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Dear Readers,
Dear Fellow Scholars,

as a member of JCEEAS Editorial, I am honoured to welcome you on occasion of publication of the first issue from 2023. This current issue recommends a good opportunity to read studies connected to Africa from various fields of research.

The first study is a fair summary of the Afro-European energy diplomacy. Based on the development of capitalism, it can be concluded that global interdependency has a growing importance, which is also applied to transnational energy policies in general. However, transnational cooperation has got its shadow economy. From the European perspective, the human trafficking seems to be one of the most concerning intercontinental phenomenon. People with false hope try to leave their homes for the Western wealth. This drastic decision is analysed in the second study. The same refers to the third paper, which is about the poor living standards and the destruction of local environment in Accra.

The fourth and the fifth studies are connected to North Africa. These countries are either parts of the Arab World or influenced by it. Turkey is seeking to strengthen the relations with African countries in general. Since Turkey is a NATO member but not a Western power, opportunities can be exploited in the case of military cooperation, which topic is elaborated in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter is a paper about the military history of World War II, namely the Casablanca Conference.

Ethnic tension and religious tensions mean crucial factor in the African civil society and nation building. The sixth study investigates the post-election violence in Kenya, meanwhile the eighth introduces readers to the activities of the Muslim terror organization Boko Haram. The seventh chapter is about the food security in Uganda and Congo.

The last three publications are about making politics and policies. The ninth chapter is about German colonialism and its economic history in Africa. Colonialism for Germany did not yield surplus but financial deficit only. Negotiating about low efficacy of financial policies, the Nigerian corruption is revealed in the tenth chapter. Finally, the security policies of Ghana are represented in the eleventh chapter.

The readers of JCEEAS are introduced via three book reviews in the Russian foreign policy in the Middle East from a broad perspective, in the diamond mining of German South West Africa, and in the activities of Rwandan Patriotic Front in the first half of 1990s. Hopefully, our readers will be enriched by this broad variety of papers, which can guarantee an intellectual fulfilment.

Dr. László Pálfi, PhD

Guest Editor,
Researcher of the African Research Institute
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Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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The Afro-European Energy Diplomacy, a Historical Reconstruction from 1973 to 2007¹

Chiara Ferri²

Abstract:

The history of international relations has as its main source diplomatic documents, among them treaties and international agreements. As Mario Toscano stated, (Mario Toscano, 1963) diplomatic documents are written statements of facts (actions or simple expressions of thought) coming from institutional bodies acting in inter-state relations. Inside the framework of diplomacy, recently emerged a new branch: energy diplomacy. This latter is a complex topic in the broad framework of the Afro- European diplomatic relations and, over the years, has continuously evolved due to endogenous and exogenous factors.

Since up to now, there's no historical rebuilding of how Afro-European diplomatic representors have acted to build their energy diplomacy and to start analyzing it, the time-space considered in this research is the following: from the 1973 oil crisis to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (Joint Africa-EU Strategy).

The relevance of this research consists of filling the historical gaps that we have about this topic between the area studies and those in the European Integration, trying to have a more *super partes* and complete vision as possible.

This research even if now in its first stage, will contribute to providing a logical combination of sources to rebuild and understand the evolution of Afro- European energy diplomatic relations. For this purpose, the literary review indicated may help to define the broad framework in which Africa and Europe started to cooperate in scientific terms.

Keywords:

Africa, energy
diplomacy, Europe, oil
crises.

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Introduction

The oil crisis happened in a delicate and unbalanced period worldwide characterized by the polarization of the two superpowers. At that time, Europe was fully experiencing some crucial processes in the formation of the European Community, while in those years, Africa was still facing the end of European colonialism which reached its peak in 1994.

In that delicate sociopolitical framework, the debate about the 1970s crisis was cautiously initiated between the late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. Scholars started to wonder about many things related to the oil crisis and, marginally, how Europe has approached Africa in scientific and technical terms, but only a few of them questioned themselves on the following issue: how has started and evolved energy diplomacy between Africa and Europe in the aftermath of the first the oil crises? Most analyses have, in part, only dwelt on how these relations began, simply to get an idea of the effects of that crisis in the Global South and to investigate the roots of that, apparently, a new international order that was being experienced at the end of the last millennium. However, the literature gap on the evolution of these relationships is still quite wide. Today is fundamental to consider what the position of the various international actors was in the aftermath of the first oil crisis because it helps to understand the current dialogue between energy producers and consumers.

The years of the second post-war period are well known to be a radical economic shift for Western countries. In particular, the latter can be observed by analyzing the rise of energetic demands such as the one concerning the oil usage. The aforementioned boosted energy imports and, consequently dependence (Clark, 1990). According to Ennio Di Nolfo (2001), to trace the path of raw materials in shaping international relations, in the long run, moral considerations are to be left to the sidelines. In placing raw materials in the international context, the author sees: if international trade and finance is understood to mean the methods by which national borders are crossed to guide political action, then the conclusion is that the link between raw materials and international relations is a mere matter of trade and finance.

Based on Giuliano Garavini (2013) analyses, oil historiography reached its peak touching the issue related to the effects of the oil crises, even if since the end of the 19th century, scholars have attempted to describe the society in terms of energy usage. The various actors' positions are to be considered in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis because the knowledge of this could help understanding the current dialogue between producers and consumers. With the increase of general worldwide interdependence, summit diplomacy arose in the 1970s along with the failure of the Bretton Woods system and the emergence of oil crises (Melissen, 2006). The most interesting thing about this is that this new wave of studies does not have a single perspective, but different ones that have in common the aim to describe how energy has shaped inter-state relations between energy producers and consumers. From this point of view, when scholars talk

about energy issues, they no longer consider only the clash between private and public powers, but also other fundamental actors, such as environmentalists, rural societies, etc. Hence, so far, this literature is very heterogeneous, and it contributes to give multiple perspectives which are to be applied and implemented to the different areas of the world (North- South, East- West). Furthermore, Giuliano Garavini (2013) stated that the historical research method is one of the most avant-garde, but however, new sources should be added to have a more complete narration.

Definition of Diplomacy and Energy Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the technique for implementing foreign policy, but also the overall organizational structure with its members who manage foreign policy (de Leonardis, 2015). Each diplomatic document has several meanings and can give different answers depending on the issues raised. In this case, the historical approach has its reference in the written documents. Therefore, cross-referencing sources is crucial.

Energy diplomacy is a broad topic and, to make a more in-depth and detailed analysis, it is fundamental to narrow it down to a blind side not sufficiently still explored. Today, this topic is one of the most relevant in the field of applied international relations research because it involves a compulsory interdisciplinary approach to history, political-economic theories, international law, energy law, diplomacy theory, etc. That is why nowadays there is no common scientific space in the field of energy diplomacy research (Reinhardt and Pronichkin, 2018). Scholars tended to focus on oil because its history has always been intertwined with the history of the environment, international relations, and the history of consumer society.

Ennio Di Nolfo (2006), used to clarify what foreign policy is before going into deep about what is the meaning of diplomacy. In him, foreign policy is the way in which every single country project itself outwards, in international life; while international politics is the moment when the different foreign policies, of the different countries, meet, and interact, raising conflicts, wars, and peace situations. Even if the diplomatic activity is ancestral, the word “diplomacy”, in the modern sense of administrating international relations and influence them, appeared only at the end of the 18th century.

One of the most representative definitions of diplomacy is given by Carlo Laroche and is the following: “Diplomacy is the art of representing the government and the interests of one’s country to foreign governments and countries: of ensuring that the rights, interests and dignity of one’s country are not overlooked abroad; of administrating international affairs, and either directing or following diplomatic negotiations in accordance with instructions received” (Laroche, 1945).

Before trying to define what energy diplomacy is, it is important to briefly introduce what Science and Technological Studies (STS) are. According to Ottinger

(2018), scientific facts are not discovered but constructed, so STS examines how political and economic factors shape the directions and products of science (Holifield et al., 2020). In some way, this branch of the science of environmental studies supports the construction of the concept of science diplomacy.

Energy has come into the sphere of diplomacy and foreign policy due to its growing importance in terms of national and economic security. Over time then, energy diplomacy became separated from foreign and public policy (Henrikson, 2005). It has come to look upon the 20th century as the primordial age of energy diplomacy that, at the beginning was mainly dominated by corporations producing and distributing fuel; with the oil shock then, problems connected to security increased, therefore were urgent to make diplomatic efforts in the energy sphere. The diplomatic route was therefore the best solution because, as the realist paradigm affirms, in the world of state relationships there's no space for moral considerations (Reinhardt and Pronichkin, 2018).

Also due to the difficulty in identifying precisely the actors involved, some analyses state that so far there's still no precise definition of energy diplomacy (Yu, 2015, Zao, 2019), which, implicitly, for the above reasons, contributes in ensuring "energy security". This latter has different meanings based on the endogenous and exogenous factors of the single states (Yergin, 2012). Among those who tried to define "energy diplomacy", Steven Griffiths (2019) carried out that diplomacy is an important instrument of energy transition and is very useful to sustain countries in managing the geopolitical consequences of the energy transition. In this regard, multilateral diplomacy is in place, and it gives the opportunity to align the energy transition interests of multiple stakeholders. During the Cold War, the period in which most of these researches are focused, energy diplomacy acted as a glue between states to ensure cooperation even during the various crises that emerged during those years (Bösch, 2014).

In contributing to define what energy diplomacy is, Giuli (2015) remarks that diplomatic relations in the energy field belong to niche diplomacy and are mainly based on the activities that fosters access to energy sources and markets. Therefore, doing energy diplomacy means influencing policies and adopting resolutions, through diplomatic dialogue, negotiations, and other soft power methods. The self-centered promotion of competitiveness or internal positions are counterproductive to the dialogue promoted by the diplomatic approach. However, the definition of energy diplomacy is problematic (Chaban and Knot, 2015).

In 2011, Youngs defined energy intergovernmental agreements as an effective tool showing that energy relations it is a matter for private companies rather than governments, but at the same time, international energy infrastructural projects require state intervention via intergovernmental agreements. In 2005, in an article written by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, was introduced for the first time the concept of 'socio-technical imaginary'. This latter aims to represent forms of social life and order

that describe future prospects that States believe should be achieved (Jasanoff and Kim, 2005).

But scientific imaginaries have caused uncertainty in the international community, especially in the Global South. With scientific diplomacy thus comes to the development of future projections that implicitly are influenced by past transgressions (Robinson, 2021). It is possible to state that in procedural terms, energy diplomacy concerns the practice of influence through negotiations to manage international energy relations.

Previous Studies on Afro-European Energy Diplomacy from the 1973 Oil Crisis

From some perspectives, it is possible to affirm that, even if not directly in terms of time and actors, the genesis of Afro-European Energy Diplomacy can be found in 1938 when the first oil deposits were discovered in Saudi Arabia. That event was the biggest shift in the global center of gravity of oil production as it switched from the Caribbean to the Middle East (Priest, 2012).

One of the earliest analyses of African-European relations in diplomatic terms, in which the subject of energy began to be touched upon, was made by Lorenzo Pacifici (2003) in 'La conférence parlementaire euroafricaine.' His contribution described the pathway to the preparatory diplomatic work that led to the first Euro-African parliamentary conference in 1961. The aim of that event was above all to strengthen cooperation between the two players also through the provision of technical assistance. During the Conference of 19-24 June 1961, among the various items on the agenda, the development of energy resources was a hot topic as it also highlighted the role of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and helped in highlighting a new energy source: the nuclear one. The goal of EURATOM, in that precise framework, was to assist the Associated States in terms of expertise and ability. The 1961 Euro-African parliamentary conference is of great importance in determining the future of Euro-African relations, for many reasons, but the most important is that it became an unprecedented forum for confrontation.

Giuliana Laschi (2017) asserted that since the 1970s Europe decided to approach Africa differently than before through agreements that were to include economic, financial, technological, and environmental protection policies, including oil cooperation. The 1973 oil crisis enforced the necessity to strengthen relations with Mediterranean countries mainly to allow Europe to have a reliable energy supply. Regarding Africa, according to Lapo Pistelli (2020), it is important to say that there are two ways to compare this international actor to the rest of the world: the first is extreme poverty and the other is energy poverty. Despite this, Europe's role in that situation was underlined by the European Fund for Sustainable Development Guarantee which offers loans, guarantees, and other credit enhancement offered by development banks, state institutions, and private actors. In deepening the analyses of the beginning of Afro-



European Energy Diplomacy is crucial to have an insight into this critical landscape in which it began to develop, and there are some authors that gave their essential contribution in this.

One of the cornerstones of the scientific literature on energy issues of the latest centuries is “Carbon Democracy”, written by Timothy Mitchell. In his analyses, based mainly on American and British sources, the author considers a model in which the State has a spectator role with respect to the energy model. Furthermore, Mitchell developed a thesis according to which oil contributed to the evolution of the concept of economics because growth without unemployment, thanks to oil, would last indefinitely (Mitchell, 2013). Giuliano Garavini (2011), emphasized how since the end of the second World War, the Western World saw continuous growth and, at the same time he investigated the different perspectives of the historical analyses of the 1973 oil crises. Carr (1961) affirmed that the description of that crisis is weakened by the fact that it is purely a Western perspective, hence there is a lack of a more complete overview. In defining the two decades after the 1973, Erik Hobsbawm (1994) affirmed that the world had slipped into a kind of instability and crisis, losing its orientation.

Anthony Sampson (1975) began to trace the origins of scientific literature on oil in a differentiated set of problems, and one of these was the one mostly ignored, but at the same time, one of the crucial: the issue of strengthening or weakening ties between countries. He stated that in those years oil-producing countries and the rest of the Global South strengthened their bonds. From this is possible to assume that oil producer's countries showed their cohesion and courage but at the same time the North was strongly exposed to weakness and fears in many areas.

In those years, many scholars agreed that the Cold War was about to be replaced by an era of conflicts over resources between an industrialized but resource-poor North and a scarcely industrialized but resource-rich South. In defining the relations and positions, not only in energy relations terms, among different countries on the international stage, Bösch and Graf (2014) carried out that between the two World Wars and up to the 1970s, energy experts met regularly at the World Conferences of Powers, but in the end, States always dealt with these issues separately. From this, emerged the necessity and the urgency to have a unified perspective on energy balances, nationals, and global.

The two authors continue their analyses by stating that energy crises saw growing international cooperation attempts and the persistence of energy security in national policies. Since the beginning of the 1970s, developing countries, have tried to use the United Nations forums to review the basic structures of the international economy that were to their disadvantage. Those countries were organized into the Group of 77 with the aim to acquire permanent sovereignty over their natural resources through negotiations with industrialized countries within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). From the frequent use of international forums

used by countries to declare their positions, it is implicitly possible to understand the orientation and the action of African countries from diplomatic documents of international forums, e.g., the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

In august 1974, the Economic Commission for Africa and the Association of African Central Banks met at the United Nations Economic and Social Council. That meeting was about the impact of energy crises on trade and development of African countries and the measures that African Central Banks had to take to control or mitigate the unfavorable effects of the situation.

During that meeting, the so-called “African paradox” was clearly put in evidence, whereby although the most affected countries by the oil crises were the African ones, at the same time they were, and are, those who produce five times more than they consume (ECOSOC, 1974). In the meanwhile, European governments, independently, developed new diplomatic strategies consisting of making bilateral agreements with producer countries (Graf, 2012), but in doing so, they clearly demonstrated a lack of cohesion in developing a common energy strategy.

On the African perspective, according to Rajhi, Benabdellah and Hmissi, despite the lively debate on the importance of oil shocks on African economies, there is still little empirical research that directly addresses this issue (Rajhi, Benabdellah and Hmissi, ADB). A more in-depth review of the literature reveals that the studies that have been done are more concerned with the effects of oil prices on African macroeconomic dynamics. Basically, what has been stated is that the vulnerability of oil-importing developing countries has also been exacerbated by the limited ability to switch to alternative fuels.

The G77 countries saw the oil embargo as an opportunity to establish a New International Economic Order and a paradigmatic case for the Global South raw materials activism. Other authors, in the industrialized world, have used the oil embargo to legitimize domestic policy changes:

- Environmentalists used to say that the oil crisis was a warning anticipating the peak of the fossil fuel era to convince people to use alternative energies or lead a less energy-intensive life.
- Capitalists opposed environmentalists because, in their view, the energy crisis left no room for ecological considerations.

New Developments between the Twentieth and the Twenty-first Century

As primary sources housed in the archives of the European Union in Fiesole (Florence) and those of the African Union in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) also confirm, from the very beginning of the energy diplomacy between the European Economic Community and

the Organization of Africa Unity, built their relationship on science, technology, and innovative (STI) collaboration and implicitly, energy issues were part of all these areas. (e.g., Historical Archives of European Union, ADLE-234). The above paragraphs emphasize on the building of cooperative partnerships in various security and development fields that emerged principally since the beginning of the decolonization process. At the bi-regional level Africa and Europe have developed several collaborative initiatives in the field of STI over the last two decades. In addition, between the two centuries have also changed the sources object of this new branch of scientific diplomacy.

European dependence on African oil was still strong in the 1980s despite the oil shocks of the previous years and the need for Europe to switch to a diversified energy supply. Countries as Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria were among the main oil suppliers for Europe leading to greater interaction and cooperation in the energy sector between the two regions. (African Petroleum Producers' Organization, 2022).

When considering the new developments in African-European energy diplomacy between the last two centuries, is crucial to mention that since the 1980s, new developments have arisen in terms of energy sources covered by bilateral diplomacy, but also in the field of scientific and technological cooperation at the bi-regional level.

Looking at the energy sources subject to cooperation, it is possible to assume that, over the time, exogenous factors have contributed to changing their meaning. While in the 20th century the main sources subject to this form of scientific diplomacy were mainly, coal, oil, gas and nuclear, at the end of the century, solar, wind, geothermal and hydroelectric energies also began to emerge. In the African perspective is fundamental stating that between the 1990 and 2004, although more consideration had begun to be given to renewable energy sources, the oil production in Africa increased by 40%: from 7 million to 10 million barrels per day (m b/d) (AAVV, 2004).

A crucial aspect to be considered in reconstructing the framework in which Europe and Africa have built their bi-regional energy diplomacy over the years, is that in recent times there has also been an important role played by international institutions and multilateral diplomacy mechanisms. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, entities like the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank have assumed significant roles in facilitating discussions and fostering collaboration and cooperation between Europe and Africa in the realm of energy and, more in general in the STI.

Programs offering technical and financial assistance have been actively promoted to bolster the development of energy infrastructure in Africa and enhance governance within the energy sector. Before starting to analyze energy diplomacy between the last and the current century, one of the recent documents about this, is the conclusions of the European Council on climate and energy diplomacy approved by the Council in 2023. This document states that climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollution are a real global threat that, by affecting the most vulnerable populations, increases poverty

and inequality undermining the global stability. At the 44 point of the document is highlighted the cooperation and collaboration with countries of northern Africa and the role of the Conferences of the Parties (General Secretariat of the Council, 2023).

Regarding the Conference of the Parties, this diplomatic forum played a distinctive role in contributing to the development of a Euro-African energy diplomacy. The first Conference of the Parties (COP) was held in 1995 in Berlin, and it is relevant in the framework of the summit diplomacy because stems from the official recognition of climate change problem. That COP highlighted a major awareness of climate change and all the problems arising from it, thus implicitly related to energy issues. In that occasion Africa was represented by Zimbabwe, while Europe by Germany which also held the presidency that year (UNFCCC, 1995). It is obvious that on a bi-regional level, that COP proved to be an important arena of dialogue for both Africa and Europe to discuss these issues, not only among them (bilaterally and multilaterally) but also with different international actors; COPs also represent a new tool of summit diplomacy with a specific focus on global climate issue.

Since the 2000s and the Cotonou Agreements, bi-regional Euro-African energy diplomacy has increasingly focused on cooperation and the development of joint energy projects. Cooperation agreements were favored to foster the development of African energy resources and their export to Europe. Investment projects in the energy infrastructure industry sector (oil and gas pipelines) were also initiated to increase the transport of energy between the two continents (European Union-ACP, 2000). These years saw a growth of focus on climate change and sustainability in the context of Afro-European energy diplomacy. Europe has begun to promote more sustainable energy policies, aiming to reduce energy dependence on fossil fuels and encouraging the use of renewable energy sources.

This change has influenced and contributed to the objectives of energy cooperation with Africa, leading to a major attention on clean energy sources and support for the development of renewable energy projects on the African continent. With the Lisbon Treaty (European Union, 2007), a new path for cooperation and collaboration between Africa and Europe began. In that occasion was launched the Joint Africa-EU strategy (JAES). Its aim was to enhance and enforce their continent-wide connection focused on development in a new mutual partnership based on shared responsibilities and common interests the main issues raised, energy has been crucial (Haastrup et al., 2020). In this regard was created the Africa European Energy Partnership (AEEP) which is the political platform used by the two actors, at continental level, to collaborate and cooperate in energy field. The aim of this partnership is to allow and facilitate universal energy access, the support to modern energy services everywhere in Africa; all this would allow a fair development for Africa and for its inhabitants. The focus of the AEEP is mainly on renewable sources and the universal energy access. The main energy sources mentioned or promoted in it include:

- Wind energy.
- Geothermal energy: in several regions of Africa, this energy source, which recycles heat from the subsoil, can be a potential source of energy.
- Hydroelectric energy: since Africa has numerous water resources that can be exploited for hydropower generation, thus contributing to energy diversification.
- Solar energy: given the abundance of solar sources in many regions of Africa, solar energy is a key source that can be used to generate electricity with photovoltaic panels.
- Biomasses: it includes agricultural residues, firewood and organic materials can be exploited to produce thermal and electrical energy.

To sum up, this partnership framework allows to foster energy supply sources diversification of energy supply sources and to encourage sustainable policies and actions with a low environmental impact (Mangala, 2012). The aim is to improve energy efficiency, contribute to universal energy access and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adopting cleaner and more sustainable technologies.

Conclusion

During the time range explored by this study, energy sources that were traded between Africa and Europe at bi-regional and multilateral level have undergone several changes. A general landscape of this shows that oil has been one of the main sources traded between these two actors for long time.

The 1970s crisis shattered into many different changes and the EEC policy towards the Southern shore was an expression of a general phase of a crisis, mutation, and transition. The oil issue is directly related to energy security. Moreover, for this reason, the relationship between energy diplomacy, foreign policy, and national security still appears complex. Energy came into the sphere of diplomacy and foreign policy because of the increased impact on national and economic security. This kind of niche diplomacy has two main perspectives: economic and security policy. Hence, sources as natural gas started to become some of the main pillars of Afro-European relations in the 1990s, and Algeria and Nigeria became important exporters of natural gas in Europe. As for coal, in the 1980s and 1990s it was still an important energy source in trade between Africa and Europe. About hydropower, African countries such as DRC and Ethiopia developed important energy projects and they signed agreements with Europe aimed to export it to the cited Continent. Energy sources traded between Africa and Europe may vary depending on the periods examined and on the phases of the global energy market. Furthermore, technological changes, shifting geopolitical balances,

energy policies and economic factors can influence the mix of energy sources traded between the regions over time.

The aforementioned demonstrates that foreign policies do not only establish trade relations, but it affects political goals and strategies. In the light of this understanding, energy diplomacy becomes one of the mechanisms to achieve these goals. The available scientific literature on the topic showed that too often the meaning of the word ‘crisis’ is taken for granted. Therefore, a generic weakness could be highlighted in terms of broadness of the subject. As the analysis of the mentioned above authors points out, crises not only lead enmity between the parties involved (in the event their interests diverge during crises) but they also potentially lead to the strengthening of ties between the actors.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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The Relationship of Environmental Migration and Human Trafficking Concerning Natural Hazards at the Affected Regions of Africa¹

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Abstract:

It is beyond dispute that the effects of climate change can be experienced more frequently at all parts of the of the ecosystem. The current change of our environment including soil erosion and the decrease of water supply contributes significantly to unpredictable natural disasters, that results increased number of children victims by human traffickers at the devastated areas, which mostly affected some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. As the overwhelming natural hazards destroy the education system and other social services, human traffickers may take their victims for mainly sexual exploitation. Determination the trauma of the minor trafficked persons that has developed as a result of the exploitation and introducing Sendai Framework as a treatment suggestions. Furthermore as a theoretical background, introducing the significances of some natural hazards and human trafficking. Mixed method, quantitative content analysis and comparative document analysis as a desk review by the used documents were applied. The study proved that its hypotheses that there is a strong and undisputed relationship between human trafficking and environmental migration at some regions of Africa intended to natural hazards. The Sendai Framework, ratified in 2015 can produce solution to this global challenge that affects millions of children. The highlights of the framework clearly summarizes the opportunities to reduce vulnerability and risk concerning the orphaned by natural disasters and who can easily become exploited persons by human traffickers.

Keywords:

Climate change, human trafficking, natural hazards, resilience, exploitation, soil erosion, water supply.

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1. Introduction

Based on research on environmental migration, it can be stated that by the 2050s, the number of the world's population will increase significantly (IEP), by which years the population may reach ten million. Due to this fact, competition for different types of energy sources will increase significantly, and due to this, the number of cultural tensions and conflicts will increase significantly. Furthermore, the mentioned study emphasizes that during environmental migration that increases as a result of climate change, up to 1.2. billion people are forced to leave their country, the majority of which will presumably come from the Middle East and Africa, as these regions are the most affected by climate change. According to the results of recent research, roughly 30 million people have been displaced in 2019 due to circumstances arising from climate change disasters.

These conditions will intensify significantly in the future, leading to mass environmental migration, which refugees can easily become victims of human trafficking. The emerging phenomenon will pose a great challenge and burden in social and geopolitical terms. It is important to highlight that not only developing countries are exposed to these risks and challenges, as climate change significantly affects water resources globally, so even developed countries may face a large shortage by the 2050s (IEP, 2020).

As the climate warms, droughts and floods will become more frequent and crops will be destroyed more and more often. Furthermore, the moisture in the air and soil decreases, leaving less water for the plants. As a result, tens of millions of acres of arable land at some parts of Africa are becoming useless. The term of the growing season will change as it is going to be shorter due to the warming of 4 degrees Celsius in most parts of Africa, or even more. As a result, tens of millions of acres of arable land at the affected areas that becoming significantly drier. The pests that destroy the crop have already infected a larger area because they are facing more favorable conditions. The growing season will be shorter, with a warming of 4 degrees Celsius in most parts of Africa, or even more (Chapman et al., 2020).

For those who can already live, any such change will be a disaster. In the absence of a set-aside reserve, the crop is destroyed and the farmers concerned are unable to take more seed. And this factor implies the clear consequence that food prices will skyrocket for hundreds of millions due to climate change and soil erosion. The increasing frequency of natural disasters in the coming years will definitely generate an increase in environmental migration, as there will be less and less access to arable land and food. Even more and more actors of environmental migration can become victims of human traffickers, of whom women and children are primarily sexually exploited (Wiederkehr et al., 2018). The aim of the study is to fill this research gap by addressing the following objectives:

1. Determination of the relationship between human trafficking and environmental migration on the basis of the Sendai Framework and interviews concerning trafficked persons who became preys because of the environmental migration;

2. Proving the trauma of the minor environmental migrants that has developed as a result of the exploitation committed by the human traffickers and suggesting the possible treatments. The objectives of the study are demonstrated by reviewing the theoretical background of human trafficking in the next chapter of the research. After this section we describe the data and the results of the analysis, adding the appropriate details, figures of the outcome of the study. The research ends with a discussion and conclusion of the results and suggestions of Sendai Framework as a resilience based management tool of human trafficking at devastated areas.

1.1. Research Methods and Data Analysis

In the course of the research I applied mixed method, quantitative content analysis (MAXQDA, SPSS) and comparative document analysis as a desk review by the used documents because the complexity of the subject and its content of heterogeneous feature did not enable the use of the method of one kind. As an additional tool, snowball method was used in order to refer the members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government organisations managing the humanitarian response at the affected areas. As the main tool of the 16 individual interviews were made in Budapest in 2016, the length of the process was about 30-40 minutes.

In the course of the content analysis, the analysis codes were made on the basis of interviews in a two-stage coding system. Besides building-up the structure of the category system I used a combined logical method, I produced the main categories in a deductive aspect and I developed the sub-categories based on an inductive method. On the basis of the deductive method fitting the content to the system of the main category I used the parts of text as research units which refer to the following subject matters: human trafficking, sexual exploitation, human rights.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. The Relationship between Soil Loss and Climate Change

The soil loss on Earth today can be 16 times or even 300 times the capacity of the soil to regenerate. The process of soil formation is extremely slow on a human scale, it is thickening by an average of 2.5 cm in 200-1000 years under normal agricultural use. There are many possible climatic and anthropogenic causes of soil degradation. Together, they could lead to a permanent, irreversible deterioration of the soil, leading

to a global agricultural crisis. It can be particularly dangerous if events occur during soil erosion that can contribute to short but high-intensity disasters (UN, 2015). Large-scale logging in mountainous areas does not lead to large-scale changes in runoff conditions due to the lack of proper afforestation. Without the vegetation that retains melt and rainwater, the surface watercourses in the mountains are otherwise incapable of draining the rushing water mass and destroying the floods leaving the riverbed. The increase in the water content of the soil facilitates the movement of the soil layers and mudslides and landslides can start. In the case of loose soils, these processes may intensify even more (Salt and Cerdá, 2020).

During deforestation, which significantly affects soil erosion, the stored carbon is released into the circle in the form of carbon dioxide. The primary reason for deforestation is the more profitable production and export of food, the most common means of which is the establishment of pastures. Food is a global commodity that is consumed by one country and it can cause a change in the land use of another. An important factor is that the world is eating more and more meat, which is accelerating deforestation. In some parts of the world, however, deforestation is not caused by the huge amount of meat consumed. In Africa, for example, the goal is to clean up the farmland to provide food and fuel to meet the continent's growing population. Nigeria, which boasts one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, has lost more than 60 percent of its forest area since 1990, and is one of the world's largest exporters of charcoal obtained by burning wood (UN, 2015).

Soil erosion in Africa threatens food and fuel supplies and may contribute to climate change. At present, the quality of Africa's soil has deteriorated so much that 40% of it is uncultivable. Degraded soils reduce food production and lead to soil erosion, which in turn contributes to desertification. This is particularly worrying as, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the livelihood of some 83% of sub-Saharan African people depend on land, and African food production needs to grow by almost 100% by 2050 to keep pace with the needs of the population. In this sense, the concept of soil erosion has become an extremely important social, economic and environmental challenge for many African countries. 1.2 billion hectares of the world are threatened by soil erosion to varying degrees. Soil destruction and degradation is caused by the erosion effects of water and wind, which are caused by agriculture, overgrazing, deforestation and firewood collection. The causes of erosion are roughly evenly distributed between overgrazing by farmed animals, agriculture, and forestry. In some places, soil erosion results from excessive fuel collection.

To a small extent (1%), industrial activity is responsible, for example, because of landfilling or excessive use of insecticides. As a part of sub-Saharan, Somalia will become a desert over the next 50 years. This problem threatens more than a third of Africa's land. Desertification is due not only to natural, dry, drought years but also to poor landscape management resulting from the overgrazing and excessive use of firewood

mentioned above. Only 11 percent of the world's soils can be cultivated without requiring any human intervention (UN, 2015).

In the next 50 years, more and more areas will have to be cultivated, which will mainly use areas with less productive soils, which are still too expensive to produce. Special efforts are needed to maintain productivity in these areas. One of the agricultural factors of soil degradation is the upset of the normal water balance of a given soil, which can also be triggered by improper irrigation. Unnecessary water replenishment saturates the soil with water, flushing out nutrients, soil air and indirectly leading to toxic accumulation of salinity and soil salinization processes. 10-15 percent of irrigated land suffers from supersaturation and secondary salinization, which in turn affects crop yields, world agricultural productivity. In order to prevent the occurrence of similar unforeseen events, it is expedient to install a monitoring and alarm system for the continuous monitoring of land movements in the endangered areas, which gives an alarm in the event of extreme ground acceleration, allowing the affected roads and railways to be closed in time (Borrelli et al., 2017).

3.The Importance of Water on the Environment

Water is a prerequisite for life on earth, a maintainer of health, which is an indispensable substance in agriculture and industry, and therefore a commodity whose value is thus a determining economic driver. At the same time, it is a risk factor for the safety of life and property. Clean water is one of the most crucial resources in all regions of Somalia, especially for vulnerable part of the population, where less than 30 percent of people have regular access to clean water. The urban water infrastructure in particular has suffered a lot of damage, making most of the water supply systems in urgent need of rehabilitation. As a result, water resources are insufficient in both quantity and quality. This is due to the high price of water as a result of water scarcity in addition to the dry climate. In the current situation, water is unfortunately the most expensive for those who can't afford it at all. The vast majority of the Somali population accesses water from deep or near-surface wells.

The water in these wells is often polluted by nearby digestion pits, and the effects of the climate change that are already present and perceptible will further degrade water quality in the near future that is a main part of the security challenges of the area (Kiss-Álmos, Besenyő, Resperger, 2014, p.158). The largest natural disaster in the world is caused by floods and droughts. According to a current study in 2021 examining the links between climate change and migration, drought is a moderate cause of environmental migration, as opposed to intense floods, which significantly affect the rate of migration (Cottier- Salehyan, 2021). Beyond all this, water is a limited, vulnerable resource that we have inherited from our predecessors, so we need to make sure it is used sustainably.

Based on these, there is no doubt that water is of strategic importance in the life of mankind.

The science that deals with the relationship between Earth and water in a broader sense is hydrology, which deals with the global transport of water masses within and between spheres. Hydrogeology studies the relationship between the Earth and water below the surface in the lithosphere. The processes and phenomena that result from the interaction of groundwater and the rock body are included in its scope of study (Ichoku et al., 2016). By groundwater we mean all the water below the surface of the earth to the depth that free water can occur. The total water on Earth is 1,400 million km³, of which about 97.2% is saline seawater. Freshwater, with a dissolved solids content of less than 1000 mg / l, accounts for 35 million km³ and is only 2.8% of the total water mass. What is perhaps surprising is that 98% of all mobilizable freshwater on land is below ground (Figure 1). However, this cannot be used indefinitely, only to the extent of replenishment. Surface water is 0.009% on land, soil moisture is 0.005%, and atmospheric water is 0.001% (Figure 2).




Figure 1. The total water on the Earth. (Source: Own construction based on Fetter, 1994).




Figure 2. Further parts of the water (Source: Own construction based on Fetter, 1994).

The extreme inequality of the spatial and temporal distribution of water resources is a problem in the distribution of water resources. 99% of the 4,000 km³ of annual global water use is estimated to come from renewable sources. We use less than 1%, or 30 km³, from nonrenewable sources, mainly aquifers in Algeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. In these regions, however, it is the main source of water (UNESCO, 2009). Globally 18% of total water use comes from groundwater, renewable and nonrenewable sources. This share is growing rapidly, especially in water-poor areas. Groundwater use increased fivefold in the 20th century. This has led to declining water levels in several places and has called into question sustainability where groundwater has been relied upon. This uncertainty makes it difficult to develop long-term water management plans, increasing the frequency of weather extremes and related natural disasters, floods and droughts. There is no doubt that the number of documented natural disasters is also increasing due to the availability of information. What can certainly be read from the data, however, is that the number of floods and cyclones is increasing relative to earthquakes (Hughes et al., 2011, pp. 97-117).

Urbanization is primarily a problem in developing countries. The urban population could reach 60% of the total population by 2030. The fast-growing megacities with tens of millions of inhabitants are proliferating without planning, and their infrastructure is opaque and unable to keep pace with demand. Due to the nutrient enrichment caused by the high organic matter load of the waters, the oxygen household may be overturned, as a result of which eutrophication may occur. Through human activity, inorganic and organic persistent micropollutants can enter the water, which can be toxic and carcinogenic even at µg / l.

Pathogenic bacteria and parasites that enter the living organism with water can cause serious epidemics. As urbanization increases, so does the need for irrigation to

supply the urban masses. Currently, 70% of water demand is attributable to agriculture, industry to 20%, and household consumption to around 10%. We often hear that water will be the determining factor in the development of the 21st century. Overall, there is an emerging global water crisis that is difficult to recognize and is associated with other crises such as the food crisis, the energy crisis, and the general economic crisis (Figure 3).




Figure 3. The parts of water demand. (Source: Own construction based on UNESCO, 2009).

The retreat of groundwater levels to deeper layers can have serious consequences for the protection of the population, where the supply of drinking water to the population can only rely on this source to meet demand. In exceptional water scarcity situations, therefore, the supply of drinking water, which is essential for subsistence, must be provided with temporary solutions provided by the reserve's water purification capacity and other resources. However, the prolonged outage of the service is also expected to increase demand (Nagy, 2017, p. 161).

4. Definition of human trafficking

One of the biggest challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has been hit hardest by climate change, is the decline in the amount of arable land that has changed as a result of climate change and unexpected natural disasters. These processes are exacerbating both internal and external trafficking in human beings, i.e. the unfavorable situation is exacerbating environmental migration and the exploitation of orphaned children. According to available data, 3.7 million people live as slaves in sub-Saharan Africa, with a net income of \$ 13.1 trillion for traffickers in the region. In countless cases, the victim knows the trafficker, who comes from relatives, distant family members. It is interesting to note that the traffickers in this area are mostly women, a factor which refutes the public belief that the majority of traffickers using the tool of exploitation are men (UNODC, 2014).

It is acknowledged that South Africa - that is currently struggling with the consequences of climate change- is a source, transit as well as destination for human trafficking in Africa. Human traffickers also use South Africa as a transit route to other countries, especially in Europe. Based on data from 2003- 2007 gained by UNICEF and UNODC the biggest challenge is the domestic trafficking of children, where young girls were trafficked for sexual exploitation purpose not only from poor rural areas to wealthy urban areas, but also between major cities. Findings carried out by HSRC emphasize the seriousness of domestic trafficking in South Africa. This research summarized the rural domestic human trafficking flows and destinations, which are the following: Pretoria and Johannesburg, Rustenburg and Bloemfontein. Other major trafficking routes and destinations include Durban and harbour, Cape Town and harbour, Port Elizabeth and surroundings, Musina and Barberton (Ironya, 2018).

In the absence of this important factor, a proper definition of the concept of trafficking in human beings complicates the process of identification and prevention. Despite the fact that most countries in the sub-Saharan region adopted and applied the definition declared by the UN in 2000, a number of definitions that contradict the provisions of the Convention are still used. The elimination of the problem is greatly complicated by the fact that the countries of the region have a different concept of exploitation, the most common tool used by traffickers. Among the sub-Saharan countries, Angola and the Congo recognize and accept the form of sexual exploitation of trafficking in human beings, while other countries include forced marriage and forced participation in military struggles (IOM, 2008).

Studies in the West African region show that the majority of underage victims who (63%) come from Burkina Faso and Nigeria (10%), some people of African descent work as prostitutes choose to make a living from prostitution, while the majority are victims of global human trafficking (Hounmenou, 2016, pp. 26-35). Thus, it can be clearly stated that the definition of trafficking in human beings is also determined by the social, political and cultural specificity of the country, which makes it extremely difficult to find answers to the end of human trafficking. Another factor complicating both prevention and rehabilitation is that traffickers are part of criminal gangs using the most sophisticated tools, in this sense, tackling the problem requires complex solutions, to which local organizations can make a significant contribution (ILO, 2014).

It is essential to clarify the definitions of human trafficking and human smuggling, whereas in most cases, due to misidentification, victims of human trafficking are defined by the authorities as prostitutes who voluntarily choose this way of life. Human traffickers forcibly remove their victims from their homeland or they are sold by their own parents but there are many cases too in which they flee from poverty in search of reliable work, much of which unfortunately proves to have been only a false promise. Of course, in this case, we are no longer talking about human smuggling, but human trafficking.



In contrast, the main point of human smuggling is that people who want to emigrate pay the human smugglers for the transportation to the desired destination country (Piotrowicz et al., 2018). Most of the victims originated from vulnerable populations and the traffickers often promise false promises of safety, a better life in order to control these vulnerabilities. In view of the control by traffickers, later survivors need extensive supplies, such as safety, housing, medical care, legal assistance, job training, employment, education and counseling (Dalla et al., 2021).

Emigrants become indebted from one to one for the rest of their lives to pay for the cost of the trip, in the hope of a new, free life while remaining slaves for the rest of their lives. This part of migrants works as a slave for their smugglers and in case of the women the most common form of exploitation is prostitution. Many young girls are being seduced by false promises from their country, encouraging them to be able to support their families in this way, but in reality, this work means only and exclusively prostituted work (Aronowitz, 2001, pp. 163–195). Unfortunately, despite experience in practice, research and studies in sub-Saharan African countries do not cover the exploitation of underage boys. Most of the researches refer to underage boys as exploitative traffickers and not as victims, which makes it significantly more difficult to combat trafficking. Experiences have shown that, with a higher rate of exploitation of underage girls, a significant number of victims come from underage boys who have been severely abused in the past. What is common in the life history of these traumatized minors is that most of them are children of divorced parents or minors raised with foster parents (Adjei and Saewyc, 2017, pp.14-23).

The methods of human traffickers are various. Due to the complexity of the concept of human trafficking and the different perceptions of the countries, it is difficult to define the concept of human trafficking precisely. Pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 55/25 of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, concluded in Palermo on 12 December 2000, the following definitions apply to human trafficking: victim collection-recruitment, transportation, hiding, coercion, restraint, seduction, physical abuse (UNODC, 2000, p. 42.).

Human trafficking can be interpreted as a crime whose victims for prostitution are mostly women and children. However, the scope of subsequent conventions already extends to both sexes - therefore, both women and men can be victims of human trafficking -, however, political statements and research emphasize that most victims are women and girls of human trafficking for material sexual exploitation (UNODC, 2020). Commercial sexual exploitation can be defined as extended of tools including sexual abuse or exploitation for the financial profit of any person. According to this, sexual exploitation means mainly sex trafficking, which is defined as recruitment and transportation (Fedina et al., 2019).

Since the countries have different criminal laws and cultural traditions, many cases are not recognized as human trafficking, but instead, the exploited victims are

produced and convicted as criminals. Due to the globalization of the world and the differences between fast-developing and slow-developing countries, different industrial environments and labor requirements are emerging.

This creates a higher standard of living and produces increased labor demand in some places, in contrast, it means a significant free supply of labor in poor regions, which flows in organized or unorganized, legal or illegal ways into key and attractive labor markets, which is intensified by natural disasters due to climate change (Póczik and Dunavölgyi, 2008). In this sense, we can state emphatically that the problem of human trafficking is a synthesis of many problems.

One such problem is environmental migration, which is part of the concept of illegal migration and which arises in the event of a hopeless situation resulting from natural disasters. In other words, many people leaving the disaster-stricken area become victims of human trafficking, as they find themselves in a vulnerable position where they can no longer shape their own destiny, their lives depend on the decisions of the traffickers.

The diseases caused by the current COVID-19 pandemic could further exacerbate this migratory pressure from the region and, through it, the involvement of organized crime, exploiting the vulnerability of those wishing to leave their homeland. The successful cessation of this and the elimination of the processes of the expansion of criminal organizations presuppose, first of all, the cooperation of the neighboring countries and the countries affected by the migration routes, as well as the international organizations. A country affected by these diseases will have to bear the extra burden of curbing the further transmission of infections. And developed countries, including the European Union, as well as international organizations, must support this with financial resources (Nagy, 2021).

It is estimated that more than one million children are placed on the sex market worldwide each year, mainly from developing countries, mostly from areas from which they are fleeing for environmental migration reasons such as unexpected natural disasters triggered by the climate crisis. The same proportion of human traffickers exploit children as factory and farm workers. According to accurate data, 170 million minors perform forced labor by human traffickers in unworthy conditions (Holt, 2018). There are several other ways of exploiting minors, such as being held in a brothel, on the streets, looking for coffins, providing out-of-home services, or there are victims who, in parallel with other forms of exploitation, are only occasionally used for sexual exploitation. Thus, due to the diverse nature of human trafficking, it is a significant economic factor in the African region (Bamgbose, 2002).

We must mention the participation of children in armed struggles and their active role in drug trafficking, which is also operated and controlled by human trafficking networks (Tiefenbrun, 2007). In addition, it is extremely common to train children from



areas affected by environmental migration to be pickpockets in western, more developed countries such as the United Kingdom. It is also not uncommon for children to be considered domestic servants later (Jones, 2012, pp. 77-94). It is difficult to find a uniform definition of the exploitation of vulnerable children, which has a place in all cultures and social conditions and is of equal importance, as the practices of child labor vary from culture to culture. A good example of this is the fate of children in the third world who, despite their minority, regularly do heavy, strenuous physical work. Nevertheless, this does not cause outrage in local communities and authorities, as it has long been a common practice for children to participate in work (Bhalotra & Tzannatos, 2003). Forced child labor can be defined as a process that results in a significant deterioration in a child's ability at school and to concentrate, which work is done in the child's spare time or is degrading to the child (ILO, 2012). From these clear signs it is easy to deduce the forced labor done with children.

According to the ILO, child prostitution and pornography are among the worst forms of forced labor required by traffickers, which, due to its complex nature, is the most horrific form of human trafficking (ILO, 2009). That is, children are repeatedly injured both physically and mentally, as in many cases, in addition to working around the house or in agriculture, they are also required to provide sexual services (Fehér et al., 2004, p. 91). In defining the concepts of human trafficking in minors, it is essential to define the types of sexual exploitation, which are: sex tourism, forced marriage, prostitution, sexual exploitation of children through intermediary's pornography, production, distribution of pornographic video, film, photo or sound recordings of children (UN, 2017, pp. 4-7).

The commercial exploitation of children knows no borders, especially in areas where there is a particular demand for this terrible business and where this is ensured by the economic, social and legal situation, of which areas affected by natural disasters are extremely good examples. It is an unfortunate fact that we do not always know for sure the exact age and number of children exploited, which makes it fundamentally difficult to define the problem. Due to natural disasters, human traffickers in these areas do not always export children to more developed countries, but many clients also travel to these less developed regions (Southeast Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean) to take advantage of child traffickers. The younger a child is, the more easily he or she is mentally impaired, as he or she does not yet have adequate mental protective and intellectual functions. In this sense, the younger a child underwent sexual exploitation, the more difficult it is to heal his or her mental wounds. Or, it can be said that the rehabilitation of a child with a more stable mental state is a much easier process (UNODC, 2020). Clearly, the fact that the child has had to endure exploitation also matters a lot in terms of prevention. It is also an interesting fact that girls experience greater trauma as a result of sexual exploitation than boys. The relationship between the perpetrator and the child is also an important factor (Kovács, 1997).

Regarding the “success” of offenders, it is important to note organized businesses, which, with their well-coordinated operation, can handle their “turnover” smoothly. Organized networks acquire marketable children in two ways. One such method is the false promise given to families that they will offer the child homework that can be done in appropriate conditions. Of course, in many cases, parents are aware of sexual exploitation and pass it on to their child. And in the case of children orphaned by natural disasters and war events, the most common means is the already mentioned tempting promise and abduction without consent (Vermeulen, 2005). It is a frequent phenomenon that some of traffickers considers themselves as caretakers of their victims, as Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick mentioned in his book “If I don’t look after their needs, what will become of them? They have no alternatives. I care for them. They need me.” (Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017). Therefore at the regions of Africa there is still a question whether traffickers are helpers as the national governments and local police refuse the fact that in fact this old practice is trafficking.

Thus, children remained invisible for the authorities who were legally transported by traffickers through the borders all over Africa and abroad. According to this practice children are sent away by their parents from home at a very young age to learn a trade where they are disciplined. Most of the parts of Africa it is commonly believed that punishment is the essential feature of parenting that can motivate children to work or learn better. Due to this practice, after a natural disaster the abandoned children can easily trust and commit themselves to traffickers (Kielland, 2013).

Another essential source of trafficking is having patriarchal cultures for instance in Nigeria, acquiring a father’s property or lands is impossible for girls, due to this fact they are disregarded concerning any employment. Therefore, leaving home by the help of traffickers is common for these vulnerable girls, the potential for this fact is multiplied after a natural disaster or the outcomes of climate change as an environmental migrant, as being the only solution for the residents at the devastated areas (Mbakogu and Hanley, 2019, pp. 953-968).

It is a well-known fact that terrorist organizations cover most of the financial resources they need for their activities through human trafficking. One of the best examples of this is the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra in sub-Saharan Africa, whose main source of income is the exploitation of mostly minors. A significant factor is that the human trafficking activities of these organizations further exacerbate the chaos that arises during a conflict or unexpected disaster (Bowersox, 2018, pp. 267-280).

As trafficking of human beings is linked to terrorist groups in the African region, it is essential to mention that the chaos caused by natural disasters contributes significantly to the activities of these organizations, that is, using a number of their proven tools, they are intensively present in the countries concerned, thus generating significant security risks. The data registered between 2001 and 2015 also prove this,

which clearly shows that the main target in this area is the civilian population, who is clearly becoming a larger target in a chaos situation caused by a natural disaster. The current activities of terrorist groups are characterized by the fact that they create chaos within society, and this is exacerbated in a situation where the population is full of fear and insecurity in a situation of chaos as a result of natural disasters.

It is further typical that they work from an ever wider and more diverse range of tools, i.e. they use a number of tools as weapons, which will make terrorist attacks smaller but more frequent in the future (Besenyő, 2017, pp. 83-100). The solution for the problem would be a degree of prevention in which countries adopt a uniform criterion that they would treat the perpetrators to the same extent in all countries. A good example of this is convention of the European Commission of 2011 with the title "Report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings", which lays down the same criteria for each Member State for the tracing and conviction of the perpetrator and the rehabilitation of the victim, which was completed in 2016 with further additions (COM (2016) 267 final, 2016).

5. Results

Proving and demonstration of the hypothesis and objectives of the publication developed by the content of interviews that made with the leaders, members, and art therapists of the relevant international and domestic humanitarian aid organizations, which due to space limitations I will report in detail but quoted verbatim.

Do you agree that with regard to children who have fled disaster areas, they are the most vulnerable and voiceless group of refugees in terms of human trafficking, as they are defenseless and invisible?

„I strongly agree, as a member of a humanitarian aid organization and as a private person, I share this position.”

Programs organized by aid organizations, counselling, etc. can promote pre-integration among these vulnerable groups?

„In the case of transit countries, the arriving refugees do not spend a lot of time there, and thus it is impossible to start a long-term integration program, since the onward journey of those fleeing disasters after obtaining the status takes even weeks. However, in this short period of time, it is possible to start introducing specific social values and customs through the programs, which clearly facilitates the later, final integration, which is why I consider it extremely important to organize social activities among refugees.

The answers highlight that the role of trauma processing sessions is extremely significant, as it clearly helps the integration process. The absence of this, the traumatized personality clearly carries a security risk. Therapeutic sessions definitely reduce the trauma experienced by both parents and children.”

Can the trauma that occurs during the sexual exploitation of human traffickers be seen in the act?

„Clearly, since a large number of them come here from areas hit by disasters by people smugglers and human traffickers. Thus, this situation causes great trauma, and the tools used by human traffickers and the situation they create are characterized by a feeling of insecurity and confinement, when the person in question does not know anything in advance.”

Can the trauma and sexual exploitation be discovered in the children’s drawings? What do you think about the role of resilience-based methods such as art therapy in trauma treatment and processing?

„All kinds of art activities have a therapeutic character thanks to the means of immersion and expression. Primarily, it fulfils a function of pastime, since doing nothing during a stay of several months is the worst thing to bear, which is greatly facilitated by the art occupation. Of course, the drawings can also be made for therapeutic purposes, as I often find that children describe the traumas they have experienced, e.g. the experienced disaster is put on paper, or the person figurative desires also appear, e.g. a ship labelled.

Based on the result of the analysis, one can state that some members of the NGOs have emphasized in their answers the topics of human trafficking, sexual exploitation concerning environmental migration while most of the members have referred to the human rights in their answers several times. It means that the human traffickers make a really intense advantage of environmental migration, as a result of which many environmental migrant under age and young women fall victim of the human traffickers through sexual exploitation (Figure 4).




Figure 4. The absolute frequency of references concerning the topics of the study. (Source: Own construction based on the interviews).

As a further result of the analysis, the absolute frequency of the words used in the interviews regarding sexual exploitation committed by human traffickers that is mostly relevant from the point of view of the research – the number of minimum frequency is 20 (Figure 5).

migrants	127	women	30
human	83	welcome	25
refugees	83	solidarity	24
migration	61	child	23
church	56	integration	23
social	42	migrant	23
countries	36	forced	22
country	32	help	20
children	31	violence	20
rights	30		

Figure 5. The absolute frequency of the words. (Source: Own construction based on the interviews).

Overall, the clear answers given to the central question of the research, the question concerning human trafficking, definitely confirm the connection between human trafficking and environmental migration. These answers of the interviews confirm the undeniable fact that nowadays the concepts and tools used in practice of environmental migration and human trafficking are closely related, the boundaries of the two processes are blurred. As a result, most of the environmental migrants- mainly women and children- become victims of human traffickers during the journey, which leads to significant trauma.

6. Discussion

6.1. Applying of the Sendai Framework as a Management of Environmental Migration and Human Trafficking

Developing resilience based method on the Sendai Framework can be one of the most effective tools for reducing environmental migration and the intensity of human trafficking as a result of natural disasters. From the numerous definitions of resilience, after one most well-known interpretations, that of Holling's (2001), resilience refers to the adaptability of a system, which can be seen as the "opposite of the vulnerability of a system." Based on this theory, we distinguish four stages of adaptation, such as exploitation, protection, dissolution, and reorganization, which denote continuous, alternating, shorter, and longer stages (Holling, 2001, pp. 390–405). Further essential features of resilience based methods on the Sendai Framework could be the "resilience of what, to what, and for whom?" process that highlights the deficiency of resilience policies (Meerow, 2016, pp. 309-329).

Sendai "Framework Convention on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030," approved by the UN General Assembly in 2015, summarizes one of the most important global tasks concerning the disaster prevention and mitigation. This convention set countless important goals for the next 15 years. The main goals of the framework is reducing of mortality, economic damage, and the impact of critical infrastructure caused by disasters. A further aim is for the most vulnerable states to develop the best possible disaster prevention strategies, increase international cooperation with countries with similar risks and, ultimately, develop early warning systems and ensure widespread access to them. In addition to the above, the Sendai Framework Convention sets out priorities for participating states.

It is extremely important that each state understands its exposure to risks, the degree of its vulnerability, and the threats to its population and assets. Strengthening public bodies which are responsible for disaster risk prevention and management, as well as increasing resilience to disaster risk exposure, disaster preparedness and response, should be a priority. Putting of experience to the framework is extremely adaptable in

addressing the challenge of human trafficking, a phenomenon which is particularly prevalent in areas affected by natural disasters. The impact of climate change is clearly felt on both global and regional levels.

The features and risks of forest fires poses continuous challenges for the regional and international disaster management. Due to the global climate change the number of forest fires have increased in the whole of Europe. The major factor of it that the dry seasons are an increasingly common part of our lives, therefore the biomass can catch fire easily (Bérczi and Bodnár, 2018, pp. 102-110).

One of the main problems is the shortcomings of the “early warning system”, one reason for which is that the climate is an extremely complex phenomenon that is difficult to interpret, such as the uncertainty of the relationship between clouds and warming or the impact of excess heat on the ecosystem. In addition to uncertainties, however, we have enough knowledge and data to establish that there is only one mean of halting climate change, namely carbon neutrality. The Earth is constantly warming because of harmful human activities, with serious consequences, including unexpected and unpredictable natural disasters.

Compared to the pre-industrial age, there has already been a warming of at least 1 degree Celsius, which, if not stopped, will probably lead to a warming of between 1.5 and 3 degrees Celsius by the middle of the century and between 4 and 8 degrees Celsius by the end. This drastic rise in temperature will bring about various changes in our climate, causing more frequent droughts, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes. As for hurricanes, it is not clear whether the increase in the number of storms is due to the warming of the oceans, but there is growing evidence that climate change will intensify and the number of severe storms will increase (Missirian and Schlenker, 2017, pp. 1610-14).

There is a clear link between the growing climate crisis and human trafficking, as climate change is causing extraordinary, unexpected natural disasters. This phenomenon creates a chaotic situation in which the general infrastructure that ensures everyday life and maintains a sense of security is lost. As a result, residents of areas affected by natural disasters can voluntarily choose to leave their country with the help of traffickers in the hope of a better life, i.e., become part of environmental migration. We have witnessed this series of events from 2015, when an intense wave of migration began, mainly from the Mediterranean, in which, in addition to the causes of war, significant environmental factors also played a role. Climate change has resulted in a degree of drought in one the home country of the largest numbers of migrants, Syria, that has triggered an internal migration, meaning that people living from agriculture have migrated to urban areas. Although no clear link can be established, it is clearly indisputable that the climate crisis is a “threat multiplier” that contributes significantly to war and other security conflicts in the region (Colin et al., 2015).

Other victims of natural disasters are orphaned minors who are forcibly deported from their home countries due to a lack of school infrastructure for border control and registration. In both cases, traffickers use the tool of exploitation, which is mostly forced labour of a sexual nature for minors and women (Cecchet et al., 2014, pp. 482- 493). Based on the regular cases experienced by humanitarian organizations and other disaster relief agencies, we can state with certainty that the immediate response to life-threatening situations in areas affected by natural disasters and the priority of the reconstruction phase show a significant lack of protection and rehabilitation of minor victims of trafficking (Hopper, 2017, pp. 12-30). Proper application of the guidelines set out in the Sendai Framework could significantly fill these gaps. These gaps can be defined as vulnerabilities of the affected communities. The definition of vulnerability cannot be described with complete precision without examining the sources of risk or threat in a given community environment.

Direct threats, but also factors which have a direct or indirect impact on communities have to be taken into consideration, such as the economic and social situation, the existence and availability of a social network, health status, the availability and accessibility of health services, needs responsiveness of specific governmental and non-government organizations. In order to turn vulnerabilities into capabilities, many factors need to be considered, from community resilience measures through resilience development programmes to ongoing impact monitoring of resilience status. The priorities set out in the Sendai Framework Agreement confirm that effective vulnerability and disaster risk reduction cannot be achieved without prior measurement of population resilience.

To prepare proper contingency plans, it is important to carry out a vulnerability and capacity assessment during emergency relief planning, knowing which communities are most at risk, where relief should be a priority in the response process, and what other measures are needed to support the population. Analyzing the usefulness of vulnerability and capacity assessment, two primary functions were found: on one hand, it is a measurement method that reveals and shows the weaknesses and resources of each community, and on the other hand, it is an excellent basis for future strategic and program planning (Sáfár, 2020). In order that resilience-based treatment be as successful as possible, factors based on an ever-changing cultural system must be taken into account too. This is particularly relevant in some system-based cases that reinforce the fight against modern slavery, which involves tools such as the media or parts of business. Ignoring these causes of exploitation leads to the failure of resilience-based intervention, resulting in the circular process being repeated over and over again (Gardner et al., 2020, pp. 338-353).

6.2. The features of Sendai Framework

Following the Hyogo Action Plan that was established and adopted in 2005 and expired in 2015, the Sendai framework came into force. At the 2015 UN International Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Japan, it adopted its document “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” for the period 2015-2030.

The formulated strategic goals are in the interests of all mankind. By 2030, the Convention has seven such global goals:

1. Significantly reduce the proportion of fatalities in disasters compared to 100,000 per capita in the period 2005-2015 by 2020-2030. Also reduce the direct economic losses caused by disasters in proportion to GDP by 2030.
2. Also reduce direct economic losses caused by disasters in proportion to GDP by 2030.
3. Significantly reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructures and disruptions to basic service delivery, among others in health and education institutions, including the development of resilience by 2030.
4. Substantially increase the number of countries with some kind of national or regional disaster response strategy by 2020.
5. Increase international cooperation with developing countries, with direct appropriate and sustainable support, to enable them to transpose the Framework into national procedures by 2030.
6. Significantly increase people's access to and connectivity to multi-hazard prediction, multifunctional alert systems and disaster risk information, and disaster risk assessments by 2030 (UNDR, 2015).

Highlights of Sendai Agreement:

1. Disaster risk management must be integrated into sustainable development strategies.
2. Prevention of new risks.
3. Coherence for sustainable development - disaster management – environment - climate change to reduce disaster risks.
4. More attention needs to be paid to understanding climate change.
5. More attention should be paid to the development of weather forecasts.
6. Switching from disaster management to disaster risk management.
7. Increased involvement of science and technology in policy making.

8. Pay more attention to the recovery and reconstruction period.

The framework is a kind of guideline for international disaster response systems, setting out what needs to be done, opportunities for development and the goals to be achieved for successful disaster management. The document is decisive for international disaster management, and can be seen as a kind of statute for global emergency response. What is included in the framework can be considered as a kind of ideological foundation for disaster relief, and its guidelines are of general application.

In addition, the International Community Sets out four Priorities for Action:

1. Understand disaster risk,
2. Strengthen disaster management to manage disaster risk,
3. Invest in disaster management to increase resilience,
4. Increase preparedness to implement effective responses and the Build Back Better concept (UN, 2015)

7. Conclusion

The analysis and results of the research data explored clearly proved and demonstrated the main objectives of the study. On the basis of the analysis of the interviews one can clearly state that in our days there is a close connection between the human trafficking and the question of environmental migration. The second objective of the study was demonstrated too by the results collected by the content analysis which was carried out with the means of absolute frequency, whereas the interviews formulate clearly that the minor environmental migrants are mostly exposed to the exploitation of the human traffickers, first of all that of sexual character.

Developing resilience based on the Sendai Framework can be one of the most effective tools for reducing environmental migration and the intensity of human trafficking as a result of natural disasters. The essence of this ability is to adapt to the challenges of the changed environment at several points in addition to some preventive steps. A concrete action plan could be to make buildings and important infrastructure weatherproof, which can significantly reduce the risks of climate change. Political and economic solutions are needed to stop deforestation, which directly contributes to soil erosion, for example, to use financial support to motivate the region's governments to protect their forests, enforce rules to protect certain areas, and provide other economic

opportunities for farming communities so that they do not have to exploit their natural resources for their survival. In addition, it is essential to draw the attention of the inhabitants of the area concerned to the abandonment of areas that have already become uninhabitable for farming and other purposes. The Sendai Framework places great emphasis on preparing for and responding to emergencies. An important part of this early warning system could be to develop and use it as often as possible. And in the aftermath of natural disasters, there is a need for temporary displacement, which requires well-equipped and trained preparedness units and a system that includes recognizing and managing the specifics of human trafficking. In the recovery phase, it is extremely important to plan temporary services for the displaced population, such as health care systems and schools, whereas one of the most useful tools for curbing human trafficking is the school system, which provides a safe, registered system for minors.

The widest and most frequent application and incorporation of the priorities and tasks established by the Sendai Framework into existing policies, especially in the regions of developing countries, could significantly reduce the number of victims of trafficking, both as part of both preventive and rehabilitative measures. Within the framework of the “risk definition” defined among the priorities, attention should be drawn to the vulnerability of children at the global and regional level, and priority should be established. One of the most useful tools for determining and addressing the risk and specificities of disaster risk, including cybercrime, could be the establishment of a registration system for minors based on age, gender and disability, complemented by registration of injuries and deaths. Building resilience-based capacity, marked as disaster risk reduction, is easily achieved by building a stable school and health care system that is able to perform this function during and after the disaster period. The tool of resilience defined by the Sendai system plays an important role in the preventive management of disasters, as it can prepare and raise awareness in children of the specifics and consequences of disasters and human trafficking. As a result, affected children and their relatives can more easily manage the harmful consequences of future disasters and help identify and avoid exploitation by traffickers. Building and strengthening a system of risk-sharing at international and regional level is an essential part of successful rehabilitation and reconstruction. In my opinion, in the current international situation, it is not enough to curb climate change or to help environmental migrants, in this sense, the application of the priorities and principles set out in the Sendai Framework could be considered in addressing human trafficking generated by natural disasters, which could save millions of orphaned children.

The aforementioned demonstrates that foreign policies do not only establish trade relations, but it affects political goals and strategies. In the light of this understanding, energy diplomacy becomes one of the mechanisms to achieve these goals.

The available scientific literature on the topic showed that too often the meaning of the word ‘crisis’ is taken for granted. Therefore, a generic weakness could be

highlighted in terms of broadness of the subject. As the analysis of the mentioned above authors points out, crises not only lead enmity between the parties involved (in the event their interests diverge during crises) but they also potentially lead to the strengthening of ties between the actors.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Fragmented Urbanisation in Accra: Tracing the Evolution of Agbogbloshie in the Context of Global and Local Dynamics¹

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Abstract:

This paper contributes to increasing and updating the level of knowledge about the Agbogbloshie site in Accra.

Starting from the most recent decongestion activity that led to the demolition of the main e-waste recycling site, the paper aims to reconstruct the leading global and local dynamics that have contributed to the construction, shaping, and now reconfiguring of the urban space of the site. By comparing ethnographic studies conducted on the site and reviewing literature on African urbanisation, the paper identifies characteristic traits belonging to the process of urban space formation and urbanisation on the continent within the site's history. The paper concludes that the development of Agbogbloshie can be traced both within the long-term trends of the fragmentary colonial and post-colonial urbanisation process in Accra and to the influence of external elements attributable to the current phase of globalisation.

Concerning the formation of the scrapyards, the paper analyses the factors that have established links between the local and global dimensions by making Agbogbloshie one of the main hubs for international e-waste traffic. Lastly, the paper traces the dynamics that led to the recent demolition of the recycling site and invites future research to reflect on the possible instrumental use by urban political authorities of the issue of environmental sustainability and economic development to re-appropriate urban spaces to the detriment of the most vulnerable citizens belonging to the informal living and working dimensions.

Keywords:

Globalisation, environmental justice, e-waste, housing and labour informality, urbanism.

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1. Introduction

Agbogbloshie, known as Sodom and Gomorrah or Africa's largest electronic and electrical waste dump, was closed mainly in 2021 by Ghana's national authorities. This evacuation took place amidst the general disregard of the Western media, which had written about the Agbogbloshie landfill for years, reporting on the living conditions of the informal workers and neighbouring inhabitants. This event is part of a more general tendency by the authorities of developing countries to want to present their urban centres as modern and orderly.

Such interventions in urban space transformation are often based on a techno-scientific logic of environmental improvement and sustainability. These actions frame the most vulnerable portions of society belonging to working and living informality as an obstacle to pursuing modernity. Such dynamics of conflict between modernisation, environmental sustainability, and the rights of the most vulnerable have been analysed by Rowan Ellies (2011) regarding India's urban centres. Similar dynamics, however, also occur in the cities of sub-Saharan Africa where interventions such as the Agbogbloshie evacuation, legitimised by environmentalist and economic development demands, mask 'the political economy of environmental injustice and uneven urban development' (Ellis, 2011).

Moving from these assumptions, this paper aims to contextualise the formation and closure of Agbogbloshie within the broader debate regarding the formation of post-independence African cities and the more recent dynamics of rapid urbanisation on the continent. In doing so, the paper draws on a wide range of literature concerning urban political ecology, African urban studies and ethnographic research projects on Agbogbloshie.

The objectives of the paper are: a) to analyse the leading global and local dynamics that participated in shaping and moulding the site's reality until its closure, b) to propose a reflection on the importance of studying marginal sites such as Agbogbloshie in order to understand characteristic elements of urbanisation and African history c) to propose initial considerations regarding the recent closure of the recycling site and the dynamics of evacuation, demolition and eviction.

2. Theoretical Framework

In the countries of the African continent, urban demography is changing dramatically under the pressure of rural-to-urban migration and, above all, unprecedented natural population growth. Since 1915, the continent's urban population has more than tripled from 13% of the total population to about 50% today (Ipsos, 2018; OECD, 2020). Although the continent continues to be largely rural, the rapidity with which the urban population has grown has posed numerous challenges to the organisational capacity of

each city. The picture becomes even more alarming in light of forecasts that estimate that by 2050, the urban population will reach approximately one billion people, surpassing the rural population by ten percentage points (OECD, 2020; Battersby and Crush, 2016).

In 'Rapid Urbanisation, Urban Food Desert and Food Security in Africa' (2016), Battersby and Crush describe such concentrated, constant, and rapid growth in urban centres with the expression 'urban revolution' (2016, p. 3), which, although in different ways and to different degrees, affects the entire continent. Although, in theory, the rapid and constant growth of the urban population can create new development opportunities, it also generates social problems, especially in those urban contexts where the capacity to accommodate "has lagged far behind the pace of urbanization" (Murray and Myers, 2006, p. 4). According to Parnell and Pieterse, this scenario can lead to a "predominance of informal modes of urbanization" (2014, p. 9), when regular, paid employment opportunities do not keep pace with the growth of the job-seeking population. Davis (2004) identifies this trend with the term 'perverse urbanism,' emphasising how the economic and structural development of cities is unequal to demographic urbanisation and negatively impacts the living conditions of urban citizens.

The negative impacts of this unequal growth on the living conditions of citizens mean that when discussing urbanisation in Africa, there is often a solid tendency to observe the criticalities present in many African cities, so much so that a "permanent condition of failed urbanism" can be perceived (Murray and Myers, 2006, p.1).

In this regard, Martin J. Murray and Garth A. Myers, in their book *Cities in Contemporary Africa*, criticise this Afro-pessimistic conception of urban space, highlighting the exclusive character that obscures everything else. Through a conception of multiple pathways of urbanisation, the two authors put forward an alternative approach for urban studies, one that is less marked by the idealistic model of the Western city and more capable of encompassing the cities of the so-called global South. In line with this, Mbembe and Nuttall also point out how African cities are developing "along unknown pathways" (2008, p. 6), dictated by entirely new forms of sociality that are foreign to urban studies, but not for this reason exempt from being studied. The critical perspective of these authors does not lead to underestimating and excluding criticalities from being the object of study but invites a less descriptive and more comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the current situation. Thus, the multi-disciplinary methodology does greater justice to a heterogeneous context of highly complex urban and social realities whose future is not 'predetermined' (Murray and Myers, 2006, p. 7).

From these approaches, it is clear that it is necessary to look at the past to understand African cities today. Indeed, a historical approach allows one to identify the events and actors that have constituted, shaped and reconfigured urban space up to the

present day. Without such an effort of understanding, African cities remain nothing more than an incomprehensible failure to emulate Western cities.

As Odile Georg (2013) points out, colonialism played a crucial role in defining the spatial features of African cities. The author points out how France and Great Britain, although driven by distinct ideological assumptions, pursued a segregationist policy, which served to ensure the domination of settlers and colonial administration. From the 1920s onwards, the two colonial powers geographically differentiated the areas of residence of Europeans from those of African subjects.

About Accra, Ato Quayson (2014) points out how racial segregation led to the formation of distinct social ecologies in the relationship between population density, characteristics of the built environment and type of natural environment. In other words, this has meant overcrowded shacks in arid or swampy areas for Africans and large brick houses in quiet areas with facilities and large recreational spaces for Europeans.

In general, colonialism represented a deviation from the possible autonomous development of African peoples, which is impossible to quantify socially, economically, and politically. From an urban point of view, the colonial era returned to independent African people's cities that were profoundly changed in size, infrastructure, and spatial, working and residential conformation. The end of the colonial experience certainly marked the re-appropriation of cities by Africans. However, this did not end various forms of social segregation.

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch points out that in the private sector, only the ruling class and the upper middle class had the resources to take over the residential spaces left by Europeans. The poorest stayed where they were, leading to what the author calls "residential segregation based on wealthy versus poor people" (2014, p. 2). Murray and Myers point out how this segregationist perspective was exacerbated by access to the "global flow of ideas, information, and images" (2006, p. 5). The consumption, development, security, and modernity paradigms have shaped "the identities of well-to-do urban residents" (2006, p. 6), distancing them from the local tradition and making them akin to global consumer culture. Quayson, for his part, in framing urban space as a "symptom and producer of social relations" (2014, p. 5), clearly explains how the division of space in independent African cities has been strongly influenced by the ambitions of African leaders to emulate Western cities by paying scant regard to the poorest.

Although the colonial past and the immediate post-independence period are crucial moments to be taken into account in understanding today's African cities, African urban scholarship emphasises that the insertion of urban centres into the world market and the current phase of globalisation has been equally important. In this regard, the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s to combat corruption and oppressive states

in favour of a free and democratic society (Cilliers, 2021). These loan packages were aimed at bringing down the debt of African states through retrenchment of the state in favour of privatisation and the free market and are widely considered in the literature to be the cause of increasing inequality and deteriorating living conditions of the poorest. As Ferguson writes, Structural Adjustment Programmes, instead of triggering the desired economic recovery, have led to the “lowest economic growth rates ever recorded in Africa.” (2006, p. 11).

The so-called Washington Consensus, a term we tend to use to define the conditionality of the loan packages of the time, not only aggravated the poorest situation but also allowed global consumerist ideas, significant capital and international corporations to enter the urban context, shaping their image and conformation. Except for a few urban areas modernised by foreign investment, African cities have suffered a decline in terms of jobs, slowing industrialisation processes, falling real wages, rising unemployment rates and dramatic increases in prices for necessities (such as health, housing, food and electricity) (Murray and Myers, 2006)

Faced with the state’s retreat to the private sector as a driver of development, urban informality and housing have advanced. As Richard Grant (2009) reminds us, squatter settlements were rare in West Africa before the 1990s and have quickly become a prevalent housing option across the continent. In Accra alone, 76 slums are recorded (Little, 2021, p. 8), and Agbogbloshie, which the paper focuses on, is just one of them.

These places and the societies that inhabit them, long placed on the margins of normed urbanism and globalisation processes, are increasingly recognised as places characterised by “a form of urban informality and directly constitutive of urbanism as such” (Quayson, 2014, p. 6) and by actors who, though poor, can “act as globalising agents” (Grant, 2021, p. 112).

The following pages, starting from these conceptual assumptions, aim to analyse this aspect of African urbanisation through the experience of the complex and varied urban reality of Agbogbloshie within the metropolitan area of Accra.

Following Gupta and Ferguson’s indications about focusing “on the social and political processes of place-making” (1997, p. 6), the analysis that follows aims to analyse the dynamics that led to the formation of the Agbogbloshie site from the perspective of the urban-social space that it occupies within the urban context of Accra and the e-waste dump that it hosts and for which the site is internationally known. This explanation will be done by understanding the interaction between the global and local dimensions. As Murray and Mayers (2006) suggest about the study of urban centres, in order to identify the phases and agents that have shaped and configured the Agbogbloshie site, the analysis aims to distinguish the elements attributable to the current phase of globalisation from the long-term trends in Accra’s urbanisation process. To do so, the indications of Ato Quayson (2014) regarding superimposing the current

image of African cities - in this case, the Agbogbloshie site - in the age of globalisation on the image of the pre-colonial and immediate post-independence period are also followed.

3. Context of the Analysis

Agbogbloshie, also known as Sodom and Gomorrah or, erroneously, as the world's largest e-waste dump (Oteng-Ababio and van der Velden, 2019), is a very complex, large and diverse urban reality. In its approximately 146 hectares of flat, triangular-shaped land, in addition to the landfill, it is home to Ghana's most densely populated slum called Old Fadama, several of Accra's major food markets, a bus depot, shops and stalls of all kinds, and numerous industrial enterprises in the brewing, construction and paint industries (Grant, 2006; COHRE, 2004).

All these socio-economic realities, which, as Federico Monica (2022) writes, might seem like an indistinct pile of metal sheets, are separated by natural barriers - the Odaw River - and artificial ones - Abossey Okai Road - to which correspond different neighbourhoods, living and working formality or informality, different histories and power networks. This complex reality, to which a great deal of interest has been devoted by scientific research and the international media, is located in the heart of Ghana's capital, Accra, in the north-western part of the city, about one kilometre from the Central Business District (CBD) and just over two kilometres from the famous Oxford Street.




Figure 1. Source: Oteng-Ababio (2012)

Figure 1 highlights the area's geographical features, employment activities and residential settlements before the recent urban decongestion intervention. This intervention led to the relocation of the onion market adjacent to Abossey Okai Road and the closure of the leading recycling site to the left of the Odaw River. As for the other recycling site north of the lagoon, in its current state, it has significantly reduced following a series of demolitions that have taken place since 2015. These demolitions led to a shift of recycling activities away from the coastal area and continue to occur in the adjacent Old Fadama slum. This slum, mainly without electricity and sanitation (Grant, 2006), is considered the most densely populated in the capital, estimated to house around 80,000 inhabitants. (Effah Oppong et al., 2020). Other housing settlements, formal and informal are located north of Abossey Okai Road within the original neighbourhood named Agbogbloshie, which also houses several light industries and offices of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA).

3.1. Explaining How and Why

The decision to explore the local and global dynamics that led to the creation of Agbogbloshie was triggered by the viewing, in conjunction with the reading of Ato Quayson's book 'Oxford Street, Accra: City Life and the Itineraries of Transnationalism' (2014), of Italian journalist Marco Maisano's documentary (Maisano, 2020). He went to Accra to investigate the causes of migration from Ghana to Europe. The extensive space devoted in the documentary by the Italian journalist to the Agbogbloshie e-waste dump, coming from different parts of the globe, led me to formulate the same initial thought that Ato Quayson had coming out of the internet café on Oxford Street: "This is globalization" (2014, IX). Although they are two very different realities, Oxford Street, a street of prestige, a symbol of the 'African Modern' (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008) - and the Agbogbloshie landfill - a degraded place, a depiction of African urban failure - the two realities immediately appeared to me very similar. On the surface, the material and non-material external influence of the globalised world and its market appeared as an explicit element linking both experiences of urban life.

As I continued reading Quayson and further investigated the area of Agbogbloshie and its landfill, the idea that the two places were related grew stronger.

What failed, however, was the impression that both places were orphans of a local dimension. This thought has been replaced by the realisation that both Oxford Street and Agbogbloshie present a complexity of elements whose sum and intersection turn out to be much more than the single consequence of globalisation and Accra's urban development process. Global and local cultures merge into an African urban experience that needs to be approached "as objects of inquiry in their own right" (Murray and Myers, 2006, p. 3) in order to be understood.

4. Creation, Development and Configuration of the Urban Space of Agbogbloshie

4.1. Local Elements that Contributed to the Formation of the Site

The land dispute over the lands of Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama has deep roots dating back to colonial times, specifically when the traditional Ga community of Accra claimed the sacred character of the Karle bu lagoon in the face of colonial development plans. Resistance from the majority and original group in the city probably led the colonial authorities to carry out limited activity in the area, abandoning ambitions to develop a large lagoon port facility. In this regard, Grant (2006) reports that except for two housing estates where low-income residents from the overcrowded areas of Jamestown and the CBD were resettled and built in the 1950s, the area remained in its natural state overall until 1961. That year, three years after independence, the government claimed land ownership in the name of public interest. It earmarked it for the development of a series of industrial projects.

As Quayson points out, ‘the promise of construction jobs that the industrial zone was to provide’ (2014, 227) may have been an early factor in attracting migrants from the North who began to arrive and settle in the area in the 1960s and 1970s. In any case, the development of light industries in brewing, food processing and car repair was a partial industrialisation process that could not satisfy the influx of labour supply. The shortage of job opportunities and low-priced housing prompted some migrants who came to the city from northern rural areas to develop the first informal settlements and work activities (Grant, 2006).

It is only since the 1990s, however, that a series of events have led to the geographic and demographic expansion of the site. In 1991, on the occasion of the Non-Aligned Movement conference held in Accra, the AMA began a major decongestion of the city centre by carrying out, as in colonial times, multiple relocations of hawkers and low-income segments of the population to peripheral parts of the city. During these relocations, many people were placed on Abossay Okai Road in what was supposed to be temporary accommodation (Fevrier, 2020). This political action, driven by a logic of urban cleansing, led to the settlement of new inhabitants, not necessarily from the North of the country, who were added to the already existing inhabitants of Old Fadama.

The 1993 relocation of the Makola market to Agbogbloshie increased employment opportunities at the site and consequently for residents in Old Fadama (Quayson, 2014; Fevrier, 2020). The subsequent expansion of the market and the diversification of food commodities, supported by production from the northern parts of the country, transformed the area into one of Accra's primary fruit and vegetable markets. The labour needs related to this expansion and the social and commercial ties

with the northern areas led to a conspicuous increase in semi-permanent residents from the Northern region of Ghana (Fevrier, 2020; COHRE, 2004).

Finally, fundamental in shaping the demographic conformity of the area were the inter-ethnic conflicts in northern Ghana between Nanumba and Kokumba that erupted in 1994 and lasted until 2000 (Grant, 2006; Little, 2022). These conflicts, prompted by pre- and post-colonial land issues, resulted in an exodus of refugees to the city (Quayson, 2014). Inter-ethnic ties, low housing costs, and employment opportunities in the informal sector meant they settled in Agbogbloshie, the only portion of land within the metropolitan area still available.

Although the socio-economic reality of Agbogbloshie came into being after Ghana's independence, the dynamics of its development find elements characteristic of the urban planning of Accra in colonial times and, more generally, of many African cities. As in most colonial administrations, urban planning intended to ensure settlers' commercial and residential dominance in the most profitable sectors and ecologically favourable areas (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2014). Under colonial administration, the process of shaping Accra's urban space occurred through a logic of expansion from the original Ga Mashie core outwards. However, colonial urban planning was highly fragmented and chaotic: reactive in resolving emergencies and programmatic in creating advantaged and separate spaces for settlers (Ato Quayson, 2014). Coquery-Vidrovitch (2014) refers to the 'sanitary syndrome' as the primary device through which the administration has established different social ecologies within the urban space. As Ato Quayson (2014) noted, the differences in the social ecologies of Accra's urban space have followed a double track of differentiation. The first, advocated by the colonial administration, was established on a Native-European racial axis, and the second, local in nature, though often exaggerated by colonial administrators, followed an ethnic-identitarian Ga/foreigner axis.

Migrants who came to the city from outside, mainly from the northern parts of the country, were thus settled in marginal, ecologically disadvantaged areas, distant from the white settlers and the original identity groups.

Accra's colonial urban policy thus marked aggregations of distinct social ecologies. A distinction is marked by location in space and the relationship between the built environment's character, population density and the natural environment. In a somewhat chaotic logic of filling empty spaces, the city has been configured by shaping degraded areas of high population intensity with evanescent dwellings that serve as interludes to areas of little more balance and others of opulence and affluence (Ato Quayson, 2014).

In line with what Coquery-Vidrovitch (2014) observed, even in Accra, white-native racial segregation in the post-colonial era gave way to rich-poor economic segregation. However, Agbogbloshie demonstrates how this new pattern of urban spatial subdivision

has also been maintained across ethnic-identity distinctions between originals and newcomers. The northern migrants living in Agbogbloshie-Old Fadama represent the last social stratum of the city and, therefore, live in the most ecologically and infrastructurally disadvantaged area. Moreover, its marshy and humid morphology, due to its proximity to the Korle Bu lagoon, reflects how the formation of this urban site is so closely akin to more general colonial urban planning logic. Indeed, as Coquery-Vidrovitch (2014) points out, marshy and wet sites were chosen to house natives. It should be noted that the very name Old Fadama, in the Hausa language ‘swampy’ (Quayson, 2014), is a reminder of the poor nature of this land - once considered sacred - where today those who last arrived in the city reside.

4.2. Global Elements that Have Contributed to Shaping the Image of Agbogbloshie

As seen in the previous section, the formation of Agbogbloshie’s urban space follows local dynamics. It can be traced within the broader pattern of formation of the Accra metropolitan area. This highlighted how the Ghanaian government and the Accra municipal administration maintained a fragmented urban planning pattern after independence, faithful to colonial urban planning logic. However, while this may explain the formation of the site, more is needed to understand the controversial contemporary reality of Agbogbloshie. It is therefore also necessary to consider Ghana’s process of liberalisation, which, through participation in the Structural Adjustment Programme, allowed global economic forces to embed themselves within the urban context of the city from the 1980s onwards (Quayson, 2014; Oteng-Ababio and Grant, 2019). These have thus shaped the image of more cosmopolitan places, such as Oxford Street, but also seemingly disconnected realities considered marginal, such as Agbogbloshie.

As far as Agbogbloshie is concerned, Ghana’s participation in SAPs has contributed significantly to shaping the reality of the site in several aspects. As Peter C. Little (2022) pointed out, the economic liberalisation induced by the SAPs has transformed the agribusiness production system in favour of export monocultures. Instead of alleviating rural-urban and north-south spatial inequalities, these interventions have fuelled migration flows from the country’s northern parts towards Agbogbloshie.

In the urban context of Accra, however, the consequences of the SAPs became apparent in the early 2000s. In those years, the cost of participating in the global economy reverberated regarding diminishing formal job opportunities and rising living and housing costs. As investments from foreign companies modernised the city centre, it became prohibitively expensive for the less affluent, who retreated to the Agbogbloshie-Old Fadama area and similar realities (Fevrier, 2020). This triggered urban housing crises and worsening living conditions in rural areas, causing the increased

influx of people into the area, the population density of the site and the number of informal economic activities, including the nascent scrap recycling and recovery business.

The inclination of the site inhabitants to trade scrap developed as a process of diversification from the main activity of the fruit and vegetable market. The profitability of metals inside the broken-down trucks that previously transported foodstuffs has prompted more and more people to trade scrap (Amuzu, 2015; Fevrier, 2020). With the technologisation of Ghana, Africa and the world more broadly, it did not take long for the trade in scrap from trucks and cars to be transformed into the trade from electronic and electrical equipment (EEE), such as home appliances, mobile phones and computers. What might initially have been a dismantling and storage site for local e-waste was then quickly expanded for international consumption, giving way to a continuous flow of e-waste in the area and forming a flourishing informal repair and recycling sector (COHRE, 2004; Amazu, 2018).

Economic liberalisation policies again played an essential role in building and decreasing Ghana's 'digital divide,' the links between the global and local dimensions. As pointed out by Amazu (2018) and Grant and Oteng-Ababio (2012), the lowering of duties on second-hand electronics through policies such as a 'laptop per household' or a 'PC per child' has facilitated the technologisation of the country's public and private sectors. However, this neglects the consequences of post-consumption resulting from the influx of second-hand equipment. Numerous studies underline how EEE comes within this traffic of used electrical and electronic equipment, many of which are non-functional and irreparable, as well as scrap of all kinds. Over the years, their informal storage and recycling have shaped the urban space of Agbogbloshie, giving it the image of the hellish e-waste dump for which the site is known worldwide.

Another aspect that links Agbogbloshie and similar realities to the global dimension is the international politics of hazardous waste trade. As Little points out, the environmental justice movements in the West in the 1970s and 1980s, although unintended, produced citizen protest phenomena with the slogan "not in my backyard" that only fuelled "the global circulation and export of unwanted dangers" (2022, p. 19) including e-waste.

The 1989 Basel Convention, born out of protests over the dumping of toxic waste in Africa and other developing countries, was the primary attempt to change this scenario by regulating and controlling the transboundary movement of hazardous waste and its disposal. Despite its mandate to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of hazardous wastes, the Convention has encountered numerous practical limits to its action, which can often be traced back to its liberal conceptual assumptions.

The first limitation debated in the literature concerns that the Convention does not prohibit transboundary traffic. Theoretically, it is always allowed if there is prior

informed consent signed by the authorities of the importing country and justified reasons from the exporting country regarding the environmentally sound treatment of the waste at the destination (Schmidt, 2006; McCann and Wittmann, 2015). Other limitations inherent in the Convention relate to the difficulty in resolving issues such as (a) the hazardousness or non-hazardousness of waste, which, especially about e-waste,

leads to confusion (GTF, 2022) and (b) the distinction between waste and second-hand EEE (GEM, 2020). Thirty years after it entered into force, the Basel Convention has had little success in counteracting exports to poor countries in the global south, which lack the resources for environmentally sound management of end-of-life EEE. This inefficiency is crucial in understanding how Agbogbloshie could end up at the centre of the international e-waste trade.

4.3. Characteristics of E-Waste that Helps to Establish Links between Local and Global

Without going into particularly technical issues concerning the international e-waste market, what needs to be analysed for the paper are the dynamics that drive some countries to export their e-waste and that make other countries privileged landing spots, creating links between poor urban communities “systematically excluded from the socio-material benefits of techno-capital development” (Little, 2022, p. 19) and global electronics consumption.

Many spatial and scaling dynamics between local and global dimensions, in the case of the Agbogbloshie recycling site, can be explained through the intrinsic characteristics of e-waste.

The first element to consider the understanding of Agbogbloshie’s position within the international e-waste market is the high global electronic and electrical equipment consumption. The increasing pervasiveness of electronics in the public and private spheres, rapid obsolescence dictated by continuous technological renewal, and economic and population growth, together with technological fads, have made e-waste the fastest-growing type of solid waste (Bello et al., 2016; Hector, 2017). According to data from The Global E-waste Monitor (2020), global e-waste has increased by 9.2 mt (million metric tons) in just five years, from approximately 44 mt produced in 2014 to approximately 53 mt produced in 2019. In the face of this exponential growth of e-waste, the share of e-waste collected and recycled in an environmentally friendly manner worldwide has only increased by 1.8 mt, 0.2 mt less than the amount of e-waste grown in a single year. This discrepancy between e-waste produced and recycled, mainly driven by consumption in middle- and high-income countries, testifies to evidence that, regardless of available resources, countries struggle to manage their e-waste and, therefore, have an incentive to export it outside their national borders.

A second characteristic element of e-waste that incentivises export in favour of Agbogbloshie is the materials that these types of waste contain within them. As reported in GEM (2020, p. 58), e-waste can contain up to 69 periodic table elements, including heavy metals and critical and precious materials. The complexity of this equipment from the point of view of material dispersion and hazardousness to human and environmental health makes environmentally friendly treatment processes extremely expensive, often not economically sustainable unless supported by financing models such as extended producer responsibility (McCann and Wittmann, 2015; Magalini et al., 2019). In the porousness of inefficient collection, transport, recycling and disposal systems, the high costs of environmentally friendly treatment provide an incentive for international electronics and waste management companies to export, in collusion with criminal organisations, e-waste to evade management burdens (Bimir, 2020). As Hector (2017) writes, the actors who export e-waste stand at the top of the hierarchy of gains in the entire circuit and, although at a distance, can significantly impact the conditions of informal dumpsites such as Agbogbloshie.

The material properties of e-waste are also relevant in explaining why some places like Agbogbloshie attract internationally produced e-waste and use EEE. To understand this, it is necessary to look at the social inequalities within the global capitalist system and to consider that in the capitalocene era (Moore, 2016), e-waste from rich, industrialised countries acquires socio-economic value in the global south. As we have seen before about market liberalisation policies, second-hand EEE, discarded by consumers in middle- and high-income countries, has value for people in low-income countries as it provides access to electronics through low-cost equipment (Bimer, 2020). In addition to second-hand EEE in these contexts, broken or non-functioning equipment, irreparable equipment, and its various components also acquire value.

This is particularly true in the African context, where the widespread propensity to repair and recycle means that every single component and piece of equipment, even if inoperable or poorly maintained, can acquire value through sale, reuse and material recovery (Stenhouse, 2016; Cross and Murray, 2018). Regarding material recovery, which is undoubtedly the most dangerous and polluting activity, it is curious to note that these materials, generally insufficient to offset the costs of environmentally friendly treatment in industrialised countries, acquire subsistence and survival value for informal workers in Agbogbloshie. Here, the workers, in line with the wordplay proposed by Myers (2016), consider, in a faithful transliteration of the French term 'ordure' (rubbish), the waste as 'solid gold' and are therefore welcome to their arrival. In line with this, the aim of the informal workers is not to carry out impeccable recycling from the point of view of material recovery and environmental protection but to collect materials that are easily recoverable and have economic value within the scrap market as quickly as possible.



A final intrinsic element of e-waste that explains Agbogbloshie's inclusion in the e-waste market from the perspective of local consequences is its hazardousness. Containing heavy metals and toxic chemicals, e-waste, if not managed with proper safeguards and through adequate treatment infrastructures, poses a significant risk to the environment and the health of workers and communities in the vicinity of recycling sites. Mathias Nigatu Bimir (2020) points out that it is not the e-waste itself that poses a danger but that in most developing countries, there still needs to be an adequate infrastructure for environmentally friendly e-waste management. This lack, coupled with the absence or poor implementation of regulations and policies on e-waste management, means that the vast majority of this waste is managed within the informal economy and through rudimentary practices, which we will see in detail in the next section. What needs to be emphasised here is that, as little points out, the goal of the informal recyclers in Agbobloshie is "to make a living, even if this socioeconomic livelihood leads to their own embodied suffering" (2020, p. 41) and severe consequences for their health.

In line with this, again, Bimir argues that "there is a relationship between the level of economic development and importation of secondhand materials as far as there exist low-income people who are willing to accept unhealthy hazardous work" (2020, p. 660). In other words, it is possible to argue that the need for survival that drives the workers at Agbogbloshie to perform 'toxic work' represents - together with the export-push factors analysed above - an establishing element of the site's place at the centre of the international e-waste trade and thus a link between the local and global dimensions.

In the same way as CO₂ emissions with the climate crisis, e-waste exports have made a global issue - the high consumption of electronics - a problem with local consequences, which, ironically, fall on the same communities historically excluded from the material benefits of technological development.

This unequal dynamic of the causes of the consequences of global electronics consumption has led to the Agbogbloshie site being framed in terms of toxic colonialism, racism, and environmental justice. In the face of these undoubtedly accurate representations, however, it is necessary to add that the e-waste clogging up Agbogbloshie does not exclusively come from international trafficking. Growing domestic consumption in Ghana of electronic and electrical equipment, some of which are reconditioned and some of which have come to the end of their life after being purchased new, adds to the imported e-waste. The latter also fuels, although probably to a lesser extent, an informal e-waste economy that Daum, Stoler and Grant (2017) estimated to generate between USD 100 and 250 million annually, supporting up to 200,000 people.

A global registry to track these products is necessary to establish the exact proportions of imports from domestic consumption (Hector, 2017; Fevrier, 2020). However, it is undeniable that Agbogbloshie has long been full of e-waste, which,

waiting to be dismantled, liquefied and burnt by young workers, lay on the ground in the two storage areas. The concentration and scale of recycling activities have contributed to contaminating the lagoon's air, soil and water, making the site known as one of the most polluted places on earth.

4.4. Perspectives of Globalisation from below in the Scrap Yard

There are two ways to look at including Agbogbloshie within the e-waste market and, more generally, of African cities within the global economy. The first is to look at the process of globalisation as a sponge that includes African cities in a subordinate position within a centre-periphery hierarchical scale. The second is to look at African cities as agents capable of attracting and seducing certain forms of global capital (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008). The first path allows us to interpret the Agbogbloshie dump as the normal process of externalising the environmental and human health costs of e-waste disposal within the global capitalist system. Based on this first perspective, African peoples are helpless victims of globalisation, which condemns them to continuous urban bankruptcy.

In contrast, the second option allows us to look at African peoples as active agents who, as in the case of Agbogbloshie, have carved out an urban space for themselves by attracting a sector of the international market that, although devious, allows them to generate an income through which to subsist.

The global dimension allows us to understand where the waste comes from and shows us the consumerist cause of its production. However, we need help understanding the actual size of the Agbogbloshie scrap market. To do so, it is necessary to move from the bottom up by taking the agents within this urban context as objects of study in their own right.

The circuit of e-waste workers within the Agbogbloshie depot is governed by informality. This scenario does not mean it is chaotic; on the contrary, it presents a well-organised hierarchical structure involving an estimated four thousand to six thousand people (Akese and Little, 2018). They are primarily young people aged 14-30 who migrated from northern Ghana and share the same Muslim religion and ethno-cultural affiliation. This does not exclude that there are also older workers and people of different nationalities, predominantly from West Africa (Hector, 2017; Fevrier, 2020).

Ninety per cent of all workers live in Old Fadama in more or less evanescent houses, depending on social status. Excluding those with family living on the site, most live in rooms shared with other workers, often overcrowded (Akese and Little, 2018; Fevrier, 2020).

The work circuit is divided into collection, recycling, dismantling, brokering, repairs and trading. Each activity is interconnected to the others and involves different



types of individuals based on personal, ethnic, economic, and seniority characteristics in the industry (Fevrier, 2020). Activities also represent the hierarchy of power and earnings within the circuit. Generally speaking, relatively wealthier people have a more comprehensive network of acquaintances and have been in the business longer. They are involved in trading scrap, brokering relationships with companies outside the depot, and repairing and selling second-hand electronic goods. Such individuals generally occupy senior roles within the Greater Accra Scrap Dealers Association (GASDA), an organisation that represents and protects before political authorities the rights of all informal workers in the e-waste sector (Fevrier, 2020; Amazu, 2015).

Interestingly, the role of this organisation, straddling the formal and the informal, in representing the landfill workers in front of political institutions is similar to the work of its leaders. In their business of buying and selling e-waste, scrap and second-hand electronic products, they move similarly in limbo between the informal circuit inside the dump and the formal world of outside companies. The revenues they earn are higher than those of the other landfill workers, although small in the market value of the goods they handle. This income often allows them to live outside Old Fadama and make small investments to improve their working conditions (Fevrier, 2020; Amazu, 2015).

Collecting, burning and dismantling equipment represent the lowest rung of the hierarchy. These are performed by the youngest segment of workers who recently entered the circuit. The period for which they carry out these activities ranges widely from 1 to 10 years, depending on their social status and the motivations that drive them to work in the sector (Hector, 2017; Amazu, 2015; Fevrier, 2020). Some of these young people interviewed by journalist Marco Maisano tell of working to be able to start a family, while others use the money to help families in their home areas in northern Ghana. These stories are confirmed in the study conducted in the field by David Amuzu (2015), who points out that many young people work in the depot only for some periods of the year, returning home in the remaining periods to support farming during planting and harvesting.

This highlights how migration to the urban context may not be an individual path but may represent a family livelihood strategy. The author also points out that some work in the depot to save money to support their studies. All this does not exclude the fact that there are also lonely and unattached young people, a type of people that Mario Giro, in the context of contemporary African migration, defines as “out of ethnicity [...] abandoned to themselves in the great sea of opportunities - but also of tragic failures - that globalisation shines before their eyes” (2019, p. 13) of the urban context.

The task of these young people is to recover metals such as aluminium, copper, iron and steel by extracting them from cables and equipment. This is done through rudimentary tools such as hammers, chisels and stones and, even worse, through the risky practices of burning and liquefaction in acid (Hector, 2017). Being aware more or

less of the risks, they are all highly exposed to severe health consequences, blackmailed by the absence of other sources of income within the urban context.

The entire informal circuit is driven by a logic of ‘urban entrepreneurship’ (Murray and Myers, 2006; Quayson, 2014) that aspires to improve individual social status and climb the hierarchy within the depot. However, this is not guaranteed, and the long continuity of people performing the same essential activity is testimony to this. Thus, working conditions and earning hierarchies remain unchanged, static in their inequality. Using the words used by Murray and Mayers to describe African cities in general, it is possible to argue that in the site:

“There is the appearance of entropy and stasis, where capacities for innovative change are stalled by ruin, choked with waste, and clogged with useless objects out of place, and where enormous creative energies have been ignored, squandered, and left unused” (2006, p. 7).

Continuing to use the description of the two authors, it is possible to argue that the informal waste management system is dominated by a logic of “self-exploitation” within which the survival of the workers depends on an apparatus that “generates only minuscule returns despite the extensive expenditure of time and effort” (Murray and Myers, 2006, p. 6).

However, these aspects of criticality must be apparent in the ‘vitality’ and ‘resourcefulness’ (Murray and Myers, 2006) through which the site inhabitants and the scrap workers give meaning to their lives through the resources they have at their disposal. The entire site and the activities within represent a successful attempt, although hugely defective from a Western perspective, to negotiate an urban space within which to subsist with modern Accra. Here, part of the city’s poor and marginalised population found their livelihood independently of government subsidies and the absence of employment opportunities in the formal sector. The informality within it acts as a filter to the city’s shortcomings, offering a chance for newcomers to launch themselves within the urban context.

The scrap market added a proper recycling function for the entire city to this area, which was commonly considered wasteful by political authorities. On the one hand, the site performed a draining and decongesting function for the city’s clogged solid waste disposal system. On the other hand, the site performed a recycling function by incorporating the metals extracted from the scrap into the production system, in part supporting local and international industrial development. This testifies that the site’s inhabitants and, more generally, African cities are not alien to globalisation but responsive in relating to it, carving out a space for themselves, and acting as globalised actors.

5. New Perspectives on the Transformation of the Urban Space of Agbogbloshie

As mentioned in the introduction and the section presenting the analysis context, the Ghanaian government authorities cleared the leading recycling site in Agbogbloshie on 1 July 2021 (Seidu and Kaifie, 2022). This intervention is part of a more extensive redevelopment programme in the city led by the Regional Minister of Greater Accra, Henry Quartermey. The Make Accra Work agenda, based on safety, hygiene, health, education, and discipline pillars, aims to beautify the capital by cleaning it of dirt and illegal structures (Business Ghana, 2021). Based on these objectives, numerous cleaning exercises have been carried out in various city areas since spring 2021, earning the minister a reputation as an efficient man ‘who does not fail in his promises’ (Ghanaweb, 2021a).

These drills, which in some cases were simply an urban clean-up operation (CNR et al., 2021a) as in the case of the ‘Operation Clean Your Frontage’ initiative (Ghanaweb, 2021b), in many others, led to the decongestion of hawkers and the demolition of illegal structures (Ghanaweb, 2022a). These structures are generally dwellings or informal workplaces and represent a source of repair and livelihood for the urban population’s poorest and most marginalised segments. Minister Quartey carried out their demolition with the support of the government, the AMA and much of the population of Accra. This reflects an administrative vision that considers informality, slums and the most vulnerable population as obstacles to the city’s development. However, this perspective of removing supposed obstacles to modernity depoliticises the historical processes that led to the formation of urban squatting, poverty and marginalisation.

This is particularly evident in the case of Agbogbloshie, where, as analysed in the previous sections, the political authorities played an essential role in producing the preconditions for forming the complex reality of the site.

Even though the decongestion work of 31 July was revolutionary in reconfiguring the seemingly unchanging space, it is necessary to consider that the eviction of the recycling site did not occur in a vacuum but was part of a long history of tensions affecting the entire Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama area.

Since the 1990s, the government and local municipalities have pursued a non-recognition policy towards the site workers and inhabitants who are regarded as unwanted settlers (Grant, 2006). The narrative held by the authorities is that the Old Fadama slum is an illegal settlement born out of the illegal occupation of state-owned land, that the entire site and particularly the recycling areas are a source of pollution, and lastly that the proximity to coastal areas is an obstacle to the restoration of the lagoon through which the problem of continuous flooding can be solved (Little, 2022; Amazu, 2018; Grant, 2006). In addition to these elements, which certainly cannot be considered specious as they tell at least part of the reality, it is also necessary to consider

the site's proximity to the CBD. Unlike the capital's other predominantly defiladed slums, Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama are in a central area and thus undermine the capital's image internationally.

Based on these assumptions and the implementation of the Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project (KLERP) in 1993, when 400 dwellings were demolished in one morning, the AMA undertook a series of evictions and demolitions, mainly targeting the coastal area of Old Fadama and the adjacent recycling site (Grant, 2006).

Without going into the merits of the individual evictions and the resistance on the part of the population, what needs to be emphasised is that last July's evacuation is part of a more extended history of 'infrastructural violence' (Little, 2022) and stigmatisation to which the inhabitants and workers of Agbogbloshie-Old Fadama have been subjected. Unlike in the past, however, the scope of the decongestion intervention was considerably broader. Instead of being directed at the squatter dwellings of Old Fadama, it was directed at the scrap recyclers and repair businesses.

The scrap dealers interviewed by Ghana Web reported that they were neither notified of the eviction nor involved in the decision-making process that led to the evacuation of the area (Ghanaweb, 2021c). As Ghanaian documentary filmmaker and photographer Muntaka Chasant reports, the onion market, another historical activity at the Agbogbloshie site that the government had been trying to relocate to Adjen Kotoku for years (Chasant, 2021), was scheduled to move on that day. While the onion merchants attended negotiating tables with the government authorities, GASDA representatives claim they were notified of the move on 30 July with only twenty-four hours notification of eviction. For its part, the government rejects these accusations and claims to have warned the scrappers who were offered compensation and a resettlement area in Adjen Kotoku (Ghanaweb, 2021c).

Although, based on available sources, it is still impossible to determine exactly who is telling the truth, specific dynamics suggest that the scrappers were excluded from the negotiating tables until 30 July. A first element in support of this hypothesis is the supposed unawareness on the part of the Basel Convention workers who, a little over a month before the closure of the site, organised two days of webinars focused on improving e-waste management in Agbogbloshie (BRS Conventions, 2021). Even more significant is the workshop organised by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) that focused on improving safety conditions for trainers and workers in the recycling site's training centre, which, as Seidu and Kaifie (2022) report, was interrupted on 30 July after the authorities' eviction notice to GASDA representatives.

Another element supporting the scrapper's version is the timing of the operation to decongest the area. As Muntaka Chasant (2021) points out, the fact that three days scheduled for the relocation of the onion market were extended to a week and that the

decision was made on the third day, when almost all the onion traders had already moved out, suggests that the decision to demolish the informal recycling site was made in the process.

Whether the scrappers were warned or not, it is undeniable that since the 'Let Make Accra Work' agenda was launched, rumours had been flying about a drastic decongestion of the entire Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama site. Minister Quartey made it clear that with the relocation of the onion market and the demolition of the recycling site, the decongestion of the area continued. From what the minister announced, there will be two more decongestion phases, the second aimed at relocating the Konkomba yam market and the third aimed at relocating the residents of Old Fadama, whose relocation area has not yet been identified (Ghanaweb, 2021d).

The relocation of the inhabitants of Old Fadama is a long-standing one for the government of Ghana and the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, which have served eviction notices on all the inhabitants of the slum since 2002 without, however, achieving the goal. This state of inaction on the part of the authorities, coupled with continuous eviction proclamations such as that of Minister Quartey, places the inhabitants of Old Fadama in a state of continuous threat of eviction. This state of uncertainty, which has persisted over time, has meant that the efforts and ingenuity of the site's inhabitants have been directed towards preserving their urban livelihood space through actions of resistance against the evacuation pursued by the authorities rather than producing change by improving the living conditions on the site (Akormedi, 2013). The same can be said about working conditions at the recycling site where, despite the efforts of some NGOs in training workers in safer working practices, cable burning and scrap storage continued until the closure last July.

5.1. Considerations on the Consequences of the Decongestion Measure

Returning to the scrappers, it is worth noting that with the decongestion intervention of last July, they suffered the most significant eviction by the authorities since the formation not only of the recycling site but of the entire area of Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama.

Federico Monica (2022), who went to Agbogbloshie following the intervention, recounts how a year later, the recycling site, which a little more than a year before was one of the most chaotic places in Accra, is now a strip of wasteland protected by a wall built by the authorities to prevent reoccupation of the land. Minister Quartey claimed the extent of the intervention and expressed dissatisfaction that despite the reclamation of 80 acres of land, Agbogbloshie is still framed on the internet and Wikipedia as an electronic waste dump and one of the most polluted places in the world. As reported by Ghanaweb, the minister is reported to have said that 'the Agbogbloshie' we know is

not long there today and then stressed that it is time that this ‘particular image for the country is expugned’ (Ghanaweb, 2022b).

In the face of this narrative, however, it is necessary to emphasise how the intervention is mainly aimed not at the environmental redevelopment of the land, which, as Chasant (2021) points out, has not yet been planned, but rather at the authorities’ desire to reappropriate the land and to redeem the city’s image internationally. The exact implementation of the Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project to remedy flooding, which was the most substantial claim the authorities made for evacuation for years, is less relevant today in the motivations behind the intervention. The choice by Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo to allocate part of the cleared area to the construction of one of the hospitals under Agenda 111 (Ghanaweb, 2021e; Ghanaweb, 2021f; Ghanaweb, 2021g) highlights how the narrative about the importance of the ecological restoration of the site is instrumental in gaining consensus around the toxic threat of the recycling site and legitimising interventions to the detriment of poor and marginalised populations.

Whether the Agbogbloshie land will be put to ‘effective, efficient and sustainable land use’ (Ghanaweb, 2022b) in the future, as stated by Minister Quartey, is yet to be seen. What is certain, however, is that this intervention tracks within a broader trend of African urban policies to perceive people with low incomes as a source of problems for cities.

In line with what Amazu (2018) pointed out a few years ago about past evacuation actions, the evacuation intervention produced a distributive injustice by depriving, rather than threatening, scrappers of their source of livelihood. As reported by Chasant (2021), many workers saw their jobs and homes destroyed in a few days, thus losing their livelihood within the Accra metropolis. Although all workers have suffered losses, those who have experienced the most problems are the young returnees with fewer socioeconomic resources to start over. As Chasant pointed out, many have been wandering around the site destroyed by the authorities for days, looking for scrap and equipment to resell. The absence of alternatives has driven some of these young people back to their places of origin.

In exacerbating the vulnerable condition of the already vulnerable scrap recyclers, the decongestion intervention has not solved the problem of e-waste pollution that has been at the root of the stigmatisation of these workers for years either. In fact, as Monica (2022) reports, informal recycling activities, although less visible, seem far from over, as well as the arrival of second-hand electronic and electrical equipment. What used to happen mainly in Agbogbloshie is decentralising to many other smaller locations around the city. While some workers have bought land in the metropolitan area to restart their scrap recycling and resale business, recycling activities at the adjacent recycling site in Old Fadama are increasing closer and closer to the slum, thus increasing the health risks for its inhabitants.

Concerns about e-waste management in Ghana have also been expressed by Marcos Orellana, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Toxic Substances and Waste, who, in an official communication dated 13 December 2022 (United Nations Ghana, 2022), emphasised that exposure to toxic substances is primarily a cause of human rights violations within the country. In the communication, the UN expert emphasised that mercury and the disposal and recycling of electronic waste continue to pose a significant threat.

From an image point of view, the closure of the Agbogbloshie recycling site ended a profound environmental injustice resulting from the externalisation of the environmental costs of global electronics consumption. However, what is clear is that the decongestion action has exacerbated the precariousness and vulnerability of the scrappers. This situation makes clear the difficulty of combining different aspects of the sustainable development agenda in the urban contexts of poor countries in the global South, where environmental protection, economic development and the defence of the rights of the most vulnerable quickly come into conflict.

From this point of view, the experience of the Agbogbloshie clearance is emblematic. Demolition interventions that, at least in theory, prioritise environmental protection provoke far-reaching social crises if not accompanied by the construction of livelihood alternatives. This scenario paves the way for future research to analyse the local and global factors that drove the Ghanaian government to such determination in this demolition and neglect of the city's most fragile inhabitants.

6. Conclusion

The analysis contextualised the urban space of Agbogbloshie within the Accra metropolitan area and, more generally, within the African urban context. In doing so, an attempt was made to identify the elements traceable to the global and local dimensions that have shaped and moulded the site's reality. Through a historical approach, four practical elements were identified that led to the formation and development of the urban space in question: the forced displacements conducted by the AMA in a logic of urban cleansing of the city centre, the relocation of the Makola market, the inter-ethnic conflicts in the northern regions, the resulting rural-urban migrations, and finally the process of economic liberalisation through structural adjustment programmes.

In addition to these elements widely recognised in the literature, an attempt was made to verify the presence or absence of a planning logic. In doing so, the work of Ato Quayson, "Oxford Street, Accra: city life and the itineraries of transnationalism," through which it was possible to trace the formation of Agbogbloshie within the process of expansive formation of the Accra metropolitan area, was of fundamental importance. Through its interpretation of distinct social ecologies, it was possible to identify the

double track of spatial expansion between whites/natives and Ga/newcomers as the primary planning logic. This highlighted, on the one hand, the colonial urban planning legacy at the root of the demographic and morphological conformation of the site and, on the other, the inability of the post-independence government to change course.

Through the experience of the scrap market and the associated mountains of e-waste, an attempt was made to identify the global dimension, which has strongly impacted the ecological condition of the site since the early 2000s. The focus here was on the international e-waste market and the consumerist logic of global capitalism, and ultimately on the informal circuit that marks the activities within the scrap yard closed last July.

Moving from the bottom up, it was possible to observe the social failures that this market causes without neglecting the positive factors that make the valuable depot to the entire urban context and fundamental to the livelihood of the washers who depend on it. This has made it possible to interpret the scrap metal workers as active agents who relate with the global market, carving out a space of survival that, however meagre, makes them much more than mere victims of the global capitalist system. Lastly, through the reality of Agbogbloshie, the paper sought to highlight how marginal urban spaces within the African urban context have much more to tell than the discomfort and degradation that is noticed at first glance.

Agbogbloshie, although an urban site of recent history, contains many historical and contemporary elements of African urbanisation. Within it, one can trace the roots of a colonial imprint of urban planning, the inability of independent governments to change their perspective, the inter-ethnic conflicts that have always punctuated power relations on the continent, the rural-urban migrations that characterise the current African revolution, the sad tendency towards self-exploitation to which African peoples are often subjected, the suffering of living at the limits of subsistence, but also the resilience of knowing how to live with what one has, through ingenuity and creativity. Such traits of a deep local history cannot be obscured by the capitalist system's tendency to decentralise waste disposal to low-income countries. Even this seemingly external and oppressive element is reflected in the local context's way of acting, which treasures all that is reusable and proactively relates to the outside world with the resources at its disposal. All this highlights the vital need to analyse and understand these places, which contain part of African culture and history. However, they do not represent the heterogeneous and modern African cities.

Conflict of Interest

This article is part of my PhD research at the University for Foreigners of Perugia. It does not present any omissions or false information motivated by conflicts of interest



regarding the article's subject. I therefore declare that I have no economic interests or personal relationships that could influence the information in the article.

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Turkish Army and Military Industry Presence in Africa¹

Jordán Olivér Petrőcz²

Abstract:

Turkey puts an emphasis on the African connections in general and also strengthening its military connection with the African countries. The economic, diplomatic, cultural partnerships of Turkey and Africa are more discussed but the security, army and military industry connection between Ankara and the African countries is less captured, according to some experts, so now we put the dimension of security, army and military industry in the centre of our study.

Turkish army and military industry is present in Africa in various forms: Turkey is supporting international peacekeeping missions in Africa, Turkish military export is growing on the continent, Ankara is making defence, military agreements with several African country, Turkish army has training programs for African soldiers. And lastly the Turkish army is present in two countries: Libya, where Turkish troops support the government in the civil war, and in Somalia, where they are operating a military training camp.

We would like to study through these actions how Turkey is connected to African countries and analyze whether these are individual actions that connect Ankara and the African countries or they indicate levels of deepening connections.

Keywords:

Military export, military industry, Turkey-Africa connection, Turkish defence, Turkish Army, Turkish defence.

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Introduction - Turkey Puts More Emphasis on Africa

Turkey increased the number of its embassies on the African continent in the last two decades. In 2002, there were 12 countries where Turkey had direct diplomatic presence out of the 54 African countries. Now in 2022 there are 43 Turkish embassies in Africa, which means that just twenty years ago Turkey had close diplomatic connections with only 22 % of the African countries and now with almost 80 % of them, and Ankara is still planning to open new embassies on this continent in the future. This one information illustrates how much more emphasis Turkey puts on Africa.

Because we focus now on the military Turkey's connections with Africa, we have to mention that Turkey has Turkish military mission attachés in several places in the world where Turkish government decides to send them. Military attachés are military diplomats which observe military missions, developments in the country which they are posted (Prout, 2002, p. 47). In total there are 83 Turkish military attachés and 19 of them in Africa, which is more than a fifth (22,9%) of the total number of this positions (Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Türkiye, 2022). The 19 Turkish military attaché is covering almost all the African countries as they are accredited for 48 African countries out of the 54 (Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Türkiye, 2022). Adding the fact that the majority of these military attachés were sent after 2002, we can state that the AKP-led Turkey take the African connections much more serious than the Turkish governments before (Kenfack Kitio, 2020, p. 53).

New Dimension of Turkey's Foreign Policy is Army and Military Industry Cooperation with Africa

These facts above are only few examples that show that Turkey puts an emphasis on the African connections in general and indicates that Turkey is also strengthening its military connection with the African countries, which we will discuss more detailed as the topic of this study. The economic, diplomatic, cultural partnerships of Turkey and Africa are more discussed but the security, army and military industry connection between Ankara and the African countries is less captured, according to some experts (Kenfack Kitio, 2020, p. 44), so now we put the dimension of security, army and military industry in the centre of our study.

Our main questions for our current topic:

- How was Turkey able to strengthen its military and military industrial presence in Africa?
- What fields does the Turkish army and military industrial presence have in Africa?

Turkey could strengthen its army and military industry connections with Africa by the following actions, which can be also listed as fields, types of presence of the Turkish



army and military industry in Africa. Before we discuss them thoroughly let us look through this fields in bullet points:

1. Support UN, NATO and EU military peacekeeping operations in an African country
2. Selling Turkish defense products to African countries
3. Defence agreements between Turkey and an African country
4. Training African troops and give them products and know how.
5. Turkish troops in Africa. e.g.: building army base in African land, like in Somalia

In the following pages we would like to detail these fields and at the end we would like to see if these fields are only types of army and military industry presence and connections or also levels of connections.

Support UN, NATO and EU Military Peacekeeping Operations

There are places on the African continent where the UN sent peacekeeping operations and Turkey contributed to several such operations. There were 12 UN peacekeeping operations in Africa between 1993-2018 in which Turkey took part, most of them was under the AKP leadership (Siradag, 2018). Between 1993-95, Turkey gave the force commander (Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir) for the UN Operation in Somalia, named UNOSOM II, “but it did not become actively involved in most of the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa until 2005” but after the AKP came to power, although with limited contribution but Turkey begun to engage actively, in the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, says Abdurrahim Siradag in his study for Africa Security Review (Siradag, 2018, p. 9).

Since the AKP leadership Turkey entered nine UN peacekeeping operation in these African countries: Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali. And also three other UN peacekeeping operation were continued since AKP were elected (United Nations, n. d. (h)).

While Turkey only contributed to eight of the 24 UN peacekeeping operations between 1989-2018, in 2018 Turkey contributed to four of the seven in Africa. (Siradag, 2018) Currently, in 2022, Turkey is contributing to eight UN operations and six out of them are in Africa. (United Nations, n. d. (a)) so we can say that, in the respect of contribution to international missions, Africa is the focus point for Turkey.

In 2022 there are six African country where Turkish delegates support UN missions: Central African Republic, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia. These are the UN missions Turkey contributing until autumn of 2022: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNITAMS, UNMISS, UNSOM.

UN Peace keeping missions in 2022 Turkey is contributing			
Abbreviation	Full Name of the Mission	Country	Goal
1, MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	to protect civilians and support transition processes in the Central African Republic
2, MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	Mali	supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali
3, MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	goal is to protect civilians and consolidate peace in the DRC
4, UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan	Sudan	to provide support to Sudan during its political transition to democratic rule
5, UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan	South Sudan	to protect civilians and build durable peace
6, UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	Somalia	to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability in Somalia

Table 1: UN Peace keeping missions in 2022 Turkey is contributing
Source: The authors construction according to UN official data available:
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

MINUSCA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic, is mandated to protect civilians and support transition processes in Central African Republic. Total number of deployed personnel in this mission: 16,327 (United Nations, n. d. (b)). Turkey gives individual police personal (United Nations, 2022a) to this mission: 5 out of the total 2629 police personnel (United Nations, n. d. (b)) of this mission.

The UN started the mandate of a mission in Mali, called the United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Established in 2013 April and is ongoing applying UN military and police personnel coming from countries all around the world supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali.



The mission has two strategic priorities: 1, “to support the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by the Malian parties and other relevant Malian actors” and 2, “to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in Central Mali” (MINUSMA, n. d. (a)). Total number of deployed personnel in this mission: 17,557 (United Nations, n. d. (c)). Turkey is one of the contributing countries (together with 25 other countries), that gives police personnel for MINUSMA (MINUSMA, n. d. (b)). Specifically 12 Turkish police personnel (United Nations, 2022a) are in this mission, out of 1744 deployed police personnel (United Nations, n. d. (c)) of this mission.

MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its goal is to protect civilians and consolidate peace in the DRC. Total number of deployed personnel in this mission: 18,278 (United Nations, n. d. (f)). Turkey gives individual police personal to this mission: 15 out of the 1665 deployed police personal of this mission. (United Nations, 2022a)

UNITAMS, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, is a special political mission, launched in June 2020 to provide support to Sudan for an initial 12-month period during its political transition to democratic rule. It was later extended twice and now runs until June 2023 (UNITAMS, n.d.). According to UN official online data as of 30 June 2022 the UN only sent 20 policemen into this mission. (United Nations, n. d. (a)) Turkey support this mission with one individual policeman (United Nations, 2022a).

UNMISS, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, is a mission which works with the people of South Sudan to protect civilians and build durable peace. Total number of deployed personnel as of June 2022 in this mission: 17,954 (United Nations, n. d. (g)). Turkey gives individual police personnel to this mission: 34 (United Nations, 2022a) out of the total 1468 deployed police personnel (United Nations, n.d. (g)) of this mission.

UNSOM, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, was established on June 3, 2013. The mandate of UNSOM was subsequently renewed until October 31, 2023. (United Nations, 2022d) The goal is “to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability” in Somalia. (UNSOM, n. d.) Turkey supported this mission with one expert on mission until September 2022 (United Nations, 2022a).

There were 179 persons from Turkey in UN missions in September 2022 altogether, which is not a very large number considering that total number of UN peacekeepers was 75,224, according to UN official data from September 2022 (United Nations, n.d. (a)) and the greatest contributor, Bangladesh, is giving 7003 personnel for the UN missions. (United Nations, 2022c) But it is significant that Turkey tries to support and be present in almost all of the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. In October 2022 there were seven UN missions operating in Africa and Turkey contributed to six of them. (United Nations, 2022b)

In connection with Turkish participation in NATO operations in Africa the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: “Turkey participates in Operation Ocean Shield which was initiated by NATO on 17 August 2009 to contribute to the international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Turkey supports a long-term role for NATO in combating piracy and contributes actively to these endeavours. Within this context, Turkey participates in Combined Task Force-151 (CTF-151) as well as NATO’s Ocean Shield Operation with naval vessels.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, n. d.) According to the article of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey also participated in NATO’s “Operations Unified Protector” (OUP), which was launched to protect Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas after the crisis of the Gaddafi government. The operation was between March 23 and October 31, 2011. “Turkey contributed to the OUP with frigates, a submarine, two tanker aircrafts and four F-16s fighters, in non-combat roles. The operation was successfully concluded on 31 October 2011” – stated the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, n. d.).

Turkey also contributed to EU military missions in Africa. Ankara supported the European Union Force Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), conducted between April 2014 and March 2015, and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) conducted between February 2013 and May 2018 (Siradag, 2018).

Turkish Defense Products to African Countries




Figure 1: African countries Turkey exporting military products
Source: Besenyő, J. (2021), ‘Turkey’s growing interest on the African continent’, JCEEAS –Vol. 1, No. 1-2
transformed by the author according to <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

Turkey is working on to be less dependent on foreign military products, and become more of a self-sufficient country in connection with military products, as well as an exporter of military products, in which the country is quite successful. The latest data from SIPRI shows that Turkey fell from being the 3rd largest recipient of US arms between 2012-2016 to being the 21st between 2017-2021. Examining the same periods Turkey increased its major arms export by 31 % (Wezeman, Kuimova and Wezeman, 2021). Both information regarding changes between 2012-16 and 2017-21 is quite a big shift for Turkey. Between 2017 to 2021 Turkey was the 12th largest arms exporter, (Wezeman, Kuimova and Wezeman, 2021) and the country aims to to be among the top six countries in the world in terms of defense and aerospace exports, (Sünnetci, 2021) and to reach a total of US\$25 Billion export in this field until 2023 for the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey (Sünnetci, 2019b). Aiming this goal Turkey is working to reach more and more buyers for its military products, it is reported that in the beginning of 2019 Turkey exported defence products to over 60 countries (Sünnetci, 2019b) however, only 2,5 years later the country exported to 140 countries in the summer of 2021 (Sünnetci, 2021). More and more African country are interested in what Turkey can offer for its security and military and many African states have already ordered Turkish defence products.

According to data from recent years, the following African countries have already imported Turkish military products in the past 5 years. We will number each African purchaser country to see together how many of the African states have already imported Turkish military products in recent years.

Until 2019 we know that these African countries were among the main purchasers of Turkish military products in the continent:

1. Burkina Faso, 2. Cameroon, 3. Chad, 4. Egypt, 5. Ghana, 6. Kenya, 7. Libya, 8. Nigeria, 9. Senegal, 10. South Africa, 11. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12. Tunisia (Sünnetci, 2019b)

After 2019 we have information about some other African countries who purchased Turkish military products:

13. Tanzania in 2019, (Bakeer, 2019) 15. Morocco in 2021 (France 24, 2021). 16. Togo in the autumn of 2021 (Lionel, 2022). 14. Angola also imported Turkish military products in the end of 2021 (France 24, 2021).

From the year 2021 we know about several African countries who purchased Turkish military products, we only mention those who are new compared to the other countries mentioned earlier:

17. Algeria, 18. Mali, 19. Mauritania, 20. Niger, 21. Rwanda, 22. Somalia, 23. Uganda. (Bayram, 2022) Also there is information that (24.) Ethiopia imported “arms and ammunition, parts and accessories” from Turkey in 2021. (Trading Economics, n. d.)

List of the African countries purchased Turkish defence products between 2018-22
Algeria
Angola
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
Egypt
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
South Africa
Tanzania
the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda

Table 2: List of the African countries purchased Turkish defence products between 2018-21 (in alphabetic order)
Source: The authors construction according to own research

As we can see on Figure 1, nearly half of the African countries have already purchased Turkish military products in recent years. Africa is large market for military products with a few major exporters (Russia, US, France, Germany, China) dominating a huge percentage (76%) (The Conversation, 2022) of military products export to the continent, but Turkey was still able increase its export to Africa in the recent years.

From 2017 to 2020 the Turkish defence and aerospace industry achieved steady and increasing export to Africa: in 2017 the Turkish defence and aerospace export to the African continent was 63,790 Million USD (Sünnetci, 2019b). In the following year,

in 2018, Turkey could reach: USD 84,349 million (Sünnetci, 2019b) in this category, which is more than 32 % increase. In 2019 it fell by about 10% to 75,961 million, (Sünnetci, 2019a) but in 2020 increased by about 10% to USD 82.9 million (Hairsine and Ünveren, 2022). The revenue that Turkey could earn from the export of its defence products to the African continent in 2020 is several million dollars higher than in 2017. We can see that this is an annual average increase of 10%, from USD 63,790 million to USD 82.9 million in three years. What is even more spectacular is that in 2021 Turkey earned USD 460.6 million from exports of defence and aerospace products to Africa, a more than five-fold (about 560%) increase compared to 2020 (Kenez, 2022a). Although according to SIPRI 2021 data Turkey is still only has 0,5% share of global defence military export to the African continent and still far behind Russia, who has a 44% share of major arms exports to African countries, and USA (17 %) both of which export billions of USD worth major arms to the continent, and also behind China (10 %) and France (6.1 %) (Wezeman, Kuimova and Wezeman, 2021), but considering the possibilities of Turkey and the efforts Ankara made towards selling Turkish defence, military and aerospace products to African countries the result is outstanding as the numbers skyrocketed between 2020 and 2021. The huge increase in the Turkish defence and aerospace export to Africa also indicates that the African countries have growing interest for Turkish products (Yaşar, 2022). What is more, although in 2021 Turkey's arms sales reached a record level in general, but the biggest increase was in the export to African countries, which shows that Turkey still has great potential in this market. (Kenez, 2022a). The reason of the increase of Turkish export is interpreted differently by experts: some see it as a successful outcome of the Turkish government's strategy of making Africa Turkey's new arms market. Others believe that Turkey has aggressive marketing that favours companies belonging to businessmen close to President Erdoğan (Kenez, 2022a).

Let us see the advantages of the Turkish military products that are making their way in Africa at the midst of other defence and military products with different backgrounds.

Nowadays, Turkish military products are reaching the level of state-of-the-art and also meet NATO-standards, but at the same time they are cheaper than similar products made in Western countries. Furthermore, Turkish military products are reported to be delivered on time and have good after-sales service (Sünnetci, 2019b).

Some experts highlight that besides the high quality and low cost the Turkish military products are sold with fewer strings attached (France 24, 2021), some even say there are no-strings attached (Yaşar, 2022). This indicates that some African countries feel that buying products from other countries make them attached to the seller, but according to some experts buying Turkish military products leaves more room for African countries as buyers and does not attach them so tightly to Turkey than if they would buy from others. On the other, hand some other experts state that the arms

exports from Turkey to Africa is an element which helps Turkey to build deeper bonds with African countries (Yaşar, 2022). It is clear that we already listed the main conditions that decide the sale of military products: quality, price, obligation, arrival of the order, after-sale service. But there is one emotional factor which helps Turkey to strengthen its position in certain regions in Africa, especially in the Sahel: in the midst of political discontent and anti-French sentiment Turkey can position itself as a new and reliable partner who is not a former colonial power (Seleshie, 2022). As we can see it on Figure 1, most of the countries of the Sahel already purchased Turkish military products. What is more, for example in 2018, Senegal, a Sahel country, was the only African country of the top 15 countries that imported defence and aerospace products from Turkey. In that year Senegal had the largest increase of the import of the Turkish military products as an African country compared to the year before (Sünnetci, 2019b).

Studying what kind of defence and military products Turkey sell to the African countries we can see electronic and technical equipment, armored transport vehicles and ships are present frequently (Besenyő, 2021). Some other reports say, lower-cost equipment, particularly rifles, handguns and armoured vehicles are also popular, however, targeting pods, combat aircrafts also occurred in some orders (Martín, 2021). We can have exact examples for products from the following: “African countries are mostly interested in armoured vehicles (OTOKAR 4x4, NUROL Ejder), battle and sniper rifles (MKE PMT-76, MKE KNT 76), as well as drones/UAV (ANKA-S, BAYRAKTAR TB2)” (Seleshie, 2022).

We should highlight more the background of two product of this list:

Otokar is a leading supplier of the Turkish Military and Security Forces for tactical vehicles and its products are widely used in Africa. In 2019 the General Manager of Otokar, Serdar Görgüç said that: „Africa is among our principal markets and we aim to increase our presence in the continent” (ASDNews, 2019). As the firm is a registered NATO and United Nations supplier, Otokar is delivering vehicles with modern equipment in line with the specific needs of users in Africa and several countries in the continent already using them. For example, Otokar Cobra was sold in a large number on the continent to: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tunisia. „The 4x4 Cobra vehicle features a common platform that can be adapted for a variety of roles, and the vehicle can be used as a weapons carrier, reconnaissance vehicle, armoured personnel carrier, ambulance, NBC reconnaissance vehicle etc. The Cobra can transport between four and nine people, including the driver, depending on configuration” (Martín, 2021).

An other Turkish-made military product popular in Africa is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) of the company Baykar: Bayraktar TB2 drone, which was already used in Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria (Kharief, 2022b). This is a Tactical UAV capable of conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and armed attack missions. Some experts say that Turkey uses its Bayraktar drone as an „armaments

ambassador” in Africa, which paves the way for Turkish companies (Kharief, 2022b). Bayraktar TB2 Drone’s length is 6.5 meter, the width is 12 meters. This drone can carry 95 kg projectiles if it is needed and its maximum firing range is 15 kilometers (Baykar, n. d.). In Libya these drones helped the UN-recognised government contain rebels led by Khalifa Haftar.

Discussing the increase of military export to Africa, the head of Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (the NGO which hosted Turkey-Africa partnership summit in December 2021), Nail Olpak, emphasised that “if we see the defence sector only as weapons, rockets, guns, tanks and rifles, it would be wrong” - highlighting the fact that the Turkish military export has a much wider scale. A good example of this is the Turkish mine-clearing vehicles, which qualify as defense industry sales, and have already been sold in the continent to Togo (France 24, 2021).

Defence Agreements with Turkey

African Countries Linked to Turkey with At Least one Military or Security Agreement	
Field of Cooperation	Countries
Military Training, Science & Techniques	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia
Gendarme Training	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya
Police Training	Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinee Bissau, Niger, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda
Defense Industry & Scientifique Cooperation	Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan

Table 3: Defence Agreements between Turkey and African countries

Source: Alexe Fridolin Kenfack Kitio, *The Rising Security Cooperation of Turkey In Africa*, p. 46

We have seen how much the sales of Turkish military products to the African continent have shown recently, however, not only the export of Turkish military products to Africa has increased significantly, but also Turkish efforts to sign various types of security-related cooperation agreements with African countries. New agreements have been signed in recent years between Turkey and African countries, such as agreements on the training of security personnel and security cooperation agreements, which are much broader in scope. Some of the security personnel training agreements permitted Turkey to open training facilities. Military framework agreements, subjects of security cooperation agreements, cover training, technical and scientific cooperation (Yaşar, 2022).

Turkey signed different types of security-related agreements with 30 African states in total, many of them are keen to take advantage of Turkey's experience in the counter-insurgencies, the modernization of its security sectors, and the developments of its defence industry (Yaşar, 2022). Objectives of the agreements, signed with Uganda, Benin, Sudan, Tanzania and the Ivory Coast in 2021: Industrial production, as well as the sale and maintenance of military equipment, technical and logistical support and information exchange (Martín, 2021).

Studying the agreement between Ghana and Turkey (Framework Agreement Ghana 2011) it can be seen as a perfect example to get an idea of the points of military agreements between Turkey and African countries. The Framework Agreement Ghana 2011 details the fields of cooperation in the area of army and military industry in these points:

- „Cooperation in military training and instruction;
- Cooperation between military institutions and contact visits;
- Participation in exercises/training, sending observers to exercises;
- Cooperation in defense industry;
- Military cooperation between the Armed Forces;
- The organizational structure of the Armed Forces;
- The structure and equipment of military units, personnel management;
- Cooperation in military intelligence;
- Cooperation in military medicine and health services;
- Cooperation on communication, electronics and information systems;
- Cooperation in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and counter piracy operations;
- Exchange of information on military legal systems;
- Cooperation in the field of mapping and hydrography;
- Exchange of personnel for professional development;
- Cooperation in military scientific and technological research;
- Social, sportive and cultural activities;
- Other areas to be agreed upon by the Parties” (Kenfack Kitio, 2020)

As we can see that this agreement and usually defence, military agreements between Turkey and African countries helps both sides. For example, it allows Ankara

to build new markets for Turkish military products, but it helps the African country, in this case Ghana, for example to modernise its military with Turkish help in field of training, equipment, education.

Another agreement which is worth highlighting is the military agreement with Tunisia from 2017, which includes the training of Tunisian military personnel, mainly on Turkish soil, and an arrangement on investments for the import of Turkish military equipment. The agreement is extraordinary in that it broke the fifty-year-old exclusive market access preference reserved for the French and American military industries and opened a new market for Turkish military products with crucial importance to Ankara (Kharief, 2022a). This agreement also shows that even if Turkey is a smaller actor today and has less experience in the field of military exports to Africa, there are still huge opportunities for them, as more and more African countries are opening up to Turkish products. For example, in 2021, Tunisia received interest-free loans worth USD 150 million to purchase Turkish military equipment (Kharief, 2022a).

Military agreements, as we can see, are important tools for Turkey to strengthen its presence on the African continent, but they are usually connected to other fields that we listed at the beginning:

1. Selling Turkish defense products to African countries
2. Training African troops and give them products and know how.
3. Turkish troops in Africa.

We can see that military agreements are usually tools for Turkey to pave the way for other actions Turkey wants to take to strengthen its connections with Africa.



Figure 2: Defence Agreements between Turkey and African countries
Source: The authors construction

Turkish Training of African Troops

Many African country needs to modernise its army and security institutions not only with equipment but also with structure, training, education, and Turkey able to help in this field and seems to be a partner in that.




Figure 3: Training cooperation between Turkey and African countries
Source: Besenyő, J. (2021), 'Turkey's growing interest on the African continent', JCEEAS, Vol. 1, No. 1-2, transformed by the author.

As we can see on Table 3, Turkey has training programs with the Gambia, Senegal, Algeria, Libya, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania.

Training cooperations give African countries different opportunities to get training for their military and security personnel from Turkish experts. The training can take place in the African country in question or in Turkish soil. Mostly leaders and staff of given African army is trained abroad in Turkey, most of the officers and NCOs would receive their training in their home country from Turkish professionals, like the training program with Somalia (Besenyő, 2021). Although there are some programs where African officers and NCOs are trained also in Turkey.

According to research of Alexe Fridolin Kenfack Kitio 2,200 military personnel from African countries received military training in Turkey by the end of 2014 and thousands of African military staffs could have training in Turkish military school until 2020. In 2017, 176 African militaries completed their training in Turkey, and for the year 2017-2018, 290 other African had the same opportunity (Kenfack Kitio, 2020).

In the year of 2013-2014 a total of 3,000 Libyan troops divided in groups of 500 received 14 months of training in Isparta, Turkey in the field of Internal Security (Şazak and Nazli, 2016). The UN recognised the government of Libya (led by Fayed al-Sarraj), but rebellious attacks led by Khalifa Haftar endangered its position since 2019. Turkey

got involved not only rhetorically but with actions: sent troops and Bayraktar drones to the Libyan government to fight back the rebels and also gave professional training for the military forces of GNA (Government of National Unity) (Zoubir, 2020).

Some Turkish Institution we can highlight regarding this topic. In The Turkish National Defence University (TNDU) almost 104 African officials from countries such as Algeria, Gambia, Senegal and Somalia received their training since creation of the University (Kenfack Kitio, 2020). The Centre of Excellence Defence against terrorism (COE-DAT) is based in Ankara and functioning in collaboration with 8 NATO countries. The NATO stated that this institute is aligned with NATO Quality Standards and gave it an unconditional accreditation (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, n. d.). Since this Centre is specialised on fight against terrorism, many African country who has problem with terrorist groups (such as Boko Haram, Al Shabab, Al Quaida in the Islamic Maghreb) decide to train their personnel in Turkey in COE-DAT (Kenfack Kitio, 2020).

Until 2019, from the 1990's, 7500 Gambian soldiers got training from Turkey (Alam, 2019). Considering the years and the total number it is about 250 Gambian soldiers yearly. Supporting our calculations, it is reported that in January of 2022 250 Gambian soldiers arrived to Turkey to the training base of Isparta to receive counterterrorism training (Kenez, 2022c). Regarding that the Gambian Army is 8000 soldier strong the number of Gambian soldiers trained by Turkey year after year is considerable.

Turkish Troops in Africa

Last action on our list for Turkey to strengthen its military, defence connection in Africa is to deploy Turkish troops in an African country. And now, of course, we are only talking about sending Turkish troops to a country according to a bilateral agreement of course and not because of Turkey has war or conflict with the African country in question.




Figure 4: Turkish Troops in Africa

Source: Besenyő, J. (2021), 'Turkey's growing interest on the African continent', JCEEAS, Vol. 1, No. 1-2, Transformed by the author

There is only two country so far where Turkish troops are present officially. In Libya and in Somalia. Both cases are different from each other.

In Libya the government, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, acknowledged by the UN, called for international help for former partners of Libya when anti-government military forces, led by Khalifa Haftar attack the government in 2019. Turkey was also addressed and decided to intervene in the conflict. After the Turkish parliament gave permission Turkish troops were sent to Libya. Since then Turkish soldiers are supporting the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) against the rebel's Libyan National Army (LNA). Turkey deployed hundreds of soldiers in support of the GNA, besides of high-tech military products, like Bayraktar TB2 drones. The US Defense Department states that Ankara also paid and called thousands of Syrian fighters to Libya, but the Turkish government denies such claims of misconduct (Jones, 2021). What is for sure that Turkish troops are present in Libya and provides also training for military forces affiliated with GNA, according to Tripoli-based government's Army Staff (The Libya Update, 2022). Although the UN put an arms embargo on Libya and called out all foreign soldiers from Libya, Turkish troops are still there. Ankara argues that Turkey's presence in Libya is legitimate because the UN recognised government called Turkey for help, secondly the GNA has the right of self-defence but lacks a power for that, so Turkey is supporting it. Turkey criticised the situation that Russia, France, UAE, Egypt recognize the GNA government officially but call Turkey to stop aiding the GNA and at the same time support the anti-government military of Haftar (International Crisis Group, 2020). According to Turkish presidential spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, Turkish troops stationed in Libya will remain there as long as a bilateral military agreement between Ankara and Tripoli is active and Libya's government requests it (The Arab Weekly, 2021).

The other country where Turkish troops are present in Africa is Somalia, near Mogadishu. The reason and background of the presence of Turkish troop is different than the case in Libya. Turkey started to strengthen its relationship with Somalia since the great famine in the country in 2011. In the last more than 10 years Turkey took part in various humanitarian project and investments, which helped Somalia to develop and also gave several good economic opportunities to Turkish businesses.

Turkey took a huge part in modernising the Somali Army organizationally, giving professional training for several Somali soldier and policemen (Kenez, 2022b). From 2010 there is a military training cooperation accord between Somalia and Turkey, and since 2017 Turkey is training Somali soldiers and policemen in Somalia. The location is special in its kind, called the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK), known in Somalia as Camp TURKSOM (Can Kasapoglu, 2020). Some called it a military base, but Turkey's ambassador to Somalia, Olgan Bekar, clarified that it is "not a military base like the one Turkey has in Qatar," but "a military training camp" (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018). Although a foreign military base would be not so unique in Somalia, seeing the



fact that the UK, the USA, and the UAE already have military bases in this country (Seleshie, 2022).

The complex of STGK was built by Turkey from the ground from about 50 million USD, started in March 2015 and was finished in the beginning of 2017. It is 400 hectares and houses three military schools, dormitories, depots and lounge. Camp TURKSOM is the base of the Turkish Contingent of about 300 soldiers and officers (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018).

The mission of Camp TURKSOM is, according to Turkish officials: 1, to protect Somalia from the scourge of al-Shabab and 2, provide meaningful security assistance, training. (Ahmed, 2021)

The goal is to train 10,000 members of the Somali National Army (SNA) and since its opening until summer of 2022, total of 5000 SNA soldiers and officers have already graduated here, which is already one-third of the SNA (Kenez, 2022b). One hundred of the Turkish soldiers are instructors in the complex and the other two hundred is protecting the facility. That is why some experts says that in functional terms, the Turkish military presence in Camp Turksom is not an overseas base (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018). Turkey extended the mandate of Turkish troops in Gulf of Aden, Somalia until February of 2023 for the stability of the region (Middle East Monitor, 2022).

Conclusions

We initially asked how Turkey could strengthen its army and military industry presence in Africa, and we saw that there are certain steps that Turkey can take to that end. The second question concerns the fields of these actions which shows the presence of Turkey in an African country. We have listed five of these fields and we have seen that all of them are valid in this topic, as there are some examples of them. Looking in detail at the five actions listed at the beginning we can see that these are not only the types of presence, but also the levels, which show how deep the connection between Turkey and that African country is in the field of the army and military industry. These can be seen as related fields that form a kind of a chain.

The appropriate way to decide the relation between our 5 actions listed at the beginning is to analyze the case of a country where we can find all of them, and Somalia seems to be a good example. So, if we look at the history of the connection between Turkey and Somalia, we can make arguments about the question of the relation of our five actions:

-Turkey supported UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II 1993-1995) (Siradag, 2018).

- 2009 Turkey joined CTF 151, the multinational counter-piracy task force off the Somali coast (Melvin, 2019).
- 2010 Turkish leadership pledged humanitarian and military assistance to Somalia, to restore integrity, for the establishment and training of the Somali Army, Police
- There is a military training cooperation accord from 2010 between Turkey and Somalia (Can Kasapoğlu, 2020) and other agreements on Military Training, Science and Techniques, Police Training, Defense Industry and Scientific Cooperation (Kenfack Kitio, 2020).
- Turkey trained the SNA with Turkish-made weapons and also donated some Turkish-made military vehicles to them, leading some to say that Turkey is creating market for its military industry (Ahmed, 2021).
- Turkey built a training center in Mogadishu in 2017

The Somali-Turkish army and military industry connections clearly illustrate that action points we listed at the beginning, about how Turkey can strengthen its military connections with African countries, are actions interconnected actions. Even if we cannot say that one action always follows the other one as successive steps, it is clear that the more of these actions Turkey and an African country can make towards each other, the deeper their military connection will be. “Turkey in Africa: A New Emerging Power?” book also states that the training of African security personnel by Turkish trainers was an aftereffect of Turkey’s pragmatic peacekeeping support on the continent, (Tepeciklioğlu and Tepeciklioğlu, 2021) supporting our statement that the actions in our introduction are not just individual tools for Turkey to strengthen its connection with the African continent, but levels, which show the depth of connections between Ankara and an African country. Put simply: Turkey’s support for an international peacekeeping mission in an African country is the level at which Turkey has a connection with that country, but it is a milder level than Turkey being able to provide training programs to that African country. Providing training for an African country is a parallel level to the sale of Turkish military products to that country, or it would represent the next, deepening level of the connection between Turkey and an African country. Sending Turkish troops to a country means an even more serious connection between the two countries. What is more: “Turkey in Africa: A New Emerging Power?” states that The Gambia is the first place where Turkey started providing a training program to an African country, it was the “first such experiment” (from 1991) and the result of this mission was that Turkey and The Gambia built strong personal relations within the Gambian army during the decades and The Gambia began using Turkish military products. (Tepeciklioğlu and Tepeciklioğlu, 2021) The authors emphasize that after Gambia, Turkey could start its training cooperation in several other African countries and thereby strengthen Turkish influence in other countries. This indicates that the countries where Turkey may start training programs, have deeper defence-level military

connections with Ankara, which could become even deeper with new defence agreements and Turkish military exports to the country.

The training programs also helped Turkey build close, high-ranking connections with African military leadership: In Gambia the Chief of Defense Staff of Gambia's armed forces is Major General Yankuba Drammeh, who was a trainee in the Turkish training program and he is now said to be a great proponent of Turkish military assistance to West Africa (Tepeciklioğlu and Tepeciklioğlu, 2021). In Somalia the Chief of the Somali Armed Forces Brig. Gen. Odawaa Yusuf Rageh graduated from the Turkish Military Academy in 2021. These two persons illustrate the success of Turkish military trainings, which prove to be a good investment for Turkey, because having good, close connection with the Chief of the Army of an African country facilitates other military cooperations, and also makes the selling of Turkish military products to that country easier. Some expert observations support our statements that if there is a mutually reinforcing policy of arms exports, military training and defence diplomacy between Turkey and some African countries, it will enable the Turkish administration to build long-term and institutional relations with African countries (Yaşar, 2022).

If there are Turkish troops in an African country, it shows the deepest, closest connection with Turkey, but we need to state that Turkey does not seem to seek to be present with its own troops in more and more African countries. It is quite logical from the point of view that the deployment of national forces abroad cost a lot of money and effort and can completely ruin the connection with the African country, if the partner country does need, accept and allow the presence of the Turkish military one hundred percent. So, sending Turkish troops to an African country shows the closest connection between Turkey and the actual African country, but it cannot be a permanent part of the strategy to strengthen connections with an African country, unless the African country requests or needs it.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Fighting in North Africa in 1942/1943 and the 1943 Casablanca Conference and their Consequences¹

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Abstract:

1941 brought a significant change in the course of the Second World War. The German offensive against the Soviets and the Japanese fleet's attack on Pearl Harbor rearranged the balance of power, as the Soviet Union and the United States of America became belligerents. On the eastern battlefield, a bloody fight broke out between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, while in Africa the German-Italian troops faced off against the British and American units. At the turn of 1942/1943, a turning point occurred in the course of the Second World War both on the eastern battlefield and in Africa, and in 1943, the military formations led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had to face the fact that Africa could be permanently lost for the Axis powers.

Keywords:

French North Africa, Casablanca, Casablanca directive, El-Alamein, German Africa Corps / Afrika Korps, Operation Torch, Second World War

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Introduction

After Italy declared war on 10 June 1940 to France and Britain, it also tried to enforce its political and military goals in Africa (Lieb, 2018, p. 14–15). On 4 July 1940, the Ethiopian Italian garrison first occupied certain border towns of the Condominium of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, then they broke into Kenya and on 3 August attacked British Somaliland Protectorate, which is important for checking the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, which was soon occupied. In response to this, in November 1940, the British launched a major offensive in East Africa, and by spring 1941 they also occupied Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. This ensured British authority in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal (Ferwagner, 2008, p. 62, Sipos, 1997, p. 543-547, Playfair, 1954, p. 165–178).

The Italians, on the other hand, not only tried to achieve results in East Africa, but from Libya from their North African colonies, they wanted to occupy Egypt, then Suez, and finally the Middle East oil fields under the command of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. The plan was undoubtedly ambitious, and the campaign of the Italians launched on 13 September 1940 was rapidly broken on Richard N. O'Connor's troops resistance, then turned into a disorganized escape after the British counterattack, as a result of which 130,000 Italian soldiers were captured by British (Ferwagner, 2008, p. 66).

Although the British achieved more serious results in the second half of 1940 and in the spring of 1941 in North and East Africa, in the main European military theater, Germany had the control of events, and with exception of the British Islands, almost every country in Western Europe were under German occupation. In the year between the summer of 1940 and 1941, Great Britain fought virtually alone against the Third Empire. For the British, there was a significant change in the military situation with the German offensive against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, and the Japanese with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. At that time, the great power in Far East destroyed much of the United States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. In response the next day the United States and the United Kingdom also declared war on the Japanese Empire (Sipos, 1994, p. 33, 551).

The Gaining Ground of Anglo-Saxons in North Africa

After the entry of the United States of America into the war, negotiations began between the Anglo-Saxon great powers regarding the war policy to be followed. At the meeting held in Washington between 22 December 1941 and 4 January 1942, under the code name Arcadia, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the American and British political and military leaders began to develop a joint strategy for the war. They agreed that defeating Germany was their primary task, and to coordinate military operations, they established the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

consisting of British and American military leaders. At the meeting, it was decided that the Allies would land in North Africa in the spring of 1942, and that the plans for the Normandy landings would begin to be developed in the Operations Department of the American Chief of Staff, headed by Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The aim was to carry out the operation by 1 April 1943 (Israeljan, 1974, p. 116, 122). During the Arcadia conference (1 January 1942), the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and 22 other states (Halmossy, 1983, p. 533) published a joint declaration of the United Nations on their war goals. In it, they declared that the war against the Axis powers would be fought in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on 12 August 1941. They declared that they would mobilize all their forces for victory and would not make a separate peace.

Although the Americans and the British agreed that they would land in North Africa in the spring of 1942, this did not happen. However, the Germans were there, as the Italian government requested military assistance from Germany on 19th December 1940. On 3 February 1941, the Berlin government decided on the military support of the Italians in North Africa. Soon after, the German Africa Corps, under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, landed in North Africa on 11 February. Shortly, on 24 March, El Agheila was occupied by the Germans, and on 10 April, the German units reached the Egyptian border, and as an addition, they managed to capture General O'Connor and his commanding staff (Playfair, 1956, p. 12–18, 31, United States Military Academy, 1945, p. 20).

The British launched an attack on 18 November 1941, but the Germans launched a counterattack on 13 December but the British temporarily came out better in the struggle when they managed to capture Benghazi on 24 December. At the beginning of the following year, the fighting between the British and the German-Italian troops continued in North Africa. The fortunes of war favored the forces of the Axis powers, and by the end of January Benghazi was again under German control, then on 21 June Tobruk was under the control of Rommel's units, and finally on June 30 they reached El-Alamein in Egypt. Then the so-called in the first battle of El-Alamein, the German-Italian troops tried unsuccessfully to break through the well-built British defense line, so from the beginning of July, the military forces of the Axis powers had to arrange themselves for defense in the region. During the summer, the German-Italian formations made several attempts to advance towards Alexandria and Cairo, but during the last attack launched on 30 August, their attack stalled 20 km before Alexandria after the troops of Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery, who had been appointed head of the British 8th Army, stopped them. The British waited with the counterattack. In the Battle of Alamein, which took place between 23 October and 4 November 1942, Lieutenant General Montgomery defeated the forces of Field Marshal Rommel, who was forced to order his troops to retreat on 4 November 1942 (Karsai, 1981, p. 331, 338–339, 345, Playfair, 1960, p. 338–339).



The decisive victory of the British in Egypt came at the best time, because in the late autumn of 1942, another attack by the Anglo-Saxons in Africa began. The historical background of this is that negotiations between the American chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, Harry Hopkins, the president's adviser, and the British general staff and government began in London in April 1942 regarding the second front line in Europe. The Americans wanted to land in France, the British supported the North African landing for geopolitical reasons. Finally, on 24 July 1942, the Anglo-Saxons decided to invade North-West Africa, codenamed Operation Torch. On 26 July with the approval of Churchill, Roosevelt appointed Eisenhower as the commander of their troops, under whose command 125,000 soldiers of the American-British forces (82,600 of them Americans) began the landing in French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria) on 8 November 1942., in order to acquire the colony, which was under the control of Vichy France and which, starting from the German-French armistice concluded on 22 June 1940, was considered a neutral state like its mother country in international law (Karsai, 1981, p. 349-352, Anderson, 1993, p. 5, 26).

The French had a serious antipathy towards the British since the fleet attack at Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July 1940, when the British sank the units of the French fleet stationed there to prevent them from coming under German control. Because of this incident, some of the French became anti-English. Despite this, the French were not clearly dismissive of the Anglo-Saxons and were inclined to support the Americans and British. Finally, in order not to scare the French away from supporting the Anglo-Saxons, British soldiers also went to war under American flags when the Anglo-Saxons landed on the North African coast (Karsai, 1981, p. 356–357, Anderson, 1993, p. 28, 30. Playfair, 1966, p. 147–148).

The Allies managed to hide their attack plan from the German intelligence (Abwehr) and thus the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), i.e. the High Command of the German Army, received false information (Karsai, 1981, p. 357).

The Allies would have begun their invasion of French North Africa in three main directions (Casablanca under Major General George S. Patton Jr., Oran under Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall and Algiers under British Lieutenant General Kenneth A. N. Anderson) at dawn on 8 November. In the end, instead of Lieutenant General Anderson, the American Major General Charles W. Ryder led the Allied forces attacking in the direction of Algiers due to the sensitivity of the French. The shipping tasks of the attackers were coordinated by the British Royal Navy, while the air support of the ground troops was handled by the British and American air forces under separate commands. The US Air Force was headed by Brigadier General James H. Doolittle (Anderson, 1993, p. 6).

The Allies encountered serious resistance only in the age of Casablanca and Oran, while negotiations between the Americans and the French were already taking place in the background. General Alphonse Juin was contacted by the American Consul Robert

Murphy on 7 November to inform him about the landing, but the French did not change sides due to the return of Admiral François Darlan, finally, in Algiers on 13 November, shortly after the capture of Casablanca and Oran, Admiral Darlan and Lieutenant General Eisenhower concluded an agreement with each other, so that 100,000 soldiers of the French troops in North Africa switched to the side of the Allies (Ferwagner, 2008, p. 75). In return, the Americans recognized Darlan as the *de facto* head of state of French North Africa and General Henri Giraud as the commander-in-chief of the French troops (Sipos, 1994, p. 42). The action of the Americans earned the wrath of General Charles de Gaulle, who was the leader of Free France. De Gaulle felt insulted that the Americans negotiated with a Frenchman whom he considered a collaborator - Darlan - and not with him, who had been fighting on the side of the Allies against the Axis powers since 1940. In this regard, Churchill explained to de Gaulle that he accepted his objections in the case of Darlan, but that their most important goal was the displacement of Italian and German forces from Africa. And this is only a temporary situation. Although Charles de Gaulle accepted the British position, but he still had reservations about this situation. Finally, after the assassination of Darlan in Algiers on 24 December 1942, General Giraud became the leader of the colony, which created a new situation, although de Gaulle's distrust of the Americans and the French leaders of the colony remained (De Gaulle, 1973, p. 259).

The OKW reacted quickly to the situation and on 9 November they occupied the Bizerte and Tunis airports with paratrooper formations, then on 15 November they took Tunis and took possession of the most important ports and airports. In Europe, as part of the Atilla Plan, the Germans invaded Vichy France, but the French fleet stationed in Toulon was sunk by French sailors, so it did not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After Operation Torch, the situation of the Anglo-Saxon troops in North Africa became extremely favorable. Although Ivan M. Majsky, the Soviet ambassador in London, had a devastating opinion about the Anglo-Saxon occupation of North Africa decades after the war: "[...] Churchill promised both in public and in his private conversations the quick end of the operations in North Africa, the results there (as expected) developed much more slowly than had been assumed. Several factors contributed to this: both the series of failures of Commander-in-Chief Eisenhower, both the disputes between Washington and London, both the military inexperience of the Anglo-American troops, both the higher standard of the enemy's military command (with Rommel at the head), and many other things" (Majszkij, 1975, p. 606). Despite the Soviet ambassador's opinion, by February 1943, the forces of the Axis powers were pushed back to the Tunisian bridgehead from the Allied troops advancing from two directions, which created another opportunity for further attacks by the Anglo-Saxons, now against Europe.

The Casablanca and Washington conferences

In addition to the combat events, the Allies also made important military and political decisions shortly after the success of Operation Torch. At the beginning of December 1942, American President Roosevelt proposed that the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union hold a meeting somewhere in North Africa to discuss the most important issues of the war and of the subsequent period (Majszkij, 1975, p. 603). In a letter to Roosevelt dated 6 December 1942, Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin canceled the invitation to the meeting planned for mid-January 1943 citing the Battle of Stalingrad. Thus, only the Anglo-Saxons and the French were represented at the conference held between 14 and 24 January 1943 in Casablanca, French-Morocco, which had been conquered in November. Led by American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the American and British political and military leaders, as well as the French, continued negotiations in Casablanca at the Anfa Hotel and 14 adjacent villas (United States Department of State, 1968, p. 522–523, Churchill, 1989, pp. 186–188). Among the Anglo-Saxon political and military leaders present on the American side were Presidential Advisor Harry Hopkins, Special Representative of the President Averell Harriman, General George C. Marshall, Admiral E.J. King, Lieutenant General H.H. Arnold, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the British side: General Harold Alexander, General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. On the French side, General Giraud was present with two staff officers from the beginning of the meeting, until after long negotiations, on 22 January 1943, Charles de Gaulle arrived in Casablanca, whom the Anglo-Saxons were able to seat at the same table with General Giraud with great difficulty, to discuss with each other, among other things, the situation in occupied France (Buchanan, 2014, p. 78–81). Among other things, De Gaulle's main concern was that, in his opinion, the Anglo-Saxons were interfering in the internal affairs of the French without authorization. As he told Churchill: “I have a duty to reckon with what remains of France's sovereignty. Do not doubt the sincere appreciation, which I feel for him [Churchill] and Roosevelt, but I do not admit that they have any right to settle the question of power in the French Empire.” (De Gaulle, 1973, p. 283).

Soviet diplomat Ivan M. Majsky wrote about the mood of the negotiations in Casablanca: “The Battle of Stalingrad is not over yet, but its outcome has already been decided. This circumstance strongly influenced the events of the conference. The mood of Roosevelt and Churchill at the conference can be roughly described as follows: the Russians fight magnificently; they take care of their own affairs; we, Englishmen and Americans, can occupy ourselves with the execution of our own plans; it is only necessary to maintain the good spirit in the Russians, for which wide ranging supplies, increased aerial bombardment of Germany and, of course, beautiful promises are sufficient.” (Majszkij, 1975, p. 603).

The actual negotiations began on 15 January 1943 in Casablanca between the political and military leaders, and after ten days of negotiations a compromise was reached on the most important issues. At its 61st meeting held in the Anfa “camp” on 19 January 1943, the Joint Committee of the Chiefs of Staff (on the American side: General Marshall, Admiral King, Lieutenant General Arnold, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Brigadier General John E. Hull, Brigadier General Albert C. Wedermeyer, Colonel Jacob E. Smart, Frigate Captain Ruthven E. Libby; on the British side: General Brooke, Admiral Pound, Air Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Vice-Admiral Mountbatten, Lieutenant General Ismay, Major General Sir John N. Kennedy and Lieutenant General Sir John C. Slessor) adopted CCS memorandum No. 155/1, i.e. the document entitled “Managing the War in 1943” (United States Department of State, 1968, p. 637, 774–775).

Regarding the Casablanca meeting, Churchill later noted, that at their joint press conference with Roosevelt on January 24 it became known to the public that the British and American leader was in Africa (Churchill, 1989, p. 194). And how well they managed to deceive, not only the public, but also the Germans, was immortalized in the diary entry of Hitler's Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels on 28 January 1943: “The sensation of the day is the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in Casablanca. So the discussions did not take place in Washington, as we thought, but in the hot land of Africa. Our intelligence service has once again failed completely, it was not even able to locate the location of the meeting. The discussions lasted almost two weeks; the hostile press talks very grandly about the gate of victory. [...] Stalin demonstrated with his absence. He did not even send his representative, which was declared very regrettable in the final announcement. Stalin declared that he could not leave the country as he had to lead the current offensive. In fact, he probably doesn't want to participate in the Anglo-Saxon pact.” (Goebbels, 1994, p. 350–351)

In Casablanca, decisions were made on quite sensitive issues affecting the Germans and their main European ally, Italy. From the continuation of the North African campaigns to the invasion of the Kingdom of Italy to the issue of European bombings. On the penultimate day of the almost one and a half of week conference, 23 January 1943, the political and military leaders met in full, to discuss the document “Managing the War in 1943” submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which contained the Allied military plans for 1943. On the American side: President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, General Marshall, Admiral King, Lieutenant General Arnold, Lieutenant General Somervell, Frigate Captain Libby. On the British side: Prime Minister Churchill, General Brooke, Admiral Pound, Air Marshal Portal, Marshal Dill, Vice Admiral Mountbatten, Lieutenant General Ismay were present. According to the ideas, the goal of the Anglo-Saxons was to defeat the German submarines, thereby turning the Battle of the Atlantic to their advantage, and to support the Soviets with as many supplies as possible. In addition to this, the goal on the European battlefield was still to defeat the

Germans, and to this end they set themselves the following tasks (United States Department of State, 1968, p. 637, 707, 774–775):

The Mediterranean region:

1.) The occupation of Sicily happened in the framework of the Husky operation since the connection to the Mediterranean Sea would be safer. This was a vital issue for the British Empire, as they were able to maintain contact with their Asian colonies via the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea and Gibraltar, while the easiest way for Iraqi oil to be delivered to Great Britain was via the Mediterranean Sea. That is why military activity in the Mediterranean region was a vital issue for the British versus landing in France. This was highlighted by Liddell Hart, who made the following statements regarding Italy's entry into the war on 10 June 1940: "...With Italy's entry into the war, the Mediterranean route became too risky, convoys carrying supplies and reinforcements had to go around the Cape of Good Hope, down along the west coast of the African continent, and from there up along the east coast and the Red Sea..." (Karsai, 1981, p. 195) The notes of US Chief of Staff George Marshall resonate with Hart's thoughts, too: "Axis powers control over the Mediterranean islands and the southern coasts of Europe – from Franco's Spain to Turkey – prevented our traffic in the Mediterranean, forced our ships to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, and this meant a detour of 12,000 miles." (Marshall, 1945, p. 28)

Another goal was to reduce German pressure on the eastern battlefield, but at the same time increase the military burden on the Italians. This is why the Sicilian landing (10 July 1943) was important, as it fell during the Citadel operation between 5 July and 13 July 1943. Thus, the allies significantly influenced the Battle of Kursk in the Belgorod and Orel region (Keegan, 2003, p. 589, 781–795, Szabó-Számvéber, 2002, p. 11–14).

2.) The involvement of Turkey to the Second World War on the side of the Allies. The British planned military actions in the Balkans involving Turkey, and there were ideas that the Allies would request air bases from the Turks for an air attack on Ploiești. At the Casablanca conference, the 62nd meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 19 dealt with the Turks. After Casablanca, Churchill held talks with Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu in Adana on 30–31 January 1943 (Üzenetváltás, 1981, p. 117, United States Department of State, 1968, p. 649–652, Iszraeljan, 1974, p. 175).

From the United Kingdom:

- 1.) Intensification of air attacks against the German military industry.
- 2.) Limited offensive operations.

3.) Joining forces with the aim of landing on the European continent as soon as the German resistance was sufficiently weakened.

4.) In addition, they wanted to maintain the pressure on Japan in the Far East and the Pacific region, so that they could launch an offensive against the island nation after defeating Germany. Therefore, the occupation of Burma, the Marshall Islands and the Carolina Islands was planned for 1943 (Churchill, 1989, p. 194, United States Department of State, 1968, p. 774-775).

Based on the above, the most important task was an offensive against Sicily as soon as possible to increase the pressure on the Italians and draw away German forces from the eastern battlefield. The other purpose was to make safer the Mediterranean shipping, they believed that due to the island's small area, there was no need to station significant occupying forces there. The Sicilian campaign, i.e. the Husky operation, was not incidental to the Anglo-Saxons in terms of moving the bases of the allied bombing forces further north, because it made the German bombing targets easier to reach (Eisenhower, 1982, p. 160).

On the issue of the Sicilian campaign, American and British ideas were different. According to Churchill, "General Eisenhower saw it as necessary to attack Sicily only if our objective is to clear the Mediterranean shipping lanes of the enemy. But if we want to attack and defeat Italy, we must first land on Sardinia and Corsica." (Churchill, 1989, p. 229). Generals Eisenhower and Marshall believed that, in military terms, the Mediterranean region was considered a secondary battlefield, and they wanted to carry out the main attack through the La-Manche Canal in 1944. Churchill however, explained the following opinion in his memoirs regarding to the debate: "Eisenhower was undoubtedly a great professional authority, but I could not share his opinion. Political factors also play a big role in the war, and we achieved much faster and far-reaching results by occupying Sicily and immediately after that we pushed into the Italian peninsula." (Churchill, 1989, p. 229).

Another burningly important issue of the Casablanca conference – perhaps the most important of all – was in addition to the Husky operation, the issue of the planned Normandy landings. It would have been extremely important for the Soviets to open a second front line in Western Europe, which the Allies had already planned at a conference codenamed Arcadia in Washington (22 December 1941 – 14 January 1942) – at that time for the spring of 1942 – however, it was postponed for various political and military reasons. For the Moscow leadership, due to the relief of the Red Army, there would have been a burning need to divide the forces of the Wehrmacht and force Germany into a two-front war. In principle, the American armed forces were ready for the attack by the spring of 1943 - the planned date of the campaign. At least US Vice President Henry A. Wallace thought in February 1943 that by opening the second front in 1943, they could defeat Germany that year. In addition, Harry Hopkins and the American Chief of Staff George C. Marshall believed that the invasion of France would

take place in 1943. This American perception was also supported by the words of Oliver Lyttleton, the British war production minister on 23 May 1943, who said that there was every opportunity to land ashore (Israeljan, 1974, p. 197-198).

General Marshall himself, in his report to the American Secretary of War after the World War, had this to say about the European battles: "It would have been advantageous to attack the Germans in Western Europe or Southern France immediately after the North African campaign, if this could have been carried out with the forces available to General Eisenhower. Except it wasn't" (Marshall, 1945, p. 28).

However, the British political leadership was of a different position. Even before the Casablanca conference, on 25 November 1942, a memorandum was presented, in which the capture of Sicily and the attack on Italy were designated as the main direction of attack (Israeljan, 1974, p. 175). Churchill himself wanted to postpone the Normandy invasion at the Casablanca conference, too. Because he believed that the air attacks would lay the foundation for the opening of the second front, while the Red Army and the Wehrmacht could cause significant losses to each other, which was obviously important to the British in terms of the political situation in Europe after the war. This is evident in Churchill's geopolitical pursuits during World War II.

In terms of military preparation, unlike Minister Lyttleton, Churchill had a completely different opinion. He explained to the Soviet ambassador in London that they were not militarily ready for the operation. In the end, British arguments triumphed in Casablanca, and the priority of the year 1943 became the European air war, in addition to the Mediterranean. Experts and leaders in this field had been studying the question of how to increase the scale of air attacks against the Axis powers for some time. Back on 3 November 1942, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Staff of the British Royal Air Force, analyzed the expected developments of the bomber offensive in a report, and he voiced his opinion that in the event that an Anglo-American bomber force is deployed to the island country, the number of which will reach 4,000 – 6,000 bombers by 1944, then they will be able to reduce the German war potential, and the invasion against the continent can be launched. Marshal Portal believed that 6 million German homes would be destroyed, and the industrial potential of the Germans will be proportionally damaged. Furthermore, in addition to 900,000 German dead and 1 million wounded, Germany will have 25 million citizens homeless. In contrast, the Americans rejected air strikes against territorial targets. Targeted bombing was believed to be more effective. Alexander de Seversky explained this in his 1942 book *Victory thru Air Power*. In his work, he described the need for targeted bombings instead of random attacks, because the morale of the German population was not broken by the air raids. Seversky's opinion significantly influenced the American position that the deliberate slaughter of civilians is unacceptable, but civilian casualties caused during precision attacks are acceptable, or at least can be justifiable (Majszkij, 1975, p. 604-605, Hastings, 1999, p. 288-289, Seversky, 1942, p. 145).

General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, doubted Marshal Portal and the British Royal Air Force's idea of this "generous" air war against Germany, but Marshal Portal's report was approved by the Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces on 31 December 1942, and submitted to their political leaders. Pursuant to the decision, the role of strategic airstrikes has increased in value. They accepted the assessment of the situation by the American and British air staffs, the essence of which was that the German fighting ability should be weakened to the level at which the invasion could be successful. The leaders of the ground forces, on the other hand, believed that in the case of the Normandy landings on the part of the air force, the most important thing is to achieve strategic air superiority and not the so-called decisive results achieved by bombing. And the timing of the invasion depends on when the political and military decision-makers judge that the time has come to attack (Hastings, 1999, p. 293).

The so-called Casablanca directive adopted at the conference was the CCS 166/1/D decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hastings, 1999, p. 293). This gave orders to British Generals Arthur Harris and American Ira C. Eaker to destroy a certain part of the targets of the Axis Powers (Germany) with their planes for the success of the landing in France. In the instruction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that the main task of the allied air forces was to destroy the German military, industrial and economic system, and to break the morale of the German people.

This directive defined the order of importance of bombing targets as follows:

- 1.) Submarine construction and repair factories, ports of diving nasads;
- 2.) Luftwaffe bases, warehouses and aircraft factories;
- 3.) Ball bearing factories;
- 4.) Oil industry;
- 5.) Synthetic rubber and tire production, as well as
- 6.) Transportation system.

The order of importance of the Casablanca Directive primarily reflected the military needs of the Western Allies, but the priorities could change over time due to the strategic situation and the constantly changing political and military situation (United States Department of State, 1968, p. 781).

The aim was to bomb targets connected to submarines, which were in first place among the targets, to attack German submarine bases between Spain and France in the Sea of Aquitaine, or in other name the Bay of Biscay, day and night, and the German fleet at sea and in ports, for the success of the Battle of the Atlantic. This was important because of supply shipments to Britain, which were closely related to the opening of the second front (United States Department of State, 1968, pp. 781–782).



In the case of the other targets, there was also a more extensive explanation of why they wanted to bomb them. E.g.: the attacks on aircraft factories were connected to the goal that weakening the Luftwaffe was of great importance to the Allies. While the attacks on the ball bearing manufacturing factories were considered important by the strategists because they believed that with a small effort they could cause significant damage to German industry and the war economy, since no technical equipment (eg. tanks, airplanes, diesel engines, etc.) can be made without bearings. There were similar reasons for the other targets (United States Department of State, 1968, p. 782, Hastings, 1999, p. 293–294, Joint History Office, 1943, p. 10).

In the period after the Casablanca Conference, the American General Henry H. Arnold tried to promote the joint control of the American and British air forces due to the complexity of the operations in his 22 April 1943, letter to Air Marshal Charles Portal. This the addressee – whom in Casablanca was vested with the decision-making authority of the Joint Committee of the Chiefs of Staff regarding the CBO plan regarding its implementation and the leaders of the RAF (Royal Air Force) also opposed it, so this proposal was finally rejected. In other words, rather the Americans could not get their will against the British in this regard during the war. Therefore, the leaders of the American and British air forces were more concerned with the war plan of the air war. The principles formulated in the Casablanca directive were broken down into orders that can be implemented in practice by an operations committee tasked with developing the actual war plans., under the leadership of Lieutenant General Eaker. The resulting war plan was the “Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom,” i.e. the CBO plan, which was completed under number C.C.S. 217, dated 14 May 1943, and submitted to the Joint Committee of the Chiefs of Staff the next day. On 15-25 May 1943, the Allies discussed this plan at the conference codenamed Trident in Washington (May 15, 18 and 21, 1943). The plan was to increase the number of aircrafts of the US 8th Air Force stationed in Great Britain in four stages between 30 June 1943 and 31 March 1944 (Joint History Office, 1943, p. 5, 285, 363, 387) :

- June 30, 1943: 944 heavy and 200 medium bombers;
- September 30, 1943: 1,192 heavy and 400 medium bombers;
- December 31, 1943: 1,746 heavy and 600 medium bombers, and
- 31 March 1944: 2,702 heavy and 800 medium bombers (Joint History Office, 1943, p. 7, 23, Hastings, 1999, p. 294).

Lieutenant General Ira Eaker thought that the American 8th Air Force and the British Bomber Command, which were to be strengthened in this way, would be able to inflict significant damage on the Germans.

In the CBO plan, as in Casablanca, the attack targets were re-ranked, and gave the following guidance:

1.) Intermediate or temporary goals:

- German fighter air force (Luftwaffe).

2.) Primary targets:

- German submarine-building factories.
- Remnants of the German aerospace industry.
- Ball bearing factories.
- Oil targets (including Ploiești).

3.) Secondary targets:

- Synthetic rubber and tire production.
- Vehicles of transport/military transport (Joint History Office, 1943, p. 23).

In the plan, the expectations regarding the extent to which the targets must be destroyed were also formulated for each target group. In this way, an alternative order of the bombing targets can be read out, too.

Under the CBO plan, Allied air forces should have reduced submarine production by 89%, 76% for ball bearings, 65% for bombers, 50% for synthetic rubber, and 43% for fighter aircraft production. While regarding the oil targets, it was determined that in the event that the petroleum refineries around Ploiești, which produced 35% of the Axis Powers' oil product needs, and the synthetic fuel factories, which covered 13% of the needs, were to be destroyed, it will have disastrous consequences for the Axis powers. According to Lieutenant General Eaker, their estimates were conservative for the extent of the destruction. This was accepted by Air Marshal Portal and General Harris, at most it was disputed that with the bombs they dropped, they would be able to destroy the German submarine bases on the French coast – especially the bunkers of the submarines (Hastings, 1999, p. 294-295., Joint History Office, 1943, p. 11).

The CBO plan also dealt with the integration of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force. Thus, it was explained in the document that the British should strike at area targets at night, while the Americans were obliged to carry out precision bombing during the day (Joint History Office, 1943, p. 14).

The CBO plan was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff at the Trident conference during the meetings on 15 and 18 May but was also reviewed on 21 May. In addition to Roosevelt and Churchill, several American and British military leaders also participated in these negotiations, including Admiral William D. Leahy, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King and Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney from the American side, while from the British side: Admiral Sir John Dill, General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Air Marshal F. A. Portal and Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay. Finally, on 10 June 1943, it was officially issued to



determine the course of the air war until D-Day, or the landings (Joint History Office, 1943, p. 285, 363, 387).

The leaders of the ground armies considered the air raids to be a supplementary operation at best, and among the leaders of the American and British air forces, Generals Spaatz and Harris believed to be sacred that the Germans would bring them to their knees until the invasion of the continent. In fact, the importance of the Casablanca Directive, the CBO Plan and its first phase, the Pointblank Plan, was that both the US Air Force and the British Royal Air Force obtained the financial resources needed to continue their operations based on the needs of the bombing offensive. The war plans did not exclude precision air attacks by the Americans and carpet bombing by the British against German cities, that is, attacks on moral stamina. General Arthur Harris, commander of Bomber Command, well before Casablanca, that is, even before the air attack on Cologne on 31 May 1942, he believed that the essence of the bombing offensive was the systematic destruction of German cities. While negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons on military and political issues were taking place in Casablanca and then in Washington, meanwhile, preparations were underway for the 1943 campaigns to exclude Italy from the war (Hastings, 1999, p. 298–299, Piekałkiewicz, 2007, p. 386).

The Expulsion of the Axis Powers from Africa and the Elimination of Italy from the War

The most important task of the year 1943 – in the period between the Casablanca conference and the meeting in Washington – first became the cleansing of North Africa from the forces of the Axis powers, and then, after the conference codenamed Trident, the preparation and implementation of the landing in Sicily.

After Casablanca, certain transformations were made in the military leadership of the Allies. Accordingly, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder was appointed as the head of the Mediterranean Air Command (MAC), and Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz as his deputy. The American II corps commander for a time became Major General Patton, then, from 15 April Major General Omar N. Bradley took over the task from his predecessor, who had been reinstated to the command of the 7th Army (Eisenhower, 1982, p. 149–150).

After the success of Operation Torch, and the Battle of El Alamein, American and British troops advanced in the direction of Tunisia. The Germans surrendered Tripoli on 23 January 1943, and finally, on 1 February 1943, the Afrika Korps retreated to the Mareth Line built by the French in 1939 and here they settled for protection. In the fact that Field Marshal Rommel – in agreement with the German military command – withdrew his troops to Tunisia, it also played a role, the fact that they realized the military realities and that it is easier to organize the evacuation of troops to Italy from the Tunisian bridgehead also played a role, as, for example, from Libya (Ferwagner, 2008, p. 77). At the same time, they did not give up striking a blow at the American

troops advancing from the west. In the meantime, significant supplies arrived in Tunisia from Europe, and the German 5th Panzer Army was set up under the command of General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim.

While General Montgomery was in Tripoli, Field Marshal Rommel and General Arnim decided to try to take advantage of the inexperience of the American military forces and strike at them in Tunisia. Field Marshal Rommel thought they should attack towards the supply base at Tebessa, Algeria, while General Arnim wanted to attack further north. Due to the rivalry between the two military leaders, they divided the African forces of the Axis powers and they so launched the offensive towards the west. On 14 February, General Arnim won against the troops of the II American Corps and advanced to Sbeitla on the 17th. In the meantime, Field Marshal Rommel left the Mareth Line and marched through Feriana towards the Kasserine Pass, then with the forces of the Afrika Korps and the 10th Panzer Division, he broke through the defense line of the American troops at Kasserine, opening the way to Constantine in central Tunisia (here was the headquarters of General Eisenhower). At that time, the German high command appointed Field Marshal Rommel to head the military forces of the Axis powers in Tunisia, and then the “Desert Fox” advanced with his troops in the direction of Tebessa. At this critical moment for the Allies, General Alexander stabilized the situation by deploying more British divisions. In the meantime, the British 8th Army led by Lieutenant General Montgomery reached the Mareth Line, so the British and American forces received significant reinforcements. On 22 February 1943, the German advance stalled. On 25 February, General Arnim's troops were defeated at Béja, and then on 6 March, near Medenine, Field Marshal Rommel's troops were defeated by General Montgomery's 8th Army. A few days later, on Hitler's order, Erwin Rommel left the battlefield, and General Arnim took the command of the German troops in Africa on 9 March 1943, while the Italian Lieutenant General Giovanni Messe became the commander-in-chief of the military formations of the Axis powers (Karsai, 1981, p. 367–368, Ferwagner, 2008, 78).

By this time, however, the situation of the German and Italian units stationed in North Africa was sealed. Led by Lieutenant General Patton, the American II Corps launched an offensive at Feriana on 19 March and almost surrounded the Germans defending at the Mareth Line. The defense line was breached by General Montgomery's 8th Army after 20 March, then everything came under their control on the 28th, and the British troops led by General Montgomery reached el-Hamma within days, too. Fortunately for the Axis powers, the Allied attack progressed slowly, so they did not achieve complete success, so the German-Italian units led by the Italian Marshal Messe were able to retreat and could build new defensive positions in the Wadi Akarit area. At the same time, after 20 March, in the area of the Mareth Line, General Montgomery's troops managed to establish contact with Lieutenant General Patton's II Corps, thus the front lines of the Allies were united (Eisenhower, 1982, p. 150). After the subsequent American and British offensive at the beginning of April, the military formations of the

Axis powers were forced to retreat to the town of Enfidaville, where the 8th British Army shortly carried out a diversionary operation in preparation for the attack on Tunis. The British 1st Army attacked the central part of the defense, while the American II corps launched an attack in the north, and soon they reached the military port of Bizerte. At that time, General Arnim still tried to stop the British advance, which caused General Alexander to suspend the siege of Enfidaville and strengthen the central section of the front line. "In the conviction, therefore, that the enemy would in any event keep strong forces in front of the Eighth Army, General Alexander quickly and secretly brought around from that flank several of the Eighth Army's best divisions and attached them to the British First Army. These arrangements were completed in time to begin the final assault on 5 May. The results were speedily decisive. On the left the American II Corps, with some detachments of French "Goumiers", advanced magnificently through tough going and captured Bizerte on the seventh. Just to the southward the British First Army, under General Anderson, carrying out the main effort, was in Tunis at approximately the same time that the II Corps reached Bizerte." (Eisenhower, 1948, p. 171). Then on May 12, Tunisia, thus North Africa, came under American and British control.

Marshal Messe, the "nominal" commander-in-chief of the military formations of the Axis powers, capitulated to the 8th Army on 13 May on behalf of the Italian troops, while General Arnim, who was captured by Indian soldiers at the St. Marie du Zit airport on 12 May did the same on behalf of the German forces. Thus, there was no longer any obstacle for General Alexander to make report on the victory of the Anglo-Saxons in Tunisia and the successful completion of the campaign. In the last week of the offensive, the Allies took 240,000 prisoners of war, of which 125,000 were German soldiers (Montgomery, 1981, p. 178, Karsai, 1981, p. 369, Eisenhower, 1982, p. 155–156).

"The Tunisian victory was hailed with delight throughout the Allied Nations. It clearly signified to friend and foe alike that the Allies were at last upon the march. The Germans, who had suffered during the previous winter also the great defeat of Stalingrad and had been forced to abandon their other offensives on the Russian front in favour of a desperate defence, were compelled after Tunisia to think only of the protection of conquests rather than of their enlargement. Within the African theatre one of the greatest products of the victory was the progress achieved in the welding of Allied unity and the establishment of a command team that was already showing the effects of a growing confidence and trust among all its members" (Eisenhower, 1948, p. 174).

The Allied victory in North Africa created an opportunity for the Anglo-Saxons to implement the campaign against Sicily, which caused a dispute between the Americans and the British in Casablanca, the planning of which had already begun in February 1943 in a special group under the command of General Alexander. This process accelerated after the conquest of North Africa. The attack on Sicily began at dawn on 9/10 July following air force bombardment and fleet snare fire. At that time, the British, American and Canadian units began to land in the designated places. In the days after the start of the operation, Churchill and Roosevelt first sent a radio message to the

Italians from Algiers, then on July 19 Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and Hitler met in Feltre. The Führer – knowing that Mussolini's position was shaky and the Italians would withdraw from the war – asked the Duce for a further war effort, who was unable to indicate that his country was exhausted and unable to continue the war. The bombing of Rome further worsened Mussolini's situation. On 25 July at the request of the Fascist Grand Council, Mussolini was deposed by King Victor Emanuel III and he was replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The fact that the Italians suffered serious defeats also on the eastern battlefield and in North Africa played a major role in the downfall of the Duce, and several influential figures believed that Hitler only wanted to defend the Reich on Italian land. The new Italian goal became the armistice (Kaiser, 1999, p. 84, Churchill, 1989, p. 237–238, Keegan, 2003, p. 593).

In Sicily, the Germans fought until August 11, and then began the evacuation. The rapid deterioration of the situation of the Italian and German formations was indicated by the fact that on 14 August the Badoglio government, due to the Anglo-Saxon bombings, unilaterally declared Rome an open city. The campaign ended with the capture of Messina on 17 August 1943, General Harold Alexander reported to Churchill that the Allies had captured Sicily in 38 days. He wrote about the opposing forces that 13 Italian-German divisions with 315,000 Italian and 90,000 German soldiers fought against 13 allied divisions. Regarding the Italian forces, he noted that they may have been destroyed, while the Germans were pushed out of the island on the morning of 17 August (Churchill, 1989, p. 235).

The Italians were concerned with the possibility of exiting the war from the time of the Sicilian landing. After the substitution of Mussolini, the Badoglio government contacted the Allies and their representative met with the Anglo-Saxon assigns on 5 August. The conclusion of the armistice was delayed due to the unconditional surrender, but after the Anglo-Saxon ultimatum of August 31, the Italians finally accepted the terms, and the armistice was signed at Cassibile on 3 September, which was announced on 8 September after lengthy complications (Keegan, 2003, pp. 593–594).

Summary

As can be seen, the Anglo-Saxons pushed the German and Italian formations out of Africa during the period from 8 November 1942 to 12 May 1943. With this, they created the opportunity to attack Italy and achieve Italian capitulation with the fall of Hitler's most important European ally. Although only partially successful, this created the possibility for the Anglo-Saxons to occupy southern Italy, and thus be able to bomb Southern Germany and Central Europe with the deployment of the American 15th Air Force, created by Brigadier General James H. Doolittle, and the 205th Bomber Group of the British Royal Air Force, which previously fought in Africa.

In other words, the goals formulated in Casablanca were partially completed. From the point of view of the Axis Powers, it was definitively decided that they would no longer have a chance to win the Second World War on any battlefield.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Ethnicized Politics in Kenya¹

Robert Maina Ndung'u²

Abstract:

This paper aimed at examining ethnicized politics in Kenya and their contribution to elections and public governance from independence to date. This paper looks into the historical context of ethnicized politics in Kenya and events that have entrenched this undesirable factor of Kenya political landscape from colonialization to date. The paper demonstrates how political elites take advantages over their ethnic groups to form political parties that enable them to occupy positions of leadership as tribal chiefs. As politicians they purport to advance their ethnic group's political interest but their aim is to form governments and to consolidate power. The paper shows that ethnicized politics have led to marginalization of small tribes and their subsequent resentments that have resulted to major conflicts like the post elections violence of 2007, the conflicts witnessed in 2017 and the post elections tensions of 2022. Ethnicized politics have led to demonstrations and political violence in Kenya leading to loss of life and property, human rights violation and abuse of the rule of law. The paper recommends de-escalation of ethnicized politics and enhanced national cohesion. It advocates for granting of national jobs to individuals based on meritocracy rather than ethnicity.

Keywords:

Ethnicized politics,
Kenya, post-election
violence.

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Introduction

According to the United Nations, the Republic of Kenya is one of the 54 Countries making the African Continent. It is located in the eastern part of Africa bordered by South Sudan and Ethiopia to the north, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the east, by Tanzania to the south, and by Lake Victoria and Uganda to the west (Emmanuel., 2014). As per 2019 Kenyan Census conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, it has a population of 46.7 Million people who are made up 43 ethnic groups, the main identification tag in the country, who are unevenly distributed over a land of 580,000 km². Some of the Kenyan citizens are distributed in East African Countries and abroad (KNBS, 2019). According to the 2010 Kenyan Constitution the country has a devolved system of government with the National Government being headed by the President who is elected by the citizens after every five. There are also 47 County governments headed by County Governors who are independent with their own budget allocated by the National Parliament in the Country's annual budget. The country also has an independent parliament and a senate each headed by a speaker. It has the Judiciary which is headed by the Chief Justice as its president.

Methodology

The research adopted a historical research design by applying its objective and systematic evaluation of occurrence of ethnicized politics in Kenya, their impact on the present and in making prediction of the future. This method is based in its capacity to present and analyse historical trends on the development of ethnicized politics in post conflict Kenya and the cost they come with in a developing society. The research establishes the nexus between ethnicized politics, and how these has led to the current Kenyan statehood. Secondary sources of data including journals and the internet were the major approaches to data collection. The data was qualitatively analysed and presented to give a balanced view on the topic of research.

Colonialism and Ethnicity

Ethnicized politics in Kenya is understood when looked at back from colonialism. A clear legacy of colonialism in Kenya today is the sense of ethnic division that has cemented group identity within the country, and which has over the years been used as a mobilising agent in pursuit of economic interest (Kwatamba, 2008) (Oucho, 2010). Ethnicism is a major phenomenon in the Kenya's politics. Same as it is in other African countries, seeds of ethnicism in Kenyan politics originated during colonial era, when borders were set arbitrary and numerous ethnic groups were grouped together form the national framework (Depetris-Chauvin and Özak, 2019). Ethnic identities have over the years continued to shape power dynamics and governance systems since independence

by influencing political allegiances and affiliations (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021). In a post-conflict situation in any country, ethnical politics that result in political violence have serious detrimental repercussions. Kenya, a country that has had remarkable democratic improvement over the past 20 years, has witnessed ethnically instigated political bloodshed, which happens most often every election season (Musya, 2023). For example, the 2007-08 PEV followed that the contentious presidential election in 2007, took an inter-ethnic conflict in the country (Makori, 2018).

Ethnicized Politics in Kenya

In Kenya, tribalism is not a historically inevitable phenomenon. It cannot be linked to past animosities or conflicts between cultures over time (Quadri and Oladejo, 2020). Prior to the arrival of colonialists, there was little to no interaction between the main opposing groups that historically formed around the Western Kenya (Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, Kisii), and the GEMA (Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru People) from the Mount Kenya areas of Kenya. However, a number of incidents provided a breeding ground for harmful tribal stereotypes, which eventually spread throughout Kenyan culture. (Boahen, 2020; Okeyo, 2020). For illustration between the Agikuyu/Luo tribes, the Agikuyu are perceived to stereotype Luo as fish-munching, indolent, uncircumcised and unpredictable to an extent they don't support Luo political leader who shows interest in presidency. The Kamba on the other hand perceive GEMA Community as conspirators, deceivers and untrustworthy, a fact which has affected their political relation even to date (Anangwe, 2014) (Kiruga, 2018). The colonialists in Kenya profited on the tribal divisions by implementing the divide and rule policy. This was accomplished by the British colonialists' arbitrary practice of basing local government and administrative borders on cultural and linguistic lines. It is assumed that this decision was made on the presumption that Africans lived in tribes, and that tribes are the foundation of colonial administration (Kwatemba, 2008).

Arguably therefore, ethnicized politics in Kenya can be linked to colonialism's balkanization of the country along tribal lines (Kimani, 2018). Once independence was achieved, the Kenyan political elite found success with this transfer of methodology. Subsequently, Agikuyu and Luo ethnic groups united in the early years after independence to form the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in December 1963 and which went on to form the first government (Oduor, 2022). According to the arrangement, Luo ethnic leader Jaramogi Odinga was the second in command and Agikuyu leader Jomo Kenyatta led this party. The other minor ethnic groups felt excluded as a result, and in an effort to challenge KANU domination, they reorganized to join the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) (Anangwe, 2014; Kimani, 2018).



Ethnicism and Kenyan Political Landscape

The Kikuyu ethnic group was given preference under the late Jommo Kenyatta government, as seen by the majority of parastatals and ministries being led by members of this group, and without meritocracy (Kimani, 2018). The president continued to favor the Kikuyu ethnic group, which led to the Luo ethnic group experiencing discrimination in appointments and government operations. As a result, the bonds between the two communities soon began to deteriorate. The Luo complaint led to coercion and even opposition group assassinations. The president issued dire warnings to the community, and Jaramogi Odinga was placed under house arrest by the administration he assisted in creating. (Anangwe, 2014; Kwatemba, 2008). At the Majimbo structure of government was fronted by KADU ideology with the intention of accommodating other marginalized ethnic groups, despite its prejudiced position (Oucho, 2010).

In 1964 KADU was merged into KANU in a major political realignment. Immediately after this, Mr. Tom Mboya, a Luo elite and by then a government appointee was assassinated. It was presumed that this assassination was planned and executed by the Kikuyu mafia who were in government with the direction of Jomo Kenyatta their leader (Tarus, 2019). Luo felt betrayed and this widened the tribal rift between Kikuyu and Luo. There was a major outcry in Kenya with other ethnic group accepting the ideology that the Kikuyu had assassinated one of the brightest minds in Luo land (Ogendi, 2022). Since then, Kikuyu and Luo have been pitted against one other in Kenyan politics, with each ethnic group attempting to win over more members in order to form the national administration (Anangwe, 2014, Kwatemba, 2008).

Daniel Arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group, succeeded Jaramogi Odinga as President Kenyatta's vice president. He went on to become the president of Kenya following the death of President Kenyatta in 1978 (Makori, 2018). President Moi's tenure, saw the ethnic Kalenjin group controlled his government, and often devoid of merit, the community members were appointed to head the police, criminal investigation department, parastatals, Central Bank and ministries (Hamasi, et al., 2023). He made sure that the majority of the provincial and district commissioners in Kenya governance structure were Kalenjins. He even went so far as to change the Kenyan constitution so that KANU would be the only political party in the nation and Kenya would become a one-party state (Towett, 2021). Kenya was ruled by Daniel Arap Moi from 1978 until his political retirement in 2002. Moi was replaced in 2002 by a new alliance made up of Kikuyu and Luo, with strong backing from Kamba (Yamano, et al., 2010). Unfortunately, this union did not survive long because Raila Odinga, a Luo, campaigned for a severely ill Kibaki, a Kikuyu. Therefore, Raila, according to the Luo, deserved a part in government. This caused discord in 2005, when Raila led a campaign in 2005 advocating for a number of constitutional amendments that supported Mwai Kibaki's viewpoint. (Moywaywa and Nyagaka, 2023).

The subsequent push and pull between various ethnic groups resulted in a highly contentious general election in 2007 that saw many ethnic groups banding together to overthrow the Kikuyu ethnic group, which they believed had long dominated Kenyan politics (Jeong and Jeong, 2023). Their primary argument was that other communities needed to be liberated since they had been marginalized for a very long time. With Luo and Kalenjin controlling the politics to unseat the Kikuyus, the election turned into a battle of 41 tribes against the Kikuyu (Yamano., et al, 2010). Despite all these a Kikuyu, Mwai Kibaki, was declared the winner of 2007 presidential election (Elischer, 2008). Following his pronouncement, the nation saw post-election unrest that resulted in thousands of deaths and the damage of property valued at billions of dollars. (Materu, 2015). The significance of ethnicity in the nation is demonstrated by the peace negotiations led by Kofi Annan and the subsequent formation of the Government of National Unity, which included the Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba, and Luhya ethnic groups (Waki Commission, 2008). Even after the government was established, disputes between the three main ethnic groups – Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo – hampered its operation (Hamasi and Amutabi, 2023). Each ethnic group desired a significant share of the executive branch.

Ethnicity during the 2012 to 2022 Elections

Tribal leaders continued courting other ethnic groups to support them in the 2012 elections with the goal of forming the next government. During this process, Uhuru, a Kikuyu, competed for president, while Ruto, a Kelenjin, served as his deputy (Oduor, 2022). The Kikuyu and Kalenjin established a coalition known as UhuRuto that dismantled Raila Odinga's other ethnic coalition and pushed out marginalized ethnic groups in Kenya. Despite the loss, the Luo ethnic minority believed that Raila's win had once again been stolen. Political protest was formed as a public uproar that Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities were disproportionately represented in government positions, marginalizing other communities. This persisted until 2018, when Raila and Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, shook hands (Elischer, 2008).

A rival ethnic alliance led by Raila Odinga (Luo), Martha Karua (Kirinyaga), and Kalonzo Mosyoka (Kamba) was defeated in 2022 by a different coalition headed by William Ruto (Kalenin), Rigathe Gachagua (Kikuyu), and Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya). After winning the Kenyan general election, the ethnic coalition led by Mr. Ruto established the current administration. (Breckenmacher and Sambuli, 2022). A recent court action was filed alleging that Kikuyus and Kalenjins, who were instrumental in founding the current government, predominate in government appointments, thereby perpetuating the ethnic minority in government. (Oduor, 2022). There are an presumption that anyone who does not belong to any of the two ethnic group despite meriting cannot secure a government appointment.



Recommendations

For Kenya to become a strong state, there must be a paradigm shift in all public spheres and especially on ethnicization of its politics. This should be enhanced national cohesion and in recruiting government employees that should be based on meritocracy rather than ethnicity. It is the high time Kenya take responsibility and abide by the constitution that assures that every citizen get political good as fundamental right regardless of ethnic and political affiliation. Failure to this, Kenya could sink into weak state and experience a similar fate like the post PEV of 2007/09.

Conclusion

It is important to draw the conclusion from the discussion above that political parties in Kenya are often created along ethnic and tribal lines, which contributes to the prevalence of ethnicized politics and electioneering process in the country. Since independence, politics generally and especially during elections time has been through ethnical formations. From 2002 when Kenya can be perceived to have fully demonstrated and exercised the real multiparty democracy, different parties headed by tribal chiefs have come together to form a major coalition. These coalitions and alliances include NARC (National Rainbow Coalition) which defeated KANU in 2002 General election; the Party of National Unity (PNU) formed as a Mount Kenya regions ethnic groups, the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) Party with Mwai Kibaki as it leader; and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a Luo political tool under Raila Odinga. Wiper Party with Kalonzo Mosyoka was also formed as a political tool of the Kamba ethnic group. Political offices in Kenya are thus positions of “tribal chiefs”.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Food Security of Region around Nyangezi in Eastern Congo and Lake Bunyonyi in Uganda¹

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Abstract:

Thinking of food security and food supply in a region, the first factors that come to mind are its natural features, geographical location and climate, as these are all factors that fundamentally determine the agricultural potential of a given region. However, a number of other factors (e.g. infrastructure development) also influence the ability of a region to exploit its natural potential and to provide stable food security. The aim of this study is to explore, question and make recommendations on the causes of disparities and food security problems in two Central African regions, namely Nyangezi in South Kivu, DRC, and the Lake Bunyonyi region in Uganda. These two regions are very similar in terms of geography, climate and agriculture, but they differ significantly in terms of food security. The Democratic Republic of Congo is the 16th most populous country in the world, 60% of its territory is covered by forests, it is rich in mineral resources (especially copper, cobalt, coltan, gold and diamonds), but the standard of living of its population is not high (Palkovics, 2021), and it is the eighth poorest country in the world. 90% of its exports come from minerals, and it relies heavily on imports for food (both wheat and maize), which are insufficient to meet its needs. Agriculture accounted for 20.6% of GDP in 2015. Based on these indicators, it is relevant to examine the background of low food security. In this study, we address the food security characteristics of the Lake Bunyonyi area in Uganda, which is to be compared with the Nyangezi region of Congo. Although undernutrition is also observed here, food security is more stable compared to the Nyangezi region in Congo.

Keywords:

Agriculture, Democratic Republic of Congo, education, food security, Lake Bunyonyi, Nyangezi region

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1. Introduction

“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, World Food Summit, 1996).

Access to food was not part of the concept of food security until the 1980s. However, in connection with the investigation of global food problems that emerged in 1970, the FAO concluded that the issues in some regions were caused by insufficient access to food. This phenomenon mainly affects developing countries (Juhász, 2007, pp. 37-52.).

In addition to the lack of information about food production and agricultural cultivation, in many cases, the nature of adequate nutrition needs to be clarified to the population. However, the real root of the problems can mostly be traced back to political and economic reasons. How can a country rich in mineral resources and agricultural lands, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have food problems? The country has 80 million hectares of arable land and is extremely rich in rivers, yet it needs to import food, and a large part of the population is malnourished or starving (International Trade Administration, 2022).

The International Trade Administration report on Uganda states that the country's agricultural potential is among the best in Africa. It has fertile soils, low temperature fluctuations, and two rainy seasons in much of the country, which ensure multiple harvests each year. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Uganda's fertile agricultural land is capable of feeding 200 million people (International Trade Administration, 2022). Uganda is an important food exporter globally. How are malnutrition and hunger possibly still present in Uganda?

In this study, we are looking for answers to these questions by presenting the situation of two regions that show significant similarities regarding their climatic and agricultural properties.

2. The examined regions: *Bunyonyi Lake in Uganda and Nyangezi Region in South-Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo*

The two Central African regions were examined in the context of more than 15 years of development work in Nyangezi. Authors were involved in a school development project in the Lake Bunyonyi area in Uganda in 2022. The fieldwork revealed differences in food security between both the Nyangezi region and the Lake Bunyonyi area, despite the two areas having significant similarities in terms of natural resources.

These areas are compared because of their geographical location, similar climatic features and agro potential. Geographically, they are located in almost the same area:

slightly south of the Equator, in Central Africa. Lake Bunyonyi and the Nyangezi region are only approximately 360-370 km from each other by car.




Figure 1, Distance between Lake Bunyonyi in Uganda and Nyangezi Region in DRC (source: Google Maps, 2022), edited by authors.

2.1. The Topographic and Climate Features of Nyangezi Region and Lake Bunyonyi Region Nyangezi Region

The Nyangezi Region included in the investigation is a settlement in South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, approximately 20-25 km by car from Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Mountains surround the region, but Nyangezi lies on an extensive plain approximately at an altitude of 1,500 above sea level. It has a humid tropical climate, with rainy seasons from September to May and a three-month dry season from June to August. The average annual temperature is 22.6°C, the relative humidity is 68-75%, and the annual precipitation amount is 1500 mm. Based on the climatic factors, the area is suitable for agricultural activities. (Mondo et al., 2021, p.3.).

2.2. Lake Bunyonyi Region

Lake Bunyonyi is located in the southwestern tip of Uganda between Kisoro and Kabale near the border with Rwanda. The surface of Lake Bunyonyi is 56 square kilometres (Saturday, 2023), its greatest length is 25 km, its width is 7 km, and its average depth is 39 m. Lake Bunyonyi is located in an area surrounded by mountains, which makes the area difficult to access. Due to its location, the climate of Lake Bunyonyi is tropical. The annual rainfall is 1000-1500 mm, the average annual temperature is 26°C, the daily and annual fluctuations are small, around 5°C (De Haan, 2016).

Comparing the topographical and climatic conditions around Nyangezi in South Kivu to the Lake Bunyonyi in Uganda, it would be expected that the agricultural production (and consequently food security) of the two regions would show similar characteristics, however, there are differences. In the following, we compare the agricultural and food security characteristics of the two investigated regions.

3. Agricultural Characteristics and Food Security of Region around Nyangezi, South-Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo

3.1. Agriculture and food security of the country (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the largest country in the sub-Saharan region, with exceptional natural resources, high water potential, vast arable land, and the second largest tropical forest in the world. The country has 80 million hectares of arable land and 4 million hectares of irrigated land. With these features, they could ensure the opportunity to become one of the world's leading agricultural powers. The agricultural sector employs more than 60 percent of Congolese, but it accounts for only 19.7 percent of the GDP. Agriculture cannot maintain food security and does not generate enough income for the population. The main cash products are tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, palm oil, sugar and southern fruits. We can mention cocoa and coffee as export products, but the ratio of them is very low – except for southern fruits. The bigger problem is that food import is very high. The Democratic Republic of Congo essentially depends on food import (International Trade Administration, 2022). Other food crops produced include cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts and rice. The level of commercial agricultural production is low, and the majority of the population is self-sufficient (International Trade Administration, 2021).

The country possesses 50% of Africa's forests and a river system that could provide hydroelectric power to the entire continent – according to United Nations surveys (FAO, 2018). This is particularly important because the income from energy production would contribute significantly to improving agricultural technologies, thereby increasing food security.

In Nyangezi, as in other rural areas of the DRC, the main livelihood activities are subsistence farming. The main crops grown include cassava, bananas and maize. The predominance of cassava cultivation is justified by the undemanding nature of the crop, which can grow even on exhausted soil. In addition to cassava, beans are the main source of protein (Ciza et al., 2022, p. 15). A significant proportion of households raise cattle (Ferf et al., 2016, pp. 30-31), and poultry is also common. In the last two decades, starvation has appeared in the region, and malnutrition is widespread. This is due to unilateral nutrition (Juhász, 2017, pp. 37-40).

The region is characterised by low levels of productivity due to a number of endogenous factors. The uncertainty of the weather due to climate change is a clear problem. The unpredictable weather conditions have led many farmers to stop farming, resulting in food shortages (Ciza et al., 2022, p. 4). At the same time as farmers have stopped farming, they have also been forced to move to other areas to find work. Migration from the countryside to the cities is exacerbating food insecurity, as farmers who had at least been able to support themselves and their families are now forced to buy food imported from abroad - if they manage to earn any income at all. In addition to the low technical level of agriculture, the main reasons include the region's inadequate agricultural education and the fact that farmers are not well informed about modern agricultural technologies. There is a lack of quality inputs for production, such as high-quality seeds and tools for cultivation (Ciza et al., 2022, p. 4). There is also a lack of knowledge about the various diseases and pests of the crops grown and, of course, about how to control them. In addition to all this, the most critical threat is the armed conflicts that are almost constant in the region. In the province of South Kivu, armed clashes have on several occasions completely destroyed agricultural production, which fundamentally determines the food security of the region, including food production, processing and transport (Juhász, 2017, pp. 37-40).

Since 1994, the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo has been one of continuous armed conflict between different ethnic groups. The bloody conflict of 1998 was followed by another one two years later. Government troops fought with the help of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe against rebel troops supported by Uganda and Rwanda. To this day, "minor" clashes continue in the region, posing a constant threat to the lives of millions of people. The reasons of the armed conflicts are mainly political and economic; they are related to the mining of mineral resources (Juhász, 2017, pp. 37-40). Many studies and reports have been published on the crises affecting the DRC, but the number of refugees and deaths caused by the crisis varies considerably from study to study. This poses serious difficulties in addressing the food crisis, as it is difficult to determine whether a region is experiencing temporary food shortages or persistent, chronic food shortages. An armed conflict can prevent the availability of the human and social infrastructure and economic conditions necessary for food production and supply (Gibárti, 2019, pp. 153-166). Food insecurity is high, hunger, malnutrition and migration are common in the eastern regions of the DRC, as families often migrate from areas



affected by armed conflict to urban areas in search of a better life. Urbanisation further increases food insecurity, as migration from rural to urban areas means the end of agricultural production. The fleeing masses often settle in refugee camps, where they fall into the trap of aid dependency (Juhász, 2017, pp. 37-40). In addition, the maintenance of refugee camps is a major challenge for society. Armed conflicts cause desperation and hopelessness among the population, especially those who remain in conflict-affected areas, as destroyed infrastructure and the absence of family members make a new start hopeless. Unfortunately, there are still occasional outbreaks of violence in the region, which cause even greater devastation and result in more refugees. The introduction of income-generating projects for the production and processing of food and food products is essential for the people of the region to the restart.

5. An Implemented Income-generating Project: Pig Farm in Nyangezi

As a result of the conflicts, livestock in the area has been reduced to a minimum. The rebel groups have been raided, executed or taken away. The few remaining animals died of disease. Prices of imported animal products are extremely high and unaffordable for locals. Local NGOs are trying to combat the situation by promoting small animal husbandry. Households mainly raise poultry. Demand for eggs and meat is extremely high, with better-off families willing to buy at prices several times higher. Both local and foreign organisations and companies are working to promote large-scale livestock farming. Cattle purchased from Rwanda have not been successfully kept or bred in the region for unknown reasons (Juhász, 2017, pp. 37-40).

The Nyangezi Region has been running an income-generating project called "pig farm" since 2008. The programme was set up, coordinated and financed by *Projet des vivres et études pour Orphelins VETO*, a company registered in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the *Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection* in Hungary.

The purpose of the project was generating income and reintroduce pork consumption in the region. The method of the project was: a total of 187 households were involved in the project, with a total of 611 pigs distributed on the condition that the reproduction was sold to their neighbours not involved in the project and the so-called surplus sold on the local market. The method has proved successful, as the pig population in the area has increased significantly in recent years. The exact number of pigs is currently being assessed, but even without accurate data, it is clear that the majority of households in the area are still keeping pigs (source: own research). The project is being maintained by the local *VETO* organisation and *Planetrise* in Hungary, in cooperation with church and NGO organisations in South Kivu.

This successful project is proof that food security can be achieved through income-generating projects in agriculture. This means that the organisation of

comprehensive and integrated income-generating agricultural projects in other food-insecure areas outside the Nyangezi Region could also be a solution. However, it is imperative to organise vocational and higher education in agriculture, to make agricultural production more resilient to climate stress and to develop infrastructure. A comprehensive and coherent programme clearly requires, of course, the involvement of cooperating partners, including governments, international and local research institutes and universities, for-profit companies and non-profit organisations, local farmers and communities. Development requires the collection, processing and interpretation of basic data in the region.

6. Agricultural Characteristics and Food Security of Region around Nyangezi, South-Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo

6.1. Agriculture of Uganda

Uganda's economy is primarily an agricultural economy. Agriculture contributes about 24.7% to the country's economy and accounts for 54% of total national GDP and 54% of the country's export earnings. Within agriculture, the crop sub-sector is the most dominant, accounting for 13.8% of GDP. The livestock sector contributes 4.3% of GDP, forestry 3.9% and fisheries 1.6%. The agricultural sector employs around 75% of the population, with almost 78% of the population living in rural areas where agriculture is the main economic activity. In addition, 60% of the manufacturing sector in Uganda processes agricultural products (Magunda, 2020, p. 32).

An abundance of fertile soil and rainfall is evenly distributed in Uganda. According to surveys, 80 % of Uganda's territory is arable, but only 35 % is cultivated (International Trade Administration, 2021). Major agricultural products produced by Uganda are coffee (Uganda is the world's 10th largest producer of coffee), plantain (the 4th largest producer after Cameroon, Congo and Ghana) and sweet potatoes (the 7th largest producer in the world). Other crops grown include maize, cassava, tropical fruits, tobacco, tea and cotton. On average, 75 % of the sold goods are purchased domestically and 25 % abroad. The main exports are coffee, leather, vanilla, vegetables, fruits, cut flowers and fish. The role of cotton, tea and tobacco is also increasing in exports. Agriculture is intertwined with Uganda's various industries, as they are primarily based on processing locally produced agricultural products. Primary industries: sugar processing, brewing, tobacco, cotton textiles (FAO, 2014).

There are many sources of production risks and constraints for Uganda's agriculture. Risks can arise from climate-related factors such as weather variability. Strong windstorms, droughts and floods are becoming more frequent. The situation of agricultural production is further complicated by the lack of, or limited access to, agricultural inputs. The seed sector is particularly underdeveloped. The total demand



for cereal seed is estimated at 110 000 tonnes, while total sales from the official seed market amount to only 12 000 tonnes. The shortage of supply is leading to the appearance on the market of poor quality, so-called counterfeit seeds, which greatly reduce yields. Other risks to agricultural production are the emergence of diseases caused by plant pests and animal viruses and bacteria, the effects of which are exacerbated by climate change.

There are also difficulties in storing and transporting the agricultural products produced. There is a lack of adequate storage capacity, which means that pests and other diseases can cause major losses to crops if not managed properly. Inadequate refrigeration poses a risk to eggs, dairy and fish products (Magunda, 2020, pp. 10-13).

6.2. Agriculture and Food Security of Lake Bunyonyi Region

According to studies, the population around Lake Bunyonyi lives in relative food security (De Haan, 2016). Kwikiriza's (2016) study on Lake Bunyonyi highlights the potential for aquaculture in Uganda's lakes (notably Lake Bunyonyi). The study suggests that cage culture may be a suitable alternative for landless fish farmers. Cage culture of Nile Tilapia (*Oreochromis niloticus*) in small ponds in southwestern Uganda has recently become widespread (Kwikiriza, 2016, pp. 42-48). Productivity can be greatly improved by this form of fish farming, which can be an income generating activity for farmers - contributing significantly to food security in the region. The main agricultural products around the lake are beans, sweet potatoes and corn. On average, most people eat the same thing twice a day, every day: it's beans and sweet potatoes, and kids eat corn at school. Although this food contains many nutrients, it is not enough (De Haan, 2016). This leads to one-sided nutrition.

The people of the Lake District have the opportunity to eat a more varied diet and produce more food, but the effects of climate change are severely limiting their options. For example, soil erosion caused by heavy rainfall, sudden storms and damage to infrastructure are serious problems (Mehdi, 2021, p.16). Heavy rainfall makes roads impassable, making access to markets impossible. Farmers (who are mainly women) produce on subsistence smallholdings, with an average of 0.5-2 hectares. However, farmers who would also produce for the market in addition to supplying the household are unable to market their quality products. Farmers do not have access to quality seeds, and their knowledge of modern agricultural technologies is severely lacking. Agricultural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa are therefore focused on disseminating advanced agricultural technologies.

These projects include improved crop varieties, good land management and efficient agronomic practices (Ainembabazi, 2014, pp. 666-679). Although the population of the Bunyonyi Lake area lives in relatively stable food conditions, the health problems resulting from a one-sided diet and the vulnerability of agricultural

production require the development of development programmes, which can only be implemented with the involvement of local farmers, traders, educational institutions and NGOs.

7. Conclusion

Summarising the data, the research concludes that Lake Bunyonyi in Uganda and the Nyangezi Region in South Kivu Province, Eastern Congo, face many of the same problems, such as climate change challenges and infrastructure underdevelopment. In the Nyangezi Region in South Kivu, political instability makes it difficult to achieve food security. Armed conflict is both a cause and an obstacle to achieving food security. In Uganda's Lake Bunyonyi region, the main threats to the current relative stability of food security are poor infrastructure, the use of outdated agricultural technologies and climate change vulnerability. However, continuous monitoring is needed in both regions, and the current food situation and opportunities for improvement need to be continuously assessed. In comparing the two regions under study, the identification of factors that have a negative impact on food security shows that the food security of a region does not depend solely on the availability of agricultural resources. A favourable climate and good soil conditions alone do not in themselves mean food security for a given region. Education, the skills needed for agricultural production, the level of development of agricultural technologies, the infrastructure needed for food trade and other economic and political factors all have a significant impact on the food supply and food security of a region. To build up a comprehensive picture of the food security situation in a region, it is essential to collect primary data and to carry out an in-depth analysis of the economic and political situation in the region. Both in the Nyangezi region and in the region around Lake Bunyonyi, incomplete and contradictory data are currently available. To remedy this, it is necessary to involve local and international civil organizations and institutions, governments, for-profit companies, local and international educational institutes, local farmers and communities, and it is necessary to start collecting current data.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Dr. Péter Gergő Juhász obtained his degree in agricultural engineering from the College of Nyíregyháza (now University of Nyíregyháza) in 2002, and his degree in environmental agricultural engineering from the Szent István University of Gödöllő



(now Hungarian University of Agricultural and Life Sciences) in 2006. Since 2007 he has been engaged in import-export activities in the field of food and other products. He has worked as a development consultant in Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia and Zambia. His research and publications focus mainly on food security in developing countries. As the President of the Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection, he is active in civil society, mainly in the field of sustainability and international development. He is the head of the "Sustainable Africa Research Group" at the Africa Research Institute of the University of Óbuda. His work has focused on the development and operation of humanitarian, environmental and agricultural projects, mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, South Africa and Malawi.

Csaba Szeremley graduated from the Pannon University in 2002 with a degree in economics, majoring in tourism. He spent eighteen months of his internship in the United States at Brookdale Living Inc. In 2009 he obtained an MA in Educational Planning, Economics and International Development from the Institute of Education, University College London. Prior to moving to Malawi in 2012, he worked for Humana People to People UK, a development aid organisation, as general manager. In Malawi, he set up his own audiovisual production company and worked for several prominent NGOs and companies, in addition to running the Hungarian Trade and Cultural Centre. In 2016, he returned to Hungary, but as an entrepreneur, he is still connected to Malawi: he has participated in 10 medical missions as a coordinator and as a member of the Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection, he coordinates development projects.

Szilvia Juhászné Veress graduated in 2006 from the Faculty of Technology and Agriculture of Nyíregyháza College (now University of Nyíregyháza) with a degree in Agricultural Engineering, specializing in Environmental Management. Afterwards, she graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture, Food Science and Environmental Management of the University of Debrecen with a degree in Agricultural Engineering and an MSc in Conservation Engineering. She is a founding member of the Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection, where she coordinates the organisation's programmes. Her professional work covers nature conservation, environmental management and environmental education. She carries out data analysis and textual evaluation and prepares studies based on data collection for the association's international and national development programmes. She works as an environmental educator, edits educational booklets and publications in the subject of environmental education. She started her studies at the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences at the University of Óbuda in September 2022. Her research topic is the protection of specific elements of critical infrastructure (food supply chain) under specific conditions.

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Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna: A Comparative Analysis of Insurgency Dynamics and Governance Failures¹

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Abstract:

This paper examines the manifestation and problems relating to the Islamist insurgencies of Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria, and Ansar al-Sunna in northern Mozambique. The thrust of the paper is that Islamist movements, driven by the ideas of jihadism, exploit conditions in weak and fragile states and expand their reach in territories affected by poor or deteriorating socio-economic conditions. In Africa, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna are two striking examples. Following the introduction, the phenomena of Islamism and jihadist insurgencies in Africa are under review, after which state fragility is theorised. The focus then moves to Boko Haram and the conflict dynamics in the north-east of Nigeria, and the political conditions and related fragility in that country. From there, the emphasis shifts to Ansar al-Sunna and the conflict dynamics in northern Mozambique, focusing on the emergence and existence of the movement, and the political conditions and related fragility in the country. The paper argues that in both insurgencies under review – Nigeria and Mozambique – fragility and violent conflict fuel each other, and thus we can argue that the state fragility–conflict dynamics nexus is key in understanding the contemporary security landscapes and conflict in these two states. Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting and reflecting on six of the most striking similarities between the Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna insurgencies, and the governance (political and military) challenges that have thus far limited or prevented successful counter-insurgency measures in both countries.

Keywords:

Ansar al-Sunna, Boko Haram, counter-insurgency, Islamism, jihadist, state fragility, Ansar al-Sunna.

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Introduction

Since the end of the 1990s, the prevalence of insurgencies across the globe has steadily increased. Insurgencies, which can be defined as “organized subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region”, now constitute the majority of conflicts globally monitored by analysts (Hankins, 2020). In Africa, one of the most striking examples in the past decade and a half is the ongoing bloodshed caused by an Islamist group in north-eastern Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin region. Another example is the more recent manifestation of a ruthless Islamist insurgent movement in the northern Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique. Both these insurgencies play out against the backdrop of serious weaknesses in governance, law enforcement and military capacity (Okoro, 2014; Zenda, 2021).

More specifically, since 2002, the north-eastern territories of Nigeria suffered from acute violent conflict conducted by a radical Islamist movement that officially calls itself Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, which means People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad. This movement has eventually become known as Boko Haram, which in the language of the local Hausa ethnic group means, “Western education is unlawful” (Agbibo, 2013, p. 53.; Besenyő and Mayer, 2014, pp. 48-50.). The impact of this movement on north-eastern Nigeria – especially since 2009 – was immensely negative with thousands of Nigerians killed and millions gripped by fear. The Nigerian government responded by establishing a special Joint Military Task Force with a view to pursuing a crackdown on members of Boko Haram and their hideouts (Agbibo, 2013, p. 66.) – but today Boko Haram is as strong as ever before.

In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, located on the northern border of Mozambique with Tanzania, Islamist militants, known as Ansar al-Sunna, meaning “supporters of the tradition”, emerged in 2017, and by 2021 more than 2 500 people had been killed and about 700 000 displaced. President Filipe Nyusi’s government labelled the insurgency as “acts of banditry” and deployed the country’s security forces in the hope of quashing the militants, but it soon became evident that the security forces were unprepared and under-resourced for the task. In view of this, Ansar al-Sunna has taken root in Cabo Delgado, and not even foreign private military companies could so far end the insurgency (Zenda, 2021, pp. 20-25). Currently, several Southern African nations are contributing to a multinational regional task force while the Rwandan government also deployed a force to northern Mozambique in an effort to quell the insurgency – thus far with limited success.

Following the above, this paper examines the problems relating to the insurgencies of Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and Ansar al-Sunna in northern Mozambique respectively. Immediately following this introduction, the phenomena of Islamism and jihadist insurgencies in Africa are under review, after which state fragility is briefly theorised. The paper then examines why the two Islamist movements exist and

furthermore analyse the respective insurgencies against the background of state fragility and related governance crises in both north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique.

The Phenomena of Islamism and Jihadist Insurgencies in Africa

In Africa, jihadism is of special relevance to examine the problem of Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and Ansar al-Sunna in northern Mozambique alike. In both cases, the existence of these two insurgent movements – and others on the African continent – should be understood in the context of jihadism and the global jihad, and the role of transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 54). In both cases, violence and bloodshed in the relevant regions are tied to the notion of jihadism.

In seeking a definition for insurgency, Johnston (2018) uses the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual's explanation of insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict". The political objectives of insurgents therefore often relate to the pursuit of political independence, self-determination or secession. Johnston further states, "the ultimate goal of insurgencies is to develop in size and capacities whilst degrading the opposing government to such a point where they may engage and defeat them in conventional combat". Like terrorists, insurgents are generally outmatched by government capacity. Given the fact that both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna intend to establish Islamic caliphates in the respective territories where they manifest and operate (Pieri and Zenn, 2017, pp. 42-43; Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 2.), the conflict dynamics of both movements are considered insurgencies in this paper.

With the phenomena of horrific religiously based attacks across the globe and political rhetoric around Islam and Muslims, it is further of scholarly importance to define or clarify specific terminology. Very often Islamism surfaces prominently in the relevant literature or discourses and, together with Salafism and Jihadism, these concepts are sometimes being tossed around in a somewhat confusing way. Given the centrality of Islamism around conflict where Islam or Muslims is involved or implicated, it is of great importance to clarify Islamism as a concept (Hamid and Dar, 2016).

In view of the above, Hamid and Dar (2016) define Islamism as follows:

Islamism as a phenomenon incorporates a wide spectrum of behavior and belief. In the broadest sense, Islamist groups believe Islamic law or Islamic values should play a central role in public life. They feel Islam has things to say about how politics should be conducted, how the law should be applied, and how other people – not just themselves – should conduct themselves morally.

Solomon and Tausch (2020, p. 11.) explain that Islamist movements are primarily political and can be linked to an ideology that emerged in the twentieth century. Islamists are divided into different factions, but are broadly associated with at least two key ideological components: the first is a commitment to the Quran as the foundation of political, legal and social systems; and the second is a devotion to return to the example of the Prophet Muhammad. According to Write (2015), Islamists are not a case of 'one size fits all'. In fact, Islamism in its contemporary form can be viewed as a spectrum or a labyrinth. In this regard, Hamid and Dar (2016) identify gradualism or a historically eschewing revolution as a distinguishing feature of what is called 'mainstream Islamism'. Mainstream Islamists accept parliamentary politics and also show a willingness to function within existing state institutions, even secular structures. Their main goal is a reconditioning of pre-modern Islamic law with the modern nation-state. A faction that sets them apart from mainstream Islamists is Salafists. The latter is less inclined to become involved in active politics. They opt instead for an approach of preaching and religious education and, unlike their mainstream counterparts, they are ultraconservatives, believing in the spirit as well as the letter of the law. As such, Salafists are fundamentalist in religious orientation and advocate a commitment and return to the authentic or original political and moral practices of Islam, something that they trace back to the lived example of the early, righteous generations of Muslims. The latter is known as the Salaf, meaning those who were closest to the Prophet Muhammad during and soon after his life on earth. Politically, they lobby for specific Sharia-based policies.

Lastly, jihadism is of special interest to this discussion. Hamid and Dar (2016) explain the notion of jihadism as follows:

Jihadism is driven by the idea that jihad (religiously-sanctioned warfare) is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) incumbent upon all Muslims, rather than a collective obligation carried out by legitimate representatives of the Muslim community (fard kifaya), as it was traditionally understood in the pre-modern era. They are able to do this by arguing that Muslim leaders today are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence. In the absence of such authority, they argue, every able-bodied Muslim should take up the mantle of jihad.

Solomon (2015, pp. 33-34.) puts matters in perspective when he points out that in several newly independent African states, Islamists and specifically jihadist insurgents exploited the conditions in weak and fragile states and expanded their reach among those affected by deteriorating conditions. This is certainly true of both north-eastern

Nigeria and northern Mozambique, which brings us to the concept of state fragility. The following section expands on this in more detail.

Theorising State Fragility

In many countries, it is taken for granted that the state is there to ensure security, uphold the rule of law, and provide service delivery, such as collecting rubbish, building roads, providing education and ensuring social security. Yet, there are many instances in the world where states do not manage to perform their core tasks. The governments of such ‘fragile’ states simply do not possess the capacity or the legitimacy to govern effectively, and citizens lack some of the most basic services, ranging from access to safe drinking water and primary healthcare to secure environments (European Report on Development Research Team, 2008).

There is no single, widely and commonly accepted definition of the concept. What is clear though, is that fragile states are falling short when measured in terms of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, fragile states share certain characteristics, such as underdeveloped infrastructure, widespread food insecurity and low levels of human capital (European Report on Development Research Team, 2008). According to Chuku and Onye (2019, p. 2.), fragility refers to situations where the ‘social contract’ is broken. This is “due to the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to provide its basic functions and obligations regarding the rule of law, poverty reduction, protection of human rights and freedoms, security and safety of its population, service delivery, equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, among others”.

Against this background, Chuku and Onye (2019, p. 2.) argue that all existing definitions of fragility correspond with three main themes, namely authority, service delivery, and legitimacy – or lack thereof. In this regard, Cilliers and Sisk (2013) define a fragile state as follows:

...one in which armed conflict and violence threaten the lives of the country’s citizens and prevent them from making a decent living. It is a state where inequality and exclusion are rife, with the majority of the population remaining poor, despite its having rich natural resources in many cases. It is also a country with very poor governance, where the state is often simply absent and doesn’t provide basic services such as schools, hospitals and roads.

According to Adeto (2019, p. 12.), fragile states are generally lacking the functional authority to provide basic security to their populations within their borders. They further fall short of possessing the required institutional capacity to satisfy the basic social needs of their populations. Also, fragile states are not in full political control of the internal dynamics of their territories. In some fragile states, ungoverned spaces

therefore open up in a landscape of privatised economies and security actors. Practically, such ungoverned spaces coincide with the emergence of rebel groups or insurgents, as well as multinational forces in some instances, all contesting for control of political dynamics. A striking example in Africa is Somalia in the Horn of Africa where a vacuum has been filled by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab movement since 2004.

The 2022 Fragile State Index indicates Africa as the most negatively affected region in the world. Among the states in Africa listed as fragile in the 2022 Fragile State Index are Nigeria and Mozambique. (The Fund for Peace, 2022) In both these states fragility and violent conflict fuel each other, and thus we can argue that the state fragility–conflict dynamics nexus (see Adeto, 2019) is a key factor in the dynamics of the contemporary security domains in these two states.

The Nature of the Boko Haram Insurgency

In this section, the Boko Haram phenomenon in the north-east of Nigeria is analysed, focusing on the emergence and existence of the movement and its connection to the global Jihad. Secondly, the political conditions and fragility in Nigeria are discussed, as these factors coincide with governance challenges and realities of state fragility, specifically in the conflict-ridden north-eastern parts of the country.

The establishment of a caliphate is central to an understanding of the existence of Boko Haram. This goal has been stated in speeches, sermons, writings and YouTube videos over the years (Pieri and Zenn, 2017, p. 45.). Walker (2012, p. 1.) describes Boko Haram as an Islamic sect that believes politics in Nigeria was captured by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. The movement therefore committed itself to a war against so-called false Muslims, but also the Federal Republic of Nigeria in general, driven by the goal to replace the status quo with a pure Islamic state ruled by Sharia (Islamic) law. The movement is also motivated by a desire for vengeance against Nigerian politicians, security forces and even Islamic authorities – relating to their involvement in a brutal suppression of the movement since 2009. Over several years, the movement proved itself adaptable, able to change its targets and tactics swiftly under the guidance of charismatic leadership.

The earliest emergence of Boko Haram is to be found in a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, the capital and the largest city of Borno State in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria. In 2002, an offshoot of this radical youth group, which was not yet known as Boko Haram, declared Maiduguri and the Islamic elites and institutions of the city to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable (Walker, 2012, p. 3.).

The founding force behind Boko Haram was Mohammed Yusuf, who initiated the movement in 2002 with a view to establishing a Sharia government in Borno State

in north-eastern Nigeria. Yusuf's work gained momentum after he had established a religious complex in his hometown, comprising a mosque and a school where many poor Muslim families from various locations in Nigeria as well as neighbouring countries could educate their children. It soon transpired that the religious complex had ulterior political goals, as it started to serve as a recruiting ground for future jihadists that could take on and fight the Nigerian state. Support from Nigerian families for Yusuf's work came especially from impoverished and alienated people of the predominantly Muslim north of the country, often inspired by the movement's condemnation of the corrupt ruling elites in Nigerian politics. This included Muslims from neighbouring Chad and Niger (Agbibo, 2013, pp. 59-60.).

Boko Haram's ideological orientation is engrained in radical Salafism, and can be traced back to the teachings of an Islamic scholar in the fourteenth-century, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya. As explained above, the hallmark of this ideological orientation relates to an appeal to modern Muslims to commit to pure Islam as during the times of the Prophet Muhammad and the two generations that followed. Since Boko Haram became an ultra-radical group in 2009, they have been influenced by a Qur'anic phrase that proclaims, "[a]nyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors". Members of Boko Haram thus believe that the overthrow of secular governments is justified because secular rulers are deemed to be leaning toward the enemies of Islam and their orientations. In fact, members of Boko Haram regard it as their divine duty and goal to challenge the perceived enemies of Islam in a violent struggle, both locally and abroad (Agbibo, 2013, pp. 59-60.; Mapping Militant Organizations, 2018).

Boko Haram transformed into an ultra-radical group in 2009 after confrontations with the Nigerian state security services in Bauchi State. This followed the enforcement of a newly introduced law instructing motorcyclists in Nigeria to wear safety helmets, which was resisted by Boko Haram. Members of the group were stopped by police and traffic officers, who enforced the new law on motorcycle helmets, and an argument ensued. Boko Haram members reneged on the helmet law after which the police and army opened fire, killing 17 people. This angered Mohammed Yusuf who demanded justice, but the state did not respond to any of the demands. Yusuf also released video material in which he threatened the state and its security forces with violent action (Agbibo, 2013, pp. 60-61.; Walker, 2012, p. 4.).

In brief, the state extended its action against Boko Haram, which instigated further animosity and inspired the Boko Haram leadership to mobilise for reprisal attacks, and in July 2009, members of Boko Haram burned down a police station on the outskirts of Bauchi. Several incidents of bloodshed followed with both members of the security forces and Boko Haram losing their lives. Yusuf vowed revenge and committed himself and the movement to fight to the death in retaliation, followed by coordinated attacks across Maiduguri, especially targeting police stations and homes of



police officers, including retired officers. Churches were also torched, and the main prison was raided, killing prison guards and freeing inmates (Agbiboa, 2013, pp. 60-61.).

Mohammed Yusuf was taken into custody and reportedly killed by the Nigerian police. The ruthlessness of the Nigerian security forces and the death of Yusuf are believed to be among the major reasons behind the further radicalisation of Boko Haram. The July 2009 uprising and related violence also inspired many members of the movement to flee countries in Nigeria's neighbourhood where they came to the attention of global jihadist movements in the Sahel region (Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014, p. 71.).

Since 2009, there have been ongoing violent activities by Boko Haram, during which many lives were lost, while properties worth millions of dollars were destroyed. In 2012 alone, Boko Haram was responsible for almost 1 400 deaths in between 500 and 600 attacks. In 2013, the movement was involved in more than 2 000 attacks with over 1 000 deaths. In 2013, a state of emergency was declared in three north-eastern federal states of Nigeria, namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, but the violent campaign embarked upon by Boko Haram was not stalled. In fact, it escalated and took a heavy toll on human lives and property (Onah, 2014, p. 64.).

As much as Boko Haram is often regarded as a religious sect, Onah (2014, p. 63.) argues that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is "a religious crisis that is flowing directly from the country's political system". He points the finger at the political system in Nigeria – a system rife with corruption, poverty and underdevelopment. These realities have ignited fierce religiously inspired violence "on account of deficiencies in the political system". This will be analysed further in the following section.

Insurgency, Fragility and Governance Failures in Nigeria

Geo-politically and socio-economically, Nigeria is commonly known as a country with a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south. The country is also known for political conflict which is linked to ongoing appeals by minority groups from the Niger Delta in the south for an equitable and fair distribution of resources as well as acute poverty in the northern federal states, especially in the north-eastern parts. Politically, this has left the country with a pattern of feuding, unending cycles of violence, and the destruction of many lives and properties (Omede, 2011, p. 93.).

Okoro (2014, p. 117.) points out that the majority of Nigerian citizens are not in a position to satisfy their basic human and socio-economic needs. Of specific concern is that a large portion of the youth lacks access to food and a proper educational system. They also lack good healthcare, pipe-borne water and proper shelter. In addition, the World Bank (2021) reports that, according to data from Nigeria's most recent official

household survey and data from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, 39,1% of the population live below the international poverty line of \$1,90 per person per day. In addition, a further 31,9% of the population recorded income levels of between \$1,90 and \$3,20 per person per day. Of specific interest, as far as Boko Haram is concerned, is that poverty “disproportionately affected rural, northern Nigeria”. Moreover, among Nigerians living below the \$1,90 poverty line in 2018–2019, close to 85% lived in rural areas and almost 77% lived in the predominantly Muslim north (World Bank, 2021). The link between poverty and the conflict dynamics in north-eastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is most active, is therefore evident. As was to be expected, poverty in the Muslim north has generated frustration and resulted in various forms of criminality and violence, such as kidnapping, armed robberies and, most importantly, insurgency and terror acts (Okoro, 2014, p. 117.).

In view of the discussion above, there is no doubt that Nigeria is a fragile state, and state fragility has major consequences for stability in the country. In the case of Nigeria, data paint a dark picture of the overall socio-economic landscape, and over many years, citizens were repulsed by the Abuja government's inability, weakness, or failure to provide for their basic human needs. This not only resulted in the militants in the southern Niger Delta utilising violence as a bargaining chip to demand concessions from government, but it also strengthened the youth's disillusionment in especially the north-eastern territories of the country and “made them ready armies in the hands of extremists like Yusuf” (Okoro, 2014, p. 119.).

Fragility relating to public institutions and the state security apparatus further contributed to Boko Haram's increasing strength since its inception. This specifically relates to sources of weapons for Boko Haram and other armed groups. Nigeria's arms market has especially two sources from which Boko Haram is benefitting. Firstly, a substantial portion of arms originates from army or police stocks. Boko Haram has proved itself sufficiently potent to raid stocks of weapons from the state security apparatus. Secondly, Boko Haram is capable of ensuring flow of arms through cross-border smuggling into Nigeria from the regional neighbourhood (Stanyard et al, 2022, p. 18.).

Due to the fragility of public institutions and the state security apparatus, Boko Haram has also been heavily involved in cattle rustling in especially the federal states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. These states closed their cattle markets in 2016 in an effort to stem the tide of cattle rustling. However, Boko Haram then smuggled cattle across the border where they sold them at markets in Jigawa. The prohibition thus did little to put a lid on revenue flows to the movement. This is a substantial source of income, considering that in 2016, an estimated figure of 20 000 cattle, valued at 3 billion naira (more than \$6 million) were sold (Stanyard et al, 2022, p. 17.). Funding is further generated from criminal activities, particularly kidnapping, bank robberies and even taxes paid to Boko Haram by the local population (Campbell, 2020).



As intimated above, border security in Nigeria has also suffered from the dire consequences of state fragility. The poor management of the state's borders results in many illegal entry routes into the country, which coincide with illicit transnational arms trafficking in the country. Not surprisingly, Boko Haram took advantage of the poorly managed borders and specifically benefitted from the smuggling of sophisticated weapons into the country. Many of Boko Haram's weapons are from external sources, including AK-47s, anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition. The origins of these weapons are mainly the key conflict zones in the regional neighbourhood, namely Mali, Libya, Chad, Niger and the Central African Republic. This explains Boko Haram's possession of sophisticated heavy firepower, including anti-aircraft weapons mounted on four-wheel drive vehicles (Stanyard et al, 2022, p. 18.).

Agbiboa (2013, p. 66.) maintains that, since independence, Nigeria has lacked a viable concept of strategic counterinsurgency (or counterterrorism), a strategy that could guide the Abuja government in its actions, facilitate the undermining of recruitment of insurgents (or terrorists), and especially change the landscape that facilitates insurgency (or terrorism). Such a counterinsurgency strategy should be far more than a simplistic security-only killing strategy, namely an overarching national security strategy that considers the broader political-economic context in which Islamist radicalisation manifests, and also pursues the altering of the landscape in a meaningful and non-violent manner. This requires the Nigerian government to find a strategy that would make Muslim societies less prone to serve as facilitating agents of radicalism, a strategy that would undercut the jihadist appeal by addressing some key fundamental human needs and the incorporation of development, security and respect for human rights (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 66.).

Whereas Nigeria adopted a strong military approach under former President Goodluck Jonathan when he declared a state of emergency in 2013 (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 65.), the Nigerian government moved to a non-military approach in 2015 under President Muhammadu Buhari in an effort to counter Boko Haram more successfully. The aim was to steer away from overused firepower in the north-eastern territories after severe criticisms of Abuja's predominantly military-based approach. Programmes were implemented specifically to address the root causes of recruitment into Boko Haram, and followed a process of rehabilitating members of Boko Haram (Onapajo, 2021).

However, Boko Haram managed to expand its footprint in West Africa and, together with ISIS West Africa (ISIS-WA), a faction of Boko Haram, which was created when ISIS-WA pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, the movement continued its attacks on government and security force targets, as well as civilians in the north-east. The movement thus continued its bloodshed, with deaths and injuries, as well as abductions and the destruction of properties. In fact, state fragility enabled Boko Haram and ISIS-WA to enjoy nearly complete freedom of movement throughout the federal states of Borno and eastern Yobe. Available data in 2020 indicated that terrorist actions by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA have been instrumental in the internal displacement of about two

million people in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. This also resulted in the external displacement of more than 300 000 Nigerian refugees in the wider region of West Africa, affecting Cameroon, Chad and Niger (US Department of State, 2020).

Not even a regional plan, the 2020–2024 Action Plan, adopted by the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) in 2019 could firmly deal with the ongoing Boko Haram–ISIS-WA challenges. Initially, meetings were conducted with the relevant actors where agreement was sought on the implementation of the plan in the respective countries. However, ECOWAS soon faced problems with inadequate resources and a lack of funds. In the final analysis, a lack of addressing the root causes of the conflict dynamics, particularly in the key areas of governance and development deficits, as discussed above, continues to fuel scepticism about the chances of success (Kwarkye, 2021).

The Nature of the Ansar al-Sunna Insurgency

In this section, the Ansar al-Sunna phenomenon in northern Mozambique is analysed, focusing on the emergence and existence of the movement and its connection to the global Jihad, including its links with transnational terrorist groups. Following this, the political conditions and fragility in Mozambique are considered, as these factors refer to the governance challenges and realities of state fragility, specifically in the conflict-ridden northern parts.

The rise of Ansar al-Sunna to significance can be traced to the year 2000 when a group of young Muslims within both the Islamic Council and the Islamic Congress of Mozambique started the development of a new reading and practice of Islam. Their work culminated in the preaching of a more dogmatic and stricter form of Islam across Cabo Delgado and from this movement an even more radical and activist group emerged, popularly known as Ansar al-Sunna of Mozambique (translated as Supporters of the Tradition). These young men undertook to revolutionise the province in a religious context. In 2012 they became more active by challenging the way Islam was practiced in Mozambique, maintaining that Islam was corrupted and diverted from the true teachings of Prophet Mohammed (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 16.).

The group's orientation was clearly anti-Christian and opposed to Western lifestyles and values, and to pursue and enforce Sharia law or Islamic law strictly in their localities. At this point, the Mozambican government did not pay much attention to the movement or even considered it a serious security threat. Even at the local level, the movement's views were not appealing to locals, including most Muslims. The movement then started using threats and eventually turned to violence. They also started to recruit other young men and in a landscape of high unemployment, they managed to expand their numbers with promises of a better life once a caliphate was created. They also forced local worshipers in churches and mosques to follow their



radical, dogmatic beliefs and discouraged villagers from going to hospitals and schools which the movement regarded as anti-Islamic and secular (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 16.).

Following a growing militancy within the movement, the movement carried out its first terrorist attack of public significance in October 2017 in the Mocimboa Da Praia region of Cabo Delgado. A group of 30 members killed 17 people, including 2 policemen, and ever since Cabo Delgado has been among the world's most conflict-ridden areas. Ansar al-Sunna used the dire socio-economic challenges in the country to its advantage and managed to expand its manpower pool significantly with promises of jobs and money. The membership was even extended to citizens from Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. Apart from frequent, methodical attacks on civilian elements, the movement also caused havoc by burning down thousands of houses, as well as government buildings, workplaces, places of worship and schools, and in the process took control of some portions of Cabo Delgado. As already stated, the bloodshed left many Mozambicans dead, homeless, displaced, or in a state of starvation (Sönmez and Arslan, 2021, p. 5.). The attacks came to the attention of international role-payers in February 2019 after the insurgents attacked a convoy of employees from Anadarko, a now-defunct United States (US) multinational oil and gas company that operated in Mozambique. The attack occurred near Palma, a town on the northeast coast of Cabo Delgado and also the headquarters of the offshore natural gas project (Alden and Chichava, 2020). After a period of calm, Mocimboa da Praia was once again attacked in April 2020 (Casola and Iocchi, 2020).

The greater part of Ansar al-Sunna's violence since 2017 was focused on government officials, installations, and symbols. At the same time, the movement did not hesitate to target civilians in their attacks, especially communities or individuals that the movement deemed obstructionist. The government's response can be described as Janus-faced: on the one hand, it publicly denied the posing of an organized threat by Ansar al-Sunna but on the other hand, it waged heavy retaliation after violent attacks occurred. Some observers viewed the movement's increased brutality as a response to the government's approach of retaliation, while others speculated that Ansar-al-Sunna escalated its violence in pursuit of recognition by national and/or international actors (Bekoe et al, 2020).

Ideologically, the movement indicated its commitment to the establishment of a caliphate in Cabo Delgado, which boils down to "government from Allah" on the basis of a hard-line version of Islamic law (Gartenstein-Ross et al, 2021; Agence France Press, 2020). In other words, Ansar al-Sunna aims to impose Sharia law in Cabo Delgado and – like Boko Haram – the movement is an extension of global militant Salafist views on the African continent where radical Islamist views have been on the rise. Since its emergence, Ansar al-Sunna did not recognise the state of Mozambique and accordingly reject all state institutions. To this end, their terrorist activities are aimed at seizing control in the northern parts of the country (Sönmez and Arslan, 2021, p. 9., p. 18).

As far as Islam in Cabo Delgado is concerned, it should be understood that Indian Ocean trade networks developed by Arab traders over many centuries have played a key role in the history and communal life of the Swahili world at large and Cabo Delgado in particular. These trade networks, according to archaeological evidence, date back to the eighth century and led to the spread of Islam along the East African coast. The northern parts of Mozambique form part of the Swahili world, and in this context, northern Mozambique shares Islamic religious conceptions and practices with its Swahili neighbours (Pemba, 2007; Bonate, 2020, pp. 1-2.). Today, Cabo Delgado is still a Muslim-majority province and the population in this province constitutes the bulk of Mozambique's Muslim population. This is in contrast with the rest of the country where the majority of the population is Christian with a one-fifth Muslim minority. In Cabo Delgado 52,5% of the population is Muslim while 36% is Catholic, according to the 2017 census. At the same time, Muslims are especially concentrated in six of Cabo Delgado's 17 districts where they constitute more than 75% of the population (Estelle and Darden, 2021).

Morier-Genoud (2020, pp. 396-397.) observes that some scholars argue that the cause and nature of the conflict are mainly material. This relates to deprivation, poverty and feelings of marginalization among the youth of Cabo Delgado. It also relates to the fact that Cabo Delgado is one of Mozambique's poorest provinces, but also a province where mega-discoveries of natural gas and the involvement of gigantic multinationals have created unmet material expectations. Such scholars tend to view religion only as a 'rallying point' or cloak. Other scholars view Islam as the key or central factor underlying the insurgency. They also posit that young Muslims in Cabo Delgado have been radicalized by Muslim preachers from Kenya and Tanzania.

From a broader and regional perspective, it should be noted that both al-Qaeda and ISIS have increased their capacity and influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It is also of interest to note that whereas some movements in Syria, Somalia, and Mali choose to operate under the banner of al-Qaeda, all other movements in West Africa, North Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East operate under the flag of ISIS. Against this background, Ansar al-Sunna can be regarded as one of the most recent additions to the ISIS "family" in Africa (Cengiz, 2022). At the same time, Ansar al-Sunna acts independently from ISIS, despite its allegiance to the larger organisation, and in recent times seemed to be in command of more or less 4 500 militants or fighters, 2 000 of which are armed (Sönmez and Arslan, 2021, p. 11.; Cengiz, 2022).

Insurgency, Fragility and Governance Failures in Mozambique

In the discussion above, it was argued that the scholarly notion of fragility is of particular relevance to the case of Boko Haram. In this section, it is argued that fragility is equally relevant to Ansar al-Sunna and the conflict dynamics in Cabo Delgado. In addition to the above, it should be understood that fragility – the lack of capacity or the legitimacy



to govern effectively – can also be explained as areas of limited statehood. In such areas the state in question is lacking the ability or capacity to carry out or enforce political decisions, or to exercise a monopoly on the use of force. In other words, areas of limited statehood are of relevance and apply to countries and specific portions thereof where the central government does not have the ability or means to implement decisions and policies. As such, limited statehood applies to a part or parts of a country – often a province far away from the state’s national capital (Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018).

In Mozambique, Cabo Delgado is the most northern province and more than 1 600 kilometres from the capital, which makes the exercising of state authority highly problematic. The distance between the capital, Maputo and Cabo Delgado has created numerous governance challenges nationally with negative regional or trans-border implications. In Cabo Delgado a lack of governmental institutional capacity and related gaps in legitimacy are clearly evident from the fact that the province is called “Cabo Esquecido” in the local language, meaning the Forgotten Cape (Sönmez and Arslan, 2021, p. 7.). Matsinhe and Valoi (2019, p. 16.) strikingly describe the lack of central authority and control in Cabo Delgado as a case of “half-mast sovereignty”. This simply means that Cabo Delgado is an area that the Maputo central government in the south of the country is unable to govern effectively and falling short of exercising its authority fully across the length and breadth of the country.

State fragility and the lack of state authority across Mozambique had a very negative effect on the northern parts over many years. Today, the wellbeing of the population is badly affected with feelings of marginalisation and exclusion acutely prevalent among the population of Cabo Delgado. Social and economic indicators show that this ‘forgotten’ province fares very poorly in comparison with other Mozambican provinces. In this regard, Cabo Delgado is a province with an illiteracy rate of more or less sixty percent. The poorest schools are in Cabo Delgado as well as the poorest health and sanitation facilities. Unemployment is extremely high – as high as 88%. In view of this, several scholars are convinced that the roots or causes of the insurgency and conflict in Cabo Delgado cannot be divorced from the extremely high level of unemployment, especially among the youth, which was further aggravated by the devastating effects of natural disasters in recent years (Alden and Chichava, 2020; Sönmez and Arslan, 2021, p. 7.).

Following the above, it is of interest to note that many members and supporters of Ansar al-Sunna are young, uneducated people who are living in a socio-economically landscape of poverty and marginalisation. Having said this, it should be noted that the notions of fragility and limited statehood apply to countries or regions where state actors are often absent or not visible. In other words, the relevant state actors are not functional and do not exercise their responsibilities efficiently and effectively, which results in non-state actors usually starting to operate in such spaces and eventually manifesting as self-regulating private actors. These non-state actors even present themselves as *de facto* governments or rulers, albeit not in a constructive role of

exercising good governance. As far as northern Mozambique is concerned, the above-mentioned political and socio-economic landscape facilitated opportunities for Ansar al-Sunna to emerge and manifest as a relatively powerful non-state actor of political significance, being responsible for many killings, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the displacement of thousands of local inhabitants (ReliefWeb, 2020).

It should further be understood that the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado is not only driven by domestic factors but that international and regional drivers are also of relevance. Campbell (2020) points out that Ansar al-Sunna's inspiration and legitimisation are drawn from international Islamist forces who are committed to the establishment of a caliphate, especially ISIS, which is linked to the fact that the movement has pledged allegiance to ISIS. Radicalisation of young members of Ansar al-Sunna is also linked to interactions with regional jihadist networks, especially networks in nearby African states, especially Somalia, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Israel, 2020).

As mentioned in the discussion above, the notions of fragility and related limited statehood pertain to countries or regions where central governments or authorities are lacking a monopoly over the means of violence. This is certainly true of the northern parts of Mozambique where the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces (FDS) have been struggling with the consequences of decades of neglect and the serious impact of long-term underfunding. The Mozambican military (*Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique*) is especially left without the required capacity and competency to undertake operations that can counter or eliminate the security threat posed by Ansar al-Sunna. Furthermore, the professionalism of the military was tainted when it transpired that there were persistent leaks of information on operational matters from elements inside the military (Alden and Chichava, 2020). This was further aggravated by reports on the inability of the FDS to protect communities of Cabo Delgado and even serious human rights violations in the province by members of the FDS – all casting a dark shadow over the competency and professionalism of both police officials and army officers (Bowker, 2020).

Shortcomings in the capacity and competency of the FDS are mainly the reason why the Mozambican government contracted foreign Private Military Companies from 2019 to 2021 in its efforts to deal with Ansar al-Sunna as a security threat, namely, firstly the Russian Wagner Group and then the South African-based Dyck Advisory Group (Cilliers et al, 2021). The contracting of Private Military Companies in support of the FDS did however not bring an end to bloodshed and violent attacks from Ansar al-Sunna. Moreover, in September 2020, Amnesty International accused Mozambique's security forces of torturing suspected members of the insurgent movement. Amnesty International also pointed fingers at the Mozambican government for "possible extrajudicial executions" and "discarding a large number of corpses into apparent mass graves" in Cabo Delgado – acts that "flouts fundamental principles of humanity"



(Bowker, 2020). In the meantime, international appeals were increasingly made for regional intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), specifically a SADC multinational military force to be deployed, supported by border management and intelligence sharing among SADC members (Cilliers et al, 2021). In June 2021, the SADC Heads of State and Government finally decided to opt for the route of formal military intervention by agreeing on the deployment of a multinational regional force to Cabo Delgado, while a force from the Rwandan military was also deployed in the province in July 2021, shortly before the arrival of the SADC force (Ndebele, 2022). The deployment of a SADC force was generally welcomed, but observers also rightly cautioned that the stabilisation of northern Mozambique would require a people-centric rather than security-centric strategy – a strategy that not only deals with the security situation but also addresses the humanitarian, political, economic, social and religious dimensions of the conflict (Cilliers et al, 2021).

The dilemma of fragility and related loss of governmental control over especially the northern parts of Mozambique is clearly illustrated by a high prevalence of organised crime and related criminal networks in northern Mozambique. In fact, over time the province (including nearby provinces) was turned into a regional hub for the smuggling of drugs and other contraband. Heroin trafficking has been flourishing in Cabo Delgado as far back as the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992. In addition, in the past decade or even longer, several other illicit activities, such as the smuggling of timber, ivory, rubies, other gemstones, drugs and human trafficking, have also been prevalent (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020). These do, however, not seem to be sources of substantial income for the insurgents as Ansar al-Sunna seems to receive most of its funding from local businesspeople, as well as cash and goods seized during attacks and looting (Stanyard et al, 2022:5).

As explained above, state fragility in northern Mozambique is especially evident in the country's weak military which was underfunded and left without the capacity and competency to counter Ansar al-Sunna as a security threat. Among other things, this extends to the Mozambican Navy, which is in no position to prevent insurgents from penetrating Mozambique via the sea and exploiting opportunities relating to drug trafficking and running criminal activities along the coastal areas of the province. Moreover, there have been serious allegations that elements of the government and state, including some police, form part of networks and activities of illegal trafficking (Stanyard et al, 2022, p. 81.; Pirio et al, 2019).

Against this background, Cilliers et al (2021) correctly point out that

At the root of the conflict is a governance challenge that includes allegations of deeply entrenched corruption in the ruling party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Poor governance and state absence have antagonised the local population and left a security vacuum... While Southern African

Development Community (SADC) members and other countries can help Mozambique, they cannot fix the problem.

Inter alia, this means that the underlying motivations of the insurgents must be addressed and, if not, the roots of the conflict will remain unaddressed. In recent times, donors have stepped forward to bankroll a surge in aid, which is geared toward the rebuilding of infrastructure, restoration of public services and assistance to civilians in resuming their livelihoods. However, all of this seems to fall short of quelling specific grievances of the insurgents (Amnesty International, 2022).

Against this background, Amnesty International argues that Mozambique and the relevant regional actors should carefully think about the key requirements to obtain peace. They must also realise that counter-insurgency measures should go beyond military operations and development money as these measures, on their own, are insufficient and unlikely to bring an end the conflict. The relevant actors should also come up with incentives for insurgents who are willing to surrender or leave sleeper cells. External actors who have an interest in facilitating an end to the conflict should also exercise pressure on the government in Maputo to enter into dialogue with local or national political elites with a view to offering insurgents a stake in the resource boom, which could potentially steer Cabo Delgado into a better economic space. The Maputo government should also win the public's confidence through development assistance, while dialogue with insurgents could help to create a stable and safe environment. At the same time, the leadership of Ansar al-Sunna should be vigorously prosecuted and dealt with through law enforcement (Amnesty International, 2022).

Evaluation and Conclusion

From the above, there are clearly several striking similarities between Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna as Islamist extremist movements. In the discussion below, six of the most striking similarities are specifically highlighted.

First, there are similarities in the appearances of the two relevant movements since they emerged as militant Islamist movements. Currently, both are committed to the establishment of Islamic caliphates in their respective territories. In Nigeria, Boko Haram emerged when the movement tried to pursue a separation from secular society and draw students from poor Muslim families to an Islamic school in Maiduguri in Borno State. However, shortly afterward there was an increase in violent conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government and eventually, the overthrow of the Nigerian government and the subsequent establishment of a caliphate became the public objective of the movement. Ansar al-Sunna is quite similar to Boko Haram in the sense that the movement was not primarily politically active when it first drew public attention. Initially, Ansar al-Sunna's emergence coincided with a rejection of the state's educational, health and legal systems on religious grounds. They demanded their



followers to support alternative services offered within their mosques; thus, offering and developing a ‘counter-society’. This sparked much tension and eventually generated political violence and bloodshed in the province after they had attacked state institutions and even managed a takeover of the port town of Mocímboa da Praia. Against this background, Mutasa and Muchemwa (2021, p. 15-) rightly point out that Ansar al-Sunna “is most certainly influenced by Salafism which make it very similar to Boko Haram”. Furthermore, Ansar al-Sunna has a clear end goal, namely that of “establishing a Caliphate which was the same scenario with Boko Haram”. The two movements therefore clearly share the same ideological foundations and end goals.

Second, and related to the above, both movements are associated with Islamic extremism and militancy, which sparked heavy-handed security responses from the respective governments. In Nigeria, Boko Haram turned into an ultra-radical movement in 2009 following confrontations in Bauchi between the movement and the government’s security agency. Since 2009, there have been ongoing reports of violent activities by Boko Haram, causing many lives to be lost in Nigeria, while properties worth millions of dollars were also destroyed. In 2013, a state of emergency was declared in three north-eastern states of Nigeria, but the violent campaign embarked upon by Boko Haram continued and, in fact, escalated and took a heavy toll on human lives and property.

In Mozambique, the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna was likewise followed by a heavy-handed response to the insurgents from the Mozambican security forces in 2020, later assisted by foreign private military companies. In fact, the government of Mozambique made a concerted effort to fight and subdue the terrorist insurgency through its FDS in dealing with the insurgents, but decades of neglect and the grave consequences of long-term underfunding left them incapacitated to stamp out the insurgency. Moreover, the government’s response sparked increased radicalisation and militancy, and to this end – as in north-eastern Nigeria – bloodshed, loss of many lives and destruction of property marked the political and security landscape of Cabo Delgado in recent years.

Third, in none of the two cases under review do we see any real documented evidence of foreign direct jihadist control of either Boko Haram or Ansar Al-Sunna. However, there are clear ideological linkages or sentiments, and possibly communication in both cases with regional and/or international jihadist groups. In both cases, the United States officially alleges ISIS connections to the two movements, as well as al-Qaeda connections in the case of Boko Haram. The observation of Mutasa and Muchemwa (2021:13) that foreign and ISIS ideological influence is of relevance to both movements is therefore accurate. It can also be stated that in both cases, the two movements succeeded in extending their links to regional and international jihadist networks. Moreover, poor management of the borders of the two states resulted in many illegal entry routes into the countries over the years, which coincide with illicit transnational arms trafficking and external support.

Fourth, from the above discussion, it can be stated that both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna are sourcing funds largely from dubious and illegal sources. In the case of Boko Haram, the smuggling of cattle across borders is a substantial source of income, as well as ransom payment for kidnapping, bank robberies and tax collections. Ansar al-Sunna receives its funding primarily locally from businesspeople, as well as cash and goods seized during attacks and looting. In both cases, we can state that the fragility of public institutions and the limitations of the respective state security apparatuses play an important role in explaining the funding channelled to the two movements and the fact that these movements possess highly potent and large-calibre weaponry.

Five, poor and even desperate socio-economic conditions facilitated opportunities for Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna to emerge as non-state actors and to enter the political landscape in the two respective countries effectively. In this regard, both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna operate in the less governed, poverty-stricken parts of their respective countries where they emerged as some kind of pure or alternative Islamic movements. Political and socio-economic conditions in both Nigeria and Mozambique correspond with definitions of state fragility and areas of limited statehood. In this regard, there is a most striking parallel between the two cases under review pertaining to the very negative consequences of state fragility and related limited statehood, especially in relation to inequality and socio-economic exclusion in the north-western territories of Nigeria and the most northern province of Mozambique respectively. In both instances, the central government and relevant state institutions are simply absent or incapacitated to address the basic human needs and provide infrastructure relating to schools, hospitals and roads. In both instances, corruption, poverty and underdevelopment are the order of the day as well as a lack of educational opportunities and employment opportunities for the youth. Okoro's (2014, p. 119.) observation that the youth's disillusionment in especially the north-eastern regions of Nigeria "made them ready armies in the hands of extremists" remains relevant and is equally of relevance to Ansar al-Sunna. This is playing out in a landscape where the Nigerian armed forces – as in Mozambique – are struggling to exercise control over the relevant rural areas or even to protect urbanised centres from attacks. Over and above, Mutasa and Muchemwa (2021, p. 15.) correctly argue that the socio-economic landscapes where Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna operate are fertile areas for an expansion of extremist paradigms.

Lastly, linked to the above-mentioned issue relating to state violence as being instrumental in feeding radicalisation and more killings, it is crystal clear from the above that, in both cases, a militaristic counter-insurgency approach had been followed with negative outcomes. In both countries, the insurgency dynamics and problems were initially treated as problems of a security nature, requiring strong military responses, but actually requiring much deeper political and economic solutions – thus strategies that go beyond military responses and address the root causes of the conflict dynamics. Eventually, in both cases, regional responses and involvement were mandated, namely



interventions from ECOWAS in the case of Nigeria and SADC and Rwanda in the case of Mozambique. Both interventions are however hampered by inadequate resources and insufficient funding. In other words, fragility and governance limitations have not only been instrumental in causing the insurgencies, but also prevent the relevant state institutions in both Nigeria and Mozambique from effectively addressing the challenges posed by militant Islamic jihadism effectively, and this is why counter-insurgency efforts in both instances have been largely of limited impact thus far.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Being World Power and Economic Utility: The Economic History of Germany's African Colonies¹

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Abstract:

As a late colonial power, Germany was seeking to conquer territories in Africa and Oceania in the last third of the 19th century. The two major purposes for founding colonies were 1) to reduce the immigration of Germans to America; and 2) to represent the young German nation state as a mature power, which can compete with the United Kingdom (called simply England in the historical sources) and with the despised Western neighbour France. The most important lobby and pressure group of German colonial aims was the German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft), a group of widely respected intellectuals, influential businessmen and politicians. After the accession on the throne of Emperor Wilhelm II, the colonial lobby became more influential, and the process of colonial expansion was accelerated. Nevertheless, there was an Achilles' heel in this policy: gaining territories did not seem to be profitable in the short term. Thus, theorists and propagandists of colonization, such as Paul Rohrbach, published papers about possible measures that could have made the colonies financially fruitful territories. This thought remained vivid in the National Socialist era as well: Germany's right to have colonies was explained on the base of the need for raw materials and the overpopulation of the German fatherland. This study has been written for the purpose to summarize the colonial economic policy of the German Kaiserreich and to briefly explain the economic plans of National Socialist German state regarding Germany's former colonies in Africa.

Keywords:

Burundi, Cameroon, Colonization, Economic History, Germany, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo.

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Before the First World War: Ideas, Plans, and Outcome

The German expansion in Africa began in the Bismarck-era. Bismarck viewed Germany rather as a European continental power; hence, his ideas were not compatible with the imperial dreams of Emperor Wilhelm II. The German monarch, who admired absolutistic and imperialistic ideas, intended to build a colonial empire as the representation of German strength. For this reason, Chancellor Bismarck was forced to leave his office in 1890.

This idea of colonialism in Africa needed support from influential intellectuals. The governing coalition of conservative and national liberal parties of the Reichstag had strong anti-colonial opponents: the left-wing SPD and the catholic Centre Party called up the government to allocate public money to relieve social issues in Germany. Thus, the pro-government public intellectuals and college professors took a considerable role in the discussion regarding the colonies. Paul Rohrbach, a Lutheran theologian and contributor of various pro-government newspapers, published books on the economic opportunities of German colonies in Africa. Paul Rohrbach is considered to be one of the most prominent pro-government advocates of German colonization. He was also working as a colonial official (e.g., colonial commissioner for settlement in German South West Africa) in the early 1900s (Anker, 2005, pp. 5-6). Since he travelled a lot across Germany's colonies, he gained a remarkable amount of knowledge about the local people and circumstances. His book *Wie machen wir unsere Kolonien rentabel?: Grundzüge eines Wirtschaftsprogramms für Deutschlands afrikanischen Kolonialbesitz* (How Do We Make our Colonies Profitable? Fundamentals for an Economic Program for Germany's Colonial Properties), published in 1907 (almost simultaneously with the crush of the Herero and Nama revolt in German South West Africa and with the Maji Maji Rebellion in German East Africa), can be considered as a collection of ideas for a government program. These thoughts were taken into account by the change of German colonial attitude when Bernhard Dernburg, the first colonial minister, who had his own portfolio separated from the Foreign Office of Germany, took his office.

The liberal banker Dernburg saw economic opportunities in the German colonies that the German state needed to exploit (Press, 2021, pp. 10-12.). Chancellor Bülow, who managed to establish a stable coalition with help of the various conservative and liberal parties (*Bülow-Block*), became devoted to creating a new colonial policy; therefore, the traditional Prussian militarism lost some of its relevance.

Togo

On 5 July 1884, Germany and Togo made a contract about the German imperial protection. Gustav Nachtigal signed the contract in the name of German Emperor, while Chief Plakkoo represented the African monarch, King Mlapa III. (Som, 2021, pp. 41). As



the smallest German colony of Africa, the establishment of colonial administration happened in a fast and efficient manner. With the aid of successful private investments, Togo became the most fruitful project of German colonization in Africa. The ‘model colony’ (*Musterkolonie*) concept recommended profitable agricultural and commercial activities to the German colonial masters.

Rohrbach characterized Togo as a tropical country, which is “relatively densely populated, and [where] the indigenous peoples are living quite well exclusively of agriculture” (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 52, 56). The colonial bureaucrat saw the dense flora of this colony as an advantage; however, he also marked that “Togo’s land is not fat”. (Rohrbach, 1907, p. 56.) He initiated to develop railway and routes, the introduction of cotton cultivation for the indigenous people, since “The indigenous tribes of Togo are peaceful and not shy to work” (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 248-249).

The German colonial administration implemented practice from abroad in cotton cultivation: John W. Robinson, a graduate of the Tuskegee Institute of Alabama, established an experimental cotton farm in Togo in 1904. “Between 1901 and 1909, cotton exported to Europe from Togo improved in quality and increased in quantity by almost sixty-fold.” (Zimmerman, 2005, p. 1362). The Colonial Economic Committee (*Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee*), an organisation responsible for increasing investment in Togo, was the main sponsor of cotton production. Introducing the cultivation of cotton also brought a change in the local and traditional Togolese agricultural technique: domesticated animals started being used in cotton production, and women and children took over the entirely men-dominated old Togolese agriculture (Zimmerman, 2005, p. 1386).

Besides the cotton fields, the Togolese monocultural agriculture was based on the production of palm kernel, palm oil, rubber, copra, cocoa and corn. Rohrbach’s thoughts about the construction of a colonial infrastructure, i.e., railroads, routes, etc. seemed to be a very clairvoyant idea, since the export of agricultural products mentioned above almost tripled as a result (Haan, 1983, pp. 132.). It is a remarkable fact that the British colony Golden Coast (today’s Ghana) participated in a customs union with Togo from 24 February 1894; hence, merchant activities enjoyed a free market-alike level of freedom of commerce (Zimmermann, 1914, p. 218).

In a longer term, Togo could have become a profitable colony. According to Alfred Zimmermann’s statistics from 1913, the total expenditure was 4,060,000 German marks, and the total income was 3,380,000 German marks. In 1911, the total import to Togo produced 9,620,000 German marks, and the total export revenue amounted to 9,318,000 German marks. Togo’s five most important export products were palm kernel (3,579,000 German marks), palm oil (1,688,000 German marks), rubber (832,000 German marks) cotton (554,000) German marks), and cattle (414,000 German marks) in 1911 (Zimmermann, 1914, pp. 269-271).

Cameroon

Cameroon's German colonization was also started by Gustav Nachtigal, who arrived from Togo to this territory. King Ndombe Lobe Bell and other eleven Duala chiefs signed a treaty on 12 July 1884 regarding exclusively German-owned commercial rights, and two days later, the German imperial flag was flown (Som, 2021, p. 68). The colony was established to help the German expansion eastward to the Congo Basin. In the late 1890s, the German plans for a Central African colonial empire became obvious. In the wake of the Second Moroccan Crisis, in 1911, the borders of the colony were established, the colonizers gaining direct access to Lake Chad (Som, 2021, p. 76).

The First and the Second Moroccan Crisis was connected to the German expansion in West Africa. Spain suffered from loss of colonies in America and Oceania. Selling the Spanish colonies in Africa was taken into consideration in Madrid. Germany and Austria-Hungary were both interested in purchasing Rio de Oro's territory. Viktor Dubský von Třebomyslice, who was the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Madrid, played a keyrole in this task. "Dubský asked the German ambassador in Madrid about the rent of this territory, who pointed out that his country has right for preemption for the Spanish African colonies, however, he did not confirm whether they are interested in Rio de Oro's emption." (Besenyő, 2018, p. 870). In 1899 the German plans changed connected to this Spanish African colony. "Karl Liebert, who was the chair of German Colonial Society, did not show any interest in the [purchasing of this] territory; hence, he proposed for the Spanish to look up the Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society [Österreich-Ungarische Kolonialgesellschaft/Osztrák-Magyar Gyarmati Társaság]." (Besenyő, 2018, p. 873).

In Cameroon's colonization, the Germans preferred the involvement of private companies and entrepreneurs. These companies owned the cocoa and rubber plantations. Cameroon was labelled as Germany's 'cocoa colony', which was of a considerable level of importance, as cocoa consumption showed a growing tendency in Germany. Emil Zimmermann hoped that Cameroon could supply Germany's entire cocoa demand, but the labour shortage made the colony unable to produce the required amount. (Zimmermann, 1918, p. 10) Contrary to Togo, there were no free indigenous peasants involved in the cocoa production, as all the plantations were owned by Germans (Westermann, 1909, p. 26).

In Cameroon, Rohrbach also initiated the construction of colonial railroads, which ensured contact between the mainland and the port of Duala. He saw the indigenous peoples quite similar to the Togolese ones, and considered that "they do not shy away from work" either. He also held a favourable view of the structure of the local indigenous society in Northern Cameroon, as he appreciated that the local tribes were led by strong chiefs who were the owners of the land at the same time, a circumstance that provided opportunity for a fast development (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 231-232, 234, 244). This statement is in accordance with the well-defined property rights that could



be a significant advantage in this ethnically very diverse colony. It also must be emphasized that Rohrbach criticized the concessions in Cameroon and the land companies (Landesgesellschaften) in German South West Africa, as he viewed them as a hindrance to free development (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 258-259).

Cameroon was not suitable to be a cotton producer. Based on its climate and soil, rubber trees could be planted more efficiently than other trees, which were also cultivated in a monocultural way. Experiments were made in the northern region to convince the local indigenous people about the benefits of cultivation of cotton, but they were not interested in working for German colonizers. They could supply their demand on their own, since they had their own handicraftsman culture for making clothing (Fabarius, 1911, p. 22).

Besides cocoa, plantations of cola, palm, and rubber were established. In 1911, Cameroon's five most important export products were rubber (11,030,000 German marks), palm kernel (4,168,000 German marks), cocoa (3,307,000 German marks), palm oil (1,424,000 German marks), and ivory (581,000 German marks). The total import in 1911 was 29,318,000 German marks, while the total export brought 21,251,000 German marks. The colony could not be turned profitable in the long term, since the financial differences were considerably disproportionate: In 1913, the total expenditure was 15,340,000 German marks, while the total revenue from the colony amounted to 8,900,000 German marks (Zimmerer, 1914, pp. 263-265).

German South West Africa

Traditional colonial powers such as England and Portugal considered South West Africa (today's Namibia) as a worthless place, full of dust and lacking opportunities for naval activities (with the exception of Walvis Bay, which belonged to the British sphere up to 1948, and to South Africa until the first free and democratic elections in 1994) (Dierks, 2000, pp. 254).

Adolf Lüderitz, an adventurous merchant from Bremen, bought land from Frederiks, the chief of Bethany Nama, in Angra Pequena via his contractor Heinrich Vogelsang on 9 April 1883. Lüderitz was afraid of a possible British expansion; hence, he wrote several letters to Bismarck asking him for German imperial protection, which he was granted on 24 April 1884 (Som, 2021, p. 105). This date can be considered as an official beginning of the German colonization of South West Africa, a territory that was meant to become a settler colony (*Siedlungskolonie*) (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 208-209). The German imperial national budget suffered a lot due to this idea. The territory was originally inhabited by Khoisan tribes, namely by the Nama and the San people (Bushmen in the old sources). The Nama lived with the Bantu Herero tribe in the central area. In the northern region, the Ovambo, a people with a staunch anti-Christian attitude, was the majority ethnic group. The Western or coastal part of the colony was

populated by the Damara or Bergdamara people. Another considerable group was the coloured population: the Rehoboth Basters were the descendants of white (mainly Dutch) settlers of Cape Colony and indigenous Africans; they migrated toward the northwest from Cape Colony in the 18th century. Some Afrikaner families also migrated to this territory in the period of the Great Trek, also called Thirstland Trek (*Dorsland Trek*). This ethnic plurality and the permanent hostility between these groups caused huge difficulties in the colonization of South West Africa (Kienetz, 1977, pp. 554-564).

The indigenous groups lived in a semi-nomadic way. Breeding livestock was their the most important economic activity, since the number of cattle he owned was a status symbol for a Herero or a Nama man (Gewald, 1999, p. 12). Their interethnic conflicts were mainly connected to looting cattle from each other. The Herero were waging war on Damara until the German colonization, as a result of which the Damara became slaves of the Herero. The main source of the interethnic conflicts changed after the beginning of German colonization: the German settlers gradually took the land from the indigenous peoples, and their methods were often unethical e.g., entering into a contract with an alcoholic indigenous man (Silvester and Gewald, 2003, p. 91).

Samuel Maharero, the paramount chief of the Herero was also notorious for his alcoholism, and the German settlers exploited his weakness. Losing land, legal conflicts and the pro-white bias of German courts of justice led to the Herero and Nama revolt. The warfare began in January 1904 and was crushed by the Schutztruppe, a German military expedition that arrived to help the German Colonial Forces. General Lothar von Trotha ordered to annihilate and to expel the Herero and the Witbooi Nama insurgents to the desert (*Vernichtungsbefehl*), and many of them were transported to concentration camps (Silvester and Gewald, 2003, pp. XXI, XXVII, 70, 180). The colonial infrastructure was rebuilt with force labour after 1907. The Herero lost 70-75% of their total population, while the Witbooi Nama had a 30-35% loss.

As a colonial bureaucrat, Paul Rohrbach was also a witness of the colonial war. He was involved in the issue of German South West Africa's economics. In his book written in 1907, he proposed a publicly financed settlement policy and detailed research by experts, which could help to establish a farm culture in the colony (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 227-229). Nevertheless, a truly remarkable change took place in the mining sector.

Even though the Germans assumed that South West Africa was as rich in metals and gemstones as South Africa, the searching expeditions could find only copper, and the mining concessions were owned by British companies (Press, 2021, p. 49). The summer of 1908 brought a great breakthrough for the Germans, since diamond was found on the territory of the colony. In the following year, the Forbidden Zone (*Sperrgebiet*) was established, which functioned up to 1989 as a territory exclusively segregated for diamond mining, where the indigenous people worked as contract labourers. Diamond was attractive for adventurers and the new settlers. Several companies were established (*Koloniale Bergbau-Gesellschaft, Vereinigte Diamanten*

Minen AG, Pomona Diamantengesellschaft, Bahnfelder-Abbaugesellschaft mbH, Lüderitzbuchter Bergbaugesellschaft mbH, Kolmanskop Diamond Mines Ltd, Diamantengesellschaft Grillental mbH), most of them under the ownership of Germans (Dierks, 2000, pp. 103-104). Regie, however, was the most important company, as it had the responsibility of selling the diamonds mined in South West Africa. The Regie was established in January 1909. The gems were sold in the Belgian city of Antwerp, which led to a severe criticism of the Colonial Minister Dernburg. Since several German liberal politicians and magnates of Jewish ancestry were involved in the diamond industry and trade, antisemitic rumours started circulating as well (Press, 2021, pp. 57, 80, 86, 93, 103).

Ultimately, diamond mining could not equalize the expenditures and the revenues of German South West Africa. The hopes and the future plans were all overestimated. According to Alfred Zimmermann's statistics, in 1913 the total expenditure was 54,140,000 German marks and the total revenue was 15,880,000 German marks. It is worth remarking that from 1907 the expenditure was almost always the double or even more of the revenue in each year. The total import in 1911 was 45,302,000 German marks, while the total export brought 28,573,000 German marks. Diamonds had the most prominent role in the total export, bringing a revenue of 23,034,000 German marks. Copper export was in the second position with a revenue of 3,754,000 German marks, while lead export in the third position, bringing a revenue of 346,000 German marks (Zimmermann, 1914, pp. 279-280, 307). While fighting against the challenging climate and the dry soil of the colony, the German settlers modified the flora and the fauna by growing potatoes, wheat, grains, various fodders and breeding camel and Karakul sheep (Jürgens and Bähr, 2002, pp. 78-79), a sheep breed originating from today's Uzbekistan. Despite the efforts to make agriculture profitable based on farms owned by German (and occasionally Afrikaner) peasants, the mining sector remained the most important economic sector in South West Africa even after the German rule ended.

German East Africa

This colony had a rich history before the arrival of German colonial masters. Its intensive relations with the Arabic world gave an opportunity for the spreading of the Islam religion on the coastal part of today's Tanzania and in Zanzibar. The Arab merchants exploited the opportunities for slave trade, selling Africans in the Muslim world. On the other hand, a form of Folk Islam and religious syncretism (traditional African religion with Muslim elements) was born on this territory. Rohrbach described German East Africa in a different way: based on the strong presence of Arabs and East Indians, he compared its "level of civilization" to the Rehoboth area in German South West Africa, which belonged to the Baster people (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 260-261).

The intensive relations with the different neighbouring civilizations created a solid base for the German East African economy. Agricultural activities developed on this territory, especially in its eastern regions. Local indigenous tribes produced the food for their own needs. Copra, rubber, nuts, rice and cotton were all cultivated before the arrival of German colonizers. The neighbouring island, Zanzibar was the centre of commerce, especially the worldwide known city Dar es Salaam (Rohrbach, 1907, p. 259; Som, 2021, p. 186).

The colonization of this region was led by Carl Peters, who did not enjoy Bismarck's support. For his colonization purposes, Peters established the Society for German Colonization (*Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation*). He signed a treaty on 26 November 1883 with Sultan Mangungu of Msowero about the complete cessation of the latter's rights to rule in favour of Peters. The territory was growing, and Bismarck decided to send the so-called protection letter (*Schutzbrief*) to Peters, which took effect from 27 February 1885. This event signalled the beginning of colonization by official German presence in East Africa. (Som, 2021, pp. 144-145)

The German rule modified the economy and the administration of the colony, which caused resistance. Indigenous tribes were forced to work in the cultivation of cotton plantation and to participate in the various communal works for free. In June 1905 the Maji Maji uprising broke out. The insurgents came mostly from villages, and people of different non-African ethnic backgrounds, such as merchants from India and the German Bishop of Dar es Salaam, were often considered by them as enemies. The southern region, inhabited by the Hehe tribe, became the centre of this uprising. The Germans crushed the uprising, and the warfare ended in 1908, after approximately 75,000- 120,000 uprising indigenous people, 400 'pro-German African' and 15 European civil people died (Som, 2021, pp. 158-159; Búr, 2009, pp. 10, 20). It is not only the simultaneity that created a contact with the Herero uprising: the 'rinderpest' in the 1890s, which killed a high number of cattle of the Herero tribe, appeared firstly in East Africa. The disease originated from China, although the mutation happened in the neighbouring British Eastern African colonies, especially on the territories where the Indians were present (Youde, 2013, pp. 44-49.).

Regarding the economic development, Rohrbach proposed the very same idea as for other German colonies: the importance of building railroads and a better exploitation of the fat lands. Agriculture in German East Africa involved the production of coffee, coconut, cotton, cardamom, sisal, rubber and vanilla on plantations established at the turn of the century (Sabea, 2008, pp. 415-416). Also, because of the increasing number of labourers more food was needed, which meant – according to Rohrbach's conviction – the cultivation of corn, millet, rice and wheat (Rohrbach, 1907, pp. 273-275.). The colony was also visited by Colonial Minister Dernburg, a key figure in the reformulation of Germany's colonial policy. Dernburg and his fellow thinkers were convinced that cotton production had to remain the number one good produced



in German East Africa; hence, the procedure became more industrialized. As a result, Germany (with its colonies) became the third biggest producer after the USA and the United Kingdom in 1909 (Sunseri, pp. 31, 35). Another agricultural product, sisal, was considered as “the gold of Tanzania” by a Tanzanian politician in the 1960s. In 1893, German colonizers planted sisal in Tanzanian soil for the first time. The leader of the project was a German botanist, Dr. Hirndorf, who was employed by the German East Africa Society (*Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft*). Hirndorf brought the sisal plants from Florida. The North-eastern Tanga region became the centre of sisal cultivation. (Sabea, 2008, pp. 411, 413-418).

According to Alfred Zimmermann’s statistics, in 1911 the total import to German East Africa in 1911 was 45,892,000 German marks, while the total export was 22,438,000 German marks. The five most notable products of the colony in 1911 were rubber (5,414,000 German marks), cotton (1,277,000 German marks), fibre crop (1,129,000 German marks), coffee (856,000 German marks), and wood products (380,000 German marks). The ratio of expenditures and revenues showed a very depressing tendency: In 1913 54,760,000 German marks were allocated, while the treasury gained only 13,780,000 German marks (Zimmermann, 1914, pp. 253-256).

After the World War I, the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist Era

Crushing the Boxer Rebellion in China after the Hun speech, the Herero revolt in German South West Africa, and simultaneously the Maji Maji Rebellion in German East Africa ruined Germany’s international reputation.

The plans to establish German Middle Africa (*Deutsch-Mittelafrika*) collapsed in the first half of the World War I, as the overwhelming majority of German colonies had to surrender due to the dominance of Belgian, British, French, and Portuguese troops (Memba, 1991, pp. 162-163, 169-173). However, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who deserved the nickname Lion of Africa, fought two days longer than the official capitulation of Germany in German East Africa (Som, 2022, p. 45).

The bad reputation of German colonization in Africa contributed to the dissolution of the German colonies by the Treaty of Versailles, since Germany was portrayed as a colonial power unable to govern colonies. There was a *communis opinio* in the Western political discourse according to which Germany had no routine and good practice necessary to be a colonial power.

Even though the German state lost all its colonies, colonialism was not eradicated from the German legal system, and the German thinkers and some political parties intended to maintain the issue. The Weimar Constitution also preserved the legislation over colonial issue (*Weimarer Reichsverfassung*, Article 6 (2)). Theorists of German colonialism saw Germany without colonies as a “one-handed giant”, which can only be

an equal member of the great nations by regaining its colonies. Wilhelm Solf, the Colonial Minister of Germany between 1911 and 1918, emphasized that the goal of Germany in Africa is to provide “common freedom for commerce and economic activities” (Solf, 1919, p. 86). A hero of the World War I, Major Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck intended to wake up the enthusiasm for colonies in his fellow countrymen, and therefore he emphasized that having colonies is Germany’s economic need. As he wrote, “Here is the question, which deeply determines the future of our fatherland” (Lettow-Vorbeck, 1919, pp. 5, 16). This statement was the core of all form of German colonial propaganda after 1919: Germany needs raw material, Germany is overpopulated; hence, Germany needs colonies. This idea was crystallized in Hans Grimm’s book *Volks ohne Raum* (People without Space) published in 1926.

Besides the conservative and liberal politicians, there was a party that declared that the Treaty of Versailles would be annulled after their takeover: the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (*NSDAP*). Hitler and the propaganda of his party viewed losing colonies as an immense injustice (Kunze, 1938, pp. 180-191). After Hitler took it over, the German Colonial Society became the Reich Colonial League (*Reichskolonialbund*), and it was meant to be an umbrella organization of all colonial associations. The official authority for relations with the German population of the former colonies was the *NSDAP/AO*, the Foreign Organisation (*Auslandsorganisation*) of the *NSDAP*, which had its headquarter in Hamburg, the most prominent city of German colonialism. The Reich Colonial League, led by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, had many plans for the colonization of Africa, and popularized this idea via propaganda materials and the German Africa Show (*Deutsche Afrika-Schau*) (Walther, 2002, p. 170; Linne, 2008, pp. 29, 48-51.).

In fact, however, the Nazi leadership was never really interested in the colonial issue, and as the World War II caused more and more losses, the colonial propaganda became even more redundant. In November 1942, Martin Bormann made it known to Ritter von Epp that there was no need for a German Africa policy, and the Reich Colonial League was merged with the *NSDAP* Office of Colonial Policy in 1943 (*Kolonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP*) (Linne, 2008, pp. 153-154). Although this event practically meant the end of German colonial aspirations for Africa, the actual end of German colonialism took place on the 8th May 1945 with the German Instrument of Surrender. As András Karácsony wrote, “in National Socialist Germany the Weimar Constitution was in fact never repealed” (Karácsony, 2021).

Evaluation and Conclusion

The German colonization was a delayed project. Its main aim was to demonstrate the greatness of a nation, which was very successful in industry, had many widely-known scientists, military personalities and philosophers.

These prominent figures, often led by romantic nationalism, were convinced about the idea that Germany was meant to be the leading power of the world. Even though the achievements of German art and science were never questioned, the lack of colonial practice and the experiment to make a German *Sonderweg* based on British colonial experience clearly demonstrated that some issues could not be solved by the military.

As a late colonizer, Germany could not conquer financially profitable territories. Hence, an expansion in Central and Eastern Africa was planned by military strategists. After the collapse of the German troops on the Western front in 1918, the colonial dreams in Africa also dissipated. The high public expenditures and the bloody wars made the colonization a loss-making period of the German economic history and prestige.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Changing the Old Narratives and Approaches in Curbing Corruption¹

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Abstract:

This paper examines the perspective of public officials in Nigeria about corruption and why corruption continues despite numerous efforts to curtail it. The study conducts a survey among a range of public officials in Nigeria. The paper finds that individuals tend to normalize corruption as they grow older. The results also indicate a slight difference regarding the beliefs of economic versus moral harm of corruption between different religious backgrounds of the public officials. The study concludes that establishing an alternative narrative at younger ages by raising awareness and education among school aged children could assist in preventing and normalizing corruption in later years.

Keywords:

Corruption, Nigeria, public officials, religion, survey.

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Introduction

In Nigeria, corruption is widely prevalent, which is a significant cause of social conflicts, destitution, low economic development, insecurity, and poverty among Nigeria's population (Fiyin, 2017). Corruption is 'dismembering' the Nigerian state because corruption in Nigeria has spread across various political institutions, police, health sectors, the judiciary, educational institutions, and business boardrooms (Fiyin, 2017). Corruption hindered "the wheel of progress in Nigeria" making it difficult to realize Nigeria's national policies despite Nigeria's vast human and national resources (Mahmoud, 2023). In addition, there is a high value placed on corruption in Nigeria, of which some Nigerians cherish and promote a corrupt culture; hence, some Nigerians see corruption as a usual way to attain their daily living (Nomishan et al., 2022). Reducing corruption in Nigeria will raise Nigeria's domestic savings over a long period (Abu and Staniewski, 2022), and make significant progress toward achieving sustainable development (Das and Drine, 2020). Despite the attention to the pervasive corruption in Nigeria, the country struggles in policies designed to reduce corruption. Nigeria has been called, 'Africa's economic giant,' (Williams, Adeniran, and Ordu, 2023), but cannot fully accept such a role without further reduction to nationwide corruption across a number of economic and political sectors. Consistent high perceived corruption ranks further make it difficult to address politically and reduce economic investment from other nations (Abu and Karim, 2021; Abu and Staniewski, 2022). Practitioners have adjudged corruption as the most significant obstacle preventing Nigeria from realizing greater potential (Matthew, 2018). For example, Transparency International (2020) indicates that Nigeria has remained at the bottom quartile of the Global Corruption Perception Index ranking since 1999.

In Nigeria, there is considerable reliance on public goods by the country's population. The citizens entrust the government to provide public services to meet their daily needs due to large amounts of poverty and underdevelopment. One of the difficulties in providing such public services involves the acts of corrupt policies that benefit public officials to the detriment of the public. Corruption drains a significant number of resources each year and derails development; also, corruption weakens the social contract or trust which exists between the public and the officials (Matthew, 2018). Sometimes this erosion of trust leads to social unrest, such as the “#EndSARS protest,” Boko Haram, social agitations, and insecurity. Corruption is a general burden on society and is an important area to study in order to reduce corruption and prevent it in other countries. According to Daniel Jordan Smith (2010), everyday experiences help determine the depth, scope, and corrupt behaviors among Nigerians. When individuals experience corruption as a regular part of their lives, for example, getting a driver's license or applying for a loan, corruption becomes normalized for the population and deepened part of societal life.

Much of the discussion about corruption within Nigeria falls within two primary opinions, excusing and justifying it versus complaining about it (Smith, 2010). Individuals who experience corruption and complain about it regularly, unfortunately, feel impotent to make any changes, while others take part in the corruption due to the necessity of participating in certain tasks in society. For example, Nigeria's corruption extends into different sectors, including economic, petroleum, legislative, and electoral corruption (Matthew, 2018). Sometimes, individuals must participate as victims of corruption at police checkpoints, where commuters pass each day and must bribe the officials in order to continue to their destinations (Smith, 2010).

This paper examines corruption in Nigeria's public sector and outlines modalities towards a narrative change in curbing the menace. This approach addresses corruption at a root level through educational and discursive practices rather than at the policy and enforcement level, which have thus far been relatively ineffective. The next section of the paper discusses corruption in the Nigerian context, followed by a review of the economic implications of corruption, outlining its effect and implication on tax revenue and foreign direct investment (FDI), health, and education. Also, the subsequent section emphasizes Nigeria's effort to curb corruption. Following this discussion, the paper also discusses the methodology used for the surveys, and the results, and concludes that changing the narrative of the corruption approach will assist Nigeria in curtailing corrupt practices by institutionalizing early age corruption awareness and education among <18-years old populations in schools and religious places.

Nigerian Corruption

This section highlights the depth of corruption in Nigeria and how the consistent practices contributed to its normalization. Also, the section discusses different unethical, corrupt practices that compromises public service procurement regulations across Nigeria's public sector. Although efforts to reduce corruption include establishing anti-corruption agencies in 2000 and 2003, the practice continues. Corruption in Nigeria generally involves public official's use of their offices and positions to achieve private gain to which they are otherwise not entitled. However, there is some discussion as to the depth and extent of corruption within Nigerian society. Generally speaking, corruption can be found in all public institutions and many areas of private life, contributing to poverty and poor economic development (Fiyin, 2017).

On one side, scholars argue that corruption in Nigeria is "polyvalent" with multifaceted proportions (Pierce, 2016). This suggests that corruption within Nigeria extends beyond public office and occurs in a variety of contexts. If we assume that Nigerian corruption extends beyond public offices, it is important to note that this suggests corruption is a norm within society. In other words, corruption is an accepted part of interaction in both the private and public spheres. Pierce traces the evolution of



corruption conception in Nigerian society to over 150 years suggesting the impossibility of understand Nigerian statecraft without conceptualizing the role of corruption (Pierce, 2016). Corruption accusations are an essential political tool within Nigeria's public sphere even as the country struggles for "development" (Pierce, 2016). Also, the culture of corruption in Nigeria has allowed Nigerians to both "demand and condemn" corruption (Pierce, 2016).

On the other hand, Joseph (1987) describes corruption in Nigeria as "prebendalism" — emphasizing how public officials in Nigeria use their office for private gain purposes. This not only places corruption firmly in places of public office but also suggests that public officials feel entitled to private gain after gaining office. As such, the quest for personal gain is rife in public procurements, where Nigeria's most significant corruption activities occur (Fagbadebo and Mbada, 2021). Arguably, the pervasiveness is visible in several abandoned and incomplete public projects and infrastructures with no trace of the allocated resources for deserted projects. For instance, according to project tracking reports, between 1962 and 2012, there were over 11,000 estimated abandoned public projects across Nigeria (BudgIT Nigeria, 2019). A recent report indicates that Nigeria's number of abandoned public projects is now more than 55,000; these include schools, hospitals, roads, and other critical public infrastructures worth N12 trillion (\$28.8 billion in 2022 US dollars) (Vanguard News, 2021).

In general, different unethical practices compromise procurement regulations, effective public service delivery, and due process in Nigeria's public sector. Hence, it hinders citizens' socio-economic aspirations, although government efforts to curtail these malfeasances and ensure good use of public resources have not yielded the desired results (Fagbadebo and Mbada, 2021). These different proportions and nuances of corruption in Nigeria include contract fraud to petty societal bribery. More specifically, corrupt practices include public resource embezzlement and more complicated money laundering schemes which occur in connivance with corporate entities—pocketing of "ghost workers" salaries by top public executives to trading in influence and acts of clientelism/nepotism in public office recruitments.

Interestingly, successive Nigerian governments, notably since the country returned to democratic governance in 1999, took measures to curb corruption without success. In 2000 and 2003, respectively, then President Olusegun Obasanjo established anti-corruption agencies, "the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)" (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The government designated these two anti-corruption agencies specifically to prevent corrupt practices. Available data shows that between 2010 and 2019, EFCC has received over 70,000 corruption petitions; however, the agency investigated only about 5000 cases, and achieved 2,544 convictions (Anaba, Ojelu and Dania, 2022). The figure shows the difficulty in investigation and insufficient prosecuting capacity by the anti-corruption agency. In other words, it is arguable to contend that the anti-corruption agency is overwhelmed by the numerous corruption petitions. Due to lack of adequate

funding, or other unspecified reasons, the anti-corruption agency prefers selective investigation and prosecution.

Although the anti-corruption agencies are doing their best to curtail corruption, considering over 2000 convictions it achieved over ten years, Nigeria continues to witness high incidents of corruption. For instance, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows that Nigeria is falling back compared to its previous CPI results. In 2019 Nigeria's CPI score had dropped from 26 in 2019 to 25 in 2020, whereas in 2021, the score dropped further to 24 (Ojo, 2022). These indices imply rising and continuing corrupt practices across Nigeria. Notwithstanding massive human and national resources to have a functional and productive state, Nigeria continues to battle high levels of corrupt practices (Mahmoud, 2023).

The Economic Implication of Corruption

The previous section demonstrated the extent to which corruption is widespread in Nigeria throughout public and private sectors. This section examines the effects of corruption on the economic sector, primarily in the areas of tax revenue, FDI and natural resources, health, and education. In addition, this section addresses the argument made by some scholars that corruption can act as a way to increase speed of action in some economic systems.

Although many scholars discuss the important negative consequences corruption contributes to economic conditions, some scholars suggest that corruption produces positive effects by “greasing” the economic “wheels” in highly regulated countries. Essentially, these highly regulated countries often lack effective governance systems; therefore, corruption helps in compensating for institutional deficiencies (Chêne, 2014). This argument extends to political systems with highly developed bureaucratic systems that might be slow moving with many procedural hurdles. In these developed economies, corruption can increase the speed and likelihood of proceeding this contributes to economic growth by removing bureaucratic barriers and inefficient regulations (Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Thus, some developed economies are said to improve their economic conditions through corrupt practices by potentially removing some bureaucratic barriers and increasing the speed of changes in highly developed countries with strong and developed bureaucratic systems. This argument, however, is generally limited to countries with highly developed and strong bureaucratic systems rather than underdeveloped political systems, making these arguments less applicable to countries like Nigeria.

It is critical to note that even if corruption “greases” economic “wheels” by penetrating over-regulated public institutions, this does not translate to economic growth (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). According to Osterfeld (1992), two specific behaviors often divide corrupt actions, “economically restrictive and economically



expansionary.” Corruption is restrictive when firms, for instance, seek government protection from competitors. In contrast, corruption expands economic activities when citizens bribe public officials to penetrate over-regulated or restrictive bureaucracies (Houston, 2007). Notwithstanding, the quality of political administration, even though often regime-specific, is essential in determining corruption’s impact on economic growth (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006). Also, whether “restrictive” or “expansionary,” some suggest that contextual factors such as governance quality and level of development can mitigate these effects of corruption (Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011).

In particular, the quality of political regimes and public governance determines the degree of corruption’s harmful effects (Houston, 2007; Meon and Weill, 2010). Corruption will be less harmful when personal and property rights are well-protected by law through quality political regimes and governance. However, the same cannot hold in countries with weak political regimes and corrupt public governance (Houston, 2007). Although Samuel Huntington (1968) argued that corruption is a valuable substitute for weak political regimes and corrupt public governance because the value of behaving corruptly outweighs the worth of productive and legitimate transactions. These circumstances are more likely where and when legal options and incentives are scarce or severely constrained for doing business (Houston, 2007).

The “restrictive” nor “expansionary” proceeds of corruption influence the economic and political systems because there is limited control on how corrupt individuals can use such illicit resources. However, different scholars and practitioners have attributed various causes to why a multifaceted economic implication of corruption is detrimental to economic growth and development. For instance, Chêne (2014) opined that corruption is economically damaging because of its diverse proportions and unpredictability. The multifarious nature of corruption and its uncertainty damages market incentives by distorting the allocation of resources to legitimate commerce. Additionally, it diverts human resources from productive and legitimate ventures to rent-seeking activities (Mauro, 1995).

On the other hand, corruption permits the diversion of public resources for personal gain purposes and ultimately increases income inequality (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). However, the consistent diversion of public resources increases the overall rate of corruption, necessitating different corrupt activities over time. As corrupt activities increase, income inequality also increases reducing investment in physical capital. Hence, the declined investment combined with the income disparity decreases income growth and increases inequality; ultimately, these consequences mainly affect the poor (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). These negative corruption trends increase the effects on economic growth and stymie development (Egunjobi, 2013).

In this regard, the upsurge in income inequality reduces economic efficiency and increases political and social instability (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Mo, 2001). On different occasions, income inequality divides opinion among citizens about corruption

as people struggle for daily survival, hence delving into various corrupt activities to sustain their livelihood. Arguably, corruption is the primary driver of most social instability emanating from meagre resource agitation among growing populations and the desire to accumulate more wealth among the corrupt political elite. Corruption in an unstable society correlates with lower economic growth and negatively influences other social and political vices (Rothstein and Holmberg, 2011). These instabilities generally distort economic growth and increase unaccountability in public service (Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). Some of this unaccountability reflects heavily in poor tax revenue collection and dysfunctional inflow of foreign investments.

Tax Revenue and FDI

Corruption can cause a decrease in tax revenue for the state, thus reducing the effectiveness of state governance. There are two mechanisms by which this influence occurs. In one case, corruption at higher government levels lowers the propensity of individuals to follow tax regulations and pay taxes appropriately (Attila, 2008; Nawaz, 2010). In other cases, corruption can lower the tax to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio (Nawaz, 2010).

For the first mechanism, Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) discovered a statistically significant negative link to growth in tax bargains between individual taxpayers and corrupt tax inspectors, subsequently reducing GDP. The authors identified that when an individual negotiates their income tax liability with corrupt tax inspectors, the mutual interest of both parties creates underreporting tax revenue from inadequate tax collection. In this instance, a bribe bargain is created between the taxpayer and the tax inspector specifying the desired bribe amount to be paid in relation to the tax rate. Such a tax system of bribe bargains increases corruption and reduces income taxes. This effect continues and can spiral into additional loss in tax collection amounts increasing bribe gains to the tax inspectors. The increase in bribes emboldens tax inspectors to persist in extorting taxpayers to collect higher amounts (Hindricks, Michael, and Abinay, 1999).

Tax corruption can also have a ripple effect on other tax categories, for example, the value-added tax (VAT) or turnover and sales tax. Individuals and businesses increasingly evade tax payments in a densely corrupt environment. Also, even when these affected individuals and businesses pay inaccurate tax amounts, these illegal behaviors reduce the country's tax revenue (Fuest, Maffini, and Riedel, 2010). In addition, many small and medium-sized firms operating in such corrupt atmospheres exploit such gaps intentionally to reduce their tax burden (Fuest, Maffini and Riedel, 2010).

For the second mechanism, the World Bank suggests that densely corrupt countries collect fewer tax revenues in ratio to their GDP (World Bank, 2022b), while less corrupt countries can sustain high tax revenues (Kaufmann, et al., 2000). This is



possible because there is a limited efficient tax regulatory system in a corrupt environment. In addition, some large multinational corporations exit to other investment destinations once they sense a densely corrupt environment (Kaufmann et al., 2000). Meanwhile, collecting less than 15% of GDP in taxes due to corruption, particularly in fragile states, drains the government revenue and capacity to meet the citizens' basic needs (World Bank, 2022b). Accurate tax collection is a critical tipping point that makes a state viable for economic growth (World Bank, 2022b).

Economic corruption also discourages foreign direct investments (FDI), hinders local business growth, and prevents investments in entrepreneurship (Chêne, 2014), which all contribute to lower GDP. For instance, investors are skeptical of investing in corrupt prone countries (Żurawicki and Habib, 2010), which can lead to a significant reduction in FDI in most countries (Wei, 2001). United States of America FDI outflows revealed that countries with widespread corruption attract limited investments from firms (Sanyal and Samanta, 2008). FDI is closely coupled with corruption indicators and the rule of law (Gani, 2007).

Overall, the corruption level indices show that Nigeria has continued to rank low in the Global Corruption Perception Index since 1999 (Transparency International, 2020). The index report shows that Nigeria has struggled to curtail corruption for the past two decades, which may have severely affected its FDI investment growth. Notably, the opportunity to attract reasonable FDI will be limited if the corruption perception ranking continues to diminish. Taxes have a pivotal role in making growth sustainable and equitable. Because corruption continues to hinder tax collection, countries like Nigeria struggle to finance their development. Hence government must deduce means that will improve competitiveness in tax collection because overly complicated tax systems allow corruption, tax evasion, and other informal tax collecting means to thrive.

Health and Education

In addition to direct effects on taxes and investment, corruption has spillover effects into other areas, which compound and spiral into adverse economic effects in the longer term. The ripple economic effects raise the cost of doing business and reduce revenue on investment and the investment-to-GDP ratio (Mauro, 1995). Corruption, through the previously discussed negative economic effects, can decrease government income, and reduce public spending on health care and education, creating further harm to economic growth (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Also, in a corrupt political environment, achieving a stable mobilization of resources to meet the medical and educational needs of society becomes more difficult, further compounding the negative effects of corruption on society (Tormusa and Idom, 2016). Corruption occurs even within the

Nigerian healthcare sector, causing additional economic and compounding effects (Tormusa and Idom, 2016).

Individual interests within the health industry weaken public healthcare regulations, and such interest causes absenteeism from duty and nepotism. Often, healthcare workers are not accountable to the regulatory authority and take advantage of the corrupt environment to gain personal benefits (Tormusa and Idom, 2016). These issues in Nigeria are similar to issues in other regions, such as Ghana, where corruption exists in different healthcare units; thus, it has cost many human lives (Agbenorku, 2012). Also, in Ghana, the health sector's challenges have promoted the underutilization of public resources due to corruption, and the poor are most affected (Agbenorku, 2012). The challenge is that West African countries are generally ranked low in the global corruption perception index.

Some of the corrupt practices include diverting patients from a public hospital to privately owned health facilities, the misappropriation of the health budget through procurement, drug theft, and improper supplies of drugs to the hospital (Onwujekwe et al., 2019). One challenge to curtailing health related corruption in some of the affected West African countries emanate from lack of thorough empirical investigations (Onwujekwe et al., 2019).

Overall, the healthcare situation in Nigeria is in decline, with a life expectancy declining from 47 to 43 years in 2015 (World Health Organization, 2015). However, according to recent data, life expectancy in Nigeria has increased to 55 years in 2019 (World Bank, 2019). There is no clear reason for this increase; though the World Health Organization's vital priorities in assisting member states are critical factors that enhance global health standards. The World Health Organization helps member states improve their health care through research and technical support (World Health Organization, 2019). However, the adverse effects of corruption locally could derail some of these efforts of the World Health Organization. On the other hand, the infant mortality ratio shows 114 deaths per 1000 live births in Nigeria (World Bank, 2022a). This high number of deaths per birth ratio is also partially attributed to the high level of corruption in public health care.

Education is another important sector that has also faced a series of corruption challenges. As such, Nigeria's education sector battles severe corruption challenges, draining quality and sustainable development (Nwaokugha and Ezeugwu, 2017). Conversely, corruption in Nigeria's education sector has negatively affected social equality, competence, and merit-based recruitment (Nwaokugha and Ezeugwu, 2017). In addition, the lack of educational strategy for the population permits inadequate economic and job opportunities, which in turn increases insurgency, terrorism, kidnapping, and other criminal activities (Abraham, 2011).



Corruption in critical social sectors adds to the burden of corruption in the economic sectors. The multifaceted economic implications impede significant economic growth and development drivers such as tax revenue, FDI, health, and education. Therefore, it is necessary to seek ways to curtail political and economic corruption. The previous discussion highlights the importance of corruption eradication in Nigerian society and the negative effects of the widespread practice of corruption. The discussion also shows that corruption within Nigeria is widespread and part of the normal operations of society. These two points are important for examining the narrative around corruption and altering the narrative to reduce the levels of corruption among later generations of workers in government and other fields. The next section further develops our understanding of corrupt practices in Nigeria by examining Nigeria's efforts to curb corruption. Following this discussion, the paper then examines an avenue to introduce an alternative narrative to reduce corruption.

Nigeria's Effort to Curb Corruption

Nigeria has applied different mechanisms such as establishing anti-corruption institutions and agencies to curb corruption. Nigeria's expansive corruption issues require a framework to understand the phenomenon, yet there is no common ground for such knowledge. Citizens understand the impact of corruption and how it has contributed immensely to the country's high economic and social instability. The continuing mistrust between the political class and the citizens about the government's commitment to eradicate or curtail corruption may also reduce effectiveness of any anti-corruption policies. However, the roles of the public institution are essential in grasping corruption's implications and how to tackle the problem. This section shows the role and efforts of Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies toward curbing corruption.

The three leading anti-corruption agencies (i.e.) the EFCC, the ICPC, and "the Code of Conduct Bureau" are responsible for fighting corruption though they have also been accused of corrupt practices (Matthew, 2018). For instance, in 2011, the then Nigerian attorney general, alongside the chairperson of EFCC, faced accusations of undermining and obstructing the prosecution of public officials because of personal affiliation and interest (Albin-Lackey and Guttschuss, 2011). Also, the same Nigerian attorney general reportedly thwarted the United Kingdom's effort to recover looted public funds from a former Nigerian state governor (Coulson, 2007). In addition, the chairperson of the EFCC undermined the same institution's prosecution and investigative efforts, which orchestrated the United States of America's suspension of its assistance to the agency (Saharareporters News, 2011). Again, in 2015 and 2020, respectively, the chairpersons of EFCC, Ibrahim Lamorde, and Ibrahim Magu, were suspended from office due to corruption allegations (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015 and State House News, 2020). These instances of corruption and corruption accusations within the anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria point to the pervasiveness of the practice

throughout society, normalizing the practice among a variety of individuals spread throughout the government.

Corruption peddling among the top hierarchy of the anti-corruption agencies, weak government institutions, and a lack of robust legal framework has necessitated lengthy investigation and prosecution of corrupt cases (UNODC, 2019). In addition to the internal corruption allegations, critics accuse the Nigerian anti-corruption agencies of turning a blind eye to the allies of the incumbent president over their respective corrupt deeds. For instance, a member of the parliament indicted President Muhammadu Buhari for using anti-corruption agencies lopsidedly to target his political rivals (Daniel, 2018). Also, critics blamed successive Nigerian presidents for using the anti-corruption agencies to fight politically perceived enemies and opponents (Daniel, 2018). This back-and-forth has since derailed Nigeria's public institutions' capacity to discharge their duties "without fear or favor."

When the institutions responsible for fighting corruption are also corrupt, this increases the delay in the prosecution and enforcement of corruption laws. The lengthy prosecution of corruption cases in Nigeria is of most concern because delayed judgment incurs additional costs for prosecuting government agencies. For instance, some corruption cases in Nigeria take a prolonged duration to conclude, costing enormous public resources. Some include [EFCC vs. Joshua Dariye 2007 ~ 2021, completed and convicted], [EFCC vs. Orji Uzor Kalu 2007 ~ 2021, inconclusive], and so many other corruption litigations facing a similar fate (TheCable News 2020, 2021). The lengthy prosecution of these corruption cases indicates that corrupt activities occur mainly in secret, necessitating enough evidence to obtain judgments (Peter and Nick, 2013).

Unfortunately, the good intention to establish anti-corruption agencies does not produce the desired results because of the internal corruption practices of top agency officials. The main challenge of corrupt practices in Nigeria is normalization of corruption in society. The challenges facing anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria lead to issues of corruption among its top executives and sabotaging prosecution of public officials because of vested interest. Also, lengthy investigations and prosecution of alleged corrupt individuals in Nigeria are expensive, can obstruct justice, and weaken the judicial system. It is paramount to achieve a paradigm shift towards a less corrupt Nigerian society and reduce the normalization of the behavior and pervasiveness across a variety of institutions and individuals that can also alter the corrupt practices within the anti-corruption agencies responsible for fighting corruption. The previous efforts to combat corruption have not considered the degree to which corruption is normalized within society. This paper explores current beliefs about corruption in Nigeria using survey methods and describes a new narrative to help reduce corruption in Nigeria, with particular attention to corrupt practices in public service. The new approach provides a different view regarding corruption reduction and prevention in Nigeria. Hence, the paper used primary data to ascertain public officials' perspectives and



adumbrates possible remedies through a narrative driving discursive policy approach derived from constructivist theory.

The task of altering the narrative and normalization of corruption in a densely corrupt environment is a difficult, though necessary change. If society continues to foster such corrupt practices, altering course becomes increasingly difficult as corruption becomes further normalized into more sectors. Therefore, the mutually constitutive relationship between state institutions, the nature and normalization of corruption, the anti-corruption agencies, and the citizens are central, as the constructivist theoretical approach might suggest (Adler, 2002). The belief that state institutional structures are designed to mitigate citizens' challenges often does not correspond with the daily realities of citizens in a corrupt society. Structural change demands emanate from the dissatisfaction of any group in the mutually constitutive relationship. In other words, the corrupt environment is both defined by the citizens and practitioners in this environment along with the institutional norms in society. However, citizens, the primary stakeholders in the mutually exclusive relationship, are expected to adhere to the constancy practice of the agent as stipulated by the institutional or structural rules and norms. The expectation is that citizens' adherence is based on state governing principles; hence, they demand a change once they are dissatisfied with the agent practices. Nevertheless, to address the citizen's demand for change and presumably the problems associated with such proposed change, there is a need to examine concepts of socialization within social processes of interaction between citizens and state agents (Wendt, 1987).

In addition, the structure is not just material but an idea (Wendt, 1999), constituted partly by the practices of those who interact with and within the institution. Change occurs not through a top-down approach of institutional rule implementation, but rather when agents alter the rules and norms through performance and constitutive interaction (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 887–917; see also Spandler, 2015: 601–622). According to Adler (2002), “if constructivism is about anything, it is about change.” If the world is what we make of it, as Wendt (1999) suggested; individuals, including state agents and citizens, can also un-make any dysfunctional practices such as corruption. Hence, we explored the fundamental premise for change through the formation of a new narrative. Although change occurs at least partly through the agents, Flockhart (2016) suggests that the constructivist concept of change focuses mainly on the structure and its stability instead of agents and change.

As discussed above, we argue that public institutions' consistent predictability is critical in overcoming some of the daunting challenges, including influence peddling, nepotistic tendencies, and agent-citizens conflicts. Also, any new narrative must entail specific actions necessary to curtail corruption activities. These specific actions must not be cumbersome or complicated for average citizens to understand. The common practice must be introduced early enough among individuals of all ages, particularly at a younger age, through education and awareness of corruption implications. In this

regard, a new narrative will suffice through consistent actions and practices. In addition, public enlightenment through communication, education, interrelation, and investigation is critical to achieving the desired results.

This paper argues that agent-led or institutional change against corruption in Nigeria may not work if the country continues on the same trajectory. Hence, we argue that to make change happen in Nigeria fight against corruption, it is necessary to change the narrative in curbing corruption through early education and awareness of corruption implications as a common practice among all individuals in Nigeria. We also posit that a deliberate preventive strategy against corruption is vital to curtail corruption's lengthy investigation and prosecution. Synergies must be directed toward education and prevention because unscrupulous individuals operating in a corrupt environment will attempt to prevent corruption investigations (Peter and Nick, 2013). In order to establish new narratives to fight corruption in Nigeria, we must first determine the current narratives emerging within the population. The next section outlines the methodology used to survey the population and understand current narrative forms.

Research Methods

In order to understand the widespread and normalized view of corruption among public officials, this research utilizes a survey approach. If the survey shows that a narrative or normalized presence of corruption exists among public officials, this supports the conclusion that corruption is a normalized practice and a barrier to reducing corrupt practices beyond institutional controls. A divergent view of corruption among different groups of public officials based on different cultural approaches suggests that a cultural and narrative approach can be helpful in reducing corruption in Nigeria. Although there are several data collection methods, survey method is a strong approach to understand a general belief among the population and is an appropriate research method to answer the research questions (Ponto, 2015). In addition, using a survey for data collection allows sampling over diverse individuals' opinions (Check and Schutt, 2012, p. 160). However, some challenges are associated with the survey method, such as 'coverage error, sampling error, measurement error, and nonresponse error' (Dillman et al., 2014; Singleton and Straits, 2009; Check and Schutt, 2012). This study ensures that it mitigates those errors by providing expansive data collection coverage using SurveyMonkey. SurveyMonkey helps to specify the categories of public officials that are targeted participants, thereby reducing sampling error. The study ensures that the survey questions concisely reflect the study's aims and that a significant percentage of the respondents (92.6%) participated in the data collection, reducing measurement error and nonresponse error.

The data collection was among three categories of the federal civil service in Nigeria: career bureaucrats, elected federal public officials, and appointed federal public

officials. The data sampling ensured mixed gender, age, and religion. The sample ($n = 151$, 92.6%) included participants from three varieties of federal civil service, comprising a public service population size of 46,488, a 95% confidence level, and a 7% margin of error, indicating 196 potential respondents. Nevertheless, 151 ($n = 151$, 92.6%) participated in the survey, which is satisfactory for the data analysis.

Data Analysis

This study uses two specific independent variables to examine two dependent variables. Data collected by SurveyMonkey targeted audience responses administered between 9 ~ 11 December 2021, among 151 individuals working in Nigeria's public sector. The survey asked the public officials for their opinion on corruption in public service. The respondents were asked two substantive questions related to corruption; "what best reflects your view on corruption?" and "why do you think corruption continues to exist in public service despite numerous government efforts to prevent it?"

The survey used other survey questions to control for factors which might influence opinions on public sector corruption, such as "age" and "religion" to establish a proxy of the cultural narrative of the respondents. The respondents were public servants aged between <30 and 60 from the two dominant religions in Nigeria, Christians and Muslims. The result shows that most public servants in Nigeria differ in perspectives about corruption in particular, based on age and religion. The data are presented in Table 1 showing the "Age distribution of participants" and in Table 2 below indicating the "Religion of participants." Out of the 151 respondents, 71.33% were males, while 28.67% were females.

Table. 1 Age distribution of participants

Age	Frequency	Percentage
<30	34	22.51%
31~40	73	48.34%
41~50	34	22.51%
51~60	10	6.62%
Total	151	99.98%

Source: SurveyMonkey target audience responses administered between 9 ~ 11 December 2021, among Nigeria's public sector officials.

The data indicates opinion disparities amongst different ages of Nigerian public servants on “what best reflects” their “view on corruption.” It shows no consensus among all ages on what corruption in public service entails, whereas the majority (75.5%) agreed that “corruption causes economic harm.” The exception is that (19.9%) agreed that “corruption is immoral.” In particular, public officials aged <30 ~ 40 have vast disparities in their views regarding corruption. The most intriguing factor is that public officials aged 51~60 (6.6%), with no exception amongst them, agreed that “corruption causes economic harm.” It shows that as individuals grow old, they tend to accept the consequences of corruption. Because younger individuals are relatively unaware of corruption and the consequences, they become more aware as they age and participate in the public institutions in Nigeria.

Although another essential finding is that respondents within the young age of <30 ~ 40, totaling about 3.3%, opined that corruption is “good for everyone” and that corruption helps them to “get things done faster.” Whereas in the older age bracket, 41 ~ 60, 0.00% responded with such a sentiment. As public officials grow older with work experience and a good number of years in public service, the 41 ~ 60 bracket (23.17%) realize that “corruption causes economic harm.” This suggests that corrupt practices take place before these public officials became aware of corruption’s economic harmful effects. Since the cost of education and changing the norms at older ages is higher, educating younger people early enough about corruption before they join public service jobs can prevent the severe effects of corruption. To further investigate the respondent’s views on corruption and how different segments of the population see corruption in their lives, we examined the relationship between religion and their views, presented in Table 2 Religion of participants.

Table. 2 Religion of participants

Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Christians	109	72.19%
Muslims	42	27.81%
Total	151	100%

Source: SurveyMonkey target audience responses administered between 9 ~ 11 December 2021, among Nigeria’s public sector officials.

Most of the respondents were Christians, 72.2%, while 27.8% were Muslims. The result shows no standard view on corruption within any religion. Muslims 22.5% and Christians 52.98% agreed that “corruption causes economic harm.” Whereas Muslims 5.29% and Christians 14.56% opined that “corruption is immoral.” These



results suggest that there is a difference in the way different religions in Nigeria view corruption. A much higher percentage of Christians in both questions had stronger views against corruption. The causes and effects of these differences within each religious group should be examined in further studies in the future.

In response to why they “think corruption continues to exist in public service despite numerous government efforts to prevent it?” again we see some differences. The Christian group of respondents responded much higher than the Muslim group that the government is not doing enough to stop corruption and that corruption is deep rooted in society. In particular, 18.54% of Muslims and 45.03% of Christians, asserted that “corruption is deeply rooted,” while 7.28% of Muslims and 25.16% of Christians agreed that “governments are not doing enough” to curb corruption. Although both groups feel strongly in some capacity about the existence of corruption and the government weakness to fight against the corruption, more Christian respondents believe in these assertions. It is worth considering the importance of religions in beliefs about corruption in future studies. In addition, when composing and implementing educational programs to change narrative understandings, these two groups might be approached differently. Since beliefs vary between the groups, the educational programs may necessitate different implementation strategies.

Discussions

This study examined the widespread corruption in Nigeria’s public service through an examination of the current literature in the field. The government of Nigeria acknowledged the vast existence of corruption in the public sector by establishing three leading anti-corruption agencies, (see Human Rights Watch, 2011), though these agencies are largely ineffective somewhat due to their own internal corrupt practices. The issues surrounding lengthy corruption prosecution in Nigeria have influenced some public officials to engage in corruption, considering that it may take a long time before state institutions in Nigeria can obtain judgment over corrupt cases. While some cases may take extended periods to resolve, other cases remain inconclusive, costing prosecuting state agencies enormous public resources. Notwithstanding the cost of prosecution, the lengthy duration of litigation emboldens other public officials to engage in corrupt practices, knowing that it will take longer or never to adjudicate, (see TheCable 2020, 2021).

The survey study showed that the Nigerian state hires individuals relatively unaware of corruption effects and implications at younger ages. From the respondents varying opinions, we find that common knowledge of corruption among public officials comes in later years of public service. This suggests that corruption is more likely to occur prior to becoming aware of the damaging effects. The disparity in the views of public servants shows the depth of normalization and how deeply rooted it has become

in Nigeria's public space. Unfortunately, most public servants in Nigeria are unaware of corruption effects and its implications before joining public service, and this is one of the major problems of corruption in Nigeria's public sector.

Most respondents suggested that the government is not doing enough to curtail corruption and that corruption causes economic harm. Despite the common thread within the survey results, lack of regulation or government involvement preventing corruption has not been very successful in the past. Thus, a new educational narrative developed earlier can help increase understanding and knowledge about corruption, reducing the practice from younger ages. In addition, the government can do better by ensuring transparency in corruption prosecution and reducing lengthy corruption prosecution. Nevertheless, both the government and the public must ensure early awareness among all individuals about corruption effects and implications before joining public service.

Conclusion

It is important to reiterate the overview of our earlier submission about the effects and implications of corruption. As highlighted above, some of these effects include that corruption impedes development and causes economic and moral harm in Nigeria. We also submit that individuals tend to normalize corruption as they grow older due to certain work conditions in Nigeria's public service. Hence, we conclude that having an alternative narrative at younger ages by raising early awareness and education will assist Nigeria tremendously in curbing corruption.

We arrived at this conclusion based on the analysis of public servants' opinions about corruption in Nigeria. For instance, responses to the first question indicate that the understanding of corruption as "immoral" increases among people aged 31~40 (11.3%), while the same view was not prominent amongst people aged 41~50 (5.9%). Meanwhile, people aged 51~60 (0.0%) completely disregarded such a notion. In contrast, individuals aged 51~60 all agreed 10/10 (i.e., 100%) that "corruption causes economic harm." This outcome indicates that age is a significant factor in understanding corruption in Nigerian public service. Therefore, an emphasis on early age education to establish a consensus and framework on what corruption entails, its implications, and how to curb the phenomenon is an important approach to maintain a clear normalized narrative from early to later years in life.

For instance, Nelson Mandela once opined that "education is the most powerful weapon that can be used to change the world" (Fiyin, 2017). Specifically, in some developed countries, citizens must attain compulsory education until age 16; this shows the significance of education toward civic responsibility and compliance with social contract and social cohesion (Fiyin, 2017). More so, Ekechukwu (2021) asserted that curbing corruption through education becomes necessary because education helps to



facilitate a national re-orientation and change of mindset towards corruption. Awajiokinor and Muhammad (2022) took a step further to determine the impact of introducing an anti-corruption education curriculum on curbing corruption in Nigeria, particularly at the basic education level. The authors ascertained that including anti-corruption education in the academic curriculum for the primary education level will have a long-term impact on corruption reduction in Nigeria. In addition, Ekechukwu (2021) maintained that anti-corruption education would help the Nigerian state champion severe penalties for corrupt public officials. Thus, using educational systems to name, shame, and publish a comprehensive list of corrupt public officials will severely deter others from engaging in corrupt practices (Ekechukwu, 2021). Thus, such an educational approach will influence attitudinal change among Nigerians towards corruption, considering the early effect of anti-corruption education at the primary level (Awajiokinor and Muhammad, 2022).

Corruption awareness among <18-years old will contribute more significantly to reducing corruption in later years. The data show that individuals >18 years old exhibit mixed views about corruption; perhaps their opinions are aligned from age 51 to 60 years old. The implication is that if people are not fully aware of corruption at <18, there is a high possibility that the menace would have become widespread among different individuals at >18 ~ 50. Accordingly, conscious, and consistent citizen early corruption awareness and education will give Nigeria's public sector the desired results in curtailing its pervasive corruption. We recommend that a bottom-up approach through early age education will empower people from diverse backgrounds to develop similar perspectives about corruption. Although the success of "any" preventive strategy remains with the citizen's commitment, further research is necessary to develop implementation strategies and effectiveness on changing the frames and narrative among the youth through education programs.

Since Nigeria's traditional means of curbing corruption through anti-corruption agencies, prosecutions, legislation, and other international and regional initiatives have not helped to "stem the tide" of corruption in its public service, a new approach is required. Changing the narrative of the corruption approach will assist Nigeria in curtailing corrupt practices by institutionalizing early age corruption awareness and education among <18-years old populations in schools and religious places. Applying this early-age corruption awareness and education among young populations in schools and religious places across densely corrupt countries will assist them in reducing the effects of corruption in their national development and cooperate social existence. Developing educational programs must generally be suited to the different cultures and practices of each nation, however. Though these results may apply widely to a variety of countries with densely corrupt institutions and deeply normalized corrupt routines, changing these narratives and educational practices must be tailored to different cultures and educational practices and norms. Research on different implementation strategies

must take into account these different cultural norms to determine what strategies are best suited to each country.

Conflict of Interest

This paper received research subsidy support for graduate students from “Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu Oita, Japan.” Declaration of Conflicting Interest: The authors have no competing interests.

Notes on Contributor

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Improving Citizen Security Education and Awareness in West Africa – A Ghanaian Perspective¹

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Abstract:

Globally, expenditure in defence and security has been rising for the past two decades. Many reasons account for this phenomenon. Among them are increasing threats, and economic and geopolitical competitions. In Africa, not a day passes without security incidents which often results in heavy casualties leading to loss of lives and properties. Security has become a huge developmental challenge on the checklist of almost all countries in the world and this is no different in Africa in general and West Africa in particular. Every year countries in Africa invest billions of dollars in security to ensure that lives and properties are protected. These investments are in the procurement of new equipment, training and capacity building, maintenance and materiel, administration and operations. These expenditures are recurrent and often do not yield direct benefits to the country's Gross Domestic Product as often expressed by the citizenry. Some have argued that though these huge recurrent expenditure on security are worthwhile, concerns have been expressed about the low level of citizen security education in West Africa. This is because some believe that when the citizens are well informed enough about the security threats and what they should do, incidents of security will be reduced. The paper focuses on the roles of government in citizen security education and awareness and explores the ways that citizen security education and awareness can be improved to reduce security threats and harm to the people.

Keywords:

Awareness, citizen, education, security.

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1. Introduction

All over the world governments are responsible for the security, safety and protection of its citizens. This responsibility has become a huge challenge due to growing global insecurity emanating from political, social and economic and geopolitical competitions. The definition of security has evolved so is the ways and means of addressing today's security challenges. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines security as first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development (UNDP, 1994). From the definition, it is evident that security is no longer only the preparedness of the police or other security agencies and their related apparatus to provide physical security. This could be termed as 'hard' security issues. The others which could be classified as 'soft' security issues exist as a result of poor human rights, famine and pandemics such as Covid 19. These challenges call for proactive and inclusive leadership, trained and adequately equipped security personnel and local, regional and international collaboration.

Countries in the West African sub-region has common security challenges due to cross border movement, common socio-economic and political systems. Regional grouping such as ECOWAS also facilitate the free movement of people and businesses, and this creates a fertile ground for cross border crimes (Lavergne, 1996). The political systems and security architecture of most of the countries in the sub-region are similar. Therefore, issues such as weak democratic institutions, institutional corruption, political violence and high mistrust for political leadership are highly pervasive. Crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping, abductions, murder, fraud, youth and political vigilantism, human and arms trafficking, money laundering continue to dominate media headlines in West Africa.

Governments are continuously exploring both 'hard' and 'soft' options in addressing the security challenges but the situation does not seem to improve. However, one of the 'soft' security measures which has not been well explored and exploited is the deliberate citizen security education and awareness creation and its likely impact on improving security in West Africa. It is good to acknowledge that citizen security education and awareness alone will not drastically address a country's security challenges. Ghana has been praised as a peaceful country compared to its neighbours. However, though Ghanaians agree with this assertion, recent events such as armed robberies, arson, murder and kidnappings have raised concerns of insecurity among the citizens. Some think that a deliberate citizen security education can help reduce some of the security incidents and to a large extent the sense of insecurity among the citizenry. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential of citizen security education and awareness in addressing insecurity in Ghana. The paper will be in four parts. The first part will discuss the citizenry, security education and awareness, the second part will

discuss the responsibility to educate and create awareness. The third part will discuss the impact of poor citizen security education and awareness. The last part of the paper will discuss how citizen security education and awareness can be explored and exploited to address some of the security challenges of Ghana.

2. The Citizenry, Security Education and Awareness – Missing Links, Relationships and Gaps

The relationship between the state and its citizen's regarding security is complex. On one occasion, you hear that the state is responsible for the safety, protection and security of its citizens and on another occasion, you hear, that the individual is responsible for their security. A close examination of the definition of democracy as given by the former US President Abraham Lincoln 'Government of, by and for the people' puts a huge responsibility on the government. However, without the support of the citizens, the state will fail in its protection responsibility. No effective protection can be successfully carried out without reliable intelligence and the citizens are an important stakeholder in the intelligence space. This assertion confirms the complicated state and citizen relationship. This calls for a deliberate effort by the state to build a framework of citizen security education and awareness. Reliable data on the level of security awareness among Ghanaians is limited. However, open-source information available indicates that Ghana has a huge security and education and awareness deficit.

3. National, Regional and International Policy Framework

3.1. Economic Community of West Africa State

States and regional bodies have developed several protocols and mechanisms to improve and fight violent crimes and cross border organised crimes in Africa. Such mechanisms and regional bodies include ECOWAS, SADC and EADC and many others including the AU. To address the challenge of terrorist financing and money laundering across West Africa, heads of states and governments of member states of ECOWAS urged member states in 2016 to enact laws in line with the revised Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) (GIABA, 2006). Similarly, ECOWAS has multilateral working agreements and relations with AU, EU, UN and the World Bank both internationally and across Africa. For example, ECOWAS is a regional partner of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee. This committee was created by the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) aimed at strengthening the capacity of UN member states to prevent terrorist acts within their countries and across borders. Multilateral alliances and cooperation among member states have achieved considerable results regarding 'hard' and 'soft' security.

3.2. Africa Union

The Africa Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (Afripol) was established by statute and was adopted in 2017 (Afripol). Afripol is a policy framework mechanism developed by AU to advance its crime-fighting efforts. Its objectives include operational and strategic level police cooperation among member state. Afripol is institutionalised in character, and it has its General Assembly, Steering Committee and Secretariat. Members are by national legislation required to set up an Afripol Liaison Offices to coordinate Afripol activities for effective and efficient coordination with little conflict of interest with other organisations.

In 1996 and member states were urged to establish drug control units in their Ministry of Police and State Security. Additionally, member states were to design their national Drug Master Plan with technical assistance from AU Commission and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Control (UNODC) and other international partners. Substantial progress was made in its implementation due to other regional efforts by ECOWAS, SADC, EADC and EADC. However, there were some challenges due to decreased funding from supporting partners. The drug use and the drug trade is complex, expensive and dangerous and it changes very fast as the drug enforcement agencies change strategies and their approach.

3.3. United Nations

There are many conventions the UN has championed to address crime. One of them is the UN Drug Convention. This framework requires all member states who are signatories to criminalise money laundering, tighten banking regulations and provide mutual legal assistance. This Convention has necessitated an international emergence of money laundering regime and world leaders have become more conscious about the dangers and the extent of the phenomenon (United Nations, 1988). Another crime-fighting framework that the UN has championed is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes. (UNTOC). This is a very important document because organised crime is complex, therefore no country can fight it alone. Fighting organised demands strong collaboration among state and institutions. As of May 2015, 185 countries had signed and ratified the Convention (Boister, 2016). Much of the work of the convention focuses on procedural matters of cooperation aimed at fighting organised crime.

The procedural aspect includes formal legal assistance to informal police cooperation. There is much focus on the issue of procedure, therefore it appears that the subject of UNTOC is more about procedures instead of criminalization (United Nations, 2015)

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4.2. Theory and the Crime Triangle

Crime is a global challenge that every country is grappling with the phenomenon which is becoming more complex every day. Many theories have been developed to understand the problem of crime and its impact on society. One such framework which is widely used by many police and law enforcement institutions is the Crime Triangle.



Figure 1: The Crime Traingle

As seen in Figure 1, the Crime Triangle has three parts namely, target, desire and opportunity. The target is the person who suffers when the crime occurs. The desire is the drive of the criminal to commit the crime which the victim cannot control. The opportunity is the conditions that make it easy for the criminal to commit the crime. A lot of work has been done on how opportunity makes it easy for people to commit crime and how the deliberate reduction of opportunity can help reduce crime. The work of Mayhew et al. in *Crime as Opportunity* was not bold enough to agree that opportunity was a cause of crime. This was because it would have gone contrary to the position of Sutherland, a sociologist who is described as the father of criminology (Mayhew et al., 1976). Sutherland indicated that the challenge with criminology was that it focuses on explaining criminal behaviour instead of the behaviour itself (Sutherland, 1947). This claim was generally accepted by many criminologists who were then sociologists. However, Felson and Clarke in *Opportunity make the Thief* proved to a large extent that indeed opportunity creates the necessary space for crime to be committed (Felson and Clark, 1998). Therefore, an opportunity is important when situational crime prevention is being designed. Crime causes insecurity among people and communities and in countries. The subsequent paragraphs will discuss some of the theories developed by criminologists to aid in understanding why people commit crime.

4.3. The Routine Activity Theory

According to the routine activity theory, crime occurs because 3 things are available: the offender, a suitable target and unavailability of a suitable guardian. A guardian is any person whose presence will serve or discourage the offender. The absence of the guardian makes the target more susceptible to attack (Felson and Clarke, 1998). The target could be a person or a thing that the offender aims to either harm or take. Therefore, the offender may want to steal a laptop or kill the owner of the laptop. The risk of the target being attacked is influenced by value, inertia, visibility and access. The value of the target will influence the offender to commit the crime. Therefore, the latest iPhone 6 is likely to be stolen than the old Nokia 3310. Inertia is the weight of the item. Therefore, a phone is likely to be stolen more than a 50inch LED TV. Visibility is the exposure of the target. If someone displays money in public, the individual is more likely to be robbed. Access may refer to street designs or patterns and placing items close to the doors. The usual predatory crimes occur because the offender has access to a suitable target that does not have a guardian. Therefore, it is possible for the level of crime to increase because there are many more targets who don't have guardians present.

4.4. Crime Pattern Theory

The crime pattern theory focuses on the interaction between the offender and their environment, and it is central to what is termed environmental criminology. The theory

is based on three concepts: nodes, paths and edges. Nodes refer to where people travel to and from as is used in the transport industry. These places or their nearby spaces may generate crime. For example, it may be easier for a knife attack to occur at a restaurant than during a boardroom meeting or inside an aircraft which is in flight. Paths refer to the geographical location of the target which includes their activities in time and space and the daily rhythm of the activities. There may be activities with many people along paths and in between nodes that present an opportunity for a crime to occur especially during rush hours or commute flows.

Edges refer to the boundaries of the area where people seek entertainment, work or live. Crime such as racial attacks, shoplifting and robberies often occur more at edges. This is because more people from different locations converge at such places. It is more attractive for offenders to commit a crime in areas far from their neighbourhoods and take refuge in their homes than to commit the crime in their neighbourhoods. Edges have been one of the arguments of crime pattern theorists regarding the design of cities, towns and business premises. This is because the design of a building has huge impact on crime.

4.5. Rational Choice Perspective

The rational choice perspective theory concerns the decision-making process of the offenders. Most crimes are deliberate because they are planned, and the offender is aware of the risk if apprehended.

Offenders of crimes have their motivations, goals and benefits they seek to achieve when planning a crime. Offenders are ready to commit a crime if the goals are short-sighted, that is if the benefits are few and the risk is high and the constraints of thinking limit the offender's level of being rational. There is a need to understand crime choices in order to analyse a category of crime. Specificity is important here because every offender has a different purpose and may be influenced by different situational factors. For example, a thief may have different reasons why he or she needs a car. One may steal a car to use it for another crime or may be interested in some parts of the car or the person wanted a car to drive home. Criminals commit crime when the opportunity is created, the risk of being caught is reduced. The same is true when the opportunity is removed or reduced. This assertion informs the saying that 'opportunity makes the thief'.

The three crime prevention theories which have been elaborated reveals many lessons for fighting crime. This is a piece of good evidence that with good and deliberate education and awareness creation among the citizens, crime and therefore insecurity among the populace can be reduced. Regarding the opportunity framework, if the opportunity is removed or reduced, the offender or the criminal may not commit the offence at all or may do further thinking.

5. The Responsibility to Educate and Create Awareness

5.1. National Commission on Civic Education

In Ghana, the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) is the body mandated to educate the public. NCCE implement many programmes either independently or with local and international partners. These programmes have helped in many ways to improve the awareness and understanding of Ghanaians on many issues affecting them.

However, the NCCE is saddled with many challenges which affect its work. These challenges are both material and human resources. The subject of security is a technical area and demands some expertise to conduct any meaningful education about it and because the NCCE do not have such expertise, it is not able to educate the public on matters of security effectively. It is not surprising that the citizens understanding of security in Ghana is so poor. This may account for the reasons the citizens keep creating opportunities for thieves instead of working to reduce the opportunities. It must be emphasised that the NCCE has collaborated with security institutions to conduct such security education and awareness many times. But the results from such educational campaigns are yet to be realised.

5.2. The Ghana Police Service

The Ghana Police Service is a professional institution, and it stands tall among its peers in West Africa. It has performed creditably both in Ghana and in several international assignments especially in UN peacekeeping Missions in Somalia, South Sudan, and Liberia (UN Peacekeeping Resource Statistic, 2016). As part of the mandate of the Ghana Police Service, they are to educate and create security awareness among the public. The purpose of such education is to help the police to fight crime and protect the citizens. This is often achieved through the community policing concepts, TV and radio discussions, social media, press releases and alerts and sometimes when officers are interviewed at crime scenes. These are laudable efforts and they have helped to educate the public and create some level of awareness among the citizens. However, more could be achieved if these activities were deliberately planned, conducted, reviewed, and evaluated. The deployment of the police in Ghana places the police better to educate the people and create the necessary awareness. This is because police posts or stations are dotted in most communities across Ghana.

5.3. Civil Society Organisations

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are no longer a mere collection or group of NGOs, but more resilient, vibrant and organised or unorganised groups who often overstep their boundaries. Some of the contemporary operations of CSOs include awareness on societal issues, conflict prevention and resolution, peace education, emergency response, providing expert knowledge to policy formulation and citizen engagement

(Fowler, 2000). The role of CSOs in Ghana is no different as enumerated. Many of them are in conflict prevention and resolution especially in the northern parts of Ghana. The role of CSOs has been instrumental in managing numbers of the conflict because the people see CSOs as more neutral than government. The impact of conflict is often devastating, and this causes insecurity. Though these CSOs may not be directly engaged in security education and awareness creation, their work contributes to reducing the sense of insecurity that some Ghanaian experience. There is a plethora of security specialists, analysts, institutions and Think Tanks who work directly or indirectly in educating and creating public awareness about issues concerning security. Though sometimes some of their analysis lack depth, they have contributed in raising the security awareness of the citizens in many ways. What is yet to be exploited is strong collaboration between these security-focused CSOs, and government or state security institutions.

5.4. Traditional Authorities

In Ghana, Chiefs have championed major socio-economic development in their communities. Among the roles of traditional authorities is the mobilisation of their people for socio-economic development which includes security, safety and protection. Chiefs have championed the establishment of community protection groups whose responsibilities include educating their community members about crime and its effect on the safety and security of their people (Crook, 2005). With support to the police, these communities and groups have helped to arrest criminals. On some occasions, these community groups have arrested criminals themselves and handed them over to the police. Chiefs educate and create awareness about issues concerning security and safety and this in many ways have saved people in their communities from falling victims to the activities of the criminals.

5.5. Community Watch Groups

Community Watch Groups are voluntary and self-help groups that mobilise people in their communities to ensure the security and safety of their communities (Wanjohi, 2014). Some of their activities include patrolling, providing information to the police and sometimes arresting offenders and criminals. They also create security awareness in the communities they operate. However, where they are not trained their messaging could confuse the people in their communities. The Ghana Police Service under its Community Policing project has trained some of these groups and their work has complemented the efforts of the police in fighting crime especially in the Greater Accra Region. This could be an effective approach in addressing information gathering gaps of the Ghana Police. Members of the Community Watch Groups understand the peculiarities of their communities such as their routine, language, and culture.

Therefore, they could be an effective tool in citizen security education and awareness if they are given relevant training by the Police Service.

5.6. Religious Leaders

In Africa, churches are involved in many socio-economic activities such as the building of schools, hospitals training centres and several charity works. Citizen security education has been one of the activities of religious leaders. They do it through their sermons and special outreach programmes. This approach has not been very effective because, security is not their core job, therefore, they don't have a better understanding of security and so they may be handicapped in many ways in their efforts at educating their followers. The state security agencies could collaborate with them in order to derive full benefits. This is because there is a multiplicity of religious organisations spread across the length and breadth of Ghana. Therefore, a large number of people could be reached if this is well planned, targeted and implemented.

5.7. The Ministry of National Security

The business of the security and defence of Ghana has always been coordinated by the National Security Secretariat though previous governments have had their policy regarding the issue. However, it was realised that the management of Ghana's national security issues was flouted with many challenges, therefore the National Security Ministry was established under the National Intelligence and Security Act of Parliament.

Article 1(1) of the 1992 Constitution states that "The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner within the limits laid down in this Constitution" (Republic of Ghana, 1992). This recognises the role of the citizens in the management of security in Ghana. The National Security Ministry has the mandate to coordinate all public and private efforts at protecting the people of Ghana. Through the collaboration of the NCCE and many other agencies and institutions, several programmes are rolled out to educate the public to create the needed security awareness.

In June 2021, the Ministry of National Security launched the first National Security Strategy. The national security strategy document in itself is an effort to educate Ghanaians on the need for security awareness. The Ministry also coordinates the conducts of scenario and practical exercises as parts of its efforts to assess standard operations procedures, drills and contingencies of agencies involved the protection and defence of Ghana. As part of such exercises workshops and seminars and are conducted to engage selected stakeholders to educate them on current security threats and what the public can do to prevent likely future incidents.

5.8. Ghana Armed Forces

The GAF has deployed in many parts of Ghana as part of its internal security operations. These operations are in areas where chieftaincy disputes, land disputes, tribal conflicts, and other perceived threats are rife. The tactical commanders of these operations engage the Chiefs and opinion leaders in their area of operation as part of their key leader engagement tasks. These engagements often focus on the need to end those conflicts and disputes and live together in peace. The challenge is that, in most cases, these important engagements are not given as specified tasks for officers who command these operations. Sometimes, for fear of being reported in the news, some of the tactical commanders shy away from these important engagements. There is a need for clear operational guidelines on these engagements because when such engagements are deliberately planned and executed, it will give the troops huge leverage in their operations and enhances the image of GAF. Another way the GAF does citizen security education and awareness creation is through, specific operations, field exercises, visits by commanders, clean up campaigns, press releases and press conferences. The challenge with press releases and conferences are that they are done when there is an incident involving the GAF. The goal of these press releases is not to create citizen security education and awareness, but to explain or clarify the GAF's position on that specific incident and what they expect the public to do in the future. These actions often achieve a double objective by educating the public. Citizen security education and awareness creation has never been the primary role of the GAF. However, the GAF's changing role and the complexity of the internal security space necessitates the establishment of a department responsible for developing civil-military coordination policy and conducting deliberate and long-term civil-military coordination operations.

5.9. Other Security Agencies

Besides the Ghana Police Service and the GAF, other state institutions such as the Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana National Fire Service, Ghana Prisons Service, Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority, and National Investigations Bureau, have programmes aimed at educating the citizens and creating security awareness besides their constitutional mandates. The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) educate people in communities where they deploy and sometime through workshops and seminars. Members of these communities also help staff of the Service by sharing information on suspected activities of individuals. The Ghana National Fire Service is mandated to address all fire-related emergencies in Ghana. The Service conducts several educational and awareness creation programmes. These programmes are focused on fire prevention and the management of fires when they occur. Frequent fire outbreaks are a serious security threat. Every year, many institutions such as schools, churches, and other bodies receive education on the operations and other security-related subjects concerning the Ghana Prison Service. The Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority has its

own programmes tailored to education and the creation of public awareness on a range of issues which include under-invoicing, smuggling and drug trafficking. These efforts by these agencies would have achieved a better impact if they are properly, planned, programmed and implemented.

5.10. Poor Citizen Security Education and Awareness and Its Impact Sense of Insecurity

Globally, the acts of kidnapping for ransom by criminal groups such as militias, ritualist rebels, gangs, and terrorists are on the rise, and it has become the fastest growing criminal industry with an estimated \$500 million (Stubbert et al., 2015). Incidences such as kidnapping, murder, armed robbery, and human trafficking have become almost a daily occurrence in countries across West Africa. The issue is not different in Ghana. The US State Department assessed the security of Accra as critical in the year 2020 (OSAC, 2020). It is estimated that there are about 1.2 million unregistered small arms in Ghana. The circulation and easy access to these guns makes the planning and commission of violent crimes very easy. In 2019, Ghana experienced isolated kidnapping incidents across the country. The most prominent of these was the kidnapping and killing of three teenage girls in the port city of Takoradi (Doe, 2020). In the same year, two Canadian tourists were kidnapped at a golf course in Kumasi. The involvement of the Canadian government led to the arrest and rescue of the perpetrators and the girls respectively. In 2018, about 70 kidnapping cases were reported in Ghana (Kaledzi, 2019). The deliberate education of citizens and awareness creation would have largely prevented these kidnappings, since the victims would have been educated and better understood the threat to their lives. These strings of kidnappings have heightened the sense of insecurity among the citizens, and this has largely disrupted their freedom of movement as a result of fear. These have often led to pressure on the government, and the frustration of the citizens is expressed in the form of street protests.

In 2015, Ghana recorded 525 and 1397 murders and robbery cases respectively. However, while the robbery cases reduced to 1377, the murder cases increased to 549 in 2016 (Ghana Police, 2016). Another phenomenon which is worrying is highway robberies. The modus operandi of these criminals was that they stop market women passengers, usually at night, and rob them of their cash, mobile phones, and other valuables. There have been occasions where some passengers have been robbed and raped women at gun points. In 2020, the Member of Parliament for Mfantseman East, Honourable Ebo Quansah Hayford, was killed when he was returning from a political campaign in a village in his constituency. The victim of the most recent highway robbery was the killing of Taalay Ahmed, a London-based journalist for Muslim TV Ahmadiyya International, which occurred on 23 August 2021, on the Kintampo-Buipe highway (Fredua, 2021). In February 2016, the Member of Parliament for Abuakwa North, Joseph Boakye Dankwah, was stabbed to death at his residence in East Legon.

Many Ghanaians wondered, if a Member of Parliament who had police protection could be killed in his own home, how could the ordinary Ghanaian feel safe? In the first quarter of 2018, Ghana recorded 124 residential robberies and 964 robbery cases nationwide (Adams, 2018). Banks are being robbed and the most disturbing part is that police personnel who are supposed to protect the citizens have become the victims. In July 2019 and August 2019 alone, five policemen were killed by armed criminals (Nyarko-Yirenky, 2019). The recent killing of a police officer occurred in Jamestown, Accra on 13 August 2021. The police officer was a security escort to a bullion van. These incidents further increase the feeling of a sense of insecurity among Ghanaians. The Ghana Police Service needs to review its operations and consider better force protection for its officers deployed across Ghana. Institutions mandated to educate the public on crime such as the Ghana Police Service and the NCCE need better strategies and resources to conduct sustainable citizen educational programmes and awareness creation.

6. Loss of Trust and Confidence in Security Agencies

The trust and confidence deficit of security and law enforcement agencies in Ghana, especially the police, is low. The perception of lack of trust in crime fighting institutions across Africa is disturbing. The loss of trust in institutions in West Africa was 45%, the law courts 59%, the police 42%, and the Ghana Police Service was 42% (Wambua, 2015; Tankebe, 2012). The Transparency International year 2020 global Corruption Perception Index painted a gloomy picture. Compared to previous years, most countries made little or no progress in the fight against public sector corruption. Sub-Saharan Africa's average score was 32/100, with Seychelles on top with 66/100 and Somalia and South Sudan at the bottom with 12/100. In West Africa, Guinea ranked 137, Liberia 137, Cote Ivoire 104, Togo 134, Sierra Leone 119, Nigeria 149, and Ghana 75. The 2019 rankings for these countries were Guinea 130, Liberia 137, Cote d'Ivoire 180, Togo 130, Sierra Leone 117, Nigeria 146, and Ghana 80 (Transparency International, 2019). There was marginal improvement for some of the countries, and others did not improve. Recommendations by Transparency International included conflict resolution, controlling political financing, strengthening electoral integrity and empowering citizens. The issue of citizen empowerment needs special attention. You cannot empower citizens without educating them and creating the necessary awareness to help them ask the right questions in order to contribute to the governance of the country. Budgets for crime-fighting institutions in West Africa are woefully inadequate. Therefore, training and education of the staff of these institutions has not been a priority. The focus has been 'hard' security such as equipment and not 'soft' security such as training, education and shaping of the mindsets and orientation of these security personnel. Current complex crimes cannot be addressed with obsolete knowledge? The concern has been attributed to a lack of trust and confidence in police, who are often perceived to be corrupt and have a general poor attitude to fighting crime. There

is the need for a comprehensive effort by law enforcement agencies, public-private partnerships, and local and international organisations.

One way of demonstrating loss of trust in law enforcement and security agencies is through mob justice. In May 2017, a mob action in Denkyira Obuasi led to the death of Major Maxwell Mahama. The military officer was part of a military detachment providing security to a mining company in the community. The Ghana police are generally reactive and slow in responding to crime and their deterrence to crime is only moderate. They often lack equipment, training and the right personnel to respond when called for assistance and other emergencies (OSAC, 2020). Therefore, it is not surprising that citizen education awareness creation, which has a huge potential to reduce crime, has not been an operational priority of the Ghana Police Service. This does not mean the Ghana Police is not making any attempt to educate the public.

To achieve a more inclusive approach to fighting crime, the Ghana Police Service introduced the Community Policing Unit. Under this unit, the Ghana Police Service organises public forums with community leaders such as Chiefs, Imams, youth leaders, religious leaders, and civil society organisations. It also trains Community Police Assistants who help to strengthen visibility and accessibility of security in their community, and they also serve as liaisons between the police and their communities. The Unit also organises sensitisation programmes in communities and schools. These programmes have been relatively successful. However, it is still on a pilot basis in selected districts (Ghana Police Service, n.d.).

7. Public Misinformation fills the Education and Awareness Gap

Misinformation, disinformation and fake news are gradually becoming one of the global security threats, and it is especially dangerous in Africa, where illiteracy rates are still high compared to those in the developed world. Fake news is estimated to cost the global economy about \$78 billion annually (Sullivan, 2019). In 2018, the World Economic Forum's analysis ranked the spread of misinformation and fake news among the world's top global risks. With the world's 4.13 billion internet users, the security risk will be even higher (Statista, 2023). As of January 2021, internet penetration rates in Africa and West Africa were 62 percent and 42 percent, respectively. Ghana's internet penetration rate was 50 percent. Policy makers should be worried about the increasing number of internet users. This is because, while this is a business opportunity, it is equally a threat to the security of Ghana. Additionally, the more people use the internet, the more vulnerable they become to cyberattacks. Furthermore, it creates a fertile ground for fake news and disinformation. Social media has made it very easy for anyone with internet data and a mobile device to start communicating with the world. Depending on the subject of discussion, these people soon get thousands of followers and viewers. Security is a sensitive issue, and it affects everyone. Therefore, whenever security is the

subject of discussion, it becomes easy for them to attract many followers. As already indicated, the security and law enforcement agencies mandated to educate the citizens and create the necessary security awareness are not meeting the challenge. Additionally, citizen security education and awareness has not been seen as an operational objective worth pursuing, therefore it has not received the needed human and material resources. One of the most dangerous things that can happen is educating people with the wrong information. There is a new crop of security experts and security consultants in Ghana who have been speaking on security issues as and when they are approached by the media. These people may not have the necessary knowledge on the subject, but many of them are available, ready, and willing to speak to TV and radio stations when approached and interviewed. The messaging and analysis of these individuals may not necessarily reflect the reality and may misinform the people.

8. How to Improve Poor Citizen Security and Awareness

8.1. A Deliberate Strategic Approach to Citizen Security Education and Awareness

Strategy is key in achieving organisational objectives. In today's competitive world, companies and institutions have no choice but to craft sustainable strategies that can survive long-term disruptions and shape the attainment of their organizational goals. A deliberate strategy should be fully formulated before its implementation (Max and Majluf, 1986). It must be controlled by top management, deliberately controlled, and well processed. Deliberate strategies are born out of analysis and by taking into consideration internal and external factors which may include opportunities, weaknesses, threats, and strengths. A deliberate strategy is further informed by the values and corporate social responsibility the organization has towards its community (Ansoff, 1980). On the other hand, an emergent strategy develops as a result of learning and responding to external forces (Mintzberg, 1987).

The issue of citizen security education and awareness is too important and critical to be approached haphazardly. As a matter of fact, nothing about the security of a state and its citizens should be handled haphazardly. It needs to be carefully planned and executed like a military operation. In the military, operations are either hasty or deliberate. A hasty defensive operation is one which is planned with little time and the operation itself may not be for a long duration. However, a deliberate defensive operation takes more time and resources in both planning and execution. The National Security Ministry must be deliberate and strategic in its citizen security by taking into consideration the needs of the people, internal and external factors, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Corporations adopt strategic marketing and spend billions of dollars on marketing their products. Each year, marketing departments are given a set of goals to achieve, and these goals include medium-term, short-term, and long-term profit and overall organization growth. Therefore, the inputs and outputs

concerning the objectives of the marketing departments are well planned, closely monitored, measured, and reviewed at the end of every year. If marketing can influence people to change their purchasing habits of their favourite products for it to reflect on the profits of companies, why can't we use messaging to change the mindsets and perceptions of citizens about crime and security education and their role in reducing insecurities? Consumers change their buying habits as a result of marketing messaging. Therefore, with the right messaging, the behaviour of Ghanaians can be changed, and they can play their roles better in fighting crime and improving security. Citizen security education should be approached in a similar manner, if not the same way. Many lessons can be learnt from Ghana's political and electioneering campaign when designing citizen security education and awareness creation programmes. During general election campaigns, all sorts of methods are used to ensure that voters understand and buy into the messages of political parties. These include a combination of print, electronic, and social media. If similar methods could be used in the approach to citizen security education and awareness, many crimes will be prevented, and this will reduce the sense of insecurity often expressed by many Ghanaians.

8.2. The Information Operations Approach

Today's security space and the complex security threats that nations' states face demand a review of the traditional operational strategies for fighting crimes. Security agencies must go into the minds of criminals, inform the citizens about the modus operandi of criminals, lead the information operations game and degrade the capabilities of criminals with the use of quality intelligence. Information operations should be a component of Ghana's national security strategy, and this must be reflected in all sectors of the economy. This is because it will be extremely difficult to reduce the level of crime when basic services such as water, electricity, healthcare, telecom services, jobs, and basic human rights are not working. These issues belong to the 'soft' security category. If law enforcement agencies focus only on 'hard' security, they will not win the fight against crime. If citizens' concerns, frustrations, and agitations are not addressed, they will become a major security concern for the government. Information operation that is aimed at educating, creating awareness and influencing citizens to change their behaviour in order to help reduce crime must be systemic, deliberate, repetitive and simple. There will be a huge challenge because of the democratisation of the media. The reality is that though the government may have a good intention of educating the citizens and creating the necessary security awareness in order to reduce crime but not everyone may like it and some criminal individuals and groups will work to undermine it. The tools and methods they may employ include false news, disinformation, or the use of false accounts using multiple media platforms. This is complex and a huge security threat in itself. Therefore, it demands an integrated and strategic government effort to fight such threats. One tool which can be employed to achieve a better result is information operations.

Information operations as the integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. The application of information operations to citizen security education and awareness should be an integrated effort.

This is because the issue of security affects every aspect of a country's economy. An information operation is a deliberate activity, therefore it should be properly planned, prepared, executed, and assessed. The ways, means, and ends of information operations must be properly defined. Information operations demand that the information environment is defined. The information environment consists of individuals, organisations and systems with physical, informational and cognitive dimensions. The physical dimension includes command and control systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure which creates effects. The informational dimension includes how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected, and the cognitive dimension is the mind that transmits, receives, and acts on the information. The informational environment is influenced by information-related capabilities, which are tools, techniques, and activities that affect the three physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. Therefore, the government (means) must employ the information-related capabilities (ways) in order to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the targeted audience (ends). The Ministry of National Security should coordinate all security-related information operational activities. It should be designed to meet the strategic, operational and tactical objectives of the government in all sectors. The targeted audience must be well defined, with specific themes and messages.

8.3. The Role of Private Security Professionals

Globally, there are more private security guards than state policemen. It is estimated that the private security industry is worth \$180 billion (Provost, 2017). Private security outnumbers the police in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and the United States, and the estimated private security to police ratio is two to one, five to one, and three to one, respectively (Mancini, 2010). Additionally, where the industry is developed, private security could be more reliable than police. This is because private security institutions are there to do business and usually their services are on contract. Therefore, when they deliver poor services, they lose such contracts. In the United States, the escort of prisoners and the protection of many prison facilities are usually done by private security companies. These companies have proven credible over the years and have won the trust of the state. G4S, one of the global private security companies, has been engaged by the US government to protect its border with Mexico. The United Kingdom and Australia also employ the same company to protect their detention centres (Avant, 2005). In Europe, Finmeccanica, an Italian private security company, is also active in border control.



In Africa, the services provided by private security companies include protecting individuals, private properties, and industrial complexes. The companies are usually small and individually owned and operated. However, there is the presence of larger conglomerates such as G4S, which employs 120,400 people in 24 countries (G4S, 2017). According to the Ministry of Interior, Ghana had 176 licensed security companies in 2014. The number of private security companies in Ghana has increased to 248 (Ministry of Interior Republic of Ghana, n.d.).

Regardless of the size of private security companies, the industry keeps growing. In Ghana, private security companies are engaged in many sectors of the economy, and they can be found across the length and breadth of the country. Their services are patronised by both private individuals, institutions and the state. The services cover areas such as man guarding, executive protection, background checks, investigations, facilities protection, and escort of bullion vans. The industry is regulated by the Ghana's Ministry of Interior and supported by the Ghana Police Service. The industry is without challenges. Most of the challenges are poor remuneration, high labour turnover, inefficient regulation and lack of professionalism. However, the private security industry is meeting its increasing clientele demands. With a strong public private partnership, the industry could be exploited to support the government in its citizen education effort. Private security is better placed in educating the citizens on their roles in ensuring that they assist the police and other law enforcement agencies to work to protect the people. The business of private security companies is to provide security, and this puts them in a better position to educate the public about matters of security. After all, that is what they have been trained to do. Additionally, their wide deployment even makes it better. In collaboration with the Ghana Police Service, who are equally widely deployed, they can achieve massive results in their effort to educate the citizens on matters of security and create the necessary awareness.

Private security companies should be encouraged as part of their corporate social responsibilities to focus on citizen security education and awareness creation. This has the potential to produce substantial results because it could be done in many forms, which include many forms including collaboration with relevant security shareholders. The image of private security in Ghana could be enhanced if they took an active part in citizen security education and awareness creation. If it is well embraced, deliberate, properly planned and executed, it will inure to the benefit of the private security companies, the government and the larger society. Though the case of Ghana is completely different, with their professional knowledge, these officers can be given a further boost by the government so that they can be encouraged to educate the people in the areas they operate. If this is properly planned and executed, it will further enhance the confidence the public has in these private security professionals.

9. Policy on Security Education and Awareness

In Africa, not many people believe in policies. This is because many feel that not many government decisions in Africa are informed by policy. In governance, and especially in democratic governance, policies are what drive many, if not all, government decisions. The United States has a comprehensive national security policy that is competitive, sustainable, and reflects the character of the country (Mueller et al., 2006). Similarly, the United Kingdom and Australia have national security and defence policies. In June 2021, Ghana launched its national security strategy. The National Security Strategy acknowledges the need to create public awareness among the youth with the objective of inculcating in them the sense of patriotism, tolerance, and peaceful co-existence as tenets of constitutional democracy. A portion of the last paragraph of the executive summary of the document is quoted below:

"Under this NSS, avenues are also to be specifically created through a national agenda on national orientation in the youth and to enhance liaison and cooperation between state security actors and non-state stakeholders at all levels. This is to include independent constitutional and statutory bodies, political institutions, women, youth, civil society organisations (CSOs), traditional authorities and faith-based organisations, and the private sector to create national security awareness among the citizenry and enhance cooperation with state security agencies through reliance on inclusiveness, a joint sense of purpose, joint planning and implementation, and coordination of effort in security matters, especially human security. This national agenda also includes an initiative to commission a research project on national orientation training for the youth of Ghana. This is aimed at inculcating in the youth the love of the country and its related values at an early age (Republic of Ghana, 2020)."

It appears the National Security Strategy thinks the orientation of the youth should be aimed at making them more patriotic instead of educating them on security and what they can do to ensure that they play their role towards the security of Ghana. However, Ghana's National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) did better work on citizen security education and awareness. The Framework has four pillars which are to prevent, pre-empt, protect, and respond. Under pillar one (prevent), the Ministry of Information, Ministry of Education, educational institutions, religious bodies/traditional institutions, civil society organisations, and the media are expected to play key roles in educating and creating the necessary security awareness (Ministry of National Security Ghana, 2019). After all, the National Security Strategy is a broad document which is aimed at driving the business of security and defence of Ghana. Article 13 of Chapter 5 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution provides for the protection of the right to life. Therefore, the state has the responsibility to protect Ghanaians wherever they live. The state cannot effectively

protect its citizens when their level of security education and awareness is poor. The UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) also supports the call for citizen security education and awareness. Peace building, justice, and the building of strong institutions is an all-inclusive endeavour. Therefore, when the citizens are educated and have been properly empowered, it will enhance the achievement of this goal. Therefore, this is why citizen security education is paramount. Ghana needs a policy on citizen security education awareness. The policy should be deliberate and comprehensive to cover all aspects of the economy with objectives, principles, monitoring, evaluation, and review. In implementing such a policy, the National Security Council through the National Security Ministry should lead the effort. Security awareness should be taught from primary schools through to tertiary institutions. Regional, Municipal, and District Security Councils should be directed to conduct security education and awareness workshops and seminars for institutions and a second cycle should be conducted in their jurisdiction. All these should be properly monitored, evaluated and reviewed from time to time in order to improve the policy implementation.

10. Conclusion

West Africa continues to experience common security challenges. A combination of old and new threats make it difficult to address these security challenges. Threats such as human and drug trafficking, cybercrime, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, terrorism, money laundering, fake news and many others continue a concern for governments in West Africa.

The results have been a sense of feeling of insecurity and frustrations of the citizens which are often expressed in violent demonstrations, pressure from organised groups and civil society organisations. Ghana is not different regarding these continued insecurities and security threats in West Africa. Several efforts are being made by the government to meet these challenges in the form of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security measures. Unfortunately, more attention has been given to hard security than soft security, however, research has proven that when opportunities that create crimes are reduced or removed, crime can be reduced to a lesser extent, and this will reduce the sense of insecurities among the populations. One way of removing the opportunity is through citizen security education and awareness creation.

In Ghana, the institutions which conduct these educations include the NCCE, the GAF, Ghana Police Service, religious leaders, traditional leaders, civil society organisations, the National Security Ministry the Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority, the Ghana Prisons Service the Ghana Fire Service and many others. However, the impact of these education and awareness creation efforts is yet to be fully harnessed. Therefore, poor security awareness creations have resulted in a sense of insecurity, public misinformation, loss of confidence in security agencies often expressed in mob actions and violent demonstrations. Much could be achieved in citizen security education efforts

if more improved approaches are harnessed, adopted and implemented. The government's citizen security education awareness should be more strategic. With a clear vision, direction identified key players and performance indicators that could be reviewed periodically for better performance. Information operations could also help address Ghana's citizen security education and awareness creation effort. This is because the activities geared toward citizen security education will be deliberately planned, prepared, implemented, and assessed. It will be specifically aimed at influencing, disrupting, and usurping the decision making of the adversary while protecting government-citizen security education efforts.

The private security industry is rich with a lot of resources that government could exploit in citizen security education. The industry is rich in security professionals, widely deployed across Ghana and has a body recognised by the government. Therefore, government could build a strong partnership with the industry and explore and exploit the private security industry advantages in citizen security educations. Government efforts at citizen security education and awareness creation should be policy-driven. Policies drive government actions, aids in continuity and give opportunity for review. With this approach, the necessary human and material resources would be allocated to achieve sustainable results.

Conflict of Interest

The article has not been submitted to any journal for publication.

Notes on Contributor

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A Review of: “Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. New Trends, Old Traditions” edited by Nikolay Kozhanov¹²

Alina Khokhlova³

The edited volume called *Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East* sets itself the task of a comprehensive analysis of the process of the Kremlin return to the Middle East, which took place in the second decade of the 21st century. Despite the events of 2022, Russia's intervention in Syria since 2015 remains the Kremlin's first major military action outside the former Soviet region in the post-Cold War era. The idea that this international political process is the quintessence of the foreign policy legacy of the Soviet era and Putin's Russia runs as a red line throughout the volume. As during the Cold War, the main motive for Russia's return to the Middle East in 2015 is political, with the Kremlin aiming to use the region as a political lever in relations with the West, as well as to strengthen the prestige of the ruling power in the frameworks of domestic and international arenas.

At the same time, other drivers that pushed the Kremlin to the proactive actions in the region (among which the main ones are ensuring economic and national security) today in their importance are not at all inferior to the political motive. These drivers are dictated by modern endogenous factors, which boil down to the continued high dependence level of the state budget on export share, the peculiarities of the ethno-confessional composition of the population of Russia with the number of Muslims exceeding 25 million people (which approximately amounts to seventh part of the Russian population), as well as to maintaining the concentration of the domestic news agenda for the bulk of the population on the “external threat” in order to consolidate it around the government and distract from internal socio-economic problems. The Kremlin's transition to the course of real politics after the events of the "Crimean Spring" may be called as an exogenous factor which contributed to the start of the events of 2015. New motives force the Kremlin hawks to resort to cooperation with new allies and use methods that were considered alien to the USSR. Russia's return to the Middle East is a complex and multilateral process, which over the course of five years has been differently assessed by the expert communities of the West, Russia, as well as specialists from the Middle East. Considering the ambiguity of the process itself, the present edited volume consisting of publications written by authors of various expert communities may be called a successful attempt to reflect this historical process on paper, representing a

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.1.228>

² Nikolay Kozhanov (ed.) *Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. New Trends, Old Traditions*. London: Hurst & Company, 2022. 1787386899, 9781787386891

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compilation of key approaches and opinions in international analytics on the topic under discussion.

The first chapter by Viacheslav Morozov is called *The Middle East in Russia's Foreign Policy, 1990-2020* and is built on genealogical approach. The main thesis of the author of the chapter concentrates on the transparent dominance of the anti-Western motive as the main factor of the Russian side in the decision to support President Bashar al-Assad against the US-backed opposition in 2015, and thereby not only declare their claims to participate in determining the track of the political development of the region, but also to consolidate the geopolitical positions gained in 2014. In his opinion, this step is the consequence of the events of the Crimean Spring, and, if we take a broader context, the Euromaidan revolution of 2014, which the Russian authorities regard as an illegal coup d'état, an invasion of the West into their sphere of interests. He says: "Syria was the perfect arena for what the Russian leadership probably saw as developing its geopolitical success achieved in Ukraine" (p. 32). In the conclusion of the chapter, the author emphasizes the importance of taking into account the fact that maintaining the status of one of the world's political leaders since the early 1990s is of the concern issue for Russia and remains a significant motive for taking such serious political decisions.

The second chapter by Mark N. Katz titled *Different but similar. Comparing Moscow's Middle East Policies in the Cold War and Putin eras* is dedicated to the comparison between the Soviet Union and Putin's Russia politics in the Middle East. The main criteria for comparison are the motives for cooperation, the mechanisms and opportunities for collaboration, the criteria for choosing geopolitical allies and the main challenges of the Kremlin in both time frameworks. The chapter argues that the policy of President Putin, in terms of the breadth of influence in the Middle East, is more successful than the policy of the Soviet Union. He emphasizes the importance of establishing bilateral relations not only with numerous political actors in the region, which are considered traditional allies of the United States (for example, the Gulf countries), but also with some quasi-state structures and political organizations opposed to local regimes. The author's analysis shows that "factors contributing to Putin's Middle East foreign policy successes also contributed to the success of Cold War-era Soviet foreign policy towards the region" (p. 38).

As noted above, a comprehensive study of the Kremlin's return to the Middle East in 2015 is impossible without taking into account not only external, but also internal political factors that provoked this decision. In the third chapter by Leonid Issaev *Domestic Factors in Russia's Middle East Policy*, the opposite point of view on the independent variable is defended, particularly: the domestic political situation and the need to solve problems of the national level led the Kremlin to the proactive actions in the Middle East. According to the author, the main factor in Russia's interference in the affairs of the Middle East was the internal mass protests of 2011-2012. These events were hardly the first manifestation of citizens' dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the



authorities since President Putin came to power. Leonid Isaev explains the socio-political lull of 2000-2010 by satisfying the demand of the majority of the population for political stability, which led to rapid economic growth among the population, tired of the uncertainty of the 1990s. On the one hand, the fall of "Arab presidents for life" in the countries of the Middle East in 2011, observed by the Russian elites, led them to the need to provide support to authoritarian regimes in the region which are similar to Russia. Another motive was the need for patriotic mobilization of the population during Putin's third presidency, for whom stability alone was no longer enough due to the rising living standards. The author comes to the conclusion that given the weakening of the state system and the multiplication of economic challenges due to the imposition of sanctions against Russia after the "Crimean Spring", in the long term the Kremlin just remains to play the role of an "honest broker" (p. 81) between warring regional forces, but in no way Russia is capable to influence the development of socio-political trends in the region.

The fourth chapter by Roy Allison *Russian Legal and Regulatory Claims For Its Intervention in the Syrian Conflict Since 2015* aims to assess the international legality of Russia's actions in Syria from the point of view of international and international humanitarian law, as well as informal normative grounds. It opens with a case study of the involvement of the Kremlin and the United States in situations of interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries. Taking into account the unsuccessful Afghan experience, which became one of the main factors in the collapse of the USSR, the author emphasizes that during the operation in Syria, the Kremlin's task was not only not to repeat the most undesirable outcome, but also to "present the surprise military operation as lawful and rightful" both for the population inside country, and in the international arena (p. 86). As the author shows, the abovementioned tasks were more or less completed by the Kremlin: countries close to Moscow political course officially recognized the legality of the Kremlin "counter-terrorist operation", which was justified as a reaction to the "invitation of the Syrian government", whereas the response of other countries was their "tacit consent" (p. 86). He notes: "No state formally contested the legality of this intervention, whatever their criticisms of it" (p. 90). As the researcher describes, the main logic of criticism of these actions comes down to the question of the legitimacy of the Syrian government, its inability to effectively control the territories and, as a result, its right to request this assistance. At the same time, as he emphasizes, when applying this criterion to the Syrian case, one should also take into account the previous experience of actions taken by both Russia and the West in relation to the governments of certain countries. The problem of Moscow's flagrant violation of international humanitarian law in its military operations in Syria cannot be avoided, as well as the issue of the formation of an appropriate image of the Russian government actions among the main population inside the region where Russia has not succeeded. In conclusion, it is once again emphasized that Moscow has managed to legalize its actions in Syria from the point of view of international law, laid a good foundation for

defending its interests and forced the Middle Eastern countries to reckon with its opinion in solving problems affecting the issue of national security. It is difficult not to share the author's opinion that in order to consolidate the indicated military and geopolitical success, it is necessary to strengthen political positions via soft power.

The fifth chapter by Ghoncheh Tazmini *Russia and Iran: Strategic Partners or Provisional Counterweights* aims to reveal the nature of relations between the post-Soviet Kremlin and Tehran after the Islamic Revolution, in which he rightly notes two separate analytical levels: common and disparate *Realpolitik* interests level and the level of common principles and perceptions of the world political system (p. 122). According to the author of the publication, the widespread idea that Iran is just a regional lever for putting pressure on the USA does not seem entirely fair. To a greater extent, these bilateral relations in the 21st century can be characterized as a "strategic alliance" (p. 137) against the post-1991 global order imposed by the Western world, built on the hegemony of one or more states, imposing Western normative values and hierarchical structures as the only right ones and universal for the whole world. Both sides stand for a global world order built on multipolarity, in which Russia and Iran could participate on parity grounds with other countries. This idea is the "fundamental commonality" (p. 138) of the two energy-resource authoritarian powers. Shared with Russia views on the global world order allow Iran to enjoy the support and protection of the Kremlin in the international arena in those matters in which, in fact, this Middle Eastern country simply does not have allies of similar strength. At the same time, in other circumstances, for example, in cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, where the Kremlin does not have to lead ideological struggle, the Russian side adheres to a pragmatic approach, which leads to an inevitable clash of economic interests of Moscow and Tehran. On the example of several cases, including those related to the extraction of energy resources in Syria and Iraq, the author shows that local players prefer cooperation with Russia, despite the disproportionate real investments of Moscow and Tehran in the economy of the Middle East Arab countries.

The sixth chapter by Nikolay Kozhanov *The drivers of Russia-GCC Relations* aims to examine the impact of Russia's direct intervention into Syria in 2015 and related geopolitical factors on Russia's relations with the Gulf monarchies, in particular Saudi Arabia, as well as the prospects for the development of this dialogue and taking it to a new level. In the first part of the chapter, he defines the main interests of Russia in the development of relations with the Gulf countries: in the leverage used in the confrontation with the West, the protection of economic interests and ensuring national security. The author draws attention to the change in the perception of the Gulf countries of the Kremlin role in the region since the beginning of the civil war in Syria: as the Arab Spring started, the attitude of the Gulf countries was negative due to the Kremlin's formal support for the regime of Bashar Assad, but subsequent years strengthened Russia's position in the eyes of the Gulf elites due to the decisiveness actions of the Kremlin in achieving the set goals in the region, as well as the fact that in most



issues the Kremlin still took seriously into account the interests of regional leaders. The author notes the "pragmatic approach" (p. 151) of Russia in building relations with the Gulf countries, as well as their parity. Establishing relations with Saudi Arabia and the desire to cooperate with the regional leader has more specific drivers: the Kremlin understands that "Assad regime's final victory in the Syrian civil war should be legitimized through a formal political agreement between belligerents" (p. 154), therefore it informally supports Riyadh's actions in Yemen, for his part, the king of Saudi Arabia contributed to the establishment of a dialogue between Russia and Syrian opposition groups. Nevertheless, the author stresses that despite the fact that these measures look very mutually beneficial, they have situational nature. The Gulf countries still see Washington as their main political strategic partner.

The seventh chapter by Samuel Ramani *Russia and the Yemeni Civil War* tells about Russia's strategy towards Yemen, which consists in non-interference in the internal affairs of the South Arabian state after the 2014 revolution. On the one hand, this is explained by Russia's relatively little interest in Yemen in general, and on the other hand, by the Kremlin's unwillingness to worsen relations with the local leader, Saudi Arabia (p.181), whose role has become decisive in the escalation of the Yemeni crisis. Taken together, the both motives turn Yemen into a leverage option for achieving regional goals in the hands of the Kremlin since 2015, mainly in relations with Riyadh. Thus, the core of the proposed chapter lies not so much in the study of bilateral relations between Russia and Yemen (although a very concise overview is presented in the beginning), but in the relations between Russia and Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Russia and Saudi Arabia in the framework of the Yemeni crisis. It is shown that for the largest local players (of which Iran and Saudi Arabia are the worst rivals), the Yemeni card is one of the central problems. This fact only reinforces the Kremlin's very logical goal of maintaining its role as the optimal mediator in reconciling the warring sides of the Yemeni crisis in order to keep its position on it as the bargain argument.

The eighth chapter by Yahia H. Zoubir *Making up the Lost Time: Russia and Central Maghreb* is the final chapter of this volume. It clearly stresses the assessment of President Putin's foreign policy in the region as more successful than the one that took place during the Cold War in terms of development opportunities. Since the period of Putin's first presidency, Russia has been considering the possibilities and prospects for cooperation not only with Algeria (as it was in the Soviet era), but also with other countries of the Maghreb like Tunisia and Morocco. Russia's direct diplomatic and indirect military involvement in the Libyan crisis also underlines the Kremlin's claims to uphold interests in the region. At the same time, the scale of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Algeria, compared not only with North Africa, but also with other African countries, is exceptional. The history of cooperation between Russia and Algeria goes back to 1963, when the USSR met the interests of the African country in selling to it the critically needed modern weapons for the so-called "Sand War" with Morocco, the last one was provided with technical support from the United States. The following

two key factors prompted Algeria to return to at least the previous level of relations with the Kremlin in the late 1990s: the need to end the ten-year international isolation after a bloody civil war and the need of the after-sales support services for Soviet weapons purchased by 1989 (p. 197). In addition to military-technical cooperation with Algeria, Russia is developing pragmatic partnerships with the Maghreb countries in the fields of energy, agriculture, tourism, and healthcare (a good example of the latter is the production of the Covid-19 vaccine Sputnik-V in Algeria). The author notes the possible growth of Russia's political involvement in the remote western corners of the region through its role of a political mediator, for example, in the conflict between POLISARIO Front (supported by Algeria) and Morocco, while doubting the Kremlin's serious interest in a broad participation in resolving this issue, as well as in the region in general. The author stresses that most of the Maghreb countries likely will remain on the periphery of Russian political and economic interests.

Overall, this volume is a valuable contribution to the direction of literature on the international politics of President Putin's Russia in the second half of the 2010s, logically chronologically limited by the beginning of the global Covid-19 epidemic. A comprehensive analysis of the Kremlin's actions in the Middle East since the events of 2015 shows that, despite widespread (and often just) criticism, the system is learnable: it takes into account not only the mistakes of the Soviet past, but also the problems that Western countries have faced in similar cases in the Middle East. One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the reviewed publications is that the main vision of Russia's policy in the Middle East in no way contradicts its main thesis in ideological opposition to the West, namely, the vision of a multipolar world and the need to reckon with the interests of regional leaders of the world-system basing on the parity foundations.



Gems of Germans in Namibia¹²

László Pálfi³

"What do we really need, water or diamond?" This question occurs very frequently in education of the Economics. And when a professor asks it, a student will answer with confidence, "Water, of course!" If this student has got some good knowledge in Biology, the professor and probably even the entire group will get the explanation that 60-70% of human body is water, and there is no survive without water, so "the only correct answer can be water". Some student with rebellious mindset will preach about the bad condition of our planet, namely, how exploited the Earth is, when it comes to resources. Probably there will also be a more realistic student who will pose to his audience the question, "It's obvious that we need water so badly, but what would you give to your beloved one, a nice ring with well-shaped diamonds, or a bottle of water?" After this short and improvised debate, our professor would introduce the concept of Giffen goods, and his students would have to approve the fact that people like to make decisions beyond their real interests. Therefore, the *homo economicus* remains a vulnerable character in further economic analysis.

In the monography *Blood and Diamonds: Germany's Imperial Ambitions in Africa*, written by Steven Press, both of the above questions are discussed, since today's Namibia, a country that was a German colony between 1883 and 1915 under the name of German South West Africa, is rich in diamonds and extremely poor in water. This combination meant bad luck for the indigenous Khoisan, the migrating Bantu and Cape Coloured, and also for the white settlers.

The title reminds readers of the movie *Blood Diamond*, which presented the adventurous story of how the African diamonds appeared on the market. The exact same can be easily applied to many chapters of this monography: the readers can get genuine information on the struggles of the German colonial masters, on how exploration and exploitation of diamonds changed the lives of people of colour, and why the diamonds that belonged to Germany were sold in Antwerp, Belgium. As the parallel between "*Windhoek and Auschwitz*" was postulated by Jürgen Zimmerer, the correlation between colonial history and antisemitism has been proven by another piece of evidence, as Press displayed the protagonists of the story of German colonial diamonds from their exploitation to their sale. The assimilation of German Jews failed at this point too, not only in the debates in German mainland.

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.1.207>

² *Blood and Diamonds: Germany's Imperial Ambitions in Africa*, by Steven Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England Harvard University Press, 2021, 352 pp., ISBN 9780674916494

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The monography is articulated to eleven chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter has a strong focus on a certain analysed point; however, the political history plays a key role, given that it makes the story more understandable. The footnotes can be found at the end of the book, and the numbering of pages begins from one with each chapter. Press' aim was to write a socio-economic analysis about the German colonial history in Namibia, concentrating on the issue of diamond. Therefore, besides the rich and diverse literature, he elaborated on many original files from the *Bundesarchiv* (German Federal Archives), documents of the German stock-market, and the contemporary media, especially influential newspapers. This last one seems to be especially important, since the German public opinion was very divided in the topic of colonisation from the beginning, i.e. the Bismarck-era.

Talking about symbolic figures, every paper and book about the German colonial rule in Namibia name Adolf Lüderitz, Lothar von Trotha and Bernhard Dernburg. As the founder of the first German settlement, Lüderitz must be noted. Leading the grime actions of the colonial war between 1904 and 1907, General Trotha ordered to annihilate the Herero, which was recognised as genocide in the near past. Bernhard Dernburg and his colonial policy, however, was not considered a particularly bad period: the first scientific works, the high financial investment, the extensive Germanization of South West Africa that created a 'Germanness' of today's Namibia, were rather considered as a good achievement. But the dark side of Dernburg's legacy and the half-baked reforms of that period also has got a long-lasting effect.

As a son of a banker and a liberal politician, he enjoyed the company of financially influential people. Thanks to his experience in New York City, he could gain up-to-date knowledge about the modern economy. Albeit the ruling coalition of the Reichstag was formed of conservative and liberal parties; the agrarian lobby could never accept the growing importance of the financial and industrial magnates. Thus, Dernburg was always a suspicious person in their eyes. The left-wing social democrats kept up the class struggle against the noble and bourgeois elements of every society; hence, their negative attitudes do not require any further explanation. As prominent members of the widely attacked Catholicism, the Centre Party could rarely find a common voice with the government, which was engaged with Protestant aristocracy and liberal anti-Catholicism. Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the German conservatives found common interests with the Centre Party occasionally, since both were opponents of class struggle and critics of industrialism. At the end, Dernburg's most vicious enemies must be named: the anti-Semites. The representatives of these could never believe that the converted-to-Lutheran Dernburg became a German, and they never took kindly to a Jewish man having a key role in finance of the German Empire. The topic of diamonds became a battlefield, where the first colonial secretary of Germany was intensely attacked by different parliamentary factions.

Meanwhile, Dernburg's policies were being heavily criticised, even though the core of the problem was not him, or at least, not from historical perspective. As Press emphasises, the establishment of Forbidden Zone, a.k.a. *Sperrgebiet* meant a considerable mistake. The surplus of this diamond mining area belonged to private entrepreneurs, and the exploited gems were not sold in the German mainland. This whole mechanism led to many negative consequences, and it highlights the fact that regardless of Dernburg's liberalism and American experiences, he could not understand the real meaning of liberal capitalism, where the average people are encouraged to participate in lucrative tasks such as the Gold Rush in America.

The existence of the Forbidden Zone was responsible for introducing and maintaining harmful social structures. As the Nama and Herero people were not numerous enough to cover the labour needs for mining, contract labour was introduced in order to solve the problem of colonial labour shortage. In fact, Ovambo workers migrated southward and settled down around the major cities. The Black workers had very restricted rights compared to White settlers, and Press points out correctly that former soldiers of Trotha's expedition army inspected them while they were working there. Nonetheless, the administrative structure established by the late 1900s also had many deficits: the German officials did not intend to move into the direction of more democracy, neither in the case of Whites, nor in the Blacks especially. As Heinrich Vedder pointed out in the South African Senate, the Germans were always living in apartheid in South West Africa, and Press also enlightens his readers that major change after 1915 occurred only in the interethnic relations between Germans and South African white people. But there was also a considerable change in economy, and it happened in the diamond business.

The Regie, established in 1909, was a company responsible for diamond production. This firm was backed by major German banks, and had the aim to show an alternative to the De Beers, which was established by Cecil Rhodes, and recently led by Ernest Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer, who came from a German Jewish family, spoke good German and belonged to the most influential South African magnates, approached to take over the Forbidden Zone and the Regie. After World War I, his dreams came true, and the De Beers became a monopoly company in the diamond business in South Africa and its C class mandate. This change led to an increase of colonial anti-Semitism, as the German settlers felt that they had lost position.

Because of the parallel between "*Windhoek and Auschwitz*", the stance of the Nazis to diamond and the whole issue of colonialism should be analysed. Dernburg remained one of the prime evils in their propaganda materials, as the Jews in general were depicted as traitors and the responsible group for the loss of World War I. Nonetheless, Dernburg's contribution created solid base of separation and segregation policies in German South West Africa, which was surely impressive for the National Socialist regime.

The elaboration of diamond rush in the history of German colonialism took a long time to happen, and this monography could show that such a tiny piece of history can be also a very complex phenomenon. The broad perspective of analysis, the abundance of information, the investigative mindset makes Press' book really remarkable. The author suggests a further elaboration of the history of diamond mining in South West Africa in the first period of South African rule. As the author of this review, I probably do not reveal a closely guarded secret by affirming that diamonds played a key role in the settlement policy of the new overlords: the South African authorities spent a fortune from the profit of diamond mining to settle Afrikaner families in South West Africa.

A Review of: “The Rwandan Patriotic Front” edited by Adrien Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper¹²

Gábor Sinkó³

The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994 is the second of two volumes that deal with the Ugandan and Rwandan military conflicts between the 1960s and 1990s and their effect on their neighbors. The authors, Adrien Fontanellaz, a military history researcher and author from Switzerland and Tom Cooper, an Austrian writer, analyst and investigative journalist, provide an overarching narrative of events leading to the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Despite analyzing local conditions culturally, ethnically and politically, the authors highlighted at the beginning of the volume that they do not intend to cover the ‘full spectrum’ of the conflict (p.4). Instead, their main focus is on “the military aspects of the civil war in Rwanda of 1990-1994” (p.3). Although the country has been in the international limelight (due to the 1994 genocide), the military component of the war is insufficiently researched.

The book is organized into six chapters following mainly a chronological order. It is a largely apolitical work, which is well-researched and –documented with a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, including scientific works, reputable publications and interviews (p.4). While the authors attempt to make it reader-friendly (and they mostly manage to do so by using endnotes instead of footnotes, and by having a glossary with the acronyms), I would argue that the content of the book is easier to digest for those who have a military background due to its specific vocabulary. It is not essential; however, the numerous materials and military operations listed in the volume may discourage ‘average readers’ from developing a deeper understanding of the Rwandan Civil War.

The first chapter is the introduction, and it contains some of the reasons that sowed the seeds of the Rwandan tragedy. Besides climate and geography, the readers can gain insight into the early history of the country with Rwanda first being administered by the Germans and then the Belgians. Even after independence, ties with these foreign powers were not severed, since West Germany provided training for the National Police (p.12) and Belgium sent advisors (p.11). Additionally, Rwanda entered into military cooperation with France and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while receiving training from Libya, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the US (p.12). As correctly pointed out by the authors it was Germany and Belgium, driven by racist misconceptions in the West that cemented the Tutsis’ first-class and

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.1.196>

² Adrien Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper. *The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994*. (AFRICA@WAR 24), Helion & Company Limited: Solihull, 2015. ISBN: 978-1-910294-56-7, pp. 64 (paperback)

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Hutus' second-class status. When Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, took power in a coup d'état, he stabilized the economy and started a military build-up. However, clientelism and patronage prevalent in the army slowed down progress and increasing violence between Hutus and Tutsis resulted in the latter fleeing to neighboring states.

The second chapter is about the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). By late 1964 the largest Tutsi exile communities were in Burundi and Uganda (p.16). Some of the people were simply stuck in another country, while others went there for work or escaped from slaughter. This section of the book details the relation of Rwandans and Ugandans. Although most of the elite Tutsis in Uganda – 'the 59ers' – lived in refugee camps and were often "misused as scapegoats for the worsening economic situation", they were also "recruited into the state-security apparatus" [in Uganda] (p.16). It was known they wanted to go back to their home country and thus posed no threat. The 59ers joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) and became combat-proven and interested in politics. In the 1980s, there was growing resentment towards the Tutsis and their influence started to wane. However, by this time the RPF was ready to invade Rwanda mostly due to "a group of highly experienced officers [and the] creation of its military wing the RPA" (p.24).

The third chapter revolves around the invasion launched by the Ugandan Tutsis in October 1990. It was timed so that both the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents were away in the US. The RPA wanted to "exploit the moment of surprise and remove the government before the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) could even mobilise" (p.24). Although they received ammunition, weapons, training and diplomatic support from Uganda, the army's first commander, Fred Rwigyema, died on the second day of the invasion, endangering the success of the whole operation. Following his death, the RPF began to radicalize and – despite the FAR reacting quite quickly – Habyarimana decided to request help from Belgium, France and Zaire. While Brussels chose not to assist Rwanda, Paris thought the insurgents were "Ugandan proxies [waging] a frontal attack against...the French zone of influence" (p.29) and thus contributed troops. United, the foreign powers and FAR managed to counterattack and after a stalemate at Nyagatare, pushed the RPF back to Uganda, winning the first phase of the war.

The fourth chapter picks up the thread after the death of Rwigyema, when Paul Kagame assumed the leadership position of the RPA, leading to its re-birth. The insurgents retreated to the Virunga Mountains as it meant not being exposed to FAR attacks and were close to the Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan borders. The RPF began recruiting and training volunteers, whose numbers had dwelt to 12,000 by 1992. Although they continuously lacked firepower, they were lucky, since "the end of the Cold War left Europe full of surplus armament, ammunition and equipment offering plenty of possibilities to buy supplies at ever lower prices" (p.34). The FAR went through a major expansion too, however, the new recruits education level and combat effectiveness were significantly reduced. The new phase of the war started in January 1991 and the RPA managed to gain foothold in Rwanda. If it hadn't been for France –



that provided ammunition, weapons, helicopters and advisors to the FAR – the RPA may have been successful earlier. Instead, a mere ceasefire was agreed on in 1992, which was far from signaling the end of the conflict.

The fifth chapter focuses on the events leading to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Several atrocities were committed by both Hutus and Tutsis against the civilian population; however, the latter was much more “careful” with the massacres. When the RPA mobilized all of its forces to take the fight to Kigali, France intervened again, supporting the FAR. The Arusha Peace Agreement demanded the neutral international presence of the UN that responded by establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). They were both destined for failure, partly due to the latter’s impotence “to force President Habyarimana into the formation of a power-sharing government” (p.45). As a result of the Rwandan Civil War, 860,000 people had to leave their homes, aggravating the problem of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). What really unleashed the apocalypse was when Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994 and Hutu extremists rose to power. Various militias came into existence and started massacring thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

The sixth chapter is about the 100-days campaign, which was a planned mass murder in Rwanda occurring between April and July 1994. With the US arms embargo and France suspending deliveries, the RPF started to have the upper hand in the conflict as the RPA was better prepared for war than the FAR, which had been distracted by its involvement in the genocide. The logistics of the government forces was on the verge of collapse as a consequence of the “low quality of hastily trained recruits [that were] used to fill the ranks of units that suffered extensive losses” (p.54). The exodus of the Rwandans continued with people fleeing to Zaire (1,244,000) and Tanzania (577,000), and remedying the situation required the intervention of France (Operation Turquoise) and the US (UNAMIR II). The Rwandan Civil War is believed to have ended with the RPA’s capture of Gisenyi. However, as pointed out by the authors, due to continuous armed struggles and political repression, it can also be argued that it has never really ended.

Although the volume presents a detailed account (with the inclusion of many photographs and maps) about the realities of the Rwandan Civil War, highlighting the primary role of militaries in war fighting, it has a couple of shortcomings. One of the major problems is the abundance of grammatical and spelling mistakes that not only detract of quality but also makes the book difficult to understand. For instance, the authors write ‘Operation Silver Black’ (p.50) instead of ‘Silver Back’ and use “mortars caliber 60, 82” and such repeatedly instead of the more common “60mm /82mm mortars” (pp. 13,21,31,36,37,38,40,51). There are also several formatting errors, especially at the beginning of the chapters. Lastly, Fontanellaz and Cooper do not always include all the reasons that would be essential for readers to see the big picture as well as they make a few wrong assertions. For example, when talking about the

divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis, the role of Rwanda's occupiers is stressed (p.6) but not of the Protestant and Catholic churches. Also, UNAMIR is blamed for non-compliance with the Arusha Accords (p.45), which is simply untrue.

That being said, *The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994* provides readers an excellent opportunity to delve deeper into the yet not-so-much-explored military – and interrelated – aspects of the Rwandan Civil War. I would first and foremost recommend the book for those who are interested in the nexus of aviation and/or military history and African affairs. It is certainly interesting to read about how a minority militia could prevail over a majority government. Learning about the brutalities, chaos and tragedies characterizing Rwanda in the 1990s could be instructive for other African countries struggling with similar problems in the aftermath of the all the wars the Dark Continent has witnessed.



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