

# Basic Researches in Communication and Media Studies

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## KOME Editors<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction to the First Issue of KOME – An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry

We are proud to present the first issue of KOME, a new academic journal aiming to serve as a scene for an innovative interdisciplinary discourse in the field of communication studies, with a focal point on basic researches. Our intention is to make a contribution to the discussion and research in the area of pure communication inquiry through the publication of both original research articles and other types of scientific communications. Submitted manuscripts are reviewed internally as well as by external reviewers, going through a preliminary selection by the editors before the double-blind review process.

KOME was founded by two members of the Hungarian Communication Studies Association, Marton Demeter and Janos Toth, with the intention of creating a professional scientific journal for Hungary's leading learned society in the field of communication and media studies, and of providing publication opportunities for results covering basic research issues of this specific segment of social sciences. The articles published in KOME are offered as an open-access publication, without any fees or charges for the authors or the readers, and using a copyright licensing approach that does not prevent them from copying and distributing any of the journal's contents (except selling it for a profit) if the first publication by KOME, with an URL link and complete bibliographic details, is referenced.

### On Pure Communication Inquiry

Since KOME focuses mainly on basic researches, the following proposal suggest (unexclusive) elucidations of pure communication researches.

A Ordinary methods of constructing communication theories normally presuppose a given concept and/or phenomena of communication; presuppositions of this kind give the primitives of individual theories. Explaining or proving primitives could not - and need not - be achieved within the confines of the theory includes them. Naturally, a meta-theory could challenge the postulates of a normal theory, and it could try to explain or criticize them; still, the very same meta-theory has its own primitives and postulates which could not be, and need

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<sup>1</sup> Marton Demeter, Janos Toth

not be explained or proved by the instruments of its own: so any meta-theory is a normal theory in connection with itself. The order of theories is potentially infinitely successive: there are no logical cogency forces a maximal resolution for a given theory (while, of course, it could be reasonable to argue for an optimal resolution).

The very fact that communication theories operate on postulated or primitive communication-concepts necessarily holds for theories searching the right concept of communication, and for those of which try to eliminate it: since the categories of labelling are given, so are the results of categorization (though as a process it could be uncompleted or even unbegun).

**B** Theories on communication could be categorized in regard to the sets of communicative phenomena they operate on.

**(i)** When theory A could exhaustively describe phenomena described by theory B, then theory A is an *alternative* of theory B;

**(ii)** When theory A could exhaustively describe phenomena described by theory B, and, in addition, phenomena could not be described by theory B, then theory A *subsumes* theory B;

**(iii)** When theory A could exhaustively describe phenomena described by theory B with less primitive terms, then theory B could be *reduced* to theory A;

**(iv)** When theory A could describe (at least a subset of) phenomena described by theory B with higher relevant resolution, then theory A is *specialization* of theory B;

**(v)** When theory A could give postulates for phenomena described by theory B with which phenomena described by theory B (and theories C, D etc.) could be exhaustively described, then theory A is the *ground* of theory B, and theory B is a *model* of theory A;

Connections (i) – (v) are typical relations between theories; any ascertained relation *ARB* could be considered as an intellectual plus, and, for a pure communication research, it is strongly required.

Consider, that a pure communication inquiry could be alternation, subsumation, reduction, specialization, grounding and modelling alike.

**C** A pure communication research could be imagined at least three ways.

**1** First, a pure communication research could analyze the postulates and primitives of a given theory, so concepts which are being used as given. Because of the fact that, unlike mathematical models, communication theories usually do not exhibit their primitive terms and presuppositions, a pure communication research has to reveal them.

**2** Second, a pure communication research could analyze the occurrences of the term „communication” in a given natural language. The after-come of a research of this kind could be multifarious. An empirical research could describe speech acts carried out with sentences including the expression „communication”. But the aim of a philosophical or conceptual analysis is much more than a pure description, because it could explore the logical structure

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of sentences including a given expression, and, typically, it could indicate that the ordinary-language uses of a given expression could be misleading in philosophy or in sciences. Furthermore, a genetic research is a pure communication research per se, which investigates (for example, with the tools of etymological analysis) the oldest or most basal occurrences of a given expression. Genetic researches have serious tradition in not just historical or philological sciences but in logics and semiotics as well. Likewise in the case of questing ordinary language, genetic researches investigate language uses of a given community, but the genetic method is the stronger, because it's outcomes are being held as normative, not just descriptive.

**3** Third, a pure communication research could analyze the possibility of a communication theory which could realize at least one of the relations mentioned under B.

**D** So, a pure communication research constitutes innovation, but this innovation could be either construction or appliance.

### **Research Themes for KOMÉ**

Following the elucidations suggested above, we think that the broadly defined research themes below are the ones in KOMÉ's center of interest:

**1. *Defining pure communication.*** Research projects of this kind rise questions in connection with:

- 1.1. The possibility of communication
- 1.2. The concept of communication
- 1.3. The epistemology of communication
- 1.4. The gnoseology of communication
- 1.5. The ontology of communication
- 1.6. The scientific place of communication theories
- 1.7. The horizontal adequacy of communication theories (i.e. concerning a specific level of reality)
- 1.8. The vertical adequacy of communication theories (i.e concerning multiple levels of reality)
- 1.9. Other basal inquiries in connection with the concept, the idea, the nature or the phenomena of communication.

**2. *Methods for pure communication research.*** Research projects of this kind rise questions in connection with:

- 2.1. The presuppositions of theoretic communication inquiries
- 2.2. The presuppositions of empirical communication research
- 2.3. The application of extraneous methods to communication inquiries
- 2.4. The adaptation of extraneous methods to communication inquiries
- 2.5. The genuine properties of the special methods of communication inquiry, if there are any
- 2.6. The analysis of existing methods in the scope of communication research
- 2.7. Other basal inquiries in connection with the methods of communication research

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3. *Axioms, lemmas and conjectures for pure communication inquiries.*

4. *The relational properties of pure communication inquiries.* Research projects of this kind rise questions in connection with:

4.1. The reflexive relation in the case of communication theories, i.e., communication inquiry as communication.

4.2. The symmetric relations in the case of communication theories, for example, communication as information processing and information processing as communication

4.3. The asymmetric relations in the case of communication theories, such as inclusion

4.4. The relations between communication inquiries and other disciplines such as theology, philosophy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, social sciences, cognitive sciences, computer science and A.I.

### **On the Contents of the Current Issue**

We were surprised by the numbers and geographical diversity of the submissions that we have been received, although we had to realize that a significant proportion of submissions was incompatible with our profile – we hope that the above clarifications on pure communication inquiry and preferred research themes will help our future authors in identifying our journal as suitable for their manuscripts. As for the content of the current issue, the reader would find examples of pure inquiries. The paper *Permutations of Theory – open channels then and now* argues that public access Television was a forerunner of today's internet, as it strengthened viewers' interactive capabilities by involving them in the production processes of video material. *Clear, unclear and non-media – an attempt at conceptualisation* investigates the semantic scope of the term 'media' and then it tries to identify differences postulated essential in the structure and operation of the constituents of the institutional structure it marks, while the discussion *On Analysis and its Role in Communication Theories* explicates the main types of analysis and then applies its analytical methods on Watzlawick's first axiom of human communication, and tries to show, that the statement that '*one cannot not communicate*' is either false or meaningless. Finally, *Mediated communities in the age of electronic communication* tries to show that the electronically mediated communication has transformed our notion of the relation between place and community.

# Permutations of Theory – Open Channels Then and Now

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**Holger Briel**

University of Nicosia, Cyprus

**Abstract:** This paper presents the case of Public Access Channels (or Open Channels) in a changing media climate. The author argues that Public Access Television was a forerunner of today's internet, as it honed viewers' interactive capabilities by involving them in the production processes of video material. It was a clear remit of these stations to train individuals to use visual media and become their own directors. Thus, it was argued, they would be able to better understand traditional visual media and would not continue to powerlessly live under their spell. Also, it would empower them by allowing their own content to be screened. With the advent of the internet, many of the above beliefs were realised. And, consequently, Public Access Television underwent a crisis, as its target audience migrated to online media, such as YouTube and others. However, its training remit is still valid today and, perhaps, more so than ever before as much more visual material is pushed onto viewers. Once stations realize the potential of the internet to its fullest (e.g. the need for training and the availability of unlimited channels), they stand a good chance to once again become an important player in video education and local engagement.

**Keywords:** Public Access Television, media conversion, media training, local activism

## I. Introduction

In a 2008 article, Geert Lovink decried today's culture of 'googlization' ruling the life of many people (Lovink, 2008). According to Lovink, such selective searching is detrimental to the cognitive allroundedness he locates in earlier generations. One important aspect in the medial formation of this generation of general common knowledge was, inter alia, the broadcasting power of television. As a consequence, in 1974, three times as many Americans trusted their television news than do today (ibid.). This allroundedness of the TV programme has been a thing of the past for some time though. But despite the fact that television has continued to change rapidly, it has nevertheless been able to create new business models, new

*Address for Correspondence:* Holger Briel, email: holger.briel@gmail.com

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viewer niches and new media realities. In recent times, this change is mostly due to the fact that TV has a new formidable foe, the Internet. According to a recent study, in 2009 German youths watched only three minutes a day more TV than they interacted with the internet (Medienpädagogischer Forschungsverbund Südwest, 2009).

These facts raise important questions regarding the education youths receive to prepare them for the digital (television) life, how their self realization will be shaped by new media and how certain TV applications, such as Public Access (PAC) and Open Channels (OC) will further impact on them. Lastly, these new manifestations also require a rethinking on the part of television theory. Accordingly, TV has begun to react to the threat of the Internet. New internet based services such as Hulu allow for watching TV series episodes anytime and Apple's iTunes store is happily selling such episodes to willing customers. Add to that all the other available legal, semi-legal and illegal download sites for such data on the internet, and it becomes clear that, at least when it comes to dissemination, today's TV does not have all that much in common with TV 30 years ago.

However, this commercial and entertainment side of TV is not all there was nor is. Especially in Western European countries, public TV has always also been charged with education purposes and pedagogy, a fact which has largely been forgotten during the recent commercialisation drives of the medium. One particular niche of programming which has taken this need for TV pedagogy seriously, is the above mentioned Public Access or Open Channels broadcasting. Such channels arose in contrast to the large networks, no matter if they were commercial or public (Engelman, 1990). This niche brought local and educative content to the fore, aiming to narrowcast rather than broadcast. And as will become evident below, the Internet has profited from this older technology at least *theoretically*, if not practically.

The arrival of these OCs goes back to the 1970s. One important contributing factor to their arrival was the introduction of satellite and cable TV in the late 1970s and early 1980s in most parts of Europe. The proliferation of stations and programmes, plus the different goals commercial television had set for itself, changed televisual landscapes forever. One interesting side effect of this was that a number of governments requested from commercial broadcasters an important feature for their consent to commercial TV: the introduction of Public Access TV, a genre explicitly created to allow 'normal' citizens more access to broadcasting tools - Citizen TV. These were mostly local channels produced for and by local people. In Germany alone, over 80 of them went on the air, but they could also be found, in one guise or another, in other European countries, such as Luxemburg, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, but also in Australia, the US, South Korea, Brazil and Fiji (cf. Rennie, 2008). Today, in Germany there exist 63 Open Channels in most federal states, with the exception of Saxony, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. Another German federal state, the Saarland, ceased its Open Channels in 2003 due to budgetary constraints and lack of political support.

These channels served a very specific purpose: not only did they provide a forum for microlocal information; they also allowed normal TV consumers to become producers of broadcasting material. Furthermore, due to their specific rules and regulations, many became laboratories for civil action. Theoretically, these changes also instilled a large part of performativity instead of mere representation into an erstwhile one-way medium. This performativity would allow local citizen to present their material (and themselves) to, in a first instance, local viewing communities via cable or terrestrial broadcasting and then even broader and potentially global audiences via the internet.

The inception of these channels then was largely legitimated by sociological discourse of the time, and there in particular that of the Frankfurt School with its emphasis on 'authentic' self formation, self realisation and self maintenance. Going beyond that, they were also early

electronic challengers of the public/private bifurcation when it came to broadcasting, an issue easily forgotten in times of ‘reality’ TV. These channels have since influenced the democratised and democratising way in which the internet is being used, having pioneered formats that would later mutate into chat rooms or blogs.

In the following, I will analyze how some of these stations have dealt with the challenge of the Internet. In 2000 I undertook a comparative study of two such channels, ROK TV Rostock Germany and Manhattan Neighborhood Network New York (MNN), and analysed their self-understanding and programming structure and philosophy. At the time, much of it was still dependant on older media theories (Briel, 2005). In 2010 I revisited these stations and discussed especially their relation to the internet. It became clear that most of their understanding had now shifted to media theories related to distributed identities and networks (cf. Briel, 2012). Some of their earlier practices had vanished, some converged and other formats had been successfully maintained (cf. Busse, 2010).

In a final step I will suggest ways in which TV and Internet as fragmented systems can learn from these stations and how this new media situation can be embedded in a (politically) revolutionary theory of distributed agency.

## II. Open Channels

The development of a two-way, participatory public media culture is not a new phenomenon, nor is it restricted to TV. Grassroots media, or media from below, have been around for quite some time, with alternative print media becoming a mass phenomenon perhaps as early as the 1960s with the popularisation of underground magazines (Cf. Hoofacker 2009, Olson n.d.). This development also took hold of the airwaves, with ‘pirate’ radio stations springing up, such as *Radio Caroline* broadcasting from off-shore locations to Britain. And when looking at the receivers’ side one might even go back as far as 1750 and the beginning of the newspaper era, as was suggested by Anders Ekström (Ekström 2010). With electronic media, however, entrance barriers to participation were higher and two-way-communication would not begin in earnest until the 1960s and 1970s.

In Germany, the history of Open Channels (*Offene Kanäle*) took shape in and can be traced back to the 1979 report of an expert group, entitled ‘Rules for the Open Channels’. Open Channels were thus defined as “a forum for all kinds of audiovisual material, initiated (also produced) by rightful users who are responsible for its contents; those programmes are not bound by any user guidelines or limits except the ones mentioned below” (Kamp 1997, p.18; Spielhagen 1996).

The 1987 German Broadcasting Act (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), amongst other issues, also specified the running of PACs. Their funding was to be provided by a percentage of the TV licensing fee, which lies somewhere between 1% and 2% of the overall fee and continues to be charged until today. Their existence is not written in stone, however, as they have to be re-licensed every five to seven years. As the above mentioned example of the Saarland shows, this means that it can also be switched off, depending on the political and financial situation. Despite the existence of Public Access Channels for over 40 years now, the idea of broadcasting as societal common property seems to have still not been anchored properly enough in people’s minds. As Kamp reminds us, PACs were intended to fulfil a number of valuable pedagogical services: In an Open channel, people are enabled - without goal-oriented actions on the part of the organisers – to

- become more tolerant or remain so in their relations with others

- become competent in regards to media and topics
- re-think their own views and formulate viewpoints on issues
- address the public with their views and issues in order to become politically active
- further develop their actions.'

(Kamp 1997, p.18)

Despite these strong arguments, PACs usually only re-emerge in the public's mind when the issue of raising TV licensing fees is discussed. Due to the relatively low awareness and take-up of PAC production and dissemination services in the general public, its services recurrently come under scrutiny by the public eye and especially conservative media question the whole package. As if this wasn't enough, they then also have to go through rigorous re-licensing procedures. Despite such counter pressures, these channels are continuing to strengthen and intensify their TV media work.

Comparing programming structures of Rostock's ROK-TV's ten years ago with today, it becomes apparent that broadcasting has been extended from 2.5 to up to 5 hours daily, with reruns broadcast three times a day. This is still far from a full programme, but time slots and programmes have been stabilised and attract many more viewers than before.

ROK-TV broadcasts daily, with new content screened on Tuesdays from 18.00 to 20.30, Wednesdays from 18.00 to 23.30 and on Thursday from 18.00 to 21.30. On the other days, only reruns are broadcast. Typical broadcasting content consists of music shows (the largest content chunk, aired on Wednesdays), news about film festivals, international fairy tales, interviews with BMX riders, slots for foreigners and related issues, local festivals, travel reports and other user generated content. It also has a cooperation agreement with the Institute for New Media at the University of Rostock for co-productions.

Compared to the broadcasts of ROK-TV, Manhattan Neighbourhood Network seems much more like a complete and full broadcast station. It has four different channels, Spirit, Community, Lifestyle and Culture, and airs around the clock.

But it is also active in community media involvement and equipment rentals, the second leg of PACs. Between 2005 and 2009, the last year for which data was available, it has trained over 12,000 people and has achieved an impressive record of studio and camcorder rental time and editing effected (Manhattan Neighborhood Network 2012).

In 2011, MNN moved to a larger, more modern facility. Today, its web pages are professionally attended to, with much more content available and cross-overs with their internet pages and YouTube channels.

In comparison then, it becomes clear that MNN has several advantages over ROK-TV: it has the more prominent location, its public acceptance is higher, it is staunchly multilingual and its funding is generally more generous, due to its funding structure. In operation since 1992, it is funded by Time Warner Cable and the RNC Corporation in a franchise agreement with the City of New York. Its annual revenues are in the lower double digit millions figure (thus significantly higher than ROK's) and it employs a larger number of staff, approximately 50 to 99. ROK is by far the smaller organisation, but a typical one for a German Open Channel. It also offers similar services and training to the public, and both of them have to deal with re-licensing issues. ROK TV is overseen more tightly and is a public broadcasting station governed by the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, whereas MNN is less strictly governed, as it is more autonomous vis-à-vis governmental influence.

These two stations are then typical for two distinct models of Public Access Television: the German (and in many ways perhaps also the European model) is managed by governmental broadcasting regulations and sees itself mostly as a media education institution. MNN is a much larger organisation and holds a special place within the US PAC mediascape, and it

sees itself more as an entertainment station and offers a large segment of its broadcasts in non-English languages. ROK's funding structure is broadly in line with most other German open channels, whereas MNN is more dependent on generous private money but also the insecurity and fluctuating funding that comes with that. On the other hand, it is able to react more quickly to market changes and has much less red tape to deal with. Both of them are achieving significant market share in media training, but MNN is ahead of ROK when it comes to audience figures.

Despite the levelling power of the internet, we are thus still a long way from global mediascapes and this is perhaps for the better as this allows competing systems to develop new best practices. In general, the most pronounced differences still exist between an American, commerce driven public access mediascape and a European, more government-driven one. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The American model has to source its funding from foundations such as the MacArthur Foundation and the public and is thus more flexible than the European one, but any Europeans (and, presumably, a large chunk of the American audience as well) having had to sit through stations' fund drives can attest to the annoying effect this has. Conspiracy theorist might even hold that this is an intended effect put in place by commercial media and conservative governments. But its European counterpart also has its work cut out for itself. It has to convince governments of changing political colours of the necessity to continue media education as a state funded undertaking, a laborious and drawn-out process. In either case, both of them have to somehow harmonise their utopian media ideals with the harsh realities of funding scarcity.

### III. Questioning Community Media Players regarding Distributed Cognition

When discussing changes within public access broadcasting, it pays to speak to major players in the field. In the following I will summarise three interviews with such media activists about what has been called 'distributed cognition' (Reilly 2010) and then analyse what their responses mean for the field of TV studies.

In an interview on 25 June 2009, Bettina Pinske (Pinske 2009), then outgoing MD of ROK TV, stated that while it was true that ten years ago most of the Open Channel stations in Germany as elsewhere were worried about competition from the Internet, this was no longer the case today; the internet has become a complement to ROK and allowed it to actually increase its reach globally and attract new viewers. In many ways, it provides a platform for the anchoring of programmes and activities, such as its popular music programmes. Nowadays this function has been taken over perfectly by the Internet. And since this programme segment especially appeals to younger viewers, it becomes clear that cognition here is achieved between the media and not on one single platform. Lastly, for the last ten years, financing has remained solid, as ROK has become a stable agent in the state's mediascape. In this sense the symbiosis between Open Channel and Internet has been a fruitful one.

Other officials from OCs echo these remarks. In an interview conducted during the *viducate* workshop on 1 October 2010 in Berlin, Jürgen Linke, Managing Director of the Bundesverband Offene Kanäle e. V. (Federal Association of Open Channels), largely confirmed Pinske's views. He stressed that today's young request easy access to media no matter which media they were. Oftentimes this is still not offered by Open Channels, as there is a certain element of bureaucracy involved, due to the fact that they are public institutions. This Linke considers one of the main barriers for OCs to recruit the next generation of content providers and users. When compared to the easy to use software and distribution channels offered on the internet, many of the Open Channels require much more formal

training and face-to-face interaction, something young people might not want to spend their time on.

Linke also confirmed that the early use of internet technology by Open Channels consisted in making it a public relations tool rather than using its interactive features. It was used to quickly disperse information about OCs to wider and younger audiences, but not for programming or implementing new two-way communication strategies. This came only much later and it continues to be one of the main challenges for OCs. According to Linke, it is a matter of survival for OCs to (re-)define their role in the digital age and master the skills to successfully compete for user numbers and platform providing.

This mastery would not infringe on other virtues of OCs, such as their central media pedagogy and skills programmes. What it does mean for those areas, though, is that they need to be updated to be compatible with new forms of usage and platforms. Thus, OC Berlin offers workshops on shooting mobile phone video clips, a strategy which allows both the broadening of the viewer base, but also the involvement of it.

But Linke also sees other dangers coming from within the network of OCs in Germany. Fact is, for instance, that the large number of Germany-based migrants engaged in OCs before has dwindled recently, as they have begun choosing easier options such as the internet when interacting with peers. Discrete circles of digital community engagement have taken over from the broader, more inclusive aims of OCs, leaving the latter bereft of a diversity that had always been constitutive for their own self-understanding and the goal of strong minority inclusion.

One other voice should be heard here, this time from the USA. In a recent interview (conducted 18 October 2010 in Nicosia, Cyprus), John Higgins (Higgins, 2010), a former board member of the San Francisco Community TV Corporation (SFCTC), stated that his entrance into community TV came with reading the book *Guerrilla Television* in the 1970s (personal discussion with author, October 2010, Nicosia). As a result, he has worked at Community TV stations in Ohio and California.

While internet technology and philosophy is critical for the success of community media, Higgins questions any unreflected celebration of technology as saviour of community media. He mentioned the 2007 Benton Foundation report on Community media, which concluded from the gathered evidence that local media commitment was a much stronger factor in the success of local media than their celebration of newer and better technology (Benton Foundation 2012).

For the future, Higgins predicts a continued growth rate of community media, taking place, however, under the threat of the changing of the institutional framework under which Community TV is working in the USA. This has to do with the fact that cable and satellite operators met with quite good success in forcing local government to diminish the former's responsibility to community media. And this will force community media to painfully search for local sponsors, much more so than in the past. And it is not only the sponsors PACs have to worry about. This attack makes it clear that old media continue to fight upstart and ideologically inconvenient media organisations and the fact that such stations are having an impact on mediascapes.

Already in 2008, Bronx Congressman Serrano defended the right of Public, Educational and Governmental stations (PEG) to exist and their need for government protection (McCausland 2008). And thus, while PAC organizations have done the sensible thing and shifted their philosophical stances from a worried distrust to an enthusiastic embrace of new media, their services for media literacy are needed today even more so than before. And indeed, this is what many provide, as the example of Manhattan Neighborhood Network demonstrates.

Having successfully concluded a merger with internet technology and created new administrative and creative venues and operations does not mean that the battle has been won.

Many battles remain to be fought. For one, and perhaps one of the most serious ones, is the fact that despite the acceptance of new media by Public Access, there still remains a gap between its usage and its presentation. An overwhelming number of portal pages of PACs are fraught with bad design, dead links and little evidence of understanding of the importance of such portals. Young users' main criteria for accessing material on the web is its aesthetic presentation (Thorlaciuss 2004).

Here a technological as well as a philosophical distance is evident between the creators/managers of PACs and their intended audience of today. Many of the former still grew up with very bad copying machines and other 'Inferior' technology. This will not do today. For better or for worse, aesthetics has become part of the message and PACs would do well to remember that. They are involved in a selling process and thus need to take into consideration the needs of their consumers. This is one area where not much has changed over the last ten years. Other areas have improved remarkably; taking the web pages of MNN (mnn.org) for example, interfaces have become better, more material is available for downloading, the four available channels have been differentiated more and taken on separate identities, the offerings in Spanish have increased and the Latina/o community is actively approached, select content is available on YouTube and all MNN channels are available as live streams. But, and perhaps more importantly, activism is also not neglected. Applications for government media grants and Tactical Tool kits are addressed and producers are invited to avail themselves of them. Here a bit of *Realpolitik* is visible. MNN does not adhere to the 'prosumer' idea of say, a Henry Jenkins, but it is very much aware of the fact that producers have different needs from users. The difference between the computer as a lean forward medium and the TV as a lean backwards medium is still very much evident here. And, judging by experience, perhaps rightly so. This is not to say that a user cannot become a producer; after all, this is the very thought that gave rise to community media. But this is not an automatic process. As the above quoted 2009 German study showed, only 5% of youths create sound files, 3% of them write weblogs, 2% write in online encyclopaedias and only 1% upload videos. Compare this to 69% who write instant text messages, 69% who are part of online communities and 58% who listen to music online (Dworschak 2010, p.123), and the picture becomes clear: While they may not recognize the internet per se as a distinct medium their usage is exactly that: they use the web as a distribution channel but do not create multimedia content for it.

The above distinction is important. Most members of online communities of course produce written content and also upload the occasional picture. But many, if not most of them are not aware of any philosophical implications associated with these activities. For those they would have to rely on training in the same way as previous generations were dependant on McLuhan for television, Brecht for radio or Weber for newspapers.

What youths are very good at is platform hopping, the switching of platforms depending on their location and need (e.g. INCLUSO – Social Software for the Social Inclusion of Marginalised Youngsters, n.d.) . And this is also something PAC stations have realized over the last years and therefore they follow their users across platforms and offer their wares in transmedial forms. This will be discussed further below.

During the interviews, all three media professionals/activists stressed very important points in relation to the changing public access mediascape. First and foremost, it becomes clear that the internet has become an ally in many ways. These include timetabling, technological and personnel issues. Public Access allows for flat hierarchies and an optimum of user production via broadcasting channels. Pinske underscores the need for the professionalization of broadcasting structures. This indeed is an important factor to retain audiences and an advantage point for public access vis-a-vis the internet offerings which are still far removed

from achieving such iterative structures. Linke puts his emphasis on the missed interactivity which is creating large problems for public access. Those who want easy access to production and dissemination tools have already opted for internet sites and it will be an uphill battle to get them back.

Another connected issue is that, typically, many community stations were founded by activists, who had a strong sense of community commitment, usually coupled with progressive and leftist politics. For them, activism had been the prime impetus to enter citizen media in the first place. These founding activists are getting on in age, and today there seems to happen a changing of the guard within community stations and organisations. This is the case on both sides of the Atlantic. Younger staff are willing and more able to tap into the new media market and are actively propagating convergence with the internet.

Lastly, all three deny any overwhelming impact of technology on the public access framework and express their conviction that public access is robust enough to continue even in the digital age. In the light of Public Access's own genesis this strikes one as a problematic viewpoint. It was exactly the lowering of price barriers that first of all made public access possible. While it is very true that it needed agency, theoretical and practical, to avail oneself of TV technologies in the 1960s and 70s, but it also needed such technological TV breakthroughs as satellite and cable TV. And, especially, when the rapid technological changes are considered that the internet has brought about in visual broadcasting, to underestimate these technologies seems hazardous. This is particularly the case when one analyses the change of theory associated with and prompted by the advent of these new technologies.

#### **IV. TRANSMEDIA THEORY, PARTICIPATORY CULTURE AND DISTRIBUTED AGENCY**

This technological digital change has not only affected public access, it has also had a large impact on the TV media sector as a whole. Media theory has to account for this change. This does not necessarily involve the re-invention of the media wheel as it were, but rather using parts of older undervalued theory and bringing them to bear upon the changed medial situation of today. One of those is the participatory culture theory, as first developed already in the 1950s and 60s by such media philosophers as McLuhan, Marcuse and Debord. It provides us with many of the tools to approach and analyse the new media situation. It could even be stated that it needed the new media in order to come wholly into its own.

Case in point is today's transmedial practice. Transmedia, oftentimes in association with storytelling can be defined as the usage of multiple media to tell disparate pieces of a single cohesive narrative (cf. Phillips 2010). In 2009, William Uricchio, described *transmedia* as a new "lens" to be used to make sense of our multifarious environments. This lens can be directed backwards but also forwards into the future (Lim 2009). This typically includes different content on the internet, in broadcasts and in documents, all related to an overarching master narrative. A very good example is the US TV series *Heroes*, which makes use of the internet, comics and TV to add a variety of depth to the overarching storyline. That transmedia is not only a fad, but has already had an impact on the media industry as a whole is proven by the fact that since 2010, Transmedia Producer is an officially recognized US job description by the Producers Guild of America.

There exists the belief that the new generation of digital natives is much more able to understand and use new media, and especially the internet, for all issues of life (cf. Media activism, 2012, Media Culture, 2012; Apperley 2007). This is at least somewhat erroneous.

As recent studies have shown (cf. Schmidt 2009, Hargittai 2008), while youths are very able to approach internet media without fear or worries, when it comes to serious research, they are challenged, perhaps even more so than previous generations who had spent more time searching for and appreciating scarce resources. And this is not just true for research; in general consumers of web content by far outnumber producers of web content. The above cited large scale German study also evidences that youths still by far prefer face to face over internet meetings. They also do not speak of the internet per se, but rather of applications such as FaceBook or Google, whereas older generations still see the internet as a monolithic medium. So in many ways, the young generation does not perceive media differentiations as strongly as older generations did. The historic battles between newspapers and radio, or radio and TV, and their ideological subtexts (i.e. written text vs. the spoken word, the spoken word vs. visualisation, etc.) do not seem to bother them when it comes to their media consumption. Transmedial content is received as any other, indeed welcomed and subordinated to their individual and group needs.

And here Henry Jenkins and his research need to be addressed a bit more in detail. Arguably, Jenkins is one of the most vocal promoters of Citizen Media when it comes to participatory media in general. With his work at MIT, and since 2009 at USC, he has decidedly helped to shape academic discourse on digital media. In 2007 he published *Convergence Media*, still one of the most read texts on the convergence of old and new media. Here, especially its last chapter, 'Democratizing Television? The Politics of Participation', is of interest.

In this text, Jenkins claims that convergence of media is a paradigm shift which moves content from being medium-specific to content that "flows across multiple media channels, towards the increased interdependence of communications systems, toward multiple ways of accessing media content, and toward ever more complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up participatory culture." (2007, p.243).

One global example he cites for such a venture is the TV Channel Current, currently broadcasting in the USA, Ireland and Italy. It is a platform for video watching, but also for production. Financially stable and having the support of the likes of Al Gore, it aims at introducing web-like content and sociability to and on TV.

For Jenkins, media consumption would then move from an individualised to a collective activity. "Rather than talking about personal media, perhaps we should be talking about communal media – media that become part of our lives as members of communities, whether experienced face-to-face at the most local level or over the Net. (2007, p.245). Against those critics whom he labels as "critical pessimists" (Chomsky et al.), he calls himself a "critical utopian" who focuses on empowerment rather than victimization. And then he states: "one focuses on what we are doing with media [critical utopians], and the other on what media is doing to us [critical pessimists]." (2007, p.247)

Here, Jenkins makes valuable points also relating to community media. Indeed, he uses community media as a blueprint for the new (commercial) media landscape. At first glance, this seems a vindication for such media. But what he overlooks is the fact that this larger commercial system is not driven by activism, as community TV is; the commercialisation inherent in the media system at large will allow for activist stances, but activities will not automatically veer in the direction of political activism. One might fear that it will lead to mere "consumerist activism". And even if the impetus is on media understanding, participation in media events such as popular casting shows will certainly increase one's knowledge of the workings of TV stations, the advertising system and audience control. What is to be questioned, though, is whether such activities lead to a heightened understanding of the systemic and political repercussions such a system has. Here Higgins' above quoted category of the 'narcissist' community TV star finds entrance again, with strong overtones of the Benjaminian chastisement of the star system in Hollywood in his *Art in the Age of*


*Mechanical Reproduction.* If this ‘communalisation’ of PACs and cyberspace alike is left to market forces alone, then, as benign as it may sound, it will not be able to deliver the kind of activism engendered by present community media. And here Jenkins’ provocative question, “Is ideological and aesthetic purity really more valuable than transforming our culture?” (2007, p.249) does not go far enough. It is exactly those community media practices which should shape ideological and aesthetic judgements. Purity has not really been an issue, but community is. And a community which is sensitised to media even more so. Subjecting any ideological and aesthetic judgements merely to market forces has so far had mixed results at best. With the advent of mass media production facilities, this verdict was to cover production as well. Adhocracies and fandom are necessary elements for thriving cultures, but reflective practices still need to be learned. And here community media must be in the forefront, professional and self-reflexive at the same time. And, indeed, Jenkins further remarks on the necessity of teaching media literacy turn his argument into this direction. Problems do arise when media are viewed mostly from a commercial aspect. Case in point is entertainment4 where transmedia is mostly made fruitful for commercial media professionals. Jenkins’ is largely an American perspective which does not cover the European situation unless properly localized. Already from its inception, American TV history has a very different background than European TV history. American TV was solidly built on commercial companies, whereas in Europe TV developed out of state regulatory agencies, mostly postal offices. This governmental regulatory framework remained by and large intact throughout the last 90 years, with commercial TV playing a much smaller role than in the US. And therefore TV remains much more politicized in Europe. The fact that in Germany the conservatively ruled federal states did not allow public access to be established clearly demonstrates that they took a conservative standpoint regarding broadcasting media, thus disclosing a certain fear of these media if they were handed over to the masses. In retrospect, this fear was wholly unfounded, as the ‘masses’ never availed themselves of these broadcasting means for the first time, which also was a shock, but this time for the leftists. Other media philosophies highlight the fact that new media change the makeup of our cognitive processes. This is true for the way media influence our own identity formation, but also includes acts of cognition via and in media themselves. Thus, Erin Reilly speaks of ‘Distributed Cognition’ and defines it the following way: “We define distributed cognition as the ability to interact meaningfully with tools that expand mental capacities. [The resulting] Collective intelligence focuses on the ability of humans working together and is a complementary skill to the new media literacy, distributed cognition which can push our notion of pooling knowledge and expanding our capacity to include not just humans but the tools we use in sharing and expanding our knowledge.” (2010) Distributed cognition is therefore one of the new skills individuals have to acquire in order to survive in medatized times. And there are quite a number of other ones which require attention as well. In the text *Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century*, the author defines the areas of intervention needed to produce media sensitised active citizens.

The long list is a call to arms for Community TV and media. The areas in which media participation training is necessary include play, performance, simulation, appropriation, multitasking, distributed cognition, collective intelligence, transmedia navigation, networking, negotiation and visualization (Jenkins et al n.d.)

Here I would argue that this is exactly the point of intervention for public access channels. They are able to use philosophies tuned during the absolute reign of TV and broaden their educational approach to new media. This is today more necessary than ever.

The chance Public Access TV has because of convergence is that it allows for transgression between platforms. This will also change content flow. It is changing from a structured top

down model (i.e. producer → aggregator → station → viewer) to a 2-way model in which aggregators receive feedback and data from stations/communities and viewers:



(Content Flow, n.d.)

Already Jenkins made clear that a distinction should be drawn between "interactivity," which he sees as a technological property, and "participation," which he considers to be a social and cultural response. He also observed that much of the viral content online right now has emerged from partnerships of new media makers and traditional non-profit organizations. "There is a new opportunity for alliances," he said. But he cautioned that non-profits and public broadcasters also need to be aware of ethical issues such as the debate about free labor—"not just in terms of uncompensated labor but the sense of consumer-driven content being exploited." (ibid.)

Additionally, public media makers need to consider the "participation gap." He notes that participation requires time and specific competencies that are not available to everyone. He also cautioned that diverse groups of people must feel empowered to participate. "As exciting as it might seem to funnel content and have a DIY ethos, we still have a ways to go before we achieve the goals of diversity," he said. (ibid)

Already during the 2008 Beyond Broadcasting Conference at the American University a session entitled 'Mapping the Money' stressed the fact that Public Broadcasting must also avail itself of commercial media. Thus, in 2008 PBS began to make some of its broadcasting

available on Hulu, a move not applauded BY all, as it was seen as a sell-out of public broadcasting by some. References in blogs would also be helpful to break into online viewership, as would social networks. The average age of a PBS viewer is 46. Ernest J. Wilson from the University of Southern California stated:

“As we think about business models, I want to reintroduce the notion of why we care about this—representation, openness, freedom, democracy....If you don’t get this right pretty soon, the quality of democracy will decline and stagnate...and it will be our fault....We are way behind the curve in public service media in adjusting to what is taking place on new digital platforms. It is frustrating and ridiculous.” (Schuler and Clark 2008)

At the same conference, Larry Irving pointed out another important change: ‘Appointment television is dead. You carry it with you. You go where you want to go. You watch it when you want to watch it.’ As an example, he cited Slingbox, a mobile device to watch DirecTV when traveling (Schuler and Clark 2008). The new mobility of TV would then add to the death of its programming schedule, as broadcasts would become both time and locale indifferent.

## V. Conclusion

Remembering the beginning of Public Access Television, it is good to note that much of it had been dependent on grassroots movements, on media activism. At least in Europe, these movements were then taken under the wing of mostly progressive governments and institutionalised. Many of them have existed for well over 20 years by now and while funding continues to be precarious, they have edged out a niche for themselves. The incision of the internet, as scary as it was at its inception, has in the meantime become a mainstay for these channels and has enhanced their programming power immensely, e.g. with YouTube clips or whole segments of programming being available for downloads or streaming. The reason for this alliance is that the internet itself sprang from the ideological bedrock upon which these stations were founded and was thus bound to create a positive impact.

Something many segments of the public have not completely come to appreciate, though, is the second function of these stations, the media training they offer. And while their programming has perhaps become contingent in some aspects due to the larger offerings available on the Internet, it is this media training that makes these stations an invaluable asset today. It is their ability to sensitise the public to and teach media participation which gives them their added value today. Oftentimes, they already in the beginning had forged close ties with media and/or communication departments at local universities, as indeed ROK TV did, but, especially in the times of the internet, this participation needs to be addressed much earlier on. Many European countries have already adopted what used to be called media literacy programmes, but what are perhaps better called ‘media participation programmes’, for schools and other early education institutions. It is these that Open Channels need to target and to forge alliances with. In the often-touted information society, these channels are simply a *sine qua non* when it comes to citizen media education. Here perhaps also lies one way of alleviating their universal funding crisis. For this to happen, governments need to be convinced that these channels are a valuable instrument and a ready source to tackle media education tasks. Initiatives such as the digital storytelling initiative by Northern California Public Broadcasting (KQED Education 2010), the *Beyond Broadcasting* conferences (Schuler and Clark 2008), education course downloads for children and youth as made available by MNN, media on offer from the Independent Media Center, the *Waves of Change* Google map project or the European *Viducate* network, the last one partly funded by the EU, are best practices which bring out the best in Public Access cross-over into the internet domain.

As demonstrated above, the American and European models of Public access do not necessarily coincide. It is also for this reason of differing (and not only financial) bases that some of the practices by media academics and activists from one realm might not readily translate into the other. Case in point is Jenkins attempt to come perhaps too close to commercial media in its effort to secure public access. However, when it comes to participatory culture and the highlighting of the need of distributed agency, both models fulfil their remits and successfully attract a significant number of individuals willing to risk their own identities in a mediated environment. Both systems are not optimal and it might be that they need to take onboard lessons learned from other parts of the world, especially those where media activism does not just result in funding problems, but rather might be detrimental to one's life. In 2009, a record 68 journalists were killed worldwide (Nichols 2009). And it might be that media practices as resistance in such countries could remind Western media systems of the importance of such resistance (cf. *The global village cat*, or the *Alliance for Community Media*, which provide links to citizen media on a global scale). Thus, while the public access stations were forerunners of the kind of media intervention which would bring the internet to its own, they now reap the latter's benefits by successfully applying its many channels. Over the last 15 years or so, Public Access has gone from being an ideological tool forged by (leftist) media activists against conservative governments to being a reservoir of media support and practices which help to participate in today's media societies, from competitor to co-creator of new media consciousnesses. Activism is needed as much today as it was 20 or 40 years ago and the structures and networks created of Open Channels go a long way towards the goal of a Popperian open society embedded in a post-modern media environment.

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# Clear, Unclear and Non-media – an Attempt at Conceptualisation

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János Tóth<sup>a</sup>, Csaba Vass<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Eötvös Loránd University, Department of Social Sciences, Hungary

<sup>b</sup> Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, Institute of Social Sciences and Communication, Hungary

**Abstract:** Today, the expression "media" firmly retains a broad language function both in professional and public discourse, the essence of which is a signification of the auditory, visual, audiovisual and digital-electronic "press", including both the tools and agents. The term seems scientific from academic viewpoint and precise in public discourse. However, analogies drawn from some of its connotations, which can serve as a foundation to signify various media organisations, are adequate only for some segments of the semantic field of the term and for the roles of various entities described as "media" in the context of mass communication studies. In this paper we shall make an attempt to clarify whether the general name "media" and the more specific "medium" adequately marks the complex institutional system and its individual members to which it is applied in mass communication studies. To this end, after outlining the semantic scope of the term, we will try to identify differences postulated essential in the structure and operation of the constituents of the institutional structure it marks. These differences, viewed through specific types and cases, can either corroborate its use or can necessitate a refinement or rejection of its application.

**Keywords:** media, producent, vertical integration, content production, influence, transformation, transition

## Introduction

The English "media", as the plural form of "medium", comes from the Latin *medius*, which in turn has its origin in the Greek μέσος (μέσος). In the following, we will base the starting point of our investigations of the entity referred to in communication sciences as "medium" and "media" on its first dictionary meaning, designating an entity "which lies in the middle, or between other things; intervening body or quantity" (Webster 1913, p.908. This

*Address for Correspondence:* János Tóth, email: [jatoth@caesar.elte.hu](mailto:jatoth@caesar.elte.hu)

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generalised definition is also supported by Weekly 1921, p.914, Klein 1967, p.956, Shipley 1979, p.228, Simpson & Weiner, 1991, p.554, Valpy 1828, p.255, Andrews 1851, p.935, Niermeyer 1976, p.667, Donnegan 1831, p.808, Giles 1840, p.416, and Liddel and Scott 1883, p.944). The semantic content of these expressions strongly varies even in a particular language. In its variations, the scope of meaning can be broader or narrower. Particularly in different language versions, loss from or addition to the meaning is also traceable: in texts about mass communication—as it is quite well-known, its earliest versions developed in English-speaking countries in the 1920's—the meanings of the English variant will be relevant, where its meaning retains the “in the middle” and “intervening” sense but lacks the meaning components suggesting “impartiality”, “neutrality”, and “public” of the Greek and Latin terms (Demeter 2011, pp.110-111). The fact that this is not only linguistically relevant is illustrated on the one hand by the classical case of thinking about a “generalized symbolic media,”<sup>1</sup> which plays a central role in human life-opportunities and mediates between, as Habermas would say, “system” and “lifeworld,” as well as between their subsystems. On the other hand, this relevance is also shown by the current discourses about the social-public role of the media, its potential in forming identities and attitudes, and its role in obtaining and maintaining power. It is easy to understand what significance the examination of the semantic field of the term “medium” has in this study from communication-theoretic viewpoint if we focus on some preliminary questions which can be constructed based both on what is covered by the English term and what is not. At the same time, it can also be put forward that the examination of these questions and the answers to them will serve as a theoretical framework to the examination of the structural and functional characteristics of media organisations.

## Preliminary Questions

Starting with McLuhan, scientific thinking about the media almost always requires a preliminary resolution whether the fundamental questions of the discipline should refer to the media itself or to the media content that is broadcasted or published. This requirement and the wide-ranging variety of conclusions one can arrive at as possible endpoints of the debates will force us too to make this choice with regard to how we will proceed. Mediation carried out by the media requires a complex activity technologically, structurally, and functionally, which, beyond its contribution to mediation, has the potential to be used to achieve other results as well. As experience suggests, these potentials may get actualised with changes in the *zeitgeist* and in individual and institutional interests, so we tend to side with the opinion that basic research needs to concentrate primarily on the mediator and only secondarily on the mediated content itself. We should also add that an interest in the latter should always remain relative to how the mediator selects and modifies the content. In order to avoid an arbitrariness of division in selecting the object of our research, by identifying an institution as “medium”, we will apply the criteria presented in the introduction: the prerequisite of mediation is the middle position. But before proceeding with this categorisation, we need to answer three questions:

1. What is the status of those institutions which are both sources and mediators of the content they transmit?

2. At what extent does a process, which can be labelled as “transmission”, allow the editing of the transmitted content? How and where can the boundary be drawn between simple transmission and the transmission of an edited content, which retains only a level of similarity to the original?
3. From communication-theoretical perspective, is it reasonable not to make a clear distinction between the following types of institutions by naming them uniformly as media?
  - a. They transmit their own content to their target audience.
  - b. They modify the content they received from external sources and then transmit the result to their target audience.
  - c. They simply transmit the unchanged content they receive from external sources.

## Discussion

A short answer to the first question is that the source of message in a process of transmission is not the medium but an agent of transmission. Here, it is appropriate to outline the difference between “mediation” and “disclosure”, which is an elemental distinction to make in this writing in order to emphasize either a mediated content or an agent responsible for initiating the process. While the role of the medium is to serve as the *vehicle* of the mediated content, the agent stands in the role of a producer: the agent *produces* the disclosed content. This distinction will also point at the middle position of the medium and the terminal position of the producer in the tritransitive process of transmission. If, according to the designated meaning of “medium”, we regard the “position between two” as an important criterion, we can supplement the question in the following way: What is the status of those entities, the position of which is between a source and its target (audience) in the mediation process? This wording makes it immediately apparent that the following conclusion can be drawn without any further analysis of the medium, which looks obvious from communication-theoretical perspective but has received little attention so far: the medium as an in-between can be identical neither with the source of the message, nor with its target audience. Furthermore, we can regard no institution or organisation as medium, if it transmits a content produced by itself, instead of one originating in an external source.

Nowadays, when there is more and more emphasis on the research of the large-scale market and organisational convergence which can be observed inside the so-called media sector, this condition cannot be neglected because the convergence can easily reach a stage where the result of a series of corporate mergers and acquisitions will be organisations capable of content production and their distribution through their own media—publishing houses, televisions, radios, and cinema networks (McChesney 2005, Bagdikian 2000, p.xvii, Noam 2009, p.104). These phenomena, as the “vertical integration” of the media, were brought into the focus of attention by media economics and regulation, although this process in fact escapes the scope of media studies because here, both analytically and in reality, one of the terminal members gets integrated with the middle member, which leads to the termination of the middle position, bringing about the dissolution of the medium on organisational level.

Naturally, this does not mean that a vertically-integrated “media” enterprise cannot take part in the process of mediation as a sender instead of a medium. In order to be able to continue the examination of the process of mediation in this environment, where mass communication

studies traditionally concentrates on media institutions whereas these institutions are gradually disappearing, we need to distinguish the technological tools of mediation from the organisations that use these tools to transmit their “media content”. After this distinction has been made, we can include the cases when media enterprises transmit content produced by themselves because, in a technological sense, it can be regarded as mediation, where the medium in this tritransitive process is the technological architecture between the media corporation and the viewer, listener, or reader. The media enterprise here stands in a terminal position, which is incompatible with the designated meaning of the term “medium”, and because of which the term could not be used legitimately and adequately. If we broaden our perspective and we concentrate on the organisations instead of the content, then a well-founded claim can be made that there is a well-defined segment of the set of organisations the categorisation of which as media is problematic: the ones belonging to this segment are those whose profile is predominantly or entirely composed of self-produced content. This problematic nature becomes particularly obvious when a programme produced by the media organisation is about the events or happenings of a situation produced, being produced, or planned to be produced by the organisation itself.<sup>2</sup> If we dispense with the question of where the content was produced or where it can be positioned and what it makes available, and we concentrate only on the fact that a news item was communicated from point A to point B, or was made accessible in point B, then we will not be able to make a distinction between a "sender" and a "mediator", or between "disclosure" and "mediation".

Nevertheless, such cases are also possible, where the media enterprise behaves both as a source and a mediator, that is, certain parts of the content are self-produced and other parts mediated. Strictly speaking, even the following assertion can be accepted as true: institutions and organisations in median position cannot function purely as mediators. There is little probability for the realisation of pure mediation, which therefore needs to be handled as an ideal type, that is, as an analytical construct, having its reality as a point of reference, serving the researcher to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in specific cases. One of the first thematizations of this problem was in Habermas’s examination of the press organizations of classical civil public sphere (*Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit*). The description he published in his seminal work ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ about the press organisations at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century is quite close to the ideal type of purely mediating media organisation. For these organisations, both news agencies and professional journalism as a full-time job were unknown, and for the content to be mediated only one editor was employed, who, in some cases, also functioned as an owner, author, and reader; but the role of this person was typically limited to the topical arrangement of the ideas and writings of private citizens making use of their reason, and, if needed, the separation of information from commentary. This led to a situation where, apart from the (civic) interests of the financier, which limited what problems could and could not be discussed, and the norms of public discourse, the reasoning citizens could discuss the problems they regarded as worth discussion based on their experience and not according to the rules of a media organisation. Due to this, the press, at least for a short period of time, “remained an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a mediator and intensifier of public discussion” (Habermas 1993, p.183).

The two main characteristics of the press organisations described by Habermas, the facilitation of a public conversation among citizens and a commitment of the organisation to disseminate unbiased and independent information, are properties that helped these organisations not only to meet the technical role of the mediator but also to satisfy the criteria of objectivity and neutrality. For this reason, they can also be regarded as significant contributors to the development of the freedom of speech and expression.

However, since the publication of Habermas's work, several historical researches (for a summary of which see for example Curran 1991, pp.38-41, and Iosifidis 2011, pp. 31-33) to revise and reveal the facts have provided severe criticisms of his conclusions, which can also serve as an effective refutation of his analysis, for which reason, the reality of a medium behaving purely as a mediator on organisational level cannot be considered as corroborated. It is not the purpose of this chapter, however, to clarify the question whether there existed, exists, or will ever exist an organisation which functions purely and exclusively as mediator of contents produced by others. Instead, our aim is to provide some clues to the creation of a theoretical model making it possible to compare the results of empiria to an ideal situation, and by so doing, media organisations will be comparable not only against each other, in a closed circle, but against a consensually acceptable mode of operation. This objective is not purely theoretical—even though this would be perfectly acceptable in the case of media, as with any targets of basic research—, its significance cannot be neglected from a practical viewpoint either, as it renders comprehensible the various modes of practical application, and at the same time can serve as a propaedeutic of this comprehension.

Pragmatic arguments can also be raised against the practicability of a pure mediating role. In the tritransitive processes, in which the mediation can happen, the mere existence of the medium can make an influence: a given medium is what it is, therefore, not something different, by which it determines the context of transition.<sup>3</sup> This is true for media with or without an organisation. In media enterprises, another productive effect is also in play: while transmitting, the members of the organisation, who map (or transform) the object of transmission, as a media organisation, recreate the object of transmission in a scene provided by the technological architecture of the medium. As Stuart Hall writes about television broadcasts, which can be extended to include the audiovisual and digital-electronic press as well:

„The 'message form' is the necessary 'form of appearance' of the event in its passage from source to receiver”, and „a raw historical event can not, *in that form*, be transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse” (1980, quoted by Moores 2005, p.110)

Why the act of transformation or mapping is the product of the media enterprise, and not of any other participant of the mass communication framework, becomes clear as soon as we name the processes which—from the viewpoint of the terminal members of the transmission process—are exactly the opposite of mediation. One of these processes is *self-disclosure*, when it is the agent who represents oneself,<sup>4</sup> the one who creates one's own media imprint and selects or creates a medium one deems suitable. In another such process, the initiative is not from the media organisation either but from the media consumer, which is called *prosuming*,<sup>5</sup> when the media consumer maps various types of content and makes it available—mainly but not exclusively in internet environment, and inside the framework of participant journalism—through a medium to other consumers.

For this reason, we have to make a distinction for media enterprises having their own organisations whether the content mediated by them is influenced by them or by an external agent, and, in the former case, whether that influence is necessary or unnecessary. The necessary influence on the mediated content exercised unintentionally by mediating organisations, which are nowadays collectively referred to as media, from now on will be called passive influence, which needs to be distinguished from intentional or voluntaristic, that is unnecessary, influences coming from inside the organisations. These influences can be

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summed up in the category of “influencing”, which can appear in several stages—namely, thematization, problematization, and formalisation—of the transformation process, where the stages do not necessarily follow each other in the same order or are the consequences of each other.

Thematization is when the media organisation—normally, in accordance with the interests or intentions of the owner or owners—applies a predetermined *profile*, that is, a preliminary, *reference-based selection is made* to determine what the owners allow to appear on the interface they provide. As it is quite probable that the medium, because of its own nature, cannot mediate content referring to certain objects, only those cases belong to the sphere of thematization where the exclusion or propagation of a certain content is subject to the voluntarist decision of the organisation. These voluntarist decisions can be further divided into those resulting from the internal regulation of the media company and those originating in conformity to external regulations—typically, state or international law—, nevertheless, in both cases the existence of thematization is a fact. Historical examples<sup>6</sup> can be listed, as well as contemporary ones,<sup>7</sup> to support the claim. However, it is more common nowadays that its application is linked to problematization and formalisation in current media environments.

Problematization is the phenomenon where those attributes of the mediated content are edited with which the content in question refers.<sup>8</sup> This activity can only be fully described as a selection from among the possible interpretations of the original content if editing the attributes presented during mediation does not make the original object or event, which it aims to map, inaccessible. If the meaning is tampered with, references to the original target can be obscured, that is, such a selection of the attributes of the mediated content can be made—by addition, omission, and substitution—that the modified attributes do not refer to the original event or object the mediation of which the content purports to be. This can happen in a way that the mediated content becomes the representation of another original event or object (→misrepresentation), but also in a way that it represents no original event or object (→false representation a.k.a untruth or lie). In problematization, therefore, “editing” signifies a decision-making process the result of which determines what meaning the mediated content can have when it is made public, which enables the organisation of the medium to behave both as a mediator and as a producent, that is, they can manufacture a meaning to the mediated content, while leaving its reference untouched.

Nevertheless, the mediated content can be influenced not only by editing the referring attributes: there is a difference between what meaning the given content has when mediated and what meaning is attributed in the head of the target audience to the mediated content, that is, it is often a part of mediation to *edit the perceptibility of the referring attributes* of the source. Earlier, it was already mentioned that it is necessary to transform or map the mediated content in the media. However, formalisation techniques used during this transformation process can be used with or without an intent to influence. Those elements of technical editing which are not exclusively for the preservation or improvement of the clarity of the mediated content (e.g. improving image or soundtrack clarity or proofreading the script or article) are especially suitable for this purpose. What concepts and opinions are forming in the heads of the target audience is greatly influenced by the perspective of perception offered by the medium. The perspective of the camera is a good analogy for the perspective of the target audience relative to the content (Rutherford 2002, Jamieson & Campbell 2006, p.85); camera viewing angle and camera movements in general imitates human space recognition and proxemics (Bordwell 1977) while cuts, transitions and focus can frame mental activities in charge for information processing.

We can firmly state about the relationship between “influence” and “medium” that the former

is not among the lexical meanings of the latter, but it is also true that it is not a criterion that a medium must be free from any intention to influence. It is a criterion, however, that a medium is in a middle position between the mediated source and the target audience, and it also makes a significant functional difference between different media whether they actively influence the mediated content or not. On the other hand, the current professional and colloquial usage of the terms “medium” and “media” lacks proper distinction and is often inconsistent when used for transmission organisations. Apparently, the basis of the appellation here is the technical-technological capability of the institutions to transmit, which is a common characteristic that we can call, borrowing the mathematical term, “a greatest common divisor”.

The most obvious weakness of this appellation is the overgeneralization of the term “media” to an extent of becoming meaningless. It is hard to imagine any entity which is incapable or unsuitable to transmit any received impulse at least on technical level and at least in a fragmentary way. We are in the situation that if we take into consideration the scientific requirement of conceptual clarity—the essence of which is not to use the same name for different phenomena, and even if we do not have a strict definition, it should be possible to give a meaningful explanation about the phenomena being examined—we consider it expedient to make a distinction between institutions commonly called “media” according to whether the content is intentionally influenced and where the content they transmit is created. The following options exist for this distinction:

- we can carry out an examination inside the set of organisations technically and technologically capable of transmittance whether they have any other qualities with class-creating power which are in conflict with the distinctive features of a “medium”
- we can create additional labelled subclasses according to their identifying characteristics inside the class-designating horizon of the “medium”

The first approach provides an opportunity to divide media enterprises on an organisational level into media and producents. Accordingly, the category "producer" will include organisations whose main profile is not mediation but primarily the disclosure of self-produced content through a given architecture as medium to a given target audience. This approach, not from the previously discussed functionalist viewpoint but with focus on economic (Vass 1992; 2011) and power theoretical issues (Vass 2005; 2010) had already been elaborated by one of the authors of the present article. On the other hand, those organisations can be categorised as "medium" which primarily organise the mediation of content originating outside of them, and this mediation on institutional level is through the media organisation, and on technological level, through the technological architecture they employ.

The second approach also provides an opportunity to make a difference between clear and unclear media from the perspective of content influencing. We call clear media those organisations, where the dominant part of the mediated content is not influenced intentionally, and unclear media are those where a dominant part of the mediated content is under any non-passive, intentional influence from inside the media organisation.

Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that a given organisation—no matter whether it is a clear or unclear medium, or a producer—shows symptoms of abnormal operation for an insignificant proportion of the transmitted content or programmes, and for this insignificant proportion, it will behave abnormally, showing characteristics of content management that can also be observed in the other two organization types.

Based on the above, we can assert that institutions capable of technological transmission can be typologized according to their effect on the transmitted content:

	Effects on content	Operation	Type of transition
<b>Clear medium</b>	mediation	Regular operation <sub>cm</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>um</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>p</sub>	
<b>Unclear medium</b>	influencing	Regular operation <sub>um</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>cm</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>p</sub>	
<b>Producent</b>	producing	Regular operation <sub>p</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>cm</sub>	
		Irregular operation <sub>um</sub>	

Table 1. General types of effects on transmitted content

**Conclusion**

In the discussion above, we made an attempt to present and explain the current problems related to the usage of the word "medium". At the same time, by introducing the term "producent", and through the distinction made between "clear" and "unclear" media, we also tried to make a suggestion for a resolution. The results can confirm us in our conviction that a correct naming of the institutions capable of the transmission in the technological sense has a great significance inside the scientific field and can have great relevance outside the field as well. One of the points we need to emphasise is the application of adequate and precise concepts, which is attached to distinguishing truth from falsehood in the scientific field, establishing and maintaining, though often indirectly, another one of the key points: the scientific reputation of researchers. Finally, this brings forth the rising social-causal stakes of orienting human lives with the help of those with high scientific reputation.

NOTES

1. In Parsons' AGIL-schema, the generalised symbolic media, that is, money, political power, influence, and value-commitments (Parsons 1975, p.104) serve as generalised interpreter languages to keep contact between the subsystems isolated analytically. This was reconsidered and developed upon from the viewpoint of communication-science by Luhman, distinguishing between language, distributive media, and symbolically generalised communication media (1995, pp.160-161), and by Habermas, differentiating steering media

replacing language as an action- coordinating mechanism (Parsons A & G's media) from communication media, preserving its dependence on language and the lifeworld (Habermas 1987, pp.273-282 esp. p.277).

2. A news programme produced internally by a media organisation makes an external event accessible more or less adequately. However, events made available to the target audience via the airing of a self-produced reality show, chat show, drama series etc. have their sources inside the media organisation and can be regarded as the direct construct of the organisation.

3. Naturally, the presence of a medium specifies not only the context of transition but also the wider macro-environment into which it is integrated. For this reason, a situation can also arise where a medium is introduced into a macro-environment for the very effects of its presence. However, these cases go beyond the scope of this writing.

4. There is only so much overlap between self-representation and the disclosure categories contrasted earlier with mediation, as self-representation, which can be considered a special case of disclosure, is self-disclosure.

5. The same way as McLuhan and Neveu have earlier predicted (1972, p.4), there's a convergence not only between source and medium, but one can also develop between the source and the target audience. Its early conceptualisation on the field of economic theory (Toffler 1980, Kotler 1986) pointed out that prosumption, which unifies the producer and the consumer when production serves one's own consumption, poses a serious challenge in the postindustrial era for the market which traditionally mediates between the product and its consumer, and marketing activities bent on influencing consumer attitudes. For our topic, the significance of this convergence lies in the fact that the prosumer employs a high degree of decoupling between the transformation or mapping process and the media organisation, and thus it also filters out from the process of mediation the content producing and content influencing effects of this organisation.

6. A well-known example is the one in 1956, when the three biggest radio networks of those times (ABC, CBS, and NBC) banned Dot and Diamond's song "Transfusion" on the ground that there is "nothing funny in blood transfusion", and Bob Dylan's "Love for Sale" shared the same fate for its references to prostitution (Gross, Perebinosoff & Gross 2005, p.201).

7. Iran serves good examples for reference-based selection, where haraam contents or contents leading to haraam are censored or sanctioned on a religious basis, as well as, following a political logic, any references to the holocaust as a historical event (Hejazi 2011, p.57-58). For the same reason, any reference to Tiananmen Square massacre is closely monitored and censored in China (Reporters Without Borders 2009).

8. Strictly speaking, naturally, it is not the content that refers but the perceiver of the content.

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### **Author Contributions**

Created and developed (in previous works) the original idea on which the concept of the manuscript is based: Cs.V. Developed the concept and drafted the manuscript: J.T. Reviewed and critically commented the draft version: Cs. V. Revised the draft, prepared the tables and wrote the manuscript: J.T. All authors take full responsibility for the content of the paper.

# On Analysis and its Role in Communication Theories

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**Márton Demeter**

Eszterházy College, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies, Hungary

**Abstract:** This paper tries to show that framing a propedeutics for a given discipline necessarily presupposes some so-called analytical movements with which the conceptual frame of the discipline could be related to itself, and to other disciplines as well. The situation is the same with communication studies, where, as this paper proposes, many of the so-called axioms of human communication should have been analyzed. After explicating the main types of analysis, the discussion tries to apply its analytical methods on Watzlawick's first axiom of human communication, and tries to show, that the statement that '*one cannot not communicate*' is either false or meaningless.

**Keywords:** propedeutics, analysis, communication, pragmatics, mental states, meaning

## Programme

Since the role which analysis plays in the formal and the so-called hard (or natural) sciences is unquestionable long before, it's unsurprising that social sciences also developed their analytic methods in time. Maybe it's not odd to say that the state of a given discipline could be estimated through its analytical methods, but, of course, it's not obvious that an analytical method should be explicitly called analysis. The main concern of this paper is to estimate the possible role of analysis in communication inquiry which could be informative in connection with the state of the discipline. For this end this discussion starts with the analysis of 'analysis' itself, then it tries to apply the various analytical forms to pure communication inquiry. Finally, as an object-lesson, the discussion ends with the analysis of the eminently antinomic but much popular statement that '*one cannot not communicate*'.

## Analyzing analysis

The English word 'analysis' obviously derives from the Greek ἀνάλυσις which first of all means loosing, releasing or dissolving (Liddel-Scott 1996), but also means problem solving.

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*Address for Correspondence:* Marton Demeter, email: demeter@komejournal.com

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In the logic, or more precisely, in the dialectics of Aristotle ἀνάλυσις means the process of the reduction of the imperfect figures into the perfect one. So analysis originally means a problem solving method, where the problem could be physical (as in the case of releasing a knot) and intellectual (as in the case of clarifying an ambiguous situation) as well. The manifold interpretations of the verb ἀναλύω (which stands for the English 'to analyze') strengthen the notion that analysis means, first of all, clarification, because ἀναλύω means to unloose, to undo, to set free, to cancel faults, to release from a spell.

But the fact that analysis is clarification could be affirmed without reference to its etymology: suffice it to say that the methods that call themselves analysis *do* clarification. Of course this short paper could not present a historically coherent picture of the concept of analysis, but it could delineate the most characteristic types. Let us suppose, that the logical structure of <Analysis> runs as follows.

- (1) Analysis <analyser<sub>i...</sub>; <analysandum<sub>i...</sub>; analysans<sub>i...</sub>>>

The formula (1) means that the process of analysis should be interpreted as ordering, which requires three necessary constituents. So analyses include the matching of (at least) one *analysandum* and (at least) one *analysans* by (at least) one *analyser*, where the analysandum is the *target* of the analysis (which has to be analysed); analysans is the *product*, and analyser is the *agent* of the analysis. In linguistic terms, analysis could be interpreted with thematic roles<sup>1</sup> as follows.

- (2) The analyser analyses the analysandum for the analysans.

- (2a) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))}

- (2b) The analyser<sub>Ag</sub> analyses the analysandum<sub>T</sub> for the analysans<sub>P</sub>.

- (2c) AGENT ><sub>dep</sub> TARGET ><sub>dep</sub> PRODUCT

- (2d) /Analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

The formulas (2) – (2d) show that, *logically*, the analysans depends on the analysandum which depends on the analyser. Of course it could be assumed that in an „analysis” the analysandum depends on the analysans, but in this case the analysis should be accounted as fake, or the thematic roles should be inverted as in (3).

- (3) (x)AG ><sub>dep</sub> (y)PRD ><sub>dep</sub> (z)TRG ⇒ (x)AG ><sub>dep</sub> (y)TRG ><sub>dep</sub> (z)PRD

The above mentioned consideration could be easily illustrated by a simple type of analysis, namely *translation*. Let's suppose that an agent tries to translate the English verb 'to occur' to German. Then the analysis would be translation, the analysandum would be the verb 'to occur', and the analysans would be 'vorkommen', and 'to occur' should be precede 'vorkommen'. When an agent tries to find an adequate match for 'vorkommen', then 'vorkommen' will be the analysandum, and 'to occur' will be the analysans. Of course, in the case of a simple translation, this kind of inversion could be easily perceived, but it should be kept in mind in the case of less common analyses too.

But the indefinite constituents of the formula (1) show that (1) could be interpreted many ways depending on the indices of the arguments. It means that, for example, plural analysans with singular analysandum makes a different kind of analysis than singular analysans with plural analysandum. Actually, every interpretation of (1) constitutes a type of it, so the following interpretations all have the logical structure of (1), but the same time they are quite unlike in practice.

### On the types of analysis

The statement that *definition* could be interpreted as a kind of analysis maybe run against the philosophical tradition but it may be tenable upon further consideration. The logical structure of definition runs as follows.

(4) Definition  $\langle \text{definiator}_{i\dots}; \langle \text{definiendum}_{i\dots}; \text{definiens}_{i\dots} \rangle \rangle$

Of course a middle-sized library could have been crowded with books discoursing on the philosophical tradition of the single word *definition*; but there are at least two interpretations in connection with definitions that should be certainly mentioned here. The problem here is similar with the Kantian question regarding mathematical and philosophical definition (Kant 1781). According to the first interpretation, definition should be considered as the determination of an intensional equality between expressions. In effect, here definition is *fixation*. For example, defining communication could be as follows.

(4) Definition  $\langle \text{definiator}_{i\dots}; \langle \text{communication}; \langle \text{information processing} \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(4a)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{DEFINE} (x(y,z)) \}$

(4b) The definiator<sub>Ag</sub> define communication<sub>T</sub> for information processing<sub>p</sub>.

(4c) AGENT  $\succ_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $\succ_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT

(4d) /Define/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

The formulas under (4) show that here definition fixates the intensional equality of two expressions, namely 'communication' and 'information processing'. But a definition of this kind could be prosperous only if both expressions are parts of the language, and at least one of them is well known or retraceable to some self-evident fact or entity. The most famous example of definition of this kind is the circumscribe of bachelor as wifeless man, and definitions of this kind are usually called as analytical. Of course there are many wifeless men that could never be considered as bachelors, while no bachelor could have wife that squarely shows that analytical definitions could constitute semantical implications instead of intensional equality.<sup>ii</sup> Definitions of this kind could be easily found in the field of social sciences, and they could be called as *methodological definitions*.

But there are another sort of definitions that mostly take place in the field of formal sciences including mathematics and logics. Here definition means *constituting*, as in the case of (5).

(5) Definition  $\langle \text{definiator}_{i\dots}; \langle \text{fractal}; \langle \text{a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension strictly exceeds the topological dimension} \rangle \rangle$ <sup>iii</sup>

- (5a)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{DEFINE} (x(y,z)) \}$
- (5b) The definiator<sub>Ag</sub> define fractal<sub>T</sub> for a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension strictly exceeds the topological dimension<sub>P</sub>.
- (5c) AGENT  $>_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $>_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT
- (5d) /Define/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

It's easy to see that in the case of (5) and related formulas (at least) the definiendum had been *constituted* by the definition. The ontological status of the constituted definiendum is an object of sustained controversy amongst philosophers and mathematicians, but the minimal notion that, at least conceptually, a new entity arises by the definition of this kind seems to be plausible as a general rule. Definitions constituting new entities could be called *real definitions*.<sup>iv</sup> The above mentioned considerations in connection with methodological and real definitions should be noted in the case of other analytical methods.

The next characteristic type of analytical methods is the so-called *reductive analysis*. An analysis should be called reductive when the analysandum could be eliminated from a description by the analysans.

- (6a) Analysis  $\langle$ analyser $\langle$ description<sub>i</sub>  $\langle$ ...analysandum... $\rangle$  $\rangle$
- (6b) Analysis  $\langle\langle$ analyser $\langle$  description<sub>j</sub>  $\langle$ ... $\langle$ analysans<sub>i</sub>, analysans<sub>j</sub>... $\rangle$  $\rangle$  $\rangle$
- (6c) analyser $\langle$ description<sub>i</sub>  $\equiv$  description<sub>j</sub> $\rangle$
- (6d)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{ANALYSE} (x(y,z)) \}$
- (6e) The reductive-analyser<sub>Ag</sub> reductive-analyse communication<sub>T</sub> for information processing<sub>P</sub>.
- (6f) AGENT  $>_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $>_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT
- (6g) /Reductive-analyse/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [REDUCTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

Two important feature of reductive analysis should be mentioned here. First, the real products of analyses of this kind are the *descriptions* from where the analysandum had been eliminated. A reductive analysis affirms that all meaningful descriptions with the analysed analysandum could be (or even must be) alternated by descriptions with the analysant. So a reductive analysis often presupposes that the analysans is somehow more elementary than the analysandum: the analysis-concepts of Carnap, Russell or the early Wittgenstein were certainly of this kind. For example, in the case of 'communication as information processing' a reductive analysis could affirm that the complex expression 'information processing' refers to more elementary entities (or: consists of more elementary concepts) than 'communication', and, basically, all meaningful descriptions containing 'communication' should be alternated with descriptions containing 'information processing' instead of 'communication'. But the term 'elementary' could be interpreted at least two ways. First, it could be interpreted *vertically*, which means that the analysandum *supervenes* on the analysant (as, with some

simplification, organs could be considered as entities supervene on cells which supervene on atoms). Second, it could be interpreted *horizontally*, which means that analysandum is a *complex* of analysans (as a table is a complex of its legs and leaf). But in both cases reductive analysis affirms that the analysandum could be examinable in the terms of the analysans (which statement evokes hard controversies in connection with the limits and fields of many disciplines, for example in the case of the philosophy of mind).

Second, interpreting the symbol of identity ( $\equiv$ )<sup>v</sup> in the case of the formula (6c) raises many problems. It is obvious enough, that, in the case of reductive analysis, the analysans and the analysandum could not be merely synonyms, because the analytic level of the analysans must be more elementary than the analysandum's. So, first of all, (6c) could be interpreted *extensionally*, which means that the *reference* of the analysandum and the reference of the analysans is one and the same (of course, this way of interpretations could lead to serious problems in mathematics and social sciences. Moreover, it's very hard to imagine, that a reference of this kind could be find for 'communication' and 'information processing'). An alternative interpretation could suggest that that formula (6c) should be interpreted *intensionally*, which means that the *meaning* of the analysandum and the meaning of the analysans is one and the same. Here reduction should show that the meaning of the analysandum could be derived from the meaning of the analysans, which means that the concept for the analysandum conceptually depends on the concept for the analysans (and, of course, this interpretation raises all the philosophical questions in connection with 'meaning'. For example, it's hard to maintain the idea that the concept of 'communication' depends (conceptually, logically or even epistemologically) on the concepts of 'information' and 'processing'). And, finally, (6c) could be interpreted *methodologically*, which means that phenomena could be described *as communication* could be exhaustively described *as information processing* - on a more basical level. Methodological interpretations are very popular in social sciences, and, in connection with 'communication as information processing', it does not raise any serious philosophical problem – because of the fact that it seems to be simply false.

But the earlier mentioned presupposition of most reductive analyses - that the analysans is somehow more elementary than the analysandum – is not necessarily prevails. Instead of being more elementary, analysans could be held as a problem-solving appliance. This conception presupposes that the analysandum and the analysans are being able to fill the same cognitive function, while the analysans eliminates some – usually scientific or philosophical – problem which holds with the use of the analysandum. A similar view had been held by Quine (1960) who thought that a reductive analysis of this kind is, in fact, not an analysis but a *construction*, where the analyser generates constructions instead of decomposing complex formulas.

A third kind of reductive analysis, namely *explication* (Carnap 1967) could be formalized as follows.

- (7a) Explication  $\langle$  explicator  $\langle$  explicandum<sub>i</sub>, explicandum<sub>j</sub> ... explicandum<sub>n</sub>  $\rangle$ ;  $\langle$  explicans  $\rangle$
- (7b)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{EXPLICATE} (x(y,z)) \}$
- (7c) The explicator<sub>Ag</sub> explicate (conversation and dance and...networking)<sub>T</sub> for communication<sub>p</sub>.
- (7d) AGENT  $\rangle_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $\rangle_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT

(7e) /Explicate/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [EXPLICATE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

In the case of an explication, as it could be seen by the formalism, an explicator usually orders only one analysans for many analysandum. Because of the fact that the direction of an explication is seemingly just the opposite as the direction of analysis (in a narrow sense), which usually orders many analysans for an analysandum, a question may be raised whether explication is an instance of analysis or synthesis, but this question should not be answered here.

As opposed to reductive analyses, a *logical analysis* won't drive the analysis to 'more basical levels' but it tries to brighten the logical structure of the analysandum. In this case the analysans belong to a dictionary of a logical system  $L$ , as in the case of (8).

(8a) Logical analysis  $\langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \langle \dots \text{analysandum} \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(8b) Logical analysis  $\langle \langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_j \langle \dots \langle \text{analysans}_i, \text{analysans}_j \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle \in L_i$

(8c)  $\text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \equiv \text{description}_j \rangle$

(8d)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{ANALYSE} (x(y,z)) \}$

(8e) The  $\text{analyser}_{Ag}$  logical-analyse (every communication is a kind of information processing) $_T$  for  $(\forall x Fx \supset Gx)_P$ .

(8f) AGENT  $>_{dep}$  TARGET  $>_{dep}$  PRODUCT

(8g) /Logical-analyse/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [LOGICAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

Here logical analysis could show that, for example in the case of (6e), if something is affirmed as communication the same thing must be affirmed as information processing. Of course formulas with entailment could not be inverted, so a logical analysis of this kind could not be considered as a class of definition. So the logical description under (8e) would be false for communication in every case when something could be affirmed as communication but the same thing (or event, or action etc) could not be affirmed as information processing. In other cases the entailment will be true. But it's easy to see that (8e) can not be true since there are many examples of communication that do not contain information processing at all (for example in the cases of „fatic” communication).

An additional kind of analysis is the *conceptual analysis* which is concerned with the  $N$  natural (or ordinary) language.

(9a) Conceptual analysis  $\langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \langle \dots \text{analysandum} \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(9b) Conceptual analysis  $\langle \langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_j \langle \dots \langle \text{analysans}_i, \text{analysans}_j \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle \in N$

(9c)  $\text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \equiv \text{description}_j \rangle \in N$

(9d)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{CONCEPTUAL ANALYSE} (x(y,z)) \}$

(9e) The  $\text{analyser}_{Ag}$  conceptual-analyse communication $_T$  for information processing $_P$ .

(9f) AGENT  $>_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $>_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT

(9g) /Conceptual-analyse/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [CONCEPTUAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

A conceptual analysis usually investigates the logical structure of ordinary language and the so-called normal usage of a given expression which includes the investigation of the conditions by which an expression could or could not be applied for an entity. So a conceptual analysis could serve as a *propedeutics* for a given discipline but, because of its firm binding to the natural language, could not be an instrument for setting it up.

The last kind of analysis should be mentioned here is the so-called *connective analysis* (Strawson 1992) which tries to explain the analysandum and its relations with other concepts without substituting it, which means that in the case of a connective analysis the analysandum could be a part of the analysans.

(10a) Connective analysis  $\langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \langle \dots \text{analysandum} \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(10b) Connective analysis  $\langle \text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_j \langle \dots \text{analysandum}, \text{analysans}_i, \text{analysans}_j \dots \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(10c)  $\text{analyser} \langle \text{description}_i \equiv \text{description}_j \rangle$

(10d)  $\lambda z \lambda y \lambda x \{ \text{CONNECTIVE ANALYSE } (x(y,z)) \}$

(10e) The  $\text{analyser}_{\text{Ag}}$  connective-analyse  $\text{communication}_T$  for (communication in relation with information processing) $_P$ .

(10f) AGENT  $>_{\text{dep}}$  TARGET  $>_{\text{dep}}$  PRODUCT

(10g) /Connective-analyse/[V] $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda s$  [CONNECTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)]

In short, connective analysis could be considered as a minimum concept of analysis, as Strawson writes: „*Let us abandon the notion of perfect simplicity in concepts; let us abandon even the notion that analysis must always be in the direction of greater simplicity. Let us imagine, instead, the model of an elaborate network, a system, of connected items, concepts, such that the function of each item, each concept, could, from the philosophical point of view, be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its place in the system – perhaps better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind*” (STRAWSON 1992;19)

If conceptual analysis should be considered as a tool for constructing a propedeutics for a given discipline, then connective analysis should be considered as a tool for searching the position of it in connection with other disciplines. So it could be said without oversimplification that conceptual analyses should *proceed*, and connective analyses should *follow* the setting up of a discipline.

### An analysis of the so-called first axiom of human communication

The second part of this discussion would try to apply the method of analysis to a platitudinous statement in connection with communication, namely, that 'one cannot not communicate'.

- (11) One cannot not communicate.

The idea expressed by this statement has been the subject matter of much discussion in recent time, and most communication theorists seem to accept it. The idea is referable with the so-called Palo-Alto school, and, more precisely, with Paul Watzlawick (1967). The question may be raised what Watzlawick meant by it, and it should also be ask what different things could be meant by it. This paper shall not discuss these questions at all, but investigates whether the idea, when understand in a certain way, could be true or not.<sup>vi</sup>

It's obvious at first sight that in the statement (11) the expression 'communicating' falls under an act-category, but it's far more obscure what the reference of 'one' could be. Anyway, the logical structure of (11) could be formalized as follows:

- (11a)  $\langle \forall x \rangle \neg \diamond \neg \langle Fx \rangle$

which means that it's not possible for an x that x is not F, and it could be transformed as (11b) shows;

- (11b)  $\langle \forall x \rangle \Box \langle Fx \rangle$

which means that it's necessary for an x that x is F. So the most broad interpretation of (11) says that everything must communicate, which could be narrowed by the famous Quineian approach as every being must communicate.<sup>vii</sup> As it will be seen, this narrower interpretation still suffers from philosophical problems but, at least, liberates non-existent entities from the compulsion of communication. Since in logic the substantive verb 'to be' could not be handled as a predicate, but as a quantifier, the undermentioned interpretations both have the logical form of (11b).

- (11ba) If x exists, than x must communicate.

- (11bb) If x communicates, than x must exist.

(11ba) says that communication includes<sup>viii</sup> existence, because from (11ba) it follows by *modus tollens* that if x does not communicate it could not exist and by *modus ponens* it is impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x is non-existent than x is free to communicate or not.<sup>ix</sup> (11bb) rather says that existence includes communication, because from (11bb) it follows by *modus tollens* that if x do not exist it could not communicate and by *modus ponens* it is impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x does not communicate it is free *to be or not to be*. It could be seen that (11ba) and (11bb) contradict each other because (11bb) allows x to be and not to communicate which is impossible by (11ba). And, because of it, (11bb) contradicts to the statement that one cannot not communicate. But with a Quineian paraphrase (11b) could be interpreted in a third way as follows.

- (11bc) To be is to communicate.

Consider that (11bc) expresses an identity statement<sup>x</sup>; then it seems that the meaning of 'to be' is the same as the meaning of 'to communicate'.<sup>xi</sup> Consider again that (11bc) could be regarded as any kind of analysis from definition to reductive analysis etc. Then the question may be raised: which component of (11bc) is the analysandum, and which one is the analysans? (11bca) and (11bcb) show the difference.

(11bca) Analysis ⟨analyser<sub>i</sub>...;⟨to be...;to communicate⟩⟩

(11bcb) Analysis ⟨analyser<sub>j</sub>...;⟨to communicate...;to be⟩⟩

In the case of the former, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of existence, while he takes the meaning of communication for granted. In the case of the latter, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of communication, while he takes the meaning of existence for granted. But in both cases, 'to communicate' entails 'to be' and 'to be' entails 'to communicate', so the logical connective between the concept of communication and the concept of existence is biconditional (iff). It means that, literally, everything that communicates exists, *and* everything that exist communicates. However, this biconditional evokes many problems in both directions that could not be discussed here in details, but two considerations should be proposed. *First*, the statement that which communicates exist seems intuitively true but trivial since it's hard to imagine anything which communicates in spite of the fact that it do not exist or, at least, it must *had been* existed. But the same could be predicated on almost every verb say 'to sit' or 'to see' etc, so this statement is not too informative. *Second*, the statement that which exists communicates seems intuitively problematic since there *are* entities that not communicates in the strict sense of the word 'to communicate', for example, it's hard to say that an armchair or the Milky Way communicates. But this second statement is obviously far more interesting than the first one, since the theological interpretation of communication could corroborate the conception that which exists communicates.<sup>xii</sup> Of course an analysis of this interpretation could not be performed here.

Naturally, the idea behind the statement (11) surely narrows the scope of predication to human agents, which is revealable from the original text of Watzlawick's. Though (11) is the most quoted form of the original idea – which leads, as it was discussed above, to indefensible or, at least, problematic consequences – a refined interpretation of the idea may be proved tenable. Consider the statement expressed by (12).

(12) A human agent cannot not communicate.

The logical form of (12) is:

(12a)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \neg \diamond \neg G \langle x \rangle$ <sup>xiii</sup>

where F signifies the property of being a human agent, and G signifies the property of being in communication. Then (12a) is the logical expression of the proposition that it is impossible for an entity to be a human agent and not to be in communication. This statement is equivalent with (12b)

(12b)  $Fx \supset \Box G \langle x \rangle$ <sup>xiv</sup>

which expresses the proposition that is necessary for an entity that if it is a human agent than it communicates. Both formulas allow not-human-agents to communicate (or not). Since the

argumentation does not stop here, it's important to analyse the whole story before making objections.<sup>xv</sup>

The argumentation, which concludes to the statement that one cannot not communicate could be interpreted as follows.<sup>xvi</sup>

- (12ca) A human agent cannot not behave.
- (12cb) All behaviour in an interactional situation is communication.<sup>xvii</sup>
- (12cc) A human agent cannot not communicate.<sup>xviii</sup>

Now consider the logical structure of the argumentation.

- (12da)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \neg \diamond \neg G \langle x \rangle$
- (12db)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Gx \supset \neg \diamond \neg H \langle x \rangle$
- (12dc)  $\langle \langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \neg \diamond \neg G \langle x \rangle \rangle \wedge \langle \langle \forall x \rangle Gx \supset \neg \diamond \neg H \langle x \rangle \rangle \supset \langle \langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \neg \diamond \neg H \langle x \rangle \rangle$

which is equivalent with (12ea)-(12ec)

- (12ea)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \Box G \langle x \rangle$
- (12eb)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Gx \supset \Box H \langle x \rangle$
- (12ec)  $\langle \langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \Box G \langle x \rangle \rangle \wedge \langle \langle \forall x \rangle Gx \supset \Box H \langle x \rangle \rangle \supset \langle \langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \Box H \langle x \rangle \rangle$

which means that if 'to behave' includes 'to be a human agent' and 'to communicate' includes 'to behave' than 'to communicate' includes 'to be a human agent'.<sup>xix</sup> In any way soever, this deduction seems correct, but only if its premisses are acceptable. However, this discussion tries to show that they are deeply problematical.

The first premiss says that a human agent cannot not behave. This statement lies on the presupposition that there is no anti-behavior, or, in other words, behavior has no opposite. But this is nonsense, and argumentation must not have a counter-example to show its absurdity.<sup>xx</sup> Consider *first*, that the application of any expression presupposes a rule by which it is decidable whether it could or could not be predicated for an entity.<sup>xxi</sup> If anything an agent *does* is behaviour, then 'to do' entails 'to behave'; if an agent must (in every occasion) do something, then 'to do' includes 'to be'. But this is not suitable for the normal use of the terms 'to do', 'to behave' and 'to be', nor does it have any reasonable plus for a scientific language. *Second*, if a predicate or property must be stated for every argument in its extension then the application of that predicate or property is *apodictical*, in other words, analytical. It means that the meaning of the predicate is part of the meaning of the argument. So, if human agents must behave (in every occasion) then the meaning of 'to behave' is part of the meaning of 'to be a human agent', which seems to be absurd. And, *finally*, the reason of using a descriptive expression is that it could be *true* or *false*. When, in an observable situation, any state or action should be described as behaviour in any case, then the hypothesis that a human agent cannot not behave could not be falsified. But there is massive

tradition behind the rule that refutability is one of the key requirements for any scientific hypothesis.

The situation is the very same with (12cb) which states that all behaviour in an interactional situation is communication. When it cannot be decided whether a behaviour is communication or not, then either there is no adequate rule for the application of both expressions, namely, 'communication' and 'behaviour' or they are synonyms, which is absurd. Furthermore, the complex expression 'behaviour in an interactional situation' uses an expression, namely *interaction*, which is often used as a synonym for communication in ordinary language. In this latter case (12cb) would not be absurd but trivial.<sup>xxii</sup> And once again, if the question *whether a behaviour in an interactional situation is communication or not* could not be raised, than using *both* expressions has no scientific values in the world.<sup>xxiii</sup> After all, this paper proposes that the incapacibilities derive from accepting the analyzed statement are based on a more fundamental misconception which should be explicated. This misconception derives from confusing communication with the fact, that every act and state *could be considered as communication*. This consideration, however, could be either *true* or *false*.<sup>xxiv</sup> Let us consider a situation which is similar to an example of Watzlawick. An agent A is sitting on a pew with closed eyes, while an agent B tries to setting up hypotheses about A. Here the multifariousness of the hypotheses is the most conspicuous thing, since B could *think* that, for example:

- (13a) A does not want to communicate with B.
- (13b) A likes to be shown mysterious, and he wants to be addressed by B.
- (13c) A is sleeping.
- (13d) A is dead.
- (13e) A is in prayer.

And so on. The question could be raised: in which cases could anybody say that A *communicates* with B? In ordinary language the answer is easy, since only the cases (12a) and (12b) could be considered as communication between A and B, while (13c) and (13d) are not communications at all, and (13e) should be considered as a communication between A and C, namely God. Moreover, the propositions expressed by (13a) and (13b) contradict each other, so (at least) one of them should be false.

Of course objections could be made against this argumentation: one can say (with Watzlawick) that in the case of (13a) A communicates, that he don't want to communicate with B; in the case of (13b) A communicates, that he wants to communicate with B; in the case of (13c) A (or, at least, his body) communicates, that he is sleeping; in the case of (13d) the body of A communicates, that A is dead and in the case of (13e) A communicates with God and *in addition*, communicates to B that he communicates with God. But these objections confuse the mental state of B with the communication between A and B by all odds. This is only the mental capacities of an agent which enables him considering practically anything as communication. What is more, a human agent could consider not just other agent's actions and states *as* communications, but his own mental states as well.<sup>xxv</sup> And the situation is the same with any physical, mental, social or ideal object in the past, in the present and in the future, with actual and with possible, or even impossible ones.<sup>xxvi</sup> Still,

there is an exceptionally odd shade in the statement that A thinks that a round square communicates with him.

So there is a capital difference between the following cases:

(14a) B communicates with A.

(14b) A *thinks*, that B communicates with A.

If there were no difference between the situations expressed by (14a) and (14b) then there are no rules by which the term 'to communicate' can be correctly applied. Where the possibility of delusion cannot be emerged, there can be nothing to judge.

## Conclusion

This discussion tried to show that analysis should play an operative role in consolidating a discipline. But analyses could not be achieved in a conceptual vacuum: they always presuppose a method and some basic concepts that serve as analysans. Moreover, there are many kinds of analyses that have the same logical structure but different presuppositions. This paper tried to explicate some of them. After ascertaining the necessity of analysis, the discussion applied its analytical methods on a so-called axiom of human communication, namely on the one which states that one cannot not communicate. If only an analysis of this kind would had been attempted earlier, then the axiom in question would not be so evident nowadays, because the analysis presented in this paper shows that the axiom is either false or meaningless. But it's evident, that in the process of consolidating a discipline, an imperious misconception could be as beneficial as an appropriate design at times.

## NOTES

<sup>i</sup> For the formalism of thematic roles see, for example, Bornkessel 2006.

<sup>ii</sup> There are many objections against intensional equality in connection with definitions, see Kripke for a classical framing.

<sup>iii</sup> This is Mandelbrot's definition of fractals, see Mandelbrot 1983,15.

<sup>iv</sup> Mathematics is overrun with definitions of this kind, consider for example the definitions of entities like 'number', 'set', or complex ones like 'Triadic Cantor Dust' (See, for example Edgar 2008). The so-called intensional problems with definitions could be illustrated by a seemingly simple example. Consider a definition of '2' as (i).

(i) Definition  $\langle \text{definiator}_{i,\dots}; \langle 2; \langle 1+1 \rangle \rangle$

Of course here 'definition' means the fixation of an equality, but this equality surely cannot be intensional: no body thinks normally that '2' *means* '1+1', and it's easy to see that the number of equality-definitions for '2' is potentially infinite. But the notion that '2' and '1+1' refers to the same *object*, as in the case of extensional equality, seems to be problematic (at least for nominalists). This example represents the main problem with methodological definitions, and arguing for  $\langle \text{communication}; \langle \text{information processing} \rangle \rangle$  is none the worse hard that arguing for  $\langle 2; \langle 1+1 \rangle \rangle$ .

<sup>v</sup> In most cases 'identity' signifies *identification*, which causes serious epistemological problems.

<sup>vi</sup> This method goes back to von Wright's procedure in connection with the Kantian idea of 'Ought entails Can' (WRIGHT 1963).

<sup>vii</sup> Quine's slogan is 'to be is to be the value of a variable', which could narrow the scope of x in the case of (11), see Quine 1953.

<sup>viii</sup> Here 'to include' should be considered as a set-theoretical relation, where the included set is closer than the includer.

<sup>ix</sup> Among others, absurdities of this kind could have been led logicians to forbid using the substantive verb as predicate.

<sup>x</sup> Of course, as it was already mentioned, in logic 'to be' and 'exist' could not be used as a predicate, but in ordinary language substantive verbs are often functioning as predicates. This paper should not discuss on the topic of the so-called logical disfunctions of ordinary languages.

<sup>xi</sup> So identity here should be considered intensionally, because the extensional interpretation of the same statement evokes serious philosophical problems that could not be discussed here.

<sup>xii</sup> See for example Psalm 19: „*The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands. Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they reveal knowledge. They have no speech, they use no words; no sound is heard from them. Yet their voice goes out into all the earth, their words to the ends of the world.*”

<sup>xiii</sup> Or  $\langle \forall x \rangle \neg \langle \exists x \rangle (Fx \supset \neg Gx)$

<sup>xiv</sup> Or  $\langle \forall x \rangle \Box \langle Fx \supset Gx \rangle$

<sup>xv</sup> This, naturally, does not mean that (12) could not be criticized *per se*, but in this form the statement seems more contentless than problematic.

<sup>xvi</sup> The basis of this interpretation is the original text of Watzlawick et al (1967), Ch 2, pp 48-51.

<sup>xvii</sup> According to Watzlawick, communication should be conceived as message-units, so communications are the elements of interactions that consist of a finite number of communications (messages).

<sup>xviii</sup> The Wikipedia entry on Watzlawick suggests a more elementary interpretation: „*Every behavior is a kind of communication. Because behavior does not have a counterpart (there is no anti-behavior), it is not possible not to communicate.*” The entry refers to Bateson (1972) in connection with this interpretation.

<sup>xix</sup> This is to say that if to be a human agent entails to behave and to behave entails to communicate than to be a human agent entails to communicate.

<sup>xx</sup> It does not mean that counter-examples could not be easily found. For example no one could reasonably state that a sleeping agent behaves. Watzlawick of course states that a behaviour need not be conscious. Then any observable state of an agent could be conceived as behaviour, which is absurd, because, for example, then a dead agent's observable states should be comprehended as behaviour. Of course in ordinary , and sometimes in scientific languages any corporeal action is called behaviour, for example, the behaviour of subatomic particles in a Wilson-chamber. But then any change could be described as behaviour, which means that the meaning of change and the meaning of behaviour is one and the same, and, according to Occam's razor, a scientific language does not need more expressions than it is necessary.

<sup>xxi</sup> One of the most articulate framing of this logical assumption is from Spencer Brown's Laws of Form:

„*Distinction is perfect continence. That is to say, a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with separate sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing the boundary. (...). Once a distinction is drawn, the spaces, states, or contents on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated. There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents are seen to differ in value. Thus the calling of the name can be identified with the value of the content.*” (SPENCER-BROWN 1972, p1).

<sup>xxii</sup> Just like the statement that 'Every basilica in Europe is a cathedral'.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Interestingly enough that a German website dedicated to Watzlawick delineates a logically different version of the axiom, which runs as follows: "*Man kann nicht nicht kommunizieren, denn jede Kommunikation (nicht nur mit Worten) ist Verhalten und genauso wie man sich nicht nicht verhalten kann, kann man nicht nicht kommunizieren.*" (Paul Watzlawick Website <http://www.paulwatzlawick.de/axiome.html>). This (unauthentic) interpretation states that all communication is behaviour (instead of the original which states that all behaviour is communication). However, this argumentation is inconclusive because it allows behaviours that is not communications:

(i)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Fx \supset \Box G\langle x \rangle$

(ii)  $\langle \forall x \rangle Hx \supset \Box G\langle x \rangle$

(iii)  $\langle \langle \exists x \rangle \Diamond Gx \supset \neg Fx \rangle$

<sup>xxiv</sup> In many-valued logics there are more than 2 values (true and false), and, for example, in a calculus of Lukasiewicz the number of truth-values could be potentially infinite.

<sup>xxv</sup> There are theories that postulate so-called inner communications, but the question may be raised whether they are communications or not. The author of this paper thinks that inner communications could not be conceived with the concepts of self-reference, because communication could not be reflexive, since the verb 'to communicate' ordinary needs at least two arguments. For example, Steve could not communicate with himself, but his father-role could communicate with his child-role, or his brain could communicate with his retina, and so on. Of course, the analytical level of a person should not be confused with the analytical level of his (psychological or sociological) roles or with the analytical level of his organs etc. The consideration that communications could be described in more than one analytical level is very important here, and the system-theory could be helpful in explicating these questions, see, for example Luhmann 1984.

<sup>xxvi</sup> There are possible world semantics for fictional and impossible worlds as well, see, for example, Dolezel 1998 and Ashline 1995.

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Paul Watzlawick Website [internet] Available at: <<http://www.paulwatzlawick.de>> [Accessed 2012-05-07]

# Mediated Communities in the Age of Electronic Communication<sup>1</sup>

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**Gábor Szécsi**

University of Pécs, Faculty of Adult Education and Human Resources, Hungary

**Abstract:** The electronically mediated communication has transformed our notion of the relation between place and community. With a greater proportion of our communicative acts taking place via electronic media, physical co-presence, the co-located interpersonal relations are diminishing as determinants of the nature of human interactions. This paper argues that the electronically mediated communication contributes to the construction of new, mediated forms of communities which are based on the interaction or operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities. The appearance of these new forms of communities leads to a new conceptualization of the relation between self and community. The aim of this paper is to show that the medium of the mediatization and new conceptualization of community is a specific pictorial language of electronically mediated communication, the semantic structure of which offers new opportunities to grasp and understand the complex notion of new mediated communities and to adopt the idea of a new global, community building language in local and national communities.

**Keywords:** electronically mediated communication, mediated community, new conceptualization of community, networked individual, pictorial language

## Introduction

Linguistic communication is a creative process which determines our personality and identity through our communication roles forming each other. Moreover, the human mind is indeed a communicative system the structure of which is affected by prevailing technologies of social communication. That is to say, there is a specific inner relation between the communicative

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*Address for Correspondence:* Gábor Szécsi, email: [szecsi.gabor@feek.pte.hu](mailto:szecsi.gabor@feek.pte.hu)

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structure of our minds and the communication technologies which can be regarded as dominant in certain cultures.

This inner relation can be shown in all major historical changes in dominant communicative technologies, from the change-over to literacy to the development of the dominance of electronically mediated communication. In this essay, I consider the above assumption by the investigation of the effects that are produced on our conceptualization of community by the use of electronic media. To clarify the theoretical foundations of this new conceptualization, I take the hypothesis as a starting point that the expansion of electronic communication technologies – including both monologic technologies (radio, television, the internet) and dialogic technologies (mobile telephone) - has transformed our notion of the relation between place and community. With a greater proportion of our communicative acts taking place via electronic media, physical co-presence, the co-located interpersonal relations are diminishing as determinants of the nature of human interactions.

It seems that in the space of electronic media, community should be understood as a mediated network of interactions between individuals who uniformly accept and apply some rules for the communicative actions aiming at the effective exchange of information. In other words, there is an inner relation between the criteria of community and the global and local conditions for an effective method of information exchange. And these global and local conditions transform our notions surrounding the structure and life of community.

The electronically mediated communication, as an inherent part of real life in today's world, contributes to the construction of new, mediated forms of communities which are based on the interaction or operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities. The appearance of these new forms of communities leads to the new conceptualization of the relation between self and community. In the age of electronically mediated communication, the essence of community is a kind of networked individualism in which the networked individuals can choose their own communities, rather than are fitted into them with others involuntarily. Therefore the new, mediated form of community implies an individual-center existence and weaker social ties. The new technologies foster communication links outside the individuals' immediate social surrounds.

Accordingly, electronic communication creates a new context in which our notions of culture, community, society, human interactions become more complex. These more complex notions can be regarded as the bases of the idea of the global and local information communities in which the communication attitudes of a person are determined by their impression of their self as permanently available individual whose communicative acts are embedded in a special information net.

The aim of this paper is to show the basis and effects of this process by examining the following propositions:

1. The expansion of electronically mediated communication leads to the appearance of new, mediated forms of communities.
2. The medium of the mediatization and new conceptualization of community is a specific, pictorial language of electronically mediated communication.

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## **Towards a new conceptualization of communities**

Our conceptualization of community, when transformed by the use of electronic media, is embedded strongly in the associative system of conceptual relations that represent the network of various communicative acts, that is the various situations of information exchange. With such a conceptualization of mediated community is conceived as a network of communicative interactions. I want to argue here that the ways of understanding of the interactions between virtual and physical communities move beyond the traditional sociological conceptualization of community-as-interpersonal towards a conceptualization of mediated communities that are based on the interaction or the operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities.

Just as traditional theories of community regard community and society as distinct forms, it is also easy to consider physical and virtual communities as mutually exclusive forms of social organization. In this view, physical community can exist only by virtue of physical collocation in space, and is based on people's natural association through sameness and residential solidarity. Virtual communities created by electronically mediated communication, however, attempt to break some of the boundaries of geographic location, gender, and ethnicity established in physical communities. In other words, physical communities are based on shared social and physical boundaries, whereas virtual communities are based on shared social practices and interest.

Considering the influence of mediated communication on our community-concept, however, many theorists believe that we need a synthesis of physical and virtual communities in order to truly inhabit our experiences. Castells (2000), for example, holds that we need a "bridge" between physical and virtual places in order to unify our experience, because virtual communities only deal in fragmented individuals when they are opposed to real life. Others, like Etzioni (2001), Walls (1993), Katz and Rice (2002), Katz et al. (2004), Katz (2007), Haythornthwaite (2007), and Haythornthwaite and Kendall (2010) emphasize that the best communities are indeed the hybrids of physical and virtual communities. They see the ideal communities as virtual communities enhancing physical communities. According to Haythornthwaite and Kendall (2010), online interactions not only have positive effects for physical, place-based communities, but the intersection between online communication and offline world also forms two halves of a support mechanism for communities. For Katz et al. (2004, p. 362), since the electronically mediated communication becomes inherently part of real life in today's world, "we need an operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities in order to have fulfilling, embodied experiences all of the time". In this view, in the age of electronically mediated communication, the dividing line between virtual and physical communities becomes increasingly indistinct. Therefore, as Poster (2001) shows it, the mediated individuals imagine their virtual communities as real. That is, the role of communication as meaningful and value-based in virtual communities also works to construct physical communities as well.

It is obvious that with this new synthesis of virtual and physical communities, electronically mediated communication contributes to a new construction of the self. The mediatization of communities leads to fractured and fragmented selves, because it opens up many other possible communities in which to participate. The new communication technologies enable individuals to participate in alterior systems of value, belief, and desires. As Gergen (2003, p. 111) notes: "New affective bonds are created outside one's social surrounds. The result is that the centered sense of a bounded self slowly gives way to a "multiphrenia" of partial and conflicted senses of self. Identity becomes fluid, shifting in a chameleon-like way from one social context to another".

Thanks to these changes, the networked individual is attached to the place and position appointed by his own social ties less and less. Through his multi-channel communicative acts he can become acquainted with more and more communal forms, ways of life, traditions and values in the light of which he can choose more deliberately from among the competing local communities. And this more deliberate choice becomes a part of the more and more complex and multi-layered identity of the networked individual. As Meyrowitz (2005, p. 28) writes on the multiple, multi-layered, fluid, and endlessly adjustable senses of the media-networked individuals' identity:

“Rather than needing to choose between local, place-defined identities and more distant ones, we can have them all, not just in rapid sequence but in overlapping experiences. We can attend a local zoning board meeting, embodying the role of local concerned citizen, as we cruise the internet on a wireless-enabled laptop enacting other, non-local identities. And we can merge the two as we draw on distant information to inform the local board of how other communities handle similar issues and regulations. All the while, we can remain accessible to friends, family, and colleagues from anywhere via a text-message enabled mobile phone.”

By using the electronic communication technologies, a networked individual becomes a part of a network of interactions between humans who uniformly accept and apply some rules for the communicative acts aiming at the effective exchange of information. In other words, the media-networked individuals become members of a virtual community that is determined both by the global and the local conditions for an effective method of information exchange. Regarding the conceptualization of this new virtual community, Green (2003), for example, argues for a new view of community, in which the significance of locality and interpersonality recedes to the benefit of symbolic processes. As Green (2003, p. 55) points out: “As is the case with internet and ‘virtual’ communities then, understandings of mobile ‘communities’ should move beyond the conceptualisation of ‘communities-as-interest-groups’ (secured via the authentication of the embodied liberal individual and their ‘right to privacy’), and indeed beyond a traditional sociological conceptualisation of ‘communities-as-interpersonal-and-co-located’ (secured via relations based on face-to-face interaction in kinship or social commonality). Rather, we should move towards a conceptualisation of ‘communities-as-trust-processes’ (secured via the mutual, reciprocal and multiple negotiation of mediated, interpersonal, and organization uncertainty and risk.)”

This new conceptualization moves beyond the traditional definition of community, according to which, as Green (2003, p. 53) writes, community “as an ideal type of relation corresponding to “natural will”, is distinguished by an appeal to a totality of cultural history in the collective memory of tradition, is defined through common property, family, custom and fellowship, and is bound by consensus, language and ritual”.

The basis of this conceptualization is a complex system of associative conceptual relations that includes our concept of community, and integrates the conceptual representations of human interactions which determine the life of community both in a direct and indirect way. The medium of the new conceptualization is a specific pictorial language, the semantic structure of which offers new opportunities to grasp and understand the complex concept of community.

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## The pictorial language of electronically mediated communication

One of the most important criteria of the new, more deliberate attachment to the local is the deliberate application of the ways of usage that create new local communities in the age of electronic communication. And these new ways of usage are rooted in the communication language of electronic media that can be regarded as a result of the convergence of the characteristics of oral and written communication. Thus we consider the new linguistic culture of electronic communication as one of the most important conditions of the conceptual and the social convergences experienced in the space of electronic media. It seemed that this new linguistic culture is the basic both of the global perspective created by electronic communication and the cohesion of the new, mediated communities that are strengthened by deliberate choices of the networked individuals.

In this new linguistic culture, the original social function of language, namely, the building and maintaining of the cohesion of human community, becomes important development, because in the print societies, language has got far from this original function as a consequence of the appearance of the oral-literal bilingualism and the linguistic asymmetry that is rooted in the social dominance of the standard dialect of literacy. That is, instead of strengthening the community cohesion, this bilingualism and asymmetry disintegrates primary human communities since the use of their own dialects is overtly stigmatized in the light of the socially preferred standard dialect of literacy. This communication culture that forces the whole society and all communities to use one preferred language variety goes against individual biologically encoded need of belonging to a primary community.

The original social function of language, however, has survived this linguistic asymmetry developed in print societies. People hold to their everyday use of language, even if they judge their own dialectal varieties incorrect under the pressure of the overt prestige of the standard. Since the members of small local communities generally communicate with one another orally, the linguistic conventions characterizing these communities have survived in the age of standard linguistic varieties too. In these small local communities the importance of cohesion-strengthening, local values outstrips the external social values that are symbolized by the standard forms of written communication. This phenomenon is experienced especially in small, isolated rural and suburban communities where the prestige of the non-standard variety of usage can be regarded, at the same time, as a symbol of communal identity.

In the space of electronic communication, literacy that generated the asymmetry of linguistic norms of oral and written communication seems to be losing of its power and the prestige of the identity-strengthening ways of usage characterizing small communities and group grows. The expansion of the non-standard varieties of language preferred by the networked individuals is accelerated by the use of electronic media (internet, mobile telephone). This process leading to decline of the prestige of literacy is accelerated by the convergence of the oral and the written communication technologies that affects usage since the new kind of orality created by the use of radio and television or, especially, use of multimedia messaging, the synchronous-complementary transmission of speech, text and pictures in the space of mobile and internet communication.

There are well-perceptible, concrete signs of this convergence of the features of the oral and the written usage. Let us consider the texts that are mediated by the internet or mobile telephone! The texts of many e-mail and SMS message actually belong to the domain of speech and not to the domain of written texts. The grammatical and stylistic characteristics of these messages can be regarded as the marks of a special kind of oral communication. These grammatical and stylistic elements, however, are integrated into the texts mediated by new communication technologies more deliberately than into the oral utterances. By using these

elements, the utterer intends to show that he wishes to accept and apply the norms and the rules of a linguistic community organized by e-mail and SMS communication. That is to say, he uses these grammatical and stylistic elements of linguistic communication to make it unambiguous that he is attached to a community accepting some forms of usage and that this attachment is a consequence of a deliberate choice.

The linguistic forms accepted in this way affect the everyday usage strongly. The use of the special linguistic forms of the texts mediated by the new communication technologies lives its mark on the written communication and leads to the convergence between orality and literacy. What can be regarded as an outcome of this process is the increasingly indistinct dividing line between the linguistic characteristics of oral and written communication. A new communication language is in the making which integrates the forms of language used in oral utterances and in written texts.

The appearance of the new language of communication can be regarded as a consequence of the networked individuals' deliberate choice who want to join in the global information exchange successfully and to express conceptual relations and emotions as a member of a small community by using the new linguistic forms. One of the most characteristic features of this culture is that the advent of multimedia communication has resulted in a strong interaction between picture and language in the process of oral and written messaging.

As multimedia technology expands, the dividing line between the linguistic characteristics of oral and written communication becomes increasingly indistinct. This means that though the syntactic features and structure of this new language of communication remind us of the linguistic world of oral communication, the new language seems to be more complex in terms of its semantic characteristics. Accordingly, the multimedia integration of verbal and pictorial elements, or the convergence of the linguistic features of oral and written communication, contributes to the transformation of the structure of the mind and the content of thought by establishing a new communication culture.

Consequently, by using the term "pictorial language", I am referring not only to the integration of verbal and pictorial components of information exchange, but to the linguistic medium of the specific synthesis of the features of conceptual and pictorial thought. The pictorial character of the language of electronically mediated communication is rooted in the fact that this language includes expressions which refer to complex conceptual relations without a conceptual analysis of them. In other words, a new metaphorical language is in the making, the function of which is to "show" the world rather than to analyze it.

By using this language, we want to "make perceptible" the complexity of conceptual relations to which we refer. The main intention of a user of this kind of language is to embed some conceptual relations in the system of more complex conceptual representations by using words that are suitable for making the complexity of newly-revealed conceptual relations intelligible. This kind of usage leads, on the one hand, to the appearance of new terms in language and, on the other hand, to the novel use of available linguistic elements. In the latter process, the meanings of some words multiply with more and more conceptual relations.

This is why the usage of the word "community" entails the intention of understanding of the overall or global criteria of community in the age of electronic media. These criteria can be attributed to the specific features of communicational space which is globalized by the use of television, the Internet, and mobile telephones. In other words, there is an inner relation between these criteria and the global conditions for an effective method of information exchange. These global conditions (a common information basis, collective trust relations, etc.) transform our notions surrounding the structure and life of community.

Focusing on the inner relation between the new conceptualization of the criteria of community and our notions regarding the global conditions for an effective method of

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information exchange, we can suggest, for example, the following definition: community is a network of interactions between individuals who uniformly accept and apply some rules for the communicative acts aiming at the effective exchange of information.

Of course, our complex notion of community urges us to form many other definitions. And it is obvious that these definitions approach the community-organizing role of information in different way. They have, however, one thing in common: they all must be founded on the analysis of the conceptual and linguistic changes that transform the structure of our minds in the mediated communities of the electronic era. Because these linguistic changes can be regarded as bases of the mediatization of communities and the adopting of the idea of a global, community building language in the new media space. But what kind of language would best serve as a global language in the network of mediated communities? Etzioni (2008), for example, argues for adopting English as a shared, secondary global language in the information age. As Etzioni (2008, p. 124) points out: “a key element of building a global community atop local communities requires that the various nations involved choose the same second language”. This second language, of course, does not replace the particularistic, identity constituting primary languages of local and national communities, rather it is best considered as an additional language. Nevertheless an opposition can be experienced to adopting such an additional language in many nations. According to Etzioni (2008, p. 124), “this opposition often conflates preventing English penetration into the primary language with resisting it as second language”. Whereas this opposition, as Etzioni (2008, p. 124) writes, “delays overcoming the “babel” effects at great cost to the transparency of global laws, the promotion of shared understandings, and the efficiency of economic transactions”.

In my view, as a global process, the appearance of the pictorial characteristic of primary communal languages can contribute to the adoption of an additional global language, because this process, as we have seen, creates the foundations of the convergences of different usages and languages. The global expansion of the pictorial language of electronic communication can be regarded as the basis of the idea of a global information community in which the communication attitudes of a person are determined by his impression of his self as a permanently available person whose communicative acts are embedded in a global information net. In other words, it is by accelerating and mediating linguistic changes leading to a complex notion of global community that electronically mediated communication becomes a source of, as Meyrowitz (2005, p. 30) writes, the “fusion of local and global identities” and, thus, the adoption of the idea of a secondary global language in new, mediated communities.

## Conclusions

This essay holds that in the information age, the medium of the mediatization and new conceptualization of community is a specific, pictorial language of electronically mediated communication. The global linguistic changes traceable to the use of electronic communications technologies lead to a linguistic galaxy which can contribute to the development of higher level of human cohesion. This paper adopts the assumption that through the appearance of this linguistic galaxy, a new, global community comes into existence which is based on the operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities. As demonstrated, with the worldwide expansion of the new communication culture, the original social function of language, namely, the building and maintaining of the cohesion of human communities, becomes important development.

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