refugee status can be terminated only and exclusively with regard to the future, in the presence of all existing reasons (UNHCR, 1992, point 113). In order to ensure the status of an individual who meets all the conditions of refugee status and is accordingly recognized as a refugee, the termination reasons must be interpreted strictly.

Based on Article 1, Part C, Paragraphs (1)-(6), the conditions that terminate refugee status can be grouped as follows:

- based on the voluntary act of the refugee;
- in the refugee's own country, the circumstances that caused the persecuted person to be recognized as a refugee no longer exist.

The definition of grounds for termination based on voluntariness also requires a separate interpretation, which is covered in detail in the Convention (Article 1, C. (2)).

- requested the protection provided by his/her country on a voluntary basis;
- he/she regained her lost citizenship on a voluntary basis;



- acquired a new citizenship, according to which he/she already enjoys the protection of the country of her new citizenship;
- voluntarily returned permanently to his/her country, which he/she had previously left due to fear of persecution.

In the case of the first point, according to which the refugee claims the protection of his country again, it must be examined whether his decision is voluntary. After all, it may happen that the competent authority of the country providing asylum forced him to make this decision, so in this case there is no doubt that this situation cannot be interpreted as a voluntary act of the refugee. Furthermore, the reason for contacting any competent body of the refugee's home country must be investigated. In the majority of cases, the reason for joining the link is the acquisition of official certificates for those who have spent a significant part of their lives administered in the country of their citizenship, they are forced to, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates or documents proving their studies, since these can only be obtained and verified by the administration of the office of the country of their own citizenship possible. In this sense, this type of contact cannot be considered without any doubt as requiring the refugee to renounce the refugee status granted by the country providing protection. The refugee's status in the country providing asylum does not cease, even if the reason for making contact is this kind of motivation, i.e. his/her primary intention is to regain his/her citizenship in his/her own country. Circumstances of this type require an extremely thorough investigation, since it is possible that he/she made this intention due to some compelling reason (Rotem & Ratner, 2015).

Pursuant to the second termination reason formulated in the Convention (1951), the refugee individual claims his/her lost citizenship on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, a person with stateless status cannot be subject to a termination reason if the country of his/her former citizenship creates a principled possibility to reclaim citizenship with effective legal instruments in his/her own country, but in this sense also the voluntary act of the refugee is necessary, i.e. the claim for citizenship is still required. The relevant national regulations may implement regulations according to which a stateless person will not be granted citizenship if he/she expressly refuses it. Pursuant to this, if the stateless individual is aware of this fact and does not use the right of refusal, then the recovery of his/her citizenship can be considered voluntary (Article 1. C./(6)).

According to the Convention (1951), the third reason for termination is if the refugee has acquired a new citizenship, thus receiving the protection of the country of his/her new citizenship. Both of the mentioned conditions must be met in order to terminate the refugee status. That is, the refugee individual must have a new citizenship with well-founded proof.

Possession of a passport that is different from your previous citizenship cannot be interpreted as sufficient evidence, only if it is absolutely clear that the owner of the passport is actually a citizen of the country in question. The second clause imposed by the Convention (1951) contains additional conditions. There must be a genuine relationship between the

holder of the new citizenship and the given country, and the individual requires protection from the state of his/her new citizenship. If this is the case, the refugee individual has properly integrated into the society of a country different from his/her country of origin, or as a result of the successful integration, the given country has deemed the necessary conditions for obtaining citizenship suitable, i.e. it is established that a relationship has developed between the refugee and the given country (C.(3) of Article 1).

Closing Phases

In addition to acts based on voluntariness, among the terminating conditions we find additional situations where the circumstances that provided the basis for the granting of refugee status have ceased, so the continued maintenance of refugee status is not justified. The biggest problem is that it is extremely difficult to prove that the fear of persecution has disappeared. Pursuant to the relevant article of the Convention, termination of refugee status is only possible if the changes in the country of origin are significant. Furthermore, if during these circumstances the reason for the persecution ceases to be valid. As a result, the refugee individual no longer has to fear any form of discrimination based on political or racial affiliation. The reason for this type of termination is that the change in the country of origin is of a permanent nature (UNHCR, 1992, points 135-139).

It is important to point out that a short-term change or a temporary ceasefire in the event of a civil war does not justify the termination of refugee status. Furthermore, if the change affects only a part of the country of origin, it does not in any way provide sufficient grounds for the termination of the refugee status on the part of the host country. However, if the refugee is able to present compelling reasons against her country of origin or former place of residence that the refusal of the protection provided there is beyond any doubt founded and indisputable. However, if the refugee is able to present compelling reasons against his/her country of origin or former place of residence that the refusal of the protection provided there is beyond any doubt founded and indisputable. The drafters of the Convention (1951) included this clause for those fleeing the Nazi regime, as they considered that those persecuted by the regime had undergone such a level of physical and mental suffering that the possibility of returning to their country was excluded.

Abolishment of refugee status

The Convention (1951) deals with a very important conceptual and procedural distinction, defining the difference between cancellation and termination of refugee status. Pursuant to the article, the definition of cancellation means the process in which a person who has been granted refugee status can never apply for international protection again in the absence of the conditions set out in the Convention (1951). However, the Convention (1951) can be considered extremely incomplete in this respect, as it does not contain the reasons and rules



for cancelling refugee status. Of course, there is a valid reason for this, since in the case of cancellation of refugee status, it means cancelling an inappropriate administrative or judicial decree, in order to maintain the humanitarian nature of the Convention.

In order to enforce legal certainty, erroneous administrative and judicial decisions must be reviewed to a significant extent, which can take place in cases defined by law. During the review, a certain time limit is imposed, within which the review of the decision granting refugee status takes place. In the event that there is a case of criminal behaviour, due to the specific nature of the reason for cancelling the refugee status, the review period is not defined. During the examination of the cancellation of the refugee status, the question of the basis for the reason, on the basis of which an already legally binding decision can be reviewed, must be clarified. Additional reasons include situations in which the refugee individual or his/her family makes contradictory statements during subsequent administrative procedures (Kapferer, 2003, pp. 23-28). According to the interpretation of the relevant article, the situation of the emergence of reasons excluding the granting of refugee status may result in extradition or criminal proceedings. Regarding the cancellation of the decision approving refugee status, the following cases are distinguished.

Deception

In order to determine the situation of deception, three conditions must be met: a false statement, a causal relationship between the false statement and the approval of the refugee status, and the intention to misinform the authorities. In other words, the asylum seeker makes a false statement about a situation, as a result of which he/she can expect a positive evaluation of the refugee application. Deception also includes situations in which there are unrelated or contradictory statements. Of course, traumas experienced during the journey or as a result of wartime conditions can also cause confusion to such an extent that, as time goes by, it becomes difficult for him/her to recall the events, or he/she talks about them in a confused and incoherent manner. In the course of deception, it often happens that the asylum seeker tries to apply for refugee status by using false documents, in which case it must be taken into account that the person is resorting to this practice due to a forced situation. Accordingly, it cannot be clearly determined whether the original motivation of this fact is direct intention or deception (Kapferer, 2003, p.37).

There are also countless cases in which the asylum seeker bribes or threatens the authorities and receives refugee status as a result, without meeting the necessary conditions set out in the Convention. The third case concerns the authority approving the refugee application, if it incorrectly determines the existence of the conditions necessary to establish refugee status. This should be understood as situations in which the authority misinterprets the reported facts and, as a result, determines a well-founded fear of persecution. If any of the listed situations is verified, the decision establishing refugee status is automatically invalidated, and neither a review nor an appeal can be requested regarding the cancellation.

Clauses excluding applications for refugee status

The Convention (1951) distinguishes three groups of exclusion clauses:

- persons who have international protection or support provided by another UN organization;
- the situation of national refugees;
- persona non-grata, i.e. those who are not entitled to international protection (UNHCR, 1992).

As a result of establishing the existence of the clauses, the given individual cannot claim refugee status. In the event that the asylum seeker was granted refugee status despite the existence of exclusionary grounds, his/her refugee status must be terminated with immediate effect. According to the exclusion clause regarding national refugees, we can define as national refugees those individuals who possess all the conditions necessary to claim refugee status, and at the same time their legal status in the host country is equal to that of the citizens of the host states. By these cases we mean situations in which the ethnicity of the receiving state is the same as the ethnicity of the refugees.

The last exclusion clause summarizes the facts according to which the individual is not entitled to international protection. According to the Convention, the following persons are not entitled to protection: has committed a crime against peace, war, or crime against humanity, or as defined in international documents containing such crimes committed a serious crime of a non-political nature outside the country of asylum, prior to being admitted to the country as a refugee guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This provision seeks to preserve the integrity of the refugee institution by not providing the rights arising from international protection to the perpetrators of such serious and serious crimes. (points D., E. and F. of Article 1)

The definition of crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity and the behaviours related to them are summarized in several additional international conventions. The initiation of war aggression or the commission of other similar activities also belong to these concepts. The Convention (1951) does not address the possibility of such activities and their details. In this case, the act committed took place before the reception of the refugee, i.e. outside the borders of the host country from the point of view of the territorial scope. For serious non-political crimes, it depends on international regulations, not local regulations (UNHCR, 1992, point 148-149).

Conclusion

The Geneva Convention contains important parts regarding refugees and victims of violence, and consequently, because of the exploitation and coercion characteristics of human trafficking, it formulates guidelines and rights that apply to victims of human trafficking as



well. As a result, the Geneva Convention is a mandatory tool for the resilience-based treatment of victims, to which the convention can provide a kind of framework. Victims of human trafficking must be considered victims of migration, as the fact of the currently experienced intensity of environmental migration and human trafficking is indisputable, which will become more and more powerful and clear in the future due to climate change. Thus, the rights of refugees and victims of migration stipulated by the Geneva Convention are the same as the rights of victims of human trafficking, thus the two phenomena and the persons affected by them will be closely intertwined in the future. In this sense, we can clearly state that the basis of the solution to the globally challenging phenomenon, in addition to the tool of resilience, is the basic guarantee of human rights, which is the right of all victims regardless of age and gender.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Krisztina Kállai is a PhD student at Óbuda University Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences. During her first PhD research, at the Department of Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training at National University of Public Service her topic was examining the refugee victims of human trafficking and the possible solutions of migration based on the directives of Catholic Church. From the beginning of her MsC studies she represented her research at many international conferences and has been publishing many articles related to human trafficking. In the course of her current research, she examines the resilience-based solutions of human trafficking at the devastated areas caused by natural disasters. She also focuses on the mental difficulties of minor victims due to the sexual exploitation committed by traffickers.

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Fighting for Africans' Hearts and Minds in the Context of the 2022 War in Ukraine¹

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Abstract:

The war in Ukraine is a theatre of struggle not only for the parties militarily engaged in the conflict, but for wider spheres. Despite its regional character, the war also has a multidimensional impact on a number of other states in the world, polarising the attitudes of their societies into three main groups: those supporting Ukraine, those expressing understanding of Moscow's actions, and a set of so-called 'non-aligned' states. This article describes how strategic communications by different actors have, through historical, political, economic, technological, social and cultural levers the potential to win the support of governments and societies in Africa.

The Russian--Ukrainian conflict, unlike many other armed confrontations in Africa had, from an information security perspective, become a global conflict long before open kinetic action began. The multilateral involvement of the leaders of both the United States and the European Union, first through attempts to resolve the dispute amicably and then in military, economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, is unprecedented. This in itself can be perceived as a bitter pill to swallow for African countries beset by political, religious and climatic turmoil, which, despite their longer history of hardships, have not received equivalent, or even due attention.

Keywords:

strategic communication, framing, Russian—Ukraine war, spheres of influence.

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The war began by the Russian Federation with its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has quickly become an arena of confrontation between East and West. The level of involvement of 'third countries' not directly related to the substance of the conflict is unprecedented. Its uniqueness, however, does not lie in the mere provision of military or intelligence assistance to one of the parties. There is an abundance of examples in the history of the involvement of 'silent actors' who provided arms, data or logistical support to their allies. The specific nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war is related to the manifestly open form in which 'third countries' provide this assistance. The consequences of adopting such a stance can be considered on a number of levels, but regardless of the perspective adopted, its predominantly escalatory nature must be pointed out. The war in Ukraine has become the canvas of an internal political struggle in EU countries and a narrative aimed, among other things, at 'covering up' the economic problems of the Old Continent in the post-pandemic period. It is also an opportunity to consolidate and clarify a set of 'common European values', so badly damaged by Brexit and the rise of 'anti-EU' populism. At this level, the aid provided to Ukraine is thus justified by the need to fight for a 'democratic and non-imperial' world order, in which every country has the right to self-determination and any violation of the integrity of another state is a violation of international principles of coexistence. However, this politically embedded Eurocentrism, which is accepted in Western societies, also has global repercussions. In Asia, the Middle East and Africa alike, the introduction of 'democracy' is viewed very differently. Two decades of American presence in Afghanistan, missions in the Middle East, colonialism and the subsequent Arab Spring in Africa have left a lasting and deep aversion to an 'imposed and foreign world order'. It seems that the collective West, utilising the war in Ukraine in its domestic politics, not only failed to recognise the processes taking place outside Europe, but then, when they became obvious - was late in reacting. Antony Blinken's and Emanuel Macron's visits to African countries in July and August 2022 did not yield the expected results (and in the case of the French leader, were even counter-productive). This is because they took place in a space that had been intensely influenced by Russian information campaigns much earlier. Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine motivated by a desire to achieve regional territorial gains, to emphasize the Russian Federation's sphere of influence and by a personal need to be an important part of world's history. The reaction of the West meant that the axis of the dispute expanded from an armed confrontation between the former imperial country and its neighbour - to a global conflict on not only a physical but also an ideological level. This situation fits into the scenario desired by President Putin, who, at least since 2000, has been trying to get the Russian Federation to return as a leader in the group of the most influential architects of the world order.

The deep polarisation of positions and narratives among the direct and indirect actors of the events, is also reflected in the official and unofficial actions taken (which sometimes contradict each other). Aspects such as the perception of the causes of the war, the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed, the legitimacy of military support, the need (or not) to continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation not only 'divide' but also 'unite' partners

who, until the outbreak of war, remained in a kind of status-quo of bilateral relations and did not have to take sides.

This article attempts to provide an overview of the communication strategies adopted by the actors involved in the war, to place them in a broader socio-political context and to illustrate how African societies reacted to the emerging actions of the main countries (Russia, Ukraine, the USA and the European Union) involved in this information war. The core hypothesis may be as follows:

„In the context of the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine, Russian communication strategies are more widely supported in African countries than Western strategies, due to their multipolar (and not unipolar) perspective on the international order.”

To verify this the following research questions were formulated:

- what is the multi-sectoral historical context of Russia's presence on the African continent;
- what is the multi-sectoral historical context of Ukraine's presence on the African continent;
- what communication strategies targeting African countries has the Russian Federation adopted in relation to the war it has started in Ukraine;
- what communication strategies targeting African countries have Ukraine and its Western allies adopted;
- how the Russian Federation responds to the communication strategies aired by the bloc Ukraine and its allied states;
- how Western countries respond to the communication strategies of the Russian Federation;
- what international events have particularly influenced African perceptions in the the Russian-Ukrainian conflict;
- what information (that is overlooked or seldom mentioned in the information space) influences the African perception of the ongoing conflict
- how African states are responding to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war in their information space.

The aim of this discussion will therefore be to answer these research questions, to profile the communication strategies of both sides, and to discuss their effectiveness.

To achieve the above objectives, more than 140 multilingual publications published up to 15 October 2022 were analysed. Methodologically, a short street survey was conducted in the city of Cairo, in-depth, non-structured interviews with representatives of the upper-middle class in Egypt were carried out, and in-depth interviews with Sudanese (economic) migrants in Egypt as well as non-structured interviews with UN representatives serving in Sudan were undertaken.

Limitations and initial assumptions

The following list presents the assumptions and limitations of this analysis. It refers both to the research methods adopted, the characteristics of the sources and the timeframe in which it was carried out.

- 1) The range of the analysis carried out covers the entire African continent, without a detailed discussion of each of the 54 countries. This generalisation blurs regional differences but allows for syncretic representations of the issues examined.
- 2) In some documents (especially those produced by international institutions), North African countries are included in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) rather than in Africa itself. In the course of the analysis, the necessary distinctions were made, but these should be seen more as an approximation of trends than a precise description.
- 3) The research findings and conclusions are presented based on 'open sources' (OSInt) accessed from both Europe and Africa. Due to the blocking of some online resources by parties to the conflict - some of the linked documents may not be accessible using IPs located in Western countries.
- 4) There is a profound asymmetry in the intensity of Russian Federation and Ukrainian influence on the African infosphere. In the case of Ukraine - its communication strategies are presented in combination with auxiliary/substitute strategies authored by European countries or the US (which refer exclusively to Ukrainian actions or narratives).
- 5) The analysis presented below is limited only to the strategies used by the parties targeting the African states. It should be noted that the outreach efforts of both Russia and Ukraine in other regions of the world are characterised by different objectives and ways of achieving them.
- 6) The Russian-Ukrainian war is a dynamic process, each day bringing new packages of information. This publication is based on data collected up to 15.10.2022.

Russian presence in Africa: historical context

Russian interest in Africa is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1869, Tsarist Russia provided military support to Ethiopia, which was at that time fighting the British for control of the Suez Canal (Besenyo 2019). The following years brought uncoordinated diplomatic and commercial efforts to establish closer relations and it was only at the end of the Second World War that a period of coherent, expansive and multifaceted foreign policy aimed at 'inviting' African states into its sphere of influence began. Already at the Potsdam Conference, Joseph Stalin sought to take under his control, the formerly Italian Tripolitania -western Libya (Kelly 2000) and although the UN blocked this plan, the Russian presence in this country, (through years of cooperation with Muamar Qaddafi (Bruce 1982, p. 136), and more recently General Haftar (Harchaoui 2021) still remains at a very high level. The strength of the historical relationship can also be demonstrated by the example of Egypt - the Russian-backed nationalist and anti-colonial rule of President Nasser (Holbik, Drachman 1971, p. 137-165) created long-lasting ties



that have survived, albeit in a less intense form under successive presidents Morsi and Mubarak and have made Egypt one of Russia's main partners in Africa (Kondratenko 2020).

Many of the similar bilateral friendships were formed on the verge of African states regaining their independence from colonial sovereignty. While in the 1950s these efforts seemed aimed more at weakening rivals notably France and Britain³ (Wezeman et al. 2021) rather than promoting Marxist ideologies, the 1960s saw opportunities to 'export communism' to young and seeking 'their own way' African states. The Soviet Union was the first to recognise the independence of Algeria - a step that permanently tied the two countries together⁴ (Strotsky&Sokolsky 2017). It also supported many national liberation movements e.g. in Mozambique FRELIMO in years 1964-1977 (Sukhankin 2020), Angola's MPLA 1975-2002 (Hedenskog 2019, p. 34-37) or movements in Ethiopia in years 1974-1991 (Felgenhauer 2020). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established cooperation with 40 African states and Marxism-Leninism presented as a remedy for European imperialism became permanently embedded in the ideological space especially in Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Egypt (Besenyo 2019a).

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a temporary freeze in relations with Africa. Nine embassies and three consulates in were closed, and the level of political, military and economic cooperation decreased significantly (Kimberly 2019a, p. 155-170). Boris Yeltsin's government in the 1990s focused on internal processes in Russia. A return to interest in Africa did not occur until after 2000, with Vladimir Putin becoming President of the Russian Federation. A new doctrine based on the political thought of Prof. Rogov was adopted which formulated a shift from 'ideological-romantic' relations to a focus on the three pillars of bilateral relations: "economism, universalism and intelligent pragmatism" (Solodovnikov 2000). Back to Africa was designed on the premise of using two „vehicles“: The African Union and South Africa (President of Russia 2015), which at the beginning of the second millennium resulted in numerous meetings with representatives of these entities. The relations established at that time have not been reduced to the present day. Importantly, thanks to Russia's support, in 2010 South Africa was accepted to the bloc of developing countries – BRIC (Soule-Kohndou 2013).

Since 2014, when sanctions were imposed on the Russian Federation over the illegal annexation of Crimea, Africa has been on Vladimir Putin's list of priorities for economic, political and military reasons (Hedenskog, Persson 2019, p. 90). A number of initiatives were undertaken, which in particular included military and energy cooperation along with deepening trade in the natural resources.

³ This objective was initially shared by Russia with the United States, which was to become its main rival in Africa just a few years later.

⁴ Algeria is the largest African partner and the third global partner in arms trade with Russia; intensely developmentally supported by the Russian Federation, which, despite sanctions and economic hardship after 2014 - forgave its US\$4.7 billion debt.

Military cooperation: Russian federation - African states

Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, responsible for about one third of all its exports to the continent (Grunstein 2018). It has signed cooperation agreements with at least 30 African partners (Hendenskog 2019). It actively participates with other countries in joint military manoeuvres, the most notable of which in recent years have been:

- Defenders of Friendship anti-terrorist exercise involving tactical groups and airborne troops from Russia, Egypt and Belarus (MoD Russia 2019)
- Exercise Mosi - the first trilateral exercise off the coast of Cape Town involving the militaries of Russia, South Africa and China (Fabricius 2019)
- Naval exercise „Bridge of Friendship 2020” (KubNews 2020)

Russia has also been training African military personnel since the Cold War - both within the Federation and in African states. It was not uncommon for the beneficiaries of these services to later become important political figures in their countries (such as Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma in post-apartheid South Africa (Stronski 2019). Available information puts the number of countries with which such cooperation has been established at least 16.

What is important to note is the agreement signed between Cameroon's Minister of Defence, Beti Assomo, and the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoygu. On 22 May 2022, a five-year agreement on military cooperation which overtly expresses the African state's opposition to the international sanctions imposed on Russia was initialled in Moscow (AfricaNews 2022). It is one of many examples of agreements signed in the military domain between Russia and African states.

Russian military cooperation agreements in Africa (since 2015).

Country	Date	Content
Botswana	August 2018	Joint peacekeeping operations and joint military training.
Burkina Faso	August 2018	Counterterrorism cooperation and exchange of peacekeeping experience.
Burundi	August 2018	Counterterrorism and joint training of troops.
Cabo Verde	June 2018	Simplified procedure for port calls.
Cameroon	April 2015	Military-technical cooperation.
Central African Republic	August 2018	Joint training of armed forces.
Chad	August 2017	Anti-terrorism cooperation and joint training exercises.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	July 2018	Military-technical cooperation. Revitalization of a previous military-technical cooperation agreement from 1999.
	May 2019	Military-technical cooperation. Technical specialists.
Republic of the Congo	May 2019	Military-technical cooperation, weapons supply, and technical training.

Equatorial Guinea	April 2016	Military cooperation. An agreement on Russian access to ports in Equatorial Guinea was signed in July 2015.
Egypt	November 2017	Military-technical cooperation and counterterrorism operations.
	October 2019	Strategic cooperation.
Eswatini	February 2017	Supply of weapons, maintenance and other military assistance.
Ethiopia	April 2018	Training and cooperation on peacekeeping, counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The Gambia	September 2016	Training of armed forces, deliveries of military equipment.
Ghana	June 2016	Military-technical cooperation, including weapons supply and joint training.
Guinea	April 2018	Cooperation in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, search and rescue at sea.
Guinea-Bissau	June 2019	Training of military personnel.
Madagascar	September 2018	Information-sharing, training, military engineering, military education, military medicine, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, anti-piracy operations and cooperation in UN peacekeeping missions.
South Africa	July 2018	Joint declaration on strategic partnership and call for greater cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction.
Sudan	February 2018	Joint information exchange, training, counterterrorism, anti-piracy operations, and UN peacekeeping missions.
Tanzania	January 2018	Arms shipments, joint training, and military research and development.
Zambia	April 2017	Supply of weapons and delivery of spare parts.
Zimbabwe	October 2015	Supply of weapons and joint military production.

Table 1: Partners and scope of military agreements signed between the Russian Federation and African countries since 2015. Source: Hedenskog, 2019; Institute for the Study of War, 2021; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018; RIA Novosti, 2016; Krasnaia vesna, 2019; Interfax, 2019; Defenceweb, 2019.

Because of the long history of Russian supplies of arms to the African continent, its simplicity, relative reliability in harsh weather conditions, and affordable price, Russian weaponry is immensely appreciated in many African countries.⁵

⁵ A symbol of this can be found, for example, in Mozambique, which has an AK47 rifle (the popular 'Kalashnikov') on its flag.




Figure 1: Russian military presence in Africa. Source: FOI.

Another aspect of Russia's military involvement in Africa is the internationally widely discussed activity of private-state armed mercenary organisations, particularly the Wagner Group (Marten 2019). Its activities in various African countries merit a separate publication, but it should be noted that it is the primary implementing actor of Kremlin policy not only in the political and military areas (Reynolds 2019). The mercenaries protect Russian investments, improve logistical routes and negotiate terms of cooperation with tribes and local governments. They are the Russian Federation's most outward-looking 'ears, eyes and hands' in the field (Lister & Shukla 2019). They provide services not only to African dictators (Searcey 2019) but also to businesses, including those with foreign capital - especially Chinese.⁶ They also provide a 'mentoring' function for both local security companies and agencies of friendly countries that, because of their significant involvement on the continent, need professional and experienced protection. The Wagner Group is an umbrella brand promoted in the media for image purposes mainly. In practice, it operates through a network of subsidiary entities with hardly identifiable origins. An illustrative example of this is the 'Association for Free Research and International Cooperation' (AFRIC). Presenting itself as a genuinely African initiative, this organisation actually pursues Kremlin political objectives (Thomas 2019). In 2018-2019, relying on the Wagner Group's information and equipment facilities, it sought to

⁶ In Ethiopia, for example, the Russians are protecting strategic Chinese investments related to the Renaissance Dam – the infrastructure object on the Nile of existential importance for almost all of East African countries (Majed, 2022).



influence elections in five African countries: Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Mozambique (Fabricius 2022a).

The unclear links and the lack of verifiable data means that the services of Russian mercenary companies are often used (unwittingly) by international organisations that principally express strong opposition to the Wagner Group's aims and modus operandi.

Energy and economic cooperation between the Russian federation and African states

„Solution to Africa's Energy problem would pave the way for the continent's development” (Vladimir Putin, G-8 Summit, 2007).

After security, the energy sector is the most important area of Russian expansion in Africa. On a continent where an estimated 620 million people suffer from electricity shortages (Kende-Robb 2016), energy issues find a permanent place in any election campaign and, along with a security issues, are part of fundamental and basic needs of African societies. Russia, understanding the relevance of this area, is broadening its influence using its unique position. As one of the very few countries fighting for African „hearts and minds” that has energy surplus it can therefore develop exports to this region (Maslov 2006). All other actors struggle with energy shortages within their countries or choose not to compete with Russia in this domain. The consequence of this situation is the widely communicated slogan Atom for Africa followed by at least 18 signed nuclear agreements.⁷ The entity that represents the interests of the Russian Federation in this sector is Rosatom, the state-owned energy corporation, which boasts in recent years (among other projects), the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Egypt (World Nuclear News 2021), the development of the Geregu Nuclear Plant in Nigeria (Proctor 2018), agreements with Ethiopia (Rosatom 2019a) and the expansion of cooperation with the DRC and Rwanda. Russia is also exploring the energy domain by influencing young people - it organises competitions (Rosatom 2019b) and a scholarship programme that allows Africans to go to Russia to study nuclear technology (Sokutu 2019). Many students from Nigeria (ESI Africa 2019a) and Egypt have taken advantage of this opportunity.

Other Russian business activities on the African continent are concentrated in the natural resources, raw material or gemstone sectors, for example:

- diamonds and platinum; cooperation with Zimbabwe (Nijin 2019), Angola (Samaita 2019)
- gold – particularly in West Africa (Sandel-Hay 2022)
- gas - cooperation with Algerian entities, despite the ongoing war in Ukraine (Interfax 2022)

⁷ South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Morocco, Egypt or the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others.

- oil (cooperation with Algeria, Angola, DRC (Zarubezhneft 2019), Sudan (SudanTribune 2022) and Madagascar (Arbunies 2019)

Russia's largest trading partners are located (with the exception of South Africa) in North Africa.

Russia's top five trading partners in Africa in 2018 (million USD).

Trading partner	Russian export	Russian imports	Total trade
Egypt	7 146	518	7 663
Algeria	4 801	10	4 811
Morocco	927	546	1 473
South Africa	286	780	1 066
Tunisia	681	137	818

Table 2: Russia's key business partners in Africa. Source: IMF DOTS (2020).

The Russian Federation is also developing two coastal industrial zones in Egypt (RioEgypt 2018).

Russia's business activities are most often implemented in a bundled model – i.e. a company entering into cooperation with an African partner is supported (and at the same time controlled) by entities linked to the Russian security and financial sector.

Media, cultural and sports cooperation between the Russian federation and African countries

Russia in Africa implements its communication strategies mainly through Russia Today and Sputnik, already present for years on the continent. These companies directly or through subsidiaries establish partnerships with local media entities (Clifford & Gruzd 2022) such as Eritrean Eri-TV (Eritrean Information Ministry 2019), Congolese National Radio TV (RIA 2019) or the South African Government News Agency (SAnews 2017).

Cultural and scientific cooperation in Africa is mainly developed through the government agency Rossotrudnichestvo (Rossotrudnichestvo 2022) operating in three domains Russian Federal Agency for Independent States, the Government Commission for Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation. Established in 2008, the agency now operates in more than 80 countries. In Africa, it has opened science and culture centres in seven countries - Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia, and has a representative at the Russian Embassy in South Africa. It is responsible for promoting Russian culture and language (RussiaToday 2019), as well as expanding inter-university cooperation, which has been continuously developing since the second half of the 20th century. The Soviet Union as early as in 1960 established the Patric Lumumba University in



Moscow (Mr. Lumumba was the first prime minister of the independent Congo, who was tortured and murdered by the Belgians), which was intended to serve as a forge for African elites and as a contact point for all scientific cooperation with Africa (Katsakioris 2019). A number of prominent African political figures, such as Hifikepunye Pohamba (former President of Namibia), Youssouf Saleh Abbas, (former Chadian Prime Minister) or Michele Djotodia (former President of the Central African Republic), were graduates of this university (which is now called the University of Friendship of Nations in Moscow). It is estimated that up to 100,000 African students were educated in Russia, more than half of whom were to benefit from scholarship programmes.

Russia holds regular meetings with African alumni of friendly universities and uses these networks to promote its image in Africa. Close relations bind Russia with, among others, the Pan-African University, universities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Botswana. The Egyptian-Russian University in Cairo, founded in 2006, also remains very active in promoting scientific cooperation.

Russia engages extensively in a number of 'cultural' events. The majority of them have a significant propaganda component. Particularly successful events in recent years include:

- the 2018 Miss Central African Republic elections (the award was presented by Miss Russia 2013), which created a new canon of beauty for women from the CAR (Bouessel 2018)
- celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the 'reunification of Crimea to Russia', held in several different countries. Confirmed reports come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bugayova&Regio 2019, Russian MoFA 2019a) and Botswana (Russian MoFA, 2019b). From today's perspective they can be perceived as 'preparing the mental ground' for the subsequent invasion of Ukraine
- the production of the latest feature-length thriller-war film, addressed exclusively to African audiences, *The Tourist* (Munshi 2022) (an earlier movie, *Shugayev*, relating the Libyan adventures of two 'social scientists' had a more regional focus). Produced in a country that lacks cinemas (the Central African Republic) and presented in a stadium in Bangui in the presence of 10000 prominent spectators, this production is a quintessentially soft – narrative of Russia aimed at African states. The film was (and still is) heavily promoted across the continent. Its plot is based on the story of the support that Russian 'consultants' give to the democratically elected president, defending him against the rebels. The “messages” spread in this movie are based on a series of subliminal semantic anchors, namely:
 - a) Russians invited to help are „tourists” and „useful guests” and not „invaders”.
 - b) The negative characters speak French and are affiliated with Christianity.
 - c) Their oft-repeated „battle cries” represent a predatory, discriminatory and proprietary attitude towards all African assets.

- d) Stationed UN forces stand idly by as they watch rebel atrocities.⁸
- e) Russians are well organized, brave, resilient and effective; they die for their non-Soviet country – saving Africans just as they themselves save their Russian friends.
- f) Russian arms deliveries radically change the course of the conflict.
- g) CAR is a beautiful, prosperous country where people, thanks to the Russians, can live without fear for their own safety.
- h) Spasiba Russia!!! (Thank you, Russia!)⁹

Shaping Russia's image in Africa

The Russian Federation currently has 40 embassies in African countries (Africana.ru 2020) through which it builds its image as:

- 1) an effective partner in the fight against terrorism (Hedenskog 2020), drug crimes (Estelle 2018) and 'rebels' seeking to overthrow the authorities,
- 2) an ally that does not impose values or how African societies should function,
- 3) sponsor of humanitarian, cultural and sporting projects, with respectful reference to African belief systems,
- 4) mediator of local conflicts (e.g. in Libya),
- 5) an opponent of neo-colonialism who wants to help African countries complete this "painful process" (Aregagegn 2022), highlighting their successes in the fight against 'Western colonialism',
- 6) an ally in making Africa a self-sufficient continent in terms of energy (ESI Africa 2019b), security, logistics, production and mining,
- 7) a partner supporting African countries in international organisations (BRICS, UN),
- 8) a country with a keen interest in multi-sectoral cooperation with Africa, (in addition to the organisation of the 2019 Africa-Russia Summit, which brought together representatives of many ministries, corporations and social organisations of African countries (Kortunov et al. 2020, p. 6), Russia organises regular events such as the UFA Security Forum, Yalta International Economic Forum, AtomExport, International Army Games to which African delegations are invited),
- 9) a creator of long-term cooperation with Africa - the next Africa-Russia summit has been planned (President of Russia 2022) and the Russia-Africa Shared Vision 2030 strategic project (Kagan, Bugayova, Cafarella 2019, p. 30),
- 10) an advocate of multiculturalism/multipolarity and self-determination as a basis for prosperity and development - African solutions for African problems (Ruptly 2018),
- 11) leader of the anti-Western bloc of states,
- 12) a partner that shares with Africa the threat of entrapment by neo-colonial states that are already trying to seize its territory referring to the Kaliningrad region or, Norwegian blockade of supplies to Russian miners (Kobylarz 2022),

⁸ The way they are portrayed is a direct reference to the Rwandan genocide

⁹ The final slogan for the advertising spot that concludes the film

- 13) an ally that understands Africa's needs and is taking concrete steps to meet them - agreeing to ship Ukrainian grain through the port of Odessa¹⁰ (Sihlobo 2022), or supplying Russian fertilisers to South Africa¹¹),
- 14) admirer of African resistance to the recognition of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation,
- 15) an ally with whom relations can be developed not only at governmental but also at parliamentary, sectoral, regional and societal level (EgyptIndependent 2021).

Presidential visits				Foreign minister's visits			
President	Period	Number of		Foreign minister	Period	Number of	
		Individual countries	Trips			Individual countries	Trips
Vladimir Putin	2018–	1	1	Sergei Lavrov	2018–	5	2
	2012–18	2	3	Sergei Lavrov	2012–18	11	10
Dmitrii Medvedev	2008–12	4	1	Sergei Lavrov	2008–12	4	5
Vladimir Putin	2004–08	5	5	Sergei Lavrov	2004–08	4	3
	2000–04	0	0	Igor Ivanov	1998–04	2	5

Table 3: Russian high-level visits to Africa between 2000 and 2020. Source: President of Russia website; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

Russia's nurturing of multilateral relations with African states is expressed, inter alia, in ten visits by the Presidents of the Russian Federation to Africa and 26 visits by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.¹²

Framing the image of Ukraine and its allies by the Russian federation in Africa

The Russian Federation is very active in AN creating the unfavourable image of its opponents, both at the level of propaganda media narratives, direct messages and concrete actions to give credence to its point of view. The war in Ukraine has become an opportunity to strike at the entire 'collective West' by linking subjectively interpreted events from the distant (colonial) as well as the nearer (Covid-19) past. The communication strategies pursued by Russia revolve around a series of parallel narratives.

¹⁰ Being in the Russian narrative the result of direct talks between the President of Senegal (and at the same time the African Union Macky Sall), and President Putin

¹¹ What was presented in both the Russian Federation and South Africa as the result of President Cyril Rampaphosa's talks with Moscow

¹² Taking into account the recent presence of Minister Sergey Lavrov in July 2022

- 1) „In relation to Africa, the collective West continues to use a master-slave logic, dictating to countries what, how and when to think.” (Tass 2022a)
- 2) „The West is using food as a weapon - it claims to support African countries, but in reality, it has been hoarding foodstuffs for itself during the covid pandemic and through recently imposed sanctions is condemning Africa to famine. It is an economic bandit responsible for climate change and sanctions- bringing African states to the brink of disaster.”

The concept of the „golden billion” is also being increasingly promoted in Africa, assuming that there are only resources on earth for one billion of the most privileged citizens, while the rest will be discriminated, exploited and „relegated at best to the role of slave.” (Tass 2022b)

- 3) „The West, by controlling the major social networks and the supply of the Internet, makes African countries dependent and because of that is able to influence their societies.” It is a digital colonialism. (Dahmm&Moultrie 2022)
- 4) „All UN peacekeeping initiatives over the years have been a disaster, with numerous crimes committed by them against local communities.”

Disillusionment with Western missions sometimes took the form of physical attacks, e.g. on 25 July 2022 the MONUSCO mission in the Congo was attacked - just before Minister Lavrov's visit a few days later. (France24 2022)

- 5) „The West is trying to influence the internal affairs of African states by provoking coups and aiming to destabilise them both in the Sahel area and also in Central Africa.” (Stronski 2019)
- 6) „Ukrainians, along with the West, display extreme racism and contempt for African communities. They represent an attitude in which the convenience of Ukrainians crossing the border into Poland is more important than the suffering of those from Africa who remain there.”

These claims were disseminated intensively through social media (e.g. #AfricansInUkraine) and were also met with a formal protest from some African states (Guardian 2022). The alleged dehumanisation of Africans, according to the Russian narrative, is also expressed in the objectification of Africans – the much-discussed journalistic and scientific 'D weapon' (demographic weapon – uncontrolled influx of migrants from Africa). President Putin seems to use this process to destabilise Europe, and points out that Europe reduces the Africans to the role of a helpless tool. On this occasion, the Russian propaganda apparatus cites examples of the treatment of African slaves during periods of colonialism, making for a strong historical anchor.

- 7) „The West's accusations against Russia with regard to influencing the internal processes of African states are unfounded. It is the West that is responsible for the occupation of developing countries.”

- 8) The term whataboutism was intensively promoted to recall the failures of Western interventions mainly in the Middle East and Central Asia (Gorenburg 2021) and to send a message about the 'hypocrisy and duplicity' of the West.
- 9) „The Russophobia presented by the West and the removal of Russians from the world's scientific, sporting and cultural bodies is reminiscent of the discrimination experienced in the West by people from the Black Continent, who are denied prestigious and well-paid jobs simply because of the colour of their skin.” The process of 'visa apartheid', which currently affects Africans (Oduor Oduku 2022) as well as citizens of the Russian Federation, is also invoked.
- 10) „The West strives for a single global vision of the world (unipolar) in which it alone imposes its political, social and worldview order on other countries without respect for their historical, cultural and religious differences.” (Krzywiecki 2022)
- 11) „The 'colour revolutions' in North Africa are other forms of Western interventionism, not a manifestation of the real needs of African societies.” (Hendeskog&Persson, 2019b)

Russian propaganda cited them as an example of 'meddling in internal affairs' and subversions in other countries, supported by, among other things, confessions from senior US officials (AlJazeera 2022).

- 12) „Ukraine is more willing to destroy grain than to send it to Africa.”

In support of this thesis, photos of burning fields of grain posted with comments on Telegram by Ukrainians themselves were widely circulated (AndriushchenkoTime 2022).

- 13) „The West forcing African states to take 'either side' limits their available options for development - Russia does not expect this but encourages a focus on deepening mutual cooperation.”

The communication strategies implemented by the Russian Federation on the African continent can be characterised by consistency and coherence in implementation, (at least in the initial phases of their realisation). Russia appears to be concentrating its efforts on the cognitive and affective phases of social influence, aiming to effectively focus attention on its actions and arouse emotions in its target group. The next phase - behavioural implementation - requires more resources (which Russia may not have) and is fraught with the risk that the initial theses will be verified by the campaign's addressees. It is therefore more effective and safer to create attitudes and trigger emotions than to support or “consume” the fruits of one's narratives.

History and development of Ukraine's relations with African states

The independent Ukrainian state, in the first years of its self-determination, continued the relations developed with Africa while the Soviet Union was still in operation. In particular, cooperation was developed in the agri-food, metallurgy and irrigation sectors. Ukrainian consultants stayed in African countries on long-term contracts, and through their relations, trade cooperation was also developed (mainly in the area of cereals, fertilisers, sugar, edible oils and heavy industry). An important domain of bilateral relations was also education and possibility for African students to study in Ukraine.¹³ Broader accessibility (than in Western Europe), a high level of education and significantly lower costs meant that by 2021 an estimated 76 000 African students had graduated in Ukraine in predominantly medical and the engineering fields.¹⁴

However, in the more than 30 years since the declaration of independence, there has not been a single visit by a Ukrainian president or foreign minister to Africa. (Veselovski 2021) The first one took place early October 2022. (Peltier&Camara 2022) There has also been only one visit to Kiev by an African head of state - in 2000, South African President Jacob Zuma visited Ukraine at the invitation of President Leonid Kuchma. Ukraine currently has ten embassies in Africa, located in countries with access to the coastline (Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia), which pursue a regional rather than a strategic and coherent vision of cooperation with Africa. An example of the rare joint initiatives at the parliamentary level could be the Ukraine - Algerian parliamentary friendship, established in 2019. (AlgeriaPress 2019)

Positions adopted by president Zelensky and minister Kuleba addressed to the people of Africa

Two events have been recent milestones in Ukrainian-African relations. The first was President Volodymyr Zelensky's speech to the leaders of the African Union on 20 June 2022, where President Zelensky gave his assessment of the condition of the African states, the functioning of the UN and the function of the sanctions imposed on Russia. He also expressed his hope for a future deepening of cooperation. The second was the visit of Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba to Africa from 3-10 October 2022 and his statements at press conferences.

Referring to President Zelensky's speech, the key issues he addressed were:

- Africa as „hostage of Russia”
- Ukraine which has never taken part in colonisation¹⁵
- Rapid population growth in African societies
- Weakness of African economies after the Covid-19 pandemic
- Africa's own funding deficit to import expensive food

¹³ Their total number is estimated at 76,000 people

¹⁴ The largest number of students came from Morocco, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Uganda and Angola

¹⁵ How was it supposed to take when the free Ukraine was established in 1991 and the decolonisation process in Africa ended in the 1970s?



- The claim that 400 million citizens of the world are dependent on Ukrainian grain
- Defending the international sanctions imposed on Russia to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Russian colony
- Criticism of African UN missions while pointing out that 300 Ukrainian nationals also took part in them
- Announcement of the organisation of the Ukraine-Africa summit and future strategic partnership

Minister Kuleba, in turn, had planned to come to four African countries (Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire)¹⁶ however, due to the rocket fired on Ukraine on 10 and 11 October 2022, he returned to Kiev. During his stay, however, he managed to give several interviews that shed light on the Ukrainian perspective on cooperation with Africa.¹⁷

- States that refrain from condemning Russia at the UN refrain from condemning war crimes.
- African states have a misconception about Ukraine's independence.
- Broad Ukrainian-African cooperation will soon develop in the areas of cyber-security, agricultural technology, diplomacy and science.
- Ukraine will send “ships full of grain” to Africa – despite the Russian blockade, some had already reached the Horn of Africa.
- Ukraine's 11th embassy will be opened - in Ghana.
- A Ukraine-Africa summit will be held in 2023. (Fabricius 2022b)

The statements of both President Zelensky and Minister Kuleba should also be presented in the broader context of the narrative of Ukraine and its Western allies, who have appealed to African states in different ways when referring to the war.

Formulating relations of Ukraine and its allies with African states

- 1) The United States directly criticised Africa for its neutrality during votes on UN resolutions condemning the invasion of Ukraine (ChannelsTv 2022), and French President Emmanuel Macron even called some of African leaders „hypocrites”. (Peltier&Breedon 2022)
- 2) In connection with the difficult situation of African citizens on the Ukrainian-Polish border just after the outbreak of the war (the segregation into „white and black” evoked associations with apartheid), there were a number of discriminatory statements by Ukrainian diplomats - Mr Vladym Prystaiko, Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, stated that „black people should be less visible”. (White 2022)
- 3) Ukraine's war narratives focus on human stories, often depicting the individual tragedies of people in places under Russian attack. While this strategy captures the attention of Europeans, it pales in the face of the scale of the atrocities taking place in Africa, which are mentioned little (or not at all) by the media (particularly in the West). Such a

¹⁶ These countries generally take a critical stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

¹⁷ Aspects related to Minister Kuleba's assessment of Russia's actions can be found later in this analysis.

juxtaposition was made in relation to early June 2022, when there was much news coverage of a few Russian missile attack victims, while the massacre in Kulbus (West Darfur), where at least 125 people were killed between 6 and 11 June, was omitted or forgotten (OCHA 2022).

- 4) Ukraine acknowledges that European policies towards Africa were mainly created by the old European countries “modes” while it can bring a new quality to these relations (Chadwick 2022). The above can be read as an Ukrainian attempt to distance itself from the difficult history linking Western countries and Africa. Along with this claim, it is also emphasized again that Ukraine has never participated in colonisation.
- 5) Ukraine points to a commonality of interests with African states, particularly with regard to cooperation within the UN, where a greater number of voices of developing states can vote in favour.
- 6) The United States, in support of Ukraine's position, to counter Russian narratives (and with due regard for its own *raison d'être* in Africa), implemented a diplomatic tour by Secretary of State Antony Blinken. This mission (which followed earlier visits to African states by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov), despite a meticulously prepared communications layer responding to Africa's needs, was not significantly successful. The keynote slogan of the visit Africa has problems and USA has solutions (BBC 2022) however media-laden did not win 'the hearts and minds of Africans'. One possible reason for this is the disconnection between Secretary Blinken's words and the then ongoing debate in the US related to „punishing African countries for cooperating with Russia”.¹⁸

Ukraine's current policy towards African states is based on an attempt to quickly 'catch up' with multilateral relations which, under wartime conditions, is difficult to implement and full of disappointments¹⁹ (Reuters 2022). The impetus initiating this process appears to have been the need to create a counter-narrative to Russia's growing influence on the African continent. However, the realisation of this goal so far (even with the support of Western allies) probably does not satisfy Kiev's expectations. In relation to Africans, Ukraine often represents an attitude that is interpreted as a combination of demands and unjustified pretensions. The failure since 1991 to develop deeper relations with African states, understanding and feeling their cultural differences and the relatively frequent instances of racism (Ray 2022), have meant that although Ukraine claims to have never taken part in colonialism, the opinions it expresses and the actions it follows up with - for some African societies - bear such hallmarks.

¹⁸ Also addressed below: Reactions of African countries

¹⁹ Such as the omission of Kiev (despite promises) by African Union President Sall at the same time as the meeting that took place between him and President Putin

Creation of Russia's image by Ukraine and allied states

The communication strategies used by Ukraine are less profiled to the specifics of the African infosphere than those of the Russian Federation. With minor variations, they replicate the narratives addressed to Western countries by focusing on a few key issues:

- 1) „Imperial Russia wants to rebuild its influence in the former Soviet states by invading an independent Ukraine as early as 2014, when it had not yet declared its intention to join NATO.”
- 2) „Russia uses terrorist tactics by attacking civilian installations more often than military ones, commits war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
- 3) „It uses methods to destabilise global markets by blockading Ukrainian ports and fuelling an already difficult demographic situation in Africa.” (AfricaCentre 2022)
- 4) „It is having a devastating impact on democratization and development processes in the Black Continent using brutal and human rights violating mercenary groups.” (OHCHR 2021)
- 5) Through its actions, it started another Cold War and is responsible for the global polarisation of East versus West. (Everett 2022)

It should be noted that the narratives of Ukraine and its allies largely duplicate the accusations made against the Soviet Union by the United States before 1991. In part, they are also similar to those used against the Taliban in Afghanistan or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The repeated slogans about autocratic governments violating democracy and human rights presenting a strictly Western pyramid of values.

Shadow messages and side-kicks

When considering the power of Russian and Ukrainian communication strategies to influence African states, it is important to highlight a number of modelling events that remain outside the mainstream information warfare, but are located in the African information space. They are rarely (or not at all) referred to in the public debate having, however, a significant impact on the perception of the messages broadcast by the parties in the conflict. Their syncretic and subjective following addresses the fundamental (and often forgotten) principles of communication strategy analysis, in which information omitted from the discourse may be similar in (or even of greater) importance than information revealed. (Dijk 1993)

- Russia (back in the days of the USSR) made surveys and produced geological maps of a number of African countries, which identified the extent and nature of the Black Continent's above- and below-ground resources. These maps were handed over to African rulers as part of an allied friendship, and are still cited to this day as evidence of both the recognition of Africa's mineral wealth and the transfer of all of it into the hands of Africans themselves. (Novosti 2008) Also highlighted is the action of colonial states

which, even if they pursued geological exploration - did not share it with the indigenous people, hoping to negotiate better prices for sovereignty over resource-rich land.

- Russia, along with African partners, claimed to have developed a vaccine for the Ebola virus, (Gamaleya 2022) considered incurable and widely feared. It has already declaratively completed the testing phase in Guinea (PharmaceuticalTechnology 2018) and has plans to mass supply the Democratic Republic of Congo. (TASS 2019) Not only was the vaccine against Covid-19 (Sputnik-5) supposed to be half the price of Western equivalents, but it had also become a 'bridge between the poor and the rich'. It was found to be available in 15 African countries. (Stronski 2021) Sputnik's promotion strategy itself was also the subject of an intensive communications campaign - replicated repeatedly by the African media. The Russian team proactively visited medical companies in various African countries encouraging them to produce the vaccine in-house based on the know-how provided free of charge (Maxmen 2021) and with the Russian technical support provided. The West, in contrast showed significant 'vaccine nationalism' during the pandemic, sending less than the declared number of vaccines to Africa, with a long time lag, mostly in only one of the two required doses and often with a borderline expiry date (Fandi 2021). It seems that Sputnik's lack of economic success (no production took place) was due to a preconceived strategy in which the social and image component dominated over the business component.²⁰
- The visit of Ms Nancy Pelosi (and the subsequent US Congressional delegation) to Taiwan, despite China's objections, in Africa was presented as an example and vindication of the West's interventionist, 'colonial' policies and provided significant support to the development of Russian narratives on the continent.
- The level of rapprochement between African states and Russia can be a factor in influencing the West, which is expected to invest more and make greater efforts to 'pull Africa to its side' (Nourddine 2020, Schenker 2021) – this is particularly true of Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria, Niger or Algeria. It suggests that if Western countries do not react quickly and decisively - African countries will return to Russia's sphere of influence.²¹
- Moscow is willing to share influence with autocrats involved in intra-African power struggles, settling for a smaller (though often crucial) share of the 'cake'²². Western states seek full influence and subordination of the will of their rulers.
- Russia has worked hard in recent years to make Africa dependent on its grains - especially wheat (Medetsky 2018). Analysing the period 2018-2020, it can be concluded that Russia was responsible for the supply of 32% of wheat to the African continent while Ukraine accounted for 12%. At least 23 African countries are dependent on the Russian wheat while just four on Ukrainian supplies. (Statista 2022)

²⁰ It can be assumed that Russia never wanted to make the production of Sputnik V in Africa realised

²¹ For example, Egypt, which had been denied sales of F-35 aircraft by the US, purchased SU-35 aircraft from Russia, sending a clear message to the Americans.

²² It is working intensively with Egypt, for example, which wants to realise its influence in Libya, Sudan and Tunisia



- Africa accounts for only a negligible percentage of Russia's overall foreign turnover (some sources even say around 1%) - sanctions imposed by the West therefore hit Africa more than the Russian Federation itself.
- A forgotten fact is the wave of racism that took place in Russia in the 2000s. At the time, ambassadors of African countries intervened with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with mass violence against Africans. 16 murders and 248 beatings were recorded against this background between 2004 and 2009 (Kozhenikova 2009).
- However, there was also a wave of violence (and killings) of Africans in Ukraine during this period, as was evoked during the Ukraine-Poland border crisis shortly after the war began. Ukraine only adopted an anti-racism law in 2012 (OHCHR 2016), however, in colloquial language people from Africa are still often referred to as 'black monkeys'.
- Russia's uranium resources are of low quality and their processing is very expensive (Deich 2007). When it comes to nuclear energy, it is not only Africa that expects Russian technology, but Russia also needs African raw materials.
- Many African countries were (and are) in debt to both Russia and Ukraine due to mutual trade. Economic crises, pandemics and droughts have left them unable to settle their debts. Russia had already announced the cancellation of Algeria's debts in 2006 amounting USD 4.7 billion (Mohammedi 2020) and in 2008 adopted a similar strategy for other countries at a total declared level of USD 20 billion. (MoFA Russia 2010) Ukraine has sought to collect its debts, which in recent years has led, for example, to a conflict with Tunisia whose multi-million dollar debt remains unpaid. (Cbonds 2022)
- China was making large grain purchases in 2021 and announced in early 2022 that it had a year-and-a-half's supply of grain, which may suggest communication occurring with Russia even before the outbreak of war.
- Russia's anti-Western narrative in Africa is supported by China, which in an unprecedented manner (following Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan) is attacking US and NATO global policies towards both the Russian Federation and Ukraine (alleging, among other things, violations of international law, crimes against humanity, imprisonment without trial, torture, unauthorised sanctions on other countries, human rights violations and instrumental treatment of democracy as a mask for its abuses – Xinhua, 2022). Given that China is the largest lender in Africa on which at least 40 African states depend (Kumar&Pike 2022) - Russia's communication strategies have gained extremely strong leverage.
- A significant item in the budgets of many African countries are foreign remittances from compatriots abroad (Egypt's receipts from this, for example, are 30% - more than from tourism and the Suez Canal). With high population growth being the source of many of the problems for African economies, 'pushing' their surplus beyond national borders is therefore beneficial in two ways - they reduce the budget burden, whilst also increasing foreign remittance receipts. The Russian Federation is attempting to stimulate and

geographically target this centrifugal process by creating what Europeans call a demographic weapon.

- Russia is making intensive efforts to bind the Christian Church in African countries more closely with the Great Russian Orthodox Church and to expand its influence through this institution among the 31 countries of Africa and approximately 680 million Christians (Saleh 2022). These activities intensified in many regions of the Black Continent after the Orthodox synod held in 2021 (Rozanskij 2022). It resulted in the establishment of two 'centres for the propagation of faith and dialogue' at two opposite ends of Africa: in Cairo and Johannesburg (Hanafi 2022).

Each of the above-mentioned processes could individually (or cumulatively) be a potential factor in modelling the perception of African public opinion.

Reactions of African countries and societies

The reactions of senior officials and the publics in African states varied considerably depending on whether their messages were directed at the internal African market or at the international community. In the first case, most opinions negated the position taken by the 'collective West' regarding the war and rationalised offensive Russian actions²³ (AlMayadeen 2022). In the second, the attitude of African states was balanced (mostly 'abstaining') with rare expressions of criticism of Russia's aggressive policy of which a widely circulated media example is, the statement of the Kenyan ambassador to the UN, Mr Martin Kimani and the allegations of Russia's colonialism (Chappell 2022). It should be noted that in the first weeks of the war, a concept that was rapidly gaining a following in Africa was the so-called Non-Aligned States Movement- represented mainly by Egypt, Ghana, India and Indonesia (Mltek 2022). This formula had its roots in the 1960s, when a number of states, in pursuit of their own economic and political interests, did not want to take sides in the Cold War conflict. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a number of states in the 'global south' expressed their willingness to opt for a 'third way'. These attempts, however, have been confrontationally suppressed by the United States and Europe, which (viewed through the prism of African sensitivities) force a 'for or against' position. Such a situation has become a perceptual backdrop affecting perceptions of both the war and its main actors. Significant events, actions and statements presenting the positions of African states in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian war can be summarized as follow:

- 1) Only four African heads of state in addition to Macky Sall of the African Union and Senegal were present during the online meeting and President Zelensky's address to the African Union: Alassane Ouattara (Côte d'Ivoire), Mohammed el-Menfi (Libyan Council) and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo).

²³ Like the slogan "An attack on Russia is an attack on Africa"

- 2) Many African countries were outraged by the treatment of black students at the Ukrainian-Polish border. Nigeria, South Africa and Congo formally complained about the racist treatment of a group of at least 12,000, mainly Moroccans and Nigerians (Resnick 2022) people wanting to get out of Ukraine. Social media was flooded with a wave of videos and posts from the border, and a social movement #AfricansInUkraine was created
- 3) Africans see Ukraine as a separatist entity that took advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union to establish its own statehood (Al Jazeera 2022). They fail to see the history, role and culture of post-World War II Ukraine as a separate entity from the Soviet Union
- 4) The pressure exerted on African states with regard to taking „a side in the conflict” evokes colonial reminiscences for the people of the Black Continent, and the surprise (and often even indignation) of the West at the attitude other than what it would expect - only deepens this impression (Obadare 2022). Balancing the two superpowers under such conditions is a very difficult challenge for African states, not only because of international circumstances, but also because of domestic politics (Annor 2022).
- 5) African countries have shown themselves to be keen observers of the international scene learning from the experiences of other countries - particularly the Middle East and Afghanistan following US 'stabilisation' missions. The US blunders in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bowman, Thomphson, Brombst 2021) and Russia's ability to 'keep President Bashar al-Assad in office' in Syria (despite intense Western campaigns to overthrow him) are repeatedly cited - a particularly relevant perspective for African autocrats as well.
- 6) In the collective consciousness of African societies, President Trump's term shithole countries (formally referring only to Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania and Eritrea (Kanno-Youngs 2022) but extended in the media to most African countries) is deeply imprinted.
- 7) The withdrawal from the Paris climate agreements (Kotchen 2017) and the marginalisation of the Green Climate Fund significantly undermined the „green” policies of the West (which were also linked to significant investment) and reinforced the focus of African governments on nuclear energy
- 8) Many African governments see Russia as a „lifeline” for their famine-threatened populations, making personal negotiating efforts (with relative success) with President Putin to help avert a food crisis (Kalondo 2022). Russia thus goes from being the perpetrator to being the „saviour”.
- 9) The actions of the European Union are seen as escalating the conflict rather than being steps towards establishing peace. Europe has identified the risk of „losing African hearts and minds” , but through the lack of a coordinated policy, the countermeasures taken have so far been of low effectiveness.
- 10) Many African countries that depend on China are watching their reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian war extremely closely and are trying to express opinions similar to

Beijing. This, in turn, after Nancy Pelosi's visit, has sharpened to a great extent its rhetoric towards the collective West

- 11) Some high officials of African countries (such as in Uganda President Museveni's son Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba) directly support President Putin²⁴ by spreading fake news in line with the message of the Russian propaganda and intelligence apparatus (such as the extremely popular tweet with a photo of a young Vladimir Putin in 1970s Tanzania talking to the „African fathers of independence” (ClubofMozambique 2002). No media report concerning any diplomat / soldier from the West has ever gained such popularity
- 12) During protests in the Sahel countries, notably Mali (Ramani 2020) and Burkina Faso (Jones 2022) participants attacked French „colonialists” while flying flags of the Russian Federation, demonstrating their sympathies clearly by this action
- 13) The African media's resentment of the West while favouring Russia may stem from years of having to denounce Western media publications spreading information about more and more 'senseless African wars' (senseless wars). African journalists and reporters have unsuccessfully tried to point out the basis, significance and consequences of the ongoing conflicts, rather than simply publishing the shocking statistics and pictures associated with them. Another reason may be the sectoral animosities associated with the primacy of information from Western sources - compared to local ones. It was the Western one that became the reference point and epicentre of socio-political discussions. Painfully for African media - the level of relevance and substance of 'Western' information mattered much less than the location of the entity that published it.
- 14) African states were very critical about offensive legislation that was being considered in the US (Diseko&Macaulay 2022), and in the following weeks of the adoption by the US Congress of the 'Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act' (US Congress 2022). This document gives the US services legislative space to determine various consequences against African entities linked to Russian Federation activities. Many African governments and societies condemned the act as an attempt to dictate with whom they could or could not cooperate. The prospect of penalties being imposed on them for contacts with Russia was perceived as an assault on their independence (Pandor 2022). The meaning of this document also stood in stark contrast to the narrative of Antony Blinken, who was in Africa at the time, in effect sinking the effectiveness of his diplomatic efforts.
- 15) Following the American example, the European Union has unofficially started discussions on potentially making humanitarian aid to Africa conditional on the representation of 'common values and shared vision'. The reaction of African countries is not yet unified, but one can anticipate voices even more critical than in the case of the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act

²⁴ *The majority of the mankind (that are non-white) support Russia's stand in Ukraine. Putin is absolutely right!" (The majority of the mankind (that are non white) support Russia's stand in Ukraine. Puting is absolutely right!"*)



- 16) Africans feel they are politically and economically discriminated against and undervalued by so-called global public opinion. Ukraine (despite the fact that it is not a member of NATO) receives not only financial and diplomatic aid, but also state-of-the-art weapons - support that the West has never given (at least officially) to African states. The budgets for the 'granary of Europe' are unprecedented, while for Africa humanitarian budgets are being cut despite growing needs due to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
- 17) Russia is seen as a counterweight to Turkey's growing influence and Ankara's 'neo-Ottoman' ambitions - thus approaching the Gulf states in particular (mainly the UAE and Saudi Arabia), for whom weakening Turkey as a competitor in Africa and MENA is an important objective (Repetowicz 2020). However, limiting Turkey's growing influence is also important for some North African states (e.g. Egypt, which shares with Russia an interest in Libya and Tunisia).
- 18) In social media, there are claims (repeated in face-to-face interviews) that the US through Poland (Karlovskyi 2022) is planning to deploy nuclear weapons systems on Ukrainian territory, which directly triggered the need for a Russian response. One of the factual bases for such suspected claims were the disseminated messages about the deepening of energy cooperation between the US and Poland (WorldNuclearNews,2022a) and the covert extension of the already functioning nuclear agreements between the US and Ukraine (WorldNuclearAssociation 2022).

African acceptance of two distinctly different types of narratives created by actors representing such antagonistic values, goals and methods is far more favourable to the Russian Federation. Many of the reasons for this have been demonstrated above, but the fundamental basis is that Russia is familiar with the Africans' mental model of the world and is able to construct a narrative that coincides with it in a very attractive and pertinent manner.

Summary and reflections

The differences between Russian and Western communication strategies used in Africa are not limited to the '*content*' itself. They are also different approaches to methods of disseminating messages and ways of aggregating and transforming the information that reaches Africans from a broad political, economic and media context.

In conclusion to the above, a number of meta-assumptions that seem to remain unconsidered by analysts, journalists and politicians are presented, as follows.

- Voting 'against' (or 'for') at the UN to condemn certain military actions of the Russian Federation cannot be equated with condemning Russia as a partner for African states.
- The Russian narrative offering Africans the 'freedom of the path they want to take', however more attractive than the 'violent dictate of the West', is well-installed *fake*

news. Russia is offering a presuppositional choice - that is, from a selection of possible solutions which has prepared in advance.

- The sanctions imposed on Russia and the probable food crisis in Africa they will cause are a greater economic threat to the countries of the Black Continent than to Russia itself. In the long term, it may even be beneficial for Russia - famine causes civil unrest and therefore an increased need for protection for autocratic governments. They will turn for help not to the discredited states of the West but to Russia itself (as long as it can continue to support them militarily).
- Colonisation in Africa continues - only the actors (China, Russia, Turkey, Gulf States) and its forms (economic colonialism, digital colonialism, cultural colonialism etc.) have changed.
- The post-colonialists (among whom, according to Africans, Ukraine aspires to be one) constitute for many Black Continent governments the 'institutions of the eternal enemy' and, in this respect, are a very important component of the African political, social, identity and psychological system. They are also used as a point of reference in the less transparent matrix of ethnic, religious and tribal struggles for power over the 'hearts and minds' of Africans. Stepping into this multi-level structure without awareness, knowledge or trustworthy guides carries a high probability of being exploited by more experienced actors. On the African continent, Ukraine appears to have been effectively 'played' by the Russian Federation.

According to Theodore Murphy, director of the European Centre of Foreign Relations, the collective West made a 'strategic mistake' by forcing African states to take sides in the conflict (Murphy 2022). This gave space to Russian information operations and stirred up post-colonial traumas. Ukraine has become so close to the West that it has taken on all historical US-European 'sins' in African perceptions. The deepening inequality in the distribution of wealth in recent years has created a fertile information space for this as well (Repetowicz 2022). Russia is devoid of these burdens. It has also managed to combine hatred towards the colonisers with the automatically triggered belief that Russia is a better partner. Operating on this 'anchored' contrast should be considered a major communication success for the Russian Federation in Africa²⁵. Russia has achieved it by profiling its strategies in relation to local specificities, constantly taking 'many small steps' that are associated with equally frequent (though not always small) gratifications. This is in significant contrast to the 'systemic and strategic' solutions proposed by the West (Hume&Phillips-Barrasso 2022), ordered 'from afar' by Washington or European capitals. Newton's second law of motion states that „Force = mass x acceleration“. The collective West has more mass but is dispersed and often incoherent in its actions. Russia is lighter but tightly focused on areas that can give it - in various dimensions - the most favourable 'return on investment'.

²⁵ As exemplified by recent events in Burkina Faso



Africa is the continent experiencing the fastest population growth (UN 2022) with the greatest risk of experiencing the negative effects of climate change (UNFCCC 2020). The combination of these two factors in a post-pandemic reality means that it is Africa that could be a significant source of destabilisation for the global security system in the future. What for some actors in international competition is a threat for others, however, may be an opportunity. Developed countries, especially at a time of a return to deep East-West polarisation, are existentially forced to fight for Africa's unique resources. Acquiring them is essential for the functioning of their economies when the availability of raw materials from eastern Europe and Asia is reduced. In the near future, therefore, one can expect not only intensification, but brutalization of the struggle for the hearts and minds of Africans, once again, as in history disregarding their needs and dreams in the big game of great powers.

„[Africa] does not want to be a breeding ground for a new Cold War, but rather a pole of stability and opportunity open to all its partners, on a mutually beneficial basis.”

(Sall, 2022)

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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A Review of: “Algeria: Politics and Society from the Dark Decade to the Hirak” by Michael J. Willis¹²

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In 2007/8, as a student at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, I had the opportunity to learn one academic year in Kuwait University, and besides studying, I had time to travel around the region, so I have some insights how the Middle East and North Africa works. Because I had some experience directly from the Arab speaking countries, this enables me little to understand better the culture and the thinking of the Arabic people. However, there is a lot more to learn. A decade later, after some serious scientific work I am now finishing my PhD-dissertation and after that I intend to specialize in Algeria and Morocco, thus the area might become my field of expertise later (of course after years of humble efforts). Thanks to hard work, I was accepted into the prestigious Africa Research Institute in Hungary (created in 2019), which enables me to concentrate more on the area.

However, the theme of my review is Michael J. Willis’s work on Algeria, which – according to my previous experiences and after writing some reviews already – is a thorough and excellent work, which includes few typos or the like. I especially liked the dedication, with what the writer made efforts to collect data on the country by doing surveys (primary sources) on the country in Algiers between 2015-17. The use of secondary sources is also impressive, and the bibliography includes fresh and relevant sources. The reading material is abundant on the theme, however – in my opinion – it succeeded not only in describing the situation in Algeria but also giving new insights into what might lie in the future of the country after the 2019 revolution, the Hirak. His style is fluent, and he tries to include other opinions for a better scientific understanding, which is a great value of a scholar. The reader can sense that the author – who works at the prestigious Oxford University – is fluent in the area, and he published several books before on the theme as well, that became popular. Concluding all, it is an honour for me to have the opportunity to review a book with such high standards and only minor errors.

After giving my first impressions on the book, I think it is important to look through, what is the writer analysing and what themes he did consider important. In the first chapter, he gives a comprehensive outlook of the first presidents of the country after independence, and then tries to give a description for the average reader as well to understand, what the beginnings of Algerian politics were like in the first decades after the independence was

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reached in 1962. He concentrates a lot on the independence movement, which he thinks was one of the main motives for later Algerian politics and it has been shaped by it (15). He continues with the Ben Bella, Boumedienne, and Benjedid governments, which he describes quite thoroughly. He examines the socialist direction these leaders took when they were presidents. In the last (Benjedid's) president's time, the Islamist power got prominence and the FIS was created, what Willis describes well to the audience. After this, he goes on to mention some other presidents (like Zeroual), who were only for a short time in rule.

In the second chapter, Willis aims to examine one of the most important eras of the Algerian politics, which took place under the supervision and rule of Bouteflika. The former foreign minister was very skilled in diplomacy, and as Willis describes, he restored the prestige of the Algerian state abroad and had a good relationship with the security services, which was called DRS. Bouteflika was president for several years, and he thwarted his enemies mostly with the help of his security services. His partnership with Mediene, head of DRS made him very powerful in the country's political sphere (74). In his third campaign, he amended the constitution, so he could become president for the third time. His third era was signalled by a coup effort from the DRS, which was unsuccessful. The 2010 Arabic springs didn't have a major effect on the country, as Willis describes, the reaction of the DRS was enough to control the events in Algeria not to get out of hand. In his fourth term, Bouteflika improved Algeria's foreign image more and showed his rule as benevolent in the eyes of foreign powers. However, he had a stroke in 2013, nevertheless, he ran for fifth time as president. The former chief of staff, Gaid Salah tried to take the power, but he was too weak, and finally – as Willis describes – Abdelmajid Tebboune became president, after the Hirak (the Algerian demonstrations in 2019) made Bouteflika resign. Tebboune had a difficult time with the protests and the COVID-19, so his rule was not as smooth as he thought of it before. At the end of the chapter, Willis states that the most important element of the elite politics of Algeria were the security services (the DRS and the ANP), which took a great part in the shaping of the politics of the country.

In the third chapter, Willis tries to capture the essence of the 1990s Islamist movements and threats, how the government tried to handle them. Willis thinks that to understand the politics of the 21st century, one must get acquainted with the events of the Islamist era in the country. After initial conflicts and terrorist attacks by Islamists, a more radical organization came into being, which was called GIA. Another radical group was created from the FIS, the AIS in 1994. This meant of course more extremism in the country. In the clashes 30,000 people died, and from 1993 to 1996, the government had to issue counter-insurgency movements. According to Willis, in the last years of the 90s, from 1997 on the Islamist threat and the influence of the FIS was successfully decreased, also by an amnesty given by president Zeroual on 20 August 1997. With Bouteflika in power – as Willis describes – he issued the Civil Concord Law, which gave amnesty to the non-violent members of the FIS, thus he guaranteed a national reconciliation for the moderate Islamists. On 14 August 2005, Bouteflika amended this Concord by implementing the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which gave compensation to the families who suffered under the Islamists and the charter also aimed to

exclude the Islamists from political life. Willis thinks that despite the GSCP – another Islamist group – came to power in the 2000s, and established relations with the AQIM, jihadism has never really become popular in Algeria (123), and the Islamist threat soon decreased.

After explaining the Islamist movements and their roots, Willis turns to describe the politics and economics of Algeria. The first thing Willis mentions, is that oil was discovered in the country in 1956, which had a huge effect on the country's economics later on. The oil and gas company, Sonatrach had a huge import not only nationwide, but regionally as well. As Willis describes, the oil prices started to fall in the 80s, which continued well into the 90s, so in 1994 finally Algeria had to take an international loan from the IMF to keep up the economy. However, after the rise of Bouteflika in 1999, the oil prices went up, so he had a lot of opportunities, and he could get closer with his economic entrepreneurs instead of relying totally on the DRS. An economic association was created by the name of FCE in 2000. There became a symbiosis between Bouteflika and the FCE, the business circles, which had won him most of his presidential elections (149). Willis tells us, that besides the rising corruption, with the increasing oil revenues, Bouteflika was able to expand the economy and invest into economic developments. The oil prices however went down in 2014, which caused some serious problems for the country's economy. Eventually the demise of the bad economic circumstances was shown in the Hirak movement, in which both the president and his economic circles were deposed of. In 2020, with the COVID-19 the economy was startled, and unemployment and inflation became a problem in Algeria.

In the fifth chapter, Willis aims to examine the political opposition that existed in the country, and which culminated in the Hirak movement, which proved to be a decisive factor in the country's history. Altogether, there were not many opposition parties in Algeria, in the beginning, in the time of the independence fights, it was the FLN, which came to be the government's party later. In 1982, the MDA came with Ahmed Ben Bella, and the communist party enjoyed somewhat legal status (PAGS). From the 80s on, there were at least 50 smaller opposition parties, among which the Islamist FIS became important later. In the 1992 elections, the FIS was excluded, and after that, for a decade, only radical Islamist opposition was present in the country. From 1997, a new opposition force, the RND was established, and the FLN became important again. At the time of the Arab Spring in 2010, a party called CNCD was created, but it didn't have much effect on Algerian politics. The only bigger Islamist party (besides the previous FIS), that won recognition was the MSP, which later merged with other Islamist parties. By some years there were small opposition parties, which didn't have big share in Algerian politics, these meant the CNLTD, which comprised of: MSP, An-Nahda, FJD, FFS, RCD, Jil Jadid. No matter the Hirak was coming, the opposition didn't gain any ground, and after the turmoil, the FLN-RND won back its previous power. In Willis's opinion, the opposition was little bit financed by the government, so it could control them, and this way they didn't disturb really the politics of the ruling, influential elite (203). Willis also tells us, that there was a small room for associations to rise and take part in politics, as long as they could be controlled by the government. In the time of Bouteflika, these groups provided the regime's bases for international recognition. Besides of some students, young people, there



was no real opposition to the regime, and this was shown in the 2010 events, when the Arab Spring didn't have any effect on the country. The Hirak, however was another story, as it really achieved a slightly independent status from the government, basing their power on associations and trade guilds. In Willis's opinion, the Hirak gave room for the new generation of students and youth, who were born after the independence fights and wanted something new, but eventually, with Tebboune, the government at least could ease the tensions against the movement. One of the main ideas of Willis is that these movements were actually peaceful, and it was thus because the bloody years of the 90s taught Algerians what violence means.

In the sixth chapter, Willis considers the Algerian politics and society, which is important for understanding the country. In the opinion of Willis, Algerian people are disinterested by politics, since they think it's corrupt and elections are thought to be fraudulent. Willis notes, that the young generation is the most disillusioned with the political life of the country, not lastly because unemployment for them is very high. Willis says that there is a gap between the younger, disillusioned generation, who is looked down by the older generation, because they think they have unreachable standards, as they fought for the independence, while the young people didn't. Willis says the young people are prone more to participate in demonstrations like the Hirak, and they use social media, internet and the like more, so they are a new generation. In Willis's view there is a common thinking in Algerian people's mind that the 90s terrorist attacks and threats were part of a foreign intrusion into the country's political life, they usually think it was a confusing time and they speak about it as the "dark" or "black" decade. Willis thinks the 2019 Hirak shows that the people still remember the effects of the 90s violence, and they don't want that aggression back (240-241), but also the younger generation is too small to remember what happened and they look on things with a rather new perspective as they participate in the Hirak. However, after the 2000s, the civilian religious life had a positive impact, and people started to take religion in personal life more importantly. For them, the first identity factor is religion, then comes Algerianness, and there is Arabness as well. Women are rarely represented in political life, and it only decreased in the last years compared to older times, when it even totalled in 25% representation in National Assembly (2017). Today, it barely reaches 9%. Nevertheless, they were strongly represented in the Hirak movement, because women's rights are becoming more and more important even in this region as well. Concerning other identity factors, tribe and regions are not the most relevant factors, however, family is one of the most important things in Algerian social life. There is small educational development, however, mostly young people are prone to new influences like social media and internet. Willis thinks that the years that have passed since independence showed that the younger generation wants democratic change, which culminated in the 2019 Hirak movements, which were peaceful and demanded a new, democratic approach to government. That they will be successful, or not remains to be seen according to Willis.

In the seventh chapter, the author tries to comprehend the so-called revolutionary regions of Algeria, the Kabyle region, the Mزاب and the Saharan South. Before even discussing the

regions, Willis notes that they are not secessionist in nature, however, they are restive regions. In April-July 2001, there was a revolt in Kabylia, which aspired for reform, but eventually, it didn't last long, and it haven't achieved its goals. This was called "Black Spring". In the South, where there is Sahara, and it's far from the center, a revolt started in 2013, and continued in 2015, because of economic reasons, but the organization, which directed these demonstrations, the CNDDC had to merge with some government powers, thus it lost its influence, and the revolution faded away. In the Mزاب, there was an ethno-religious problem between two tribes: the Mozabites were Ibadis and Berbers, while the Chamba were Arabs and Malikites, who were semi-nomadic people, and this culminated in troubles in 2013-15. After describing the revolts, Willis tries to give common reasons for the occurring enmities. First thing he explains to be common in nature was the high level of unemployment and marginalization. He looks at the revolt from the ethnicity perspective as well: he concludes that in Kabylia, in spite of a lot of opinions, the Berber identity (which is present in the area) was not the main reason of the tensions (302). I personally think that the protests were also of ethnic nature, as the Berber roots are important for the people of this region, however, Willis' idea is to be considered and his thoughts are generally excellent. He also tries to prove, that ethnicity had no impact on the Mزاب conflict, rather the Ibadi-Malikite enmity was important. Here I also would like to add, that in my opinion, the Berber-Arab differences could also be a factor in the clashes between the two ethnic groups, however, Willis's opinion is very interesting in nature. In the south, he is on the same opinion, and my thought is the same about the theme as well, however, ethnical differences are not so strong in that region. Beside these, Willis has another interesting thought, which I think might be true, that these regions – instead of secession – want more integration into their homeland. To conclude the three regions, Willis says that they all want more piece of the national cake rather than to secede from the Algerian state. Then Willis considers the foreign influence accusation in the three revolts, which he thinks are mostly unfounded and are rumours.

In the last, eighth chapter, Willis concludes his book by describing Algeria in the international world. Willis summarizes the experienced Algerian diplomacy's rules in the following: non-interference, supporter of independence movements and the importance of national sovereignty (337). Thus, after the Cold War it gained a reputation for being a good mediator in the diplomatic life. During the 90s, it became isolated because of the Islamist terrorist attacks, and sense of distrust became apparent from foreign governments and organizations. After the time of Bouteflika (who was foreign minister before) Algeria recovered from the isolation, and its former reputation had been reinstated. After 9/11, Algeria became very important as a major participant in the global war against terrorism. Algeria thwarted the Arab Spring uprisings, so national sovereignty was still important for it, and it could fill the gaps Gadhafi and Ben Ali left after themselves in the MENA region. After some incidents which involved hostage taking at the borders of the country with Libya, it changed its non-interventionist policies slightly, and defended its borders with at least 100,000 soldiers. After this, Willis examines Algeria's foreign relations on three levels: neighbours; US, France, EU and Russia, China, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East. In the case

of its neighbours, Algeria stayed rather indifferent in the case of Mali and the Sahel, mainly earning the reputation as a mediator. In Libya, it condemned the NATO incursions in 2013, and it remained neutral. With Tunisia, it maintained a restrained, but good relationship. The enmity with Morocco is a longstanding issue, since the 1963 Sand War, their relationship was stained, and in 1994 they even closed borders. There was also the problem of Western Sahara, in which Algeria supported the Polisario and the referendum for the area, while Morocco wanted ownership. On 24 August 2021, Algeria broke even diplomatic ties with Morocco – due to the recent recognition of the country’s rights to Western Saharan territory by the US – and even closed its gas pipeline to the country. Taking into consideration Western powers, Willis says the relationship of Algeria with France was an old and sometimes problematic one, since the Algerians were sensitive of their independence from them. However, after 1999 with Bouteflika, relations became better, as the two countries still had a lot in common on the economic and political field. Algeria was not so satisfied with the EU’s partnership programs as well, and demanded more of an effort from the European organization. With the US, it enjoyed better relations, as it imported gas from them, and after Bouteflika, the fight against terrorism brought the two powers closer to each other. Then Willis goes on to consider the Middle East: he thinks that Algeria had cold but correct relations with the Arab states, and it condemned the Israeli actions in Palestine. After 2019, Tebboune improved relations with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. With Russia, Algeria had generally good relationship, and it became the largest arms importer from the eastern power, which strengthened the relations between Algeria and Putin, so it didn’t condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine officially. With China, relations started early, in 1958, and went on well. They created good political and diplomatic relations, but their economic cooperation was not so prominent.

In the Conclusion chapter, Willis looks on the future of Algeria, and states that the leadership, the economy and the society of Algeria was slowly changed, and this culminated in the 2019 Hirak movement. Willis cites a sociologist, Nacer Djabi, who thinks that after the independence generation, a second and a third grew up, and especially the third was a more active and Western-influenced youthful generation, which wanted and still wants changes in the political life of Algeria (410-411). Willis finishes by saying that although in 2022, the Hirak movement faded away, he thinks that in some way, the needs for change from this young generation will find a form for it to be expressed again. This is, what the author expects from the future of Algeria.

In conclusion, it can be said that the book is a thorough and excellent interpretation of Algeria from every way possible, and the author can be praised for that. Most of the views he has are well founded, there are only minor things I could debate with, but altogether the work can be considered very important in the field of research concerning the North African and the MENA region. Therefore, I can only recommend to researchers and also ordinary readers the book if they want to get to know better the North African country, or if they want to do further research based on these grounds.

A Review of: „German Colonialism in Africa 1884-1920” by Krisztián Som¹²

Ákos Treszkai³

This is the third monograph by the author, Krisztián Som, whose research and writing began a quarter of a century ago. He previously published two studies on the history of the police forces of the German colonies.

Monarchia Publishers and the Africa Research Institute of the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences at the University of Óbuda jointly published the book „German Colonialism in Africa, 1884-1920” in November 2021. The book was peer-reviewed by Dr. habil János Besenyő and edited by Ákos Bíró.

The list of publications, which are dealing with the history of African colonies in Hungarian language, is not too long, and those that are focusing on the period of German colonialism are rare, but fortunately, they are not unprecedented. There are works (books, theses) describing the life of a single German colony or the colonial period, but the one written by Krisztián Som is more comprehensive than the previous ones and covers the four African colonies of the German Empire in detail. In the history of Togo, Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, Rwanda and Urundi the three-three and half decades of German colonial rule was a brief period. However, this period was significant in the lives of those countries and peoples. The German colonial government developed the territorial administration; however, some territories operated under supervision. In the field of education, the establishment of governorate schools were a step forward, but of greater importance were the growing church schools. In many provinces, the modernisation of health care brought the achievements of modern medicine. However, alongside this development, German colonialism (also) had a significant downside. In all German colonies, there was a resistance to the introduction of foreign (European) rule. In German East Africa and German Southwest Africa, this extended over vast areas of land. These resistances were suppressed by the Berlin government through a major redeployment of troops, with the use of firearms; terrible reprisals were carried out, leading to the extermination of a large number of the civilian population. The memory of these events still lives on in Namibia, and the German governments of the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries made several gestures to gain their forgiveness.

By the very end of the 1900s, life in the German colonies had entered a period of relative

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2022.2.4.79>

² Som Krisztián, *Német gyarmatosítás Afrikában, 1884–1920*. Budapest: Monarchia, 2021. ISBN: 9786158086431

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calm, because of the harsh crushing of resistance and the reform of the colonial administration. This significantly contributed to the revival of the local and colonial economy. Investment increased, and infrastructure began to develop at an ever-increasing rate. In addition, railways and telecommunications also developed. Plantations became more widespread and provided livelihoods for more and more workers.

However, events in Europe have finally brought about a radical change in Africa. Within days, the outbreak of the First World War had significant results in Africa because the neighbouring colonies became hostile territories. The German colonial governorates recognized that they had a very low combat value of colonial police forces against an external aggression. They attempted to recognize their neutrality by neighbouring governorates in the early days but all these attempts were unsuccessful.

The African battlefields of the First World War, however, required the commitment of a larger force and for a longer period, contrary to the expectations of the Allied powers. Only Togo, with its small population, resisted for a few weeks. German Southwest Africa was fought for 11 months, Cameroon for 19 months, while in German East Africa and the nearer countryside German colonial forces were at war until the very end of the war.

In German East Africa, Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck used the opportunities in the military situation very effectively because his relatively small force, - which was divided into several parts by several fronts on long, open borders - successfully held off a British force that was considerably larger than the German.

The book has a standard B5 size, 491 pages in total, and it is divided into three main sections. On the back cover, a quote from the Imperial German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, "I do not want any colonies; they are only good as supply stations." This quote is in stark contrast to the content of the book. This is apt to raise the curiosity of the person who is holding the book. The author's introductory reflections are followed by a foreword of Dr. habil János Besenyő, the Head of the Africa Research Institute at Óbuda University.

In the first part of the book, the reader will read about the history of the Prussian African trading colonies in the 18th century, which is not a direct precursor to the German colonial efforts and achievements of the late 19th century. With change in Bismarckian policy in the mid-1880s, a supervisory body for the German colonial administration was set up in the imperial government.

In addition to a historical account, we get an overview of the main data on the German colonies. Following this chapter, Krisztián Som presents the history of the establishment of the German protectorates in Togo, Cameroon, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa from the immediate antecedents to the outbreak of the First World War. The reason for this division is clear: each colony was a separate administrative unit, its natural environment and population density provided significantly different economic opportunities, so its development path was therefore different. The presentation of each colony covers the

history of the establishment of its administration, population trends, the main settlements, economic development, infrastructure and public services. The author introduces some of the research and activities of some Hungarian citizens during their stay in the German colonies in Africa. The chapters provide a picture of the numerical changes in life in the colonies through data sheets, ranging from economic indicators and population figures to local wages and prices. Detailed maps at the end of each chapter will help the reader who may be less familiar with the geography of the German colonies.

After a while, Togo in West Africa became a model colony for Germany. However, the future of steady development was limited by the size and potential of the land devoted to commercial agriculture, and by the labour market opportunities resulting from population density. Over time, its budget became less and less dependent on subsidies from the Berlin government, and the balance of income and expenditure was then balanced, Togo was the only one of all the German colonies to do it.

Cameroon's vast rain forested landscapes, savannah in the north and more populated coastal areas offered very different opportunities for investors and residents alike, but economic growth was slow despite the opportunities. Following the establishment of colonial borders, Cameroon was the only one among the German colonies to gain significant territory in 1911.

The history of German Southwest Africa is very different from that of the other German colonies, and even from the colonies of the wider region. The vast protectorate was very sparsely populated, many areas were covered by deserts, and the scarcity of rainfall limited the cultivation of the savannah. However, its mining industry grew from strength to strength at the turn of the century, with significant diamond mining along the coast and ore mines with substantial production in the north. These also increased the influx of German labour significantly. The early history of German patronage of East Africa was essentially influenced by competition with the British. It was the only German colony not established at the direct will of the German government, and for many years, it was controlled by a joint-stock company, the German East Africa Company. The population density and agricultural potential of the country, which was eleven times the size of present-day Hungary, varied greatly and the development of some regions was therefore different.

After a while, there was a relatively peaceful time for the colonies, and it had a positive impact on their economies and development.

The introduction to the second chapter briefly summarises some of the major stages leading up to the First World War and the situation of the African colonies in that context. Each chapter describes the defensive struggles of the four German colonies and the invasion operations of the Entente forces separately. The chapters are justified by the fact that the outcome of the fighting on the German side was unrelated to the other defences, although the British movements in East Africa was influenced by the liberation of troops tied down in Southwest Africa in 1915. In particular, the Author gives a detailed account of German events



in East Africa, for which, in addition to contemporary and later sources, he has drawn on reports and publications by the two opposing commanders. In addition, the later published memoirs of two Hungarian officers who fought for the Germans in East Africa over a long period of time are also included. Two of the more specific events of the East African theatre of operations were the military operations on the frontiers of the region and the battle of the German light cruiser *Königsberg* and his crew. The reader will also learn about the supply problems and the results of efforts to solve the supply shortage of the German East African forces and government. In addition, the reader will learn about the wartime resupply efforts of the Berlin command, including the journey of the L59 airship, which is of aviation historical significance. The maps of the East African theatre of operations are a special feature, because most of the settlements, towns to villages, which were involved in the operations, are depicted. The maps greatly help the reader to locate the events of the war.

The third and final section briefly summarises the afterlife of the four German colonies, with a focus on their possible German connections.

The author adds a total of 26 map supplements and 4 picture supplements. Among the used sources, 175 have been published in print (books, studies, journal articles, encyclopaedia articles, etc.) while 23 are the online sources which are available on the internet.

The book will be a help not only to readers who are interested in African history, but also to those who research the subject directly or indirectly, whether they approach the decades of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the period of German colonialism and the First World War from an economic or military perspective.

A Review of: „Conflict and Peace in Western Sahara: The Role of the UN's Peacekeeping Mission (MINURSO)” edited by János Besenyő, R. Joseph Huddleston and Yahia H. Zoubir¹²

Richárd Schneider³

The United Nations (UN) and the Security Council (UNSC) as its main political body is definitely the key actor in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. To put it briefly, as a way to abide by its principles defined in the Charter of the United Nations, the UN have deployed peace operations in order to stabilize conflict-torn situations since quasi the very beginning of its existence. After the Cold War the international system has changed, just as power and international dynamics, that might have an impact on the evolution of armed conflicts and counter-strategies developed by the international community. During the 1990s, the changing nature and role of peace missions resulted in developing new multidimensional operations with wide range of tasks and broad mandates. The international community's commitment toward such conflict resolution endeavours with complex mandates concerns better accountability, cost-efficiency, international law compliance, human rights monitoring, and context-specific or community-based approaches, just to mention a few.

After the end of the Spaniard authority over Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco occupied a meaningful part of the territory. In contrary to the exploitation of the natural resources and the support of the influx of new settlers to the territory by Rabat, and the strengthening of its military presence, the Saharawi population is still insisting on to exercise its self-determination. Since then, no other than the United States (US Embassy & Consulates in Morocco, 2020) has officially recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Territory, and “Morocco's claim to Western Sahara is in fact not recognized in international law” (Quesada and Brooks, p. 145). The international community is divided, some supports Western Sahara's autonomy under Moroccan authority, while others insist on recognizing it as a sovereign state. The resolution of this conflict is in the interest of the whole international community and there is a must to force the parties to compromise. Even though both the International Court of Justice⁴ and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights⁵ considered and confirmed the

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2022.2.4.144>

² Besenyő, J., Huddleston, R.J., and Zoubir, Y.H. (eds.) (2022). *Conflict and Peace in Western Sahara: The Role of the UN's Peacekeeping Mission (MINURSO)*. Routledge: London.

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⁴ See: International Court of Justice. 'Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965', available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169> (accessed 30.01.2023).

⁵ African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Application 028/2018 - Bernard Anbataayela Mornah vs Republic of Benin Republic of Burkina Faso Republic of Cote d'Ivoire Republic of Ghana Republic of Malawi Republic of Mali Tunisian Republic



right to self-determination as an *erga omnes* duty, the dispute is still unsettled. Unless a mutually and generally agreed formula on the census and the identification process is reached on which a future referendum can be based, and great powers (like the United States and France) take a stand and support the peace process, conflict escalation and regional instability in North-Western Africa is guaranteed.

The basis of the UN's presence in the Territory goes back to the mid-1970s when a "visiting mission" reported to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that Spain, as the former colonizer, as well as Morocco and the Sahrawi population expressed its will to welcome the UN in order to assist and mediate in the conflict. As a result of countless efforts, in 1988, all the conflicting parties gave their agreement to the so-called Settlement Plan made by the Secretary-General (SG) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and the Organization of the African Unity's (OAU) Chairman Kenneth Kaunda, and to the Implementation Plan that complemented it, as a result of which the UNSC Resolution 690 approved the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force on April 29, 1991. Inspired by a detailed plan by the OAU, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was set up to carry out the monitoring of the ceasefire between the Saharawi National Liberation Movement (*Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Halma y de Río de Oro* – POLISARIO) and Morocco. The mission sought to guarantee the Sahrawi people their right to self-determination by organizing a referendum under UN auspices.⁶ As Kozera and Poplawski puts it in Chapter 9, the international mission is authorized to conduct the following:

„monitor the ceasefire, verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory, monitor the confinement of Moroccan and POLISARIO (*Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Halma y Río de Oro*— Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Halma and Río de Oro— the Sahrawi pro- independence movement) troops to designated locations, take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees, oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) (to be implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC), repatriate the refugees of Western Sahara (a task to be carried out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR), identify and register eligible voters, organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results, and reduce the threat of mines and other unexploded ordnances (UXOs).” (p. 163)

The head of the MINURSO was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara among which the letter was created in 1997 and was not part of the mission's structure. A civil component of the mission contained two main bodies, namely the Identification Committee that was responsible for reviewing the 1974 census made by the Spanish and updating it as it would be the basis of a future referendum, and Independent Juris that was to ensure the release of all political prisoners and detainees of the parties to the conflict as a prerequisite to the referendum. In

United Republic of Tanzania, available at: <https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/62f/df0/6af/62fdf06af1518109175690.pdf> (accessed 30.01.2023.)

⁶ The latter planned "to be carried out about 36 weeks after the UN General Assembly's approval" (Balboni, p. 6) of the mission.

order to guarantee the effective work of such bodies, military and security (civil police) units charged with diverse tasks and as parts of the mission were created.

Even though the UNGA called for Morocco to terminate the “occupation” (e.g., A/RES/34/37), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UHCHR) along with the all-time Secretary-General recommended and called for the extension and reinforcement of the mission (as it noted several times throughout the book), the UNSC’s inaction – being reluctant from making decisive decisions in order to avoid direct confrontation with Morocco – and the lack of political will to extend MINURSO’s mandate triggered mass protests and demonstrations in the Moroccan occupied Western Sahara, among which Gdeim Izik protest camp in late 2010 was emblematic.⁷ In 2016, when Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the Territory and used the term “occupation”, further heightened the situation that ended in Rabat’s refusal to negotiate and the expulsion of MINURSO personnel that constituted a cornerstone in the mission’s history. As a consequence, fragility and instability, in parallel with military tensions between Morocco and POLISARIO, increased. After numerous and unsuccessful attempts to continue the peace process and reach a compromised solution, the “arguments for a return to war increasingly gained credibility” (Mundy, p. 74) among the Sahrawi population, meanwhile upholding the status quo was in the interest of Rabat. As of 2023, many alternatives to overcome the conflict on the ground have been given, but since the very beginning none of them seemed to be on which the parties would indeed have agreed.

Western Sahara, as the last colony of the African continent, and as a Non-Self-Governing Territory⁸ without any listed Administering Power, and the regional conflict derived from such a prolonged and unsettled dispute in the territory between the indigenous Sahrawi population and Morocco, seems to be unique in the history of UN’s international peacekeeping missions and some valuable implications this case may have for future operations. According to the authors, the UN’s response to the conflict was conceptually closer to the traditional peacekeeping approach, however it could not be changed, nor the mandate of the mission could be adapted to the evolution of the conflict as time has passed. Therefore, this book with the diverse issues it contains – applying qualitative as well as quantitative methods by reviewing relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions, SG reports, while using interviews and presenting field experiences – seeks to reveal such the uniqueness and the whole complexity of the conflict in Western Sahara which also include the international, the regional, as well as the local context and the revealing of relevant geopolitical interests of the great and neighbouring powers. The book explores numerous issues with respect to different subject areas like African studies, peace and conflict resolution, security and conflict studies, political violence and terrorism, regional and development studies, international (security) studies, military and law enforcement, international law. Therefore, academic scholars, counter-

⁷ Another recent incident was when Morocco reacted harshly when demonstrators blocked the movement of people and goods in the Guerguerat strip on November 13, 2020.

⁸ Based on Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, Western Sahara has been on the list of the Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963. See: <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt/western-sahara> (accessed 30 January, 2023)



terrorism experts, mission practitioners, military and civilian personnel in peace operations are considered to be the primary audiences of this book.

In Part I, after Balboni giving a brief and concise introduction to the topic, Miguel overviews the historical background of the Western Saharan conflict and outlines the way to the MINURSO including its legal establishment and structural framework. The author further investigates the referendum, the cease-fire, and the topics of refugees and political prisoners that were all crucial elements of the mission's mandate. In this regard, on the one hand, Naili seeks to further explore the legal aspects of UN peace operations in general, and MINURSO in particular, while Souto lists the main pitfalls in the MINURSO saga on the other: Morocco's "obstructionism"; the accusation against the MINURSO's complicity and pro-Moroccan position; the destruction of archaeological sites by MINURSO members that is further analysed in detail by Quesada and Brooks⁹ in Chapter 8; corruption; diplomatic scandals and the expulsion of the MINURSO civilian component by Rabat, among which the last one was a stalemate in MINURSO's history. Finally, Mundy investigates the crucial events of the last decade of the peace process, and explores the abrupt end of the three-decade-long peace, happened in November 2020 that, by the way, was also the collapse of one of the most durable UN ceasefires.

As there was no reference to general human rights protection in the "Settlement proposals" agreed by the parties to the conflict, which means that MINURSO had and still has neither the mandate nor the resources to address human rights violations, it gained a great international attention which called for the attribution of a human rights mandate to the mission. However, by now, it has not been done yet, creating MINURSO "*the only one post-Cold War operation that does not explicitly include observation, monitoring, and the report of human rights violations*" (Naili, p. 77). Therefore, in Part II, Shelley reviews the political and social developments and the political manoeuvring around human rights issues in detail. After, Bellosso reviews the evolution of gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding in general, and explores its impact in the context of the Western Saharan conflict. In this regard, while stressing the difference between the belligerents' stance on gender issues, the author draws a conclusion that MINURSO "*has reached significant milestones in terms of the progress toward equality*" (Bellosso, p. 128). In Chapter 8, Quesada and Brooks give a great emphasis to the archaeological heritage in Western Sahara by investigating how this issue got overpoliticized in the conflict and how this unsolved dispute impacted the preservation of such places.

In part III, based on qualitative research, literature and official document review, Kozera and Poplawski analyse the military component of MINURSO. Then, with regard to the mission's Police Contingent, Besenyő and Pintér detail the deployment of police forces, the tasks it had, the requirements expected from it, and the challenges it faced. They further present how the number of the contingent, its duties and efficiency has changed until March

⁹ Nick Brooks confirmed damages regarding Sahrawi archaeological heritage on the ground.

1, 2019, when the civilian police presence in the mission was terminated. In Chapter 12, Besenyő discusses Hungarian military and police experiences in the Western Saharan conflict. Furthermore, Atanasiu presents the logistic aspects of the mission, which includes the exhaustive overview of the overall UN Logistic Support Framework as well as the financial resources, among which the latter also contains the exploration of how new chapters were given to the mission's budgetary over time.

Having the international dynamics that definitely have had fundamental impacts on the conflict evolution in Western Sahara, Part IV of the book concerns the great powers' stance on the dispute. Huddleston and Zarate analyse the American position and detail some sort of a shuttle diplomacy which refers to a proactive attitude based on mutual agreement of the parties to the conflict on the one hand, and a conservative position that is rather in favour of Morocco. In this sense, the authors reveal the behind-the-scenes political dynamics which add valuable information to better understand the conflict and the various interests of different actors. Fábíán frames France's position and stresses the dichotomy which is uncovered when looking at its great power ambitions through international organisations and its bilateral and regional – not rarely economic – relations as well as its pro-Moroccan diplomacy. Nikonov emphasizes the Soviet and Russian position as one characterized with an initial disinterest and a later supportive diplomacy to solve the conflict. In addition to detail China's contribution to UN peace operations and clarifying the general ambitions Peking has throughout the African continent, Horváth reveals the Chinese pragmatic approach, namely, how it combines and enforces its economic and political interests under the appearance of a global humanitarian. The author includes Moroccan phosphate reserves into the analysis that ease to understand Morocco's increasing strategic significance on the one hand, and the Chinese interests on the other. After that, Vogel discusses the African participation in the mission's life, demonstrating how the continent is willing to take part in solving the conflict. Finally, Lagdaf and Zoubir present a detailed overview of the main peace plans delivered during the last three decades, and by considering regional and international dynamics, they give a summary and sketch up some alternative visions for the MINURSO.

MINURSO definitely has had positive implications like it succeeded to prepare a provisional list of voters,¹⁰ and achieved political prisoners to be released and did a valuable work to organize the return of refugees. It further prevented war recurrence for 30 years. However, the authors of this book mostly present a highly critical approach toward the UN and its peace mission in Western Sahara. By and large, "*Morocco consolidated its colonization under the flag of the UN*" (Lagdaf and Zoubir, p. 318) which means that Rabat still wants to preserve the *status quo*. As Balboni puts it: "*the core measures included in its [MINURSO] mandate is far from being implemented*" (p. 9) and the "*mission has no access to the local population*" (Kozera and Poplawski, p. 177) on the Moroccan controlled territory. The parties to the conflict have developed their own diverse and usually incompatible interpretations of the mission since the

¹⁰ Even though both Morocco and the POLISARIO wanted the voters' list to be more favourable to their position, creating tensions throughout the identification process.



beginning. While Morocco favoured a narrower operation and caused numerous obstacles that fundamentally hindered operative efficiency, POLISARIO insisted on to deploy a mission with the inclusion of issues like the monitoring of human rights. By now, there is no political agreement between Rabat and the POLISARIO, nor in the international arena. There is no real interest in the UNSC to settle the dispute, meanwhile a general unwillingness to renew the mission's mandate has always been quite determinant in terms of mission efficiency. Despite direct talks facilitated by the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy, and the numerous peace plans given to the parties: limited capacities and political will to solve the conflict, the lack of human, military, financial resources resulted in a low-intensity conflict in Western Sahara that is still not just continue to exist, but escalate. What's next after that? A renewed mandate or a new operation? By the way, does MINURSO still have its *raison d'être*? The book aims to answer such questions by concerning different topics from different perspectives.

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A Review of: “Britain, Germany and Colonial Violence in South-West Africa, 1884–1919: The Herero and Nama Genocide” by Mads Bomholt Nielsen¹²

László Pálfi³

Horst Drechsler made a revolutionary move when he explored the “Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany” a.k.a. Blue Book, written by the South African invaders of German South West Africa. The East German historian, whose book “Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus (1884–1915)” meant a paradigmatic change in the research of German colonial history, since the socialist scholar was the first who declared that the German rule in South West Africa was a form of colonial guilt.

More than half a decade later, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas called the colonial war crimes genocide and recognized it as a fact. The longtime work of historians, activists and other political actors was paid off: Germany no longer denies its dark past in Africa. However, a phenomenon can be observed in the German society, which was identified as ‘colonial amnesia’ by Reinhart Kössler: the Germans do not really know that their country was once a colonial power.

The European colonizers did not follow the same pattern in the era of ‘Scramble for Africa’; nevertheless, they shared a similar point of view, as they saw in the native Africans the ‘lower level of civilization’. Besides exploiting their goods, this attitude led to the establishment of oppressive systems: the French in today’s Algeria, the Belgian in Congo, the German in today’s Namibia, the British in today’s Zimbabwe, and the descendants of the refugees from The Netherlands in Cape Colony were acting in a very same way when it came to deprive the Natives from their land, force them to slavery-like labour and to impose corporal punishment on them.

This phenomenon created an alliance between these colonial powers, and even led to some brutal actions. One of the strangest of these was the British helping Germans in crushing the Nama and Herero uprising. The history of this international collaboration was written by Danish researcher Mads Bomholt Nielsen. His monograph, entitled “Britain, Germany and Colonial Violence in South-West Africa, 1884–1919: The Herero and Nama Genocide”, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2022, is based on contemporary sources and the books of

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² Mads Bomholt Nielsen, *Britain, Germany and Colonial Violence in South-West Africa, 1884–1919: The Herero and Nama Genocide*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. ISBN 978-3-030-94560-2

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the most notable historians on the topic.

Bomholt Nielsen's conscientiously written book reminds the readers that the international politics is always a complex phenomenon; even states with opposite interests are able to cooperate, as it happened in German South West Africa. However, Wilhelm II openly approved Kruger's success against the British, who were the ruler of Cape Colony, and London did not help Samuel Maharero to regain the independency of the Herero. In fact, exactly the opposite happened, since the Cape authorities were afraid of a possible harmful effects of a successful anticolonial revolt in the neighbourhood.

Although, the Cape government made efforts to conquer South West Africa, London only supported the incorporation of Walvis Bay, which was the only port with good navigability. The rest of this territory was seen as less valuable, and the British frontier intended to connect Cape with Egypt anyway.

Bomholt Nielsen enlightens the reader about the interesting fact that Leopold II and his soldiers became symbols of injustice of colonialism in the early years of the 20th century, but the German actions in German South West Africa were not able to receive the level of attention that the Belgian king could. The author emphasized the debate in the Reichstag and the anticolonial attitude of German social democrats in the debate on the Hottentot election (1907) and the bad reputation of the German military after Wilhelm II's Hun speech. Besides the development of the Imperial German Navy, these issues played a key role in the deterioration of British-German relations.

The author wrote an entire chapter about the Blue Book. The source-critical analysis gives valuable new knowledge about the birth and the impact of these documents. The South African invaders were seeking to justify the deprivation of Germany from its colonies; therefore, Gorges and O'Reilly tried to collect proofs and evidence of the brutal German rule. However, their aim was clearly political, as they wanted to merge South West Africa – just like their 'spiritual and political forefathers' in the 19th century Cape Colony.

The credibility of the Blue Book remained somewhat questionable. Andreas Eckl condemned the political agenda behind it, but Jan-Bart Gewald and Jeremy Silvester published a critical edition under the title "Words Cannot Be Found. German Colonial Rule in Namibia: An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book". Bomholt Nielsen can be positioned on Gewald's and Silvester's (probably even Drechsler's) side, as he did not belittle the political motivations, but presented the importance of pictorial and oral historical evidences, which make the Blue Book a relevant document.

The interpretation of the Blue Book remains a core problem of the historical analysis of the Namibian history, and this is why a less concrete deficiency occurred: the South African authors predicted the extermination of the Ovambo tribe if the German rule were to continue. The utter hypocrisy of the South African authors is more than egregious if the UDF campaign in Ovamboland is taken into consideration, as the Ovambo Uprising was ended by the death

of King Mandume ya Ndemufayo who was killed and decapitated by South African soldiers. This can be linked to Heinrich Vedder's statement about the 'apartheid since German rule' in South West Africa. Bomholt Nielsen discoursed about Vedder's observation (sadly, the scientific work of this German scholar was not noticed in the monograph) and the crush of the Bondelswarts Rebellion, but the lack of a campaign in Ovamboland set back the complexity.

Bomholt Nielsen was seeking to collect the most relevant original sources. British, German, Namibian and South African files of colonial history are very well-elaborated. The only disturbing issue is the abbreviation of the German documents, since the Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives) recommends the form 'BArch' not 'BAB', which was used by the author. The shortage of original German documents caused by the World Wars I and II are well-balanced by the use of newspapers and important German intellectuals and colonial officials, e.g. Theodor von Leutwein and Paul Rohrbach.

Based on this broad perspective and consistent work, the fact can be concluded that Bomholt Nielsen's book is a valuable contribution of the world history. His task of the elaboration of the German-British collaboration in colonial history yielded a genuine monograph.



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