

Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

ISSN 2786-1902

Volume 3 Number 4 2023



**Africa Research
Institute**



Óbuda University Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences
Africa Research Institute
Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies



Dear Readers,
Dear Fellow Scholars,

I would like to take this opportunity to introduce you to the latest issue of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). As the Journal is gaining local, regional and as international attention, it is becoming increasingly difficult to choose the most up-to-date, high quality contributions submitted by renowned academics studying the African continent. Despite the growing challenges, I believe that the current issue of JCEEAS covers a wide range of interesting topics and disciplines. The vast majority of the material is full-length articles; however, some book reviews have also been included at the end of the Journal.

The author of the first study, Rachael M. Rudolph, utilizes data from the ACLED and GTD databases to construct the profile of the Islamic State in the Sahel and assess potential threats to Chinese interests in the Central Sahel. Following that, Mariann Táncoz and Gergely Fejérdy attempt to capture recent changes in the relations between France and the Central Sahel. Jordán Olivér Petrőcz then draws our attention to the continuously strengthening Turkish-Somali military connections with the recent creation of the Turkish military camp in Mogadishu. Matthieu Gotteland aims to explore the new paradigms behind Somalia's foreign relations under the new government to see what possible scenarios there are in the future. Using a researcher-administered and structured questionnaire, Josephat Nyanduro Omuria studies the status of Kenya's counter-terrorism measures in Lamu County.

In the next paper, Alta Grobbelaar questions the application of concepts such as cyberthreats, cyberterrorism and cybersecurity in African-centered approaches, the author argues that it has to be established whether cyberthreats pose a real threat on the continent, or if the concept has become a platitude or blanket term to describe any form of information-based hostility. Mmaphuti Felicia Langa then focuses on the assessment of South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism financing and the counter-terrorist financing framework. The authors of the next study, János Besenyő and Éva Hegedűs, elaborate on countering extremist violence and terrorism in Cabo Delgado by asking the question (how) past peace-building and DDR lessons can be of use. Following that, Aleksandra Skrabacz and Patrycja Bryczek-Wróbel discuss immigrant security in a culturally different environment by taking a closer look at the Polish experience after the Arab Spring. The topic of the Tokai Attila's research article is Hungarian technology export to Angola through 'Socialist Solidarity', which offers insight into the relations of Hungary with an African country. Lastly, Szilárd Biernaczky poses the question about how many languages there are and in how many languages there is literature in Africa, which proves to be much more difficult than it initially seems.

Following the studies, there are three book reviews. László Pálfi writes about German Colonial Guerilla Warfare in German East Africa and the "China Matter" at the First World War, while Bálint Somkuti reviews the following book: "Hitler's Spies: Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa 1939–1945". At the end of the current issue, András Málnássy shares his opinion on Ryan Shaffer's Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures.

We truly hope that our readers will have a pleasant experience familiarising themselves with the topics included in this issue.

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China and the Islamic State in the Sahel: An Assessment of Potential Threats to Chinese Interests in the Central Sahel¹

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Abstract:

Seeking to fill a void in the existing scholarship since no scholar has yet to examine the Islamic State Sahel Province's threat to China, this study utilizes a unique approach to examine two questions, namely does the Islamic State Sahel Province pose a threat to Chinese interests in the Central Sahel, and is it likely to impact Beijing's relations with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger? Part one of this study utilizes data from the Armed Conflict and Event Data Location Data (ACLED) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to construct the group's operational profile. The operational profile covers political violence and strategic developments in each country and across the subregion; the expanse of and shifts in areas of operations; and tactics and targets in each terrorism incident by country and the subregion. Findings from the data analysis are utilized in the second part in conjunction with additional data collected on the economy and China's economic relations to assess whether the group poses a threat to Chinese interests. The study concludes that in the short-term, the Islamic State Sahel Province does not pose a threat to those interests and recognizes the potential change of the threat in long-term.

Keywords:

Central Sahel, China, Islamic State, Sahel Province, Terrorism

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.4.218>

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1. Introduction

China's relations with Africa have grown significantly since the 1960s (Rudolph 2022; Abegunin and Manyeruke, 2020). Under Chairman Mao Zedong, Beijing aimed to raise China's profile; maintain friendly relations with countries with different political systems; and support revolutionary struggles and promote common interests in the people's struggles for liberation from colonial rule on the continent. China's rivalry with the former Soviet Union and its One-China Policy were the main drivers. Under Deng Xiaoping, China sought to promote decolonization, continue support for revolutionary parties that were anti-Soviet, and expand its economic engagement with the continent. The only addition in the drivers of Beijing's relations in this period was Deng's economic opening-up and going global policies.

Under Xi Jinping, China's political and diplomatic, economic, and military/security relations increased significantly. Emphasis on non-interference in countries' economic development and internal affairs; the rejection of the imposition of political conditions; and pursuit of relations based on self-interested political gains contributed to enhancing political and diplomatic relations in this period. Economic relations expanded because of the *One Belt One Road* policy (or BRI), while military and security relations increased through the provision of free military assistance to the African Union and security assistance to United Nations programs for peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and counterterrorism. The latter two initiatives were seen as Beijing's desire to enhance its international profile. China's multilateral engagement was the biggest change in the Xi period (Rudolph, 2022). According to Alden (2007), what its relations over the years demonstrate is a shift from a bilateral to a multi-dimensional approach, with the latter encompassing bilateral, state-to-state, and sub-state relations; regional public diplomacy through FOCAC and the African Union (AU); multilateral engagement through UN initiatives such as peacekeeping missions; and military cooperation with the AU.

China's military involvement in the region is minute compared with traditional western powers such as France, but there is speculation that it could increase in the future due to its increasing reliance on Africa's resources and the continent's perpetual state of conflict (Rudolph, 2022; Abegunin and Manyeruke, 2020). Up to the present, China has sold small arms; developed military alliances with six countries, namely Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Chad, and Egypt; and provided financial, logistical, and defense support to many countries. As Abegunin and Manyeruke (2020) note, many African countries cannot finance their own security agenda and a lot of them face significant problems with respect to countering terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters.

Missing from the nascent literature on China's military and security engagement generally and in Africa specifically is the role played by Chinese private security companies (Sukhankin, 2023; Markusen, 2022). Chinese private security companies (PSCs) have evolved since they were first introduced during the Song Dynasty and their

practical disappearance following economic, political, and military stagnation in the 1920s (Sukhankin, 2023). The first modern PSC was created in 1984 under the auspices of the Public Security Bureau and operated in the first special economic zone in Shenzhen. Other PSCs operating during this period were confined domestically and under tight government regulation. It would not be until China's going-out policy, increasing outbound foreign direct investment, and rapid integration in the global supply chain network that many Chinese companies operating abroad in medium-to-high risk countries would be exposed to a range of security challenges.

Wang Duanyong and Zhao Pei categorize the security challenges according to extraneous risks and endogenous risks (Spearin, 2020). Extraneous risks refer to challenges emanating from weak states and conflict environments such as crime, extremism, terrorism, ethnic strife, and separatism, while endogenous risks refer to those of Chinese origins such as anti-Chinese sentiment due to poor working conditions; changes in local economic power configurations from investment; disregard for environmental degradation; failure to engage the local population; and cultural insensitivity. In some instance, as Spearin notes, the two categories merge when local, national, and external actors utilize the "Chinese card" to oppose, or facilitate a shift in, existing power dynamics within specific countries. Despite the growing security challenges and their associated risks, Chinese PSCs would not be legalized until 2009 when the State Council issued the Regulation on Administration of Security and Guarding Services (Sukhankin, 2023). Since then and particularly after 2013, they would continue to grow domestically and abroad and become essential for large Chinese state-owned enterprises operating in Africa.

According to Nantulya (2021), Africa has around 10,000 Chinese companies (two thousand of which are SOEs), 200,000 Chinese workers, and around one million Chinese migrants. The companies operate and migrants live in primarily medium-to-high risk countries where there are both extraneous and endogenous risks and have experienced a range of incidents over the years from kidnapping to terror attacks. Zhang (2019) examines the threat posed by international terrorism to Chinese foreign direct investment along the BRI, arguing the government needs to strengthen its laws and regulation to protect Chinese interests and increase counterterrorism cooperation while companies need to improve their risk management to prevent harm to their activities. While he focuses on international terrorism generally, other scholars note that China recognizes the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates to its *One Belt, One Road* (OBOR) Initiative and other economic and energy investments and projects in both OBOR and non-OBOR countries in specific areas across the globe (Wang, Zhang, and Yang, 2017).

Does the Islamic State Sahel Province pose a threat to Chinese interests in the Central Sahel, and is it likely to impact Beijing's relations with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger? Existing scholarship has primarily examined the threat of the Islamic State to Chinese interests in South Asia and the Middle East. Very few scholars have examined



the threat posed to Chinese interests in Africa, let alone the Sahel. Scholars have referenced Chinese hostages taken in Mali, but there exists no study examining exclusively the challenges the Islamic State Sahel Province poses to Chinese interests in the Central Sahel. Building on Xi Zhang's study examining the general threat that international terrorism poses to Chinese foreign direct investment, this study seeks to answer these two questions by examining publicly available data on its operations in the subregion and China's economic relations with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Part one of this study utilizes data from the *Armed Conflict and Event Data Location Data* (ACLED) and the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) to construct the Islamic State Sahel Province's operational profile. The operational profile covers political violence and strategic developments in each country and across the subregion; the expanse of and shifts in the Islamic State Sahel Province's areas of operations; and its tactics and targets in each terrorism incident by country and the subregion. Findings from the data analysis are then used in the second part in conjunction with additional data collected on the economy and China's economic relations with each country to assess whether the group poses a threat to Chinese interests. Chinese interests are defined by trade, investment and migrants living in each country. The study concludes that in the short-term, the Islamic State Sahel Province does not pose a threat to those interests and recognizes the potential change of the threat in long-term.

2. Operational Profile of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Formerly the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (GSIS), the Islamic State Sahel Province (hereinafter "ISSP") formed in 2015 following Adnan Abu Walid Al-Sahraoui's pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and subsequent split of his faction with that of Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar's faction of Al-Mourabitoun (see the works of Warner, et. al., 2021) and Thurston (2020) for a more detailed accounting of its emergence and evolution). Despite Abu Walid's pledge of allegiance, the ISSP was not recognized by the Islamic State until 2016. From 2016 to when the decision was made to place it under the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2019, the ISSP first operated under its original name, namely the GSIS, and then ISWAP-Greater Sahel. In 2022, it was rebranded to the ISSP when the Islamic State granted it provincial status. Nsaibia (2023) posits that these temporal shifts are important for not only understanding its growth but also how it evolved operationally.

This section provides an operational profile of the ISSP using data from both the *Armed Conflict and Event Data Location Data* (ACLED) and the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD). The ACLED data covers the period between 2016 and 2023, while the GTD data covers the years from 2016 to June 2021. The ACLED data is state-centric, covering political violence and strategic developments between the state, armed forces (national and foreign forces) and police and the ISSP, as well as between the latter and other armed non-state actors, and their areas of operation. The GTD, on the other hand,

covers incidents designated as both terrorism and insurgent attacks and breaks them down according to the tactics used and targets selected. Although data for 2022 and 2023 are missing what is available is sufficient for generating inferences regarding the how and who, and later for assessing whether Chinese national interests could be a target in the future. All subsequent findings and inferences made are utilized and built on in the subsequent section.

2.1. Political Violence and Strategic Developments

The ISSP participated in 608 events between July 19, 2016 and July 27, 2023 in the Central Sahel, which comprises Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (ACELD 2023). Ninety-three percent of the events were categorized as political violence and seven percent as strategic developments. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide a breakdown of the political violence and strategic development events across the region in which the ISSP was involved (See the Appendix).

Battles in general and armed clashes in particular comprise most of the political violence events and fatalities (See **Table 1.1** in the Appendix). The two immediate questions emerging from the data are: 1) Who are the primary actors involved in the armed clashes; and 2) Are the fatalities mostly civilians, government/military/security personnel, ISSP militants, or others? The primary actors involved in clashes with the ISSP, in the order of the most engaged, include foreign and national armed forces (205 events); Jamaat al-Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM; 129 events); ethnic, ethnonationalist, militia groups (70 events); Wagner (11 events); and other ISSP militants (5 events). National and foreign armed forces are combined in the 205 events since the latter conduct operations on behalf of the state; the actual number for each is 115 and 90, respectively. If they are treated separately, then JNIM would rank number one, with a total of 129 events in terms of the actors involved in clashes with the ISSP. Ethnic, ethnonationalist, or militias participate in seventy events, while Wagner participates in eleven and other ISSP militants engage in five. ACLED does not collect data on private security companies operating in the Central Sahel other than Wagner.

Study written by Raleigh and Dowd (2016, p. 32) includes fatalities for each event but warns that those numbers are “typically the most biased, and least accurate, component of any conflict data. They are particularly prone to manipulation by armed groups, and occasionally the media, which may overstate or underreport fatalities for political purposes.” An examination of fatalities for the armed clashes reveals militants rather than civilians, government or security personnel comprise most deaths. Of course, this raises the question: Who is responsible for their deaths? JNIM is responsible for 46 percent of the ISSP militant deaths, while foreign and national armed forces killed 42 percent. Other armed actors are responsible for the remaining 12 percent of the ISSP militant deaths. Other armed actors are working in conjunction with foreign and



national armed forces either overtly or covertly in counterterrorism operations targeting the ISSP (Chivvis, 2016). That fact has reinforced some scholars and practitioners' proposition that operations combining foreign and national armed forces and non-state armed actors have a greater impact on militants. Other scholars, on the other hand, dispute the effectiveness of this traditional counterterrorism strategy, arguing a human security approach is far more efficacious in the long-term (Emerson and Soloman, 2018). The implications of this finding and the efficacy of such a strategy are beyond the scope of this study. Militant fatalities for explosions and remote violence are not examined. As was previously mentioned, fatalities from the armed clashes are the primary focus since they represent the majority. Examining them in relation to one another, however, could potentially provide some interesting insight into the larger debate about whether air/drone strikes are a more effective traditional counterterrorism measure (Tar and Bala, 2020; Chivvis, 2016).

Strategic development events are the other category of events outside of political violence. According to Raleigh and Dowd (2016), strategic developments refer to contextually important incidents affecting future events in the country including those impacting the government or group. **Table 1.2** provides the breakdown of those events (See the Appendix). The implication of the results reinforces what has been stated above; that is, foreign and national armed forces have a significant impact on the ISSP and its operatives' activities. However, the above finding regarding the impact of JNIM on the ISSP suggests competition and rivalries should be counted as strategic developments for the purpose of better understanding their effect on both militant and counterterrorism operations. Moreover, there is likely to be an increase in the "Armed Group Event" category due to significant changes in theatre dynamics.

2.2. Expanse of and Shifts in Areas of Operations

An examination of both ACLED's political violence and strategic developments for geographical differentiation reveal Mali has the highest percentage of events (45), followed by Burkina Faso (36.5%) and Niger (18%). Of course, this finding is not surprising given that the Islamic insurgency first emerged in Mali and later spread to Burkina Faso (See also **Figure 1.1** and **Table 1.3** in the Appendix). Scholars and practitioners debate the insurgency's beginning, with some associating its commencement with the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 and others denoting the period between the end of France's *Operation Serval* in July 2014 and the start of *Operation Barkhane* in August 2014. *Operation Serval* began on January 11, 2013 (Chivvis, 2016). France began withdrawing its forces from Mali in February; the last military personnel left the country in August. On November 9, 2022, *Operation Barkhane* officially ended.

Unlike ACLED, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) does attempt a rudimentary classification of events by insurgency and terrorism incidents. An

examination of that database suggests a greater frequency of insurgent operations began in Mali on January 7, 2013 (START, 2021). From that date to the most recently published GTD data of June 2021, Mali has experienced a total of 1006 incidents; and 67 percent of the incidents are classified as terrorism, 31 percent as insurgent attacks, one percent as criminal acts, and one percent as attacks targeting state actors. Islamic militants are responsible for fifty percent of the attacks, while 40 percent of them were conducted by unknown operatives. The remaining 10 percent were conducted by militia (4%), (ethno)nationalists (5%), and separatists (1%).

Mali's insurgency spread to Burkina Faso in 2015. According to the publicly available GTD data on Burkina Faso, there are a total of 444 incidents between 2015 and June 2021 (START, 2021). Seventy-eight percent of the attacks are classified as terrorism, 21.6 percent as insurgent attacks, and less than one percent (0.4) as criminal incidents. Fifty-eight percent of the incidents are conducted by unknown operatives, forty-one percent by Islamic militants, and the remaining one percent by ethnic extremists, vigilantes, and criminal outfits. Niger saw a total of 220 attacks, with sixty-seven percent classified as terrorism, thirty-one percent as insurgent attacks, one percent as intra/inter-group conflicts, and one percent criminal acts. Sixty-six percent of those incidents are conducted by Islamist extremists, twenty-four percent by unknown assailants, and twenty percent by separatists, nationalists, and dissidents.

The ISSP's total number of incidents (both insurgent operations and terrorism) reported by the GTD across the Central Sahel is 108, with Mali comprising 38 percent, Burkina Faso 36 percent, and Niger 29 percent of the total. **Figure 1.1.** depicts areas of operation by each country and the regions in which they occur between 2016 and 2023, while the percentages in the table in the figure represent the total number of events or incidents by regions within and across the countries. What is interesting to note is the significance of specific regions, and that the Sahel Region in Burkina Faso had the highest percentage over some key regions in Mali. Mali's Gao Region, of course, had the second highest percentage.

Within Burkina Faso's Sahel Region, the Oudalan Province has the highest number of incidents compared to the other provinces in the country. Asongo Cercle, an administrative subdivision of Gao Region and important for both transportation and the economy, had the highest number of incidents compared to Bourem and Gao subdivisions. Niger's Tillaberi Region had the highest number of incidents, and within that region Tera, Abala, and Ayerou were significant locations for operations over the years.

While **Figure 1.1.** captures the expanse of the area of operations where the ISSP is engaged, a closer examination of data by country and region reveals geographical shifts by time and space. **Table 1.3.** depicts these shifts (See the Appendix). From 2018 to the present, there have been sustained operations in certain regions, subdivisions, departments, cities, towns, and villages across the Central Sahel. When examining



incidents across the countries and years, the years 2020 and 2023 stand out. The year 2020 is significant in the total number of events or incidents across all three countries and 2023 for conducting simultaneous operations across different regions and countries and capturing the ISSP's operational shift from Mali to Burkina Faso. Of course, there is variation temporally and spatially by country.

In Mali, the years 2022 and 2023 are significant overall in comparison to previous years, with 2022 having the highest number of incidents and 2023 for simultaneous operations across the regions. As mentioned previously, the Gao region remains a significant area of operation for the ISSP. For Burkina Faso, the years 2020 and 2021 are significant in terms of the total number of incidents, while 2020 is the most significant for the expanse of ISSP's simultaneous operational engagement in the country. Prior to that year, the Sahel Region experienced consistent operational activity. What is also interesting is that the numbers also signal the ISSP's operational shift back to Mali in 2022 and an increase in its activities in Niger in 2023 when comparing them temporally.

However, when looking at Niger independently from the other two countries, the increased activity in 2023 does not make that year significant in terms of the total numbers of incidents by year or expanse of operations. The year 2022 was the most significant for both the total number of incidents and areas of simultaneous operation. All three regions experienced operational activity. Niger's Tillaberi region is like that of Burkina Faso's Sahel Region and Mali's Gao Region in that it has both a higher number of incidents across the years. The Tahoua Region has also experienced operational consistency, but the total number of incidents is small in comparison to the Tillaberi Region.

Given the significance of 2022 in each country and the operational changes within the ISSP mentioned by Nsaibia (2023), it is important to note that this is when it was granted provincial status by the Islamic State. Neither the granting of provincial status nor the end of *Operation Barkhane* and the withdraw of French forces from Mali can alone explain the spread of ISSP's activity. Rather, significant changes occurring in theatre, namely increased clashes between JNIM and the ISSP in Mali and their economic and political competition on the ground; the movement of foreign armed forces from Mali to Niger and growing tensions between the governments and external Western powers; increasing numbers of western special forces and intelligence operatives operating on the ground in Niger for regional counterterrorism operations contribute to understanding why 2022 was significant for each country. They also put in context what has been observed thus far for 2023, which is an increase in activity in terms of both numbers and areas of operations across the Central Sahel. It is anticipated that in 2023, the ISSP will surpass 2020 in terms of total number of incidents across the Central Sahel and 2022 in terms of expanse of its operations within each country.

2.3. Tactics and Targets

The main tactics employed by the ISSP across the Central Sahel include armed assaults followed respectively by bombings, hostage-taking, assassinations, and hijackings. Private citizens, the military, infrastructure, police, non-state armed actors, government, education, business, and religious figures are the primary targets. Both the tactics and targets are ranked and listed in order of most to least employed and targeted based on the total number of incidents and their corresponding percentages. **Tables 1.4** and **1.5** provide a breakdown of tactics and targets by country and across the Central Sahel (See the Appendix). Their rankings change when looking across time to assess the consistency of their usage and the targets selected. **Tables 1.6** and **1.7** provide a temporal breakdown of both tactics and targets, which is used for assessing consistency (See the Appendix).

Armed assaults are consistently adopted over the years followed by hostage-taking and bombings, respectively. Neither assassinations nor hijackings are tactics consistently used by the ISSP. Private citizens are more regularly targeted followed by military, police, militias, government, and infrastructure. Business, education, religious figures, and civil society are not typical targets. In all cases, if the military, police, and government targets are combined, then they outnumber and are more consistently targeted than private citizens. A closer examination of the private citizens counted in the GTD database finds that many of them are not *per se* ordinary individuals (see **Tables 1.8** to **1.10** in the Appendix). Variations in the targets also exist when looking at each tactic by country. The remainder of this subsection examines tactics and targets for each of the countries and their variations.

In Mali, armed assaults are the most common tactic employed by the ISSP, and they are followed respectively by bombings, hostage-taking, and assassinations. The military is the primary target followed by private citizens, and non-state armed actors (see **Tables 1.4** and **1.5**). An examination of each tactic reveals variation in the ranking of the targets and some commonalities regarding who is specifically targeted. All private citizens targeted are politically or economically symbolic. **Table 1.8** lists the tactics and targets by their rankings and provides additional detail about specific targets.

In Burkina Faso, armed assaults are followed respectively by hostage-taking, bombings, assassinations, and hijacking when examining the total number of tactics used, while private citizens are followed by infrastructure, military, police, government, education, business, non-state armed actors, and religious figures when examining the total number of targets (see **Tables 1.4** and **1.5**). It is interesting to note that hostage-taking was ranked higher in this country than the other two countries, and there were more incidents of this type than in those before or after 2018. The private citizens targeted were those living in areas where rival militias or non-state armed actors were located or under their protection. Business was also targeted in this country while the other two countries did not have similar experiences. **Table 1.9** lists the tactics and targets by their rankings and provides additional detail about specific targets.



In Niger, armed assaults are followed respectively by assassinations, hostage-taking, and bombings when examining the total number of tactics used, while private citizens are followed by infrastructure, military, police, and government when examining the total number of targets (see **Tables 1.4** and **1.5**). It is interesting to note that assassinations were ranked higher in this country than the other two. The individuals targeted were either former or current government officials or leaders of rival armed actors, and there were more incidents of this type than in those before or after 2019. Private citizens targeted included those living in areas under the control of rival non-state armed actors, village chiefs or leaders, or off-duty military personnel. There was only one incident where unknown individuals were targeted in an IED attack on a vehicle driving on one of the main transport roads. Thus, most incidents targeting civilians in this country had either political or strategic value. **Table 1.10** lists the tactics and targets by their rankings and provides additional detail about specific targets.

Despite the variation among targets in each country, a few generalizations can be made. First, military, police and government comprise most of the targets across the countries when they are combined. Military targets primarily consist of bases, camps, checkpoints, convoys, detachments, patrols, personnel, and vehicles. Police targets are not typically targets in Mali, but they are in Burkina Faso and Niger. Police stations or posts, convoys, and on-duty officers are the main targets in those two countries. The government targets varied, with local government officials in areas under the control of rival armed groups being targets in Mali and Burkina Faso and representatives from the courts and parliament being targets in Niger. Custom posts are common targets in both Burkina Faso and Niger but not in Mali. While most of these targets are politically and strategically symbolic, the customs post targets hold economic value.

Second, all the private citizens targeted are symbolically significant and contain either political, strategic, or economic value. They are either living in areas under the control of rival militias or in areas where there are socioeconomic tensions or disputes with rival groups or communities.

Third, a closer examination of the areas where there is political competition among militant groups finds there to be a socioeconomic dimension to armed operations. This finding reinforces other scholars such as Idrissa (2017) claiming much of the violence among Islamic militants in the region is about political competition and that competition carries a socioeconomic component.

Fourth, businesses are not typically targeted by the ISSP. It was only in Burkina Faso where specific attacks targeting miners, traders, and livestock convoys occurred. These targets are not *per se* surprising when taking into consideration the role of both cattle rustling and artisanal mining to all militant groups' revenue generation. The economic dimension is explored in more detail in the following section.

3. The ISSP in the Central Sahel: Assessing the Potential Threats to Chinese Interests

The operational profile in the preceding section covered the type, nature, and frequency of violence, areas of operations, tactics used, and targets selected within each country and across the Central Sahel. This section uses that profile and its component to assess whether the ISSP is a current or potential future threat to Chinese interests. It does so by examining the countries' GDP and its breakdown by sectors; top market partners, including the main importing and exporting countries, as well as what is being imported and exported; the main foreign direct investors and their principal areas of investments; and China's position, trade, and investment in each country. Each country is examined separately given the variation in their economies and economic relations with China and the shifts in the ISSP's operational activities.

3.1. Mali

Mali's GDP continued to grow between 2016 and 2021, only experiencing a slight loss of almost 0.5 billion in 2022 despite years of continued violence (Trading Economics, 2023b). Agriculture makes up 35.69 percent of its GDP, followed by services at 35.39 percent and industry at 20.61 percent (O'Neill, 2023). South Africa, Switzerland, Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso are its top market partners. China ranks ninth. Gold, raw cotton, oily seeds, wood, and refined petroleum are the country's main exports (OEC, 2023d). Its top exporting partners include the UAE, Switzerland, Australia, China, and Turkey. The UAE comprises 78.1 percent of the exports to Asia, while China only comprises 1.23 percent. Refined petroleum, broadcasting equipment, woven cotton, packaged medicaments, and cement are the major imports, and the top import partners are Senegal, China, France, India, and the UAE. In terms of foreign direct investment, France, China, the U.S., Canada, India, and South Africa are the main investors (Lloyds Bank, 2023). Most of their investments target mining, oil extraction, the textile industry, financial intermediation, telecommunication, and infrastructure, and none of these appear to be major targets for the ISSP. The only exception is the one incident near the Kayes mine (See **Figure 1.1** in the Appendix). Areas such as Gao and Menaka where there is illicit trade in artisanal mining are primarily under the control of other armed groups and not the ISSP (GI-TOC, 2023).

Most of the ISSP's attacks occur in cattle rustling hotspots and near cross-border cattle markets (GI-TOC, 2022). Scholars have pointed to the relationship between cattle rustling and armed activity, while others have dismissed such claims. See **Figure 1.1** for the exact areas where the ISSP is operating and **Figures 1.2** and **1.3** in the Appendix for both the cattle rustling areas and known areas where armed groups are operating. What the data indicate is that there is some kind of relationship between the two. The GI-TOC reiterates what other scholars have claimed, namely that armed groups have



inserted themselves into disputes between herders and sedentary communities. Cattle rustling is not the only illicit activity in these areas, however.

Utilizing the GI-TOC's Illicit Hub Mapping tool, Gao, Menaka, and Mopti are identified as major hotspots for arms trafficking, cattle rustling, and illicit trade in counterfeit goods. Gao has become a smaller, alternative illicit arms market due to increased security in the Lake Chad region, while Menaka is the largest weapons market in the Liptako-Gourma region. They are also major transit zones for drug trafficking by criminal elements who pay the armed groups for protection of their convoys. Gao is a major transit point for illicit cigarette smuggling entering Mali via Burkina Faso for both the domestic market and North Africa markets. It is also a significant migrant-smuggling hub.

Taking into consideration ISSP's operational profile and the nature of the licit and illicit economies in the areas where it is active, it does not appear to be a threat to Chinese national interests at present. China's trade with Mali has remained consistent, with its exports surpassing that which it imports from Mali (Trading Economics, 2023g). Its top five exports include electrical equipment, vehicles, machinery, pharmaceutical products, and coffee. Exports have trended upwardly over the years. Mali's main exports to China include raw cotton, wood, electrical equipment, vegetable, fruit and nut products, and rawhides, skins, and leather. China's imports from Mali remain consistent apart from 2017 when there was a significant decline. However, they resumed their normal level the following year. The Chinese community living in Mali is small and concentrated primarily in Bamako. They have opened businesses, retail shops, small hotels, and construction firms. The threat to Chinese national interests could change, however. Expansion of the ISSP's activities into Bamako and the mining areas in Sikasso and Kayes or China's direct military support for counterterrorism operations including increasing the presence of its own private security companies where it has significant business interests in the country could place Chinese interests in the ISSP's cross hairs.

3.2. Burkina Faso

Like Mali, Burkina Faso's GDP continued to grow between 2016 and 2021, only experiencing a 0.86 billion dollar decline in 2022 despite the political instability and violence (Trading Economics, 2023a). Services make up 42.09 percent of the GDP, followed by industry at 32.01%, and agriculture at 17.46 percent (O'Neill, 2023). Switzerland, India, Singapore, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali are its top market partners. China ranks thirteenth. Gold, raw cotton, zinc ore, oily seeds, and coconuts, Brazil nuts, and cashews are the country's main exports. Gold comprises 85.3 percent of the exports. Switzerland, India, Singapore, Cote d'Ivoire, and China are the most common destinations for these exports. China makes up only 1.49 percent of Burkina Faso's exports to Asia, while India comprises 10.7 percent (OEC, 2023a). Refined petroleum,

packaged medicaments, electricity, cement, and petroleum gas are its main imports. China, Cote d'Ivoire, France, Ghana, and India are the top importing countries. China comprises the largest share of the Asian countries. In terms of FDI, the main investing countries are Canada, France, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Morocco (Lloyds, 2023). The mining sector attracts most of the investment.

Burkina Faso's main mines are in Inata, Tambaro, Essakane, Kalsaka, Sabce, Taparko, Perkoa, Mana, Poura, and Youga. Inata, Tambaro and Essakane are in the Sahel Region, while Kalsaka, Sabce, and Taparko are in the Centre-Nord Region. The other mines are in areas where the ISSP has not been active. As will be recalled from **Figure 1.1**, the Sahel Region had a higher percentage of incidents involving the ISSP than did Mali's Gao Region and Niger's Tillaberi Region, and it was the Oudalan province in the Sahel Region that experienced most of the violence. When comparing the Sahel Region to Centre-Nord and Est Region, 94 percent of the incidents occurred there while the latter two experienced three percent of the incidents, respectively.

A closer examination of where the mines are located finds little correlation between the ISSP's armed incidents and the mining sector. The Inata Mine is in the Soum Province, the latter of which comprises only eight percent of violent incidents involving the ISSP. However, when looking at where in Soum the ISSP conducted attacks, all incidents are not in proximity to the mine. In Soum, the incidents took place in Arbinda, Baraboule, Dijibo, Koutougou, Nassoumbou, Pobe-Mengao, and Tongomayel. The Tambaro Mine is in Oudalan Province; the latter accounts for 70 percent of violent incidents in the Sahel Region. However, none of the areas where attacks occurred are in proximity to the mine. Armed operations occurred in Deou, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Our Si, and Tin-Akoff. The Essakane mine, the third mine located in the Sahel Region, is in Seno Province. Seno Province comprised 19 percent of the total incidents; however, none of the areas where they occurred are in proximity to the mine. The Centre-Nord's Katsaka is in Yatenga Province, and there are no incidents of violence involving the ISSP. Some incidents are conducted by the ISSP in proximity to the Sabce and Taparko mines; these mines are in the Bam and Namentenga provinces, respectively. As should be recalled, the Centre-Nord only comprises three percent of the total violent incidents involving the ISSP. There was one incident in Bam and four in Namentenga. Finally, when examining the specific targets (see **Table 1.9**), there was only one incident where a foreign employee of mining company was targeted by the ISSP.

Utilizing the GI-TOC's Illicit Hub Mapping tool to explore Burkina Faso's illicit economy reveals no correlation between the ISSP's violent incidents and illicit activities. Criminal activity in three regions of particular concern in this study is primarily conducted by JNIM, local militias, and bandits. They engage in arms trafficking, illicit gold, and trade in counterfeit goods. Foreign mining companies operating in the areas under the control of armed groups are known to have reached agreements with them to operate and transport their goods safely. The southwest region of the country is also a hub of polycriminality, according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational



Organized Crime. Arms, fuel, and drugs comprise the bulk of goods smuggled into the country. Motorbikes, electronics, and food items from Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire are brought in for the domestic market and for transport to Mali. Goods coming from the southwest bound for Mali typically pass through the Sahel Region, which again links some of the armed groups. However, it does not link to the ISSP currently.

Considering the ISSP's operational profile and the nature of licit and illicit activities, there appears to be no immediate threat to Chinese national interests in Burkina Faso. China's trade with Burkina Faso saw continued growth between 2016 and 2023 (OEC, 2023b). Broadcasting equipment, non-fillet frozen fish, motorcycles and cycles are the main products exported. Shandong, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Chongqing are the primary provinces exporting goods to the country. China's main imports from the country are zinc ore, raw cotton, and other oily seeds. Zinc ore comprises 63.4 percent of the imports while raw cotton consists of 21.7 percent. Guangdong, Beijing, Liaoning, Anhui, and Zhejiang are the main importing provinces. China's imports from Burkina Faso have oscillated over the years (Trading Economics, 2023d). Power China and Beijing Urban Construction are two known investors, with the former investing in the energy sector and the latter in the health sector. The size of the Chinese community living in the country is insignificant, with the suspected population being somewhere between 300 and 1,000. Unlike in Mali, the lack of threat to Chinese interests by the ISSP in Burkina Faso is unlikely to change in near the future.

3.3. Niger

Niger's GDP grew steadily between 2016 and 2021, and then fell by 0.95 billion in 2022 (Trading Economics, 2023c). Services consist of 37.05 percent of its GDP, followed by agriculture at 36.48 percent and industry at 20.83 percent (O'Neill, 2023). The country's top five market partners include France, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and South Africa. China ranks fourteenth. France's market share is 37 percent and Mali's is 21 percent. Gold, other oily seeds, refined petroleum, and uranium and thorium ore are its main exports (OEC, 2023c). Gold comprises 71.41 percent of the exports. The UAE is Niger's largest Asian exporter with 70.8 percent. China's share is only 9.1 percent. The top five countries it imports from include China, France, India, Nigeria, and Germany, and the main goods imported include rice, cars, rolled tobacco, palm oil, and vaccines. The mining sectors and uranium hold the lion share of FDI (Lloyds, 2023). Uranium is expected to decline due to the closure of the Akouta mine, but Niger is expected to become an oil exporting country following the completion of the pipeline being built by China National Petroleum Corporation. China is Niger's second largest foreign investor after France (Hayley, 2023).

Uranium is industrially mined in Arlit, Akokan, and Azelik, all three of which are in the sparsely populated Agadez Region. The Arlit mine is the largest mine, but the

Akokan mine is the world's largest underground uranium mine (Hassoumi, 2017). The Azelik mine is popularly referred to as the Chinese mine since Chinese investors hold a 70 percent stake. Agadez also has artisanal mining sites that were discovered in 2014, namely the Djado, Mount Ibl, and the Tchibarkaten mines. Artisanal mining in the region was shuttered in 2017 for security reasons since they are hotspots for illicit gold trade, human smuggling and trafficking, drug smuggling, and banditry. The only mine that mines gold industrially is the Samira Hill Gold Mine, which is in Tera Department of the Tillaberi Region. As will be recalled from the preceding section, the Tillaberi Region experienced more violent incidents than the other regions in the country where the ISSP was engaged (See **Figure 1.1**). The Tera Department saw 24 percent of those violent events. Neither mining nor those involved in it were targets (see **Table 1.10**). The nascent oil and gas industry is expected to comprise a sizable portion of Niger's exports in the future. China holds concessions in Agadem, Bilma, Tenere, and Kafra. There were no reported incidents of violence involving the ISSP in any proximity to those concessions.

China's trade with Niger has shown growth over the years (Trading Economics, 2023e). Rice, other large iron pipes, and iron pipes are its main exports to Niger (OEC, 2023c). Exports come from Shandong, Henan, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Guangdong. Other oily seeds, tanned sheep hides, and jewelry are Niger's main exports to China. Other oily seeds comprise 98.6 percent of the total imports. Shandong, Anhui, Beijing, Hubei, and Fujian are the main importing provinces. Power China, China National Petroleum Corporation, and China National Nuclear are three top investors in the country, with the first two focusing on energy and the latter company concentrating on metals.

Taking into consideration all the above and the ISSP's operational profile, Chinese national interests are not under direct threat at present. At present, political instability poses a greater threat to Chinese investments and nationals living in the country but not *per se* to trade. Chinese interests in the country could potentially be threatened by the ISSP in the future, however. China has more to lose in Niger than it does in Mali and Burkina Faso with the spread of not only the ISSP's activities but the Islamic insurgency itself and the competition that comes from that between the various militant groups.

4. Conclusion

Taking all the aforementioned into consideration, it can be concluded that in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger the ISSP poses no immediate threat to Chinese interests. As mentioned in the introduction, Chinese interests are defined by trade, investments, and migrants living in each country. The ISSP's current operational activity is unlikely to alter China's economic relations in the region. The threat could change, however; and it is



more likely to do so in Mali and Niger than in Burkina Faso. Niger is the country of greatest interests given the nature of Chinese investment and its building of the pipelines.

Competition between the ISSP and JNIM, the Al-Qaeda affiliate operating in the region, and rivalries between them and other armed actors could change the nature of the threat posed. If the ISSP can gain ground in territories where JNIM and other armed actors are operating and where China has significant investment in the countries, then it is feasible to infer that it could become a threat. This study did not examine the threat posed by JNIM and the other armed actors. They need to be examined to have a better assessment of how political violence and strategic developments are likely to impact relations with China and if Chinese interests are at stake given their operational activity.

Despite this weakness, this study does fill an existing void in the literature and is important for pondering how Chinese companies can better protect their interests. As the terrorism threats increase in the region and given the difficulties the countries' military and security bodies are having containing the violence, those companies may need to consider whether to hire and how to effectively use Chinese private security companies (PSCs). Chinese PSCs are limited in what they can do operationally given existing laws. However, as expands its security cooperation, it will have to revisit the matter. Expansion of Chinese PSCs and increased support for the national armed forces and other non-state armed actors who are engaged with the ISSP could also result in Chinese interests being targeted in the future. This still seems unlikely given the ISSP's operational activity, but theatre dynamics are constantly evolving in the Central Sahel.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express gratitude to the organizers and panel three moderators for providing the opportunity to present the major findings on September 20, 2023 at the International Conference on Counter-Terrorism, Technology & Development in Africa, sponsored by the Africa Research Institute, Obuda University in Budapest, Hungary and the Centre for Military Studies, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. She would also like to recognize and commend Angel Qihui Chen at Penn State University for serving as my research assistant for this project. Ms. Chen was responsible for collecting the relevant economic data on each of the countries as well as Chinese investment in the Central Sahel.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that she has no known competing or financial interests in the production and publication of this study. All disclosed information is correct to her knowledge and there is no real, potential, or apparent conflict of interest known to her at the time of the study's publication.

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Acknowledgements

Tables and figures are listed in the order they are referenced in the study for the reader's accessibility.

Table 1.1. Political Violence Involving ISSP in the Central Sahel, 2016-2023

Type of Political Violence		
Battles		Percentage of Type of Violence and Fatalities
Armed Clashes	370	
Non-State Actor (NSA) overtakes territory	2	
Government regains territory	1	
TOTAL	373	66.13%
FATALITIES	2178	73.98%
Explosions/Remote Violence		
Air/drone strikes	186	
Shelling/artillery/missile attack	3	
TOTAL	189	33.51%
FATALITIES	763	25.92%
Riots		
Mob Violence	2	
TOTAL	2	0.35%
FATALITIES	3	0.10%


Source: Author-generated; event data from ACLED, 2023.

Table 1.2. Central Sahel Events by Actor Type and Specific Strategic Development, 2016-2023

ACTOR TYPE	SPECIFIC STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT							TOTAL/ PERCENT BY ACTOR TYPE								
	Disrupted Weapons Use	Arrests	Agreements	Change in Activity	Looting/ Property Destruction	Non- Violent Transfer of Territory	Other									
Government, Police, or Military Event	18	7	2	1	1	1	1	31	72%							
MINUSMA Event	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2%							
Armed Group Event (ISSP or Other Groups)	4	0	0	1	1	3	2	11	26%							
TOTAL/PERCENT BY SPECIFIC STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT	23	53%	7	16%	2	5%	2	5%	2	5%	4	9%	3	7%	43	

Source: Author-generated; event data from ACLED, 2023.

Figure 1.1. Areas of ISSP Operation in the Central Sahel, 2016-2023



Source: Author-generated using Google Earth; event/incident data derived from ACLED (2023) and START (2021) databases.

Table 1.3. Geographical and Temporal Shifts in Areas of Operations in the Central Sahel, 2016-2023

Country	Region	Percentage of Events/Incidents Across the Central Sahel, 2016-2023 (Figure 1)	Number of Events by Year							
			2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Mali	Gao	27.60%	0	1	18	6	81	34	24	0
	Menaka	12.56%	0	0	0	0	0	0	66	10
	Tombouctou	2.31%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
	Mopti	1.98%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	Segou	0.66%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Burkina Faso	Sahel	34.38%	0	0	1	2	56	77	46	26
	Centre-Nord	1.16%	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	0
	Est	1.16%	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
Niger	Tillabéri	15.21%	0	0	10	2	23	9	19	29
	Dosso	2.64%	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
	Tahoua	0.33%	0	0	0	1	3	3	6	3

Source: Author-generated; event data from ACLED, 2023.

Table 1.4. ISSP Tactics by Country in the Central Sahel, 2016-2021

ISSP Tactics by Country	Mali		Burkina Faso		Niger		% of Tactics Across the Central Sahel
Armed Assaults	18	45%	13	39%	15	58%	46%
Assassinations	2	5%	3	9%	4	15%	9%
Bombings	8	20%	4	12%	2	8%	14%
Hijacking	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	1%
Hostage-taking	4	10%	7	21%	3	12%	14%
Unknown	8	20%	5	15%	2	8%	15%
TOTAL	40		33		26		

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.5. ISSP Targets by Country in the Central Sahel, 2016-2021

ISSP Targets by Country	Mali		Burkina Faso		Niger		% of Targets Across the Central Sahel
Business	0	0%	3	8%	0	0%	3%
Education	0	0%	4	11%	0	0%	4%
Facility and Infrastructure	1	2%	3	8%	7	21%	10%
Government	1	2%	4	11%	1	3%	5%
Military	18	44%	7	19%	4	12%	26%
NGO	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0%
Non-State Armed Actors (Militias, JNIM and others)	5	12%	2	5%	0	0%	6%
Police	0	0%	5	14%	3	9%	7%
Private Citizen & Property	16	39%	8	22%	18	53%	38%
Religious Figures	0	0%	1	3%	1	3%	2%
TOTAL	41		37		34		

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.6. ISSP Tactics by Time in the Central Sahel, 2016-2021

ISSP Tactics by Year	2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021	
Armed Assaults	1	25%	5	83%	10	34%	8	31%	13	57%	9	100%
Assassinations	0	0%	0	0%	3	10%	4	15%	0	0%	0	0%
Bombings	1	25%	0	0%	5	17%	6	23%	2	9%	0	0%
Hijacking	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	4%	0	0%	0	0%
Hostage-taking	1	25%	1	17%	7	24%	3	12%	2	9%	0	0%
Unknown	1	25%	0	0%	4	14%	4	15%	6	26%	0	0%

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.7. ISSP Targets by Time in the Central Sahel by Year, 2016-2021

ISSP Targets by Year	2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021	
Business	0	0%	0	0%	1	3%	2	8%	0	0%	0	0%
Education	0	0%	0	0%	2	6%	0	0%	2	8%	0	0%
Facility and Infrastructure	0	0%	0	0%	3	9%	0	0%	1	4%	7	37%
Government	0	0%	0	0%	4	12%	1	4%	1	4%	0	0%
Military	1	25%	4	67%	5	15%	7	28%	12	48%	0	0%
NGO	0	0%	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Non-State Armed Actors (Militias, JNIM and others)	0	0%	0	0%	2	6%	2	8%	3	12%	0	0%
Police	2	50%	0	0%	2	6%	1	4%	2	8%	1	5%
Private Citizen & Property	1	25%	2	33%	14	41%	10	40%	4	16%	11	58%
Religious Figures	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	8%	0	0%	0	0%

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.8. ISSP Tactics and Targets in Mali, 2016-2021

Tactic	Target (Listed by Most to Least Targeted)	Specific Target
Armed Assault	Private Citizen	Individuals living in rival Tuareg encampments and villages
	Military	Bases, camps, and military personnel
	Non-State Armed Actors	Self-defense militia
	Government	Local government representative in rival Tuareg area
Bombing	Military	Bases, convoys, vehicles, and personnel
Hostage-Taking	Private Citizen	Prominent Tuareg community members and villages where there exist socioeconomic disputes
	Military	Soldiers
Assassination	Private Citizen	Deputy chief of rival Tuareg group fighting the ISSP
	Non-State Armed Actors	Military commander of rival Tuareg group

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.9. ISSP Tactics and Targets in Burkina Faso, 2016-2021

Tactic	Target (Listed by Most to Least Targeted)	Specific Target
Armed Assault	Private Citizen	Villages considered militia strongholds and traders
	Police	Police stations or posts
	Military	Military posts, detachments, and personnel
	Non-State Armed Actors	Self-defense militia
	Government	Customs post
	Education	Highschool building
Hostage-Taking	Private Citizen	Individuals living in areas held by rivals and at a market in a town under the control of self-defense militias
	Business	Foreign employee of a mining company and native miners working at a gold mine
	Health	Ambulance driver
	Education	School teacher targeted for teaching French
	Religious Figure	Foreign priest
Bombing	Military	Convoy and post
	Police	Convoy
	Business	Convoy
Assassination	Government	Former and current local government officials
Hijacking	Health	Ambulance


Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Table 1.10. ISSP Tactics and Targets in Niger, 2016-2021

Tactic	Target (Listed by Most to Least Targeted)	Specific Target
Armed Assault	Private Citizen	Individuals living in areas under the control or influence of other non-state armed actors and others traveling in a convoy from a livestock market. The first incident is retaliatory in nature, while the second is suspected to be related to either livestock disputes or cattle rustling.
	Military	Bases, convoys, checkpoints, patrols, and on-duty soldiers.
	Police	Police stations and on-duty officers
	Government	Custom posts and the president of high court
	Civil Society	Foreign aid workers on a holiday
Assassination	Private Citizen	Village chiefs and a Tuareg leader
	Government	Parliamentary speaker
Hostage-Taking	Private Citizen	Off-duty military officer and a Tuareg leader
	Religious Figure	African priest
Bombing (All targets for this tactic are targeted equally)	Military	Military vehicle
	Police	Police Station
	Private Citizen	Vehicle traveling along the road

Source: Author-generated; event data from GTD, 2021.

Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Cattle-Rustling Hotspots and Armed Group Activity



Source: GI-TOC, 2022

Forced Withdrawal: The Case of France in the Sahel Region¹

Mariann Tánczos² and Gergely Fejérdy³

Abstract:

Once part of the French colonial empire, the Sahel region played an important role in France's Africa policy. All French presidents had their specific approach towards the region. Emmanuel Macron, with his 2017 speech on the Sorbonne even claimed that the Sahel is not just important for France but the European Union as a whole. But the Europeanisation went hand in hand with serious French commitment too. Since Bamako's invitation France had a significant military presence in the region, which may have transformed over time, but remained in the region. However until 2022 the status quo remained similar, lines of fragmentation became more and more visible. The coup epidemic, and growing Russian influence in the Central Sahel affected French interventions too, leading to a large scale withdrawal from the region. The present paper attempts to capture these changes in the relations between France and the Central Sahel.

Keywords:

Central Sahel, France's Africa policy, French military operations, West Africa, Russian influence in Africa

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.242>

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Introduction

France has been a traditionally important player in Africa and in the Central Sahel, which role can be traced back to the colonial era. The region is part of the Francophonie and is connected with myriad of ties to France. It is thus not a surprise that the region is important to France as well. Paris and the respective presidents are interested to formulate their own strategies regarding the area. Francophone Africa was open to this engagement, and for a long time France was a welcome actor in the area regardless of the type of its actions. At least up until recent years this was the case. In 2013 France started *Opération Serval*, as an answer to a presidential invitation letter from Mali, requesting bilateral help. Paris of course was eager to help. Since then, during the past decade the mood changed dramatically towards France and its Western allies in the Sahel. From a welcomed partner, it became a persona non grata not just in Mali, but in the Sahel altogether.

Several different factors led to the practical cessation of connections between the parties. Firstly, a good look at France's actual Africa policy must be examined to seek the answer, since this sets the general picture and basic understanding between France and the continent and the Sahel within. Secondly, since Paris was heavily involved in the Central Sahel area the military engagement and in parallel the security situation of the region must be assessed.

Since the start of the French and wider international intervention in the Sahel, the security situation in the region actually deteriorated despite international investment to improve its security. The Islamist threat remained one of the biggest issues in the region, and even a spillover effect became visible over time. This can be traced back to the political and security developments since 2020, which made it abundantly clear, that France, hand in hand with the European Union, could not make a difference in the Central Sahel, notwithstanding their interventions. This affected severely the internal stability of the countries in the Central Sahel. Thus, the countries in question, fed up with their standstill or even declining security situation, started to turn actively to other partners, like Russia and its Wagner Group. The turbulent changes, which characterised the region's past decade, fueled social discontent with the security situation led to coups d'état in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which further eroded French ties to the continent. As a last resort, countries in the Central Sahel severed their ties with France, and called for the withdrawal of forces (Fejérdy and Király, 2023a).

This paper attempts to map out the process which led to the withdrawal of the French forces from the region. For this, France's general approach to Africa and the Central Sahel are considered in the first section of the article. Subsequently practical steps taken by France, bilateral military initiatives and operations are introduced. From these two elements emerges the general state of play before the withdrawal. In the third section the security challenges which led to the French withdrawal are introduced. Lastly, future perspectives are presented regarding the Central Sahel region.

France's Africa Policy

Africa has had a prominent place in French foreign policy, all presidents since Jacques Chirac wished to renew it (Szűcs, 2022). The scope of the article however discusses only President Macron's Africa policy. The incumbent president inherited large scale French intervention in the Sahel from his predecessor, François Hollande who started the intervention in Mali in 2013. President Macron oversaw the reduction, transformation and finally the complete withdrawal of the French operations. During his two presidential terms he experienced the changes of the political scenery since in the Central Sahel. Thus, only his take on the policy is considered for the purposes of this paper.

President Macron set the path for national Security and Defence Policy in his famous Sorbonne speech in 2017. However, the speech was mainly directed to describe European foreign policy musts, it also gave a window to how President Macron thought about Africa at the time. According to the speech, Europe's, and therefore France's, destiny is bound to Africa (Marchand, 2017). This statement set the tone for the review of the French National security strategy, which was published later that year. Regarding the operating environment, the Sahel was identified as a vulnerable, yet very important area, where the main problem was seen as the proliferation of terrorist groups (Ministère des armées, 2017). The continent however is not just represented with its vulnerabilities in the review. The Sahel is also mentioned in the challenges section, where areas neighbouring Europe are considered. France was busy with large scale interventions in the Sahel since 2013, when *Opération Serval* started in Mali. By 2014 *Opération Barkhane* took over its place, with a more robust area of operation, extended to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger (Nádudvari, 2018).

Besides the strategic review, it was also symbolic, that President Macron travelled to Gao, Mali just four days after his inauguration, and later to Ougadougou, Burkina Faso. In his speech in Burkina Faso, the new president wanted to signal the start of a new era, the end of the French interventionist approach towards the Sahel, and the importance of dialogue between Europe and Africa (Türke, 2023). This latter is especially important, since this represents a complete departure from the previous colonial-style relations and France's engagement with Africa through Europe is a reference to the Sorbonne speech (Szűcs, 2022). This approach, which attempts to break with previous policies however is not new. It was reintroduced to the French – African relations from time to time by every president. Most recently its introduction derived from the recognition, that *Opération Barkhane* cannot fulfil its overambitious aims, to tackle terrorism in the Sahel region as a whole completely alone.

Thus, President Macron encouraged G5 Sahel countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to form their own joint force, to secure borders and conduct cross-border counterterrorist operations (Bertrand et al., 2023). In consequence, the G5 Sahel Joint Force was established in 2017, and should have achieved full operational capability until mid-2018 (Nádudvari, 2019). This would have led to the phasing out



and eventual complete withdrawal of *Opération Barkhane*. It was clear, that a solely military approach to the root causes of the conflict in the Sahel is not sufficient enough to handle the situation. Thus, France ventured to introduce a comprehensive plan to tackle the situation in the Sahel, without conviction (Bertrand et al., 2023). The deteriorating security situation and the rapid emergence of Islamist radical groups reversed the French strategy to focus on its heavily criticised military approach to the problem (Szűcs, 2022). Thus, France's strategy to stabilize the region fell through due to the late recognition of the lop-sidedness and miscalculation of its intervention. This idea was supported by the recent coup epidemic in the Central Sahel region.

French Operations in the Sahel

Large scale French intervention in the Sahel begun in 2013, when as a response to Mali's invitation letter Operation Serval started on 11 January. By 15 January, nearly 2,000 French troops had been deployed to Mali. The first phase of the French intervention lasted until 30 January. The joint-force operation brought rapid success: in almost a week, the airfields of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal were retaken (Marsai, 2013).

The next phase of the operation started on 19 February 2013, after a pause. *Opération Panther* was launched with the additional support of 2,500 Chadian troops in the Kidal region, in the Iforas Mountains, which covers an area of about 250,000 km² on the north-eastern border of Mali (Besenyő and Miletics, 2013). The difficult terrain, which also lies is a border area later influenced the decision to create a regional force.

During the third phase of the operation, French forces were increasingly confronted with the fact that the Malian population had been successfully radicalised in preceding months, while under occupation, by the Islamist groups present in the area. This was the result of the power vacuum in the respective areas, which were filled up by Islamist organisations. During this period, the conditions for a protracted guerrilla war were fully met. Accordingly, the planned French withdrawal was not justifiable. Thus, by July 2014 there were still 1,600 French troops fighting in Mali in *Opération Serval* (Vecsey, 2014).

The next phase of the French intervention was the transformation of *Opération Serval*, and *Opération Épervier*, a stabilisation mission in Chad since 1986, to *Opération Barkhane*, with a significantly wider area of operation. Consequently the area of operation was extended to all of the G5 Sahel countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (Türke, 2023). The widened operational theatre allowed French forces to compete more effectively with Islamist groups by crossing borders (Vecsey, 2014).

To live up to the regionalisation, *Opération Barkhane* was given a very wide mandate. Including the fight against terrorism, including groups like al-Qaida in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram among others, preventing terrorist organisations to prepare their safe-heaven (Griffin, 2016), through combatting illegal migration and transnational crime (Cumming et al., 2022).

As its regional mandate required, *Opération Barkhane* had multiple bases across the five countries it operated in. The main focus remained on Mali, thus multiple military bases operated in the country throughout the intervention. The headquarters of the operation was located in the capital of Chad, N'Djamena, while an intelligence unit was operating in Niger on multiple locations, and finally a special operations unit was placed in Burkina Faso (Cumming et al., 2022).

In the framework of *Opération Barkhane* planned operations were conducted with the support of partner countries (Türke, 2023), while it led cross-border counterterrorist operations which were more and more specific on their targeted groups (Cumming et al., 2022; Szűcs, 2022). During its peak, around 5,500 soldiers were deployed to the operation (Gormezano, 2022). France intended to scale down and later close its *Opération Barkhane*, an idea introduced in mid-2021, however the security situation in the Sahel did not improve, in fact terrorist activity was on the surge in the Sahel (Casola, 2022; Cumming et al., 2022; Bertrand et al., 2023).

This again led to a change in the intervention, and *Opération Barkhane* was leaning more and more on Task Force Takuba, which was established in March 2020 (France 24, 2022). The Task Force was an example of the European Intervention Initiative, introduced by President Macron in 2017 (Sweeney and Winn, 2020). Around 800 special operations soldiers were deployed to Task Force Takuba, which included troops from Estonia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Sweden Italy, and Belgium, under French command. The Task Force also sought to increase its numbers, and additional countries conducted negotiations with France to join the ranks of Takuba, like Norway, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Germany and the Netherlands (Wilén, 2021). Task Force Takuba was under the command of *Opération Barkhane*, with the task to conduct counter terrorism operations, support and training to the Malian armed forces with its area of operation focusing to the Liptako-Gourma border region (Türke, 2023).

The Task Force was a short lived one: despite some tactical success, it was still incapable to improve internal security in Mali. The stalemate of the security situation led to two coups in Mali, one in August 2020 and the second in May 2021 (France 24, 2022). The military takeover in the country resulted in tensions with France, which came to the break in June 2021, when President Macron announced the end of *Opération Barkhane* (Türke, 2023). The announcement did not come unexpected, since Bamako openly turned towards another actor in the hope for help to its security woes, to Russia and its Wagner Group (Fejérdy and Király, 2023a).



Changing Security Environment in the Sahel and the French Withdrawal

In 2014, when France deployed *Opération Barkahne* countries in the Central Sahel willingly cooperated, and even formed the G5 Sahel, the partaking countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger were mostly supportive of the French intervention. In 2017 they even established the G5 Sahel Joint Force to fight along with *Opération Barhkane* and Task Force Takuba. The creation of the two institutions were encouraged by France (Welz, 2022). Thus, with the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the Central Sahel and the country led to the end of the sub-regional organisations.

Diplomatic relations started to get tense between Mali and France in 2019, when the Sahelian country started a security cooperation with Russia (Fejérdy and Király, 2023a). It was not Moscow's first step to gain momentum in Africa. After the illegal annexation of the Crimea in 2014, Russia actively started to seek partners in Africa. The peak of the charms offensive was the first Russia – Africa Summit in 2019 (Issaev et al., 2022). Moscow also engaged Wagner Group in the Central Sahel, along with excessive information campaigns in the region (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024).

Together with the surge in Russian activities in the Central Sahel, the security situation remained mostly unchanged, or even started to deteriorate in the course of 2019-2020 (Fragile States Index). The unchanged situation led to societal dissatisfaction, and eventually led to public unrest. Since 2016 inter-ethnic tensions were escalating in central Mali, besides the presence of violent extremist groups in the north and south of the country. Fulani and Dogon people clashed over resource scarcity, and radical groups capitalised on the inter-ethnic violence (International Crisis Group, 2016). Bamako deployed military operations against the warring parties as a response. Public unrest increased in other parts of the country and peaked when the Constitutional Court invalidated the result of several hundred polling stations after the parliamentary elections of 2020. This event led to weeks of protests in Bamako, and the unrest resulted in a coup on 18 August 2020, when the military took over the country (International Crisis Group, 2021a). Ten months after the coup, on 21 May 2021, following a wave of arrests of civilian members of the transitional government another bloodless coup was conducted by dissatisfied military personnel (International Crisis Group, 2021b). During the protest Russian flags and pro-Russian slogans were displayed (Issaev et al., 2022), thus the junta, having a closer relationship with Moscow, had severed ties not just with France, but also with MINUSMA, the United Nations' mission in Mali. In consequence France pulled out both *Opération Barkhane* and Task Force Takuba from Mali, with plans to keep forces in the Sahel under a new framework (France 24, 2022).

In the meantime, the unresolved security situation in the Liptako Gourma region caused a serious spillover of violent extremist activities in Burkina Faso spreading to almost the entire country (International Crisis Group, 2024). The consequences were so severe that in the course of 2021 two coups d'état occurred in the country. Fatalities of

the attacks grew steadily over time, and together with the re-election of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in 2020 public unrest grew to the point, when a military coup replaced the president on 25 January 2021 (Engels, 2022). The first coup did not bring any changes to the security situation of the country, and frustration grew within the military ranks because the lack of success against violent extremist groups. A group of young officers took the lead and led a second coup in September 2021 (Engels, 2023). The junta's main aim is to reclaim those territories which are under jihadist control. For this, the recruitment of civilian self-defence groups (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie, or VDPs) started (International Crisis Group, 2024). By this time Burkina Faso was also turning towards Russia as a security provider. Before the first coup in 2021 demonstrators in Ougadougou were also showing pro-Russian sentiments (Issaev et al., 2022). The junta is friendlier towards Moscow, turning increasingly to this new partner, even going to the lengths to release a declaration of support of the war in Ukraine (International Crisis Group, 2024).

The last resort to relocate French forces to was seemingly Niger. But, with neighbouring Mali submerging in a never-ending fight against jihadist groups, Niger was not spared of the spill-over either (Elischer and Mueller, 2018). Islamic State in the (Greater) Sahara (ISGS) conducted regular attacks along the Mali-Niger border. It led to the establishment of self-defence groups, which were also used to settle inter-ethnic tensions among Fulani and Djerma populations (International Crisis Group, 2021c).

The mounting security issues led to yet another military coup in the Sahel. General Abdourahmane Tchiani spearheaded the military take-over in 26 July 2023, because of increased jihadist activity and inter-ethnic violence in Niger. The junta followed the path Mali and Burkina Faso already took, and severed ties with most of its former Western allies, like France and the United States of America. Niger too turned towards Russia as its new partner, thus the provisional country for the Task Force Takuba relocation was not available anymore (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023).

The three countries in the Central Sahel not just turned away from France but also from the regional organisations. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger all announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel and G5 Sahel Joint Force (Deutsche Welle, 2023) and also from the Economic Community of West African States (Rich, 2024). Additionally, the three countries formed their own defence organisation to fight jihadists in September 2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) (Rukanga, 2024).

Future Perspectives

France lost ground during the past years not just in the Sahel, but in Africa as a whole. The inability to bring meaningful changes into the French Africa policy led to mutual frustration both from the side of France and the countries in the Central Sahel. It is however highly unlikely that France will withdraw from Africa altogether. Due to the



setbacks in the Central Sahel region, and the dissolution of the G5 Sahel group, France has limited opportunities in the area. The main routes of exit, Senegal and Chad may seem a viable solution to stay at, but national governments are not keen on hosting French forces on their territories. Besides this, France has its doubts regarding the two countries, which are already unstable.

Nevertheless, Paris is keen to maintain its influence on the continent, despite the growing challenge of a multipolar world: the growing presence of Russia, China, Turkey, and many more great and middle powers, which all want a slice from Africa. This will make France's plans even more complicated to see through. It is also not in Paris' favour that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formed the AES in September 2023 with seeking Russia's support. Moscow is also seeking to improve its stance in the Sahel through the deployment of Wagner Group, disinformation campaigns, propaganda, and elite-based diplomacy (Fejérdy and Király, 2023b). Russia is overly keen now to get and keep as many friends as possible with the war in Ukraine stepping in its third year. European countries, like Italy are also interested to benefit from the French loss. Rome loudly criticises French Africa policy, which it considers incapable of renewal, and offers instead a policy based on partnership under the Mattei Plan (Simonelli et al., 2024). However, it is highly improbable that French influence will disappear permanently and that the former colonial Italy is unlikely to make any radical changes. Rather, it would be in Europe's interest to unite and rebuild its relations with Africa on a new basis. Not only France, but also the future of the Old Continent is closely linked to Africa.

Cultural Discourse on Responsibility for Children Born in Captivity

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Turkey in the Horn of Africa: Turkish-Somali Military Connections Focused on the Turkish Military Camp in Mogadishu, Somalia¹

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Abstract:

Turkey has started to build closer ties with Somalia in the last decade. Somalia is in a strategically located at a key point in Africa which is also of global importance as a gateway from the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, leading to the Mediterranean. This indicates that many world powers want to gain influence in Somalia, but when the African country was in serious crisis, Turkey took advantage of the difficult times to step in, show its power and start building connections in the Horn of Africa. In 2011, during the humanitarian crisis, which devastated Somalia, Turkey helped the country with important and unforgettable volume. Since then, the relations between the two countries have been strengthening connections. In 2023 we can state that Turkey has its largest embassy in the world in Somalia, Turkey has a huge military camp in Somalia's capital, Turkish companies run the Mogadishu's international airport and international port, and one of the Mogadishu's biggest hospital is named after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as Turkey renovated the facility.

In this study we aim to focus on Turkey's military connections in Somalia, as several thousands of Somali soldiers have been trained by Turkey and several thousands more are yet to be trained by Turkish professional soldiers in a military facility build by Turkey: the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK) which is one of a kind in the world.

Keywords:

Camp Turksom, Horn of Africa, STGK, Turkey-Somalia connections, Turkish Task Force Command

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.220>

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Main Questions about Turkey-Somalia Connections

In this study I would like to discuss the following topics:

- 1) Overlook of Turkey-Somalia connections in the last decade. How the political and diplomatic connections altered between the two countries since 2011?
- 2) Turkey and Somalia defence and military industry connections. How Turkey's army institutions and military industry are affected in the Horn of Africa?
- 3) The introduction of Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK), Turkey's military training facility in the capital of Somalia. How was this built? What does it contain? What are the activities there?
- 4) Conclusion of the ideas about the role of Turkey's military training and support in Somalia. Does Turkey have political or military objectives for its presence in Somalia? What is the role of the Turkish presence from the aspect of Somalia?

Turkey Somalia Connections in the Last Decade

In 2011 there was a massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia that devastated the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu was suffering from lack of food and the country was in the grip of a historic famine and drought. At that time Recep Tayyip Erdogan personally visited the country with his family and a delegation to show his country's support, and launched a humanitarian aid mission from Turkey to Somalia and also pledged, along with other Muslim countries, USD 350 Million for famine relief (BBC, 2011). Erdogan has announced grandiose projects that Turkey wants to implement in Somalia: the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to the Somali capital, the remodeling of a hospital, and the opening of the largest embassy in Africa (Ahmed, 2021). These plans were almost unbelievable at a time when more and more countries were closing their doors to Somalia and many thought of the Horn of Africa as a no-go zone.

According to some experts, before 2011, when a foreign country arrived in Somalia with the above mentioned perspective, Somalis would have seen it as an occupying force, but at this critical time Somalis perceived Turkey differently (Ahmed, 2021). The timing of Turkish visit and assistance in 2011 was truly special, as it was not only a humanitarian crisis, but also the month of Ramadan, a combination that left an indelible impression on Somali society, and Turkey got the credit of "Mother of Humanity" in the Horn of Africa (Abdulle and Gurpinar, 2019). Ahmet Davutoglu, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, stated during his visit in 2011: "We came to Somalia to show our solidarity with our Somali brothers and sisters, but this is not just for one day, we will continue to work for our brothers and sisters and we will never abandon them" (BBC, 2011).

And indeed, since 2011, Turkey has not only done a one-day job with an important diplomatic visit, but over the years has strengthened its connection with Somalia in what many experts consider to be a well-planned strategy on the Turkish side, starting at the humanitarian level and then expanding the scale of cooperation (Abdi, 2021). Erdogan's grandiose announcement became reality since then. In 2011 Turkey reopened its embassy in Mogadishu, which had been closed for two decades since 1991 because of the outbreak of Somali civil war. (Turkey has built an entirely new embassy building within five years in 2016, which is the largest Turkish embassy in the world (Turkish Embassy Mogadishu, n.d.).

Later, the Turkish company (Favori LLC) started operating Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu in 2013. Two years later, in 2015, Turkish Albayrak Group took over the operation of Mogadishu International Port. Since 2013, the Turkish state has also been involved in the renovation of Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu, which was abandoned since the 1990's and reopened in 2015 as the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital (Levy, 2023). Turkey also participated in various humanitarian projects and investments, that have helped Somalia to develop and provided several good economic opportunities to Turkish businesses.



Picture 1. The largest Turkish embassy in the world is in Mogadishu, Somalia

Somalia imported goods from Turkey worth USD 4.8 million in 2010, but in 2019 these Turkish imports were USD 256 million. This can be seen as the fruit of developing relations and years of cooperation, but some critics say Turkey has

unilaterally expanded trade, mentioning the fact that Somali exports to Turkey increased from USD 1.36 millions to only USD 6.7 million in the period 2010-2019 (Ahmed, 2021).

As some experts highlighted “Turkey's involvement in Somalia dramatically increased from humanitarian to economic, developmental, and political and security dimensions” (Abdi, 2021). In this study we would like to focus now on the security dimension between the two countries.

Turkey-Somalia Defence and Military Industry Connections

On the security dimension between the two countries, we can mention several areas in which Turkey is involved in Somalia. Turkey took part in UN missions in Somalia during the past decades, but its contribution to UN missions has also increased since 2011.

Turkey contributed to UNOSOM II, the second attempt by the UN to deal with the instability and violence in Somalia between 1993 and 1995. UNOSOM was once commanded by a Turkish general named Cevik Bir. However, until 2005, Turkey did not participated as actively in most UN peacekeeping operations in Africa as it did after the AKP came to power in the country (Siradag, 2018, p. 9). In 2013 the UN established a mission in Somalia, UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), which was renewed until 31 October 2024 with the goal “to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability” in Somalia (UNSOM, n.d.). Turkey continues to contribute to this mission (United Nations, 2023). Hundreds of Turkish soldier have been deployed throughout the history of the mission (Abdi, 2021).

Turkey also participates in NATO operations initiated in support of international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa, such as Combined Task Force-151 (CTF-151) and NATO Ocean Shield Operation, in which Turkish forces participate with naval vessels. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, “Turkey supports a long-term role for NATO in combating piracy and contributes actively to these endeavors” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, n.d.).

Turkey has military attachés in several African countries, and this position helps to represent Turkey’s military institutes and military industry in the actual country. Turkish military attachés also observe military missions and developments in the country and contribute to cooperation between Turkey and local African defence forces (Prout, 2002, pp. 47). In Somalia, the official name is „Office of the Armed Forces Attaché in Mogadishu” (Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Türkiye, 2022).

There are only two African states where Turkey has troops, one of them is Somalia, the other is Libya. This fact also shows the security and military connections with Somalia are important for Turkey (Besenyő, 2021). Since 2008, Turkey has deployed naval elements in the Gulf of Aden, to ensure the effective protection of



Turkish-flagged vessels and commercial vessels with links to Turkey sailing in the region, and to support humanitarian activities in the region (Middle East Monitor, 2022). In the beginning of 2022 Turkey extended the mandate of Turkish troops in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia until February 2023 (Middle East Monitor, 2022) and then extended the mandate until February 2024 for the stability of the region and to halt piracy (Cimen, I., Balta, A., 2023). Turkish land forces are present in the Capital, Mogadishu in the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK), whereof we will write later.

Another aspect of Turkish-Somali defence and military industrial connections is the military industry. Somalia is one the African states that signed an agreement with Turkey on cooperation in the defense industry and one of the countries on the continent that has already imported various weapons and military vehicles from Turkey (Bayram, M. 2022). For example Turkish-operated TB2 drones are now being used on the battlefield in the Horn of Africa, helping Somalia attack al-Shabab targets (Levy, I. 2023). The Somali Army also uses the Turkish military's MPT-76 assault rifles (Akwei, I. 2019).

According to United Nations COMTRADE database, Turkey has exported USD 44.880 worth of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories to Somalia in 2022, mainly pistols and revolvers. This category of export exceed USD 1 million all together since 2013. Turkey has also exported aircraft, spacecraft and ships, boats, and other floating structures worth over USD 6.5 million to Somalia between 2021-2022 (Trading Economics, 2023).

Turkey has also donated some military equipment and vehicles to Somalia in recent years. For example, in 2020, Turkey delivered 12 off-road vehicles to Somalia as part of bilateral military and financial cooperation agreements (Ozkaya, 2020). In 2021, Ankara donated 22 military vehicles to Mogadishu: 8 fully armored Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected 'Kirpi' military vehicles and 14 military trucks (Dhaysane, 2021a). Turkey also provided necessary equipment for Somali coastguard and navy as well (Aksoy, 2021).

Turkey and Somalia have a number of several military and security agreements for cooperation in the fields of 1. Military Training, Science and Techniques, 2. Police training, 3. Security cooperation, 4. Defense Industry and Scientific Cooperation (Kitio, 2020).

Signature Date	Where	Agreement
17 April 2009	Ankara	Technical Cooperation Agreement
22 May 2010	Istanbul	Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Field (Framework)
13 April 2012	Ankara	Military Training Cooperation Agreement
25 January 2015	Mogadishu	Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement

Table 1. Turkey-Somalia Military/Security Agreements 2009-2019

Source: Abdulle and Gurpinar, 2019

As seen the previous agreements in Table 1., Turkey helps in the professional training of Somali armed forces. Turkey has played a major role in organizational modernization of the Somali Army, providing professional training to several Somali soldiers and policemen (Kenez, 2022b). Since 2010 there is a military training cooperation accord between Somalia and Turkey, and several Somali officials have been trained in Turkey at the Turkish National Defense University (TNDU). The impact of the Turkish training on the Somali armed forces cannot be better demonstrated than the fact that General Odawaa Yusuf Rageh, who was the commander of the Somali National Army between August 2019 and June 2023, also completed his master's degree at Turkish National Defense University, before became the Chief of Defence Forces. Furthermore, in the past decade, the Turkish Armed Forces provided language courses and the "Officer Basic Indoctrination Training" to hundreds of soldiers from Somalia (Kitio, 2020).

Since 2017, Turkey has been training Somali soldiers and policemen in Somalia. The location is special in its kind, called the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK) (Can Kasapoglu, 2020). This topic is the focus of this study and will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The Introduction of Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK)

Since 2017, Turkey has been training Somali soldiers and policemen in a special facility in Somalia, the Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK), known also as Camp TURKSOM (Kasapoglu, 2020). Some call it a military base, but Turkey's ambassador to Somalia, Olgan Bekar, clarified that it is "not a military base like the one Turkey has in Qatar," but "a military training camp" (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018). Although a foreign military base would be not so problematic in Somalia, as the UK, the USA, and the UAE already have military bases in the Horn of Africa (Seleshie, 2022).



Picture 2. Somali soldiers in Turkish Task Force Command

The STGK complex was built from the ground by Turkey at a cost about 50 million USD, started in March 2015 and completed in early 2017. It is located on a 400 hectares land on the coast of the Indian Ocean in Mogadishu, which territory worth approximately USD 1,5 billion, although Turkey did not buy the land and does not have to pay rent to Somalia (Ahmed, 2021). The STGK houses three military schools, dormitories, barracks, depots and lounge, sport fields, and an area for testing weapons and combat situations. It is the base of the Turkish Contingent of about three hundred soldiers and officers, one hundred of the Turkish soldiers are instructors in the complex and the other two hundred protect the facility. That is why some experts say that, in a functional sense, the Turkish military presence at Camp Turksom is not an overseas base (Rossiter and Cannon, 2018).

Picture 1. Territory of Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK) before 2015.





Picture 2. The Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia (STGK) finished in 2017.

Many of the soldiers arrive at the training course without proper equipment and weapons. Turkey gave Turkish-made rifles to the first 400 graduates. “Turkey equipped them, and Turkey promised to equip every soldier who is being trained at the camp”- said Somali State Minister for Defense Mohamed Ali Haga in 2018. (Maruf, 2018)

What does the training and education at Turkish Task Force Command in Somalia look like?

1. First, Somali Soldiers first receive 6 months of accelerated Turkish language training at the school.
2. After that, NCOs receive one year of education, while officers receive two years of education. (Africanews, 2022.)
3. Many of the Somali trainees are sent to Isparta, Turkey to receive modern commando training. (Dhaysane, 2021b)

As we can see, the language of the training is Turkish. Somalis trained in the STGK also follow the same ceremonial rituals as the Turkish Armed Forces, including singing the Turkish Military Academy’s traditional anthem, furthermore Somali soldiers commemorated a memorial, important for Turkish soldiers, for the fallen troops in the Ottoman Empire’s Gallipoli (*Çanakkale*) defensive campaign against Britain (Kasapoglu, 2020).

In addition to courses such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, computer science, military history, military geography, operations management and intelligence, students



receive practical training in combat training, mechanics, marksmanship, shooting and combat formations (Africanews, 2022).

Somali soldiers trained in the STGK will be Somali National Army troops (SNA) but are also known as ‘African Eagles’, ‘Somali Eagles’ or in the local language ‘Gorgor’ (Eagle) commandos, who already demonstrated its combat effectiveness in the country against terrorists. The characteristic that a Somali unit is specially trained by a foreign power does not apply only to the Gorgor unit. Somalia’s elite forces known as ‘Danab’ (Lightning) are trained by the USA, which power also has a military base in Somalia. (Maruf, 2022) What is more problematic is that during the previous president, Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmaajo’ the Gorgor commando was accused to be deployed by the president to compel political support (Levy, 2023).

Role of Turkey’s Military Training and Support in Somalia

The mission of Camp TURKSOM is, according to Turkish officials:

1. to protect Somalia from the scourge of al-Shabab, and
2. to provide meaningful security assistance and training to Somalia armed forces. (Ahmed, 2021)

The idea to establish such a facility is the result of years of process to strengthen connection between Turkey and Somalia, which began with the framework agreement on military training, technical and scientific cooperation in the military field signed between Turkey and Somalia in 2010, followed by the agreements, protocols and the decision of the Council of Ministers (Africanews, 2022).

The goal with this huge facility is to train 10,000 members of the Somali National Army (SNA) and since its opening in 2017, until the summer of 2022, a total of 5000 SNA soldiers and officers have graduated here, which is already a third of the Somali Army. The other goal is to train 1,000 police officers, and by 2022, 600 policemen completed their studies at the STGK. (Kenez, 2022b) Turkey also created and trained a special police unit called the ‘Haramcad’ (Cheetahs) (Ahmed, 2021).

The Turkish contingent aims to generate three Somali battalions per year through the training program in Somalia followed by a customized commando specialization course in Turkey (Kasapoglu, 2020). Turkish officials stated: “These battalions will form the backbone of the Somali National Army in the future. We believe that the personnel trained by the Turkish Armed Forces will serve not only the security of Somalia, but also the security of Africa and beyond.” (Maruf, 2022)

So, on the one hand, Turkish training in Somalia contributes to the rebuilding of a professional, organized, modern national military force in Somalia that can sustain

itself. This helps Somalia to maintain order in the country and fight against terrorist and militant groups, mainly against Al-Shabaab.

On the other hand, the Turkish training in Somalia helps Turkish-Somali connections and strengthens Turkey's influence in a highly strategic economic and political location in the Horn of Africa. Focusing on security and the military, some critics say Turkey is using its connections to the Somalia's armed forces to create a bigger market for its military industry. One example is that Turkey equips Somali soldiers trained in the STGK with Turkish-made weapons (e.g. MPT-76) which on the one hand provides them with modern, NATO-compatible technology, and on the other hand hinders the integration of soldiers into the SNA, because older types of weapons, such as Kalashnikovs, are much more widespread in Somalia (Ahmed, 2021).

Many of the critics do not agree with the system that Turkey trains the Gorgors in Turkish, adding that it is also problematic for them that the Somali Ministry of Defense does not participate in the training of the STGK and does not exercise any supervision over it. (Ahmed, 2021) As mentioned earlier, the Gorgors used weapons against civilians protesting against the then president 'Faarmajo' who is said to be an ally of Turkey. What's more, 'Farmaajo's rival, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, stated that „army under the command of the [...] president attacked my residence” (Reuters, 2021). The Turkish-trained 'Haramcad' police unit took part in raiding on independent radio station and journalists, (Ahmed, 2021) These facts also strengthened the accusations that the Turkish-trained armed forces support politicians favorable to Turkey.

Conclusion

Seeing the facts, we can say that Somalia has one of the closest cooperation with Turkey in Africa in the security sector. Somalia is connected to Turkey in several key areas of the security:

1. UN and NATO missions with Turkish participation in Somalia,
2. Import of Turkish defense products to Somalia,
3. Defence agreements between Turkey and Somalia,
4. Turkish training to Somali troops inside and outside of Somalia,
5. Turkey provides Turkish military products and know-how to the Somali armed forces,
6. Turkey has troops in Somali territory

As we have seen, Turkey has invested a huge amount of money in Somalia's security sector (built a 50 million USD training camp, provided training to Somali armed forces, donated high-end Turkish-made weapons and military products to the Somali



army etc.) Adding that Turkey entered Somali politics at a very difficult time when Somalia was mostly abandoned by others, but Turkey helped Mogadishu with large humanitarian aid and infrastructure investments. Overall, Turkey's presence in Somalia's armed forces and military equipment helped the country to modernize and acquire resources to become a stronger national army, police, and navy, which the African country could not afford on its own in the past decade. On the other hand, according to critics, Turkey used this situation to create great projects for Turkish businesses, create a market for its products, and influence Somali politics in a pro-Turkish direction.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Somalia's Foreign Relations in the Context of the Latest Offensive Against Al Shabaab¹

Matthieu Gotteland²

Abstract:

The political and military weight of clans, foreign interventions, the relations between the local, provincial and federal levels, the strength of the national idea and attachment to political islam have historically been determining factors behind either success or failure of state policy in Somalia. 2021 was an annus horribilis in Somalia's annals, marked by an electoral crisis, mutiny, tensions between the president and prime minister, a conflict between the federal state and Puntland, the departure of the last American soldiers, intensifying crisis with Kenya and Djibouti and attacks of the capital by al Shabaab, which are on the offensive since 2019. 2022 however saw the stars aligning for the strengthening of the state and the recovering of Somalian sovereignty: election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, nomination of PM Hamza Amdi Barre, appeasement of the wars in Tigray and Yemen, setting of ATMIS to give the former AMISOM a clear mandate to support the Somali Transition Plan. Despite the new president's willingness to address the Shabaab menace not only militarily but ideologically, calls for dialogue and the appointing of a Shabaab co-founder as religion minister, 2022 also saw the deadliest engagements ever recorded by NGO ACLED in the country during an offensive that seemed to gain momentum in the second half of the year with the support of ATMIS and other foreign partners. This paper therefore aims to explore the new paradigms behind Somalia's foreign relations under her new leadership, to evaluate how much they help or hinder Somalia's war effort against al Shabaab and state consolidation and to explore possible scenarii in the near future.

Keywords:

Al Shabaab, Islamic State, MENA Region Somalia, Terrorism

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.269>

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The political and military weight of clans, foreign interventions, the relations between the local, provincial and federal levels, the strength of the national idea and attachment to political islam have historically been determining factors behind either success or failure of state policy in Somalia. 2021 was an *annus horribilis* in Somalia's annals, marked by an electoral crisis, mutiny, tensions between the president and prime minister, a conflict between the federal state and Puntland, the departure of the last American soldiers, intensifying crisis with Kenya and Djibouti and attacks of the capital by al Shabaab (AS), which are on the offensive since 2019. 2022, however, saw the stars aligning for the strengthening of the state and the recovering of Somali sovereignty: election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, nomination of PM Hamza Amdi Barre, appeasement of the wars in Tigray and Yemen, setting of ATMIS to give the former AMISOM a clear mandate to support the Somali Transition Plan.

Despite the new president's willingness to address the Shabaab menace not only militarily but ideologically, calls for dialogue and the appointing of a Shabaab co-founder as religion minister, 2022 also saw the deadliest engagements ever recorded by NGO ACLED in the country during an offensive that seemed to gain momentum in the second half of the year with the support of ATMIS and other foreign partners (ACLED, 2023a). This paper therefore aims to explore the new paradigms behind Somalia's foreign relations under her new leadership, to evaluate how much they help or hinder Somalia's war effort against AS and state consolidation and to explore possible scenarii in the near future.

Six consecutive seasons with poor rainfalls – in Somalia, the Gu rain season typically lasts from March to June – caused the death of 3 million heads of cattle in 2022 and the loss of 80% of plantations, in a country where agriculture contributes to 2/3 of the GDP (Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 2021; United Nation News, 2022). Conversely, as is becoming more frequent across the Sahel (Mayans, 2020), flooding causes damage to infrastructure and farmlands, helps propagate disease and causes population displacement on a large scale (ReliefWeb, 2023a). Recent invasions of locusts have been the worst the country has known in 25 years (Mukami, 2021). While the Shabelle river broke its banks and submerged the city of Beledweyne last May, the satisfying rain levels in 2023 are unlikely to help the country recover from a drought that has been the gravest in the last 40 years (Harb, 2023; Reuters in Mogadishu, 2023). This situation, the recent COVID-19 pandemics, and the war in Ukraine have driven inflation to the highest in 15 years, notably for food products, fertilizer and fuel (Ahmed, 2022). Although the federal government is reluctant to officially acknowledge the situation, food insecurity affects half of the Somali population, with famine criteria technically being met (Outlook Web Desk, 2022).

The consequences are of diverse and far-reaching consequences, also from the point of view of international relations (Maystadt and Ecker, 2014). The high number of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries put a strain on bilateral relations, while those populations, subject to pressure to return to their homeland, are also vulnerable



to recruitment by AS (France 24). It is drought and famine, on the other hand, combined with efforts by the insurgency to raise heavy taxes on the population of territories it controlled, that allowed for certain clan militias in Hiiraan province to actively resist the organization, which in turn influenced the decision by the federal government to declare all-out war on AS (ACLED, 2023a).

Before the war in Ukraine, Somalia imported 90% of its wheat from either Russia or Ukraine, the remaining 10% coming from India (OEC, 2024). The latter banned wheat exports as a direct consequence of the war (Menon, 2022). Both Russia and Ukraine have placed food security, and particularly so vis-à-vis African countries, at the centre of their war narrative. Ukraine, likening the Russian war effort to the Holodomor – a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine that killed millions in 1932-1933³, announced it would provide 50 thousand tons of wheat – funded by France and Germany – through the World Food Program to both Ethiopia and Somalia in September 2022 (Getachew, 2022). All the while, the yearlong Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) allowed for the export of 53,500 tons of wheat to Somalia (from July 2022 to July 2023) (United Nations, 2024).

On the other hand, Russia, which openly wages a war of influence on the African continent by framing herself as the subversive power of the hour against Western “colonizers”, has attempted to mitigate the criticism it attracted by pulling out of the Initiative by offering free grain to six African countries: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Eritrea, Mali, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Of these, five cultivate close political and/or military ties with Moscow (Osborne, 2023; Sauer, 2023). Not all, however, were highly dependent on imports from Russia and Ukraine, nor were all African countries which were highly dependent on such imports beneficiaries of the Russian offer. Other announcements granting debt relief worth 684 million dollars to Somalia, while the latter is in discussion over such relief with the IMF and the World Bank, offering military supplies (as per Mohamud’s request) or the services of PMC Wagner (as per Russia’s request) point to a possible thaw in relations between the two countries (Hassan, 2023; Horn Observer, 2023b; Reuters, 2023).

Nevertheless, from March 2014 to February 2023, the Somali vote at the UN General Assembly and at the UNHRC has consistently been cast in favour of Ukraine – apart from the vote on April 7th 2022 on the suspension of Russia’s rights at the latter institution⁴. The effects of the Russian decision to pull out from the BSGI are making themselves felt, which could make such a move unpopular (AzerNews, 2023). Finally, the intervention of Wagner forces would certainly push away Western aid and military assistance, vital in the current offensive against AS, as has happened in the CAR and the

³While the man-made nature of the famine is undoubtable, the issue of whether Holodomor should be labelled a genocide is still debated, while highly politicized. Some argue, for example, that ignorance and incompetence played a significant part (Marples et al., 2014); while others point to the ethnic question, and consider it sufficient to call the event a genocide (Marples, 2009).

⁴The Somali representative was absent during that particular vote.

Sahel in similar circumstances. It is notable that despite the announcement Somalia's president would attend the latest Russia-Africa summit, the Somali delegation was eventually led by the deputy PM Salah Ahmed Jama (TASS, 2023).

Russia's campaign for influence and arms exports has made it one of the most vocal opponents to the UN-imposed arms embargo – along with African members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Somalia sanctions regime, as was extended on November 17th 2022, still opens the door, on Russia's request, to further bilateral agreements between Somalia and “any other State forces” to support militarily and train the Somali government, provided they inform the Council (Security Council Report, 2022). Of the four abstaining states (China, Gabon, Ghana and Russia), China's stance has been the most ambiguous. While nominally supporting Somalia's request to lift the sanctions, the explanation to her vote points to a staunch opposition, in principle, to any easing of the arms embargo, for fears that it would feed arms trafficking and put arms in the hands of AS (ReliefWeb, 2022).

Somalia is a member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which translates into infrastructure projects including the renovation of the national stadium, Banadir hospital and north-south highway (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2019). A bilateral agreement was struck in 2021 to modernize Somalia's media institutions (Xinhua, 2021). China ranks 2nd as a supplier of imports and Somalia's economy relies in part on fishing licences given to Chinese companies (OEC, 2022; Schipani, 2023). China's navy participated in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast since 2008, which was its first deployment outside of the Asia-Pacific (Henry, 2016); and obtained a military base in Djibouti in 2017 (Bearak, 2019). The main driver of the Sino-Somali relationship, however, are the strong ties between Somaliland and Taiwan, both *de facto* independent states lacking international recognition (Dhaysane, 2022c).

The main market for Somali exports is the MENA region, notably camels (Brenton and Edjigu, 2021). The region is not only crucial for its economic importance to Somalia. Geographic, historical and religious proximity – the population is almost entirely of Sunni Muslim faith – make for a potent combination. The three pillars of Somali politics are clanism, nationalism and political islam (Abdullahi, 2012). The AS insurgency embrace those in its propaganda, thus requiring a response in kind by the legitimate authorities. This is why Mohamud's “three-pronged strategy” against AS includes not only a military offensive and cutting the insurgency's finances, but also ideology (Dhaysane, 2022b). The president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud himself has been described as a “moderate Islamist”, by opposition to the fundamentalist ideology and violent means of the insurgency (Ali, 2022; Gardner, 2023).

This, along with the intensity of conflicts or willingness for reconciliation in the Middle East, is one of the keys to understand Somalia's diplomatic posture in that region. Another is Mohamud's principle – and one of the most striking ruptures with



the policy of his predecessor – of “zero enemy outside”, priority being given to the fight against AS (CSIS, 2022). Exemplary to this approach is the Somali president’s attitude towards Israel. While the Abraham accords (with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 2020) and the subsequent normalization agreements with Morocco (2020) and Sudan (2021) initiated a positive dynamic in favour of recognition, Mohamud had already secretly visited Israel and met with PM Benjamin Netanyahu during his first tenure, in 2016. Overtures made by Somaliland might be an added incentive, so as to discourage mutual recognition between Israel and the breakaway Somali region. It is questionable, however, whether Somali public opinion is ready for such a move. While there were reports President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may have met Israeli officials during his tour of the Middle East and East Africa in the summer of 2022, or even gone to Israel, such reports have been denied by the presidency (Times of Israel Staff, 2022).

Iran is a counterexample. The Iranian embassy was closed, and the Iranian Red Crescent and Khomeini Charitable Foundation banned in 2015, during Mohamud’s first mandate. They were accused of spreading Shiite ideology under the guise of humanitarian operations. He reiterated these accusations in June 2023 (Mahmoud, 2023). The civil war in nearby Yemen between forces loyal to the president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi supported by a Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi movement supported by Iran has direct consequences on Somalia and the Horn. Iranian naval presence in the Red and Arabian seas seems to have been instrumental in smuggling arms between Yemen and Somalia in both directions (Segall, 2022). Iranian arms have been found in possession of AS (Bahadur, 2021).

The rivalry between the UAE and Qatar is also reflected in Somalia’s international relations. While Qatar was widely seen as being the main backer of former president Farmajo, who has settled in the country after his electoral defeat, the current president Mohamud is understood to be backed by the UAE. Under Farmajo’s tenure, Somalia refused a financial incentive to sever ties with Qatar (Africa Intelligence, 2023; Middle East Monitor, 2017). The latter once had hoped to build and operate the port of Hobyo, in Galmudug (2019), although the contract was later awarded to a British-Turkish-Somali consortium (Global Construction Review Staff, 2020). It doesn’t seem to have lost interest in building stronger ties, offering aid in 2022 and 2023 and launching an initiative along with US and UK aid agencies to help Somalia face the current drought (Gulf Times, 2023; ReliefWeb, 2023b).

Relations between Somalia and the UAE have been rockier until Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second tenure. The Emirates have first funded, trained and equipped the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) for anti-piracy purposes since 2010, and are reported to have kept supporting it to this day despite a scandalous termination of the contract in 2012 and later more difficult relations with the federal state under Farmajo (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2018). The PMPF has recently aided Dhulbahante militias against Somaliland security forces in Las Anod and have been used by the president of Puntland Said Abdullahi Deni amid electoral tensions in the region,

including deadly clashes in Garowe on June 20, 2023 (ACLED, 2023c; Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023e; Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023f).

In 2016, as consequence of the war in Yemen, the UAE tried to step up their involvement in the breakaway region of Somaliland, upgrading the port and airport of Berbera, setting up a military base in the same city, training Somaliland's police and army and building a highway to Wajaale, Ethiopia (AfricaNews, 2019; Dogan-Akkas, 2021). To this president Farmajo responded by calling to the UNSC and seizing \$9,6 million from a UAE plane (Al Jazeera 2018a; Al Jazeera, 2018b), bringing bilateral relations to their lowest point. UAE plans for a military base were scrapped in 2020, although it is unclear whether as consequence of Farmajo's actions, a UN report logically accusing the UAE of violating Somalia sanctions or of the lesser intensity of the war in Yemen (Al Jazeera, 2018c; Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2020). The UAE had established a military training centre and a hospital in Mogadishu in 2015 (ReliefWeb, 2015); both have been disbanded as a result of the crisis (Reuters, 2018).

The Emirates are making a comeback on all accounts, however. Berbera's airport has been renovated and serves for civil purposes (Hawilti Desk, 2021); UAE investment, including in Somaliland, being "most welcome", says president Sheikh Mohamud (CSIS, 2022). Days after his election, president Sheikh Mohamud released the money with an apology, and shortly after received Emirati aid against the drought (Hassan, 2022). In Puntland, UAE soldiers have landed in October-November 2022 in support to president Deni (Garowe Online, 2022a). A deal struck in 2017 by Emirati company DP world to renovate the port of Bosaso in Puntland, later declared illegal by the Somali parliament (2018), was revived in December 2022 (Ship Technology, 2022).

The close ties the Emirates fostered in Jubaland since 2014 have been followed by concrete steps, with Emirati control of Kismayo's port and airport and plans to open a UAE military base there in order to participate in the second phase of the offensive against AS (Garowe Online, 2014; News Desk, 2023). This last move comes in the context of a security deal that was agreed upon by the federal government in January 2023, albeit with difficulties, which should allow it to bypass UN sanctions (Dhaysane, 2023).

Despite her FM prince Faisal bin Farhan attending President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's inauguration (Saudi Gazette, 2022), it is unclear whether regional power Saudi Arabia intends to seize the same opportunity as the UAE to support the fight against AS. The attendance of Sheikh Mohamud at the summit of the Arab League in Jeddah may have rekindled Saudi interests; the Somali and Saudi defence ministers have indeed met in June 2023 to discuss "cooperation and coordination" in the military field (Arab News, 2023b). The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center, created in 2015, is most active in Yemen, Syria, Palestine and Somalia (\$256 m) (Arab News, 2023a).



The ties between Somalia and Turkey have irrefutably acquired a sentimental value that goes beyond political divides. The “common destiny” trope, often used in support of French- or Sino-African relations (Gotteland, 2023b; Sun, 2018), is now also predominant in the discourse on the Somali-Turkish friendship (Nur, 2023). A piece of concrete evidence of such a sentiment is the financial donation of \$5 m sent as a sign of support and solidarity at the time of the earthquake that struck Southern Turkey in March 2023, despite Somalia being herself in desperate need of aid (Gedi, 2023).

Dating back to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia at the occasion of a severe drought in 2011, bilateral relations have only grown stronger since, in the fields of education, healthcare, trade, humanitarian aid, or the training of Somali police and national army (Bishku, 2019). A military base, camp TURKSOM, was installed in Mogadishu in 2017, while Turkish companies operate the capital’s port and airport (Middle East Monitor, 2022a). In 2020, concessions were obtained for oil, gas and mining operations in the country (Kenez, 2022); earlier this year, the first foreign banking licences to have been awarded in decades benefitted an Egyptian and a Turkish bank (Schipani, 2023).

The Gorgor elite forces, trained at TURKSOM, first graduated in 2021; while essential in the fight against AS, they are also accused of having participated in the repression of the opposition after former president Farmajo tried to extend his mandate and bypass elections (Kenez, 2022). Despite some exemptions to the Somalia sanctions, a UN report also accuses Turkey of breaching them by delivering Bayraktar TB2 drones for use by the Somali national army (SNA) in 2021, despite denials by the federal government. The Turkish air force takes part to operations against AS (Bozkurt, 2023). Qatar, Turkey and the UAE have been known to influence federal elections in 2012 and 2017 (Cannon and Donelli, 2021).

Somalia has a long history as a ground for covert operations and misguided interventions by the United States (US), either as the lead of an international coalition (Operations Provide Relief & Restore Hope, 1992-1993), the main provider to UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (UNOSOM I & II, 1992-1995), a backer to an Ethiopian intervention (2006-2009) (Malito, 2021). US involvement in the country has never ceased entirely since 1992, and has escalated since the beginning of the infamous “war on terror”, which itself motivated both the creation of a unified US Africa command (AFRICOM) in 2007, located in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, as well as the ever-increasing use of drone warfare (Campbell, 2020).

Despite president Farmajo’s US links – he lived in exile in the country since 1985 and held dual citizenship until 2019, relations were marred under Donald Trump’s stay at the White House by both the “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” act barring Somali citizens from entry, the suspension of US support to Somali forces (2017-2019) and the order to withdraw American troops from Somalia in 2020 (Babb, 2017; Cooper, 2020; Cordesman, 2017).

A decision reversed by the Biden administration last year, at the time of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's election, including on drone strikes and targeted assassinations within AS (as well as the smaller Islamic State (Macaulay, 2023)), a decision welcomed by the new Somali government (Savage and Schmitt, 2022). The US are currently the main provider of military assistance to Somalia, as well as humanitarian aid, and is one of the main backers of ATMIS (Dhaysane, 2022d; Yousif, 2023). It trained and funded the Danab brigade, an elite force active since 2014 and at the forefront of the fight against AS (Harding, 2022). In a symbolic but potent move, more than 61 tons of weapons and ammunition were delivered in March 2023 (Rédaction Africanews, 2023b).

Concerns about the legality of US support, the leftover consequences of earlier CIA interventions, such as the infamous Puntland Security Force (created in 2002), or the civilian casualties caused by US drone strikes have not so far blunted American efforts in the war against AS (Airwars, n. d.; Sperber, 2022). The US role in supporting the Somali state and its war effort, while crucial (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2022c), might be challenged as consequence of the upcoming presidential election.

The United Kingdom (UK), former colonizer of today's Somaliland (then British Somaliland, 1884-1960) and occupier of the rest of today's Somalia (then Italian Somaliland, 1941-1949), is also the home of a large Somali diaspora (3rd country of residence after Yemen and the US). The UK was the first Western country to re-open its embassy in Somalia in 2013 and is the penholder at the UNSC for the situation in Somalia⁵. It is a large provider of humanitarian aid, while also supporting the fight against AS. SNA troops are trained in a camp at Baidoa, in the South West (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2022b). Its contributions are steadily diminishing (Davies, 2023). Another point of contention since 2012 has been continued efforts by British firm Genel Energy to explore for oil in the breakaway region and *de facto* state of Somaliland, despite an earlier nod to UAE investments in the area (Middle East Monitor, 2022b).

The involvement of the European Union (EU) stems from the involvement of EUNAVFOR in a Djibouti-based anti-piracy operation in Somali waters since 2008 (Operation Atalanta). Currently, Atalanta can only count on one vessel, one chopper, one drone and one plane, all Spanish, although it is sometimes supplemented by French means based at Réunion island (Gros-Verheyde, 2022). Its mandate now encompasses the enforcement of UN Somalia sanctions, fighting against AS (finances) and drug trafficking. EUTM Somalia, launched in 2010, provides training, mentoring and advice to the SNA. EUCAP Somalia, launched in 2012, assists in the building of a Somali maritime police and coast guard. The mandates of all three operations have recently been extended up to December 2024 (Council of the European Union, 2022).

⁵The US is the penholder for piracy-related issues in Somali waters and Russia for juridical questions linked to the latter (Sievers and Daws 2014, pp. 243-294.).



The winding down of anti-piracy measures does not mean the EU is becoming an irrelevant actor in Somalia. Milestones this year include the Somalia-EU Political Dialogue (March 6th), the Joint Operational Roadmap (May 2nd) and the EU Council Conclusion on Somalia (June 26th). The EU has been the first of Somalia's international partners to bring a budget support (2017), while being the largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance and the main financial backer of AU mission ATMIS (ECDPM, 2023). Like in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, Italy is currently pulling EU-Africa relations in a direction favourable to her immediate interests – the so-called but yet undefined “Mattei plan”: the tightening of the EU's Southern borders and energy investments (Pascale, 2023).

Relations between Somalia and its southern neighbour Kenya have often been execrable. This is partly due to the fact that since their respective independence, both countries claim a sizeable chunk of the other's territory. While Somalia eyed the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District (today divided between the Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties), Kenya set their views on Jubaland, which was ceded by the UK to Italy in 1925 as consequence of the First World War (Castagno, 1964).

Al Shabaab operates on both sides of the border. This motivated the launching by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) of Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) in 2011-2012, the KDF then joining AU mission AMISOM. Today the Kenyan contingent of ATMIS, based in Dhobley, is responsible for security in the provinces of Gedo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle (Sector Two), as well as Kismayo (Jubaland's capital, Sector Six) together with the Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) (ATMIS, n. d.). The land border, which is closed since 2011, was set to reopen in June-August 2023 in the wake of the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the signing of an IGAD (International Governmental Authority on Development) agreement on free movement of people and warming bilateral relations. The move was delayed following increasing AS activity in the border area (ACLED, 2023b; Wario, 2023).

The maritime border is another point of contention, as Somalia brought Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2014. While Kenya contested the jurisdiction of the ICJ and did not participate in the final hearings, a judgment was delivered in October 2021, favouring Somalia's border claim while dismissing a claim that Kenya's conduct in the disputed area (the granting of oil concessions) violated her international obligations (International Court of Justice, n. d.; Bamberger and Skovsted, 2016). The disputed waters are thought to be rich in oil, gas and tuna, although oil exploration has mostly been fruitless to this day (Business Daily, 2022). The Somali government has recently rejected the possibility of a mediation by Djibouti, considering the ICJ judgment to be final (Khalif, 2023).

Kenya has later cut diplomatic ties over the granting of oil concessions by Somalia in the same area (February 2019) (The EastAfrican, 2019). That issue, together with

bilateral agreements with Somaliland and the support of Kenya to president of Jubaland Ahmed Madobe and meddling in the electoral process in this latter state, have been cited as the main reasons for Somalia to break off diplomatic relations in November 2020 (Al Jazeera, 2020). Bilateral trade has suffered and the restarting of direct flights between Nairobi and Mogadishu has been announced and suspended on several occasions since 2017 (Garowe Online, 2017). The crisis was deepened by a ban on khat imports from Kenya in 2016 (BBC, 2016).

A Qatar-led détente allowed to mend ties as soon as May 2021 (Al Jazeera, 2021). As a result, Nairobi seems to have scrapped any plans to allow for direct flights with Somaliland's capital Hargeisa. The election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at the head of the federal state allowed for the lifting of the ban on the khat trade as well as a gradual warming of relations that has been exemplified by the creation of a Joint Commission for cooperation, as well as a recent agreement on bilateral air services (Dhaysane, 2022a; Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2022f; Kipkemoi, 2023). Such neighbourly relations are crucial to the long-term Somali ambition to join the East African Community (EAC). Somalia's application seems to have been fast-tracked, with the organization already looking into inviting Ethiopia to join (Mutambo, 2022).

Burundi and Uganda, while EAC members, are also troop-contributing countries to ATMIS, which mandate was extended until December 2024. Burundi's foreign minister has met president Mohamud in Mogadishu in April 2023 (Khalif, 2023); Burundi National Defence Forces (BNDF) are currently in charge of Sector Five, that is Middle Shabelle, and based in Jowhar (ATMIS, n. d.). Mohamud's election to the presidency seems to have also brought a new impulse to bilateral relations with Uganda, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation that had been drafted in 2018 (Wright, 2022). Uganda is currently under pressure both in Somalia and at home over its support to the fight against AS. Her bases in Sector One, which covers Lower Shabelle and parts of capital Mogadishu, have been under attack (ATMIS, n. d.; Barigaba, 2023; Rédaction Africanews, 2023a).

The other troop-contributing countries are Djibouti and Ethiopia. Both of them as well as Kenya pledged more troops to ATMIS in December 2022 (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023f). Djibouti Armed Forces (DJAF) are responsible for Sector Four (Hiiraan and Galgaduud), with ENDF occupying some areas. That sector saw the brunt of the first phase of the offensive against AS. ENDF are also co-responsible for Sector Six, together with KDF, and solely responsible for Sector Three, which includes Bay, Bakool and Gedo provinces (ATMIS, n. d.). Ethiopia has attempted a mediation in the recent clashes in and around Las Anod, but has been accused by Somaliland, alongside the UAE, to support the Dhulbahante clan (Ethiopia Insight, 2023). Meanwhile, Djibouti had to deny claims it is supplying weapons to the government of Somaliland (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023c).



Ethiopia has a difficult history with her Eastern neighbour. Tensions over the Somali-populated Haud and Ogaden regions (today's Somali region), given by the British to Ethiopia in 1948, resulted in two wars in 1963-1964 and 1977-1978. Although dubbed a nationalist, president Farmajo, who had difficult relations with Kenya on similar accounts, has been an ally to both Ethiopia and Eritrea, notably during the Tigray war (begun in 2020). The election of opponent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which was seen as close to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) during his first tenure, along with alarming signs in the first months of his presidency, seem to have convinced the Ethiopian government to pursue a "dual-track policy"⁶ in a way similar to that adopted by the UAE or Kenya when faced with a hostile federal government in Mogadishu (Addis Standard, 2022a). Ethiopian delegations met with President Deni of Puntland and Jubaland authorities while president Laftagareen of the South West flew to Adis Ababa and Jigjiga, where he met Ethiopian federal authorities and the president of the Somali region (Addis Standard, 2022b; Hiraan Online, 2022).

President Mohamud's avoidance of Ethiopia during his inaugural trip throughout East Africa and the Middle East, his Egyptian policy as made apparent during that same trip, the nomination of an AS founder as minister of religion and renewed AS activity across the border into Ethiopia during the summer of 2022 were reasons for alarm regarding Ethiopian-Somali relations (Kandil, 2022; Maruf, 2022a; Ingiriis, 2022).

These fears were alleviated in the beginning of September 2022, when a deal was unveiled for the development of the port of Gara'ad, in Puntland, completed by the construction of a road up to the Ethiopian border, thus making up for a torpedoed UAE investment in 2018 in Berbera, Somaliland (Ahmed and Marks, 2022). The announcement preceded the first visit of president Mohamud in Ethiopia, who thanked the sisterly nation for her involvement in the fight against AS, but did not mention Tigray (Addis Getachew, 2022). Access to a seaport for the landlocked country is considered a vital interest, and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed has recently (July 2023) said as much while talking of negotiations with Somaliland, Djibouti and Eritrea, but not excluding the use of force, should diplomatic means fail to achieve the desired outcome (Horn Observer, 2023a).

Meanwhile a bilateral agreement has been inked in November 2022 to allow for information exchange and joint operations of Ethiopian and Somali intelligence agencies NISS (National Intelligence and Security Service) and NISA (National Intelligence and Security Agency) (FanABC, 2022). Intelligence has long been considered to be Ethiopia's decisive advantage to keep AS within Somali borders. Ethiopia, like Djibouti and Kenya, has pledged more troops for the second phase of the offensive, and an Ethiopian delegation visited Beledweyne in March 2023 to help coordinate (Hiraan Online, 2023).

⁶ An expression dubbed by the US government in the 2000s to signify engagement with all political levels in Somalia, from the local to the regional and the national.

The situation in Ethiopia is currently volatile however, the end of the Tigray war having translated into an augmentation of Amhara-Oromo violent incidents, while Adis Ababa's decision to integrate all regional special forces into either the federal army or regional police has rekindled conflicts with the Fano militia (Amhara), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and may destabilize the Somali region and favour AS (Ismail, 2023). An attack has been attempted and repulsed in the border town of Dollo, in June; others may follow (Al Jazeera, 2023b).

Relations with Eritrea were likewise forecasted to be difficult. Some five thousand Somali soldiers had been sent to this country for training under former president Farmajo. Public opinion at home has been hostile on the issue, with relatives claiming the soldiers were recruited under false pretenses and held captive. The Somali government only recognized the truth in this secret arrangement in May 2022, as president Farmajo was stepping down, and Eritrea in July, when president Mohamud came for his first visit, despite the first troops reaching the country as soon as 2019 (Garowe Online, 2022b). This first visit allowed for the signing of a MoU on defence, security, diplomatic and political cooperation, while a second visit, in November, allowed for the repatriation of the Somali troops (Maruf, 2022b; The EastAfrican, 2022).

Following warming ties with Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, Eritrea rejoined IGAD in June 2023, an organization it had left in 2007 to protest the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2023a). Eritrean-trained Somali troops have been reported to have been taken to the frontlines in Tigray, despite Somali and Eritrean denegations (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023e; Radio France Internationale, 2021). According to a former deputy chief of NISA, 370 Somali soldiers have died in Tigray (Garowe Online Staff, 2021). Qatar has called for a probe into the matter, until now to no avail (allAfrica, 2021).

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's "zero enemy outside" policy seems to bear fruits. Feuds have been temporarily resolved with Kenya and the UAE; others, with Ethiopia and Eritrea, avoided. The US, UK, EU have increased their support; engagement with Russia has not barred support for Ukraine, and wheat deliveries have been less affected than they could have been. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya have announced sending a very large number of troops in support to the second phase of the offensive (maybe 30 thousand as opposed to the 18,500 of 5 nations currently under ATMIS command (Hiraan Online, 2023b)); the UAE built a military base in Kismayo with the same intent. 12,000 soldiers have been sent for training in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda in January 2023 (Maruf, 2023b). Thanks to Italy's involvement and success in the first phase of the offensive against AS, Brexit has not meant the end of EU support but its upscale. The cooling of tensions in Tigray and Yemen, the end of the Qatar blockade have likewise played in Somalia's favour.



Several underlying factors remain unaddressed however, and at least some of these successes are to be credited to the momentum the military operations in the fall of 2022 helped build. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will allow for the second phase of the offensive to succeed, in spite of or on cooperation with local clans. The destabilization of Ethiopia is a prospect that is nearer every day and has more potential to affect her Eastern neighbour than the war in Tigray may have had. The war in Sudan and the prospect of a regional spill-over have been until now contained; but with every supplementary week this conflict lasts, the future of the wider region seems dimmer (Gotteland, 2023b; Najimdeen, 2023). This explains Somalia's attempt at mediation and a wider IGAD initiative to deploy a regional force (Garowe Online Staff Reporter, 2023d; Al Arabiya News, 2023).

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Mathieu Gotteland holds a PhD in History of international relations from University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. His research interests include informal imperialism, terrorism, imperial and anticolonial networks at the global level, with a focus on China, India and Vietnam. An analyst for African think tanks IPSA (Initiative pour la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique) and CRCA (Conflict Research Consortium for Africa), he now endeavours to apply the principles of the French school of international relations to the analysis of contemporary African conflicts and geopolitics. He has been awarded a Prize for Military History by the French Ministry for Defence.

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Status of Kenya's Counter-Terrorism Measures in Lamu County, Kenya¹

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Abstract:

This study explored the status of Kenya's counter-terrorism in Lamu by looking at the effectiveness of security operations implemented by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism and the effectiveness of community engagement in countering terrorism in Lamu County. A descriptive research design was used. The target population was the residents of Lamu who had information regarding the topic under discourse as well as the various security agencies heads such as the Military and the Police. Their population was 87429 from which a total of 156 respondents who participated was drawn. The sample was selected through purposive sampling. The questionnaire used was researcher-administered. A structured questionnaire was used to obtain information from the residents while interview schedule guides were used to obtain information from Intelligence the heads of security agencies in the area of study. The questionnaire was administered to 156 residents. Hypotheses were tested using Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r) at $\alpha = 0.05$ level of significance. The results obtained from Lamu County determined that there was a statistically significant effect of security operations and community engagement on countering terrorism. The findings also demonstrated the reasons for the negligible community engagement effect on countering terrorism.

Keywords:

Community Engagement, counterterrorism, security operations, terrorism, violent extremism

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.224>

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1. Introduction

The history of counter-terrorism is marked by evolving strategies and responses to combat the persistent threat of terrorism. While counter-terrorism efforts have ancient roots, contemporary counter-terrorism has been shaped by significant events and changes in the modern world. Counter-terrorism gained prominence in the late 20th century with the rise of transnational terrorist organizations. The 1972 Munich Olympics massacre by the Palestinian group Black September and the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis were early examples that drew global attention (Costanz, Kilburn and Helms, 2018). The 9/11 attacks in 2001 transformed the landscape of counter-terrorism. The United States and its allies initiated the War on Terror, invading Afghanistan to dismantle Al-Qaeda and later toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This era saw an expansion of intelligence sharing, enhanced airport security, and the proliferation of counter-terrorism agencies worldwide. Counter-terrorism strategies shifted towards addressing root causes, such as poverty and political grievances, to reduce radicalization. Soft power, including diplomacy and international cooperation, became central in addition to military and intelligence efforts (Piombo, 2019).

The emergence of self-radicalized lone wolves and homegrown extremists presented new challenges. Governments focused on countering radicalization through community engagement and online monitoring. Community engagement involves collaborating with the local community in this case the residents of Lamu County to come up with local based solutions which they may think will help them counter violent extremism and terrorism in their respective localities and ecosystems. The residents come up with solutions that they think will best work for them in countering terrorism and violent extremism. The state can then enhance these suggestions in order to make them work so as to enhance security. In the 21st century, counter-terrorism also faced ethical dilemmas, such as mass surveillance and the balance between security and civil liberties. The fight against terrorism remains ongoing, with the threat evolving in the digital age. Cybersecurity and countering online propaganda are now integral parts of counter-terrorism. The field continues to adapt to emerging threats, emphasizing intelligence, international cooperation, and addressing underlying causes of terrorism while striving to protect societies from violence and instability (Greener-Barcham, 2012).

In North America, Islamist extremism has also had significant implications. While the frequency of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks remains relatively low compared to other regions, the impact of such attacks has been substantial. Incidents like the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States have left lasting scars on society, leading to increased security measures, heightened surveillance, and debates over issues of immigration, religious freedom, and national security. The influence of Islamist extremist ideologies has also affected communities and individuals within these regions (Briggs, 2010; and Breidid, 2021).

Violent extremism has also been a growing concern in West Africa, particularly in countries like Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Cameroon. This region has witnessed the emergence and activities of various extremist groups, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram, founded in Nigeria in the early 2000s, has since become one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world (Sempijja, Brito and Moutaouakil, 2023). The group's initial objective was to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, but its activities have expanded to neighboring countries (Onuoha, 2016). Boko Haram's tactics involve suicide bombings, mass killings, abductions, and attacks on security forces, resulting in significant human suffering and displacement of populations. ISWAP, an affiliate of the Islamic State, split from Boko Haram in 2016 and has also gained prominence in the region. It has carried out attacks against military forces and civilians, contributing to the deteriorating security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (Adesoji, 2010).

Scholars and policymakers have devoted significant attention to the status violent extremism measures worldwide, recognizing the pressing need to address these complex and evolving threats. A multitude of literature has emerged, offering insights into various aspects of counterterrorism strategies, including prevention, intervention, and response mechanisms. One common theme across the literature is the recognition of the global nature of terrorism and violent extremism, transcending national borders and affecting countries across different regions and continents (Terki, 2020).

Authors such as Wu, Tang & Wu, (2016) emphasize the interconnectedness of terrorist networks, the spread of extremist ideologies through digital platforms, and the potential for cross-border attacks, underscoring the importance of international cooperation and collaboration in addressing these threats. Moreover, Patel, and Koushik, (2017) highlight the multifaceted nature of terrorism and violent extremism, which encompass not only overt acts of violence but also the propagation of radical ideologies, recruitment and radicalization processes, and the exploitation of social, economic, and political grievances. This comprehensive understanding underscores the importance of adopting holistic approaches that address root causes, vulnerabilities, and risk factors associated with terrorism and extremism.

Several authors such as Stephens, Sieckelink and Boutellier (2021) converge on the importance of preventative measures and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives aimed at disrupting radicalization pathways and mitigating the drivers of extremism. These initiatives often involve community engagement, education, youth empowerment, and promoting alternative narratives to challenge extremist ideologies. Salyk-Virk, (2020) suggests that proactive CVE efforts can help build resilience within communities, reduce susceptibility to radicalization, and prevent individuals from embracing violent extremist beliefs and behaviors.

There is recognition of the significance of strategic communications and counter-narratives in undermining extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts (Meleagrou-



Hitchens, 2017). Scholars such as Smith, Blackwood and Thomas (2020) advocate for the development of nuanced messaging that addresses the grievances exploited by extremist groups while promoting values of tolerance, inclusion, and respect for human rights. Effective communication strategies, coupled with partnerships with civil society organizations, religious leaders, and local communities, can play a crucial role in countering extremist narratives and fostering social cohesion. Findings in the literature also highlight areas of contention and debate within the field of counterterrorism and CVE. One point of contention revolves around the balance between security-focused measures and human rights considerations (Bolhuis and Van Wijk, 2020). While some argue for robust counterterrorism measures, including surveillance, intelligence sharing, and law enforcement actions, others caution against the potential erosion of civil liberties and the stigmatization of marginalized communities in the name of national security (Feinberg, 2015).

There are also debates surrounding the effectiveness of military interventions and kinetic approaches in combating terrorism, particularly in conflict-affected regions. Critics argue that military interventions may exacerbate grievances, fuel radicalization, and inadvertently strengthen terrorist groups, highlighting the importance of addressing underlying political, social, and economic drivers of conflict and instability (Coccia, 2018). By extension, scholars like Kim and Sandler, (2020) disagree on the role of foreign policies, geopolitical dynamics, and socio-economic inequalities in contributing to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. While some emphasize the role of external interventions, geopolitical rivalries, and regional instability in facilitating extremist activities, others focus on domestic factors, governance failures, and socio-economic disparities as primary drivers of radicalization and violence.

The history of counter-terrorism measures and violent extremism in Kenya reflects a complex interplay of domestic, regional, and international factors. Kenya, as a regional economic and political hub in East Africa, has faced significant challenges stemming from terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in recent decades (Kamau, 2021). One of the earliest instances of terrorism in Kenya dates back to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, orchestrated by the terrorist group al-Qaeda (Adinoyi, 2016). These attacks, which resulted in hundreds of casualties, highlighted Kenya's vulnerability to transnational terrorism and underscored the need for robust counter-terrorism measures. Subsequently, Kenya has grappled with the emergence of various extremist groups, including Al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based militant organization with links to al-Qaeda (Cannon and Pkalya, 2019). Al-Shabaab's activities in Kenya have included high-profile attacks targeting civilian populations, government institutions, and security forces. Notable attacks include the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi and the 2015 Garissa University College attack, which claimed scores of lives and underscored the persistent threat posed by terrorism in the country (Jirásek, 2023).

Many scholars have extensively researched the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and strategies in addressing the threat of violent extremism around the world. They have analyzed various approaches, ranging from military interventions and law enforcement operations to preventive measures and community engagement initiatives. One common finding across the many works is the recognition that traditional security-focused approaches, such as military interventions and law enforcement actions, have limitations in effectively countering terrorism and violent extremism (Malet, 2021). While these measures may succeed in disrupting terrorist networks and preventing specific attacks in the short term, they often fail to address underlying grievances, root causes, and drivers of radicalization. Some scholars such as Kaltenthaler, Kruglanski and Knuppe, (2022) argue that heavy-handed security measures can inadvertently fuel resentment, alienation, and backlash within affected communities, potentially exacerbating the problem.

Lee, (2024) suggests that strategic communications and counter-narratives play a crucial role in countering extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts. Effective communication strategies involve crafting messages that challenge extremist narratives, promote alternative viewpoints, and offer positive alternatives to violence. By amplifying voices of moderation, tolerance, and resilience, policymakers can undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies and empower individuals to resist radicalization (Rees and Montasari, 2023).

Findings in the literature also highlight areas of contention regarding the effectiveness of different counterterrorism strategies. One point of contention revolves around the balance between security-focused measures and human rights considerations. While some argue for robust counterterrorism measures, including surveillance, intelligence sharing, and law enforcement actions, others caution against the potential erosion of civil liberties and the stigmatization of marginalized communities in the name of national security (Akbar, 2015). There are debates surrounding the effectiveness of military interventions and kinetic approaches in combating terrorism, particularly in conflict-affected regions (Patel, 2013). Critics argue that military interventions may exacerbate grievances, fuel radicalization, and inadvertently strengthen terrorist groups, highlighting the importance of addressing underlying political, social, and economic drivers of conflict and instability.

Nigeria has grappled with terrorism primarily in the form of Boko Haram, an extremist group founded in 2002. Boko Haram's insurgency escalated significantly around 2009, leading to widespread violence, kidnappings, and displacement (Eji, 2016). Nigerian security forces have engaged in both military operations and intelligence-driven efforts to combat the group (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020). International partnerships, including support from the United States and neighboring countries, have played a crucial role in these efforts. Additionally, Nigeria established a multi-agency Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) to coordinate responses. The counter-



terrorism strategy has also involved community engagement and countering radicalization.

Algeria's history with terrorism is rooted in the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s, marked by the conflict between the government and Islamist militant groups. The conflict resulted in significant loss of life and social disruption (Meijer et al. (2012). The government's counter-terrorism approach included military operations and a controversial policy of national reconciliation, which aimed to reintegrate former militants into society (Santos, 2011). By the mid-2000s, Algeria had largely quelled the violence, although isolated extremist incidents persisted. The government maintained strict security measures, while also addressing socio-economic grievances and political reforms.

Kenya's entry into the global fight against terrorism was catalyzed by the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These attacks, orchestrated by Al-Qaeda, prompted Kenya to intensify counter-terrorism measures. Kenya's proximity to Somalia has made it vulnerable to the activities of Al-Shabaab, an extremist group (Schaefer, 2014). Al-Shabaab's attacks on Kenyan soil, notably the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garissa University College massacre, led to significant losses and propelled Kenya's military involvement in Somalia as part of AMISOM (Onguny, 2020). Kenya has implemented security operations, border controls, and intelligence-driven efforts to counter-terrorism. The country established specialized anti-terrorism units and received international support for capacity-building (Magogo, 2017).

In response to the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism, the Kenyan government has implemented a range of counter-terrorism measures. These measures have included enhancing security and intelligence capabilities, strengthening border controls, and cooperating with regional and international partners to disrupt terrorist networks and prevent attacks (Kamau, 2021). Additionally, Kenya has enacted legislation to combat terrorism, including the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2015, which provides a legal framework for prosecuting individuals involved in terrorist activities (Ponge, 2015). These laws criminalise terrorism, the funding of terrorist groups and the pursuit of terrorist suspects, and are aimed at preventing the country from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists (Kirima and Khayundi, 2024). They also have a symbolic value of showing the country's support of the fight against terrorism. Although Kenyan authorities were reluctant to enact a national anti-terrorism law because of concerns about the reaction of Muslims, pressure from the West, especially the US, forced them to rethink their position (Ngeno, 2019).

Kenya has experienced the impact of violent extremism, primarily associated with the Somalia-based extremist group Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has carried out numerous attacks within Kenya, particularly in the border regions near Somalia and in major cities like Nairobi and Mombasa. The group's activities have included bombings, shootings,

and kidnappings, leading to loss of life and creating a climate of fear. Scholars and experts have highlighted several factors contributing to the presence of violent extremism in Kenya. These factors include social, economic, and political grievances, marginalization of certain communities, and recruitment efforts by extremist groups. The porous border between Kenya and Somalia has allowed for the movement of individuals and weapons, facilitating the activities of extremist groups (Mutahi, 2011). In response, the Kenyan government has implemented various counterterrorism measures, including security operations, intelligence gathering, and community engagement efforts (Orodho, 2018).

International collaboration has also played a role, with Kenya cooperating with neighboring countries and international partners in intelligence sharing and capacity-building initiatives (Ndungu and Owuor, 2010). Efforts to address the root causes of violent extremism in Kenya involve promoting inclusive governance, socioeconomic development, and countering extremist narratives (Owiti, 2017). Community-led initiatives focusing on youth empowerment, education, and dialogue have also been implemented to prevent radicalization (Nyabola, 2008).

The Kenyan government, in collaboration with international partners, has implemented security operations to disrupt extremist networks and prevent attacks. Intelligence sharing and cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly Somalia, have been important in addressing the cross-border activities of extremist groups. Additionally, efforts have been made to promote community resilience and engagement. Community-led initiatives (joining members of anti-radicalization group in Garissa that focus on countering extremist narratives, fostering dialogue, and providing alternative pathways for vulnerable individuals have been implemented. These initiatives aim to address underlying grievances, promote social cohesion, and empower communities to reject violent extremism (Orodho, 2018).

Scholars in other parts of the world have highlighted various factors contributing to the rise of violent extremism. Socioeconomic factors, including poverty, unemployment, and marginalization, have made certain communities more vulnerable to recruitment (Chiricos, Padgett and Gertz, 2006). Weak governance, corruption, and limited state presence in certain areas have also created fertile ground for extremist groups to exploit grievances (Kudnani, 2014). Online radicalization has also become a significant concern in recent years. Social media platforms and the internet provide a space for the dissemination of extremist propaganda and recruitment (Berger, 2018). It became apparent to establish whether there could be a connection between socioeconomic factors and violent extremism in Kenya and if there is, to what degree, which was the concern of this paper.

Counter-terrorism efforts in Lamu, a coastal county in Kenya, have been significantly influenced by its proximity to Somalia, where Al-Shabaab, an extremist group, has been active. Over the years, Lamu has experienced multiple attacks, including



the targeting of security forces, residents, and infrastructure (Wanjiku, 2020). These attacks have disrupted daily life, caused loss of life, and threatened economic stability, particularly in the tourism sector (Simiyu, 2023). Lamu County's proximity to the Republic of Somalia and the expansive Boni Forest makes it ideal for Al-Shabaab to easily infiltrate into the area. The forest gives an ideal haven for surprise attacks and guerrilla warfare to thrive. This makes it difficult for the security agencies to stamp out terrorism. The proximity to Somalia and the open and porous borders makes it easy for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which can be employed for various crimes. Hotspots for terrorism and counter terrorism in the area include but not limited to Pandanguo Basuba, Boni Forest, Pangani, Gamba, Milihoi, Bargoni, Mpeketoni, Amu, Witu, Kiunga, Faza, Pate, Siu and Dar es salaam Point.

Another factor is land disputes pitting several groups of residents in Lamu County. These are; The young people versus the older generation and the indigeneous versus the non-indigenous community. These disputes makes the parties that feel aggrieved to resort to violent extremism in order to evict other parties. In this case the young generation and the indigenous people engage in violence in order to disposses the older generation and the non-indigenous community off their lands. These incidences have been witnessed in Amu, Witu, Kiunga, Faza and Pate.

Settlement tensions due to land conflicts in Lamu are closely linked to religion in the area. The County like its neighbours such as Garissa, Mandera and Wajir all of which boarder the Republic of Somalia are Muslim majority counties. However, migration of non indigeneous people who are majorly non-muslim have led to religious diversity in Lamu. Areas like Gamba, Faza and Mpeketoni have witnessed religious intolerance and rise in violent extremist and terrorist incidences. Terror attacks by Al Shabaab and other terror groups target Lamu because of its importance in the tourism circuit in Kenya. It has some of the top beaches in Amu and Pate islands. The beaches have rich marine ecology, terrestrial wildlife and sports such as water surfing and cultural and food festivals. As such it's a magnet for international tourists from western states making it a prime target for terrorism.

The importance of studying the status of Kenya's counter-terrorism in Lamu is evident for several reasons: The well-being and safety of Lamu's residents and visitors are paramount. A comprehensive study can assess the effectiveness of security measures in the region, ensuring a safer environment. Lamu's porous border with Somalia requires a focus on border security to prevent illegal crossings and smuggling, making it vital to assess security efforts. The recurring attacks have had economic consequences, impacting sectors such as tourism and agriculture. Understanding these impacts is crucial for economic stability. The examination of community engagement and resilience-building is vital for empowering local populations to participate in counter-terrorism efforts, gather intelligence, and prevent radicalization (Langat and Handa, 2023). In light of the above considerations, it is evident that the effectiveness of security operations and community engagement are intertwined, and an in-depth study is required to

comprehensively address the ongoing challenges of terrorism in Lamu County. This research will contribute to the development of evidence-based strategies for enhancing security, community resilience, and overall peace and stability in the region of Lamu.

1.1. Objectives and Hypothesis of the Study

The study aimed to determine the status of Kenya's counter-terrorism measures in Lamu. The study was guided by the following objectives:

- i. To assess the effectiveness of security operations implemented by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism in Lamu County.
- ii. To examine the effectiveness of community engagement in countering terrorism in Lamu County.

1.2. Research Hypotheses

- i. H01 There is no statistically significant effect of security operations implemented by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism in Lamu County
- ii. H02 There is no statistically significant effectiveness of community engagement in countering terrorism in Lamu County.

2. Methodology

Descriptive research design was employed in this study. The study was conducted in Lamu County- Kenya. The target population was the residents of Lamu who had information regarding the topic under discourse as well as the various security agencies heads such as the Military and the Police. Their population was 87429 from which a total of 156 respondents who participated was drawn. The sample was selected through purposive sampling. The questionnaire used was researcher-administered by employing in person interviews where the participants were easily reachable due to factors such as good roads and nearness to towns in the study area. For areas that were far flung and not easily accessible by road phone interviews were conducted. The presence of strong mobile telephone network coverage in the area made it easier to conduct the phone interviews and seek clarifications where possible. A structured questionnaire was used to obtain information from the residents while interview schedule guides were used to obtain information from Intelligence the heads of security agencies in the area of study. The questionnaire was administered to 156 residents. The questionnaire contained 2 items (indicators of security operation and community engagement) and 1 item (indicators of countering terrorism). The residents were asked whether or not they

agreed with the statements under each indicator by ticking Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Not Sure, Agree, and Strongly Agree in the boxes that were provided.

As some experts highlighted “Turkey's involvement in Somalia dramatically increased from humanitarian to economic, developmental, and political and security dimensions” (Abdi, 2021). In this study we would like to focus now on the security dimension between the two countries.

3. Results

The following questions and hypotheses were answered and tested respectively:

3.1. The Existence of Security Operations Affects Countering Terrorism

It was determined that 79% of the respondents alluded that incessant security operations countered terrorism in Lamu while 21% on the other hand were of the contrary opinion. This implies that the majority thought that security operations mounted in the area were indeed effective in countering terrorism.

Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) and Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have led the government’s response at home to al-Shabaab. Their deployment in the county along major roads, towns and villages gave the residents a sense of security and overall incidences of terror and violent extremism dropped significantly. Patrols and collaborations from local and community leaders show that security has improved. This is evidenced by a decrease in the amount of terrorism and violent extremism crimes being witnessed in the area. Although the security status has improved it is also alleged that ATPU is responsible for extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of suspected militants as well as Islamic activists in Kenya.

The information is shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Table showing whether the existence of security operations affects countering terrorism

Relationship exists	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	123	79
No	33	21
Total	156	100

3.2. The Existence of Community Engagement Affects Countering Terrorism

It was determined that 54% of the respondents alluded that community engagement countered terrorism in Lamu while 46% on the other hand were of the contrary opinion. Community engagement involves collaborating with the local community in this case the residents of Lamu County to come up with local based solutions which they may think will help them counter violent extremism and terrorism in their respective localities and ecosystems. This implies that those who disagreed with the statement were almost a match in number as those who agreed. This necessitated the need to look at the question why?

Several forms of community engagement have been established as a measure to mitigate terrorism and violent extremism in Lamu County. The county commissioner's office has supported engagement with youth through football tournaments, engaged them in committees and worked with groups such as the Kenyan Muslim Alliance and the Muslim Youth Alliance on events and projects. These events aim to identify talents among youths so that they can use such talents to earn decent living and dissuade them from joining terror groups or engaging in violent extremist activities. Most projects focus on building resilience of communities, countering extremist messages, engaging with young people and dealing with broader inter-community grievances. Some believe their work on alternative livelihoods has been useful, while others feel that their work in schools has had a measurable impact on changing attitudes.

The information is shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Table showing whether the existence of community engagement affects countering terrorism

Relationship exists	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	84	54
No	72	46
Total	156	100

Table 3

There is no statistically significant effect of security operations implemented by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism in Lamu County

Area of Study	Security Operations	Countering terrorism	Pearson Correlation Coefficient Value	Sig. (2-tailed)
Lamu County			.691*	.002

* - Means significant at 5% level

Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r) of the variables i.e., income inequality and violent extremism is .691 and a significant level of .002 which is less than .05. This means that there is a statistically significant relationship between security operations and countering terrorism. The coefficient (r) is a strong positive correlation which means that as security operations increase so does countering terrorism. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Table 4

There is no statistically significant effectiveness of community engagement in countering terrorism in Lamu County.

Area of Study	Community engagement	Countering terrorism	Pearson Correlation Coefficient Value	Sig. (2-tailed)
Lamu County			.153*	.004

* - Means significant at 5% level

Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r) of the variables i.e., social exclusion and violent extremism is .153 and a significant level of .004 which is less than .05. This means that there is a statistically significant relationship between community engagement and countering. The coefficient (r) is a very weak positive correlation which means that as community engagements increase so does countering terrorism but in a very negligible sense. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected.

3.3. Reasons for the Weak Correlation between Community Engagement and Countering Terrorism

To better understand the views concerning the reasons for the correlation between community engagement and countering terrorism, interviews were done with the heads of security agencies. The correlation is deemed weak because the locals feel that there was unfair targeting of particular sections of the community in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. These include what the locals consider as biased targeting of the unemployed youths, motorcycle riders, as well as youths who are not in formal employment. Thus the security agencies in the area are viewed as agents of the state who are after innocent victims in the fight against terrorism. Arbitrary and targeted arrests as well as long periods of detentions of suspected terror militants without being presented in the courts of law have also led to weakening ties between the government security agencies and the residents. Although the security status has improved it is also alleged that ATPU is responsible for extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of suspected militants as well as Islamic activists in Kenya. This has led to weakening collaboration as the community feels targeted without any judicial help to the victims.

When asked about their weaknesses, many participants gave their respective opinions as can be noted from the following statements:

There is a lack of trust between the community and the security agencies. If there is a long history of mistrust between the local community and the government or security forces, it can be challenging to establish a productive dialogue. Without trust, community members may be hesitant to share information or cooperate with authorities [ATPU 1_Male_August, 2023_KII].

The majority of the community members fear retaliation. In areas where terrorist groups have a strong presence or influence, community members may fear retaliation from these groups if they collaborate with security forces. This fear can deter people from actively engaging with authorities [Military 1_Male_July, 2023_KII].

In some cases, some members of the community have sympathies or ideological alignment with the terrorist groups. In such situations, community engagement efforts are not sufficient to change their beliefs or motivations [GSU_Male_August, 2023_KII].



Communities are divided along religious, or political lines, making it difficult to foster a unified approach to counter-terrorism efforts. These divisions hinder community engagement [RBPU_Female_September, 2023_KII].

Some community members in Lamu do not fully understand the nature and risks of terrorism. Because they do not recognize the threat, they are less motivated to engage in counter-terrorism efforts. This has been a huge drawback [Military 2_Male_July, 2023_KII].

In regions with ongoing insurgencies like Lamu, specifically in Manda, terrorist groups exert significant control over the population, making community engagement challenging or even dangerous [ATPU 2_Male_September, 2023_KII].

The interviews revealed some deep seated issues which need to be addressed in order to strengthen ties between security agencies in the fight against counter terrorism and violent extremism in the area. It came out that the behaviour of some of the security personnel was wanting because they generalised the entire community. Majority of the having been raised in christian dominant in the Kenyan hinterland and thus treated everyone as a suspect in the muslim majority Lamu County. Therefore, ethnic and religious difference overlaid with inequality has created fertile ground for violent rebellion.

Further, social economic injustices in the area whereby non indigenous people get employed at the behest of the indigenous people has resulted in increase in number of youths joining violent extremist groups as a protest to the government. Ideological factors such as the need to believe and fight for something has also led to people joining terror groups. Individual factors like drug-use, troubled families, and bad role models demonstrated that radicalisation is most strongly predicted by psychological determinants, above all historically troubled social relations, and process-oriented factors, particularly high levels of religiosity and exposure to radical networks.

4. Discussion

The findings of our study align with previous research conducted by (Ploch, 2017) and confirm that security operations have played a significant role in mitigating the terrorism threat in many parts of the world. Through a combination of intelligence gathering, enhanced patrols, and rapid response units, security forces have successfully disrupted terrorist networks and thwarted potential attacks. Their proactive measures have

significantly reduced the number of terrorist incidents, ultimately leading to an increased sense of safety among local communities.

Consistent with the work of (Gatuiku, 2016), our research underscores the importance of community engagement in countering terrorism. Community engagement initiatives, including outreach programs, awareness campaigns, and dialogues, have contributed to building trust and cooperation between government authorities and the local population. By involving respected community leaders and religious figures, these programs have been instrumental in addressing ideological sympathies and preventing radicalization.

Conversely, there is growing consensus on the importance of adopting holistic, multi-sectoral approaches that address the socio-economic, political, and ideological factors driving radicalization and violent extremism. Adnan, (2023) advocate for preventive strategies that focus on building community resilience, promoting social cohesion, and addressing grievances through inclusive governance, economic development, and social inclusion initiatives. These approaches aim to tackle root causes of radicalization, empower communities to reject extremist ideologies, and address structural inequalities that contribute to vulnerability to violent extremism.

Prislan, Borovec and Mraović, (2020) suggests that effective counterterrorism efforts require meaningful engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations, religious leaders, youth groups, and marginalized communities. Involving these stakeholders in the design, implementation, and evaluation of counterterrorism initiatives, policymakers can build trust, foster cooperation, and ensure that interventions are contextually appropriate and sensitive to local dynamics. Lee, (2024) also emphasize the importance of strategic communications and counter-narratives in countering extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts. Effective communication strategies involve crafting messages that challenge extremist narratives, promote alternative viewpoints, and offer positive alternatives to violence. By amplifying voices of moderation, tolerance, and resilience, policymakers can undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies and empower individuals to resist radicalization.

It is also noted that findings in the literature also highlight areas of contention and debate regarding the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and strategies. Some scholars like Ahmed, Belanger and Szmania, (2018) question the impact of certain preventive interventions, such as deradicalization programs and community engagement initiatives, citing challenges in measuring their outcomes and assessing their long-term effectiveness. Additionally, there are concerns about potential unintended consequences, such as the stigmatization of communities perceived as at-risk or the diversion of resources from other pressing social issues. There is also ongoing debate about the role of military interventions and kinetic approaches in countering terrorism, particularly in conflict-affected regions. While some argue that military force is necessary to degrade terrorist capabilities and dismantle networks, others caution against over-



reliance on military solutions, which may exacerbate violence, civilian casualties, and instability, while failing to address underlying grievances (Barry, 2016).

Various studies have examined approaches spanning from traditional security-focused measures to preventive interventions, community engagement initiatives, and ideological counter-narratives. One common theme across the literature is the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to counterterrorism. Authors such as Jensen, Seate, and James, (2020) emphasize the need to address not only the symptoms of terrorism, such as attacks and violence, but also the underlying drivers and root causes of radicalization and extremism. This holistic approach recognizes the interconnectedness of social, economic, political, and ideological factors that contribute to the spread of violent extremism.

Allan et al, (2015) highlight the significance of preventive strategies aimed at disrupting radicalization pathways and mitigating the appeal of extremist ideologies. Preventive measures often involve community engagement, education, youth empowerment, and promoting alternative narratives to challenge extremist propaganda. By empowering communities to reject violent extremism and address underlying grievances, preventive interventions aim to build resilience and reduce vulnerability to radicalization. Further, there is growing recognition of the importance of addressing structural inequalities, social injustices, and governance failures that contribute to feelings of marginalization and alienation, which can make individuals susceptible to radicalization. Ozer and Bertelsen, (2019) advocate for inclusive governance, economic development, and social inclusion initiatives that address underlying grievances and promote social cohesion. Addressing root causes of radicalization, these strategies aim to create more resilient societies less susceptible to extremist ideologies.

While this study acknowledges the overall effectiveness of security operations and community engagement, it also highlights some critical challenges. The historical lack of trust between the government and the local community, as noted by (Nathanson, 2015), remains a formidable obstacle. To address this issue, we recommend sustained efforts to build trust, promote transparency, and involve community leaders in decision-making processes. Additionally, allocating more resources to community engagement programs, as proposed by (Hartley, 2021), will enhance their reach and impact in resource-constrained areas like Lamu County.

In summary, our study supports the assertion that the Kenyan government's security operations and community engagement initiatives have been effective in countering terrorism in Lamu County. These efforts have resulted in a reduced threat of terrorism, enhanced community cooperation, and an overall safer environment. However, to further improve the counter-terrorism strategy, it is essential to address the existing challenges and implement the recommendations mentioned in this study.

5. Recommendation

Encourage closer collaboration and information sharing between security forces and community engagement initiatives to create a more comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Develop joint training programs for security personnel and community liaisons to foster a unified approach.

Prioritize trust-building measures between the government, security forces, and local communities to address the lack of trust. Regularly engage in dialogue with community leaders, religious figures, and tribal authorities to build trust and confidence in government initiatives.

Develop and communicate clear procedures for ensuring the safety and anonymity of community members who cooperate with security forces to address the fear of retaliation. Establish witness protection programs and mechanisms for reporting threats or acts of retaliation.

Expand efforts to counter extremist narratives and ideologies within the community by engaging religious leaders, educators, and local influencers. Support programs that challenge extremist propaganda and offer alternative narratives.

Continue and expand awareness campaigns to educate communities about the nature of terrorism, its risks, and the importance of countering it. Include educational institutions and local media as key vehicles for disseminating information.

6. Conclusion

There exists a relationship between security operations and countering terrorism. Security operations implemented contribute to countering terrorism as the coefficient (r) was a strong positive correlation which meant that as security operations increase so does countering terrorism. Community engagement contributes to countering terrorism even though the coefficient (r) was a weak positive correlation which meant that as community engagements increase so does countering terrorism but in a very negligible manner. Community engagement is weak in countering terrorism because of various challenges such as lack of trust, fear of retaliation, ideological sympathies, limited awareness, and insurgency dynamics among others.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.



Notes on Contributor

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Cyberterrorism in Africa – Is This the Real Life, Is This Just Fantasy?¹

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Abstract:

This paper seeks to examine the relevance of the term ‘cyberterrorism’ within African spaces. Although the notion of cyberterrorism as a concept is contested by scholars such as Jason Burke and Marc Sageman, the application of the concept in an African context raises a number of concerns. Firstly, rather than focusing on the semantic and conceptual issues only, more attention should be paid to the material implications of such discourses for people and states on the continent who are on the receiving end of such conceptualisation. Discourses regarding fear are always very complex and shape the way in which reality is perceived, understood and how hegemonic power-relations are formed within certain contexts. Secondly, these discourses reflect a Eurocentric bias, because, as visible in the definition used and accepted by US defence analysts, cyberterrorism would refer to “*Unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.*”. These types of discourses are largely state-centric or government-centric, created to operate in spheres where effective governance varies from what is accepted as such on the African continent. While connectivity and globalization are becoming increasingly important for Africa as a whole, it begs the question whether the term is not more appropriate for highly globalized, technologically advanced contexts of the global North. In contrast with countries in the global North, African countries’ limited use and penetration of information technology thus underline the need for a critical (re)examination of the discourses relating to cyberterrorism in the African context. What needs to be established is whether cyberthreats, specifically cyberterrorism, pose a real threat on the continent, or whether the concept has become a platitude or blanket term to describe any form of information-based hostility. The paper questions the application of concepts such as cyberthreats, cyberterrorism and cybersecurity in African-centered approaches.

Keywords:

African security, cybersecurity, cyberterrorism, cyberthreats, terrorism

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.4.197>

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1. Introduction

The term “cyberterrorism” might seem like a new threat, a new word, and a new concept in need of examining, defining and explanation. The term was coined in the mid-eighties by research fellow Barry Collin, who defined cyberterrorism as simply as “the convergence of cybernetics and terrorism” (Collin, 1996). Although pinpointing actual events of cyberterrorism throughout history is a difficult task, various scenarios have been imagined where crimes parallel to terrorism – with an added cyber-element – can take place and create mass disruption or even destruction. Cyber-attacks are increasing at an alarming rate around the world (CSIS, 2023) and they are oftentimes linked to the threat of cyberterrorism. As with many contentious terms in politics and international relations, the difficulty does not lie in whether or not the threat is real, but whether or not the threat justifies its own stand-alone field of study, definition and counter-measures.

Mark Pollitt already pondered the validity of cyberterrorism when he wrote whether the threat should be regarded as “fact or fancy” (Pollitt, 1998). He refers to cyberterrorism as “a combination of two great fears of the late 20th century” – random violent events, and new technology. For Pollitt these fears were contextual to the temporal space in which he wrote – the late 90s – and technology was something to be feared because of its ability to carry out actions that used to be done by humans, thus an underlying fear for a loss of control is clear. Thus, this article seeks to examine the validity of cyberterrorism by utilizing the main ideas of the politics of fear, but from an African point of view – a geopolitical landscape that is no stranger to terrorism, but still developing in terms of technological capabilities. Although the temporal and geographical context would differ vastly from Pollitt’s in that violence, technology and terrorism are timeless threats, that justify study in as many contexts as possible.

Ongoing understanding of terrorism on a global scale is evolving to include the term ‘cyber’. This prefix does not differentiate between different geographic locations, yet the way in which this prefix can impact the well-known threat of terrorism within different contexts will be differentiated across continents, space, and time. To avoid broad generalization regarding the large geographic scope of the research (the Western context and the African context), certain multistate actors and states were strategically selected to provide an overview of terrorism and cyberterrorism discourses in practice.

The article at hand will address the validity and possibility of cyberterrorism in Africa, but before that can be done, a certain understanding of terrorism needs to be achieved. A fundamental problem exists here: the term terrorism has not yet been universally defined, and a myriad of academic works have been published on this contentious issue (Correia, 2022; Ganor, 2002; Margariti, 2019; Saul, 2006; Schmid, 2023; Schmidt, 1984). Thus, this article will start by clarifying a suitable definition or understanding of terrorism within the African context and juxtapose this with possible definitions of cyberterrorism. This will be done by using established definitions as used



by regional and international institutions like the United Nations and the African Union. The comparison of these definitions is important in uncovering how contextually accurate definitions of these threats are, and how different states – all with unique manifestations of various terrorism threats – understand, define, and eventually address the threats of terrorism and cyberterrorism.

As the use of various definitions, their creation, contexts, and applications are central to this study, the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will serve as the methodological basis for this study. By using CDA, a possible power imbalance in terms of how discourses regarding cyberterrorism are created will be exposed. As cyberterrorism discourse is more prevalent in a Western context, it is expected that this is where most definitions and discourse regarding cyberterrorism emanate from. The international and regional bodies that address terrorism within this context also have international leverage and discursive advantage, and this may indicate a power imbalance in how African countries apply discourses and guidelines on how to address the threat of cyberterrorism.

Due to the constant change in the nature and appearance of all manifestations of terrorism, and the evolution and impact that the emergence of “cyber” has had on the threat, the use of Critical Discourse Analysis is an important part of this study. A prominent theme in discourse analysis is that specific discourses oftentimes become assumptions that are universally accepted by society – be that a regional, national, or international society. CDA not only studies the texts and words used to describe the phenomenon of terrorism, but also investigates the role of discourse in strengthening or positioning roles in certain power relations. International and multistate institutions, such as the United Nations create resolutions on the prevention of terrorism, to guide member states on how to address threats. With the esteem that these bodies hold, they advocate for a ‘safer’ and ‘better’ world (Fairclough, 2013, p. 479), and states across the world are encouraged to participate and support these political and/or economic endeavors, should they want to reap the benefits of this world. This refers to “discursive privilege”, as mentioned above, (Thurlow and Jaworski, 2017, p. 246), and in this study it will be examined whether states and multistate actors with more influence in the global arena have discourse privilege over the African context, and how this influences the discourse privilege between the Western context of cyberterrorism and the African context.

2. Discourses and Definitions of Terrorism

There is a steady stream of research done by scholars regards terrorism and its various manifestations across the globe (Archetti, 2015; Giroux, 2016; Nacos, 2016; Waxman, 2011). These analyses increasingly incorporate media and technology and start to lean toward where the proverbial line is crossed into the cyber realm. But, despite this increasing body of knowledge, the prefix “cyber” is pushing researchers and decision

makers to look for even more and better applicable ways to understand the threat of terrorism in a new light. Still the issue remains, how to understand the threat, without the added difficulty of the prefix. It remains open to various interpretations and contextual adaptations. For this study, to gain an encompassing understanding of the minefield of definitions and contextualisations, some definitions of terrorism need to be brought to the fore.

In a report, “Defining Terrorism” Schmid (2023) discusses the difficulty of defining this contested and complex term and addresses the large number of publications that has contributed and continues to contribute to this debate. Schmid employs methods in his report that are very much in line with the principles of CDA, as he starts by examining the histories of terrorism and the term terrorism itself. This indicates contextual relevance of how the term has been employed, and how similarities and differences in its applications can be found. Schmid suggests that rather than defining terrorism, the focus of a definition could be on the terrorist act (Schmid, 2023, p. 10). This approach has already been taken by many Western governments and several conventions and protocols enacted by international organizations like the UN and the AU.

The United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism defined terrorism in its Article 2.1.b as:

“Any act intended to cause death of serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” (United Nations Information Officer, 2002).

This definition is broad in its description of the terrorist act and can be applied in a wide range of contexts, it also does not refer to any specific means of how an act is performed – only to persons affected by an attack – which leaves ample room for this definition to be utilized for cyberterrorism as well. Although no explicit reference is made that the attack is carried out through means of armed conflict, this meaning can be implied, when analysing the position held of “persons not taking active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict”. This definition is ambiguous and leaves ample room for interpretation. The United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1566 of 2004 elaborates on this definition – in terms of the terrorism acts:

“...criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provide a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” (United Nations Security Council, 2004).



The definition provided by the United Nations Security Council is an expansion on the first, including the taking of hostages and the creation of a state of fear, or “terror”. This is an indication that discourses are adaptable, and that the international organisation that has the discursive privilege to create powerful definitions can take into consideration changing tactics of terrorist organisations. However, both definitions are somewhat limiting in their scope of semantics as they specifically refer to intent – something that legally can only be determined after an attack has taken place, a perpetrator has been apprehended, and intent has been established. Intent – much like motive – can only be determined after the fact, by legal prosecution, after thorough investigation. Thus, eliminating the goal of preemptive counterterrorism since analysis can only happen once attacks have happened, and the perpetrators have been apprehended. The mention of terror in the United Nations Security Council definition of terrorism is a valuable addition to the discourses regarding terrorism, as a state of terror or fear is more easily recognizable than the intent of an attack is determined.

The politics of fear is a valuable consideration here. As Al Gore describes terrorism as “the ultimate misuse of fear for political ends” (Gore, 2004), terrorism, and any use thereof will always have an element of fear added to it. Whether that fear is justified or not is irrelevant to the fear at hand. A threat does not have to have physical consequences for it to generate a response of terror and anxiety from a population – another indication of the power of discourse. Gore continues in his article on the politics of fear stating that disproportionate amounts of fear is created by terrorists in comparison to the actual dangers or threats that they can pose. This research differs with Gore on proportioning fear according to physical or actual danger. On the one hand, it should be contended that states and international organisations alike should be wary and conscious of the possible dangers that terrorists may pose. On the other, by addressing fear – regardless of the consequences or intent of the act – a certain amount of power (discursive or physical) can be taken away from terrorist organisations.

In the same year as the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism first draft of their definition, the Organisation for African Unity (later transformed to the African Union) published the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism convention, and defined the terrorism act as:

“any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to: 1. Intimidate, put it fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or to abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or 2. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or 3. Create a general insurrection in a state” (Organization of African Unity, 1999).

Similarities can be drawn between the UN definitions of the terrorist act, and that of the OAU. The OAU incorporated a more state-centric approach to their definition, referring to local laws of state parties, freedom, and cultural heritage. This refers to the importance of including contextual knowledge and understanding into international threats. Although the threat of terrorism, and the fear of thereof is something that can be universally understood, it cannot necessarily be universally addressed.

3. Discourses and Definitions on Cyberterrorism

The ideas and possible implications of cyberterrorism were beginning to gain momentum in the late 1990s, during a wave of high-profile terrorist attacks in the United States (the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and the Oklahoma bombing in 1995) as well as attacks on US embassies in Africa (specifically Kenya and Tanzania in 1998). After these events, the Naval Post Graduate School conducted a comprehensive study on “cyberterror” for the US Defence Intelligence Agency. One of the major findings of this research was in line with developments that we see today: “terrorist use of information technology in their support activities does not qualify as cyberterrorism” (Nelson et al., 1999, p. 9). The research and subsequent report proposed a definition of cyberterrorism, limiting cyberterrorism to damage done to digital property. As will be seen, this differs slightly from more modern proposed definitions of cyberterrorism.

“the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are political, religious or ideological... As a subset of terrorism, cyberterror involves using information as a weapon, method, or target, to achieve terrorist goals. Cyberterror exists in and beyond cyberspace and includes physical destruction of any device, system of devices, or process with an information component... Acts taken to disrupt, deny service, destroy, and corrupt binary code are thus acts of cyberterror. A characteristic of cyberterror is its ability to leverage inexpensive means to gain disproportionate effects through destruction, denial, deceit, corruption, exploitation, and disruption. Cyberterror can increase the destructiveness, or disruptiveness, of the act by enabling greater target coverage, effect, and efficiency. Cyberterror may augment or support traditional terrorism, or be employed as a distinct form of action in its own right.” (Nelson et al., 1999, pp. 9–10).

Existing cyberterrorism discourses and definitions rely on traditional and existing definitions of terrorism, with the added element of the usage of internet technology, as is well illustrated in the text above from the report by Nelson et al. According to Correia (2022, p. 5) attacks can qualify as cyberterrorism if there is a political, social, or economic threat to a group, organization, or country. At the same time, there are



scholars (Futter, 2018; Wall, 2007) who argue that the ‘cyber’ prefix is nothing more than an umbrella term added on to an already overly complicated term due to the broad spectrum of factors which it tries to cover.

Additionally, there are those scholars (Holt, 2012; Jarvis et al., 2016; Murray et al., 2019) who support the idea that any definition of cyberterrorism should include the behaviour leading up to an act (much like traditional definitions of terrorism and the problem of “intent”), without necessarily resulting in physical disruption or damage – supporting the notion of addressing the fear related to terrorism and cyberterrorism without binding the responses thereto merely to the physical effects or aftermath of these attacks.

The complexity of the cyber-realm further complicates what may and may not qualify as cyberterrorism. Considering discourses on terms like cyber-activism, hacktivism, and cybercrime are used interchangeably, a differentiation of sorts would be needed to draw a clear delineation as to when the intent of online activity was for the purposes of terrorism (as provided in broader and more traditional guidelines) and when not. Academics take different stances on the matter, as seen above, and detecting and investigating cyberterrorist activity would require large amounts of resources, skills and time, something not always readily available within the African context.

Cyberterrorism has the potential to be another very broad topic, and to venture into another decades-long debate on finding definitions would be challenging. Thus, the argument can be made that broader discourses and guidelines could be provided by regional and international organizations – like the United Nations and the African Union – after which states would be in a position of discourse privilege where they could practice their own interpretation of the threat, as it applies within their operational and geographical context.

In terms of proposing a more encompassing academic definition of cyberterrorism, Plotnek and Slay (2020) present a guideline that incorporates modern technology, and the key characteristics present in an array of studied cyber terrorism definitions:

“Cyberterrorism is the premeditated attack or threat thereof by non-state actors with the intent to use cyber-space to cause real world consequences in order to influence fear or coerce civilian, government, or non-government targets in pursuit of social or ideological objectives. Real-world consequences include physical, psychological, political, economic, ecological, or otherwise that occur outside of cyber space” (Plotnek and Slay, 2020, p. 8).

It can be argued that the motive or intent would serve as the primary mechanism through which regular criminals are distinguished from terrorists. However, the discourses regarding intent or motive would be nearly impossible to quantify, as finding

the scope of these motives is not easy, and this process might render the entire process of trying to create a definition ineffective (Ejeh, 2019).

It is no mere saying that Africa is “a continent on the rise”. The African population has grown from 800 million in 2000 to 1.4 billion in 2023, with a median age of 18.8 (Worldometers.info, 2024). Because of this young and growing population, it is no surprise that technological companies would see Africa as a ripe investment opportunity, as these youths are looking for increased global connectivity, social engagement, and expression. Technology adoption in Africa is also rising, and the need for social media and access to mobile ownership (Symantec & African Union Information Society, 2016, p. 7). This opportunity for growth comes with the increased risk of that misuse of growing networks, and advantage being taken from insufficient internet- and cybersecurity, which is not growing at the same pace. As Africa has more than 500 million internet users (placing the region ahead of North America, South America, and the Middle East) (Interpol, 2021), the high demand for online capabilities serves as both an opportunity and a possible threat – should security not be able to keep up with the demand.

Terrorists and terrorist organisations in Africa often make use of information technology for various purposes to advance their ideological causes (Aly et al., 2017; Archetti, 2015; Chilwa, 2012, 2015; Niglia et al., 2017; Stevens, 2009). These include but are not limited to the spread of propaganda, radicalization, the gathering of information, networking, recruitment, communication, and coordination. According to the previously discussed definitions, the use of technology, internet technology and cyberspace do not equate cyberterrorism. These examples are all known uses of communication technology that have been employed by traditional forms of terrorism for decades. This would indicate that there is a need to differentiate between when internet and cyber activity of terrorists can be deemed “cyberterrorism” and when it forms part of their day-to-day activities.

The UN Counter-Terrorism Centre provides capacity building support to member states, international and regional organizations to help develop and implement effective responses to challenges that the internet and other ICTs provide in countering terrorism. These programmes operate according to UN Security resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). Although these programmes do not classify cyberterrorism as a standalone term, it does express concern over:

“The use of such technologies for terrorist purposes, including but not limited to artificial intelligence, 3D printing, virtual assets, unmanned aircraft systems, as well as weaponization of commercial drones.” (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2022)

In 2014 the African Union adopted the Convention on Cybersecurity and personal data protection act (later known as the Malabo Act) (African Union, 2014). This convention was aimed at the establishment of a legal framework for cybersecurity



protection, and to set broad guidelines for the incrimination and repression of cybercrime and related issues. As with the UN guidelines, this convention did not address cyberterrorism directly, as cyberterrorism is viewed as a subsection or subcategory of the broader issue related to cybercrime. In 2019, a more direct stance was taken by the AU as a call was made for more enhanced monitoring of internet activity “in order to combat terrorism activities” (Xinhua, 2019). This call was made during a global conference on counterterrorism in Kenya. To incorporate understanding for the African context, deputy director of the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism at the AU specifically called on member states who already adopted and ‘domesticated’ the existing Malabo Act, to assist their regional partners in improving cybersecurity on the continent – although, by 2019, only two countries have domesticated the Malabo act into their own legislation (Digiwatch Team, 2019).

Just as there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, neither is there an accepted definition of cyberterrorism. Various scholars have tried to fill the discursive void by providing differing opinions on what constitutes cyberterrorism, some including the act of using internet technology (Conway, 2006; Goodman et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2019; Wall, 2008), others referring more strongly to the intent to do harm to critical or electronic infrastructure (Cohen, 2014; Goodman et al., 2007; Pollitt, 1998; Wall, 2007). The fact remains that there is no consensus, not amongst scholars, nor among states. This complicates counterterrorism efforts, as terrorist acts within the cyber-realm have even less regard for borders than terrorist acts within geographic regions. An urgent need for the development of minimum standards of security for computer networks remains (Gordon and Ford, 2002), together with the mindful use of surveillance and research methods to share and collect information on terrorist activities – while respecting the growth of internet capacity, user privacy and sovereignty.

4. Is the Fear of Cyberterrorism in Africa Justified?

Although concern about the potential danger posed by cyberterrorism and the use of cyber capabilities by terrorists is grounded in evidence of growing cyberattacks across the globe (CSIS, 2023), the reality of cyberterrorism remains vague. Too often cyberattacks on critical infrastructure of states or institutions could not be classified as cyberterrorism, as it does not meet the poorly defined criteria, and ends up being grouped and classified somewhere in the vast realm of cybercrime. The element of fear, and if the fear is justifiable, is a point that can come under debate in many academic fields. According to the principles of the politics of fear, the threat does not have to manifest into a physical attack for the fear to have a desired effect. In this sense, even the lack of cyberterrorism and cyberterrorism discourses is a possible tool for terrorists – in Africa and beyond.

One of the difficult issues regarding cyberterrorism is whether an act can be deemed cyberterrorism if it results in offline harm. The contention arises in differing between terrorists' everyday use of the internet (dissemination of propaganda, communication, recruitment), and in the coordination of attacks (planning, hacking). Denning purports that a narrow conceptualization of cyberterrorism should include that a cyberattack should be "sufficiently destructive or disruptive to generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism" (Denning, 2006, p. 6).

This is in accordance with the definitions seen of traditional terrorism, where the concept and idea of fear remains a main element of the discourse. Although the physical effects of cyberterrorism may not be the same as those of traditional terrorism, the effects of the fear and intimidation might be. However, the problem remains that even the expansive definitions of cyberterrorism do not distinguish between cyberterrorism, cybercrime and terrorists' use of the internet, and thus cyberterrorism loses its meaning. One of the definitions of cyberterrorism that lends itself to interpretations and use in the African context is by Dorothy Denning as well:

"[cyberterrorism is] highly damaging computer-based attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce government or societies in pursuit of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts of destruction and disruption against digital property" (Denning, 2006, p. 123).

Leading countries with digital capabilities and connectivity in Africa are Kenya with 83% of its population being online, Nigeria with 60% and South Africa with 56% (Interpol, 2021). The risk here arises that in two of these countries significant terrorist organisations are very active (Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Kenya) and have been known to adapt to innovate and make use of increased technological capabilities (Al Jazeera Staff, 2016; Allen, 2022; Baken and Mantzikos, 2012; Freeman, 2019; SAPA-AFP, 2012). International bodies like the African Union, United Nations and even Interpol have pledged their support towards African countries in improving and developing joint operational frameworks to improve coordinated actions against cybercrimes. In these reports or resolutions, cyberterrorism is hardly the focus, as due to the ambiguity of the discourses surrounding cyberterrorism, it is easier and more encompassing to develop the continent's overall cybersecurity in terms of cybercrime, of which cyberterrorism forms a part – whatever its definition may be.

There is no question that terrorist organisations in Africa use ICT to assist in planning and even carrying out terrorist attacks. A clear example of this is the live Tweeting of the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in 2013. However, the way ICT was used is not indicative of cyberterrorism, and the attack itself, and others in which ICT was used in planning, does not fall into the scope of what constitutes cyberterrorism –



not even cybercrime in many cases, but merely terrorists' day-to-day usage of the latest technology available to them, to advance their cause. This adds a difficult dimension to cybersecurity in Africa, as Africa's ICT development, and the usage of ICT for these purposes differs from how ICT is used in Western contexts. There is much that can be learnt from the Western contexts, but caution needs to be applied when domesticating policies and guidelines for African use.

Evidence-based policies and developments need to come to the fore in Africa, tailored for the African context of technological development, socio-economic growth – including digital growth – and the nature of terrorist organisations. In Kenya, for example, the Kenyan Terrorism Prevention Act of 2012 has in a sense attempted to prevent the usage of ICT for terrorism, but while doing so has been described as preventing human rights – under the flag of countering terrorism (Horowitz, 2013).

5. Conclusion

To address the question whether cyberterrorism in Africa is “real-life” or “fantasy”, a more difficult question of fear needs to be posed: Is fear of the unknown justified, or is fear only justified once the effects thereof are palpable or physical? A real-life cyberterrorism attack is yet to be identified and solidified in the annals of history, yet the fear thereof is ever-present and ever-growing. This fear is justified by increased cybercrime, and the increased vulnerability of international networks to the effects of malicious use of ICT to advance ideological causes of terrorist organisations.

Africa's fast-growing digital capabilities present both an opportunity and a threat. Governments in Africa need to work with multinational and civil society organisations to find suitable alternatives to provide cybersecurity, without encroaching on human rights. It is possible that clearing the field of ambiguous discourses on cybercrime and more specifically on cyberterrorism would assist in this task. If cybercrime is to serve as an umbrella term of which cyberterrorism is a sub-category, then that needs to be clarified, accepted, and addressed accordingly. If not, the concept of cyberterrorism needs re-examining to determine its overall validity in Africa and beyond. Terrorists that are active in African countries like Kenya and Nigeria have proven many times over that they are not only capable of adapting to modern change, but they welcome and embrace it. Thus, the African context of terrorism research needs to adapt to this change as well – all the while applying caution by remaining mindful of the African context of development. Technological development is happening fast – as can be seen in the information provided – but that does not indicate that cyberterrorism is imminent, it merely poses an opportunity to either curb the threat or fear even before it manifests to its fullest potential, or to fall on the wayside and be led by discourses as it trickles from international organisations that do not have access to the lived realities of African nations themselves.

Terrorists all over the world will always aim to make use of the best and most advanced resources at their disposal – be that short wave radios, drones or advanced cyber networks and attacks on information networks. Is this simply another manifestation that will continue to evolve as the threat of terrorism evolves, or will the fear and fantasy of cyberterrorism continue to haunt the dreams of Africans as they yearn for connectivity, online privacy and safety of information?

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Dr. Alta Grobbelaar is a researcher of Terrorism in Africa; Conflict Studies, Critical Discourse Analysis, Cyber Security in Africa, Terrorism Studies, Terrorism and the Media. She has been working as a Lecturer of Political Studies and Governance at the University of Free State Bloemfontein Campus since 2017.

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An Assessment of South Africa's Vulnerability to Terrorism Financing and the Counter-Terrorist Financing Framework¹

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Abstract:

Terrorism financing poses a direct threat to South Africa's national security as well as the integrity and reputation of its financial system. Terrorism financing has the potential to finance and enable terrorist activities locally and abroad. Over and above posing a security threat, it also impacts the integrity of non-financial institutions such as charities and non-profit organizations which could be exploited, often unwittingly, for the financing of terrorism. Terrorist groups make use of multiple methods to raise, move, store and/or use funds and exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of countries' regulatory, financial, law enforcement and security frameworks. Their techniques vary and depend on the sophistication and objectives of terrorists, terrorist organizations and their sympathizers. Terrorism financing investigations are usually extremely complex, particularly with regard to the identification of financiers and ultimate end-users of the generated funds. This is due to the myriad financial transaction mediums such as cash and crypto assets, the international nature of transfers between financial jurisdictions, the informal financial sector (e.g. Hawala), as well as the capacity and capability challenges faced by financial institutions, regulators, supervisory bodies and law enforcement agencies. Funds intended for terrorism related activities may be derived from legitimate as well as from illicit sources, making terrorism financing particularly difficult to detect, disrupt and prevent. The constant evolution of terrorism financing methods in response to new and increasingly sophisticated countermeasures remains a continual challenge locally and for international financial oversight bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional-style bodies. This paper will investigate and assess South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism financing and the counter-terrorist financing framework to effectively combat terrorism financing. The key issues to be appraised include an assessment of factors that contribute to SA's vulnerability to terrorism financing. A counter-terrorist financing framework adopted by SA.

Keywords:

Counter-terrorism, FATF, finance, South Africa, terrorism

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.198>

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Introduction

Terrorism financing can be defined as the financial and logistical support of any form of terrorism, individuals, entities or groups that encourages plans or engages in acts of terrorism that includes plans or intended plans to support or commit an act of terrorism (Levi and Gilmore 2003). Terrorism financing constantly poses a threat and risk to the national security, integrity and reputation of any country's financial system by enabling terrorist activities to thrive locally and abroad. Both financial and non-financial institutions such as charities and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) can be exploited negatively by being used as channels for terrorism financing acts. Different terrorist groups use multiple channels such as financial and non-financial institutions to raise, move, save, use funds and exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of countries' regulatory, financial, law enforcement and security frameworks. The terrorist modus operandi differs and is depended on the terrorist group's objectives, organizations and membership (Levi and Gilmore 2003).

In response to the increasing threats posed by terrorism financing, many countries, including SA have adopted different counter terrorism measures. These measures seek to stop the flow of illegal cash to terrorist organizations (Ryder, 2022). However, it is important to note that addressing the threat presented by terrorism financing demands a global, coordinated and unified response. This is because the investigation process for counter terrorism financing is usually lengthy and extremely complex as it entails identifying financiers and the ultimate end user of the generated funds. The investigation process is complicated by the countless financial transactions avenues used such as cash, crypto assets, the international transfer nature used between financial jurisdictions, the informal sector (Hawala). The capacity and capability challenges experienced by financial institutions, regulators, supervisory bodies and law enforcement agencies also complicate the terrorism financing investigations. Furthermore, terrorist groups use legitimate as well as illicit sources to generate funds, which makes terrorism financing difficult to detect, disrupt and prevent. Thus, there remains a continual challenge locally and internationally to investigate terrorism financing because of the constant evolution of terrorism financing methods in response to new sophisticated countermeasures (Levi and Gilmore 2003). This paper will seek to assess South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism financing and the counter-terrorist financing framework adopted by the country. The subsequent section will assess factors that contribute to South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism financing.

An Assessment of Factors that Contribute to SA's Vulnerability to Terrorism Financing

South Africa is facing numerous terrorism financing vulnerabilities and risks which are perpetuated by many factors such as the porous borders, challenges in addressing the

informal economic sector as well as the use of often inadequately regulated alternative remittance system and mobile payment systems. The informal economic sector pose a terrorism financing threat to the country through the use of cash and alternative remittance services. The risk associated with the use of cash is attributed to the fact that it is accessible, largely untraceable and anonymous. The use of cash also poses a cross-border movement risk as it can be used by South Africans and/or foreigners in transit as a channel to fund terrorist groups and their activities in a foreign country. These risks increases when South Africans travel to high-risk countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen and areas on the African continent where terrorism activities have been declared such as Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. South Africans may travel to these countries to participate in the terrorism activities, be used as money mules or cash couriers to these areas from SA.

SA hosts a large émigré communities from countries associated with terrorism such as Somalia, Pakistan, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia. The presence of this émigré communities contributes to the threat of terrorism financing in the country through the use of cash that they sent to their home countries. The predominant use of cash in the émigré communities is in the form of remittances which is associated with the large informal economy in the country and neighboring countries. Remittances is usually understood as the money or goods that migrants send back to families and friends in their countries of origin (Levitt, 1998). The use of remittance services such as Hawala and mobile money payments by the émigré communities may be carried directly to a particular conflict country or neighboring countries where it can be carried overland across further borders. Various risks associated with the use of remittance services is the anonymity of the sender and recipient. This anonymity can make it difficult for service providers to identify the source of funds and the ultimate recipient. This anonymity can also make it difficult for service providers to identify the source of funds and the ultimate recipient which can lead to money laundering or other illicit activities. Additionally, the high volume of transactions increases the terrorism financing risks, which can make it difficult for compliance officers to manually monitor every transaction. This can create opportunities for criminals to exploit the remittance system (Levitt, 1998).

According to Nicoli et al. (2018) an estimated 25% of adults in the South African Development Communities (SADC) were reported to be using regulated remittance services while 8% were reported to be using unregulated (informal) channels such as friends and family (Nicoli et al., 2018, p. 8). Research conducted by the World Bank (2011) suggests that close to 80% of émigré communities in SA sent money home through the unregulated channels. Furthermore, the World Bank reports that SA has the largest outbound remittance markets outflow in Africa with recorded \$1.1 billion in outflows in 2022 (Gilbert, 2023).

The challenges associated with remittance outflow from the country is that it is difficult to detect and confiscate cash moved across borders, and outside the formal banking sector. For the country a significant challenge is to develop an alternative



remittance system that can be used for channeling funds by the vast émigré communities in the country. This is because the informal remittance system used currently by the émigré communities are unregistered, unregulated and operate outside the formal banking sector. It is equally challenging to distinguish between legitimate diaspora remittances for the maintenance and financial support of families in countries of origin and money syphoned off to fund terrorism related activities (Gilbert, 2023).

The second terrorism financing vulnerability factor is porous borders. The porous borders of the country have enabled international terrorist individuals and groups to travel in and out of the country undetected by using fake SA travel and identity documents. Many of the international terrorists are attracted by the unique geographical position and status of SA as a regional economic hub in Africa. Additionally, the sophisticated financial system of the country makes it attractive for terrorist and their supporters as well as making it vulnerable to being used for terrorism financing. Porous borders as a results of poor controls at the land and sea entry points as well as the borderlines are common in Africa, making the continent vulnerable to undetected movement of terrorist individuals and groups. The easy access and undetected entry movements into the country allows suspected terrorist individuals and groups to illegally enter the country and extend their stay to avoid detection. This international terrorist groups often link up with local terrorist groups in the country to become a channel through which funds are collected or transmitted to terrorist groups in the region as well as worldwide (Rédaction Africanews, 2006).

Although SA has never battled with jihadist attacks, the current terrorist activities in Northern Mozambique have brought the terrorism threat closer. There has been a recorded cross-border movement of small number of terrorist suspects between SA and Mozambique in the past. The terrorist suspects cross the border with cash to be used for personal consumption or to fund the activities of the insurgents in Mozambique. SA is also vulnerable to being seen as providing funding for terrorist attacks in Mozambique, Somalia and Kenya based on the fact that the country hosts a large number of émigré communities from these countries (Rédaction Africanews, 2006). There is a high possibility of international crime syndicates and refugees travelling through the region to abuse SA by facilitating the movement of cash or other assets to terrorist groups in the region.

South African border security is challenging because of its numerous lands, sea, and airports of entry for international travelers. Multiple South African law enforcement agencies police its borders, but they are often stove piped. Inadequate communication and equipment limit their border control ability. The Department of Home Affairs in 2016 submitted to Parliament the Border Management Authority Bill to create an integrated and coordinated agency to ensure effective control of the border. President Ramaphosa signed the Border Management Authority Bill into law on July 2020. CT measures at the international airports include screening with advanced technology X-ray machines, but land borders do not have advanced technology or infrastructure.

Trafficking networks use these land borders for illicit smuggling, and South Africa does not require neighboring countries' citizens to obtain visas for brief visits. SAPS internal affairs office investigated corruption allegations related to illicit sale of passport and other identity documents in the Department of Home Affairs, but utilization of illegitimately obtained identity documents continues (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

The third factor is charities, Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), which play a critical role in providing educational, religious and humanitarian services in the country. SA has a large footprint of charities and NPOs which play important roles in the daily lives of many people, however they can also be exploited and used as channels of raising, storing and diverting funds towards terrorism financing. South African-based NPOs and charities are vulnerable to potential abuse by terrorist groups despite the fact that they are not currently assessed as posing a significant terrorism financing risk. Although there have been no terrorism financing convictions related to the South African NPO sector, the prevalence of cash and specifically charities operating near or in conflict zones associated with terrorism pose a higher terrorism financing risk. These charities and NPOs, or individuals within the charities and NPOs are at risk of being exploited by terrorist groups in these areas (Bissett, 2023).

Funds collected in South African communities, ostensibly for benevolent causes, through crowd funding or donations, and channeled abroad for humanitarian aid could potentially be intercepted and siphoned off by terrorist groups. Some donors may willingly provide donations to support these groups as a means to support a particular call for aid and assistance, while other donors, and the charities and NPOs themselves, may be coerced, extorted or misled about the purpose of funding. The possibility that funds channeled by local charities and NPOs to international NPOs and aid organizations can also be used to disguise funding to foreign conflict zones and terrorist groups. The risk of potential terrorism financing abuse could increase if funds collected are channeled through less formal, unregulated and start-up entities. It is likely that funds collected could be sent via conduit countries to conflict zones making it more difficult for financial institutions to link international money transfers directly to terrorism. Conduit entities may also be used to channel terrorism financing to evade resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (Bissett, 2023).

Counter-Terrorist Financing Frameworks Adopted by South Africa

South Africa has enacted Laws and Acts to assist in countering terrorist financing in the country. In addition to the Acts, the country is a signatory member to organizations both on the continent and internationally to help combat terrorism financing. The Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA) was enacted to introduce measures to combat organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities. The Act also provides for the prohibition of money laundering and for an obligation to



report certain information (Republic of South Africa, 1998). Another Act is the Financial Intelligence Centre Act No 38 of 2001 (the FIC Act) established to combat money laundering activities and financing of terrorist activities. The intelligence Centre applies the FIC Act to perform various duties such as imposing certain duties on institutions and other persons who might be used for money laundering purposes and the financing of terrorist and related activities. They implement financial sanctions and administer measures pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations. They provide for risk management and compliance programmes, governance and training relating to anti money laundering and counter terrorist financing. They facilitate the registration of accountable and reporting institutions as well as acting as a supervisory body with powers to conduct inspections. The Centre has the authority to regulate certain applications to court, provide for administrative sanctions that may be imposed by the Centre and supervisory bodies. The Centre has the authority to amend the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 1998, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Republic of South Africa, 2001).

The FIC Act introduces a regulatory framework of measures requiring certain categories of business (accountable institutions) inter alia an authorized user of an exchange, a collective investment scheme manager and a financial services provider to take steps regarding customer due diligence, record-keeping, reporting of information to the Financial Intelligence Centre and internal compliance governance. The Financial Intelligence Centre uses this financial data reported to it and other available data to develop financial intelligence, which it is able to make available to the competent authorities i.e. law enforcement agencies, South African Revenue Services and supervisory bodies for follow-up with investigations or to take administrative action (Financial Intelligence Centre, 2017). The Financial Sector Conduct Authority (the FSCA) is responsible to supervise and enforce compliance with the FIC Act by authorized users of an exchange, collective investment scheme managers and financial services providers. The FSCA has delegated its obligation to supervise authorized users to the licensed exchanges. The FSCA may, however, still take enforcement actions against authorized users (Republic of South Africa, 2001).

In 2004 government established another counter terrorism financing Act called The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA). PCCA is the primary law governing anti-bribery, corruption prevention and enforcement in South Africa. It applies to organizations based in the country and those based outside but doing business in the country. Additionally in 2004 the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (POCDATARA) was established. The Act provides for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities. To provide for counter-terrorism measures on terrorism offences and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities. To support international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities as well as providing for a mechanism to comply with binding United Nations Security Council Resolutions. To provide for measures to

prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities including conducting investigations in respect of terrorist and related activities (Republic of South Africa, 2005).

In July 2020 Through the POCDATARA Act, South African police arrested individuals in South Africa with Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) propaganda, weapons, and flags. The court was also able to arrest and charge Sayfudeen Del Vecchio and Fatima Patel, in 2018 with murdering British-South African dual nationals Rodney and Rachel Saunders. In 2019, South African Police arrested four members of the National Christian Resistance Movement, a white supremacist group that allegedly planned attacks on shopping malls, informal settlements, and government installations. The four suspects were charged under the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act. Two members were found guilty and sentenced in December for an effective eight years' imprisonment for preparing and planning to carry out acts of terrorism. Their leader Harry Knoesen was sentenced by the Mpumalanga court to two life terms and 21 years behind bars for terrorism-related offences (McCain, 2022).

In early November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury levied sanctions on associates and companies of Farhad Hooper, an alleged South African Islamic State (IS) cell leader (Maack, 2023). According to U.S. authorities, Hooper headed an IS cell in Durban, which he organized in 2017-2018. The cell is believed to have provided technical, financial, and material support to IS in southern Africa. In addition, the sanctions indicate that the IS cell was mainly raising funds for IS operatives elsewhere in Africa, such as in Mozambique and the Congo, for conducting kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extorting major businesses, which provided more than one million South African rand (around \$60,000 dollars) in revenue for the cell (Maack, 2023). The sanctions targeting Farhad Hooper shine a light on ISIS's attempts to exploit Africa's most industrialized economy to raise and move funds to support the growth of ISIS affiliates and networks in Africa. There are other innovative fundraising methods used by ISIS such as using fake Tinder profiles in an attempt to catfish and blackmail South Africans into funding the organization. Using fake profiles set up by IS militants and photos of lesser known actresses and models, they target South Africans by asking them to share intimate pictures of themselves. These ISIS profiles then use these photos to blackmail the targeted individuals by demanding payment, which is then funneled to the ISIS leadership (Maack, 2023).

However, South African authorities seem to be struggling with the terrorism caseload. This was evidenced by the U.S. Treasury Department's announcement on Hooper after the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria and other Western countries' embassies issued a security alert about a possible terrorist attack in the upper class Sandton commercial district of Johannesburg (Fabricius, 2022). The attack did not occur, as a result of the heightened security prompted by the alert. South African politicians,



including President Cyril Ramaphosa, nevertheless criticized the U.S. for issuing a public alert without consulting with South African authorities (Rédaction Africanews, 2022).

In addition to the above Acts, South Africa is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that leads global action to tackle money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing. FATF is essentially a policy-making and standard setting body that promotes policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF researches how money is laundered and terrorism is funded, promotes global standards to mitigate the risks, and assesses whether countries are taking effective action. FATF continuously monitors how criminals and terrorists raise, use and move funds. As countries put in place effective measures to disrupt illicit financial flows, criminals also find alternative ways to launder their dirty money. FATF regularly publishes reports that raise awareness about the latest money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing techniques so that countries and private sector can take the necessary steps to mitigate these risks (FATF, 2023).

The FATF Recommendations, ensure a coordinated global response to prevent organized crime, corruption and terrorism. They help authorities go after the money of criminals dealing in illegal drugs, human trafficking and other crimes. The FATF also works to stop funding for weapons of mass destruction. The FATF continuously strengthens its global standards to address new risks, such as the regulation of virtual assets, which have spread as cryptocurrencies gain popularity. The FATF monitors countries to ensure they implement the FATF Standards fully and effectively.

In total, more than 200 countries and jurisdictions have committed to implement the FATF's Standards and they are assessed with the help of nine FATF associate member organizations and other global partners, the IMF and World Bank. The FATF holds countries to account that do not comply with the FATF Standards. If a country repeatedly fails to implement FATF Standards, it can be named a Jurisdiction under Increased Monitoring or a High Risk Jurisdiction. These are often externally referred to as "the grey and black lists" (FATF, 2023). For example: on 24 February 2023, FATF took the decision to include SA on its grey list by classifying it as a jurisdiction under increased monitoring. SA was subjected to an onsite visit by FATF in 2019 where it was assessed on its compliance with the FATF recommendations. SA was given 67 recommendations to act upon by the FATF with the following areas requiring corrective action state capture, money laundering risks, law enforcement, and inadequate records and monitoring of beneficial ownership and judicial capacity.

The 2021 follow-up report that supplemented the 2019 report and included 12 shortcomings in SA's anti money laundering and counter terrorism financing framework propelled FATF to conclude that the legal framework of the country was incapable of addressing the scope of risks within the FATF mandate. They concluded that the

legislated areas lacked the necessary implementation oversight. SA was thus given one year to report on the progress made to achieve the recommendations set out in the 2021 report, failing which the country would be added to the list of "jurisdictions under increased monitoring" (the "grey list") at the following FATF plenary meeting in February 2023. At the plenary meeting, the FATF determined that South Africa had serious weaknesses in its Anti Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) framework and had not successfully demonstrated sufficient compliance with the Recommendations. This posed a threat to the international finance system and as a result South Africa was added to the grey list (Department of National Treasury, 2023).

South Africa is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). ESAAMLG is a Regional Body subscribing to global standards to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism and proliferation. Its 20 Member Countries are Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe and includes a number of regional and international observers such as Commonwealth Secretariat, East African Community, FATF, IMF, SADC, United Kingdom, United States of America, UNODC, World Bank and World Customs Organization. The United Kingdom and United States of America have been cooperating and supporting nations of the organization since it was established in 1999 (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, 2021).

Their main objectives are to adopt and implement the 40 Recommendations of the FATF which are divided into seven distinct areas such as AML/CFT Policies and coordination, money laundering and confiscation, terrorist financing and financing of proliferation, preventive measures, transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements, powers and responsibilities of competent authorities and other institutional measures, international cooperation. Other objectives are to apply anti-money laundering measures to all serious crimes, implement measures to combat the financing of terrorism, implement any other measures contained in the multilateral agreements and initiatives relevant to prevention and control of laundering of proceeds of all serious crimes and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ESAAMLG efforts includes coordinating with other international organizations concerned with combating money laundering, studying emerging regional typologies, developing institutional and human resource capacities to deal with these issues, and coordinating technical assistance where necessary. It enables regional factors to be taken into account in the implementation of anti-money laundering measures (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, 2021).

Despite the established CTF laws in the country as well as being a member of the both the international and continental organizations SA has failed to effectively address the terrorism financing threats. This failure to deal effectively with terrorist financing has a host of causes such as problems in the intelligence, detection and prosecution services



as well as the fact that the country is still recovering from the ravages of state capture during Jacob Zuma's presidency. These issues are aggravated by political factors such as an ideological disposition to underestimate the terror threat and see it as an obsession of the West. The FATF report alluded to this by noting that South Africa's reluctance 'to classify politically motivated violent acts as terrorism' was constraining its ability to tackle terrorist financing. Apart from increasing the risk of violence, these failures will damage South Africa economically. The February 2023 FATF grey listing ratings has the potential to lead to a ratings downgrade, followed by decreased investment and reduced trade if SA is placed on this rating for a long period.

With the grey-listing, the country needs to continue working to improve their counter-terrorism financing frameworks. The country needs to make improvements to meet the FATF recommendations requirements in the outlined areas. The country also needs to continue strengthening its capability to fight money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, and other financial crimes. This will principally be for the benefit of the country, its economy, its financial system, and also for the safety and security of the country's citizens. In this regard, continuously improving the integrity of the financial system is not merely an FATF exercise, but rather part of government's objectives for the regulation of the financial sector. The Department of National Treasury must continue to strengthen and expand anti-money laundering (and combatting terror finance) systems in the financial sector, to minimize perceived risks relating to this sector, including from new and emerging risks (e.g. crypto-related risks). This is because the biggest economic risks of being grey-listed is related to the withdrawal of banking and payments services necessary for trade, remittances, and other transfers and economic growth.

Conclusion

The strengthening of the working relationship between the following role players in the country is important in ensuring that the country acts and addresses the recommendations made by the FATF. The Minister of Finance, and the South African Police Service (SAPS) responsible for investigating terrorism financing cases and offenses pertaining to terrorism, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) that deals with fraud, corruption, and serious maladministration in state institutions. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) including the National Prosecuting Services (NPA: NPS) which institutes criminal proceedings on behalf of the State. The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (NPA: PCLU) which manages and directs investigations into and prosecutes all offenses under the POCDATARA (including Terrorism Financing), non-proliferation offenses, as well as other serious crimes impacting on State security. Specialized Tax Unit who guides investigations into and prosecutes tax cases.

The Asset Forfeiture Unit (NPA: AFU) which implements the freezing and forfeiture provisions in respect of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, as well as freezing obligations created under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. The Investigative Directorate (NPA:ID), which has special investigative powers to address serious and complex economic crimes with a focus on the crimes detected by the Commissions of Inquiry into State Capture (Zondo Commission), the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), and the SARS. The NPA: ID is also mandated to investigate and prosecute statutory offenses including contraventions of, inter alia, the POCA and the FIC Act. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) which is the tax and customs authority. Along with the SAPS and the National Immigration Branch (NIB) of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). The SARS is involved in controlling the movement of people and goods across the border. The SARS investigates tax offenses of which tax evasion is a predicate offense to terrorism financing. Finally, the State Security Agency (SSA) which is responsible for the domestic and foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence security. It coordinates all counterterrorism and terrorism financing investigations in its capacity as the chair of the CTFC.

The strengthening of the important role players and improving their working relationship will help South Africa take control of its counter-terrorism framework. This will also help the country achieve restoration of its international and domestic confidence. Therefore, determined and concerted action is needed by all government agencies involved – including better cooperation with other governments.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Countering Extremist Violence and Terrorism in Cabo Delgado: (How) Can Past Peace-Building and DDR Lessons Be of Use?¹

János Besenyő² and Éva Hegedűs³

Abstract:

Radical Islamic insurgency and violent extremism have claimed over 5,250 lives and forcibly displaced at least 734,000 people in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique over the past six and a half years. Counter-insurgency efforts of the government to date have mainly focused on a military- and security-based response, paying less attention to the structural drivers of extremist violence, such as socio-economic inequalities, poor governance, historic ideological, ethnic and religious oppositions, and an incomplete peace-building and reconciliation process from the post-civil war period. The paper examines how Mozambique can learn from its past peace-building and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) experience, build on the achievements while also correct the shortcomings, which have equally contributed to the rise of violence. It also analyses ways to implement a tailored, inclusive, and effective strategy of Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE), building on the past but linking it to present needs and future challenges. Addressing long-standing root causes, focusing on youth and their communities, and furthering reconciliation are just a few areas, among others, to focus on to ensure that a heavy military response does not undermine the prospects of long-term peace.

Keywords:

Counter-terrorism; countering and preventing violent extremism, peace-building; DDR, Mozambique

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.244>

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1. Introduction

Since October 2017, radical Islamic insurgents have staged more than 2,190 attacks in the province of Cabo Delgado, in northern Mozambique (ACLED, 2024). Violence has also spread over to Niassa province and the border areas with Tanzania. The group called *Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo/Ansar al-Sunna* or in short *Al-Shabaab*⁴ targets both military and police forces as well as civilians, with a total death toll of more than 5,250 to date. Violent extremism has also displaced at least 734,000 people who had to seek temporary refuge among host communities and internally displaced camps elsewhere (UNOCHA, 2024). Displaced people require continuous humanitarian assistance including a safe place to stay, food, healthcare, psycho-social support, and protection. Most of them have limited hopes to return home due to the persisting risk of further attacks.

The violence has also halted major investments that are critical for the economic development of the country that is among the ten poorest in the world (UNDP, 2023). Following the attack in Palma on 24 March 2021, the main investor Total Energies has suspended its liquified natural gas (LNG) extraction project, which was the largest foreign investment project in Africa worth US\$20 billion, for an indefinite term (Total Energies, 2022).

The insurgency takes place in one of the most impoverished, remote, and rural areas of Mozambique, with analysts arguing that Cabo Delgado has long been ripe for conflict (ICG, 2021, p. 4). The government has been historically (and purposefully) neglecting the province, characterised by extreme poverty and income inequality, low socio-economic indicators, weak governance, endemic corruption, and widespread organised crime (Faria, 2021, p. 6-8). This is despite the great economic potentials that Cabo Delgado would have thanks to its fertile land, access to the sea, touristic sights, and a wealth of natural resources. Most significantly, the exploration of the recently discovered vast LNG deposits, the biggest on the continent, could boost economic growth and socio-economic development for the country with billions of dollars over the coming decades, if revenues are well-managed and distributed. The population of Cabo Delgado, especially its youth, has, however, little benefitted so far from all these potentials. On the contrary, they have experienced lost livelihoods, land grabs, pollution and forced resettlements (Faria, 2021, p. 6; Rawoot, 2020). These have further fuelled the centuries-long oppositions between the north and the south, and their dominant political, ethnic, and religious groups, paving the way for an escalation of violence.

⁴ The name *Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo/Ansar al-Sunna* meaning ‘supporters of tradition’, and the name *Al-Shabaab* means ‘youth’ in Arabic. Habibe et al. (2019) have found the group to be linked to the Somali *Al-Shabaab*. Alden and Chichava (2020) as well as ACLED reports (2024) confirm links to the Islamic State, even though Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2021) have doubted any meaningful connection to the latter.

The situation not only presents a serious humanitarian problem, and a local and regional security risk affecting both people and the economy. Faleg (2019, p. 1-7) also calls it a ‘test case for a renewed international focus on conflict prevention’, which, in case of failure, may render the country into a ‘hotspot of instability’. Whereas, in case of success, ‘a model for sustainable resilience and peace maintenance’, referring to the – in a way, still ongoing – peace-building and maintenance efforts since the early 90s. This task has become more complex, however, with the appearance of a radical Islamist and violent extremist non-state armed group and the different facet of armed conflict compared to that between the FRELIMO and RENAMO in the past.⁵

This also requires new approaches and techniques that cover the various elements and tasks of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as well as prevention, deradicalization and disengagement. This paper explores how Mozambique can build on its past peace-building and DDR experience, including capitalizing on the achievements and correcting the shortcomings thereof to support its efforts on Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism (hereinafter C/PVE) in Cabo Delgado. It also analyses where the focus should lie as part of completing the so far incomplete DDR and implementing C/PVE, with a close integration of the two. In examining the above, the paper builds on two hypotheses, namely: 1) The shortcomings of the peace-building and DDR process are contributing factors, among others, to the insurgency; and 2) C/PVE efforts can and shall build on past peace-building and DDR experience and their general elements to ensure that transformation, if achieved, is long-term and sustainable.

The first two chapters provide a short overview of the insurgent group and the government’s counter-terrorism approach until now. This is followed by a review of DDR and C/PVE including the clear and potential linkages and synergies between the two. The fourth chapter goes through point-by-point on how one can build on lessons from the past to counter violence and radicalisation and further a more durable peace. Finally, the Conclusion summarises the main arguments and notes some complementary issues that are also to be considered in and for an effective response to the insurgency.

2. The Insurgents and Their Motives

The insurgents are typically young and marginalised men, such as poor and frustrated farmers, fishermen, petty traders, and unemployed youth with no or little schooling (Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira, 2019, p. 15). They struggle with social integration; the need to care for big households; and ‘live in a constant fear of the unknown’. Most of them come from the area of the first attack, Mocímboa da Praia, but there are also

⁵ Mozambique’s ruling, previously Marxist, party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the anti-communist insurgent forces of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) fought a civil war between 1977-1992, with several instances of renewed hostilities after the 1992 peace accord up until 2019.



Tanzanians and Somali among them, alongside others from the Great Lakes region, the Middle East and South Asia (ICG, 2021, p. 4, and p. 29). Most of them do not speak Portuguese but are fluent in ethnic local languages and Kiswahili.

Group members have various incentives to join the group: the need to survive and meet their families' basic needs; to have a sense of belonging, community, and security, and to obtain a purpose of life and solutions to their complex problems (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 21-28). On the one hand, the group aims to combat Maputo's military and political authority and gain local power including increased political and religious representation and a fair share of the socio-economic benefits. On the other, they seek to establish a new society in the province ruled exclusively by hardline, fundamentalist Islam (Gartenstein-Ross, Chace-Donahue, and Clarke, 2021; Heyen-Dubé and Rands, 2021⁶). 'Jihad [is] the right extremism' for them to build a new political, economic, and social order and tackle political and economic exclusion, social inequalities, unemployment, and corruption (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 23).

Morier-Genoud (2020) notes that religion is only a 'rallying point' for local youth, the main drivers are material deprivation, poverty, marginalization, and lack of perspectives. Indeed, many of the youth members were not attracted to the group because of ideology or religion, nor were they required to be 'sophisticated adherents'; it was enough to be committed to an explicit opposition to local government policies and local Sufi and Wahhabi Islamic leaders (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 25), the latter two considered as a deviant from the 'real version of Islam' (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2019, p. 3). Some analysts also think that Al-Shabaab has only gone through an endogenous transformation from a radical Islamist sect into an armed violent jihadi group (Morier-Genoud, 2020). The Mozambican government has claimed a 'theory of conspiracy' behind the insurgency, with external actors attempting to hinder the country's development (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 33). The opposition RENAMO president, Momade, considered it as merely a power struggle within the national elite for the control of Cabo Delgado's resources (Morier-Genoud, 2019). Mozambique, as many other African countries, indeed struggles with severe corruption and competition among the political elite for individual rather than collective enrichment (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 24). Party loyalty and ethnic belonging play a key role in securing power, access, and control, leaving certain groups feeling excluded from political representation and economic benefits.

The country's historic ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity and dividedness adds another layer to the dynamics of radicalisation. Feeling politically and economically long side-lined, the Muslim-majority Mwani ethnic group that dominates Cabo Delgado in terms of numbers promotes violent extremism to achieve justice against the 'invader', Christian-majority Maconde. The Maconde control political and

⁶ Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2021) claim that the group has already abandoned Salafi-Jihadism, which is also one of the reasons why the group is not vocal about its ideological foundations.

economic life in the province, just as key positions in national and provincial governments and in FRELIMO (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2021). Cabo Delgado hosts a large number of former RENAMO combatants, who either have or not have gone through post-war DDR.

Finally, as Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2021) and Habibe et al. (2019, p. 28) describe, the group is mainly financed from the illicit local economy, including illegal trading of local natural resources, loan repayments, facilitation money to smuggling networks and human trafficking, including of sex slaves. In the longer run, the jihadist group might become more commercially than ideologically motivated due to their reliance on criminal proceeds.

The group's multiple motives are reflected in the selection of their targets: insulting local Islamic leaders in mosques; attacking state facilities such as police, defence, and security forces, economic establishments and convoys transporting gas; and raiding entire villages and civilians in urban areas, killing often indiscriminately regardless of religious affiliation or ethnicity (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2019, p. 5-6).

3. Approach So Far to Countering the Insurgency

While radicalization in the province has already been happening in the preceding years, it was the October 2017 attack in Mocímboa de Praia district⁷ that put Cabo Delgado in the centre of attention. Being under heavy pressure to contain the violence, the Mozambican government has so far taken a primarily military- and security-centred approach. Concerned of its sovereignty, the government initially intended to resolve the situation through own force, and (up until 2020) it did not accept any foreign help. It insisted that the insurgency is nothing else but a series of criminals' actions and foreign conspiracy to keep Mozambique poor (Nhamirre, 2021, p. 3). According to analysts, to some extent the socialist government also feared the threat of imperialism by asking other states to help to tackle its security problems. Furthermore, an international military intervention in Cabo Delgado, that is a major hub for trafficking illicit narcotics, which benefits, among others, members of the ruling political elite, would have meant increased scrutiny for the government (Cilliers, Louw-Vaudran, Walker, Els and Ewi, 2021).

As first measures, the government moved troops to the north, set up a regional military command and (in April 2018) passed a new anti-terrorism law that introduced heavy sentences (Faleg 2019, p. 4). It also concluded security agreements with Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. However, the severely under-equipped, illtrained and low-morale national military and police forces were

⁷ Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2021) claim that the group has already abandoned Salafi-Jihadism, which is also one of the reasons why the group is not vocal about its ideological foundations.



unable to defeat the insurgents (Demuyne and Weijenberg, 2021), who continued to advance and kept attacking remote and urban areas, government buildings, economic infrastructure, banks and so on. In a video broadcast, they also made clear their intention of ruling instead of FRELIMO and by the Law of Allah (Nhamirre, 2021, p. 3).

As a response, the government resorted to contracting foreign private militaries with limited transparency towards the Parliament and the public on its costs and terms. The two-month deployment of the Russian private mercenary Wagner Group (in September 2019), followed by the one-year (April 2020 – April 2021) ‘service’ of the South African Dyck Advisory Group were also unsuccessful in halting the insurgents⁸. In the meantime, local militia, composed of Maconde war veterans in the province, also mobilised themselves to block Al-Shabaab’s advance.

Finally, March 2021 marked a turning point in the government’s approach after the group had waged a massive attack on the town of Palma, killing some 2,500 people, including foreigners working on the LNG plant, and displacing a further about 700,000 people. This event both proved the seriousness of the conflict and internationalised it. The government decided to accept support from Portugal in training special forces; from the United States in patrolling the coast and countering maritime narcotics trade; and from France in training Mozambican authorities on state action at sea. Rwandan troops of 1,000 also arrived in July 2021, although this was again not approved by either the Mozambican Parliament or the Council of Ministers, nor provided for by any military cooperation agreement between the two countries.

Following a technical assessment mission, and despite the Mozambican government’s reluctance, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also deployed a 3000-strong Standby Force to help combat terrorism through ground, air and maritime assets and personnel (‘SADC mission’, 2021). The SADC Military Mission (SAMIM) started its first offensives in August 2021. Local and international observers welcomed this development for two reasons: on the one hand, to ensure a coordinated regional response to a problem that has evolved into a regional security issue; on the other, to find local, African solutions to the problem that serves local needs in a durable manner instead of foreign dominance⁹.

In November 2021, the European Union has also set up a (multinational) military training mission to train armed forces on operational preparation, counter-terrorism and the protection of civilians, humanitarian law, human rights law, and peace and gender (‘Military Training’, 2021).

Foreign troops – notably SAMIM and the Rwandan forces – have so far managed to significantly contain the advance of Al-Shabaab and the spread of extremist violence.

⁸ The government also engaged a third private company – a consortium of Burnham Global (from the United Arab Emirates) and Paramount Group (from the South African Republic) – in February 2021 to provide military training, equipment, and advice.

⁹ The SAMIM mission is now expected to withdraw by 15 July 2024 (ACLEDA, 2024).

Regardless, the insurgents are still active across Cabo Delgado. As Nhamirre (2021, p. 9) notes, over six years of terrorist insurgency (and over a decade of radicalisation) cannot be turned back and defeated in just a few months. This is only the stepping stone towards building peace and stability in the province.

3.1. DDR versus C/PVE: Linkages and Synergies

DDR is essentially a combination of four main elements to promote and create conditions for sustainable peace, security, stability, and development in post-conflict environments. Traditional (first-generation) DDR programmes used in the past start with disarmament: the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of all types of weapons and explosives held by combatants and often also by civilians; and the development of responsible arms management programmes (UNDPKO, 2010). This is followed by demobilization and reinsertion, through which combatants are formally discharged in a controlled manner (in designated sites, camps, centres etc.) and are provided with immediate transitional support to cover their and their families' basic needs (e.g., shelter, food, clothing, healthcare, short-term education, employment etc.) for a certain period up to around a year. This is followed by a long-term reintegration support, with an open timeframe, through which ex-combatants integrate back into civilian life and active socio-economic production. Participants of DDR programmes typically include adult male ex-combatants, but also women and children who usually fill support roles in armed groups (as cooks, sex slaves etc.).

Over time, as the characteristics of conflicts and the nature of armed groups have changed, DDR programmes have also evolved (Idris, 2016, p. 1). While traditional DDR programmes mainly focused on ex-combatants and included defined armed groups, the current, so-called second-generation DDR faces mixed types of (often radical, undisciplined and non-cohesive) armed groups with diverse motivations and many times blurred lines between combatants and civilians. First-generation DDR was normally started at the stage of peace, with the consent of the involved armed groups. Whereas in current DDR programmes, there is often no sign of peace yet and warring parties may be reluctant to participate. Second-generation DDR targets the broader community instead of individuals. It also promotes reconciliation between armed groups and communities, contains the level and forms of violence, and helps to rebuild and reinforce social institutions (Muggah and O'Donnell, 2015, p. 3).

Muggah and O'Donnell (2015, p. 5-12) also describe the emergence of a 'new generation DDR' that is even more complex and is connected to transitional justice, security sector reform and national development plans. It is more flexible and instead of following the traditional DDR 'formula', it is negotiated and adjusted to the local context. It often includes stabilization measures while peace is being negotiated. Very importantly, instead of the principle of voluntary agreement to participate, it can resort



to using force to engage the armed elements. It also incorporates Community Violence Reduction and active community mediation alongside a sociological approach to encourage former combatants to embrace new civilian identities instead of their privileged military ones.

C/PVE refers to non-coercive and systemic preventive measures that, in contrast to a security-based approach, address the drivers of adopting extremist views that potentially or eventually lead to terrorism (UNGA, 2015, p. 2). C/PVE activities essentially centre around four main elements: prevention, intervention, deradicalisation, and disengagement (Schmied, 2021, p. 70). The scope of C/PVE is very broad: it addresses any aspects that (may) push or pull individuals or entire communities to violent extremism. Some of these also form part of traditional conflict and violence prevention, peacebuilding, and development strategies and the strengthening of the state-society relationship. C/PVE has a whole-of-society approach, with concrete activities including, among others, cross-community dialogue; promotion of peace, democracy and human rights; education, job creation and social inclusion schemes; provision of livelihood assets and opportunities; sports, arts and spiritual programmes; strengthening of government and security sector (military and police) capacities; deradicalization programmes with religious and ideological debates (typically with detainees) and countering extremist propaganda in and through traditional and social media.

Today, in many contexts, DDR and C/PVE activities take place alongside each other. Fink argues that there is a ‘natural nexus’ between DDR, particularly second-generation and new DRR and C/PVE (including terrorist rehabilitation). While they do have differences, there are also several potential synergies among them and the two can ultimately inform each other (Fink, 2015, p. 66-74). Essentially, both aim at addressing immediate security concerns; stopping, and preventing violence; preventing recidivism; reinserting, and reintegrating previously violent actors into society; and enabling longer-term socio-economic development. Both aim to strengthen community resilience, foster constructive debate, and dialogue and promote education and economic opportunities. Both can take place in custodial and community settings. Both place an importance on the role that social networks, institutions and families play in shaping norms and violence (Cockayne and O’Neil, 2015, p. 147) and work to build and strengthen social bonds. Both focus on identifying ‘legitimate interlocutors as credible messengers.’

Particularly in case of C/PVE, community leaders, faith leaders, women’s and mothers’ groups, and civil society leaders may serve as better interlocutors than foreign actors since the legitimacy and authority of the latter are often rejected by terrorist fighters. Lastly, to prevent recidivism, both C/PVE and DDR have a component of disengagement (to change behaviour, such as use of violence) and deradicalisation (to change cognitive aspects, such as ideologies and beliefs).

There are also differences between them: while DDR is mainly reactive, C/PVE is rather proactive and preventive. DDR works at the level of broader group behaviour, while C/PVE focuses on individual-level conduct and outlooks (or only small group level at most), as radicalisation is a highly individualised process (Fink, 2015, p. 67). In case of DDR, where larger organised groups are the counterparts, group leaders have typically agreed to participate. In contrast, in case of C/PVE and terrorist rehabilitation, there is rarely any leadership agreement and ownership at the start.

4. The Case of Cabo Delgado: Building on Past Lessons to Counter Violence and Radicalisation

4.1. An Incomplete Peace-Building and DDR

Following – and thanks to – international, mainly Italian mediation, in 1992, the warring parties of FRELIMO and RENAMO laid down the arms and signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome. The United Nations Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was deployed and tasked to monitor the implementation of the agreement between December 1992 - December 1994. UNOMOZ played a critical role in putting (and keeping) the country on the path to peace and development, and its departure after its mandate expired left behind an incomplete DDR process (Reppell, Rozen and Carvalho, 2016, p. 7). Mozambique's newly elected government lacked post-conflict capacity and experience in DDR, which remained stalled in the first phase of disarmament. While civil society actors and the church and later also the government tried to move ahead the process, the demobilization and especially the reintegration of former combatants was not completed. As Ayissi (2021) notes, Mozambique continues to face the challenge of 'significant "remnants of war" comprising non-disarmed or inadequately demobilised ex-combatants', despite the large-scale peace-building and DDR effort, involving some 93,000 former RENAMO and FRELIMO troops. Reintegration is typically the 'Achilles heel of DDR' with those who have been successfully and sustainably reintegrated in Mozambique only forming the minority.

Following the departure of UNOMOZ, peacebuilding became 'synonymous with economic development'. While programmes such as the 7 Million Fund, the Peace Fund and the Development Observatory, which people associated with peace consolidation, were applauded, they failed to bring about sufficient and inclusive development opportunities and peace for the poor (Murdock and Zunguza, 2010, p. 63). Furthermore, while the Rome agreement brought peace on paper, Mozambique has been characterised ever since by a 'climate of negative peace' (Bussotti, 2021). Bussotti argues that the current Cabo Delgado events are another, more violent manifestation of this negative peace, with persisting socio-economic inequalities between the north and the south, and between the various ethnic groups.



4.2. Tackling Root Causes: Disarmament, Governance, and Development

The past three decades have shown that sustaining peace in Mozambique has challenges and there is no clear-cut recipe to how to do it. However, they have also pointed to a few underlying, systemic causes the addressing of which would contribute to tackling challenges including the rise of violent extremism.

As mentioned earlier, radicalisation and the choice of violent extremism is a highly individualised process. There are several push and pull factors which together may drive a person to violent extremist behaviour, typically through an individual pathway (UNGA, 2015, p. 7-10). Push factors are structural within the society and include elements of the context, for instance, socio-economic marginalisation and lack of opportunities, perceived or actual inequalities and injustices, human rights violations, prolonged and unresolved conflicts, poor governance, and radicalisation in prisons. Pull factors are psychological ones and refer to individual background and motivation. They range from individual or collective victimisation stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention; distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences by appealing social networks and charismatic leadership; to material and social benefits offered. What is relevant and works in case of one person may not be that same in case of another, depending on multiple factors (Fink, 2015, p. 67). Rapoport's concept on the 'waves' of terrorism also point to the interrelation between the social and political culture in which a terrorist group rises, and the impact of this on group members and the motivation (UNODC, 2018).

Experience from the post-civil war period and peace-building efforts in Mozambique show, although not surprisingly, that inclusive and equal economic development and peace-building considerations must go hand in hand. The latest government plans such as the Agenda 2025 and the National Development Plan (2015-2035) explicitly recognise the link between peace and development, as well as the potential for the re-emergence of armed conflicts and related threats such as a growing gap between the rich and the poor, systemic corruption, partisan struggle for power etc. (Reppell et al., 2016).

While these plans are highly visionary, and were built through a collaborative drafting process, their long-term visions are not coupled with clear and strategic short-term objectives and specific details of implementation. On the one hand, this has the tendency to reduce people's confidence in the genuineness of government efforts to effectively tackle local problems, such as the grievances in Cabo Delgado. On the other, it leaves space for mismanagement of resources and corruption, fuelling further discontent. Bridging the gap between economic development that benefits all, the consolidation of peace-building and democratization is necessary to ensure that related push factors towards violent extremism can be eliminated and that the north's 'forgotten Cabo' (and the country itself) can revert back from conflict.

As Reppell et al. (2016, p. 21) also argue, this should be guided on an overarching peacebuilding plan, or in the absence of it, a coherent set of peacebuilding priorities and processes across the intertwined areas of social and economic development, natural resource investment, decentralization, and DDR. According to the ICG (2021, p. 6), the government's Northern Integrated Development Agency, set up in March 2020, should have the central role in leading strategic consultations with the local population in the province on how resources should be allocated going forward, in line with the 2021-24 multisectoral Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado. This would help to ease tensions and start rebuilding trust with the disappointed communities, in addition to providing incentives to some of the militants to demobilise. Many security experts, government officials and community leaders are of the opinion, that it may not be possible to fully eradicate Al-Shabaab, thus the focus should be on stopping their expansion, squeezing their size, and winning them over through addressing their grievances including through gainful employment (ICG, 2021, p. 40). Channelling resources equally to the different ethnic and political groups, accounting for all development spending, involving RENAMO representatives in the development agency, and stepping up humanitarian assistance for the recovery of communities and livelihoods will equally be important to curb current tensions and avoid new ones.

As regards natural resources, the conflict-sensitive implementation of the 2014 Gas Master Plan – Mozambique's strategy to manage its LNG wealth and sustainable extraction –, should be paramount in addressing economic grievances and improve socio-economic conditions across Cabo Delgado. As Reppell et al. (2016, p. 18-19) also argue, given the dominant roles that private, for-profit oriented companies play in the LNG sector, their inclusion in macrolevel peace-building efforts should be important.

Similarly, the areas of decentralisation and political inclusion require more strategic government efforts and (political) will to tackle the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Post-war institutional reforms have not created an equal space for the opposition RENAMO (greatly backed by the Mwani) to partake in local governance. The parallel local governance system¹⁰ set up has only consolidated the ruling FRELIMO's position and power (Faleg, 2019, p. 2) vis-à-vis the opposition, paving the way for an insurgency. Greater local autonomy and inclusion in governance processes – i.e., tasks that have remained outstanding from post-war peace-building –, will be a pre-requisite for a sustainable solution to violent extremism.

Finally, disarmament (and the rest of the RENAMO DDR process) needs to be completed. Following the Rome Peace Accord, disarmament was not prioritised so as not to undermine the peace process in a context of mutual mistrust between the former warring parties (Faleg, 2019, p. 2). Thus, tens of thousands of weapons have remained in the hands of RENAMO combatants, who eventually used them again to try to force

¹⁰ The provinces and districts are accountable to the government, while municipalities have devolved autonomy in terms of resources, competencies, and power.



FRELIMO to cede power. Finally, the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation relaunched the DDR process, including a strengthened focus on demobilization and reintegration. The completion of the process will also positively affect the efforts to curb the expansion of Al-Shabaab, decreasing hinterland resources (arms, manpower and support) across Cabo Delgado.

4.3. Tackling Root Causes: Disarmament, Governance, and Development

The post-war period in Mozambique has seen the emergence of numerous **local peace-building civil society organizations (CSOs)**. On the one hand, this was an organic process given the paramount task of bringing and maintaining peace in a country ravaged by decades of conflict. On the other hand, it was also a necessary step as the government had neither the capacity nor the experience in peace-building processes, including in DDR, and this gap had to be filled (Murdock and Zunguza, p. 60). CSOs have built capacities of community and civil society leaders on alternative dispute resolution; developed relations with national and international stakeholders; and gained influence and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. As Reppell et al. (2016, p. 21) argue, the ‘current strength of Mozambique’s civil society comes at least in part from how it filled the space left by the UN and government DDR process.’

CSOs can continue to play an indispensable role in helping to tackle violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. As Gwinyayi (2022) argues, strong local ownership and co-management are ‘a critical cornerstone’ in the province’s ‘dynamic, complex, and unpredictable violent extremist environment’. In their new ‘mission’, CSOs can build on their established image of being an ‘impartial broker’ (Reppell et al., 2016, p. 26) that works for and with the population. There are also several lessons to utilise from the previous (though in some areas still ongoing) peace-building phase (Murdock and Zunguza, 2010, p. 60-61). The strategic focus should again be on rural and local level conflicts, with a need to ‘quiet the countryside’; and ensure that local conflicts do not escalate and destabilise the rest of the country. CSOs must again focus on the social fabric (while political, economic, and broader institutional and policy areas remain for the government); promote dialogue and peaceful resolution, shape minds and attitudes; and build relationships and skills, particularly important for the reintegration of combatants. In addition, involving and building the capacities of government officials in conflict transformation, conflict-sensitive and participatory governance, and development, remain important.

Religion and the church have an extremely strong influence in Mozambicans’ life. Most people are Roman Catholic (27 per cent), followed by Muslims (19 per cent), Zionist Christians (16 per cent), Evangelical/Pentecostal (15 per cent), believers of pre-

Conversion faiths/traditional African religions (5 per cent), and Anglicans (2 per cent). Only some 14 per cent of the population are non-practitioner (INE, 2017a¹¹).

The church was instrumental – in fact, the key protagonist – in bringing the civil war to an end and the parties to the negotiation table. There are various reasons and factors why this could succeed, which can also be ‘exploited’ in case of the Cabo Delgado conflict, given its religious layer. The churches’ deeply-rooted position in the society, regardless of the denomination, provide them with a power of influence at all levels, from grassroot community level up to top-level leadership (Reppell et al., 2016, p. 7). During the civil war, churches were also able to create social cohesion and build unity in a very diverse society, believing in and promoting the values of diversity, tolerance, consensus, dialogue, and reconciliation (Murdock and Zunguza, 2010, p. 54-55, and p. 63). In addition, they managed to capitalise on political developments (such as the transition to a multi-party system, democratisation, institutional reforms etc.) to grow and seize the momentum for peace.

C/PVE literature highlights that religious re-education may form part of the package to demobilise, deradicalise and reintegrate combatants, especially if recruitment is (also) happening through religious networks and establishments (imams, mosques etc). It may not be relevant for every Al-Shabaab participant, however, as not all join out of reasons of religious ideology. At the same time, at group level it may encourage some level of community healing. The selection of the right interlocutor is key (albeit challenging in most cases) as experience shows that this essentially defines the success of the rehabilitation effort (Fink, 2015, p. 72). Government or law enforcement officials or other representatives who are seen as closely aligned to the opposite may not be considered as legitimate and trusted by Al-Shabaab to engage with on spirituality, theology, and ideology.

Given Mozambique’s historical dividedness based on religious affiliation (in addition to geographic and ethnic basis), the promotion of interreligious dialogue and of the principles of cohabitation, respect, forgiveness, and reconciliation need to be sustained and intensified within the different orientations of Islam, Christianity, and other recognised religions.

4.4. Focusing on Youth, Women, and the Community

As described earlier, the great majority of Al-Shabaab members are marginalised and **disillusioned youth** who have resorted to violent extremism to seek solutions to their complex set of problems. The sense of alienation, frustration and powerlessness is a general trend among young Mozambicans across the province and the country, especially in rural areas and urban peripheries (Faleg, 2019, p. 5). Young people aged

¹¹ For 3 per cent of the population, the religion is unknown.



15-34 make up 30 per cent of Cabo Delgado's population (INE, 2017b), and most of them have no or minimum level of education and functional literacy.

Thus, C/PVE and DDR efforts must treat them as a priority target group to tackle violence and its underlying drivers. The need to empower youth is also specifically highlighted by the UN Plan of Action on Violent Extremism (UNGA, 2015, p. 17), recognising their central role in taking up the 'causes of peace, pluralism and mutual respect'. The Action Plan recommends activities, some of which are highly relevant for the Cabo Delgado context: the integration of young women and men in local decision-making and the political discourse; meaningful involvement in peace-building and C/PVE activities; mentoring programmes in preferred fields; community service opportunities; and small grants to young social entrepreneurs to develop their ideas on strengthening community resilience to violent extremism.

Furthermore, as Nhamirre (2021, p. 9) points out, youth captured should be included in deradicalisation and social reintegration programmes, complemented with technical training courses to facilitate their local employment, including in the province's LNG industry. Training and educational opportunities can have both a responsive and preventive nature: to enhance constructive and viable employment opportunities outside extremist groups; to provide means of support upon release; and to discourage youth to join violent extremist groups out of economic necessity or to find solutions through the means of force (Fink, 2015, p. 70). Another lesson from the past DDR process is that providing support with and for reinsertion and reintegration prior to disarmament and demobilisation, e.g., through employment and education opportunities, can create incentives for defection (Idris, 2016, p. 2-3). Especially in contexts where poverty and un- or underemployment is among the drivers of extremist recruitment, formal and non-formal education opportunities (including via alternative means such as sports and arts) help to develop critical thinking skills, raise awareness about diversity and challenge extremist narratives (Fink, 2015, p. 70). This is the case in Cabo Delgado and highly relevant in the context.

In addition to youth, **women** should also be given a central role in bringing about and sustaining peace, and in tackling violent extremism including its multiple drivers. As noted by the UN Plan of Action on Violent Extremism (UNGA, 2015, p. 18), societies with higher gender equality indicators are less vulnerable to violent extremism. Concrete actions, recommended by the Plan, that are also applicable in the Cabo Delgado context include: the identification of specific drivers that lead women to join Al-Shabaab; the inclusion of women in national law enforcement and security agencies; the building of women's capacities in preventing and responding to extremist violence; and the addressing of specific needs women have either being affected by violence or as an extremist group member to be disengaged.

Research has found that while the predominant majority of Al-Shabaab members are men, there are also some women in their ranks. Women are typically used for

housework, food preparation and reconnaissance of enemy military movements. Many are also forced to marry or have sex with group leaders. Generally, they are found 'easy to indoctrinate' (Habibe et al., 2019, p. 28).

Beneficiaries of DDR and C/PVE efforts should include these women, and going further, those who are family members (spouses and daughters) of (ex)-militants. Women (and girls) tend to be vulnerable to being excluded during DDR programmes due to lack of gender-sensitivity and capacity to address gender-specific needs, the risk of gender discrimination and stigma, and limited access to information and services (Idris, 2016, p. 8). Rehabilitation of female group members must focus on their likely post-release activities (Fink, 2015, p. 77) which may be very different from those of men, given the differing social roles and responsibilities. Women's specific needs also usually include separate shelter and sanitation facilities, counselling on and treatment of sexual- and gender-based violence, and support with reproductive health, childcare, and vocational training (Idris, 2016, p. 8). As past RENAMO DDR experience also shows, uniform reintegration packages, that are not sensitive to the diversity of group members and their needs based on age, gender, socio-economic status, and other factors are rarely effective, especially if the support is not part of a broader socio-economic process. In case the man as primary breadwinner is detained (as a captured combatant) or is absent due to other reasons, women must also receive targeted support as head of household to ensure that extremist groups cannot step in and fill the gap (Fink, 2015, p. 77).

This leads to the importance of considering the **broader community** of individual (ex-)combatants in Cabo Delgado in DDR and C/PVE strategies, particularly in the reintegration phase. As Gwinyayi (2022) argues, a 'whole-of-society' approach should 'pro-actively engage all affected individuals, families, and communities' to prevent recidivism, mitigate further radicalisation, and strengthen community resilience. DDR (but also C/PVE) programmes are not or less effective if they are not fully adapted to the local context, do not respond to local needs, and do not build on local capacities (Idris, 2016, p. 7). This was also one of the shortcomings of the RENAMO DDR process, which focused mostly on the ex-combatants, without considering the capacities and needs of families and communities expected to absorb ex-militants.

Family, religious and community relations are also important when it comes to influencing personal level behaviour and transforming mindsets. Research has found that changing the beliefs and practices of key people, who can then instigate change in others who trust them, has the potential to deliver systemic transformation (Murdock and Zunguza, 2010, p. 63). In cases, such as Al-Shabaab, when youth also seek a sense of belonging, community, and camaraderie, building on community and tribal connections and leaders, who are important pillars of the local social structure, should be considered. Typically, youth have their family relations lost or weakened, and violent extremist groups manage to exploit that, unless the community can offer alternative sources of support (Fink, 2015, p. 70).



4.5. Human Rights, Transitional Justice, and Reconciliation

For peace to be sustainable, linking DDR and P/CVE to transitional justice and reconciliation and protecting human rights are crucial (Reppell et al., 2016, p. 13). This requires a solid, well-functioning, transparent and impartial justice sector that provides guarantees for citizens either victims or perpetrators of crimes. Effective access to justice helps to build a mentality among the population that conflicts can be resolved through legal channels and through an intervention of the state, instead of having to use violence.

The 1992 Rome General Peace Accord and the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation granted ‘blanket amnesty’ to both sides, which essentially protected perpetrators and denied justice to victims, among them women, who were particularly impacted by armed violence (Weimer, 2020, p. 8.). In addition, it deepened the trauma, fear, and hatred towards former combatants. No formal reconciliation or restorative justice opportunity was offered to the war-torn population (Reppell et al., 2016, p. 15). Communities developed reconciliatory justice mechanisms building on traditional practices, but these lacked any macrolevel institutional design and direction. Community-level justice mechanisms ‘often [remain] the only option available to rural Mozambicans’. While community-level justice providers are important in certain contexts, including Cabo Delgado, ensuring access to formal justice mechanisms for all segments of the population is crucial, to offer institutional responses to violation of human rights. This would also help in reconstituting trust towards the state as well as between demobilised combatants and the communities they have harmed (Gwinyayi, 2022). This is particularly important in the case of Cabo Delgado as the government is willing to ensure amnesty to Al-Shabaab fighters.

Upon defection and/or demobilisation, combatants will require safe exit corridors with plans for reintegration into social and economic life, and as the ICG (2021, p. 45) argues, potentially also into the security sector in Mocímboa da Praia. Their human rights and safety will need to be respected, whereas high-level Al-Shabaab leaders will need to be prosecuted to also demonstrate to the public that justice is served in Mozambique.

The government has already been accused by human rights groups of arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, and extrajudicial executions of Al-Shabaab members and suspected collaborators as well as national and foreign journalists. Therefore, upholding international humanitarian law and human rights standards is essential to avoid the danger of further alienating the local Muslim population (Faleg, 2019, p. 4), since this may lead to new instances of radicalisation and incentives for violent extremism. Field practice shows that good treatment in detention can also yield positive transformation among demobilising combatants (Fink, 2015, p. 73).

Conclusion

The existing factors and underlying root causes are conducive to prolonging the insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2021). A long-term prolongation also requires a long-term and sustainable (re)solution. As argued in this paper, a security- and military-based counter-terrorism approach must be complemented with a broader set of tools focusing on addressing the various root causes of the insurgency and drivers of violent extremism. A comprehensive political settlement, as Evans argues, is generally a more viable way to disarm groups and achieve peace than by way of military dominance (Evans, 2016).

The strategy shall build on the successes but also shortcomings, and thus lessons, of past peace-building and DDR efforts as they still influence the local dynamics and developments of the context. The strategy must also be adapted to the complex and changing situation in Cabo Delgado and the threats, motivations, and nature of the radical Islamist group in question. Existing DDR tools and practices need to be adapted and integrated with C/PVE, as well as terrorist rehabilitation, and community violence reduction under ‘new generation’ DDR, to disengage and demobilise violent extremists. This will require, on the one hand, technical support to Mozambique (given past and limited experience). And on the other, a strong government ownership and recognition of the fact that the ultimate key to success is in the hands of the state, being in control of all national resources and decisions.

Timely action is necessary before violence ravages further and chances for transformation and effective prevention (further) decrease. Given the shrinking national and donor resources, securing funds may also become more difficult over time in line with the global trend (as highlighted by Idris, 2016, p. 7). The evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of C/PVE and terrorist rehabilitation programmes have rather been challenging to date (Cockayne and O’Neil, 2015, p. 148) due to the sensitivity of the topic, and limited access to participants and data. However, regular monitoring and evaluation would be critical in the Cabo Delgado context to ensure that any resolution strategies can build on learning and evidence and innovate based on the evolving context. Finally, the main government and non-governmental actors and stakeholders involved, either national or international, need to continually exchange and share their plans, lessons, and good practices. This is to ensure that the military- versus human-focussed approach and the structural and institutional changes complement and do not undermine each other, (further) destabilizing the chance for sustainable peace.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.



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Immigrant Security in a Culturally Different Environment. The Polish Experience after the Arab Spring¹

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Abstract:

Since the decolonisation of Africa - especially after 1960 - more and more people have been arriving from the African continent to Europe for settlement purposes. In 2017, the countries of the European Union there were already 9.1 million African nationals living in the European Union. Of this group, 5 million people came from North Africa (most from Morocco) and the rest from Africa south of the Sahara.

Poland is one of the countries in the European Union that has received many migrants from different parts of the world. Figures indicate that 2.1 million foreigners, mostly from Africa and Asia, will live in Poland in 2020. The possibility of frequent contact with immigrants has increased. Meeting a person of African origin in their place of residence is now declared by 39% of respondents, while in 2015 it was only 13%.

The attitude of Poles towards immigrants from Africa has also changed in recent years. Poles have become accustomed to the everyday presence of foreigners, as indicated by a clear increase in their level of acceptance in their immediate environment. An African as a close neighbour is now accepted by 84% of Poles (up from 61%) and as their son or daughter-in-law by 58% (up from 34%).

There is also a growing concern for keeping immigrants safe, especially when it comes to situations where their life or health may be at risk. However, difficulties arise due to differences in culture, religion, customs and the lack of a common language.

The paper will discuss and clarify these problems.

Keywords:

Arab Spring, challenges, immigrants, security services, threats

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.216>

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1. Introduction

Since the decolonisation of Africa - especially after 1960 - more and more people have been arriving from the African continent to Europe for settlement purposes. In 2017, the countries of the European Union there were already 9.1 million African nationals living in the European Union. Of this group, 5 million people came from North Africa (most from Morocco) and the rest from Africa south of the Sahara. There are different reasons for migrating to Europe: looking for work, getting an education, creating families. The latter was the main reason for legalising a presence in Europe for Africans.

From a European perspective, the last significant wave of migration in 2011, initiated by the Arab Spring, caused significant impacts on the European population. Data from the International Organisation for Migration, shows that more than 390,000 people moved to the European continent in 2016. Data also shows that in 2017 there were more than 180,000 irregular migrants and by November 2018, almost 130,000 had arrived, with more than 106,000 by sea and the rest by land (IOM 2019) (Skrabacz, 2020).

The increase in irregular immigration is the result of policy tightening of the EU. European countries are increasingly less likely to grant Africans (and not only) residence permits before entry. Meanwhile, as a result of destabilization in the Sahel region, climate change, armed conflicts and other threats, new migration routes to Europe have been created, and thus the number of migrants has increased. More and more people also have the financial and logistical opportunity to move from African countries to Europe to fulfill their aspirations in life.

Poland is one of the European Union countries that has received many immigrants from different parts of the world. The data shows that in 2020, 2.1 million foreigners from all over the world, including Africa, lived in Poland. The possibility of frequent contacts with immigrants has increased. Today, 39% of respondents declare meeting a person of African descent in their place of residence, in 2015 it was only 13%.

There is also growing concern in the host countries about ensuring the safety of immigrants. This is especially true of situations where their life or health may be directly or indirectly threatened. However, there are difficulties arising from cultural and religious differences, different customs and the lack of a common language. Therefore, the aim of the article is: firstly, to present the changes in the migration policy of the European Union that we have observed in the last decade, secondly, to indicate migration movements in Africa itself, especially in its northern and western parts, thirdly, to determine the changes that can be diagnosed in Polish society in perception of immigrants from Africa over the last few decades.

The main research problem for which the authors are looking for an answer was posed as follows: What changes have occurred in the migration policy of the European Union in the last decade and have they contributed to the increase in migration flows



from African countries? What factors attract African immigrants to Poland and how has the attitude of Polish society towards them changed in recent years?

To solve the research problem, a holistic approach was used, through the prism of EU policy and solutions adopted by the European Commission. In addition, the perspective of Poland as a culturally different country with an increasing number of immigrants has been adopted for detailed analyses. This implies changes in the perception of immigrants in the receiving society.

Among the research methods used to solve the research problem, an analysis and synthesis of the literature on the subject was used, especially reports of the International Organization for Migration and the European Union, as well as data obtained from reports of Polish research centers on migration. Then, using deduction and induction, trends in the environment of immigrants who chose Poland as the country of destination were indicated. It also identified the challenges faced by incoming and host communities in the migration process. The article ends with conclusions containing the most important conclusions resulting from the conducted research process.

1.1. Cooperation between the European Union and North African Countries in Tackling Illegal Immigration

Recent years have seen significant progress in addressing irregular arrivals, human trafficking and smuggling networks in Europe. However, irregular flows continue to put migrants at risk and present the European Union with serious migration challenges (European Commission, 2022).

The EU and its African partners have inaugurated two initiatives on migration routes in the Atlantic and Western and Central Mediterranean. These actions aim to bring together the joint efforts of Member States and the EU to address migration threats. The main concern is the increase in illegal flows and abuse by smuggling networks developed in some African countries.

Migrants and asylum seekers use the Central Mediterranean route to enter the EU in an irregular manner. They embark on the long and dangerous journey from North Africa and Turkey across the Mediterranean to Italy (and much less frequently to Malta). The vast majority of migrants on their way to Europe pass through Libya. This encourages the emergence of persistent and resilient smuggling and trafficking networks in the country. In February 2017, EU leaders agreed new measures to curb irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route. In November 2017, the EU established a joint task force on migration with the African Union and the UN. The group was meant to combine efforts and enhance cooperation in response to migration challenges in Africa and especially in Libya (Gatta, 2019).

Thus, large-scale voluntary humanitarian return programmes and evacuation operations could be launched. In June 2018, EU leaders called for further measures to reduce irregular migration on the Central Mediterranean route. It was decided to step up efforts to end the activities of smugglers operating from Libyan territory or elsewhere; to continue to support Italy and other EU frontline states; to give more support to the Libyan coast guard, humanitarian reception conditions for migrants and the voluntary return of those stranded in Libya to their own countries; to enhance cooperation with other countries of origin and transit and cooperation on resettlement (Campiglio and Ricci, 2022, pp. 320-322).

In July 2019 the EU approved 5 new migration programmes in North Africa worth a total of €61.5 million. The projects are designed to provide protection and assistance to refugees and vulnerable migrants, improve living conditions and strengthen the social resilience of Libyans, and promote migration and labour mobility (IOM, 2019).

The programmes were adopted under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The fund was established in November 2015 to address the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration and to help better manage it. The overall budget of the fund is more than €5 billion.

In July 2022 the European Commission launched the first anti-smuggling operational partnerships with Morocco and Niger for the period 2021-2025. Also, the first joint operations were launched between Frontex and Senegal and Mauritania. They aim to support border management, combat migrant smuggling and reduce irregular migration along the Atlantic route. There is also a working arrangement between Frontex and Niger in the field of common security and defence policy.

In November 2022, given the significant increase in migratory pressure on the Central Mediterranean route, the European Commission presented an EU Action Plan for the Central Mediterranean. The plan proposes 20 measures to reduce irregular and unsafe migration, address emerging search and rescue issues and increase solidarity, while spreading responsibility among Member States. The EU has launched major projects to support voluntary return and reintegration in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to this, a joint EU-IMO initiative for the protection and reintegration of migrants continues to provide assistance to migrants in distress in African countries.

In December 2022 the EU and African partners inaugurated the Team Europe initiatives, which focus, among others, on the Central Mediterranean route, and are intended to support the joint efforts of Member States and the EU to address migration challenges. Team Europe initiatives will support partner countries in providing protection, resilience and self-reliance, including life-saving assistance, to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Activities are being carried out in two areas. The first relates to the central Mediterranean, bringing together the European Commission and the European External Action Service with Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic,



Denmark, France, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, and - on the African side - Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Niger, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Nigeria. To date, the EU, its member states and Switzerland have agreed to mobilise €1.13 billion to work with African partners on the five pillars of the initiative. The second area concerns the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean route, which will be handled by the European Commission and the European External Action Service together with Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. So far, €908 million has been mobilised for cooperation with Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Nigeria (European Commission, 2022).

2. Diagnosis of Migration Movements in North and West Africa

We can assess the scale of migratory movements of African nationals to Europe using data from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat). Between 2008 and 2019, on average, several hundred thousand Africans migrated towards the European Union each year. Of course, these movements do not just take place between continents, but also occur between and within countries.

West and North Africa together comprise 10.4 million migrants and 21.8 million emigrants, representing 1.6 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively of the 633.2 million population. These are 2019 estimates from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (UN/DESA, 2019).

This overall level of international migration is relatively low (inward) or moderate (outward) compared to the global ratio of migrants to population estimated at 3.5 per cent. However, important differences can be identified between the two regions and between countries in each region. In North Africa, the three central Maghreb countries - Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia - are mostly senders of migrants. Their migrants, representing between 4.5 and 8.6 per cent of their populations, are mainly directed to Europe (JRC, 2019).

In contrast, few migrants come to their territory from West Africa as long-term settlers. Libya shows the opposite pattern. Despite political chaos and civil war, it remains a destination for hundreds of thousands of locally employed migrants. Its citizens still have a low propensity to migrate abroad, despite intensive internal displacement.

West African countries are both countries of origin and destination for mainly intra-regional and often temporary migration. Returning nationals account for a high percentage of internal migration each year and most countries have a low migration balance. Burkina Faso and Mali emerge as key emigration countries and Côte d'Ivoire

as a major destination country. Since independence (1960), Côte d'Ivoire has continuously been a magnet for migrants from across the West African region and beyond, with the exception of the years of political and social turmoil in the early 2000s. (IOM, 2020).

The migratory movements described are relatively dynamic, existing both within countries and beyond their borders. If we examine the reasons why people move, the main motives are to seek work, opportunities and livelihoods; to escape conflict, persecution, violence and human rights violations; to escape environmental degradation and/or food and water insecurity; and to join family members. Regardless of destination or reason for departure, migrants often share the same destinations (IOM, 2019).

When analysing the type and numerical scale of migration, it can be divided into two categories: legal and irregular. Within the former, a total of 56% of African arrivals in the EU-28 between 2008 and 2019 held a residence permit (visa) when they crossed the community border. They mostly came from Africa south of the Sahara (sub-Saharan). In the same years, as many as 87% of Africans, also from sub-Saharan Africa, attempted to cross the EU border illegally (Giménez-Gómez, Walle and Zergawu, 2019).

A sharp increase in migratory movements was particularly observed between 2014 and 2016, when many Africans without residence permits in Europe took advantage of the increased opportunity to cross the Mediterranean illegally into the European continent. Such a situation was linked to the crisis that began at that time, during which more than one million migrants from conflict-ridden South West Asian countries (mainly from Syria and Afghanistan) arrived in Europe (IOM, 2016).

The destination of irregular migrants was most often Italy, including the island of Lampedusa, Sicily and the Calabrian Peninsula. There, migrants flowed in most often from Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The second country was Spain, especially the Canary Islands and the Spanish enclaves on the African continent: Ceuta and Melilla. There, the largest number of immigrants was from nearby Morocco and Algeria. When arriving in Europe, migrants treated these countries as destinations, or as transit countries, moving on to other countries, including Poland (IOM, 2019).

3. Africans in Poland - A Case Study

Analysing data on migration movements in Poland at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, one can conclude that Poland was until relatively recently a country with a strong emigration rather than immigration trend. Data from the Central Statistical Office shows that from 1966 to 2016, emigration movements in Poland outnumbered immigration movements. This trend has changed since 2016 and remains at a comparable level, as shown in the table (Central Statistical Office, 2023).

Table. Migration flows to/from Poland between 1966 and 2022 (permanent migration):

Year	Emigration	Immigration	Migration Balance
1966	28843	2228	- 26615
2014	28080	12330	- 15750
2015	No data	No data	No data
2016	11970	13475	1505
2022	13633	15572	1939

Own elaboration based on CSO data.

The visible upward trend of immigration movements indicates that the second decade of the 21st century saw a change in migration flows in Poland, from emigration to immigration, as evidenced by the positive migration balance starting in 2016. Thus, the inflow of foreigners to Poland is systematically increasing, and the territory of the Republic of Poland is increasingly perceived as a destination and not just a transit country.

Interesting conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the data on the origin of people arriving in Poland. In general, between 1973 and 2022, 281,425 people came from Europe, 19,690 from Asia, a total of 55,857 from North and South America, 5,760 from Africa and 5,084 from Oceania (Central Statistical Office, 2023).

On the basis of a detailed analysis of the inflow of people from Africa, it can be indicated that the migration movement towards Poland began to gain momentum at the beginning of the 1990s (1990 - 87 persons; 1991 - 163 persons) and has continued at a similar level until the present (2021 - 131 persons; 2022 - 163 persons) (Central Statistical Office, 2023).

As researchers of migration processes note, the figures presented are for the whole of Africa, and therefore also for inflows from Arab territories to the north of the continent. The values for sub-Saharan Africa or so-called Black Africa are much lower. Only around 2,300 immigrants living in Poland come from this region. Thus, immigrants from the African continent as a whole account for less than 4.5 per cent and immigrants from so-called Black Africa for only 2 per cent of all foreigners living in Poland. The actual number of newcomers from the sub-Saharan African region is unknown and can only be the subject of estimates. The main country of origin of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria, whose citizens account for more than one third of all

immigrants from the region, followed by Cameroon, then Kenya and Angola (Danecka and Jaroszewska, 2013).

In terms of place of residence in Poland, Mazowsze dominates, followed by provinces such as Łódzkie, Małopolskie, Wielkopolskie and Dolnośląskie. Africans, like groups of other immigrants, prefer large urban agglomerations, with the highest concentration in Warsaw and in Łódź, Kraków, Poznań, Wrocław and the Tri-City. (Danecka and Jaroszewska, 2013).

Turning to the push-pull factors of immigrants to Poland, it is worth devoting more attention to this issue. From the qualitative (interview technique) and quantitative (survey technique) research conducted in 2022 by the 'Afryka Inaczej' Foundation entitled 'Africa in a different way.' *Afryka po polsku*, shows that among the factors attracting people to Poland, respondents most often mentioned: geographical advantages (landscapes, lots of greenery, diversity); economic factors; infrastructure development in recent years; economic development; living cheaper than in Western countries; safety, peace, lack of wars; Polish cuisine; national characteristics of Poles (hospitality, friendliness) (Ohia-Nowak and Duński, 2022).

Of course, in addition to the positive sides, negative factors that are perceived by Africans were also mentioned by the respondents. The following were mentioned: weather conditions (gloomy autumn and long winter); the political scene (division and polarisation of society by politicians, aggressive language of political debate, lack of State/Church separation); ignorance and closure to other cultures (lack of knowledge about other cultures, pervasive stereotypes about people of other origins, open and latent racism) (Ohia-Nowak and Duński, 2022).

In the analysis of the reasons for the low inflow of immigrants to Poland from the sub-Saharan African region, many scholars further point to the following barriers: relational - poor attitude of the Polish society; cultural - large cultural differences; communicational - poor (or lack of) language skills, differences in the sphere of non-verbal communication; climatic; untraveled paths - lack of tradition of migration to the country and an extensive migration network (Danecka and Jaroszewska, 2013).

What advantages and disadvantages do Africans believe Poles themselves possess? Among the most frequently mentioned advantages of Poles were: hospitality, kindness, helping others; openness and tolerance (especially among the younger generation); strong family ties; attachment to tradition; sense of humour; ability to unite in times of need.

Among the disadvantages mentioned were: complaining about everything, not being able to appreciate what is; being easy to judge and judge others; focusing on the past, martyrdom, putting oneself in the role of victims; fear of otherness resulting from complexes (Ohia-Nowak and Duński, 2022).



It is worth noting that the presented assessment of Poles is in line with the opinions of other nationalities, and also largely coincides with Poles' views of themselves.

4. Poles towards Immigrants from Africa - An Analysis of Attitudes and Behaviour

The image of immigrants of African origin is created in Poland, as in many other European countries, by a number of factors. Among the most important, it is worth mentioning, on the one hand, the understanding, sympathy and willingness to help expressed especially during the Arab Spring, and on the other hand, the growing fear in European societies of the terrorist threat, exacerbated, among other things, by the series of attacks in Paris in 2015. (Almasy, Meilhan and Bittermann, 2015).

This trend did not bypass Poland either, although the views presented among Poles on refugees were not based on practical experience in this area, but only on media messages and stereotypes functioning in society (Omyła-Rudzka, 2016).

Subsequent events in the world and in the close vicinity of Poland, such as the covid-19 pandemic, Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, or the conflict on the Polish-Belarusian border contributed to a gradual change in the image of immigrants and refugees, and Poles themselves have shown a dramatic change in their views and behaviour in this area (Zieliński, 2021).

If we make comparative analyses of the attitudes of Poles towards immigrants, including those of African origin, over a certain period of time, it is possible to formulate certain regularities and trends indicating a change in views in the discussed area.

Research reports on the perception of foreigners coming to Poland generally indicate a positive attitude of Poles towards immigrants and refugees. A study conducted in 2014 showed that Poles declared more sympathy than antipathy towards immigrants (70 per cent versus 30 per cent on a scale of 1 to 10) (Kostrzyński, 2014).

In addition, 61 per cent of respondents did not mind if a person of a different race was their neighbour / superior / relative (14 per cent of respondents would not agree). 46% agreed with the position that refugees in Poland should have the same opportunities for development as Poles (23% were of the opposite opinion) (Kostrzyński, 2014).

Almost half of the respondents believed that accepting refugees is beneficial for society, as they can enrich cultural life in Poland and contribute to the labour market. Importantly, more than a quarter of respondents declared that they could personally get involved in helping refugees without any reservations. 55% had no opinion on the matter, and 8% did not intend to help at all. The most frequently declared type of

support was to help a refugee get along in a shop or in an office (i.e. help that does not require a lengthy and energy-intensive effort). The least frequently declared support was help in finding a job (Kostrzynski, 2014).

The distribution of responses was very similar in the 2015 survey. Almost 54% of respondents asked whether Poland should accept refugees from areas of armed conflict gave a positive answer. A year later, this figure dropped to 40% (Bieńkowski and Świdorska, 2017).

However, if this relatively positive picture is juxtaposed with data from the Prokuratura Krajowa (National Public Prosecutor's Office) on hate crimes, a worrying decline in the positive attitude of Poles towards foreigners was unfortunately evident. The data shows that the scale of crimes in this category has been increasing continuously since 2000. At the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, there was a significant increase (from 165 cases in 2015 to 263 in 2016). These were offences under Article 119 § 1 of the Penal Code, consisting of beating or using threats based on ethnic or religious affiliation. At the same time, among all registered cases of hate crimes, there was a significant increase in the number of acts against people of Islam (29% of cases in the first six months of 2016) (Prokuratura Krajowa, 2016).

The occurrence of a certain level of prejudice and negative attitudes is explained by researchers of migration movements in Poland by four basic factors. Firstly, religious difference, specifically Islam, to which many Poles attribute attitudes of hatred towards 'infidels.' Secondly, the threat of terrorism and the decline in the sense of security, especially common in those countries where immigrants have arrived in large numbers (France, Germany, the United Kingdom). Thirdly, cultural threats, arising from different culture, traditions, beliefs and language. Fourth, threats in the area of social security, including the impact on the labour market, the burden on the state budget due to extensive social benefits and the increase in unemployment benefits (Danecka and Jaroszewska, 2013).

It is also worth adding that many of the presented views of Poles on refugees resulted not from personal experiences, but from the image of refugees created in the media and the subjective interpretation of information and comments heard online (Bieńkowski and Świdorska, 2017).

How has the attitude of Poles towards immigrants changed in recent years, especially post-pandemic years and what factors influenced this? There is no doubt that Poland is gradually becoming a country of immigrants. Although it is not as large as in France or Germany, it is noteworthy that more and more foreigners work in Poland. This is confirmed by the data of the Social Insurance Institution, according to which in May 2023 the number of insured foreigners was 1 million 85 thousand. and increased compared to April 2023 by 8.3 thousand. The largest increase was recorded in the case of citizens of Ukraine - by 3.3 thousand. and Belarus - by 1.9 thousand, and the largest



decrease - citizens of Moldova and Russia - 0.1 thousand each. (Social Insurance Institution, 2023).

The above shows that the contact of Poles with people of foreign origin is constantly increasing. Currently, 39% of respondents declare meeting a person of African descent in their place of residence, in 2015 it was only 13%. People of Asian origin are now seen by 45%, before - 22%. Of course, meetings with Ukrainians are the most common, declared by almost every Pole (92%).

More personal contact translates into greater acceptance as measured by the social distance scale. Today, 84% of Poles accept an African as a close neighbor, and 58% as a member of their family (through marriage with their child). Identical results were obtained for people from Asia. A higher degree of acceptance was declared in the case of Ukrainians (93% and 68%, respectively), and significantly lower for people of Arab origin (68% and 45%). In the group of people who have personal contact with Africans, everyone accepted them as a neighbor, and the vast majority (83%) as a son-in-law or daughter-in-law (Ohia-Nowak and Duński, 2022).

5. Conclusion

The analysis of the obtained data allows us to conclude that ordinary, everyday and direct contacts between immigrants and the host society reduce the level of mutual fear and prejudice. Opinions of Poles built on the basis of personal experience allow to refute the stereotypes that have been functioning for centuries in hermetic communities. Polish society was such a society for many years. In the period after the end of World War II (1945) until the beginning of the 1990s, it was emigrants who left Poland, not immigrants. Political, economic and social changes initiated at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries and Poland's accession to the European Union (2004) contributed to opening the country to newcomers from other countries and continents.

The migration processes described in the article in many cases occur rapidly, often in an uncontrolled manner. This was evident during the Arab Spring. This is also visible after Russia's armed invasion of Ukraine and the massive influx of Ukrainian war refugees in the first quarter of 2023.

However, regardless of the conditions, both for the arriving and receiving communities, such situations pose significant challenges, including threats that may turn into social conflicts and even civil wars. That is why it is so important to take effective and appropriate actions to prevent this, and in the worst case, to mitigate the consequences for both parties.

In order to properly prepare the Polish society for immigrants, it is worth taking appropriate actions in this regard in advance. It is postulated that:

1. Reliably inform citizens about when, who and in what numbers will come to the country. This will allow for the creation of a positive image of immigrants, based on true information.
2. Define the aid package that Poland is ready to provide to people arriving in the country. It is primarily about social security, work, health care and access to education and culture.
3. Properly prepare the services responsible for security. The point is to prepare fire brigade officers, police officers and paramedics to behave skilfully in a situation where life and health of immigrants are at risk. Cultural differences, traditions, language and customs are factors that radically increase the risk of misunderstandings and even conflicts between rescuers and those in need.

As for the actions that should be taken in the community immigrating to Poland, it is advisable to:

1. Give immigrants detailed information about the country they are arriving in. It is about knowledge about the climate, culture and customs of the host society. This will increase the empathy of both parties.
2. Define the rules of residence of immigrants in terms of social and economic security, working conditions and quality, as well as access to education and culture.
3. Familiarize immigrants with the cultural and national specificity of Poles. It is important to respect local traditions and adhere to common law norms. This will not intensify unnecessary conflicts on this background.
4. Relocation of immigrants in Poland. The experience of European countries shows that locating immigrants in large, closed enclaves is not beneficial for either side. The assimilation of immigrants with small local communities will be more efficient when both sides have a chance to get to know each other and gain trust in each other. With fewer immigrants, the assimilation process will be faster and more efficient.
5. Taking special care of children and youth in order to mitigate the effects of staying in a foreign environment. In this group of immigrants, it is worth focusing on learning the Polish language, which will allow overcoming communication barriers in the long run.



Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

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Hungarian Technology Export to Angola through ‘Socialist Solidarity’¹

Attila Tokai²

Abstract:

Hungarian activity in the developing world is being explored again. As the topic is quite peripheral, thus it needs a comprehensive analysis. As an Eastern Bloc country, Hungary was engaged with socialist solidarity, however it never had real colonial past, thus its anti-colonial point of view seemed credible for the newly independent African countries.

Decolonial orientation of the People’s Republic of Hungary started in the 1960s, and it had various other aspects as well. Different political and economic interests also played a key role, as Angola had an incredible abundance of resources, which gave a big push not only for Hungary, but for many other Eastern Bloc countries to play a significant role in the restoration of its economy, in the hope of establishing new commercial relations.

Hungary offered - among others - significant financial support, bank loans, and scientific-technological help to counterbalance the former colonial powers' and other capitalist countries, who were seen as possible enemies and oppressors. On the other hand this “socialist help” meant a search for potential new markets for the Hungarian economy, and the possibility to get access to western markets and technology through international cooperations in the African continent.

Keywords:

Angola, export, Hungary, socialist solidarity, technology

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.225>

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Introduction

Today every region is connected to each other via numerous trade links. As a result of socialist orientation, Hungary as one of the Eastern Bloc countries became a part of the global trade networks in the 1970s through technology export supplied to the developing world.

The present paper raises an important question: how a semi-peripheral country tried to open towards the newly independent Angola to fuel its economy and innovation in the context of Cold War. Both countries promised each other the most favorable commercial treatment (Apáti, 1981, pp. 225, 229). In January 1980 the first session of the Committee for Hungarian-Angolan Economic Cooperation took place in Budapest to lay down the theoretical foundation of a long-term economic cooperation.

The study integrates some findings of the intensive technology transfer, which followed the basic patterns of Soviet foreign policy, although with specific Hungarian features. Furthermore, the key motivation can be compared to the trends of other Eastern Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia) in the 1970s and 1980s, therefore different fields of technological cooperation (bus manufacturing, broadcast technology, medical equipment, agriculture, animal health) were examined in this turbulent period. The research is mostly based on new primary sources: archival records, daily news media archives and oral history interviews taken with former experts with still living Angolan memories, as they provided the researcher an unparalleled storehouse of interesting stories. Unfortunately, only very few contemporary articles, books and memoirs can be found about Hungarian-Angolan relations in the 1970s and 1980s.

The only monograph is Sándor Apáti's *Angola: múlt, jelen, jövő* ('Angola: past, present, future'). Sándor Árgyelán's dissertation *A szocialista orientáció kialakulása a volt portugál gyarmatokon, különös tekintettel az Angolai Népi Köztársaságra* ('The development of socialist orientation in the former Portuguese colonies, with a special focus on the People's Republic of Angola'), Nándorné Maász's thesis: *A gyarmati sorból szabadult Angola fejlődési problémái* ('The development problems of Angola freed from the colonial rule') as well as the article of Éva Hegedűs *Angola és Magyarország kétoldalú kapcsolatai 1975 és 1993 között* ('Bilateral relations between Angola and Hungary between 1975 and 1993'), are the only publications regarding this research topic. Consequently, the history of Hungary's economic and technological connection to Angola has become a vital field, which may have many positive contributions to the fruitful inter-state relations in the future.

The Origin of Hungarian Technology Export

After 1945 Hungary was isolated in terms of foreign policy, only on December 20, 1955, it became member of UN, but until 1963 the so-called 'Hungarian question' hindered



establishing international relations outside the Eastern Bloc (Király, 2006, p. 37-49, 47-48; Békés, 2019, p. 82). Western economic relations were considered a key issue in socialist times regarding Hungarian modernization, therefore foreign policy's Soviet aspects could be characterized mostly by conflict avoidance, flexibility and a strong willingness to cooperate (Békés, 2019, p. 193).

Transnational history of Eastern European countries, connecting to decolonization, understanding global economic integration and connections between the Second World and the Third World still remains a largely undiscovered field (Ginelli, 2017, p. 3). Examining Hungary's economic relations in the developing world the next points also had to be taken into account:

1. The role of political orientation was significant in Hungary's economic relations too, as socialist countries played a decisive role in decolonisation, which led to a necessary political alliance between the socialist and developing countries
2. International cooperation had been a fundamental condition for economic expansion, which was justified by the fact that the country is small with a narrow internal market
3. Expanding cooperation with developing countries was necessary for Hungary to import raw materials, which could not be covered only by cooperation with COMECON countries, in many cases only from the developing world (Szita, 1968, p. 132-134).

TESCO International Organisation for Technical-Scientific Cooperation was founded in 1962 as a state-owned Hungarian firm responsible for technological cooperation, and for sending experts of different fields to developing countries (Tarrósy and Morenth, 2013, pp. 10-11, 77-96). The very first political relations were founded with Angola in the 1960s during independence struggle between MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), for the care of the wounded soldiers and by sending aid supplies (Apáti, 1981, p. 219; Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 7, 29-47).

In February 1967 the first delegation of MPLA arrived at the invitation of Hungarian Solidarity Committee, two years later, Augustinho Neto³ himself visited Budapest. On February 10, 1973, a seven-member Angolan delegation arrived, which officially contacted both the Central Comitee of MSZMP and the Solidarity Committee (Apáti, 1981, pp. 219-220). The African continent, emerging from colonial rule quickly

³ Agostinho Neto was son of a Methodist minister from the Mbundu tribe. He was born on September 17, 1922. He completed his high school studies at the Liceu Salvador Correia in Luanda, later he studied medicine at the universities of Lisbon and Coimbra. Involved in anti-Salazar fights, he was arrested in 1952, after graduation in 1958 he returned to Angola with his Portuguese wife (Sugár, 1978, p. 37).

became one of the favorite topics of the contemporary Hungarian public, which was primarily mediated by popular art and literature (Apor, 2022, p. 289).⁴

In an agreement signed in Alvor, Portugal on January 15, 1975, the three independence movements declared that after the transition period, a democratic election would decide the future leading party of the country (Weigert, 2011, p. 56). As a result of the 14-year armed struggle, People's Republic of Angola became independent on November 11, 1975. The country's first president, Dr Agostinho Neto held this position until his death. As leading force MPLA movement has changed its name as MPLA-Workers' Party in 1977 (Gál, 1983, p. 113). However, the biggest problem in Angola were the lack of available foodstuff and disruptions in the continuity of public supply. After gaining independence, hundreds of thousands of people poured into the bigger cities, queuing in front of shops, thus speculation aggravated the supply problems (Maász, 1979, p. 18). However, there were serious shortages of consumer goods, the so-called 'parallel market' dominated the economy until the period of 1984-85 (Frigyes, 1999, p. 985).

Independence war was followed by a longer and more bloody war: all three liberation movements wanted to get rid of the other two (Birmingham, 2015, p. 83). 30-50 thousand people died during the war of liberation against the Portuguese colonialists, then 1.5 million died during the civil war, when the rival liberation movements (MPLA, UNITA, FNLA) turned against each other (Búr, 2020, p. 169). In Angola, parallel to the strengthening of the socialist orientation, the process of transformation of MPLA liberation movement into a party has accelerated significantly (Somogyi, 1981, p. 88).

Through Cuban internationalist military assistance by the end of 1977 an estimated 12,000 personnel were stationed in the country (George, 2005, p. 120). Although Angola chose the socialist way, by 1979 the ban on foreign investments was not only abolished, but the inflow of international capital was rather encouraged, especially in the oil industry (Black, 1992, p. 20). The large international monopolies have therefore made extra profits, while the population lived in incredible backwardness and poverty (Oliveira, 1962, p. 15). Diamond extraction entirely owned by American companies, while a British firm conducted petroleum research (Sík, 1964, p. 315). The agricultural production of the country has mainly taken place on a plateau in the northern part, close to the coast (Planalto), where outstanding coffee production has been going on for a long time. Cabinda exclave was the only primeval forest-covered area in Angola, where raw wood extraction was produced (Probáld and Szegedi, 1983, pp. 60-61).

⁴ The concept of 'socialist solidarity' had a global context: "It could mean spending financial support, organisation of international campaigns, direct involvement in the local (predominantly proxy) war, and general help programs." (Pálfi, 2022, pp. 68-69.)



In June 1977 the accredited permanent ambassador of Hungary started his work, who presented his credentials to President Neto. The Congress of MPLA took place in Luanda on 4-10 December 1977 on which György Aczél - member of the Political Committee of MSZMP - also took part (Apáti, 1981, p. 223). Socialist technology transfer to Angola traces back its origin to Neto's visit to Moscow in 1976, where he called COMECON countries to send skilled workforce from different fields. In April 1977, a decision was adopted, that the total number of foreign experts would be 900 in Angola, which would be increased to 6,000 by 1980. (MNL TESCO Angola) Neto mentioned: "The choice also defines our relations with the socialist countries: they are our natural allies in the struggle to build a socialist society, in the fight against imperialism" (Gulyás, 1978, p. 47).

According to the plan, socialist countries would have provided the leading state personels for 5-10 years, during this time a new generation of Angolan experts would have been trained. In the framework of this agreement, Hungary undertook to send only 50 experts in the first round, with the stipulation that the number of staff will have to be gradually increased to 100-150 by 1980. From the academic year 1977-78, Hungary made the training possible for twenty scholarship holders (MNL TESCO Angola; Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 10, 29-47). Angola has developed in an unequal and differentiated way, therefore business opportunities for Hungary was constantly changing. Hence efforts had to be made to expand foreign economic relations to this remote region, and there was a demand for further deepening economic cooperation as well (Hoós, 1985, p. 19-41, 39).

Between 1977 and 1981 Angola and Hungary realised a range of bilateral agreements, including the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Trade Agreement, Cultural Agreement, Health Cooperation Agreement, Television Cooperation Agreement and Inter-Bank Cooperation (Hegedűs, 2022, p. 82). Nearly 140 Hungarian experts worked on assignment, with the largest number at the bus assembly plant in Viana and at the bus repair and engine generating plant MANAUTO 3 near Caxito. All costs of the paid specialists were covered by Angola, but for unpaid experts only the cost of the trip, food and housing (Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 10-13, 29-47). Depending on education and experience, they received a monthly salary of 730-1290 dollars, which was considered outstanding. As a kind of "informal advertisement" their role was also to showcase industrial products and the achievements of modern Hungarian agriculture (Apáti, 1981, p. 228; Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 18, 29-47).

In April 1977, the first delegation of experts arrived, who held training sessions for representatives of Angolan specialized ministries. In 1979 a contract for the delivery of day-old chicks was signed, and an offer for the establishment of complex poultry farms and fish hatchery stations were also made (Apáti, 1981, pp. 229-230.).

Ikarus: Hungarian Bus Production and Maintenance in Angola

MOGÜRT Foreign Trade Company concluded an 11-year contract with Angolan ENACMA in 1979, for the delivery of bus bodies packed in crates to the factory in Viana (20 kilometers from Luanda) (Népszabadság, 1983). In 1973 Ikarus company signed a contract with Iraq for the delivery of packaged bus units. In the meantime, the market expanded: in addition to Iraq, SKD-CKD elements were also transported for Cuba, Angola and the Malagasy Republic. Ikarus delivered the main units and spare parts needed for the assembly of 780 buses to Iraq and 350 to Angola, and everything was packed in crates. The bus body is built on Scania and Volvo and Saviem chassis. (Vasas, 1981; Népújság, 1979).

In a ten-year period around 9,000 Ikarus buses were planned to be assembled at the Angolan bus factory, mostly from Hungarian components. According to the agreement, Ikarus also provided technical documentation and plans to its partner and supplied special tools for production (Zalai Hírlap, 1979). The bus factory undertook the production and delivery of the bodywork and interior equipment in its Székesfehérvár factory, where crates of the right size had to be produced for the shipment for a 3-4,000 km journey. From 1981, the entire documentation was done by computer, the uniform packaging system was developed at the end of 1980. Ikarus also handed over documentation and technological plans to the Angolan factory unit. The task of the dispatched Hungarian specialists was to train local workforce (Ikarus, 1981b; Magyar Hírlap, 1979; Zalai Hírlap, 1979).

Work began with restoration of 55 different buses left over from the Portuguese colonialists. Visitors of the Keve Bus Factory immediately noticed the sign written in Hungarian at the entrance: “Long live Angolan-Hungarian friendship and cooperation!” (Ikarus, 1981a) According to László Viola, who arrived with the first team in January 1980, “we had to build a factory here almost from scratch”, because the Portuguese destroyed all tools and machines, only the hall has remained.⁵ The building of a new, modern construction hall was planned for 1984, where eight buses could have been assembled a day (Népszabadság, 1985).

In 1983, ten Hungarian professionals worked here, mostly the achievements of Lajos Kolompár⁶ were praised by the Angolan side, who from 1983 acted as the head of Mogürt-Ikarus’ customer service (Népszabadság, 1983). In 1985, 280 locals were employed under the management of four Hungarian experts, the initial staff of 11 technicians was no longer needed due to the growing number of trained locals.

⁵ According to the observation protocol kept in the Historical Archives of State Security Services, László Viola “would like to stay for several years, and his contacts are only with the branch management and his Portuguese language teacher. He speaks English and Portuguese well.” (ÁBTL Kongó).

⁶ He only spoke basic Portuguese, but knew some Russian. He arrived on July 8, 1980. Although his contract expired in the summer of 1981, he wanted to extend his stay by another year. His contacts were limited to his workplace, so according to the monitoring report, he probably could not have posed a threat to the state security order (ÁBTL Kongó).



According to a new agreement ‘small Keve minibus’ was planned to launch on the market (Népszabadság, 1985). However, the drop in oil prices and external debts negatively affected the balance of Angolan payments (Ikarus, 1983).

According to an article published in government paper Népszabadság (‘People’s freedom’), the company’s CEO Simao Silva mentioned significant results in production, but he has complained about organisational problems too. His views were also shared by Hungarian technicians László Viola and János Wieland, as production worked at almost half-steam, fearing that if all the delivered elements were used, it had to be interrupted due to supply disruptions (Népszabadság, 1983). As production director Gaspar Francisco Pereira observed, the main obstacle was the small number of skilled workers. Various social benefits - such as free breakfast and lunch - were also supplied; however, if it had not provided, the day’s work must have already declared finished (Magyar Hírlap, 1982).

Engine generation and body repair were also carried out at the Ikarus service center called MANAUTO 3. The tender was won by the firm 14th AFIT from Pécs. Intergovernmental agreement was signed in the fall of 1981. As first step, a plant capable of refurbishing 300 buses was created, and a comfortable residential complex was built in Luanda for the Hungarian mechanics. 27 people started an intensive Portuguese language course in Pécs led by a high-school teacher. The first technicians arrived at fall 1982 (Dunántúli Napló, 1982).

MANUTO 3 repair plant for Ikarus buses was organized by Géza Tóth, a graduate of Szolnok Technical University of Transport, that time engineer of the 14th AFIT Company in Pécs, who first arrived in February-March 1980 to assess exactly what was needed, and found that practically everything: machines, tools, medicine, etc. (Dunántúli Napló, 1981). The former Portuguese car repair facility may have been built about 15 years earlier to overhaul English Leyland buses, many wrecks were still in the yard, even a Ford T-model.

Although the building was completely empty - as the Portuguese had taken all movable equipment with them - it was still found in acceptable condition, with excellent natural ventilation and lighting. Géza Tóth first surrounded the territory with a three-meter-high concrete fence, barbed wire and moat on the advice of the local police. In addition, even Linda and Petya, the Hungarian pooch couple kept a watchful eye on order. The equipment was transported in 45 six-foot containers, each weighing 20 tons, to the port of Luanda via the port of Hamburg. The ship covered the 8,000-kilometer distance in one month, but there were also interesting “sabotage actions” in the port, when the tied-down container was “accidentally” dropped by the crane and fell on its heel, so that its door opened (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).

There were three MANAUTO plants in Angola, each of them specialised to a type of socialist vehicle (e.g. Škoda, ZIL, etc.), MANAUTO 3 maintained Ikarus buses. According to Géza Tóth’s memories, this plant was located next to Caxito, at 250 Cacuo

National Road, 30 kilometers from the capital. The total number of employees was around 100 people, at the beginning all Angolan workers were assigned to a more experienced Hungarian specialist. There was significant fluctuation among the workers, since most of them just joked or drank all day. The general manager, Armando José Carvaiho, did not have enough authority to improve productivity either, only a single “foreman”, whose word was immediately listened to. The deputy of the local tribal chief, and at the same time the highly respected sorcerer of the tribe. Géza Tóth had good relationship with him, he just called the wizard, and everyone continued working at that moment (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).

The wage of Hungarian experts was considered outstanding, with a value of around 1,000 dollars per month, but in Angola paying in dollars was strictly forbidden, although local currency (kwanza) has worth almost nothing. Instead of the official exchange rate of 1 USD = 30 kwanzas, on the black market 1 USD rated 5,000 kwanzas. Angolan workers earned around 600 dollars, which was considered a good salary even in local conditions. Hungarian experts could only spend their money in the diplomatic shop. Géza Tóth had to write the celebratory speech on May Day, where on the parade various local companies presented themselves with spectacular scenery on marching trucks, although people were not allowed to take photos, since at that time Angolans still had a kind of ritual fear of the camera (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).

Experts had time for entertainment too. A huge garden party was organized by the Hungarian colony around 1985. All state leaders were invited, only Dos Santos did not come, who otherwise never went to any event. All the ambassadors were among the guests: Portuguese, French, German, Soviet and Czechoslovak, as well as representatives of African states. The female members of the Hungarian community cooked day and night for 2-3 weeks, the embassy staff has served as waiters; as locals remembered there was no such event even in the Portuguese times (Interview with János Valentovics, 2023).

On Candonga (black market) one could buy almost everything. Since payment in dollar was forbidden, only beer and whiskey were used. Géza Tóth has bought a Barkas van from the Cuban soldiers and made them dug a 3-meter-wide and 2.5-meter-deep pool in the garden, which he filled with fertile soil (since the area had red sand, not suitable for growing plants). He installed a small kitchen frame where he could grow tomatoes, pineapples, bananas, papayas, Angolan roses and ‘diabo’, a very strong, long, narrow pepper-like herb. He was accompanied by her daughter, Andrea, who in the daytime worked as a warehouse manager, at home she cooked and was the boss of three black girls. Mr. Tóth ordered daily necessities for the whole Hungarian community worth of \$10,000 from Lloyd Diplomat Supply Store. Despite he kept all the accounting in a huge spreadsheet there were no gaps in the invoice (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).



All bus drivers must have taken part in one-month internship under the supervision of Hungarian technicians, then pass an examination on maintenance. Strange complaints have occurred, as somebody poured water into the engine instead of oil, and oil into the battery and didn't understand why it was out of work. However, after all the drivers were thoroughly trained in maintenance, there were no such problems (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).

According to the article of *Dunántúli Napló* ('Transdanubian Diary'), in 1981 after a serious accident, general manager Armando José Carvaiho spent a few months in Hungary for medical treatment. First at the 400-bed Munkácsy Mihály street clinic in Pécs, followed by the special spa treatment in Harkány. He was very grateful for the care of the nursing staff and the 14th AFIT company, who not only served delicious coffee and Portuguese-language newspapers, but presented him a new Portuguese-Hungarian technical dictionary written by a local author from Pécs, which he found very useful (*Dunántúli Napló*, 1981).

Newspapers do not mention a common case, that Angolan chief officers organized break-ins almost everywhere in Luanda hoping for money.⁷ According to Géza Tóth, such cases were commonplace, often the experts had to report it to President Dos Santos himself. Local military officers regularly cut out the doors of their apartment buildings with welding guns (Interview with Géza Tóth, 2021).

Tamás Zilahy, a journalist from Néphadsereg ('People's Army'), visited Manauto 3 plant in 1987. Following his description, the seven-person Hungarian community has created a wonderful oasis, being almost self-sufficient. In addition, air conditioners and fresh drinking water were available, but the most important thing for the journalist was the amazing cohesion and solidarity of these people (*Néphadsereg*, 1987).

Export of Broadcast Technology

Hungarian news technology industry proved to be suitable for technical cooperation, it looked back on almost a 100 years of scientific and industrial history, and dynamical export-oriented production grew rapidly (Czeglédy, 1974, pp. 130-134). In 1981 BUDAVOX Foreign Trade Company started supplying USW broadcasting equipment to Angola, telephone switch components were manufactured in the Budapest Radio Technology Machinery Factory, which realized almost \$1 million business in July 1981. At the end of the year it fulfilled another \$1.2 million obligation (*Esti Hírlap*, 1981).

⁷ Archival records also confirm that armed robberies against foreigners were regular: "...the many unemployed (especially in the capital), the lack of basic foodstuffs, speculation, the devaluation of the local currency, the public wealth and number of common law crimes against private homes. The general public safety of the country can be classified as bad." (*ÁBTL Kongó*).

In 1985 the company sold a communication system consisting of radio telephones for \$1.12 million, next year roughly one-third of all exports were shipments of different equipment. The fact that Angolan exports declined later, - between \$152 thousand and \$2.5 million a year -, was mainly caused by general fluctuations in the country's monetary solvency (Világgazdaság, 1985).

Budavox strengthened its market positions with new export contracts in both the Middle East and Africa. After that, another deal worth 2.5 million dollars was concluded for the delivery and installation of microwave lines. As a novelty, the firm even managed to realize advantageous cooperation for the delivery of telephone factory transmission equipment (Veszprémi Napló, 1984). Export of radio communication network infrastructure was so successful that a second similar contract had to be signed for the sale and delivery of broadcasting equipment in order to build a complete communication system of fixed, mobile and portable USW radiophones for a total of \$1 million 200 thousand (Világgazdaság, 1985).

Medicines and Medical Equipment Production

Export of medicines and medical equipment was carried out by MEDIMPEX Pharmaceutical Foreign Trade Company, that accounted for 15 % of the total export. It was considered quite profitable, as its increase was justified by the growing demand for medical products and the catastrophic situation of local health care (Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 21, 29-47.). When the country became independent, the value of Hungarian medical export was only \$150,000, although it mainly consisted of life-saving drugs. Between 1976-79, the company was able to realize really high export improvement worth \$1.5 million per year. By 1980, the upgrowth of exports rose to 10-15 % (Világgazdaság, 1979).

Angolan pharmaceutical industry collapsed, and temporarily ceased operation in the year of independence (1975) due to the departure of Portuguese specialists, whose absence was felt strongly. On the other hand Kőbánya Pharmaceutical Factory played a great role in the restart, as a result of the superhuman work of Hungarian experts in 1977-78 (Világgazdaság, 1979).

In 1979 those drugs that were totally unknown in Angolan medical circles were presented in the framework of a Hungarian pharmaceutical exhibition. László Kádár, the deputy general manager and his colleagues signed a \$750,000 agreement with the Angolan pharmaceutical procurement company for the export of animal feed premixes provided by Bábolna BCR Works, established as a joint venture (Világgazdaság, 1979).

In April 1984 the delegation of MEDIMPEX negotiated with foreign trade representatives of Angomedica company, as they examined the distribution of imported foreign medicines, on the other hand a Hungarian-Angolan joint pharmaceutical



production company was planned in the near future. The foreign trade company supplied Chlorocid, Semicillin, Vitacolan and various vaccines and premixes (Világgazdaság, 1981; Hegedűs, 2008, p. 21).

New marketing strategies were also implemented, when in 1979 Hungarian Pharmaceutical Days were held, a range of new medicines were introduced in both the countryside and in the capital. With the help of Hungarian specialists, two drug manufacturing laboratories were united in Luanda, thus the first pharmaceutical factory of Angola was established (Világgazdaság, 1981). Marcela Ramalho, director of the serum production laboratory, praised the work of Hungarian pharmacists, for example the work of Dr Zoltán Riedl, who established the production of anti-malaria tablets in Angola.

According to a news report in Népszabadság, countless difficulties have occurred with the lack of technological discipline among the local workforce, but the quality requirements could not be relaxed either (Népszabadság, 1983). In addition to these, the Hungarian specialists also participated in the operation and modernization of Angolan health institutions (Besenyő et al., 2013, p. 108).

Cangola Agricultural Secondary School

From 1978 Dr Lajos Szabó, a scientific associate of Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture Department from Gödöllő University of Agricultural Sciences spent several years in Angola to teach professional skills in Malange. Since this institution was still under construction, the director commissioned him the opening of Cangola Agricultural Vocational School in Uige province in the middle of the primeval forest (Mezőgazdasági mérnök, 1981; Interview with József Pekli, 2023).

The buildings of the former Capuchin priest training institute in Cangola had to be transformed into a new agricultural school, which was done only in three months (Mezőgazdasági mérnök, 1981). Different classes were organized: plant cultivation, plant protection and animal husbandry. G. Luiukuta became the director, meanwhile two more Hungarian colleagues Lajos Bíbor and Dr András Markó arrived in January 1979, to help in organization, in addition they have also written five textbooks for Angolan students (Népszabadság, 1983).

According to the observation protocol in the Historical Archives of the State Security Services, Lajos Bíbor had good relations with the leaders of local and provincial bodies, especially the provincial commissioner, who was a member of the Central Committee of MPLA-Labour Party. He maintained friendly relations with the local Portuguese - mainly communist-minded - experts. On summer he dared to travel from Portugal to Morocco without Hungarian state permission (ÁBTL Kongó).

The school had to be built almost from scratch. Armando Muta, a staff member of the International Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, highly appreciated the activities of Hungarian teachers working at the Cangola Agricultural Vocational School (MNL TESCO Angola). In 1983 the first graduates were released: 12 animal breeders and 22 plant growers. Since pre-training was extremely low, teaching was not easy, but the instructors became almost friends with all the students, who were often interested in everyday life of Hungary. A small celebration was even held on the occasion of the Béla Bartók centenary, thus it was a surprise when it turned out that two students had already heard of the famous Hungarian composer (Népszabadság, 1983; Interview with Dr József Pekli, 2023).

The teaching staff consisted of educators of Angolan, Portuguese, Bulgarian, Cuban and Hungarian nationalities, but there were also some Dutch, Congolese and Cameroonian ones, and a fifth-year Angolan student was also asked to teach due to the dire shortage of teachers (Mezőgazdasági mérnök, 1981).

Since Dr Lajos Szabó's subject only started in the second academic year, he had plenty of time in Luanda to acquire the still missing equipment, and at the director's request, he also held courses in Huambo Agricultural Research Institute under the title "Soil protection in tropical conditions" (Mezőgazdasági mérnök, 1981). He also had to write the necessary textbook for the two-year university preparatory course, on the other hand the Minister of Agriculture wanted him to teach soil protection and ecology at the Faculty of Agriculture of Angolan State University, thus he had to reach the appropriate level of Portuguese language in just half a year (Szent István Egyetem, 2004).

In addition to these activities, he has also actively participated in the restoration of a 50,000-hectare teaching farm, and during his free time, he took on the physical training of the local tennis team, during which he made many new friends (Mezőgazdasági mérnök, 1981).

Animal Health Assistance

Even in the Portuguese era, veterinary health was lagging behind, after independence only a few dozen veterinarians remained. In 1980 COMECON organized a vaccination campaign of the livestock in Angola, where all vaccines were made available free by the socialist countries. On February 4, 1980, a group of eight Hungarian veterinarians set off on the scheduled Aeroflot Moscow-Budapest-Luanda flight on board of an IL 62 plane (Népszabadság, 1983).

The Hungarian veterinarians were distributed in Angola to the following places:

Location	Veterinary's name	Task
Cunene province (Cahama)	DVM Lajos Radácsy	vaccination
	DVM Miklós Török	diagnostics
Huila province (Lubango)	DVM László Merényi	mobile lab
	Mustafayev	Soviet coordinator
Benguela province (Benguela)	DVM László Écsi	diagnostics
	DVM Sándor Gabnay	in a bacteriology lab
Uige province (Uige)	DVM Péter Perényi	in a parasitology lab
Huambo province (Huambo)	DVM Béla Juhász	vaccination
Luanda	DVM Tamás Szabó	vaccination and diagnostics

Table 1: Territorial assignment of the Hungarian veterinary group, Source: Merényi and Szabó, 1981, p. 572

The other experts (Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish, Bulgarian, East German, Cuban, Mongolian and Vietnamese) were already in Luanda. Dr Fernando Riberio Leal, head of the veterinary service, and Victor Duarte, director of the Huambo Veterinary Institute, were the professional supervisors. Georgy Alexeyevich Yugyin, the Soviet COMECON coordinator, divided all experts into mixed international brigades, emphasizing the internationalist nature of the assistance, thus a total of 25 brigades worked in the country's 13 provinces: 12 groups vaccinated the animals, and 13 brigades performed related diagnostic work.

All Hungarians worked in such a diagnostic team, their task was to examine the cattle herd, detect tuberculosis, brucellosis and contagious lung disease. DVM Merényi worked in Lubango, where he lived with a Polish and a Vietnamese expert. Lunch was almost rice every day, fruit was sold in the street, but the only local shop had a very poor selection: only raw fish (Merényi and Szabó, 1981, p. 572). Hungarian specialists did not take Portuguese language course⁸, they were only required to know Russian. For Mustafayev, the Soviet coordinator they had to write a daily report either in Russian

⁸ With foresight, DVM László Merényi visited the antiquarians in Budapest before his departure, and with great difficulty found an English-Portuguese dictionary in the Foreign Language Book Shop. He rarely used it, as learning the Portuguese language orally proved to be much more useful. He was able to communicate in English with the laboratory manager who was more qualified than the others (Interview with DVM László Merényi, 2022).

or Portuguese, but the latter language was preferred, because the lack of Cyrillic typewriters it would have been quite tiring to write everything in Russian by hand (Interview with DVM László Merényi, 2022).

The main task was to vaccinate cows against anthrax, squealing heifers and contagious lung lobe. During their stay, they often threatened by the danger of malaria, although Hungarians regularly took the tablets, two Polish colleagues caught the terrible disease, thus they had to travel home earlier. The Vietnamese, in a forward-thinking way prepared mosquito nets to protect themselves against the tsetse fly, which carries the dangerous African Sleeping Sickness. Everyone was vaccinated against yellow fever, but they were allowed to drink only boiled water, tea or milk made from milk powder. They tasted the local beer called 'Cuca' or the rare 'Flamingo' whiskey too (Interview with DVM László Merényi, 2022). During their stay a total of 1,022,243 cattle were vaccinated, in 43,232 cases brucellosis was detected, in 6,910 cases contagious lung lobe was observed (Merényi and Szabó, 1981, p. 572).

DVM László Merényi worked as the only Hungarian veterinarian in Lubango, the capital of Huila province, with Polish bacteriologist Tadeusz Malciewski (nicknamed Tadek), a Soviet-Armenian serologist and a Vietnamese veterinarian in a poorly equipped laboratory. Their task was to start an animal health laboratory, to train the local staff, to carry out parasitological tests and to vaccinate the cattle. Since they lived far from the capital, not even the local representatives of TESCO visited them. Although the small Hungarian team faced many unexpected situations, it managed to overcome all the problems. The tragedy of László Écsi shook everyone, as he and his Vietnamese colleague were just leaving work when two unknown soldiers opened fire on them⁹, in which the Hungarian veterinarian lost his life (Interview with DVM László Merényi 2022).

Three slaughterhouses have operated in Lubango, the most equipped one produced only for export, but veterinarians were not allowed to enter there. The other two were characterized by a high degree of unpretentiousness, - even goats were slaughtered here -, where veterinarians came regularly to prevent the spread of infectious parasites. Due to continuous civil war, water or electricity cuts occurred almost every day. Many times shortages happened during slaughtering, which could also have resulted significant hygiene risks (Interview with DVM László Merényi 2022).

This is how he writes about the city of Lubango in his diary: "Around the center, even though it's like a farm, there is a kind of peripheral city. According to my imagination, during the time of the Portuguese, mainly whites lived in the city, - judging

⁹ However, it was not revealed that the attackers could have been government troops or UNITA guerrillas, since almost "everyone there shot at everyone without consideration". The Vietnamese colleague spoke perfect Hungarian, since he attended university in Budapest, he was able to tell the authentic story of what happened. However, for understandable reasons, it was not allowed to write down the story after returning home (Interview with DVM László Merényi 2022).



by the houses - and blacks lived in the periphery. Lubango must have been nice once upon a time. Full of shops, wide tree-lined roads, parks. Now it gives a very neglected impression, despite the fact that even in empty shops, the lights come on in the evening, the neon signs work. Many Western companies were represented here: Peugeot, Shell, SKF, Pelikan, Mobil, etc. Now it's all empty" (Merényi 2013, p. 94).

Although there were little opportunities for entertainment, they sometimes played cards, but everyone was a bit careful with each other. The other two veterinarians, Dr Miklós Török and Dr Lajos Radácsi rarely came to visit, with whom they went to Casino Park on the outskirts, which was closed, but the large swimming pool was still there, although there was no water in it. The small zoo in Lubango and the modern cinema - where films ran in French - were also free time options. On a basketball match Dr Radácsi, - pretending to be a foreign journalist - made a thorough sports report.

On 4th, April the veterinarians announced that since it was a state holiday in Hungary, they would not be working, but take a trip to Moçâmedes on the coast. It was also very important not to deviate from the designated asphalted roads, because of unknown mined areas. They met a group of chimpanzees who were very afraid of humans. During such a walk, they noticed an interesting road sign on which the inscription "Hungaria" could be read, thus everybody believed it might have been the former settlement of the great Hungarian scientist, László Magyar, since he lived somewhere in the area in the 19th century (Interview with DVM László Merényi 2022).

For Women's Day held on 8th, March a military unit came to Lubango to ensure the street carnival, where everybody danced kizomba, played drums on metal barrels, soldiers got so drunk that they kept shooting in the air. At night DVM Merényi only heard that a gun was drawn outside the house, after that an incredible big bang could be heard. All they were frightened, since the door was only made of plywood and could not be locked; thus a gunman could have easily entered. Two Cuban soldiers immediately jumped out of the window from the other room and asked the Angolans why they had fired. The only answer was that they were just drunk and had the idea that someone was trying to break in. Anyway, they were happy to shoot in the heat of celebration without any reason. The other heavy gunfire was heard when South African fighter jets fired intensively at a concrete statue in Lubango, in which Cuban soldiers were believed to be hiding. During each attack planes thoroughly fired the area, but fortunately no one was injured (Interview with DVM László Merényi 2022).

According to the Angolan Minister of Agriculture, COMECON's veterinary campaign had been a great success, he expressed his gratitude to the government of the Hungarian People's Republic in addition to other socialist countries (Merényi, and Szabó, 1981, p. 572).

End of Cooperation

From the beginning of the 1980s, the expansion of economic relations was hindered by a number of factors:

1. Angola, as an integral part of global economy was forced to use its relations with traditional capitalist states too
2. Economic crisis severely affected Luanda, as oil prices stabilized, trade began to deteriorate, so austerity measures must have been taken
3. Economic problems of the socialist world have increased, the assistance of COMECON has narrowed
4. Serious liquidity problems arose, that affected the growing debts (MNL 1985a).

In 1983, Luanda declared insolvency to its creditors and requested the rescheduling of its debts. In 1984, an intensive consultation between the Hungarian National Bank and the Angolan National Bank started, as a result the Angolan party had to transfer only 10 % of its overdue receivables in advance, and the remaining 90 % only from July 1984 in equal installments over 24 months (MNL 1985b). During discussions the number of Hungarian experts were required to be fixed at 50, those of which worked without salary could have not exceeded 10%. In addition, the number of all Angolan scholarship holders in Hungary was limited to 30 students (MNL TESCO Angola).

According to former ambassador András Gulyás, the number of the Hungarian community was close to a hundred people in its heyday, including experts, doctors, pharmacists, car mechanics, veterinarians, members of the financial advisory group and family members. There were regular weekly film screenings and lectures at the embassy, New Year's Eve parties, trips to the nearby safe beach, these were the main forms of relaxation (Interview with András Gulyás 2022).

From the middle of the 1980s the sending factor was also made difficult, in many cases it was unable to provide qualified professionals, thus Hungary together with other socialist countries, restrained the sending of technicians (Hegedűs, 2008, pp. 10-11, 29-47). On the other hand experts were very slowly accepted in Luanda, requirements were modified several times during the procedure, and the partner could not always fulfill its commitments regarding accommodation and food either.

In 1988, there was still a Hungarian community of 42 people: 25 workers, 8 wives and 9 children. In 1989, the commercial office in Luanda was closed, the next year TESCO stated that it could provide additional expert assistance only on a regular fee basis (MNL 1988c). After that Hungarian Defence Forces officers served in UNAVEM missions on United Nations (Besenyő, 2019, pp. 12-16).

Conclusion

The entire Socialist Bloc - including Hungary - have always paid great special attention to the Third World including former Portuguese colonies. Like other members, Hungary wanted to put an emphasis on the expansion of foreign trade relations, on one hand for ideological reasons (Marxism-Leninism), on the other hand to counterbalance its foreign policy isolation through gaining access to Western technology and currency. Marxist ideology could have only served as a kind of common ground in Angolan-Hungarian bilateral relations. Hungary needed raw materials and new markets for its products, Angola needed specialised expert help and infrastructure.

In the course of my research, which basically serves to uncover the missing primary sources, I have collected a number of previously unknown documents, and I wanted to show a tabloid of the colourful memories of former experts. In the near future I would also need new archival materials of the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to be able to put my results in a wider context. I hope that a detailed analysis and interpretation can enrich the ongoing research on the connection between the Eastern Bloc and the Third World in the framework of transnational and global economic history.

My series of in-depth interviews with former experts and diplomats also proved to be useful for mapping the basic information of the process of technology transfer. I could also find primary information in Soviet documents kept in the archives of the Russian Federation, but this is rather doubtful due to the current political situation and the limited accessibility. I hope that more “relics” could be found in the future either in Hungary or Angola.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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How Many Languages Are There / In How Many Languages Is There Literature in: Africa¹

Szilárd Biernaczky²

Abstract:

The question posed in the title is much more difficult to answer than the various lists on the Internet suggest. A good example of this is the dispute that arose between the author of this article and an English teacher (Mária Béres) a few years ago (by the way, she gave information about the world-famous Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe, more specifically about the number of languages in Nigeria).

Keywords:

African languages, African literature, Nigeria, Sociolinguistics, traditional languages

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.270>

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Basic Data

Following the large collections created in the 1960s and 1990s (which also include reviews and figures from various literary lexicons), it seems as if the efforts in this direction, i.e., to take stock of African literatures and their languages, have run out. Part of the reason for this is that, despite all attempts, experiments, and calculations, an accurate picture of Africa's linguistic situation could not and cannot be obtained. The other is that they realised that there is no point in striving for such data-likeness after all. It is much more important to follow the attempts in specific African languages, occasionally, one by one (by author), observing a given cultural milieu (or country or ethnic group).

In addition, in terms of numbers, we can get an idea of the languages of the world from the *Ethnologue* internet database, which I was once confronted with, whose information bases were previously freely accessible. More recently, they can only be used with a subscription. So we now had to look up the detailed data from other sources. In addition, the *Ethnologue* website now includes the following basic data: the number of languages in Africa: 2144, the number of the related population: 887 million. For comparison: Number of languages in Asia: 2,294, related population: approx. 4 billion. In other words, for a given population, there are more than four times as many languages in Africa as in Asia.

Add to this that this wealth of languages is not evenly distributed on the continent. For example, while in Nigeria there are more than 500, in Congo there are approx. 300, but more than 100 languages have also been registered in Tanzania or Congo. On the other hand, in Rwanda or Burundi, the three ethnicities of quite different characters speak one language. Thus, the common language of the Hamite pastoral people of uncertain origin (perhaps immigrated from the southeast, from Ethiopia), the *Tutsis*, the majority Bantu *Hutus*, and the settled, small number of pygmy *Twas* was unified as *Kinyarwanda*, and in a similar structure, although with modified names, the same is the case in Burundi and even in Eastern Uganda (see the *Bahima* and *Bairu*, Hamite pastoralist and Bantu agricultural linguistic community in the former kingdom of Ankole).

The situation is further complicated when we consider that, although we have to accept as a fact the figure of more than 2,000 for African languages, the number of Bantu languages, which are believed to have radiated from the area of present-day Cameroon (although there are several theories about this), is about 370 according to István Fodor's excellent book and database (*A bantu nyelvek*, 2007), although other information shows that there may be more. See, for example, the huge enterprise edited by Mark van de Velde et al. (2019), which sheds light on the complexity of the situation. According to the introduction of the authors/editors: in terms of Bantu languages, there are 440 in Guthrie's classic work (1971), about 680 in Mann and Dalby's (1987), Bastin et al. (1999) mentions 542, in Maho's bibliography first (2003) 660, later in his

expanded edition (2009) 950 language variations are distinguished. The volume itself, on the other hand, lists and briefly describes 555 languages in its database (see page 3).

At the same time, these large numbers, which are significantly different from each other, shed light on the question that, since they are languages with the same root, it would be necessary, most of them having yet to be done, to catalogue them and to distinguish between them as separate languages or just dialects. Let's think about the fact that the least understandable Hungarian dialect is probably Csángó, but is it a dialect or an independent language? From his former trips to Vienna and Berlin, my grandfather brought home the knowledge that there are mutual words that are not understood in the other place. An even more sensitive example: we know that they speak English in Australia. My friends in London, on the other hand, claim that they do not (or hardly) understand the language of the distant big island / continent.

And an African example: decades ago, I became good friends with two married couples who came to study in Hungary from what was then only one large country, Sudan (the husbands studied with us). In their mother tongue (Shilluk), I tried to collect folklore texts (some tales and songs have been lying unpublished on one of my bookshelves ever since). We transcribed the texts collected from the wife of Joseph Bol Chan (later the president of the Senate of South Sudan for a while) with the help of Peter Adwok (later the minister of higher education of South Sudan), who came to us later, in the original language, then into English and Hungarian we translated it. In the case of one of the texts, regarding the name of the *grass skirt*, Peter exclaimed: "It's a Nuer word, but I understand it." Then I immediately asked him how well the Siluk and Nuer people understand each other: he said that he thinks at least 80 percent of the vocabulary is the same!!! In other words, in the literature between these two completely separate languages, could not only similarity, but identity be so great?

One more fact that confuses the cataloguing: to this day, George Peter Murdock gives a picture of the African peoples in a systematic form (divided into 53 groups) in his handbook (1959). At the end of this work there is a folk list, which includes approx. 6000 names. Undoubtedly, it also contains versions of some folk names. In addition, the figure suggests that there are bigger questions than we expected when we started looking for African languages. In particular, if (taking Murdock's book, among others, into account) we leave the scope of a strictly linguistic approach, and we also take into account the presence of different peoples and ethnic groups (also a large number) behind languages.

Case Study: Nigeria

In my previous article, I dared say that there are no more than 150 significant languages in Nigeria. Said teacher schooled me thoroughly that according to *Ethnologue* there are 528 languages in this large and diverse country, although the international database also



counted approx. 20 extinct languages, and if we looked carefully at the knowledge material provided by the data collection, it also includes dozens of languages that, according to the listed data, have a few dozen speakers, that is, we were dealing with languages on the verge of extinction.

At the same time, it was a peculiar contradiction for me that the various collections floating on the internet (e.g. Nairaland) mentioned 250 ethnic groups. In other words, in this case, each ethnic group (must have) had two or possibly more mother tongues?! More information: Rudolf Leger, professor emeritus of the African languages department of the University of Frankfurt, who has visited Hungary several times (I myself have visited his city several times) as part of the interuniversity cooperation under the Erasmus Programme, stated that, as one of the European experts of the Fulani language, he really there may be about 400 languages in Nigeria.

Since I became more and more interested in the problem, I managed to find an excellent summary, Renate Wente-Lukas's book (1985), which even though is not based on the existence of languages but of ethnicities, the database of this volume provides extraordinary lessons. If I am not mistaken when counting the data (since it is not numbered), the German researcher takes into account more than 500 ethnic groups. I must emphasise that it always characterises the language of each ethnic group, and provides the data of the publication serving as a source, which is mostly a linguistic description (as well).

But this is where the surprise begins. On the one hand, if we also pay attention to the data of the subgroups indicated in the given article, the number of ethnic groups increases to at least four times the given number. At the same time, for many groups, we recognise the main populations of other West African countries. Such is e.g. the *Zarma*, which is a tribe related to the *Songhai* of Mali and Niger, and whose oral traditions and heroic epics are now widely known (there are apparently scattered diasporas in Nigeria, reducing of course the total real number of Nigerian languages). But let me mention some more examples to characterise the contradictions. The listing of the *Jukun* and *Jukunoid* peoples forms a separate group (although they presumably speak the same language). In many places, two types of names of the given ethnic group appear side by side (e.g. *Akbet – Ehom*, or *Akweya – Yachi*, etc.).

The most notable example of a separate language or dialect problem, however, is the following: “*izi – ezaa – ikwo – mgbo... See Igbo. The izi–ezaa–ikwo–mgbo cluster, often regarded as a dialect of Igbo, is treated separately on purely linguistic grounds, although closely related to the Igbo language cluster*” (Wente-Lukas 1985, p. 185.). In addition, we are aware that the Igbo (pronounced: “ibo”) people and language, which now number 40 million and are divided into more than 10 dialects, including at least 13 *Igboid* language groups, are beginning to be assimilated by languages with a larger number of speakers, such as *Efik*, *Ibibio* or *Ijaw* are also spoken in the Niger Delta region.

But I cannot help but cite my own ethnological / folkloristic insights here. In his study of Nigerian Yoruba *praise poetry* (1974), Bolanle Awe presents three different types of examples in his remarkable analysis. The text cited as a description of the *Oriki Orile* type praises Oni-koyi, one of the chiefs of the Ikoyi area, who is one of the descendants of the families that played a role in the ancient Oyo Empire in the first decades of the 19th century. According to tradition, he was given tasks in the political and military administration of the kingdom. The text does not seem to say much to the non-expert:

1. As long as the Sun Bird remains a wandering bird, / Olukoyi cannot cease to be in battle. /
2. Iyeke Igede, Gbon-n-kaa's offspring. /
3. If the enemy surprised them in an open forest landscape, /
4. They transformed themselves into a forest tree. /
5. If the enemy surprised you in the savanna region, /
6. You turned yourselves into savanna grass. /
7. And if you were surprised by the enemy in a deserted land full of anthills, /
8. You turned into an anthill fungus. /
9. You are known as someone who only sometimes stays at home, /
10. Sometimes you live in an open forest, /
11. Sometimes in a "forested area", /
12. Sometimes on the streets, /
13. Sometimes on a farm, /
14. Sometimes in Aawe, /
15. Sometimes in Aagba, /
16. Sometimes in Kobai, /
17. Sometimes in Ogbomosho, /
18. Sometimes in Ile Ifon, /
19. And sometimes in Kuta.

However, Awe points out that the image of the Onikoyi family emerges from it; whose members were famous and restless soldiers and members of the respected Eso order, the most outstanding soldiers of the Oyo army. But in the eulogy, we also get a



glimpse into the fighting strategy of Onikoyi himself, who was able to hide in many places, which made it difficult for the enemy to trap them easily. Second, listing all the caches gives some information about the historical geography of the area, which has seen many changes, especially in the 19th century. Because people who earn onikoyi oroki can be found in places as far away as Ibadan, Oyo, Ogbomosho, or the city of Ikere. Other traditions clearly indicate that many people fled Ikoyi after the Fulanis destroyed the city at the beginning of the 19th century. The frequency of occurrence of their oriki shows the extent of their dispersion.

All of this also meant that the Yoruba dialect spoken by the people of the city was dispersed, and over the course of centuries new dialects of a diasporic nature were born from them in new places, or when their own city was founded, languages with independent changes arose (which were presumably registered in the databases as independent languages). And this short case study aims to show that additional entanglements in determining the number of African languages prevent us from finding the key to the solution.

Origin, Exploration, Kinship, and Unification Process of African Languages

The origin of African languages is a very controversial issue. The beginning of the migration of the Bantu peoples (and with it the start of the spread of languages) has been dated as recently as in the millennia BC. We can find an even more specific case around the language of the indigenous people of Africa, the *Sans* (better known as Bushmen), who are considered a unique phenomenon. It has long been known that the artists of the South African petroglyphs, which are at least 2-3,000 years old, were ancestors of the *Sans*.

According to the hypothesis, they once formed a much more significant and organised society than today's fishermen-hunters-gatherer **Stone Age population** fleeing from the immigrating Bantu tribes, scattered in the Kalahari desert, in large family-ethnic groups of 20-120 people, with a very rudimentary material culture. In addition, recent genetic studies have shown that their origin can be traced back to more than 100,000 years ago. And they have a special language, which contains 8 clicking sounds, and which can only be learned correctly in childhood, formed from the stomach, probably the result of tens of thousands of years of slow development and transformation.

As for today's rich knowledge of African languages, this is certainly due to the much-maligned proselytising missionaries, who learned and then wrote down many, many African languages in order to translate the Bible into that language. But most of them later started to collect the local oral forms and even folk customs.

Perhaps the most famous example of this is the case of the Belgian missionary Gustaaf Hulstaert (see my correspondence interview with him: *Egyháztörténeti Szemle*,

2019, issue 4), who essentially lived his life in the Congo. He not only became a proselytiser of the Mungo-Nkundo people, an ethnic group of perhaps 12-15 million people, but also recorded the very rich folk traditions of this group, which has now become a nation. The magnitude of his work is shown by the huge bibliography of his works and his numerous monographs. Leaving the work on notable heroic epics to his religious colleagues, he published 5 full-length collections of fairy tales, a collection of proverbs containing 2,670 examples, greeting formulas (*losako*), and two huge volumes containing folk songs, as well as in hundreds of studies, he reported on the social image, material, and spiritual culture of the people.

In addition, he published the grammar of the Mongo-Nkundo language in three substantial volumes and published the large dictionary of this Congolese group in two volumes. And in cooperation with local colleagues who had been raised to be literate, he translated the Bible, moreover, the songs and hymns in the style of Mongo lyrical folk poetry. And with this, he created perhaps the best African Bible translation. Father Hulstaert also stood up for the interests of his chosen people during difficult times and successfully defended the Mongo's right to land against the Belgian colonial authorities.

It is worth quoting one of his thoughts, in his opinion, what today's scribes owe to the rich African oral culture that still exists:

“In my opinion, we should create monographs on all cultural sectors of all African traditional communities, regardless of the political course of the moment, in order to preserve this multifaceted cultural miracle for future generations of all mankind.”

As for the discovery of the kinship of languages, in this regard, I believe that despite the existing classification of Greenberg (*Languages of Africa*, 1963; the Hungarian István Fodor discovered its pitfalls, resulting in a huge international debate), we are still at the beginning. After all, a sufficiently high-quality description of a large number of African languages has not been completed (Wente-Lukas also tries to paint a picture of certain Nigerian languages based on only fragmentary journal publications in many cases). There was a fashion wave in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when students from Western universities traveled en masse to Africa for a few months to prepare their PhDs in order to collect data on an African language.

But in the opinion of German linguist colleagues, the dissertations made from these are of extremely uneven quality: at best, they only describe a few thousand words and the most obvious grammatical rules. In fact, they are not suitable for comparative work. And the fashion wave blew out in the nineties. In addition, as we have already mentioned above, the unification of related languages is of course still ongoing (see especially the previously mentioned information about the *Igbo* language).



Literature in African Languages

As far as the literatures born in African languages are concerned, their magnitude certainly corresponds to that, as shown by the summation experiments that produced lexicons in the seventies and eighties. Their number was probably between 120 and 150 then. Today, this number is believed to have increased significantly.

The number of languages in which folklore texts have been collected and published (mostly in bilingual form) is probably much larger than this. Fortunately, there are now a large number of locally born African folklorists active in this area.

Regarding literature in African languages, here we can only take a look at the most important groups of phenomena. Significant and early writing and written literature from the 18th century are associated with the *Fulani* (Fula, Fulbe, Ful, Peul) people, who now live in 19 mostly francophone West African countries (just as a counterexample to African multilingualism). Before the invasion of the whites, the former authors recorded their works in the *Ayami* script adapted from Arabic. In a similar way, the early writing of the Nigerian *Hausas*, who now number well over fifty million, exists, in which a historical narrative (royal chronicle) and epics, which were saved early on from orality to writing, have also survived.

The *Yoruba* and *Igbo*, also in Nigeria, now have a rich literacy in their native language. On the one hand, these publications contain the historical memories of traditionalists, but in an almost unique way in Africa, the production of canvas novels (even in the *Hausa* language) is huge. Among the *Igbos*, the name of the genre is *Onitsha* market literature (from the name of the town that publishes the publications).

The other group of phenomena that deserves attention is the literature written in the native language of the South African Bantu peoples (*Zulu*, *Kosa*, *Sotho*, *Tshwane*, etc.), which was created in connection with the operation of the missions settled there, e.g. Thomas Mofolo's key novel, originally written in Sotho, is about the Zulu king Shaka, who is also referred to as the African Napoleon, due to the wars of conquest fought amid great cruelty, and in connection with the creation of a unified Zululand. The Hungarian Tibor Keszthelyi called the decades from the 19th century to the 1930s the Bantu Golden Age, which produced numerous literary works and professional works (unfortunately, most of them are still not available in European languages).

Swahili literature, which begins with a voluminous epic written in the middle of the 18th century and culminates with the work of an outstanding 20th-century writer, Shaaban Robert, among many others, is undoubtedly the most significant stage of writing in African languages (see later).

As for the former lexicons, there are two encyclopedic compilations marked by the name of the German Africanist literary scholar Janheinz Jahn, published one year apart (1971 and 1972, respectively, which are preceded by a data collection that also

includes material on American black and Caribbean literature, 1965), in the first there are about 7-800 authors (writers, poets, playwrights, critics), totalling approx. 2,200 works. In terms of their language use, English naturally dominates, followed by French, followed by Portuguese, and we can even find authors writing in German and Spanish. As far as African languages are concerned, we can learn about fifty languages in which literature has already been created, although it is not clear from the compilation whether they are only collections of church books or folkloric texts, or whether literary works were also created in them.

The first volume also includes Arabic works born in the sub-Saharan region, the latter does not, although it turns out this time too that we should not sway ourselves in the belief that the Arabic language is a unified, single language. There are significant differences between Egyptian and Sudanese Arabic or Sukrian Arabic, which took root in Africa as a result of the long Turkish rule. There are at least six Arabic dialects in Sudan. Even then (before 1972), the languages that excelled in several works include: the Ghanaian *Ewe* and *Chi* (Akvapem, Asanti), the Nigerian Yoruba and Igbo, the Ugandan *Ganda*, Malagasy from Madagascar, as well as the South African Bantu *Bemba*, *Ndebele*, *Nyanja*, *Sona*, Northern and Southern *Sotho*, *Tshwane*, *Venda*, *Kosa* and *Zulu*. And, of course, East African *Swahili*, which currently has around 120 million speakers. The fact that these data collections were not complete even then can be seen simply from the fact that a total of three *Swahili* works are listed in them, while from the middle of the 18th century to the seventies, at least fifty *Swahili* epics with authors were born or became known, primarily singing the events of Islamic history, which are completely absent from both volumes.

Let us note that the rapid literary development of the southern Bantu languages blossomed out of the extraordinary situation that the tools of writing were born in the last decades of the 19th century, as a result of the activities of numerous Catholic and Reformed missions that settled in the area and undertook book publishing. The local scribes flourished, and thus the first great wave of literature in African languages was created, which, as already mentioned, is also called the Bantu Golden Age. While these missions created not only a rich prose and poetic literature, but also a series of local newspapers and a wide range of professional (religious and practical, ethnographic, and historical) book publications in the listed languages.

It is interesting that in the American enterprise published seven years later (Herdeck 1979) there are fewer, only approx. six to seven hundred authors listed, although the editor provided the volume with numerous indexes, distinguishing 39 African languages along with European languages: he lists 219 novelists, 292 poets, 149 critics, 106 playwrights, 77 journalists, 43 autobiographers (the contradictory numbers they clearly follow from the fact that some authors cultivated several genres).

These former manual lexicons were, of course, already surrounded by sub-experiments at the time of their creation, by enterprises aiming to summarise the



literature of a particular country or larger ethnic group. In some cases, provided with sufficient data, in other cases only undertaking an aesthetic analysis of the works of the given authors. Of course, other lexical enterprises were also born. However, these are more conscious selections, directing attention to the most prominent ones. Thus, Hans M. Zell and his colleagues, who later formed the excellent independent so-called reference publishing house, published a reader's guide (1983), which includes about 80-100 short biographies and a few hundred art reviews with short reviews in English, French, and Portuguese, broken down by country and including children's literature in a separate group. In the same year, a French lexical database edited by Ambroise Kom was published (1983), which, in turn, directly includes descriptions of a few hundred African literary works in French. Years later, a two-volume version of this, expanded to more than double, was published, even before the death of the great Canadian mentor of African literature, Mr. Antoine Naaman (who once sent us many publications), but unfortunately the author of this article could not get hold of it. The Handbook (1999) edited by Douglas Killam and Ruth Rowe contains many hundreds of short biographies together with even shorter art descriptions, but in this volume the aspect of selection prevailed when processing the increasingly rich African literature, and conceptual articles (e.g. Anglo-Boer War, West-African literature, Southern Sotho language, etc.) were also included.

The influence of Jahnheinz Jahn, who passed away early, is shown by the fact that the main library of Gutenberg University in Mainz, which preserves his memory and bears the name of Jahn, has about one hundred and fifty African folk names listed on its website, for which a written record covering church books, practical technical books and folklore collections certainly exists, but more significant literature or at least initial literary endeavors can also be seen in most of them (the list is filtered and supplemented, and of course it is far from complete):

Acholi, Adangme, Afrikaans, Akan, Akuapem-Twi, Amharic, Angolan, Asante-Twi, Bambara, Bemba, Bini, Bulu, Calabar, Creole (Guinea-Bissau Creole), Creole (Krio, Sierra Leone), Criol / Crioulo (Cape Verde), Cheva, Tshwane, Dangme, Dawida, Dinka, Edo, Efik, Northern Sotho, Eve, Fang, Fante, Fon, Fulani (Ful, Fula, Peul), Fulfulde, Gã, Ganda, Gbaya, Gen, Gĩkũyũ, Guinea-Bissau Creole, Guingbé, Hausa, Herero, Ibibio, Idoma, Ig-Bo, Yoruba, Kaboverdianu, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kanuri, Kaonde, Kereve, Kimbundu, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, Kiswahili, Kosa, Congo, Creole, Creole Kriol, Krobo, Kwanyama, Lenje, Lingala, Lozi, Lunda, Luba, Luyia, Lunda, Luo, Luvale, Manding, Malgas, Maasai, Mauritian Creole, Mbukushu, Mbundu, Mongo-nkundo, Morisien, Mwanga, Nama, Ndebele, Ndonga, Nuer, Nyanja, Nyoro-Tooro, Nzema, Oromo (or Galla), Ovambo, Ovimbundu, Pedi (or Southern Sotho), Rundi, Sotho (Northern), Sona, Shilluk, Serer, Siswati, Somali, Songhai, Soninke, Swahili, Swazi, Taita, Tsonga, Tem, Tigrinya, Tiv, Tonga, Tuba, Tumbuka, Venda, Wolof, Zulu.

To date, the most complete starting point for learning about literature in African languages is the landmark work of the Belgian scholar Albert S. Gérard (1920–1996) (1981), in which, in addition to literature in living Bantu or other sub-Saharan languages, we also get an idea of writings born in historical languages (*Axumite Kor*, *Ge'ez*, *Amharic*, late medieval *Arabic*, *Hausa*, old literatures preserved with the *Ayami* script such as *Hausa*, *Fulani*, *Wolof* and *Malgas*, etc.).

Literary Works in African or European Languages? – The Problem of the Target Audience

For decades, the biggest question mark in the life of African literature has been: who is it for, which audience, who is it being prepared for, who does it want to address. After all, the vast majority of the continent's 1.3 billion inhabitants do not understand European languages. Novels, poems (or pulps) in English, French, or Portuguese can only be read by the educated and literate class, and in the best case this is not more than 20-30 percent of the population of the given country, but in many cases much less.

In this regard, it is worth taking a moment to look at the data that the francophone player living in Pécs, Tibor Kun, collected on one occasion about how many people know the French language in which French-speaking African countries. According to his summary, based on data from 1989, only 12.5 million French speakers in Africa at that time were considered full-fledged francophones, and approx. another 20 million spoke French occasionally (for a total population of at least 200-250 million). But already then the process started, as a result of which schools taught more and more in local languages, while the illiteracy rate was 50-85 percent (these figures have obviously changed significantly nowadays).

Still, with this mirror in front of them, African writers have been fighting for decades whether to choose European languages leading to world literature as the basic medium of their works, or whether they should serve their own people with their art. The issue was debated during conferences, and in practice, there were many similar experiments. We would like to outline a few cases here.

Undoubtedly, the ethnic groups living in Nigeria, with a population of more than 200 million, are in the best position today, as urbanisation has progressed in most places, and millions live in an environment where knowledge of the English language is almost a prerequisite. It is therefore no coincidence that writers such as the Nobel laureate Yoruba Wole Soyinka choose a European language as the basic medium of their works. And in a less open, self-confessed form, he chose/is choosing the same path as his fellow countryman, the Igbo Chinua Achebe, creating a kind of African English, in which he weaves elements of Yoruba traditions, imagery and myths, often causing



puzzlement for his readers and viewers of his stage works, even if the elemental effect of his works ensures his success.

Chinua Achebe, who is of Igbo origin and world famous like Soyinka, who also chose English, speaks directly about the Igboisation of English, while Soyinka even undertook, one might say, going the opposite way, to present to the world a great novel saturated with folklore elements, with a fabulous-mythical character, translated from Yoruba into English. The most peculiar Nigerian phenomenon is the so-called the long-standing popularity of *Onitsha market literature*, which is essentially a kind of canvas literature in pidginized English. Light literature as a genre spread from this Igbo town in the 1960s and can now be found in many African countries.

We do not have adequate knowledge, but according to our impressions, the classic, 18-19th century literature with Islamic roots in the now more than fifty million *Hausas* community in Nigeria, or among the *Fulanís*, who are scattered in 19 West African countries, but also have a significant population of about 40 million. Before the Europeans, these literatures were written in *Ayami* script adapted from the Arabic script. Today, Latin script is used. Orality is still a defining element of their community life, so the Fulani have the richest epic tradition in West Africa, which has now been published in dozens of publications, namely in the spirit of the fact that in Africa folklore is considered part of literature.

And if the concept of classical African literature has already been mentioned, we cannot refrain from mentioning the library, which is enriched day by day as a result of continuous excavations, whose shelves are filled with the written messages of the nearly three-thousand-year-old ancient Egyptian culture (in addition to practical records of cultural historical value, various stories, narratives, fragmentary novels, poems, hymns, farewells reminiscent of the Book of the Dead, etc.), are filled with their translations. In the same way, we cannot forget Ethiopian literature (*Axumite* 330-900 and post-Axumite Christian 1200-1672 as well as modern Christian 16-18th century literature written in *Ge'ez* and *Amharic* respectively), which not only contain religious books, but also hagiographic they also contain works containing literature (life histories of saints), and even a work revealing the origin story of the *Oromos* (also known as *Gallas*) from the beginning of the last era has been preserved. The richness of the ancient written literature that is waiting to be discovered is shown by the fact that in West Africa there are reports of about 300,000 manuscripts, mainly in Arabic, but also in other African languages, and in Ethiopia the number of scrolls hidden in various monasteries or families is estimated at 250,000. About 30,000 manuscripts are preserved in the Ahmed Baba Institute and Library in Timbuktu, a famous city in Mali. (Also, in connection with old or older African literature, one should also take into account the *experimental* African writing systems on which records have survived here and there, but this can be the subject of another study.)

If we examine the use of languages and literature in Africa, we cannot forget Arabic, which is otherwise dominant in North Africa. Never forgetting the debate (in 1984 at the second international conference of the ELTE African Research Programme directed by the former and current author), which took place between a francophone Africanist researcher and Egyptians, and the most vehemently disputing Tunisian Africanist, Abderrahman Ayoub, the notable researcher of the famous Hilali epic that spanned the entire Arab world, who demanded with no small offense that the literature of North Africa be considered part of the culture of the African continent. But now I would like to briefly explore the special situation of Nagib Mahfuz, the Nobel Prize-winning Egyptian writer-prodigy, who lived to be a hundred years old. This artist who reached a very old age and left behind a very rich literary heritage, who lived his last years in a very difficult physical condition due to an assassination attempt against him (he could only dictate), did not create his works in the Middle Arabic Egyptian television language, which made the means of communication of a populous country that thrives on program production in all other Arabic-speaking countries as well, so to speak, even though in the latter in many cases they speak completely different dialects, significantly different from Egyptian – but in the language of the people of the streets of Cairo. This, despite the fact that Mahfuz's works are extremely popular, certainly hides linguistic difficulties for readers who speak and know the dialects of, say, Moroccan, Tunisian, Algerian or even Middle Eastern countries. But this is likely to cause problems for otherwise well-prepared translators in the case of translation into any other language. However, the different situation of Mahfuz from other African writers lies on the one hand in the much larger number of possible readers (Egypt's population has now exceeded 150 million), and on the other hand in the much more advanced literacy of the Arab countries.

The key novel of the Bantu Golden Age is Thomas Mofolo's novel *Shaka*, the story of which can be said to be dramatic in itself, since its publication was withheld for a long time by the otherwise well-intentioned missionaries for a long time (they had a hard time coping with the cruelty-filled life story of the nation-founding tribal king, nicknamed the Zulu Napoleon), but its language path also shows specific features. Mofolo probably went on a study trip to Zululand before he wrote his novel, as he was Sotho, since the work, originally written in Sotho, contains not only authentic historical moments, but also quotes from the Zulu king's famous oral praise song. The novel, albeit with a long delay, was only later translated into English, and only then was the Zulu translation completed, giving the opportunity for the work to reach the circle of those about whom it is written, who once experienced or could have heard directly from their ancestors about the *mfecane* (multi-meaning expression: crushing, dispersion, forced dispersal, forced migration) about the period of Zulu conquests punctuated by many cruel wars and led by King Shaka, after which the unified Zulu nation was born.

Shaaban Robert's fate can be related to Mahfuz's from a linguistic point of view, since Swahili, the language of the East African coast, is now spoken by an estimated 120



million people in at least four or five countries. In addition, hundreds of years of cultural traditions serve as a background for the population of the area known as the Swahili zone. The Bantu-based language, although heavily influenced by Arabic, has at least 400 years of writing. The year of creation of the first heroic epic: 1728 (genre name: *utenzi*, title of the epic: *Bwana Mwengo*), to which the author himself refers in the text.

But as far as the oeuvre of the famous Tanzanian artist is concerned, the only Hungarian summary of Shabaan Robert (1909–1962) comes from the hand of Géza Füssi Nagy (The oeuvre of Shaaban Robert in Swahili literature, *Helikon*, 1986, 3–4, pp. 359–376). In it, we get an idea of his life path and his main works, among which his autobiographically inspired work titled *My Life* (*Maisha yangu*, 1949) appears first, while he writes poems in classical Swahili measures. We have to mention here his three notable novels that form a trilogy (*Adili na mduguze/Adile and his siblings*, 1952, *Kusadikika/The land of faith*, 1951, *Kufikirika/The land of consciousness*, 1967), which, like his entire oeuvre, are still highly respected, known and widely read. Several other important novels should be mentioned here. His biography includes a total of 178 independent prose works, stories, essays, studies, novels, quite a few epics, and a large number of lyrical poems, and several verse anthologies. Although, let us add, perceiving the flow of newer and newer Swahili works, this oeuvre reminiscent of Hungarian Mór Jókai's widespread influence in Hungary is already embedded in the historical dimension of modern Swahili-language literature, since the author's popularity is still unbroken.

Our last examples are several times peculiar, since André Brink, who works in a European language adapted to Africa, in Afrikaans, which evolved from Dutch, later translates his works written in his mother tongue into English himself, like the Kenyan Kikuyu Ngugi. The Kenyan prose writer James Ngugi wa Thiong'o, known for his several novels translated into Hungarian, recently wrote two novels in his native Kikuyu language, in addition to several children's books in his native language, and then translated them into English. But here we can face the situation and role of essentially English-speaking white African writers. Nadine Gordimer, Doris Lessing, or Maxwell Coetzee, some of whom are connected to or from South Africa and have appeared on the scene, or let us add Wilbur Smith, born in Zambia, who cultivates a popular genre, who in today's Africa are already, to put it mildly, treated with aloofness, and some critics do not directly consider them African writers. Interestingly, however, this distance did not develop in relation to Angolan-Mozambican Portuguese writers who have become world famous today, such as Mia Couto or Eduardo Agualusa, who already have Hungarian translations. At the same time, and this would also be worth a separate analysis in order to find out the reasons, we do not know any white writers from Francophone Africa (except perhaps the Algerian-born Albert Camus)!

Summarising what has been said, we see that the African language Babel will certainly create many more special situations similar to or even different from those mentioned in the field of language use, the application or Africanisation of languages. On the other hand, it can be predicted that the African literary output will continue to

be offered in the world selection in European languages. On the other hand, their national role will be strengthened primarily in African languages, the background of which is the literacy of the relatively larger populations, the spread of literacy among them, one might say, becomes almost complete, and the mother tongue will therefore play a greater role in their community life. Some African languages, above all Swahili and Arabic, are expected to make a strong literary breakthrough. Finally, let us mention that, according to African literary analysts who pay close attention to Afrocentrism, Arabic is also considered a *colonising language* in the continent's cultural bloodstream.

Question Marks

In conclusion, the author of this summary would like to draw the future reader's attention to the fact that he is not a linguist but an ethnologist, a folklorist, and a writer. In other words, he acquired his knowledge primarily not on the basis of linguistic works, but rather on the basis of general orientation, drawing from ethnographic / ethnological / cultural anthropological and literary literature. Presumably, István Fodor (1920-2012) or Géza Nagy Füssi (1946-2008), who were prominent Africanist linguists in our country, could have come forward with more professional work on this topic, but unfortunately, as can be seen from the year numbers, both have already passed away. To the best of our knowledge, there are two Swahili linguists in Hungary today, Attila T. Horváth, who, on the other hand, works in another field as an employee of the University of Technology's library, so he is considered (almost) a dropout. On the other hand, Zoltán Szombathy, who, on the other hand, is the saviour of our field of science, recently defended his doctoral dissertation (Islam in Black Africa), but who divides his research attention between Arabic studies, Islam studies, and African studies.

Unfortunately, today in Hungary, where the number of taught disciplines has just decreased as a result of the Bologna process – in stark contrast to western universities with the opposite expanding themes – it is not even possible to obtain a bachelor's degree in African linguistics. We can only hope that some enterprising young people will make it to Western universities (see: Frankfurt, Leiden, Paris, London, Bloomington, or Evanston, as well as many other prominent and extensive foreign higher education institutions with African studies education), and precisely in this country, obtains a qualification in the field.

And finally, as far as our topic is concerned: (1) we can only give an approximate picture of African languages and their number, based on estimates, even if the order of magnitude is clearly visible; (2) as for the process of becoming a literary language, it is not easy to keep track of it, because on the one hand, it also happens recently that new literary experiments are created, for which an African language that is not yet in use serves as the basic medium, but even if they are worth local publication, they mostly do



not make it (at least for the time being) to European libraries, and thus there is no way to learn about them.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Dr Szilárd Biernaczky is one of the most renowned Hungarian researcher of Africa. As an ethnologist and linguist, he is author and collector of several Africa-related works. Currently, he is the chief of Afrika Tudástár (Africa Scientific Repertory).

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German Colonial Guerilla Warfare in German East Africa and the “China Matter” at the First World War¹²

László Pálfi³

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck is one of the most prominent person of the First World War. His character was woven of the elements of an unbreakable Prussian soldier and a conservative gentleman. His emotional and ideological distance from Hitler and the Nazi regime in general combined with the respect from his Askari soldiers and the incredible performance as a sharp-minded warlord got him adored even by the rivals.

Since we are living in an era, where the public opinion is influenced by protagonists who require drastic re-evaluation of colonial history in general, scientific studies and books can contribute to the intellectual content, which cuts back the expansive nature of current wild thoughts. Nowadays, the colonial past gains more and more interest: activists, movements, mass media, politicians involved themselves into this topic. Smashing statues, renaming public places, deheroisation of historical figures are popular in Germany too.

The topic of this book review is the monography *The African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War of Africa* written by Robert Gaudi. As a historian, he works as a freelancer and contributor of different newspapers. Being an American, he completely went against the *Weltgeist* when he published his monography about the widely-known German General, namely Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who deserved the different nicknames, eg. “Africa’s Lion” and “African *Kaiser*.”

As I have mentioned in the title, there is a thing called “China Matter” in Gaudi’s book. The monography begins with an introduction about the history of Zeppelin. The German military leadership made efforts to take control over the British sky. Firstly, the Britons were intimidated by the German Zeppelins, which threw bombs on them. Secondly, this intimidating factor began to shrink due to the vulnerability of these airships which were working by gas.

The German Zeppelin L 59 (or LZ 104) made a mission in Africa in 1917. This mission had the name Operation “China Matter.”⁴ The majority of German colonies in Africa and Oceania were occupied by the Entente powers, only one German unit was fighting until the end: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s *Schutztruppe*. This unit consisted of German Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, which does not mean exception for the first sight, but the high numbers of Askari infantrymen, who served

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.4.239>

² Gaudi, Robert: *The African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War of Africa*. London: Hurst Company, 2017. 2nd Edition ISBN: 978-1849048675 pp. 448.

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⁴ In German: “Unternehmen China Sache.”

loyal their *Bwana Oberst*⁵, namely General Lettow-Vorbeck. This Zeppelin came back to Germany with the encouraging news from Khartum that German East Africa was occupied by Belgian, British (and South African), Portuguese troops but there is a successful guerilla warfare in the jungle of East Africa.

Prussian war machine earned its high reputation in the 18th and 19th century. These descendants of *Deutscher Orden* (Teutonic Order) converted to Lutheranism and ruled Prussia. Those members, who refused the conversion, were expelled and went to Vienna. However, German ancestry was a must in the medieval times, plenty of Prussians (in its medieval context their refers to the old Baltic tribe) became Germanised and got membership among the knights. Hence, German surnames of noble families with the ending “-ow” have Prussian of Pomeranian forefathers. For this reason, Gaudi compares Lettow-Vorbeck to Gylipus: The Spartan warlord had a non-Spartan mother, Lettow-Vorbeck had old Prussian ancestors.

Gaudi’s methodology shows similar patterns with the books from field of cultural history. Even though his monography is about a German soldier and his unbelievable genius, the overwhelming majority of resources are either diaries or newspapers. The mixture of the two fields (military history and cultural history) makes Gaudi’s book easy to read. There is an impression in the air that writing the monography meant a joyful activity to Gaudi. His most favourite author, Richard Meinertzhagen shared numerous entertaining stories and episodes. This English ornitologist of German ancestry was a witness of the military campaign in German East Africa, his *bon vivant* character belongs to the typical personalities of the 19th century, who travelled a lot and gained various experiences, then shared the adventures either in books or among friends.

This monography has got 25 chapters completed with Prologue and Epilogue. These chapters subsequently follow the chronological order. The readers gain information about Lettow-Vorbeck’s ancestry, family, education background, and military experiences. One of the most notable of experiences happened to him in German South West Africa. The colonial war of 1904-1907, which ended with a genocide against the uprising Herero and Nama tribes, taught him a lot about Africa. Observing the guerilla tactics of Jacob Morenga and his troops, enriched Lettow-Vorbeck with a piece of knowledge that had not been taught in the German military tertiary education.

On the battlefield of German East Africa he earned the respect of his Askari soldiers who came from the indigenous population. Lettow-Vorbeck cannot be labelled as a democrat, however, he avoided the ethnic differentiation of his soldiers. Meanwhile, German colonial policies were based on strict racial norms, Lettow-Vorbeck’s classical virtues did not allow him to implement them in the army. Hence, German East Africa’s military history differs from other German colonies: However, the exploitation of indigenous population had extreme tendencies, especially on the cotton fields, and the whole history of this colony started from Carl Peters’s fraudulent letters

⁵ This expression is the mix of Swahili word ‘Bwama’ (it means: Lord) and the German word ‘Oberstleutnant’ (Lieutenant Colonel).



to Bismarck combined with mistreatment of African people to crushing of Maji Maji Rebellion.

Regardless to the loss of First World War Lettow-Vorbeck became a hero in Germany. In the time of peace he was a conservative politician of the German National People's Party. This political party was based on conservatism and monarchism, in a long term the members intended to reintroduce the rule of Hohenzollern dynasty. The capital city Berlin, which became a battlefield of different far-left groups in 1918, was not able to express the gratitude towards the German heroes of East African campaign.

Participating in the crush of Spartacus uprising in January 1919 made Lettow-Vorbeck archenemy of the far-left. The Free Corps militia that co-operated with Friedrich Ebert's Defence Minister Gustav Noske, a prominent anti-revolutionary and anticommunist member of SPD, eliminated those groups, which were interested in a Trotsky's world revolution. Soldiers from *Schutztruppe* joined to these Free Corps units, so did Lettow-Vorbeck. The General could crush the revolutionary activity in Hamburg without killing anyone, which is a notable fact mentioned by Robert Gaudi. Although this gesture did not make him appealing to the left. When he was member of the Parliament of Bremen, the representatives of left groups called him "imperialist" and "oppressor."

The Nazi era treated Lettow-Vorbeck unwell. Hitler made lip service about regaining former colonies, although it was never serious. Easternward expansion and annihilation of the Soviet Union were Hitler's priorities. Knowing his conservative political beliefs, Hitler and his followers detested Lettow-Vorbeck. Gaudi also noted the fact that conservative politicians became first victims of the National Socialist rule. Being an old and retired soldier Lettow-Vorbeck did not fight at the Second World War but his sons did and all of them died. This tragedy meant the end of his bloodline.

After the Second World War, his renown improved. His funeral took place in Tanzania. Former Askaris could meet *Bwana Obersti* again. The ceremony was organised and carried out by the *Bundeswehr*. There are video footages on different websites about former Askaris who took farewell in German from Lettow-Vorbeck. Recognising their heroism, German experts also came to Tanzania to examine who was entitled for German military pension among the indigenous former soldiers.

As it was mentioned above, Gaudi's book is an intellectually wholesome monography. Although the deficits of this book need to be mentioned, eg. Frederick the Great is labelled as "homosexual" (p. 28.), which was a rumour disseminated by Voltaire; "an African band played 'Deutschland Über Alles'" (p. 153) that is hard to imagine since the official anthem of Kaiserreich was the "Heil dir im Siegerkranz"; brothel is called as "whorehouse" (p. 62). Other descriptions like "Carl Juhlke, a handsome blond Teuton" (p. 111) might be the evidence of good sense of humour but has got nothing to do with a scientific work. The lack of exact footnotes can be also disturbing. Occasionally, there was a thought that the author is not that good at German.

Finally, it can be conclude that Gaudi's book is a good contribution to the comparative world history, even if some paragraphs remind the reader to the genre of "infotainment." The adventurous stories, the broad field of research and the excellent story-teller skills of the author make a good combination; hence, I personally recommend for those readers who intend to gain knowledge about the campaign in German East Africa at the First World War.



Book Review of “Hitler’s Spies: Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa 1939–1945” Edited by Evert Kleynhans¹²

Bálint Somkuti³

It is a common joke that military intelligence is an oxymoron yet without its activities any military would be running around in complete darkness. World War 2 in Africa usually confined the German, Italian and allied manoeuvres in North Africa yet there were other theatres of operations like the Italian colonies at the Horn of Africa or even South Africa itself.

Thank God that the natives were unable to show that kind of proficiency in the area of secret services that they have presented in ground warfare. Most definitely it had to do with the lack of attractive common goal because who would have wanted to live under the *Übermensch*. Yet among the small group of white supremacists their ideas have fallen on fertile ground. There could have been probably no better place to attract similarly thinking sympathizers than deal ready highly segregated South Africa. Yet this danger was aware known to the Brits who have kept a close eye on possible Nazi prospects.

Title and author of the book deals in great detail about the thankfully successes of the German secret services tool get information and to influence the outcome of Second World War in South Africa. It is rare to read such interdisciplinary work which craft fully presents various aspects of military and intelligence issues of that era.

It has been really heart-warming to see the thoroughness of the author describing German and South African relations from the onset to the supremacist *Ossewabrandwag* (Ox-Wagon Sentinels) movement. Such balanced, and visibly well supported approach is unfortunately sorely missing from contemporary historical works. Kleynhans’ traditional method is clearly to be seen in the description Hans van Rensburg, the South African movement’s talented leader. Nowadays such a clearly negative historical, especially right-wing extremist figure are not shown in their complexity but rather as two-dimensional villains of a bad movie. In order to understand and to avoid mistakes made between the two world wars we need to have such balanced and the neutral description of clearly negative historical figures as well.

By describing the difficulties of two-way communication of the pre-digital era the readers detailed look about setting up and running an informer circle in World War 2.

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.4.271>

² Evert Kleynhans: *Hitler’s spies, Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa 1939–1945*. Johannesburg, Cape Town, London: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2021. ISBN: 9781776190201, pp. 271.

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The less known role what Portuguese and French colonies played in German Intelligence, especially after the complete occupation of France in November 1942, is also presented in detail. Another gem of is the detailed description of the Nazi avars organization which also helps to German Intelligence in World War 2 (p. 61.).

As a navy and naval warfare fan the reviewer has found the description of the *U-Boot* war around South Africa also fascinating, as Suez Canal was mostly unavailable for commercial shipping for the better part of the war until Autumn 1943. Many of the cargo ships had to take the long detour around South Africa offering a chance for the German wolfpacks operating in the area (p. 100-101).

The story of Lothar Sittig (dubbed as “the accidental spy” by the author is also tell-tale description of what was it like living in non-combatant parts of the British Empire during the years of World War 2. Sittig upon the start of hostilities was immediately arrested and sent to internment camp: “You are a German and we are at war with Germany, therefore in you go.” (p. 110). Similar stories such as the operations of spying called Felix (p. 121) introduce us to the difficulties of an intelligence organization operated by civilians, with no or little previous experience.

It shows the thoroughness of the book that British counterintelligence efforts, among the operation them of Royal Navy ‘Y’ organisation, the British naval SIGINT also known from stories about German commerce raiders and the Hunt for Bismarck, is also described in detail starting from page 165.

Though the title says until 1945 the text goes on to describe the postwar hunt for possible collaborators. In the author's words “By February 1946 the Rein Mission had been appointed [...] to assist in the gathering of documentary and oral evidence relating to treasonable acts committed by Union nationals during the war. The mission was headed by Rudolph Rein, a lawyer and the professional assistant to the attorney general of the then Transvaal.” (p. 191) The hunt is described in detail in ‘The Bloodhounds of the Empire’ chapter, only to end the story with a big surprise. “The National Party victory in the 1948 general election was a watershed moment in the country’s history. Just as Winston Churchill had been defeated in the 1945 British general election, the South African electorate decided to reject Smuts and his United Party. DF Malan and the National Party came to power, with Malan as the new prime minister and CR Swart the minister of justice. Not long after their victory, the National Party began to contemplate the release from prison of individuals convicted of politically motivated crimes.” It shows well the significantly altered post war realities, that among those to be set free [prominent *Ossewabrandwag* member] Robey Leibbrandt was also mentioned, who had by then served five years of a life sentence for treason (p. 223).

The final, concluding chapter is a profound evidence, how much the world has tuned in only a handful of years. “By the end of 1948 all traces of the Barrett Report had disappeared. The documentary evidence, and all the copies of the report, were allegedly handed to the then State archivist. Alarmingly, with the passage of time, the



so-called German Documents seem to have gone missing from the State Archives. Consequently, the entire episode surrounding the hunt for Union war criminals, and for individuals who committed treasonable acts by assisting the German war effort, has received little or no attention within the broader post-war South African historiography.”

It took almost eighty years and the determined work of Evert Kleynhans to collect the pieces and assemble the jigsaw puzzle from a myriad of smaller pieces of information into this magnificent magnum opus which deals with a very less known part of the last apocalypse. It does worth to read Evert Kleynhans’ masterpiece, not only for those who are interested in the era, or the craftsmanship of intelligence, but also for those who would like to know more about life in the non-combatant parts of the British Empire.

Book Review: “The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures” Edited by Ryan Shaffer¹²

András Málnássy³

The African continent has experienced a broad range of internal and external security challenges during the last decades. Intelligence services have been utilized as a tool by autocratic or authoritarian leaders to suppress democratic, ethnic, or separatist demands. This book discovers that this has been a common feature of intelligence across the continent. Intelligence continues to play an often unseen but significant role in the lives of Africa’s people. In the book the reader can learn more about African intelligence services that have not been examined as a serious field of inquiry. It is more valuable because the number of academic studies published on the topic is relatively small. This book provides a comprehensive exploration of intelligence cultures in Africa, covering all African countries. The book’s purpose is to provide an introduction to African intelligence services for students and a reference text for scholars. Some of the authors are researchers who have specialized in intelligence for a given African country. Others are experts on a specific country, and their researches are the first English-language studies on a country’s intelligence structures and services.

There are many different approaches to understanding intelligence services. The book’s great advantage is that it sees the diversity of approaches as a strength, rather than imposing a model that might limit inquiry into a subject that is already challenging to research in many African countries. The other advantage that can be emphasized is that this book not only offers readers overviews of each country’s intelligence services but highlights different perspectives and methodological approaches in studying African intelligence. This book explores African intelligence cultures by examining how a state’s internal and also external dynamics influence intelligence services and in turn how intelligence services themselves shape the state, society, and culture. The book also aims to provide an overview of intelligence cultures through diverse and interdisciplinary approaches. Some contributors are historians, political scientists, sociologists, or have government backgrounds.

With some chapters leaning more historical and others delving into current events. They do not necessarily follow the same approach or even define intelligence in the same ways. Indeed, some chapters emphasize security and law enforcement agencies, reflecting the status of countries’ focus, institutions, and sources available. Another valuable part of this book that each chapter provides readers with a country-

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.4.240>

² Ryan Shaffer (ed.): *The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series. ISBN 978-0-7556-4051-5. pp. 832.

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specific overview of intelligence history and systems, national security challenges, international alliances, and intelligence oversight or reform efforts. Human rights are another important aspect in the chapters. It is seen that international relations have been vital to African intelligence since the late nineteenth-century scramble for Africa attracted competition between the great powers for influence on the continent. The Cold War has shaped African intelligence until this day. However, Africa faced different or compounded issues in the Cold War, as many countries simultaneously experienced decolonization and state building during the post-war era. This book covers over fifty-five countries, and while each chapter is centred on similar themes, it does not take a comparative analytic approach in the sense of presenting an overarching theory about African intelligence services.

Given the variety and differences of services, histories, cultures, and governments the authors encourage further research on intelligence in Africa. In my opinion, this book can also help to address the geographical imbalances that exist in intelligence studies. Intelligence services can influence African governments, cultures, and societies. This book describes the specific experiences in well-known and lesser-known African intelligence services. Readers can identify the differences between the intelligence apparatuses in Africa. Furthermore, readers can develop a more diverse understanding of African intelligence, and intelligence in general. This book provides an alternative perspective by approaching fifty-five African countries' intelligence services on their own terms rather than focusing on external actors. In the book we can see that there are some broad commonalities among African intelligence services. First, it is that government and politics are significant influences on many African intelligence services. Whether a country is a monarchy, authoritarian, or a multiparty democracy, government and politics have a significant impact on African intelligence cultures in terms of collection, analysis, operations, and targets. Second, the history of a country also has a significant role on the intelligence community's structure and function. Third, civil-military intelligence relations and bureaucratic demarcation appear to be connected to the size of a country. Less-populated countries consist of smaller intelligence services, which means the intelligence community is smaller and likely has stronger connections between civilian intelligence, military intelligence, and law enforcement. Fourth, many African countries' intelligence services have long been in some state of reform and reorganization, which has been a consistent aspect of African intelligence since the end of the Cold War.

Since national structures and international issues have shifted, African governments have reformed which also has impelled reforms to African intelligence to meet the new legal frameworks. African countries face some common threats from state and nonstate actors. The authors found out that global power competition from foreign countries, in terms of investment and aid, have created security concerns for Africa nations. Nonstate actors, in the form of insurgencies and terrorists, have proliferated across the continent since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The transnational

nature of some of the separatist groups, such as the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, embodies contemporary challenges influenced by globalization and technology. This has resulted in new African organizations. Notably, the African Union Commission's Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa was established in 2004 for intelligence and security coordination and communication and now includes over fifty countries.

In the book *János Besenyő* addresses the activities of Somali intelligence services that are little known to the international community, as there is no monograph about them, and few other studies have been published. *Nuno Fragoso Vidal* argues that the Angolan intelligence and security services have maintained their foundational purposes and strategic objectives since they were created in 1975. *Juste Codjo* finds out that Benin has struggled to establish a professional intelligence community since it achieved independence from France in 1960. The evolution of the country's intelligence services closely mirrors its political trajectory, which consists of three major historical periods. *Lawrence Ookeditse* explores Botswana's intelligence culture through an appraisal of Botswana's Directorate on Intelligence and Security Services (DIS)'s politicization and oversight of the agency. *Jude Kagoro* explores the intelligence culture in Burundi and offers an empirical and nuanced understanding of intelligence cultures in the context of a sub-Saharan African country characterized by continuous episodes of political violence. *Manu Lekunze* examines Cameroon's intelligence culture and he argues that Cameroon maintains an "all of government," and in some cases, an "all of society" intelligence culture. *Dávid Vogel* provides a brief introduction to Central African Republic's intelligence services and culture by examining key historical events, actors, and issues. *Ryan Shaffer* states that there is little research written about Senegalese security broadly and intelligence specifically. *Ashton Robinson* argues that the intelligence culture of Seychelles has been facing a difficult transition for several years. The intelligence culture seeks to leave behind the former dictatorship's security and intelligence methodology, while reforming to address the strategic pressures arising from piracy, maritime competition, and threats to its critical financial sector. In conclusion, in this book we can have a broad insight to all African countries' intelligence cultures and their different security aspects. The book surveys Africa and provides insight into African intelligence services to examine their roles in the countries. The research demonstrates that there is great diversity between the intelligence services on the continent. It means that there is no single model of African intelligence. The larger countries receive more attention and have a more prominent role in regional issues. Yet it is vital to study all African intelligence cultures if one wants to understand the past, present, and future of national security in Africa.



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Editorial Office: Africa Research Institute, Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences,
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Hungary – 1081 Budapest, Népszínház u. 8. III. 316.
+36205585579; besenyo.janos@uni-obuda.hu.
ISSN 2786-1902



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