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Dear Readers, // Dear Fellow Scholars,

I am pleased to present the most recent edition of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). As the Journal continues to attract significant attention locally, regionally, and internationally, the selection of contemporary, high-quality submissions from esteemed scholars focused on the African continent has become increasingly challenging. Nevertheless, I am confident that the current issue of JCEEAS encompasses a diverse array of engaging subjects and fields of study. While the majority of the content consists of full-length articles, a selection of book reviews has also been incorporated at the end of the Journal.

The author of the first study, László Pálfi, makes an effort to explain the context and outcome of the 2024 South African general election through the normative analysis of its programs and goals. Following that, Katalin Horváth examines how the European Union and the African Union are developing in parallel as voluntary integration projects, and how they compare with regard to the respective development of their defence policies, Union level military forces and strategies for the future. Mert Efe Özüygun studies Türkiye's Immigration Landscape with the inclusion of cultural exchange and labor dynamics with Africa through the power of social media as well as the importance of arts, music, films and television series and their role in shaping society. Abraham Ename Minko looks at the case study of Kenya's Fintech Landscape when it comes to enhancing fintech security and countering terrorist financing. By examining the unique socio-economic and geopolitical dynamics of Kenya, the author sheds light on the critical role of fintech in national security efforts, including the detection and prevention of illicit financial activities linked to terrorism.

In the next article, Azeez et al. focus on psycho-demographic factors in influencing social and political activism in Nigeria. Their study uses the world value data wave 7 collected between 2015 and 2020 for Nigeria to assess the factors that determined participation in socio-political activism in the country. The author of the next study, Chinedu Christian Odoemelam, elaborates on disrupting advertising models by asking the question how social media are used as new business frontiers among student entrepreneurs in some universities in South-South Nigeria. The study examines whether students who engage in small businesses know that advertising can help their businesses grow; and how they use social media to advertise their goods and services. Following that, Ezugwu et al. discuss learning from educational impediments by considering insights for Nigeria from the Tigray Conflict. The study employs a qualitative method using case study research design and examines the educational impediments faced in Tigray from the Ethiopian-Tigray conflict, the potential lessons that Nigeria can learn and strategies Nigeria should implement to mitigate these challenges. The topic of the Valentin Cseh's research article is the Black Gold of the Sahara, which offers insight into the brief history of the Algerian and Libyan oil industry up to 1973. Lastly, Oluwakemi Olayemi investigates the turn-taking sequence, organisation of turns and the question patterns adopted during the examination of witnesses at the Oputa Panel sessions. The study employs purposive procedure in the selection of five questioning sessions as available on YouTube.



Following the studies, there are four book reviews. Zsolt Szabó writes about Portugal's air war for Guinea between 1961 and 1974, while Krisztina Kállai reviews the following book: "Negotiating with the Devil Inside the World of Armed Conflict Mediation". At the end of the current issue, Krisztián Sztankai shares his opinion on "Montgomery McFate Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire" and Alexandra Batonai reviews "Double-Edged Politics on Women's Rights in the MENA Region".

We sincerely wish for our readers to enjoy a rewarding experience as they explore the subjects presented in this issue.

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Change after 30 Years? Evaluation of the General Election in South Africa¹

László Pálfi²

Abstract:

The South African people elected a new parliament and new provincial legislation on 29 May 2024. The election seemed to be a historical one: Nelson Mandela's party, the African National Congress (ANC), is less and less able to attract South African voters. Firstly, the municipal election of 2021 showed decreased support (less than 50 per cent) for South Africa's dominant party, secondly, the cooperation of liberal and right-wing parties earned the attention from the voters. Finally, former head of state, Jacob Zuma, made his comeback.

This unusual situation made the dethronisation of ANC possible. However, after 29 May, neither the ANC, nor the Multi-Party Charter, a.k.a. MPC (electoral alliance of these parties: Action South Africa – ActionSA, African Christian Democratic Party – ACDP, Democratic Alliance – DA, Inkatha Freedom Party – IFP, Freedom Front Plus/Vryheidsfront Plus – FF Plus/VF Plus), nor the far-left opposition – Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) – could not achieve majority in the National Assembly. A Coalition is needed, otherwise, South Africa will not be able to work.

My article tries to make effort to explain the context and outcome of this current general election. A normative analysis of programs and goals. South Africa's economic and social state suffers from a serious level of inefficiency that can be turned into success by decentralisation of public administration, reform cultural and linguistic rights, the exploitation of the competitive advantage of South Africa's provinces.

Keywords:

ANC; far-left; general election; MPC; South African politics.

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1. Introduction

The South African nation is divided by ethnic, lingual, and financial background of its citizens. An English person from the Western Cape (South Africa's richest province) can be barely compared to a Xhosa citizen from the Eastern Cape (South Africa's poorest province). The first one might live in a respectable area in Cape Town; the second one is suffering from a lack of sufficient public services, the good education background, or a decent living condition in general. However, since they are living in the same country, their perceptions and preferences will almost never meet in this universe, as the current general election has proven it.

Although many similarities can be explored in their mind-set, and the expectations connected to the current general election, which showed many similarities with the first democratic one in 1994: South African people, who registered to vote, require straight answers to their questions about their future. The quasi one-party-state of the apartheid era (1948–1994) led by the National Party seemed to be replaced by the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC), since Nelson Mandela's party created a program that received huge support from the black majority and won all the general elections. For this reason, Seekings's concerns became real (Seekings, 1997, pp. 303–306).

As it is known, the ANC lost the majority of seats in the National Assembly (lower house) of the South African Parliament. An overview of 1) the South African electoral system and 2) the most important political parties is presented in the subsections below.

1.1. The South African Electoral System

The South African Parliament is a bicameral legislative body in Cape Town. The National Assembly (lower house) has 400 seats: 200 mandates are elected from the national list, and 200 other mandates are from the provincial lists. General elections are held every 5 years, and the system is in favour of small and micro parties, since there is no minimum threshold (Mattes and Southall, 2010, p. 51; Government of South Africa, 1996, pp. 1269–1273, 1331.). The core of legislation is carried out in this chamber.

The Senate is the upper house. All 9 provinces delegate 10–10 representatives. To pass an act, the National Assembly needs the accordance of the Senate; thereafter, its promulgation. (Government of South Africa, 1996, p. 1331). The provincial legislatures, which are elected at the same time, have 30–80 representatives. (Government of South Africa, 1996 pp. 1312–1313.) The majority of representatives in the National Assembly elect the president of the Republic of South Africa, and in the provincial legislatures, the own premier (Government of South Africa, 1996, pp. 1323–1324).


As it was mentioned above, the lack of a minimum threshold helps to get the representation of parties without significant support, although it must be concluded that the winning party always gains the key role when it comes to the issue of forming

government. Hence, the winner can show a form of generosity, for example, the ANC co-operated with the micro party GOOD (former left-leaning members of the DA), which seems to be appealing to the image of a functioning democracy.

1.2. The Main Parties

This subsection introduces the reader to the South African political parties and their main programs. The ANC is the most important one; from 1994 until 2024, it was the dominant and hegemonic one. Its partners are the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Cedras, 2021). However, it must be pointed out that the ANC approved members from the former apartheid ruling party: the New National Party decided to dissolve itself and merge into the ANC collectively (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005, pp. 166–186). This institution is “crossing the floor.” All parliamentary systems in British tradition have this opportunity.

The ANC implemented policies that caused controversies in South African politics. Firstly, Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (Republic of South Africa, 2003), and secondly the Constitution was modified to make possible the land expropriation without compensation (Kloppers and Pienaar, 2014). In this case, the far-left EFF supported the ANC’s bill; hence, two-thirds of the representatives of the National Assembly changed the Constitution.



The ANC’s support reached its peak during Thabo Mbeki’s presidency. The South African economy received credits from international banks in the second half of the 1990s. Mbeki could exploit his opportunities; hence, the government passed legal norms in favour of the black population. From the beginning of Zuma’s presidency, the ANC’s support started to decline (Election Results on the Internet, 2019; Toit and de Jager, 2015; Haddad, 2024).

Opponents of the ANC’s policies are coming from the centre-right and far-left. The liberal and right-wing opponents have very different backgrounds. The DA, which is a liberal party, became a descendant of the progressive opposition parties of the apartheid era. The FF Plus/ VF Plus, a party that defends Afrikaner interests, e.g., Cape autonomy,



linguistic rights of Afrikaans, and protection of land owned by white smallholder farmers, is a mixture of the Conservative Party (an opposition party to the change in 1990–1994) and Afrikaner interest groups. (Southern, 2011). Paradoxically, the cooperation agreement that was initiated by this last small party. Corné Mulder took contact with the DA after the municipal elections in 2021, when the ANC could receive somewhat more than 45 percent of all votes. Other culturally right-wing parties, like the conservative and Zulu nationalist IFP, and the economically libertarian ActionSA signed a cooperation that was given the name Moonshot Pact. In August 2023, the popular DA federal leader John Steenhuisen announced this agreement. Microparties, like the United Independent Movement (UIM) and the Spectrum Nationalist Party (SNP), furthermore, the Independent South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), which is an NGO, also engaged themselves with the change (Pillay, 2023). On 7 October 2023, the ACDP entered the coalition as a party with a presence in the National Assembly and municipalities (ActionSA, 2023). Finally, other micro parties also entered into this electoral coalition, namely the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), the Ekhetu People's Party (EPP), and the Unemployed National Party (UNP). This coalition of 11 forces signed the Multi-Party Charter (MPC). The president was not named by them, however, the DA is the strongest party in this coalition; hence, Steenhuisen had the highest chances. Sadly, South African society is not as colour blind as the liberals, and the fact that Steenhuisen is a white man from a middle-class family with a Dutch-sounding name, means disadvantage (Thornycroft and Farmer, 2024; Gray, 2024).

The MPC created a program that has the following priorities: 1. Growing the economy and creating jobs; 2. Ending load shedding and achieving energy security; 3. Achieving law and order that combats crime, corruption and drugs; 4. Ensuring quality education that delivers opportunities for all; 5. Delivering basic services to all through high quality infrastructure; 6. Building a professional public service that delivers to all, and ending cadre deployment; 7. Ensuring quality healthcare for all within a caring healthcare system; and 8. Building a social relief framework for South African households living in poverty. Social democratic and liberal elements are represented in these sections. The governing principles are based on classical liberal values like decentralisation, equality, and free-market economy: 1. The South African Constitution, the rule of law, and equality before the law; 2. Decentralising power to the lowest effective level of government; 3. Accountable, transparent government with zero tolerance for corruption; 4. Capable government that spends public money efficiently to deliver quality services to all; 5. Caring government that puts people first and prioritizes the poor; 6. An open market economy; 7. Policies guided by evidence that they produce positive results for society; and 8. Redress our unjust past by promoting non-racialism and unity in our diversity (ActionSA et al., 2023). The public policy specialists of this MPC program were seeking to find common grounds, which can provide a sufficient governance for the very heterogeneous nation of South Africa.

Last but not least, let us examine what the far-left planned to deliver to the South African citizens. The EFF created by Julius Malema (among EFF members: Command-in-Chief, a.k.a. CIC Malema) in 2013 by the split of young radical members of the ANC Youth League, is a Black nationalist and Marxist party. Since the socialist elements (nationalisation, racial quotas) are mixed up with Pan Africanism, populism, and the propagation of ‘white guilt’ by hate speech, Malema and his companions might be easily identified as some neofascist group (Satgar, 2019). Malema’s most prominent voters are coming from the “second lost generation”: These young people belong to the NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) population. In 2022, approximately 17,100,000 people from the age group 15–60 years were classified as NEET (Khuluvhe and Ganyaupfu, 2023, p. 4). Malema converts their despair and anger into mandates, and the fact must be pointed out that his effect is transnational: His violent statements are popular across Africa (Mbetse, 2015). The members of the EFF Parliamentary Group frequently and vehemently attack the ANC, scandalous events in the National Assembly are usually connected to their activities (Fölscher et al., 2021). Furthermore, Malema considers Zimbabwe a positive example and, in his opinion, Mugabe was a “hero of the people.” (Karrim, 2019).

Analysing the South African far-left, the most spectacular event of the current general election was Jacob Zuma’s comeback. Zuma, who is an uneducated person, a former member of the resistance against the apartheid, a president of the republic who must have to resigned because of his corruption, shook up the South African politics. His part, the uMKhonto weSizwe (MK, in English: Spear of the Nation) has overwhelmingly similar goals like the EFF (transformative change, challenging economic disparity), although there was a considerable exception: Malema’s team is a Black nationalist party, while Zuma portrayed himself as a proud Zulu. Zuma exploited the nostalgia of the elderly and disappointed poor black people by choosing this party that is named after the ANC’s former paramilitary organisation (MK Party – uMKhonto weSizwe, 2024; Rapanyane, 2021). The 82-year-old politician, who has four polygamous wives, was barred by the Constitutional Court from running for parliament (Dean and McKenzie, 2024).

The cooperation of Malema and Zuma was not carried out, despite all the similarities. On the other hand, it can be concluded, that the antagonisms of the most prominent parties are not able to create a frame, where the centre-right MPC could cooperate with Malema and Zuma purely against the formation of a new ANC government led by Cyril Ramaphosa.

2. The General Election

On 29 May, 27,672,364 registered South African voters (66 per cent voter turnout) visited the voter stations nationwide. This high number is almost half of the total



population (59, 89 million people). The opinion polling data made sure that voters are in a historical situation, when the ANC's support did not reach 40 per cent, and the MPC enjoyed more than 30 per cent: The last opinion poll made by Atlasintel between 25–28 May predicted for the ANC 37.3 per cent, for the MPC (DA – 19.7 per cent, FFP – 3.1 per cent, ActionSA – 2.5 per cent, IFP – 2.5 per cent, ACDP – 0.8 per cent) all together 28.6 per cent, and the far-left parties could calculate more than 10 per cent, as for the MK 14.3 per cent and for the EFF 11.6 per cent was calculated (Haddad, 2024; Atlasintel, 2024, p. 7).

The primary result came very slowly: People were staning in the queue later than the official closing (19.00), around 21.00 meant the end. Ballot counting began on 30 May and lasted until 1 June. Meanwhile, the election was held, public services performed occasionally quite badly, and a box disappeared, but the legality of this election was not challenged by the participants (Gadzo and Mohamed, 2024).


Analysts, media staff, and political scientists were sharing their observations with the public during the voting and ballot counting. They were eager to express the emotional side of this general election, plenty of them compared this one to the general elections in 1994. However, wishful thinking and future plans were present among the politicians too. From this point of view, Malema exploited the opportunity to make a show, when he was wearing a pro-Palestine scarf on 29 May (Ngcobo, 2024).

Around noon of 30 May the first results came into the open. The DA and the EFF performed worse than expected; the ANC was above 40 per cent. Practically, the ruling dominant party did not really fall under 40 per cent but the glory of the old days passed forever. At the end, only Zuma's MK was able to surprise the public, since they achieved an enormous breakthrough in KwaZulu-Natal province. The man who is "one of us" became the most prominent and credible representative of Zulu nationalism.

Besides the considerable change in the province with Zulu majority, other provinces remained the same when it came to observing political developments. Western Cape is the high castle of South African liberalism; the DA gained a majority. Other provinces were voting in favour of the ANC. Surprisingly, the Afrikaans-speaking Coloured population did not stand up for the MPC, however, the unfair treatment of their language done by Blade Nzimande (South African Communist Party, Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology) could be a good reason for that.

The ANC list reached its most miserable support of 40.18%. It was enough for 159 seats in the National Assembly. No ANC government is possible without a coalition partner. The DA became the second in this contest with 21.81%, the liberals got 87 mandates. The allied parties of DA gained the following support: IFP – 3.85% and 17 seats, FFP – 1.36% and 6 seats, ActionSA – 1.2% and 6 seats, ACDP – 0.6% and 3 seats; hence, the MPC list did not perform much better than the members in 2019, the number of seats in the National Assembly grew from 112 to 119. Neither the far-left has reason to be happy, as the EFF gained only 9.52% of votes and 39 of seats in the National

Assembly, and Zuma’s MK received 14.58% of votes and 58 seats. Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance (PA) became a nationwide small party: 2.06 per cent of support and 9 seats in the National Assembly. It seems like a promising performance.



Not a single party could achieve a majority (201 seats) in the National Assembly (400 seats). The ANC remained the dominant party (159 seats), the centre-right MPC (119) is unable to form a government, so does a cooperation of far-left with 97 seats (MK – 58 seats, EFF 39 seats). However, the ANC’s pro-Palestinian actions are in favour of Al Jama-ah (Congregation) party that represents “Islamic values,” and the “transformation” of society is appealing to the African Transformation Movement (ATM) and GOOD (former left-leaning members of DA) or the Pan-African Congress (PAC). The small parties have low representation (Results Dashboard, 2024).

3. Looking for a Junior Partner

The outcome of this general election was not unpredictable for the ANC. There must be organised some kind of negotiation “behind the scene.” The possible coalitions will be explained in this section. There are two ways but only one is operable. The situation is very similar to the German one in 2021 when the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was predicted to win the Bundestag election, and there was a frightening imagination about the coalition of SPD – The Greens – The Left. Voices from the mainstream media encouraged the SPD to make an agreement with The Greens and the Free Democratic Party, which has been leading coalition of Germany since 2021.



John Steenhuisen called a possible government by an ANC-EFF coalition the “doomsday coalition.” After Zuma’s re-entry into South African politics the federal leader of liberals added the MK to this coalition (Bavier, 2024). Furthermore, he never held the PA trustworthy, but rather a party that has ties to the ANC (Mahlati, 2023). A majority of 256 or 265 seats means a comfortable majority, 267 representatives can change the constitution. In the case of the implementation of a far-left policy, this coalition could count on the support of minor left-leaning and left-wing parties like GOOD and PAC. However, Steenhuisen’s most negative prediction cannot work for personal reasons: President Ramaphosa had Malema led out of the National Assembly more times; previously, Ramaphosa was one of those who expelled Malema from the ANC (Imray, 2024; Mange, 2024). A majority government would be somewhat more possible with Zuma’s MK. According to this outcome, 217 representatives mean a majority, but Ramaphosa should go. Zuma did forget nothing and forgave nothing. Ramaphosa played key role in Zuma’s resignation in 2018 (Dean and McKenzie, 2024).

A coalition government must be acceptable to external powers. A government led by left and far-left parties would create a “New Zimbabwe” in the domestic economy: confiscation of land owned by white farmers, nationalization of firms owned by whites and expelling them abroad means a straight way to bankruptcy and international isolation. Furthermore, the pro-Palestinian stance of South African foreign policy (ICJ decision about the invasion of Gaza that was called genocide) caused hostility towards Pretoria in the Western world (Horne, 2024; Kachroo, 2024). These tasks must be solved if South Africa intends to preserve the positive image of Mandela’s “Rainbow Nation” respectable position in the international politics in general. An ANC-EFF-MK government could not provide positive outcome, for this reason, let us see the only viable option.

The coalition with the DA is widely welcomed by the international public. A move into the centre was advised by the ANC-leadership to the president (Rose and Pilling, 2024). Ramaphosa is eager to create a coalition with the liberals and the IFP. This coalition means 263 seats in the National Assembly. The idea has opponents in the ANC, since there are members of far-left orientation charged with corruption (Pilling and Rose, 2024). The negotiations between the ANC and DA began on 3 June. On the one hand, a common government with the DA and the IFP is the primary option for the ANC. On the other hand, Steenhuisen is eager to avoid an ANC-MK or ANC-EFF “doomsday coalition.” The COSATU still opposes a coalition and favours a supply-and-confidence accord (Bartlett, 2024; Sguazzin, 2024; Thukwana, 2024).

The negotiations between the DA, EFF and MK belong to the category of an impossible outcome. There are huge contradictions and antagonisms in their programs and aims. As a result of the ANC-DA negotiations, the ActionSA left the MPC and cut its ties to all members (Nkosi and Sithole, 2024). There are high chances that the DA and the AFP will drop the two openly right-wing partners, the FFP and the ACDP.

4. The Program

This section is about to elaborate on a program that could mean a minimum to the future governing parties. As it was previously written above, there are many key elements that cause hardship in the negotiation process.

Firstly, the racial quotas. These policies, predominantly connected to the Black Economic Empowerment, were introduced by the ANC. This program guaranteed top jobs for loyal and influential ANC members or their circles. The voters of the IFP were also positively affected by these implemented norms, since they are overwhelmingly Zulu people. The DA must be ready to make a compromise on this issue.

The harmful effects of racial quotas cannot be underestimated. Quotas were created as affirmative actions to help the historically disadvantaged people (Black people, Coloureds, Indians). The apartheid system was not able to work, since it needed the contribution of black people, otherwise, sectors of the South African economy could have been unable to operate (Burger et al., 2016, pp. 2–7). Nowadays, young and educated white people are leaving the country. If this tendency does not stop, the domestic economy is going to suffer from a lack of capable people (Griffiths and Prozesky, 2010, pp. 27–29).

The social programs must be also cut. The reliefs for the poor never eggs anybody to find a job, the individual remains in a vicious circle: the jobless who receives a paycheck will not be motivated to change their own lives, and this lifestyle will be just more favourable for many people. “[...] as a result of subsidizing individuals because they are poor, there will be more poverty” (Hoppe, 2007, p. 98).

For the exact same reasons, land expropriation without compensation must be smashed by government policies. South Africa’s agriculture is widely known for its prime quality products, especially the South African grape and wine. These products belong to the global supply chain. On the other hand, the uncertain situation causes a lack of investment of white farmers (Xaba, 2020, pp. 89-90). By nationalising and redistributing of vineyards, the farm economies will be bankrupt. Here, in the former Eastern Bloc, the people have very negative experiences from the socialist past. Hopefully, the openly anti-socialist parties of the future coalition will be able to convince the ANC.

Conclusion

This South African general election can be called historical not only because of its results. The outcome will be a coalition government, since the ANC needs an allied parliamentary group.



South Africa's further development depends on the junior partner. The participation of far-left parties in the government can accelerate the so-called "transformation," which leads to the expropriation of land and nationalisation of white-owned firms. In this case South Africa will be a "second Zimbabwe": Robert Mugabe, who was the quasi-dictator of that country, implemented all these policies. The outcome was tragic, since the economy bankrupted, and the educated, predominantly white people left the country. Hence, an ANC-MK or ANC-MK-EFF coalition can dramatically ruin South Africa's international reputation.

As it is known, the ANC makes the first effort to form government with the DA and the IFP. The DA is a supporter of non-racialist policies and free-market economy. For this reason, those policies, which are based on the Black Economic Empowerment Act in 2003, must be – at least partially – withdrawn. This step-to-centre can cause distraction among staunch left-wing and far-left wing members of the Tripartite Alliance.

With the help of the centrist-liberal DA and conservative IFP, a comfortable majority can be established in the National Assembly (lower house) and in the nine provincial legislations, which can secure the government's majority in the Senate. Furthermore, the international reputation of Africa's most important power will be improved.

As a conclusion can be drawn, the government formation in South Africa will have long-lasting effects on international politics and global supply chains. Only one option is viable.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that she has no known competing or financial interests in the production and publication of this study.

Notes on Contributor

László Pálfi defended his PhD in History in December 2022 at the Eötvös Loránd University. He studied History BA (2012-2015) and History MA (2015-2017) at the Eötvös Loránd University, and he also obtained a MSc degree in Public Policy and Management (2020) at the Corvinus University of Budapest. He wrote his thesis about the history of German-Namibian international relations from the 1840s to 2021. As a lecturer, he held courses about colonialism, German history and the topic of racial inequality. As an external researcher, he has been working for the Pilecki Institute since May 2019.

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A comparison of the EU and AU in the field of peace and security – partners and rivals?¹

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Abstract:

The intention of this paper is to examine how the European Union and the African Union are developing in parallel as voluntary integration projects, and how they compare with regard to the respective development of their defence policies, Union level military forces and strategies for the future.

The author looks at the EU and AU as peace projects, their efforts regarding crisis management and territorial defence, the structures they use to further their integration, and also cooperation with each other. Remarkable parallel processes and also problems are found with respect to the financing, generation and use of forces. The paper compares the standby forces of the two organisations, namely the Battlegroups and the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) in the EU, and the African Standby Force (ASF) in Africa.

The author assesses the priorities, strategies, levels of ambition of the EU and the AU, taking into account their geopolitical situations, military alliance membership, and their potential regarding their size, population, resources, amounting to advantages and disadvantages with regard to reaching potential great power status in the future.

According to the author's assessment, the topic of cooperation and/or rivalry between the European Union and the African Union is a topic to watch, as the two continents come from very different histories but develop in remarkably similar ways, which might point to structural patterns working at deep levels.

Keywords:

African Union; European Union; integration; military; peace operations.

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Introduction

In this paper I will examine specifically the EU-AU cooperation in the field of peace and security, with emphasis on strategic and institutional developments, analysed in the context of what this might mean for political and defence integration of both continents and how those processes might influence each other.

The partnership and cooperation between the EU and the African Union (AU) has started in 2000, with the first Africa-EU summit that was held in Cairo. There have been 6 Africa-EU summits since then, the last one in 2022. This cooperation of the two continents is wide in scope, encompassing issues ranging from trade and investment through human rights, development, migration, sustainable economic growth to peace and security. The cooperation has been institutionalized for about a quarter of a century now, and it is time to examine how this process has developed, what results it has brought and what the direction for the future might be (Brujić, 2024; Abebe and Maalim, 2020).

The partnership and cooperation of the EU and the AU is bringing together 27 and 55 Member States, respectively, which is altogether 82 countries. Out of the 195 states in the world, 193 are Member States of the United Nations, meaning that the EU and AU Member States together count for 42 % of all the states on the planet. That is, Africa and Europe together mount to almost half of the political communities of our world, and there is huge, so far largely untapped potential in their cooperation.

Since about the 1990s the EU started developing and applying its cooperation in the field of foreign and defence policy (the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy) in earnest. That meant moving away from the exclusively national foreign, security and defence policies of the Member States (while those continue as well, in parallel) and starting to act, with a mixed tracked record, but more and more, as a true Union. At the same time, the states in Africa have established their own organisations for cooperation and integration. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been established in 1963, not long after the historic year of 1960, when most African states have declared their independence and the colonial rule of European powers has ended. In 2002, the 55 African states have established the AU, as a successor to the OAU (Besenyő, 2021).

There are also 8 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, which are key institutions in the integration framework of the AU. The RECs, and a myriad other groups of economic, monetary and defence integration in Africa (Türke 2022) have overlapping membership (only 6 countries in Africa out of the 55 are members of only one REC, some countries are members of 5 RECs at the same time). This makes both cooperation and analysis much harder and more complicated, but it also shows how powerful the centrifugal forces are not only in Europe, but also in Africa, pointing towards processes of integration that are not due to outside forces, but are organic and driven by political, economic and defence interests of the Member States of both Unions.

The African Union

The AU sits at the top of the African integration framework, built on an institutional structure with very remarkable similarities to the EU institutions (Iroulo and Boateng, 2023; Stapel, 2022):

- the EU Commission has a counterpart in the AU Commission;
- the EU and AU both have regular meetings of Heads of State and Government;
- the EU Council has a counterpart in the AU, the Executive Council;
- the EU COREPER (Comité de Représentants Permanents) is analogous to the AU Permanent Representatives Committee;
- the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the EU corresponds to the Peace and Security Council in the AU (also PSC), although the AU PSC is a more complex body that can sit at the level of permanent representatives, ministers and heads of state and government as well;
- the Specialized Technical Committees of the AU are similar to the EU Council preparatory bodies, although much less numerous;
- the European Parliament is mirrored in the Pan-African Parliament of the AU;
- not to mention the African Central Bank, the African Investment Bank, the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the African Court of Justice, and other institutions, all obvious counterparts to parallel EU structures. The AU and EU have also established delegations to each other, to Brussels and Addis-Ababa, the seat of the AU, respectively.

The EU-AU Joint Vision for 2030 was adopted at the last summit in 2022. The European Commission and the AU Commission joint meetings take place regularly, the 11th such meeting took place in 2022. These meetings are dedicated to implementing the joint commitments agreed at the EU-AU summits. There are regular joint ministerial meetings, multilateral dialogues on mutually agreed priorities, strategies and implementation plans. The EU PSC and the AU PSC also hold regular joint meetings, discussing peace and security issues of common interest, the last EU-AU PSC meeting took place in May 2023.

The AU Constitutive Act of 2000, signed in Togo, established the AU and its institutions. It has established, at the same time, the common defence and security policy of the AU as well. It has defined in Article 3, as objectives of the AU, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States, and also, promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. In 2005, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union has adopted the African Union



Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. This Pact has an “African Article V”, if we compare this to the Washington Treaty that established NATO, or an “African Mutual Assistance Clause”, if we compare it to the Lisbon Treaty of the EU. It specifies in Article 2 c) that “any aggression, or threat of aggression against any Member State shall be deemed to constitute a threat or aggression against all Member States of the Union”. In Article 4 b), it says: “State Parties undertake, individually or collectively, to respond by all available means to aggression or threats of aggression against any Member State”. The AU Common Defence Pact is not without its predecessors, either, Türkiye for example mentions the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence of the ECOWAS, one of the major RECs in Africa (Türke 2022).

The AU Common Defence Pact goes further than the NATO treaty, which only provides for collective defence in Article V. It also goes further than the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which itself has a higher ambition than collective defence (provided for in its mutual assistance clause in Article 42.7) in its provision for a future common defence in Article 42.2. The EU common defence article merely says that the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU “will lead to a common defence when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”, not specifying how or by what means that would happen. The words “European army” do not figure in the Lisbon Treaty at all (Aniche, 2020; Willa, 2019).

However, the AU Common Defence Pact, in Article 4 d), explicitly provides for an African Army, saying: “State Parties undertake to establish an African Army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the Continent”. The Pact also specifies how to get to the African Army: “In the meantime, State Parties will make best efforts to address the challenges of common defence and security through the effective implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including the early establishment and operationalisation of the African Standby Force” (AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, 2017).

Agenda 2063 and African integration

The Agenda 2063 document, adopted in 2013 and envisaging a strategy for the development and integration of Africa for the next 50 years, goes even further. It declares that the goal by is to unite Africa, either in a confederation or a federation. It encompasses all important policies, in a whole of government approach, clearly aiming for the ultimate objective, a “United States of Africa”-type entity, and defining what intermediate steps need to be taken to get there: the free flow of people, goods and capital, customs union, monetary union, financial union, economic union, political union. If that sounds very familiar, the reasons I believe are twofold (The Agenda 2063, 2013). One is that the AU has one example of a voluntary association, cooperation and progressive integration of independent, sovereign states, and that is the EU. In this vein, we can say that Africa is “copying” Europe’s strategy for surviving and staying relevant,

and able to defend its values and interests in a globalized, multipolar world. In other words, Africa is using the EU as a blueprint for regional integration. The other reason is that in today's world, there is not a whole lot of other ways independent, sovereign states can get to the next level: unite, federate, become a great power, or, a modern "empire", if you will. In the past, empires were created by military conquest, but that was before the solidifying of states, boundaries and international law which penalizes war. Now, the only way to "get big" is through political, economic and military unions, based on the free will of participating states, which become Member States of a Union (both in Europe and in Africa) voluntarily, based on treaties and institutions. (Not to mention that this is also partly how the United States of America was created.)

The economic, political and military integration process of the EU and the AU are processes that are running in parallel to each other. We have seen above the eerie similarities in the legal bases, institutions and processes. However, the AU has three advantages compared to the EU, regarding the speed and potential perspectives of the integration process. The first one is related to geography, which is that Europe is a (rather big) peninsula of Asia, the Western part of the huge Eurasian land mass. It is surrounded by water in the North, West and South, but has a long, vulnerable flatland border to the East, and two very big Eastern neighbours, Russia and China, sharing the same continent. Africa, on the other hand can be considered an island continent, which is connected to the Middle East only through the small Sinai Peninsula. That means it has natural borders that defend it from a conventional, large scale land forces attack from the outside (Waldman, 2023; Outhwaite, 2020).

The second and third advantages are related to history. Paradoxically, Africa's weakness might in the future become its strength. Africa does not have nation states, like Europe does, its development has been slow and stunted due to numerous factors, the chief of those being colonialism and economic exploitation. Since most of Africa's borders have been literally drawn by a ruler on the map by colonial powers, cutting through the territories of tribes, African states are traditionally weak and rife with internal ethnic and religious conflict, civil wars, coups d'état and terrorism. Both economic and political development are weak, to the point where many African states are unable to even control their own territories, and provide essential services to the population, making them in effect failed states. This means that the forces of integration do not have to fight against strong, established, in many cases very old nation states that naturally resist the threat to their sovereignty, even if the threat is not through armed attack, but through being offered the advantage of sharing that sovereignty and exercising it through a larger political entity as part of a Union. Strong nation states are an impediment to European integration, but no strong nation states exist in Africa (Cleland, 1990).

The third advantage is that Africa does not have the sort of relationship with the US that Europe does. In terms of defence integration, that means that in the EU, any defence



union has to be established progressively, in the face of resistance by the US within the framework of NATO, which the US claims has been defending Europe for 75 years and will continue to do so. This is true, but NATO has also been a way of keeping Europe down, and turning it from a potential rival to the US into allies of the US, who are conveniently divided and weak (the principle and practice of divide and conquer still works). Since this has for decades paid a very considerable “peace dividend” to Europeans who could spend much less on their own defence and spend more on the welfare state, it is an uphill struggle to say no to a good deal and for Europeans to start paying for and taking seriously their own defence. The Russian-Ukrainian war has been a rude awakening to the military weakness and fragmentation of Europe and compared to the last 20-30 years, now significant steps are being made to make progress on European defence (Besenyő, 2024). However, this process, although gathering momentum, is still weak and whether or not a European defence union can be achieved seems doubtful. The words “European army” are still a taboo in Brussels and in most Member States.

Compared to this situation, Africa is not part of a military alliance led by the up to recently only superpower on the planet, so it is freer than Europe to choose its own path. Of course, the US, China, Russia and the EU are all present in Africa and are pursuing their own interests, but neither of them are recruiting African states into military alliances with them (Bustamante, 2023).

This leads us to an analysis of what the AU has been doing with the above mentioned freedom to choose Africa’s future. The AU’s objectives are clear and long term, stated in Agenda 2063: “pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance”, „social and economic development, continental and regional integration, democratic governance and peace and security amongst other issues aimed at repositioning Africa to becoming a dominant player in the global arena”, based on, among other things, a „fully functional and operational APSA” (African Peace and Security Architecture).

The African Peace and Security Architecture

As the 2018 EU Court of Auditors report summarizes, APSA is a

“set of institutions, legislation and procedures designed to address conflict prevention and promote peace and security on the African continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union lays down the legal basis for the APSA. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the AU member states in 2002, defines its structure, objectives and principles. Ten African sub-regional organisations (SROs), to which their respective member states conferred a mandate to act in the area of peace and security, also play a role in the APSA. Eight are Regional Economic Communities

(RECs), and two are Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs)” (2018 EU Court of Auditors report).

The 8 RECs are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 2 RMs are the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC).

Decision-making in APSA belongs to the AU PSC (Peace and Security Council), which is supported by and can rely on the 5 pillars of APSA: the AU commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the AU Peace Fund. So, besides political decision-making and the bureaucracy needed for that, what Africa needs and has created for peace and stability is not surprisingly the same that every other state or regional international organization on the way to becoming a federal state needs: an army and money to support that army. The African Standby Force is the first try at creating that army, and the AU Peace Fund is the first try at creating an African defence budget (Adeyeye, 2024).

Financing

The AU Peace Fund was established by Article 21 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2002. It was to be funded by money from the AU budget and voluntary contributions from AU Member States. Many of those Member States did not pay their contributions to the AU budget in time and in full, leaving the AU and also the Peace Fund significantly underfunded, to the point that Africa had to rely on donors to fill the gap, and the donor was mostly the EU, through varying financial instruments. The African Peace Facility (APF) has been established by the EU in 2003, and it has been integrated into the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021 (Erforth and Keijzer, 2023). The EU has also used the European Development Fund, the European Fund for Sustainable Development, the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and several other instruments to support Africa financially. These funds in 2021 have been all merged into one financial instrument, the NDICI: Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. (NDICI, as its name suggests, is not only for Africa, but all other regions as well that the EU wants to support, but Africa is a large part of it.)

The EU approach to supporting African peace and security is to support local solutions, meaning that the EU supports Africa by training, capacity building and financial contributions, and also by EU-led peace operations, but expects African forces



to do peace operations increasingly independently and encourages AU-led peace operations. Until the AU can take over, the EU is trying to involve the Africans by doing joint peace operations with them, for example in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, with varying degrees of effectiveness (Plank 2022).

The African Standby Force

The African Standby Force has been established, together with the other pillars of the APSA (except for the AU Commission) by the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2002 in Durban. It was supposed to be a multidisciplinary force, composed of civilian and military components standing by in their countries of origin, ready to deploy rapidly when needed. Its tasks were defined as conflict prevention, peace operations, humanitarian assistance and any other task the AU PSC may have mandated it to carry out (Adeyeye, 2024). The chain of command of the ASF was remarkably more developed (at least on paper) than the chain of command of the analogous battlegroups and the Rapid Deployment Capacity of the EU, which are still to be decided on an ad hoc basis in case of use in an operation (which has never happened so far) and which rely on national commands to be augmented and turned into an EU command only in case of activation.

The ASF chain of command since its inception was designed to be subordinated to the AU Commission, and also, integrated the military and civilian components, placing military contingents under a force commander subordinated to the AU Commission, and placing the civilian components under a special representative, also subordinated to the AU Commission. This means that at least on paper the AU has solved two problems that the EU is still grappling with: it has integrated military and civilian peace operations and commands, and it has created a genuine AU operational headquarters (the ASF headquarters in Addis Ababa), which the EU has still not been able to do, despite 20 years of debates on these issues. The EU only has the MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capacity) in Brussels (which is a far cry from being an operational headquarters), and the above-mentioned national headquarters of Member States.

However, 22 years after the creation of the ASF, its track record is not better than the similar standby forces of the EU, namely the Battlegroups (which have never been used) and the Rapid Deployment Capacity (which is supposed to reach Full Operational Capability in 2025, but it did not manage to amount to much more than the merging of the two Battlegroups previously on standby at the same time). The ASF has never been used either as it was intended, which is to deploy it to manage crises in Africa, based on the 5 regions and the 5 ASF brigades corresponding to those regions (North, West, East, South and Central). The reasons for the failure of the ASF concept and the need for its fundamental overhaul, which is happening at the time of writing this article, are remarkably similar to the reasons for the failure of the EU Battlegroups (which is supposed to be remedied by the EU RDC).

In the ASF's case, AU Member States preferred to use for peace operations forces generated in the framework of regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs), and not even all of these, using some more, and some not at all. Sometimes African states simply used coalitions of the willing outside any established AU or REC frameworks. The reason for this was that AU Member States engaging in a costly peace operation wanted to be directly involved in the decision-making regarding that operation, not through the Peace and Security Council of the AU (which does not comprise all 55 Member States, but only 15 elected members at any point in time). The other major reason is that AU Member States do not really like to deploy forces outside their region, first, because they do not have strong enough interests to be engaged far away, and second, because deploying that far is very expensive and (as is also the case regarding the EU battlegroups) the cost of deploying and carrying out the operation falls mostly on the participating Member States (de Coning 2023).

This points to the same structural weakness in both Unions: if there is no central, Union level defence budget that fully funds operations, Member States will use their own forces according to national/state priorities, not Union priorities. Also, AU Member States will spare their own defence budgets and not spend it on managing crises in other AU Member States. In parallel, EU Member States are also reluctant to spend their defence budgets on crisis management operations outside the EU, in areas of the world where some EU Member States do have strong interests, but most have no interest at all. That is one of the most important reasons for the failure of the Battlegroup concept and the regular force generation problems that operations face.

Crisis management versus territorial defence in the EU and in the AU

Europe has a surface area of roughly 20 million square kilometres and a population of roughly 750 million people, and the EU itself has about half of that: 10 million square kilometres and 450 million people. Africa is a simpler case, because all of its 55 countries are Member States of the African Union, meaning we can count only once: Africa is about 30 million square kilometres and has about 1.5 billion people. So, if we are comparing strictly the two Unions, the AU is roughly 3 times the size of the EU in terms of both size and population. The political level of ambition of the EU regarding defence is ambiguous, hovering somewhere between crisis management only, leaving territorial defence to national armed forces and NATO (so, in effect, the US) and tentative attempts at territorial defence (the EU Global Strategy defines 'protect the Union and its citizens' as one of the three strategic objectives). There is no European army, only national armed forces. Even for crisis management, the forces available to the EU through a structured process, pre-assigned are very limited, currently to one brigade size force, the RDC, and between 2004 and the present to (first one, then two) battalion sized battle groups. That is not even remotely enough for crisis management, which is why EU peace operations still operate based on force generation by Member States

(voluntary contributions) and the financing of these operations is funded also mostly by the Member States in a costs lie where they fall scheme (Besenyo, 2019). The common costs of these operations is still only around 15 %, and is financed through an off-budget financial instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF). However, the EU has one characteristic that makes it very different from the AU, and also, is the basis of very wide popular support to the European integration project: EU Member States are not fighting each other, and also, there is and there was no violent conflict (civil war) in the EU since its inception. The EU has been very successful as a peace project, and also as an economic powerhouse. This means, crises happen elsewhere, outside the Union, so crisis management is not a survival issue for the EU, but a contribution to international peace and stability (and a stable neighbourhood, which the EU desperately needs), in the spirit of the UN Charter.

The territorial defence of the EU is another matter altogether, which still, for most of its Member States, is entrusted to NATO. If the EU did make the big leap to common defence, it would require a European army at least on par with the US armed forces, on account of the roughly comparable size and population of the two (the EU is actually slightly bigger than the US). At the moment, the EU does not have an ambition to take the decision and move to a common defence. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war has already had a strong effect and the EU, slowly and bureaucratically, as usual, is moving toward developing its military capabilities and defence technological and industrial base. These EU efforts are by now not only for crisis management, but territorial defence as well, in the spirit of the implementation plan of the EU Global Strategy, adopted in 2016, that can be summarized as “act with partners when possible, act autonomously when necessary”. The talk in Brussels is moving from “strategic autonomy” to strategic sovereignty” (Tocci, 2016; European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

Africa, on the other hand does have a stated objective, adopted by its Heads of State and Government, both to establish a political union, and a confederate or federate state, and an African army to go with it. This strategy established in 2013 in Agenda 2063 is very long term, 50 years into the future (out of which 11 years have already passed), which is reminiscent of the Chinese practice of planning 50 years ahead. (While even the longest term European planning does not look beyond 10-15 years into the future, and is typically only for 4-5 years, that is, the next European/national elections.) Territorial defence for Africa, at the African level is a huge ambition and undertaking and it is doubtful whether anything close to that could be achieved, even in 50 years.

Coming to peace operations in Africa, or in other words, the crisis management level of ambition and requirements, we also find a bleak picture. There are grave obstacles to be faced by African peace operations, or crisis management operations. Number one is obviously the lack of funds, due to the very weak economic performance of most African states and the need for the EU as a donor to even get off the ground (Besenyő, 2019; Besenyő 2021). The 2018 EU court of auditors report on the functioning of APSA

showed that EU financial support was mostly used for salaries and did not even begin to cover the actual operational needs of African forces. Number two is the lack of the forces themselves, because even a few brigades of the AU/SROs are nothing compared to the amount of forces managing all violent conflicts in Africa would need.

If Africa wants to put into practice the principle of “Africa belongs to the Africans” that AU documents and especially Agenda 2063 are built on, and realize the desired African ownership, including the ambition for Africa to become a dominant player in the world, it has to go a very very long way indeed. The EU has adopted a policy of “African solutions to African problems”, which dovetails with the AU ambition, and means the EU wants to support Africans to stand on their own feet, not dominate them. The EU of course does this not only based on values, but interests as well: it is in the European interest to have a southern neighbour that is peaceful and prosperous, and as such, is not a drain on European resources and a source of illegal mass migration to Europe, contributing to the potential destabilization of Europe by upending its political, social and cultural structures.

This brings us to one the greatest difference between what we mean by crisis management or peace operations in Europe and in Africa: the EU, internally, is at peace. The military threats the EU faces are coming from the outside, all the wars in Europe are happening in the East, outside EU borders. Africa is in contrast the continent that has, on a par with the Middle East, the highest incidents of wars, civil wars, terrorism, violent conflict, unlawful and violent changes of government in the world. (Africa alone is where about half the violent conflicts in the world happen.)

All this means that the traditional distinction between crisis management as something that has to be done externally, and territorial defence, which would have to be done internally, is something that for the last 80 years belonged to the politically and economically most developed regions of the world, North America and Europe. Africa is not so lucky, and after the end of colonialism in the 1960s, the threats to its long term peace, stability and prosperity are not coming from the outside, but from the inside. Nobody is planning or threatening to invade Africa, or individual African countries. It would not make any sense, and it is simply not needed any more. That mode of domination by outside actors has long ago gone out of fashion, at least in Africa, where revisionist powers have no self-defence, sphere of influence or identity reasons to invade. What Africa experiences now from great powers is economic and political influence and exploitation, without military conquest. This is much less overt, but at times not much less damaging than colonialism has been.

Consequently, crisis management for Africa is an internal issue, and is a much bigger challenge than territorial defence, which for the foreseeable future is not needed. The African army, if ever created, would have internal crisis management as the main task, a sort of “policing” function, much more than a classic territorial defence function. Not to mention the “projecting influence and protecting African political and economic



interests outside Africa” function, which would come into play if Africa ever became a great power. This, if African integration could happen, would absolutely be possible, based on the size and resources of the continent. However, this is so far into the future as to be pure science fiction at the moment.

The AU has launched an initiative called “Silencing the guns”, which originally was meant to be achieved by 2020, and has now been extended until 2030 (Achu Check and Hlanyane, 2021). Ending dozens of ongoing wars will obviously not happen until 2030 either, but the fact the African countries working together within the AU, copying the only similar peace project they have as an example, the EU, is important and grounds for optimism.

Conclusion

Africa has enormous potential, both regarding its human resources (unlike Europe, its population is young and the work force is enormous) and its natural resources, its geopolitical situation as a continent almost entirely surrounded by oceans, and as a continent that succeeded in creating an integration framework in the African Union that spans all 55 of its states. Africa is economically still very underdeveloped, and it is further weakened by the artificial borders of its states, not even remotely reflecting the ethnic and religious affiliation of its people. However, this can also be a blessing, as there are no strong and old nation states in Africa and its integration process, if it can be backed by strong political will and gather momentum, can go more smoothly and can in theory even overtake that of Europe. Africa is also not held back by a military alliance dominated by an outside power, as it is non-aligned and independent in a way that Europe has not been since the Second World War.

It remains to be seen what Africa will make of this chance and whether in the next few decades it will secure itself a place as one of the great powers, or it will remain what it always has been so far: the playground of the great powers. The interplay between the EU and the AU, the two Unions, the two potential great powers in the making, and whether they will be partners or rivals in the long run will be a rich field of study for the future.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributors

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Türkiye's Immigration Landscape: Cultural Exchange and Labor Dynamics with Africa¹

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Abstract:

Türkiye's relations with the African continent trace back to the periods of the Ottoman Empire's existence there. Beginning with trade, continuing education, and improving labour force requirements continue to strengthen relations with the Modern Türkiye. As a result of the transformations the African continent has undergone in recent years, Türkiye wants to take advantage of the opportunities in the region, increasing its reputation through civil society organizations and aid agencies, while exerting a protective and reassuring influence in the region through military cooperation. Due to factors triggering migration from African countries, Türkiye and Europe are seen as a new hope for immigrants. In addition to the increasing need for the labour force, affordable education, and scholarship opportunities, the university entrance exam prepared specifically for foreign students also makes Türkiye an attractive centre. In this article, you will witness the journey stories of hope that often begin with aspirations to become football players, the changes in the perception of Africans over the years through the power of social media, and the factors influencing this, as well as the importance of arts, music, films, and television series in shaping society. From the challenges faced by African communities seeking hope in a new country to the conveniences provided by government institutions during the integration process, all these processes are addressed in this article.

Keywords:

Ottoman Empire; Türkiye; Africa; foreign policy; Türkiye-Africa relations; African perception.

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Introduction

In recent years, Turkey has become a popular destination for African migrants seeking new opportunities. This influx of African migrants represents a complex phenomenon shaped by various economic, political, and social factors, both within Africa and Türkiye. They are comprised of immigrant and refugee communities mostly from Western, Central, and Eastern Africa. African immigrants are distinct from Afro-Turks. Afro-Turks are Turkish people of African Zanj descent, who trace their origin to the Ottoman slave trade like the Afro-Abkhazians. Afro-Turk population is estimated to be between 5,000 and 20,000 people. While official government data on the exact population of Africans in Türkiye is lacking, a 2017 report by the state-owned Anadolu Agency estimated their numbers to be nearly 1.5 million (İncekaya 2017). However, a political party named Zafer Partisi (Victory Party) which is known for anti-migration promises, leader Ümit Özdağ suggested on his Twitter account that this number could surpass 2 million by 2023 (Özdağ 2023).

These new faces, encountered in almost every field from academia to art, from trade to sports, come to the country for various purposes; while some prefer to return after the migration experience, others choose to settle and lead their lives in Turkish society as one of them. Among this community, the most notable group consists of those who come from sub-Saharan African countries to Turkey with two fundamental purposes: "work" and "education." This article aims to discuss the migration experiences of Africans who come to Turkey from the regions designated for work in our country.

Navigating rough migration routes fraught with risks, African migrants undertake arduous journeys to reach Turkey and often face exploitation trafficking along the way. Türkiye's strategic geographical location serves as a gateway, facilitating migration flows and positioning the country as a pivotal transit point for those journeying toward Europe and beyond.

Furthermore, Türkiye's relationship with Africa, both historically and in the contemporary context, plays a significant role in shaping migration dynamics. From the Ottoman Empire's presence across three continents to Türkiye's present-day engagement with African nations, this historical backdrop influences migration patterns and diplomatic relations. Recent revelations regarding Nelson Mandela's acceptance of the Atatürk Peace Prize, contrary to previous beliefs, underscore the complexity of Türkiye-South Africa relations and highlight the importance of accurate historical narratives in diplomacy."

The Turkish Africa Partnership Policy, crafted through collaborative efforts among public institutions, the private sector, civil society organizations, and humanitarian aid entities, aims to promote peace, stability, and socio-economic development across the continent. It endeavours to foster relations grounded in equality and mutual benefit. High-level visits between Turkey and African nations play a pivotal role in sustaining

this partnership. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during his tenure as Prime Minister and thereafter, has undertaken visits to 31 African countries, spanning from Angola to Zambia.

Upon their arrival in Türkiye, migrants encounter numerous challenges, including securing housing and employment, overcoming language barriers, and navigating legal obstacles. The landscape of migration to Turkey underwent a significant transformation following the 2014 Syrian refugee crisis, impacting both minor and major migrant groups. However, African migrants have historically received less support and fewer integration programs compared to Syrians, exacerbating the obstacles they face in building a new life. Despite the challenges, African migrants demonstrate resilience, buoyed by support from the Turkish people, Muslim organizations, governmental humanitarian relief foundations, and initiatives aimed at fostering assistance and integration. Through an examination of the influx of African migrants and their experiences in Türkiye, this article seeks to analyse the evolution of their representation in Turkish society in recent decades (Brigitte 2013).

Turkey's Relationship with Africa in the Past and Today

The historical narrative of Turkish-African relations diverges significantly from that of the Ottoman Empire, which extended its influence across three continents. Although Turkey's contemporary engagement is predominantly in Asia, its historical imprint in Africa, particularly in regions like Egypt, Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria, and Abyssinia, has left enduring legacies. These provinces facilitated centuries of interwoven relations between Turkish and African histories from the 16th to the 20th centuries. Unlike imposing Turkish language, customs, or Islamic sects, cultural interactions with North African natives evolved naturally. This seriousness paved the way for relations to reach different dimensions. Turkey, which became an observer member of the African Union in 2005, attained strategic partner status in 2008. In the same year, declared as the "Year of Africa," Istanbul hosted the first Turkey-Africa Summit.

The increasing presence of African students studying in Türkiye holds promise for future relations. Beyond social and economic dimensions, Turkey's engagement with Africa encompasses defence treaties, exemplified by its interest in acquiring Rooivalk attack helicopters from South Africa in the early 1990s and this period marked the beginning of the modern Turkish Republic's relationship with Africa, exemplified by the appointment of Sami Onaran as Consul General to South Africa following the peaceful transition to Nelson Mandela's government. However, on May 14 of the same year, the refusal of Nelson Mandela to accept the Atatürk (Founder of Modern Türkiye) Peace Prize awarded to him led to a scandalous incident that marked the beginning of relations between the two countries (Wheeler 2011).

Recent findings by the South African ambassador reveal that Nelson Mandela did not reject the Atatürk Peace Prize, as previously believed. According to the ambassador, Mandela had expressed gratitude for the honour but could not personally receive the award due to scheduling conflicts and health reasons. This revelation contradicts earlier reports and highlights the importance of accurate information in diplomatic narratives. The clarification may reshape perceptions of Turkey-South Africa relations and underscore the need to carefully examine historical events (Anadolu Agency 2014).

Governmental Approach

Turkey's approach to Africa is guided by principles of equality, mutual respect, and common interests. The country aims to establish partnerships that are based on mutual benefit and cooperation. To achieve this, Turkey engages with African countries through various channels, including diplomatic visits, high-level meetings, and economic cooperation forums. The government emphasizes the importance of political dialogue and economic cooperation to strengthen ties with African nations. Additionally, Turkey provides development assistance to support African countries in areas such as infrastructure, education, healthcare, and agriculture. Cultural and educational exchanges are also promoted to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between Turkey and African nations. Overall, Turkey's approach to Africa underscores its commitment to emphasize comprehensive and mutually beneficial relations with countries across the continent.

Africa's Growing Significance in Turkish Foreign Policy

Africa has become a top priority in Turkish foreign policy, with Turkey making significant strides in its relations with African countries. The expansion of Turkish embassies on the continent to 44 underscores the importance of diplomatic ties. This heightened engagement has facilitated progress in various domains, including trade, infrastructure investments, cultural exchanges, security cooperation, and humanitarian initiatives.

Historically strong relationships serve as a foundation for Africa's growing importance in Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, this surge in engagement has led to a rise in the number of African students studying in Turkey. However, alongside these positive developments, it's crucial to acknowledge that there have been some missteps and criticisms regarding Turkish involvement in Africa.

Since 2011, Turkey has witnessed a steady rise in the number of African university students, driven in part by state scholarships offered as part of Turkey's soft power strategy on the continent. Recent data from 2022 indicates a total of 260,000 foreign students in Turkey, with 61,000 hailing from Africa. Egypt and Nigeria emerge as the

leading countries of origin among African students (Kavaş 2022). In addition to scholarships, education companies, and education fairs play a pivotal role in attracting African students to Türkiye. Nonetheless, state institutions remain at the forefront of these efforts. The Maarif Foundation, Turkish Language Association, Yunus Emre Institute, and Study in Turkey, affiliated with Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu (Higher Education Council), stand out as key institutions driving initiatives to enhance educational cooperation between Türkiye and Africa.

Turkish Impact on Africa is Rising

Dr. Ali Onur Tepeciklioglu, Dr. Elem Eyrice-Tepeciklioglu and Dr. Can Karabıyık investigate the influence of Turkey's embassies on trade with Sub-Saharan Africa. Employing a panel data set covering 28 African countries from 2002 to 2020, their methodology aims to assess whether the establishment of embassies correlates with increased exports to these nations. Their findings align with previous empirical studies on the relationship between diplomatic representation and export dynamics, indicating a significant positive effect of embassy openings on export promotion to these regions. Furthermore, the analysis extends to examining the policy relevance of establishing foreign missions, shedding light on the economic viability of these new embassies. These complementary studies offer valuable insights into the diplomatic initiatives and strategies of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in the region, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu, Vreÿ & Baser 2024).

Turkey's relations with African countries continue through various institutions and agreements in addition to diplomatic missions. These include institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Turkish Airlines (THY), Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), and Turkey Maarif Foundation (TMV), as well as agreements in different fields. In addition to Turkey's diplomatic relations with African countries, direct flights have been initiated to many countries through Turkish Airlines (THY). Making its first flight to Africa in 1956, THY increased the number of countries it flies to on the continent to 40 and the number of destinations to 61 with flights to the capital of Angola, Luanda. The Turkey Maarif Foundation (TMV) also conducts activities in the field of education by opening schools and dormitories across the continent (De Bel-Air 2016).

It is stated that there are 208 universities in Turkey and more than 8 million university students, and this figure is the highest in the field of Higher Education in Europe. Turkey is located within the European Higher Education Area. The score it received in the Bologna report is 5 out of 5. The diplomas of 45 thousand departments in these 208 universities are accepted in European countries. Attractive reasons for African students. University education, which is quite expensive in the world, is quite cheap in our country compared to other countries. The annual fees of Hacettepe University, Ege University,

Amasya University, and universities located in Istanbul are 0 to 5 thousand, while Başkent University is 5 to 10, and Bilkent University is 10 to 15 thousand USD per year.

Turkey has military attachés in 19 countries in Africa

After South Africa imposed a weapons embargo against Türkiye in 1995, bilateral relations between the two nations became more strained. However, Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, pursued a more conciliatory stance toward Türkiye. This shift paved the way for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's inaugural visit to South Africa in 2005 (Öztürk & Duman 2023). Türkiye's ongoing reconstruction efforts across Africa are expanding, enhancing its potential for greater collaboration and mutual benefit (Ozkan 2014).

With the military attachés established in 19 countries across Africa, Turkey is engaged in cooperation in the field of security. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) personnel have been serving in Mali and the Central African Republic under the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 2016 to ensure peace and stability.

In 2017, Turkey established the Somali Turkish Task Force Command, which serves as the largest military training centre abroad. This command trains officers and non-commissioned officers who will form the backbone of the Somali army. Under the "Security and Military Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding" signed between Turkey and Libya, the training program prepared by the TSK for Libyan military students continues. Most recently, 90 members of the Libyan Counter-Terrorism Force, who underwent basic and advanced training lasting 6 and 12 weeks, received their diplomas on April 18th (Kavak & Aktaş 2021).

The Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) Doctrine

Developed by Turkish retired admiral Cihat Yaycı, the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, known as Mavi Vatan in Turkish, represents a comprehensive maritime strategy crafted by Turkey to assert its maritime interests and territorial claims. It encompasses Turkey's aspirations to safeguard its maritime boundaries, assert its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, and protect its interests in the Black Sea and the Aegean. Embraced by various segments of Turkish society, including military, political, and intellectual elites, the doctrine underscores Turkey's determination to assert its influence and protect its maritime resources. However, its adoption has also sparked debates and tensions, particularly concerning its alignment with traditional ideologies and the need for modernizing Turkey's naval capabilities. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's endorsement of the doctrine further underscores its significance in Turkey's foreign policy and national security agenda. As Turkey navigates regional dynamics and international relations, the



success of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine will depend on its ability to balance assertiveness with diplomatic engagement and strategic partnerships (Katsikidis 2022).

Turkey's Role in Libya

Türkiye has a key position on the energy corridors, smuggling, and illegal migration routes according to Türkiye's geographical location in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey's influence and balancing role in western Libya, along with its significant military presence, play a crucial part in shaping the political atmosphere. This factor attracts countries who are looking for solutions to controversies in Africa to collaborate with Turkey.

Additionally, Turkey's military presence in Libya acts as a deterrent, helping to prevent the emergence of a new influx of migration by containing the potential internal conflict or, in other words, by preventing the tense political atmosphere from translating into social dynamics. The geographical proximity of Turkish military forces to the cities of Zawiya and Zuwarah, which are seen as key migration routes from Libya to the Mediterranean, as well as Turkey's experience in border security, make Turkey an effective ally in migration management (Şefkatli 2024).

Italy's Development, Migration, and Security Agenda in Africa: The Mattei Plan

Italy has recently implemented the "Mediterranean diplomacy" known as the Mattei Plan, in Africa under Prime Minister Meloni's leadership. As a Mediterranean country, Italy relies on African nations for 40% of its natural gas needs. However, escalating instability and conflict in the Sahel region and North Africa threaten Italy's energy security. Thus, the primary objective of the Mattei Plan is to position Italy as an energy hub bridging North Africa and Europe. Nevertheless, it's arguable that Italy also aims to manage migration flows through this initiative. Initially conceived in the 1950s to secure Italy's energy supply, the Mattei Plan now encompasses irregular migration alongside energy and economic priorities, especially amidst increased global engagement with Africa.

Within the Mattei Plan, Italy seeks to address poverty, economic challenges, and structural barriers as part of its approach to tackling migration issues. The emphasis is on promoting economic growth and development as solutions to migration challenges. These initiatives may foster backdoor diplomacy on migration, emphasizing principles of development and mutual benefit. Moreover, Italian officials highlight the Mattei Plan's distinctiveness from China and Russia's policies in Africa, aiming to expand Italy's influence on the continent.

During the January 2024 Rome Summit, which saw the participation of over 20 African leaders and European Union representatives, Meloni outlined a comprehensive

\$5.95 billion investment strategy, with a primary focus on energy cooperation as a pivotal aspect of economic development. This initiative represents a proactive approach by Italy, potentially reshaping its historical engagement with Africa and offering a platform to manage irregular migration flows through enhanced mediation efforts on the continent (Torkington 2024).

Push Factors in Africa (Economic Hardship, Political Instability, Conflict, etc.)

According to the International Monetary Fund's 2024 GDP projections, South Africa ranks as the wealthiest African country with a GDP of \$401 billion (equal to ₺13 billion), while Türkiye's current GDP stands at \$1.34 billion (equal to ₺43 billion) (IMF 2023). Moreover, political instability, governance challenges, frequent coups, and persistent conflicts in various African nations compel individuals to seek refuge and safety elsewhere. Additionally, environmental factors such as climate change and environmental degradation further exacerbate the need for displacement and migration.

Highest GDP Countries		Lowest GDP Countries	
South Africa	\$401B	Eswatini	\$5B
Nigeria	\$395B	Liberia	\$5B
Egypt	\$358B	Sierra Leone	\$4B
Algeria	\$239B	Djibouti	\$4B

Figure 1: Highest and Lowest GDP in African Countries
 Source: IMF

In 2024, South Africa is expected to have the highest unemployment rate in Africa, projected at approximately 30 percent. Djibouti and Eswatini are also anticipated to face significant challenges, with unemployment rates of around 28 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Conversely, Niger and Burundi exhibit the lowest unemployment rates on the continent. However, across Africa, youth unemployment remains a prevalent issue, with projections indicating a rate of around 11 percent in 2024. Djibouti faces an especially acute challenge, with an estimated youth unemployment rate of nearly 80 percent in 2022, followed by South Africa with approximately 52 percent. Gender disparities persist, with female unemployment rates in Africa reaching around eight percent in 2023, compared to 6.6 percent among men. Djibouti and South Africa rank highest for female unemployment, with rates of approximately 38 percent and 31 percent, respectively. The mass unemployment and rootless situation of young people, particularly in urban areas, is a source of constant unrest in many African countries. Consequently, these states do not hinder but rather support the emigration of young people. (Galal 2023).

Pull Factors in Türkiye (Growing Economy, Labour Demand)

Türkiye has a large influence over African nations due to their religious and historical relations. A secular republic founded in 1923 as a predecessor of the Ottoman Empire that is located in a unique location from Asia to Anatolia, Anatolia to Europe is a massive pull factor for Africans who are looking for better life conditions. According to the World Bank, Türkiye's GDP per capita (PPP) is \$38,355, the Middle East and North Africa average is \$19,806 and the Sub-Saharan Africa average is \$4,434 (World Bank 2022).

Country	Most Recent Year	Most Recent Value
Türkiye	2022	\$38,355.2
Middle East & North Africa	2022	\$19,806.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	2022	\$4,434.7

Figure 2: Comparison of Türkiye and Africa's GDP Averages

Source: The World Bank

Additionally, the Gross External Debt Stock of Türkiye amounted to 499.9 billion US Dollars. Between 2004 to 2024, Türkiye's Debt Stock skyrocketed from \$149 billion to \$499.9 billion.³ Africans who migrate to Turkey to work are active in many different sectors. Among them, the most well-known are those who work in salaried jobs like Turkish citizens, those active in the television and film industry, employed athletes, freelancers, street vendors, cargo workers, interpreters, guides, educators, and artisans. Sport facilities, particularly football hold significant appeal for many African migrants in Türkiye, offering the promise of stability for themselves and their families. While some secure contracts in Türkiye's Regional Amateur League (BAL) or Turkish top division Trendyol Süper Lig (Trendyol Super League), which boasted a \$500 million (₺16 billion) broadcasting revenue in 2017,⁴ others aim to advance their careers in a Muslim-friendly environment and may choose Türkiye as their first destination. Indeed, Türkiye has served as a starting point for numerous talented players who have successfully moved on to the top European leagues and the English Premier League. Notable players like Demba BA, Didier DROGBA, Jay Jay OKOCHA, Stephen APPIAH, Ibrahima YATTARA, and Daniel AMOKACHI have made indelible marks on Turkish football. However, for those encountering setbacks in their footballing aspirations, Türkiye offers limited alternatives. Some explore alternative employment opportunities, while others contemplate returning to their homelands. In the face of these challenges, time becomes a crucial factor for these individuals, who are acutely aware of the need to seize opportunities swiftly (CLERCK & Marie-Lou 2013).

³ <https://en.hmb.gov.tr/duyuru/gross-and-net-external-debt-stock-of-turkiye-as-of-31-december-2023>

⁴ <https://www.sporx.com/super-lig-yine-digiturkte-500-milyon-dolar-SXHBQ584599SXQ>

Athletics emerges as a notable pathway for migration to Türkiye among athletes. Between 1999 and 2008, six Ethiopians, followed by eight Kenyans along with two Jamaicans and one South African between 2013 and 2016, transitioned to Turkish citizenship to represent the country on the international stage. Among these athletes, Elvan ABEYLEGESSE stands out as a prominent figure. Born in Ethiopia, she excels as a middle and long-distance running athlete, competing across distances ranging from 1500 meters to the marathon, as well as in cross-country events. A former world record-holder in the 5000-meter event with a time of 14:24.68 minutes, ABEYLEGESSE has garnered a remarkable collection of medals, including two gold, one bronze, and one silver. Her sportsmanship was recognized in 2010 when she received the Pierre de Coubertin World Fair Play Trophy for her act of lending a pair of running shoes to competitor Meselech Melkamu just moments before the start of the 10,000 meters final at the 2009 World Championships in Athletics, ultimately leading Melkamu to win the silver medal.⁵

Migration Routes and Methods

In many other African countries, men between the ages of 18 to 40 years head to North Africa every year along well-established migrant smuggling routes, then board boats to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. African migrants employ diverse routes and migration channels to reach Turkey, reflecting the complexities of their journeys. Some opt for land routes, navigating through multiple countries and crossing borders to reach their destination. Others choose perilous sea journeys, particularly those originating from North African countries.

The Mediterranean Sea route is one such path, notorious for its dangers yet frequented by migrants from countries like Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. For many, Turkey serves as both a destination and a transit point, with some aiming to settle in the country while others continue their journey toward Europe.

Over the past year alone, approximately one million new migrants have joined the ranks, contributing to the estimated total of 43 million African migrants. The majority of these migrants, predominantly young and unattached individuals, remain within the continent, seeking employment opportunities in urban centres. However, some opt to pursue job prospects beyond Africa, with a notable presence in the Middle East and Europe. Despite this, Africans represent only a small proportion, comprising 6.6% and 8.2% of all migrants in the respective regions (World Bank 2023).

Analysis of Turkey's Immigration Policies

⁵ <https://worldathletics.org/news/iaaf-news/fair-play-to-abeylegesse>

Demographic Data

Since the late 1990s, there has been a significant rise in the number of immigrants and refugees of African origin in Turkey due to migration. The contemporary migrant community primarily comprises individuals from countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Senegal. Initially, many African migrants came to Turkey intending to cross into Europe. However, with both Turkey and the EU implementing stricter migration policies, an increasing number of migrants now choose to settle in Turkey instead. As of 2021, Istanbul hosts around 70% of the African population in Türkiye due to the availability of work (Dedecan 2023).

Arriving from Sub-Saharan African Countries			Arriving from Whole African Countries		
Country	20016	2017	Country	2016	2017
Nigeria	1583	1734	Libya	4344	6029
Somali	1452	701	Egypt	4094	8582
Sudan	656	442	Morocco	1763	2556
Ethiopia	551	495	Nigeria	1583	1734
Ghana	477	326	Algeria	839	1478

Figure 3: Sub-Saharan African Countries and Whole African Countries Immigration and Refugees in Türkiye

Source: DHA (Demirören News Agency)

Legal Status

The legal status of African migrants in Turkey is diverse and can significantly impact their access to various services and opportunities. While some may arrive with valid visas for work or study, others may be undocumented, facing challenges in employment, housing, and accessing social services. This revised overview sets the stage for a more detailed exploration of African migration to Turkey. Subsequent sections will delve into the specific factors driving migration, the experiences of migrants upon arrival, and the challenges and opportunities they encounter in their new home.

Turkey does not grant refugee status to approximately 400,000 asylum seekers from non-Council of Europe member states such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and African countries. Due to geographical limitations, Turkey has established a unique international protection status called "conditional refugee status." In 2024, Turkey hosts a diverse range of residents, including 612,331 short-term residence permit holders, 171,992 students, 125,048 individuals with family residence permits, and 216,212 holders of other types of visas, totaling 1,125,583. The top three cities in Turkey by residence permits are Istanbul with 554,552, Antalya with 122,535, and Bursa with 51,060 residents. Additionally, data from Turkey's Directorate General of Migration Management reveals that in 2020, 281 individuals were identified as human trafficking victims, a number that increased to 402 in 2021, decreased to 343 in 2022, and further dropped to 223 in 2023. Currently, Turkey provides shelter for 42 victims of human trafficking (Presidency of Migration Management 2024).

Residence Permit Types in Türkiye	
Short Term Residence Permit	612.331
Student Residence Permit	171.992
Family Residence Permit	125.048
Others	216.212

Figure 4: Residency Types in 2024 at Türkiye
Source: Presidency of Migration Management

In 2023, Turkey demonstrated robust efforts in managing irregular migration, with 42,738 irregular migrants apprehended, marking a significant stride in border security. Impressively, 39,576 irregular migrants were efficiently deported, representing a commendable 93% success rate in curbing unauthorized entry. Additionally, proactive measures prevented the entry of 96,785 irregular migrants into the country, underscoring Turkey's commitment to border control and immigration management. Over the last 12 months, a substantial 134,602 irregular migrants were deported, reflecting sustained efforts to uphold immigration regulations and ensure the integrity of Turkey's borders (Presidency of Migration Management 2023).

Efforts to Facilitate Integration

Initiatives aimed at facilitating the integration of migrants into Turkish society encompass a multifaceted approach, addressing social, economic, and cultural aspects. Government-led programs prioritize language instruction, vocational training,

employment assistance, and legal aid, equipping migrants with the necessary skills and resources for successful integration. Community-driven initiatives, in collaboration with local businesses and educational institutions, provide platforms for migrants to actively participate in society and contribute to its growth. Additionally, promoting intercultural dialogue and fostering mutual understanding between migrants and host communities are pivotal for creating an inclusive and cohesive society. Through concerted efforts at all levels, Turkey endeavors to cultivate an environment where migrants can flourish and engage fully in their new communities.

Potentials & Exceptions for Higher Education

Türkiye has emerged as a preferred destination for African students seeking higher education opportunities. In 2020, Turkey ranked 8th among African students' preferences, attracting over 28,000 students for education purposes. By 2023, this number had surged to 61,000 African students choosing Turkey for their studies (Kavak 2023a).

Between 2011 and 2021, Türkiye Bursları (Turkey Scholarships) received applications from more than 314,000 students from 54 African countries, with 13,982 students being awarded scholarships. Additionally, thousands of African students pursue university studies in Turkey through other means. In 2021 alone, 4,403 African students enrolled in undergraduate, master's, and doctoral programs at Turkish universities. Furthermore, there are 8,786 graduates from Turkey across 51 African countries (Anadolu Agency, 2021).

Civil society organizations, including the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities and the Diyanet Foundation, have also played a significant role in facilitating education opportunities for young Africans. Their contributions have enabled over 30,000 African students to pursue studies in Turkish universities, whether public or private (Kavaş 2022).

This data underscores Turkey's growing prominence as a destination for higher education among African students and highlights the collaborative efforts of various stakeholders in promoting educational exchanges between Turkey and Africa.

Turkish universities play a pivotal role in welcoming African students, offering them various privileges such as scholarships, part-time work opportunities, and participation in conferences. For instance, Istanbul Aydın University has established an African Student Union dedicated to assisting students in making the most of their experience in Türkiye. The university hosts panel meetings, known as "African Students Meets Business Life," aimed at connecting students with potential employers who value their diverse backgrounds and skill sets.

The YÖS Examination (Foreign Student Exam) serves as an entrance examination tailored for foreign students aspiring to pursue higher education in Turkey. Individual universities administer their variations of the exam, which is exclusively open to candidates seeking admission to undergraduate programs. Students aiming for transfer opportunities or postgraduate studies apply directly to their preferred institutions. Annually, approximately 5,000 candidates sit for the YÖS Examination (OSYM 2024).

A recent analysis of the exam questions suggests that they are generally considered easier compared to the Turkish university placement exam, which is designed for Turkish citizens. This discrepancy has led to discontent among Turkish adolescents, as university quotas are being occupied by foreign students instead of local applicants. One notable instance is Karabük University, located in the Turkish city of Karabük, where out of a total student population of 45,358, 11,890 are international students (Karasu 2024).

The Role of NGOs and Community Support Initiatives

TMV (Turkish Maarif Foundation) extends educational opportunities to 17,565 students across 175 institutions in 26 African countries and addresses accommodation needs through 18 student dormitories. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) has supported higher education for 5,259 students from 52 African nations between 2010 and 2019.

TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) and YEE (Yunus Emre Institute) are actively engaged in development and educational projects benefiting Africans. TIKA operates in Africa through 22 representations, while YEE manages cultural centers in 10 countries. With offices in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Senegal, Mauritania, and The Gambia, YEE expands its presence to Abuja, Nigeria, to promote Turkish language and cultural exchange. Additionally, YEE fosters collaboration in culture and arts, alongside Turkish language instruction, to strengthen bonds with African communities.

Immigration Groups and Their Status

In the context of immigration groups and their status, it has been observed that certain companies in Türkiye are due to a lack of official statistics or reports published. Such as the chicken farm Lezita, has begun to hire African workers following the employment of Indian & Syrian workers. While the exact statistics on the number of foreign workers in Türkiye remain unclear, Lezita recently announced the hiring of 37 foreigners, equivalent to 1% of their labour force, to replace 69 individuals who recently left due to reasons such as resignation, retirement, or marriage. This move triggered a strike and



protests against the company which is currently on its 45th day, expressing concerns about potential job losses and the preference for a labour force without a full package of benefits, also leading companies to access special interest rate loans from government banks. Despite this, African workers hired by Lezita have expressed satisfaction with their work experience in Türkiye, prompting inquiries and requests for guidance from other Africans seeking job opportunities or contemplating relocation. Lezita's official statement highlights the necessity for foreign labour to sustain production amid inadequate recruitment efforts, particularly considering the factory's location. The statement emphasizes that this approach is also adopted by other companies facing similar challenges. Additionally, it was noted that the strike had no impact on operations, as the facility continued production at full capacity without any disruptions in the supply chain or changes in quality or operations (Yeniçağ 2024).

Following the preceding discussion on the utilization of foreign labour in Türkiye, it's noteworthy that African workers continue to play a significant role in various sectors, including agriculture. As exemplified in the annual tea harvest, African workers contribute to Türkiye's agricultural workforce, particularly in tea-rich regions like Rize, known for its tea cultivation. In 2021, the tea harvest saw the active involvement of African workers, highlighting their integral role in meeting the labour demands of Türkiye's agricultural sector. The presence of African workers in activities like tea harvesting underscores the diversity of Türkiye's labour force and the collaborative efforts across different communities to sustain crucial sectors of the economy (NTV 2021).

Integration Challenges

Legal Obstacles & Language Barriers

A significant portion of immigrants and refugees from African countries face difficulties with registration. The majority of Africans who have been in Turkey for 3-4 years but have not been able to access any registration process are predominant. While those who are refugees should benefit from the international protection regime, it is observed that due to both language barriers and the attitude of migration authorities, these individuals cannot even apply.

Africans who have had their residence applications rejected, cannot access the asylum regime, are subject to administrative supervision, and face the risk of deportation are compelled to continue their daily lives by working in the informal sector, just like other migrant and refugee communities.

Discrimination, Unpaid Wages, Poor Housing Conditions

Turkish perception of Africa has undergone significant changes throughout history. In the 1970s and 1980s, Africans were often portrayed in Turkish films with stereotypical

terms such as "Arap bacı" (Arab sister) and "Zenci" (Negro), reflecting a problematic perception of the continent. These terms serve as evidence of the problematic nature of the perception of the continent in Turkey (Kavak 2023b). Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from various Turkish cities began operating in Africa during the late 1990s. However, their perception of Africa was influenced not by what they observed but rather by preconceived notions.

This situation has been likened to Europe's post-independence aid policies, which perpetuated colonial cooperation, mirroring Europe's perception of Africa. The portrayal of Africa by some NGOs solely as "the hungry, deprived, and poor" has led to a distortion of the realistic portrayal of Africa (ChatGPT 2023).

General Impact of African Immigrants on Turkish Society

Societal Tensions and Conflicts

Recent refugee crises worldwide have had a profound impact on Türkiye, which hosts more refugees than any other country. The growing support for repatriating refugees to their home countries also affects Africans who have established long-term residency in Türkiye. Despite the generally welcoming attitude towards Africans in Turkish society, negative media portrayal of refugees has contributed to the dissemination of prejudiced beliefs. Turkish citizens are increasingly cognizant of neighbourhoods with a predominant foreign ethnic population, leading to a decline in societal support, particularly in the wake of economic challenges stemming from events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian War. These factors have fuelled concerns among Turkish citizens, exemplified by the influx of Russian refugees fleeing conflict to cities like Antalya, resulting in soaring real estate prices and significant demographic shifts, which are viewed with apprehension by residents.

The presence of Africans in Turkey significantly impacts Turkish society, reflecting the interconnectedness between Turkish and African communities. This bond was vividly exemplified during a natural disaster in Turkey in 2023, where Africans demonstrated their adaptability and solidarity by extending invaluable assistance and aid.

A significant example occurred in Turkey's Cape Town Municipality, where efforts were promptly organized to provide support. According to the Anadolu Agency, these humanitarian contributions encompassed a range of essential supplies, including over 500 tents, 1000 sets of winter clothing, 250 blankets, 200 medical kits, and more (Güvendik 2023). This remarkable initiative underscores the depth of the bonds shared between these communities, bridging the geographical distance between Türkiye and African lands.

Cultural Exchange and Integration: Movies, TV Series, Arts and Music

Television serves as a powerful medium through which one can gain insights into Turkish culture, societal norms, and the government's influence on media. Throughout various periods of the Ottoman Empire, Africans came to Turkey and settled within its borders. Among them were individuals who made significant contributions to Turkish cinema and television, leaving an indelible mark on the entertainment industry.

One notable example is Dursune Şirin, an Afro-Turkish actress born in Türkiye in 1913. Throughout her illustrious career, Şirin appeared in over 70 films, leaving an enduring legacy in Turkish cinema. Another prominent figure is Ihsan Küçüktepe, known for his portrayal of 'Çitlembik,' a trusted companion to the main character in Turkish television series. Küçüktepe's character resonated deeply with Turkish audiences, earning him widespread acclaim and popularity.

Max Bendo, born in 1972, is another inspiring example of an African actor who found success in Turkey. Starting his career as an animator, Bendo transitioned to television series acting after coming to Turkey. He became known for his roles in series such as "En Son Babalar Duyar" and "Akasya Durağı." Bendo later obtained Turkish citizenship and appeared in more than 300 episodes, mostly from these television series, which lasted for over 5 seasons.

Bendo's journey serves as an example for African individuals seeking better life conditions in a new country and for nations that embrace minorities and integrate them into their communities.

In Turkish television series, representations of cultural customs and traditions, such as circumcision, are often portrayed for comedic effect. Max Bendo is depicted wearing traditional Turkish circumcision celebration attire. Circumcision is a significant event in Turkish culture, and actors often portray humorous reactions to the ritual, reflecting the Turkish community's religious roots. Additionally, Turkish audiences are curious to see Kenyan customs depicted in television series, although this curiosity sometimes leads to portrayals of African tribal village life and customs with voodoo magic jokes (Ramm 2016).

Travel blogger Marion Kate Smith, who has attended Turkish courses and explored Turkey over the past decade, is showcasing his memories, photographs, and sketches in an exhibition in Istanbul, supported by institutions in Turkey. Concurrently, five friends studying in Turkey have formed a band named 'Highlife' that performs at festivals across the country by singing in Turkish. They highlight the warm reception they receive from Turkish people when foreigners attempt to speak in Turkish, noting that singing in Turkish is particularly appreciated.

Example 1: Jacob Kakra Bida's Journey in Türkiye

Jacob Kakra Bida, a 21-year-old from Ghana, epitomizes the aspirations and struggles of many young African migrants in Turkey. With dreams of European football stardom burning bright in his heart, Jacob left behind his family and the familiar comforts of his homeland, seeking a chance to prove his talent and transform his life. His family, unwavering in their support, believes in his potential to become a renowned footballer, a conviction that echoes Jacob's unwavering determination.

As Jacob navigates the complexities of life in Turkey, he faces a myriad of challenges, determined to overcome them all. For Jacob and countless others like him, the pursuit of professional football is not merely a personal ambition; it's a lifeline, a chance to break the cycle of poverty and elevate their families' circumstances. This article delves into the experiences of African migrants in Turkey, exploring their dreams, struggles, and the unwavering hope that drives them forward.

Example 2: Somali President's Son in Hit-and-Run Case

A collision in Istanbul involving Mohammed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud who is the son of Somalia's president ignited public anger in Turkey. The incident, which resulted in the death of a motorcycle courier named Yunus Emre Göcer, drew accusations of a cover-up and unequal treatment under the law. Initial reports indicated a lack of action from authorities. This sparked outrage, leading to protests from motorcycle drivers and couriers demanding justice for Göcer. Istanbul's mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, said in December 2023 that he was glad the prosecutor's office had issued the arrest warrant. The mayor had written on X, formerly known as Twitter, that the prosecutor's office would need to explain discrepancies between the initial police report and the latest statement "which allowed the suspect to flee abroad" (İmamoğlu 2023).

The Somali president, denying his son had fled, claimed he left due to prior business commitments and the absence of an arrest warrant. He expressed condolences to Göcer's family and stated he advised his son to return for court proceedings. News reports also mentioned communication between the Turkish and Somali justice ministers. At the time, Turkish state news agency Anadolu reported that Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç told reporters in Ankara he had personally spoken with the Somali justice minister (McLean 2024).

Example 3: Various Interviews

Pascal, one of the hundreds of Africans who came to Turkey seven years ago at the age of 20 with dreams of playing football, faced disappointment. Despite being liked by numerous teams, he never received his payment from any of them.

"I didn't understand what was happening. They would tell me 'You're very good,' but everything would fall apart after the team gathered. I don't know why. They took me to Tokat Spor football club. I stayed there for three years. They were supposed to get a license for the league. Then it didn't happen again. I went to Zeytinburnu Sport football club. The same thing. I went to many teams like this, but the same thing happened in all of them. I couldn't get my money."

After his experiences, Pascal lost hope and gave up playing football. Now his biggest dream is to get a coaching license and coach a major team in Africa (Koşar & Yalçın 2020).

Yakuba, 32 years old and from Gambia, came to Turkey as a political refugee. Due to the pandemic, he is unemployed and lives in a house with 16 people. One of the most common problems he faces is, once again, not being paid for his work.

"I experienced it myself. I worked but didn't get paid. We asked for our money. My friend went to the police station. He wanted to return to Senegal. Later, we went to the police and the employer together. The employer still didn't give us our money. 'I'm here too, just like you. Go now, I'll give it to you later,' he said. Months passed, and we still haven't received our money (Koşar & Yalçın 2020)."

Discussion

The conclusion of the article sheds light on the intricate interactions between Turkish society and African migrants, where skin colour emerges as the dominant social marker of difference. While religion and legal status also significantly impact social interactions, skin colour often plays a pivotal role in shaping perceptions and determining social dynamics.

Technological advancements, particularly widespread access to social media, have had a profound impact on perceptions of Africa and Africans globally, including within Turkish society. The influence of state-controlled media further shapes public attitudes toward migrants, contributing to both positive and negative portrayals. Additionally, the prevalent assumption of Africans transiting Türkiye rather than settling has implications for interactions, especially among segments of the population with nationalist tendencies. The experiences of many African migrants aiming to reach developed countries, often through pursuing dreams in sports, reflect a racialization of their undocumented status in Türkiye. Despite these challenges, examples exist of African migrants carving out advantages for themselves by navigating historical boundaries dating back to the Ottoman Empire.

The increasing number of marriages between Turks and Africans reflects Türkiye's multicultural identity, rooted in its history as an empire. Some individuals feel closer to Middle Eastern culture than Europeans, contributing to reduced social tension and a

nationalist rather than racist outlook. However, categorizations based on Arab or European cultural affiliations raise questions about Turkish identity and warrant further study. The EU's stance on human rights and immigration, particularly following the Syrian and Afghan refugee crisis, poses challenges to integration efforts in Türkiye, which has become the largest illegal migrant hub. The predominantly male demographic of migrants aged 18-35 raises concerns and is sometimes framed as a hidden army by opposition parties, prompting debates about repatriation versus integration.

The presence of 500,000 Syrian babies born in Türkiye raises concerns about the potential rise of Arab nationality in Turkish territories. Despite this, African representation in society remains relatively positive, with their skin colour often viewed as a positive attribute. However, discourses about race are primarily framed as a potential danger rather than approached pragmatically, reflecting socio-cultural attitudes towards visibility and potential risks associated with migrant populations.

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Enhancing Fintech Security and Countering Terrorist Financing: A Case Study of Kenya's Fintech Landscape¹

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Abstract:

This research aims to investigate the intersection of fintech security and the War on Terror within the context of Kenya's burgeoning fintech landscape. With the rapid growth of fintech solutions in Kenya, there arises a pressing need to assess the security challenges and vulnerabilities that accompany this growth, particularly in light of the country's ongoing efforts to combat terrorism. The research will delve into the present challenges and prospects of fintech security, with a specific focus on strategies for managing complex threats and risks associated with terrorist financing, both locally and globally. By examining the unique socio-economic and geopolitical dynamics of Kenya, this study will shed light on the critical role of fintech in national security efforts, including the detection and prevention of illicit financial activities linked to terrorism.

Keywords:

Fintech; security challenges; War on Terror; Kenya; terrorist financing, cybersecurity; financial integrity; national security; regulatory frameworks.

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Introduction

Background and Context

The background and context of the proposed research topic on fintech and the War on Terror in Kenya provide a foundation for understanding the intricate relationship between financial technology, national security, and counterterrorism efforts. Kenya, situated in East Africa, has experienced significant security challenges due to the presence of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, which has carried out attacks targeting civilians, government institutions, and international interests. These security threats have necessitated robust measures to combat terrorism financing, disrupt illicit financial networks, and safeguard the integrity of the financial system.

Against this backdrop, Kenya has witnessed a rapid proliferation of fintech solutions, driven by factors such as widespread mobile phone penetration, an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, and a burgeoning tech ecosystem. Mobile money platforms like M-Pesa have revolutionized financial services, enabling millions of Kenyans to access banking services, make payments, and transfer funds conveniently and affordably. However, this digital transformation has also introduced new security challenges and vulnerabilities, including the risk of fintech platforms being exploited by terrorist organizations for illicit activities such as money laundering, fundraising, and illicit fund transfers.

The convergence of fintech innovation and terrorism financing poses multifaceted challenges for Kenya's national security apparatus, regulatory authorities, financial institutions, and law enforcement agencies. The anonymity, speed, and convenience offered by fintech platforms make them attractive tools for terrorist groups seeking to finance their operations clandestinely and evade detection. Moreover, the cross-border nature of fintech transactions and the interconnectedness of global financial systems amplify the risks of terrorist financing and transnational financial crime, necessitating coordinated efforts at the national, regional, and international levels to address these threats effectively.

Critically analysing the background and context of the research topic reveals the urgent need to examine the security implications of fintech innovation in the context of Kenya's counterterrorism efforts. By understanding the interplay between fintech, terrorism financing, and national security dynamics, policymakers, regulatory authorities, and other stakeholders can develop targeted strategies and interventions to mitigate risks, enhance regulatory compliance, and safeguard the integrity of the financial system. Moreover, empirical research and case studies can provide valuable insights into the modus operandi of terrorist groups, emerging trends in fintech-related security incidents, and best practices for enhancing fintech security and countering terrorism financing effectively.

Research Objectives and Scope

The research objectives and scope of the proposed study on fintech and the War on Terror in Kenya delineate the specific goals, areas of inquiry, and parameters within which the research will be conducted. These objectives guide the research process, shape the analysis, and provide clarity on the intended outcomes of the study. By critically examining the research objectives and scope, stakeholders can gain insights into the key questions to be addressed and the potential contributions of the research to academia, policy, and practice.

The primary objective of the research is to examine the intersection of fintech security and counterterrorism efforts in Kenya, with a specific focus on understanding the security challenges and vulnerabilities associated with terrorist financing through fintech platforms. This objective entails conducting a comprehensive analysis of the evolving landscape of fintech innovation, terrorism financing methods, and regulatory responses within the Kenyan context. By identifying the modus operandi of terrorist groups, vulnerabilities within fintech platforms, and regulatory gaps, the research aims to inform policy development, regulatory reforms, and technological interventions to enhance fintech security and mitigate the risks of terrorism financing.

The scope of the research encompasses several key dimensions, including the analysis of fintech platforms and technologies, regulatory frameworks and policy responses, technological innovations, and case studies of fintech-related security incidents. Specifically, the research will examine the security features, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with various fintech platforms, such as mobile money, digital payments, cryptocurrencies, and peer-to-peer lending. By critically assessing the regulatory frameworks governing the fintech sector, the research will identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities for enhancing regulatory oversight, compliance, and enforcement measures to combat terrorism financing effectively.

Furthermore, the research will explore technological innovations and counterterrorism strategies aimed at enhancing fintech security and resilience against illicit financial activities. This includes examining emerging technologies such as block chain, artificial intelligence, and biometric authentication, as well as methods and mechanisms of terrorist financing through fintech platforms. By analysing real-world case studies and examples of terrorist financing incidents involving fintech platforms in Kenya, the research will provide empirical insights into the challenges faced by regulatory authorities, financial institutions, and law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism financing and safeguarding national security interests.

Critically analysing the research objectives and scope reveals the comprehensive and interdisciplinary nature of the study, which integrates insights from fintech, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and regulatory studies. By addressing these objectives within the specified scope, the research aims to contribute to academic scholarship, inform evidence-based policymaking, and guide industry best practices for enhancing



fintech security and countering terrorism financing effectively in Kenya and beyond. Moreover, the research outcomes are expected to have practical implications for stakeholders, including regulatory authorities, financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations, involved in combating terrorism financing and safeguarding the integrity of the financial system.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the proposed study on fintech and the War on Terror in Kenya extends beyond academic inquiry to encompass broader implications for national security, regulatory governance, and technological innovation. By critically examining the significance of the study, stakeholders can understand its relevance and potential contributions to addressing pressing challenges at the intersection of fintech security and counterterrorism efforts.

Firstly, the study holds significant implications for enhancing national security and countering terrorism financing in Kenya. With the country facing persistent security threats from terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, understanding the vulnerabilities and risks posed by fintech platforms is essential for developing effective counterterrorism strategies. By shedding light on the modus operandi of terrorist groups, emerging trends in fintech-related security incidents, and regulatory gaps, the study can inform evidence-based policymaking and regulatory interventions aimed at disrupting illicit financial networks, safeguarding the integrity of the financial system, and enhancing national security resilience.

Moreover, the study has implications for regulatory governance and policy development within the fintech sector. As fintech innovation continues to reshape the financial services landscape in Kenya, regulatory authorities face the challenge of balancing innovation with regulatory compliance and consumer protection. By critically assessing the regulatory frameworks governing the fintech sector, and identifying gaps, challenges, and opportunities for regulatory reform, the study can provide valuable insights for strengthening regulatory oversight, enhancing compliance measures, and fostering a conducive environment for fintech innovation while mitigating the risks of terrorism financing and financial crime.

Furthermore, the study contributes to advancing knowledge and understanding of the evolving relationship between fintech security and terrorism financing in the context of emerging markets. While previous studies have explored the security challenges of fintech platforms and the dynamics of terrorism financing separately, there is a dearth of research that comprehensively examines their intersection within the specific context of Kenya. By filling this gap in the literature, the study can generate new insights, theoretical frameworks, and empirical evidence that contribute to academic scholarship in the fields of fintech, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and regulatory studies.

Additionally, the study has practical implications for industry stakeholders, including financial institutions, fintech companies, and technology providers, involved in safeguarding the integrity of the financial system and mitigating risks associated with terrorism financing. By analysing technological innovations, regulatory best practices, and case studies of fintech-related security incidents, the study can inform industry best practices, risk management strategies, and investments in cybersecurity technologies to enhance fintech security and resilience against illicit financial activities.

The significance of the study lies in its potential to inform evidence-based policymaking, regulatory governance, and industry best practices for enhancing fintech security and countering terrorism financing effectively in Kenya. By addressing these pressing challenges and shedding light on their implications for national security, regulatory governance, and technological innovation, the study aims to contribute to building a safer, more secure, and resilient financial ecosystem that fosters sustainable economic growth and development in Kenya and beyond.

Analysis of Fintech Security Challenges

Overview of Fintech Security Landscape

The overview of the fintech security landscape provides a foundational understanding of the security challenges and vulnerabilities inherent in Kenya's rapidly evolving financial technology sector (Mobarek, 2014). Fintech innovations such as mobile money platforms, digital payments, and block chain technologies have revolutionized financial services, offering convenience and accessibility to millions of users (Muthinja, 2016).

One critical aspect of the fintech security landscape in Kenya is the prevalence of mobile money platforms, exemplified by M-Pesa, which dominates the market (Aduda, 2012). While these platforms have facilitated financial inclusion and economic empowerment, they are susceptible to various security threats, including fraud, identity theft, and unauthorized access. For instance, mobile money users may fall victim to phishing scams, where fraudsters trick them into disclosing sensitive information or transferring funds to fraudulent accounts (Mobarek, 2014).

Moreover, the rise of digital payments and e-commerce platforms has introduced new vulnerabilities, particularly concerning data privacy and cybersecurity. Instances of data breaches and cyberattacks targeting fintech companies and financial institutions highlight the need for robust security measures to protect users' personal and financial information. For example, in 2017, the Kenya Credit Information Sharing Association (CIS Kenya) suffered a data breach, compromising the personal data of millions of Kenyans, including their credit histories and financial records (Deng, 2017).

Additionally, the emergence of block chain technology and cryptocurrencies presents both opportunities and challenges for fintech security in Kenya. While block chain offers

immutable and transparent transaction records, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have been associated with illicit activities, including money laundering and terrorist financing. The anonymity afforded by cryptocurrencies poses challenges for regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies in tracing and monitoring financial transactions, raising concerns about their potential misuse by malicious actors (Cassis et al., 2018).

Furthermore, the proliferation of fintech platforms and technologies has expanded the attack surface for cybercriminals, who exploit vulnerabilities in mobile devices, software applications, and network infrastructure to launch sophisticated cyberattacks (Allen, 2022). Ransomware attacks, malware infections, and social engineering tactics are among the prevalent threats facing fintech users and organizations in Kenya. For example, in 2019, the SimJacker vulnerability exposed over a billion mobile phone users worldwide to potential remote surveillance and fraud attacks, underscoring the pervasive nature of security risks in the fintech landscape.

In critically analysing the overview of the fintech security landscape in Kenya, it becomes evident that while fintech innovations offer transformative opportunities for financial inclusion and economic development, they also present complex security challenges that must be addressed. By understanding the multifaceted nature of these challenges, stakeholders can develop proactive strategies and adopt advanced security measures to mitigate risks, protect users, and safeguard the integrity of the financial system. Regulatory frameworks, technological innovations, and industry collaborations play crucial roles in enhancing fintech security and resilience against evolving threats, thereby fostering trust, stability, and confidence in Kenya's fintech ecosystem.

Identifying Vulnerabilities and Threat Vectors

Identifying vulnerabilities and threat vectors within Kenya's fintech landscape is crucial for understanding the security risks that fintech platforms face and developing effective mitigation strategies (Disemadi et al., 2020). These vulnerabilities can stem from various sources, including technological weaknesses, human errors, and regulatory gaps, which malicious actors exploit to perpetrate financial crimes and cyberattacks.

One prominent vulnerability in Kenya's fintech ecosystem is the prevalence of mobile devices as primary channels for financial transactions. While mobile money platforms have facilitated financial inclusion, the reliance on smartphones exposes users to risks such as malware infections, phishing attacks, and SIM-swapping fraud. For example, cybercriminals may compromise mobile banking apps or exploit vulnerabilities in operating systems to gain unauthorized access to users' accounts and conduct fraudulent transactions (Lemma, 2020).

Moreover, the widespread adoption of digital payments and e-commerce platforms has increased the exposure to online fraud and identity theft (Anyasi et al., 2009). Weak

authentication mechanisms, inadequate encryption protocols, and insufficient user awareness contribute to the vulnerability of fintech platforms to account takeover attacks and payment fraud. Instances of unauthorized transactions, card skimming, and account hijacking underscore the need for stronger security measures and user education initiatives to mitigate these risks effectively.

Additionally, regulatory uncertainties and compliance challenges pose vulnerabilities in Kenya's fintech landscape, particularly concerning anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) regulations (Deng, 2017). Fintech companies may struggle to comply with Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, customer due diligence (CDD) procedures, and transaction monitoring obligations, leading to potential regulatory violations and exposure to financial sanctions. The lack of standardized AML/CTF frameworks across fintech sectors, such as cryptocurrencies and peer-to-peer lending, further complicates regulatory compliance efforts and creates opportunities for illicit financial activities (Muthinja, 2016).

Furthermore, the evolving nature of cyber threats and attack techniques presents dynamic threat vectors that exploit vulnerabilities in fintech platforms and technologies (Avgouleas, 2018). Advanced persistent threats (APTs), zero-day exploits, and social engineering tactics are among the sophisticated techniques used by cybercriminals to breach fintech systems and compromise sensitive data. For instance, phishing emails masquerading as legitimate communications from financial institutions or mobile money providers may trick users into divulging their login credentials or personal information, leading to unauthorized access and financial losses (Demajo et al., 2020).

Analysing the identification of vulnerabilities and threat vectors within Kenya's fintech landscape, it becomes evident that addressing these challenges requires a multi-faceted approach encompassing regulatory reforms, technological innovations, and cybersecurity best practices. By proactively identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, stakeholders can enhance the resilience of fintech platforms, protect users' assets, and preserve the integrity of the financial system. Moreover, fostering collaboration among regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, and cybersecurity experts is essential for developing proactive strategies and sharing threat intelligence to stay ahead of emerging threats in the rapidly evolving fintech landscape.

Case Studies of Fintech-Related Security Incidents

Examining case studies of fintech-related security incidents in Kenya provides valuable insights into the real-world impact of security vulnerabilities and threat vectors on users, financial institutions, and the broader financial ecosystem. By critically analysing these case studies, stakeholders can understand the root causes of security breaches, the effectiveness of existing security measures, and the lessons learned for enhancing fintech security and resilience against cyber threats.



One notable case study is the 2019 data breach at the Kenya Credit Information Sharing Association (CIS Kenya), which exposed the personal data of millions of Kenyans, including their credit histories and financial records. The breach occurred due to a vulnerability in CIS Kenya's IT infrastructure, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive information stored in its databases. The incident raised concerns about data privacy, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance in the fintech sector, prompting calls for stricter regulations and enhanced security measures to protect users' personal information (Disemadi et al., 2020).

Another example is the proliferation of counterfeit mobile money agents who exploit vulnerabilities in the registration process to conduct fraudulent transactions (Ji et al., 2020). These rogue agents deceive unsuspecting users by offering discounted transaction fees or enticing incentives, only to abscond with the users' funds or misuse their personal information. Despite efforts by mobile money service providers to enhance agent vetting and oversight, cases of fraudulent activities persist, posing risks to users' financial assets and eroding trust in the mobile money ecosystem (Cassis et al., 2018).

Furthermore, the emergence of mobile banking malware targeting smartphone users highlights the evolving tactics used by cybercriminals to compromise fintech platforms and exploit user vulnerabilities. For instance, the BankBot malware, discovered in 2017, infected Android devices and intercepted users' banking credentials, enabling attackers to conduct unauthorized transactions and siphon funds from victims' accounts. Despite efforts by cybersecurity researchers and mobile security vendors to detect and mitigate such threats, mobile banking malware continues to pose significant risks to mobile banking users in Kenya and globally (Fenwick et al., 2020).

The emergence of ransomware attacks targeting fintech companies and financial institutions underscores the evolving threat landscape facing Kenya's fintech ecosystem. In a recent incident, a ransomware attack paralyzed the operations of a leading fintech company, encrypting sensitive data and demanding a ransom payment in cryptocurrencies to unlock the files (Allen, 2022). Despite efforts to restore systems and mitigate the impact, the attack disrupted services, eroded customer trust, and incurred significant financial losses for the affected company. This highlights the need for robust cybersecurity measures, incident response plans, and data backup strategies to mitigate the risks of ransomware attacks and ensure business continuity (Mobarek, 2014).

Moreover, the intersection of fintech and social media platforms has given rise to new forms of fraud and identity theft, as cybercriminals exploit the vast amount of personal information shared on social media to perpetrate financial scams (Mwando, 2013). In one example, fraudsters impersonated legitimate businesses on social media platforms and lured users into fraudulent investment schemes or fake loan offers, resulting in financial losses and reputational damage to both the victims and the targeted businesses. The anonymity and reach afforded by social media platforms make it challenging for law enforcement agencies to track down and prosecute cybercriminals,

underscoring the importance of cybersecurity awareness and consumer vigilance in mitigating such risks.

Furthermore, the growing popularity of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms in Kenya has introduced new risks of fraudulent activities and investment scams, as unscrupulous individuals exploit regulatory gaps and lax due diligence processes to solicit funds from unsuspecting investors. In several cases, investors have fallen victim to Ponzi schemes or fraudulent lending platforms promising high returns on investment, only to lose their funds when the schemes collapse (Aduda, 2012). These incidents highlight the need for enhanced regulatory oversight, investor education, and transparency in the P2P lending sector to protect investors' interests and maintain trust in alternative finance platforms.

Looking at these additional examples of fintech-related security incidents in Kenya, it becomes evident that cybersecurity risks pervade various aspects of the fintech ecosystem, including mobile money, mobile banking, social media, and P2P lending platforms. Addressing these risks requires a concerted effort from regulatory authorities, financial institutions, technology providers, and users to implement robust security controls, enhance regulatory compliance, and foster a culture of cybersecurity awareness and resilience (Noor et al., 2021). Moreover, leveraging advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and behavioral analytics can help detect and mitigate emerging cyber threats in real time, thereby safeguarding the integrity and stability of Kenya's fintech ecosystem.

Regulatory Frameworks and Policy Responses

Review of Existing Regulations and Policies

A review of existing regulations and policies governing the fintech sector in Kenya provides insights into the regulatory framework, compliance requirements, and enforcement mechanisms aimed at safeguarding financial stability, protecting consumer interests, and mitigating cybersecurity risks. By critically analysing these regulations and policies, stakeholders can identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities for enhancing regulatory oversight, promoting innovation, and fostering a secure and resilient fintech ecosystem (Sun et al., 2022).

One of the key regulatory frameworks governing the fintech sector in Kenya is the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) Act, which provides the legal basis for regulating and supervising financial institutions, including banks, microfinance institutions, and payment service providers. The CBK Act empowers the Central Bank of Kenya to issue licenses, set prudential standards, and enforce compliance with regulatory requirements to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system (Lemma, 2020). Additionally, the National Payment Systems Act and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money



Laundering Act (POCAMLA) establish legal frameworks for regulating payment systems and combating money laundering and terrorist financing activities, respectively (Anyasi et al., 2009).

Furthermore, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) regulates telecommunications and information technology services, including mobile money platforms and digital payment solutions. The CA oversees compliance with data protection regulations, cybersecurity guidelines, and consumer protection measures to safeguard users' privacy, prevent cyber threats, and promote fair competition in the fintech sector. Additionally, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates securities and capital markets activities, including crowdfunding platforms and peer-to-peer lending services, to ensure investor protection, market integrity, and financial stability (Deng, 2017).

However, despite the existence of these regulatory frameworks, some challenges and gaps need to be addressed to enhance fintech security and regulatory compliance in Kenya. One such challenge is the fragmented and overlapping regulatory landscape, where multiple regulatory agencies oversee different aspects of the fintech ecosystem, leading to regulatory arbitrage, jurisdictional conflicts, and inconsistencies in enforcement (Amutabi, 2006). For example, the lack of coordination between the CBK, CA, and CMA may create regulatory gaps and uncertainties for fintech companies operating across multiple sectors, hindering innovation and increasing compliance costs.

Moreover, the rapid pace of technological innovation and the evolving nature of fintech business models pose challenges for traditional regulatory approaches, which may struggle to keep pace with emerging risks and complexities (Nurhasanah et al., 2020). For instance, cryptocurrencies, decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms, and other block chain-based innovations present novel regulatory challenges related to investor protection, financial stability, and systemic risk, requiring adaptive and forward-looking regulatory frameworks that balance innovation with risk management.

Additionally, the effectiveness of existing regulations and policies in addressing cybersecurity risks and protecting consumer interests in the fintech sector remains a concern. Despite regulatory requirements for data protection, encryption standards, and incident reporting, fintech companies may face challenges in implementing robust cybersecurity measures, conducting regular security assessments, and responding effectively to cyber threats. Instances of data breaches, fraud, and cyberattacks on fintech platforms highlight the need for enhanced regulatory oversight, cybersecurity standards, and industry best practices to mitigate risks and protect users' assets and personal information (Irawansah et al., 2021).

A thorough review of Kenya's existing regulatory landscape governing the fintech sector reveals both strengths and areas for improvement. While the regulatory frameworks established by institutions such as the Central Bank of Kenya, the Communications Authority of Kenya, and the Capital Markets Authority provide a

foundation for oversight and consumer protection, challenges persist in terms of fragmentation, adaptability, and cybersecurity effectiveness.

To address these challenges effectively, concerted efforts are needed to streamline regulatory frameworks, enhance coordination between regulatory agencies, and foster collaboration with industry stakeholders (Alam et al., 2019). By promoting a cohesive regulatory environment that balances innovation with risk management, Kenya can stimulate fintech growth while safeguarding consumer interests, maintaining financial stability, and mitigating cybersecurity risks. Moreover, ongoing capacity-building initiatives, stakeholder consultations, and knowledge-sharing platforms are essential for building regulatory resilience, promoting regulatory compliance, and staying abreast of emerging trends and best practices in fintech regulation. Additionally, fostering international partnerships and aligning regulatory approaches with global standards can enhance Kenya's competitiveness as a fintech hub and facilitate cross-border cooperation in combating financial crime and cybersecurity threats. Overall, by adopting a forward-looking and collaborative regulatory approach, Kenya can harness the transformative potential of fintech innovation to drive inclusive economic growth, promote financial inclusion, and advance national development goals, while ensuring the security, integrity, and resilience of its fintech ecosystem (Xu et al., 2020).

Assessment of Regulatory Gaps and Challenges

One of the primary regulatory gaps in Kenya's fintech sector is the fragmented and overlapping regulatory landscape, characterized by multiple regulatory agencies overseeing different aspects of the fintech ecosystem. For example, while the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) regulates mobile money services and payment systems, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) oversees telecommunications and information technology services, and the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates securities and capital markets activities. This fragmentation can lead to regulatory arbitrage, jurisdictional conflicts, and inconsistencies in enforcement, hindering regulatory clarity and compliance for fintech companies operating across multiple sectors (Zhai, 2020).

Moreover, the rapid pace of technological innovation and the evolving nature of fintech business models pose challenges for traditional regulatory approaches, which may struggle to keep pace with emerging risks and complexities (Anyasi et al., 2009). For instance, the emergence of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms, block chain-based cryptocurrencies, and other novel fintech innovations presents regulatory challenges related to investor protection, financial stability, and systemic risk. The lack of clear regulatory frameworks and guidance for these innovations may create uncertainty for market participants and inhibit responsible innovation in the fintech sector (Mobarek, 2014).

Additionally, regulatory gaps exist in terms of cybersecurity oversight and consumer protection measures, particularly concerning data privacy, encryption standards, and incident reporting requirements. Despite regulatory requirements for data protection and cybersecurity, fintech companies may face challenges in implementing robust security measures, conducting regular security assessments, and responding effectively to cyber threats. Instances of data breaches, fraud, and cyberattacks on fintech platforms highlight the need for enhanced regulatory oversight, cybersecurity standards, and industry best practices to mitigate risks and protect users' assets and personal information.

Furthermore, regulatory challenges arise from the dynamic nature of fintech business models and the blurring of boundaries between traditional financial services and technology-driven innovations (Mwando, 2013). For example, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms, crowdfunding portals, and digital asset exchanges may fall outside the scope of existing regulatory frameworks or operate in regulatory grey areas, leading to uncertainties regarding compliance requirements and investor protection standards. Clarifying regulatory expectations, promoting regulatory sandboxes, and facilitating dialogue between regulators and industry stakeholders are essential for addressing these challenges and fostering a conducive regulatory environment for fintech innovation (Shashkova et al., 2020).

In critically analysing the assessment of regulatory gaps and challenges in Kenya's fintech sector, it becomes evident that addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach involving regulators, policymakers, industry stakeholders, and international partners. By streamlining regulatory frameworks, enhancing regulatory coordination, and promoting innovation-friendly regulatory approaches, Kenya can create an enabling environment for fintech growth while ensuring consumer protection, financial stability, and cybersecurity resilience. Moreover, ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and periodic reviews of regulatory frameworks are essential for adapting to evolving risks and technological developments in the dynamic fintech landscape.

Proposed Strategies and Interventions

One proposed strategy is to enhance regulatory coordination and collaboration among relevant government agencies, industry associations, and international partners (Macchiavello, 2018). By establishing inter-agency working groups, coordinating committees, and regulatory task forces, Kenya can promote information sharing, streamline regulatory processes, and facilitate consistent enforcement of regulations across different sectors of the fintech ecosystem. For example, the Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD Kenya) initiative facilitates collaboration between regulators,

policymakers, and industry stakeholders to promote financial inclusion and innovation while ensuring regulatory compliance and consumer protection.

Another strategy is to leverage regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs to encourage responsible experimentation and innovation in the fintech sector (Lemma, 2020). Regulatory sandboxes provide a controlled environment for fintech start-ups and innovators to test new products, services, and business models under regulatory supervision, allowing regulators to assess risks, gather insights, and tailor regulatory responses accordingly. For instance, the CBK's Regulatory Sandbox Framework enables fintech companies to pilot innovative solutions while addressing regulatory compliance requirements and consumer protection concerns, fostering a culture of innovation and collaboration between regulators and industry players.

Furthermore, promoting regulatory clarity and transparency is critical for reducing regulatory uncertainty and promoting investor confidence in Kenya's fintech ecosystem. By issuing clear guidelines, regulatory frameworks, and policy statements, regulators can provide certainty regarding compliance requirements, licensing procedures, and regulatory expectations for fintech companies (Noor et al., 2021). For example, the CA's Guidelines on Data Protection and Privacy provide comprehensive guidance on data privacy principles, compliance requirements, and enforcement mechanisms for telecommunications and digital service providers, enhancing transparency and accountability in data processing practices.

Additionally, enhancing cybersecurity standards and promoting best practices is essential for mitigating cyber risks and protecting consumers' assets and personal information in the fintech sector. Regulators can collaborate with industry stakeholders to develop cybersecurity frameworks, conduct cybersecurity assessments, and promote information sharing and incident response coordination (Xu et al., 2020). For example, the Kenya Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Cybersecurity Framework guides cybersecurity risk management, incident response, and collaboration mechanisms to strengthen cybersecurity resilience across critical infrastructure sectors, including financial services and telecommunications.

Moreover, promoting financial literacy and consumer education is essential for empowering users to make informed decisions, protect themselves against fraud and cyber threats, and effectively navigate the digital financial landscape (Anyasi et al., 2009). Regulators, financial institutions, and industry associations can collaborate on public awareness campaigns, educational programs, and digital literacy initiatives to raise awareness of fintech risks and promote responsible usage of fintech services. For instance, CBK's Financial Literacy Program provides resources, tools, and workshops to educate consumers on financial management, budgeting, and safe digital banking practices, empowering them to safeguard their financial well-being in the digital age (Loesch, 2018).

When analysing these proposed strategies and interventions, it becomes evident that addressing regulatory gaps and challenges in Kenya's fintech sector requires a multifaceted approach that integrates regulatory reforms, capacity building, industry collaboration, and consumer empowerment. By adopting a proactive and collaborative regulatory stance, Kenya can create an enabling environment for fintech innovation while ensuring regulatory compliance, consumer protection, and cybersecurity resilience, thereby fostering inclusive economic growth, financial inclusion, and sustainable development in the digital era.

Technological Innovations and Counterterrorism Strategies

Emerging Technologies for Fintech Security

Exploring emerging technologies for fintech security offers promising avenues for strengthening cybersecurity defences, enhancing data protection, and mitigating evolving cyber threats in Kenya's fintech ecosystem (Shashkova et al., 2020). One emerging technology with significant potential for fintech security is block chain, a decentralized and immutable ledger system that enables secure and transparent transactions without the need for intermediaries. By leveraging block chain technology, fintech platforms can enhance data integrity, traceability, and auditability, thereby reducing the risk of data manipulation, fraud, and unauthorized access. For example, block chain-based identity management solutions enable users to control their personal information securely, reducing the reliance on centralized databases and minimizing the risk of identity theft and account takeover attacks.

Moreover, block chain-based smart contracts enable programmable and self-executing agreements that automate and enforce contractual terms without the need for intermediaries. Smart contracts can streamline financial transactions, automate compliance processes, and reduce the risk of disputes and transactional errors, enhancing efficiency and trust in fintech operations (Cassis et al., 2018). For instance, decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms utilize smart contracts to facilitate peer-to-peer lending, decentralized exchanges, and algorithmic trading, enabling users to access financial services securely without relying on traditional intermediaries.

Another emerging technology for fintech security is artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, which enable advanced threat detection, anomaly detection, and predictive analytics capabilities to identify and mitigate cyber risks in real-time (Lemma, 2020). AI-powered cybersecurity solutions can analyse vast amounts of data, detect patterns, and identify suspicious activities, enabling fintech companies to proactively identify and respond to cyber threats before they escalate (Demajo et al., 2020). For example, AI-driven fraud detection systems can analyse transactional data, user behaviour, and contextual information to detect fraudulent activities such as account

takeover, payment fraud, and identity theft, enhancing security and reducing financial losses for both users and fintech providers.

Furthermore, biometric authentication technologies such as facial recognition, fingerprint scanning, and voice recognition offer secure and convenient authentication methods for accessing fintech services and conducting financial transactions (Alam et al., 2019). Biometric authentication enhances security by providing unique and immutable identifiers for users, reducing the risk of identity theft, password-based attacks, and unauthorized access. For example, mobile banking apps and digital wallets leverage biometric authentication to verify users' identities securely, enabling seamless and frictionless user experiences while mitigating the risk of fraud and unauthorized access.

In critically analysing these emerging technologies for fintech security, it becomes evident that while they offer significant benefits in enhancing cybersecurity defences and protecting user data, they also pose challenges and considerations in terms of implementation, scalability, and privacy implications (Shin et al., 2019). For example, block chain scalability issues, regulatory uncertainties, and interoperability challenges may hinder widespread adoption and integration into existing fintech infrastructures. Similarly, AI bias, data privacy concerns, and algorithmic transparency issues require careful attention and ethical considerations to ensure responsible and equitable use of AI-driven technologies in fintech security.

Overall, by embracing emerging technologies such as block chain, AI, and biometrics, Kenya's fintech sector can enhance security, resilience, and trust in digital financial services, paving the way for inclusive economic growth, financial inclusion, and sustainable development in the digital age. However, effective implementation and regulatory oversight are essential to harnessing the full potential of these technologies while addressing associated risks and challenges in safeguarding fintech platforms and protecting consumer interests.

Methods and Mechanisms of Terrorist Financing

Exploring the methods and mechanisms of terrorist financing is crucial for understanding how illicit funds are sourced, transferred, and utilized to finance terrorist activities in Kenya's fintech landscape (Zhai, 2020). One method of terrorist financing involves the exploitation of mobile money and digital payment platforms to transfer funds covertly and anonymously. Terrorist groups may use mobile money accounts or digital wallets to receive donations, remittances, or illicit proceeds from sympathizers or criminal networks. For example, in 2013, the Kenyan government imposed restrictions on mobile money transfers following reports of terrorist groups using mobile money services to finance attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of digital payment systems to terrorist financing activities.



Moreover, the use of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum presents challenges for detecting and disrupting terrorist financing networks due to the pseudonymous nature of block chain transactions. Terrorist groups may leverage cryptocurrencies to raise funds, transfer value across borders, and launder illicit proceeds with reduced risk of detection by law enforcement authorities (Nurhasanah et al., 2020). For instance, in 2019, the United Nations Security Council reported that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS were increasingly using cryptocurrencies to evade financial sanctions and fund their operations, underscoring the need for enhanced regulatory oversight and cybersecurity measures to address emerging threats in the digital asset space.

Furthermore, terrorist groups may exploit informal and unregulated financial channels, including hawala networks and cash-based remittance systems, to transfer funds clandestinely and evade detection by financial authorities (Mobarek, 2014). Hawala brokers and informal money transfer operators facilitate cross-border transactions with minimal documentation requirements, making them susceptible to abuse by terrorist financiers seeking to circumvent formal banking channels and international sanctions. For example, the 2019 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation Report on Kenya identified weaknesses in Kenya's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime, including inadequate supervision of informal money transfer systems and limited resources for law enforcement agencies to combat terrorist financing effectively.

Moreover, terrorist groups may exploit legitimate businesses and charities to raise funds, disguise illicit proceeds, and finance terrorist activities through trade-based money laundering, front companies, and charitable organizations (Muthinja, 2016). For example, terrorist organizations may infiltrate the trade sector by smuggling goods, falsifying invoices, and exploiting trade finance mechanisms to launder money and finance illicit activities. Similarly, charities and non-profit organizations may unwittingly become conduits for terrorist financing by accepting donations from individuals with links to terrorist groups or using funds to support extremist ideologies and violent extremism.

Case studies and examples of terrorist financing through fintech provide concrete evidence of how these innovative platforms have been exploited by illicit actors to fund terrorist activities in Kenya and beyond. One notable case is the use of mobile money platforms by terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab to finance attacks and sustain their operations in East Africa. Al-Shabaab operatives have been reported to use mobile money accounts to transfer funds within and across borders, enabling them to receive donations, pay operatives, and procure supplies without attracting attention from law enforcement agencies. For example, in 2015, Kenyan authorities arrested individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities through mobile money transactions, highlighting the vulnerabilities of these platforms to terrorist financing.

In Kenya, there have been instances where terrorist groups have exploited mobile money platforms to facilitate illicit financial activities. For example, in 2019, Kenyan authorities uncovered a terrorist financing network linked to Al-Shabaab operatives operating in the country. The network used mobile money accounts to transfer funds covertly, enabling the financing of terrorist activities such as recruitment, training, and procurement of weapons. This case underscored the vulnerabilities of mobile money platforms to terrorist financing and highlighted the challenges faced by regulatory authorities in detecting and disrupting such activities in the digital financial space.

Moreover, the emergence of cryptocurrency-related terrorist financing activities has raised concerns among Kenyan authorities. In 2021, the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) of Kenya flagged suspicious cryptocurrency transactions linked to individuals with suspected ties to terrorist organizations. The FRC's annual report highlighted the growing trend of cryptocurrency-based illicit finance and the need for enhanced regulatory oversight and collaboration to address emerging risks in the digital asset space. This example illustrates the evolving nature of terrorist financing methods and the importance of regulatory vigilance in combating financial crime in Kenya's fintech sector.

Additionally, the use of social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps by terrorist sympathizers to solicit donations for extremist causes has become a growing concern in Kenya. In recent years, there have been reports of individuals using social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram to solicit funds for terrorist groups operating in the region. These platforms provide a convenient and anonymous channel for terrorist financiers to reach a global audience and solicit donations without attracting the attention of law enforcement authorities. The case highlights the challenges faced by regulatory agencies in monitoring and regulating online fundraising activities and underscores the need for enhanced cooperation with social media companies to combat terrorist financing in the digital sphere (Loesch, 2018).

Furthermore, the proliferation of online crowdfunding platforms has facilitated the fundraising efforts of terrorist sympathizers and supporters in Kenya. In 2020, Kenyan authorities disrupted a crowdfunding campaign linked to individuals with suspected ties to terrorist organizations. The campaign sought to raise funds for extremist causes and propaganda activities, exploiting the anonymity and reach of online crowdfunding platforms to solicit donations from sympathizers worldwide. This case demonstrates the evolving tactics employed by terrorist financiers to raise funds and the importance of proactive measures to counter online fundraising efforts that pose a threat to national security.

In light of these current examples, it is evident that terrorist financing remains a persistent threat in Kenya's fintech landscape, requiring coordinated efforts from regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, and technology companies to address this effectively. Enhancing regulatory oversight, strengthening compliance measures, and

promoting public awareness of terrorist financing risks are essential for safeguarding the integrity of the financial system and countering the evolving tactics of terrorist financiers in the digital age (Shashkova et al., 2020).

In critically analysing these methods and mechanisms of terrorist financing in Kenya's fintech landscape, we can see that addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach involving regulatory authorities, financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and international partners. By enhancing regulatory oversight, strengthening AML/CFT measures, and promoting public-private partnerships, Kenya can mitigate the risk of terrorist financing in the fintech sector, safeguard the integrity of the financial system, and protect national security interests in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

Exploitation of Fintech Platforms for Illicit Activities

Examining the exploitation of fintech platforms for illicit activities provides insight into how these innovative technologies can inadvertently facilitate money laundering, fraud, and other illicit financial activities in Kenya's digital financial landscape. One significant concern is the use of mobile money platforms for money laundering and terrorist financing due to their widespread adoption and ease of use. Criminals may exploit mobile money accounts to transfer illicit funds domestically and internationally, leveraging the anonymity and convenience offered by these platforms (Amutabi, 2006). For instance, in Kenya, cases have been reported where individuals have used mobile money services to disguise the source and destination of funds, making it challenging for authorities to trace and disrupt illicit transactions effectively.

Moreover, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms and crowdfunding portals may be susceptible to abuse by fraudsters seeking to solicit investments under pretences or launder illicit proceeds through fictitious projects. Criminals may create fake profiles or businesses on these platforms to attract unsuspecting investors and solicit funds for non-existent ventures. In 2019, the collapse of a P2P lending platform in Kenya, which allegedly defrauded investors of millions of shillings, underscored the risks associated with inadequate due diligence and oversight in the fintech sector.

Additionally, digital asset exchanges and cryptocurrency platforms have been exploited for money laundering, ransomware payments, and other illicit activities due to the pseudonymous nature of block chain transactions (Anyasi et al., 2009). Terrorist groups, cybercriminals, and other illicit actors may use cryptocurrencies to obfuscate the origin and destination of funds, making it challenging for law enforcement agencies to track and disrupt illicit financial flows. Notably, in 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice seized millions of dollars in cryptocurrency linked to terrorist financing activities, highlighting the need for enhanced regulatory scrutiny and compliance measures in the cryptocurrency sector.

Furthermore, the proliferation of mobile banking and digital wallet applications has raised concerns about account takeover attacks, identity theft, and unauthorized access to financial accounts (Aduda, 2012). Cybercriminals may exploit vulnerabilities in fintech platforms, phishing attacks, or social engineering tactics to gain access to users' credentials and compromise their accounts. Instances of unauthorized transactions, fraudulent withdrawals, and account breaches have been reported in Kenya, highlighting the importance of implementing robust authentication mechanisms, encryption standards, and cybersecurity protocols to protect user data and financial assets.

Looking at these exploitations of fintech platforms for illicit activities, we see that regulatory authorities, financial institutions, and fintech providers must collaborate to address these risks effectively (Irawansah et al., 2021). Enhanced customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures are essential for detecting and preventing illicit activities on FinTech platforms. Moreover, regulatory frameworks must be updated to address emerging risks associated with digital financial services, including cryptocurrencies, P2P lending, and mobile money, while promoting innovation and financial inclusion. By fostering a culture of compliance, transparency, and accountability, Kenya can mitigate the risks of illicit activities in the fintech sector, protect consumers, and preserve the integrity of the financial system (Fenwick et al., 2020).

Conclusion – Summary of Findings

In summarizing the findings of the analysis on terrorist financing through fintech in Kenya, several critical insights emerge, shedding light on the multifaceted nature of the issue and the challenges it presents to national security and financial integrity. The examination revealed that terrorist groups exploit various fintech platforms, including mobile money services, cryptocurrencies, peer-to-peer lending, and crowdfunding, to raise, transfer, and launder illicit funds. These platforms offer anonymity, convenience, and global reach, making them attractive channels for terrorist financiers to solicit donations, transfer funds, and finance extremist activities while evading traditional banking channels and regulatory scrutiny.

Moreover, the analysis underscored the evolving tactics and techniques employed by terrorist financiers to exploit fintech platforms, highlighting the need for adaptive and proactive responses from regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies. Examples such as the use of social media platforms, encrypted messaging apps, and online crowdfunding campaigns illustrate the growing sophistication and adaptability of terrorist financing networks in leveraging digital technologies to fund their operations. This poses significant challenges for regulatory authorities tasked with detecting and disrupting illicit financial activities in the digital space.

Furthermore, the examination of regulatory gaps and challenges revealed shortcomings in Kenya's AML/CFT regime, particularly concerning the supervision of



informal money transfer systems, oversight of digital financial services, and regulation of emerging technologies such as cryptocurrencies. The case studies and examples demonstrated instances where regulatory oversight and enforcement mechanisms were inadequate to address the risks posed by terrorist financing through fintech, highlighting the importance of strengthening regulatory frameworks, enhancing international cooperation, and promoting public-private partnerships to combat financial crime effectively.

Additionally, the analysis highlighted the role of technological innovations, such as block chain, artificial intelligence, and biometric authentication, in enhancing fintech security and resilience against terrorist financing threats. While these technologies offer promising solutions for improving transaction monitoring, identity verification, and cybersecurity in the fintech sector, their adoption and implementation require careful consideration of privacy concerns, regulatory compliance, and interoperability challenges.

Overall, the findings underscore the need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to addressing terrorist financing through fintech in Kenya, involving regulatory reforms, capacity-building initiatives, public-private partnerships, and international cooperation. By strengthening regulatory oversight, enhancing AML/CFT measures, and leveraging technological innovations, Kenya can mitigate the risks posed by terrorist financing in the fintech sector, safeguard the integrity of the financial system, and preserve national security interests in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

Implications for National Security

The implications of terrorist financing through fintech for national security in Kenya are profound and multifaceted, posing significant challenges to law enforcement, regulatory authorities, and policymakers. The analysis reveals that the exploitation of fintech platforms by terrorist groups threatens the stability and security of the country by providing them with a means to fund their operations, recruit members, and propagate extremist ideologies. Examples such as the use of mobile money services, cryptocurrencies, and online crowdfunding campaigns demonstrate the diverse range of channels through which terrorist financiers operate, highlighting the complexity of the threat landscape.

Moreover, the infiltration of terrorist financing networks into Kenya's fintech ecosystem undermines efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial activities, thereby weakening the country's financial integrity and reputation in the global financial system. Instances where regulatory gaps and enforcement deficiencies have been exploited by terrorist groups to evade detection and circumvent regulatory controls underscore the need for robust AML/CFT measures, enhanced regulatory oversight, and international cooperation to address emerging threats effectively.

Furthermore, the implications extend beyond the financial domain to encompass broader societal and security concerns, including the potential for radicalization, recruitment, and violent extremism fuelled by the availability of funds and resources through fintech channels. The anonymity and accessibility of fintech platforms enable terrorist groups to reach a wider audience, disseminate propaganda, and recruit followers, posing a direct threat to public safety and social cohesion. Examples such as the use of social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps to radicalize and recruit individuals highlight the nexus between fintech-enabled terrorism and broader security challenges facing Kenya and the region.

Additionally, the implications for national security encompass technological vulnerabilities and challenges associated with the rapid digital transformation of the financial sector. While technological innovations offer opportunities for enhancing fintech security and resilience against terrorist financing threats, they also introduce new risks and complexities that require careful management and regulation. Examples such as the use of cryptocurrencies and block chain technology by terrorist groups underscore the need for adaptive regulatory frameworks, cybersecurity measures, and technological innovations to stay ahead of evolving threats and safeguard national security interests.

In analysing these implications for national security, it becomes evident that addressing terrorist financing through fintech requires a holistic and multi-stakeholder approach that integrates regulatory reforms, law enforcement efforts, public awareness campaigns, and international cooperation. By strengthening regulatory oversight, enhancing information-sharing mechanisms, and promoting responsible innovation in the fintech sector, Kenya can mitigate the risks posed by terrorist financing, protect national security interests, and preserve the integrity of the financial system in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

Future Directions for Research and Policy Development

One future direction for research is to explore the potential of emerging technologies such as block chain, artificial intelligence (AI), and the Internet of Things (IoT) in transforming financial services and addressing societal challenges. For example, research studies can investigate the application of block chain technology in enhancing financial transparency, reducing transaction costs, and improving access to credit for underserved populations. Additionally, research on AI-driven risk assessment models, predictive analytics, and alternative data sources can inform policy development and regulatory reforms aimed at promoting responsible lending, credit scoring, and financial inclusion.

Furthermore, research on fintech regulation and policy development can provide insights into effective regulatory approaches, regulatory impact assessments, and best practices for promoting innovation while ensuring consumer protection, financial stability, and cybersecurity resilience. For instance, comparative studies on regulatory



sandboxes, innovation hubs, and regulatory frameworks in different jurisdictions can inform policymakers about the strengths and weaknesses of existing regulatory models and guide the design of tailored regulatory interventions for Kenya's fintech ecosystem.

Moreover, research on fintech's socioeconomic impact and implications for sustainable development goals (SDGs) can contribute to evidence-based policymaking and strategic planning efforts. By assessing fintech's contribution to poverty reduction, job creation, gender equality, and access to financial services, researchers can identify opportunities for leveraging fintech innovations to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development objectives. For example, research studies on the impact of mobile money platforms on women's economic empowerment and financial inclusion in rural areas can inform policy initiatives aimed at closing gender gaps and promoting women's participation in the digital economy.

Additionally, research on fintech cybersecurity, data privacy, and consumer protection can inform policy development and regulatory reforms to mitigate cyber risks, enhance data protection standards, and safeguard consumers' rights and interests. For example, research studies on the prevalence of cyber threats, vulnerabilities in fintech platforms, and consumer perceptions of fintech security can provide empirical evidence to support the development of cybersecurity frameworks, incident response protocols, and consumer education initiatives.

Analysing these future directions for research and policy development in Kenya's fintech sector, it becomes evident that interdisciplinary collaboration, stakeholder engagement, and knowledge exchange are essential for advancing the fintech ecosystem and addressing its complex challenges. By fostering a conducive research environment, promoting evidence-based policymaking, and embracing innovation-friendly regulatory approaches, Kenya can position itself as a regional fintech hub and drive inclusive economic growth, financial inclusion, and sustainable development in the digital age.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Psycho-Demographic Factors Influencing Social and Political Activism in Nigeria¹

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Abstract:

Prior studies on social and political activism have neglected people's demographic and psychosocial factors, particularly in Nigeria. Thus, an inquiry is germane. This study used the world value data wave 7 collected between 2015-2020 for Nigeria, to assess the factors that determined participation in socio-political activism. The data were subjected to t-test, correlation, and regression analysis. A positive statistically significant correlation existed among gender, age, social class, and employment status, and interest in politics and participation in political activism, while negative correlation was found among educational level, geo-political region, and participation in political activism. A significant difference was found in participation and political activism based on social class, educational level, age, income, place, and marital status. No difference was found based on gender. Multiple regression analysis showed that the greatest potent set of predictors of participation in political activism are interest, gender, the highest level of education and marital status. The findings have germane implications for the realization of the Sustainable Development Goal 5.

Keywords:

Gender; interest; politics; political participation; political actions.

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Introduction

The Nigerian nation has, over the years, witnessed a swell in social and political activism across its six- geopolitical regions, with the major ones happening in cities like Lagos, Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Enugu, Kaduna, and Kano. This could be confirmed with the heightened interest among social scientists in political activism in the past two decades, perhaps due to changes in patterns of civic engagement in the political space across the world, Nigeria inclusive. In societies, and across time, there has been some semblance of activism. Some forms of activism include various mass protests, civil disobedience, rallies held across America, Europe, Asia, and Africa for social and political change.

With a population of over 200 million people, it is impossible for every citizen to make his or her voice heard against the government, especially when the citizens are unhappy or dissatisfied about any government policy. Activists are known to always want to look for creative ways to stand up and demand change. To this end, some protests are vast, with thousands joining together on the streets of the State capital or cities as observed in the #EndSARS protest of 2020, and recently, the nationwide youth hunger protest, tagged #EndBadGovernance in Nigeria, the anti-racism protest in the UK and demonstration against proposed new taxes in Kenya. Mayer (2024) submits that radicalism is pronounced in Nigeria as activists constantly mobilise against policies that are anti-masses. While we have had vocal personalities like Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, Baba Aye, Gani Fawehinmi, Femi Aborishade and the likes, other activists are quieter in their modus operandi - all that they do is to share their posts online to spread awareness. This reflects the fact that not everyone can participate equally. Some are too afraid to speak out after seeing what happened to those who have been too vocal in the past. It is therefore germane to probe into those demographic and psychological factors that have contributed to the increasing interest and rise as well as the subterranean involvement of some people in social and political activism.

Shaw (2012) and Ricketts (2012) provided guidelines for grassroots activism which included the importance of building grassroots movement, setting clear goals and objectives, effective communication and messaging strategies and the importance of selfcare and prevention of burnout. Nygard et al. (2015) postulate that activism is a deliberate action taken by an individual or individuals to facilitate socio-political change. Activism, therefore, is an action taken on behalf of a cause, that is, an action that goes beyond conventional or routine means. The action takes different forms - it could be organized rallies, public meetings, door-to-door canvassing, mass media (print or electronic) or fasting. It refers to deliberate action to bring about change in social, political, economic, or environmental spheres of society that are hitherto not pleasing. The concept 'social activism' is a tool for social movements. It is a catalyst for social change. Social activism is about actions and attitudes to challenge, persuade and call for change in social life, status, power, and resources distribution of society (Atkinson, 2017; Dragonas, and Vassiliou, 2017; Kutlaca et al., 2020).



As for the concept of political activism, different meanings of the term have arisen. Drozd (2015) avers that activism refers to the various voluntary activities engaged in by citizens, aimed at influencing decisions of the political system. Norris (2009), for instance, describes political activism as the ways in which people engage, the mechanisms that lead them to do so, and the implications of these actions. From Norris' definition of political activism, it literally means acts such as rallies, street marches, sit-in or sit-at-home, hunger strikes, petition signing, boycotts, nonviolent demonstrations, strikes, and other movements to call for correction of government policies by individuals or groups of people.

A review of existing literature shows various factors and socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, and age affecting people's participatory behaviours (Cheeseman and Dodsworth, 2019; Guillemot, and Price, 2017; OECD, 2018). Several studies conducted have reported different findings on social and political activism across age groups, gender, ethnicity, and occupation activists (Nolas, et al., 2017). Age has been identified as an important factor in political activism. This could be seen from two perspectives, that is, political practice and generation-specific engagements. While young people participate in political activities such as voting and membership of political parties, they however, are likely to engage in protests than older members of the society. The young ones born in the Internet age are more visible and present in the cyber sphere.

Aside socio-demographics, scholars have identified some psychosocial factors that could influence human behaviour and specifically activism. These factors include attitude, interest in politics, political efficacy, socialisation process, trust in institutions, civic responsibility, and democratic values (Petrović, and Stanojević, 2020). What this implies is that political activism only attracts people who have the means needed and not those who are the least satisfied and objectively the most vulnerable. This study has identified interest as a psychological variable that may influence socio-political activism.

Interest in politics, an innate disposition, may be difficult to describe. Psychologists and other scientists who have attempted to research on interest have described it from varying viewpoints, depending on their schools of thought. Interest could be described as an idiosyncratic attitude that stimulates an individual to execute a certain task. It offers fun and pleasure and leads to inquisitiveness about the item of interest, excitement to be attached to the object, intensity of commitment to face problems when engaged in the mission of one's interest (Hidi and Renninger, 2019a, b). Thus, interest in politics can then be viewed as an attachment to decisional latitude in the public space. Prior studies have identified political interest and political efficacy as predictors of political participation.

In a four-continents-cross-countries study, Vecchione et al. (2015) observed that political activism relates to openness to change values. It positively relates to self-transcendence and autonomy of thought. It, however, relates negatively to conformity

and personal security. In Palestine, Spellings et al. (2012) tested the influence of family psychosocial and socio-economic characteristics as predictors of political activism of Palestinian 9th graders' political activism. Youth activism is predictable by parental activism which was the strongest predictor. Socioeconomic and religiosity were not potent enough in understanding activism.

Petrović, and Stanojević (2020) found that Serbians prefer novel and unconventional forms of political activism (such as petition-signing) to older systems of political participation. The study indicated that Serbians' participation in political activism increased as resources, economic and education. It was also found that as citizens get older, they tend to prefer the traditional forms of political participation, while the younger generation preferred unconventional forms. Using the Malaysia Wave 6 (2010–2014) data of the World Values Surveys (WVS), Norhafiza and Grasso (2020) found that demographic variables such as the levels of gender, ethnic group, and education are linked generational participation (between the old and the young) in political activism.

Social and political activism have persisted over time, despite increased attempts at greater and equitable distribution of resources of the state and involvement in political activities. The well-known political reality is that women have lower political representation than men (Akpanika, 2019; Dim and Asomah, 2019; Idike, et al., 2020). Explanations whether women are interested in political acts or not are not well known. In this regard, dearth literature exists on the underlying factors of gender differences, specifically in Nigeria. Investigating these differences in interest in politics, participation and political activism has important implications for representative democracy, accountability, and good governance. Thus, this study tries to unpack the interest in politics, participation in socio-political activism, to either confirm or disprove the assertion that women remain less interested in politics as against their male counterparts, and to also find out if socio-demographic variable will affect interest in politics and participation in socio-political activism.

Individual demographic characteristics as well as psychological factors are believed to be capable of shaping the likelihood and nature of a group's level of activism. The desire to investigate this relationship can lead to the discovery of the role which these factors can play in the motivation and behaviors of the activists and the influence of such in contributing to the amendment of the socio-political system of the country. To guide this study, two research questions were raised and tested:

1. What is the relationship between socio-demographics, interest in politics and participation in socio-political activism?

2. Will socio-demographics and interest in politics determine participation in socio-political activism?




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

2. Methodology

2.1. Sample

The sample consisted of 1,227 respondents drawn from the seventh World Value Survey wave data for Nigeria, published in 2020 (World Values Survey, 2017-2022). In each country, the WVS data was independently collected using the random sampling method.

Nigeria is a Federal Republic of 36 States, with Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory. The states are divided into six geo-political regions, namely, the Southwest, the Southeast, the Northwest, the Northcentral, the Northeast, and the South-south (Figure 1). The country shares frontiers in the west by Benin Republic; in the east by Chad and Cameroon; and in the north with the Niger Republic. Its southern coast lies on the Atlantic Ocean in the Gulf of Guinea. With a total population estimated at 206,139,589 million in 2020, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with approximately 51.2 % residing in urban areas (Worldometer, 2024).



Figure 2: Map of Nigeria showing the 36 States, the Federal capital Territory and six geo-political regions



2.2. Measures

Dependent variable of socio-political activism was measured with items on the questionnaire. The items include: (i) Signing a petition, (ii) Joining in boycotts (iii) Attending peaceful demonstrations (iv). Joining strikes and (v) Any other act of protest. etc. The independent variables include socio-demographic characteristics (gender, marital status, age, geo-political region, social class, highest education attained, ethnic group, employment, status, and income interest in politics.

2.3. Data Analysis

Data obtained were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Minimum, maximum, mean scores, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis were determined. Also, Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was done to present the nature of the relationship among the variables while the relative and combined influence of socio-demographic variables and interest in politics in determining participation in socio-political activism was done with multiple regression.

3. Results of Data Analyses

3.1. Respondents' Background Information

The demographic characteristics of respondents showed that the male (50.5%) and the female (49.5%) participated in the study. Most of the respondents are in age group of 25 to 34 years, with a mean age of 30 years. As for the social class, 2.6% of the respondents are in the upper class, 11.8% are in the upper middle class, 17.7% are from the working class while 41.4% are in the lower class. One-quarter is from the Southwest region, and 9.5% is from the Southeast. South-south has 13.1% and the Northeast has 10.8% and 13.2% respectively. Northwest has 24.0% while 18.9% are from North central. On marital status, 54.9% are married while 40.6% are single. The widow/widower and divorced/separated are 1.9% and 1.1% respectively. Fifty-one percent of the respondents are from rural areas, 49 % of the respondents are from urban areas. A majority (57.7%) of the respondents belong to the medium-income earners category, 35.2% of the respondents are in the low-income category while only 7.1% of the respondents belong to the high-income class.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. D	Skewness (SE = .071)	Kurtosis (SE = .141)
Interest in politics	1	4	2.43	1.163	.080	-1.456
How often are political matters discussed with friends?	1	3	2.08	.700	-.106	-.959
Political action: Signing a petition	1	3	2.60	.622	-1.315	.592
Political action: Joining in boycotts	1	3	2.70	.551	-1.690	1.892
Political action: Attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	1	3	2.28	.761	-.521	-1.103
Political action: Joining unofficial strikes	1	3	2.34	.758	-.647	-.989
Social activism: Donating to a group or campaign	1	3	2.32	.732	-.588	-.937
Social activism: Contacting a government official	1	3	2.28	.681	-.409	-.839
Social activism: Encouraging others to take action about political issues	1	3	2.30	.737	-.534	-1.000
Social activism: Encouraging others to vote	1	3	1.82	.808	.333	-1.393
Political actions online: Searching information about politics and political events	1	3	2.19	.811	-.363	-1.388
Political actions online: Signing an electronic petition	1	3	2.64	.571	-1.339	.800
Political actions online: Encouraging other people to take any form of political action	1	3	2.41	.711	-.768	-.680
Political actions online: Organising political activities, events, protests	1	3	2.50	.666	-.991	-.207
Interest in Political	2.00	7.00	4.4925	1.65975	.025	-1.186
Socio-Political Activism	12.00	36.00	28.5125	5.60133	-.422	-.697

Results in Table 1 revealed that respondents' interest in politics was moderate ($\bar{x} = 4.493 \pm 1.667$) and high socio-political activism ($\bar{x} = 28.513 \pm 5.601$). Respondents have high political actions. They sign petitions ($\bar{x} = 2.60 \pm .622$), join boycotts ($\bar{x} = 2.70 \pm .551$), attend lawful/peaceful demonstrations ($\bar{x} = 2.28 \pm .761$) and unofficial strikes ($\bar{x} = 2.38 \pm .758$). On social activism, it can be inferred that participants have high interest in social activism. They donate to groups and campaigns ($\bar{x} = 2.32 \pm .732$), contact government officials ($\bar{x} = 2.28 \pm .681$) and encourage others to act on political issues ($\bar{x} = 2.30 \pm .737$). However, they do not encourage others to vote ($\bar{x} = 1.82 \pm .808$). Furthermore, the respondents participate highly in political activism online. They search for information about politics and political events ($\bar{x} = 2.19 \pm .811$), sign electronic petition ($\bar{x} = 2.64 \pm .571$), encourage other people to take any form of political action and organise political activities, events, and protests.

3.2. Interest in Politics

From Fig 1, only 22 % of the respondents said they are very interested, 31.0% answered interested, 27.0% not very interested while 20.0% were not at all interested. This implies that an average Nigerian is apolitical.





Figure 2 shows the respondents' responses to the item 'membership of political party'. The result shows that two-third, that is 66% were not a member of a political party. Only 10.0% are active member while 24.0% are inactive. This result corroborates the results in Figure 1.



The Pearson product moment correlation explored the relationship among socio-demographic variables, interest in politics and participation in socio-political activism indicated in Table 2. Moderate to strong positive and negative relationships were found. Interest in politics and socio-political activism ($r = .451$, $p = 0.001$) were strongly related. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, gender was also positively related to

interest in politics as well as political activism. There was also a positive correlation between respondents' social class, employment status, and interest in politics as well as political activism. Age positively correlated with political activism. On the correlation between some respondents' socio-demographic variables (educational level and geo-political region), a positive correlation was found between interest in politics and socio-political activism ($r = .451, p = 0.001$).

Table 2: The Correlation between socio-demographic variables, interest in politics and socio-political activism

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Gender	1													
2. Age	-.055	1												
3. Marital status	-.200**	-.439**	1											
4. Highest educational	-.137**	-.129**	.194**	1										
5. Employment status	.103**	-.224**	.239**	-.023	1									
6. Social class	.066*	.056	-.136**	-.192**	.115**	1								
7. Income level	-.095**	-.047	.081**	.148**	-.119**	-.471**	1							
8. Religious	.001	.061*	-.199**	-.197**	.049	.084**	-.042	1						
Ethnic group	-.014	.031	-.047	-.148**	-.039	.047	.085**	.239**	1					
9. Urban-Rural	.023	.009	-.036	.018	.098**	.173**	-.159**	.022	-.140**	1				
10. Geo-politics Region	.003	-.068*	-.090**	.108**	.123**	.103**	-.131**	.374**	.004	.307**	1			
11. Membership-political party	-.173**	.054	.014	.113**	-.095**	-.035	.013	-.030	-.012	.059*	-.004	1		
12. Interest in politics	.287**	-.067*	.038	-.083**	.057*	-.021	-.003	-.105**	.027	-.105**	-.170**	-.485**	1	
13. Socio-Political Activism	.289**	.011	-.191**	-.322**	.078*	.155**	-.064*	.269**	.166**	.007	.085**	-.402**	.451**	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3 reveals the combined effects and the relative contribution of each independent variable to participation in socio-political activism. Findings revealed .649 as regression value for the combined effects an adjusted R2 of .414. This suggests that 41.4% of the variance in the criterion was accounted for by the independent variables. Analysis also shows that the F-value of 56.827 is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$. This



shows a significant influence of the predictor variables on the participation in socio-political activism by Nigerians. Interest in politics was the most potent indicator of participation in socio-political activism ($\beta = 1.192$; $t = 12.296$; $p < .05$), followed by gender ($\beta = 1.148$; $t = 3.916$; $p < .05$).

Table 3: Multiple regression analysis of socio-demographic factors and interest in politics on participation in socio-political activism

	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	206681.443	31123.575		6.641	.000
Gender	1.148	.293	.103	3.916	.000
Age	-.094	.136	-.019	-.687	.492
Marital status	-.194	.067	-.085	-2.906	.004
Highest educational level:	-.365	.055	-.175	-6.640	.000
Employment status	.060	.073	.021	.830	.407
Social class	.457	.134	.095	3.415	.001
Income level	.514	.259	.054	1.982	.048
Religious denominations	.649	.096	.193	6.777	.000
Ethnic group	2.069E-5	.000	.088	3.497	.000
Urban-Rural	.278	.291	.025	.953	.341
Region	.160	.084	.055	1.907	.057
Membership: political party	-1.311	.197	-.182	-6.643	.000
Interest	1.192	.097	.354	12.296	.000

R = .649

R² = .421

Adjusted R² = .414; F (13, 1016) = 56.827, $p < .001$

Predictors: (Constant), interest, ethnic group, social class, age, urban-rural, highest educational level, employment status, religious, gender, membership: political party, income level, region, marital status

a. Dependent Variable: Socio-Political Activism

Table 3 demonstrates the differential influence of the predictor variables to the variance in the participation in socio-political activism. The interest in politics had a significant positive regression weight indicating that individuals with higher interest in politics were expected to participate in socio-political activism. Gender had the highest beta value (0.533), interest in politics (0.505), followed by the social class (0.289), age (0.248), employment status (0.148), marital status (0.087), region (-0.264), and the highest education level attained (-0.183).

4. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper was based on the World Value Survey data for Nigerian Wave 7 and investigated the relationship between some demographic factors such as gender, age, social class, age employment status, educational level and marital status, socio-political activism, and interest in politics/participation in political activism. The outcomes of the study established the influence of gender and interest in politics on political participation in Nigeria. This is consistent with Fridkin and Kenney (2007) political views on gender differences and political attitudes. Some socio-demographics and interest in politics and participation in political activism were found to be significant. Our analysis suggests that political interest may be substantially more potent in predicting socio-political activism, a finding with implications for research and practice.

The correlation results indicated that the relationship between socio-demographic variables of gender, age, social class, highest educational level, social class, and employment status, and the participation of men and women in political activism are in concord with the submissions by Bolzendahl, and Coffé (2013) and Ngwu et al. (2022) which reported a correlation between demographic characteristic (gender) and political activities. Multiple regression analysis indicated that the predictor variables (gender, region, employment status, highest education attained and interest in politics) engendered participation in political activism by Nigerians.

This result is consistent with Dim and Asomah's (2019) findings regarding the socio-economic factors that predict women's political participation in Nigeria. He reported that education, place of residence, party affiliation, and geo-political zone are the predictors of political participation. However, United Nations (UN, 2015) asserted that women remain overwhelmingly alienated from the political arena in every part of the world, mostly due to patriarchal rules, policies, perceptions, low levels of education, gender stereotypes, lack of access to health care, and disproportionate effects of poverty on women. Despite, the fact that there is a positive relationship between gender and interest in politics, lopsidedness in women political participation still exists. This calls for a further probe as it could be a new normal that is probably due to the current propaganda on the need to involve more women in politics and political appointments.

This paper has thus far confirmed that no single factor can predict human behaviour. The study has shown that there is a relationship among socio-demographic factors and interest in politics and citizens' participation in socio-political activism in Nigeria. More precisely, to predict involvement in political activism by Nigerians, the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals are very important and relevant.

The fact that one of the findings revealed a moderate interest but correlation with high socio-political activism implies that there could be some other latent factors which may be responsible for this correlation. For instance, the study revealed that despite this correlation, the respondents expressed a position which revealed their non-readiness to



engage others to vote. This could probably be due to political apathy, and past experiences like electoral violence, rigging, disenfranchisement and unwarranted litigation.

The results have important implications for achieving SDGs goal 5 of (achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls) and more precisely, goal 5:5 'Ensuring full and effective participation of women and equal leadership opportunities at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life' (United Nations, 2019). Therefore, if the goal 5 and the target (5:5) of the SDGs are to be achieved, women need to be economically empowered so that they can be financially capable of vying for political offices.

The Second implication is related to women education. There is abundant evidence (Dim and Asomah, 2019; Mlambo and Kapingura, 2019) associating formal education with participation in politics by men and women. Getting more women to acquire formal education will provide them opportunities for acquisition of knowledge and communication skills which are necessary for public debate, and training in political analysis.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

From the findings of this study, it is important to note that gender, age, level of education, and economic status/income level are some of the factors that can influence people's propensity to either fully or partially participate in socio-political activism.

Government and its relevant agencies would need to stop seeing socio-political activism as a tool of confronting any government in power. Rather, it is high time such intervention became perceived as a wakeup call for good governance. Avenues for embracing and listening to such calls must be made available for the nation to promote political maturity and be seen to be democratising its dealings with the citizens.

Furthermore, conscious, and deliberate efforts must be made to remove every discriminatory constitutional, institutional, socio-cultural, and religious beliefs that hinder women's participation in politics. Patriarchal values need to change and be replaced with gender-neutral values.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Disrupting Advertising Models: How Social Media are used as New Business Frontiers among Student Entrepreneurs in some Universities in South-South Nigeria¹

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Abstract:

Social media provide platforms for small businesses that neither have the funds nor can compete favourably for advertisement space and time with large-scale businesses to create awareness for their goods and services. Based on the premise that social media has potentials to create visibility for small businesses, this study examined whether students who engage in small businesses know that advertising can help their businesses grow; and how they use social media to advertise their goods and services. These issues were interrogated within the context of the uses and gratification and domestication of technology theories. Data came from a cross-sectional survey of 193 subset of the population that were randomly selected from two universities across two States in the south-southern Nigeria through multi-stage sampling techniques. One Hundred and Eighty respondents were included in the final sample (n=180). Respondents were (n=101, 56.1%; Males, n=79, 43.9%) participants. Findings suggest that social media platforms foster economic development and define new frontiers for small businesses among student entrepreneurs. The study bears implications for curriculum on entrepreneurship in Nigerian universities to leverage on the potentials of social media in promoting advertising among Nigerian students.

Keywords:

Small businesses, economic development, social media, advertisement, usages.

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Introduction

Given the critical position occupied by information and communication technologies in business communication, studies on how small businesses can harness the potentials of ICTs to grow their businesses have occupied the research space. One of such discourse is the question of how social media and the advertising landscape can stimulate business growth and development (Nesterenko, et al., 2023; Anie, 2011; WEF, 2009; KPMG; 2018; KPMG, 2019). Chatzithomas, Boutsouki, Hatzithomas and Zoro (2014), and KPMG (2018) believe that the advent of social media tools have led to a disruptive era in advertising theory and practice. Studies (Sandi, 2023; Bernoff & Schadler, 2010; Hana et al, 2011; Kietzmann et al, 2011; Chatzithomas, 2014) suggest that social media represent a significant challenge for businesses as tools of existing marketing strategies are considered insufficient and incompatible with an era when consumers appear to be more empowered than before.

The growing importance of social media as advertising platform stems from the gradual distancing of consumers from traditional promotional approaches characterised by marketing communication controlled by distinguished and recognisable corporate representation (Chatzithomas et al, 2014). What seems to characterise this new order of marketing communication is a disorderly cluster of communication performed by numerous participants like consumers, rivals, employers, observers and stakeholders (Odoemelam, Okeibunor, Ovie & Odoemelam, 2023; Mangold & Faulds, 2008; Muniz & Scahu, 2007).

Apart from their numerous relative advantages in terms of interactivity and flexibility, one of the reasons put forward for increased use of online advertising platforms (Twitter, Facebook Instagram) by advertisers, is their comparative cheaper cost. According to Lunden (2009), online advertising is a lot cheaper than printed or broadcast advertising.

Advertising has been a long-standing companion of business growth and expansion (Odoemelam, 2021), and Advertising expenditure reached N88.0 billion in the year 2017 (Mediafacts, 2018). The impact of advertising in the sustenance of businesses has been well documented (Rolnicki, Tate and Taylor, 2007). Rolnicki et. al have suggested that the major roles that advertising play for businesses include: to provide income, perform service for a business by providing awareness for products and building bond between products and the consumers. Among marketing weapons, advertising is renowned for its long lasting impact on viewers mind (Katke, 2007). Abideen and Saleem (2012) remind readers that the major aim of advertising is to impact on buying behaviour. Advertising models suggest that exposing potential buyers to advertising leads to cognition, such as memory about the adverts, the brand, which in turn leads to attitude (Mendelson and Bolls, 2002). Advertisers' primary objective is to reach prospective customers and influence their awareness, attitudes and buying behaviour.



Abideen and Saleem note that one major factor that is changing the way and manner of the traditional advertising model, is the advances in ICTs, especially the internet technologies. They support Newell & Merier, 2007 and Fumiyo, Kondo & Nakahara (2007) in the following view:

“Technology advancement had not given us new products and services, but had changed the meaning of many words....now advertisers are looking for a less cluttered media. The current age of digital media had given consumers choices to opt in and out of marketing messages and adverts. Consumers are getting more control of what they want and when they want. All these things are moving towards the interactive marketing model.”

The discourse on social media and economic development is situated within the studies examining the role of ICTs on development and the literature is rich and vast (WEF, 2009; Anie, 2011). A considerable number of these studies have shown strong positive correlation between economic development and innovations in communications technologies called web 2.0 which rely on internet connectivity and mobile applications (Chatzithomas et al, 2014; Kietzmann et al, 2011). Anie (2011) reminds us that, ICTs are important prerequisites for any developing country’s economic success.

Since social media, as the literature seems to suggest, create awareness for businesses. This is what has predominated the influential marketing domain. According to Odoemelam, Bah and Odoemelam (2024), influencer marketing has become the go-to desk, when seeking brand’s influence on social media platforms. Since our study was limited to advertising in the context of social media, we were prompted to ask the question whether students who engage in small businesses use social media to advertise their goods and services, and the extent to which they do use these platforms to advertise their services or goods. According to studies, social media are cheaper than any form of advertising available today. They are the only forms of media that can expose you to over 1,000 people for less than \$3 (Lyfe Marketing, 2018). Lyfe Marketing indicates that social media is more effective than traditional media for advertising. The benefits include the ability to communicate with consumers in a two-way format, developing a long-term following, and being able to quickly promote new products and services.

Some of the theories that provide contexts for this study include the Disruptive innovations, Uses and gratifications, and Domestication of technology theories. These theories explicate the phenomenon of the disruption of advertising models, use of and gratification from media content and the extent to which communication technologies are being adopted by entrepreneurs for business visibility.

The novelty of this study stands out on a number of fronts. For instance, though extensive research efforts have been conducted addressing the issue of social media and advertising (see Nyekwerre et al, 2013; Chatzithomas, 2014), the issue of how

undergraduate students who engaged in small businesses use the social media for advertising has not been sufficiently explored. The present study is motivated by the need to provide an understanding of how undergraduate students, who engage in goods oriented (sells/supplies) or services oriented (consultancy), use social media in advertising their products and services.

Youth unemployment in Nigeria rose from 23.63 percent in 2104 to 38 percent in 2018. This shows a figure of over 11 Million youths who are unemployed in Nigeria (NBS, 2019). Studies have analysed some of the problems associated with youth unemployment to include increased militancy, violent crimes, kidnappings and delinquent behaviour (Ajufo, 2013; Ongbali & Afolalu, 2019). In the same vein, corpus literature (Uddin & Uddin, 2013; Putun, Karatas and Akyildiz 2017) have recommended effective career guidance, technical and vocational education as well as entrepreneurship education as strategic interventions. The United Nations (2017) education and entrepreneurship as remedies in addressing youth unemployment is a strong government policy action that has key positive results.

Government policy thrust on entrepreneurship skills among university undergraduates envisages the eradication of unemployment and poverty through business ownership and job creation. For such businesses to grow and be sustained, advertising is a critical factor (Adekoya, 2012). However, advertising on mainstream media (newspapers, radio, television, magazines etc) pose big financial challenge to small businesses. The alternative media literature (Mba 2015; Nyekwerre et al, 2013; Chatzithomas, 2014) suggest that the online platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube etc. are veritable media by which businesses could create awareness for their goods and services.

However, much of the discourse on online advertising has focused on multinational businesses and how they to the internet platform to connect to their customers. This suggests a hegemonic dominance of these businesses on the Internet platforms. Now, the question that is left unanswered, is, whether small businesses ran by undergraduate student entrepreneurs are leveraging on these less cost-intensive online platforms to advertise their goods and services and if they do, the extent to which they incorporate these platforms in their business communications. On the other hand, if this question is left unanswered, society stands to lose because the insight on the potentials that internet-mediated advert platforms may hold for small businesses may remain unclear. More importantly, in a developing country like Nigeria where entrepreneurship-drive among young people is critical to development, it is in the best interest of policy to know the role of internet-mediated adverts in small businesses. Given these circumstances, this study shall do the following: examine the extent to which undergraduate entrepreneurs think advertising can grow their businesses; ascertain the extent to which they use the online platforms for services and products advertising; identify the platform that is mostly related to advertising purposes among this group. Further, we examine their



perception on the effectiveness of online media advertising in creating awareness. Finally, the study tests whether there are significant differences in the use of social media for advertising across demographic variables like gender and age.

Providing answers to these questions have implications at different levels. At one level, the study informs policy formation on ICT and business growth by providing a context for debating on the alternative media as advertising platform for small-scale businesses. At another level, the study sets agenda for the discourse on entrepreneurship and the place of ICTs among young entrepreneurs. Further, at another level, the study extends the discourse on the theories of domestication of technology and the uses and gratification perspective, by examining how information and communication technologies (social media) are put to use in the business sphere. The next section examines the frameworks for our key research question: the technological facilitation of advertising and how small businesses leverage this to grow their brands.

Advertising and business growth

The role of advertising in increasing business profits and viability is well grounded in recent advertising and marketing literature (Adekoya, 2011; Abideen, & Saleem, 2012; ACM, 2013). For instance, Abideen and Saleem found that advertising is associated with consumers' buying behaviour and increased sales. They note that as a form of communication, advertising convinces intending buyers to make a purchase. Adekoya (2011) suggest that advertising helps businesses to thrive and thereby increase profitability. He reminds readers that advertising campaigns stimulate depressed consumer demands, by persuading the consumers on the need for consumption. ACM (2013) contends that one of the ways that businesses can increase profit is through advertising. According to ACM, advertising and other promotional techniques are investments in increasing sales volume.

The essence of being in business is to produce for sales and profits and advertising is very relevant in realising these objectives (Agbeja, Adalakun and Akinyemi, 2015). Agbeja et al reminds readers that advertising is able to achieve these objectives because it serves as a major tool in creating product awareness in the mind of potential consumers to take eventual purchase decision.

The Britannica 2012 cited in Faleke (2012) notes that advertisement can be commercial and non-commercial. Commercial ads increases consumption of products or services through branding which involves repetition of an image or product name in an effort to associate related qualities with the brand in the minds of consumers, while non-commercial ads involve that advertisers spend money to advertise items other than a consumer product or service.

While the concept of advertising has remained unchanged in terms of objectives and goals, it has drastically changed in terms of its operation and mediation. Nyekwere, Kur

and Nyekwere (2013) remind readers that this is largely due to the revolution in ICTs that has witnessed accelerated developments. According to Nyekwere et al the advertising landscape has changed dramatically and that this change is mostly visible in internet-mediated advertising. Tuten (2008) supports this notion and reminds readers that the internet technology has gone as far as changing partially the very philosophical concept underlying the advertising enterprise.

Following the preceding discussions, we ask our first research question and propose our first hypothesis:

RQ1: To what extent do undergraduate student entrepreneurs know that advertising is important to business growth?

1. **H₁:** There is significant mean difference in the awareness of social media as an advert platform between male and female undergraduate student entrepreneurs.

Disruptive Technologies and their uses for Advertising

In this study, the domestication of technology and the uses and gratification theories provide very useful approaches to examining how people adopt ICTs in their everyday life as well as the motivations (gratifications) that support their desire to use such technologies. The study applies both theoretical perspectives in examining how undergraduate students who are entrepreneurs in their own right, engage the social media technology in creating awareness for their products and services. We further, examine the factors that influence their use of these alternative media platforms for advertising purposes.

According to Berker, Hartman, Prince and ward (2006 cited in Odoemelam, Okorom and Okwudior, 2016) domestication emerged as a concept within media, communication and technology studies. The domestication perspective views technology as untamed animal coming into the household and other environments, and undergoing a process of domestic appropriation, changing and being changed (Berker et. al, 2006)

The concept of domestication, developed by Roger Silverstone and his colleagues refer to the ways in which technology becomes socially embraced, "tamed" and incorporated into everyday living. In its original formulation, the process involved the appropriation, objectification, incorporation and conversion of objects. An object is appropriated when "it leaves the world of the commodity and the generalized system of equivalence and exchange, and is taken possession of by an individual or household and owned" (1992, p. 21). Objectification is expressed in the usage of the object while incorporation involves the various ways in which the object is used. For instance in this



study, we examine how the social media is used as an advertising platform by undergraduate students.

Bolin (2010 cited in Odoemelam et al, 2016) refers to domestication as the process through which a certain technology (social media technology in the present case) is successively appropriated, objectified, incorporated and converted within the framework of a national communication structure. In this case, the internet platforms of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram could further have communication meanings and purposes for undergraduate student entrepreneurs. Beyond the use for social communication (chats, status display and networking) these internet platforms, have constructed meanings in business and marketing communication for these category of students. This is the focus of the disruptive innovation perspectives in businesses. The next subsection of this study examines this framework in detail.

Our second research question and hypothesis draw from the above analysis:

RQ2: What is the extent to which undergraduate student entrepreneurs use social media for advertising?

2. H₂: Business' worth is a significant factor in the use of social media for advertising among undergraduate students

Disruptive Innovation Theory

Disruptive innovation is a useful analytical tool for analysing how technological innovations play important roles in shaping the business environment. The term disruptive innovation has roots in the academic work of Professor Clayton Christensen in (Christensen, 1997). Christensen coined the term to describe a process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up the market, eventually displacing established competitors (Okorom, 2018). These disruptive innovations, create business threats and opportunities not nominally predictable from past historical experiences and thus require incumbent participants to engage in strategic behaviour and organisational practices that represent a departure from past successful and familiar strategies and practices (Okorom, 2018)..

Typically, businesses tend to innovate faster than their customers' needs evolve and by so doing, some businesses end up producing products and services that are too sophisticated and complex that they overshoot the needs of their customers. This ironic situation, ultimately, creates a loophole that unwittingly opens the door to disruptive innovations at the bottom of the market.

Christensen (2013) cited in Okorom (2018), notes that disruptive innovation allows a completely new population of consumers at the bottom of the market access to

products and services that were historically only accessible to consumers with a lot of money or skill.

In the context of this study, the concept of disruptive innovation shows how previous advertising channels like TV, radio, newspapers, magazines and outdoor media can be upended by new technologies like social media that first appear as cheaper products with fewer features, but improve quickly and ultimately take over the advertising space among certain business community.

Our third research questions follows, thus:

RQ3: Which platform(s) do undergraduate student entrepreneurs mostly use for advertising?

3. H₃: The social media platform on which undergraduate students mostly advertise their products is dependent on the business type (whether product selling/supplies or services/consultancy).

- Uses and Gratification Technology in Advertising

In its original form (see Katz, Gurevitch and Haas, 1973) the uses and gratification perspective focuses on how audience approach media content (Katz, et al, 1973; Swanson, 1987; Ruggiero, 2000; Rosengren, 1974; Daniel, 2010). Research in uses and gratification provided rich data for understanding socio-demographic factors that predicted audience exposure to contents on the one hand, as well as content factors that influenced the audience (Ruggiero, 2000; Mcquail, 1994 cited in Odoemelam, Okorom and Okwudiogor, 2016). Odoemelam et. al., reviewed the role that audience members play in the communication continuum by deliberately choosing technology to enrich their communication experience. Odoemelam et al, extended the original understanding of the uses and gratification perspective which had concentrated mainly on media content. They suggested the modification of the uses and gratification perspective to include media technology. They further situated their contention on the fact that, because of the constant change in ICTs, audience members have now been empowered, not to only make choices on programme contents but also on choices and decisions bothering on what technology to use in other to access content.

We see this context replayed in this study, where undergraduate student entrepreneurs may make a choice between traditional media (TV, Radio, Newspapers and Magazines) platforms and the internet platforms (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) to advertise their products. Odoemelam et al remind readers that this evolving understanding of uses and gratification suggests that audience members negotiate the media landscape with a set of social and psychological nuances (in this present case, benefits derivable) which mediate the technology selection and communication decision continuum (Odoemelam et al, 2016). Following the above



arguments, we are faced with a scenario where it is important to ask what reasons do student entrepreneurs, give for their use of the social media platforms for advertising. In sum, the domestication of technology and the uses and gratification theories, extend an understanding of how undergraduate student entrepreneurs appropriate and 'tame' the internet technology for specific business communication relationship and how these internet platforms in turn may serve their advertising needs. If their expectations (for the use of these platforms) are met, they in turn, derive gratification from their choice and preference for these platforms rather than traditional media. Our fourth research question emerges from this analysis, thus:

RQ4: What are the reasons why undergraduate student entrepreneurs prefer specific social media advertising platform(s)?

Perception of the Effectiveness of Advertising Platform(s)

Advertising is correlated with business growth and expansion (Adekoya, 2011; Agbeja et al, 2015). In fact, some business literature (ACM, 2013; Abideen & Saleem, 2012) inform us that businesses rise and fall at the altar of advertising. This suggests a strong social construction of advertising within the precinct of power tussle in business survival (Abideen & Saleem, 2012). Represented in this way, advertising is very significant in discussing how small businesses could survive, especially in a thriving economy like Nigeria. This is because, there is a growing index of unemployment and underemployment, which has resulted in an increasing policy thrust on the diversification of the economy. It should be borne in mind that, the increasing discourse on economic growth and development in Nigeria has been a direct consequence of poor growth performance of the economy over a long period.

Wrelicki and Arendt are of the view that small businesses have significant function in national economies as both employers and cooperatively contributing an average 90% of national economic growth output. Sarvana, Gupte and Ghatak (2008) further highlight the role of SMEs in national economies. They note that SMEs comprise 90 percent of African business operations and contribute towards 50 percent of African employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Sarvana et. al., agree with Apenteng (2014) that social media fosters SMEs objectives by allowing businesses to build on the assets they already have like, brand name recognition and operational infrastructure. Following Sarvana et. al (2008) and Apenteng & Doe (2014), Goel (2016) comments that the Internet helps small businesses to have access to international markets, thereby increasing their market share. Also, some recent research (Kaplan & Haelein, 2010; Stelzner, 2012; Jagongo & Kinyua, 2013) align their thoughts with the above arguments and suggest that social media is important for small businesses and that the benefits of social media include increased exposure, improved sales, loyalty and establishment of partnerships-factors which are important for business growth and development. This naturally gives birth to our fifth research question:

RQ5: What are undergraduate entrepreneurs' perception of the effectiveness of their advertising platform(s)?

Materials and Methods

- Selection of Respondents

A total of 193 undergraduate students were selected for the study from three pre-selected universities in the south-south Nigeria. The universities were selected from Delta and Edo states. Snowball and Self-report techniques (Wimmer and Dominick, 2016) ensured that only those who had the required characteristics (those undertaking entrepreneurial courses and who are engaged in any type of business enterprise) were included in the study. The snowball technique meant that, word-of-mouth, was passed around by the research assistants about an ongoing recruitment for the study and this was diffused into the student population in which those who were interested indicated. The self-report technique meant that those who indicated interest informed the recruiters that they had a business or service for which they offered for profit purposes. In that case, eligibility involved self-reporting that the prospective participant was involved in a profit-making venture or business. Inclusiveness involved any type of legitimate business, which could be goods oriented or service oriented. This process of selection ensured the elimination from the study, those who did not have the required characteristics (Ohaja, 2003). The purpose of the study, which was to examine the trend in the use of social media for advertising among student entrepreneurs, necessitated this exclusive approach.

Further, stratified sampling technique was used. This meant that respondents who have been selected through the snowball and self-report criteria were stratified based on type of business (supply/sells of goods and services) and business worth (start-up capital or overall worth in Naira, Nigeria's currency). In the end, due to problems resulting from ineligibility and mistakes in filling and providing answers to relevant sections of the research instruments, only 180 of the recruited students participated in the final study. The selected universities (University of Benin, Delta State University and Igbinedion University) were based on randomness. No pre-required characteristics informed their choice other than that they must be within Edo and Delta states. This choice was due to convenience since the research field officers live in both states. The selection of these universities involved a ballot selection process. The number of universities included in the study was however, based on manageability and limited resources criteria.

The survey research design was adopted with the questionnaire as the instrument for data collection. The questionnaire was based on standardized formats in previous related studies (Nyekwerre et al, 2013; Newell Meirer, 2007; Chatzithomas, 2014). The instrument comprised five sections serialized as A-E. Section A measured demographic



variables of the respondents (Items 1-4). These were: gender, age, Business worth and Business type. All were measured at the nominal level. Section B had two items (items 5 and 6) which measured respondents' perception on the extent to which advertising can grow businesses. Section C had four items (items 7-10) which measured the extent to which respondents used the social media platforms for advertising. They were on ordinal scales of 'Yes,' 'No', 'Not sure'. Section D had only 1 item (item 11) which measure the social media platform that are mostly related to undergraduate students' advertisements.

Section D had 5 (items 12-16) which measured undergraduate students' perception of the social media-based advertising platform. A five point Likert scale of 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' was used to determine the outcome. The last segment, section E, had three items (17-19) and they measured perception of the advert-related effectiveness of social media platform. For instance, item 17 measure effectiveness on an ordinal level of 'Yes', 'No' and Not sure. Item 18 measured the extent of effectiveness in terms of reach (extent to which respondents think their preferred advert-related social media platform was able to target their desired customers). This was evaluated on a three point scale of 'Large extent', 'Small extent', 'No extent'.

Item 19 further measured effectiveness in terms of causing the customers to respond affectionately (meaning: *like*) or connotatively (meaning: *buy*) (Leckenby and Wedding, 1982, cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2011). This was measured on a three point scale of *Large extent*, *Small extent*, *No extent*. The questionnaire had a total of 19 items. The Likert scale options were determined by statistical mean (\bar{x}) values that are equal to or above ($M=3.0$). This was determined by ascertaining the mean value (\bar{x}) of the Likert scale $5+4+3+2+1=15/5=3.0$. Consequently $M=3.0$ served as the baseline for acceptance or rejection of an assumption or a research statement.

Results

Respondents' demographic data showed that, majority of the respondents were females (n: 101, 56.1%); Males (n: 79, 43.9%). In the age category: 16-25 years were in the majority (n: 110, 61.1%); 26-35 (n: 51, 28.3%); 36-45 (n: 11, 6.1%) and 46 and above (n:8, 4.4%). This suggests younger age category predominance among undergraduate students. A similar outcome was observed in a study on social media and skill acquisition among university students selected from the southeast. A plausible explanation to this recurrent scenario is the age at which undergraduate students were admitted into the universities (JAMB).

The business worth distribution showed that those whose businesses were worth N10, 000-N49, 000, were in the majority (n: 83, 46%). Those N50, 000-N99, 000 (n: 75, 41.7%), while the least were those within N100, 000-N500, 000 (n: 22, 12.2%). The predominance of the N10, 000-N49, 000 business worth category is not surprising. One reason for this could be found in what previous studies suggest: large capital is a major

constraint of small-scale businesses. Another explanation could be that, since entrepreneurs were still students, it would be more convenient to control businesses with smaller financial worth given that they combine it with their academic responsibilities.

Further, it could be explained off that these businesses have not had long life span especially those that were started off when the respondents were still students. Business literature suggests that 5 years circle is required for a business to grow/expand and begin to become profitable. The demography on business category showed the following: sells/supplies (n: 103, 57.25%); Services or consultancy (n: 77, 43%). (See Table 1).

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std. Dev.
GENDER				
Male	79	43.9	2.0000	.49764
Female	101	56.1		
AGE				
16-25	110	61	1.0000	.80059
26-35	51	28.3		
36-45	11	6.1		
46-above	8	4.4		
BUSINESS WORTH				
N10,000-N49,000	83	46.1	2.0000	.68637
N50,000-N99,000	75	41.7		
N100,000-N500,000	22	12.2		
BUSINESS TYPE				
Selling/Supplies	103	57.2	1.0000	.49614
Services/Consultancy	77	42.8		

Figure 1: Frequency and mean distribution of Demographic Data

Extent undergraduate student entrepreneurs think advertising can grow businesses

Majority of the respondents (n: 148, 82.2%) believe that advertising can help their businesses grow, while 17 (9.4%) did not think so. Those who were not sure were the least (n: 15, 8.3%) among the respondents. The extent to which the respondents think advertising can help grow their businesses showed the following distribution: the majority, ‘Very large extent’ (n: 82, 45.6%); followed by, ‘large extent’ (n: 71, 39.4%); ‘Very small extent’ (n: 11, 6.1%); ‘Not sure’ (n: 11, 6.1%); and the least, ‘Small extent’ (n: 5, 2.5%).

Extent undergraduate student entrepreneurs use social media for advertising.



Those who have never advertised on the mainstream media (in this case, campus radio, television, newspaper or magazine) were in the majority (n=97, 54%); those who have (n=83, 46.1%).

Large number of respondents, (n=155, 86.1%) are aware that the social media avails advertising opportunity. However, others do not think so (n=14, 7.8%), while another insignificant number of respondents (n=11, 6.1%) were not sure. Majority of the students (n=125, 65.3%) had advertised on the social media; while 65 (36%) had not.

Platforms mostly used for advertising among undergraduate student entrepreneurs.

Sixty-four (36%) of the respondents who advertise on social media, said Facebook was the major platform they use for advertising. Other category and responses were: WhatsApp (n=18,10%); Instagram (n=15, 8.3%); while Twitter was the least (n=13, 7.2%). Twelve respondents (6.7%) indicated that the type they use was not included in the categories. We do not know why Facebook emerged the most advert related platform. We think further studies should be initiated to examine the justification for the preference of the Facebook for business adverts among undergraduate student entrepreneurs.

Reasons for undergraduate student entrepreneurs' preferred social media advertising platform.

The respondents provided their justification for the use of social media for advertising on a Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree and a middle position of 'undecided'. The justifications include those shown in table 2:

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decisions
preferred platform is specific	4.0000	1.00180	Accepted
I think most of my customers are literate so they access these platforms	4.0000	1.03224	Accepted
I am experienced in using social media, so I find this platform easy to navigate	4.0000	1.02568	Accepted
I design my adverts myself	3.5000	1.19958	Rejected
I am not experienced in designing so I pay others to design my adverts	3.0000	1.33495	Rejected

Figure 2: Reasons for preferred social media advertising platform.

Effectiveness of the preferred advertising platform of undergraduate student entrepreneurs

Those who think that social media is effective in reaching the target customers, were in the majority (n=99, 55%). However, a large number, (n=70, 39%) of the

respondents were not sure. The least (n=11, 6%) were those who did not think social media was effective in reaching the desired target. Those who think that social media was effective in terms of reach, were further asked to rate the extent of effectiveness in a three point scale of Large extent, Small extent and No extent. Analysis showed: Large extent (n=92, 51.1%); Small extent (n=36, 20%); No extent (n=52, 29%). Further, we measured effectiveness on a three point scale in terms of causing the customers to respond affectionately (like) or cognitively (buy). Responses showed: large extent (n=83, 46%); Small extent (n=44, 24.4%) and No extent (n=53, 29.4%). According to Leckenby and Wedding (1982) Conative dimension of responses resulting from advertising influence, makes the prospective customer want to buy the product.

Hypotheses

1. H1: Awareness of social media as an advertising platform will be dependent on gender

Hypothesis one, predicted a significant mean difference between males and females on their awareness of the social media as advertising platform. The t-test showed no relationship between gender and awareness of social media as advertising platform (t=.902, df =178, P >.05). The number of responses of each gender category to the issue of awareness comprised roughly insignificant differences (See Table 3).

Sex	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Error	T	Df	Sig.	95% Conf Int.	
								Lower	Upper
Female	101	1.2405	.60373	.06793	.902	178	.368	-.08579	.23017
Male	79	1.1683	.47052	.04682				-.09087	.23525

Note: (t=.902, df =178, P >.05).

Figure 3: Test of dependence on gender and awareness of social media as advertising platform among undergraduate students.

3. H₂: Business worth is a significant factor in the use of social media for advertising among undergraduate students



Hypothesis 2 predicted that the total business worth (in Naira) of the undergraduate students would determine the use of social media platforms for advertising. The ANOVA for the use of the social media for advertising based on business worth, was statistically significant ($F=4.083$, $df=179$, $P < .05$) (See Table 4). Specifically, those whose total businesses were in the lower category were more likely to use the social media ($MD=.26908$, $SE=.09$) than those in the higher business worth category ($MD=.14786$, $SE=.09$) (See

Variables	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	13.990	2	1.430	4.083	.018
Within Groups	771.477	177	.350		
Total	64.861	179			

Table 4 and 5). Thus,

Figure 4: ANOVA of Business worth and the use of social media for advertising

Note ($F=4.083$, $df=179$, $P < .05$).

Ever advertised on social media
LSD

(I) Business worth	(J) Business worth	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
N10,000- N49,000	N50,000- N99,000	.26908*	.09429	.005	.0830	.4552
	N100,000- 500,000	.14786	.14192	.299	-.1322	.4279
N50,000- N99,000	N10,000- N49,000	-.26908*	.09429	.005	-.4552	-.0830
	N100,000- 500,000	-.12121	.14350	.399	-.4044	.1620
N100,000- 500,000	N10,000- N49,000	-.14786	.14192	.299	-.4279	.1322
	N50,000- N99,000	.12121	.14350	.399	-.1620	.4044

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 5: Multiple Comparisons of advertising on social media and Business worth/value

4. H₃: The social media platform on which undergraduate students mostly advertise their products is dependent on the business type (whether product selling/supplies or service rendering).

Hypothesis 3 predicted that the business category (Sells or Services oriented) would influence the social media platform that is mostly used for advertising among undergraduate students. On the contrary, the t-test showed that there was no significant relationship between the business type and the social media platform mostly used for advertising ($t = -1.672$, $df = 178$, $P > .05$). Rather we observed roughly equal mean scores for both categories (Sells/supplies: $M = 3.1748$; Services/consultancy: $M = 3.7143$) (see table 6).

Business T.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Error	T	Df	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Sells/supply	103	3.1748	2.14854	.21170	-1.672	178	-1.17628	.09722
Services	77	3.7143	2.13281	.24306			-1.17596	.09690

Note: ($t = -1.672$, $df = 178$, $P > .05$).

Figure 6: Test of dependence of social media platform on which undergraduate students mostly advertise their products and the Business type

Discussions

Our findings showed that majority of the respondents believe that advertising can help their businesses grow. This outcome has serious implications for policy drive on economic development in Nigeria, especially as social media provide alternative advertising platforms for small businesses. The data correlating advertising with business growth serves useful information for policy action on social media and economic development in Nigeria.

Respondents' believe in the potentials of advertising to grow businesses is very important. This suggests that they would be in a better position to make decisions to



advertise their products and services. Part of that decision may mean seeking cost-effective methods to create visibility for their products. In the literature review section of this study, we noted that social media is far cheaper means of advertising, which is in tandem with the findings of Lunden (2009). This will serve well the circumstances of undergraduate student entrepreneurs who may not have adequate budget to advertise in the traditional media like television, radio, magazine and newspapers. One may argue that based on the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission's community broadcasting mandate, universities are licensed to operate campus media channels like radio, television, newspapers, and magazines and that undergraduate student entrepreneurs could advertise their products on such media since they are known to be cheaper.

However, it must also be observed that campus media outlets may not serve well the intentions of most student entrepreneurs especially if their target market is not students or if their businesses are not situated within or near the universities. In these circumstances, it seems internet media platforms would be the veritable alternative. That is why we found not surprising, the predominance of those who have not advertised in mainstream media as the analysis showed. It supports previous findings, which suggested that lack of fund might deter small businesses from advertising on mainstream media (Lunden, 2009).

However, it was observed that a high percentage of respondents use mainstream media for advert purposes. Thus, contrary to assumptions, mainstream media (even if they are campus media) still hold some impressive level of relevance among undergraduate students who are engaged in businesses. However, it could be argued that campus media (radio, newspapers, magazines or TV) do not qualify as mainstream media in the real sense, especially when it comes to evaluating them based on the level of reach (coverage) and advertising fees. It is important to make this concession, since reach is a major factor in determining advertising fees and price regimen. That notwithstanding, this categorisation provides an avenue to see social media platforms as different from the more traditional platforms of radio, television, newspapers and magazines. Instructively, it would make a lot of sense if future studies examine advertising behaviour among students on campus media as against industry media (mainstream or traditional media).

In this study, majority of the respondents who used the social media for advertising were the youth. This study is therefore in line with other studies, which found that social media use is prevalent among the youth. While existing studies (Bunco 2011; Ferzana, Mushahid & Mahe, 2010) suggest that social media use was, more prevalent among younger people, our study extends this knowledge and provides an understanding of the level of awareness among undergraduate students on the utility of social media for advertising purposes. While the outcome suggest 58 percent student entrepreneurs advertise on social media, the thirty-six percent that do not, is remarkable. The

implication is that the use of social media for advertising is not yet prevalent among undergraduate students. This may be enough to raise concern among policy makers on ICTs and business growth.

Further, we found that majority of the respondents think that social media is effective in reaching their target customers. Effectiveness was measured on a three-point scale in terms of causing the customers to respond affectionately (like) or conative (buy). According to Leckenby and Wedding (1982) Conative dimension of responses resulting from advertising influence, makes the prospective customer want to buy the product.

Our study further showed that lower financial business worth predicted the use of social media platform for advertising. However, we need to note that, we did not control for extraneous effects such as, other factors other than business capital layout being the reason for the use of the alternative media for advert purposes. This may require further research to determine whether undergraduate students, who had fewer funds, were motivated to use the social media for advertising. Notwithstanding, our finding confirms prior assumptions that since advertisement in mainstream media is capital intensive, smaller businesses would drift to the social media. This finding supports the alternative media model (Mba, 2015). Given this outcome, the implication is that irrespective of the type or category of business (sells/services) in which undergraduate students engage in, they will not be restricted to a particular type of social media platform. Thus with respect to our theory of uses and gratification, neither use nor gratification in the use of social media for advertising is predicted by the type of businesses engaged in by students.

The issues which this study interrogated, have implications for advertising, small businesses, online communication and economic development at different levels in Nigeria. Firstly, with the shift in focus from oil driven economy to diversification in Nigeria, the federal government's policy thrust on entrepreneurship at different categories, especially among young graduates can only be relevant if young people engage in small businesses and enterprises. While advertising is critical part of the process of business growth, limited budget to set up small businesses cannot absorb mainstream advertising costs. Hence, the alternative media for advertising small businesses, which are cost-friendly, may become an alternative indeed. What this means, is that, if policy is informed by research on the trend of social media advertising among young entrepreneurs, policy action would be in a better position to implement suggestions that emphasis ICT-driven business environment.

Secondly, while it is known that social media platforms serve the purpose of interaction and communication, their use as business platforms is not widely known in scholarship. This study therefore, extends the frontiers of the discourse on social media and economic development. Thirdly, the study adds to the growing body of knowledge on domestication of technology and the paradigm adjustment in discussing the uses and



gratification perspective (Odoemelam Okorom and Okwudiogor, 2016; Ayotunde, 2012). For instance, the study sheds light on how users subject technology to specific uses (Scannel, 1996; Sconce, 2000; Berkertel et al, 2006) and how the dominant understanding of the uses and gratification perspective (Katz 1959; Akpan, Akwaowo and Senam, 2013), seems to be shifting to an emergent view that emphasises the technology-choice-power of the audience member. Given this scenario, literature stands to gain from the insights a study of this nature provides.

However, while our study has provided perspectives on the use of social media for advertising among undergraduates student who are engaged in small businesses, the study was limited in that specific scope since it did not examine groups beyond the student community. We feel that this introduces serious challenge of external validity and generalisation. Despite this, the findings of this study provides fresh perspectives to the debate on social media among small businesses. We are of the opinion that research in this area is only emerging and growing and our study constitutes one of the pioneer information in this area.

In addition, we acknowledge that the perspective detailed in our study were just those of students who are engaged in entrepreneurship. There are a vast number of small businesses that are outside the university system that were excluded. It will be more enriching if future studies were more inclusive by examining these perspectives. For instance, the trend in the use of social media for creating awareness for this group's goods and services would be beneficial to knowledge in the domain. Again, it is important for future studies to examine the relationship between the level of education and or literacy level and the use of social media for advertising among small businesses. We could not examine this factor since our participants were a homogenous group.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that disruptive innovations are increasingly becoming acknowledged global phenomenon, especially in the advertising arena. This impact is more visible in the advertisement of goods and services by small business owners. This study detailed how student entrepreneurs who are engaged in small businesses adopt social media and other online platforms to create awareness for their products and services.

In this study, among others, we observed that the increasing discourse on economic growth and development in Nigeria has been a direct consequence of poor growth performance of the economy. As such, we noted that the need to diversify the Nigerian economy has become paramount. We also pointed out that encouraging entrepreneurship among undergraduate students would help reduce the growing index of unemployment and underemployment among Nigerian graduates. Furthermore, student entrepreneurs need to know the role advertising plays in business growth. For instance, they need to know how online media can create awareness for their businesses,

especially, since the traditional advertising model is being overtaken by Internet technologies.

To explain the phenomenon, the disruptive innovations, domestication of technology and uses and gratification theories provided theoretical contexts to examine how undergraduate student entrepreneurs appropriate and 'tame' the internet technology for relevant business communications and how these internet platforms serve their advertising needs.

In sum, our conclusion is that, social media and online advertising platforms are disrupting the advertising space, are fast becoming very significant part of business communications, and are supportive of small businesses to survive in a developing economy like Nigeria.

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Declaration of Interest Statement

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

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Learning from Educational Impediments: Insights for Nigeria from the Tigray Conflict¹

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Abstract:

Education serves as a crucial foundation for the advancement and prosperity of any nation, shaping individuals, empowering communities, and fostering economic growth. Nevertheless, educational systems are vulnerable to disruption caused by conflicts and violence, resulting in significant consequences for students, teachers, and educational institutions. This study examines the educational impediments faced in Tigray from the Ethiopian-Tigray conflict, the potential lessons that Nigeria can learn and strategies Nigeria should implement to mitigate these challenges. The study employed a qualitative method using case study research design. Purposive sampling technique was used to select twelve interview participants for the primary data, while secondary data were collected from scholarly publications, journals, articles, and online materials. The findings revealed common obstacles encountered by Ethiopia's educational sector, including disrupted access to schooling, displacement of students and teachers, infrastructure damage, loss of learning resources, and psychological trauma among students. These challenges significantly hindered the provision of quality education and impeded progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education. This study concludes that education plays a vital role in Nigeria's economic growth and political stability, and by drawing upon Ethiopia's experiences recommends Nigeria to enhance its resilience and preparedness in similar crises, such as strengthening emergency education response mechanisms, investing in inclusive and community-driven education, bolstering infrastructure resilience, and prioritising psychosocial support for affected students, among others.

Keywords:

Africa; conflict; economic growth; education; security; Tigray conflict.

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Introduction

Education is a fundamental pillar for the development and progress of any nation. It plays a crucial role in shaping individuals, empowering communities, and fostering economic growth and societal development. However, in regions affected by conflicts, access to quality education becomes severely compromised, impeding the overall progress of the population (Fore, 2020). One such conflict-ridden region is Tigray in Ethiopia, where the recent conflict has had significant ramifications on the educational system. The Tigray conflict, which started in 2020 between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), has had devastating consequences on the educational sector; as schools were destroyed, educational resources depleted, and teachers and students displaced, resulting in a disruption of the learning process (Mlaba, 2021). On 28 February 2022, UNICEF reported that in 2021, more than 2.8 million children missed school from Afar, Amhara, Tigray regions. The devastating conflict prevented Tigray's children from receiving further education, which is especially worrying given that the COVID-19 pandemic had previously caused a protracted disruption and that many children are still unable to attend school (UNICEF, 2022).

The Tigray conflict officially began on November 4, 2020; after Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, declared the "Law enforcement operation," which ordered the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the Armed Forces against the Tigray Region (Ethiopian Embassy, London, 2021). The unexpected attack carried out during the night by members of the Tigray Regional Special Forces and Militia on the offices and bases of the ENDF in Mekelle - which is the capital of Tigray; was the immediate precipitating factor that led to the conflict. The conflict became an international crisis as it escalated beyond Ethiopian boundaries to neighbouring countries in East Africa and international organisations.

Reported by Ghent University, Belgium, the Tigray conflict caused more than 500,000 deaths from direct violent killing and famine. The estimate comprises 50,000 to 100,000 victims of direct homicides, 150,000 to 200,000 fatalities from malnutrition, and more than 100,000 additional deaths brought on by a lack of access to healthcare (Ghent University, 2023). According to the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), more than 20 million people required protection and humanitarian aid by the end of 2022 due to the Tigray conflict (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2022).

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, faces its own security challenges, which have over the years affected its educational sector and effectiveness of policies. Despite commendable efforts to improve access to education, Nigeria continues to grapple with issues such as inadequate infrastructure, limited resources, low enrolment rates, and disparities between urban and rural areas (Odia & Omofonmwan, 2007; Jacob & Samuel, 2020). Even though elementary education in the nation is both free and required by law, 10.5 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 do not attend. Only

61% of children aged 6 to 11 routinely attend primary school in Nigeria, while only 35.6% of children from 36 to 59 months receive early childhood education (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 2022). Many schools have been forced to close in recent years due to insecurity, particularly in regions of northern Nigeria, without explicit orders from the government because school administrations could not ensure students and teachers safety (UNICEF, 2022).

The state of insecurity in Nigeria, especially in the north-east region, posed by the terrorist group Boko Haram and other insurgent groups, and conflict outbreaks in the Niger Delta region over boundaries and resources, have detrimentally affected the educational institution amongst other institutions (Baba, 2020; Ubiebi & Ogbonna, 2021). Since December 2020, more than 11,536 schools have been closed due to insecurity. In less than two years, 1.3 million children's education in Nigeria has been impacted by security issues (Abdullahi, 2022). The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South has altered education in the South-East to the extent that pupils were not permitted to complete part of their papers for the West African Senior School Certificate Examination (WAEC) in 2022. Educational observers claim that the country's educational system is still under threat from insecurity affecting students, teachers, and the government, resulting in the decline of education (US Department of State, 2022).

The choice of the Tigray conflict as a case study stems from its relevance to issues of political instability and regional/ethnic disparities, which are prominent drivers of insecurity and conflict in Nigeria. While existing research on the impact of the Tigray conflict on the region's educational sector is substantial, it predominantly focuses on the Tigray region itself and lacks comparative analysis with other conflict-affected nations on the African continent. Given Nigeria's enduring challenges with insecurity and political instability, there exists a pressing imperative to scrutinise the educational barriers confronted in Tigray due to the conflict, particularly in light of Nigeria's security context.

Understanding the specific challenges faced in Tigray, such as the disruption of educational infrastructure, the psychological impact on students and teachers, and the long-term consequences on the education system, Nigeria can learn from addressing its own educational impediments even before the escalation of conflicts and instability. The experiences in Tigray offer a unique learning opportunity for Nigeria on the strategies and measures that should be taken to mitigate educational challenges during and after a conflict. This includes examining the role of local communities, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations in restoring educational stability.



Review of Related Literatures

The Concept of Conflict

Conflict has been a part of human history for as long as people have been around. It is a prominent trait that can be passed on from generation to generation in current society. Morgenthau (1948) proposes that even in situations where individuals do not have access to firearms or other instruments of violence, they are nonetheless likely to fight using only their fists. According to Holsti (1983), conflict is a close relationship between states or competing parts within a state that signifies internal friction or hostility that surface as exterior political, economic, or military conflicts. This close relationship might be between two states or between rival sections within a state. Coser (1998), on the other hand, defines conflict as a fight between competing parties for limited prestige, power, and resources with the purpose of damaging or eliminating their opposition. In agreement, Folarin (2015) states that the surrounding of the society with other humans brings up issues of disagreement, clash of interests, which would commonly lead to confrontations or disagreement, thus creating a community of men and women who succumb to conflicting behaviour and disagreement.

According to the explicit definition of conflict in politics, conflict is a manifestation of the competing interests of opposing or complementary political organisations. Conflict frequently results in political violence, which, when understood in the context of Weberian theory, makes political violence an acceptable tool for venting rage (Anifowose, 1982). However, conflicts can either be dominant or recessive, non-violent or violent, and resolvable or unresolvable depending on the circumstances. However, the vast majority of conflicts that have been documented throughout the course of human history have been characterised by violence, having a severe impact not only on the states involved but also on the residents of those states (Omotosho, 2004). Accordingly, it would be acknowledged that not all conflicts are intrinsically violent, but that some conflicts could potentially take the form of violence.

The Tigray Conflict

The Tigray conflict was a violent struggle that raged from November 2020 to November 2022; between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF). The conflict is said to have been caused by some underlying factors such as: ethnic diversity, unacceptance of Abiy Ahmed as the new Prime Minister by the TPLF; introduction of the Prosperity Party by the Prime Minister as a replacement for the dissolved Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (which was the former ruling party under the leadership of TPLF); and the immediate cause which was the TPLF attack on the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) offices and bases in Mekelle - capital of Tigray. The conflict saw violent confrontation of arms (guns, T-72 tanks, rockets, M20/A200 missile launchers, AR2 MRL, jet fighters, etc.) by both

parties, which caused more than thousands of deaths from direct violent killing and famine (Al Jazeera, 2021). By its spill over effect to other communities, the conflict attracted the intervention of the Amhara ethnic group, Oromo ethnic group, Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea and other external actors. The Tigray conflict was the most escalated conflict in the Horn of Africa between 2020 and 2022; with high humanitarian crises - more than 20 million people were in desperate need of humanitarian aid and protection, more 500,000 deaths were recorded (UNOCHA, 2022), and about 5.5 million people were compelled to flee their homes and seek refuge in other parts of Ethiopia, due to subsequent escalation of the conflict to neighbouring states of Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan (Wilson Center, 2023).

The vital social services in the Tigray region and in the nearby regions of Afar and Amhara, notably the educational system, suffered tremendous harm as a result of the two years of violent conflict in Ethiopia. It is unfortunate that even after the African Union (AU)'s African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, for instance, urged African nations to "either ban the use of schools for military purposes, or, at a minimum, enact concrete measures to deter the use of schools for military purposes," throughout the conflict, schools were used as military bases by all combatants, as well as for sexual violations (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

In particular, the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) engaged in widespread abuses of civilians while fighting alongside the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) against Tigrayan forces. Both the EDF and ENDF bombed, plundered, and invaded schools - on occasion, these locations have been used to perpetrate further crimes, such as weaponized rape; as Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) became a major weapon during the conflict; pervasive and systematic. According to Human Rights Watch (2022), an eyewitness reported to have seen various women taken inside a school where they occasionally stayed for two, three, or five days with the militants, only to be released with battered and sobbing faces. The environment made it difficult to inquire about the women's whereabouts, and no one dared.

Education in Ethiopia During the Tigray Conflict

Education in Ethiopia is a critical sector that the government has prioritised for the country's development. With the creation of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP) in (1997), which is a government-led initiative that outlines the strategies, priorities, and goals for the development of the education sector. According to the Federal Ministry of Education, Addis Ababa (2015), the Program aims to improve access, quality, and relevance of education through various interventions, including infrastructure development and teacher training. The Ethiopian government over the years have maintained significant educational growth, especially among children and youths.



Ethiopia introduced free primary education in 1994 (World Bank, 2009), to increase access and enrolment rates. This policy helps remove financial barriers to education for families and has contributed to improved school attendance. Although the Ethiopian Education and Training Policy focuses on enhancing access, quality, and relevance of education; emphasising inclusive education, technical and vocational education, and technology integration in teaching and learning, according to the World Bank (2023), the literacy rate for individuals aged 15 and above in Ethiopia was estimated to be around 56.8% in 2018. There is a gender disparity, with the male literacy rate at approximately 63.5% and the female literacy rate at about 50% (Galal, 2022). As of 2019, the net enrolment rate for primary education in Ethiopia was reported to be around 86.6%, reflecting increased access to education. However, despite progress, Ethiopia still faces challenges of out-of-school children. The number of out-of-school children was estimated at 3.3 million in 2019. Efforts are being made to reduce this number through targeted interventions and policies (Carmichael, Darko, Kanji, & Vasilakos, 2022).

It is not deniable that Ethiopia recognizes the significance of education as a catalyst for development. While progress has been made, challenges remain in terms of access, quality, and inclusivity. The government, in collaboration with international partners, has been working towards addressing these challenges and improving education outcomes for all Ethiopian citizens. However, during the Tigray conflict which started in November 2020, until November 2022, the educational system and stability of Ethiopia were highly devastated, especially in the Tigray region; where the military forces attacked and fought the opposition.

The Tigray conflict led to the disruption of school activities in the region. Many schools were damaged, destroyed, or occupied by armed forces, preventing students from accessing education. As reported by the Save the Children Organization in 2022, between June and December 2022, Ethiopia's out-of-school population increased from 3.1 million to 3.6 million, in part due to recent war in the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions and ongoing instability in some areas of Oromia that displaced more civilians. With 24.1 million people hit by the greatest drought in four decades, including 12.6 million children, Ethiopia experienced one of the biggest humanitarian disasters in its history. The drought caused more than 1 million people to be displaced, only in the Somali region. From the statement made by Henrietta Fore - UNICEF Executive Director, in 2020, many children were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other areas, leading to interruptions in their education (UNICEF, 2022). Due to the security situation, many schools in Tigray were forced to close, depriving students of learning opportunities. Some schools were repurposed as shelters for displaced individuals, further impacting access to education (Wilson Center, 2023). During the conflict, education infrastructure, including schools, classrooms, and educational materials, were not left undamaged. This hampered the ability to provide a conducive learning environment for students, nor a safe environment for all.

Education in Nigeria

The Universal Basic Education (UBE) Policy was introduced in 1999 to provide free and compulsory basic education for all children in Nigeria. It covers nine years of formal schooling: six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education. According to Labo-Popoola et al. (2009), all governments in Nigeria from colonial times until the present have consistently placed primary education at the centre of their educational policies, raising the possibility that the difficulties may not lie in the creation of the policies themselves but rather in their implementation. Since Universal Primary Education (UPE) was first based on regions (Eddy & Akpan, 2009), universalizing primary education became a national endeavour in Nigeria in 1976. All students, regardless of status, are entitled to equal educational opportunities. The strategy states that education should level the playing field and provide prospects for achievement for everyone, regardless of background (Labo-Popoola et al, 2009). Everyone has the fundamental human right to a basic education, as stated by the Convention on Human Rights and the Treaty against Discrimination in Education (Babalola, 2013, Baba, 2020).

In response to the security challenges facing the education sector, the Safe School Initiative (SSI) was launched in 2014 by the Federal Government, in order to provide safe and secure learning environments for students and teachers in areas affected by insecurity through measures such as increased security presence and infrastructure improvements. According to Umar (2022), schools have been forced to close in recent years due to insecurity, particularly in regions of northern Nigeria, without explicit orders from the government because school administrations could not ensure student safety. Since December 2020, as reported by UNICEF (2022), more than 11,536 schools have been closed due to insecurity in the country. Additionally, the Organization reported that in less than two years, 1.3 million children's education in Nigeria has been impacted by security issues, affecting all aspects of their lives, including education - which during crises is not usually recognised to be important (Abdullahi, 2022).

According to the World Bank, the literacy rate in Nigeria for individuals aged 15 and above was estimated to be around 62.0% in 2018. Nigeria, according to the 2022 UNICEF report has one of the highest numbers of out-of-school children globally, which was estimated to be around 10.5 million. Although the allocation of budgetary resources to the education sector is essential for its development, and the Nigerian government in recent years has committed to allocating a significant percentage of the national budget to education. However, the actual implementation and disbursement of these funds remain areas of concern.

While Nigeria has made efforts to improve its education sector through various policies and initiatives, challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, high number of out-of-school children, and regional disparities persist. Addressing these challenges requires



sustained commitment, increased investment, and comprehensive reforms to ensure inclusive and quality education for all Nigerians.

Conflict and Instability in Nigeria

Education in Nigeria, in relation to insecurity challenges, is a complex and multifaceted issue. In recent years, Nigeria has faced significant security challenges, particularly in the form of insurgency, terrorism, banditry, and communal conflicts. These security challenges have had a detrimental impact on the education sector in various ways. There have been instances where schools have been directly attacked by insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram. These attacks have resulted in the loss of lives, injuries, and abductions of students and teachers (Momodu, & Tukur, 2021). Such incidents have created fear and trauma among students, parents, and teachers, leading to a decline in school enrolment and attendance.

Especially in the northern and south-eastern part of Nigeria, insecurity has led to the destruction of school infrastructure, including buildings, classrooms, and educational materials. This hampers the ability of schools to provide a conducive learning environment for students and further disrupts educational activities (Shinge, Barde, Umar, Suraj, Bukar, and Garba, 2022). Additionally, many students and teachers have been forced to flee their homes, seeking safety in other regions. This displacement disrupts their education and results in the loss of valuable educational opportunities. Regrettably, insecurity has created an environment where young people, particularly those who lack access to quality education and economic opportunities, are vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent groups. Lack of education and prospects for the future make them more susceptible to radicalization and involvement in violent activities.

In the northeast region of Nigeria, where the insurgency has lasted for well over twelve years, incidents are increasingly frequent: due to widespread kidnappings at educational facilities, banditry also poses serious dangers to education in the northwest and north-central zones. Since 2021, as argued by Anyadiegwu and Nzekwu (2022), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has designated Mondays as a day of solitude in honour of their respected leader Nnamdi Kanu, who has been facing prosecution by the Federal Government. In addition, both the IPOB and various South-East regional groups have consistently enforced "sit-at-home" orders on Mondays and other days, resulting in the suspension of all activities, including educational activities, leading to significant and negative impacts on the educational sector.

The 2023 UNICEF report stated that Nigerian school enrolment is severely hampered by pervasive dread. From 10.5 million in 2021, there are currently over 18.5 million out-of-school children, which significantly impedes the educational and economic growth of the country. The Northeast terrorism and banditry in the northwest and north-central regions are factors, according to UNICEF, in the spike. Beyond the

violence, there are restrictions to supporting numerous children who are trapped in conflict-affected environments, typically due to security considerations. Additionally, a lot of children live in areas affected by war where both social and economic resources are scarce. In the face of a protracted humanitarian catastrophe, educational services seem to take a back seat, it would not be a necessity nor priority.

The statistics on poverty will get worse if barriers to education persist (Baba, 2020). A lack of educational possibilities for the younger generation will have an impact on their vulnerability, productivity, and self-reliance. Recruits are required to fill out the ranks of the numerous non-state armed groups. Therefore, groups that are uneducated, unskilled, and underproductive are susceptible to the antics of violent people (Jacob & Samuel, 2020). According to the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), a good education safeguards cognitive growth and psychological well-being, offering kids hope in difficult situations. In order to provide educational services to millions of disadvantaged children in Nigeria, it is necessary to persistently address the institutional, cultural, security, and humanitarian barriers to education (NextierSPD, 2022).

Methodology

This study adopted a qualitative method, using case study research design to examine the educational impediments faced in Tigray during the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict (2020-2022), and the lessons that Nigeria can learn from this experience. It explores the intervention of the Ethiopian government to resolve the challenges to education in the Tigray region caused by the conflict. The research is based on primary data from in-depth interviews with twelve (12) respondents: academic experts in Ethiopian politics and education, experts in Nigerian education and international affairs, and citizens of Ethiopia living in the Tigray region. Secondary data were collected from government reports, international organisation reports, pertinent books, journals, and online resources. This is in order to identify the educational impediments faced by the Tigray region during the two-year Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, and to provide recommendations and mechanisms that the Nigerian government can adopt in fostering its educational system during conflicts and instability. By understanding the educational impediments in the Tigray region, Nigeria can develop more informed and effective policies to safeguard education during times of conflict. The study can serve as a basis for policymakers to design mechanisms that prioritise continuity and resilience in the education system.



Findings

Educational Impediments in Ethiopia During the Tigray Conflict

Disrupted Schooling: The Tigray conflict led to the closure of schools and universities in the Tigray region and surrounding areas, resulting in a significant disruption of education. The Tigray education bureau in 2021 carried out a preliminary assessment that comprised 2,054 primary, elementary, and secondary public schools as well as two teacher-training institutes, but excluded schools in Western and Northern Tigray that were under the control of Eritrea and Amhara. From their findings, 88.3% of classrooms suffered substantial damage; this damage included the theft, demolishing, and burning of 96.5% of student desks, 95.7% of blackboards, and 63.5% of student textbooks (Tigray Education Bureau, 2021). Additionally, many schools were damaged or used as shelters for internally displaced people, making them inaccessible for learning purposes. According to one of the interview respondents living in Tigray:

“During the two-year war period, I and my family were in Tigray. I have three kids. Two of them were in school before the conflict and they were forced to suspend schooling due to the war. All schools were closed and students were forced to listen to war news and propagandas ... Students were forced to suspend school, causing a four-year delay in their education. Now, they are struggling to catch up on what they've missed, which is made very difficult due to a poorly designed accelerated learning program. Additionally, students have aged, affecting the age-grade connection, with many learning below their appropriate level. The second effect is on teachers: they were forced to suspend teaching, with many joining the military, resulting in casualties among educators.”

Another respondent stated:

"the region's educational institutions are using a crash in education to compensate for the time passed during the war (crashing six months of lectures into three months), but I say it's not efficient and I guess the consequence will be huge. So it's better to stop a war before it starts.”

Inaccessibility and Safety Concerns: The conflict and insecurity in the region made it difficult for students to attend school regularly. Ongoing violence and attacks on educational facilities created safety concerns for students and teachers, leading to decreased school attendance. Further survey by the Tigray Educational Bureau stated that, because of damage to schools, Tigray's primary school children now walk an average of 7.3 kilometres (km) rather than the 2.5 km they did just two years ago to get to school. From the study, it was reported that 1,911 students and 235 teachers (from elementary and secondary schools) were killed in the war, but there could be more unidentified persons (Tigray Education Bureau, 2021). This made it difficult for both

students and teachers to attend school, and with further escalation of the conflict and reported number of displacements and deaths, education ceased to be a priority or necessity to the teachers and students. As Respondent 11 stated that during the conflict, most schools, if not all, were closed due to the risk of bombardment (Air and Land), land mines, and systematic sexual violence. Additionally, a lecturer at Mekelle University responded:

“Due to the heavy military presence in the region, there was active fighting in and around Mekelle, there were serious security threats which put students, especially children, females, and students with disabilities at heightened protection risks. The safety and security of the pupils was jeopardised. After the cessation of hostilities agreement, students returned to school, but the security of the region has become very fragile and lots of abductions are going on, which creates security concerns for students.”

According to Respondent 9,

“There was no fuel for transportation, no access to banks, and no internet. The situation was a complete deadlock. Students couldn't learn, and teachers couldn't teach because it was too dangerous to leave home, with federal government soldiers violating human rights and with drones coming unexpectedly to attack areas of the city.”

Displacement of Students and Teachers: Reported by the European Parliament (2022), hospitals and schools, among other important facilities, were devastated by the conflict. Armed groups from all sides attacked and destroyed several of the camps housing over 100,000 Eritrean refugees living in Tigray before the crisis began. Amnesty International reported in February 2021 that in the Tigrayan city of Axum in December 2020, Eritrean forces targeted and killed more than 100 civilians (Amnesty International, 2021). Despite pressure from the international community, Eritrean forces did not comply with promises to remove their presence in the area. Just a year into the conflict in 2021, Ethiopia claimed to have 5.1 million internally displaced people (IDP), the most of any nation in a single year (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). The conflict caused large-scale displacement of populations, including students and teachers. Many students had to flee with their families to safer areas, resulting in interrupted education and difficulties in finding alternative schools. Teachers were also displaced, leaving schools with a shortage of qualified educators.

As stated by one of the respondents:

“Large numbers of students, especially from Western Tigray, Northwestern, Eastern and South Tigray were displaced and still living in IDP camps resulting in separation from their families. They have not been able to attend school, and their education records are lost, and access to education seriously curtailed.”



Lack of Educational Resources: Schools in conflict-affected areas often faced shortages of teaching materials, textbooks, and essential resources necessary for effective learning. The destruction of infrastructure further exacerbated the lack of resources. According to the Wilson Centre report (2023), the Tigrayans were the main target of the Eritrean military force, who equally blocked and damaged the roads and links that would deliver humanitarian assistance to Tigray from external organisations. Particularly when fighting alongside the ENDF against Tigrayan forces, the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) engaged in extensive abuses against civilians. Schools were attacked, plundered, and occupied by EDF and ENDF soldiers. During the conflict, according to the responses from the interviewees, there was restriction on movement within regions, violating the rights to freedom of movement. The Tigray conflict promoted human rights abuse and corruption through the unlawful arrest and detention of citizens across the country, especially those found to support or promote the TPLF.

Respondent 12 stated that most schools in Tigray were intentionally destroyed, school educational materials were torn down and burned into ashes, and educational facilities such as offices, classrooms and chairs were stolen, damaged or destroyed.

Psychological Trauma: The violence, displacement, and insecurity experienced during the conflict resulted in significant psychological trauma for both students and teachers. The Tigray conflict caused a high degree of sexual violation, robbery, demolition of infrastructures in Tigray - schools, hospitals and religious institutions. Although the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of the AU urged African nations to "either ban the use of schools for military purposes, or, at a minimum, enact concrete measures to deter the use of schools for military purposes", during the conflict, all belligerents utilised schools as military installations. The Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), occasionally used schools, religious buildings and demolished health centres to conduct other crimes, such as weaponized rape - conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) on women and young girls. According to one of the respondents:

The war was conducted using ground forces and aerial forces such as jets and drones. This created huge psychological impacts on students, teachers, and parents. The sounds of artillery, drones and jets were so awful that our kids developed stress related problems. The level of psychological trauma is so high because there were serious problems with food and non-food items due to the blockade imposed by the Ethiopian government.

In addition, Human Rights Watch in 2022 interviewed an eyewitness who reported to have seen various women taken inside a school where they occasionally stayed for two, three, or five days with the militants, only to be released with battered and sobbing faces. According to Wilson Center (2023), over 20 million people were affected by the war, of which nearly three quarters were women and children. Witnessing or being

victims of violence can have long-lasting effects on mental health, affecting the ability to concentrate and learn effectively.

Discussion of Findings: Lessons for Nigeria

The Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia has undoubtedly had significant implications for the country's education system. Nigeria, as an African country facing instability and insecurity, can draw valuable lessons from Ethiopia's educational impediments during this conflict to address potential challenges in its own education sector.

The most important thing to note, emphasised by one of the respondents is: “War is the greatest enemy of mankind. It not only destroys property but also intellect, innovation, and generation. It kills not only the present generations but also kills the future.” War and conflict should by all means be avoided through mediations, dialogue and other conflict resolution mechanisms before escalation. The impact of war is very serious to the sustainability and development of every society. In the educational sector in Tigray, the gains in education over the last 30 years have been completely destroyed in a matter of two years or less. Not only this, but education also cannot wait; as age progresses, the school age and the school grade become very difficult to balance. Second, as war destroys not only the school infrastructure of the school systems but also the good minds of students. In addition, the respondent stated:

As a fragile state like Ethiopia, Nigeria can learn from Ethiopia to solve political problems through democratic political process ... if by any means there is conflict, educational institutions must be always protected, including the continuation of education even during war. Another lesson is the accountability mechanism. Conflict entrepreneurs and violators of human rights need to account for their actions.

On strengthening education in emergency preparedness, one of the critical lessons from the Tigray Conflict is the importance of safeguarding schools and educational facilities during periods of insecurity. Nigeria should prioritise protecting schools from being targeted, damaged, or used for military purposes during times of conflict to ensure that education can continue uninterrupted. However, based on findings from the Tigray conflict, it becomes evident that education is often deemed less of a priority and necessity during periods of armed conflicts. Both national and international organisations tend to allocate their resources primarily to humanitarian aid and security initiatives. As noted by one of the respondents:

“During the conflict, both the Ethiopian government and the TPLF were busy in the war and propaganda. Nor were external organisations such as non-governmental and donor agencies had the interest and plan to start schooling. There were some attempts by non-governmental organisations but due to the



frequent aerial bombardments and drone disturbing sounds, there was no right condition to continue teaching-learning during the war.”

Even in cases where educational infrastructure is safeguarded by the government amidst crises and wars, there is no assurance that all school children and teachers can be adequately protected. Consequently, citizens may choose to prioritise personal safety over attending educational institutions, opting to stay within the confines of their homes. Respondent 7 also stated:

“The Ethiopian government has refused to send all kinds of educational materials and salaries for teachers. As a result, education has been halted for almost three years. The regional government has tried to run/operate the schools for very few months; however, that has stopped because of continuous air and land bombardment that has been carried out by the Federal Government. Besides, an acute shortage of educational materials has played its own role in the stoppage of the service. External organisations (e.g. UN, were not allowed to transport educational materials for the schools in Tigray). During the brutal conflict, UN and other NGOs employees were not allowed to carry any medication in the one and only flight/Transportation of World Food Programme (WFP) from Addis Ababa to Mekelle/Tigray region.”

In light of these insights, Nigeria should take proactive measures by establishing dedicated institutions that focus on training teachers and educators to be well-prepared to provide education during times of conflict. By equipping them with the necessary skills and knowledge, these trained teachers and coaches can create conducive learning environments, even in challenging circumstances, thereby ensuring that education remains accessible and effective despite the prevailing security challenges. This approach aims to address the apparent disparity in resource allocation during conflicts, where education tends to receive less attention than humanitarian and security assistance. By investing in the preparedness of educators, Nigeria can demonstrate a commitment to prioritising education and safeguarding the learning opportunities of its citizens, even amidst uncertain and volatile situations. Such initiatives are pivotal in fostering resilience and continuity within the educational system during conflict times, ultimately contributing to the overall stability and development of the nation.

Additionally, the Tigray conflict resulted in a significant number of people being internally displaced, including many children. Nigeria should develop robust mechanisms to ensure that children who are displaced due to conflicts or other emergencies have access to education, whether through temporary schools, catch-up programs, or distance learning initiatives. The Government should leverage digital technologies to facilitate distance learning during emergencies, provide access to educational content and resources, and train teachers and students on utilising technology for remote learning. However, a critical concern arises regarding the feasibility of implementing this strategy in rural areas, where schools often suffer from

underfunding, resulting in inadequate educational facilities, unreliable internet connections, and mismanagement of infrastructure and educational budgets. In such circumstances, the use of digital technologies and distance learning becomes challenging for both students and teachers, given the unavailability and unfamiliarity with these facilities.

Nigeria and other African nations should prioritise the establishment of clear demarcation and separation between key institutions, including the judiciary and political parties, the Human Rights Commission and political entities, the Federal Army and political organisations, as well as education and other essential services, in order to mitigate conflicts of interest. These services, such as education, healthcare, food aid, banking, electricity, fuel, agricultural inputs, transportation, among others, represent fundamental rights of citizens that governments are morally obligated to provide without discrimination.

Recommendations

In light of these challenges, this research recommends that, in addition to training teachers for emergency preparedness, the Nigerian government should also provide specialised training for teachers and educational administrators to establish localised educational centres in every street. These centres would serve as short-distance learning hubs, where instructors can gather all students residing within a specific street into a communal space, such as a house, to conduct classes for different groups. The adoption of such an approach would encourage individuals who harbour safety concerns to attend classes, as the learning environment would be within their immediate community, eliminating the need for long-distance travel. Additionally, the creation of localised educational centres ensures that students and teachers can navigate the challenges posed by underfunded rural schools and limited access to digital technologies, making education more accessible and inclusive for all. By incorporating this recommendation into the broader education system, the Nigerian government can take significant strides towards mitigating the impact of underfunding and inadequate infrastructure on rural education.

The government should also prioritise inclusivity and equity in education, ensuring that vulnerable and marginalised populations are not left behind during times of conflict. Special attention should be given to the needs of displaced children and those from conflict-affected communities, including IDPs and refugees.

Furthermore, Nigeria should provide psychosocial support for students affected by conflicts. The trauma and stress associated with living in a conflict zone can significantly impact a child's mental health and well-being. Implementing counselling services and resilience-building programs can help students cope with the challenges they face and continue their educational journey. During conflicts and wars, human rights violations



such as rape and assaults are inevitable; as the Tigray conflict witnessed the rape of women and young girls. The Nigerian government learning from this should employ therapists and psychologists who would visit and medically attend to the children and teachers, towards rehabilitation and healing. The government should also address the challenges of child soldiers; children adopted into the conflict by the warring parties instead of going to school. Whether the conflict is between the Federal Government and a region; as in the case of Ethiopia, or between other regions, the Nigerian Government should protect children from being utilised as war shields or soldiers during wars or conflicts.

There is also a need to advocate for international support and partnerships. Ethiopia faced challenges in accessing resources and assistance during the conflict. Nigeria should forge strong partnerships with international organisations and neighbouring countries to enhance its capacity to address educational issues during times of crisis and conflict. The government should work with organisations and agencies to access additional resources and expertise to support education in crisis situations, to seek support for education in emergency initiatives, and to mitigate the impact of conflicts and crises on education. Additionally, Nigeria should seek and welcome humanitarian aid for education during conflicts. International organisations and donors often provide support for education in conflict-affected areas. Welcoming this assistance and using it effectively can help alleviate some of the educational challenges faced by students in Nigeria during times of crisis. Similarly, Nigeria should involve local communities in decision-making processes related to education. Engaging parents, community leaders, and local stakeholders can help ensure that education remains a priority during conflict and fosters a sense of ownership and responsibility for the well-being of schools and students. Through community engagement in supporting education during emergencies, by involving local actors in decision-making processes, this will promote their active participation in creating safe and conducive learning environments for their communities and children.

Implementing these recommendations will require strong political will, commitment, and collaboration among stakeholders. By drawing insights from the educational impediments experienced in the Tigray conflict, Nigeria can enhance its preparedness and response to educational challenges during emergencies, ultimately ensuring that all children have access to quality education even in times of crisis.

Conclusion

Studying the educational impediments faced during the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia provides valuable insights for Nigeria and its education system. The Tigray conflict has highlighted the detrimental effects of armed conflicts on education, and Nigeria can

learn from these experiences to better protect and promote access to education in times of crisis.

The conflict in Tigray resulted in widespread displacement, destruction of infrastructure, closure of schools, and disruption of educational activities. These challenges have severely impacted the learning and well-being of children and young people in the region. Nigeria, being a country with its own history of conflicts and security challenges, can draw important lessons from the Tigray conflict to enhance its preparedness and response mechanisms. One key lesson is the critical importance of ensuring the safety and security of schools and educational facilities. Nigeria can strengthen measures to protect schools from attacks, including developing robust security protocols, promoting community engagement in safeguarding schools, and raising awareness about the importance of protecting education in times of conflict.

Additionally, the Tigray conflict has shed light on the need for coordinated humanitarian efforts to address the educational needs of affected populations. Nigeria can enhance its coordination mechanisms among government agencies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and local communities to provide timely and comprehensive support to students and teachers during crises. The Tigray conflict underscores the significance of prioritising the continuity of education in emergency settings. Nigeria can invest in innovative solutions such as in-house schooling or street conducted classes.

By learning from the educational impediments faced in the Tigray conflict, Nigeria can develop comprehensive strategies to safeguard and strengthen its education system, particularly in times of crisis. The insights gained can inform policy decisions, resource allocation, and collaborative efforts to ensure that all children and young people in Nigeria have access to quality education, regardless of the challenges they may face.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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The Black Gold of the Sahara

Brief history of the Algerian and Libyan oil industry up to 1973¹

Valentin Cseh²

Abstract:

Until the middle of the 20th century, Africa did not feature prominently as a mining area for crude oil, i.e. black gold. It is true that oil was found in Egypt and French Morocco already in the first half of the century, but this was not significant in world terms. Although there were traces of oil in the area already in ancient times. Two millennia later, in the 1930s, in Algeria and Libya, geologists also found clues indicating that there could be significant oil reserves deep underground. These assumptions were realized only from 1949 onwards. After that, however, the North African states that became independent from the colonial rule had to deal with many difficulties. Among them are the aspirations of the large international oil cartels and the accompanying political projections.

Keywords:

Algeria; Libya; Sahara;
crude oil; natural gas;
OPEC; Seven Sisters.

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Introduction

The sources of ground pitch in North Africa were already written about in ancient times by Strabo in his geographical work “*Geógraphika hypomnémata*”. However, in the first century of the oil industry, the Black Continent was not among the most important oil deposits in the world. The first targeted oil exploration began at the end of the 19th century, and in 1886 the first well was drilled in Egypt. After that, oil was found in Egypt in 1909 and in French Morocco in 1918, but the amount was not significant. In 1938, Egypt's crude oil production was 226,000 tons, while that of French-Morocco was 3,000 tons. With this, 0.1% of the Earth's 1938 production was mined in Africa, where 100 million tons of crude oil reserves were believed to be 2.1% of the world's estimated reserves at the time. Of course, it must be added that during this period, many things were not yet known about the oil deposits of the Black Continent (Strabón, 1977, p. 847, Juhász, S.a., p. 259–261, Petroleum Panorama, 1959, p. A-32, Traut–Boote–Clark–Lowes, 1998, p. 70–71).

The description of György Aladár in 1904 clearly shows how North Africa, that is, the Sahara, was not the oil in the public mind:

“The Sahara is almost identical to the northern part of Africa. In the northwest, it extends from the southern reaches of the Atlas Mountains, the region of which the French call «petit Sahara», to an indefinite point; in the east it breaks through the Nile all the way to the coast of the Red Sea, and in the south, even the mighty Niger River and Lake Chad cannot prevent its expansion everywhere. If we call the area Sahara, where the land is poor and barren, and where the dry atmosphere prevails, so we get an area that is not much smaller than Europe. [...] The Sahara Desert is the huge stove, the hot air of which penetrates both north and south, and which has made the whole of Africa famous for its bleakness” (György, 1904, p. 121–122).

Based on György Aladár's description, the Sahara was famous in Europe 120 years ago because of its desert lunar landscape and merciless heat. At the same time, in Algeria, a more thorough exploration of the surface oil spills mentioned by Strabón took place in the Selif basin in the northern part of the country in the Oran region from 1877. In 1892, the company Ain Zeft, established with British capital, drilled an oil well that produced 125 barrels of oil per day. Smaller oil fields were discovered in the southern part of the Selif Basin, but between 1892 and 1932 only 15,000 tons of oil were mined in the area. Which is an insignificant amount, and not much has changed that. In the current situation, serious research was not carried out in Algeria for two decades (Szurovy, 1993, p. 276).

In 1936, the French geologist Francois Théodore Conrad Kilian wrote a letter to the French Academy of Sciences, in which he drew the scientific society's attention to the fact that the Sahara could hide oil deep underground. He wrote about this:

“The Sahara has the world's largest oil deposit. The Fezzan basin is closer to the sea than any other desert basin, and consequently the construction of an oil pipeline is relatively easy. Cheaper than any other way to transport crude oil. This crude oil is 1,300 kilometers from Algiers, in the Edzele Basin. And Edzele is only 675 kilometers from Tripoli. One kilometer of oil pipeline costs fifty-three million francs. It is worth sacrificing so much, because the Sahara contains billions of tons of petroleum, the invested amount would quickly pay off, France and Algeria could quickly get back on their feet thanks to Sahara oil.” (Kanyó, 1976, p. 140).

Based on the letter, it is no coincidence that he also wanted to persuade the French government to finance oil exploration in Algeria from 1921. This would also have been important to the Paris government, because France, as an oil-poor country, had to import crude oil. Before the Second World War, Albert Duchêne believed that very important raw materials for their country, including petroleum, would be found in the Sahara (Ónody, 1978, p. 103–104, Taquet 2007, p. 183–190). Research was renewed in 1941-1942. At that time, a couple of novice French geologists went to Algeria with the aim of conducting geological investigations. Their activities were also extremely important due to hydrocarbon exploration, and their results were also shared with oil companies. During this period, it was possible to find a Paleozoic basin in the Sahara, where there was a serious chance of the presence of hydrocarbons. From 1940, the French Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP, nowadays TotalEnergies SE) also got involved in research. Which was also important because during the Second World War in Algeria it became very difficult to supply the motor vehicle fleet with fuel. And this brought with it the renewal of oil research, thanks to which it was possible to find crude oil near the exhausted Mesila field (Szurovy, 1993, p. 277, Traut–Boote–Clark-Lowes, 1998, p. 69).

After World War II, the French government created an organization called the Bureau de Recherches des Pétroles (BRP) whose job it was to supply petroleum from their colonies for France. At that time, increased oil exploration also began in Algeria. In the course of this, research began in the northern foreground of the Tell-Atlas, during which 43 exploration wells were drilled between 1947 and 1952, but only a small amount of natural gas and salt water was found. After that, the investigations were moved to the area of Vádi Guetirni, where oil was produced from pits dug by hand during the war. The first serious result was achieved in 1949, when a well yielding 15 tons of oil per day was drilled. After that, they also drilled a 100 ton per day production well in this small oil field, which produced 330,000 tons of oil by 1956 (Szurovy, 1993, p. 278, Traut–Boote–Clark-Lowes, 1998, p. 70).

After the possibilities of oil exploration in the previously researched areas were exhausted, the researchers began to investigate in the area of the Saharan Atlas and the Ahaggar massif. Meanwhile, back in 1946, BRP and the Algerian government created the Société Nationale des Recherches et d'Exploration des Pétroles d'Algérie (SNREPAL),

which together with CFP and other oil companies with Anglo-Saxon interests created CFP(A) i.e. Compagnie française des pétroles (Algérie). Shell and ESSO (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey) acquired a 35% stake in this company based on the agreement. Shell's subsidiary Compagnie Pétrole d'Algérie (CPA) received exploration rights for 240,000 km² in 1953. (Szurovy, 1993, p. 281–282, Traut–Boote–Clark–Lowes, 1998, p. 70).

Finally, in 1956, it was possible to discover an oil field at Hászi-Meszúd and a natural gas field at Hászi R'Mel. The dimensions of these two hydrocarbon deposits are well illustrated by the fact that the crude oil reserves of the former were estimated at half a billion tons, and the natural gas reserves of the latter at 900 billion cubic meters. This discovery was a real breakthrough compared to previous research and their results. After the discovery, Saharan oil became the focus of interest and every year more and more investment came into the desert country's oil industry. In the spring of 1957, following the investment of French banks and companies, the Compagnie Française du Sahara (CFS), the Compagnie Financière pour le Développement Économique d'Algérie (COFIDAL), the Groupement Technique et Financier pour le Sahara (GTFS) and the Compagnie Financière pour l' Outre-Mer (COFIMER). The goal of these companies was to exploit the Algerian oil wealth, like Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell, which invested in the French colony in North Africa (Ónody, 1978, p. 105–106, Devernois, 1958, p. 271–310).

In this period, the oil industry goals of the French were greatly influenced by the 1956 Suez crisis and the independence aspirations of African countries. The French began colonizing Algeria in the 1830s, and the colony had a civil government in 1858. In the first years of the Second World War, it belonged to Vichy France, and in 1943, the French National Liberation Committee led by Charles de Gaulle was founded in Algiers, and in this year, the independence aspirations of the local population also began under the leadership of Ferhát Abbasz. This struggle was restarted in November 1954 under the leadership of the National Liberation Front. Although the French Union established in 1946 was replaced by the Communauté Française in 1958, even this could not prevent the African colonies of the Paris government from becoming independent. Finally, at the cost of 8 years of fighting mainly affecting the northern part of the country and 1 million deaths, Algeria won its independence after Charles de Gaulle's France concluded the Evian Treaty with its former colony in 1962. The agreement granted exploration rights to the oil monopolies, and an appropriate economic cooperation was also established between the former colonial state and its former colony (Szurovy, 1993, p. 281–282, Fischer, 2005, p. 105, Ónody, 1978, p. 105–107, Szlávik, 2007, p. 19–20, Traut–Boote–Clark–Lowes, 1998, p. 73, Sóger, 2019, p. 92, Saba, 2016 p. 159–176).

Another major hydrocarbon-producing state in the Sahara was Libya. Most of the country's population was concentrated on the Mediterranean coast, while the desert part was uninhabited except for a few oases. The country became a colony of the Kingdom of Italy in 1911, then during the Second World War it was occupied by the Allies from German and Italian troops, and British and French administrations were



established on its territory. Until the war, the Italians were primarily looking for water in the Saharan country, although natural gas was already found in Tripoli in 1914. At the same time, the reason for hydrogeological research was that the Italian government led by Benito Mussolini wanted to develop the local economy and agriculture. Despite this, in addition to natural gas from Tripoli, Italian hydrogeologists also found traces of oil on several occasions, although geologist Ardito Desiro managed to collect a bottle of crude oil, and this resulted in AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli) also sinking eight exploratory wells, but a serious result was The Italians did not reach it in the 1930s (Szurovy, 1993, p. 272, Szlávik, 2007, p. 445, McLachan, 1989, p. 243–250, Tjønn-Lemberg-Pedersen, 2022).

Even after the Second World War, the country was under British and French occupation until 1950, after which it became an independent state in 1951 under the name of the United Kingdom of Libya, although the power of its ruler, King Idris I, was nominal. The main source of income for the extremely poor state was provided by the money received for the air base at Wheelus Field, which was leased by the Americans. However, this was not enough for the country struggling with a significant shortage of professionals to get ahead. The hydrocarbon research started in 1947 by two American geologists, but only slowly unfolding, could give some hope for this. On November 7, 1953, on the advice of the UN, a general mineral law was adopted in the country, and on January 19, 1955, the new petroleum law came into force, which regulated matters related to hydrocarbon research. Due to oil exploration, the country was divided into four large zones and each zone into smaller areas (squares). Finally, at the turn of 1955/1956, 9 operators from 15 oil companies received exploration permits for 433,000 km² (Szurovy, 1993, p. 273, Kaszap A., 1965, p. 618, Simons, 1993, p. 164–190).

One of the biggest problems at that time was that during the World War, a lot of landmines - 6 million - were installed in the territory of Libya due to the fighting in the country. 210 groups of firefighters worked to eliminate this situation, and until the end of 1962, these mines caused the death of many workers of the oil companies. Demining the hydrocarbon exploration areas cost the oil companies one and a half million US dollars. Thanks to the neutralization of the explosives, the investigation of the area around the Algerian border could begin. British Petroleum (BP) invested 20 million pounds, but no oil was found in the Saharan country. The Libyan American Oil Company's first exploratory drilling in 1956 was also unsuccessful. In contrast to them, the Italian ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) did not even get as far as obtaining a concession. However, the head of the Italian energy giant, Enrico Mattei, negotiated with the Libyan ambassador to Rome in early 1957, and then with Prime Minister Mustafa Ben Halim in March. At first, it looks like everything is going well. An agreement was reached, according to which ENI would have acquired a concession area in the Fezzan area, and according to the agreement, ENI would have shared 75% of its profits, and Libya would have shared 25%. In the end, nothing came of the deal, because shortly after the visit of the special representative of the US Secretary of State John F. Dulles to Tripoli, the Libyan Prime Minister fell, and then the new government of the

North African country withdrew from cooperation with ENI (Szurovy, 1993, p. 273, Ónody, 1978, p. 102, Kaszap A. 1965, p. 618).

The fact that the large international oil companies were able to push the Italian company out of Libya played a major role in ENI's failure. As John D. Antony put it in his 1975 book „The Middle East Oil, Politics and Development”: "Libyan oil fell into the hands of international companies, among which American independents played the leading role. The traditional oil companies here were no longer in a position to control the oil, as they did in other Middle Eastern countries." (Ónody, 1978, p. 102)

Anthony's opinion is confirmed by the facts, since in Libya, after minor difficulties, the following companies played a decisive role in the prosperity of the local oil industry: ESSO Standard (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey), Shell, Standard Oil Company of California, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil Corporation and Texaco, and of course the Italians were also able to get involved in the oil exploration of the Saharan country (Ónody, 1978, p. 102).

The first result in Libyan oil exploration was achieved on January 20, 1958, when an exploratory well in the Atsan area was successful and the well yielded oil. The breakthrough came in 1959, when ESSO Standard employees found 2,800 m³ of oil per day at Bir Zelten in the Sirtica basin at a depth of 1,676 meters. The discovery was reported on June 13, 1959 by geologist Joe Brown (MOGIM Ad. 147-75., Szurovy, 1993, p. 273).

Oil exploration in the North African country continued after the success of 1959, and by 1960, 282 million US dollars had been invested in the hydrocarbon industry there, and by 1963, 952 exploratory wells had been drilled, of which 420 wells yielded oil and 2 produced natural gas (Libya's natural gas reserves were 750 billion m³). During the early research in Libya, it was also possible to find an oil well, the production of which reached 5.5 million m³ per year. The development of the Libyan oil industry took on extraordinary proportions in the years following the discovery. The transportation of the oil via pipeline had to be solved. Therefore, a 167 km long pipeline with a capacity of 6 million tons per year was built between the Bir Zelten field and the port of Marsa el-Brega in 1961, then in 1962 an oil port was built in Sidra, and two more were under construction in Libya, and new pipelines were also planned. The infrastructural developments created the basis for the export of the African country's crude oil. Then on September 12, 1961, the ESSO Canterbury tanker delivered the first export shipment from ESSO Standard's port in Marsa el-Brega. With this, Libya entered the ranks of oil exporting countries. Two factors had a favorable effect on crude oil exports. On the one hand, the oil found in the country was of good quality, rich in white goods and free of sulphur. On the other hand, the European (Western European) buyer market is close to Libya, which made it easier to find buyers for North African crude oil. Thus, it is no coincidence that the share of African oil in the supply of the western part of the old continent increased to 13.5% between 1959 and 1962. In a short time, Libya became the world's third largest crude oil exporter (MOGIM Ad. 147-75.,



Szurovy, 1993, p. 273, Szlávik, 2007, p. 445, Mosley, 1974, p. 233–234, Ónody, 1978, p. 101, Friedensburg–Dorstewitz, 1976, p. 260, Kaszap, 1965, p. 98).

Exploration continued after that, and in 1965, 50 drilling rigs were already working in Libya. Encouraged by the success of oil exploration, by 1966 the number of concessions had already increased to 46, and the number of explorations to 124. As King Idris' Petroleum Minister Khalifah Mussa noted, foreign oil companies were competing to produce crude oil in Libya. Hydrocarbon exploration was carried out on a third of the territory of the country that became an oil superpower, and the annual production of crude oil rose from the level of 800,000 tons in 1961 to 159.2 million tons in 1970. This made the African country one of the largest oil producers in the world after the United States, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait. Based on all of this, it was no coincidence that the oil revenue of 143,000 USD in 1955 rose to 1,106,000,000 USD by 1969 (Szlávik, 2007, p. 445, Szurovy, 1993, p. 273, Ónody, 1978 p. 302, Scselkacsov, 1975, p. 163, Bowerman, 1967, p. 1564–1586).

In the mid and late 1960s, significant political changes occurred in both Algeria and Libya. First, in 1965, Colonel Huári Bumediën took control of the Algerian government after removing the country's first president, Ben Bella, from power in a military coup. This year was also important because it was then that the Franco-Algerian agreement was signed in Algiers, which regulated the cooperation between the two countries regarding the exploitation of the oil resources of the Saharan state. According to the agreement, the Algerian government obtained a larger share of the profits from the oil wealth, and the oil company had to invest a part of the profits in the African country. In addition, they agreed with the French that Algeria would receive a long-term industrial development loan. As a result of the agreement, Algerian oil production increased by 40% in 1966 (Soós, 1968, p. 778).

In the beginning of the 1960s, progress was also made in the field of natural gas exports in Algeria. A natural gas liquefaction plant was built in Arzew between 1962 and 1964, which was able to convert 1.5 billion m³ of gas into 2.3 million m³ of liquid gas per year. The same factory was built in 1972 in Marsa el-Brega, Libya. The gas converter there converted 3.65 billion m³ of natural gas into 5.84 million m³ of liquid natural gas per year. And with this, it became the largest such plant in the world. LNG was delivered from these factories to European customers on ships (Szurovy, 1993, p. 274–275, Friedensburg – Dorstewitz, 1976, p. 260).

In 1969, a significant political change took place in Libya as well. King Idris I was driven from his throne, and military officers seized power under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. After that, the Revolutionary Military Council proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. Later, this change did not leave the Libyan oil industry untouched either, because the political and economic environment was more favorable for the international oil concern while the king ruled. The new management wanted to change this (Szlávik, 2007, p. 445, Sampson, 1978, p. 303).

In the meantime, serious progress was made in the Libyan oil industry. Not only in the field of exploration and production, but also the petroleum processing industry

began to be developed. There was a compelling reason for this, because the country's processing capacity was low, so the Libyans were forced to import fuel and motor oil made from their own crude oil, as well as other oil products, primarily from Italy. To change this situation, a new refinery was first built in Zawia together with an Italian company. After that, a processing plant was built in Tobruk and then near Benghazi. In order to mitigate the shortage of professionals, a Petroleum Industry Institute was established in Tripoli with French help. From 1970, the city's university offered courses in petroleum engineering, then in 1973, geologist and geophysicist. Géza Szurovy played an important role in the organization of the latter trainings (MOGIM Ad. 147-75., Szurovy, 1993, p. 275).

As already mentioned, Libyan oil production rose to 159.2 million tons in 1970. Oil mining peaked at this level, as the country's new leadership intervened in production because they believed that Libya's huge oil reserves, estimated at 6 billion tons, could be exhausted within two decades. Therefore, they forced the oil companies to reduce production, and thus by 1974, the country's crude oil production was only 77 million tons. This was achieved in such a way that the oil income of the Libyans did not decrease, that is, the price was raised after an agreement was reached with the oil companies (MOGIM Ad. 147-75.).

At least the "agreement", as Anthony Sampson wrote about it, was not easy:

“General Gaddafi soon faced the companies. He told twenty-one companies that if they did not agree to the price increase, he would take unilateral action. The new regime, to show what it meant, soon established contact with Moscow to discuss eastern markets for their oil. Also, separate dialogues were initiated with the oil companies to bring them down one by one. Their demand was an additional forty cents per barrel; and when comparing the quality and availability of Libyan oil to that of the Persian Gulf, it was not an exaggeration. In addition, they received some support from an unexpected place, the United States Department of State.” (Sampson, 1978, pp. 303–304).

Gaddafi's other goal from the beginning was to nationalize his country's oil industry. Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud was able to temporarily divert him from this plan, who was aware that his country needed the large international oil companies in order to be able to sell their crude oil abroad. In defiance of Jalloud's proposal, in 1971 Gaddafi nationalized British Petroleum's Libyan plants on the grounds that the British government did not object to Iran's occupation of two small Arab islands in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, in 1973, 50% of the company AGIP (Libya) was acquired from ENI. Then in 1974, the equipment of several Anglo-Saxon companies with capital interests (e.g.: Texaco, Libyan American Oil Company) was nationalized. Shell's sales network in Libya also became state property (MOGIM Ad. 147-75., Kanyó, 1976, p. 148-150, Friedensburg-Dortsewitz, 1976, 260, Mosley, 1974, p. 333, Libya Law, 1974 p. 60–63).



During the period of political transformations in Algeria and Libya, major changes took place in the Arab world's oil industry. On the one hand, OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was established in 1960, and after the six-day (Israeli-Egyptian) war in 1968, OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) was established in 1968. After the Six-Day War, the Arab oil-exporting states blocked the Trans-Arabian transmission line, and as a result of the war, traffic on the Suez Canal also ceased. Although the embargo did not achieve results at that time, in 1970 OPEC raised the price of crude oil, which in 1971 they were able to pass through the Western oil industry concerns with great difficulty. The situation opened the possibility for the subsidiaries of the American and British oil companies to be closed in Algeria in the summer of 1967, then their capital export was prohibited and in the spring of 1968 the facilities of ESSO, BP and Shell were taken over by the state. And in 1971, Boumedien announced that he would nationalize 51% of the shares of the local French oil companies, as well as the natural gas fields and pipelines. The transformation of the international political situation made it possible for Gaddafi to carry out nationalizations in Libya, as was already discussed above (MOGIM Ad. 151-75., Kanyó, 1976, p. 148, Libya Law, 1974 p. 60–63).

The fight between the oil-producing states and the Western oil conglomerates continued in the following years, during which the price of a barrel of oil rose from \$2.23 in 1970 to \$16 in 1973 because of the oil price explosion following the Yom Kippur War, i.e. the oil crisis. This brought about significant changes in the world, but the world still needed the black gold of Algeria and Libya, i.e. the Sahara, and the oil industry of the two North African countries continued to operate after the nationalizations (Szurovy, 1978, p. 352, Tarján, <https://rubicon.hu/kalendarium/1973-oktober-17-kirobban-az-also-olajvalsag>, Downloaded: 10.05.2024).

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributors

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Organisation and Allocation of Turns at the Oputa Panel Sessions¹

Oluwakemi Olayemi²

Abstract:

This study investigates the turn-taking sequence, organisation of turns and the question patterns adopted during the examination of witnesses at the Oputa Panel sessions. The study employs purposive procedure in the selection of five questioning sessions as available on YouTube. The data is transcribed and analysed using the linguistic approach of discourse analysis. In the findings, the counsel and the witness situate their talks firmly in the legal field with adherence to the turn-taking rules, explicit through yes/no responses, providing explanation to information seeking questions and also through the way the lawyers structure their questions to reveal narratives that shed light on the petition. The study notes that all activities and accomplishments at the Panel are carried out through the singular act of questioning. In order to prevent the language of conflict resolution procedures from seeming to alienate certain parties, particularly lay litigants, the study suggested the creation of a system for resolving disputes that is not closely tied to the usage of a particular linguistic form. Future efforts should focus on integrating additional language theories, such as psycholinguistics and critical discourse analysis.

Keywords:

Oputa Panel Sessions; turn-taking; discourse analysis.

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Introduction

Courtroom discourse is a sub-category of professional discourse that exists, and is differentiated from common place conversation and communication in daily human interaction (Santos, 2004). Legal discourse explains the diverse relationships between the use of language and the field of law. The uniqueness of courtroom discourse can be ascribed to many factors that range from the explicit rules of evidence that guide and guard conversations in the courtroom to issues that bother on linguistic theories of Schema (mental representations of events or 'scripts'), Stylistics (modality; expression of the speaker's attitude toward the truth and certainty), Discourse Analysis (face threatening acts and turn-taking) and Pragmatics (Cooperative Principle in conversations) among discourse participants in the courtroom (Coulthard & Johnson, 2007). As identified by Coulthard & Johnson (2007), turn-taking is one important feature of courtroom conversation. Everywhere, both formal and informal discussion, people take turns when speaking. In a classroom setting, the roles that teachers and students play differ, and so do the ways in which they express themselves.

President Obasanjo founded the Nigerian Human Rights Violence Investigations Commission, widely referred to as the Oputa Panel, as soon as he took over as the country's first president of the fourth republic in 1999. The launch of the Commission garnered positive coverage in the media and from the general population. This was caused in part by the distinguished and well-known members of the Panel, such as Father Matthew Kukah, a former secretary-general of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, and the chair, retired justice Chukwudifu Oputa. The Commission was tasked with investigating grave violations of human rights between the 15th of January 1966, when the civilian administration was overthrown, and the 28th of May 1999, when a civilian president was chosen.

After waiting for a period of six months for the publication of the report, the government dissolved the Commission in January 2003, citing the Commission's unconstitutionality as justification. The Supreme Court's decision supported the decision of the government. Consequently, the administration chose not to make the report public, and all of the Panel's recommendations were disregarded. As a result, the report's reach was constrained, despite the fact that several civil society and organisations made it available online (Oderemmi, 2005; Olokojobi, 2004).

Despite the limitations of the Panel among which were constitutional issues, the Commission remains a prominent legal institution with a unique form of legal discourse which attracted this study. The Commission sessions featured all the established procedures, participants and known discourses like turn-taking sequence, question patterns and the organisation of turns, all of which are peculiar to court proceedings. Hence, the Commission's discourse is categorised under forensic discourse. The basic focus of this study is to investigate turn-taking sequence, turn-taking organisation and

the question patterns at the Panel and to determine how these manifest through choices of language.

Discourse Analysis

The foundation of discourse analysis is an understanding of the relationship between language and the context in which it is used. Discourse analysis, according to McCarthy (1991), is the study of language in use, encompassing conversations, written texts of all kinds, spoken language, and highly institutionalized discourse forms. Discourse analysis establishes the relationship between a text - spoken or written - and its social setting. It is curious to know how a listener or reader would comprehend the speaker's (or writer's) intended message on a particular occasion and how the organisation of the generated discourse is influenced by the needs of the particular listener (or reader) in a particular situation (Brown and Yule, 1983; McCarthy, 1991; Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975). Therefore, words, phrases, and sentences included in a written speech should be viewed as proof of an author's endeavour to convey his ideas to a listener or reader. Discourse can be spoken or written, as the foregoing implies. Conversational cues, such as false starts, gestures, pitch, intonation, emphasis, incomplete sentences, topic change, etc., are what define spoken discourse.

The simplest way to understand spoken discourse is to think of it as 'utterances which are most often laced with extra-linguistic realities to achieve communicative effect,' as explained by Widdowson (2004). Therefore, informal writing should be regarded as utterances since it contains sentences that are not fully formed but nevertheless have meaning, including notes to friends, casual letters, and lecture notes. McCarthy (1991) asserts that coherent devices, the absence of false beginnings, hesitations, etc., are characteristics of written discourse. According to him, we do not have to put up with people speaking in printed language all at once. Because the writer usually had time to think through what to say and how to say it, the sentences are usually well-formed than in genuine, spontaneous speech.

A discourse is shaped and constrained by the nature of the discourse in the same manner as social institutions shape and constrain our identities, relationships, knowledge, and beliefs. Discourse analysis focuses on the function and structure of language in use, especially on the ways that language is organised in context and at the level of the sentence. Discourse analysis also examines intricate and abstract linguistic details, such as how authors and speakers use language in formal settings or how sociocultural perspectives affect the creation and comprehension of language.

Discourse analysts are interested in much more than just linguistic forms, even though discourse analysis is not wholly divorced from the study of grammar and phonology. Their worries include how two speakers can understand each other's grammar correctly, how to have a cohesive conversation between two speakers, what their respective roles



are in regard to one another, and what conventions or rules they adhere to when speaking to one another. Humans engage in a variety of spoken interactions, including phone calls, shopping, doctor-patient or job interviews, formal meetings or classroom discussions, and private conversations with friends and loved ones. Different settings, and opening and shutting mechanisms are used in these scenarios. Discourse Analysis is interested in all of these elements and aims to dynamically account for them with a different set of descriptive labels than those employed by traditional grammarians.

In Brown and Yule's (1983) general introduction to Discourse Analysis, they explain the circumstances that account for the successful analysis of discourse. These linguists categorise language according to the function it performs, which is a categorisation that coincides with the earlier linguists like Halliday (1970). Brown and Yule (1983) posit that the transactional function of language is message-oriented. The transactional nature of language becomes the focus of attention when language is used purposely for the transference of factual and propositional information. They maintain that for the effective performance of a transaction to be achieved, there must be clarity – the speaker should make what he says as clear as possible, because failure to do so often results in unpleasant consequences in the real world.

Theoretical Framework

Mostofi (2019) claims that a subset of the Discourse Analysis methodology is conversation analysis. The study of language analysis in both written and spoken form is known as discourse analysis. Since conversations are seen as spoken discourse, conversation analysis can be thought of as a subfield of discourse analysis. Accordingly, conversation analysis is subordinate and discourse analysis is superordinate. Bloomer claims that a few sociologists, including Sacks et al., created language studies as a subfield of ethnomethodology in the middle of the 1960s. They think that the methods people employ to start a discussion make up conversation. Thus, conversation analysis is the process of examining verbal or conversational interaction.

The study of conversational structures in social interactions is known as conversation analysis (Liddicoat, 2007). The focus of conversation analysis is on exchanges between two or more speakers who alternate turns (Fathimiyah, 2016). The goal of conversation analysis is to comprehend how individuals control their communication. Here, one speaker initiates a turn, and the subsequent speaker takes note of what the preceding speaker has said. Thus, conversation analysis is used to learn how to listen to each other throughout a discussion and reply appropriately (Hutchy and Woffitt, 1998). The development of social connection through language use is examined. Conversation analysis examines natural conversations that occur in daily life. Conversely, conversation analysis examines linguistic exchanges in contexts other than daily interactions, such as consultations between doctors and patients, news interviews, fair hearings, and so forth.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, sociologists Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson developed conversation analysis. The three issues they addressed were how individuals take turns in a conversation, how to open a conversation, and how to end a conversation.

This study is anchored on Walker's (1986) Turn-taking and Sequencing Theory in addition to Sacks et al. (1974) Organisation of Turn-taking for Conversation Theory as core tools in Discourse Analysis. From these scholars, it can be understood that turn, in interactional activity, is the beginning and the ending of talking. Sacks et al. (1974) have the evidence which supports the proposition that parties, in conversation, take turns quite efficiently. This conversation witnesses brief utterance that overlaps and few gaps between parties' alternating turns. They emphasise the fact where parties in conversation allocate and negotiate turns. The move made by the party that is speaking at turn is referred to as interactional activity. Insertion sequence and adjacency pair are identified as notable interactional activities. Question/answer pair, complaints, accusations, invitations, requests, proposals, offers and informative expressions are features of adjacent pairs. According to Sacks et al. (1974), adjacency pair is unique and known for instances of very tight type of sequence organization. It is the two-part sequences.

According to Mazeland (2006), insertion sequence is the insertion of pertinent words or ideas. It discusses how words or concepts are injected into conversations to make them more interesting. If the recipient is unclear about how the question was delivered, the answer or reaction will be delayed. It is also possible that the receiver, who is the second party, is unfamiliar with or even uninterested in the concepts or ideas communicated by the first party. In this situation, the parties use a variety of techniques to finish their turns, including the current speaker choosing another participant to be the next speaker, with the chosen participant starting another turn, and self-selecting if no other turn starts, and the current speaker continuing if the chosen participant is unable to finish.

Turns from both parties constitute transitional relevance. When taking turns, transition can be seen as each party's position throughout the conversation, negotiation, and point of completion allocation. If the points made by both parties are well-planned and conveyed, the adjacent pair will be structured and organised. In order to finish points in a certain amount of time during courtroom procedures, it is believed that turn-taking organisation is crucial. According to Walker (1986), turn-taking and sequencing appear to be the court's means of self-representation and persuasion for both the counsel and the judge. Through proper turning which refers to the transitional relevance place at speaking in contacts, sequencing of points can be effectively accomplished in turn-taking. Therefore, transitional relevance place is divided into three types by Sacks et al. (1974) – present speaker may choose the next speaker; next speaker may self-select if current speaker does not; and current speaker may, but is not forced to, continue speaking.

Methodology

The study adopts a content analysis research design and also employs qualitative procedures in the analysis of data. The data for the study are five purposively selected questioning sessions of the Commission. They comprise the transcribed recorded hearings which involved the verbatim discourses during the Commission's proceedings as retrieved from YouTube. A total number of 504 exchanges from the five selected cases are subsequently analysed.

Data Analysis

One of the important and obvious features of courtroom conversations is the question/answer approach. Questioning is a major tool employed by the lawyers during the courtroom/panel proceedings to unravel the matters surrounding the cases. In the table below, statistical details of all exchanges studied in the data are presented.

	Extract 1	Extract 2	Extract 3	Extract 4	Extract 5	Total	%
No. of Exchanges	118	80	190	54	92	534	100%
Wh-Q	14	03	16	03	08	44	16%
Statement-Q	17	10	22	07	10	66	25%
Probing-Q	06	04	10	06	06	32	12%
Open-Q	02	02	04	--	04	12	5%
Yes-no Q	14	12	25	06	13	70	26%
Statement followed by Question	06	08	18	05	05	42	16%
Yes-no Response	09	10	12	06	08	45	
Detailed Response	50	30	45	21	36	182	

Figure 1: Summary of Narrative Analysis

In reference to the table 1 above, six different styles of questioning are identified in all the data selected for this study. They are wh-question, yes-no question, statement question, probing question, open question and question proceeded by statement. There are 118 exchanges in Excerpts 1, 80 in Extract 2, 190 in Extract 3, 54 in Extract 4 and 92 in Extract 5. Adjacent pairs dominate discussions at the Panel; the witnesses present the second pair, and the lawyers present the first. These pairs were reoccurring through all

the conversations. Turn-taking is an important aspect of discourse and the study notes that this distinguishes discourse at the Panel from other types of discourse.

Each speaker's share of the conversation and the length of turns in the five extracts reveal something about control and topic switching. When there is a question-answer adjacency pair, the questioner (lawyer) has a "reserved right" to speak again right after the witness has finished speaking. A 'chaining' situation in which the turns of the question and the answer alternate indefinitely happens if this right is used to ask another inquiry (Sacks, 1995, p. 264). The analysis shows that the turns at the Panel are efficient. The lawyers in the excerpts utilise their rights to talk again immediately following the giving of the answers by the witnesses. As can be seen from the preceding samples, the Panel's discourse follows a sequence of questions followed by answers. Courtroom discourse could be distinguished and described by this peculiar feature of turn-taking.

It is observed that Excerpt 3 has the highest number of exchanges which is instructive to this study. The research notes that like other exchanges, the lawyer seeks to unravel the circumstances surrounding the death of Chief MKO Abiola, but the deliberate non-cooperation of Major Aliu results in the long exchanges witnessed. The lawyer has to resort to reconstructing questions as a way of extracting information from the witness. In Excerpt 3, Major Aliu is evasive, giving 'I don't know' responses in many instances of the turns. In view of this, the lawyer rephrases and reintroduces questions which account for the long exchanges.

There are more yes-no questions in all the extracts than any other types of questions as seen in the table except in Excerpt 1 where the statement question has the highest number. It is to be pointed out that questioning at the Panel is mostly yes-no question. Yes-no questions require the witness to either accept the suggested evidence or deny it. Conversations at the Panel are geared towards finding the truth, so the questions are presented to the witnesses for confirmation or otherwise. It means that lawyers at the Panel seek to establish certain facts. Closely related to the yes-no question is the statement-question. The statement-questions are not questions in their grammatical form. The statements are realised as questions through the change in the tone, from falling to rising. The pitch at the end of the statement, rather than falling is raised by the lawyers to indicate a question. Notably, in the absence of the rising tone, the witnesses understand and give answers as required in the adjacent pair of turn taking. The statement-question is characteristically synonymous with the yes-no question. Just like in a yes-no question, the fact is presented to the witnesses by lawyers to accept or deny. Both yes-no questions and statement-questions are employed by the lawyers in the excerpts to construct narratives. The strings of these questions deliver a narrative about the case being interrogated at the Panel.

It is noted that lawyers at the Panel use their institutional role to construct questioning turns (of yes-no and statement questions) that simply require confirmation from the witness. This leads the witnesses in all the extracts through a plot-like narration of their



stories. All of the extracts' sets of questions for the witnesses are mostly yes-or-no questions and statement-questions, which transform every question into an information-seeking exercise to extract additional crucial material for evaluation and evidence. This is evident in the type of questions directed at the witnesses in the five extracts. In total, 267 questions were asked of the lawyers; 44 of those questions were wh-questions, accounting for 16% of the total; 70 questions were yes-or-no questions, accounting for 26%; 66 questions were statement questions, accounting for 25%; 32 questions were probing questions, accounting for 12%; 12 are open questions, accounting for 5%; and 42 questions preceded by statements, accounting for 16%.

The study also notes extract 4, where the witness gives the equal numbers of yes-no responses to the numbers of yes-no questions asked by the lawyer. This is important, as it points to the fact that witnesses usually in the courtroom conversation avoid being 'truthful'. They beg questions and employ various tactics to frustrate the truth. But in extract 4, the witness, Professor Wole Soyinka, is seen as being willing to answer questions truthfully.

The highest percentage occupied by both yes-no and statement questions (26% and 25%) buttresses the fact that conversation at the Panel is fact-finding. Facts and evidence already sought after by the lawyers are presented to the witnesses in the extracts for confirmation or denial. 44 turns were wh-questions (16%) which required the witnesses to give an explanation and detailed description. This is also significant as the lawyers seek to extract specific information from the witnesses to expose/reveal their complicity or role in the case being interrogated. In Extract 1, the wh-questions seek to reveal the role played by Col. Yakasai in the murder of one of the bodyguards to late General Abacha, the former Head of State; in Excerpt 2, the wh-questions seek to unravel those behind the bomb blast at Durban Hotel, Kaduna and the role played by the witness in Excerpt 3, the wh-questions seek to reveal the cause of Chief MKO Abiola's death in the custody of the military rulers and the role played by the witness. In Extract 4, the questions probe into the tenure of Professor Wole Soyinka as the former Head of Federal Road Safety Commission and in Excerpt 5, the questions seek to unravel the role played by Sergeant Rogers in the death of Kudirat Abiola and others.

The wh-questions are also significant to the organisation of conversations at the Panel. The lawyers use a total of forty-four Wh-questions, or sixteen percent of the questions in all the extracts. Lawyers on the Panel use these sets of questions to get clarification on particular issues. These sets of questions help the lawyers to extract specific information from the witnesses in all the excerpts. Significantly, wh-questions manifest as a break in the sequence of yes-no questions in the excerpts.

Excerpt 1

17 Q: *When you got there, did you see General Diya?*

18 A: *No.*

19 Q: You said you followed the victim to Gbawagalada hospital. Did you see General Diya?

20 A: No.

21 Q: Did you see General Bamayi at the Airport?

22 A: No.

23 Q: You said that on that fateful day, you went to Abuja Airport?

24 A: I said that.

25 Q: You said you find the car burning?

26 A: I didn't say so.

27 Q: I put it to you, did you find the car burning?

28 A: I didn't find it burning.

29 Q: What happened to the car?

30 A: I saw a 504 saloon car.

Excerpt 3

126 Q: Now, you did say that you took part of the tea that Abiola was served? Did you take?

127 A: No

128 Q: You did not take part of the tea?

129 A; I did not.

130 Q: Do you know who prepare the tea?

131 A: The steward that worked in Aguda House.

132 Q: But the tea was served by a member of American delegation, to your knowledge.

133 A: Yes my lord, because the steward had already left before he requested for the tea.

134 Q: As a security expert, can you remember any single incident where a foreigner gave 135 food or tea or water to a detainee in Nigeria, ant incident?

136 A: My lord, the situation ...

137 Q: (Interruption) Can you remember one incident?

138 A: No, my lord.

139 Q: Now, did the member of the international doctors interview you?

140 A: No, my lord.

In the excerpts above, the lawyers alternate the questions to achieve the goal of the examination. In the extract from Excerpt 1, the yes-no questions in lines 17 to 27 are punctuated by a wh-question in line 29. However, in the extract from Excerpt 3, there is an alternation of statements-followed by questions, wh-question, yes-no question and statement question.

Generally, in an adjacent pair, the second part is expected to follow the first part immediately. However, there are instances where this does not occur so. The second part in the excerpt from Excerpt 1 as shown below does not follow immediately the



succeeding turn. The occurrence of another turn in between is regarded as an ‘insertion sequence’ between the first and second parts of the adjacent pair.

Excerpt 1

57 *Q: You were a medical student and you joined the army. How long were you at the*

58 *university before you graduated?*

59 *A: Let me educate you on the issue.*

60 *Q: (Cuts in) Don't educate me. Answer my question, how long have you been a medical*

61 *student before you graduated?*

62 *A: I spent one year.*

Line 62 is the second part of the adjacent pair of which line 57 is the first part. Lines 59 – 61 are an insertion sequence of the adjacent pair. The research notes that this occurrence is not common with the conversation at the Panel, but it is a feature of examination worthy of mention. According to the study, the witness's attempt to cut short the lawyer's planned conversation is what caused the incident. The witness is attempting to change the direction of the conversation, but the attorney is resisting.

According to the report, statements followed by questions are another crucial form of question that is used at Panel meetings. These sets of questions allow the lawyers to present ‘detailed’ information to the witnesses followed by questions. These statements could be a sentence or more. The study observes that these sets of questions are important and significant to the examination at the Panel sessions. The lawyers are conscious of vagueness and ambiguity in conversation and the need to avoid that while questioning the witnesses during examination. The lawyers in all the five extracts deploy these sets of questions. Excerpts of such types of questions are shown below.

Excerpt 1

83 *Q: When the incident happened, the Commissioner of Police said at the press conference* 84 *the matter would be properly investigated. Is that not correct?*

85 *A: He said so.*

Excerpt 2

10 *Q: Did you say you analyzed the various respects you received, And I want you to*

11 *confirm, to this honorable commission, specifically, was it that the Management of ICL* 12 *had any connection with bomber of the Hotel? Or are you saying that it is either the*

13 *Management ICL had a connection with number of bombings Or the Late James Bagada acted independently?*

14 *A: That is precisely what we mean.*

Excerpt 3

33 Q: According to the Americans, with whom you visited Chief Abiola, he showed them his 34 swollen ankle. As at 7th July, his ankle was still swollen. When you took over June 8, he 35 also showed you hi swollen ankle. Is that correct?

36 A: He did not show me on June 8.

The organisation of examination at the Panel is quite different from conversation outside the courtroom. This is an important revelation of this study's consideration of the extracts. Turn transfer at the Panel sessions is effected through "current speaker selects next", that is the lawyers have the sole power to select the next speaker. In fact, the conversation at the Panel involves only two participants almost all the times: the lawyers (questioners) and the witnesses (questionees). It is noted that turns taking at the Panel session is not fixed and the length of each examination in the five extracts is not specified in advance; rather the response and the cooperation of the witness determine the number of turns and the length.

There are two important distinct types of examinations at the panel. First, it is revealed that questions and answers are the dominant types of turns that occur in all the extracts, which could be coded as Q-A-Q-A-Q-A sequences. This feature has been addressed. The second turns are pre-allocated, meaning that the examining parties have the right to ask questions while the examined parties have the obligation to answer them. So, this right of the examining parties gives the lawyers the situation to ask questions and as well determine the relevance of an answer from the witness. In the five extracts, the lawyers exercise this right, as seen in the extracts. The lawyers ask questions after each response from the witness and reframe or redirect their questions whenever the lawyers in the extracts are not satisfied with the response. This is so pronounced in Excerpt 3 specifically. Aside from Extract 3, all other extracts feature this peculiar characteristic of courtroom conversation. Examination at the Panel is a two-party speech exchange system: conversation is arranged as a sequence of question and answer turns that are allocated to lawyers and witnesses respectively.

The dominant and only activity of the participants at the Panel is question and answer turn. This relatively only activity is used to accomplish many goals as observed by the study. The question-and-answer turn sequences of the conversation at the Panel are used to accomplish indirect accusation, denials, justifications, challenges and rebuttals. Some of these actions are achieved in the extracts considered for this study. It is revealed that the turn-taking sequences of examination at the Panel operate as a constraint that makes participants to perform their actions indirectly in the making of questions and answers. Besides, it is a constraint that both lawyers and witnesses at the Panel use as resources in managing their actions. Let us consider these extracts:

Excerpt1

42 Q: And it was you who took the custody of the corpse for burial?

43 A: No.



- 113 Q: *And let's get this straight. As a medical doctor, you will agree with me that it is*
- 114 *possible to accelerate the death of someone by some sorts of dangerous injection.*
- 115 A: *Not as far as I know.*
- 116 Q: *Have you not heard of someone's life being cut short as a result of medical process?*
- 117 A: *Not to my knowledge.*
- 118 Q: *Haven't you heard of massive killing, people dying as a result of pain, hardship*
- 119 *through medical process?*
- 120 A: *You are asking about a process called euthanasia.*
- 121 Q: *What does it do when you inject the patient?*
- 122 A: *You see euthanasia is usually a method agreed by the family and doctors before it can* 123 *be administered on the patient.*
- 124 Q: *It kills the patient?*
- 125 A: *It doesn't it kill the patient.*
- 126 Q: *What does it do?*
- 127 A: *It works to end the suffering of the patient as agreed by the family.*
- 128 Q: *Now you agreed it was a drug given to end the suffering, and you know about it?*
- 129 A: *I know about it.*
- 130 Q: *Have you used it before?*
- 131 A: *No.*
- 132 Q: *And I put it to you, on this occasion, in order to destroy evidence of what actually* 133 *happened, it was convenient for Aso Rock to put his life to an end.*
- 134 A: *I told you that ...*
- 135 Q: *(Cuts in) Do you agree or not?*
- 136 A: *I don't agree.*

Excerpt 2

- 19 Q: *Now you had cause to seal up the premises of ICL when you arrested one of its staff.*
- 20 A: *It is not correct my Lord. I didn't seal off the premise of the ICL.*

Excerpt 3

- 33 Q: *According to the Americans, with whom you visited Chief Abiola, he showed them his* 34 *swollen ankle. As at 7th July, his ankle was still swollen. When you took over June 8, he* 35 *also showed you his swollen ankle. Is that correct?*
- 36 A: *He did not show me on June 8.*
- 37 Q: *When did he show you?*
- 38 A: *I can't remember exactly.*
- 39 Q: *Did he tell you he had hypertension?*
- 40 A: *He didn't tell me.*

78 Q: *'What role do you want to play in the politics of Nigeria after your release?'*
That was 79 what they asked him.

80 A: *I can't remember.*

115 Q: *Good, since you were in these meetings, did Chief Abiola give up his mandate to your 116 knowledge on June 12? Did he?*

117 A: *To my knowledge, I don't know.*

Excerpt 4

47 Q: *The director prescribed by the decree shall be appointed by the President. But you*

48 *illegally appointed your friend as the Chairman of the Board.*

49 A: *That is not true. Every appointment which was made went through the Secretary to the 50 Government for approval. And there was absolutely no objection.*

58 Q: *That means you were running an illegal body.*

59 A: *If you want to call it illegal, what I know is that it began its operation even before the 60 inauguration of the Board. I have told you about the basic research that went on long*

61 *before the Board was inaugurated*

As stated above, questioning at the Panel is utilized to accomplish different activities. In the immediately preceding excerpts, lines 42 to 43 of Extract 1 accomplish accusation; lines 113 to 136 accomplish 'justification'. The lawyer, through the questions, tries to justify the suspicion that the victim was poisoned and that the witness is a culprit. Also, in lines 19 to 20 of Extract 2, the witness's response accomplishes 'denial'; questions in lines 33 to 40 of Extract 3 accomplish a 'challenge' and lines 78 to 80 accomplish 'denial'. In lines 47 to 48 of Extract 4, the question accomplishes 'accusation' while the response in lines 49 to 50 accomplishes 'rebuttal'.

The Excerpt 4 is observed to be smooth and efficient. The examination is highly conversational, as the witness provides yes/no responses and detailed explanations to questions where necessary. Though the lawyer seems to be too confrontational, the witness exhibits a high level of civility and calmness. This buttresses Coulthard and Johnson (2007)'s assertion that professional witnesses give more cooperative response and exert 'authority' during examination. However, in Extract 3, Major Aliu is non-cooperative. He avoids answering directly most questions put to him, while his responses are dominantly 'I don't know', 'I was not aware'. The examination becomes obviously of the witness's denial and evasiveness.

The study notes negative judgements in cross-examination. The lawyer in extract 4 displays subjectivity which is reinforced with the use of 'illegally' and 'illegal' in lines 47-48 and line 58, '*...But you illegally appointed your friend as the Chairman of the Board'* 'That means you were running an illegal body'. The deliberate use of these words serves



as a spotlight that throw light on the lawyer's subjectivity, which negates the politeness principle in language use.

Substantially, by general overview of the study's findings, questions at the Panel are highly constrained and constraining courtroom interactions. The nature of the Panel conversation places restrictions on the types of questions and methods that lawyers can ask. However, the witnesses in every extract are limited by two factors: first, the questions are structured to naturally limit the witnesses' answers in order to create a particular type of evidence; and second, the witnesses are naturally limited as a result of the lawyers' framing.

Conclusion

This study concludes that the Oputa Panel, as an instance of legal discourse, is absolutely different from the everyday discourse. The analysis of the conversation at Panel indicated a genre of language as both parties (the examiner and the examined) deployed words, phrases, sentences and linguistic elements in the consciousness of the institutional status of the Panel. The organisation of examination by the examining party is carefully done in such a way that it led to a narration. This narration is the case built by the examining parties and the proof they attempted to establish. In turn-taking rule, all excerpts conformed to turn-allocation rule. It is further revealed that the extract as typical courtroom discourse conforms to the indications of TRPs. The study notes that all activities and accomplishments at the Panel are carried out through the singular act of questioning. The lawyer controls the topic, changes it and asks questions from the witnesses.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Book Review of “Sanctuary Lost. Portugal’s Air War for Guinea 1961-1974” Edited by Matthew M. Hurley and José Augusto Matos¹

Zsolt Szabó²

The air battle for the former Portuguese colony Guinea-Bissau between 1961 and 1974 was an important part of the colonization movement in Africa that started in the 1950s. Matthew M. Hurley and José Augusto Matos give a precise account in their book about the first part of the mission that Portugal undertakes to „defend” the rights of the West and its empire in Africa. The work is part of the Africa@War Series published by Helion & Company Limited. These books are interesting works that circumscribe the wars that developed on the black continent just before the modern era and that are connected with the independence movements of the former colonies.

The present book is composed of five chapters. The first one introduces the beginnings of the war and the Portuguese power forces that came to power at the time. The second chapter takes each of the aircrafts of the FAP (*Força Aérea Portuguesa*) and describes them to give a picture about the Portuguese air forces. The third chapter evaluates the terrain and the environmental circumstances that characterized Guinea-Bissau at the time of the war, while the fourth chapter goes on to explain Portugal’s first attempt to restore peace in the African country. Finally, the authors endeavour to describe the second attempt of Portugal to pacify the rebellious area, which was more or less successful.

In the first chapter, the writers start with describing Portuguese interests in the region and on the continent, explaining the role of Guinea-Bissau among these gemstones in the Portuguese crown – which became from 1910 a republic. However, the writers explain that this government didn’t last for long, as from 1932 the radical right-wing governor, António de Oliveira Salazar rose to power, and he implemented the „Estado Novo” system which represented the unity of the colonies with the central Portuguese government. Hurley and Matos state that from the 50s on there was an air of difference, which was also felt on the Portuguese colonies as well, and starting with Angola, it created a „wind of change”. As the researchers conclude, Portugal had to decide its preference between the NATO defensive operations and the „*Ultramar*” offensives, from which the Portuguese leadership chose the latter. From 25 November 1960 on the government decided to turn to the African territories and dispatched a load of its air force and 32,000 soldiers to Guinea-Bissau (p. 14.).

The second chapter goes further in evaluating the FAP which fought the war in the skies above Guinea-Bissau. This part of the book takes into consideration each fighter or reconnaissance plane, helicopter and air unit that was part of the FAP during the time

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when it took part in operations in Guinea-Bissau. The authors express that with the NATO-membership a set of new responsibilities arose to which the Portuguese government wanted to adhere to. Thus, their leaders went to NATO trainings and came back with a lot more experience in the air combat that helped them improve their capabilities in fighting. The authors explain that there were 5 bases in which the air training and ground training were situated: Sintra, Ota, Tancos, Lajes (Azores archipelago), Espinho, Montijo, São Jacinto and finally Monte Real. Hurley and Matos explain that most of the fighter jets were obsolete and were used in the Second World War and the pilots fighting in the Guinea-Bissau war were usually inexperienced because there was not a lot of combat at the time for Portugal. The authors first pick the F-86 Sabre, which was a fighter plane, and the FAP acquired 65 of them from the US and Norway. They go on then to the T-6 Texan/Harvard, of which the FAP had 251 pieces. The G.91-R4 was a lightweight air jet which was useful for the Portuguese air forces. The P2V-5 Neptune was also part of the Portuguese fleet, and it was a special aircraft designed mostly for anti-submarine and anti-naval combat. The P2V was used in Portuguese force until 1977. The B-26 Invader was a more heavyweight aircraft carrying bombs and rockets. Portugal was able to get 20 pieces from this valuable carrier. The SE3130 Alouette II was one of the light-fighter helicopters the FAP used in the war against Guinea-Bissau, but its upgraded series was the real hit which was called SA3160 Alouette III. It was more powerful and it could take with it a lot more weaponry and crew so it was a more useful helicopter in the Portuguese air fleet. The FAP got 142 Alouettes altogether and they were very useful for the air force. There was then the Auster D.5/160, which was a light-weight air jet, and 102 air fighters were used in Africa by the Portuguese. The MH.1521 Broussard was a transport and reconnaissance vehicle, and 5 of them were used in Portuguese forces. 149 pieces of the German Do-27 fighter was bought by the FAP, which was praised by the pilots as one of the most aerodynamic aircraft of the fleet. There were several other aircrafts that were ordered by the FAP, but due to limited space we mention only these ones. However, the Portuguese aircrafts included transport vehicles and heavy bombardiers as well which have to be mentioned. The Portuguese nevertheless knew, that if they would want to begin a fight in Guinea-Bissau with all the jungles and hard terrain, they had to rely a lot on intelligence gathering, instead of destroying everything with bombs (p. 26).

The authors then turn to the actual battles that took place in Guinea-Bissau and they described the circumstances and the environment the fighter pilots had to go through to fight in the area. First of all, the terrain of the small country was disastrous for the air fleet of the Portuguese, they couldn't see a thing, the 90% of the land was covered by jungles and the 100 kms of seaside was unable to be accessed because of the mud and difficult terrain that developed at the shores. It was obvious, then, that the Portuguese forces, however strong they have been were unable to exert enough force to achieve significant results in the area. Rather, the morale of the pilots diminished, and they were practically disappointed in the mission, since after years of useless bombing the rebels couldn't have been detained at a successive level. Notwithstanding, the ammunition,



the post and the accessories were all either lacking or missing, and the letters from their beloved ones were late, which further lessened their morale in the fighting. They had only 60 stretches of earth where they could land, and they immediately found themselves in some jungle or forest, where they lost their way. The logistics of the missions were catastrophic and the morale of the soldiers was desperate. The special fighters they brought with themselves were second world war-made, so they were practically a wreck, and useless for a full-fledged attack on a well-organized guerrilla force. Even though they concentrated intelligently a lot on reconnaissance missions, intelligence gathering that couldn't solve at the end the fight and these 3-5 years looked like an endless effort to achieve nothing. The best to describe the situation was the opinion of Edgar López, one of the pilots, who said that the worst part was when he arrived, and the best when he left... (p. 42.).

The fourth chapter concerns Portugal's first endeavour to suppress guerrilla counterinsurgency that developed in the meantime at the territory. There were previous signs already in 1961 that the guerrilla forces of Amílcar Cabral were gathering in neighbouring countries to strike an offensive against Guinea-Bissau. Soon all right the Portuguese guerrillas used the terrain and the environmental circumstances to their advantage and took hold of 15% of the territory of Guinea-Bissau, which was a considerable amount for a rebel force to take control some parts of the country. Meanwhile, the Portuguese – who planned a retaliation attacks against the guerrillas – gathered their territorial forces, but it can be concluded, that the air, naval and ground powers of the country were not fit to conclude an operation on the terrain. The territorial forces were obsolete, they desperately needed reinforcements, so they turned to the British and the USA (p. 50.), and got some helicopters which proved effective in „*Operation Tridente*”. During the war, the air forces mostly concentrated on intelligence gathering although they employed some napalm bombs as well, but these were ineffective and hazardous so they stopped using them. At the end, they were able to chase away the rebels from Guinea-Bissau, but it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory as the rebel forces later came back to the area and stood their ground against the Portuguese offensive.

Finally, Hurley and Matos describe the last part of the war between the Portuguese aircrafts and the local guerrillas. The Portuguese leadership realized, that it needed serious improvement if it wanted to defeat the rebel forces in Guinea-Bissau. It employed new, more modern aeroplanes, deployed more forces and distributed another type of administrative reform: it deployed its forces locally, so the ground and air forces could react in time if there was a guerrilla uprising. The Portuguese forces announced *Operação Resgate* (Operation Rescue) (p. 67.), which was an assault in the winter of 1965. The Portuguese learned from their previous mistakes, although they fought against heavier anti-aircraft guns, but eventually achieved partial results against the rebels, however, the problem remained ever so important. At the end, it can be assumed, that it was a difficult task for the Portuguese to keep order in the rebellious Guinea-Bissau.

Altogether, one can assume that the book of Matthew M. Hurley and José Augusto Matos gives a comprehensive view on the air war fought by Portuguese air fleet against the rebel Guinea-Bissau ground forces, which is an ever-exiting theme and I would recommend both for the average reader and the scientific researcher to read the book to get acquainted with the area and its conflicts.



Book Review of “Negotiating with the Devil Inside the World of Armed Conflict Mediation” Edited Pierre Hazan with the Collaboration of Emmanuelle Hazan¹

Krisztina Kállai²

A book by Pierre Haza, a former journalist and currently advisor to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, is a work that unquestionably fills a gap concerning this issue and presents an unexplored, unexamined perspective on the subject. The book is structured in a highly readable and detailed way to explain the importance of mediation in armed conflict.

The phenomenon presented by the author is a very complex subject, but it is nevertheless presented in a very clear and comprehensible way, so the book is not only intended for experts in the field, but also for the ordinary reader, who can easily and thoroughly understand the subject. The book raises issues such as ethical dilemmas, justice, peace or impartiality that arise in mediation in armed conflicts. Thanks to the author’s unique style and experience, the specifics and potential uses of mediation in armed conflict could reach a wider readership. The foreword was, by the author’s own admission, changed at the last minute because of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he believes is a very good example of the particularities of mediation in armed conflict. Haza stresses that the situation has reinforced the basic rule of this type of mediation that we never negotiate with terrorists.

The author highlights the importance of the role of Qatar as a mediator, uniquely both a strategic partner of Washington and a major financial supporter of Hamas, which clearly shows the end of Western hegemony over international systems. Qatar is a very unique example of mediation, defined by the UN as a terrorist state, yet offering Israel many compromises and assistance.

One of the most significant and successful outcomes of the Qatar mediation was the earlier truce between Israel and Hamas, co-organised with Egypt, which was an undisputed international diplomatic success. This is a good example of the extent to which mediation in the multipolar world has changed from being an enemy the day before to a partner the day after.

The first chapter of the book describes in detail some of the details of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the author experienced personally. The most significant challenge that he mentions is the difficulty of maintaining impartiality and seeking the truth where both sides have committed war crimes. He describes in detail how, as a

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member of an aid organisation, they had to select the prisoners to be released, in which one has to give up all one previous moral principles and the horrifying fact that in the process of mediation people become living commodities in a barter trade. The chapter gives further insight into the author's work as a consultant, which he began during the Basque conflict, a period during which he experienced the very turbulent and chaotic road to peace-building. The author's role as a mediator during this period was one of the most ethically sensitive areas, dealing with issues of reparation, justice and amnesty. This part of the chapter is entitled „grey zone”, quoting the words of an Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi, who defined and described the camp with this word, in which the purpose of the leader of the camp and inhabitants is surprisingly similar, despite the fact that they are very different.

The peace-building process is similar to this grey zone, but fortunately less tragic, in which the warring parties and mediators seek the same thing: to limit suffering. A key point of the chapter is to draw attention to the fact that one of the greatest challenges of mediation is the responsibility to safeguard moral values. It may be a situation manipulated by others, where the promised peace turns out to be an illusion, of which the author refers to the Munich Agreement signed in 1938 as an example. The author's primary aim is to draw on his experience to collect useful methods and tools that can benefit all mediators and reduce the possibility of any risky action. The chapter discusses important questions such as in what context and how deeply a mediator can be involved in ethnic cleansing, even if it is a means to save more lives, or whether justice is worth sacrificing for a partial peace. The rest of the chapter examines how evil has emerged in the West since the end of the Cold War and how the parties concerned have subsequently sought to find a solution for peace.

The author examines the last three successful periods, firstly the conflicts during the 1990s, in which the international court's decision played a significant role in the sentencing of war criminals. The following chapter analyses the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, the reaction of the US government, the birth of the concept of terrorism, the terrorist, the first anti-terrorist directives, the emergence of a new type of war. Furthermore, the author stresses that the emergence of terrorism has also posed new challenges for mediation. Another chapter of the book covers recent conflicts, from the Syrian war to the current conflict in Ukraine, during which the hegemony of the Western world in mediation has declined. In the chapter „Should we negotiate with the devil?” the author refers to the specificity of mediation with the answer given by Emanuel Macron at the conference in 2022, during which the President was called to account for his failure to reach an agreement with Putin despite numerous negotiations, to which journalists were told that we do not negotiate with war criminals, we fight them.” This statement by Macron is, according to the author, a key part of the mediation. The chapter describes in exemplary detail the relationship between humanity, truth and politics and power, citing such leading figures in history as Clausewitz, Kant, Cicero and Churchill. A sub-chapter of the book has a very expressive definition of the attack of September 11, 2001, which refers to the new face of evil,



referring to the emergence of terrorists. One of the major challenges of this period, according to the author, was the failure of both human rights organisations and governmental bodies to deal with this new phenomenon. In the end, the US government opted for a particular form of solution, foregoing the role of mediation in order to protect democracy, and instead launching an all-out war on terrorism, which has claimed many lives.

In the following part of the book, we read about events in which mediation has had a successful and prominent outcome, such as 'An Agenda for Peace', created in 1992 by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which emphasises the important role mediators can play in preventing disputes and disagreements and can point to the real causes of conflicts during the period when the peace process was being established. The chapter notes that mediation underwent its greatest transformation and development in the period from 1982 to 1992, with the significant role played by figures such as Nelson Mandela or conventions such as the Dayton Agreement ratified in 1995. In 1992, the United Nations created the Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, which was the cornerstone of mediation and focused primarily on mediation between states. The author refers to this period as the glorious years of mediation, with the successful peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq in 1988, the struggle for independence in Namibia, and the Lebanon peace talks in 1989.

Furthermore, the book raises major questions, like what role should mediators play in the face of the horrific events in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) and Rwanda (1994) during those periods when the process and feature of mediation have changed fundamentally.

In the second part of the book, the author clearly summarizes the activity of the ICRC during the Second World War and how the UN turned its position on the war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and later in Syria. The issues raised by having mediators find a middle ground with the perpetrators of mass violence is still on the agenda. This part of the book highlights the role of the international justice system concerning mediators, as the international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Court introduced a new principle for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 2002 that states, war criminals should be eliminated from peace processes. Henceforth, the pressure between the peace-making and the demand for justice has been perceptible, from the former Yugoslavia to Liberia, in Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Libya that has lasted to the present day, even though the attempt of Articles 16 and 53 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that tried to carry out a measure of flexibility and correctly order transitional or post-conflict justice implement.

This chapter refers to the discussion on 'peace versus justice' by the quote of Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, writes: 'A peace masterminded by and in order to accommodate the concerns of vicious war criminals defiant of all the fundamental international law prescriptions or norms is [not an] effective or enduring peace. The quest for justice for yesterday's victims ... should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today's living the dead of tomorrow. That, for the human rights

community, is one of the lessons of the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of people are dead who should have been alive—because moralists were in quest of the perfect peace. Unfortunately, perfect peace can rarely be attained in the aftermath of a bloody conflict. The pursuit of criminals is one thing; making peace is another.”

The author devoted a widely detailed chapter to the key factors and wars involved by the U.S.A. that formed significantly the feature of the American mediation. Haza comes to the conclusion that several peace agreements disclose obvious similarities, as if, under the incitement of the United Nations, under the idea of ‘democracy’ had been automatically installed, creating the rule of law by state bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, and economic improvement. Unfortunately, this type of results falls short of expectations, and there are a huge number of causes why mediation has had average results.

In the last chapter of the book, the author highlights that two decades of American hegemony promoted a type of circumstances that was undoubtedly useful to United Nations mediation and other areas of peace agreements. After the period of war on terror’, which began after 11 September 2001, huge changes have been experienced, namely soft power giving way to military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Following this period, the erosion of American power and the emergence of a new international equation could have been seen regarding Russia and China and other regional powers that grew in strength. A new multipolar world has evolved, where states have enough power to oppose to any country of the international system, furthermore the principles of war-time commitments raised some question, therefore the ability of mediators to act is limited.

The book is a unique piece for those who would like to follow up the space of three decades of mediators whose territories of action have transformed remarkably. From the beginning of the book, the readers could experience from the soft to the hard power, from the end of the cold war to a new war comprising the conflict between the West and Russia, even China, from the unipolar world of American hegemony to a multipolar world by the words of the personal experiences and view of the author.

At the end of the last chapter, the author sums up again clearly the basic feature of mediators by the words of journalist Elena Kostyuchenko, “war is like cancer, it spreads easily and no one knows how to stop it. Mediators have the merit of trying to do so despite the obstacles, and will play an essential role in this multipolar and fragmented world, building compromises between a growing array of participants.”



Book Review of “Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire” Edited by Montgomery McFate¹

Krisztián Sztankai²

I really looked forward to the publication of a book that provides insight into some of the detailed case studies of American military anthropologists, working as an anthropologist myself for the Hungarian Defence Forces. Since there is a huge difference between the Hungarian Defence Forces and the United States Army, it is impossible – and I do not wish – to make a comparison regarding their purpose, strength, size, historical background and experience. However, any issues arising from military presence can equally affect the soldiers of both countries in the present and in the future, in which case this book can serve as a good basis for preparation.

My name is Krisztián Sztankai, I work as a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training at the National Public Service University in Hungary. I graduated from the University of Miskolc as a cultural anthropologist in 2006, then in 2008 I joined the Hungarian Defence Forces and served in four different operation areas: as a Tactical PSYOPS Team commander in Kosovo in 2009, as a CIMIC officer in Afghanistan in 2011, and as a military observer both in the Central African Republic in 2016 as well as in the Western Sahara in 2022. Being the one and only military anthropologist in my country's armed forces, I have been unable to achieve significant progress so far, but I am determined to strengthen this cooperation, introduce the notion of cultural awareness as part of university education and trainings, as well as to conduct research that can gather up-to-date information in military operation areas. I find myself in the very special position that a continuous cooperation has been maintained with the social science faculties and research centres of the five largest universities in Hungary since 2008, including the University of Miskolc, Eötvös Loránd University, University of Debrecen, University of Szeged and University of Pécs, which have been supporting the goals I articulated earlier, namely the cultural preparation of soldiers along with the reduction of insults and conflicts, which – as a preventive tool – can contribute to saving lives and ending the war more quickly.

Since I had been familiar with the author's studies, the book did not disappoint. As McFate puts it, each chapter presents the life of an anthropologist who worked directly with a certain organization of the army, focusing on a certain period of their lives, while covering a topic included in the military education curriculum. What made the book enjoyable for me to read is the fact that each chapter can be processed independently and, with minimal overlap, can be interpreted as a separate case study analysis. Although the author did not intend to address the military anthropological challenges,

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experience and cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan when writing the book, the comparative study of modern challenges presented in the individual chapters was refreshing to read. As a matter of fact, the book mostly deals with examples of poorly executed military operations (McFate, 2018, p. 295).

The first chapter presents Gerald Hickey, whose experience in Vietnam is used as a reference during my university lectures, as the uphill battle he fought against the military leadership and mindset reflects my current challenges back home. This chapter depicts Hickey's fundamental insight and opinion about the affairs in Vietnam, and how his opinion was often ignored in the US military's Vietnam strategy. In addition, he also provides some insight into the details of the Strategic Hamlet Program, in which he personally participated. The chapter is an excellent portrayal of typical problems that occur whenever military organizations appear in a foreign cultural environment as well as the challenges caused by the lack of ethnographic research. Despite the considerable negative experience, it is interesting to see how resistant the military mindset is to change, and even though the importance of cultural awareness is emphasized in education and doctrines, the practical use of it is ignored, while there is a constant return to solutions that are in favour of using weapons and force.

The second chapter gives an account of the experience of Robert Sutherland Rattray, who describes how and to what extent the British colonial officials' misconceptions limited their understanding of the African political systems. As the author claims, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of the origins of European colonial expansion and the different manifestations of European rule. It is through Rattray's experience (*Ashanti - Golden Chair*) that we can learn about the difficulties of British colonial policy with which colonial administrators encountered in Africa. Reading Rattray's work, it was interesting to gain insight into the experience how he helped resolve the conflict between the British and the Ashanti, which is a shining example of how cultural information and knowledge can be used to resolve or prevent a conflict. Through the example of the "indirect rule", an experimental government system of the British Empire, it is well described how the British tried to win over the members of the community by influencing their local institutions. McFate himself admits that the United States also pursues a strategy abroad similar to indirect rule, and has tried – or perhaps is still trying – to intervene and influence the politics of foreign states. The questions – What is the political structure? How is power distributed throughout society? What are the institutions that govern people's lives? (McFate, 2018, p. 64.) –, raised in the case study, are all relevant to this day and bear significance in military education, provided that the establishment of cooperation with the civilian population and the leaders is considered a priority.

In the third chapter, what we can learn from Ursula Graham Bower's case study is how a foreign woman was able to make herself accepted by the Naga society – a violent and closed head-hunting tribe –, and through her actions, earn the Nagas' respect so much as to become their military leader. Among other things, the chapter deals with the concept of leadership along with its different versions. In addition, it discusses the



differences between male and female leaders. Ursula Graham Bower did not come to the Naga tribe as an anthropologist, only later did she become one. After enduring many hardships, Bower returned to Great Britain with her husband in 1948 and received a doctorate in anthropology from the University of London in 1950. This is a truly intriguing piece of text about the adventures of an unknown British woman, how she turned into the queen of the Naga, and how her struggles against the Japanese earned the recognition of the military in the British Empire.

From among those who are presented in this book, it is Gregory Bateson, besides Gerald Hickey, whose work I had already encountered during my research, so I was already familiar with the cases described in Chapter 4. Bateson's experience with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is perhaps the most well-known and most controversial of the nine cases mentioned. In this chapter, we can receive more insight into Information Operation (IO) and the capabilities of PSYOPS through Bateson's work. We can learn about the details of the development and application of schizogenesis as a scientific method. In this chapter, the reader can learn more about the failures of US Information Operations, presented through a few case studies. Although Bateson's role in black propaganda campaigns is to be condemned, his contribution to the development of Information Operations is undeniable. Moreover, he believed that social scientists had a direct and important role to play in national defence. "Our enemies in this war are applying social science on a large scale, for the first time in history," wrote Bateson in 1943. "They have a planned economy; and they are using various sorts of applied psychology in their propaganda, and they are doing this with quite sufficient success to make it essential that we use our own social scientists, both for defence and attack."³ Writing in his letter directly to OSS director "Wild Bill" Donovan, Bateson proposed that the United States create a third agency that would use covert operations, economic controls, and psychological pressure as part of the new warfare. This organization is now called the Central Intelligence Agency.

In chapter 5, irregular warfare is illustrated with the case of Tom Harrison, who fought against the Japanese in the jungles of Borneo with the help of local indigenous tribes during WWII. Although Harrison was not an anthropologist, he participated in expeditions under the auspices of the Oxford University Exploration Club, notably the 1932 expedition to Borneo followed by another expedition to the uncharted parts of the New Hebrides in the Pacific. When the rest of the group travelled home in 1934, Harrison remained on the islands and decided to immerse himself in the culture of the Big Nambas, a warring cannibal tribe, which he mastered during the 2-year period of his stay. Harrison came from an upper-class British family with military ancestry. The time spent in the New Hebrides proved to be a great help for him later in the jungles of Borneo. The chapter portrays Harrison as a difficult person, and while considered rather irritating by the British, he made a completely opposite impression on the inhabitants of the Borneo jungle, and thanks to him, the number of the native irregular

³ Bateson, G. (1943) 'The Science of Decency', *Philosophy of Science*, 10(2), p. 141. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1086/286802>, ISSN 0031-8248

fighters increased to nearly 2,000, who helped the British crown to suppress the rebellion in the region. His cooperation with the Dyaks of Borneo is a shining example of unconventional warfare, facilitating the preparation of the area as well as militant infiltration. He also contacted a resistance group recruiting his soldiers from the locals, whom he trained and equipped with weapons. This chapter also compares T.E. Lawrence's unconventional warfare with Harrison's, who also developed his own strategy, which he used effectively with the support of the native Kelabites fighting a war against the Japanese.

In chapter 6, we can learn about the United States' military governance strategy in the field of operations through the lens of John Useem's time spent in Palau, and we take a closer look at how the military presence shapes the social structure of the defeated nation. The concept the author discusses in this chapter is very complex and can vary from operation to operation. The appearance of military forces in a foreign culture requires government involvement, no matter how much it tries to stay away, the security situation requires political, civil and economic intervention. The writer puts emphasis on the training of commanders and military personnel, which aims at the cultural preparation for the given culturally different area. However, following the debacles of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the trend in U.S. foreign policy circles is to eschew exporting democracy through occupation of foreign countries (McFate, 2018, p. 203). The writer emphasizes that one of the principles of military government, derived from The Hague and Geneva Conventions, is that occupying armies should strive to avoid interfering with local civilian, political and social institutions. In international humanitarian law, the relationship between occupier and occupied is seen as a contract in which occupying armies provide security and relief. Local civilians, in turn, should avoid interfering with the conquering army's mission. If these conditions are met, the army should not interfere with civilian institutions, allowing them to abide by their local laws and customs (McFate, 2018, p. 215). During the Second World War, the United States established training courses at several universities, where military personnel could learn about the cultural background of the given society, but after the war these were closed. According to the writer, what we can learn from the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan is that if these courses had been maintained and cultural awareness as well as anthropological knowledge had played a greater role in the education of the soldiers, then operations would have been approached with a different mindset in these two areas, which might have taken a different turn.

In chapter 7, we read about the rivalry between Jomo Kenyatta and Luis Leakley. The writer first studies the life of Jomo Kenyatta, a poor young Kenyan who made it as far as London, and had the chance to learn the methodology of ethnographic fieldwork from its developer, Malinowski himself. Kenyatta attempted to apply his anthropological studies to present the Gikuyuk society and culture as a unity with an independent political structure, which could facilitate the beginning of a negotiation between the British and the locals. However, this proved to be inadequate. Even though Kenyatta wrote several books about the culture of his own people, his attempts failed to make



the desired impact on the British administrators to view the Kenyan population as an equal party in the negotiations. While doing his studies, Kenyatta met Luis Leakley, the other character in this chapter, who – despite being British himself – had immense knowledge about the Gikoyuk culture, claiming that he spoke the Kikuyu language even better than English. Leakley was born in Kenya and grew up among the Kikuyu before relocating to England at the age of thirteen. Later, as Malinowski's student, he had an argument with Kenyatta in the Kikuyu language during one of their seminars. Just as Kenyatta used the science of anthropology against the British, so did the government in order to put down the Mau Mau insurgency with the help of Leakley. His book *Defeating Mau Mau* served as a good basis for the British to defeat the insurgents in the country. In this chapter, we can read in detail about the Mau Mau organization, the background of its establishment as well as the institution of the oath. We can learn about the concept of fantasy ideology, a cultural stereotype, which is utilized by one culture to (mis)treat another. This chapter is a perfect portrayal of the kind of modern military mindset that I also encountered wherever I served. The foreign soldiers who arrive to serve in a given conflict-ridden country approach the locals with disdain and negative stereotypes. In my experience, partially due to such perception, the resolution of the conflicts takes longer, because the lack of knowledge and the attitude of the military personnel serving on the location hinder the resolution of the conflict. Since professional soldiers work for money, only a few possess a sense of devotion, and therefore it is very difficult to make such staff understand the long-term effects of their actions and their impact on the operation.

Chapter 8 is the account of Don Marshall's experience in Vietnam. Marshall, a co-author of the *Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN)*, spent twenty-one months doing research in Vietnam. The establishment of the PROVN work group was considered important because it was necessary to prepare a new action plan based on the research of this study. Marshall wanted to contribute to Vietnamese culture and society being taken into account in the strategic rethinking of operations. As in many other chapters of this book, the very same idea occurs here in connection with Marshall, namely that the local culture and social structure are a decisive factor in the conflict, and that understanding these greatly contribute to the outcome of the war. The chapter presents the escalation of the Vietnam conflict and the attempt of the American decision makers to solve it with force and weapons through the concepts of social cohesion and change. The chapter compares the Bush administration's mission in Iraq with the Vietnam War and reveals that despite the many thousands of casualties of American soldiers had to suffer fighting the Viet Cong, it still proved insufficient to pay more attention to the political power of the local population later in Iraq. The central argument in this chapter is that social conditions should be considered along with other political, military, and economic strategic objectives in the military planning process. The reason is simple. "The object beyond war," as General Johnson noted, should be "the restoration of stability with the minimum of destruction, so that society and lawful government might proceed in an atmosphere of justice and

order (McFate, 2018, p. 313).

In the final chapter, the reader is presented with the case of David Prescott Barrow, who arrived in Siberia after the 1918 Bolshevik coup, when the new Bolshevik government took over power following the collapse of the Russian Empire due to the 1917 October Revolution (McFate, 2018, p. 315). Barrow might be the only U.S. military general with a doctorate in anthropology. He joined the army as a major at the age of 46 with the goal to make a difference in WWI. Barrow's claim, which the writer agrees with, is that it is Western arrogance and cultural intolerance that mostly affect human interactions, especially between two culturally different nations, groups or individuals.

In conclusion, it can be said that most chapters of the volume deal with the long-term consequences of foreign military interventions, formulating responses along with possible solutions, which serve as food for thought. As recounted so often in this book, in the interests of improving an indigenous system, a Western government had destroyed the very thing it hoped to create (McFate, 2018, p. 258). As a Hungarian military anthropologist, I can agree with the author, whose purpose with this book was to help the reader better understand how important it is for military organizations strategically to involve sociocultural research and researchers at different levels of military planning, and also to provide the reader a greater insight into the challenges of anthropologists who have ever actively participated in this cooperation. It cannot be emphasized enough that the military presence has immediate consequences in any given society (operation area), which can escalate further without proper training in cultural awareness. Not only do soldiers have to fight against the enemy, but also ethnocentrism and orientalism, which can negatively affect their cooperation with the civilian population. The writer also articulates, what I myself have experienced during military operations, that the environment where soldiers serve abroad is not empty, but an area inhabited by civilians with a unique language, culture, customs, traditions and social structure, which is essential to gain ample knowledge about. Civilian residents can be just as much partners as enemies of the foreign occupying soldiers. However, as enemies, they can be very dangerous, because they cannot be distinguished from other civilian residents and their attack will surely hit their target, causing serious destruction. To avoid such occurrence, increased attention should be paid to training soldiers cultural awareness and increasing tolerance in the military education and training of all nations. In my opinion, soldiers should not be sent to Foreign Service without developing cultural awareness. However, in order to achieve cultural awareness, up-to-date information is necessary, which requires socio-cultural research. I received my doctorate in 2020, and in my dissertation I formulated such a system-level methodology by which anthropological research can be integrated into military tasks. This system-level methodology not only involves operational planning and research to be carried out in the operational area, but also formulates the need for the integration of up-to-date knowledge into training and preparation. Furthermore, with the aid of an experience processing system, the information received is constantly fed back to the planning team,



leaders and military staff.

The book is more than a collection of case studies; by filling a void, it has become an essential piece of literature in military anthropology, because it raises such important issues that can be a perfect starting point for the development of modern military anthropology. I would like to close my thoughts with a quote that could even be the motto of military anthropology: “While military victory might be necessary for peace, it is often not sufficient to sustain it” (McFate, 2018, p. 321). I hope Montgomery McFate will not stop processing the case studies related to the past of military anthropology, because otherwise a foreign anthropologist like myself will never be provided the opportunity to familiarize with the experience and knowledge accumulated by the anthropologists and the military of the United States. Thank you for this book and good luck!

Review of “Double-Edged Politics on Women’s Rights in the MENA Region” Edited by Hanane Darhour and Drude Dahlerup¹

Alexandra Batonai²

The questions of feminism, gender equality and women’s rights have never been more important than in the 21st century. Although women in the Western world have been openly struggling for equality since the inception of the suffragette movement, they still have to face many difficulties to break through the glass ceiling. It is undoubtedly true that now they enjoy most of the rights they originally fought for, but the phenomenon of sexual harassment and gender-based discrimination at the workplaces has not yet completely disappeared. Compared to Europe, the situation of women in the Middle East and North Africa is significantly different. It is a well-known negative stereotype that Arabs live in a patriarchal society where the women are oppressed by the men and their lives are complicated by several restrictions. Is this true or only a prejudiced Western narrative? The *Double-Edged Politics on Women’s Rights in the MENA Region* finds answer to this question by scrutinising how the position of women has changed in MENA³ countries since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. It discusses the forms of women’s activism in the area, highlights women’s political opportunities after 2011, and analyses the relationship between feminism and Islam. Moreover, it also endeavours to identify the factors that have a decisive impact on the development of women’s rights in the above-mentioned region.

This book was published as the part of the *Gender and Politics series* in 2019 and contains monographs by international, world class scholars who provide the reader with new and detailed empirical research on the topic. The range of authors is very multiple. Not only are they from different countries, but they represent a variety of disciplines, including Comparative Politics, Women’s Studies, Political Science, Linguistics, Arts and Human Sciences, Social and Cultural Studies, Sociology, and Arabic-Islamic Studies. This work was edited by Drude Dahlerup and Hanane Darhour. While Dahlerup is a professor in Denmark and Sweden, Darhour is a lecturer in Morocco, who organises workshops and conferences on gender and politics. In addition to cutting-edge scientific articles, this study also includes distinct tables and figures, which were created based on statistics and surveys. Furthermore, the end of the introduction offers a short summary of each chapter. According to the editors, the primary aim of *Double-Edged Politics on Women’s Rights in the MENA Region* is to examine the changes in women’s position in the public sphere from a global perspective before, during and after the Arab Uprisings.

Apart from the introduction, the content of this book could be divided into four main parts and eleven smaller sections. Chapter 2 makes a theoretical contribution by

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³ MENA: Middle East and North Africa.



representing the changes in the so-called “Center” before and after the Arab Spring. It argues that four ideological trends shaped the “Center” in the pre-Spring period: the conservative, the modernist, the secular, and the Islamist. Previously there had been a constant competition between the elite supporters of these ideas, but after the Arab Uprisings it became possible for new, young activists and women from slums to make their voice heard too. On the other hand, in Fatima Sadiqi’s⁴ opinion, the rise of extremist movements in the region could create obstacles that might hinder them from achieving their goals.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship between feminism and Islam by scrutinising whether the two are compatible with each other. When it comes to feminism, most people think only of the European and American perceptions of this ideology, which is laden with Western values. Therefore, being a feminist and a devout Muslim at the same time, might be considered as an oxymoron by some scholars. However, other academics argue that this kind of double commitment is a legitimate path for feminism. In his article, Ilyass Bouzghaia⁵ categorises Islam feminist movements into three different types: Islamist (traditional), secular (liberal/left in orientation), and Islamic feminist (progressive). While secular feminists are afraid of that Islam is not sufficient to fulfil gender equality requirements, Islamic feminists are sceptical about the possible Western hegemonic consequences of the CEDAW.⁶ Instead of making a firm statement regarding the question of Islam and feminism, the distinguished scholar just objectively compares the two contradictory positions.

Chapter 4 demonstrates the variations in common attitudes towards women’s economic, social, and political empowerment in North African countries based on the results of World Values Survey data. Ginger Feather⁷ studies these variations over time, between genders and among generations. She infers that the Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) are the most progressive in women’s empowerment in socioeconomic and political spheres in MENA region, but the situation of women in Egypt and Libya also seems very promising. Besides, she concludes that according to the surveys, democracy is not a necessary condition for female political development. On the contrary, it might even have a negative impact on gender equality, if it is pursued prematurely in conservative countries.

In Chapter 5, Saskia Glas⁸ and Niels Spierings⁹ are searching for the reasons why support for feminism has increased considerably in some Arab countries after the

⁴ Fatima Sadiqi is Professor of Linguistics and Gender Studies at the University of Fes, Morocco.

⁵ Ilyass Bouzghaia is a Doctoral Researcher at Sidi Mohamed ben Abdellah University, whose research focuses on women’s rights, gender studies, feminism, Islamic feminism and decolonial studies.

⁶ CEDAW: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

⁷ Ginger Feather completed her master’s degree at the University of Kansas in Arabic/Islamic Studies and continued her PhD at the same institution in Political Science.

⁸ Saskia Glas is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at Radboud Social and Cultural Research at Radboud University. Her main research interests include women’s equality, politics and religiosity in the Arab Middle East and North Africa.

⁹ Niels Spierings is Assistant Professor in Sociology at Radboud Social and Cultural Research at Radboud University. His current projects focus on Islam and social attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa.

uprisings, but not in others. Within the framework of a comparative study, they also examine whether the support for Muslim feminism or secularist feminism has evolved to the same extent. Furthermore, they research how the anti-Westernism influences the public's opinion about the feminist ideology. Chapter 6 explains the role of women's activism in the democratisation process from a broader socio-political perspective. In addition, it presents the changes in the women's rights in the three Maghreb countries before and after the Arab Spring. Based on Moha Ennaji's¹⁰ research shows these changes were very successful, because in North African countries they were conducive to a significant gender gaps reduction in education, health, and employment.

Chapter 7 analyses how political opportunity structures (POS) shape Islamist women's political participation in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (JDP), while also scrutinising how Islamist women can reshape their political opportunities by using different strategies. Moreover, it discusses the history and role of the Muslim Sisterhood in Egypt. Chapter 8 compares the situation of women in the Maghreb and the Middle East countries, regarding the question of gender equality, gender discrimination, political participation, and available career paths. It gives a reader an insight into the legal system of some Arabic states. While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are exceptional in the sense that their constitutions are one of those very few state documents in the world, which use both masculine and feminine pronouns, the constitution of Saudi Arabia does not make any reference to provisions on equality. Another problem is that in countries where equality rights appear in the constitution, women are often mentioned only alongside children, as if they too were minors, or second-class citizens.

Chapter 9 examines the structure of legislative committees in Jordan based on aspects of women's membership, and the horizontal and vertical segregation of women within governmental institutions. In their article Marwa Shalaby¹¹ and Laila Elimam¹² try to prove two hypotheses: First, that horizontal segregation has resulted in women legislators in the Jordanian parliament being underrepresented in committees dealing with general freedom - and human rights, investment, financial and economic issues - and concentrated in committees closer to traditional gender roles; and second, that vertical segregation has resulted in few women gaining access to leadership positions.

Chapter 10 provides in-depth research of the implementation and intersectional effects of the gender and youth quotas in Tunisia, and it endeavours to analyse whether these quotas have a positive or negative effect in the long-term. Finally, Chapter 11 presents the special reserved seats system in Morocco, which tries to ensure democratization and strengthening of women's rights. It examines the effectiveness of quota provision on women's empowerment and democratic development. It addresses

¹⁰ Moha Ennaji is Professor of Social and Cultural Studies at the University of Fes in Morocco, and he is the founding president of the International Institute for Languages and Cultures.

¹¹ Marwa Shalaby is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin.

¹² Laila Elimam is a Political Science Researcher.



the negative side effects of the quota system, the problem of proxy women and de-democratization process. Furthermore, it also discusses the marginalisation of women in the Moroccan parliament.

The *Double-Edged Politics on Women's Rights in the MENA Region* has many strengths. For instance, it includes several scientific high-quality articles from interdisciplinary scholars, which make the book very diverse and interesting. All studies are well-organised, and logically structured. Some chapters focus on specific countries, while others compare several MENA countries. The authors explain how the changes after the Arab Spring altered the opportunity structures and made it possible for women to increase their political representation and public activities. Nonetheless, at the same time they also show examples of how men still discriminate and marginalise women. Therefore, it is easy to understand why the politics in the MENA region on women's rights can be characterised as double-edged.

Among the few weaknesses of the book, it should be mentioned that the researchers sometimes write in a very complicated style, and they do not explain some events or expressions that are not necessarily evident for the wider audience. In addition, some chapters are less exciting than the others. In my opinion, a short general description of the antecedents and episodes of the Arab Uprisings could have greatly facilitated the historical contextualization of the case studies and allowed the readers to gain a better understanding of the reasons why feminism experienced a hitherto unparalleled flourishing after 2011 in the Arab world.

In conclusion, the biggest moral of this book is that, when assessing the situation of women in the Arab countries, we cannot treat the whole MENA region as a homogenous entity. These research papers dispel typical Western prejudices in many cases, but they also shed objective light on how women's rights can still be improved in the region. Even though I have found the book very interesting, I would rather recommend it to scholars and researchers of gender studies, sociology, or history, because of its difficult language style.

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Smith, D. L., & Claytor, R. P. (2018). An acute bout of aerobic exercise reduces movement time in a Fitts' task. *PloS One, 13(12)*, Article e0210195. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210195>

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