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Perspectives



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TÖRTÉNELEM ÉS TÁRSADALOMTUDOMÁNYOK

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Contents

Studies

Workshop

Review

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Karl Polanyi in the context of "non-death" of neoliberalism



Abstract

Karl Polanyi's works have been widely thematized regarding the transition in Central and Eastern Europe. The transition was viewed as the "second great transformation". Polanyi's works undoubtedly have numerous followers and it is owing to them that his works have started to be critically interpreted. We are here considering the possibility of reconceptualization of the works after the crisis of neoliberalism. The paper consists of three parts, each focusing on the selected points of Polanyi's work. In the first part, the goal was to confront Polanyi's thought with the consequences of neoliberalism; this part is explicitly involved in political-economic reflection. The second part focuses on the discussion about the meaning of embeddedness, and the third part shows the relevance of some reflexions with respect to the money. The second and third part make a dialogue between political economy and economic sociology, economic anthropology, and economic theory.

Keywords

Polanyi, neoliberalism, embeddedness, money, political-economic reflexivity

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1. Confronting with the strange dynamic of neoliberalism

Over the last decades, there have been such extensive interpretations of neoliberalism that even a *Handbook for neoliberalism* (Springer – Birch – MacLeavy 2016) was written. However, a consensus on the explanation of neoliberalism has not been achieved. Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, and others present it as metanarration. The 2008 crisis generated an idea that neoliberalism has reached its end, that it has become exhausted, and that we are in a constellation of *post-neoliberalism;* today, the main issue for discussion is that neoliberalism is persistently and stubbornly being reproduced (Crouch 2011). We, on the other hand, are neither interested in arguing about the divergence in opinion on neoliberalism, nor discussing about the reasons of existence of neoliberalism.

1.1. Can Polanyi help us understand neoliberalism?

As we all know, Polanyi implied that the market system in XIX century did not develop spontaneously; instead, it was an organized, strategic endeavor of the state. We could say that Polanyi offers a radically different causal order: he criticizes the idea that non-intentional market genesis can provide explanation for the economy dynamics; in his opinion, the concept of market must rely on external elements set by the state. In modern language of social sciences, it is obviously a certain kind of ambivalent *structure.* We can also easily claim that liberal naturalization of the market, the market as self-referential entity is being criticized here.

If the emergence of the market is actually the result of above directed *implementation,* then affirmation of the market categories provokes opposite reaction of the society; that is Polanyi's famous "double movement". On the one hand, there is a strategically planned involvement of the state highly interested in market implementation, and on the other hand, there is unplanned self-protection of the society that tries to save itself from market destructiveness. This should prevent the emergence of holistic "market society"; the internal resistance of society represents the limit for imposing a market that would thus remain within the framework of "society" as the part of the whole. A well-known historical narrative about Speenhamland, about corrective actions due to derogation of community ties and poverty falls in this category, although this narrative, too, has been interpreted in many and divergent ways (see an influential interpretation, Block – Somers 1984, 2003).

Polanyi's critical articulation definitely has certain parallels with the ascendance of neoliberal reorganization of society. A historical sequence in Great Britain that Polanyi analyzed, *mutatis mutandis,* enables the consideration of trends in today's capitalism: Polanyi's generalized point is that market can be created and reproduced with organization and constant non-market control, or paradoxically, with *organized and conditioned socio-economic reality.* We call it a deep Polanyi-moment. Namely, neoliberalism ideologically emphasizes market-mediated self-organization of the society that enables reduced involvement of the state and entrepreneurship: research have shown the opposite. Instead of entrepreneurship being the "blueprint" for society cohesion, and instead of tendency to consider us all as entrepreneurs who exploit unused market resources ("slack"), there is something else that seem to be dominating, different forms of "rentiership" and "economic rents".

We should remember that Thomas Piketty's bestseller in certain sense already predicted such a tendency but based on economic data that were not available to Polanyi: he showed that, in the long run, patrimonial aspect dominated in the tension gap between "meritocratic" and "patrimonial" aspects of capitalism.

This can be illustrated with a concrete example. Diversification of rentiership implies *state secured forms of rents* based on the logic of legal ownership, that is: *"neoliberalism is actually characterized by a non-entrepreneurial rationality... concerns the pursuit of housing ownership, housing renovation, and housing speculation...it involves the appropriation of value through government fiat (e.g. laws, regulations, standards), monopoly rights (e.g. location), and organizational reconfiguration (e.g. mortgage securitization). It is not...about the production...rather, it reflects a reliance on unearned income and speculative wealth"* (Birch 2017. 143).

"Government fiat" and "reregulation" are those who strongly affect the neoliberal situation. "Pro-market orientation": this common and well-known denotation does not explain the dynamics of neoliberalism. After all, we can see that Polanyi's historical description and narration proves one structural fact that the market cannot be perpetuated without systematic non-market interventions. Polanyi would not be surprised if he had to analyze the relationship between the renewned "government fiat" and market, or between the market and forms of ownership organized by a state.

Overcoming the liberal contradiction between state and market Polanyi offers insights not only for the *structure* but for the *genesis* of neoliberalism as well. He uses "double-movement" logic to articulate the developing of protective measures for the society: at the same time he claims that there is *noncompatibility* between market organization and self-protection of the society in the form of social protection (this is his "countermovement"). By even avoiding to analyze different forms of "countermovement", it is clear that Polanyi projects certain *structural* instability (which he, sometimes, describes as a contradiction between capitalism and democracy).

Polanyi is often described as a welfare-capitalism follower who tends to correct welfare-based measures with respect to the "laissez-faire" capitalism. Still, this description is too simplified and neglects the *process* related components of Polanyi's thought. He demonstrates the *instability* of welfare-based capitalism as well, both from historical and theoretical aspects, caused by the structural incompatibility of the logic of social protection and market dynamics. He relentlessly emphasizes the "utopian" elements of economic liberalism, but not even the welfare version of capitalism is spared from the instability. To put it differently, if we turn to Polanyi we can explain why the welfare-based capitalism was realized after the WWII and replaced with neoliberalized capitalism.

Protection from market dynamics is like a double-edged sword to Polanyi: it is a corrective measure which, in the long run, results in malignant effects. This proves not only the obvious fact that Polanyi is still "up-to-date", but it also confirms his relevance regarding the socio-economic logic of neoliberalism. Yet, not everything can be explained by analyzing Polanyi who still poses some dilemmas.

First, we need to consider that Polanyi's thinking is "ideational"; he attributes strong causal power to the ideas from social changes. Consequently, ideas, for him, give meanings to the organization of society, and this fact explains his energetic engagement in the analysis of different theoreticians. Naturally, Polanyi was not the only theoretician working with such a complex concept of ideas,

but he was the only one to raise a question with devastating consequences of "utopian", "fictitious" ideas (see, POLANYI 2012–13, especially, THOMASBERGER 2012). Interestingly, those thinkers who are listed among neoliberalism architects (such as Friedrich Hayek) put ideational approach to the forefront as well: they are all convinced that only the comprehensive conceptual mediation of reality can provide a path to (neo)liberalism. Thus, ideologically prepared hegemony, in the first place, can ensure a true and complete change of society (see, REHMANN 2013. 298.). If we allow ourselves a certain kind of short speculation, then we can say that not only are Polanyi's assumptions about liberal utopia still valid, but they have become especially effective in neoliberalism. Finally, certain approaches to the analysis of neoliberalism emphasize the role of conceptual articulations that, already in the thirties, prepared the transformation of the conceptual field, that is, struggling and agressive "epistemological collectives" (D. Plehwe).

But how are these ideas formed? Is it enough to affirm the ideational approach? Can we explain the rise of economic liberalism, that is, "liberal utopia" by turning to Ricardo and Malthus, or is it that the same utopia is conditioned by other (not ideational) moments? Does the state follow "fictitious ideas"? Does Polanyi may be pay a tribute because he does not have a complex theory of ideology?

Our explanation clearly shows that the state can take dual role: during the implementation of the market, and as an element in the self-defense of the society. The state's involvement is temporally defined, *before* and *after* the introduction of a market. However, Polanyi does not clarify the role of the state as a carrier of this double capacity in relation to market dynamics. We can only assume how this problem can be resolved in the absence of an articulated theory of the state.

We also appreciated Polanyi's highly important intellectual contribution to the presentation of a constitutive element of such a non-market subject as the state in the process of creation of a market order. This effect is still of a clear critical significance. At the same time, Polanyi has left us in doubt: if state involved correction aimed at protecting the society is understood as a regulation of the market, then we should be aware of various modes of regulation directed by state. There are even those that have not been established with the purpose of society protection, but to stabilize the market frameworks. We have just discussed the state-based regulation and affirmation of rentiership which proves this because stabilization of "economic rents" requires active involvement of the state or its agencies. In other words, "regulated capitalism" a priori does not destabilize the market order, not even in the long run. Thus, despite our preference for Polanyi's theory, we can see certain drawbacks arising from the unrealized theory of the state.

Furthermore, the problems we have mentioned here and our discomfort with Polanyi turn to be even greater if we take into account that Polanyi gives an incomplete answer to the question that every social science faces; namely, the *relation between the social structure and human action, that is, between structurality and subjectivity.* If we check the modes of "countermovement" regarding the introduction of the market, we will get an insufficiently articulated picture. "Countermovement" really exists: a researcher who, for example, tries to trace it in some contemporary works, he/she will come across various forms of resistance to austerity-politics in the first and second decade of the 21st century. Different movements are marked with "countermovement", but with Polanyi, we get the impression that the reaction of society is too

deterministic in relation to the implementation of the market. In other words, the same reaction appears as *deus ex machina* in his conceptualization of social dynamics.

Is the defensive self-affirmation of a society in relation to the emerging market an pre-determined process? Does this mean that "countermovement" is a logical shift from a defensive society to a situation where society can put its life under definitive control?

On the other hand, shouldn't social theory be the one to offer some conditions under which *subjectivity* of resistance would be possible, subjectivity manifested as "collective action"? Is Polanyi's thinking still insufficiently processual, in spite of our appraisal? Isn't this insufficiency the result of undeveloped political-economic configuration?

We should mention another problem in this chapter, although the meanings are related to the following chapter as well. It is about too broad and undefined idea of the market that has been continuously present over a long period of time throughout the history. It should also be noted that in spite of the market being a metaframe today for economic reflection, some theoreticians of social sciences lament *"that the market has been little analyzed"* and that it functions as a transcendental principle which is often left without concrete explanations (North 1977. 710., Mirowski 2016). Is market just a mechanism for supply and demand – although there are only few to defend this reductive interpretation? Is it the place where equilibrium is? Is it a machine for information processing, as believed by Hayek in later years, a machine which operation goes beyond the man's epistemological capacities? Polanyi is not interested in the mediation between exchange and market, which sometimes leaves the impression that he employs these notions as homologous. Eventually, we get a homogenized, poorly biased *"market as a monolithic self-consistent phenomenon"* (Mirowski 2015. 27.). If so, why do we need market as a category at all? Why not stopping at the level of exchange? Even though Polanyi takes us to historical topos where rudimental forms of market are developed, he, too, lacks more elaborated relationship with market.

In fact, we could criticize Polanyi for not making a connection between capitalism and the market. To avoid any long argumentations, here is just a quote: *"his 'static' conception of capitalism fails to identify the way in which the development of capitalism modifies the forms taken by markets... his analysis yielded an inadequate explanation of what guided the pragmatic retreat from the extremes of the market in the mid-twentieth century, with an undue explanatory weight placed upon the contradiction between economics and politics"* (Dale 2010. 246., see for comparison, Dale 2016a,b).

Every sentence here is deeply meaningful: *Polanyi's theory lacks understanding of structural dynamics of capitalism.* Finally, there is poor analysis of articulation between politics and economy, which is a problem that cannot be avoided. We apply rigorous qualification, but should assess Polanyi by taking himself as a criterion. He, indeed, was particularly interested in the said articulation; he constantly emphasized discontent with liberal economic philosophy that was unprepared to explain the dense interaction between economy and politics; moreover, it just (unconsciously) confirms the differences between the two domains. However, even Polanyi failed to succeed in developing political-economic reflection which, in spite of all other contribution, which affected his interpretation of neoliberalism.

2. Embeddedness: for what?

The category of embeddedness has been several times mentioned in economic sociology which is particularly flourishing in recent times (besides other things, Polanyi has remained one of the most frequently quoted theoreticians in this field, Steiner 2007). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the theoretician (Mark Granovetter), who introduced this term in use, did not rely on Polanyi, and this is the reason why some sort of confusion was actually created because his opinion was divergent in relation to Polanyi's. Some interpreters expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the deformed interpretation of embeddedness led to the incomprehensive analysis of the market, thus reflecting the claims regarding the undifferentiated concept of the market. In fact, it is critically argued that: *"Quite paradoxically, the basic intuition that markets are socially embedded – while containing an important insight – has led economic sociologists to take the market itself for granted"* (Krippner 2001. 710., but see, Dale 2010. 198., Mirowski 2016). Others criticized the mentioned Granovetter for connecting the analysis with "structuralist network approach" and for making it impossible to understand "social action" (Beckert 2006, a, b), thus abating the influence of Polanyi's work which, as we have already said, aims at developing political-economic reflexivity. Therefore, Granovetter remains within the frameworks of rational choice methodology, but not Polanyi. We agree with the same criticism.

However, it must be said that Polanyi himself has brought confusion about the meanings of embeddedness. That is to say, he has not clearly conceived the term that is obviously of strategic importance in his vocabulary. Namely, there are certain doubts about it in his work: the mentioned category has hardly been mentioned in the main part *(The Great Transformation)*. In addition, some Polanyi's formulations are contradictory. In some respects, we must play the role of a hermeneutic who tries to understand the author better than he does himself.

In Polanyi's opinion, embeddedness has polemical and political aspects. *Polemical* aspect of embeddedness criticizes every attempt of economization to separate the sphere of economics from a wider society and promote economics as an *un-social* sphere. It is suggested that economics/market is only an integral part of a more complex system so it should be analyzed accordingly. Undoubtedly, Polanyi would see a similar attempt of separating economics from cohesion of society in neoliberalism as well (which was in rudimentary forms present in the 1930s of the 20th century, and Polanyi was able to notice it, at least in traces). Furthermore, embeddedness is a *political* term and Polanyi uses it to oppose to "liberal utopia", that is, he wants "re-embedding" of the market order as politically mediated project. In other words, he wants to restore the economy to its "basic" sources and, in this way, to treat the status of the economy in terms of only *relative autonomy* that has its own logic but at the same time is an integral part of the society. Finally, the term is critical to economic discourse as well, to the one which treats economization as an hegemonic un-social field. It is unquestionable that Polanyi's approach provides a point of reference for a number of applications that provide valuable conclusions that differ from standard approaches: so, Soviet Union economics can be analyzed in the framework of centralized planning but with all the possible effects of "disembedding" (Dale 2010. 194.). In fact, disembedding is the structural feature of this type of economy.

However, dilemma is still acute. We should bear in mind that Polanyi is a moralist and that moral reflection plays a significant role in his opinions. Moreover, his moralism also has communitarian

horizons and his reference to famous distinction of Ferdinand Tönnies between *Gesellschaft* (society) and *Gemeinschaft* (community) is well known. "Reembedding" also presents certain dynamics of community *within* a society. The discussion about embeddedness is logical in that context.

However, is embeddedness an *ontological* term that suggests that embeddedness is a *transhistorical* characteristic of every market and every economization? Polanyi himself suggests something similar from time to time (POLANYI et al, 1957, see SOBEL 2005). At the same time, the suggested concept represents *critical intention* when it comes to the fact that "liberal utopia" is related to the dynamics of "disembedding", and in this way, capitalism (unlike pre-capitalist societies analyzed by Polanyi) systematically produces "economization" in terms of "disembeddedness". What is the strategic position of the category of embeddedness within the capitalism as "exception" in relation to the said ontological criteria? Some interpreters rightly emphasize the determining role of institution in Polanyi's work: for this reason, we should discuss about "institutional embeddedness". Polanyi's work could be associated with certain tendencies of American institutionalism of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons and others (see, MACOURANT 2001, 2003). On the other hand, other interpreters still believe that it is the special case of "social embeddedness". There are also certain interpreters who believe that Polanyi provokes controversy because he simultaneously develops a "holistic view" (economy as such is transhistorically embedded in the relations of society) and "restrictive institutionalism" (economy as such is reduced to the *"socio-spatial patterns in the circulation of goods and services"*); embeddedness could be saved as a "methodological principle" in the analysis of economic status (KURTULUS 2008. 7.).

Our argumentation will now take two directions. First, we will list certain moments that additionally hinder the definition of the concept of embeddedness (apart from the problems in terms of market definition); secondly, we will try to reconceptualize the term of political-economic concept.

Therefore, there is a problem of *simplified naturalism* in Polanyi's work including various texts. Naturally, Polanyi criticized the ideological naturalism presented by classical economists. By analyzing their categories, he subjected them to criticism because of their poor definitions of naturalism. Finally, the entire concept of "constructing" the market is actually the criticism directed to naturalism. However, his work has also been influenced by implicit naturalism. Actually, some aspects of naturalism reach some basic categories, that is, the definition of the economics.

We know that Polanyi devised two definitions of economics, the first one was formal and the second one was *substantive* by his determination. We are also aware that he devotes his attention to criticizing the formal concept of economics that is seen in "liberal utopia" and in the concept of "self-regulating market". If we discuss about substantive concept, it is obvious that there is a connection with embeddedness: here, Polanyi discusses about economics which, as a part of social system, is regulated by normative and regulative social forms. Production, distribution, consumption, exchange represent constituent parts of economics; man realizes "metabolism" with nature but always in accordance with social patterns. Following the substantive concept, Polanyi has opened the door to economic anthropology (Sahlins, Dalton, Godelier, etc., see, Isaac 2005). By critically emphasizing the formalist concept ("economic fallacy"), Polanyi criticizes various "liberal utopias" that are related to the triad of "scarcity", "market" and "instrumental rationality" (MACOURANT 1993). We can call it a criticism of economization based on formalism that determines the instrumental rationality, that is, calculative rationality by reducing the complex relationships between means and goals, and denying the social determinations of economic categories.

In his search for universal definition of economization (even the generally accepted one for all social sciences), Polanyi offers the other triad: "nature-needs-institutions". In their friendly criticism, Postel and Sobel (Postel – Sobel 2008) subjected Polanyi to a thorough analysis in an attempt to universalize the relationship between man and nature: in the end, we get replacement of scarcity with material needs in general perspective. Based on the careful analyses of Polanyi's texts, authors criticize Polanyi for not having the developed concept of institution and needs. The author of *The Great Transformation* and other works uses the category of "material needs", *but neglects the fact that "material needs" are also social-historical set of categories.* The needs are indeed historically variable with regard to social determinations, but Polanyi neglects that fact or does not attach enough importance to it.

It is particularly important to mention that Polanyi's work is affected by undesirable functionalism: he defines "material needs" using "institutions" and *vice versa.* Unexpectedly, the institutions are conceptualized as a set of functions that aim at satisfying the universalized material needs. Naturally, Polanyi offers different definitions of institutions (the anthropological definition as well, according to which the institution is a "human project"), but we cannot deny the fact that rest of naturalism is a need. Postel and Sobel suggest the other triad "needs-institutions-practical reason". Naturally, there are different interpretations of Polanyi's intervention in both economic anthropology and economic discourse: there are certain nominalists such as Serge Latouche who decisively reject any "substantive" definition of economics, and they emphasize that there are communities that reject *"economics in the same way as they reject the God or state"* (Latouche 2004. 476.). This would then mean that not a single substantive definition of economics is adequate. It is not sufficient to insist on the fact that economics in pre-capitalist society has been involved in social forms in advance; it should be said that it does not exist in some communities. Other interpreters try to reduce the influence of "substantivism" in Polanyi's work and offer more exact definitions of economics (Caille 2005. 307., Sobel 2005. 172.). We may think that the analysis of "nature" is very important in Polanyi's work but the relevant analysis has some disadvantages (Mirowski 2015).

Here, we should put aside the most important discussion about the relationship between substantive and formalist definition of economics based on Polanyi's work. We are satisfied with the fact that residual "substantivism" prevails in his work. We assume that there is a problem between substantive and formalist definitions of economics and that it has not been resolved yet in Polanyi's work. *We also believe that this moment has influence on the dilemma about embeddedness.* Isn't it true that embeddedness that goes beyond historical level is exposed to substantivism? Isn't the concept of embeddedness affected by substantivism?

The second part of our discussion leads to the reformation of the concept of embeddedness based on *political-economic reflexivity,* and we claim that it is in line with Polanyi's opinion. If we regard Polanyi's thesis of embededdness with ontological indication, we will then undermine his approaches. If we complacently state that Polanyi's intervention exacerbates the fact that market economization must have its own legal and cultural prerequisites, starting from the legal state, relevant legal regulations, then we can conclude that Polanyi's work is not thorough and he cannot be distinguished from other theoreticians. Then, we could say that his work is similar

to the work of different theoreticians who constantly thematize the market conditions that are beyond the economics.

Actually, it should be *consistently* insisted on *polemical* and *political* aspects of embeddedness. Furthermore, it should be persistently insisted on the aforementioned *processuality* that is a guaranty for development of political-economic reflexivity. Each social-economic formation is characterized by the fact that economic frameworks show certain type of embeddedness, which is the same for capitalism that has its own historically determined modes of embeddedness. However, it is an exception in comparison to the rest of the history because, paradoxally (or dialectically), *it affirms embeddedness of market economy based on the mechanism of embeddedness* (see similar but not the same formulation, Dale 2010. 202., Block – Somers 1985. 65.; therefore, economization is nothing else than the *"embedding of the society into the economy"*). Embeddedness is the socio-economic form of disembeddedness in capitalism. Mechanisms of the capitalist society are involved in reproduction of this paradoxical constellation.

This way, we could understand the aforementioned dominance of rentiership in neoliberalism that develops its paradoxical forms despite the dominance of market ideology.

Based on Polanyi's work, we can conclude that the degree of embeddedness can only be understood based on the approach that focuses on the analysis of systematic interaction between politics and economics. The modus of embeddedness is *politically* determined and it is not an expression of a neutral-descriptive articulation. "Liberal utopia" is a phantasmagoria because, by self-determination, its tendency represents (impossible) separation of politics from economics and it is precisely what it denies, the *political determination of embeddedness in capitalism.*

Finally, at the end of this part: the economic discourse, a critical goal of Polanyi, starts from the fact that legal, ideological and other requirements need to be fulfilled first so that complex market economy could become invigorated. It is only after setting down the mentioned requirements that market economy can start functioning. However, we cannot understand the dynamics of embeddedness based on the previously mentioned. We suggest the other formula that might be consistent with Polanyi: there is *simultaneity* of conditions and consequences in terms of development of market dynamics. Market economy is neither an output of the previous conditions nor *prima causa. Timeliness* between the mentioned conditions and dynamics of the economy coincides more with Polanyi and neoliberalism as well.

2.1. Money as the sign of totality

Polanyi analyzed money in the above-mentioned main part and his papers on economic anthropology ("primitive" and "archaic money", Polanyi 1957, 1966, 1968). His reflections on money could help us with the configuration of money in neoliberalism, to be more precise, with the financialization phenomenon. In addition, let us consider one important criticism of Polanyi's work regarding money. Actually, the criticism by Viviane Zelizer (1994, 2000, 2005a,b) centers on the fact that the distinction between embeddedness and disembededdness is inadequate and she finds the balance/interaction rather than constitutive tension between market and society. Money is not only subject to market dynamics and there are specific forms of money that Zelizer calls "earmarking".

However, let us first see a brief description of the role of money in Polanyi's work (SERVET 1993, 2001), although we do not want to be too extensive because a lot of opinions that have been accepted so far (constitutionality of ideas, ideological articulation, for example) can also be applied here. If we accept our previous remarks regarding political determination of embeddedness, then we can understand the first Polanyi's intervention against traditional economic discourse according to which: a) money is seen as a neutral mechanism, b) money is treated as separated from the so-called real sphere. As we already know, in his articulations, Polanyi analyzes the monetary flows of the 19th century, gold standard, *"haute finance"* in the same period. Without repeating the details of this description (and without mentioning the problems with consequences of Polanyi's critical analyses of orthodox analyses of money),[2] we can conclude that money has a strategically important role in *The Great Transformation.* Polanyi's opinion about money can be analyzed from the aspect of those theoreticians who believe that money is "an expression of social totality" (AGLIETTA – LORDON 2007. 242.). Namely, it is certain that Polanyi's non-instrumentalist concept is rather complex and that, in his opinion, money is more than just means of exchange (in his later works, he mentions "payment-money" and "standard of values"). He does not want to equalize money and market; he recognizes the use of money in such societies where market is subordinated. His intention is to show trustworthy but "multifunctional money".[3] After all, we should bear in mind that the phenomenon of non-market money has been thoroughly described in economic anthropology that examines religious-ritual money in history that coincides with ruler's performance/calculation, that is, with 'political technology': money is a 'ruling sign', crucial element of "political technology" (ORLEAN 2002, LAUM 1924, 1925, 1992).

"Liberal utopia" or "self-regulating market" cannot be perceived without money as a non-neutral mechanism; we insisted on the concept of embeddedness as a non-neutral mechanism and we apply the same rule in case of money that reorganizes the relationship between state and market. Money is not a commodity here but a "debt-setting" and "accounting practice", except for "means of exchange". Polanyi shows his well-known political polarity ("double movement") in the field of money: he believes that commodity-based ideology of money, which is seen in the legitimacy of the gold standard, had to be the subject of "countermovement" (he even attributes the practice of central bank to this phenomenon). In commodity-mediated money, he sees an ideology that supports "liberal utopia", that is, ideology that causes society resistance.

However, this method is not completely clear and it involves some problems. Polanyi often uses the term "fictive". Namely, "fictive" is particularly used in terms of "fictive commodity", which implies that money, together with work and country, is treated as a "fictive commodity" (POSTEL – SOBEL 2010).

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[2] SAIAG (2014) shows some Polanyi's inconsistencies in relation to orthodoxy: his attitude to barter, especially in his later work, "incomplete break with the dichotomous approach", attitude to accounting, as well as occasional tendency to accepting functionalism in treating money. Simultaneously, we disagree with him when (ibid., 572) he claims that every theory of values (the one which Polanyi rejects) ends in dichotomous distinction between "real" and "monetary" spheres. It seems as if there is no monetary articulation of the theory of values!

[3] SAIAG (2014) emphasizes that there is a close connection between universality of money and multifunctional money in Polanyi's work.

There are certainly critical reasons that justify Polanyi's method: using his triad, he wants to show the impossibility of the mentioned moments to be subjected to the processes of commodification. However, there is a problem here with sharp dichotomy between 'fictive' and 'non-fictive'. It seems that we are again faced with certain type of unreflected "naturalism". Namely, why would only certain commodities be 'fictive' and others are not fictive? How to articulate the demarcation line? We cannot claim that there are 'naturally' determined goods and we should not claim that some things are commodities by nature. Here, we can refer to nominalist criticism of Polanyi but just briefly. In addition, we should address the above-mentioned naturalism because the terms 'fictive' is abundantly used in today's analyses of financialization.

Interestingly, there is a different course in Polanyi's analysis which has barely been noticed and which could be used in more fruitful manner and that is "semantics of money" (Polanyi 1968). We should probably discuss about pragmatic semantics of money because Polanyi strongly emphasizes that the essence of money is understood by the expression "money is what it does". By pointing out the "semantics of money", Polanyi falls into the category of those theoreticians who raise the question of money and language (certain theoreticians believe that there is strong homology between linguistic and monetary referentiality, Goux 1973. 197.), and those who thematize the way the "money talks" (Bandelj – Wherry – Zelizer 2017.). It seems to us that it is the far-reaching exploitation of semantics that enables us to address the problem of 'fictive' money in a better way.

Finally, we have to return to the problem emphasized at the beginning of this part and which seems important for additional clarification of Polanyi's attitude to money. Zelizer is a theoretician whose work focuses on "commercialization of life insurance" and points out the relationship between "intimacy" and money: instead of the game with null-sum, there are different shifts between market/money and society. Zelizer is not satisfied with Polanyi's tendency to reduce the forms of money to monolithic target function ("all-purpose money") because he should be careful when it comes to "pecuniary forms of money" such as "earmarking", which proves that subjective societies do not have to be subjected to money imperialism at all. Actually, as stated by Zelizer, there is no need to be worried because cultural resources are strong enough to withstand the dominance of money that leads to multifunctional money. Accordingly, the expansion of monetary forms implies strengthening of moral identity rather than moral degradation.

We believe that Polanyi's method was not understood here. This criticism affects Polanyi's intentions (let us see Steiner 2009, who allows Polanyi and Zelizer to be right but only in different fields). Zelizer ignores the fact that Polanyi himself wrote in his anthropological works about "multifunctional money" in pre-modern society. He developed the argument of "all-purpose money" because he claimed that there was non-neutral, politically-determined tendency that connected money and "self-regulating market". The fact that money is not neutral means that, in Polanyi's works, functioning of money results in such relations which the said economist-sociologist-anthropologist believes to be deeply problematic. Money is a particularly important medium, means/goal of commodification and it is this constellation of neoliberalism that shows it plausibly. We criticized Polanyi for insufficiently consistent denaturalization and "fictive commodities" but we believe that his work has enough elements for overcoming the above-mentioned inadequacies.

Conclusion

The actuality of Karl Polanyi can be demonstrated in a representative way by

a) economization in neoliberalism as a metaframe for the contemporary epoch,

b) transformation of meanings of embeddedness,

c) dynamic of money.

Taking into account the chosen elements, we analyzed the importance of this work for further studies. Simultaneously, after criticizing the certain tendencies in Polanyi's arguments, we insisted on "rethinking" of his work. We particularly emphasized disadvantages in

a) theory of state and ideology,

b) field of naturalism,

c) disadvantage in relationship between "substantive" and "formalistic" understanding of economics.

Our approach was primarily politically-economically oriented and this was the perspective from which we tried to initiate the discussion about economic anthropology and economic sociology starting from the fact that it was this methodology that was the most adequate for productive arguments against Polanyi.

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Identity and social determinants of perceiving ethnic discrimination of Hungarians from Romania



ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the subjective ethnic discrimination in case of Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania. We would like to know to what extent the subjective perception about discrimination is determined from a social, national identity and ethnopolitical point of view, based on a representative survey data from 2007 and 2010. During our research, we have pointed out what are the social factors that determine the perception of subjective discrimination. We analyzed the extent to which social and demographic factors, as well as the character of the ethno-national identity and the character of the regional ethnocultural environment probable alter the perception of subjective ethnic discrimination among the members of an ethnonational minority, such as Hungarians from Romania. According to our hypothesis, the perception of ethnic discrimination is primarily determined by the ethno-national minority identity loaded with nationalistic or ethnocentric elements and by the character of relationship between majority and minority, while social-demographic determination or even educational level or knowledge of other languages are less important.

A logistic regression model was involved in the analysis in order to explain the social determinants of perceiving ethnic discrimination, in three steps, including independent variables the social-demographic ones, as well as the variables about education, school socialization and ethnolinguistic environment (variables of regional belonging). Thirdly, the model incorporates elements of national identity variables and the attitudes towards Romanians.

KEYWORDS

discrimination, ethnicity, Transylvania, Romania, Hungarian minority

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Introduction

It is not unusual for persons belonging to national minorities to be discriminated in certain situations. In the last few decades, several countries have made significant political efforts to eliminate or at least reduce any kind of discrimination affecting persons belonging to national minorities. They have launched several educational and information programs in this field and they have also adopted legal norms to regulate situations in which discrimination is prohibited.

This paper relies on the concept of ethnic discrimination and we shall analyze to what extent its subjective perception is determined among Hungarians from Romania from a social, national identity and ethnopolitical point of view after Romania's accession to the European Union, based on 2007–2010 data collections. During our research, we have pointed out that the subjective perception of ethnic discrimination is significantly connected to national identity filled with nationalism and to the perception of the minority-majority relationship. Therefore we may indirectly identify a consequence of the social functioning of national ideologies.

Hungarians from Transylvania became a minority in Romania in 1918 when, following the disintegration of the Austrian–Hungarian empire, Transylvania was unified with Romania. In our days, the number of Hungarians from Romania is approximately 1,23 million[1] and they represent 19% of the population from Transylvania and 6,5% of the population from Romania, while 99% of them live in Transylvania. From the point of view of the aim of our study it is important to see the position of Hungarians from Transylvania from a territorial and ethnopolitical point of view. The proportion and territorial structure of Hungarians is strongly different from a regional point of view. As shown in Table 1, Transylvanian Hungarians live in local majority in the Eastern Transylvania (historically known as Szeklerland, now are Covasna and Harghita, and mostly, Mures counties). In Northern Transylvania they live in smaller insular blocks, their majority live in towns and in certain towns the number of Hungarian communities is significant (20–40%). Hungarians live in minority in Western area, Crisana (Patium), the border region with Hungary (Bihor, Satu Mare, Salaj), but their proportion is significant: it varies between 20–40% county level, and their majority live along the Hungarian–Romanian border. In Southern Transylvania and in Banat, the Hungarians live in diaspora, therefore their proportion is below 10% in each county and their majority live in towns (in which their proportion is, in most cases, below 10%).

[1] According to Romanian census from 2011, National Institute of Statistics, www.recensamant.ro (accessed in 20 December 2013)

Regional area	Component counties	Total population	Hungarians (No. inhabitants)	Proportion of Hungarians (%)
Northern Transylvania	Bistrita-Nasaud, Cluj, Maramures	1 455 990	150 559	10.3
Crisana – Vestern Area (Partium)	Bihor, Satu Mare, Salaj	1 144 142	300 970	26.3
Eastern Transylvania (Secklerland)	Covasna, Harghita, Mures	1 071 890	609 033	56.8
Southern Transylvania	Alba, Brasov, Sibiu, Hunedoara	1 707 480	81 303	4.8
Banat	Arad, Caras-Severin, Timis	4 824 708	237 407	4.9
Total Transylvania		6 789 250	1 216 666	19,0

Table 1 *The proportion of Ethnic Hungarians in different regions of Transylvania, 2011 (Source: Romanian Census from 2011. INS, 2013)*

Theoretical Considerations: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Cultural Discrimination

The basis of perceiving one's minority situation in a negative manner is represented by experiencing negative discrimination or its perception. In modern thinking, treating people with equal rights in an unequal manner is considered discrimination. (Schnapper 1999. 138.)

Discrimination can be defined as "those actions designed to maintain own-group characteristics and favored position at the expense of the comparison group" (Jones 1972)

Although individual prejudice and stereotypes may produce actions, such as political support for laws and public policies that lead to institutional discrimination, which can operate separate from individual discrimination. The institutional discrimination can be supported by laws and policies. Cultural discrimination appears when one group exerts the power to define values for the entire society, privileging their own culture, traditions and values. In this case the dominant group, imposes this culture on other minority groups. This kind of discrimination is deeply embedded in the fiber of a culture's history, customs and norms; it involves not only privileging the culture and values of the dominant group, but also imposing this culture on other non-dominant groups. As a consequence, everyday activities implicitly communicate group-based bias, passing it to new generations. Thus, members of a minority group may develop a 'false consciousness' in which they not only comply with but also endorse cultural values that systematically disadvantage them. (Dovidio et. al. 2010. 8–11.)

The contemporary legal concept of discrimination may be interpreted in the context of the modern normative order. Differentiations that refer to the origins or to a biological characteristic of a person or which are based on one of these may be considered unjust and therefore sanctioned based

on this normative order. However, discrimination does not only consist of acts, but it is also their qualification. Thus, it is also important to know what is considered discriminative and on what basis. (Horváth 2006. 135., 140.).

In their analysis, Brubaker et al. (2006) have shown, based on a research in Transylvanian city, Cluj-Napoca, that ethnic and national consciousness and the ethnicization of space and time is more present in the everyday life of the Hungarian population than among the majority of Romanians who form the majority population6. This type of worldview may increase the subjective perception of ethnic discrimination as minority neurosis, which mean that the actions not necessarily qualify as discrimination in legal terms, it is more likely an oversensitivity in interethnic interactions (see Magyari 2000). We also analyze the perception of discrimination related to national identity, ethnocentrism, and the Romanian – Hungarian interethnic relations in Romania.

The national identity is a multidimensional construct with a categorization dimension, that is, "patriotism," and a discrimination dimension, that is, "nationalism." Patriotism is simply defined as a positive emotional attachment to one's own nation-state, whereas nationalism means discrimination against others. Theoretically, national identity may have two main forms, ethnocultural or civic version. This depends on how and based on what principles the nation to which people express, their belonging has been formed (Gellner 1987). The national identity of the Hungarian minority from Romania is defined mostly ethnoculturally, as demonstrated in several studies, but certain elements of civic identification with Romania, with the Romanian citizenship can also be identified in the collective identity of Transylvanian Hungarians.[2]

In Verdery's (1993. 179–203) view "nationalism is using the symbolic content of nation in an emotionally exalted form for political reasons". Although nationalism is not induced through "nation", but through particular manifestations of the political sphere (Brubaker 1996. 13–17.). It may be assumed that influenced by nationalism, the members of an ethnocultural national minority tend to perceive the relationship with the majority as characterised by conflict, especially on a national level and their attitude is more repulsive than that of the members of the majority ethnocultural national community. These attitudes may influence the way in which different everyday situations are perceived, thus the perception of discrimination as well. Naturally, the dynamics of intergroup relationships may not be viewed in an idealistic way. In Calhoun's (2003. 531–553.) view, "culture and social relationships are as real as individuals, even if they lack bodies", criticizing the "extreme cosmopolitanism" which promotes the elimination of all loyalties lesser than that of each individual to humanity as a whole.

Inasmuch as the ethno-national identity of minorities is influenced by the phenomenon of affectedness, these people are oversensitive to national belonging, while they are less sensitive to other things (Csepeli 1997). Ethnic minority neurosis may also be found behind this phenomenon which refers to the oversensitiveness induced exactly by former cultural discrimination, not necessarily experienced personally, but oriented against the community to which the person belongs to. In last decades the Transylvanian Hungarians experienced nationalist political actions which could imply oversensitivity to national belonging. Starting from 1956, and more likely after 1965, the state politics gradually ceased previous linguistic and educational rights (Schöpflin 1991),

[2] See Brubaker 1996, Csepeli – Örkény– Székelyi 2000, Veres 2005.

with hidden aim to assimilate the Transylvanian Hungarians, on cultural and linguistic sense (Bugajski 1995. 200.). Even in first decade of political transition after 1989, Romania "underwent problematic democratic transitions at the beginning of the 1990s, marked by continued patterns of ethnic minority discrimination, security fears, nationalist rhetoric, and the presence of leaders with extremist views" (Mihailescu 1999).

We may speak of subjective discrimination in the case of our respondents, which means that actors who do not have legal or symbolic legitimacy qualify an attitude or act as discriminatory as opposed to qualified discrimination which is established by a socially acknowledged authority, for ex. the National Council for Combating Discrimination in Romania (Horváth 2006. 143.).

The research question of this paper is: what are the social factors that determine the perception of subjective discrimination? Searching for an answer, we analyze the extent to which social and demographic factors, as well as the character of the ethno-national identity and the character of the ethnocultural environment ender probable the perception of subjective ethnic discrimination among the members of an ethnonational minority, such as Hungarians from Romania.

Our hypothesis is that the perception of ethnic discrimination is primarily determined by the ethno-national minority identity loaded with nationalistic or ethnocentric elements and by the character of relationship between majority and minority, while social-demographic determination or even educational level or knowledge of other languages are less important.

Data and Methods

The empirical data source of the research is represented by the Charpatian Panel project, waves 2010. In some cases, we will refer to data from wawe 2007.[3]

We carried out the first wave of the Kárpát Panel research from Romania, in Transylvanian counties, in 2007 by means of a representative survey with 900 subjects, employing a questionnaire based method on a Hungarian speaking population sample, using an aleatory multistadial survey method. We took samples from 15 counties of Transylvania in a broader sense (Caras-Severin county was left out due to the small number of Hungarians living there). In this phase, a questionnaire based survey among Hungarians from Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, as well a Hungarian control sample survey were carried out, on a total aleatory sample of 2915 cases. The second wave was carried out only in Transylvania during 2010, on a sample consisting of 890 cases. The sampling method used was the following: the population from the 2007 representative sample was contacted again and those who could not be contacted anymore were replaced by using the original supplementary sampling lists (from 2007).

Respondents were selected if they spoke Hungarian. The questionnaire comprised questions on national/ethnic self-identification as well. Respondents were asked to indicate, in order, the communities they felt they belonged to, and we processed the first identifications mentioned. (Veres 2010)

[3] The institutions coordinating this research project are the following: Minority Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA NKI, Hungary) and the Max Weber Foundation for Social Research, Cluj-Napoca (Romania). Partners: Babes-Bolyai University Cluj, Sociology Dept. (Ro), Forum Institute (Slovakia), T. Lehotczky Institute (Zacarpatija, Ukraine), Research coordinators: Attila Papp, Valér Veres, director: László Szarka. The next Karpat Panel wave took place in 2010, but only in Romania.

We used the following question in order to measure the subjective perception of discrimination: *How often were you discriminated against for the following reasons?* The answers were recorded on the following scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = frequently, 4 = very frequently). We considered that the measuring level of the scale was ordinal. The respondents could provide different types of discriminatory experiences based on ethnic origin, sex, age, material situation, social origin, political views or region of origin.

Secondly, we analysed the associations with different social-demographic variables (sex, age, type of locality, educational level, region or residence) by employing the Chi-square test.

Next, we analysed the indicators used to verify the nature of ethnic and national identity, as well as of the ethnocultural environment. By means of the Chi-square, t test we analysed the bivariate correlations that these variables had with social-demographic variables.

First, we analysed the ethnonym they primarily designated by addressing the following open question: *What do you primarily consider yourself?,* then we addressed the next open question: *What is homeland for you?* The respondents could answer anything they wanted and the answers were grouped at a later moment.

For measuring national attitudes toward the ethnonational majority (Romanians), we used a five-level scale of attitudes of like/dislike towards specific groups to capture the distance between the Hungarian minority and other social groups. The question was: *How do you see the following groups?* The answer-options ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 = very agreeable, 2 = rather agreeable, 3 = neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4 = rather disagreeable, and 5 = very disagreeable (the most negative attitude, see Veres 2013. 87–112).

We operationalised general and auto heterostereotype for measuring prejudice towards majority Romanians. The respondents had to estimate to what extent each reference group (one's own minority group, Romanians as majority nation, Hungarians from Hungary) could be characterised by four previously provided positive and and four previously provided negative traits. These percentual answers were used to elaborate two aggregate indicators: one by calculating the mean value of the positive characteristics and one by calculating the mean value of negative characteristics. Then, we analysed their mean and variance values by means of the t test.

The perception of interethnic relations on local or country level (i.e. perceived interethnic conflict or cooperation) were measured by the question: *What is the relationship between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority like at the country/at local level?* The possible answers were the following: 1 = conflict, 2 = neutral, 3 = cooperation. For the purpose of multivariate analysis, we have combined these three categories into a dummy variable, where conflict = 1, else = 0.

We also used other variables in the logistic model but in this paper we did not present the answers to these in detail. They were used to measure the nature of the ethnocultural environment. One was used to measure the degree of knowledge of the official language (Romanian) on a six degree scale. The other question referred to *the language used in relationships with public administrative authorities (during office routine) in the locality of residence. Romanian* or *Hungarian* could be opted here. The third referred to the language of general (mandatory) education. Again, *Romanian* or *Hungarian* could be opted as languages of education.

Last, the analysis involved a logistic regression model in three steps.

The dependent variable was a dummy variable created on the basis of the following question: *How often were you discriminated because of your ethnonational belonging?* The value of the *Yes, I was (frequently) discriminated* and the value of the *Rarely* answers was 1, while the value of the *Never* answer was 0.

The model was elaborated in three steps. First, the social-demographic variables, as well as the variables strongly related to them, i.e. school socialisation and language environment were the independent variables.

Then, the model was extended and the variables of regional belonging were included. Thirdly, we included the elements of national identity and the attitudes towards Romanians in the model, as well as a general variable measuring satisfaction with one's life (but the influence of this latter one was not significant). The variables included in the second and third step also served as control variables to measure the influence of variables included in the previous step.

The independent variables included in logistic regression model were the following: age, education (the number of years of study completed) dummies for gender (women = 1), settlement type (urban = 1), Hungarian language of instruction in secondary school (Hungarian = 1, else = 0). Multivalue variables: the language use in relation of local administration (office routine) (1 = Hungarian, 2 = Romanian, reference value: in both languages), Regional (4 values, reference: Partium) Identity: you primarily consider yourself as (reference value: Transylvanian), Homeland (reference value Romania, knowledge of the Romanian language (1 to 6-grade scale), perception of interethnic relationships with the Romanian majority population at country level (conflict = 1), interethnic relationships at the local level (conflict = 1), attitudes towards Romanians (5-grade scale, see description above), negative stereotypes about Romanians, positive stereotypes about Romanians (values on a scale between 1–100), satisfaction with one's standard of living (1 = very unsatisfied, 6 = very satisfied)

Results

In 2007, 57% of the Transylvanian Hungarian respondents (59% in 2010) responded that they were never discriminated on grounds of ethnic belonging. 34% of the respondents were rarely discriminated on grounds of ethnonationality both in 2007 and in 2010. While 6% of the respondents said that he were discriminated frequently and 1,7% very frequently in 2007, their percentage toned down to 4,2 and 1,6% respectively during 2010. However, these differences are within the margin of error, therefore we may assert that there is no significant change in the degree of the perception of ethnic discrimination in time. Comparing these answers of ethnic Hungarians from Romania with the Romanian data on national level regarding discrimination, according to a national survey from year 2004, a similar percent of 6–7% of Romanians consider that in Romania, ethnic Hungarians are discriminated frequently or very frequently, in different situations, because of their ethno-nationality.[4] In a recent national survey from 2013 commanded by National Council against Discrimination from Romania 22% of respondents said that they were

[4] See *Barometrul de opinie privind discriminarea în România,* Bucharest: Metromedia Transilvania, 2004, in: http://www.cncd.org.ro/ publicatii/Sondaje-4/ (accessed February 10, 2014)

ever discriminated (on any reason) in Romania, while 12% of Romanians said that the persons belonging to ethnonational minorities are discriminated very frequently and other 20% said frequently. In case of getting a new job, 30% of the Romanian respondents considered that an ethnic Hungarian can find a job more difficult than an ethnic Romanian. Also, 52% of Romanians don't accept a Hungarian in family (as relative) and 47% of them don't accept a Hungarian as a friend.[5]

In comparison of other types of discrimination, the Transylvanian Hungarian respondents consider that discrimination on grounds of ethnonationality is the most frequent type of discrimination. A significant part of the respondents were rarely discriminated on grounds of their material situation, thus for poverty and their region of origin. This tendency has increased during the last 3 years from 17% to 21% in the case of the material situation and from 11% to 13,6% in the case of the region of origin. Yet, the number of those mentioning discrimination on grounds of sex has decreased from 7% to 3% (see Table 2 and see also Papp – Veres 2007). This may also be due to the fact that our respondents are oversensitive to national belonging and less sensitive to other issues. It is also possible that minority neurosis is to be found in the background of all this. Minority neurosis refers exactly to the oversensitiveness entailed by one kind of discrimination. We may primarily speak of subjective discrimination in the case of our respondents, which means the qualification of an attitude or action as discriminatory by actors who do not have the legal or symbolic legitimacy as opposed to qualified discrimination which is established by a socially recognised authority, for ex. the National Council for Combating Discrimination of Romania.[6] (see Table 2)

		Never	Rarely	Frequently	Very frequently	No answer
2007	Ethnonational belonging	57.1	34.7	6	1.7	0.6
	Material situation	75.5	17.6	5	1.5	0.5
	The region where came from	85.8	11.2	2.2	0.3	0.5
	Political opinions	86.2	9.3	2.3	0.6	1.6
	Social origin	80	15.8	2.8	0.8	0.6
	Age	85.3	11.9	2	0.5	0.3
	Gender	91.6	7.2	0.5	0.2	0.6
2010	Ethnonational belonging	59.7	34.1	4.2	1.6	0.5
	Material situation	74.2	21.1	3.3	0.6	0.8
	The region where came from	84.2	13.6	1.2	0.3	0.7
	Political opinions	85.1	11.8	1.6	0.7	0.8
	Gender	95.4	3.2	0.6	0.2	0.6
	Sexual orientation	97.8	1.5	0	0	0
	Other	93.3	1.2	0.5	0.5	4.5

Table 2 *How often were you discriminated on grounds of the following reasons? 2007, 2010 (%), N_{2007} = 891, N_{2010} = 850 (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author])*

[5] *Perceptii Si atitudini privind discriminarea 2013. Raport de cercetare IRES,* (Bucuresti: CNCD, 2013)

[6] See website of National Council for Combating Discrimination of Romania: http://www.cncd.org.ro

There are significant association both according to sex and age groups: a higher percentage of men, people from towns/cities and younger people experienced discrimination – although rarely – as compared to other categories. A higher percentage of the latter categories considered that they were not discriminated (see Table 3).

Frequency of ethnic discrimination		Never	Rarely	Frequently	Very frequently	Total
Gender	Men	56.4%	37.8%	4.3%	1.5%	100.0%
	Women	63.4%	30.9%	4.1%	1.6%	100.0%
Settlement**	Rural	65.9%	28.6%	4.0%	1.5%	100.0%
	Urban	54.6%	38.8%	4.6%	1.9%	100.0%
Highest level of education**	Elementary school	64.0%	30.7%	3.8%	1.5%	100.0%
	Vocational school	58.3%	35.0%	5.3%	1.5%	100.0%
	High school	59.7%	33.3%	5.3%	1.6%	100.0%
	University	49.5%	47.7%	1.9%	0.9%	100.0%
Age group*	18–29	54.6%	40.0%	5.4%		100.0%
	30–44	56.0%	39.2%	3.3%	1.4%	100.0%
	45–64	58.8%	35.1%	4.9%	1.2%	100.0%
	65+	66.9%	26.5t h%	3.5%	3.1%	100.0%
Total		60.0%	34.2%	4.1%	1.7%	100.0%

Table 3 *Were you discriminated on grounds of ethno-national belonging? The distribution of respondents according to social-demographic variables, 2010 (N = 844) (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author] Note: **p < 0,01 ***p < 0,001 level significant associations [Chi-square])*

Differences related to the level of education could be observed among those who were discriminated on grounds of their ethnonationality. As also shown in Table 4, in 2010, 17% more higher education graduates than basic education graduates mentioned that they were discriminated on grounds of ethnonationality, even if rarely (the difference was 15% in 2007, see Table 4).

The biggest differences may be observed according to region: 52,5% of the respondents from Northern Transylvania (where the Hungarian diaspora and insular blocks of Hungarians live) and almost 40% of the respondents from Southern Transylvania and Banat answered that they were rarely discriminated on grounds of nationality, while their percentage is 33,5% in the Partium region and 27,8% in Eastern Transylvania. Almost 6% of the Hungarians from Northern Transylvania experienced discrimination frequently. This percentage is smaller in other parts (see Table 5).

In the following, we shall briefly present the values of those national identity and attitude variables based on which we will try to explain the evaluation of ethnic discrimination in the logistic model.

We used several indicators for identity variables. One refers to what they primarily consider themselves. Based on their answers, a strengthening of regionality may be observed by 2010: while 16,6% of our respondents considered themselves Transylvanian without an ethnonym in 2007, the percentage of those who declared themselves Transylvanian was 29,6 in 2010. This is followed

by the option with a regional attribute, Transylvanian Hungarian with 27% in 2007 and already 24,4% by 2010. Thus, the two regional "Transylvanian" options make up the majority of the answers. Another 24,4% of the respondents declared themselves Hungarian without a regional attribute in 2010. Almost 22% of the respondents from Transylvania declared themselves to be something else. The most characteristic is Szekler: 9% of the respondents declared themselves Szekler in 2010, while their percentage was 7% in 2007, which also reflects the strengthening of regionality. The other question was used to analyse what people considered as their homeland. In 2010, 40% of the respondents considered Romania as their homeland and 45,5% (as compared to 46,6% in 2007) indicated Transylvania as their homeland (as compared to 31% in 2007). Hungary was only indicated by 3% as their homeland and there were several other distributed answers (more often: locality of residence, locality of birth, other answers).

Education level	Never experienced ethnic discrimination		Experienced ethnic discrimination (rarely or frequently)		Total
	2007**	2010**	2007	2010	
Vocational school or lower	64,6	65,4	35,2	44,6	100
High school	52,4	59,7	47,6	40,3	100
University	50,0	47,7	50,0	52,3	100
Total	60,4	60	39,6	40	100

Table 4 *Discrimination on grounds of ethnic belonging, answers according to level of education (%), N_{2007} = 891, N_{2010} = 845 (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author]. Note: **p < 0,01 level significant associations [Chi-square])*

	Regional area***				
	Eastern Transylvania	Crisana-Partium	Northern Transylvania	Southern Transylvania and Banat	Total
Never	66.3%	61.4%	40.0%	56.4%	60.0%
Rarely	27.8%	33.5%	52.5%	39.6%	34.3%
Frequently	4.6%	3.4%	5.8%	2.0%	4.1%
Very frequently	1.3%	1.7%	1.7%	2.0%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5 *How often were you discriminated on grounds of nationality? The distribution of answers according to regional area, 2010(%), N = 850 (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2010 [data calculation by the author]. Note: **p < 0,01 ***p < 0,001 level significant associations [Chi-square])*

We used a 5-level scale for measuring attitudes towards ethnic-national groups, where 1 denoted very likeable and 5 very antipathetic. The question referred to the respondents' attitude towards different ethnic groups, to what extent they are likeable: in 2010 the average value of Hungarians from Hungary was 2,3, while that of Romanians was 2,4. There is only a small, not significant difference between these two values. Average values are 0,1 smaller than for the group analysed in 2007. Looking at the distribution of answers, it may be seen that the attitude towards Romanians is rather indifferent, while somewhat more respondents feel that Hungarians from Hungary are more likeable or antipathetic than Romanians. The majority of the respondents feel antipathy towards Roma and the average value is considerably higher than for other groups: 3,1 in 2010 (3,2 in 2007). We have also analysed the averages for the answers according to locality types and we have noticed that there are significant differences in the perception of Hungarians from Hungary: urban people feel more antipathy towards them than village people. The answers indicate a new situation as compared to research carried out in previous years. While in 1997 and 2000, for example, Germans were the most accepted ethnic group, by 2007 and 2010 this had changed: Hungarians from Transylvania also consider Romanians to be closer than Germans (see Figure 1).

While measuring preconceptions, our respondents had to estimate to what extent the analysed groups (one's own minority group, Hungarians from Hungary, Romanians as the majority nation) could be characterised as described above (Method) by four positive and four negative traits. The answers show how minority ethnocentrism functions: positive traits are mainly attributed to Hungarians from Transylvania, they are followed by Hungarians and then by Romanians. The hierarchy is reversed in the case of negative traits: negative traits are attributed approximately



Figure 1 *How do you relate to the following groups? Ethnic groups /Average values/ N_{2007} = 892, N_{2010} = 890 Scale: 1 = Very likeable 2 = Rather likeable 3 = Indifferent 4 = Rather antipathetic 5 = Very antipathetic (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author])*

to the same extent to Hungarians than to Romanians and to a smaller extent to their own minority group. In the case of positive traits the biggest differences may be noticed for "helpfulness" in 2007: the respondents consider that 56% of their own group, 45% of the Romanians and only 40% of the Hungarians are helpful on average. In 2010, the difference decreased for both Hungarians (45%) and Romanians (48%), while the value for Hungarians from Transylvania did not change. As for the other traits, the changes are not significant, except that, in 2010, 3% less respondents consider that Hungarians are selfish than in 2007. No significant correlations between the different characteristics attributed to Hungarians or Romanians and the main social-demographic variables could be revealed (Veres – Papp 2012).

We used the answers to each trait to elaborate aggregate indicators taking into consideration if they were positive or negative traits and we analysed the average and deviation values of the new variables for each region in relation to Romanians and Hungarians from Hungary (see the annex for the regional averages calculated according to each trait). 43% of the entire analysed population attribute negative traits to Romanians and 40,3% to Hungarians from Hungary, which also shows the extent of the difference between the relationship with these two groups. Regionally, the results clearly outline that the average values for the negative traits that characterise Romanians are higher in Eastern[7] and Northern Transylvania (around 45%) and they are lower in the Western area (Crisana-Partium)[8] region, in Southern Transylvania and Banat (around 39%). Hungarians from

Stereotypes	Regional area									
	Eastern Transylvania		Crisana-Partium		Northern Transylvania		Southern Transylvania and Banat		Total	
	m	s	m	s	m	s	m	s	m	s
Negativ traits about the Romanians**	45.1	13.8	39.5	17.6	45.0	17.9	39.3	17.8	43.0	16.1
Pozitiv traits about the Romanians	46.9	13.5	47.5	13.8	46.5	14.1	46.8	12.7	47.0	13.5
Negativ traits about the Hungariansa**	43.0	14.3	39.0	15.8	39.2	17.9	32.7	12.8	40.3	15.4
Pozitiv traits about the Hungarians*	50.0	13.1	50.7	16.1	45.1	14.3	48.9	13.6	49.5	14.2

Table 6 *What percent of Hungarians (from Hungary) and Romanians respectively could be characterised by positive and negative traits? Average values according to regional areas, 2010 (N = 890)(Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author]. Notes: **p < 0,01 ***p < 0,001 level significant differences [Anova-test]; m = mean, s = standard deviation; a.Hungarians in this case mean Hungarians from Hungary)*

[7] Eastern Transylvania here means: Covasna, Harghita and Mures counties. The old name of area was Secklerland (Secuime inRomanian, Székelyföld in Hungarian).

[8] Western Area (Crisana, in Romanian terminology, Partium in Hungarian terminology). See also Table 1.

Hungary are attributed negative traits to the greatest extent in Eastern Transylvania (43%) and this decreases in correlation with the proportion of Hungarians (it is only 32,7% in Southern Transylvania and Banat). Positive traits do not significantly differ for Romanians. There are also small differences for Hungarians from Hungary. The average value is the highest in Crisana (50%): they are the ones who consider them the closest as we have already seen it at the group definition or at the concept of homeland, while it is the smallest in Northern Transylvania (45%).

We have also compared the answers related to discrimination with the answers to certain aspects of the ethno-cultural national identity, thus with self-identification, with the answers to the concept of homeland and with the attitude towards and preconceptions about Romanians. We have found significant correlations with the perception of ethnic discrimination and the attitude towards the majority both in 2007 and 2010: on average, those who assert that they have never been affected by ethno-national discrimination assume closer relationships with the majority population than those who assert that they have been affected by discrimination, but we have also carried out a more complex analysis of this by means of a multivariate logistic regression model (see below, Table 8).

In order to evaluate the minority situation, we inquired how they perceive the relationship between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority. In many cases, ethnic groups in contact have a different representation of the commonly used geographical space and common past in their collective consciousness, which may give birth to conflicts (Smith 1991).

There are significant differences between the evaluation of the country-level relationships shaped by power ideologies and the intergroup relationships directly perceived by our respondents on local level, which may also be attributed to the conflictive Hungarian–Romanian relationships during the course of history.

While in 2010, 61% considered that locality level Hungarian–Romanian relationships from Transylvania were characterized by cooperation (as compared to 68% in 2007), 32–33% of Hungarians from Transylvania considered that country-level Hungarian–Romanian relationships were characterized by cooperation. However, a significant change may be noticed here: while in 2007, 33.5% considered that Hungarian–Romanian relationships were conflictive, their proportion toned down to 26% by 2010. Therefore, in 2010, more respondents, i.e. 35.9% viewed country-level Hungarian–Romanian relationships with indifference.

The perception of conflict is significantly different according to regions. Country-level Hungarian–Romanian relationship are perceived as conflictive by Hungarians living in blocks and Hungarians living in significant proportion in Eastern Transylvania and in Western Area (Partium) (31%), while in Northern Transylvania only 24,4%, in Southern Transylvania and Banat 15,5% perceive that there is a conflict. Accordingly, the majority of diaspora Hungarians consider that this relationship is characterized by cooperation, while in the other two regions not even 30% consider it as such! However, the situation is different on locality level: an above average proportion of Hungarians from Northern Transylvania perceive that there is a conflict (more than 17% as compared to the average 8,3%). 80,4% of Hungarians living in Southern Transylvania and Banat, almost 70% of Hungarians from Western Area (Partium) consider that Hungarian–Romanian relationships are characterized by cooperation at the level of their respective locality, while in the other two regions only 55% consider that this is the case (Table 7).

Rather surprisingly, there are no significant correlations between the perception of Hungarian–Romanian relationships and different social-demographic variables, neither at country level nor at the level of localities, except a weak correlation with the type of locality (a few percent more consider that there is a conflict in villages than in towns/cities).



FIGURE 2 *How could you describe country-level relationships between Hungarians and Romanians today? And at the level of the locality you live in? (%)* $N_{2007} = 894$, $N_{2010} = 846$ *(Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2007 and 2010 [data calculation by the author]*)

		Eastern Transylvania	Crisana-Partium	Northern Transylvania	Southern Transylvania and Banat	Total
Relations on national level***	Conflicted	31.3%	31.9%	24.4%	15.5%	28.5%
	Cooperation	22.9%	26.6%	51.2%	61.9%	33.1%
	Ignorance	45.8%	41.5%	24.4%	22.7%	38.4%
Relations on local level***	Conflicted	7.3%	8.1%	17.3%	2.2%	8.3%
	Cooperation	54.4%	70.3%	55.5%	80.4%	62.1%
	Ignorance	38.3%	21.6%	27.3%	17.4%	29.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 7 *The characterization of the interethnic relationship between Romanians and Hungarians at country and local level, by region, 2010 (%), N = 846 (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2010 [data calculation by the author]. Note: **p < 0,01 ***p < 0,001 level significant associations [Chi-square])*

The multivariate model of the perception of ethnic discrimination

In the following, we analysed the variables that could explain those who answered that they had been discriminated on grounds of their nationality in Romania. The analysis was carried out by means of logistic regression. The dependent variable was a double-value dummy variable which was 1 if the person in question had ever experienced subjective ethnic discrimination and 0 if never. The model has three levels. First, we analysed the social-demographic variables, as well as the influence of the closely related school socialisation and language environment. Secondly, we extended the model by including the variables of regional belonging and, thirdly, we included the elements of national identity and the variables related to attitudes towards/ relationships with Romanians, as well as a general satisfaction variable. The variables included during the second and third step also serve as control variables for measuring the effects of the variable included in the previous step.

The explaining power of the model is 0.052 on the first level based on the Nagelkerke R-square, 0.101 on the second level and it has increased to 0.244 on the third level by including the elements of national identity and the variable measuring the attitude towards Romanians, which counts as considerable based on the peculiarities of this method.

Independent variables	I. Socio-demographic and linguistic socialization variables		II. Regional settlement variables		III. Ethno-national identity and attitudes variables	
	Exp (B)	sig. (p)	Exp (B)	sig. (p)	Exp (B)	sig. (p)
Gender (1 – women)	.826	.201	.787	.118	.704	.090
Age	.988	.002	.986	.001	.986	.014
Settlement type (1 – urban)	1.669	.001	1.581	.003	1.868	.003
Education (no. of finished classes, in years)	.992	.205	.992	.199	.992	.340
Teaching language (1 – Hungarian)	.869	.383	.906	.553	1.017	.941
Knowledge og Romanian language (1–6)	1.023	.773				
LLPA (languge in local public administration)[1]		.044		.000		.269
LLPA (1) Hungarian language	1.583	.015	2.253	.000	1.519	.126
LLPA (2) Romanian language	1.314	.125	1.093	.635	.978	.931
Northern Transylvania			2.220	.001	1.755	.119
Southern Transylvania			.965	.892	.805	.556
Eastern Transylvania			.560	.004	.407	.001

Table 8 *Logistic regression model for explaining the perception of ethnic discrimination (2010) (Source: Charpatian Panel Survey, Transylvanian Hungarians from Romania, 2010 [data calculation by the author]. Dependent variable: discrimination because of ethno-national belonging [1 – experienced, dummy] Notes: 1. reference value = both Romanian and Hungarian languages; 2. reference value = Transylvania; 3. reference value = Romania)*

Independent variables	I. Socio-demographic and linguistic socialization variables		II. Regional settlement variables		III. Ethno-national identity and attitudes variables	
	Exp (B)	sig. (p)	Exp (B)	sig. (p)	Exp (B)	sig. (p)
Ident 1[2]						.021
Ident 1 (1) Hungarian					.426	.005
Ident 1 (2) Transylvanian Hungarian					1.106	.708
Ident 1 (3) Romanian, with Hungarian mother tongue					.954	.915
Ident 1 (4) Seckler (székely)					1.380	.410
Ident 1 (5) other					1.286	.596
Fatherland[3]						.300
Fatherland (1) Transylvania					1.646	.030
Fatherland (2) Hungary					1.558	.373
Fatherland (3) Settlement					1.396	.511
Fatherland (4) Oher					1.300	.713
Romanian–Hungarian conflict perception on national level					1.361	.209
Romanian–Hungarian conflict perception on local level					.898	.775
Negative stereotypes about Romanian					1.025	.000
Positive stereotypes about Romanian					1.002	.795
Attitudes toward Roamnians					1.633	.001
Satisfaction with standards ofliving					.953	.385
Constant	.918	.745	1.148	.638	.015	.146
Model Chi-square (df)	31.317 (7)	0.000	61.634 (10)	0.000	101.626 (25)	0.000
CV block Chi-square (df)	31.317 (7)	0.000				
IV block Chi-square (df)	31.317 (7)	0.000				
Correct prediction (%)	61.5		61.1		59	
Cox and Snell R^2	0.039		0.015		0.181	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.052		0.101		0.244	

Table 8

Based on odds ratios Exp(B),[9] of the variables included in the first round, living in an urban environment, age (0,988) and the nature of language use in administration (1,5) display significant roles in the increase of the chances of discrimination, according to the following: living in urban areas significantly increases the chances of discrimination by an odds ratio of 1,669. To a small degree, a younger age also increases the odds of discrimination (0,988), while the chances of being discriminated on grounds of nationality are 1,58 higher for those who mainly use Hungarian in their relationships with administrative authorities (office routine) than for those who use both languages and 1,3 higher than for those who use only Romanian. Sex, educational level, the language of the last school graduated or the level of proficiency in Romanian do not have a significant influence on discrimination based on ethnic origin [we omitted this latter one from the extended version of the model because the value of Exp(B) was 1,023].

If we include regional belonging into the model, the situation slightly changes. The value of Northern Transylvania will have the most significant influence from the point of view of the regional variable with an odds ratio of 2.22, while Eastern Transylvania has an odds ratio of 0,56. Thus, the chances of ethnic discrimination are significantly increased by residence in Northern Transylvania, while residence in Eastern Transylvania decreases the chances of ethnic discrimination. Of the previously analysed variables, the influence of age and locality of residence have barely changed. On the contrary, in the case of administrative language use the influence of the use of Hungarian has become even stronger (2.25), while it has practically disappeared in the case of Romanian (1.09). Thus, if a respondent is from Northern Transylvania and he/she lives in a locality where the language of office routine is mainly Hungarian, the chances of ethnic discrimination are higher than for others. Moreover, the chances of people from Northern Transylvania of being ethnically discriminated are on average higher even if they use Romanian in their relationships with administrative authorities.

We may notice smaller changes due to the influence of the control variables measuring identity and attitude introduced during the third step: the influence of urban residence increases (1.868), the influence of the use of Hungarian in office routine remains the same, but it decreases to the level of the first version (1.519), the influence of the Northern Transylvanian residence decreases, but it is still the most significant (1.775), while residence in Eastern Transylvania contributes to an even smaller degree to the chances of being discriminated (0.407).

Of the control variables, the attitude towards Romanians (to what extent they are likeable) has the most significant influence with an odd ratio of 1.633, therefore those who relate to Romanians in a more negative way are more likely to experience discrimination. The homeland variable is another variable with a significant influence: i.e., those who named Transylvania as their homeland (with a value of 1.646) as compared to those who named Romania as their homeland, the influence of those choosing another option is not significant due to the number of cases, although odds ratios are rather high (see Table 8). We have included several other variables into the model, but they do not have a significant influence, except the respondents who use negative stereotypes to characterise Romanians. The experience of ethnic discrimination is more characteristic among them, although the odds ratio is barely above average (1.025), yet the significance level is smaller than 0.001. The results lead to the conclusion that subjective

[9] The Exp(B) odds ratio shows what are the odds of a value specific to the dependent variable (here: experiencing discrimination) to occur upon the influence of another significant variable: if the value is 1, there is no influence, above 1 the expected influence is linear (straight), below 1 the expected influence is reverse.

ethnic discrimination is partially explained by the spatial variables that may objectively increase the chances of ethnic discrimination given that the modification of ethnic proportions in Northern Transylvanian towns/cities, the symbolic space loss and the sometimes ethnically charged political fights may otherwise also increase the chances of Hungarians living in these towns/cities to ethnicise their life events as also observed by Brubaker (2006) and other scholars.[10] Cluj-Napoca. The fact that in some cases mentioning discrimination is the result of minority neurosis increases the chances of subjective discrimination not being explained by weak proficiency in Romanian besides regional and locality variables, but rather by the rejection of Romanians or by certain identity elements.

Discussion

Research on interethnic relations and national identity carried out in Romania shows that in the first two decades following the political and economic regime change from 1989/90, the relationships between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority had improved, the perception of interethnic conflict had decreased and the attitudes of minority Hungarians towards the Romanian majority had also improved (see Veres 2010, 2012). As a result, the social atmosphere obstructing ethnic discrimination had also intensified, but a significant part of the Hungarian population from Romania (almost 40%) subjectively still perceived ethnic discrimination even in 2010, even if most of them rarely.

Based on the interpretation of the multivariate logistic regression model, the chances to perceive ethnic discrimination are increased by the regional location of residence, especially Northern Transylvanian, mainly urban residence and this does not significantly change even if several control variables are introduced. The chances of perceiving national discrimination are higher among those who rather use Hungarian language during their relationships with local administrative authorities (office routine). Yet, the use of Hungarian language in administration is not explained by a low proficiency in Romanian language, because this does not influence the perception of discrimination, but rather by negative preconceptions about Romanians. Thus, those for whom the Romanian majority population is antipathetic are more likely to perceive ethnic discrimination.

Thus, some Hungarian individuals could have had discriminatory experiences for example before 1989 or in the following years, which led to certain disadvantages on the individual level (the absence of professional promotion at work, verbal warning for school performances) due to their Hungarian ethnonationality. Other respondents, on the other hand, experienced discrimination at the collective level. For example, during the 1980-ies, the Hungarian language had been gradually eliminated from the administration, from signs with the name of public institutions and locality name signs, between 1987 and 1989 even the use of Hungarian locality names in Hungarian newspapers/periodicals was prohibited (Bugajski 1995).

As for the peculiarities of the Transylvanian Hungarian identity, it may be asserted that the most important differences in their national attitudes are to be noticed on a regional level. The regional differences in the proportion of Hungarians and the existence or absence, as well as the extent of the system of Hungarian cultural, educational institutions which are related to regional differences,

[10] see Brubaker et al 2006, Culic, 1999. 35–47, Csepeli – Örkény – Székelyi 2000, Veres 2005.

as well as the frequency of everyday interactions with Romanians, the language use in administration are all decisive: a higher proportion of Hungarians living in the Eastern Transylvanian counties (Covasna-Harghita) and along the Romanian–Hungarian border (Partium) consider that their Hungarianness is something natural. In other parts of Transylvania, Hungarians living in diaspora perceive this as a special resource, although – even if rarely – more people have experienced ethnic discrimination in Northern Transylvania than in other regions, where ethnic Hungarians live in a high proportion, or in very low proportion, like in Southern Transylvania and Banat.

Social distances between Hungarians and Romanians are, on average, greater among Hungarians living in a county-level majority. They have less frequent everyday interactions with Romanians than Hungarians living in diaspora or insular communities in Northern Transylvania. Southern Transylvania and Banat are characterised by an even stronger diaspora situation. People living in Hungarian diaspora areas perceive the Romanian–Hungarian relationships more collaborative, not conflicted, both at the country level or the local level as the Transylvanian Hungarians living in a local or county-level majority.

Conclusion

We may assume that a certain discriminatory experience from the recent or distant past – which could have happened at the individual or collective level – has contributed to the evolution of the present minority neurosis, measured by the subjective perception of ethnic discrimination. The state nationalism – institutionalized in the Ceausescu's dictatorship, and also in the first years after the 1989's transition period – has been manifested as the cultural discrimination against ethno-national minorities, especially against Transylvanian Hungarians. However, the proportion of ethnic Hungarians, that often (or very often) perceived ethnic discrimination in their lives, is similar to general perception of Romanian population about the frequent perception of discrimination of Ethnic Hungarians from Romania.

The results of the multivariate model showed us that the subjective perception of the ethnic discrimination significantly differentiate according to local ethnopolitical context and the ethnocentrically loaded ethnonational minority identity, in Verdery's sense, and not according to personal or social status characteristics (as age, educational level etc.). The local ethnopolitical context implies the ethnic composition of the population, and the quality and history of interethnic relations. The local experiences on interethnic relations implied the affectedness in minority identity of the Transylvanian Hungarians living in regions as cities in Northern Transylvania, like in Cluj-Napoca, the period of mayor Funar (1992–2012). In this region, the Hungarian-speaking population have a collective memory about a more equilibrated presence of Romanian and Hungarian language and culture in public sphere, especially in the 1940's, 1950's and even 1960's (Brubaker et al 2006).

According to our multivariate *analysis* the subjective perception of ethnic discrimination, among Transylvanian Hungarians, is explained, *next to* the local ethno-demographic context reflected by the territorial location of respondents, by the minority ethnocentrism, measured by the negative attitudes toward the Romanians, associated with the manifestation of certain elements of the local Hungarian minority identity. Consequently the Transylvanian Hungarians from the urban Northern Transylvanian areas, tend to perceive the local ethnonational majority-minority relationship as conflicted in a higher degree than in other regions.

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Are traditional minority languages a bench marking for the rights of migrant languages in the European Union?



ABSTRACT

In this paper a normative position will be defended. We will argue that minimal territorial minority language rights formulated in terms of the personality principle referring to traditional minority languages granted in the framework of the European Union (EU) are a benchmark for non-territorial linguistic rights. Although territorial minority languages should be granted collective rights this is in large parts of Europe not the case. Especially in the Central and Eastern European Member States language rights granted to territorial languages are assigned on the basis of personal language rights. Our argumentation will be elaborated on the basis of a comparative approach discussing the status of a traditional territorial language in Romania, more in particular Hungarian spoken in the Szeklerland area with the one of migrant languages in the Netherlands, more in particular Turkish. In accordance with the language hierarchy implying that territorial languages have a higher status than non-territorial languages both in the EUs and Member States' language regimes non-territorial linguistic rights will be realized as personal rights in the first place. Hence, the use of non-territorial minority languages is conditioned much as the use of territorial minority languages in the national Member States. So, the best possible scenario for mobile minority languages is to be recognized as a personal right and receive full support from the states where they are spoken. It is true that learning the host language would make inclusion of migrant language speakers into the host society smoother and securing a better position on the labour market. This should however be done without striving for full assimilation of the speakers of migrant languages for this would violate the linguistic rights of migrants to speak and cultivate one's own heritage language, violate the EUs linguistic diversity policy, and is against the advantages provided by linguistic capital in the sense of BOURDIEU (1991).

Keywords

Romania, The Netherlands, minority languages, migrant languages, Council of Europe, Language Charta

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Introduction

In this paper, we will compare the legal status of traditional minority languages and migrant languages in the European context and its practical implications for the trade-off between mobility and inclusion.[1] In fact, below it will be demonstrated that territorial minority languages as traditional minority languages are usually referred to enjoy restricted linguistic rights in the European Member States, where they are spoken. It has been argued that traditional minority languages in Central and Eastern European Member States have less rights compared to official languages and that their status and position is best described by language hierarchies, asymmetries, subordination, and threshold restrictions. This against the background of international and EU treaties, such as article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) stating that the Union respects cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity.[2] Although linguistic inequality in these cases is an unwanted state of affairs violating the ECFR, and other international treaties and obligations of Member States, it is realistic to suppose that these traditional minority language cases will function as a benchmark for the assignment of linguistic rights to languages of migrants to which we will refer in the remainder of this paper as non-territorial, mobile minority languages. Although among the traditional minority cases of linguistic inequality there are instances of successful practices because peaceful co-existence is guaranteed. This, however is realized at the expense of the traditional minority languages in a language regime that assigns these languages restricted rights only. The language rights of non-territorial minorities in the EU are not only restricted by a language policy favouring full support for the official majority language at the expense of traditional territorial minority languages, but they are further restricted by the mobility-and-inclusion trade-off, which is detriment to the mobile minority languages.

[1] The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 613344. See for the equilibrium between mobility and inclusion Grin et al. 2014.

[2] See Vizi 2012 for an extensive discussion of ECFR in connection with linguistic rights.

Governments tend to intervene in the language regime on behalf of the official host language of the state at the expense of mobile languages. Therefore, it is safe to hypothesise that the quality of the linguistic rights of non-territorial minorities in the EU or in individual Member States due to a lack of a Union wide supranational language policy for mobile language minorities will be under the assigned level of the linguistic rights which territorial minority languages in the EU or individual Member States enjoy.

Our discussion will take the linguistic rights within the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe as a starting point, for these states are clearly defined as national states with one official language spoken by the majority population. All other languages spoken in these states are considered minority languages. These traditional minority languages are not integrated into the country's language policy on the basis of the territoriality principle but on the basis of the personality principle, even if the minority language speakers are in the majority in a specific sub-national jurisdiction, such as in the case of the Hungarian speaking Szeklerland in Romania which we will discuss. The application of the personality principle granting a lower ranking official status to the traditional minority language results into bi- multilingual asymmetries, subordinations, and so forth, in reference to the official, majority language.

It is difficult to characterise the EU as a political entity. It can be argued that it is a hybrid structure compromising institutional aspects of the traditional European system of nation states and institutional aspects of federalism, such as the European Commission and other institutions of the EU.[3] In order to understand the politics of multilingualism in the Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to investigate political and institutional aspects of both systems, i.e. the nation state system and the more recent supranational features of the EU. Seemingly, there is a conflict in this system. Most of the traditional nineteenth century nation states are characterised by the concept of "one state-one nation-one language," whereas the supranational aspects of the EU imply a different relation between the different levels of governance. In the European framework, there is no one-to-one mapping between citizenship-institutions and language. Here comes in the politics of multilingualism, for the language regimes and the use of individual languages is depending on power constellations.[4] Although a complete multilingual regime is guaranteed in the EU by language regulation 1/1958 this language regime has not "percolated down" to the Member States. By and large, a restricted set of languages in the Member States are official and might function as a lingua franca for the citizens that live in the territories where those languages are used. This traditional language situation, characterised by a so-called upgrading of national languages onto the level of the EU, does not hold factually in the Member States of the EU. European language policy is further guided by an educational resolution that was adopted at the Barcelona European Council in 2002, the so-called '1 + 2 formula'.[5] The Barcelona formula states that all citizens should be taught to master at least two foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue. A recent resolution on multilingualism adopted by the European Parliament on 24 March 2009 states that that the Union "[r]eiterates its political priority of the acquisition of language skills through the learning of other EU languages, one which should be the language of a neighbouring country and other international (...) 'lingua franca' (...)" (compare article 36).

[3] See Mccormick 2015; Lelieveldt – Princen 2014.

[4] See Marácz 2012.

[5] See Marácz 2012. 21.

The conflict consists in the fact that in the traditional model of nation states the matching between the official language of the nation state and the mother tongue of its citizens is taken for granted. The language policy schemes of the EU leave more space for the detachment of mother tongue and official languages, as compared to the traditional nation state scheme. This detachment has been recognised by the Council of Europe, an organisation monitoring the issue of human and minority rights in the Member States of Europe and which is closely involved in the conditioned accession of candidate Member States to the EU.[6] Two conventions of the Council of Europe guarantee the linguistic rights of traditional minorities in the states that are a partner to these legal treaties, i.e. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) signed on 1 February 1995 in Strasbourg, and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) adopted on 5 November 1992 also in Strasbourg.[7] Both charters have been included by the Union as one of the four accession criteria – the so-called Copenhagen criteria – for EU membership. Especially the new EU-candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe having traditional ethno-linguistic minorities on their territory had to fulfil the obligations of these charters before they could enter the Union. As a result of these supranational interventions concerning member state accession, a supranational linguistic space in the EU has been developing.[8] The conflict can be resolved in a flexible framework of multi-level governance (MLG) which is able to absorb the characteristics of the national Westphalian system and the federal aspects of the EU system.[9] The idea is that policy is generated as an outcome of the interplay between different levels of governance, distinguishing different tiers that might operate autonomously but also in an interactive fashion, including the supranational Brussels, the national, regional, and local tiers.

Below the working of the European system in the case of linguistic diversity will be discussed and compared. Hence, if linguistic rights of mobile minorities in the EU or in the Member States will be granted, it is to be expected that this will take place in reference to the existing linguistic rights for traditional minorities. A relevant case is presented by the Hungarian speaking minority in Romania's Transylvania. Although the conditions for an application of the territoriality principle are fulfilled, the linguistic rights situation of traditional minority languages in Romania is regulated in accordance with the personality principle.[10] This gives us a point of reference of what the limits of the linguistic rights for migrant languages in the European space are. In most European Member States, non-territorial minority languages or the languages introduced by migrants or internally mobile European citizens have hardly or no legal position at all. Realistically speaking migrant languages will not enjoy in the near future a higher level of linguistic rights than traditional

[6] See the following references: Gál 2000; Skovgaard 2007; Schwellnuss 2005.

[7] See Skovgaard 2007; Marácz 2016. 31–32.

[8] Compare Brubaker 1996; Csergő – Goldgeier 2013; Marácz 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, 2016.

[9] See the papers in Scholten – Penninx 2016.

[10] The territoriality versus personality principle was first discussed in McRae (1975). The 'territoriality versus personality debate' is one of the most important debates concerning language policy and language rights, roughly speaking whether rights should be attached to the person, i.e. the so-called 'personality principle', or whether they should be connected to territory, i.e. the so-called 'territoriality principle'. The debate plays a central role in language policy and language planning; it is a key issue in understanding ethno-linguistic struggles and the demarcation of the rights of linguistic minorities. See also Laponce (1987) and Dembinska et al. (2014) for further discussion. See for an extensive discussion of these principles in connection with the Hungarian language minority in Romania Csata – Marácz (2016).

minority languages that have a legal position in the Member States. In order to make a realistic estimation of the linguistic rights to be granted to mobile minority languages in the EU or individual Member States these rights will not surpass the linguistic rights of traditional minority languages in national states, such as Romania. Hence, the linguistic rights assigned in those cases will be in terms of the personality principle.

In the course of this paper, we will elaborate on two case studies representative for the linguistic rights situation of a traditional minority language and a mobile minority language, i.e. Romania's minority languages, especially Hungarian and migrant languages in the Netherlands, i.e. Turkish respectively. Comparing the two cases will also give insight into what policy measures can contribute to the optimal equilibrium between mobility and inclusion.

Traditional Minority Languages in Romania

There are several territorial minority languages spoken in Romania, including Hungarian, German, Roma, and others. In principle, these minority languages have a similar legal position and have been granted the same type of linguistic rights. Although the conditions for a territorial language regime granting traditional minority languages equal linguistic rights to the majority language are fulfilled, i.e. in sub-national territorial jurisdictions the minority language is in majority only the personality principle is operative in these cases and territoriality is used as a negative restriction due to a threshold of twenty percent of minority language speakers in a certain territorial jurisdiction. Hence, even if there is a majority of minority language speakers in a certain jurisdiction, linguistic rights are only granted at an individual, personal basis and not as a collective right. Let us consider the case of traditional, territorial minority languages in Romania in more detail.

The Hungarian minority in Romania counted by the latest 2011 census 1,227,623 persons who make up 6.5 percent of the total population of Romania.[11] However, the Hungarian speaking minority is predominately concentrated in the north-western part of the country, i.e. the Transylvanian region, stretching from the Hungarian–Romanian country border to Szeklerland at the feet of the Eastern Carpathians mountains.[12] This "stroke" is a traditional multi-ethnic region and the ethnic Hungarians are not present in it in equal concentrations. The percentages of the ethnic distribution of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania clearly differ from the national percentages.

In the whole area of Transylvania, ethnic Hungarians make up around 19 percent of the total population, while ethnic Romanians make up around 75 percent. The remaining six percent are other ethno-linguistic groups, like Germans, and Roma. Transylvanian Hungarians inhabit three spatially connected sub-regions displaying a different and heterogeneous geo-ethnic distribution.

The first sub-region 'Partium' is located in the Hungarian–Romanian border area in northwest Romania. In this region, a substantial percentage of ethnic Hungarians constitute a majority

[11] See Csata – Marácz 2016 for extensive discussion of the demographic situation in Romania's territories with Hungarian minority language speakers.

[12] The Szeklers (Hun. Székely) are an ethnic Hungarian group in Transylvania displaying a peculiar set of ethnographic, cultural and linguistic features. In the Hungarian kingdom, they were employed as border guards defending the isolated Eastern Carpathian mountain range (see Csata – Marácz 2016).



Figure 1 *Ethnic map of Transylvania (2016) (Source: Csata – Marácz 2016.)*

in a number of municipalities and districts, except the greater towns like Oradea (Hun. Nagyvárad) and Satu Mare (Hun. Szatmárnémeti). The second sub-region, the area landward is central Transylvania with the major city of Cluj-Napoca (Hun. Kolozsvár). In this region, the ethnic Hungarians are often smaller minorities and live frequently in mixed Hungarian–Romanian–Roma communities, but in some municipalities and districts they can have a relative or absolute majority.[13]

The third sub-region, which is matching the historical area of Szeklerland is of approximately 13,000 km^2 and consists of the three counties Harghita (Hun. Hargita), Covasna (Hun. Kovászna), and Mureș (Hun. Maros).[14] More than a half of the Transylvanian Hungarians live in Szeklerland and display an absolute majority. Note that what the Hungarian community in Romania calls

[13] See Brubaker et al. 2006.

[14] According to Csata – Marácz 2016, following recent methods of record determined by the accessibility of statistical data, the population of Szeklerland refers to the residents of Harghita (Hun. Hargita), Covasna (Hun. Kovászna) and Mureș (Hun. Maros) counties. The territory of "historical" Szeklerland – the one that existed during the Hungarian Kingdom – differs from this, it included the following smaller regions (seats): Bardoc-Miklósvár-, Sepsi-, Kézdi- és Orbaiszék (in today's Covasna/Kovászna county), Csík-, Udvarhely- és Gyergyószék (in today's Harghita/Hargita county) and Marosszék (in today's Mureș/Maros county). A smaller region in Aranyosszék (in today's Cluj/Kolozs county) was also part of the historic Szeklerland.

'Szeklerland' is not recognised by the Romanian state; the term itself does not appear in any official national or international document ratified by the Romanian state. The total population of Szeklerland, that is the population of the three counties Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș together, is according to the 2011 census numbering 1,071,890 persons. The ethnic Hungarian share of the total population of Szeklerland is 609,033 persons (56.8 percent), which is an absolute majority.[15] More specifically in Harghita, Covasna and Mureș the absolute figures and percentages of the ethnic Hungarian population are as follows: 257,707 persons (85.2 percent); 150,468 persons (73.7 percent); and 200,858 persons (38.1 percent). Note that in two of the three Szekler counties, namely Harghita and Covasna the ethnic Hungarians have a clear majority.

After the collapse of communism, the Romanian language regime anchored in the 1991 Constitution is clearly path dependent on the historical state tradition displaying two "diagnostics".[16] The first diagnostic is the language hierarchy. This hierarchy is caused by the official status of the Romanian language in the Romanian Constitution providing the Romanian language a hegemonic position outranking all other minority languages spoken on the territory of Romania, including Hungarian.

The second diagnostic is asymmetric bilingualism. Successive Romanian Constitutions guarantee the language use of the other languages of Romania, including the minority languages, only on the basis of the personality and not on the basis of the territoriality principle.[17] Territoriality is relevant for the use of the Hungarian language and other minority languages, but only as a negative condition restricting the personality principle by a demographic factor, i.e. the twenty per cent threshold rule per territorial-administrative unit.[18] This implies that Romanian mother tongue speakers do not need to learn or to speak Hungarian, even if they live in administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, like the counties of historic Szeklerland. However, all Hungarian minority speakers have to learn and to speak Romanian. The latter but not the former is a requirement in the official primary and secondary school curriculum. As a consequence, the Hungarian language use is restricted in scope and although legally not banned from Romanian educational institutions where the language of instruction is Romanian, Hungarian is not offered to their pupils. This leads then to asymmetric bi- and multilingualism. Bi- an multilingual ethnic Hungarians always speak the official language of the country, i.e. Romanian and their own mother tongue Hungarian, whereas ethnic Romanians only speak the official language of the country.[19] However, research makes clear that asymmetric bilingualism is disadvantageous for the weaker language, in this case the Hungarian minority language as opposed to the Romanian state language.[20]

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[15] According to Csata – Marácz 2016, out of the total population of Szeklerland, the ethnic affiliation of 38,096 persons is unknown. These persons were added to the results obtained in the original census survey using a very controversial methodology. So, if we distribute this population according to the ethnic ratios of the original census data, the number of Hungarians would increase with 20,665 persons to 629,698 and their proportion to 58.7 percent. Using the same method of estimation, the number of Hungarians in Transylvania would increase by 56,487 persons to 127,3153 and their proportion would change to 18.8 percent.

[16] See Marácz 2017 for a detailed discussion of Romanian path dependency.

[17] See Dembinska et al. 2014.

[18] See Marácz 2014b.

[19] Next to international languages as English, German or French.

[20] See Laponce 1987; Csata 2016.

Although Romania's accession to the EU in 2007 is a clear critical juncture in the country's state tradition affecting many features of the political, socio-economic and institutional spheres both "diagnostics" of the traditional language regime can clearly be observed in the societal context.[21] The critical juncture of 2007 has not brought a fundamental change in the language policy of the country. There is no equality of the languages used on the territory of Romania, or in its Transylvanian parts where most of the minority languages are being spoken, nor is there symmetric bilingualism in Transylvanian administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, such as in the traditional counties in historic Szeklerland.[22] From the point of language policy the accession of Romania to the EU can hardly be called a critical juncture.

It is true that the liberal regime in Central and Eastern European space of which Romania is a part too has some positive side effects on the language use of the minority languages that are due to the liberal democratic and commercial market society empowering the use of minority languages in the public spheres. European transnational actors and structures have positively affected the language situation of minority languages after the accession of Romania to the EU as well.[23]

After the collapse of communism and the expansion of the EU eastwards, global and transnational structures have led to the introduction of European human rights norms and standards in the field of minority rights and minority language rights in Central and Eastern European countries. Even more robust policies in support of indigenous minority rights and languages have been adopted by the Council of Europe. All the Member States of the EU are members of the Council of Europe and its arrangements in these domains have been part of the set of conditions to enter the EU.[24] Conditionality as a part of the EUs accession criteria has guaranteed the implementation of the Council of Europe's minority rights arrangements.[25] Of the conditionality requirements two legal treaties of the Council of Europe are relevant in this case, namely the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) signed on February 1, 1995 and November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg respectively.[26] The Framework Convention supports the positive discrimination of national minorities on the basis of human rights and general freedom rights, although the explanatory report text is ambiguous on the status of minority groups.[27] It emphasises the individual belonging of persons to national minorities and does not recognise the collective status of national minorities.[28] The ECRML, "Language Charta" has been motivated by similar considerations. Languages are seen as part

[21] See for a discussion of the notion of critical juncture the introduction of Sonntag – Cardinal 2015.

[22] Compare Marácz 2017.

[23] Compare Marácz 2014c, 2015c.

[24] See Gál 2000, Schimmelfennig – Sedelmeier 2005, Grabbe 2006, Sasse 2005, 2008, Marácz 2015b.

[25] The Council of Europe has its own sanctioning mechanism through the legally binding judgements within the framework of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its Court. Minority rights are included in the ECHR, such as the prohibition of discrimination on the base of language in article 14. Romania is part of this treaty since 1994. Recently the ECHR has been interpreted also as a collective obligation to protect minority rights. Compare Vizi 2012 for detailed discussion.

[26] See Skovgaard 2007; Marácz 2016. 31–32.

[27] See Council of Europe. 1995. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report. H(95)10. Strasbourg.

[28] This is explicitly stated in the paragraphs 13, 31, and 37 of the explanatory report of the FCPNM.

of a common cultural heritage and the protection of languages is deemed necessary to counterbalance assimilatory state policy and uniformisation by modern civilisation.[29] Note that Romania, just like all the other Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities, has also ratified these international instruments, as is shown in Tables 1 and 2:

State	Signature	Ratification	Entry into Force
Romania	01/02/1995	11/05/1995	01/02/1998

Table 1: *Framework Convention (FCPNM, CETS no. 157)*

State	Signature	Ratification	Entry into Force
Romania	17/07/1995	24/10/2007	01/05/2008

Table 2: *Language Charter (ECRML, CETS no. 148)*

Therefore, national and ethno-linguistic minorities receive recognition and protection from these supranational arrangements,

So, the position of the Hungarian minority language is governed by the personality principle, especially in the domains of education and public administration, it enjoys "external," supranational protection from the CoE's treaties and from the transnational spaces which have been created in Europe.[30] Due to the transnational spaces information and communication flows via Internet, social media and so on the use of the Hungarian language both in the private and public sphere is heavily intensified. Before we compare the linguistic situation of traditional, territorial linguistic minorities with the one of mobile linguistic minorities let us first discuss in the following section the linguistic rights of mobile minority languages in the EU. The section will focus on migrant languages in the Netherlands, especially Turkish.

Migrant Languages in the Netherlands

In this section, the practical angle referring to mobile minority languages will be discussed. Would it actually be beneficial for mobile minorities and the host society, if non-territorial linguistic minorities are granted more rights and facilities in order to construct an optimal equilibrium between mobility and inclusion, or would such a step be counter-productive? This question will be answered by drawing upon historical and contemporary examples from the Netherlands, a country that has received a significant number of immigrants since the 1960s, and has experimented with different cultural and linguistic integration policy frameworks. Furthermore, the experiences

[29] See Brubaker et al. (2006); Marácz (2011).

[30] See Janssens et al. (2013).

from Turkish migrants with Dutch language policy will be discussed. This information is based on a dataset compiled of in-depth interviews collected between 2015 and 2017.[31]

Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has been, similarly to other Western-European countries, a main destination, for both European and non-European migrants. Due to the rapid growth of the post-war economy and the increasing disinterest of the Dutch population in accepting work at the lower end of the job market, the Dutch government actively recruited temporary foreign workers between the 1950s and in the mid-1970s. In the early periods, most workers originated from southern-European countries such as Italy and Spain, but in the 1960s and 1970s the majority came from states such as Morocco and Turkey. Among government officials the question rose what the appropriate policy response to this newfound ethno-linguistic diversity in the Netherlands should be. One of the first documents that sought to formulate the beginnings of an answer is the "Nota Buitenlandse werknemers" (Note on Foreign workers), drafted jointly in 1970 by four Dutch ministries, including Social Affairs & Health Ministry, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Minstry for Culture, Recreation and Societal Affairs. The document emphasises the economic nature of the foreign migration flow and discusses potential problems regarding recruitment.[32] Dutch policy at the time emphasised the temporary nature of these migration flows, assuming that most foreign workers would return to their countries of origin once their labour contracts had ended. When it came to the adaptation of migrants to Dutch culture and society, the notion of "mutual adaptability" was of key importance. Both migrants and the native Dutch population needed to get accustomed to the new situation. The concept remained vague however, and was rarely backed up by actual policy measures. In practice, the guest worker system revolved around circular migration, with migrants coming to and leaving the country according to the time periods of their labour contracts. This situation changed in the late 1970s. The Dutch authorities acknowledged that many migrants planned to stay in the Netherlands indefinitely, and even made use of their right to family reunification to bring their wives and children to the Netherlands. This new reality called for concrete policy measures. One of the first comprehensive policy briefings is the so-called "Nota Minderhedenbeleid" (Minorities policy document), which continued the philosophy of "mutual adaptation," but also attempted to make it concrete with a set of policy interventions. One of the main interventions announced in the Minorities policy document was the so-called "Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur" (Education in mother tongue and culture) policy, also abbreviated as OETC. The main argument to implement this policy was practical: it was assumed by the Dutch authorities, on the basis of socio-linguistic research, that migrant children would be better capable of learning Dutch if they mastered their mother tongue first. This view is still shared by many linguistic and psychological studies. Learning one language that the child is already somewhat familiar with at a proper level makes the transition towards learning a second language, in this case Dutch, much easier. Thus, the Dutch authorities organised classes in the main migrant languages, such as Turkish and Arabic at primary schools, that were specifically designed for the migrant children. The Dutch government primarily perceived itself as a facilitator rather than the main organiser of mother tongue education. Initiatives of immigrant communities to self-organise mother tongue education were financially supported by the authorities, as long as these initiatives did not hinder Dutch language acquisition.

[31] This research is a part of Houtkamp's PhD research.

[32] See Nota Buitenlandse werknemers. 4.

This system of shared responsibilities, but with a focus on the role of the migrant communities, produced rather mixed results. In the early 1990s, the main scientific advisory bureau of the government, the "Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid" (WRR) (The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) critically analysed Dutch integration policies and also discussed OETC extensively. The WRR criticised the unproven effectiveness of the mother tongue education programme and the immigrants' children poor mastery of the Dutch language. Mother tongue education was according to the WRR poorly organised, mainly because of a lack of good study material and, most importantly, a severe lack of qualified teachers. Teachers were often recruited from the migrants' country of origin and usually lacked a connection with the Dutch society and sometimes also did not have a teaching degree. This combination of a poor evaluation of the mother tongue education system, and an increased focus on Dutch language acquisition, inspired governments to gradually deconstruct the mother tongue education facilities, by first reducing its teaching hours and eventually by abolishing it all together in 2004.

This very brief overview of the Dutch situation makes it clear that simply granting educational rights to non-territorial languages is not sufficient to guarantee a vivid linguistic landscape in practice. The Dutch history regarding mother tongue education presents several important considerations for future policy-makers who might wish to experiment with new facilities for immigrant languages. Firstly, a government should not merely be a facilitator, but an active organiser of mother tongue education, to ensure the consistency and quality of the courses offered. Secondly, it is of paramount importance whether a government treats non-territorial language rights as accessory to integration, or as an intrinsic value. The Dutch government pursued a policy of what could be called "pragmatic multiculturalism": mobile minority cultures were nurtured and facilitated, but mainly for a pragmatic reason (i.e. serving as a bridge to Dutch language acquisition). It is therefore unsurprising that after the WRR concluded there was no empirical proof that mother tongue education benefitted Dutch language acquisition in any way, that OETC (later renamed to OALT, 'Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen' [Education in allochtonous living languages] was slowly deconstructed and eventually abolished. There was another reason why the Dutch government abolished the mother tongue education for immigrant children. In-depth studies on the language proficiency of migrants' children, who had participated in home language education in elementary school, radically changed the policy perspective. It turned out that especially Turkish and Moroccan youngsters in their last year of elementary education at the age of twelve faced serious deficient language skills in Dutch compared to their Dutch classmates. Due to the delay in language development, migrant children had to qualify for lower types of secondary education, resulting into a much worse position on the labour market. In 2004 the Dutch government concluded that mother tongue education was a detriment to solving this problem, since immigrant children also faced deficient language skills in Dutch. The Netherlands decided to abolish the state-sponsored heritage language education of migrant children in elementary school. From then on, all educational efforts were concentrated on teaching migrants and their children only Dutch at school. The switch from a multicultural to an assimilatory language policy was thus motivated first and foremost on economic grounds. It was argued that improving Dutch language proficiency among migrants and their children was needed for strengthening their position on the labour market. But also among the migrant

communities the opinions with reference to the education of immigrant children in their heritage language, even if it was offered in a restricted way, was also different, as interviews with members of the Dutch Turkish community underline.

Migrant communities are naturally one of the most important actors in the non-territorial language right debate. The question whether they actually desire the rights that are (or are not) granted upon them, and how they evaluate the policy measures that are targeted at them is a valid consideration when designing a policy framework. In practice, immigrants and their descendants seem to have a rather mixed view on both the principle of migrant rights and its practical application in the Netherlands. The interviews are part of ongoing field work and analyses attitudes of Turkish (and Polish) migrants in France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This section will discuss preliminary results of the study conducted in the Netherlands. The interviews were held between 2015 and 2017. Eleven Dutch Turks participated in the research. They lived in Amsterdam or Veendam (near Groningen). The sample is well partitioned in terms of education level, social class, migration generation (first, second and third), age (but all older than 18), and gender. Participants have been selected using a snowball method. It is however complicated, if not impossible, to generalise the results of these interview sessions to the whole of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The sample size is not sufficient for such a purpose. The value of this research is however (at least) twofold. Firstly, it is one of the few studies about language policy towards immigrants that places the immigrants' perspective at the forefront. Secondly, the in-depth interview method allows for new perspectives to emerge that might have been unknown beforehand to the researcher, hence providing perspectives for new hypotheses and future policy-oriented studies.

The interviews covered two very significant components of language policy towards migrants: citizenship courses and/or training in the host language (here Dutch in the Netherlands) and mother tongue education. Lastly, the interviews covered the connection between the respondents' (perceived) language skills and their opportunities to be mobile within the EU, hereby also explicitly including the role of their mother tongue.

At this place, we will discuss the results pertaining to the topics pointed out above, and if needed in connection with the respondents' migration history. The Dutch Turks that were interviewed were mostly planning to stay in the Netherlands for the mid-long term (at least 5–10 years). This fact alone incentivised all the interviewees to at least gain a basic understanding of the Dutch language, and also make sure their children master the language, either by speaking it actively at home or learning it at school. Especially for the respondents in the lower social classes, Dutch is considered by far the most important language for them to speak, as they see it as a prerequisite for economic and social mobility in the Netherlands. Respondents thus supported the idea of the government facilitating Dutch language acquisition courses. However, Dutch Turks reported a lack of proper organisation of the language acquisition classes, both in the past (from the 1970–80s onward) and in the present. An often cited issue is the lack of an emphasis on oral communication and a too strong focus on teaching the basics of Dutch grammar. Respondents often felt that simply being active in Dutch society by working and socialising with native Dutch speakers would have a significantly more positive effect on their oral communication skills than spending the evenings in a classroom. Views on Dutch language training were quite coherent both within and across the migrant groups. It can easily be summarised as follows: it works very well in principle, but partly fails in practice.

Perspectives on mother tongue education were, in contrast with Dutch language acquisition, very different within the group of Dutch Turks being interviewed. Firstly, there was a remarkable class difference. As mentioned previously, especially immigrants with a low socio-economic status (SES) strongly emphasise the importance of learning Dutch. A significant minority of the low SES Turks are at the same time sceptical about mother tongue education for their (prospective) children. They mainly cited two arguments. Firstly, they were afraid that bilingual education might hamper their children's ability to properly learn Dutch. A second related reason is that they believe they are capable of teaching their children their mother tongue at home, meaning that there is no need for bilingual education at school.

A third reason, that is cited by across all SES-levels, is that they might be afraid that mother tongue education might lead to segregation. Especially within the Turkish community, which is one of the most well organised immigrant communities in the Netherlands, this is seen as a probable outcome by some Turkish interviewees. One of the interviewed Dutch Turks mentions for example: "us Turks can easily get by sticking with our own, and just speaking our own language (...), promoting Turkish at school might make it easier for some people to stay within our own group, rather than connecting with the Dutch." It needs to be mentioned that this danger was seen more in urban areas, with a relative group of Dutch Turks present, as opposed to a town like Veendam, where the Turkish community is much smaller in size.

At the same time however, there are many interviewees who would applaud a return of the Dutch OETC system where the government facilitates at least 1 hour (but preferably more) of mother tongue education in the official school system. They don't see any of the three problems mentioned above, even when explicitly asked. Often, they claim that "the more languages you know, the better it is" (when speaking about bilingual education) and find that there is no danger for the communities to segregate due to mother tongue education, as long as the children also properly learn Dutch.

Furthermore, there seems to be an ethnic and generational difference on how the value of mother tongue education is perceived in the Turkish communities. Turkish interviewees of the first and second generation often appealed to their heritage and the strong cultural value of their language. They want them and their children to properly speak Turkish so that they can easily access the fruits of Turkish culture. When asked by the interviewer "why do you think mother tongue education is important?" reactions would vary between "because I am a Turk and so are my children," "because it is important to at least partially preserve our cultural heritage," and "I want my children to be able to return to Turkey one day." This is different among members of the third generation, who have a much more instrumental perspective on their mother tongue. They cite reasons such as "it is useful to know many languages, so why not Turkish?" or "I want to be able to talk to my family, and I would want the same for my children."

As stated previously, the fieldwork is still in progress and more data is being gathered at the moment of writing this paper. It should also be mentioned again that due to the qualitative nature of the research, we should be careful with generalising the results to the whole of the Dutch Turkish communities. The data collected thus far, however, shows some remarkable patterns that could have interesting implications for the discussion on linguistic rights for immigrants, general language policy discussion, and future policy research.

Firstly, host society language acquisition is deemed extremely important by immigrants, but they heavily criticise its practical implementation, due to the strong focus on Dutch grammar.

They think the courses would be much more effective if the focus would lie more on oral communication skills. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse whether this claim holds true from an educational point of view, but it is at least a perspective to keep in mind when potentially reforming host society language acquisition policies.

Secondly, perspectives on mother tongue education, and multilingualism in general, seems to be a class-issue. Low SES parents are sometimes discouraged from raising their children bilingually or give them a bilingual school education due to the fact they perceive it might hamper their chances of learning Dutch, and thus decrease their socio-economic opportunities in the Netherlands. This perspective is not supported at all by socio-linguistic research. If a large chunk of low SES immigrants persist in this misguided view, the linguistic gap between poorer and richer immigrants may grow, even if immigrant languages are granted extensive rights. The government could counteract this development with good information campaigns and by for example instructing teachers to stimulate bilingual education with parents. Field work conducted in Sweden and France suggests teachers at primary and secondary school play a crucial advisory role for parents.

Thirdly, some immigrants think and see that mother tongue education policies, and multicultural policies in general, can foster segregation. Again, this could be an undesirable side effect of facilitating mother tongue education for migrants.

Concluding Remarks and Outlook

The main question that was put forward in this paper is whether the languages of non-territorial minorities could benefit from the same facilities currently granted to traditional, territorial minority languages in the EU. There are different angles from which to approach this topic. In order to answer the central question of this paper, namely 'are traditional minority languages a bench marking for the rights of migrant languages in the European Union?' we have to make a comparative analysis of the two case studies presented here, i.e. the status and position of the Hungarian minority language in Romania and the ones of the Turkish language in the Netherlands. The analysis unambiguously demonstrates that the traditional minority language is higher on the language hierarchy in its own national context than a mobile non-territorial language in its Member State context.

The strongest option for minority language protection, i.e. the territorial option is not even available in the case of traditional minority languages in Central and Eastern European Member States, like Romania.[33] However, traditional minority languages like Hungarian in Romania are assigned linguistic rights on the basis of the personality principle., that is in terms of individual "personal" rights, and not in terms of collective or territorial rights, even though in some cases the conditions to introduce such a language regime would be fulfilled leading to more respect for linguistic diversity, the balancing of rights and a more equal position of the traditional minority languages, such as Hungarian in Szeklerland. For now, the benchmark in which the linguistic rights of mobile languages in EU Member States can be drafted is under the denominator of "individual rights."

In both cases, the dominant position of official state languages is not challenged. Traditional territorial minority languages enjoy however recognition. The use of these languages is regulated

[33] See Laponce 1987 for the relevance of territoriality in the case of minority language protection.

on the level of the Constitution or otherwise in the legal system. The history of Turkish in the Netherlands demonstrates that the recognition of migrant languages in the context of Member States is fuzzy. Although Turkish was recognized as a language in the Dutch educational system without real legal anchoring of migrant languages it was slowly less facilitated in the educational system. However, mobile minority languages just as territorial minority languages within a national context could be included into the language regime on a personal basis. This would however not guarantee equality of the languages involved resulting in asymmetric bilingualism which is at the disadvantage of the minority language. Majority language speakers, i.e. Romanian in Romania and Dutch in the Netherlands do not speak the minority languages but vice versa is normally the case. Setting asymmetric bi- and multilingualism aside recognition of migrant languages on the personality basis would satisfy the concept of "linguistic diversity" celebrated in the European Union, although in a somewhat limited form.

Recognition of the traditional minority language in the Member States' legal system also triggers recognition at the supranational level in terms of European minority and minority language treaties, as discussed above. Migrant languages completely lack recognition at the European level. It is reasonable to suppose that these languages could be integrated under the umbrella of the Language Charta of the Council of Europe. What makes a pan-European regulation and implementation complicated is what the interviews with the Dutch Turks unambiguously demonstrate, although due to the limited scope of the research presented here it might be too early to draw definite conclusions. In any case, the speakers of migrants languages themselves, like Dutch Turks do not have a uncontested position on the protection of their own linguistic heritage. Note, that this is very different from the case of the traditional minorities which have their own interest organizations that lobby for more linguistic rights.[34] Hence, there are clear constraining circumstances that do not support the practical implementation of migrant languages in the educational system of a host country.

There is an unjustified but persistent belief among policy makers and a part of scientific researchers that mother tongue education of the heritage language does not benefit language acquisition of the host language and spoils changes of migrant language speakers on the EU labour market. Interviews show that even some parents of migrant children from low SES are in principle not in favour of extending language rights for their own heritage language because they think that mother tongue education will lead to unsuccessful integration and negative host language acquisition results.

Hence, a way out of this situation more in line with respect for the principle of linguistic diversity in Europe that has been the official stance of many different organs of the EU in a number of its official documents (see a collection below) and Bourdieu (1991) idea of linguistic capital. Bourdieu (1991) argues that the more languages you speak the more your financial-economic value will be at the "language market" as an individual citizens of a country. By providing the facilities for reciprocity it would imply access to hidden, untapped resources of linguistic capital in the sense of Bourdieu.[35] The official and educational authorities will have to counterbalance misguided views that plurilingualism narrows the chances for integration and a better position

[34] See Csata – Marácz 2016 for a discussion of self-determination claims among the Szeklers.

[35] Reciprocity can also be justified on the basis of welfare economics argumentation (see Caminal 2016) and it is central in some models of intercultural relations (see Grin 2007).

on the labour market. An integration policy without full linguistic assimilation should also be granted to children from migrant and intra mobile European citizen families by introducing language learning facilities for mobile minority languages in educational curricula and open these courses also for children speaking the host language. In fact, to teach these languages in e.g. the elementary school context as it was done in the Netherlands until 2004 and is still done in Sweden. This implies that there is no segregation in the educational context but reciprocity would guarantee that the teaching of these mobile minority languages is available in elementary school education where these languages or other languages of wider communication could be offered for both children of newcomer families and children speaking the host language.

The question is whether social cohesion which is normally safeguarded in national states by speaking and using the official language of the state will be undermined by introducing reciprocity in language education. PUTNAM (2007) argues that a high degree of ethnic and cultural diversity is associated with a decrease in social trust. In other words: in diverse neighbourhoods *all* citizens, be they part of a majority or minority group, tend to become more individualistic. Social capital for the population as a whole thus decreases, which logically leads to lower levels of social cohesion. To counteract this trend, Putnam pleads in favour of reinvigorating institutions that can positively influence social capital, such as community centres and sport associations. He also argues strongly in favour of solid, state sponsored courses in the host language, so all citizens have at least one common language they can use to communicate. Putnam's solutions are steering in the right direction. We also deem good quality host language courses of the utmost importance. Nonetheless we would like to propose an addition to his solution. It is our claim that if reciprocity is introduced in the language educational system and autochthonous children learn to speak mobile minority languages as well social cohesion does not need to be undermined in a context of symmetry. The recognition of the symbolic value of mobile minority languages could contribute to a quick inclusion and integration of the children from these groups into society.

The introduction of mobile minority languages in the educational curricula should further be conditioned by linguistic subsidiarity which is also conditioning the language use of territorial minority languages. Granting linguistic rights to mobile minority languages should only apply in cases, when the mobile minority languages are spoken in sufficient numbers and in a territorial concentration, such as urban spaces. In sum, in order to guarantee the linguistic rights of territorial and non-territorial minority languages state recognition, sponsoring and intervention are highly relevant; reciprocity is considered as a contribution to social inclusion and does not have to be viewed as a threat for social cohesion; and linguistic subsidiarity and multi-level governance are interpreted as relevant for securing linguistic diversity. Hence, state intervention, reciprocity, and linguistic subsidiarity provide background facilities that make possible a language policy that strives for the optimal equilibrium between mobility and social inclusion.

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At the Southeastern End of Schengen

Accepting Refugees in Hungary in 2015's refugees' wave



ABSTRACT

In my study I would like to show how the refugees' situation, motivation and lifestyle have been criminalized in the public discourse (political, press and social public discourse) despite the fact that the Hungarian asylum procedures seem to be converging to the EU standards.

I will approach the acceptance of and behaviour towards refugees in two ways: based on my experience from fieldwork carried out in diasporas in Budapest and based on my analysis of the press from the perspective of the host society. These approaches are important because my results show that socio-cultural acceptance is demonstrated almost exclusively by the diasporas even though the economic and official procedures manifest in the body of the host (Hungarian) society.

I would also like to speak about the picture the Hungarian media and the government's discourse show of people crossing the border illegally, how it raises fear and uncertainty among them. This kind of influence conveys messages which hinder fitting in in various aspects, obstruct integration, and at the same time make transnational communication among refugees stereotypical and equivocal. Consequently, ethnically or religiously homogeneous connections are getting stronger, while the importance of diasporas with weak economic, political and advocacy background is also increasing. However, the newcomers hardly ever enter the Hungarian scene.

KEYWORDS

refugees, criminalization, public discourse, acceptance of refugees, behaviour towards refugees

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Introduction

The reception of refugees is a complex issue which includes a formal procedure, the host society's attitude. This includes both the political approach, which is able to affect the formal procedure, and the legislative environment that asylum seekers encounter. The attitude of the host society is also fragmented: while most citizens are not involved in these matters, small groups have committed themselves to helping refugees, and civil society initiatives emerge and are supported by the diasporas as much as possible. Other groups, however, reject the reception and presence of refugees, emphasizing nationalist values verbally and occasionally physically against the refugees.

In this study I would like to present this complexity: the participants, their actions and the media appearances of related discourses. 2014–15 brought significant changes to the legal environment regarding the reception of refugees, their media appearances, social perception, which present the changes well, especially the responses to the challenges and the extremes.

It is an important approach for me that the changes in the reception of refugees can be understood as encounters: meetings between civilians and refugees, refugees and the law, diasporas, refugees and the host society, politicians and the challenges.

In this study I would like to interpret this diverse, complex and dynamic process by (1) presenting the firm political discourses and the responses thereto starting from the turn of the years 2014–2015, including the solidarity initiatives to border hunter volunteers and vigilante patrols. I present in detail (2) the networking initiatives in the civil society and (3) the robust statistical data of reception and the changes in the reception conditions. Finally, (4) I will close this paper with a case study of negative reception. This case study shows that the refugees, even if they stay in Hungary, bind strongly to their diasporas through their networks and homogeneous links, but are hardly connected to the host society.

The reception of refugees in Hungary – a theoretical approach

I interpret the reception of refugees as a diverse field of transnational encounters, fears, foreignness and xenophobia, in order to simultaneously interpret the constantly growing anti-refugee attitude, and the physical, media and public discourse appearance of refugees. I would also like to present how the reception of refugees leads to a network that strives for homogeneity and has both positive and negative experience. This network is created in the new environment, under the conditions of the host society. I call this process neo-integration because of these properties, considering the special condition, according to which this network knows no borders, but is very much aware of the dichotomy of *us* and *them*.

I interpret transnational relationships as an opportunity which allows refugees moving forward (and sometimes backward) to internalize cultural knowledge and reflect on their own and on other people's cultural properties, and allows cultural and social capital to be converted into economic capital, and vice versa. On the other hand however, reception is associated with concepts of indifference, detachment and xenophobia. Only a fraction of the Hungarian society has become inclusive, but in their case multicultural experience accumulates and internalizes and the image of remote regions (countries of origin) appears.

My theoretical approach is based on several years of fieldwork carried out in diasporas and among refugees in Hungary from East and West Africa, the Maghreb and South Asia and later among waves of refugees in 2015 where I utilized my previous experiences as a researcher, volunteer and mediator. Meanwhile my focus ranged from the viewpoints of refugees and diasporas, and the way they were pictured by the host society and the media. This pluralistic approach has led me to study the reception of refugees not just from the viewpoints of neo-integration, hybridity and transnational encounters, but also from the perspective of social and political discourses, reception and rejection. At the same time, I return to the considerations of foreignness, which include the discursive analysis of stereotypes and the interpretation of the presence of authority and power.

Studies often describe the dynamic movements and variability which characterize transnational spaces in a static way, and analyse socio-economic phenomena in a given locality. While dealing with a local phenomenon – the reception of refugees in Hungary – in this study I intend to reflect on this as a much more global phenomenon from the perspectives of the refugees, the host society and the power alike, based on experience, political discourses and information (and misinformation) circulating in the networks.

Diasporas come into being as separate entities within the host society's body and reflecting upon that (Nagy 2009 and 2011), and create a distinct milieu through preferential choices, in which the mythical Home (Safran 1991) and the endeavour to homogeneity are in the focus. However, the diasporas are also networks consisting of structured groups which strive for ethnic and religious homogeneity within the network, but on the periphery they have comparative and reflexive links to other diasporas and the host society, and this leaves space for transnational and intercultural approaches (cf. Wilson 2009, Clifford 2007, Hannerz 1997, Tilly 2001, Faist 2010). However, members of the diasporas are bound to global diaspora networks through their relations, which further strengthen their exclusion from the host society.

The presence of refugees means cross-cultural relationships and challenges. This partly manifests in mutual stereotypes found in narratives, and partly in the fear of foreigners (cf. Glick Schiller 2010). The exigency of adaptation (see A. Gergely 2005), which compels refugees to enter the path of integration, does not force the host society to do so. However, the evolving neo-integration, which is a new concept of integration, is based on distinctions, failures at several things (e.g. relations) and the convertibility of diasporic relations. Neo-integration moves towards the diaspora along the relational successes and failures, thus forming a unique island where the dynamic effect of foreignness and exoticism can be detected.

The dynamics of transnational encounters can be observed on the edge of the diaspora (see Wahlbeck 2002). The static, permanent link between two or more ethnic groups has been

replaced by a reflected, contextual relationship. It is heterogeneous ethnically and religiously (and in other aspects) and is only sustainable in the diaspora in case of mutual satisfaction. Transnational relations preserve and nurture the original cultures and convey new elements (Clifford 1992). The motivation of transnational relations is not only a sort of cosmopolitanism, but a necessity, and in the case of refugees it is particularly important to interpret the transnational connections and evaluate them with network analysis methods so that we can grasp the impact of transnational relations on the neo-integration strategies of refugees (Nagy 2010, 2011).

The diasporas in Hungary are surrounded by a 'traditionally xenophobic' society with an aversion not only towards people from faraway countries, but also towards other social groups (see Sik 2012, Rajaram – Arendas 2013. 203.). This is in part caused by authoritarianism appearing in identity (Fábian – Sik 1996). However, it is equally important to perceive exoticism and understand the nature of foreignness and xenophobic narratives. Based on this consideration, the analysis of the inherent power concepts of discourses (Schiffauer 2004. 159–160.) and the fine analysis of foreignness can be the way to understanding the attitude towards refugees. In this manner the transnational and diaspora-focused neo-integration and the anti-immigrant attitude based on negative stereotypes can be observed concurrently.

The history of the Hungarian asylum system shows low acceptance rates in addition to large-scale onward migration. Onward migration can primarily be observed among refugees, subsidiary protection beneficiaries and asylum seekers who are expected to be able to integrate more successfully based on the socio-demographic indicators (see Kováts 2003). It is also known that the more successful networkers can operate the global network of diasporas to create the opportunity to resettle and join the world of multigenerational diasporas (Brubaker 2005), while in the imaginary space of nation-states one may observe the proliferation of reflexive, transnational, but homogeneity-aspiring diasporas. In the social, political and power discourses departures, success, talent, humanity as well as arrivals, failures, the social burden and the nation's survival are actualized. Sensitive approaches are marginalized, and the discourses are no longer determined by hybridity, fluidity or multiculturalism, but rather by identity, the borders, inclusion and exclusion, political, legal and labour market aspects as well as cultural and religious challenges of being in the same space.

Aversion, the fear of the unknown, the lack of information about the unknown surrounding the increasing number of refugees as well as migrants and people with migrant background have led to a heightened discursive strategy (Bernáth – Messing 2015). This strategy has given way to the special framing of issues related to refugees, so while we examine inclusion we can also get to know non-reception discourses. Consequently, authority, sovereignty, power discourses and criminalization provide the background in which we can interpret the aspects of the refugees' reception, settlement and onward migration. However, in 2015, particularly during the summer of refugees, discourses emerged along the line of sensation, shock and self-justification (see Fokasz 2006, 2008) in which left- and right-wing media outlets and forums, disaster tourism and enthusiastic volunteers also played a major role.

The reception of refugees can be interpreted in a dichotomous field, in which the host society and newcomers, locals and aliens, regular and irregular, the worthy and the fraudulent clash

with each other, while the cause of voluntary and forced migration is restricted to the experts' discourses (cf. HOLMES – CASTANEDA 2016. 16.). In addition, this dichotomy is a two-way process where the interests of macro-politics and the economy collide with the grassroots initiatives of the civil society, and the refugees and asylum seekers who arrived in large numbers in the migration wave get stuck in between. The powerful appearance of interests and commitments provides a framework for the concept of crisis (which is already assigned with values), and the search for sensation in the media is also present. For this reason, in this study I have decided to interpret the reception of refugees, the forces influencing reception and the partial results of the dynamic process (i.e. changes in legislation and its implementation, powerful manifestations or withdrawal to homogeneous zones) from several directions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The results in this study are based on fieldworks carried out among refugees living in Hungary between 2005 and 2014 (when I examined the refugees' neo-integration, networks and the operation of diasporas) and in 2015 (when I focused on the reception of refugees arriving through the Hungarian–Serbian border and related narratives). These were completed with the analysis of narratives of non-governmental organizations and civilians as well as with a wide-perspective discourse analysis. During the discourse analysis I examined the media appearances of 2015, more concretely a differentiated text corpus compiled from articles that appeared in left- and right-wing media outlets related to refugees and migrants. When I use the term *media* in this study, it is based on the discourse analysis of a total of 7,500 articles that appeared in left-wing media, 5,900 pieces from right-wing media and 685 pieces from local (Szeged-based) papers. The articles were downloaded from the selected media websites and grouped accordingly, and the dates of publication were also indicated. I analysed the text corpus partly via a concordance study to know what other terms accompany the ones related to migrant discourse in the particular media. This meant relevant terms appearing up to 45 characters away from the term *refugee* or *migrant* in both directions. I also made efforts to follow the change of terms. I examined the concordance of terms with the linguistic software WordSmith. The results show the frequency of terms and their concordance. These data were processed and visualized with the network analysis software Gephi. The terms are the network nodes, the size of the nodes indicates the frequencies, while the relations of the concepts are shown by the edges. However, the impressive presentation of the results in a network requires an interpretative approach, therefore I carried out the qualitative examination and narrative analysis of the narrative blocks organized around concording words.

The results of the fieldwork and the discourse and narrative analysis are interpreted side by side in this paper, while I seek to ensure that the chronology of the events can be tracked, such as the changes in legislation or the decisions of the government which changed the discourse and institutional framework of the reception of refugees.

PUBLIC DISCOURSES, COUNTER-REACTIONS, SOLIDARITY AND THE CRIMINALIZATION

The concepts of 'migration' and 'refugee' in the political and media discourse and in research

Hungarian discourse on migration took a sharp twist in the spring of 2015; the previously silent negative attitude in political statements and the government's media campaigns turned into open rejection. While at the turn of 2005–2006 the total number of media appearances of refugees – in two outlets – remained under 150, during the migration wave thousands of articles and writings were published (cf. VICSEK et al., 2008). However, this meant not only quantitative growth but also a diversified, sensation-focused approach, divided in accordance with political orientation: This also indicates that the public, political and social discourse turned towards the issue of refugees and asylum policy. This move gave an opportunity to interpret the reception of refugees by discourse analysis methods.

In May 2015 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said: 'We want no more people to come. Those who are here should go home.' (MNO, 08/05/2015) We can interpret it as a programme-defining sentence. By then it was known that a so-called national consultation would start on migration and the government underpinned its consultation with a billboard campaign a few weeks later. The wave of refugees during the spring urged right-wing politicians and the media to use powerful statements such as 'subsistence immigrant'. Then both sides of the media softened their language to 'refugees' and 'migrants' used simultaneously. With the unfolding media campaign and the growing wave of refugees, the terms 'illegal migrants', 'illegal border-crossers' and later 'illegal invaders' appeared in the public discourse. Furthermore, the right-wing media and social websites increasingly began to refer to migrants as criminals and continent conquerors, and made racist and islamophobic comments on them. Meanwhile, the left-wing media tried to reduce fear and kept referring to those arriving in the country as refugees or migrants. It is interesting that Hungarian papers in the Serbian province of Vojvodina referred to refugees as 'temporary guests'.

However, the discourse analysis of the media clearly shows that researchers and professionals struggle to have the concepts of *asylum seeker, refugee, subsidiary protection beneficiary* and *migrant* interpreted as they should, while the term *migrant* was assigned negative connotations. It is obvious that the political discourse is purposely built upon the fact that Hungarians are not familiar with the traits of being a refugee and an array of anti-refugee measures can be justified by drawing fear. Within a few months we got from the term 'refugee' to 'illegal border-crosser', acts were adopted to allow building the fence and make asylum seeking inaccessible to the majority. Meanwhile, the social gaps were deepening and the right-wing social media focused on being against the refugees and their helpers, referring to them as 'migrant-huggers', while left-wing sites can be described as supportive of refugees, they criticise the government and present the human side of the crisis.

Public discourses have started to focus on refugee camps, near which people feel insecure and claim that crime rates have increased, although this has not been confirmed by the statistics. Plans for constructing new camps have been received with fear and rejection, especially in Debrecen, where residents are trying to get rid of the camp. However, the camp will be closed only in December. In the meantime, new terms like *transit zones, transits, immigration detention centres* and the *Hangar* (the storage building temporarily used as a guarded reception centre) and *unaccompanied children*

appeared, then the concepts and pictures of *razor wire fence, border closure* and *collection points* emerged. However, the interpretations depend on the political orientation of the media. One side discusses the waves of refugees from the perspective of security, terrorism and healthcare (e.g. Ebola and other epidemics), while the other side deals with the aspects of the humanitarian crisis. The Schengen borders, the Dublin Regulation, the fate of refugees: they have suddenly become daily topics in newspapers and the situation has intensified thanks to active readers on both sides. Consequently, cases which earlier hardly got any media attention, and characterized the status of refugees who had arrived earlier, are now given more publicity: legal procedures conducted without interpreters, poor quality and religiously unacceptable meals, or corrupt practices and humiliating treatment in immigration detention centres.

Naturally, in this study I also address the concepts of discourses responding to the refugee situation and legislative and scientific terms, so I distinguish the concepts of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time I must also make a distinction between refugees who had arrived before the wave of migration started and the ones who arrived (and left) in mass numbers in the summer of 2015.

Criminalization processes in the media – results of the discourse analysis

The previous silence of the government regarding the asylum system was replaced by intense anti-refugee communication in 2015. It emphasized the significant growth in the number of asylum-seekers, disregarding that most applications are closed before any in-merit decision is reached since the applicants leave the country after submitting the applications. Consequently, statistics of expenditures related to asylum seekers and refugees are debatable. However, this was enough for the government to launch a so called national consultation in which tendentious questions blended the issues of migration and terrorism. Besides, some of these questions were quite difficult to answer with a clear conscience, e.g. deciding between supporting Hungarian families or refugees (*National Consultation* 2015). In addition, the government threatened the population with the number of refugees coming and returned to Hungary based on the Dublin procedure, and by calling them economic immigrants. Initiatives were set off against this campaign almost immediately, so the government supported its national consultation by a billboard campaign, triggering a counter-campaign from the civilians' side. While the government is anxious about the national culture and Hungarian jobs, and addresses refugees in Hungarian, the counter-campaign billboards apologize in English and reflect to current political issues and multiculturalism in Hungarian (e.g. by citing the first Hungarian king, Stephen I: "Weak and fragile is a kingdom with one language and custom").

An especially important element in the government's communication is the restriction of immigration after the terrorist attacks in Europe and that it emphasizes its own courage and openness. We must not ignore that this happens in a milieu which rarely encounters refugees, has a limited knowledge of foreigners but xenophobia is still around 39–46% (TÁRKI 2015). As much as 64–67% of the population thinks that refugees pose a threat to Hungary and should not be let in according to a survey conducted by Republikon Institute (MTA 2015). Therefore,

it is important that the fundraiser prankster party (MKKP – Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party) and its non-governmental partner (Vastagbőr – Thick Skin) collected far more donations for the counter-campaign in a few days than expected (see The Guardian, 06/01/2016), and the politically inactive civilians actively participated in writing lines for the billboards against the anti-refugee campaign. The government's anti-refugee activity continued: relying on an inaccurate analysis of the national consultation they repeated the billboard campaign twice: both in transit countries and in the domestic, Hungarian language campaign based on the results. Meanwhile, left-wingers and refugee-supporting civilians saw a hate campaign, and new, 'not in my name' types of narratives were born.

Media framing is divergent: left- and right-wing media contextualization is different, they highlight different elements, while the increasing anti-refugee attitude in the public political discourse also thematises discourses on refugees. In this context, terms related to refugees are changing, narratives related to terrorism and crime appear in addition to rigorous and negative statements that are so strong that they are constantly dealt with even by the left-wing media. An especially important narrative block reports on illegal border crossings, border closure, illegitimate ways of arrival ending up by criminalizing border crossing, and by showing the picture of an infiltrated Muslim terrorist (see Holmes – Castaneda 2016. 18) and in general a crisis with never-ending risks.

Compared to its political commitments, the media thematises the public discourse on refugees well, and if there are any common points, such as the concepts of help or multiculturalism, they appear in different contexts. In the following figure I intend to present the results of articles that appeared in left- and right-wing papers on refugees in August and September 2015.

I have examined the relevant terms that appeared in conjunction with the concept of refugees from the aspects of concordance and frequency. Figure 1 clearly shows that the concepts relating to the status of refugees, their origin, the challenges (security, health, legal, housing, transport challenges) can be found together in both the left and right-wing media, but both sides have developed their own conceptual frameworks, which reflect their approaches well. While left-wing media outlets highlight the humanitarian issues, the right-wing media focuses on the legal, criminal and territorial aspects.

A concordance study establishes the narrative interpretation of media framing in terms of quantity and context alike. The framing in government-related media has also been intentional: sometimes data, presentation and contextualization make media consumers move away from the empathic understanding of the refugees' situation. They speak about migrants without introducing them, or show unattractive migrants, migrants without children, and sometimes show refugees who litter, disregard the rules or let their children scribble on the pavement. The fear from Ebola has been taken over by anti-terrorism supported by occasional unruly conduct and European examples. At the same time, the left-wing media tried to uncover the causes of the refugee wave as well as the migrants' fate and experiences during the journey.

This situation is heavily complicated by the fact that the media (and the majority of civil organizations) are forbidden to enter reception and detention centres, so information on how migrants are taken care of in Hungary can be gathered along the way in transits maintained by civilians. In addition, the left-wing media also highlighted how former Hungarian refugees and migrants

were received in the West, and the effects of xenophobic, anti-refugee, racist and islamophobic discourse also appear on both sides – albeit in different ways – ranging from the lard attack on a mosque to physical abuse on citizens with migrant background and many minor cases which have accompanied the wave of refugees. Near the Schengen border the media noticed the concerns and fears of the populations of small villages and farms early on, but the local people also became bolder and reported much greater damage than assumed, and occasionally the locals' reaction grew hysterical. The fears of the local population are well thematised by the many distorted stories, hatred-inciting and unfair comments appearing in the social media, forums and groups as well as by both sides of the battle of comments. However, it must be mentioned that scientific measurements of these fears in Szeged, a city near the border, show a different picture than journalistic sources: residents demonstrate a slightly more positive attitude than the national average: 43% of them would receive refugees persecuted in their home countries, and while 53% are intolerant according to national surveys, this ratio stands only at 26% in Szeged (*Szeged Studies,* 2016).



Figure 1 *About refugees August–September 2015. Concordance analysis and visualization of relevant articles that appeared in Hungarian newspapers*

Pro-government media outlets have exploited the opportunity to strengthen their support base by actions against the refugees, and by mixing the term 'refugees' with 'economic immigrants', 'social benefit abusers' or 'extremists'. However, the attack provoked strong moral resistance, which encouraged many people to volunteer. Solidarity induced a moral community and collective actions which could respond to the needs, the social and political challenges in a higher volume (see Cabot 2016. 152–153.).

From right-wing discourse to border hunter 'volunteers'

While we could only see a continuously growing, permanent wave of migrants, the right-wing media already reported on the border pressure, stories that conveyed the fears of the local people, as well as on field rangers and civil guards on the Hungarian side of the Serbian–Hungarian border, who consider it a duty to capture refugees crossing the green border, and are strengthened by local decision-makers in this activity. When the migration pressure began to intensify in the spring of 2015, mounted field rangers, civil guards and border hunter volunteers appeared, and later at the peak of the refugee wave, border protection units were deployed saying that the homeland had to be protected, with arms if necessary. A whole range of anti-refugee movements were launched starting from border hunters, border security brigades, "outlaws" (betyárs) and voluntary border protectors. Their discourses showed wide-scale xenophobia. In addition, a strong narrative appeared on territoriality which depicted the Hungarian Schengen border as the defender of Europe, European culture and of the Christian Europe. Such discourses legitimized the practice of using night vision binoculars to detect and seize refugees and keep them back until the arrival of civil guards or the police. Some groups are built up like an authoritarian system, similar to the structure of the military, and try to copy the organization and functions of the army. In other groups anti-Europeanism appears in conjunction with nationalism. However, most groups do not turn their words used in social media comments into actions.

Civilians in action – results of the fieldwork among civilians

Solidarity and grassroots organizations

After Hungary's transition to democracy in 1989, smaller, isolated associations were set up to bring the diasporas together. After that, professional organizations for migrants, multicultural knowledge and sensitivity were founded which have been actively involved in the work of the reception centres and advocacy, and have continued supporting the integration of refugees after they leave the centres. About one and a half years before the refugee wave of 2015, the MigSzol migrant solidarity group was set up, which was one of the organizers of independent civil initiatives during the refugee wave.

At the beginning of the wave, civilians faced the fact that the Immigration Office (OIN) dismissed refugees without information, food and accommodation and sent them to railway stations to find their ways to the designated reception centres. Soon new groups were organized via Facebook which tried to provide first-aid-like support at the local railway stations. Within a short period of time these teams were helped through a coordinated flow of information, so they knew exactly what type of support the groups of refugees arriving by train needed.

Professional task sharing (fundraising, storage, translation, interpretation and sandwich-making) quickly organized the helpers into a network working beyond its capacities. The number of civilian helpers multiplied within a few days, partly in response to the government's anti-refugee campaign and because of the need for assistance, though at the same time the number of refugees entering the country reached 1,000–1,500 per day. Meanwhile, the oldest, most experienced organization that had worked with refugees for years had to leave the Hangar for the lack of resources. Places controlled by the police and the border guards (OIN, HRK, Hangar) were temporarily left without civilian helpers.

After several months of "service", the closure of the Serbian–Hungarian border and later that of the Croatian–Hungarian border almost shocked the helpers. Internal conflicts came to the surface and the gap between the organizations continued to grow. Many people returned to their daily lives while others looked for opportunities outside the borders to help refugees or tried to use their experience at helping others and fundraising to the benefit of Hungarian disadvantaged people. Overall, the masses of helpers (thousands of people) gathered positive experience, their social networks widened and they gained multicultural experience both from fellow helpers and refugees. However, the respect of large, conventional organizations declined because they moved much slower and had fewer tools and helpers than the newly created, energetic groups, even though cooperation of the latter ones was also characterized by competition. During the days of the Hungarian–Serbian border closure (which is considered as a turning point) many Hungarian and foreign organizations, self-organizing groups, churches and friends flocked (cf. Rozakou 2016. 185. on pro bono transfers) to the major locations, which resulted in a festival-like atmosphere, chaotic moments, competition, success and resentment at the same time. The chaos was caused not only by amateurism and disorganization, but also by the fact that each group had a definite idea of how help could and should be rendered. However, this chaos led to new pro-refugee cooperation projects that spanned the weeks following the chaos. These collaborations still provide a supportive and receptive environment for new refugees and help everyday life in the reception centres.

Reception processes or how not to accept refugees

Asylum seekers and the refugee processes – fieldwork experience

The rules on refugees and the asylum procedure have considerably changed in recent years and while the changes seemingly served harmonization with EU legislature (see Rajaram – Arendas 2013), in reality enforcement happened in a lean way, and those who wished to stay in Hungary were left with a small chance to integrate. A good example is that most applicants are no longer put in detention centres due to European pressure. However, since 2013 one tenth of asylum applicants have been placed in closed asylum reception centres (source: helsinki.hu). Thus legal aid and civil society organizations have a major role in fostering the integration of the few people that applied for asylum or who wished to stay in Hungary after the decision. In the regular procedure the Office of Immigration and Nationality conducted a shorter and a longer interview to decide whether the applicant would be granted refugee, subsidiary protection beneficiary, or accepted status, or would be rejected. During this time, the applicant should stay in an open refugee camp

or in a closed asylum reception centre. The applicant may appeal a rejection and request a judicial procedure. According to statistics, the majority of the applicants (90%) left the country before or even after the decision was reached. Obviously this was due to the lack of housing and social support as well as the school integration of children.

The growth in the number of refugees in 2015 was accompanied not only by an anti-refugee campaign, but also by the change in the asylum system, on the basis of which international protection seems inaccessible in Hungary. Since August 2015 Serbia has been considered a safe third country, and new migrants coming from there are turned back, their asylum applications are deemed unacceptable, and if Serbia does not accept them, they are detained. An accelerated procedure has also been introduced. This procedure is conducted in the absence of personal documents or if it cannot be determined where the applicant comes from, whether he/she has the right to apply for asylum, or whether he/she has arrived via a safe third country (more can be found about its importance in Rajaram – Arendas 2013. 204.). The appeal has no suspensory effect, so the applicant may be deported for the time of decision. The personal interview is no longer mandatory for the court and the provision of native language interpreters has become even more uncertain (see *Hungarian Helsinki Committee,* 10/07/2015).

The news of Hungarian legislative changes were considered by many to have an accelerating effect on the movement of refugees via the Balkan route, as they wanted to get into the EU before the changes took effect. After the migrants' arrival and registration in Hungary, the OIN assigned them a refugee camp, and gave a 48-hour travel card with which they could reach the camp from the railway station. However, the travel cards were only valid for journeys towards the refugee camps, and as weeks went by, the refugees found it more and more difficult to travel within the country. They could not travel to the western borders. Later separate carriages were assigned to them, and they could only get off at junctions leading to refugee camps (sometimes the doors on the carriages were locked from the outside). Many refugees had valid tickets to travel to the west. They were allowed to buy the tickets, but were not allowed to travel. Refugee camps and transit zones at train stations set up by civilians were full by the end of the summer and the growing crowd wanted to leave for the West. Refugees who were reluctant to register and be fingerprinted at collection points at the Southern border in Röszke and Ásotthalom as well as in the Hangar rebelled several times against being kept in Hungary forcefully. Meanwhile, some trains carrying refugees could leave the capital towards the western border, others could not. This unpredictability and the fact that a train carrying refugees was 'diverted' by the police (the train left for the west, but it was stopped at the nearest refugee camp), and the fact that later these trains were altogether cancelled, showed the uncertainty of the Hungarian authorities and further undermined confidence in them. Finally, the 'March of Hope' began and hundreds of refugees started walking westwards, while civilians gave them water, food and first aid along the route. While the debate was going on whether or not the transportation of refugees should be allowed on the Hungarian side, Austria organized convoys and took the refugees to the Austrian–Hungarian border, which they crossed on foot, and were then helped by Austrian civilians and NGOs.

It is certain that the news about the changes reached the people in the South Balkan in about three days. Greek and Serbian civilians' reports suggested that many of the refugees could hardly believe the news. However, the growth in the number of migrants was also influenced

by the fact that the images broadcasted by the media about the terrible and inhumane conditions had shocked the western media and politicians, leading to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel giving all Syrian refugees fleeing the war zone a green light to come to Germany. In addition, the new migrant detention centre opened and the Hangar was left empty for a day or two. However, it was needed once again, since the possibility of travelling west and the date of border closure drawing near accelerated the movement of refugees. The responsibility of the German government appeared in the political discourse: the promise of accepting Syrians accelerated the flow of refugees. Meanwhile, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that he was glad to welcome kebab house owners because they are organized people, but the ones who had reached Turkish refugee camps were no longer fleeing for their lives. In addition he mentioned the challenge of Roma integration (*index.hu,* 07/09/2015).

The night before the border closure it had repeatedly spread among civilians, journalists and police officers that the border might be closed in the evening or during the night of the 14th of September, or in the following morning. Meanwhile, hundreds of refugees arrived on the railway track because there were no fences there. The military and the police surrounded the border, armoured vehicles, dogs and border guards turned up, giving a special atmosphere to the night march. The groups of 100 on average were led to the collection point, where Hungarian and foreign volunteers helped refugees in a unique chaos: everybody helped as they could, neither the positions of helpers, nor the allocation of donations were organized. There was neither water, nor lighting, with the latter meaning that a huge amount of donations went to waste because refugees who were transported from the site could not take them. Finally, on 15 September the border was closed with a reinforced freight carriage (creatively called Mad Max Wagon by civilians).

When the Hungarian border was closed, a crisis caused by mass immigration was announced and transit zones were set up in no man's land according to immigration laws. The modified Asylum Act combined with the physical border closure ensured that Hungary would escape the refugee challenges – at least at the Hungarian–Serbian border – as after 15 September, the Hungarian–Croatian border became the route for refugees for about a month. During this month the asylum system was ambivalent: those who came through the Hungarian–Serbian border faced expulsion and were charged with the crime of illegal border crossing, but those arriving through the Hungarian–Croatian border were transported by the state in trains, mostly without registration.

After the closure of the Hungarian–Serbian border the crowd swelled at the Röszke border crossing point within hours, law enforcement and military forces as well as civilians on both sides waited for the events to unfold. The mass of refugees became impatient observers, started dismantling the fence and shouting over it to the Hungarian side. Minor incidents also took place as the crowd tried to open the gate obstructing the border-crossing point. Law enforcement officers lined up on the Hungarian side and when the gate was brought down, they pushed the refugees back to the Serbian side. Tear gas and a water cannon were deployed, while some 'leaders' were arrested. According to the government and the police, terrorists were captured, i.e. refugees who had become terrorists by attacking the Hungarian border. The interpretation of current events as crisis and terrorism framed media releases, but disappeared from the public discourse quickly and the 'battle of Röszke' is only remembered by a few. Similarly, only few people remember how uncertain information, changing rules and the roles of civilians and the police contributed to the fact that the crowd started to act more firmly.

Since the border closure in September 2015, asylum applications can be submitted only at the transit zones, where the police and immigration officers are in charge. However, it soon turned out that most of the applicants would face detention and expulsion. The detention centres, transits, closed asylum reception centres, the detention and the conditions of detention and the lack of access to remedy, social and health services have raised many questions that are examined both by the EU and human rights organizations (see e.g. *http://helsinkifigyelo.blog.hu/, http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org*).

The trends of asylum applications

Asylum applications and the ratio of successful claims are good indicators of the impact of the socio-economic and legal environment that awaits refugees. Asylum applications terminated without a decision show that those who can move on because the chances of integration and success are small in Hungary. Furthermore, the proportion of decisions granting various forms of refugee status is small, which shows that the legal and institutional conditions promote rejection and negative reception.

Despite the fact that Hungary is not a destination country (Rajaram – Arendas 2013. 202), the number of asylum applications rose year after year, and a sudden change occurred in 2015 when the numbers multiplied on transit routes (Figure 2). In 2013 and 2014 17,700 and 42,000 people arrived and applied for asylum, respectively, while in 2015 as many as 411,000 refugees crossed the country, but only 180,000 people sought asylum. Many of them moved westwards after or without registration. While the February wave mainly comprised of Kosovars, later the largest groups consisted of Syrians followed by Afghans, Pakistanis and Iraqis respectively (*bmbah.hu,* MTA 2015).

The relatively rapid growth in the number of refugees generated different ideas: refugee camps on the outskirts of towns were intended to be closed in part due to safety reasons, and new ones were planned to be opened. At the peak of the wave, the capacity of the four refugee camps was 1,500 people, but since almost that many people arrived each day, the capacity of the temporary camps was increased to accommodate more people. However, neither administration, nor access to health and social assistance improved and capacities turned out to be insufficient at the peak of the wave. After the closure of the Serbian–Hungarian and Croatian–Hungarian borders, 'late-comers' were placed in transits, detention centres and in closed asylum reception centres.

An asylum seeker's claim is terminated if the applicant stays at an unknown place or fails to turn up for the interview or (in rare cases) when the asylum seeker himself requests termination. The data of the OIN (see Figure 3) clearly reveal that more than half of the procedures end with termination, mostly due to the fact that the applicants leave, presumably for the West, in line with their original intention. If we only look at the merit procedures, we can see that the ratio of positive decisions has drastically decreased.

In 2015, the overwhelming majority of the 400,000 refugees travelled on to the West, only 500 people stayed at Hungarian refugee camps at the end of the year, and due to the legislative changes, only 100,000 people arrived in the last quarter of the year (927 persons after the border closure). Since vandalizing and destroying the border fence is regarded as a crime, slightly more than 1,000 criminal proceedings have been launched, which have mostly ended with detention and



FIGURE 2 *Number of refugees, before and after border closure, 2015*



FIGURE 3 *The trends of asylum applications*

expulsion. Expulsions have been facilitated by the change of law, according to which Serbia is now considered a safe third country. Those who were not prosecuted either came through another section of the border, and only committed an offence or were minors and therefore could not be penalized. The increase in migration flows is also indicated by the fivefold growth in penal proceedings related to human smuggling, rising to 1,200 cases in two years.

Service providers and the lack of services

In recent years it has become a growing problem that after the gradually shortening subsidized period refugees face serious housing problems, partly for the lack of available social/council housing and partly because landlords are less likely to lease houses or flats to foreigners. In the meantime civilians try to reach the public, either by raising awareness about discrimination or by celebrity endorsement (http://menedek.hu/hirek/velkam-majgrentsz-alberletet-keresunk). Yet, refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries can be often found in public shelters, homeless shelters or on the streets after they leave the camps. Reducing the maximum length of stay at reception centres to two months have paralyzed groups that are not yet able to integrate into the labour market and many of whom are traumatized too. Unaccompanied children are placed at special children's homes, however fluctuation is typically high because unaccompanied children soon flee and they are rarely sent back to Hungary in the framework of the Dublin procedure. Since the spring of 2016 services have shrunk even further: the financial support linked to the integration contract, as well as housing, schooling subsidies have been terminated, therefore a greater role has been attributed to formal and informal non-governmental organizations: they do their best to find a place for refugees leaving the camps, fight against homelessness and begging.

On the road to neo-integration or connecting to the global diaspora network

The negative reception of refugees by agencies, service providers or the majority of the society drives refugees towards homogeneous relations: the ethnically, linguistically or religiously homogeneous connections in the refugees' ego-network are more significant than the ones to the host society. A significant part of the relations go beyond the diasporas, but remain in the sphere of diasporas because of the common religion or language (Figure 4). In the case of refugees neo-integration means the process in which the refugees who have left their former social milieu behind, integrate into the host society through a transnational network in which previous relation failures, social and societal successes are decisive, and this is a reflected, conscious, value- and interest-driven process. The hub of a diaspora becomes the centre of the diaspora and concurrently serves as a bridge towards the host society, economic actors or even towards non-governmental organizations.

However, diaspora networks do not stay inside national borders, they have many ties to the homeland through relatives living in the countries of origin or neighbouring countries, and most of them have contacts in Western Europe and other regions. Due to this feature the diasporas connect to a global diaspora network which spans enormous distances, albeit in an ethnically and religiously



FIGURE 4 *An example: the Somali diaspora in Budapest and its transnational cooperative relations*

differentiated way. The global diaspora network is not only a forum for keeping contact. In addition to instrumental ties it also has an economic potential which can support both resettlement and moving further. It is primarily the hubs that can benefit from this. This is crucial for the people of diasporas in Hungary, because labour market integration in Hungary can support neither subsistence, nor progress. Jobs and especially social benefits do not provide the means for supporting family members back home, so it is particularly important for migrants to become self-employed or move further west.

This sole example clearly illustrates that while we talk about encounters and the reception of refugees, the reception of refugees in Hungary is determined by transnational relations that lead refugees towards ethnically and religiously homogenous communities, and they rarely keep up supportive relations that bind them to the host society. In this field we can perceive exoticism and paradoxes of foreignness.

Conclusion: reception and rejection

In different segments of power and in the associated (moderate or extreme) right-wing press, the reception of refugees appears clearly with aversion, xenophobia, social, economic and cultural burden along with health risks, and more and more often in the context of terrorism. Left-wing newspapers and political blocs stood up for the refugees cautiously at first and then more and more vividly, and approached the issue from the aspect of the humanitarian crisis, while independent NGOs created a growing and increasingly fragmented helping network. On this side foreignness appears as an attractive or at least interesting exotic feature.

The government has repeatedly started an apology-like discourse by speaking about other social problems, the modest economic indicators and the liability of other countries. The latter included other Schengen states, the wealthier half of the Union, the liability of those who triggered the Arab Spring, as well as the southern states and Turkey, which would have had a role in stopping the refugee wave.

After the wave of refugees subsided in Hungary – when the Balkan route turned to Slovenia through Croatia, and the daily number of refugees in Hungary decreased to two-digit figures, the government's anti-refugee discourse took a new turn. On the one hand, they appeared as the guardians of the Schengen border, showing solidarity with other countries for the protection of the borders. On the other hand, the refugees were described as aggressive assailants of European culture and terrorists. The government rejects the reception of refugees – both by protesting against the quota system and through legal and physical border closure. The anti-refugee discourse is amplified in right-wing movements, groups and in the social media through continuing stereotypical, racist, xenophobic and hateful communication.

However, positive neutrality among civilians has been replaced by a high degree of activity. Knowledge-sharing and facilitating networks and a series of informal contacts have taken action to help during the humanitarian crisis. The inclusion of humane and professional gestures, the shocking and uplifting, but surely intense experience has created powerful ties which can constitute a strong background for NGOs dealing with refugees and can also help other initiatives launched to assist disadvantaged groups.

Overall, the negative attitude towards refugees, the change of acceptance criteria and power discourses reinforcing criminalization provoked such a strong opposition which has mobilized the civil society and has broadened the group who are open to transnational encounters in their social relations and are willing to receive refugees. However, anti-migrant sentiment has also lost some of its modesty, and the media continuously refers to refugees as a source of problems. The fear of migrants, which has become a defining element of social discourse, has reorganized the political discourses too. The anti-refugee attitude of the government can be detected not only at the level of discourses but also in the tightening of the legal framework, in decreasing inclusion and in the dismantling of the support system.

However, refugees and many migrants who arrived previously have not left the country. They and other people with migrant background must face xenophobic discourses as well as intolerance on the labour market and in everyday life. However, with the current regulations in place it is not expected that other large groups of refugees will have to face this negative reception.

Refugees still trying to go through Hungary must either turn back or choose the illegal way. The few who do gain protection/asylum, will move on or get connected via the diasporas: primarily to the global diaspora networks and secondly to the Hungarian society. This also indicates that although we wish to speak of a local phenomenon, it is bound to other localities and authorities through multiple ties. The dynamics of inclusion and neo-integration are affected not only by changes in the situation in Hungary, but also by political attitudes, the reception policy of the EU, the reception capacity of the diasporas, personal commitments and plans as well as the influence of the authorities and the media on the local discourse.



Figure 5 *The main localities*

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The effects of Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) border security deployment on the civilian population's subjective sense of security

ABSTRACT

Communities that are directly affected by the migration crisis perceive and evaluate events differently than others who live farther off, and just have got information about the events from different news channels. The civilian population's attitudes toward the military or security forces are key factor in maintaining conflict-free or in minimizing conflict situation in times of various crises. Civilians living in an operation area are directly affected by the operations with the events often taking place on their own property. It follows from that the civilians in the operation area relate differently to migration and migrants, and border protecting troopers and policemen too, than others who live far off. In this research we have focused to regional level, because the national researches that try to examine the irregular migration mostly on a national representative sample, so these have limited ability to provide reliable information on smaller territorial units. Otherwise this study is analysing how the attitudes changed in these smaller territorial units or societies which was affected by the migratory crisis directly. A further aim of this analysis is to show those possible explanations and interpretations which are lying behind the quantitative data. This study aims to show the attitudes to migration among the civilian population and the changes in their subjective sense of security, based on empirical data, along the Southern border in Hungary.

KEYWORDS

migration crisis, border protection, subjective sense of security, civil attitudes, empirical research

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This study aims to show the attitudes to migration among the civilian population and the changes in their subjective sense of security, based an empirical data, along the Southern border in Hungary.

Communities who are directly affected by the migration crisis perceive and evaluate events differently than others who live farther off, and just have got information about the events from different news channels. (Vajkai 2017)

The civilian population's attitudes toward the military or security forces are key factor in maintaining conflict-free or in minimizing conflict situation in times of various crises. Civilians living in an operation area are directly affected by the operations with the events often taking place on their own property.

It follows from that the civilians in the operation area relate to differently to migration and migrants, and border protecting troopers and policemen too, than others who live far off (Ritecz – Sallai 2016. 11–22.). In this research we have focused to regional level, because the national researches that try to examine the irregular migration mostly a national representative sample, so these have limited ability to get provide reliable information on smaller territorial units. Otherwise this study is analyzing how changed the attitudes in this smaller teritorial units or societies which was affected by the migratory crisis directly. Further aim of this analysis, to show those possibility explanations and interpretations which are lying behind the quantitative data.

This study also aims to draw attention to the importance of Civil-Military Co-operations (CIMIC) which can support cooperation between the military troops and civilian population in the operation area.

Methodology

In the time of our fieldwork and datagathering the Western Balkan was the third busiest route (Frontex 2015a; Frontex 2015b) among the migration routes. At this route mainly two main groups arriving to the EU (Besenyő 2016). Firstly, western Balkan states residents (from Albania, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro) and secondly, Asian or Middle Eastern migrants who arrive through the Bulgarian–Turkish and Greek–Turkish borders, then trying to get to Austria, Germany or the northern countries via Hungary (Kuschminder – De Bresser – Siegel 2015). Besides, this route manages the most Syrian and Somali migrants. Those who arrive to Macedonia, smugglers transport them by taxi cabs to the Serbian borders. For a long period this route was mainly used by illegal migrants from West Balkan states who were heading to European countries (Frontex 2015a), but recently these states citizens (except Kosovo) can travel without visa in the EU, so their number decreased significantly. In 2012, approximately 33,000 refugees arrived from Western Balkan states to Europe. This is 53 per cent higher than

the year before (2011), and means 12 per cent of all refugee applications in EU countries. These migrants are not likely to return after their visa expires simultaneously, number of illegal migrants from Kosovo (especially Albanians) increased. In the beginning of 2014, monthly 1,000 Kosovan arrived via this route, since September this amount increased to 9,000 (Besenyő 2016).[1]

Most of the published analyzes of migration and migrants have been discussed with the notion of xenophobia (Kriska 2014. 36.). These are the ideas that built such an analysis – usually a questionnaire – where the conceptualization of the surveys is determinated that every respondents are xenophobic who has gave negative answers in the questionnaire about migration and had negative opinions of migration. These analyzes – the conceptual decision on this course – point out that Hungarian society is explicitly against immigration (Wetzel 2011). One of the most important goals of our research was therefore to explore the deeper cause-effect relationships behind the generalization claims.

We have investigated the different communities (rural and city) that are directly affected by migration crises. We combined the quality and quantitative data collections in Csongrád County in the three settlements of the southern border region of Hungary: Ásotthalom, Mórahalom and Röszke. The research methods were carried out in two phases.

1st phases: Qualitative methods, with unstructural personal interviews
In this phase interviewers content on illegal immigration was grouped around five key opinions:

1. Illegal migration and the appearance of the course for the first time
2. Changes of attitudes towards immigrants
3. The subjective sense of security
4. Border protection task just with Police
5. HDF appearance and manage of the situation

Irregular migration appearing in the vicinity of Csongrád county's Serbian border region

The irregular migration as a phenomenon could be perceived not only in 2015, but a lot sooner at three cities of the Csongrád county border region. Although the larger part of the people living here (40.4%) came across with migrants in 2014, the migrants' memory had become widely known between 1990 and 2016.

The first increase in the percievement of the phenomenon can be observed in the year of 2012. According to the interviews before 2012 only smaller *"really immigrant-like"* groups had arrived,

[1] Some think that the trend changed in connection with the rumours that France wanted to exclude Kosovo from the list of safe countries. In that case, Kosovan economic migrants could earn refugee status in western countries (Frontex 2015b). Later it was revealed that the assumptions were a hoax and France never thought about the step above, so Kosovans do not get refugee status but will be sent back as soon as possible.

the *"larger Black African groups"* appeared first in 2012, in addition to that there was a continuous inflow of the smaller groups of non-Black migrants. The migration phenomenon at the examined border had reached the critical level in 2012 when it has started to disturb the local population. The different parts at time between the beginning of the migration crisis (according to the people living at the southern border at 2012) and its height (September 2015) were intertwined with the appearance of different ethnic groups. The migration pressure became *"unbearable"* at the borderline when the Kosovan "refugees"arrived. However this Kosovan migration flow made the already existing problem "mesmerising". Regarding the migrants arriving from Kosovo a very negative picture started to formulate among the locals. For one thing, this pessimist view was in relation to the "new immigrants" behavior and their appearance. *"The Kosovans from one point of view neither behaved, nor appeared as the real refugees"* (i.e. the "regular", formerly often seen by the locals, not European-looking, badly dressed), from the other they were *"irresponsible",* not once they were often out in the fields endangering infants and children several times. The ones arriving from Kosovo arrived typically in families, while the Middle-Eastern and Black African migrants consisted usually of men. Nevertheless, contrary to the former refugee-groups the Kosovans have *"arrived obviously organized to the borders".* The Riot Police (Készenléti Rendőrség) appeared at the borders in 2015, and at about the same time, in March the number of the Kosovans dropped almost to the zero, however the migration flow itself didn't languish, in fact, it was strenghtened by the newcomers from other countries.

The Hungarian government had serious problems with the growing crowd of arriving migrants. In 2009 they were coming mainly from Kosovo (Frontex 2010a), but in 2012 migration became more "international". The next year an unprecedented migration crisis developed. Almost 20,000 immigrants entered Hungary illegally and applied for refugee status in 2013. Most of them were Kosovans, but there were Pakistanis, Afghans, Moroccans, Algerians and Sub-Sahrawians. This was the moment when Hungary strengthened its border guards and introduced a new regulation on refugee status applications from 1st January, 2013 (Frontex 2014). This was not followed by a radical decrease in illegal migration. In July 2013, 130 illegal migrants were caught on an average day. They were taken to registration points, from where they immediately headed to Austria or Germany and applied for refugee status in those countries. The number of migrants decreased appreciably in the second half of the year, but since 2014 there was a significantly emerging number of refugees from Turkey. Hungarian authorities tried to reduce it with different instruments. (Besenyő 2016) According to a Frontex report 43,357 illegal migrants were registered in 2014, that means a significant, 46 per cent increase. Illegal migrants were mostly Kosovans (22,059 individuals), Afghans (8,342 individuals) and Syrians (7,320 individuals).

[2] The survey conducted by TÁRKI concludes, that contrasting attitudes differentiate between those, who have "just" met with refugees or migrants and those, who know personally this kind of people. Thos e in particular who don't know personally immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers – namely they have only met with them – are more rejective and they harbour fear above the avarage against them. (Bernát et. al. 2015)

Meetings

Among the Hungarian research we find relevant data in the surveys of TÁRKI[2] and the University of Szeged, Department of Sociology concerning how many of the interviewed men have met with migrants. The percentage of the people who 12 months previously to the interviews have crossed paths with refugees in the 2015 national representative surveys of TÁRKI is 27%[3] (Simonovics 2015:13), in the 2016 Szeged research it is 80%,[4] while in the border region examined by us it is 92%.

From compassion to rejection

After the first meetings, that is at the beginning of the irregular migration (1990–2012) the population was characterized by solidarity and supporting behavior. Our surveys also point out that before September 2015, namely at the tip of the crisis the borderline municipalities and civilians – until the appearance of the national and international media – were practically left to themselves, regardless that they indicated on lots of forums the intensifying migrational pressure disturbing the settlements and the problems surrounding it.

At this time the provision of the migrants had come from self-effort, local and municipal cooperation, and in effect stayed this way until the migration wave didn't reach its height and got larger media publicity. Only at this time did the miscellaneous – non-local – non-governmental organizations (NGO), which – in the light of increased media attention – got bigger publicity than the civilians or the municipalities helping at the place. The beginning, pre-crisis supporting behavior – which was mainly invisible in front of the larger publicity in absence of the media presence and other reports, sith it had no newsvalue – later became more and more distant, and due to the development of the chaotic setting, the restoration of the order and security it became more and more rejecting towards the migrants and the migration. The change of attitude is partly because of the migrants' multitudinous and uncontrolled appearance at the villages, this foreign masses' demographic composition (most of them are young men), their unsuppliedness and their behavior different from the local cultural customs (Póczik 2014) created more and more repugnance and even more it generated fear among the population.[5]

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[3] Our counted percentage according to the diagram in the referenced research.

[4] Szegedma.hu: A lot of people from Szeged refuse to react on the admission of refugees. 16 June, 2016. http://szegedma.hu/hir/szeged/2016/06/sok-szegedi-elzarkozik-ha-a-menekultek-befogadasa-a-kerdes.html

[5] The same course can be observed in other countries as well, for example in Germany, where between the governing parties more and more fear is generated because of the large quantity of migrants arriving in a short period of time. (Besenyő 2015. 8–9.).

The decrease of the subjective sense of security

Sense of danger, conflicts

Already at a 2014 questionary it has been shown that the immigrants' lengthy sojourn at a given settlement would be get conflicts between the locals and the migrants; at Röszke and Horgos the interviewed persons' 47% thought likewise (Kriska 2014.46.). Although the result of the two surveys – because of the events that took place at the time and the diversification of the territorial demarcation – can be compared only limitedly; it is meaningful, that the distribution of the answers for the similar question put up by us in 2016 shows a drastic increase in the number of the persons frightened from the conflict, which – in May, 2016 – has risen even to 84,3%.[6]

The escalation of the sense of danger and the intensification of fear can be traced back on the one hand to the lack of proper supply of the migrants, because the large number of uncontrolled and unsupplied groups roaming continuously through the green border tried a lot of times to aquire the things necessary for their further travel (food, water, mobile charging, etc. as well as obtaining night shelter) from the locals, which in some cases created conflicts. 12 months previously our data survey conducted in May–June, 2016 the 41% of the questionned felt themselves in danger.[7]

There is a statistically justifiable relation between two groups regarding the frequency in the sense of danger: those of women and those who live in the periphery, who felt themselves more and often in danger than men or the people living in the center. Almost every second woman (49%), but at least almost one third of them had experience of some kind of fearful situation regarding migrants or in connection with migrants between May, 2015 and May–June, 2016.

Among the population at the outskirts there have been more frequent situations that created the feeling of danger then among the civilians living in the center. We have examined by age group and by settlement the frequency of danger, starting from the presumption that the elder and the people living in villages closer to the moving route felt themselves more often in danger, but we couldn't find statistically justifiable relation between these groups.

We collected information concerning the concrete situation, when in our questionnaire we asked the answerers, if they could describe in an open question the events causing the sense of danger. The situations creating the feeling of danger concentrated around four security-determining problem:

1. The appearance and the continous flow of foreign people in the vicinity of their home

> *"At the weekend my children played in the courtyard. My smallest son (6 years old) runs in our old courtyard crying: »Mommy, mommy they are here, the immigrants are coming after me.« I was alone at home with the children. There were 10–15 immigrant young men. We were very frightened and afraid. I would rather call it fear and shock, then danger, but it could have easily had a different outcome."*

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[6] This proportion at Röszke is 87,1% (at Ásotthalom 93% and at Mórahalom 77,2%). Nevertheless by settlements the results can't be called representative.

[7] It is but rightful that a methodological problem emerges; the answers given to questions formulated in this way could contain theoretically other situations not directly involving migration that could create fear in the questionned person, although the given situation has nothing to do with irregular migration. Whatsoever we can exclude this approach, since in the questionnaire's next open question only the answers related to the migration crisis appeared.

2. The feeling of helplessness and vulnerability at the sight of the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement forces' steps.

"In my garden, in the street there is a huge, pretentious and shouting crowd, who rather push me then stand. I was frightened because the policemen only escorted them, which was equal to nothing."

3. Regular home violations, damages in private property

"They collected in my own house 14 migrants. 4 persons in the WC, 7 in the hen-house, 3 in the wood-shed. However thanks to the fast reaction of the police and the military nothing serious happened."

4. Human traffickers appearance near the villages

"The migrants settled down in front of our gates. We didn't dare to sleep at night. The human traffickers were in front of our house."[8]

The appearance of the organization of the migration

One of the most disturbing tendencies that had made its presence felt were the everyday life-influencing and the population's security-reducing organized crime, namely the human traffickers appearance (65,4%), right next to the flow of the migrants (58,4%), the migrants' outlook (56,4%) and their behavior with a 42.8% answering frequency. (Hautzinger 2017 69–83 pp.)

The organized trafficking of the migrants, the smugglers appearance during the Kosovan migrant wave was the first thing apparent for the population. Regardless of the relaxing of the wave, the organized trafficking of the migrants was further underway, and it was still well comprehensible for the locals living in the area. The difference appeared only in that other nationals arrived organized to the border. One of the groups were the *"day-time arrivers' group",* among whom there were families and they didn't reject the registration procedure. The other group, *"the forbidden night-time border-crossers"* consisted mainly of men and they headed for the meeting point agreed upon, where the human traffickers had already been waiting for them.

The uncertainity regarding the situation's controllability and proper handling is obvious from the answers given to the questions asked in the questionnaire. More then the third of the participants (34,3%) thinks that the migration to our country became uncontrollable, though altogether this proportion is close to the two-third (73,4%), if we count the somewhat concurrent. At the time of the October, 2015 questionnaire made in the Visegrád Group (V4) the percentage of the concurrents to the statement by some degree in Hungary was 62%, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 69–69%, in Poland 52%. (Bernát et al. 2015.)

The proportion of the people living at the southern border, those who think that the uncontrollable immigration puts the country at risk is even higher (93%).

[8] see criminal law aspects of smuggling: (Gaál, 2017 233:240 pp.)

Handling efforts of the phenomenon by the Border Police

Ordering the Riot Police to the southern border (February, 2015.) the population hoped for the settlement of the situation in a short time, but this expectation didn't realize. Contrary to every effort of the police the situation started to become unbearable, the policemen practically were able only to *"bus the collected migrants to Szeged"*. They weren't able to protect the population – mostly the people living in the villages – from the conflicts created by the migrants' heavy inflow, thus the security sensitivity of the people dropped heavily. The migrants stopped, *"took over"* vehicles, regular bus–lines, so not merely the locals' private property's integrity, but also the traffic wasn't provided in the area.

> *"The refugees broke into a car at Kissor and stole it. Since then I fear for my cars. Once as I was coming home there were a lot of people standing near the road, and as we drove along them they were hitting our car, asking our help to take them away. This was very frightening."*

> *"I came from the periphery by automobile with trailer. In front of me on the road the rioting migrants near the street, who lit a fire. Policemen guarded them who warned me – if necessary – to go slowly with closed windows. Because I can't reverse with a trailer, I went further with a trembling stomach..."*

At night they knocked at the doors of a farm, or they went without even a knock while the dogs were barking.

> *"They came to the estate and they wanted electricity. They were swinging poles at me."*

Since the locals felt that the dispatched police forces – regardless of their tiresome efforts – are unable to handle the situation, so the flow of the migrant groups wouldn't disturb the everyday life of the civilians, continue to create fear or cause economic damage – among other things a fall of income, for example in tourism – they were forced to find alternative solutions, so that neither the migrants in groups wouldn't go through the populated areas, nor the human traffickers would appear at the inner parts of the villages.

The role of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the border control and its public perception

The situation was resolved by the deployment of the border barrier as well as by the participation of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the border control tasks, which put an end in a short time to the unbearable conditions at the settlements, and order was restored. (Besenyő 2017)

87,1% of the citizens in the three examined villages agreed with the building of the border barrier,[9] and 96% of the people living in the cross-border settlements support the participation of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the border control tasks.

[9] This percentage is – according to the national representative survey of the Migration Research Institute conducted also in May–June, 2016 – is 80%. http://www.migraciokutato.hu/hu/2016/07/12/kozvelemenykutatas-sorozat-a-migracio-tarsadalmi-megiteleserol-i/ (Downloaded at: 12 June, 2016.)

The presence of the soldiers: the *"sight of the armed soldiers had a relaxing effect on the people",* and it increased the subjective feeling of security at the settlements.

The civilian population after a long time could see again Hungarian soldiers in the line of duty, when the forces of the Hungarian military were dispatched to handle the migration crisis. Again, since 1991 the social image of the Hungarian Defence Forces shows a deminishing tendency (Eszényi 2001, cited by Róth 2005. 7.), which is partly because for the public the military security was relegated to the third place after the social and the public ones in the last 25 years (Róth 2005) and partly because the civilian population not or just very rarely meets military personnel on duty.[10]

Thus inasmuch the civilians see, that what level of work does the military do, and that its social usefulness hasn't declined, that way the social image of the soldiers could improve.

This is supported by the measurable differences between the national[11] and the action-regional (Ásotthalom, Mórahalom, Röszke) representative data. The proportion of people largely content with the military's control of the illegal migration – in the case of both regional narrowing – is more then two-third (national: 75%; action-regional: 85,9%), nevertheless more then the half of the people living in the action-region, but only a quarter of the national population is totally content with the border control-duty of the soldiers. Examining the differences it can be seen that nationally the proportion of those who said that they can't form an opinion about the question is also higher (with near 10 percent).

The people of the action-region described the role of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the fight against illegal migration more favourably – although with a small margin –,[12] than that of the police.

Another important part of the country's opinion about the military is the trust in the defence abilities of the Defence Forces, which is influenced also by the activities seen during duty – equipment, military technology, organization, execution, etc.

From the results it can be concluded that the people living in the territory (action-region) who are directly exposed to irregular migration – where the military executed border control operations – place their trust more in that the Hungarian Defence Forces are able to protect the nation's security in a migration crisis.

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[10] The unfavourable social image deriving from this can lead to the deterioration of the soldiers self-discipline. (Vámosi 1997:12, cited by Róth 2005. 5) And if the soldiers themselves think their duty is useless, inferior, that will lead to the deterioration of their service- and life-circumstances, job abandonment, lastly the diminishing of the military's abilities.

[11] The source of the national data is the telephone public opinion research of the Nézőpont Institute conducted between 1 and 5 February, 2016. among 1000 persons.

[12] The difference lingers between the statistic margin, thus it can be concluded from the results of the public image of the two organization that about half of the people living at the southern borderline of Csongrád county were fully content with the duty of the police and the military concerning illegal migration. The more favourable image of the Hungarian Defense Forces is all the more interesting, since regarding the task of border control in most of the cases the media writes only about policemen, so nationwide the work of the soldiers is less visible. However evaluating the questionnaires it became clear that the people living at the borderline sees and approves of the task of the soldiers, without whom the Ministry of Interior wouldn't be able to handle the task of border control.

New solidarity. Civil support for the participants in the border protection

Most of the analysis' were made from among the various non-governmental organizations that had to do with irregular migration about those volunteers, groups and organizations, that were concerned with the support and provision of the migrants, so they were solidaric with the migrants. During the events, the public media and the leading television channels broadcasted their news focusing explicitly on the volunteers helping the migrants. In a lot of cases the migrants used this to gather support for their goals, to gain the solidarity of the locals – the people (Bernát et al. 2015:76). Among these grass-root, locally organized civilian groups there were also types which aimed to help the work of the policemen and soldiers on border control-duty, thus a new solidarity form appeared in the line of events.

The reason why we regard the civilian participation evolving along the solidarity movements pointing in two different paths worthy of evaluation is because it is similar in its course and its tendency to the change of attitude towards the migrants in the case of the people living at the borderline.

The solidarity towards the policemen and soldiers taking part in the border control becomes publicly apparent in the middle of September 2015, when the Facebook-group "Zsaruellátó" published its following appeal:

> *"We decided it is time that the people – namely We and You – of the country should unite in support of the guys serving overtime – just as we/ and you had already done a lot of times. Let's serve and protect those, who do it for us everyday!"* (Source: NLcafe: 13 September, 2015. http://www.nlcafe.hu/ezvan/20150913/zsaruellato-rendorok-roszke/)

> *"The Zsaruellátó is a civilian intiative, an organization estabilished independently from parties, whose goal is that we show for the »modern hussars« that they have the full support of the civilian population. We don't criticise nothing, we don't believe that their povision would be insufficient or not according to standards; we only want to show that we stand out for those who protect us. We are able to do this by helping their work where and how it is necessary [...] Althoughwe send the donations in full to the soldiers on duty at the borders, we can only give back in parts to the appropriate places that unbelievable amount of love and faith what thousands of the donators feel. Yes, the people believe in them and they are grateful to them. We are working for those men, who gave their lifes to the safeguarding of security, who work 26–30 hours in this difficult international situation, and are far away from their loved ones for weeks. [...] We thank all of them, and we wish them persistence for the upcoming events too!"* (https://www.facebook.com/zsaruellato/info?tab=page_info)

The solidarity, support of the people of the country thus besides the migrants became apparent also towards the Law Enforcement Forces and Armed Forces. This helping intention presented itself not only at the level of group organization but also at the level of individuals, namely when more and more people volunteered at the different corps of the Hungarian Defence Forces, for that the MH HKNYP published the following appeal:

> *"In the recent days the Hungarian Defence Forces Replacement and Central Record Command (MH HKNYP) was approached by several civilian nationals to take part*

in the tasks caused by the migration crisis and the building in the temporary border barrier, so they would volunteer ardently for military duty." (29 September, 2015. http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/53318_az_mh_hadkiegeszito_es_kozponti_nyilvantarto_parancsnoksag_kozlemenye)

Conclusion, consequences

1. One of the most important connclusions of the survey evaluating the attitudes of the civilian population of Csongrad county directly implicated in the migration crisis is that the people reject the large, uncontrollable migration along practical, palpable everyday-life concerning viewpoints and experiences, similarly to the opinion of the entire Hungarian society on migration.[13]
2. According to the data of the researches conducted at Szeged among the 15 year olds the percentage of considering opinions (the unsecure-type) is the highest all along. In the period between 2001–2015 the proportion of the tendency of the approving views shows rather increasement, while at the same time the diffusion in the pro-isolation attitude shows a declining trend. Nevertheless, in 2016 these tendencies will break and the values going to move to the opposite direction.
3. The rejection of the migration is not against the migrants, namely nations, ethnicities and ethnical groups or people, but the uncontrollability of the course of events, its creation of subjective sense of danger and the effects of its intrinsic security risks.
4. 92% of the answerers have personal experience about the migrants, which is essenially negative.
5. The large, uncontrollable migration and the conflicts and atrocities surrounding it create fear and sense of danger in the population of the borderline villages.
6. Besides the holding up of the migrants (by the border barrier) the involvement of the military in the border control-tasks has also got larger support.
7. Involving the Hungarian Defence Forces in the border control-tasks brought order to the chaotic situation, and its presence had a relaxing effect on the subjective sense of security of the borderline civilians.
8. Next to the declinement of the subjective feeling of security and the terrorist attacks the decrease of the trust placed in the institutions guaranteeing state sovereignty is well conceivable.
9. After the 2016 Brussels bombings the trust placed in the law enforcement agencies has declined, although the ratio of the decrease in the case of the police is not apparent, while in the case of the already higher trust index of the Defence Forces is considerable.
10. The citizens expect security protection regarding terrorist attacks not just mainly from the police, but from the military too.
11. The appearance of the Defence Forces, their recent visibility during duty created favourable attitudes among the civilian population, it has a positive effect on the social image of the military.

[13] For the result of the nationwide research see: national representative survey conducted by the Migration Research Institute in May–June, 2016. http://www.migraciokutato.hu/hu/2016/07/12/kozvelemenykutatas-sorozat-a-migracio-tarsadalmi-megiteleserol-i/ (Downloaded at: 12 July, 2016.)

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BELVEDERE MERIDIONALE

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Maritime Piracy as an International Crime in the 21st Century



ABSTRACT

Maritime piracy is an ancient crime which have still not disappeared and, since the mid 90s, we have been living a new golden age of piracy. According to the 2017 annual report of the International Maritime Bureau, 180 piratical incidents happened in that year. Although, piracy arised almost three decades ago, the international community only started dealing with it ten years ago on a day-to-day basis. That is why we can state that it became a 'real' international crime in this century.

Piracy has always been linked with the Carribean – and it has turned up there again – but there are new hotspots, as well. In the past decade the region of the Gulf of Aden (and mainly the coast of Somalia) was the infamous one, despite the fact that the most reported attacks have been happening in Southeast Asia since the 90s. The Gulf of Guinea is also dangerous and the most violent piratical attacks happen there.

Pirates endanger the most important sea trade line all over the world. Last year, according to the Oceans Beyond Piracy foundation, they caused more than $10 billion total cost for the economy in all endangered regions. And, of course, it threatens the lives of the seafarers, as well: according to this report, 19 of them were killed during the attacks.

It is clear that the international community has to fight piracy. There are several joint patrols in all of the regions mentioned above, but as effective they can be, they are only symptomatic treatment of the problem. The states have to deal with the criminal accountability of pirates to create a real restraining force to prevent them from committing the crime again.

KEYWORDS

Maritime piracy, international criminal law, International Criminal Court

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Introduction

Nowadays when we hear the word 'piracy', the first thing that comes into our mind is not a 'traditional' pirate but illegal filesharing. Although many people consider piracy posed danger in the 17th and 18th century, they are wrong because this crime still endangers a lot of seafarers and vessels' cargo on different locations.

It was definitely the acts of Somali pirates that turned the world's attention to this threat. A little more than ten years ago their attacks were day-to-day and often appeared on the news. Their acts also led the international community to react, although modern-age piracy began to be a problem since the 1990's. This reaction is the reason we can state that piracy only became a 'real' international crime in the 21st century.

In this paper I present the regulation and definition of piracy used by various international agreements, the reason why it is still being conducted today and its main hotspots. I also deal with the different types of conduct and the security measures which can be done by the vessel's crew. Finally, I examine the problems of accountability and the question whether it is necessary to include the crime of maritime piracy into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and raise it to the level of 'the most serious crime of international concern'.

Historical review

Maritime piracy is one of the oldest crimes in history: it is as old as maritime navigation. That is why it is not a surprise to possess evidence about serious pirate activity in the Mediterranean Sea dating back as far as the Bronze Age.[1] By the way this sea was a hotspot of piracy through history, along with the Carribean, the Indian Ocean and the Southeast-Asian seas. Between 1690 and 1730 lasted an era which is often called the 'Golden Age of Piracy'. In these decades pirates attacked almost every vessel on the Carribean and managed to earn high reward and they often did it legally, thanks to the piracy licences provided by Eurpean monarchs. This era is also well-known because pirates started to use the infamous black flag emblazoned with a skull flag.[2]

Retaliations ended this era. The criminal cases were always tried in front of the public and after the judges established the guiltiness, the verdicts were carried out in large numbers, thus contributing to the effect of general prevention. One glaring example: 54 pirates were hung up in the same time

[1] Konstam 1999. 22–23.

[2] Konstam 1999. 93.

in 1722 in Cape Coast Castle, West Africa. As for the courts themselves: until 1700 the perpetrators were sentenced by the courts of the motherlands. After this, the colonial courts tried the cases of pirates, in accordance with the laws of the motherland.[3]

In the 18th century piracy once again became a standard type of warfare as monarchs used pirates to attack the enemy's merchant ships and navy. These pirates were called privateers. Strictly speaking they had state licence to attack other vessels and the loot was shared by the investors, crew and treasury. The privateers later returned to their original way of life but by this time they became more powerful and only an enormous co-operation could end their rule on the Carribean.

Nowadays the Carribeans is considered safe but pirates have not disappeared from other parts of the seas.

Definitions

When we examine the definition of piracy from both national and international perspective, we can see that many times the elements of the conduct of the perpetrator are different. Since the Bronze Age the law of people *(ius gentium)* have considered pirates to be the enemy of mankind *(hostis humani generis)* and therefore everyone could have apprehended and called them to account for their crimes.[4]

After World War I many international agreements (or their drafts) tried to define piracy. The first attempt occured in 1926 by the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. This definition contained the following elements: a pirate is basically a robber at sea whose actions are limited to the high sea (because otherwise it would not be under international law) and qualifies as a crime againts the security of trade at sea.[5]

This time the comprehensive approach was that piracy only can be committed for private ends but the London Treaty in 1930 and the Nyon Treaty in 1937 extended the definition to acts committed by warships and submarines. Nonetheless in 1956 the United Nations International Law Commission declared that maritime piracy can only be committed from a privately owned ship by private reasons. Thereafter this approach defined the dominant tendency for further regulation in international law.[6]

The United Nations General Assembly established the Conference on the Law of the Sea with a resolution in 1957. At this conference many agreements were passed in 1958, including the most important one, the Convention of the High Seas which codified the customary law of the sea. Article 15 of this convention contains the first definiton of piracy which was passed in an international ageement. This definiton has 5 key elements:

– the criminal act has to be violent (e. g. robbery, homicide)

– the criminal act has to be committed on high seas

– the perpetrators use a private ship or aircraft

[3] *Legendás kalózok és a hajórablások aranykora.*

[4] Varga 2011a. 30–33.

[5] Varga 2011a. 33.

[6] Varga 2011a. 33–34.

– at least two ships or aircrafts has to be involved: by which the perpetrators commit the crime and on which they commit it
– the criminal act has to be commited for private ends.

The most important source of law on the topic, the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) uses the same definition. A common feature of these agreements is that all of them state the high seas as the place of perpetration and also, they do not go into details about what 'private ends' mean exactly. By the way, the 'private ends' was ment to be a really important element of the definition because that is how the codificators tried to avoid using universal jurisdiction for political reasons by any state.[7]

A different approach was brought by International Maritime Organization (IMO) when in 1988 it helped to formulate the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). Definitions used by this convention can extend to maritime piracy and the location of perpetration to the territorial sea.[8] Furthermore, the IMO General Assmebly adopted Resolution 1025(26) which made a difference between piracy and armed robbery against ships. The former's definition is basically the same as in UNCLOS. Armed robbery against ships differs from it in two ways: the number of conducts of the perpetrator have increased (e. g. looting) and the resolution specifically points out different places of perpetration ('within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea').[9] According to these the main difference between piracy and armed robbery againts ships is the place of perpetration.

There is one more useful definition to examine: the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) also created one and – in my opinion – it is the most comprehensive one. It does not contain a restriction that the crime only can be committed on high seas. Furthermore, this definition rejects the element which says that two ships need to be involved. With this, it expands piracy to those – otherwise really frequent – situations when the perpetrators attack from a vehicle that does not count as a ship (e. g. raft). Also, this definiton expands the place of perpetration to ports and does not contain the element of private ends – the last one means that piracy could be committed from political ends, as well. Another interesting thing about this definition is the stating the possibility for a warship to commit piracy, as well – if it commits an act wich fits the definition of piracy.[10]

Hotspots and the main reasons behind piracy

Currently the most endangered places by pirates are the Gulf of Guinea (mainly the shores of Nigeria) and Southeast Asia (primarily the Singapore Strait, the territorial waters of Indonesia and the South China Sea).[11] The infamous Gulf of Aden is much safer nowadays, thanks to the coordinated navy patrols, but Somali piracy is still a really important cornerstone of modern-day piracy, thus I will refer to it in several occasions in this paper.

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[7] Varga 2011a. 35–38.

[8] Lattman 2010. 68–69.

[9] *International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1025(26).*

[10] Amri 2014. 7–8.

[11] *IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map 2018.*

In the past, piracy was committed mainly for political ends. By today this has changed and economical became the most common reason and piracy is a way of subsistence in hotspot areas. Criminal organizations and terrorrist groups take advantage of the bad financial situation of the perpetrators and corrupt bureaucrats also share in the profit.[12] The last one is important because we can state that piratical activity is strong in countries where the rule of law is weak or does not even exist.

What is really necessary for commiting piracy is the favourable geographical position and within that, the proximity of trade routes. With the example of the Gulf of Aden: the European Union concludes 95% of its sea trade and 20% of its energy import through this route. Furthermore, the safety of these waters is a common interest of the United States, China and Russia, as well.[13] The situation is really similar in the Gulf of Guinea, too: this region is rich in petroleum and 40% of the EU's and 29% of the US' consumption is coming from here.[14] Furthermore, the Western African countries are rich in other natural treasures (e. g. gold, coca, diamonds), thus the trade routes are busy and this creates more chance for the pirates to attack, as well.[15]

We have to say a few words about Somalia. As I mentioned, this is the most infamous hotspot of modern piracy but the coordinated navy patrols managed to make the Gulf of Aden safer. Although, shipping through those trade routes is still dangerous, less and less pirate attacks happened in the past few years. By today, Nigeria has taken the place of Somalia as an infamous piracy hotspot. These pirates more often kidnap seafarers and demand a ransom, moreover an IMB report from 2016 pointed out that this is the pirates' primary objective now. This report also remarked that a really notable feature of the attacks happening here is that they are more violent than attacks at other hotspots.[16]

However most of the registered attacks happen in Southeast Asia. These are similar to the Somalis in a way that the perpetrators attack every vessel from fishing ships to oil tankers.[17] The special feature of this region is its geographical conditions which are incredibly useful for pirates: the vessels have to cross narrow straits and archipelagic waters, thus bigger ships cannot hold the 18 knots speed which was stated in international directives as the safe velocity against pirate attacks.[18]

Finally, there is a familiar hotspot where piracy became a threat again in the past few years. This is the Carribean and Latin America. In 2017, Oceans Beyond Piracy[19] recorded 71 piratical incidents, which is a 163 percent increase over 2016. Pirates here usually attack yachts, not merchant vessels.[20]

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[12] Harkai 2015. 184.

[13] Nagy 2014.

[14] *Defining piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.*

[15] Fiorelli 2014. 9–10.

[16] *International Maritime Bureau Report (25 July 2016).*

[17] Klemensits 2016.

[18] *5 Reasons Why Southeast Asian Piracy is Here to Stay.*

[19] As a program of One Earth Future foundation, Oceans Beyond Piracy is a response to maritime piracy through e. g. "developing public-private partnerships to promote long-term solutions at sea and ashore".

[20] *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017.*

Types of attack and perpetration and what the crew can do

Robert Beckman distinguished the different types of attacks based on four core elements:

– The weapons used by the pirates (because no pirate commits the crime unarmed).
– The seriousness of violence used by the pirates on crew members (from assault to homicide).
– The value of the misappropriated valuables (including the ransom for the crew, as well).
– The level of danger posed to maritime transport. This means that if the pirates attack in a strait, which is narrower, then they endanger not only the attacked ship and its crew but the rest of the ships travelling through that strait.

Although pirate attacks can be different in smaller details but we can distinguish three typical classes of them:

– Hit-and-run: the perpetrators attack the ship, rob the crew and leave. This only takes a few minutes.
– The pirates not only rob the crew but also the ship's cargo. These attacks usually happen between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m. when the crew is sleeping and the pirates almost always use modern technology for the hijacking.
– The 'phantom ship': this is the most sophisticated one. The pirates buy or somehow acquire a ship. They rename it, repaint it and reflag it. After that they find a shipper who is short on time to move his cargo. They offer him their 'phantom ship' as carrier and simply sail off with the cargo.[22]

The last one shows us the best how dangerous the pirate attacks can be. These kind of operations need weeks of preparation to execute.

The various international organizations passed several recommendations which can help the crew to prevent the attacks. These documents recommend them to travel on internationally recognized maritime routes, increase the speed on dangerous waters, illuminate the vessel at night and not to stop in case of an attack.[23]

But the most effective way to defend the ships is to hire a private armed security service. They can defend against an attack even when navy patrols are far away. Another, although somewhat radical method is the 'Q-ship'. This is a fortified ship with more effective defence and weapon system which appears to be a defenceless merchant vessel and thus a fine target for pirates, luring them into an attack and destroying the pirate vessel outright. This is actually a known method in warfare. But piracy is not a war situation. The goal is to bring the perpetrators to justice, not to destroy them. That is why this method gives reason for concern.[24]

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[21] Varga 2011b. 43–44.

[22] *Types of pirate attacks.*

[23] Varga 2011b. 45.

[24] Varga 2011b. 51–53.

Criminal accountability

The international community is trying to suppress piracy with the effective assistance of international organizations. The United Nations Security Council has passed several resolutions regarding this crime and the maritime organizations (IMO, IMB) are making an effort to help seafarers, as well. For example, IMO is operating the Piracy Reporting Centre which is a database, updated every 24 hours, where captains can report suspicious vessels and attacks. We have to mention the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which organizes special trainings for states along the Gulf of Aden to strenghten their "prosecution capacity". This means that UNODC helps the police, judges and prosecutors to deal piracy cases. This program also includes the development of the penitentiary system of Somalia.[25]

In addition, there are ongoing military operations at the hotspots which are including coordinated navy patrols. We have to point out the NATO's Ocean Shield Operation which has helped to deter and disrupt pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa since 2008.[26] Thanks to this operation, the number of attacks are greatly decreased (only 2 attempted attacks in 2018 until September according to IMB's Live Piracy Map).[27] But no matter how successful these operations are in the short term, they are only a symptomatic treatment of the problem and to succeed in the long term, the most important is to deal with the shortcomings of criminal acountability.

As for the legislative nature of maritime piracy: according to customary international law, this is the oldest crime to which universal jurisdiction applies, meaning that every state may use its own domestic law to punish those combatting piracy regardless of the pirates' nationality or where the attack took place.[28] But bringing pirates to justice is difficult because many times the countries interested in repressing piracy did not conduct the criminal procedure, but they released the perpetrators. There is a simple explanation for this hesitation: these countries simply do not want to bear the costs of the transportaion of physical evidence and witnesses to the place of the trial. Furthermore, the coordination of jurisdiction also has its difficulties because the crime of piracy can involve several states, namely the state to which the victims are nationals, the state to which the pirates' ship belong to or the state to which the owners of the cargo are nationals.[29]

Again, we have to mention Somalia, as a cornerstone of modern piracy. The UN declared Somalia a failed state. It does not have a real government which has control over the full territory of the state, thus it cannot enforce the execution of the law either. Furhermore, in Somalia, the procedural guarantees and the right to a fair trial are not provided during the criminal procedure which are well-known and demanded by most of the countries. Nonetheless the states interested in repressing piracy are urging that trials should take place in the region where the piratical act happened.[30]

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[25] Hodkingson 2013. 153–154.

[26] *Operation Ocean Shield.*

[27] *IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map 2018.*

[28] Dutton 2010. 203–204.

[29] Kalra 2011. 3.

[30] Varga 2011b. 36–37.

In a few scholars' opinion, the problem of piracy has to be solved regionnaly, thus it is necessary to establish regional courts. They say that local judges would know regional customs better, so the procedures would be more effective. Furthermore, it could increase the anti-piracy operations' efficiency if the coordinating parties would know the exact procedural rules applied by this regional court (e. g. what evidence it accepts). In Diana Chang's opinion, a regional court could create the conditions of a unified system which could get rid of the contradictions of different domestic laws, including the difficulties that come from the lack of a generally accepted piracy definition. Thus, they do not have to rely on whether every counry in the region has an appropriate piracy definiton or punish this crime in its penal code. Furhthermore, she believes that the framework of the coordination has already been created in every country of the region.[31]

States along the Gulf of Aden indeed signed an agreement which could be a fine basic to establish a court like that: the Djibouti Code of Conduct which was passed in 2009 and has 20 contracting parties. The coordination stated in the Code includes the investigation of piracy and armed robbery against ships and the arrest and charge of the suspects. The state parties also ensure that their penal codes would punish these crimes and that they would excercise their jurisdiction during the criminal procedure.[32] This indeed a good starting-point and a leading example for other regions.

Here, we have to mention Somalia again because it is a good example for the international community's activity. The UN Secretary General presented a report to the Security Council about the accountability of Somali pirates in May 2010 which contained several possible solutions – all of which would have been realized with the help of the UN. In this article I will only present a few of these. One suggested the establishment of a Somali court which would have its seat in another country of the region. This could create the conditions for the operation of the court that are not possible in Somalia because of its failed state status. The court would excercise Somali jurisdiction on the territory of an other state. The problem with this proposal is that it would be hard to find a state which has the will and capability to receive a foreign court. Also, the Somali anti-piracy laws and judicature system give reasons for concern, thus it might not worth the energy and fundings to establish this court.

Another suggestion would be the establishment of a special divison of court in the jurisdiction of a state in the region. The judges would be selected by the UN. For that, it would be necessary to change the domestic law of the home country because divisional adjudication is unknown in the region. The report also suggests the establishment of an international court in two different ways. The first would be the establishment of a court based on an agreement between the UN and the region's countries. The majority of the judges would be selected by the UN but the international pattern would be beneficial for the home country. The second option suggests that the UN Security Council should establish an international court acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. All of the judges, prosecutors and staff members would be selected by the UN, in fact it might not be seated in the region. The advantage of this court is that UN members have to oblige the Security Council's resolutions. But both of the options have the same disadvantage: they are money- and time-consuming and the problem of accountability needs a solution as soon as possible.[33]

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[31] Chang 2010. 285–286.

[32] *Djibouti Code of Conduct.*

[33] Varga 2011b. 40–42.

[34] Kamal-Deen 2015. 108–109.

Although this report has referred specifically to Somalia, generally we can state that the regions endangered by piracy do not have a proper legal system supplemented by judiciary, thus they cannot provide the accountability of the perpetrators on an expected level. Even though the Western African states' justice systems are on a higher level than the Somali one, only Liberia and Togo have an up-to-date anti-piracy law. The lack of proper laws comes from the fact that the states along the Gulf of Guinea do not have the necessary starting-point. For example Cameroon, Angola and Gabon are not state parties of the above-mentioned SUA Convention, Cote d'Ivore and Nigeria have not implemented it to their domestic law.[34] The situation is slightly better in Southeast-Asia because several pirates have been charged in the past few years. But Indonesia and Malaysia, which are two of the most endangered countries, are also not parties of the Convention,[35] and without that it is hard to provide the neceassary legal framework.

In my opinion, it is not the right way to spend serious amount of money on establishing new courts, whether they will be regional or international. This would be really time-consuming and the seriousness of the situation requires actions as soon as possible. I believe that the best solution would be to involve of an already existing court – the International Criminal Court (ICC). According the Statute of Rome, the ICC has jurisdiction over 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole', namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and agression.

I think that piracy causes so much trouble for the international community that it really have think think about expanding the jurisdiction of ICC. It causes grave damage to global economy, in a not so extreme situation, it can cause a natural disaster (e. g. an attacked tanker damages and its cargo flows into the sea) and endangers human lives, as well. Furthermore, pirates often commit crimes which are on the list of conducts of crimes againts humanity (e. g. homicide and torture).[36] In my opinion, these arguments show us the necessarity of reconsidering the jurisdiction of ICC. Also, under Article 121 of the Statute, an amendment can be submitted at any time by any state, thus negotiations could be started easily.

Article 17 declares that every state has to investigate and prosecute international crimes and the ICC only steps in if the state, which has jurisdiction over the case, is unwilling or unable to conduct the procedure. This complementary role means that the Court does not have to trial every case. Another argument in favor of the ICC is that its regionality could be achieved because Article 3 of the Statute states that it 'may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, as provided in this Statute'. This way it would not be necessary to establish *ad hoc* tribunals like ICTY or ICTR.[37] On one hand the costs of moving the required personnel would be really high, but on the other hand the costs of transporting witnesses and other evidence would decrease. Despite all these, it is unnecesary to move the Court or one of its chambers because some extra fundings could cover the extra costs mentioned above.

There are also several jurisdictional issues to discuss. Article 12 of the Statute declares that the ICC can only excercise its jurisdiction (along with the fact that a State Party is unwilling or unable to do so) when the crime was committed on a State Party's territory or by a national of a State Party. But how can the ICC obtain its jurisdiction, for example, over an Indonesian pirate in Malaysian territorial waters when non of these two states are State Parties of the Rome Statute?

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[35] *International Maritime Organisation. Status.*

[36] Dutton 2010. 233–234.

[37] Dutton 2010. 233.

There is no perfect solution for this problem, but any proposal that could increase the number of piracy cases would be welcomed. The first probable solution would be to consider the flag state of the attacked ship. If it is a State Party, the Court could excercise its jurisdiction over the perpetrators. Another solution would be the application of the principle of passive personality jurisdiction. If the victim is a national of a State Party, this state could refer this situation to the ICC (which is allowed by Article 14). Finally, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could also refer a situation to the ICC to excercise its jurisdiction. This way the Court can investigate and prosecute crimes that were not committed by a State Party's national or within the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. However, the referral like this would be problematic in relation to piratical acts committed on territorial waters (e. g. the Malacca Strait or South China Sea) because the littoral states of these waters are not parties to the Statute and they might see this Security Council resolution as a restriction of their jurisdiction. Also, it is certain that China would excercise its right to veto, thus the resolution would not be adopted.[38]

Conclusion

Maritime piracy is a serious threat to international peace and security. Pirates endager the lives of seafarers and the safety of the world's most important sea trade lines every day. Although, joint patrols and navy coorporation could suppress the attacks in Somalia and the Malacca Strait but that is not enough to deal this problem. The states interested in the fight against piracy have to make sure that a real restraining force is in their hands, which is criminal accountability.

We do not know yet how the international community will deal with the criminal accountability of pirates. But the situation requires a solution as soon as possible and pirates have to face trials where they can be sentenced. This would mean the real solution because the coordinated navy patrols cannot hold pirates back forever. A proper international legal framework is also not provided for the accountability, just for their capture. The best solution would be the including piracy within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is useless to fund the creation of a new court, because the ICC can deal with piracy cases, if the necessary resources are provided.

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[38] O'Brien (2014) 100–101.

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Cooperation in conflict

Investigating the patterns and outcomes of coalitions in the field of organized violence



Abstract

Social embeddedness may ensure a facilitating context for cooperation and the opportunity of individual actors to harmonize their interests. In a corresponding social setting coalitions can be formed that have the potential to support goal-attainment. By outlining a brief theoretical frame we intend to apply the concept of social embeddedness and cooperation in the rather specific field of international conflicts. We introduce two case studies investigating the structure of the global coalition of the war on terrorism, and the long-term trends of terrorist attacks and the international cooperation network of terrorist organizations. Based on the results of the case studies we seek to shed some light empirically on the patterns and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building.

Keywords

social embeddedness, cooperation, coalitions, war on terrorism, terrorist attacks

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1. Research topic and conceptual remarks

In his economic sociological program Mark Granovetter (2006) introduced a concept to efficiently understand economic action, outcomes and institutions. The approach of *embeddedness* investigates economic issues from a network perspective: individual actions tend to be integrated into wider social relations. The outcomes and success of economic action depend not only on the characteristics of the actual relationship between the actors (*relational* aspect of embeddedness), but the overall patterns of the participants' network play an important role. This latter; *structural* aspect of embeddedness highlights the diverse social composition of individual goal attainment (Granovetter 2006. 34–36.). The issue of the structural dimension of embeddeness had been widely raised in the frame of structural balance theory, and from an analytical perspective it has been explicated by Szántó (2008) as a specific instance of a three-agent configuration of the prisoner's dilemma. In this argument there can be distinguished four stable and four imbalanced socio-matrices (Szántó 2008. 326–328.) which reflect the problem of cooperation in a social context when there can be one actor who – by the decision to join one of the others – might disrupt balance between the two others and this cooperative act might lead to the emergence of a coalition. After two agents linked together and formed a *coalition,* they have a majority in the *triad* against the third actor and an asymmetric relationship emerges in which the two joining ones might have better perspectives in the process of goal-attainment.

This particular cooperation form and the problem of coalition is the central topic of this paper which attempts to empirically investigate the pattern and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building with case studies in the specific field of international conflicts.

The nature of violent conflicts and the features of warfare seem to be remarkably changed in the beginning of the new millennium. Various disciplines of the social sciences interpret these changes under the paradigm of new wars (Kestnbaum 2009. 240–241., Malešević 2008. 98–100.). In accordance with the cross-border tendencies of the new millennium – integrating the world into an inter-connected system (Rostoványi 2002. 72.) in a major extent due to the information logistics and replacement system covering more than one continent (Józsa 2002. 100.) – conflicts; security and terrorism also took a new form (Haskó 2002: 14–15.). A global space (Kiss 2002. 39.) and global threats (Rostoványi 2002. 77.) emerged, in which the challenge caused by the cross-border terrorist networks became more remarkable (Kiss 2002. 40–42.). That is, in accordance with the global changes, wars after the end of the 20th century differ from the earlier ones in several dimensions. A wider social scientific approach argues that the new warfare can be represented by two different – but fundamentally related – types of wars. The form of (1) *parasitic/predatory war* is based on the ruins of states that have been fallen behind in the fierce process of global economic liberalization due to their lack of abilities to keep up with their competitors. In these failed states then privatization of violence – among others – appears. In the process of global economic liberalization (2) *technologically advanced western form of warfare* is employed to facilitate to gain new markets worldwide and sanction or force potential adversaries of the global course. This latter form of war is linked generally to the developments of the military system and the technology applied: the dominance of air power, increase of precision, the possibility to carry

out operations from a distance and so lessening the risk of experiencing remarkable casualties (Malešević 2008. 100.).[1]

The concepts of asymmetric warfare, fourth generation war, gray zone conflicts and new terrorism can be regarded – at least partially – as responses to these processes in the discipline of military science. *Asymmetric warfare* refers to the changes and innovation in war by distinguishing particular dimensions of asymmetry in the field of the power and the cost of the threats and the time factor, but most of all asymmetry in the methods and objectives (Resperger 2015. 14–15.) is particularly important from the perspective of this paper. The adversary in an asymmetric conflict seeks to apply *new methods* to attack and/or resist. It is also noteworthy that the participants in this new form of war are primarily not states (Somkuti 2015. 50.) as the nation-state has lost its monopoly of violence (Kiss 2015. 71.).

In the concept of *fourth generation war* decentralisation as one of the distinctive features is emphasized, and the role of initiative – inherited from third generation war – becomes even more significant. The emergence of non-state opponents and the lost monopoly on war are key points in this case as well. Furthermore, a return of the role of culture in the sphere of conflicts must also be mentioned (Lind 2004). A remarkable 'innovation' (Schumpeter 1980.) can be observed in the organisational dimension of confrontation: beside decentralisation, a *self-organizing network structure* appears and the processes indicate that networks tend to be less and less concentrated and dense (Kiss 2015. 71.). It proves to be a commonly accepted assumption that international terrorism is one of the most visible forms of fourth generation war (Somkuti 2015. 60.) and the connectedness of asymmetric warfare and terrorism is also acknowledged (Resperger 2015: 14.).

The issue that the state has lost its monopoly of violence broadens the spectrum of international encounters. The concepts of *gray zone* or *hybrid* conflicts (Oskarsson 2017; Brands 2016) refer to the cases when a rather complex compilation of methods, tactics and strategic thinking is present in an actual situation. This unique way of war proves to be an essential part of the approach followed by the USA – represented by the unconventional warfare methods applied by special operations forces (Votel et. al. 2016; Brands 2016. 3.; Freier et. al. 2016; Oskarsson 2017. 16.) –, although the most active state and non-state gray zone actors are considered to be Russia, China, Iran, North Korea; the Islamic State and Boko Haram (Brands 2016. 2., Oskarsson 2017. 5–6., Votel et. al. 2016. 102., Freier et. al. 2016. 33–40., 41–55.). Since the international order as it exists today is advantageous for the United States and the Western world, contemporary gray zone activities fundamentally aim to modify or rather to oppose this status quo (Brands 2016. 2., 6., Oskarsson 2017. 6.). Besides the traditional hard power (Hlatky 2016), further unconventional tactics and methods play a significant role – e.g. cyberattacks, information warfare, propaganda, political warfare, economic coercion, the use of proxy fighters, misinformation, deception – forming a challenge that is political and military at the same time and relies heavily on the social effects (Brands 2016. 2., 6., Oskarsson 2017. 6–7., Votel et. al. 2016. 102., Hlatky 2016. 1.).

[1] In the sense of technological supremacy of the methods applied the *global war on terrorism* could be seen as a proper example of a globalizing or technologically advanced western form of war. Considering, however, the thorough critical review of the new wars paradigm it might be more appropriate to say that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – included in the global war on terrorism – were much less globalizing ones; ideology and geopolitics could have played an essential role (Malešević 2008. 103–110.).

Scholars of terrorism also argue that certain noteworthy changes could be observed in the market of terrorism (TÁLAS 2006. 8.). One of the concepts interpreting these developments introduces the notion of *new terrorism,* distinguishing it from the former (old) type (NEUMANN 2009). This new pattern of terrorism is regarded as a more diffuse, de-territorialized one, and involves transnational networks. Its further characteristics are that the motivation is based on religion, attacks tend to be more violent, and mass-casualty aggression becomes more frequent. Although some also argue that it might be more proper to distinguish between the *network approach* and the organizational aspect while studying the further progressions in the field of terrorism (TUCKER 2008).

2. CASE STUDIES

2.1 The global coalition of the war on terrorism

The international coalition against terrorism – initiated at the end of 2001 – can be considered a rather multifaceted one – at least if we examine the participants involved: the overall number of belligerents is 181.132 countries from all regions of the world fought or fight against 49 terrorist organizations, insurgent groups and even pirates in several international missions. Eleven international missions and operations are[2] analysed, from 2001. 10. 07. (the starting date of the Afghanistan operations) to the Operation Inherent Resolve.

We investigate the cooperation network of the states based on their participation in the missions and operations. It needs to be stated that the network we could draw from this research does not necessarily reflects the actual importance of the states in direct combat activities.[3] It could rather be interpreted as a nominal or *symbolic* partnership among nation states to overcome the global threat of terrorism. The structure of the cooperation network proves to be rather complex, and notable differences can be observed among the participants (Graph 1). According to some quantitative indicators the United States of America plays the most important and central role in the cooperation, that is, the highest level of involvement can be measured in the case of the initiator. The mean value of degree centrality – the number of ties or links towards other countries in the cooperation network – is 96,4 coupled with a standard deviation of 54,8. Considering the distribution – in the light of the value range defined by the mean and the twofold ± standard deviation statistics – further countries can be identified as ones highly embedded in the network structure (e.g. Australia, United Kingdom, Spain).[4]

As for the characteristics of the top members of both the collaborating countries and the enemies it can be assumed that the first ten percent – the first 13 of 132 countries and the first five of the 49 enemies (Graph 2) – of the participants cover approximately one-fifth of the overall links.

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[2] NATO-ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P), Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge, Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan, support for the Northern Alliance, Multi-National Force – Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

[3] It is particularly true if we consider that the objectives of some of the missions and operations included in the analysis were solely training (e.g. Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge), capacity building (e.g. Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa) or access to physical infrastructure (e.g. airbase; Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan).

[4] These measures are calculated for the sub-graph of the participating countries, the data of the enemies' is not taken into account.



Graph 1 *Cooperation network of 132 countries against 49 enemies in the global war on terrorism. Legend: white circle = countries; grey square = enemies (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*



Graph 2 *The sub-graph of the top countries and top enemies. Legend: white circle = countries; grey square = enemies (Source: Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*

The top countries participating in the global coalition – besides the USA including ones from Western Europe, Africa and even Eastern Europe – possess 17,2 percent of the relations, while the most remarkable enemies – dominated by the two greatest ones; Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – acquire exactly 20 percent of the ties (Table 1).

#	Top countries	% of ties	Top enemies	% of ties
1	United States of America	1,8	Al-Qaeda	5,1
2	Mali	1,5	ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)	5,0
3	Somalia	1,4	Boko Haram	3,7
4	Spain	1,4	Abu Sayyaf	3,2
5	United Kingdom	1,4	Aal-Nusra Front	3,0
6	Morocco	1,3		
7	Tunisia	1,3		
8	France	1,2		
9	Germany	1,2		
10	Australia	1,2		
11	Georgia	1,2		
12	New Zealand	1,2		
13	Ukraine	1,2		
Sum		**17,2**	**Sum**	**20,0**

Table 1 *Share of the top countries and top enemies from the links (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*

Considering the structure of the differences among the participating countries in the global war on terrorism, macro-level organizational integration seems to be a clear factor as both in the case of European Union member states and the NATO member countries significantly higher level of involvement can be measured: compared to the mean value (96,4) the average degree centrality indicator of the EU member states is remarkably higher (147,1), and the NATO countries show an even greater level of participation with an average value of 162,3 relations (Table 2).

It is also a clear empirical pattern that the status of the participating country in the globalized world order is roughly proportional to its position in the coalition against global terrorism. Investigating the Global Connectedness Index[5] a moderate positive correlation (R = 0,53) can be observed indicating the tendency that the higher the rate of globalization, the higher the involvement in the global cooperation against terrorism is of the countries participating (Figure 1).

[5] Mean values for the time period between 2005–2015 for that data is available. Source: own calculation based on the data of Ghemawat. P – Altman, S.A. *"DHL Global Connectedness Index 2016"* Deutsche Post DHL, November 2016., http://www.dhl.com/en/about_us/logistics_insights/studies_research/global_connectedness_index/global_connectedness_index.html#.VFff5MkpXuM

A similar positive relationship – although a much lower correlation coefficient (R = 0,22) – can be measured in the case of the global firepower of the countries (Figure 2). The general pattern shows that the higher the level of military potential[6] of the country, the higher its degree centrality in the network proves to be. However the rather low correlation value expresses that there

	Degree centrality (number of relations)
Not EU member states	83,4
EU member states	147,1
Not NATO member states	78,7
NATO member states	162,3
Mean	96,4

Table 2 *Higher involvement of EU and NATO states in the global war on terrorism (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*



Figure 1 *Involvement in coalition of the war on terror and global connectedness (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*

[6] In order to make the general positive correlation recognizable between global fire power and the involvement level in the cooperation network against global terrorism I transformed the initial fire power index values which originally indicate higher military potential with lower – closer to zero – fire power index. I calculated the inverse values of global fire power (GFP) according to this function: $GFP_{inverse} = (GFP)^{-1}$.

is a remarkably less intense connection which might be – at least partially – explained by the apparent outliers at the lower value range of the horizontal axis. That is, these countries are characterized by approximately the highest level of global fire power coupled with degree centrality values belonging to the lowest value range.[7]

We might conclude from this brief empirical overview of the global war on terrorism that a great number of countries from all over the globe allied in a complex coalition against a smaller group of various enemies. Both the leading participating countries and the top enemies could be identified, and further interesting tendencies could be explored: a higher level of involvement in the international cooperation network can be observed in the case of EU and NATO member states, the more globalized countries, furthermore the states possessing armies with more significant fire power.

However, the more important question from the perspective of this paper is the outcome or success of the cooperation. That is, whether this rather monumental global coalition managed to overcome – or even eliminate – the threat of international terrorism. In our second case study we wish to empirically shed some light on this latter problem.



Figure 2 *Involvement in the coalition of the war on terror and global firepower (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*

[7] Russia and China can be identified as the two outliers which implies that two of the main gray zone actors of the world (see Brands 2016: 2., Oskarsson 2017: 5–6., Votel et. al. 2016: 102., Freier et. al. 2016: 33–40., 41–55.) are integrated – at least in a certain level and with a specific kind of *'friend and foe'* pattern – into the USA-led coalition against global terrorism.

[8] In order to make the different trends more apparent we calculated the three-year moving average values from the raw frequency data and visualized it on the time-series figure.

2.2 Global network of international terrorism

Based on the long-term time-series of the terrorist attacks there could be revealed three different trends (Figure 3):[8] the period ranging from the beginning date of the database (1970) until 1989 can be characterized by relatively small but increasing number of terrorist actions. After the fall of the bipolar world structure and before the announcement of the global war on terrorism – that is, in the period between 1990 and 2001 – the number of terrorist attacks seem to be decreasing. Whilst in the present phase a remarkable growth of the terrorist attacks can be observed, specifically after the first decade of the new millennia.

It is also indicative for the disproportional distribution of the terrorist attacks that in the first period almost one-third (28,9 percent) of the total number of actions can be found, in the second period less than one-fourth (22,9 percent), while in the third period starting after the emergence of the global war on terrorism, nearly half of all the terrorist attacks (48,3 percent) is contained.

That is, according to this simple temporal distribution of the number of terrorist incidents it could not be stated that after the international coalition to fight global terrorism was formed, the presence of the threat had been mitigated. Actually, the opposite can be observed: since the announcement of the global war on terrorism, the number of terrorist attacks seems to continue to increase.

Nevertheless the period of the war on terror proves to bring further developments in the field of international terrorism – the one we intend to highlight in the second part of this case study is the emergence and diffusion of *cooperative terrorist attacks.*

In the light of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) the share of the attacks carried out collaboratively by at least two terrorist groups is 0,7 percent of the total in the period investigated:



Figure 3 *Number terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2014 (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)*

930 cases can be identified as cooperative attacks. The temporal dynamics and regional differences of the diffusion process is worth to be given a brief description. As for the dynamics of the evolution process, only approximately one-tenth (11,1 percent) of the 930 cooperative terrorist actions occurred before 1990. Furthermore, by the end of the century they still comprise only less than one-fourth (23,4 percent) of the total. So it seems that – considering the temporal process – *cooperation as the part of the tactics of the terrorist organizations becomes truly notable in the new millennium.* Cooperative terrorist attack proves to be an innovation from the North American region as the first terrorist case of this kind in the database for the period can be found in this area (Figure 4). However the regional distribution of these cooperative actions shows that it is not the North American region where this particular kind of terrorism proves to be dominant. It might be rather stated that the rate of the cooperative terrorist attacks prove to be the highest in the South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions. The two regions – with nearly equal numbers of cooperative terrorist attacks – account for nearly three-fifths (58,6 percent) of all such attacks. In the regions of South America and the Sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of the cooperative form of terrorism is also relatively higher (13,8 percent and 10,0 percent, respectively) compared to the areas of Southeast Asia, North America and Western Europe, where the share of cooperative threats is at around 5 percent, while in the rest of the world the presence of the collaborative manner among the terrorist groups seem to be insignificant.



FIGURE 4 *Regional diffusion of cooperative terrorist attacks (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)*

Considering the separate diffusion processes in the various areas, there seems to be an approximately steady growth in the South America region where the number of cooperative attacks exceeds 120 by the end of the period, although it might be more remarkable that the most rapid pace of growth can be observed in the South Asia, Middle East and North Africa regions.[9] That is, the cooperative form of terrorist attacks seems to flourish mostly in the areas where the operations of the war on terrorism were executed.[10]

The significance of the terrorist actors from the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions also appears in the global terrorist network as both in number (Table 3) and in relative importance (several of) the terrorist groups of the area seem to have an outstanding role (Graph 3).

Region	Frequency	(%)
North America	18	4,1
Central America and Caribbean	14	3,2
South America	29	6,7
Southeast Asia	17	3,9
South Asia	126	29,0
Central Asia	4	0,9
Western Europe	48	11,0
Eastern Europe	10	2,3
Middle East and North Africa	112	25,7
Sub-Saharan Africa	55	12,6
Australasia and Oceania	2	0,5
Total	435	100,0

Table 3 *Regional distribution of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)*

[9] It is also notable that these extremely intense growth processes in these regions seem to emerge in a specific accordance with the diffusion process in the North America region. Namely, since the late 1990s or the early years of 21st century there has been no further increase in the number of cooperative terrorist attacks in North America, and approximately the same time – the cooperative form of terrorism has emerged and begun to quickly spread in the South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa regions. So, the latter regions seem to show a *delayed, but intensively growing adaptation,* resulting in a terrorist practice characterised by a remarkable portion of this organizational innovation of violence originated in the North American area.

[10] Furthermore considering the diffusion processes in the South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions it is also important that by the end of the period investigated in this analysis the curves representing the cumulative number of terrorist attacks carried out in a collaborative manner do not seem to lose their steepness; the diffusion processes do not prove to reach a saturation level. That is, it cannot be expected – considering the processes explored from the time series data – that this intensive progress would slow down, i.e. a further increase and importance of cooperative terrorist attacks might follow in the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions.

[11] The network includes a total number of 435 terrorist groups and organizations that could be clearly identified and recognized as relevant. That is, the name of the organization is known, recognizable and relevant (the cases in the database nominated as 'other' or 'individual' were excluded from the analysis) furthermore the regional affiliation of the group can also be ascertained (both the lack of information and the indefinite affiliation information in the database was treated as missing case).

Terrorist organizations from the regions of Australasia–Oceania and Central Asia prove to be the least involved in cooperative terrorist actions as only a tiny number and very low rate can be measured in these areas.[11] In the case of Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and the regions of the American continent (Central America and the Caribbean, North America, South America) the share of the terrorist groups involved in actions carried out in a collaborative manner is also low, not reaching ten percent. The terrorist organisations in Western Europe and the Sub-Saharan Africa areas incorporate above ten percent (11,0 percent and 12,6 percent, respectively) of the cooperative terrorist groups, and more than the half of the organizations (54,7 percent) carrying out terrorist attacks in cooperation belong to either the Middle East and North Africa region (25,7 percent) or the South Asia area (29,0 percent).



Graph 3 *Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD network data)*

One of the structural characteristics – beside the composition regarding regional affiliation of the groups – of the network built among certain terrorist organisations through cooperative attacks is a kind of fragmentation: the interacting groups of Australasia and Oceania are completely isolated from the other actors of the network, and an analogous situation can be observed in the case of the groups and relations of the Eastern Europe region (Graph 4). The central area of the American continent (Central America and Caribbean region) and the North America region prove to be similar to the former Eastern Europe area in the sense that these consist of also basically few and less significant organisations, however it should be noted that in these regions *bridging ties* (Granovetter 1991) connecting organisations from other regions can already be observed.



GRAPH 4 *Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (regional clusters) (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD network data)*

The most remarkable regions in the global network of cooperative terrorist actors are inevitably those of the South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa as these two areas supplemented – as densely linked – with the groups of the Sub-Saharan Africa and Central- and Southeast Asia regions. Aside from the regional differences of the composition, frequency and relative importance of the particular elements of the terrorist network arisen from the cooperative actions, another structural characteristic is a global integration. As there can be observed, several ties which connect organisations from different areas of the world resulting one single interregional, globally embedded terrorist network.

It has been shown, that – essentially after the beginning of the war on terrorism – by the middle of the 2010's through the diffusion of cooperation among terrorist groups a *globally linked and integrated network of terrorist groups has evolved.* This consequence can be regarded as a brand new threat, particularly if we investigate the benefits of cooperative terrorist attacks.

As the results of data analysis suggest, cooperation provides a noticeable advantage for the organisations involved. The success rate of the terrorist attacks is higher in the case of the actions carried out with a partner (multiple, cooperative attack) compared to those implemented by a single organisation alone (single attack). Considering the latter type of attacks, 90,9 percent of the terrorist actions appear to be successful (Table 4), while in the case of the multiple (cooperative) ones the share of success is 93,9 percent – a relatively small but statistically significant difference.

	Share of remarkable material damage (%)	Success rate (%)	N. of killed (average p.)	N. of wounded (average p.)
Single attack	2,6	90,9	2,29	3,02
Multiple (cooperative) attack	8,2	93,9	6,39	10,25

Table 4 *Benefits of cooperative terrorist actions (Source: calculations by the author, based on GTD)*

However cooperation not only raises the success rate itself, but also proves to increase both the physical/infrastructural and the social/human destructive potential of the successful attacks. In the case of the multiple (cooperative) terrorist events a higher rate of remarkable material damage can be measured in contrast to the single attacks (8,2 percent vs. 2,6 percent respectively). Considering the human dimension, cooperative terrorist actions are characterised by more casualties. In the attacks carried out by a single organisation on average 2,29 persons get killed,[12] while in the case of the cooperative terrorist actions the average number of persons killed is 6,39; significantly higher. The same pattern, but an even greater difference can be measured in the number of wounded persons: in a single terrorist attack approximately 3 persons become wounded on average, and cooperation increases the number of wounded innocent victims to 10,25 persons on average. That is, as a general tendency it can be said that cooperation – to mention only the most important outcomes – nearly triple the average number of persons killed in the terrorist actions and increases more than three times the average number of wounded persons and the share of significant infrastructural damage.

Considering the main outcomes of the case study it can be argued that after the launch of the global war on terrorism the number of terrorist attacks have not decreased – actually it has risen, furthermore by the middle of the first decade of the new millennia the overall network of the cooperative terrorist attacks encompasses the whole globe linking the different regions and this embeddedness proves to be beneficial also on micro-level for the violent organisations as the collaborative forms of terrorist threats are characterised by higher success rate and superior destructive capacity.

3. Closing remarks

In this paper we introduced the results of two case studies investigating the patterns and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building in the rather specific field of organized conflicts. The outcomes of the research imply that a reasonably complex structure has evolved through the participation of several countries in the global coalition of the war on terror to fight some of the most violent terrorist organizations and other types of adversaries. We described the composition and the differences of both the cooperating countries and the pursued violent organizations, furthermore outlined some connections between the integration level of the countries in the coalition and their position in the global sphere. However, studying the long-term time-series of terrorist actions there could

[12] The number of terrorist killed in the attack – if relevant – is excluded from the analysis.

be explored different tendencies of this specific form of international violence and in the recent period a noteworthy growth could be measured. Furthermore it could also be confirmed in the second case study that in the field of terrorist cooperation a global network has also emerged, characterized by participants and attacks with more remarkable destructive potential. So considering the impact of the global coalition, it could be stated that the war on terrorism could not succeed to abolish, not even to mitigate or reduce the global threat of terrorism. That is, it might be argued that the coalition of the war on terrorism had been counterproductive, resulted in counter-final consequence.

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Growth coalitions and the control of public space

Abstract

Public spaces are contested spaces; various groups compete for their control and to (re)present themselves there to the public. The political and economic changes and global competition transformed the mechanisms of production of spaces in post-socialist countries. New interests and new actors emerged in urban development with strong influence on the processes. They often form formal and informal alliances; growth coalitions to support their interests.

This study examines how growth coalitions are related to public spaces in Hungarian cities. These coalitions work differently then those in the US – usually, the state has a more significant role in the European growth coalitions. That is the case in Hungary as well; the state plays a significant role in the formation and operation of pro-growth regimes through legislation and national policies. Furthermore, the paper suggests that post-socialist social conditions are favourable to the emergence of growth coalitions mainly because of the weak civil sector. This means that the power relations between the actors of the local development are highly unbalanced. Global capital and local pro-growth actors are the most influential stakeholders in local policymaking. Local and state legislation and policies are not capable to compensate the ambitions of the investors – moreover, often they support them.

Keywords

growth coalitions, urban development, post-socialism, Hungary, neoliberalism

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Introduction

Public spaces are crucial elements of everyday life; not only they are the places of movement or leisure, but they are the spaces of social representation as well. Various social groups can (re)present themselves (their values, cultures, ideolgogies etc.) within public spaces. But these groups and their values are often conflicting: the presence of a group of people and their values, cultures considered as threat to other groups (Mitchell 2003, Belina 2007, Bodnár 2015).

After the changes of regimes, due to the strengthening of the market processes and the effects of the globalisation a rapid transformation has started in the post-socialist societies. The political and economic changes were accompanied by the influence of globalisation, which led to the emergence of the so called New Urban Policy (NUP). This process is characterized by the decreasing importance of the collective consumption and the growing entrepreneurial role of the local authorities (DeFilippis 1999). The reason beyond the spreading of the NUP is that the hypermobility of investments places local jobs and tax incomes at risk. Therefore, the localities have to compete against each other to attract investment and stimulate growth (Cox 1993, 1999). Some researchers see this as the end of local decision making, while others argue that this makes the local state a more important actor in the development process (DeFilippis 1999). The economic globalisation and the decreasing role of the national scale increased the chances of the local governments to define their development policies.

The post-social legacy and the process of globalisation created favourable environment to the informal alliances between various actors of urban development – this is a phenomenon which is called a "growth coalition" by Logan and Molotch (Molotch 1976, Logan – Molotch 1987). As a result, these coalitions often have a decisive role in post-socialist urban development and they dominate the public sphere and the social production of public space. The members and their role and importance in these coalitions are different than that of the Western cities – due to the different development path and political legacy.

The aim of this paper to present the role of growth coalitions in the regulation and control of public space. The paper is based on the analysis of legislative texts and the content analysis of local and national media.

1. Theoretical background

As I mentioned in the Introduction, public spaces have crucial role in society. They are arenas of social contacts and provide space for social represenatation (Mitchell 2003). Public spaces are also related to the symbolic economy (Zukin 1991), thus they can help to create value – which highlights their economic significance. As several papers have demonstrated (see for example Harvey 2005a, Jámbor – Vedrédi 2016, Udvarhelyi 2014), "real" public space is a utopia; public space is never neutral or accessible to everyone. Thus, the control and access of public spaces is a contested phenomenon. Commodification, policing, rehabilitation and renewal processes, zoning regulations all shape public spaces.

The paper uses the concept of the urban growth machines (Molotch 1976, Logan – Molotch 1987). This concept emphasises the role of the local policy – therefore differs the earlier neomarxist interpretations which were focusing mainly on the structural aspects

(Cochrane 1999, Orum – Chen 2003). This theory is related to the elite theories inspired by Mills (1972) who defines the elites as people who can make the most important decisions. Logan and Molotch interpret the intra-urban power relations in a more dynamic way than the neomarxists do; therefore, their theory connects to the latter conflict theory approaches. The concept of the growth machines emphasises the path dependent development and the importance of the local interests and past. In a sense, the concept of growth coalitions is a Gramscian approach, since it emphasises the significance of shared goals and values – presenting them as universal and indisputable (Harvey 2005b).

One of the basic statements in the concept is that local is a site from which change can started (Cox 1993, Ward 1996). Furthermore, according to Giddens (1979) the "locale" plays a part in the construction of the agency and the structure as well. Because of its flexibility the concept of growth machines is often used – especially in the USA – to interpret the urban conflicts (Domhoff 2006). However, some of the critics state that this theory only fits to the American cities and is not suitable for the analysis of European urban development. Other critics such as Cox (1993) or Cochrane (1999) point out that the New Urban Policy oversimplifies the effects of globalisation and it concentrates mainly on the local scale and neglects the importance of the other scales – therefore falls to a "local trap" (Cox 1993, 1999, Purcell 2005).

Logan and Molotch (1987) interpret the city as a "growth machine" which is a place for the capitalist accumulation and it is heavily influenced by the national and international economic processes. The certain places in the city are commodities with use and exchange values, too (in fact every place can be commodity, but conflicts related to the use and exchange values only evolve in certain cases). The collective consumption (Castells 1983, DeFilippis 1999) of the people living in the same neighbourhood creates collective interest between individuals; their aim is to keep or to increase that location's use value. This makes them important actors in the decisions regarding to the neighbourhood. But there are other actors with different purposes which can lead to conflicts over land use. In some cases, these conflicts can create anti-growth coalitions (Cochrane 1999) or try to influence development through community benefits agreements (Cain 2014). The neighbourhoods with great exchange value and with less powerful residents or weak social ties are the most vulnerable because they can be "sacrificed" to the growth goals (Logan – Molotch 1987).

The aims of growth coalitions can be different due to local processes, opportunities, social and economic conditions. Stone (1993) claims that four types of urban regimes are possible in the United States: maintenance, developmental, middle-class and, and lower-class opportunity expansion. But the fourth one is mainly a hypothetical (because of the lacking resources in the lower classes) and the middle-class regimes are rare as well. There are specific factors to form these types of growth regimes. The middle-class regimes seek neighbourhood and environmental protection and amenities. For example, middle-class coalitions can be formed in small or middle-sized cities or university towns. In these cities environmentalists of leftists can be "injected" among city leaders. Maintenance regimes are basically failing growth machines because they carry out routine functions and are not headed to growth in any sense. The developmental regimes are formed in large metropolitan areas and need a large amount of resources to their activities (Stone 1993, 2006, Domhoff 2006).

The city is a growth machine to the elites: they accumulate the profit. The interest of profitability bonds them together no matter if their other interests are conflicting: they form a growth coalition. To make their own consensus into general one they try to discredit the other development purposes: *"...they unite behind a doctrine of value free development"* (Logan – Molotch 1987: 32.) In other words: they try to monopolise the public interest, thus create and control the Gramscian "common sense". The pluralism of the opinions and purposes is often an illusion: case studies showed that everyone agrees that the growth is good – at best they believed in different ways to achieve that.

The local authorities tend to emphasise the use value in their development policy – but it is mainly rhetoric: their decisions and development policies concentrate on the exchange value of the places; therefore, they serve the interests of the investors (Logan – Molotch 1987).

In addition to the politicians and investors, the local media can be an important actor in the growth coalition as well. The media is interested in the growth of the city and its economy because it increases the market. The local media is often owned or controlled by the local authority or investors and follows (and promotes) the owners' interests. The newspapers, local radio stations and television channels can create a territorial bond, a sense of community which is a prominent feature of the growth politics according to Molotch (1976). Additionally, the local cultural institutions, labour unions, great sport or cultural events can contribute to the growth machine. These actors play an increasing role in the urban governance; therefore, their co-operation is crucial (Raco 2003). This fragmentation can be favourable to the investors because it weakens the local decisionmaking.

The members of the pro-growth coalition usually emphasise the benefits of their activity, but the empirical evidence shows that the situation is not that simple: there can be negative externalities on the labour market, the city's budget or the environmental processes.

The growth machine theory (and the related urban regime theories) became popular in the urban research because the globalisation and the crisis of the western welfare state raise questions about the collective consumption in cities. The concept offers an opportunity to fit the local actors into analyses and at the same time it considers the broader structural factors as well. Although there are significant differences between different countries regarding their urban development processes, the urban deal making process described in NUP can be seen in different localities (Cochrane 1999). The "Europeanised" version of the theory sometimes moves further from the original statements, for example in regards the role of the state (e.g. Bassett – Harloe 1990, Cox – Mair 1991, Therhorst – Van De Ven 1995). Taking into consideration the previous researches, it seems that by using a more flexible approach (e.g. putting more emphasis on the role of national scale) the concept of growth machine can be a useful tool to interpret the European urban development processes – for example the transformation of public spaces.

According to this, I also made some alterations to the original theory. The concept of growth machines applies to the urban property market and the land use but I argue that it narrows down the analysis. Therefore, in this paper I use concept of the social production of space (Lefebvre 1991). If we accept that assumption that the production of space is determined by the power relations than the concept of growth machines can be used to analyse this process.

Under the term "production of space" I mean the Lefebvrian concept that space is a social construct determined by various values, meanings and interpretations. It is *"...a precondition and a result of social superstructures"* (Lefebvre 1991. 85.) Space influences the individual's everyday life and the way that he/she interprets the world. Therefore, space has ideological function.

Lefebvre in his "conceptual triad" defines the spatial practice, the representations of space and the representational spaces (in other words the perceived, the conceived, and the lived space) which are interrelated to each other. The changes in producing one of these spaces have effect on the others as well.

The social production of the urban space is fundamental to the social reproduction and to the existence of capitalism. Therefore, capitalism constantly reproduces itself: every regime has an own way of producing space to create a legitimating basis. The change of regimes in the former socialist countries obviously changed the practices related to the production of the spaces. Therefore, the production of the spaces of everyday life also occurs under specific conditions. Because of the growth and the scale of the changes it is important to analyse the process and the role of different actors in it.

To understand how growth coalitions can form and work in Hungary we must review some elements of the country's political culture and the role of different actors in the Hungarian society which can influence the urban policy. On global scale the most important processes are the globalisation and the flows of capital, therefore the most important actors are the transnational corporations. Following the relative isolation from the world economy during the socialist era, Hungary tried to re-integrate into the global economy as soon as possible after 1989. The global competition between localities appeared in the county and became more and more intense. Of course, the global consumption preferences influenced the society. Because of the growing competition and the economic downfall, the localities had to move towards the more efficient management and they used the neo-liberal agenda to achieve this. Hungary, which is a relatively small economy became one of the most open economies in the region. This led to a quick inflow of investments. The modernization and the economic growth became processes which should be managed by external actors. Therefore, the sudden and intense effect of the globalisation made the New Urban Policy maybe more important than in other countries.

In national scale the specific history and political culture both are significant factors. As other countries in the region, in Hungary there is a different relation between the state and the society than those in Western Europe. It means that there is a deep belief that the development should be conducted from "above" (Berend T. 2003, Kulcsár – Domokos 2005). In Hungary even the change of regime was a process managed by the political elites. Although two rival elite groups formed in the political sphere, in a lot of cases their conflict is rhetorical or just about the ways of the growth. But both followed a pro-growth, neo-liberal policy.

The weakness of the civil society and the atomised social networks are important to the urban processes as well. These factors derive from the socialist power structure (Kovách 2002); in the "actually existed socialism" the labour was not separated from the power therefore their conflict remained hidden. The individuals could only represent their interest in an informal way which led to an atomised model of goal attainment. This model rejected the possibility of the explicit and collective representation of interests but guaranteed a limited autonomy to the stakeholders. The members of the society were not concerned to create a model for representing the common interests (Ferge 2002, Szalai 2004).

The rate of the high central redistribution rate is often mentioned as a proof that the state does not follow a neo-liberal agenda. But as Harvey (2005b) presents, neoliberalism can have

different forms – with different role of the state. The high redistribution rate serves as the legitimating basis of the neoliberal policy. The post-socialist political elites are interested in the centralized financing because it helps to keep their power and they can access to the state-owned resources (Kovách 2002, Szalai 2006, Bozóki 2003).

After the change of regime, modernisation, raise the quality of life and the Western-like consumer society all became widely recognized goals in the society. These goals became interrelated and also became central issues in the political discourse (Kulcsár – Domokos 2005). This situation created an excellent opportunity to the elites to control and shape social process using the consumer demands. By raising and controlling these demands the elites dominate the economic sphere; the goals and the ways to achieve them as well.

The local processes are similar to those of the national level: the members of the former nomenclature also transformed their power in localities (Kulcsár – Domokos 2005), although the proportion of the newcomers is higher, and the local elites are often more diverse than the national ones. The most important element of the changes was the transformation of the local government, i.e. the establishment of the local authorities. The new authorities had their own properties and the right (in fact it is an obligation) to manage their own finances. At the same time, the state tried to limit the local autonomy by making the authorities financially dependent on the central subsidies – this is especially true to the processes after 2010, due to the centralisation policies of the national government. The situation seems to be similar to the state socialist era: there is an increasing competition for the redistribution of the resources. This process was accompanied with a growing deficit of the local authorities – therefore, they were forced to turn to the idea of the entrepreneurial local government.

The commodification of space and place was the most obvious on local level in the post-socialist countries. The rapid shift *"from minimal to maximal investment"* (Smith 1996. 173.) changed the land use in urban areas; the former homogenous zones disappeared and a more fragmented urban landscape evolved (Kovács 1999, Kovács – Enyedi 2006). The transformation of the city centres and historical districts are amongst the most intense changes – especially in the most populous cities (Sykora 1994 Bućek 2006, Murzin 2006).

Real estate investors also became important actors in the shaping of the urban landscape. They influenced the transformation of the inner-city districts (e.g. gentrification) (Smith 1996, Timár – Nagy 2007, Czirfusz et al. 2015) and the suburbanisation (Timár 2001). Their activities caused conflicts related to the built environment, urban heritage, etc.

In local level the civil activities, NGOs are weak – just like in national level. The local elites adopted the same strategies as the national ones: they tried to influence – moreover to control – the urban social movements. They had the opportunity to do this because these movements are dependent from the financial support from the state or local authority. Therefore, those who are supported do not have the autonomy to freely oppose the local government's decisions. As a result, the local communities are weak in their self representation and even the solidarity movements, the institutional or spontaneous social actions are sporadic in the society. This is a result of the atomised society mentioned at national level.

The main actors of the urban development tried to utilise the common goals (modernization, raising the quality of life and the Western-like consumer society) presented earlier and tried to merge

with their own goals. The political and economic actors identified themselves as the only ones who can achieve those widely recognised goals. The local media played a significant role in the process promoting the growth goals and their – real or supposed – benefits. The monopolized public interest serves as a legitimating tool for the growth coalitions (Crines 2013).

Due to the above-mentioned processes the economic (mainly the global) and political capital became the most important forces while the residents and civil movements are insignificant in the decision-making process. Therefore, civil society cannot control the elites, only a rival elite group could do this. The cultural elites could be competent, but their role decreased after the change of regime. The possibility of control remains to the economic elites and of course they emphasise the logic of the capitalist accumulation (Szirmai 1996, Ferge 2002, Kovách 2002, Szalai 2006). The interaction between the political and economic elites created a complicated system of dependence. This hierarchical power structure (with the political and economic elites on the top) determines the preferences of the development and social policies. With the political culture mentioned above (the development should be conducted from "above") and the financial centralization these factors create a paternalistic solidarity model which is a tool to preserve the actual power relations. The society accepts these relations and the pro-growth goals. Using Habermas' (1980) theoretical explanation it can be interpreted that the mechanisms maintaining the capitalist structures are working. These mechanisms charge the poorest and powerless with the expenses. The above introduced power relations determine the social production of space: it creates a regulation system in which the most important aspect is the profitability.

2. Contextual background: the Hungarian growth machines

An earlier research (Kulcsár – Domokos 2005) analysed the Hungarian growth machines using the "classic" approach of the growth coalitions. Kulcsár and Domokos introduced the local elites' role in two cities ("Fur City" and "White City" as they call them): how they influence the creation of the Western-like urban landscape and the external investments. As I have mentioned earlier it is worth to analyse the growth machines in the context of the spaces of everyday life – i.e. urban public spaces.

As I mentioned earlier, the change of regime started various new processes and introduced new actors in the urban development. The rapid reshaping of the urban landscape heavily influenced the historical quarters of the cities. These areas have a specific ideological meaning in Europe as they are part of the local and national identity. Because of this, the regeneration was a key issue for the society (Kovács – Enyedi 2006). In the 1990s the production of representative urban spaces was characterised by aestheticisation and theintent to create spectacular environments for consumption. To create collective bonding the municipalities and investors often used the existing tradition or created traditions. The latter means that they created artificial landscapes using external (even global) samples, often ignoring local traditions – thus creating homogenous spaces without real local character (Boros 2018).

Although local authorities and investors usually claimed that their developments were value free, there was a clear ideology behind that process; and it was consumerism. Therefore,

the process was accompanied by the production of the spaces of consumption: the city centres became valuable commodities as they became important centres of the consumption. The production of these spaces was characterised by urban rehabilitation, spectacular festivals and the growing importance of the urban design. Because of the low level of their resources the local governments drew investors into the projects. The neo-liberal urban policy influenced every city's decision-making (Boros – Hegedűs – Pál 2007, Hegedűs 2007).

The increasing role of the real estate developers resulted that in some cases the new developments privatised public space or damaged the built environment, the architectural heritage – especially in the case of the gated communities (Hegedűs 2007). During the production of the spaces of everyday life the local elites introduced regulations with relevance to the "appropriate" behaviour in public space (e.g. smoking, begging, sleeping on the streets etc.). The localities also tried to influence the use of space in indirect ways for example installing street furniture that is not suitable to sleep on it.

3. The growth machines and the production of public space

Neo-liberal policies are often "tested" at the peripheries as some kinds of pilot programmes. With the experiences from peripheral countries, regions and towns, the policies can be refined and spread over the more central areas (Harvey 2005b).

National legislation had a crucial role in the formation of conditions to growth coalitions – they created possibilities to control and regulate public space. In 2010 with the amendments of the Act on Built Environment [1] and the Act on Spatial Development and Planning [2] it became a misdemeanour to use the streets and squares 'improperly' – i.e. begging and sleeping there. The amendment of the Act on Misdemeanours [3] in 2012 provided possibility for municipalities to introduce statutory provisions against homeless people and beggars. In 2012 the Hungarian government made possible for local governments through the fourth amendment of Fundamental Law (the Hungarian Constitution) to forbid living in the streets, underpasses and other public spaces [4]. The aim of these regulations was to create safe, aesthetic urban spaces with the removal of disturbing behaviour.

4. Experiments at the periphery

The spatial exclusion is one of the most radical actions of the neoliberal urban policy. The practice spatial exclusion in the name of "quality of life" programs is a popular agenda for many local authorities (Mitchell 2003). The first ones of these policies were tested in 2004 and 2005 Kaposvár (Jámbor – Vedrédi 2016) and Szeged. In this paper I present the case of Szeged; in spring 2005 the city council of Szeged adopted a regulation [5] that forbids begging in the city centre (Picture 1). Those who violate the decree can be fined up to 25 000 Forints. The aim of the decree was to displace from the marketable spaces those who can threaten the profitability. The different surveys show that most of the residents agreed with this decision (Boros – Tóth 2007).

Photo 1 *The renewed city centre in Szeged (Source: the author)*

According to the surveys, the residents supported mainly the pro-growth investments and the social investments are less important to them (Boros 2007). Based on the responses, it became obvious, that the residents think that helping the poorest is not their task. It should be made by the state, but they would not pay more tax to support this. Theoretically, they sympathise with the poor, but this is not manifested in their actions. The residential location and the previous bad experiences of the respondents had no significant effect on their attitude towards the beggars according to the chi square tests. No matter that which part of the city does the individual live or have they had nasty experience with the beggars.

All the surveys show that the respondents would support the "deserving poor" – those who behave properly and deserve the financial aid. This attitude can be interpreted as solidarity is conditional therefore it is a tool for the social control. The elites can use this to achieve their goals. The undeserving poor can be a scapegoat for the social conflicts or problems. It makes them a legitimating element for the system and the political elites (Gans 1992). As the part of the growth coalition the local media also supported the spatial exclusion and tried to manipulate the public opinion:

> *"At Széchenyi Square, Kárász Street, Klauzál, Dugonics and Mars Squares, outside and inside the churches mainly fake and hired beggars bother the residents and visitors of the city. Majority of the beggars is extremely aggressive, and they often use the streets or even the churches as a toilet."* [6]

The article indicates that the beggars are hired by someone and they try to make money for a so called "beggars mafia". (See the phrases "fake" and "hired".) According to the phone-based survey this opinion is quite popular among the respondents as well. The author of the article emphasises that the beggars do not respect neither the sacred places ("they often use [...] the churches as a toilet"). In another article other activities were classified as begging and harassment – which show the real intention of the decree and the growth coalition:

> *"You arrived just in time – said Klára Sándor, Member of Parliament to whom a Krishna follower wanted to sell one of his books – a lot of people think that begging is a right and easy way of living. It is impossible to judge whether someone is really needs help or is forced to beg by the »beggar mafia«. It is a difficult situation: on one side our social sensitivity comes into play on the other there is a decree that forbids begging. That should be respected."* [7]

The Krishna follower mentioned in this quote is clearly not a beggar; he/she is a member of a religion who tries to raise funds for religious and social activities. But this behaviour does not fit into the logic of consumption and to the aestheticised urban landscape. It represents problems which threat the consumption of the spectacular environment. Mentioning the visitors in the first quote suggests that the beggars jeopardise the tourism and the profit derived from it – consequently, they threat the economic development of the whole city. Furthermore, the beggars endanger one of the common goals; namely the raise of quality of life. Because of the representative function of the city centre most of the residents accepted or even felt necessary to displace the beggars and the homeless, too (Boros 2007). This policy intended to displace the people who represent the social problems and to banish them from the central areas – as one of the local policymakers admitted;

> *"...the regulation achieved its aim; Kárász street became as it should be: an asset for the town, wich should not be spoiled by begging. [...] the banned people respect the regulation by relocationg themselves by few hundred meters"* [8]

5. The growth coalition and public space in the centre

In Józsefváros (the 8th District of Budapest) similar processes took place. As many post-socialist inner-city areas, the District suffered from disinvestment in the decades of communism. Obviously, this affected the public spaces as well: the condition of local squares, parks and markets deteriorated. Because of its favourable location, Józsefváros became attractive to investments. Furthermore, extensive urban renewal processes have started using local, national and European funds. As a result, several urban rehabilitation programmes have been initiated by the local government and investors (Ladányi 2014,Szemző – Tosics 2005). These programmes aimed to enhance the quality of life of the locals and to attract young professionals, tourists, students and well-off foreigners (Czirfusz et al. 2015). The transformation, creation and maintenance of public spaces were important elements of these renewal programmes. One of the most important developments was the creation of Corvin Promenade (Picture 2), a market-led large-scale urban rehabilitation project with new apartment buildings, a shopping mall and new public spaces. This project was the latest and most significant modification to the previously evolved street structure. The Downtown of Europe Programme aimed to upgrade the inner parts of the district in the Palota Quarter, to reposition the area in tourism [9, 10]. The physical form of new public spaces was aestheticised, with street furniture not suitable for sleeping or staying too long on them (see photo 2).

With the physical transformation of public spaces new practices spatial regulations were also introduced on city and district level. The aim was to keep public spaces secure and to protect

PHOTO 2 *The Corvin Promenade (Source: the author)*

the spaces of consumption. A regulation in 1999 has banned consumption of alcohol in public space – except for certain occasions and events. Furthermore, bars, pubs and restaurants are also exceptions – they are the profit-oriented quasi-public spaces. The regulation was confirmed in 2012 [11]. The consecutive versions of the Integrated Urban Development Strategies (2008, 2012, 2015) of Józsefváros all aimed to create safe and clean public spaces, to handle the problems related to begging and homelessness, to create quality places for leisure and to expand the green areas [9, 10, 11]. But, the most often used tool the manage public spaces was regulation – for example the closure of Kék Pont to push out drug users from the District.

PHOTO 3 *Regulations at a renewed public space in Józsefváros (Source: the author)*

New regulations were also extablished to protect the renovated playgrounds and parks; these defined the time periods of use as well as the appropriate behaviour (e.g. no eating in playgrounds, no sleeping or alcohol consumption in parks etc.) in these places (Photo 3). The renewed parks and playground are often fenced to keep away the unwanted users. In some cases, security guards were also hired to enforce the regulations. The local government of Józsefváros also banned eating the food waste from the trash cans in 2010 because 'it is unhealthy and dangerous' [9]. The local government also initiated a referendum in 2011 on begging and homelessness, trying to enforce the previously accepted anti-poor regulations. However, the referendum became unsuccessful, since the voter turnout did not exceed the validity limit – but most of the voters supported the regulation. Many of the local newspapers and webpages [e.g. 11] supported the action against beggars. But at the end, Constitunional Court decided that the regulation is against the Constitution thus it was withdrawn. However, other national and local regulations on the control of public space remained in force.

The most important actors in these processes were the local government and real estate developers. They formed an effective coalition to transform the degraded neighbourhoods, creating new public spaces or upgrading existing ones – and protecting them through local legislation. According to an interview-based research (Boros et al. 2016), the entrepreneurs evaluate the regulations positively.

Conclusions

The key actors in the processes in the above-mentioned cases are the central government, local authority, the residents, entrepreneurs and local media. Among them, the central government and local authority seem to be the decisive actors, who served the capital interests related to the urban space. With the adopted regulations the economic actors (real estate developers, other entrepreneurs – e.g. in hospitality sector, etc.) could enforce their interests. The residents played a more active role in the second case study than in the first one: however, they did not take any actions, but majority supported the regulations and the market-led transformation of urban space. The local media represented and promoted the pro-growth attitude. The formal or informal social movements – according to the national trends – were missing in both cases.

As mentioned in the paper, the characteristics of the post-socialist society helps the forming and functioning of the growth coalitions. The weakness of the national and urban social movements causes that an important counterbalancing actor is missing from the society. The predominance of the external actors (state, TNCs) results that the residents have a legitimating role only – without an active role. But this does not cause a conflict because the society accepts this situation. The maintenance of the power relations is the interest of both the political and economic actors. Their task is to solve the problems but in exchange they have a very efficient tool for social control. Therefore, the power and market structures are strongly interrelated in the local communities and determine the social production of space.

The growth machines in Szeged or in the Józsefváros are developmental one by Stone's (1993) classification – just like the other Hungarian growth coalitions as well. These are extremely stable; therefore, there is a little chance to convert them to a lower-class opportunity or middle-class progressive one. The dominant neo-liberal agenda emphasises the role of competitiveness, financial efficiency and profitability and fights against the factors which can be threatening to these aims

(Brenner – Theodore 2002, Peck – Tickell 2002) As Logan and Molotch describe in their explanation of growth coalitions; the most vulnerable members of the society are excluded to achieve the growth goals.

The activities of the Hungarian urban growth machines incorporate the residents more than in Western Europe or the United States. Therefore, the growth coalitions have a very strong legitimation basis. It can be interpreted as an evidence to Habermas' (1980) theory; the powerless, marginalised and poorest suffer the most the effects of crises because their interest could be sacrificed in the sake of growth. It is an important national characteristic that these urban growth machines are heavily influenced by external actors: not only the investors but the state as well. As Cochrane (1999) claims, urban policy in the 21st century will be a growth policy. The analyses regarding the growth coalitions can put the post-socialist urban governance and the relation of public and private in new light. Furthermore, the concept of growth coalitions can help to understand better the transformation of public spaces.

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The Mental Map of a Rural (workers') Housing Estate in Hungary

An Urban Anthropology Research

Abstract

The results from two stages of a research project will be compared in this study. The research was conducted at a housing estate which used to belong to a characteristic element of the Borsod industrial region, the metallurgy in Diósgyőr. 20 years ago, when the research was done, it was also a methodological experiment. The goal of the research was to map and understand the complex lifestyle of the inhabitants of the colony mostly in the context of historical anthropology. Mental mapping was one of the research methods. Today, the research applies mental mapping as a central method and intends to reveal the social changes over time based on the information gathered in the previous research. The architectural environment and permanent spatial system of the housing estate makes it a suitable research site for fine tuning mental maps and drawing more detailed ones. The present research aims to contribute to this by including the time factor.

Keywords

rural workers, space usage, mental map, social hierarchy, masculine and feminine space, public and private space.

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Social science publications more and more often report about research projects where the researchers work with mental maps. This tendency will slowly make it possible for us to create more coherent methodological suggestions and discover the use of mental maps in a variety of new situations through the accumulated experience and examples. The present research report intends to contribute to the above.

A workers' colony of a country town in Hungary provides the location for the research. The surveyed urban space can be considered a typical one for the reason that it reflects the economic and social problems which have characteristically followed the closure of heavy industry plants all over Europe: (permanent) unemployment; the lack of rehabilitation of brownfield sites and the need for it; the "slumization" of city districts; internal tension developing in these communities and their generally negative reputation. In the same time the urban space in focus is unique in the sense that the physical environment (the dwellings, the overall spatial structure, the location of old outbuildings, the streets, city squares) of the 150-year-old Diósgyőr-vasgyár workers' colony has not changed due to the lack of rehabilitation. These features make the place suitable for conducting a longitudinal research by the means of a simple method: getting mental maps drawn.

The model colony built for the metallurgy workers of the Diósgyőr Ironworks differs from the building of other workers' dwellings in the country from many aspects. One of these aspects is that it was an empty, marshy plot where the construction of the factory started, far from Miskolc and Diósgyőr, then two separate communities. This aspect made the unique construction solutions possible; the architects were not constrained by existing spatial features when planning. The second important aspect is that the constructions were publicly financed, which on one hand played an important role in the identity of the generations who worked here and on the other hand it meant a more stable workplace for them compared to the market dependent private sector since it was centrally directed and financed accordingly. The third aspect is its rural location which made a difference in terms of the contrast between the capital and the rural cities and its distance from Budapest (200 kilometres). These three unique factors together created a non-typical workers' colony in Diósgyőr. As a result of the constructions, which took a start in 1868, a housing estate for 9000 people were built within 30 years that followed.

As there was no previous settlement on the site, the Colony[1] was designed to be self- sustainable. For this the designers had to create a complex, fully functioning city plan which would encourage workers to be loyal to the factory, also listed as a strategic centre, to satisfy their needs and to make them settle for long-term here. The consequences of this idea can still be spotted in the colony today.

The residence and public buildings were constructed at a very high quality compared to the standards of the era. A sewer system was built, the streets were lit by electric lights and they started to equip the district with a great variety of functions from the very first years i.e. schools, shops, a steam-bath, a hospital, a slaughterhouse, a community bakery, a post office, a pharmacy, a restaurant, community spaces and a church were all built in the years to come. The houses were designed according to the different job positions. Certain types of houses were built in each street, so people who were on the same level in the company hierarchy lived in the same street. (Olajos 1998. 39–50.).

[1] The housing estate had various names: "Gyári telep", "Telep", "Gyarmat", the name "kolónia" was only used after 1945. The first building plans used the expression "Gyarmat" (Colony). The map of the Colony: A Diósgyőri magy. kir. vas- és aczélgyár története 1910.

The visual elements of the built environment also reflected the different ranks in the factory. Only the workers were allowed to live in the colony, there were no privately-owned estates, the factory had all the houses in its possession and the residents could only live there until they were employees of the ironworks. Documents prove that the control mechanism of the factory also had a great influence on the local system of norms in the Colony. If a person infringed the rules at his workplace or in the Colony with his misbehaviour (fighting, drunkenness, stealing, going on strike) he was soon expelled from the community with his family. If they kept themselves to the rules, the factory provided them with a good living. There were worker families of many nationalities and languages. Everybody was foreigner when they first arrived there, workers form the surrounding villages only started moving in later. The first classes in the primary school had no children who spoke Hungarian. By 1910 the inhabitants of the Colony all defined themselves as Hungarian. A discharge document from 1890 tells us (Dobák 2012. 233.) that the workers are registered as Hungarian–Austrian and of foreign nationality. Skilled workers were mostly Hungarian but furnaces which required special knowledge were mainly operated by German speaking experts. People from the Colony would rarely pay a visit to the neighbouring settlements: Diósgyőr or Miskolc and if someone would arrive there from Miskolc, the local paper never missed the opportunity to write about the news.[2] This professional endogamy and the relatively closed local community of the second and third generation of workers could not be disjoint even by the great wars either. It was only the 1950s when the process of becoming a community was halted (R. Nagy 2012. 45.). The stimulated population growth of the factory and the simultaneous wrecking of the labour aristocracy caused conflicts even within the families. In the meanwhile, Miskolc grew around the Colony,[3] hence it became less isolated and formed more and more connections with its environment. The first economic restructuring in the history of the factory brought changes in the work routines and in the company hierarchy too but the spatial structure of the Colony could not follow these for obvious reasons. The simple but firm framework, which was previously considered to be a stable one, collapsed. The second economic restructuring was another important turning point in the life of the local society. This was a critical situation too and it was made worse by the fact that the factory and the Colony parted due to the privatization of the workers' houses, so the housing estate was not related to the factory or the iron industry anymore. The workers' houses in the Colony had not been changed to that point, apart from filling the empty plots among them, the houses and the spatial structure of the Colony remained untouched.

In the first phase of the research project (1998) this process was still visible and the interviews made with the old, true-born inhabitants of the Colony helped us map the personal and collective memories too (cf. Dobák 2007.). The second phase of the research project (2017) makes the evaluation of this process possible. Applying mental maps in the research of the spatial representation of social hierarchy and its changes over time is a very effective method. The Vasgyár Colony of Diósgyőr can serve as an excellent location for a research like this since, unlike other factors, the spatial structures have been preserved here in their original state, which can give us a firm reference point in the comparative study.

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[2] *Borsod Miskolczi Értesitő.* Local and other news 25th January 1882: "Since the new ironworks in Diósgyőr has electric streetlights installed, it has become frequented by visitors from outside. We had a chance to pay a visit there in the company of the Mayor and the chief engineer of our city last week and we can say, we were truly amazed..."

[3] When the "Big-Miskolc" concept was realized in 1950, Diósgyőr became the part of the administrative unit.

The comparison was also assisted by Kevin Lynch's "elements of the city image" (Lynch 1960. 99–105.):

– paths,

– edges,

– nodes,

– districts,

– landmarks.

I used the five space defining data types both during info-gathering and in the comparative evaluation. The maps were drawn by the informants individually, however the evaluation was made from the aspect of the entire local community in respect, i.e. the mental map of the local community is what I address in this study. What might the level of this abstraction be? Where is the border between the mental map of the researcher and that of the local community? These are legitimate questions to ask.

First Research Phase

The first difficulty in the methodology was encountered when it came to have the hand-drawn maps prepared by the informants among the factory workers of Vasgyár. I started the research with a blank sheet in 1998 also in the very practical sense that I placed a blank A4 size sheet of paper and a bunch of coloured pencils, ballpoint pens and drawing pencils. The order in which the different colours or drawing tools were used by the informants or how the maps were drawn were not in the focus of the research, hence the process of drawing was not recorded by any means. Most of the drawings were made with a blue ink pen, colours were only occasionally used. I analysed maps drawn by 25 informants. Most of the families I contacted were inactive; the majority of them were retire and only a few were unemployed at that time. Only three of the families had members with a job and this proportion reflects the rate of active inhabitants in the entire Colony.

The analysis of the Vasgyár Colony was easier in this phase of the research for several reasons: there were still many elderly people living in the Colony who had been the members of the community for most of their lives, their active working years were related to the nearby ironworks or to one of the surrounding factories, so their way of life was determined by the Colony in general. They were happy to speak in detailed accounts about the history of the Colony and proved to provide fairly exact information about it as it turned out, when later the information from the interviews was compared to that of other documents. The informants were very motivated and enthusiastic to talk and mainly due to their being retired, they had enough free time to allocate for the researchers.

There is very little found about the process and circumstances of the map drawing sessions in the literature. Most of the studies settle the question with that this method of data recording is a subjective one and drawing helps bridging cultural differences (Letenyei 2006. 164.). Based on the field experience I can say that the willingness of the informants to draw the maps may depend largely upon their sociocultural background, their education and the forms of communication they practice every day. The inhabitants of the Colony, now and in the past, have mostly done

manual work and has cultural roots in the iron industry or a related professional field. Apart from a few exceptions they needed a lot of encouragement and long convincing explanations before they would start drawing on the maps. The task of evaluating certain areas by grading them on a scale made things clearly easier. The informants were asked to evaluate the streets, areas, institutions they know and frequent on a 10-grade scale. They had no problem performing this task, they were more comfortable with it than with drawing the maps. After this grading task they were easier to start "filling up" the maps.

I asked my informants to tell me and show me the places which they like and use on a daily basis, but also which they usually avoid for some reason. The areas determined by the different informants mostly overlapped each other.[4] Because of this it was possible to localize 5 districts and some other passive areas.[5] My next question to them was to grade different areas of the Colony by sympathy on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the least appealing and 10 means the most appealing grade. Ten points could be given to places where they would like to move the most or where they like going the most to visit friends or relatives or just during a walk. Grade 5 meant places which are emotionally neutral areas.



Figure 1 *Districts on the mental map of the Vasgyár Colony of Diósgyőr (cf. Dobák 2007.)*

[4] I copied the maps drawn along the basic streets given as guidelines on transparencies and putting them over one another I located the most frequently marked areas. I identified these districts by simple numbers.

[5] The informants graded residential areas as it was suggested by the questions raised. Passive area: entrances of factories, shops, buildings of different institutions, the hospital (!) Asking about these areas later, it turned out that there are quite frequented places among them, but they mostly only pass through these areas by means of public transport or private vehicles or they only visit the institutions, shops located there, hence they are important for the function of the buildings in respect rather than because of the location of the area.

The Colony is situated among several fenced factory areas which are not open to the public. Its boundaries are permanent due to its geographical and built environment, hence it leaves little space for analysing symbolic meanings. The only exception is the Stream Szinva: *"The area over the Szinva has never been part of the Colony."* On the first plans the Colony only extended up to the southern banks of the Szinva. The factory was forced to start expanding its area to the other side of the stream in 1907. These newer houses they built on the opposite bank were of much weaker quality. The area of the Colony on the opposite banks of Szinva has never become integrated as a real part of it either from an architectural or a social aspect. The Stream Szinva is characteristically considered as a positive location. It also appears as a community space sometimes: *"We used to go bathing in the Szinva, it did not look like this at that time."* The water from the stream was used for the production too. As for the earliest plans it would provide sufficient water for metallurgy, so it had an industrial role and also served as a natural boundary for the Colony.

Ógyár Square, at the junction of the two *edges* (Vasgyári Road and Gózon Lajos Street) and another inner street (Kerpely A.) was getting outlined as a central node on the maps. This square with its significant size, besides being a traffic hub (a city bus and a tram lines and a big parking lot) has a great deal of symbolic relevance too. This is where we can find the first and ever since used entrance of the factory, there are several pubs and other commercial units here and the building of the old consumers' cooperation, "Konzum", which served as the single convenience store in the Colony for a long time. The experience of the crowded square at the time of shift changes[6] is closely attached to this place and was remembered as an ever-desired bright past by all the informants. Their emotional relation to certain spaces was generally stronger in case of memories from the past.

Accessing the Colony is possible by tram, by city bus, by walk and by car. Most of the informants who use the public transport system marked the tram stop of line 2 as hot spot. Mainly *paths* exiting the Colony were identified as roads for car traffic. Moving around in the Colony mostly happens on foot due to the relatively short distances. Moving directions both in and out were marked on the maps in the area of the Colony to the south from the Szinva. In the same time, the informants only marked the outbound routes from the "numbered streets".[7] None of the maps show passages between the two areas (there is a walking bridge, which connect the areas on the right and left banks of the Szinva).

The drawings on the maps define 5 separate *districts,* which more or less cover the housing area in the Colony. The districts were graded and this revealed that opinions about each of them show differences. The highest average grade, 6.24 was given to the central area of the Colony where the place of the Roman Catholic church was originally marked on the blank maps. This is also where first and oldest entrance of the metallurgy factory is. The lowest grade was given to the area of the "numbered streets" on the left banks of the Szinva, as the rows of houses which were later built for the Colony. This area mostly got points between 0 and 2, due to higher grades given by the few families living there, the average of the points was 2.32.

The best regarded areas host the old Chief Officers' semidetached houses and the Roman Catholic vicarage is also located here. *"This is the most distinguished area in the Colony, it is simply*

[6] At times of shift change several thousands of people gathered here.

[7] Numbered streets: First, Second, Third, [...] Fourteenth Street (These set of streets are only referred to as "numbered streets" because they never had proper names but numbers.)

good to look at those houses whenever you walk by them. The whole thing looks so noble. These had bigger gardens too and some of them had a maid's room in the basement.".[8] Retired skilled workers and ex-employees from the lower management lived in these houses at the time of the research. The mod con buildings and the gardens were well maintained, the characteristic red brick style of the houses was preserved. The apartments were bought by private owners and were made mod con at their own expense.

The worst regarded area marked was the district of the "numbered streets". As the informant said, *"Slovaks, Polish, Romanians lived here"* at the time when those houses were built. *"These people had only one set of clothes, they didn't even have a proper home to live in where they came from, they were happy to have one here. The people who live here now are also immigrants, only that these came from a nearby place, the Avas.*[9]*"*[10] The quality of the work performed by these people was the basis of how they were judged by the others. *"Well, these were the second class people, so to speak. They were put up in barrack like houses"*.[11] The barrack like dwellings, due to their condition, meant a comfortless life in one-room apartments on the fringes of the Colony. They were the ones on the bottom of the workers' hierarchy. *"Workers, foundrymen or forgers went home, ate, drank, made children and went to bed. Their job consumed them. Those in higher positions, had the motivation, they would go home, change and the family went to the choir group [...]"*[12]

The house in the "numbered streets" were rented to workers without children or to temporary workers, *"as it was good enough for them"*.[13] The negative qualities of "Hundredhouses"[14] stuck in the collective memory of the locals. The Colony with its closed structure used to have access to the city through the "numbered streets"; people of Miskolc tend to identify the whole Colony with this slum-like image and this causes discrepancies in the identity of the community.

The other low regarded area is smaller in its area, a district practically on the edge of the Colony is district 5.[15] The average of the points it received from the people I asked is 3.4. even if the district is populated by gypsy families it has not become a "gypsy slum", it has not gained ill fame and not as segregated as the previously mentioned "numbered streets". This district was not put in the category: *"I avoid it for some reason"* as opposed to the other district.

There are semidetached Officers' houses and pairs of workers' houses here. The district got 4.12 points in average despite it was often mentioned as a *"nice and clean area"*. When asking about the reason for the low grading the informants shared with me that unwanted visitors from the outskirts of the Colony often come here and disturb the people living here. They come to beg, to steal from the gardens. *"People live in fear here."*

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[8] 62-year old skilled worker – excerpt from the interview

[9] Avas: A housing estate built in Miskolc, in the 1970s with nearly 40,000 inhabitants. Families moved from the mod con blocks of flats to the negatively regarded areas of the Colony, they were satisfied with the lower standard accommodation for some money in return. This moral and physical unambitiousness is reflected in how the area is judged.

[10] 72-year old retired turner – excerpt from the interview

[11] 72-year old retired turner – excerpt from the interview

[12] 72-year old retired turner – excerpt from the interview

[13] 72-year old retired turner – excerpt from the interview

[14] "Százház" – "Hundredhouses": the alias was used in colloquial language because there were exactly 100 houses were built in the "numbered streets"

[15] The part of the Puskin and Kabar Streets closer to the Ládi – Colony, the Bolyai and Örös Streets

Only two informants marked the Vasgyár Cemetery as a frequented place by them. As it turned out during the interviews all the families involved in the research visit the tomb of a family member in the cemetery at some frequency. It has a very standard structural arrangement. There are some exposed tombs which have a distinguished position in the structure: the group of children's tombs and the so called "Officers' Lane", where the Engineers and important technical leaders of the factory rest.

"Konzum" (a convenience store today), "Szaletli", the by now demolished building of the riding-hall, the ice factory, "Szabadságkert", the swimming pool and the market are all preserved in the locals' memories.

It reveals a lot that the factory itself and the gates of the different plants were only marked by the retired ex-employees of the ironworks. 16 people thought it was important to mark these but nobody among the otherwise inactive informants did so. Not even those who have a view on the gates of DIGÉP[16] at the end of their street. The Colony is only valuable as a living place for these people. Those who used to work in the factory looked at it and the Colony as one organic unit as it was planned at the time when they built it.

The community was further pushed towards the edge of its collapse by the fact that public places and community programs were discontinued. There is a nursing home working in the old director's house but apart from that, there is no other community spaces in the Colony open for the public. There are 3 schools in the Colony (one primary school and two vocational schools), which are not running anymore. Only 4 informants marked them on the maps.

One of the most essential results of the first phase was to see how the relationship between the space and society was revealed by the maps. It was obviously due to the maps drawn that we could see this result, since they made a specific understanding of the social structure visible and because despite the players changed over the years, this image seems to persist in the community. The closest house to the main gate of the factory was the director's house. The lower one was in the company hierarchy the farther his house was from the factory gate. The hierarchy also determined the size and level of comfort of the houses. The best regarded districts were where the early leaders, engineers and foremen of the factory used to live. The population changed since and skilled workers moved in the place of the technical elite. The houses of the skilled workers were then occupied by workers of lower ranks and later by people who had no relation to the factory.

Second Research Phase

16 interviews and 16 maps were recorded between August and September 2017 in this phase of my research project. One of the criteria of choice was that the informant had to be living in the Colony for at least 5 years in a row. I only managed to talk again to one of the map drawing informants from the previous phase of the research. The youngest informant was 40 years old and the oldest was 93. There were two informants in the group who had been living for less than 30 years in the Colony, the rest of them had been living here since their birth. Two of the informants have no professional skills, one informant has finished studies in higher education, four of them

[16] Diósgyőr Machine Factory

attended a technical school. Two of the informants in the group identified themselves as gypsies.[17] The 16 maps were drawn during interviews out of which 4 interviews were more in-depth conversations conducted about the whole lifestyle of the interviewees in general. In the rest of the interviews the discussion was strictly about the use of the physical space, moving between the specified elements of the space and grading, evaluating the defined districts.

I strove to set the criteria of the analysis as much alike the previous ones as possible. For the sake of comparability, I gave the same blank maps, tasks and instructions to the informants as before. However, it was necessary to make minor corrections as some of the streets in the original map do not exist anymore and some houses are now replaced by various service providers. As it happened in the first phase (Dobák 2007.), the informants were asked to evaluate the streets, areas, institutions and community spaces they know and frequent on a 10-grade scale.

There was only one informant this time and during the first phase too who asked to keep the map for a few days to think more about it and spend more time with drawing it. These maps proved to be more detailed and colourful than the ones drawn instantly.

The drawing task was not easily accepted this time either, some of the difficulties at the time of the first try repeated themselves. The majority of the informants have eyesight problems as it is reflected in the drawings; even if they had their glasses on, they could not properly identify everything they saw on the white sheets. Compared to classic verbal interviews the different method appeared to cause some hindrance too.

Details about the financial situation of the informants or their consumer habits were not included in the interview concept. One can guess the interviewees' approximate financial situation by their clothes, their homes, their yards and gardens. Moreover, the tools and objects surrounding them may tell the researcher about the position of the informants in the wider local community. The everyday problems shared by the informants during the interviews (e.g. difficulties to pay for utilities) let us know that the amount of regular expenses does not allow those people to spend on luxury products, in this case, a pair of new glasses. Some of the informants objected the drawing task, among them those who were otherwise motivated by the interview and happy to talk. Therefore 4 of the 16 maps were manually drawn by the researcher by the instructions of the informants.[18] Including these 4 drawings in the research is explained by the fact that these elderly informants had been living in the Colony for over 70 years (since their childhood), hence had a long-term perspective on the life of the Colony. It is a rare opportunity to be able make an interview with informants like them, since the old population have mostly moved from here of have passed away.

The complete area of the Colony today is about 1.5 km^2. A few small nooks or skew street parts break the orderly grid of the parallel street structure. The streets appear very similar for the outside spectator; red-brick houses stand everywhere. Looking down the streets, the image may seem monotonous. The network of the streets and the basic characteristics of the houses did not change, but unique modifications, which change the unified picture of the street, are more and more frequent. the smaller houses are less and less convenient for today's modern way of life. Certain indoor modifications of the houses make outdoor modifications necessary too. One of these

[17] The question was not asked from them directly, the informants referred to themselves as gypsies during the interview. I did not ask the informants about their ethnic background or their religion.

[18] I tried to keep the drawing real by asking control questions and continuous directions.

is the elimination of the small, characteristic windows from the street front of the houses, or the utilisation of the attics by turning them into loft rooms, which makes the changes in the roof structure visible from the street too. But the original physical dimensions have neither changed since the beginning of the 20th century nor since the previous research phase in 2000.

The routes the map drawers usually take between their homes and some important destinations are the same every day. Only one of the informants said that he sometimes takes a walk among the houses of the colony without any specific destination. The rest of the interviewees only take certain routes for daily routine tasks. *"I don't usually walk much. I like to get on the tram here at the square* [Ógyár Square]. *But I don't like coming home at night, I don't feel safe. I had no incidents so far, but you can always see young rascals show off. Just the other day, I saw one of them swinging a baseball bat. I avoid that area when I can. There are some troublemaker families living around here, you'd better avoid those. There are more and more gypsies."*[19]

Vasgyári Road seems to have a privileged position, which was only marked by those who use a car. Vasgyári Road is the car traffic route that connects the Colony and Miskolc, this is the only road through which you can reach Andrássy Road going towards Diósgyőr. The second most often mentioned streets were Gózon Lajos Street and Alsószinva Street. The rest of the streets were only mentioned because the informants had their houses there. Like Vasgyári Road, Gózon Lajos Street also stretches on one of the boundaries of the Colony. This is the second of the two optional routes that takes one to Diósgyőr. Alsószinva Street provides access to the area with smaller, one-floor houses. The frequent mention of the three streets is not surprising; even if the grid of the streets is simple to comprehend, because of different obstacles (tramrails, fenced factory area, cemetery, hospital, the Stream Szinva) the access to the Colony by car is only possible through a few defined routes. There are only two traffic lights set up in the Colony (one at the railway crossing and a three colour traffic lights), both can be found on exit roads. Traffic is not busy within the Colony, there are only a few traffic signs too, even in some narrower streets only a couple of the junctions have a sign showing the direction of the traffic. People who live in the inner streets always keep an eye on any unknown car that enters their street and look at those who get out the cars with expectations. Every passer-by who rarely walk here, also get the attention of the locals. Attention of similar intensity is usually payed to strangers by the population of very small villages or closed communities only. Asking them about this element of attentiveness, some of the informants told me that no strangers can be seen in the inner streets, there are some regular visitors (postman, nurses, doctors, frequent relatives), who are known to everybody. In both the first and the second research phase it got highlighted that the routs get cut at the Stream Szinva. The stream divides the area of the Colony into two. The access on foot or by car to the Colony over the Szinva is either on the edge (Vasgyári Road) or through one of the hubs in the direction of the Catholic and Evangelic churches (Fürdő Street). There is a walking bridge over the stream (at the end of Kabar Street) and the tram has its own bridge, on which no other traffic is allowed. The bridges are about 100-200 metres away from each other, which makes the access to the other side of the stream easier. As opposed to all this, none of the maps has routes connecting the two parts marked.

[19] Interview excerpt, 40-year old woman, 2017.

The majority of the informants marked the Andrássy Road and the Stream Szinva (pre-drawn on the maps) as the *edges* of the Colony. There were no dominant inner boundaries drawn. Only when asking them about the different districts did any of the informants mentioned some inner boundaries which previously played a role in the grouping task. However, the informants did not define them as edges. When I asked them to draw the edges of the *districts* they previously graded, they drew them bigger than in the research phase in 2000. The "numbered streets" appeared as a block with a negative reputation. The problematic "numbered streets" (from First to Fourteenth Streets), which have always been regarded low are owned by MIK[20] and have never been sold, they are still belong to the property of the Municipality of Miskolc. Part of the houses there were demolished in 2014 which received great media attention.

Other negative areas, which are related to fear were marked around the old entrance of the factory (Ógyár Square). The "numbered streets" received 1 or 2 points from the informants there was only one person, who gave 7 points, so the average 2.25 points does not differ much from the earlier result (2.32 points).

One elderly lady expressed her happiness over the demolition of some of these houses. She marked this by crossing the area out and she told me, that she moved to the Colony in the 1970s and *"there were good people living in the numbered streets",* they even helped her with moving in. She used to stop to talk anyone from there, children would often visit each other, *"the stream did not mean no obstacle"*. His son had a little gypsy friend from there when he went to primary school, she said and she showed me the distance between the house of the friend and their house. In her opinion, the population of the "numbered streets" has changed over time and now she would be afraid to go there alone now.

Opinions of the informants about the new, monumental stadium being built right at the corner of the "numbered streets" and hence at that of the Colony are divided. Whoever marked this area on the map voluntarily had a positive opinion about it, one of the interviewees gave as much as 9 points to the stadium. There were two essentially negative opinions recorded: *"Whenever I walk past it [the stadium], the view almost makes me cry! Why is it so necessary to build here? Who on Earth will visit this at all?"*[21] And there was the narrative of the current political situation: *"This area has a bad reputation because of the parking lot and the stadium being built here. It has always been like that and will always be like that. In the place of the slum like numbered streets, an insane but petty and pitiful dictator is having his own memento built."*[22] The bigger part of the map drawers did not mark it on the map, neither did they comment on it despite that it was pre-drawn on the map. From the direction of the Colony the construction site of the stadium does not look so significant because the it is farther away from the residential area, but the question of the construction seems to be a real issue among the locals. As one of the informants said, *"The houses had to be demolished to make space for the parking lot for those who will come*

[20] MIK: Miskolci Ingatlan Kezelő Vállalat, now called Miskolc Holding Önkormányzati Vagyonkezelő Zrt (Miskolc Holding Municipality Asset Management Corporation), but it is still referred to as MIK in everyday use: e.g. rents owned by the Municipality of Miskolc are called "MIK-flats".

[21] Interview excerpt, 83-year old man, who drew a map in the first phase too

[22] 58-year old male teacher – interview excerpt

to see the games by car and buses and because they wanted to make those very low standard gypsy houses disappear".

The concept of fear was mentioned during the drawing of almost all maps. When asking them about certain neighbours or cases, the interviewees sounded more hesitating. The 83-year old, male informant praised his two next-door neighbours, describing a several-decade long good relationship and cooperativeness, he said: *"I've got hundred percent neighbours. No matter, they are gypsies, they are very nice, I wish everybody had neighbours like them [...] the other one too, he is also very nice to me. But there are some who are always fiddling at the corner there, smoking. I am afraid of those."*

Only steers or parts of streets were identified as groups on the fringes. The inside part of the Colony appeared as one large block. While in the previous research phase this area was marked to have 3 districts, now it appeared as one coherent spot in the middle of the map. Only in three cases did an informant refer to the old parts in some way or another. Even the informant who also drew a map earlier made one of two previous inner parts now as one. He talked about the system of districts in the Colony as in the previous interview, but he drew less districts this time. Nevertheless, the buildings or the spaces they are set in have not changed in a physical sense in those streets over the years. The drawings now showed three districts, two of which were intact areas and the third was the broken line of the districts on the outskirts of the Colony.

The cemetery was marked by six informants this time, more than in the previous research phase. The cemetery is not to be further extended, only old plots can be reused.

The ones I asked do not go out within the Colony. They only meet others in public spaces for the mere reason of meeting. As R.Nagy pointed it out in his study about a village workers' colony (R. Nagy 2002. 81–82.), the same defined space which was designed by German architects for other Germans (immigrants) to live in, worked as a sociopetal space and for the indigenous Hungarian peasant population as a sociofugal space. In case of the Vasgyári Colony the micro-cultural elements which have appeared as sociopetal forces in the defined space for long, from the aspect of the local community do not work for the new community anymore. The social content which used to fill these spaces have disappeared.

The informants I asked this time, rarely or only occasionally visit the local churches. Those who practise their religion go to other religious communities or churches outside the Colony even if the local churches of three different religion are active. Most of the information shared with me in relation to the church (4 mentions) was about the midnight mass of the Roma Catholic church, which is often visited by many locals even by some who do not generally practise their religion.

Some landmarks, the Catholic church, the cemetery and the Stream Szinva were pre-marked on the blank maps. The first research phase showed that analysing these is not necessary, premarking landmarks was to assist the method. The choice of the three landmarks was the result of a test before creating the map. There were no other reference points marked on the map apart from these. The informants added their present or former houses as further reference points.

Summary

Using mental maps in my research helped reveal new things while identifying the certain areas and characterizing them. Due to the local structure of space the paths, edges, nodes, landmarks did not produce any surprising results, however the grading of the different areas provided some further and deeper information which could not be revealed by the interviews or by studying the history of the local built environment. The interesting thing about grouping or grading was not the difference of the average results. The most surprising thing was that the informants made a connection between the building of the Colony, the grading of the houses and the position in the company hierarchy.

Besides the local structure of space and the social layers, some other important horizontal aspects were brought to the surface by the maps. A hot spot in the Colony turning into a slum identified as the "numbered streets" area, the gender aspects of space analysis in the Colony and the relationship between fear and space are all horizontal aspects, which appear in both phases of the research.

The role of the "numbered streets" proved to be important in both phases of the research. A two-step reorganization process took place in the time between the two research phases. In the first step the houses in the beginning of the "numbered streets" (First, Second, Third and Fourth Streets) were demolished. Buildings for service providers were pulled up at a quick pace in their place. In the second step of the reorganization the residential function of the area up to the Eighth Street has been terminated so far.[23] Erosion has started to speed up after this. Some of the buildings were taken apart by the locals, who took the reusable parts. There are several ruined houses can be seen there today. The problem was much more articulated and emphasized at the time of the second phase of the research, while in the first phase it was only mentioned as a side story.

The earlier discussed natural edge, the Stream Szinva also appears as a boundary in the social texture of the Colony and this is clearly reflected by the mental maps. During the fieldwork it was observable that the informants do use the bridges/passages, however they did not mark these on the maps as important routes. This was also against the fact that certain destinations can be easier accessed via the route through the "numbered streets". People living in the right banks of the Szinva marked the area on the left banks with an intact spot in both research phases without any subdivisions. No such subdivision appeared in the grading task, the reputation of these streets was generally bad in case of both data collection phases and they appear as a separate block on almost all the maps. The map-drawers who only put numbers on the blank maps marked this area with a single digit too and gave low points to the area in both phases.

Only negative opinions were articulated about the "numbered streets" in both research phases. This general image was somewhat altered by the informants living there, however they gave the lowest points to their own streets in the Colony too. This negative reputation reflected by the given grades and the explanatory comments in the second research phase too. Although, the *element of fear* was only attached to the district in the second phase. Most of the informants said, they choose to avoid the area, they never enter and never pass through the few streets that still exists.

[23] The Municipality of Miskolc demolished some houses in these streets in September 2014.

Nevertheless, even a feature of this area would support this, since there is a kindergarten situated in the "numbered streets" besides the dwellings. Even so, people seem to avoid it on purpose as they admit and even emphasize the fact. Many of them brought the problem up while drawing the maps even without asking them.

The strong masculine character of metallurgy was well represented in all phases of the research. The public spaces in the Colony also reflect this. From the gender aspect the use of space in the society, the public and private spaces in the Colony exhibit all the possible conditions of private-feminine and public-masculine roles.

The results of the research phase in 2000 showed the obvious masculine characteristic of the Colony. Media interviews, professional discourses were all about the problems, technical innovations of production and the supply sector, the masculinity of the workingman and his family. This local male dominance was unquestionably represented in the memoires from those times. *"Only men would work in the factory. Women would only perform support or administrative tasks."* The Colony was the home of the factoryworkers and their families. This obviously indicated that the Colony is built upon the idea of the workingman. The family, the woman was (only) a natural and requisite element to it. No matter if the respective informant was male or female the axiom of the characteristic male dominance in the Colony was rarely shaded in any interview.

The same can be observed in case of the analysis of street names. 17 out of the 39 street names have a reference to masculinity. 13 names of famous males (6 of them are related to the metallurgy in Diósgyőr) and 4 names with a masculine reference. Two streets wear a female name but none of them are related to Vasgyár (Irma Street, Jászai Mari Street). The other 20 street names are neutral (Fürdő, Sás, Sétány, Kórház [Bath, Sedge, Promenade, Hospital] etc.), 11 of them belong to the "numbered streets". Public sculptures or similar non-functional objects are rare here. The ones we can find are all related to industrial production which can be identified as a masculine concept of space forming. The drawings do not reflect this. The informants did not comment on the street names and did not form an opinion about them in any way. The older male informants tended to bring up the more famous names like Técsey or Kerpely during storytelling not in relation of the maps.

The space seems to be divided into two in the family photos too: men are often represented in a work environment, while women appear solely in family photos of the private scenes of life, they appear in the house or in the yard. Only propaganda[24] photos are an exception, which started to be more frequent in the 1950s, but the photos found in the families all reflect a characteristic division of public and private spaces where the first is dominated by the male and the second respectively by the female population. The gender aspect within the Colony can only be mentioned here, the extent of this article does not allow to discuss it in detail. The spaces being divided by the above-mentioned idea match the locals' approach to work, religion, the different roles in society and their view on the world. The questions of feminist geography, e.g. "Who had a word in choosing the common living place" within the family; "How was work shared between the sexes?" (Tímár 1993. 4.) are not relevant in this community. It is not because of the questions, the reason for this is that the answers are too obvious. Some memoires highlight that the traditional dominance

[24] A gyár közleményeiben, helyi sajtóban megjelenő képek.

pattern of male and female roles was unquestionably made the community more stable. Besides being a barrier, it also meant predictability and security. The community has never tolerated any deviation from the traditional system of male and female roles. It was mentioned several times that divorced women were soon excluded from the texture of the Colony. Only in case a woman was left alone due to a tragedy did she and her children deserve the protection of the Colony, unlike in any other case. In the interviews recorded in the first research phase it was often mentioned that women used to have their own public spaces in the Colony. They were mostly related to the household duties and the past (childhood memories of the informants) e.g. community bread making, courses organized for women, learning circles, the women's bath.

These elements did not appear in the second research phase, the gender roles were reduced to the opposition of the private and public spaces. As Staeheli and Mitchell define this: the public space is constructed through the discourse about the public sphere. (Staeheli – Mitchell 2009.) Duncan highlights the strong gender aspect in the division of public and private spaces. In his view, this dividedness makes it possible that "the relationship of oppression and dependence formed by gender inequality can be legally justified" (Duncan 1996. 128.). The public sphere is ideally formed around a payed job, production, action and heroism and is related to the masculine gender category. Because public spaces are the products of society through the discourse about the public sphere, it seems obvious, that they will bear masculine characteristics. (Molnár 2012. 32.) Because of the long history of this patriarchal aspect, similar to marginal farmers (once peasants) (Molnár 2004:172), this dividedness of the public and the private spheres between the sexes has only started to dissolve by the end of the 20th century (strict difference between masculine and feminine spaces).

Looking at the local structure of space, there can be no feminine space or space elements found. Because none of the aspects of life is purely masculine or purely feminine, a world where the division of sexes reach an extreme level it causes the distortion of reality and the distortion gets fixed by the built space. (Alexander 1977. 147.) The interviews lead us to think that spaces dominantly used by women are concentrated around the elements of the public transport system and smaller local convenience stores outside the private sphere, nowhere else. Female interviewees between the ages of 76 and 77 marked the paths and destinations related to shopping or other routine-like tasks and the relevant (public) transport routes on the maps. the majority of the men interviewed uses a car. This determines the paths they take and means the role of the leader at the same time. None of the interviewed women drives a car alone. They are either transported by relatives (a husband and in the other case a son) in a car or use public transport to leave the Colony. One of the older women takes a bus to move between her own and her son's house within the Colony.

The spaces which used to be considered as feminine spaces have disappeared or their feminine character is not dominant anymore. At the time of the first research phase the mentioned feminine spaces were marked on the mental maps e.g. the bath (3 mentions) or the community bread making (2 mentions) but they were considered to be part of the past, nobody talked about or drew such spaces existing in the present. By the second research phase there was no mention of these spaces at all. There had been no shops for women in the Colony. The interviewees said, that they went to Miskolc to get new dresses or photos taken. Spaces of beauty-care as a feminine thing have always been outside the Colony, so the informants had no chance to draw anything like this on the maps.

The Colony belonged to the families. Single men all lived in the outskirts, while single women only lived in one place, "Angyalvár" (The Angel Castle) as it was referred to in the colloquial language. "Angyalvár" is one of the oldest buildings in the Colony, which hosts a nursery home today. As for one of the map-drawers there were nuns living once. "Angyalvár" only appeared in the drawings during the first phase. They tended to appear on the drawings of those interviewees who talked about the history of the Colony like storytellers and sometimes went into details in relation to a story. The mystery of the building was encouraged by a few legends. One of the informants said to know why the name was stuck to the building. He said, that they used to perform the abortions of girls with unwanted pregnancy, they "made angles" here. Another informant originated the name from a couple of female teachers who once lived there. In the first research phase the building was mentioned four times, it appeared as a landmark and a reference point too. It was only mentioned spontaneously one time, in the other three cases the building was mentioned when I asked them about the values to be preserved and this is how it became part of their mental maps. In the second phase no informant marked the building, I could not find any trace of the legends either. It faded from the collective memory and was missed out of the maps too, although it is one of the most beautiful buildings in the colony with its ornamented red brick portal and carved hanging corridor, besides its significant volume. It has preserved its feminine space character. It has functioned as a police station and a music school for a short time, but it has mostly been used for functions related to the feminine side. Even if it was designed to be a public building, it had never been involved in production and its location is also somewhat peripheral.

The gender aspect also appears in how the reputation of the "numbered streets" is conceptualized. Three of the informants in the first research phase had the incentive to additionally mention that it was only single males who first moved in the houses of "Százház", today known as the "numbered streets". 76 of the 100 houses were built with one room and 24 of them with two rooms in 1909. The importance of this relies in the fact that the informants could not have personal memories about the issue, the image of single men moving into the houses of low comfort level was preserved in the collective memory of the families.

The division of space based on gender dominance has gone through an ethnic transformation. The streets of the Colony *"were took over by gypsies",* said one of the informants, involuntarily referring to the element of dominance which appears in an areal sense too. Until the company managed the houses there were no gypsies living in the Colony. The forced growth of the factory staff starting from the 1950s brought a great number of gypsy workers from the countryside who commuted to the factory for quite some years. The unskilled or "quick-trained" workforce was never excluded on ethnic base there was a gap between the true-born Vasgyár people and any other "intruder". The process was simultaneous with the wrecking of the labour aristocracy or making it weightless. Gypsies working in the factory were generally accepted at that time, there were no significant problems in the factory or in public events because of their gypsy origin.[25] Gypsy families started moving in the Colony in the 1980s which initially had no segregating or negative connotations. The locals used the opportunity brought by the privatisation of apartments to move to other parts of Miskolc in bigger and higher comfort level apartments, all with the hope

[25] Based on the interview with Drótos László, former CEO of LKM (Lenin Metallurgy Works)

of a better life.[26] The empty houses in the Colony were then occupied by gypsy families in an increasing number. As the result of the economic recession in the area and in the whole of Miskolc the lower educated, less mobile social group, so to speak, stuck in the Colony. Their presence has been visible, there were other social problems attached to the appearance of gypsies. The local media and every city leader since the regime changed in Hungary have tended to let things evolve or even helped things evolve to a point where the gypsy population can be accused of all the problems. *"This is now Little-Lyukó",* as one of the map drawing informants, a 43-year old man said about the part of the Colony referring to one of the biggest slums in Miskolc. *"There are only gypsies here", "it's either empty or a gypsy lives in it."* as another informant talked about the street they live in. An element of fear appeared in every interview and it was mentioned in relation to gypsies every time, despite the fact that crime rate shows no difference with that of in the entire city of Miskolc.[27] Koselka and Pain discuss the complexity of the relationship between certain places and the fear attached to them when they say that "fear of crime is the result of complex processes; these processes define our opinion about certain places by making us aware of the possibility of becoming a victim: fear of crime can define the meaning of a place and in the same way a place can affect the fear of crime". (Koskela – Pain 2000. 278.) (quoted in: Molnár 2012. 33.)

Researches working with mental maps rarely discuss the vertical characteristics of space. There is no obvious reference to the vertical dimensions of the space in the field documentation of the present research either. Only the church, the hospital and some industrial buildings are tall in the housing estate I chose to study. However, the volume of buildings is not significant in case of the tall ones either, they do not stand out from their environment e.g. the Evangelic church can hardly be noticed in the shade of the surrounding trees. There are no multi-storey houses among the buildings in the Colony, the houses characteristically have one or two floors. Taller buildings appeared as landmarks in the interviews and on the maps drawn. The most often mentioned buildings were: the Roman Catholic church, the hospital and the DAM office building. The latter one also has only three floors but it is built on a base structure with stairs, hence it looks tall from the street level. Environmental psychology researches have shown that the lower housing density, overseeable spaces, semi-public spaces, lower houses motivate community life and induce new social relationships. The architectural structure is considered as the physical expression of the social texture/network (Dúll 2010. 91.). Relevant parts of the interviews also support this idea. The method of mental maps needs additional support to be able to cover vertical dividedness as well.

The "numbered streets" district received extra emphasis at numerous points of the mental map recording and in every aspect of the analysis. It appears segregated in the structure of the physical space, but there are stories related to it, it has a certain reputation, it is identified as a slum, it is mentioned in relation to gender aspects and in ethnic questions. the general reputation of the "numbered streets" has not changed since the district was built. News in the media a hundred years ago was almost literally about the same problems, you can read and hear about today.

[26] Based on an interview recorded in the first phase with a 73-year old woman, who grew up in the Colony.

[27] The local family counsel has no info about any violence against people for years now. A few years ago, someone broke into a closed grocery store, but no other atrocities have happened since as far as she knows, and she meets many families in the Colony every day.

Low quality housing can only keep a social group who accept lower living standards, preserving the problems of the past by this.[28]

The general atmosphere of the interviews recorded in the first and the second phase is very different. In the time of the first research phase there was an air of hope and expectations in how the informants spoke and it was clearly due to the lingering possibility of a restarting industry. In the second phase this air of hope was switched to an air of resignation and disappearance.

The maps drawn and the comments added reveal the steps the area is taking towards becoming a slum. In the first research phase, only negative points given to it and it general bad reputation characterized the area and a passive attitude with some expectations. There were still some positive memories recalled about it and some pleasing remarks. Although, expressions like "distinguished" and "noble" only appeared in nostalgic memoires at that time, but they were apparent. In the *second* research phase the points went down and the element of fear was characteristically represented. This time, the overall run-down condition was strongly articulated with the opinion added, that the situation in the area cannot be mended. The positive memories recalled earlier were only present in fragments and there were less positive remarks. A new element was the general approval of and the relief over the disappearance of one part of the Colony. The level of deprivation can be also measured by the fact that the informants were not interested in the future of the demolished area. They did not support the idea of the demolition to create something new, only the elimination of the bad was important for them.

From the aspect of methodology this also means, that besides the existing values, the social hierarchy, positive/negative general opinions, edges, contact zones it is also worth asking questions about the future vision of the changes in the area and the possible disappearance of it. Because if this vision or the approval of it appears, it means that the researched area is on a deeper level of deprivation. If this can be completed with a longitudinal analysis for comparison, we can measure the intensity of the slumization process by mental mapping.

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Agglomeration Issues in respect of Budapest

"The image of a city is obviously not only determined by its visually perceptible features and its cityscape. It also includes the state of its facilities, the social profile of the residents in that city, everyday life on its streets, and so on."
(PREISICH, 1998).

ABSTRACT

Budapest agglomeration around the capital is the largest agglomeration, comprising of the most settlements, of Hungary. Its settlements are located on both sides of the Danube River and on two larger islands in the Danube River (Csepel Island and Szentendre Island). The Danube River is a line of geological demarcation, as it roughly divides the area into a lowland landscape (to the east, on its left bank) and a mountainous/semi-mountainous landscape (to the west, on its right bank), which have an impact on the network, size of and access to the settlements.

This study seeks to provide the brief history and to describe the current situation of the Budapest agglomeration in the light of data and differing theories. European countries have a long history of agglomeration, and the agglomeration process is not only ongoing in developed countries, but also subject to permanent changes in interpretation. The Budapest agglomeration covers 80 + 1 (Budapest) settlements, the majority of which have undergone dynamic development in the last 30 years.

In addition to spatial development, the Budapest agglomeration is also characterised by large growth in its population following its spatial restructuring. Road and railway infrastructure have also developed significantly. With regard to the relationship between the capital and the agglomeration, Budapest continues to play a vital role, as 25–35% of the population in the agglomeration work and use the educational institutions in the capital. Thus, the agglomeration would not exist without the opportunities offered by the capital.

KEYWORDS

agglomeration, history of Budapest, development, suburbanization

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Introduction

The description of the present situation of Budapest and its agglomeration belt is not an easy task. Researchers and urban analysts have been concerned for decades with analysing the capital of Hungary and its surrounding area, suburbs, agglomeration belt in the context of changes of economic issues on the one hand, and of territorial and closely associated societal issues on the other hand.

The Budapest agglomeration is an administratively fragmented area comprising the capital and agglomerating settlements around the capital which are interconnected regarding their past, present and future, and interdependent. 27.8% of the population of Hungary, that is 2,743,333 persons, lived here in 2016.

However, the structure and fragmentation of an urban agglomeration is not only determined by distance from capital, but also by natural conditions, traffic corridors and local social conditions. With this in mind, we cannot fail to interpret and take a broad look at the concept itself.

Developing areas are primarily characterised by agglomeration process, even today. The main outcome of that process is absolute concentration; both the population of cities and the area of city-regions increase, and companies become concentrated. The locating of commercial and industrial establishments in a city's surrounding area (relocation) becomes a possible way of territorial expansion in order to ensure economic efficiency of an urban area. Thus, the concept of agglomeration covers not only the principle of population concentration, but also different mechanisms and institutional functions.

If we take the findings of 'Agglomerációk, településegyüttesek' (Agglomerations, settlement groups) published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) as a basis, and incorporate György Kőszegfalvi's thoughts, the concept of urban agglomeration can be defined as follows:

> *'Agglomerations are settlement structures comprising of settlements which are characterised by population growth and housing construction activities. Changes during the 1990s indicate that the increasing population number and housing construction activities are not specific to centres, but to settlements surrounding the centres:* **people move for various reasons from centres to surrounding settlements, migrate from other regions to the surrounding suburbs, and build their homes in these settlements.**

> **The places of work of the working population are (mainly) in centres. Manifold functional relations are established between a centre and settlements located in its immediate vicinity (place of work and place of residence, business, economic, commercial and market-related relations etc.). Intensive urban agglomeration process leads to a contiguous settlement group comprising of physically merging settlements which grow together' (HCSO 2014).**

Éva Perger defined the concept of urban agglomeration from an administrative point of view, as follows: **'agglomerations are settlement groups which are mostly divided by administrative boundaries, but are brought together by tight social and economic relations, and functional and territorial links. Urban agglomerations are the result of the process of urbanisation and urban development, during which previously separate settlements are merged, the city exceeds its boundaries, and new settlements are established in the hinterland of the city'** (Térport, Perger 2006).

In this context, economic aspects, rather than territorial aspects, are more decisive in the definition given by the National Spatial Development Concept (NSDC 2005): *'The Budapest agglomeration consisting of the capital and its suburban belt is the most competitive area and the most important connection point of the country, which is uniquely suitable for connecting the whole country to the European and global economic, social and cultural vitality. A basic objective is to make – in harmonious cooperation – the Budapest metropolitan region a competitive city, the main centre of the central European area, the leading centre of Central and Eastern Europe, and the economic "core" of the Carpathian Basin through its international economic, commercial-financial and cultural-touristic role'* (NSDC 2005).

The *Demográfiai fogalomtár (Glossary of demographic terms)* takes a demographic approach: *'Urban agglomeration is a settlement group within which multifaceted and close cultural, economic, communal and service-related relations are established between a centre and settlements located in its vicinity. Migration from the city into surrounding villages and smaller towns plays an important role in the development of urban agglomerations'* (Kapitány 2015).

> *'Attaching surrounding settlements to a city (e.g. the creation of Greater Budapest) had been typical of previous decades, urban agglomerations were delimited later, and the tertiarization of urban economies, the unfunctionalisation of villages, and suburbanisation have made the ties of suburban areas closer by today; thus, this functional cohesion should also be reflected in the spatial structure'* (Faragó 2008).

According to Peter Haggett (2001), the concept of urban agglomeration is explained by the factors of agglomeration, thus he accorded a particularly important role to economic aspects: *'benefits derived from the high-degree concentration of the economy are collectively called agglomeration factors'.*

The definition of 'metropolitan area' which became the focus of urban researchers' attention in the 1970s extends interpretation frameworks. In line with that definition, urban agglomeration can develop around a large city, that is termed one-centred or monocentric agglomeration. Another type of agglomeration is the development of towns of the same size into a settlement cluster of equal size.

'In fact, such type of urban agglomeration does not have a joint centre, but the centres of the settlements in the settlement cluster continue to function as centres, and develop further; i.e. several equivalent centres function at the same time. That type of agglomeration is known as multi-centred or polycentric urban agglomeration' (Bernát – Bora – Fodor 1973). (It should be noted that in the case of a multi-centred or polycentric urban agglomeration, surrounding smaller settlements are often absorbed into urban areas.)

Lastly, as a conclusion to the description of urban agglomeration-related concepts and processes, we have to introduce a concept which describes urban agglomeration as the closer and closer ties of administratively still independent settlements to a large city, in which employment, trade relations and traffic connections play an active role. Population movements into suburbs within a large city (suburbanisation) and other processes thereafter (the development of residential areas and the construction of shopping centres etc.) strengthen that process. *'Thereby, the territory of a large city shows greater and greater increase, while smaller settlements almost merge with this city. The resulting settlement clusters are called urban agglomeration'* (Szűcsné – Szűcs 2007).

From an overall perspective, an urban agglomeration is therefore a system in which settlements have active and daily relations with each other, however the central settlement of an urban agglomeration (in economic, social and territorial terms) – in this case, Budapest – still shapes the everyday life of the settlements. Main drivers primarily are urbanisation, the spreading of urbanised lifestyle, the development of the settlements, the development of the specific roles of the settlements, and the development of regional relations; the interrelation of the settlements and the distribution of tasks between the settlements are less decisive factors. However, territorial functionality, and genuine cooperation between the settlements are also key factors.

The concept of urban agglomeration is often equated with suburbanisation. Some of the literature describe suburbanisation as migration from a large city into surrounding villages and smaller towns, which actually plays an important role in the development of urban agglomerations. *'The process of suburbanisation is enhanced by growth (growth of the total population), and the change in the internal structure of towns. Several people previously living in a large city no longer live and work in the same urban space; they rather choose to live in an agglomeration belt and commute to their workplace. Suburbs are built-up areas in the outer edge of a city, outer parts of a conurbation or outside a city's administrative boundary'* (Térport 2017).

Suburbanisation has become a permanent process after the 1990s. Suburbs are mostly determined on a human ecological basis, when regarding them as a system that forms a coherent unit with a city. In this approach, a significant proportion of researchers consider suburbs as mere residential areas. Another line of the human ecological approach highlights the principle of dependence; *'the other focus is the dependence of suburbs on a city, i.e. on its municipal property and services; the degree of dependence is expressed as the ratio of people commuting into a central city'* (Tímár 1999).

As determined by the Hungarian legal environment and international literature, suburbanisation is the process of a shift of the population and economic activities (industry and services) away from urban centres towards the surrounding settlements. An essential characteristic of suburbanisation is out-migration from centres, however the same process applies for economic functions. In fact, the emergence of urban agglomerations is the result of suburbanisation processes. All this leads to a complex activity which has an effect both on the economy and society of the settlements

of a given territorial unit. Overall, that conceptual framework prepares the ground for and makes the substance of the concept of urban agglomeration easily understandable. The concept refers to a long-standing spatial phenomenon which undergoes and is subject to permanent changes to its area and society.

History of the Budapest Agglomeration

> *'Metropolitan development in the 20th century has become an integral part of economic and social development; in fact, it is one of the conditions for development. The need to direct or at least influence development is a political issue that all societies has to face. Traditional towns are unravelling, and the new production method facilitates the territorial differentiation of functions'* (Meggyesi 2005).

The history of the development of the Budapest agglomeration started with the merger of Pest, Buda and Óbuda (Old Buda) in 1873. 'The increase in employment in the industrialising city exceeded the number of employees in certain periods, which triggered a migration of people from rural areas into the capital. All this directly affected the settlements surrounding the capital; thus, the number of inhabitants of the settlements around the capital showed a significant increase. 'Opinions were already offered as to the organisation of relations between Budapest and its rapidly increasing suburban area (conurbation) as early as the turn of the century. Ferenc Harrer drew up a proposal for reforming public administration in 1908, however both Pest County and the capital opposed and rejected the proposal. The issue of the Budapest agglomeration slipped down the agenda following the First World War. Ferenc Harrer raised again that issue in 1933; Act on urban planning and building administration – that placed the approval of plans prepared for suburbs of Budapest into the competence of Budapest Public Works Committee – was adopted in 1937. Even compared to concepts of today, modern visions for public administration were outlined in the concepts of the law in order to establish a single administrative organisation of the core, its closely related suburbs and rural 'protective belt'.

Greater Budapest was finally created in 1950 by attaching 23 surrounding settlements to the administrative area of the capital. The creation of the greater city was not at all motivated by the integration of the agglomeration belt with the capital as a political consideration; indeed, the Socialist state power wished to ensure the appropriate composition of urban 'working population' by attaining this objective. However, it took ten years for the first General Master Plan covering the entire capital to come into force. That delay reliably reflected the strategic direction of the then urban policy which promoted the integration of the former suburbs only to a very limited extent.

The capital has acquired a new status and has enjoyed county rights, the districts of Budapest have established district councils, and the surrounding settlements have become parts of Pest County and different districts of Pest County. The governance of those settlements was not in their own hands. The General Master Plan for urban development of Budapest and its surrounding area, approved in 1960, regarded 64 settlements within a distance of approximately 15 km of the boundaries of the capital as parts of the Budapest conurbation. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by the acceleration of urbanisation processes; migration into the metropolitan area of the capital continued even in the 1970s.

The General Master Plan of Budapest, drawn up in 1960, was aimed at developing its outer areas. *'The Plan underlined that the settlement groups of the agglomeration belt were to attach to district centres designated for development in a tentacle-like manner, while these settlements should not become parts of Budapest'* (Kocsis 2009).

'The Budapest agglomeration was firstly delimited in 1971. Then, 1005/1971. (11.26.) Government Decision listed 45 settlements as parts of the agglomeration belt of the capital' (Gergely 2009). The basis for that delimitation was the strength of transport and recreational relations, and the volume of commuting traffic. The delimitation had long been subject of debate; later more and more scientific studies evidenced that new factors should be taken into account in delimitation.

The 1980s marked a turning point both in the development of the Budapest agglomeration and in the restructuring of public administration. The districts of counties were abolished in 1984. The abolishment of county districts and the decommitment of the rigid rules of workers' councils were a further step towards the establishment of a local-government system. The administrative division of the capital and its surroundings was affected by that system, as a few settlements of the conurbation had organized a separate urban periphery.

The new General Master Plan relating to the capital was approved in 1989. The new Plan took the agglomeration belt ('ring') into account, however a specific metropolitan viewpoint prevailed in it. It envisaged a role of serving the capital for the settlements of the conurbation, i.e. the Plan also based its visions on the concept that the population of the agglomeration belt was to continue to work and use the majority of public services in Budapest.

After the adoption of the amendment to the Constitution, the Parliament created Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments and Act LXIV of 1990 on the Election of Representatives in Local Governments and of Mayors. Under the new Act on local governments, the powers and tasks of counties have been significantly reduced, and counties have lost their former character of being intermediate administrative level. Thereby, the settlements of the agglomeration belt have been put on an equal footing in legal terms with the capital and the districts of the capital. The Act on local governments and the Act on the capital have established a highly fragmented structure of local government in the Budapest area. The new system has not provided a solution with regard to the harmonisation of cross-boundary public services or spatial development tasks. As the Act has given local governments the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily with one another, however it has been soon obvious that voluntary cooperation is not adequate to fill the gap arising from the lack of regional coordination. As regards the capital and the settlements of the agglomeration belt, the new system has kept administrative disparities between the capital and its region. The agglomeration belt has continued to administratively belong to Pest County, thus it has constituted an administrative territorial unit with other local authorities that have not been part of the region. The Act on local governments has offered four types of associations to settlements: office of district-notary, official administrative association, association for the (joint) direction of certain institutions, and joint body of representatives. In addition to these options offered, local governments have been entitled to establish any other association, or subregional, regional or national interest association. The cooperation between local governments has been developed very slowly in the Budapest agglomeration, and has not provided an answer to the problems of the agglomeration belt. The establishment of associations and interest associations has primarily followed two association trends. In addition to the forms of association related to the most pressing issues – mainly the operation

and development of basic health and social welfare provisions, basic infrastructure and technical infrastructure –, loose subregional associations of settlement local governments have also appeared. Various specialist reports indicated as early as the beginning of the 1980s that agglomeration processes had already stretched the framework set up by legislation, however the new legislation was adopted only after the regime change in 1997.[1] **In autumn 1994,** the Hungarian Parliament amended the Act on local governments. The amended law has aimed primarily at providing a solution to the problems arising from the administrative disparities of Budapest. The biggest flaw of the amendment is that it has not given any possibility to administratively connecting the capital with its agglomeration belt. Even though the development of Budapest and the surrounding settlements has been closely interrelated (common economic-social problems, and the establishment of association relationships) following the regime change, and their network of relationships has become multifaceted, two-way and closer. Government Decree 89/1997. (V.28.) designated the capital and 79 settlements as the Budapest agglomeration area in 1997, thus the Budapest agglomeration officially covers 81 settlements – the reason for the change in the number is not the change of delimitation, but the separation of two settlements – today (based on the research by Júlia Gergely).

> *'The Hungarian Central Statistical Office altered former official delimitation with regard to the administrative area of Budapest and 78 settlements in finally 1997, thus the agglomeration belt has been significantly increased'* (www.terport.hu).

The lines of delimitation valid at present were established in 2005, which have also determined the area of the agglomeration. The agglomeration of 81 settlements covers 38 towns, 11 large villages and 32 villages. (See Map 1.)

Agglomeration and its Role

> *'The Budapest agglomeration is thus an administratively fragmented area comprising the capital and 80 agglomerating settlements around it, however its spatial structure is coherent. It is the only real metropolis of Hungary which has a metropolitan agglomeration that can be regarded as significant even at a European level'* (Spatial Plan of the Budapest Agglomeration, 2011).

That 'formation' is the most dynamically developing area of the country, in which both Budapest and the settlements in the region have a crucial social and regional role.

There has been a significant change in the agglomeration since the 1990s. Contributing factors have been economic changes in the agglomeration, and political and administrative decisions which have been forming their relations in different ways over the last 27 years.

'The agglomeration is Budapest and its interconnected, interdependent and administratively fragmented area' (according to the Urban Development Concept 2011). Despite that fact, the substantial cooperation between Budapest and the surrounding settlements is tension-filled and is struggling with several unresolved problems.

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[1] Under the Act XXI of 1996 on Regional Development and Regional Planning.

'Changes in the urban space of Budapest are quite complex in nature. The main reason for this is that the processes of large Western European cities took place, for historical reasons, in a short period of time. After the Second World War, the Socialist regime artificially put the [same] processes [in Hungary] on an entirely different track' (Kocsis 2013).

Against this backdrop, the current (imbalanced) situation of the Budapest agglomeration becomes easier to understand. When giving a complex description of an urban agglomeration, one can use two approaches. The first one is the use of the perspective of settlements when the model of the assessment of the types of settlements with town or village status is a primary consideration, and the second approach means a sectoral focus on the examination of a group of settlements from the perspective of sectors. In both cases, the actual agglomeration bonding lies in day-to-day relations between settlements, the use of institutions, and economic formations.



Map 1 *Settlements of the Budapest Agglomeration (Prepared by Attila Fekete, 2017.)*



Map 2 *'History' of the Boundaries of Budapest (Source: http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop412A/2010-0019_Telepulesepiteszet/ch03s03.html)*

> *'The extensive growth of the agglomeration belt has stopped in parallel with the decrease of the staffing needs of Budapest. The out-migration of well-off sections of the population from the capital into micro-districts in conurbations providing a more comfortable living environment – the Buda side, the group of settlements along the River Danube, and the north-eastern sector in the area of the Hills of Gödöllő in the Pest side (see the settlements of the sector below) – has become a mass phenomenon'* (Enyedi – Horváth 2002).

The number of population living in the capital and its agglomeration belt has been following an upward trend since the 1990s, the reasons for which are two-fold: out-migration from Budapest on the one hand, and in-migration from different parts of the country into the agglomeration belt on the other hand. When speaking about out-migration from the capital, the towns and villages which are close to the capital and have good transport links have always been favoured. That aspect has been less relevant for those moving from different areas of the country into the agglomeration belt; proximity to Budapest does not necessarily mean active participation in employment.

The conurbation of Budapest consists of six sectors which have received their names according to their orientation by the cardinal points. Most settlements are in the North-Western sector, the Southern sector is most highly populated, and the proportion of urban population is highest in the Northern sector.

	Northern	Eastern	South-Eastern	Southern	Western	North-Western
Sesctor	Csomád	Csömör	Alsónémedi	Délegyháza	**Biatorbágy**	**Budakalász**
	Csörög	Erdőkertes	Ecser	**Diósd**	Budajenő	Csobánka
	Dunakeszi	**Gödöllő**	Felsőpakony	**Dunaharaszti**	**Budakeszi**	Dunabogdány
	Fót	**Isaszeg**	**Gyál**	**Dunavarsány**	**Budaörs**	Kisoroszi
	Göd	**Kerepes**	**Gyömrő**	**Érd**	Herceghalom	Leányfalu
	Őrbottyán	**Kistarcsa**	**Maglód**	**Halásztelek**	Páty	Nagykovácsi
	Sződ	Mogyoród	**Ócsa**	Majosháza	Perbál	Pilisborosjenő
	Sződliget	Nagytarcsa	**Üllő**	Pusztazámor	Telki	**Piliscsaba**
	Vác	**Pécel**	**Vecsés**	Sóskút	Tinnye	Pilisjászfalu
	Vácrátót	Szada		**Százhalombatta**	Tök	**Pilisvörösvár**
		Veresegyház		**Szigethalom**	**Törökbálint**	Pilisszántó
				Szigetszentmiklós	**Zsámbék**	Pilisszentiván
				Taksony		Pilisszentkereszt
				Tárnok		Pilisszentlászló
				Tököl		Pócsmegyer
						Pomáz
						Remeteszőlős
						Solymár
						Szentendre
						Szigetmonostor
						Tahitótfalu
						Üröm
						Visegrád

Table 1 *Settlements of the Budapest Agglomeration by Sectors (2016) (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

It can be provisionally concluded in the sectoral analysis of the Budapest agglomeration that the popularity of the Western and North-Western sectors has shown a gradual upward trend compared to the other sectors due to social and territorial differences. The educational attainment and employment rate of the total population in those two sectors are high, and the 'quality-of life' indicator is also above-average. The same only applies to very few settlements in the other four sectors (Vác, Veresegyház, Göd, Gödöllő, Diósd and Érd).

The relationships of the settlements of the sectors with the capital are different, however rather active. The relationship of the nearest settlements with the capital can be considered close, as their inhabitants travel to work, commute on a daily basis to Budapest, and use of its institutions and services.

10 settlements – 5 settlements with town status and 5 settlements with village status – belong to the Northern sector of the Budapest agglomeration. Out of the towns of the sector, Dunakeszi is characterised by the greatest population growth rate: a 61.5% increase in the population of the town took place between 1990 and 2016, however it is necessary to point out that this settlement was affected by the largest flow of people moving out from Budapest between 2001 and 2011.

Besides Dunakeszi, Őrbottyán also showed a high population growth rate (57.3%). Őrbottyán was created in 1970 with the unification of two villages, named Őrszentmiklós and Vácbottyán; it gained town status in January 2013. Its population has further grown after the settlement won town status. Fót and Gödöllő showed a population growth by 5000–6000 inhabitants between 1990 and 2016. Göd gained town status in 1999, and Fót in 2004, thereby the prestige of these settlements has reached an even higher level. There has been a slight decline in the population of Vác, a town of the Northern sector of the agglomeration belt. There could be lots of reasons behind that trend, such as migration into a surrounding settlement or Budapest, or its diminishing popularity. Nevertheless, that town still has stable functions and urban role in the agglomeration belt. Experts in the field of urban agglomeration have often raised the question of whether Vác can be considered a settlement of the agglomeration belt.



Figure 1 *Urban Population Changes in the Northern Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Dunakeszi	Fót	Göd	Őrbottyán	Vác
Year	1977	2004	1999	2013	1900

Table 2 *Year of Gaining Town Status*

The two largest towns of the Eastern sector are Gödöllő and Veresegyház. The urban autonomy of Gödöllő has a prominent and strong role to play, as a consequence of which its involvement in the life of the agglomeration can be hindered.

The population of Gödöllő has grown by 8.7% during the past 26 years, while the population of Veresegyháza has almost quadrupled (increased by 275%). High-quality agglomeration living area has been developing in that settlement since the 1990s. The settlement has a special role in the agglomeration, however it makes heavy demands on the capital.

The third largest town of the sector is Pécel functioning as town since 1996. It also applies to the settlement that its town status has raised its prestige – the number of its inhabitants increased by 50% between 1990 and 2016 –, and the majority of its inhabitants work in the capital and use the services of the capital. Kerepes and Kistarcsa functioned as settlement Kerepestarcsa in 1978, they separated in 1994, and they take their decisions as separate towns today. Kistarcsa won town status on 1 January 2005, and Kerepes on 1 June 2013. Actually, only Gödöllő has long-standing town status in the sector, the other settlements of the sector – like the settlements of the agglomeration belt – have a newly gained town status.



Figure 2 *Urban Population Changes in the Eastern Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Gödöllő	Isaszeg	Kerepes	Kistarcsa	Pécel	Veresegyház
Year	1966	2008	2013	2005	1996	1999

Table 3 *Year of Gaining Town Status*

The South-Eastern sector of the agglomeration could basically be regarded at the time of Hungary's regime change and in the following decade as a poorer and less developed area regarding its social status compared to the other sectors. The settlements of the sector have very close links with the capital due to the commuting workers living in these settlements. The population of these settlements increased significantly between 1990 and 2016, as a high number of people moved from Budapest and the southern counties into the sector due to lower market prices. Out of the settlements of the sector, there was a notable increase – by 15–35% – in the population of Gyál, Gyömrő and Maglód between 1990 and 2016. The settlements of the sector gained town status in the early 2000s, with the exception of Gyál which won this status in 1997; data collected shows that the change in their status only has had a limited impact on their population growth rate.

Only the town of Maglód stands out clearly from that group; it was affected by the 19th largest out-migration from Budapest between 2001 and 2011.

The Southern sector has been a favoured area of the Budapest agglomeration even before the regime change. Érd, Diósd, Halásztelek and settlements along the south line have been favoured by people who want to move closer to Budapest and have modest incomes. The population number of the town Érd has been increasing since the 1990s, however there has been a clear change in the population of the other settlements in the sector since the 2000s. The population number increased by 266% in Diósd and by 66.8% in Érd which is in the 2nd place in a ranking of the settlements of the agglomeration belt most affected by out-migration from Budapest



Figure 3 *Urban Population Changes in the South-Eastern Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Gyál	Gyömrő	Maglód	Ócsa	Üllő	Vecsés
Year	1997	2001	2007	2007	2005	2001

Table 4 *Year of Gaining Town Status*

(between 2001 and 2011). In addition, it also should be noted that more than 60% of people living in that sector are commuting to Budapest or to a nearby settlement.

Among the towns of the sector, Szigetszentmiklós stands out for being the third most popular target town of out-migration from Budapest; an 87.5% increase can be seen in this regard. It is also characterised by an active day-to-day relationship with the capital, which is mainly based on the use of its institutions. The population of Halásztelek grew by 57.2%, and the population number of Százhalombatta increased by 12.2% during the same period. The specificity of the Southern sector is based on the fact that a significant percentage of its population actively use the centre of the agglomeration; people moving out from Budapest favour settlements nearer to Budapest, while people moving from different parts of the country prefer settlements distant from the capital. Some settlements of the sector have had town status for 30–40 years, which have had a direct impact on their development and their role played in the agglomeration. The decades-long active relationship and close cooperation of certain towns (Érd and Százhalombatta) with the capital should also be highlighted with regard to their role.



Figure 4 *Urban Population Changes in the Southern Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Diósd	Dunaharaszti	Dunavarsány	Érd	Halásztelek
Year	2013	2000	2004	1978	2008

Town name	Százhalombatta	Szigethalom	Szigetszentmiklós	Tököl
Year	1970	2004	1986	2001

Table 5 *Year of Gaining Town Status*

The Western sector is a territorial unit providing living area for higher social strata. The most innovative and most popular settlements – in respect of out-migration from Budapest – (Budaörs and Törökbálint) are in that sector. Even though the settlements are integral parts of the agglomeration belt, their inhabitants mainly use the infrastructure of the capital. All settlements of the sector are characterised by continuous increase in their population number.

Their absolute proximity to Budapest causes their almost inseparable character from the capital. Budaörs was the 4th settlement in a ranking of settlements most affected by out-migration from Budapest, and has been preferred by the higher social strata of the former residents of Budapest. The population grew by 43.2% in Budaörs, by 41.5% in Törökbálint, by 38.4% in Zsámbék and by 80.2% in Biatorbágy between 1990 and 2016. That enormous increase of the population of Biatorbágy has also affected the structural change of the settlement; the former settlement with a traditional economic structure has become a commuter town and service-centre. At least two-thirds of people living in the sector work in Budapest or its vicinity, and use the services of the capital or its surrounding settlements. Generally, it applies to almost all settlements of the agglomeration.

Out of the 12 settlements of the sector, there are 5 towns; Budaörs is the only town of them which won town status decades ago, the other towns gained their town status only in the early 2000s. Town status has played a particularly significant role in the case of Biatorbágy which experienced a significant growth of its population between 2001 and 2011.



Figure 5 *Urban Population Changes in the Western Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Biatorbágy	Budakeszi	Budaörs	Törökbálint	Zsámbék
Year	2007	2000	1986	2007	2009

Table 6 *Year of Gaining Town Status*

The North-Western sector is the other continuously developing green-belt area of the agglomeration belt. The sector consists of 23 settlements: 6 towns and 17 villages. The smallest, but historically very important town, Visegrád can be found in that sector. Visegrád gained town status at the turn of the Millennium. The population of the towns continually grew between 1990 and 2016, especially in the case of Szentendre. Population increased by 33% in Szentendre, by 34.3% in Pomáz, by 25.6% in Pilisvörösvár and by 57.5% in Piliscsaba. Piliscsaba has become a university town, which has certainly triggered urbanisation and the spreading of urbanised lifestyle.

Overall, the settlements of the sector are very popular; besides towns, small villages have also played a similar role. The towns of the sector have very close links with Budapest, while small settlements show strong cohesion with each other. In a previous study (Laki 2008), our experience indicated that the social cohesion of the region proved to be excessively strong compared to that of the other sectors.

Out of the towns of the sector, Szentendre was the first settlement which gained town status, the other 5 settlements won this status before the turn of the Millennium or in the last few years.

The population of 81 settlements showed a 10.06% growth between 1990 and 2016. When excluding Budapest, there was a population growth of 55.9% in the settlements of the agglomeration belt in the same period. The data of the population census 2001 indicates that the population declined by almost 10% (9.42%) in Budapest between 1990 and 2001. As already mentioned above, out-migration



Figure 6 *Urban Population Changes in the North-Western Sector of the Budapest Agglomeration (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

Town name	Budakalász	Piliscsaba	Pilisvörösvár	Pomáz	Szentendre	Visegrád
Year	2009	2013	1997	2000	the 1900s	2000

Table 7 *Year of Gaining Town Status*



FIGURE 7 *Types and Number of Settlements in the Budapest Agglomeration on 1 January 2016 (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

to the suburbs became more active in that period. The capital has continued to function as a 'supply system' in the sense of employing commuters, satisfying the needs of people using its education institutions, and providing different services.

The importance of settlements with town status is undeniable in the development of agglomeration roles. The question is how the capital and the 80 settlements belonging to the metropolitan area can execute functions resulting from their involvement in the life of the agglomeration, either on a sectoral or a professional basis.

The settlements of the agglomeration belt mainly won town status after the 1990s. Only a few settlements of the agglomeration belt gained town status after the 2010s.

That factor determines the strength of the relationship between Budapest and the agglomeration belt, as the exploiting of opportunities arising from the proximity of the capital depends largely on labour market situation at local level, the satisfying of local needs and other types of use of the services or institutions in the capital.

The population of Budapest and the agglomeration belt showed an upward trend in recent years. While the population decline rate of the capital was significant in the 2000s, there was a robust growth in the population of the settlements of the agglomeration belt. All that plays a prominent role in the assessment of the situation of the agglomeration belt of the capital, as it appears that there is some kind of link between the capital and the surrounding settlements. However, the settlements of the agglomeration belt are not able to specify their relations with Budapest. In this regard, the question arises as to what links there should be between the settlements of the sectors and the capital, which would make the scope of functions expected from the agglomeration belt of the capital and its settlements characterizable.



FIGURE 8 *Year of Gaining Town Status by the Settlements of the Agglomeration Belt between 1990 and 2016 (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*



FIGURE 9 *Population Changes in Budapest and the Settlements of the Agglomeration Belt between 1990 and 2016 (persons) (Source: own edition based on the data from the Gazetteer of Hungary, 2016.)*

The second group of reflections regarding the agglomeration belt lies in the relations between the settlements. When adopting the sectoral approach, the settlements are interrelated in different ways, which often include daily cooperation. There is a stronger synergy between the settlement groups in the Western and North-Western sectors compared to that of the settlements in the Eastern and South-Eastern sectors, the reason for which may be the different times of out-migration from Budapest into the given sectors. Another factor that further strengthens the links between the settlements is the strength of cooperation between districts and subregions. Their common regional interests are important in this regard, provided that these settlements are struggling with common regional-social problems; it is clear that the cooperation of settlements is more dynamic in this case contrary to the case when they are not facing any difficulties.

Summary

'Clearly, agglomeration/suburbanisation processes have revealed themselves not only in the change of the functions of settlements, but also in its impact on demographic and employment situation' (Beluszky 2015).

This study provides an outlook with regard to the actual population changes and situation of the agglomeration belt of the capital and its settlements. This study which does not contain in-depth analyses presents an outlook for the group and substance of different concepts relating to urban agglomeration, for frameworks and processes related to this phenomenon, the specific features of urban agglomeration at national and international levels, and the implementation of the process of suburbanisation closely linked to urban agglomeration. The regional specificities of an urban agglomeration can only be observed in historical context; Hungarian historical analyses of urban agglomeration have taken an administrative or a socio-geographical approach. It makes those analyses biased on the one hand, and the results in the assessments of urban agglomeration are given from different angles. *'Cultural-historical and social factors almost predestinate conflicts between the capital and the settlements in the agglomeration belt, the atmosphere of mistrust and their inability to cooperate. The specific administrative provisions applicable to Budapest and the agglomeration belt, and political controversies and interests further aggravate the problem'* (Kocsis 2015).

The agglomeration belt of the capital, which comprises 81 settlements, is divided into six sectors, thereby each sector can be assessed according to their own specificities. The settlement groups following different paths towards development have different relationships with the capital, and they thus ensure or reject agglomeration opportunities provided by Budapest (transport and services). The study provides a separate assessment of the social and spatial development of each sector, and underlines population growth without explaining the reasons behind it. Since the most important aspect is that the population of towns and settlements has significantly increased, the collection of alternatives is an unimportant detail in this case. The fact remains that the agglomeration to the capital is today the largest territorial unit in the map of Hungary. By reason of its size, it is also clear that it is struggling with several conflicts, clashes and problems yet to be solved.

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Exploring the Effect of Different Modes of ICT Use on School Performance Including Social Background



ABSTRACT

Nowadays the use of ICT, the Internet is indispensible in everyday life. We are supposed to go online for administration, working, entertainment and for learning as well. The different modes of use, whether for entertainment, recreation, or for learning or work, influence our position in the matrix of digital inequalities. Digital inequalities at the same time have an effect on educational inequalities. Therefore our paper focuses on the effect of ICT use for different purposes on school performance to reveal the correlation between digital inequalities and educational inequalities. Both types of inequalities are strongly influenced by social background. We intend to explain the relationship between these factors by showing the effect of ICT use on school performance when taking into consideration the socio-economic and cultural status. First we introduce the main theories and results from previous researches on the tie between on the one hand social background and academic achievement, on the other hand between social background and ICT use. Then we present the main outcomes of our analysis conducted on the Hungarian subsample of the latest PISA data from 2015. Finally conclusions are summarized and further research possibilities are suggested.

KEYWORDS

digital inequalities, ICT use, school performance, social background, PISA

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1. Social background and school performance

One of the initial functions of education was to diminish inequalities among students coming from different social backgrounds by offering everyone the same knowledge. However social theorists pointed out that school doesn't fulfil this expectation as inequalities are even strengthened by grading the performance of the students. Pierre Bourdieu (1974) called attention to this contradictory function of school. Due to his theory the inequalities are strengthened because school performance is not the outcome of diligence but of the cultural capital of the student's family. This means that the grade gained at school reflects for instance more the educational attainment of the parents then the hours spent on learning. Similarly Bernstein (1975) explained how school reinforces social inequalities on the level of sociolinguistics. He made a distinction between two codes of speaking, the restricted and the elaborated codes which correlate with social class position. The restricted code is characteristic for the working class and the elaborated code for the middle class. As education is dominated by the elaborated code, those who are not familiar with it bear disadvantages at school.

In his report about the American education system Coleman (1966) also highlightened the correlation between family background and school performance. In the 60's the American education system was suffering from ethnical segregation, leading to the enhancing of inequalities between the ethnic groups. This finding encouraged many reforms of the American education system.

In Hungary the correlation between social background and school performance was also found to be very strong. In the 1970's Ferge (1980) drew attention to the fact that contrary to the ideological concept school doesn't diminish the differences among students from different social background but sustains them and even intensifies them (Ferge 1980). There has been not much change in this correlation recently, as international researches report Hungary to be one of those nations where the effect of social status mostly determines school performance (Vári 2003). In Hungary the biggest proportion of students from a disadvantaged background, where parents have a low socio-economic status and low educational level, belong to the group of students with lowest competencies (Róbert 2004).

Analysing PISA data on long time series we found, that the effect of socio-economic and cultural status (measured by the ESCS index) on performance in mathematic is the biggest or one of the biggest in Hungary among all participating countries. In 2003 the relationship between the ESCS index and mathematics achievement was the strongest of all participating countries (Beta = 0,52), furthermore this index explained the biggest part (27%) of maths performance in Hungary (Graph 1).

In the following years of the survey similar correlations are found. In 2006 Hungary was again the last in the ranking based on the effect of ESCS index on maths performance, in 2009 next to last (Peru), in 2012 fourth from last and in 2015 fifth from last. Thus international comparison shows that in Hungary school performance is strongly influenced by the social, economic and cultural background of the student.



Graph 1 *The effect of ESCS index on PISA mathematics scores in 2003*

2. Social background and ICT use

When ICT began to spread, two concepts arose about its effect on social inequalities. One approach said that ICT will weaken inequalities by offering everyone independent from his social status the same chances, knowledge and information. Due to the other concept, which was more sceptic, inequalities won't be weakened but strengthened and a new form of inequalities will appear as access and the modes of use are determined by the socio-economic background (Pintér 2007, DiMaggio et al. 2001). This latter theory has been confirmed by empirical work, since ICT spread unequally and generated new forms of inequalities: first the digital divide, then digital inequalities.

In the beginning – at a lower level of penetration – researches focused on the digital divide, the differences between users and non-users. Within the society the borderline between users and non-users was signified by the traditional socio-demographic characteristics like gender, age, ethnicity, educational attainment, income and profession (Norris 2001). Later when info-communication technology reached a higher level of penetration, scholars called attention to the change of focus: from the digital divide to digital inequalities. DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001) worked out a model of digital inequalities, which consists of five dimensions: the technical means, autonomy of use, skills, social support and the purposes of use. This latter dimension is considered to be the most important of all regarding digital inequalities. Inequalities in these five dimensions are strongly influenced by demographic and socio-economic factors (DiMaggio – Hargittai 2001).

3. Data and methods

Our investigation on the relationship between social background, ICT use and school performance is based on the Hungarian subsample of the latest student-level dataset of PISA recorded in 2015. This huge, extensive international survey aims to evaluate education systems by testing student skills and knowledge in three main fields: mathematics, reading and science with a focus on one every three years since 2000 when the first survey was conducted. In each participating country[1] a random sample of the population of 15-year old students is involved in the survey from randomly selected schools. The main survey is supplemented among others[2] by an ICT questionnaire which gathers information about ICT access and use inside and outside of school.

The Hungarian sample comprises 5658 students from 250 schools in 2015. Our analysis builds on linear regression models to reveal the effect of the different modes of ICT use on school performance. The dependent variables (Table 3) in our analysis are measures of student performance in mathematics, reading comprehension and science. As the students participating in the survey fill out different combinations of different tests, the achievement scores are estimated by five plausible values in each field.[3] On large samples using one plausible value or five plausible values does not make a substantial difference between mean estimates and standard error estimates (OECD 2009: 44.). Therefore in our analysis we use the first plausible value of mathematics, reading and science achievement.

The independent variables in the first set of regression models are measures of different modes of ICT use. The PISA ICT questionnaire included a set of items referring to the purpose of computer and Internet use outside of school. The students reported the frequency of use on each item.[4] In our analysis we applied principal components based on these items (Table 1). Three principal components have been separated. The first (FUN) refers to a frequent use of entertainment and communication activities on the internet except for playing games. The second one (PLAY) stands for a frequent use of playing games. Finally the third principal component shows the frequent use of ICT for gathering information on the internet by reading news or searching for practical information (INFO).

In 2015 the PISA ICT questionnaire included a set of items referring to the use of ICT outside of school for learning or for school related tasks. The students reported the frequency of use

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[1] In 2015 the following 72 economies took part in the survey: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong-China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kosovo, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao-China, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Republic of Montenegreo, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam

[2] The PISA assessment also includes a questionnaire for school principals who provide information about the schools' composition regarding students and teaching staff and also the teaching and learning environment of the school.

[3] The concept of using plausible values instead of other measuring methods is explained in detail in OECD (2009): PISA Data Analysis Manual: SPSS, Second edition.

[4] The answer categories were: 'Never or hardly ever'; 'Once or twice a month'; 'Once or twice a week'; 'Almost every day', 'Every day'.

on each item.[5] Therefore the fourth principal component (LEARN) stands for a frequent use of ICT for learning purposes or schoolwork (Table 2).

As outlined in the first section both performance and ICT use are influenced by socio-economic and cultural background of the student. Therefore in the second set of linear regression models the effect of ICT use on test scores has been accounted for social background. We applied the index of economic-social-cultural status (ESCS) as independent variable which comprises the highest educational attainment of both parents, the professional status of parents, the quantity of household goods, and the quantity of books in the household – to test the cultural status of the family.

Table 3 and Table 4 present descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and independent variables applied in the analysis.

Items	Principal components		
	1. FUN	2. PLAY	3. INFO
Social networks (e.g. <Facebook>, <MySpace>)	0,852		
<Chatting online> (e.g. <MSN®>)	0,766		
Browsing the Internet for fun videos, e.g. <YouTube>)	0,725		
Playing collaborative online games		0,902	
Playing one-player games		0,894	
Reading news on the Internet (e.g. current affairs)			0,885
Obtaining practical information from the Internet			0,876

Table 1 *Rotated Component Matrix*

Items	Principal components
	4. LEARN
Downloading science learning apps on a mobile device	0,84
Downloading learning apps on a mobile device	0,837
Doing homework on a computer	0,816
Doing homework on a mobile device	0,806
Using email for communication with teacher\submit of homework or other schoolwork	0,803
Using email for communication with other students about schoolwork	0,774
Browsing the Internet to follow up lessons, e.g. for finding explanations	0,771
Download\upload\browsing from school website (e.g. time table or course materials	0,758
Checking the schools website for announcements, e.g. absence of teachers	0,741
Browsing the Internet for schoolwork (e.g. for preparing an essay or presentation	0,696

Table 2 *Component Matrix*

[5] The answer categories were: 'Never or hardly ever'; 'Once or twice a month' 'Once or twice a week'; 'Almost every day', 'Every day'.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. deviation
Mathematics score (PV1MATH)	5658	185,9	782,7	484,3	91,7
Reading comprehension score (PV1READ)	5658	163,5	754,6	476,6	95,6
Science score (PV1SCIE)	5658	156,8	763,8	484,8	93,4

Table 3 *Descriptive statistics for dependent variables*

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. deviation
ESCS	5570	–6,7872	3,0072	–0,17724	0,943751
1. FUN	4948	–3,4741	1,42179	0	1
2. PLAY	4948	–1,44212	2,38812	0	1
3. INFO	4948	–2,34611	2,28994	0	1
4. LEARN	4690	–1,34977	2,82802	0	1

Table 4 *Descriptive statistics for independent variables*

4. Results

4.1 ICT use and school performance

First the effect of the different modes of ICT use at home was tested on school performance (Graph 2). Two of the separated types of use have a positive impact on achievement, namely the use for fun and communication, and the use for browsing for information. Thus those students who frequently use the internet for social networking, chatting or watching fun videos reach on average 13 points more on the maths and science tests and 16 points more on the reading comprehension test compared to those who don't. Similarly the frequent browsing for practical information and reading news on the internet increases the test scores on average for 6 to 7,5 points in the three fields of competencies.

As for the negative impact of modes of internet use on school performance in the case of playing there is a significant difference between the tested competencies. It seems that playing on the internet alone or in collaboration does not influence mathematic competencies.[6] Scientific literacy is biased moderately. However students who frequently play on the internet alone or in collaboration get worse results in reading comprehension tests: test scores are lowered

[6] The linear regression model is not statistically significant ($p > 0,5$).



Graph 2

on average for about 13 points. The outcome of the relationship of internet use for learning and school related tasks and academic achievement might be surprising. The linear regression model shows that out of the modes of internet use in our investigation the frequent use for learning has the biggest impact on test results. However this effect is negative. Students who frequently do school related tasks on the internet or use the internet for learning reach 17,5 points less in mathematics, 22 points less in science and 24,5 points less in reading comprehension.

When interpreting the results of the first linear regression models we need to consider that beyond the found correspondences there might be other influencing factors. As outlined in the first section, socio-economic and cultural statuses play a crucial role in both school performance and ICT use. Therefore the next section investigates the effect of social background on the relationship between different modes of internet use and the three fields of literacy.

4.2. Social background, ICT use and school performance

In the following regression models the effect of the principal components indicating different ways of internet use outside of school has been accounted for the economic-social-cultural (ESCS) index. As the correlation coefficients show (Table 5), the socio-economic and cultural status is statistically in relation with the use for fun and the practical use. Nonetheless playing on the internet and the use for learning purposes don't depend on one's social background.

In accordance with the results of the Pearson's correlation, the regression models have modified when including the ESCS index as explanatory variable (Graph 3).

	FUN	PLAY	INFO	LEARN
ESCS	**0,123****	**–0,005**	**0,137****	**0,003**
Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,731	0	0,845
N	4925	4925	4925	4673

TABLE 5 *Correlation between ESCS index and the principal components of ICT use (** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level]2-tailed].)*



GRAPH 3

The effect of the use for fun and communication on test scores decreases a little but still stays positive when controlling for the ESCS index. Playing on the internet has still a quite significant negative impact on reading literacy independent of social background. However scientific competencies are no more influenced by playing when integrating ESCS in the regression. In the second set of regression models the former positive effect of the use for searching information on the internet on achievement disappears in case of all three competencies. As the correlation coefficient indicated this mode of use is strongly influenced by socio-economic and cultural background. Since correlation was not statistically significant between the ESCS index and the frequent use of the internet for learning and school related tasks, the noteworthy negative effect of this mode of use on school performance stays almost the same when accounting for social background.

5. Conclusions

The results of the analysis on the Hungarian subsample of the PISA dataset from 2015 reveal interesting correspondences between school performance, different modes of ICT use and social background. The frequent use of the internet for networking and fun outside of school influences all three fields of literacy positively even when accounting for socio-economic and cultural status. We assume that this mode of use enhances the social capital in an online field which in turn has a positive impact on achievement (Pusztai 2009, Gábor 2012, Jancsák 2013). The influence of playing on the internet is ambiguous. On the one hand mathematics and science achievement is not affected, on the other hand reading comprehension is notably brought down by this mode of internet use. In our analysis the third mode of internet use, frequent browsing for practical information and reading news on the internet has first shown a moderate but positive impact on test scores, however it turned out that this correspondence is due to the effect of social background. A privileged socio-economic and cultural status leads to such use of the internet and to better academic achievement at the same time.

The most unexpected outcome of our analysis is the effect of frequent internet use for learning purposes or school related tasks on school performance. We found that this mode of use has a notably negative impact on each field of literacy even when accounting for social background. This means that those students who frequently do school related tasks on the internet or learn with the help of ICT perform worse on the PISA mathematic, reading comprehension and science tests. Furthermore we found that this mode of use outside of school is not related to the socio-economic or cultural status of the student.

There might be several explanations for these findings which need further investigations. One of these might be the opposition of quantity and quality or form and content. The PISA ICT questionnaire measured the frequency of use of each listed item referring to the use for learning. We might suppose that the frequency of use does not reflect properly the effectiveness of use. Maybe the frequent use of ICT for learning is misleading as the technology gets more emphasized than the content, the gaining of knowledge. This might be one explanation for the worse test scores. In this context another question arises: why social background does not correspond with the use of ICT for learning and school purposes? We assume that this mode of use outside of school is more influenced by the school's and the teachers' expectations and teaching methods. This means that students use the internet for learning and school related tasks not because of internal motivations or ambitions but external pressure or expectations. Of course the negative results found regarding the relationship between the use of ICT for learning and school performance need deeper and more detailed analysis. We have to consider that our findings are limited to Hungary therefore international comparison regarding this correspondence could make the picture more clearer: Is the negative effect of frequent use of ICT for learning on school performance a universal pattern or specific for Hungary or for groups of nations including Hungary? How do other factors (demographic, school characters, etc.) modify this correlation?

Some of these questions and hypotheses can be answered best by deeper quantitative analyses on PISA data, however others are better to investigate by qualitative research. The author of this paper intends to do interviews among students and teachers to bring the deeper correspondences to surface and shed light on how the 'digital natives' and (mostly) 'digital immigrants' themselves see the relationship between ICT use and school performance and how they explain the role of ICT in learning and teaching and academic achievement.

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The Impact of Brand, Sex, Moment and Distance of Estimation on the Speed Perception of Vehicles



Abstract

Our research explores whether stereotypes influence estimations of the speed of a cheap vehicle and an expensive one viewed on film by participants. A second aim was to determine whether stereotyping could arise while completing a questionnaire. Davies (2009) demonstrated that no effect attributable to stereotyping could be detected among 18–21 year old participants' contemporaneous estimates of two vehicle speed (the cheap Volkswagen Polo and the expensive BMW).

In Experiment 1 we tested Davies' result among 14–18 year old school students. No interaction was found between any of the factors involved. The analysis also revealed that neither the main effects due to brand, nor the moment of estimation of the speed was significant. Furthermore, the main effect due to participants' sex was not significant.

In Experiment 2 we tested Davies' same results (2009) among university students (N = 351), but with a different experimental arrangement. Participants estimated the speed of cars from two different distances.

No interaction was detected between any of the factors – brand, distance, sex – involved. The analysis revealed that neither the main effects of the brand, nor the distance of the vehicle from the camcorder was significant. However, the effect of participants' sex *was* found to be significant: females' overall speed estimate achieved a higher grade of accuracy.

Keywords

estimating speed; impact of brand on speed estimation; moment of estimation; stereotypes; cars.

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The impact of vehicle brand on speed estimation can have important implications in eyewitness psychology. However, only a few researchers – Davies – Patel (2005), Davies (2009), Kósa et. al. (2011), and Kósa – Zsigmond (2013) – have addressed this issue. Davies and Patel (2005) demonstrated that stereotypes associated with particular types of car can influence judgments of culpability in a road accident report. Later, Davis (2009) conducted three experiments on speed estimation. In his experiments the impact of aggressiveness attributed to drivers through stereotyping on the estimated speed of the vehicles (a BMW 3 Series and VW Polo) was measured. The first two experiments concluded that no effect of stereotyping could be detected in the speed estimation of 18–21 year old participants who, having viewed a film of both cars, estimated the speed immediately after watching the film.

Experiment 1

Based on the findings above, our aim was to find out whether stereotyping due to brand could arise among students aged 14–18 not only after a day delay, but also during completing the questionnaire, within 4–5 minutes after watching the film. The question considering the first group's speed estimate – of the Matiz – was placed at the end of the questionnaire (1st condition), while the second group were asked for their estimation of the same car at the beginning of the questionnaire (2nd condition). The same procedure was followed for the third and fourth experimental groups but in this case using a film of the VW Polo. While testing Davies' result (2009) in another age group (14–18 years old) we also took into consideration the sex of the participants and the moment of speed estimation. In this experiment participants observed video sequences of either a cheap Daewoo Matiz or an expensive Volkswagen Polo, both of similar shape and size and of identical grey colour.

Method

Participants and Design

The 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design featured a quasi-experimental between-subject factor (sex) and two other between-subject factors (brand, and moment of estimation of the speed).

The experiment took place at two secondary schools, one in a small town, the other in a county town. Out of four groups of secondary school students (N = 214), aged between 14 and 18 years, the question requiring the first group's speed estimate – of the Matiz – was placed at the end of the questionnaire (1st condition), while the second group were asked for their estimation of the same car at the beginning of the questionnaire (2nd condition). The same procedure was followed for the third and fourth experimental groups but in this case using a film of the VW Polo.

Materials

A cheap Daewoo Matiz and an expensive Volkswagen Polo – of similar shape, size, colour and same year of manufacture – had been filmed from a car parked at an intersection outside each location. The two cars passed by the camera separately at a speed of 80 km/h (77 km/h or 48.84 mi/h calibrated speed). Local traffic was stopped during filming with the help of the County Police Inspectorate.

The same car registration plate was used for both cars and both were driven by the same person (the driver's sex, age etc. being unrecognizable). The film was then edited to produce two 4 second long sequences (one of the Matiz, the other the Polo) each passing directly in front of the camera and continuing at the same constant speed for about a further 20m, (when filming was stopped). The noise of the cars was kept unaltered during the presentations. In order to check the recognizability of the vehicle brands, the two short film sequences were first pretested to 33 secondary school students without mentioning the brand.

Participants in experiments completed a questionnaire (in Hungarian) firstly concerning the speed of the vehicles seen on the film. The questionnaire also asked for the participants'

driving history, frequency of car usage and the brand of car(s) they drive. Next, these participants were asked to name the brand and approximate price of the two cars from the sequences. Then based on their brand preferences they were asked to rank in descending order – from the most desirable to the least desirable – the following 10 vehicles of similar shape and size to those used in the research: Peugeot 206, Renault Clio, Volkswagen Polo, Dacia Logan, Opel Corsa, Daewoo Matiz, Mercedes Smart, Suzuki Swift, Chevrolet Spark and Skoda Fabia.

Using a 4-point rating scale (from '1' *very important* to '4' *not important at all*) they were also asked about the importance in their everyday life of certain brands of products, their price, quality, shape, trendiness, popularity among friends, equipment level, uniqueness and to what extent they are advertised. Finally, they answered questions concerning their age, sex and what information they had used to estimate the speeds of the vehicles.

Procedure

Students were tested in a classroom in their respective secondary schools. They were asked to participate voluntarily and anonymously in a five-minute research on cars organized by our university. They were randomly assigned by a researcher to one of the four experimental groups and then asked to sit in front of one of two notebooks, (Samsung NP300ESZ with earphones and '15,6' monitors). They were told that they would be shown a video clip of a passing car, and immediately afterwards would be required to fill in a questionnaire at an adjacent table. After completing the questionnaire the volunteers were thanked for taking part in our research, told they would be given an explanation of the aims of the research later that day and that the results of the research would follow a few months later.

Results

Of the participants who observed the Matiz, and whose estimate of the speed were given at the beginning of the questionnaire (2nd condition); 96,8% were able to recognize its brand and 3,2% did not provide an answer. Of those who observed the Polo sequence (again as the 2nd condition); 83,7% were able to identify it accurately and 7% as belonging to the same price category (9,3% did not provide an answer.) A similar pattern emerged for the groups who were required to give their estimates at the *end* of the questionnaire, (1st condition); 91,9% of participants who observed the Matiz were able to recognize its brand, 1,6% as belonging to the same price category and 6,5% not providing an answer. Of those who observed the Polo sequence, 69,6% were able to identify it accurately, 13% as belonging to the same price category, 2,2% identified the Matiz and 15,2% did not provide an answer. In the statistical analysis, only the data of those participants who could precisely identify the brand of the car in the film, or at least categorize it as belonging to the same price category, were taken into account. The differences between the means of the estimated prices of the two cars were analyzed by independent sample t-test, revealing a significant difference between them. The Polo was estimated to be more expensive than the Matiz, $t\,(160) = -3{,}884$, $p = 0{,}04$. Thus our assumption that the prices of the two cars involved in the experiment are perceived to differ significantly from each other was met.

Concerning the ranking of the mentioned 10 brands of vehicles, we were also able to identify an important difference: Marking with '1' the *most desirable* and with '10' the *least desirable* they expressed the same strong dissimilarity between the Matiz and Polo. The highest score was reached by the former, the least by the latter (Table 1).

We transformed each participant's judgments into scores representing the deviation from the true speed (77 kph) regardless of over or underestimate. After checking the assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity of variances (extreme scores removed), the estimated speed scores were analysed using factorial analyses of variance of a quasi-experimental between-subject factor (sex), and two between-subject factors (brand and moment of estimation of vehicle speed).

No interaction could be detected between any of the factors involved. The analysis also revealed that neither the main effects due to brand; ($F(2, 201) = 0{,}243$, $p = 0{,}622$, $n^2 = 0{,}001$), nor the moment of speed estimation; ($F(3, 201) = 0{,}333$, $p = 0{,}717$, $n^2 = 0{,}003$) were significant (Figure 1). The main effect due to participants' sex was not significant either ($F(1, 336) = 6{,}304$, $p = 0{,}322$, $n^2 = 0{,}021$, Figure 2).

We conducted one-way ANOVA tests to identify in participants' everyday life any potential relationships between the variables of brand importance, price, quality, shape, trendiness, popularity among friends, equipment level, uniqueness, advertising and the speed estimation: No statistical relationships were found.

Conclusion and discussion

Our results are consistent with those of other researchers who have demonstrated the relatively high accuracy of speed estimation, (Scialfa et. al. 1991; Evans 1970), and the work of Davies (2009), that demonstrates the lack of a stereotype-driven effect on contemporaneous speed estimation. We have shown that in case of secondary school students, stereotyping does not seem to arise in the case of contemporaneously made judgements, nor within the time-frame of a 4–5 minute questionnaire. This held true whether participants observed the expensive VW Polo or the Daewoo Matiz passing in front of the camera, or when film of the cars was cut 20 meters *before* the vehicles passed directly in front of the camera.

More research is required to find out whether stereotyping after a day's delay in speed estimations, based on brand (as described by Davies 2009, and by Kósa – Zsigmond 2013), can be detected within this age group. If such stereotyping were shown to exist, it would be highly beneficial to identify exactly when, within that first 24 hours, it arises.

Experiment 2

In his above mentioned paper Davies (2009) presented the third experiment that showed stereotyping when estimations were given the following day by phone or e-mail: the estimated speed of BMW was then significantly higher than that of the VW Polo.

Kósa and Zsigmond (2013) revealed a relationship between the passing order of the vehicles and their brand during speed estimation of an expensive (Volkswagen Polo) and a cheaper car (Daewoo Matiz). Every participant in four groups observed the two vehicles in two different

passing orders, half of the groups estimating the speed at the time of viewing the film, the other half being asked a day later by phone or e-mail. Results showed that a slower speed was attributed to the Matiz than to the Polo in each speed estimation / passing order. In addition, they found a significant relationship between passing order and brand, showing up a stereotype-driven judgment of speed-estimation even in estimates given at the time of viewing the film.

This current paper explores the impact of vehicle stereotypes on witness judgments of speed. According to the hypothesis, although traveling at the same speed, a significantly higher speed is attributed to the expensive car than to the cheap one regardless of experimental conditions.

Participants observed video sequences of either a cheap (Daewoo Matiz) or a more expensive (Volkswagen Polo), both of similar shape and size and of identical colour (grey). The cars were filmed travelling at a 77 kph calibrated speed and were filmed separately by a camera in a stationary car situated at a local intersection. After passing directly in front of the camera, the cars continued travelling for about 20 m at constant speed until filming was stopped.

These two films, called "passing in front of the camera" were seen by the participants belonging to the first two experimental groups.

By editing these two original films, two other sequences were produced for viewing by the third and the fourth experimental groups. In these new sequences, filming was cut when the two vehicles were approximately 15 m from the camera. (These new sequences were named "15 m before reaching the camera"). Therefore, participants observed either the Polo (third experimental group) or the Matiz (fourth group) also travelling at 77 kph, but not passing directly in front of the camera. According to the hypothesis, a significantly lower speed is attributed to the cars on these short films than those films in which the cars passed in front of the camera.

Regarding the role of sex in speed estimation, it was supposed that there would not be differences between men and women.

Method

Participants and Design

The 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design featured a quasi-experimental between-factor (sex) and two other between-factors (brand and distance of the vehicle seen from the camera; whether the car passed in front of the camera or not on the film).

A random sample of 351 persons (176 female and 175 male) aged between 18 and 26 years were approached on the University campus to take part in a short survey on cars. They were randomly allocated to one the four groups (3 groups of 88 and 1 of 87). All participants observed one film sequence, either the Polo or Matiz and completed a questionnaire immediately after it was shown.

Materials

Both vehicles were filmed travelling at 77 kph calibrated speed (80 kph on the milometer). Local traffic was stopped during filming with the help of the County Police Inspectorate.

The same car registration plate was used for both cars and both were driven by the same person (The driver's sex, age etc. being unrecognizable). The film was first edited to produce two 4 second

long sequences; (one of the Matiz, the other the Polo) each passing in front of the camera. These sequences were then re-edited to produce two more (4 second) sequences in which the two cars were seen *not* passing in front of the camcorder, (the recording being cut with the cars at about 15 m from the camera). The noise of the cars was kept unaltered during the presentations.

In order to check the recognizability of the vehicle brands, short film sequences were first presented to 30 secondary school teachers without mentioning the brand.

These participants completed a questionnaire (in Hungarian) firstly concerning the speed of the vehicles seen on the film. The questionnaire also asked for participants' driving history, frequency of car usage and the brand of car(s) they drive. Next, participants were asked to name the brand and the approximate price of the two cars from the sequences. Based on their preferences they were also asked to rank in descending order – from the most desirable to the least desirable – the following 10 vehicles of similar shape and size to those used in the research: Peugeot 206, Renault Clio, Volkswagen Polo, Dacia Logan, Opel Corsa, Daewoo Matiz, Mercedes Smart, Suzuki Swift, Chevrolet Spark and Skoda Fabia.

Using a 4-point rating scale (from "1" *very important* to "4" *not important at all*) they were also asked about the importance in their everyday life of certain brands of products, their price, quality, shape, trendiness, popularity among friends, equipment level, uniqueness and to what extent they are advertised. Finally, they answered questions concerning their age, sex and what information they had used to estimate the speeds of the vehicles.

Procedure

Students were tested in the hall of the University. Three students and one of the researchers walked around asking people to participate voluntarily and anonymously in a five minute research on cars organized by our university. They were accompanied to the big round table in the Hall, randomly assigned by a researcher to one of the four experimental groups and then asked to sit in front of one of four laptops (Dell Inspiron 6400 with earphones and a "15.4" monitor.) They were told that they would be shown a video clip of a passing car, and that immediately afterwards, they would be required to fill in a questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire the volunteers were thanked for taking part in our research. They were also told they would be given an explanation of the aims of the research later that day and the results of the research a few months later.

Results

92% of participants who observed the Matiz on the "in front of the camera" film were able to recognize its brand and 2% of them identified it as belonging to the same price category. Of those who observed the Polo sequence 73% were able to identify it accurately and 16% as belonging to the same price category. A similar pattern emerged for those who observed the "far from camera" sequences (for both the Polo or the Matiz.) 85% of those who viewed the Matiz were able to recognize its brand and 6% identified it as belonging to the same price category; 47% of those who observed the Polo recognized it precisely and 31% categorized the vehicle

as having a similar price. In the statistical analysis, only the data of those participants' who could precisely identify the brand of the car in the film (Table 2), or at least categorize it as belonging to the same price category (Table 3) were taken into account.

The differences between the means of the prices of the two cars were analyzed by independent sample t-test, revealing a significant difference between them. The Polo was estimated as more expensive than the Matiz, $t\,(349) = –5{,}173$, $p = .006$. Thus our assumption, that the prices of the two cars involved in the experiment are perceived to differ significantly from each other, was met.

Concerning the ranking of the mentioned 10 brands of vehicles we were also able to identify an important difference. Marking with "1" the *most desirable* and with "10" the *least desirable* they expressed the same strong dissimilarity between the Matiz and Polo. The highest score was reached by the former, the least by the latter (Table 4).

We transformed each participant's judgements into scores representing the deviation from the true speed (77 kph) regardless of over or underestimate. After checking the assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity of variances (extreme scores removed), the estimated speed scores were analyzed using a factorial analyses of variance of a quasi-experimental between-factor (sex) and two between-factors (brand and distance of the vehicle from the camcorder at the moment of estimation: whether the car passed in front of the camera or not on the film). No interaction could be detected between any of the factors involved. The analysis also revealed that neither the main effects due to brand; ($F(2, 336) = 0.237$, $p = 0.627$, $n^2 = 0.001$), nor the distance of the vehicle from the camcorder at the moment of the estimation, were significant; ($F(3, 336) = 1.025$, $p = 0.381$, $n^2 = 0.009$). However, the main effect due to participants' sex was significant ($F(1, 336) = 6.304$, $p = 0.013$, $n^2 = 0.021$). Thus, approximately 2% of the variation in the scores for speed estimation is accounted for by this factor.

Females' overall speed estimate achieved a higher grade of accuracy ($M = 13.10$, 95% $CI = 11.32 – 14.88$) than males' ($M = 16.25$, 95% $CI = 14.54 – 17.96$). (See Figure 3 and 4).

Conclusion and discussion

Based on two different speed estimation distances, a new experiment arrangement was tested in the current study. Two groups of participants – one group observed the Matiz, the other the Polo – observed a nearing car from 15 m. The hypothesis that significantly lower speed would be attributed to the cars in these short films than to those which passed in front of the camera, were not supported. Consistent with the conclusions in the field (Evans 1970, Scialfa et. al. 1991, Davies 2009, Kósa et. al. 2011) estimates of vehicle speed are considerably accurate. Results of Experiment 1 show a relatively high accuracy of speed estimation regardless of the distance from where estimates were done.

Taking into consideration Scialfa et. al. result (1987) that compare to younger men and women only older women overestimated cars' speed, we hypothesized no difference between university students by sex. It is surprising, however, that females achieved a higher accuracy of speed estimation in every condition compared to men. More research is required to find out whether stereotyping due to sex is also characteristic to other speed estimation contexts.

Acknowledgements

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Brand	Average of classification (1–10)	Ranking order
Peugeot 206	4.43	3
Renault Clio	5.29	6
Volkswagen Polo	4.34	2
Dacia Logan	7.30	9
Opel Corsa	5.38	7
Daewoo Matiz	8.06	10
Mercedes Smart	4.73	4
Suzuki Swift	5.52	8
Chevrolet Spark	5.06	5
Skoda Fabia	4.32	1

Table 1 *Desirability of brand*



Figure 1 *Estimated marginal means of speed of vehicle – brand of vehicle*



Figure 2 *Estimated marginal means of speed of vehicle – sex*

Experimental group	Brand	%
Matiz, 'passing in front of the camera' film	Recognized the Matiz	92
	Recognized the Matiz as belonging to a similar price category	2
	Recognized it as belonging to a higher price category	7
	Total grup – Matiz	*100*
Polo, 'passing in front of the camera' film	Recognized the VW Polo	73
	Recognized the Polo as belonging to a similar price category	16
	Recognized it as belonging to a cheaper price category	11
	Total grup – VW	*100*
Matiz, '15 m before reaching the camera' film	Recognized the Matiz	85
	Recognized the Matiz as belonging to a similar price category	6
	Recognized it as belonging to a higher price category	9
	Total grup – Matiz	*100*
Polo, '15 m before reaching the camera' film	Recognized the VW Polo	47
	Recognized the Polo as belonging to a similar price category	31
	Recognized it as belonging to a cheaper price category	22
	Total grup – VW	*100*

Table 2 *Recognizability of brand*

Experimental group	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Matiz, 'passing in front of the camera'	2 060,63	2 000	1 000	1167,49	300	6 000	88
VW, 'passing in front of the camera'	3 969,38	4 000	5 000	1847,20	1 500	13 000	88
Matiz, '15 m before reaching the camera'	2 615,95	2 000	2 000	1909,13	600	12 000	88
VW, '15 m before reaching the camera'	4 216,66	3 500	5 000	2 750,28	500	15 000	87

Table 3 *Estimated price in Euros of the vehicles by experimental groups*

Brand	Average of classification (1–10)	Ranking order
Peugeot 206	4	2
Renault Clio	5,17	6
Volkswagen Polo	3,45	1
Dacia Logan	7,70	9
Opel Corsa	4,70	4
Daewoo Matiz	7,98	10
Mercedes Smart	4,86	5
Suzuki Swift	5,88	*8*
Chevrolet Spark	5,70	7
Skoda Fabia	4,57	3

Table 4 *Desirability of brand*



Figure 3 *Estimated marginal means of the speed of the cars – experimental group*



FIGURE 4 *Estimated marginal means of the speed of the cars – brand*

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Publicity, Communication and Community in the Information Age



Abstract

In the age of electronic communication, a new virtual social space is in the making which strengthen the cohesion of competing virtual communication communities, and in which, therefore, the influence of traditional social and political institutes declines. The new communication situations created by the use of electronic technologies (radio, television, the internet, mobile telephony) transform our notion and expectations of political communication, and have a tremendous impact on the social and political rituals. This article argues that the new multi-channel communication situations created by the use of new media have a significant impact on politicians who address so many different types of people simultaneously. The aim of my essay is to show how the networked spaces of multi-channel electronic communication, the multiple public spheres and the new, information-centered redefinition of social and political categories transform the style and content of political communication and, thus, our expectations concerning the political performances.

Keywords

information age, electronic communication, publicity, community

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Introduction

Electronic communication creates new situations which transform our notions of the norms of social and political behavior. A new, virtual social and political space is in the making which has a tremendous impact on the social and political rituals. The old hegemony of state-structured and territorially bound mediated public life is being replaced by networked spaces of communication not tied to territory, and not resembling a single public sphere within nation-state framework. Thus in the new social space there is a fundamentally new possibility to change the rules of social perception and the conceptualization of relation between our community and traditional political institutes of state.

This paper argues that the new multi-channel communication situations created by the use of electronic technologies (radio, television, the internet, mobile telephony) have a significant impact on politicians who address so many different types of people simultaneously. The aim of my essay is to show how the networked spaces of multi-channel electronic communication transform the style and content of political communication and, thus, our expectations and interpretation strategies concerning political communication and performances.

Multiple public spheres in the space of new media

The new communication situations created by electronic media have a significant impact on politicians' communication role for two reasons: (a) by using new technologies, the political communication role has become more complex, and (b) the expansion of electronic communication has transformed our expectations concerning politicians' communication role.

With the expansion of the multi-channel communication, our notion of public spheres has become more complex. The use of the new communication technologies has led to new kinds of public forums. And thanks to the appearance of these new kinds of forums, both the structure and our conceptualization of public sphere are transformed. The multi-channel mass communication offers not only new technological conditions for communication between isolated social situations, but a communication practice which transforms the social situation itself. As Joshua Meyrowitz writes on the relationship among electronic media and new social situations: *"Electronic media have combined previously distinct social settings, moved the dividing line between private and public towards the private, and weakened the relationship between social situations and physical places. The logic underlying situational patterns of behaviour in a print-oriented society, therefore, has been radically subverted"* (Meyrowitz 1986. 308.).

In a print-oriented society, the framework of the traditional public sphere has usually conceded with the boundaries of nation-state. In the age of electronic media, the old hegemony of state-structured and territorially bound public life mediated by radio, television, and newspapers is being rapidly eroded. With the expansion of multi-channel mass media, a new complex mosaic of differently sized, overlapping and interconnected public spheres is developing.

One of the most interesting arguments linking new media with multiple public spheres has been articulated by John Keane whose central concern is the decline of public service broadcasting, arguing that the traditional hegemony of state-structured and territorially bound mediated public life is being replaced by networked spaces of communication not tied to territory, and not resembling a single public sphere within a nation-state framework (KEANE 1995).

Keane distinguishes among *"macro-public spheres",* hundreds of millions of people enmeshed in disputes at the global level; *"meso-public spheres",* millions of people interacting at the nation-state level; and *"micro-public spheres",* with dozens, hundreds or thousands of disputants interacting at the sub-nation-state level. These are not discrete spaces overlapping networks defined by the lack of differentiation among spheres. In Keane's view, social movements comprise low-profile networks of small groups, organizations, initiatives, local contracts and friendships submerged in everyday life. These networks use various means of alternative media and communication, including telephones, videos, and computers, to question and transform the dominant codes.

These public forums operating through various kinds of communications technologies, of course, are related to each other, exercise mutual influence and form each other. Thus they make more complex the politician's role who wants to take a stand on public affairs. Moreover, the expansion of electronic media leads to the appearance of a new communication language which integrates the forms of language used in oral utterances and in written texts, and which also affect the style of the political communication formed by complex system of multiple public spheres.

Politicians aim at forming and sending their political messages efficiently in the new networked spaces of communication. This new complex communication situation, on the one hand, requires more complex communication strategy of politicians, and, on the other hand, leads to the simplification of the content of the messages and the instrumentalization of the themes and values concerned by political performances. As Meyrowitz writes concerning the new political style created by electronic media: *"»Truth, not artifice« and »issues, not images«, are themselves important chants and central themes in the political drama"* (MEYROWITZ 1986. 277).

In the changing practice of political communication, values and moral dilemmas become increasingly instruments of the convincing communication rather than real foundations of moral decisions. This is why though the political communication concerning programs and strategies is usually *"value-centered",* politicians hardly ever speak about their decision dilemmas and the moral dimensions of these dilemmas.

A specific competition is in the making in the space of multi-channel mass communication in which the political rivals' aim is to overbid each other concerning the values referred by them in a political drama mediated by new media.

Political communication and tabloidization of mass media

The above mentioned process is accelerated by tabloidization of mass media. Tabloidization involves a shift by the media away from national and international issues of importance to a more entertainment or gossipy style of journalism. It is a shift to new and more entertainment-oriented kinds of content, and a shift from verbal to visual priorities. The effect of this shift to a new journalism style is that the important issues such as socio-political reforms which require to be addressed with seriousness have been given the back seat.

In the process of tabloidization of mass media, marketing has become a large part of both electronic and print media. In other words, this process can be regarded as a shift from journalism to the market.

The result of this process, for example, is a news media which manipulates information to push the agenda of the corporations that is based on marketing themselves and their products. This is where tabloidization comes into play. In order to push their interests, the corporations have created a news media that concentrate on attracting audiences through stories about scandal, lifestyle, sleaze and personal lives.

Since media is an integral and imperative component of democratic polity and the prospects of mass media are today viewed as more powerful than ever before, this process of tabloidization has a great impact on the style of political performances. One of the most important consequences of the expansion of tabloid media is that new communication technologies have been eroding barriers between the politicians' private and public spheres, in other words, traditional back and front regions. A new politician role is in the making which is referred to as "middle region" role by Meyrowitz in his work, *No Sense of Place.* As Meyrowitz writes: *"The reconfiguration of the stage of politics demands a drive toward consistency in all exposed spheres. To be carried off smoothly, the new political performance requires a new »middle region« role: behavior that lacks the extreme formality of former front region behavior and also lacks the extreme informality of traditional back region behavior. Wise politicians make the most of the new situation. They try to expose selected, positive aspects of their back regions in order to ingratiate themselves with the public. Yet there is a difference between coping with the new situation and truly controlling it. Regardless of how well individual politicians adjust to the new exposure, the overall image of leaders changes in the process. The new political performance remains a performance, but its style is markedly changed"* (Meyrowitz 1986. 271.).

As a consequence of this process, it is increasingly difficult for politicians to distinguish between the ways in which they behave in private situations and ways in which they present themselves for the mass media. *"The new public image of politicians"*, writes Meyrowitz, *"has many of the characteristics of the former back-stage of political life, and many once informal interactions among politicians and their families, staff, reporters, and constituens have become more stiff and formal as they are exposed to national audiences"* (Meyrowitz 1986. 274).

Consequently, tabloidization of mass media affects not only the perceptions of audiences but also the response of politicians to their own roles and performances. To use the multi-channel public forums in their performances effectively, politicians adopt the language and formal means of tabloid mass media willy-nilly. They adapt to the tabloidization tendencies as active participants of the mass media processes, and by adopting style of tabloid media, they contribute to the tabloidization of political communication itself too.

The political practice is determined increasingly by the massages simplified extremely. And this tendency leads, as we have seen above, to the instrumentalization of such communication themes as ethical values and moral dilemmas. The complex network of the forums created by multi-channel mass communication and stylistic consequences of tabloidization of mass media can be regarded as bases of a political communication practice that is less and less suitable to present the real values and intentions motivating politicians' acts.

In addition, a politician must face up to the fact that the expansion of the multi-channel mass communication leads to a new conceptualization of community. With this new conceptualization, community is conceived as a virtual network of interactions among individuals who uniformly accept and apply some rules for the communicative acts aiming at the effective exchange of information. In the following, I would like to consider this information-centered conceptualization of social and political interactions among networked individuals.

Towards an information-centered redefinition of social and political categories

By using the electronic communication technologies, the media-networked individuals become members of a virtual community that is determined both by the global and the local conditions for an effective method of information exchange. In this new virtual community, new localities are in the making which are particular in many ways, and get are also influenced by global processes and global consciousness. Thus the new local communities organized in the space of electronic communication, on the one hand, strengthen the local attachments, the local identity and, on the other hand, can be regarded as integrated elements of the virtual communities created by global information exchange. Consequently, the global virtual community serves as a kind of comparison background for the local communities organized in the age of electronic media.

With globalized communication space, electronic media give the networked individual external perspectives from which to judge and define his own local community. In other words, the twentieth-century expansion of electronic communication technologies, as Meyrowitz writes, *"have placed an interconnected global matrix over local experience"* (Meyrowitz 2005. 28).

The networked individual determines the characteristics of his own local community in the light of information acquired in the global communication space. The global perspective created by electronic communication has transformed not only the community-definitions but the individual relation to social rules. In the space of electronic communication there is a new possibility to change the rules of social perception and the national institutions of political and cultural domination as a consequence of new global perspectives.

One of the most characteristic features of the virtual space of electronic communication is that it lacks the compulsory categorization system and the classificatory forms and norms of a print society. In the media-networked global and local communities it is difficult to maintain several traditional categorical distinctions that characterized the print societies. That is, as electronic communication technologies expand, the dividing line between several political and social categories becomes increasingly indistinct.

The age of electronic communication is the age of opening categorical and classification boundaries. In this new space of communication the traditional distinctions between private and public, between children and adult experiences, and between male and female spheres collapse and traditional distinctions between private and public, between children and adult experiences, and between make and female spheres collapse and disappear. In the age of electronic media, as Meyrowitz suggests, we are experiencing *"both macro-level homogenization of identities and micro-level fragmentation of them"* (MEYROWITZ 2005. 29.). These permeable linguistic, cultural, and social boundaries affect both the particular behaviors and social identity in general. The increasing functional permeability of these boundaries is a result of such linguistic, cultural and social processes that contribute to develop the media-networked individuals' complex identity.

This complex identity, however, is rooted, first of all, in the new forms of communities. In other words, the use of electronic media can make our concept of community more complex by creating new kinds of communities. A networked individual becomes a member both of a global community based on the global communication crossing cultural, national boundaries and a local community that is organized on the basis of specific, inner norms in the space of electronic communication.

As Joshua Meyrowitz writes on the "multiple, multi-layered, fluid, and endlessly adjustable senses" of the media-networked individuals' identity: "*Rather than needing to choose between local, place-defined identities and more distant ones, we can have them all, not just in rapid sequence but in overlapping experiences. We can attend a local zoning board meeting, embodying the role of local concerned citizen, as we cruise the internet on a wireless-enabled laptop enacting other, non-local identities. And we can merge the two as we draw on distant information to inform the local board of how other communities handle similar issues and regulations. All the while, we can remain accessible to friends, family, and colleagues from anywhere via a text-message enabled mobile phone"* (MEYROWITZ 2005. 28.).

A new virtual social space is in the making which strengthen the cohesion of competing local communities, and in which, therefore, the influence of traditional social and political institutes declines. The new communication situations created by the use of electronic technologies foster greater emotional attachments, to the local community which we choose from among the competing communities deliberately without social and political restriction.

Thus in this new social space there is a fundamentally new possibility to change the rules of social perception and the conceptualization of the relation between the local communities and traditional political institutes of state. Thanks to these changes, the networked individual is attached to the place and position appointed by his own social class less and less. Through his multi-channel communicative acts he can become acquainted with more and more communal forms, ways of life, traditions and values, in the light of which he can choose more deliberately from among the competing local communities. And this more deliberate choice becomes a part of the more and more complex and multi-layered identity of the networked individual.

Considering the influence of mediated communication on our conceptualization of community, many theorists believe that we need a synthesis of physical and virtual communities in order to truly inhabit our experiences. For example, Manuel CASTELLS (2000) holds that we need a "bridge" between physical and virtual places in order to unify our experience, because virtual

communities only deal in fragmented individuals as opposed to real life. Others, like Amitai ETZIONI (2001) and James E. KATZ et al. (2004), emphasize that the best communities are indeed the hybrids of physical and virtual communities which have a higher level of social capital.[1] They see ideal communities as virtual communities enhancing physical ones. If the mediated communication actually does increase social capital of communities, then it will be accompanied by a rise in offline contact, civic engagement, and other traditional forms of social capital. It seems that users of new communication technologies are more likely to be involved in community organizations, to be political involved, and to communicate with friends and family, than non-users.

According to Katz et al., since electronically mediated communication becomes inherently part of real life in today's world, "we need an operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities in order to have fulfilling, embodied experiences all of the time" (KATZ et al. 2004: 362). In this view, in the age of electronically mediated communication, the dividing line between virtual and physical communities becomes increasingly indistinct. Therefore, as Mark Poster shows, mediated individuals imagine their virtual communities as real (POSTER 2001). That is, the role of communication as meaningful and value-based in virtual communities, works to construct physical communities as well.

In this view, these hybrid communities can be regarded as moral entities that allow individuals to transcend themselves and find partnership with humanity, and that, therefore, have some level of social capital. Thus well-developed social capital of community is linked to a strong internal morality in which individuals balance their individual rights with collective responsibility. Collective responsibility appears to be closely bound to an acceptance of moral norms and values. According to Amitai ETZIONI (1996), moral order then rests on core values that are shared by community and embedded in its social structures. As Etzioni suggests, communities often have strong "moral voices" that help to maintain social order in which values are accepted voluntarily rather than being forced to do so. Such a "moral voice", therefore, should encourage individuals and communities to reflect on their shared moral values and to avoid behaviour that contributes to unsustainable development.

Accordingly, electronic communication creates a new context in which our notions of morality, community, society, and human interactions become more complex. These more complex notions can be regarded as the bases of the idea of global and local information communities, in which an individual's communication attitudes are determined by their impression of their "self" as a permanently available individual whose communicative acts are embedded in a special network of communicative interactions. In earlier eras, communal ties were based on what DURKHEIM (1984) termed mechanical solidarity and were contingent on spatial proximity. In the new forms of communities, however, human relationships have become organic, since communal ties are based

[1] As a common set of expectations and values, social capital of community is based on the fact that trust among individuals will allow a community to accomplish more with their physical and mental capacities that/than can individuals alone. That is, social capital of community can be regarded as an ability of people to associate and work together for common communal purposes. It is influenced by social interaction and communication, relations of trust, communal norms and values, and it describes the social networks of the individual along with the various webs of reciprocity. As Robert PUTNAM (2000. 19.) notes: "social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" and "calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal relations".

more on common values, ideas, and interests. It seems, therefore, that social capital is enhanced when new forms of communities develop around and extend traditional forms of communities.

The transformation of our notion of community, the complex network of the forums created by multi-channel mass communication and tabloidization of mass media are such developments that fundamentally change the stylistic elements of the political performances, the means and criteria of the convincing political communication, the social, communal expectations concerning politicians' communication role. And these developments, as we have seen, set politicians a big challenge who have to adapt to these changes, but who, at the same time, also have to stick to the human, moral values that can make the political communication authentic and, thus, convincing.

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Escape to Football

Péter, László (2016):
A labdarúgás szociológiája [The Sociology of Football]
Presa Universitara Clujeană/Kolozsvári Egyetemi Kiadó

Péter, László (2017):
Forbidden Football in Ceaușescu's Romania
New York – London, Palgrave MacMillan

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I have always loved football and as a sociologist I consider it as an indicator of important social issues (insomuch that I have become a football blogger in my later years). In the eighties I've been regularly watching the football matches (usually the Steaua) which were part of *Album Duminical* on Sundays from 1 pm in the Romanian television accessible also in Szeged. Accordingly, I was able to admire Hagi, Bölöni, Belodedici and the others. I got to know László Péter on a workshop in Szeged ten years ago, and by reading his book[1] on social problems I've got

[1] PÉTER, LÁSZLÓ (2009): *Elmélet és empíria öt globális társadalmi probléma vizsgálatában.* Kolozsvár, Kriterion Kiadó.

ascertained of him being a good expert. That is why I appreciated a lot that recently he has published two books on the sociology of football.

Let's see first *The Sociology of Football.* Prior to all the reviewer has to highlight that this book fills a lack of writings in such issues. Some might be confused about the interconnection of these two words: what has football to do with sociology? (It's a pity that the Giddens book, which is considered a 'Bible' in the education of sociology, doesn't mention football or sports at all!) Well, the author's answer to the question is quite acceptable: "It's a fact that football [...] is not just about sports, but means much more: it's a political tool, in many cases source of legitimacy for power, business, channel of social mobility, replication of long lasting conflicts, the postmodern variant of ancient rites [...]. I consider football a symbolic and deep game, along which different social drama's take place generating strong individual and collective experiences and memories, frustrations and hopes."[2] Unfolding the Geertzian definition of deep game, later he continues: "By playing football, different big social groups struggle with each other in a symbolic way: ethnic groups and the majority, metropolitans and people from the rural areas, natives and newcomers, working class (at least what is left of it) and the middle class, winners and losers of changes, the representatives of local and international capital, leaders and followers, minority and majority. It can give explanation for wars, national characters and even globalization. And as for the main social issues, the relation to power, media, racism and masculinity are also central subjects of football."

The book begins with a short summary of the history of football. The main thesis of the author is that "football, as we know it in Europe, is a modern product."[3] By relying on classical works,[4] László Péter highlights properly the main points. The uncivilized, vandal, but at carnivals played 'ancient football' was followed by a traditional period. However, the term 'traditional' refers just to a certain period in the history of the game because football is the product of the modern, industrial era. Contrary to popular belief, in the beginning football was not a working class sport as it had been evolving at English schools for boys. Later the rules of the game were standardized, international sports associations and championships were set up, and then international competition systems have been organized. In the later stages, which László Péter calls pre-modern, transitory modern, late modern and post-modern,[5] the game became more and more professionalized (it means the standardization of the game's inner practice and institutionalization), national styles of football appeared,[6] the national and international football fields evolved.[7] Football had become the main form of entertainment for the crowds of workers living in the big industrial centers. Parallel to deindustrialization and the decline of the working class, the workers begun to lose their position which played a crucial role in the emergence of football hooliganism. This was partly the reason for the 'civilization' of football stadiums, namely the extrusion of the working class spectators being considered 'dangerous class' again. However, by the appearance of satellites the management

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[2] Péter, László (2016): A *labdarúgás szociológiája.* Kolozsvár, Presa Universitara Clujeană/Kolozsvári Egyetemi Kiadó. 9.

[3] Péter 2016. 24.

[4] For example:. Giulianotti, R. (2004): *Football. A sociology of the global game*. Cambridge, Polity Press.; Goldblatt, D. (2006): *The ball is round. A global history of football.* London, Penguin Books.

[5] The use of the terms "traditional" and "post-modern" in the periodization of the modern is somehow confusing.

[6] Péter 2016. 37.

[7] Péter 2016. 38.

of the clubs has changed: they don't make a living by the spectators – who come more and more from the middle class – visiting the football matches, but by the fans sitting in front of the television. This mediatization enhances commercialization and celebrity cult.

For Hungarian readers the part of the book about the Romanian situation is particularly interesting. It is perceptible that László Péter is sad about his favorite sport in his homeland getting more and more manipulated, 'estranged' and determined by money.[8] Still the problems of Hungarian football which is on a lower level are not this sophisticated. At our eastern neighbors the building of stadiums is less politicized[9] and less divisive, while in Hungary it has become a political catchword: "Go Hungary, go Hungarians!". That's why not only the attitude towards certain teams, but towards football itself is a question of political identity. Moreover, Romanian football gained its biggest international success – Steaua won the European Cup – in the same year when Hungary faced its historical catastrophe losting 6–0 in Irapuato. Later Romanian football kept on being successful and has just begun to fall back slightly in the last few years. By contrast, Hungary used to be one of the best football teams in the world before losing to the Soviets at the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. After 1989 Hungarian football began to decline even more and this process is still going on. It is true that it's not a sociological problem but rather an issue of professional football, however it seems that the author doesn't take the professional aspect into account elsewhere either.[10] He also neglects that the great development of football in terms of tactics and conditional training[11] wouldn't have been possible without scientific training methods, which can be financed due to the penetration of *big business* into football.

All in all *The Sociology of Football* is like a course book, which summarizes the main results and approaches of a special field of sociology in a logical and clear way. Of course it's not avoidable to be lesson like, but books like this are necessary[12] because the sociology of sports is quite a new discipline. That's why[13] it is now at a stage like sociology itself was in the beginning, at the time of 'Introductions' and 'Einleitungs'.

I started to read *Forbidden Football* with even higher expectations than *The Sociology of Football* because its subject is not well-known. This quite slim book deals with a phenomenon very specific in Eastern Europe: the very prevalent and illegal watching of football matches. The reason for this phenomenon was that at the time of the Ceaușescu dictatorship, parallel

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[8] However he admits (see Péter 2016. 14.) that mediatization helps to fight the manifestations of racism on the football pitches.

[9] Péter 2016. 113.

[10] There is also a counter-example: when talking about the contrasts between *menottismo* and *bilardismo* he notices sensitively that at the time of the Argentinian military junta the creative football of Menotti signified a way of thinking opposite to the military discipline. By contrast, the *anti-fútbol* of Bilardo didn't generate resistance because then there was democracy and no need for subversion. A deeper analysis reveals that the cynical defensive football was first established also at a time of military junta when fluid possession football, the *la nuestra* tragically lost 6–1 to Czechoslovakia at the World Cup in 1958. See: Wilson, Jonathan (2016): *Angels with Dirty Faces.* London, Orion Books. 197–225.

[11] See the "revolution" of Barcelona with the 'tiqui-taca'.

[12] See also a deep analysis: Szegedi, Péter (2014): *Riválisok. Debrecen futballtársadalma a 20. század első felében.* [Rivals. Society and Football in Debrecen in the First Half of the 20th Century]. Budapest, Korall Kiadó.; Hadas Miklós (1995): *Futball és társadalmi identitás.* [Football and Social Identity] *Replika* 6. 17–18., 89–120.

[13] See the book which presents how to apply the classical theories in sociology for sports: (*Sport and Modern Social Theorists.* Giulianotti, Richard [ed]: Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2004).

to the passing of the period of so-called socialist consumerism, from the mid 80s the television broadcasted almost only programmes about the Conducator and his wife. That's why hardly any football matches had been broadcasted although in similar regimes sports and specifically football were important factors of system legitimation.[14] Therefore the fans of this sport (Romanians and Hungarians as well) tried to watch the channels of the neighbour country. This required deep technical knowledge and remarkable organizational skills. Moreover, if a Hungarian team played or the MTV (Hungarian Television) broadcasted the match, illegal TV watching involved political commitment and – because of the paranoia of the Romanian communist system about the Hungarians – even a risk similar to the listening of Western radio stations.[15] The absurdity of this very similar to *Ubu Roi* by Jarry and is also indicated by the title *Forbidden Football.*

The patterns of common watching of football matches were different according to the possibility of catching the channels at a given town or residential area. Where it was possible, for example at some places in Cluj-Napoca, the "ceremony" was quite the same as in Hungary at the beginning of the 60s: those who had a tv hosted several people during the football match. Where it was not possible, for example at Szeklerland, many people had to cooperate to assure the conditions of watching. Some were responsible for the technique (television set, antennas), others for the transport, the supply of food and drinks, or the fooling of authorities.

There were different patterns of the relationship of the fans and the power. The members of the nomenclature formed a separate group, who enjoyed the matches apart from the common people, within a small and 'good' company. Among the common spectators sometimes there were policemen, however, the police many times took measures against the organizers and the participants. It's a big question why the Securitate didn't take a stronger line; maybe many of them were interested in World Cup or European Cup games. Sometimes spectators ably took advantage of state infrastructure: there was a case when a technical description from the magazine of the communist youth organization was used to construct a device. The silly censor didn't notice what an antenna, which receives signals from big distances, could be used for.[16]

The main thesis of the book is that the underground movement of watching football matches was some kind of struggle for freedom. This contradicts the theories of totalitarianism[17] and the saying "hominy doesn't explode", i. e. the Romanians endure everything. The meetings were not only motivated by fandom but also by escape from tyrannism at the village of Csomafalva[18] in Szeklerland and the socialist town of Balánbánya[19] where the "masculine"[20] worker culture had been destroyed in the 80s as well. This is indicated by the very witty chapter title referring to Erich Fromm:[21]

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[14] This led to astonishing anomalies; for example even the Steaua vs MTK game in the European Cup wasn't broadcasted. Péter, László (2017): *Forbidden Football in Ceaușescu's Romania.* New York–London, Palgrave MacMillan. 3.

[15] The author has conducted many in-depth interviews and is relying on his own experience from the 80s as well. (Péter 2017. 18–20.).

[16] Péter 2017. 64.

[17] Péter 2017. 128.

[18] Here the tradition of escapism and the brave self-organizing was established by ice-hockey, a speciality of the Szeklers. (Péter 2017. 19.).

[19] Péter 2017. 60–62. The part of the book which presents the situation of this town in the 80's has value.

[20] Erről ld. Willis, Paul (2000): *A skacok.* [Learning to Labour] Budapest, Új Mandátum Kiadó – Max Weber Alapítvány.

[21] Fromm, Erich (2002): *Menekülés a szabadság elől* [Escape from Freedom]. Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó.

Escape to Freedom,[22] but also by an excerpt of an interview: "We went outdoor to be free".[23] Another interviewee mentioned[24] Woodstock when talking about the adventurous, party-like happenings of watching matches. The community building character is highlighted where common entertainment reduced even the conflicts[25] between workers and intellectuals. Of course ethnic Hungarian viewers expressed their national identity by singing the forbidden hymn of the Szeklers and rooting for Hungarian teams. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Church didn't take back the land during privatisation where the crowd had watched the 6–0 disaster because they thought "the place was damned".[26]

The author notices by a witty association that escapism occupying spaces and protesting against formal norms is similar to *gangs.* Finally, these outdoor meetings which were identifiable by the authorities and therefore quite risky meant much more than *escape:* they were forms of *protest*[27] and *riot.* When at the Romanian revolution the crowd shouted: "ole-ole-ole-ole, Ceaușescu nu mai e", they could rely on a background and antecedents.

Forbidden Football somehow gives a feeling of nostalgia, connected to the cult of civil society, towards the televised football samizdat and *underground* sport consumption.[28] This romanticism is longing for a time when belonging to the underground gave a feeling of moral and cultural superiority, when Western products were rare and one needed special communication competencies and finesse to get them. After "second society" became first society, nowadays anyone has access to these goods, including football in television, *if* he has enough money.

The sociology of sports and of football is not an apprentice any more. It is coming of age, as the books of László Péter prove it.

Translation: Vincze, Anikó

[22] Péter 2017. 93.

[23] Péter 2017. 47.

[24] Péter 2017. 117.

[25] Péter 2017. 66.

[26] Péter 2017. 133.

[27] For the understanding of the differences between these, see: Hirschmann, Albert O. (1995): *Kivonulás, tiltakozás, hűség. Hogyan reagálnak vállalatok, szervezetek és államok hanyatlására az érintettek?* [Loyalty, Exit, Voice] Budapest, Osiris Kiadó.

[28] D. Lőrincz, József (2002): *A civil társadalom problémája 1989 után. Politikai kultúra az átmenetben.* [The Problem of Civil Society after 1989. Political Culture in the Transitional Period.] WEB 10. sz. 9–12.

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Patterns of integration

A new model of social stratification

Kovách Imre (2017) (ed.):
Társadalmi integráció. Az egyenlőtlenségek, az együttműködés, az újraelosztás és a hatalom szerkezete a magyar társadalomban
[Social integration – The structure of the inequalities, the cooperation, the redistribution and the power in the Hungarian society]
Budapest – Szeged, MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Szociológiai Intézet – Belvedere Meridionale Kiadó. 378 p.

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The assumption that the capacity of the traditional stratification models to explain social dynamics and differences, investigate individual and group activities, explore the motives and choices of norms and values – even in the Hungarian society – has led to the claim to find a different perspective. Accordingly – as Imre Kovách, the editor and one of the several authors[1] of the book *Social*

[1] The thirteen articles of the edition have been authored and co-authored by the following nineteen researchers and scholars: Fruzsina Albert, Ildikó Barna, Adrienne Csizmady, Bernadett Csurgó, Ibolya Czibere, Beáta Dávid, Márton Gerő, Gábor Hajdú, Ákos Huszár, Éva Huszti, Júlia Koltai, Imre Kovách, Luca Kristóf, Boldizsár Megyesi, Dóra Nemes, Ágnes Lukács, Endre Sik, Bori Simonovits, Andrea Szabó.

integration – The structure of the inequalities, the cooperation, the redistribution and the power in the Hungarian society (2017) argues – it became necessary to change the former paradigm. The research team offers the new – or rather newly discovered – concept of *integration* as the key element of this distinctive paradigm. They assume that the various mechanisms responsible for and facilitating integration and disintegration make it possible to elaborate a multidimensional conceptual scheme with the potential to exceed the approach based on the classical labour force positions. The editor introduces in the first article of the book some essential conceptual remarks about the notions and approaches applied in their far-reaching investigation. We can get familiar – besides other issues – with the interpretation and operationalization of the concept and mechanisms of integration,[2] and the framework expected to be employable in empirical investigation.

The methodological background of the empirical research and the integration model itself is introduced in the second paper by Kovách, Hajdu, Gerő, Kristóf and Szabó. The data analysis is based on a representative survey (N = 2687) carried out in the spring of 2015 by TÁRKI SRI.[3] Besides the proper and detailed description of the research methodology and the process of fieldwork the authors outline certain further specialities of the survey. Namely the main questionnaire has been supplemented with two – rather noteworthy – innovative techniques. On the one hand smaller, random segments of the overall sample have been requested to fill in an extra questionnaire. This specific method of *factorial survey* enabled the researchers to appropriately study the attitudes towards breaking the norms and the opinions about the intentions to help in different situations. On the other hand – again on a smaller random sub-sample – there has been applied a novel form of personal network research method; *contact diary.* As the respondents themselves answered the regarding questions, they described and unfolded their everyday social relations enabling the researchers to better study the role of social resources in various fields.

The integration model – which might truly be considered the key element of the investigation as dominantly (although not exclusively) the following research papers of the book use or further investigate this basic scheme – distinguishes three different levels of the individuals' integration and – from a methodological perspective – there are different variables or groups of variables assigned to these integration levels. The researchers investigated the (1) *system level of integration* with political participation, institutional trust and the acknowledgement of and adherence to the norms. Social dimension has been raised as a separate level of integration. This (2) *social level integration* has been measured with data about the labour market position of the respondents and the patterns of voluntary civil participation. Finally the researchers quantified the (3) *individual* aspects of integration with the number of both the strong and the weak ties, furthermore an index of subjective assessment of exclusion has also been developed. Applying the statistical method of latent class analysis on the eight variables and indices attached to the distinct levels of integration enabled the scholars to explore, recognize and interpret seven different clusters; integration groups in the Hungarian society. The authors then systematically characterize the particular clusters – the groups of the *connection-rich politically active* ("kapcsolatgazdag politikailag aktívak"; 15,5%),

[2] The primary theoretical papers investigating and elaborating the concept of integration and disintegration have not been included in the book. Those who wish to have a more detailed outline of this conceptual framing process might review Kovách – Dupcsik 2012 and Dupcsik – Szabari 2015.

[3] The research project *Integrációs és dezintegrációs folyamatok a magyar társadalomban* – as well as the publication of the book – was financed by the OTKA/NKFIH program.

the *locally integrated* ("lokálisan integráltak"; 9,2%), the *labour market integrated* ("munkaerő-piacon integráltak"; 23,2%), the *system-level integrated* ("rendszerszinten integráltak"; 17,4%), the *weakly integrated* ("gyengén integráltak"; 16,1%), the *norm-following disintegrated* ("normakövető dezintegráltak"; 12,9%) and the *excluded disintegrated* ("dezintegrált kirekesztettek"; 5,6%) – and describe the share of the group types in the society.

A further remarkable novelty of the paper is that the researchers undertake to reconstruct other former models of stratification on the same empirical database which leads to a unique possibility that enables them to explore the similarities and differences of the schemes. The outcomes of the comparison between the newly elaborated integration model and the Ferge-, Kolosi- and latent class (BBC-) models reveal a more remarkable polarization between the upper and lowest segments of the Hungarian society and facilitate a more sophisticated and more appropriate understanding of the position of the disadvantaged social groups. According to the research results it could also be noted that the integration model proves to have the potential to better comprehend the different integrative and disintegrative mechanisms behind the upper and lower groups of the society. In this sense the authors argue that the integration model seems to be able to grasp and empirically perceive the real patterns and mechanisms of social stratification in the Hungarian society.

After outlining the conceptual and empirical background of the integration model, the volume continues to introduce particular research results based either on the integration model itself and/or on the complex database of the research. The articles are edited into five different thematic chapters reflecting the distinct areas or dimensions of the essential integration scheme.

The first chapter focuses on the *integration mechanisms* and contains four research papers which investigate the issue in different fields of societal life. Czibere, Gerő and Kovách *(Redistribution and integration)* argue that distinct forms of redistribution play an essential role in the integration of the society. Besides giving a profound empirical overview about the forms of redistribution the authors highlight that contrary to the *welfare-* and *project-based* types, *recombinant* redistribution proves to be fruitful exclusively to gain and to keep political and economic power and – consequently – has tremendous effect on these sectors. The paper describes this rather complex phenomenon from various perspectives, denotes the tendency that recombinant integration might become a part of the structural system, and reflects on its specific connections with welfare- and project-based redistribution.

Redistribution – especially its recombinant form – and the political sphere are more or less connected fields, and the second analysis of the chapter by Gerő and Szabó investigates this latter segment from the perspective of integration *(Political integration of the society).* The authors build on the three-level interpretation of integration outlined in the general conceptual frame of the research project and carry out a brief analysis based on the dataset where they study political preferences and related attitudes along the structure of the integration model, however they also rely on the data of a further, more detailed thematic survey. In this – major – part of the article the authors explore and thoroughly describe five different clusters of the society based on their opinions regarding the political system and the personal orientations. According to the results of the data analysis group-affiliation proves to have remarkable potential to understand political beliefs and opinions.

The paper by Hajdu and Megyesi *(Social capital, social structure and social integration)* focuses on the role of social capital in integration processes. The researchers investigate whether there can be measured different levels of social capital in the case of the different groups of the society and they compare the results of the integration model and the other stratification and structural models using the dataset of the research project. In order to give a proper measure of social capital they introduce and construct a complex index of social capital. This three-component index incorporates relational capital, trust and participation as separate sub-indices and is employed to illustrate the differences and inequalities of social resources in the hierarchies reflected in the Ferge-Andorka-, the normative-functionalist-, the Kolosi-, the latent class- and the integration models. The outcomes of the analysis corroborate that social capital can be regarded an essential factor of structural differentiation and the results also imply that there is a positive relationship between the extent of social capital and other further dimensions – e.g. subjective exclusion and importance – of integration.

The chapter finishes with an article about the relationship between territoriality and social integration *(Territoriality and social integration)* written by Csizmady, Csurgó, Kovách and Megyesi who investigate the characteristics of the integration model clusters and the integration mechanisms from the perspective of urban-rural dichotomy. In the course of data analysis however they also elaborate a further, more sophisticated – five-categorical – measure of the territorial dimension and utilise it to explore the differences of both the groups and the integration mechanisms. The locally integrated group is also examined separately and the results imply that this cluster directly illustrates the role of territoriality in social differentiation.

Kovách, Kristóf and Szabó open the next chapter *(Stratification and integration)* with their analysis about the integration model *(Social integration and social stratification)*. However they do not investigate only the original classification model but also attempt to take a further step and integrate the normative-functionalist and integration models. The authors conclude that both the initial integration model and the combined – integration normative-functionalist (INF) – model exhibit clear structural hierarchies along certain dimensions: development level of locality and education level. Furthermore the models enable the researchers to reproduce the knowledge gained formerly from the classical stratification schemes – if the dimension of social capital is investigated – and to reconstruct the processes of stratification and integration in the Hungarian society.

The other article *(Stratification, segmentation, precariat)* of the second chapter (Huszár, Sik) thoroughly examines the failure and shortcomings of the classical occupation-based stratification models to express the objective structural conditions of the social sphere and yet offers a possible conceptual frame to explore the main structural features of the Hungarian labour market. The scholars argue – and also empirically illustrate – that the approach of labour market segments can be applied to appropriately investigate the specific positions and processes of the Hungarian labour market. The theory of precariat is the other perspective the authors apply to interpret the characteristics of the labour market and – in this case again – they draw on empirical results during their argument as the uniquely complex variable sets available in the database of the integration research program enable them to operationalize and analyse this specific position of uncertainty.

The next thematic unit of the volume contains articles focusing on norms and values and the authors (Kristóf, Szabó) of first paper *(Social integration and consumption)* investigate

the topic from the perspective of consumption. The researchers construct and empirically measure three distinct dimensions of consumption and utilize these indices to statistically describe and characterise the groups of the integration model and the INF-model. According to the results several clusters of the integration model can be considered consumption groups as well since they reflect distinctive and particularistic patterns of consumption.

Koltai, Kristóf and Simonovits employ the specific method of factorial survey in their research paper *(Norms, values, integration).* They introduce the method in general and profoundly describe the way it has been applied in the basic empirical investigation of the integration research program. In the course of data analysis they illustrate the advantages and perspectives of factorial surveys – actually the explaining factors of the attitudes about giving help in everyday-life situations is concerned in their work. The outcomes of the analytical models imply that there can be found a robust and rather general norm of helping in the Hungarian society; in more serious situations the respondents do not seem to hesitate to help regardless of the characteristics (e.g. ethnic group) of the ones in need, however the role of some individual attributions and the perception about the cost of giving a hand has also been implied.

The topic of *relationships* is covered by the final chapter. In their paper *(Network typology and social integration)* Albert, Dávid, Gerő and Hajdu introduce a novel typology of interpersonal relationships based on the data of the integration research project. They considered six different variables that reflect distinct aspects of individual social networks and applied the method of latent class analysis to explore a four-group structure. The interpretation of the clusters leads to the identification of specific groups characterized by the danger of relational poverty, loneliness, the role of the family and general social life. The network typology is also described along some basic demographic features and subjective measures of different integration aspects. Furthermore the authors compare their network structure and the clusters of the general integration model and conclude that the personal and the other dimensions of integration prove to be connected.

It is the paper by Dávid, Lukács, Huszti and Barna *(Contact diary – plus and minus)* that expounds the other novel methodological technique applied in the survey of the integration research program. The authors profoundly present the background and approach of *contact diary* – a recent method in the research of ego networks that relies on the systematic registration of contact persons – alters – of the individual's network. The data gathered this way explores the list of the ego's actual relationships, and in the empirical sections of the article some main characteristics – size, composition, interactions – about the network of the respondents included in the additional investigation (N = 345) are revealed. The results of the analyses corroborate that certain socio-demographic factors – age, marital status, education level – notably affect personal network structure which proves to be rather homophile. The authors emphasize also the remarkable speciality of the method that it enables the researchers to explore the structure of connections based on concrete interactions instead of the perception of the respondents – as the comparison between the data of the contact diaries and the responses about the number of friends illustrates.

Koltai and Nemes, the authors of the final article *(The impact of locality on social relations)* of both the chapter and the book investigate the role of the territorial characteristics in social connections. In order to measure the size of the social networks they quantify strong and weak ties separately and ascertain three different levels of territoriality – the direct neighbourhood

of the locality, settlement type and regional affiliation. The complex model estimates imply that territoriality has noticeable impact on the number of ties – particularly in the case of the weak ties –, furthermore the researchers illustrate that social integration is also related to the features of the locality as there could be measured significant differences between the clusters of the integration model and the territorial characteristics.

The book outlines the patterns of differences and inequalities in current Hungarian society from various perspectives and the authors of the compiled papers present an extensive empirical illustration of the diverse mechanisms. The concept of integration seems to be adequate and fruitful for the scholars who strive to make explicit efforts to exceed the classical stratification and structural models. Accordingly the volume offers – on the one hand – helpful insights for the professionals of several fields of social science about the actual processes of the current Hungarian society and some novel methodological techniques to investigate them more appropriately. However – on the other hand – the articles may raise the attention of those from the wider public who are interested in and wish to better understand the directions of changes and the prevailing social conditions around them.

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Demographic picture of Hungarians in Transylvania

Review

Veres Valér (2015):
Population structure and ethnicity/nationality. The demographic picture of Hungarians from Transylvania in the light of the 2002 and 2011 censuses
Cluj-Napoca. Cluj University Press

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Several analytical and overview volumes about the demographic results of the 2011 census from Romania concerning Hungarians have been published in Transylvania.

In our review we shall present Veres Valer's volume published by the Cluj University Press in 2015, which is a very comprehensive work that also presents the evolution of the demographic situation of Transylvanian Hungarians. Its biggest strenght is that the author does not only present the situation of Hungarians from the point of view of trends in Transylvania, but also from those

specific to Romania as a whole and to Transylvania, therefore the focus of this volume is larger than the group of Hungarians from Transylvania. On the other hand, the text and the analyses contain several other statistical data – primarily migration and education-statistical data – besides census data, all in important places.

At the beginning of the book the author also reveals the special characteristics of the 2011 census. This was Romania's first census carried out according to EU requirements in which, based on Eurostat recommendations, persons residing abroad for more than a year were not counted into the country's permanent population.

In fact, this book may also be considered a monograph on social statistics which comprehensively presents the situation of Hungarians from Transylvania. The volume contains eight descriptive and a summary chapter. The first chapter is methodological in its nature, presenting the censuses analysed and – by means of content analysis – the discourses related to these censuses from the Hungarian public space from Transylvania. The following seven chapters cover the thematical analysis of the population number and its evolution, age structure, educational level, occupational stratification, natural movement of the population, marriages and divorces, as well as migration, all in a classical way. The internal structure of the chapters also follows a regular logic. First, the trends are presented at national level, then according to ethnic/national distribution and finally in relation to Hungarians, generally separately presenting the territorial differences within the Hungarian community. Of the scales used for the delineation of territorial analyses perhaps the use of development region is not the most felicitous methodological solution in the analysis of demographic processes, especially when approaching this problem from the point of view of a given ethnic/national group. Due to the ethnic-geographical specifics of Transylvania that have been formed over several centuries, the bigger regions (historical Transylvania, Partium, Banat) have different ethnic, economic and social characteristics. Development regions arbitrarily redraw the social, economic map of Transylvania, as well as territories outside of it, by setting aside historical regions. At the same time, considering that there are no data or there are only limited data which would allow historical regional analyses, it is understandable why the author has undertaken such a territorially delimited analysis.

There is an abundance of tables, maps and figures within the chapters and, moreover, tables are also annexed to each chapter. Yet, the author moves freely within the framework of this regular structure, from the point of view of the extent, the time span analysed and the data. Although in certain parts census data are pushed into the background compared to other data sources, this may rather be considered an advantage because it renders the volume more colourful and – by applying social historical and territorial analyses – more readable. The topic of the volume is otherwise larger than narrowly defined demography as it also contains detailed chapters on educational level and stratification, which are clearly as important to the author as "classical" dempographic topics. As already mentioned before, in spite of the time delimitation signalled in the title, characteristically the analyses and data go back to 1992 and in several places even to the 1930-ies. It is obvious that the author is strongly interested in where the begginings of the decrease of the Hungarian population can be dated back. Hungarian demographers from Transylvania are trying to clarify the demographic trends from the 1970-ies and 1980-ies and their causes by employing a serious

methodological apparatus. In order to shed light on this question, in his book Veres makes a complete, backwards construed cohort-component calculus based on 1992 census data. He also puts significant effort into refuting the standpoint according to which the "Romanisation" of Transylvania which took place during state socialism had been carried out by moving Romanians from the Romanian Old Kingdom (Vechiul Regat) to Transylvanian cities.

With his professionally construed data series and analytical description, in his book Veres Valér provides an exact diagnosis concerning the demographic situation of Hungarians from Transylvania based on official statistics. The understanding of tables and analyses is also aided by explanatory notes, therefore this book is not only useful to sociologists and readers with an affinity towards demographic trends, but also to those who start pursuing their studies in this field or to layman who manifest an interest in demographic processes.

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The Value Structure of Students of Teacher Education

Jancsák, Csaba (2018):
Students of Teacher Education in Hungary: before and during the Bologna process
Cluj-Napoca, Presa Universitara Clujeana. 157 p.

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In his upcoming book, entitled *Students of Teacher Education in Hungary: before and during the Bologna process, Csaba Jancsák* aims to understand the value structure of students taking part in teacher education. The author's work, which is the result of nearly two decades of scholarly endeavour, primarily focuses on youth research, within which students participating in teacher training play a prominent role (Jancsák 2011a, 2012, 2014).

The book, published at the Presa Universitară Clujeană, provides a framework for the author's research of many years. In the first part of the book, one gains an insight into the details of a research conducted in 2009. At the dawn of the Bologna process, altogether 526 students from eight faculties of the University of Szeged and the University of Debrecen took part in the research. In the paper-based questionnaire study, students responded to questions related to their academic

progress, personal values, future orientation, career perspectives, and the evaluation of their training programs. The second research took place during the Bologna process, in 2011. Through a nationwide representative data collection with the help of the Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development (OFI), 1210 students of 19 faculties and 12 pedagogical institutes were involved in the research. In the second part of the book, one can read about several aspects of this large-scale research, such as the characteristics of transition from secondary education to higher education, the motives for choosing teacher education program and the institute offering it.

The topic is relevant due to the changes affecting Hungarian higher education in recent decades, the accelerated world of the 21st century, and the continuous transformation of the economic and social environment. The author emphasizes that change of the concept of knowledge necessitated the reformulation of the role and functions of school and teacher as well. What is more, as a result of the expansion of higher education, students with special needs, learning opportunities and values, have also appeared. The above mentioned factors put teacher training into a new context. As the teacher's role affects students' progress in school, which indirectly influences their future labour market positions (Csapó 2016), it is crucial to understand how teachers of the future generations think.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the research presented in the book focuses primarily on the questions of teacher education from the viewpoint of university students. In accordance with the relevant literature, the research claims that the value of the students basically reflects the nature, content and other formal and non-formal factors of education in the institution. Taking students' feedback into account allows communication among students of teacher education, institutes and educational policy makers, which is in turn relevant in order to increase efficiency.

One of the returning motifs in the book is change. The results show that traditional carriers of values (e.g. school, state) have decreasing impact on the value structure of students, but at the same time new influencing factors (e.g. media, other age groups) become significantly more important. This kind of retreat into smaller communities justifies the idea of an emerging value crisis.

On the basis of the results, it can be clearly seen that students were mostly motivated to enrol in higher education by the acquisition of tertiary level qualifications (college or university degrees). This motivation was driven by the prestige of higher education qualification, the financial benefits and the easier prevailing in the labour market. According to the students' opinion, the role of educational institutes is outstanding in value transfers as they serve as examples for teacher trainees. It is also proved that the students consciously prepared for the teaching career were more receptive to the content of the training, which is essential for successful socialization. Moreover, it is interesting to note that students committed to the teaching profession were characterized by a preference to traditional values, while the lack of such awareness was generally associated with material values. The research also revealed that conscious career planning was also related to the interest in the chosen subject.

One of the most exciting research questions in the book is the social appreciation of the teaching profession. It is an interesting result that both daytime and correspondent students have evaluated the social esteem of the profession as low, and only instruction in higher education was rated as a high prestige position. However, students with conscious career motivations saw their future more positively than their less committed peers. They believed in the social usefulness of the teaching profession and had more trust in successfully being employed in the labour market.

Furthermore, it is particularly worth emphasizing that the book is written in English, as the dissemination of these results in international academic life is also directly realized. By orienting towards evidence-based educational research, the author is involved in a scholarly discourse that can contribute to improving the efficiency of Hungarian teacher education in the long run (e.g. Jancsak 2011b, Csapó 2016; Csapó – Bodorkós – Bús 2015).

The book can serve as a valuable resource for educational policy makers, education researchers and teacher trainers, as well as for practicing teachers. The actuality of the topic is well illustrated by the fact that since the results of this research have been presented, there have been many changes as regards the structural and the content elements of the Hungarian teacher training. On the basis of the results of *Csaba Jancsák's* research, it can be plausibly argued that globalization, the media and other age groups emerge as stronger control factors than the higher education institution or the family. At the same time, all this prompts the relevance of undertaking further research.

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MEGJELENT! KAPHATÓ A KIADÓNÁL.