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THE CONCEPT OF CLASS: A MULTILEVEL APPROACH

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ABSTRACT *Most controversy that arises around the concept of class is a consequence of the fact that protagonists do not differentiate the level of abstraction at which the discussions take place. Namely, the definition of the concept of class essentially depends on the analytical level at which social phenomena are analyzed. Therefore, it must be defined differently at different analytical levels. It is necessary to distinguish at least four such levels in societal analyses: social formation, historical system, concrete-historical society, and the reproduction of everyday life. At the most general level (capitalism, for example,) classes are established on the basis of the control of overall social resources, and their relations thus appear as antagonistic (dichotomous model). At the historical system level, the totality of control branches into domination over economic, organizational, and cultural resources, and the unified body of class is broken up into strata, including also some differentiation of intraclass interests. At the level of concrete-historical society, further intra- and inter-class differentiation develops, and classes appear as internally divided and potentially conflicted entities. At the level of everyday life, the central subject of research is individuals, whose class membership must be analytically reconstructed, which is the field of operation of empirical sociology.*

KEYWORDS: social class, analytical levels, social formation, historical system, concrete society, everyday life

INTRODUCTION

Controversy related to the concept of class has persisted for over 150 years if we date the beginning of the former phenomenon to Marx and Engels' renowned

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work *The Communist Manifesto* (2012). In this book, as is well known, historical changes are interpreted as a result of class conflict involving—at all levels of social development—two antagonistic classes (slaves and slave-owners, feudalists and serfs, bourgeoisie and proletariat). This simple view served as the starting point for those who denied the very validity of the class concept, as well as to quite a few who accepted the concept. Naturally, the latter group displays significant differences in terms of the stress they place on the specific dimensions upon which social antagonisms are formed (e.g. differences between those who have attributed the foundation of classes primarily to economic, political, or cultural factors, or their various combinations).

The above-mentioned controversies however, derive from the fact that participants in relevant debates as a rule fail to grasp that differences between particular approaches to class analyses are due to a simple epistemological oversight: in these debates, classes are defined at essentially different analytical levels. That is why this text will seek to indicate these different levels and stress the need to see that in analytical procedures this concept is defined differently as well as mutually consistently at each of these levels, or that at least attention is paid to the level at which the analysis is carried out (i.e. to the existence of different levels).² This kind of clarification could, I believe, dispense with both a substantial number of futile discussions between authors concerned with class analysis and part of the censure of those whose criticism of the concept of class relies on its unjustified extension to other analytical levels of objection relevant to a particular one (i.e. by claiming, for example, that the two-class model of society, which appears at the abstract analytical level of social formation, must be rejected due to the empirical complexity arising in concrete historical circumstances).

Accordingly, the first part of the text will summarize some of the currently most influential and largely different views in relation to class analysis and warn of the difficulties deriving from the above-mentioned epistemological oversight. Goldthorpe's reliance on Weber's market dimension of class differentiation results in the disappearance of the ruling class from his class scheme, as well as in the merging of different analytical levels (social formations and concrete historical societies). This leads him to an erroneous conclusion about the universal level of fluidity in contemporary (capitalist, and at that time also socialist) societies (Marshall 1997: 7-10). E. O. Wright in his most recent works reveals an awareness of the differences between analytical levels, but fails to make the different definitions of the concept of class developed in

2 The existence of different analytical levels in Marx's historical analysis is pointed out by Sztompka (1994: 157-173).

his work mutually consistent, or to establish a systematic link between them (Wright 2015). Finally, Savage, in his most recent works, hinges his analysis on a fundamental epistemological error, believing in the possibility of (statistically) reconstructing the concept of class at higher levels of abstraction (concrete-historical society, historical system) starting from direct empirical insights into everyday life (Savage, M. et al. 2013).

The main body of this text indicates the existence of (at least) four analytical levels on which the concept of class appears. These are: social formation, historical system, concrete historical society, and the reproduction of everyday life.³ Then, mutually consistent but different concepts of class are formulated at each of these levels, accompanied by statements of varying bases concerning social divisions existent in each one of them. It will be shown that these bases differ with respect to the different forms of integration of the main resources upon which the social reproduction rests: economic, political, and cultural. In other words, it will be revealed that forms of the material reproduction of society, regulation/control of hierarchical social integration, and symbolic communication are systemically integrated into different social formations in different ways, where at the most abstract analytical level all resources are under absolute control of the ruling class (the two-class model), followed by the increasing relativization of this control at more concrete analytical levels (multi-class model, intra-class differentiation, etc.).

A brief conclusion summarizes the main findings by indicating that the concept of class, discriminatively but mutually consistently defined, is valid at each of analytical levels providing that—if used at only one of these levels—it pays heed to the entire analytical “field” it covers.

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF CLASSES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The previous period of the cyclical ascent of capitalism, the culmination of which in the 1990s was designated as “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), was short lived. It was primarily marked by the seemingly unstoppable advance of globalization, which ushered into the dominant social-economic order such countries as China and Russia, to mention but the largest among them. At the theoretical level, attention shifted from general questions concerning the nature of that order towards more concrete studies of its variants (“variants of

³ Sztompka differentiates three levels: action-individual, socio-structural, and world-historical level (Sztompka 1994).

capitalism”). In line with this focus on the specific and individual, the nominalist approach to social analysis has become almost universally accepted.

This harmony was however disrupted by the dramatic economic crisis of 2008 which had global proportions, just as with the previous stage of ascent. Since we are primarily interested in the analytical apparatus used by social theory, we will only note that the viewpoints which speak of deep economic divisions between different groups in the population have once again become the focus of attention, occasionally reaching the scale of planetary bestsellers as was the case with Picketty’s book (2014). Furthermore, the theoretical legitimacy of the idea of the division of society into classes as groups which due to their structural position have potentially conflicting (or even antagonistic) relations and therefore represent the key feature of modern society has also been restored. This is why, looking backwards, it may now be easier to see that, despite its largely blocked development, this particular view was also present and even influential in the previous period—for example, in mobility studies (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; for a recapitulation of different contemporary approaches to class analysis see E.O. Wright ed. 2005).

The delay in the development of a class approach to social analysis had two sources: external criticism, and the vagueness of certain epistemological assumptions in the approach itself. We will not extensively dwell on the former factor since this was widely addressed during the well-known discussion about the relevance of the concept of class (for a systemized approach, see Crompton 2008). In brief, those who deny the concept of class relevance in social analysis may initially be divided into two groups. The first includes authors who believe that this concept has never been scientifically founded and that its use was primarily ideological. The second comprises those who claim that class as a form of social grouping has lost its historical relevance. Extensive discussion of the arguments proposed by authors in the first group would here be pointless because the relevant debate may be resolved on the basis of overall scientific contributions that are attributable to specific approaches. As for the critics who emphasize the historical obsolescence of the class concept, their starting point is the following: The heuristic value and even epistemological foundation of this concept started to disappear following the last quarter of the twentieth century due to deep changes within post-industrial, disorganized capitalism. Hierarchies in modern society are constituted in a remarkably multidimensional and fragmented way. Therefore, none of these dimensions can any longer retain a structurally deterministic role. Economic inequalities, regimes of social mobility, value and political orientations allegedly all undergird the former class barriers (Lash 1990; Beck 1992; Pakulski and Waters 1996).

Opposed to inferences of this kind are authors who argue that the concept of class maintains the central role in the interpretation of current social, economic,

political and cultural processes in present-day societies. With this, they also invoke the developed programs of empirical research.⁴ Most of these authors can be divided into two uneven subgroups. The more numerous among them build their understanding of class following Weber, claiming that classes are formed on the basis of the substantially different positions individuals occupy on the labour market, the nature of their labour contracts, employment stability, level of income, etc. The most prominent author in this theoretical stream is Goldthorpe (1996; 1999; 2000/2007; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). His class scheme has provided the basis for a large number of pieces of empirical research focused primarily on the problem of social mobility, but also the voter orientations of members of different classes, cultural consumption, etc. What gives particular importance to this orientation is the remarkable rigorousness of research procedures in the approach to conceptual operationalizations, the collection of data, and the statistical techniques for their processing. There is no doubt that the sociological analysis in the work of those who share this view has come quite near to the contemporary understanding of an empirically founded, contestable scientific theory (Nagel 1961).

Although a more detailed critical examination of Goldthorpe's approach is here impossible (it is known widely enough, and requires no comprehensive explanation), some observations should still be made. Construed primarily for the study of vertical mobility and deliberately kept at the level of a "middle-range theory," the proposed class scheme starts from a view which lacks a complete conceptual basis and, moreover, has not been empirically verified in a more extensive and systematic manner. More precisely, authors who use it make no attempt to answer the question which inevitably precedes it: which particular social processes produce the inequality of market chances as the basis for the empirically identified differentiation of the working situations of individuals grouped into social classes?⁵ In other words, social formation as an analytical level is completely absent from this theoretical concept, while the second and the third levels (historical system, concrete-historical society) appear undifferentiated.

4 Marshall objects to those who criticize the usability of the concept of class in contemporary conditions due to the fact that their theses are primarily declarative and unfounded in systematically collected data, in contrast to supporters of the class approach who also tend to seek an empirical foundation for their views (Marshall 1997: 13-18).

5 Research programs which depart from Goldthorpe's class scheme as a rule leave out the wider thematization of the economic inequalities of social groups. In terms of content, these programs focus on the (statistical) link between the central category of this approach—occupation, and mobility—and thus also the degree of education, voter orientation, and income (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004; Goldthorpe 2007; Crompton 2008).

Gearred more towards research than the theoretical sphere, this class scheme has subjected its form to research techniques (at the most concrete analytical level of everyday life). Its top social ranks include the “service class” (in later works, the “salariat”) groups—considered substantially different by the majority of stratification theorists—such as middle- (e.g., professional) and higher strata individuals (higher-level managers, and owners of large and medium-size firms).⁶ The reason invoked for this coupling – underrepresentation of the latter groups in proportional samples used as a rule in sociological research – itself indicates program-related difficulties with this approach. The “drowning” in the widest middle stratum of that part of the dominant social groups who essentially control the economic conditions of social reproduction is not only problematic from a theoretical point of view but also from an empirical one, which the advocates of Goldthorpe’s class scheme cherish the most. Namely, this leaves in the dark the recruitment patterns of precisely that class which present the greatest analytical challenge to research.⁷ The practical consequences of this approach, as well as its cognitive limits, are well illustrated by the claim that empirical analyses represent fluidity in developed industrial societies as basically equal, and that therefore there has been no significant difference in mobility between formerly socialist and capitalist countries (Marshall 1997: 7-10). This conclusion is basically incorrect, precisely because the dominant class in socialism was substantially more open than its capitalist “cousin” (Lazic and Cvejic 2007).

Another variant that defends the relevance of a class approach in the study of modern society is the perspective of E. O. Wright (1978; 1985; 2015; Wright et al. 1989; Wright ed. 2005). Based originally on a neo-Marxist interpretation of capitalist social relations and theoretically (deductively) developed, and then operationalized and applied in empirical research, it has led to problematic theoretical results as well as unconvincing empirical findings. Briefly, Wright’s view underwent three stages of development. In the first one, he started with production relations and distinguished three basic classes in capitalism: bourgeoisie, proletariat, and petty bourgeoisie (an insight which does not relate to the first, most abstract analytical level, the concept of capitalism, but to the second level of the historical system). According to Wright, class positions are,

6 Authors speak of the social top conditionally, since they insist on the scheme being relational rather than hierarchical. However, the fact that the service class is in every respect superior to all other classes is indisputable to such a degree that it is explicitly referred to by the authors themselves. They, namely, conditionally hierarchise the scheme in order to introduce “the dominance approach” into the identification of the class positions of respondents (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 265-277).

7 The absence of the top of a class hierarchy in Goldthorpe's scheme is criticized in Savage et al. (2013).

in real relations, revealed as jobs rather than occupations. Within the structure of jobs, class relations are manifested as differences between individuals with respect to degree of ownership, control and autonomy. Since in these dimensions inequality is manifested gradationally—as a higher or lower degree of control, autonomy, etc.—in addition to the three basic class positions in the overall social space, we also find “contradictory class positions.” This is why three additional classes are introduced into the class scheme: managers and foremen; small employers; and semiautonomous wage workers (which brings us to the third analytical level of concrete society). Applied in empirical research, this scheme led to the proliferation of holders of contradictory positions, so that the basic class in capitalism, the proletariat, became a minority group (Wright 1985: 84).

Dissatisfied with his own original scheme, Wright introduced important changes in the new version. In place of domination as the central category of class relations, he introduced exploitation, which is in different societies based on specific types of ownership of: labour (feudal); capital (capitalist); organization (statist); and education (socialist). The last three forms of ownership are also present in modern capitalism, and their intersections on the new class map gave rise to twelve classes (Wright, 1985: 88).

It is clear that within this viewpoint the non-systemic intertwining of diverse analytical levels is even more pronounced. Furthermore, this solution fails to remove the previous difficulties with the approach, and may have even increased them. On the conceptual level, departing from the concept of domination as the centre of differentiation and substituting it with that of exploitation interpreted on the basis of game theory, it essentially approached the view of market-based class relations. Game theory, namely, implicitly assumes the voluntariness of participation. In contrast, within class relations the rules of the game themselves are determined by dominant players while subordinates cannot opt out or choose another game in which their position would be substantially different.⁸ At the level of operationalization, the proletariat as one of the basic classes disappears even more in extensive differentiations. This way, the constitutivity of this class for the capitalist process of production becomes problematic. Wright himself saw difficulties in the explicative potential of this view for the analysis of the available empirical material. He thus explains the further dwindling of the proletarian class in American society with reference to the advancement of the process of globalization, which relocates proletarians to Third World countries, turning the class structure of the USA into a predominantly managerial one (Wright and Martin 1987).

8 Using Durkheimian terminology one may say that Wright here does not take into account the “noncontractual bases of contracts” which he invokes in his recent work (2015: 177).

Finally, in a recent work Wright uses an approach which at first glance seems very close to the one we will suggest in this paper, stating that “class and its related concepts can be analysed at various levels of abstraction” (Wright 2015: 189). These levels are determined differently in different chapters of the book, as: a) “micro and macro aspects of economically rooted inequality in capitalist societies” (p. 2); b) “three clusters of questions” relevant for the analyses of these inequalities—domination and exploitation (control of the means of production), control of economic resources (property rights), and individual attributes of people occupying specific class locations (pp. 3-7); c) class relations, location and structure, class structuration and formation, and collective class actors (p. 94); and d) system level, institutional level, and situational level (p. 120). The most important point Wrights makes is, however, that the conceptual apparatuses adequate for analyses of these “different aspects of class structure” have been developed by different theoretical traditions: (neo)Marxist, (neo)Weberian, and stratificational, which makes these traditions complementary and “not mutually exclusive” (p. 12).

The problem with Wright’s late approach is that, while he rightly points out the need to “develop a coherent, consistent way of theoretically understanding social cleavages and possibilities of transformation” (p. 173), he fails to demonstrate how we can conceptually reconcile the competing theories (or, in other words: how can different analytical frameworks be linked; and which of the above-mentioned analytical frameworks should be used?). Namely, what he only tries explicitly to show is that at some analytical points discrepancies between Marxist and Weberian analyses are less deep than the protagonists of these approaches try to demonstrate. In this way his “reconciliation” inevitably remains eclectic. Additionally, his insistence on the sole economic foundations of class relations, the limitation of class phenomenon to capitalist societies, and the methodological usefulness of game theory as an instrument of class analysis mean that Wright’s attempt at integrating different theoretical traditions is far from a synthetic approach and much closer to a (neo)Weberian orientation.

Finally, we should also mention an approach which in its foundation of class analysis seeks to reach beyond the frameworks of previous theoretically based orientations (neo/Marxist, neo/Weberian etc.), and which looks for a mainstay in empirical research material. This refers to authors who believe that the statistical processing of data about various dimensions of individual inequalities may produce insight into the systemic groupings of these inequalities, which may then be attributed the quality of “classness.” A recent attempt of this kind is that of M. Savage and a group of authors (Savage et al. 2013; Savage et al. 2015), who, on the basis of a latent class analysis propose a new “multi-dimensional model of social class.” Their class scheme is developed on the basis of research

into indicators of economic, social and cultural capital (construed on Bourdieu's categories). Their latent analysis "produced" seven classes, with the elite on the top, two subgroups of the middle class, three working classes, and a precariat at the bottom of the pyramid (2013: 12; 2015: 165-181).

This more recent attempt at "inductive analysis," however, obviously cannot overcome the already mentioned problem: that theoretical concepts (types of capital/resources, a list of indicators, etc.) are necessary for the premise of the research itself, and therefore predetermine the statistically obtained categories.⁹ In addition, it must be kept in mind that Bourdieu's categories are explicitly relational (Bourdieu 2002), as opposed to Savage's class hierarchy which is not, and can hardly be (moreover, authors do not seek to present it as such). The most conspicuous deficiencies of this scheme—for example, the arbitrariness of the division into subgroups, and theoretically illogical features in the "distribution" of both the forms of capital (2013: 12) and "socio-demographic correlates" (2013: 13)—are here of lesser importance than methodological problems stemming from the manner of founding the theoretical view on class relations. Namely, the objective Savage set for himself—to induce theoretical insights into class structure—rests on a fundamental epistemological error: the concept is not the final but rather the starting point of the analysis. The concrete cannot arrive at the concept because without a concept it appears as pseudo-concrete.¹⁰ To wit, empirical research at the level of everyday life cannot be conducive to the most abstract analytical level, but the path must be reversed: from a concept towards facts (precisely how Savage himself started his book with Bourdieu's categories, only to subsequently "forget" this beginning).

TOWARD A CONCEPTUALLY DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF CLASS

Basic analytical levels

The purpose of the above discussion was to give a brief introduction to a conceptually more differentiated manner of establishing the perspective of

⁹ On the devastating theoretical and methodological critique of the GBCS data upon which Savages's analysis is based, see e.g. Mills 2014, 2015. See also the special issue of *The Sociological Review* (2015).

¹⁰ Kosik 1976; 40. For more details, see the explanation below.

classes as groups whose relations are crucial for the reproduction of a given social system and its change. If one of the main areas of sociological analysis is the establishment of principles on the basis of which a society is reproduced and changed, then the focus of such research must clearly be on the old and new social relations which form the so-called structures, on the one hand, and on the other, the very process of their change (i.e. the agents of these changes: actors). This approach begs the following question: what precisely are classes in these processes of reproduction and change: structures or actors, or *both* structures and actors?¹¹

The assumption that classes, or more precisely their relations, form structures will hardly be questioned by anyone who accepts the validity of the concept itself. Class relations are, according to different authors, constituted on the basis of economic structures (Weber 1978), power structures (Dahrendorf 1959), cultural practices (Gramsci 1971), or all of the above taken together: on the system of re/production of overall social life (Marx 2005). There is no need to dwell on this point, as it stands or falls with the basic approach to overall social problems. The second point, however, requires somewhat more extensive commentary, knowing that even those authors who accept the class concept as a valid analytical category deny it the possibility of representing an active historical subject. Such is the view of Weber, as well as Giddens and many other (“nominalist”) authors. The former has been incorporated into various influential modern theoretical orientations such as symbolical interactionism.

Consideration of this issue will start with a more or less generally endorsed statement. Every sociological perspective, regardless of its basic theoretical assumptions (whether it accepts the analytical validity of using the class concept or not), includes, explicitly or implicitly, at least an elementary conception of the specific nature of social groups, according to which their existence is relatively autonomous from the individuals who form it. Suffice it to recall the trivial joint assumption: namely, that a group as a specific unit may be reproduced, the changed composition of its members notwithstanding. If that assumption is brought into doubt, the very notion of society would *a fortiori* have to be declared an empty abstraction, or discarded altogether. In this way, sociology itself would lose the status of a relatively autonomous science and revert to the sphere of social philosophy, or else be reduced to social psychology (the examination of exclusively interpersonal relations).

Contrarily, the very process of the constitution of sociology as a scientific discipline during the twentieth century developed in firm opposition to the

11 The fact that the latter question is not an empty paradox has long been proposed by Giddens, who insists on self-reflexivity as the key component of human action (1995: 41-109).

previous social-philosophical tradition through the consolidation of its empirical orientation. During this process, as a rule, many authors—from Durkheim to the neofunctionalists—overemphasized the positivistic-empiricistic foundation of this discipline. Starting from a remarkably firmly formulated view (that structures are things [Durkheim 1982]), this development led to empirical studies wherein units of observation are inevitably individuals or small groups (organizations, etc.). On the other hand, with the increasingly stronger forms of criticism of structuralism, and reified relations as subjects of sociological research, interpersonal relations were declared the only real forms of human social existence. This is how a seemingly unbridgeable breach between collective and individual forms of manifesting sociality opened up. At this, collective forms were either denied or reduced to mere abstractions as in the seemingly paradoxical view of Giddens that structures may influence but groups cannot act.

The ostensible paradox was resolved by defining the concept of action in a restrictive Weberian tradition. Its determination was subject to conditions which, by definition, excluded its collective forms: human action was defined as an interpersonal relation, because it postulated a “subjective meaning” according to which the actor was “oriented” (Weber 1978, 1: 4). In line with this approach, forms of sociality with Weber can in this case appear only as “ideal types.” The problem with this perspective for the study of patterns of social reproduction, and especially social changes, lies in the fact that the ideal-typical approach freezes the opposites of the two historical phenomena. It antagonizes them to mutual exclusion and thereby methodically implies a static relation towards reality. This is why the ideal-typical method is unsuitable for researching the processuality of historical change in the overall social sphere, wherein existing basic social relations are over time reconstructed into relations established on different bases through the process of action of basic social actors.

The problem of mediation between categories—collectivities/groups (social) and individuals (individual)—is highly complex and cannot be systematically examined here. But, with a view to a brief and illustrative presentation of this problem, and taking Weber as the example, we should recall the whole series of concepts he introduced as mediators between the concept of capitalism as the social order and the ideas of Martin Luther: the capitalist economy, factions of the bourgeoisie (monopolists, speculators, bankers), political movements (puritans, levellers), religious denominations, organizations and movements (Catholics, Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists), capitalist ethics, the ethics of religious groups, mentalities (individual, group), interests (economic, political; collective, individual), etc. (Weber 2003). It is quite obvious that the list of mediating categories is in principle inexhaustible. Moreover, its initial, abstract,

and finally empirically verifiable points, as well as the conceptual sequence between these two (the number and contents of mediating notions) depend on the problem that is addressed. Successful sociological interpretation of a social phenomenon implies precisely the merging of a relevant (abstract) concept with (concrete) empirical evidence—which may relate to both individual and collective actors—on the basis of the mediation of a series of relevant notions, increasingly close to historical directness (“medium-range” categories). The more this sequence is, among other things, complete, the more successful the explanation will be. Abstraction (concept) is stated to be the starting point, because that is what it always is in science, in contrast to commonsense opinion, which starts and ends with directness.¹² Thus empirical research of intergenerational and intragenerational changes of positions in the occupations of individuals inevitably start from the concept of social mobility.

A focus on our narrower subject reveals the following. To approach the definition of the concept of class it is necessary to start from an assumption of a higher order of abstraction, which is the following: global social systems/ social formations (feudal society, capitalism, real socialism, etc.) are based on the domination of a specific mode of social life production. This is always accompanied by others which appear as remains of the past, or “in potency,” and may represent alternatives to the existing dominant mode of production. Due to possible misunderstandings created as a rule by a reductionist understanding of the Marxist approach to social analysis (by both its critics and supporters) from the tradition of which this concept originates, the following comments should be made. The concept of the mode of production of society does not refer to the economic roots of each and every social order, but to the following interrelated series of assumptions:

1. fundamental social relations are products of human action;
2. this production develops in spheres of:
 - a. the material reproduction of society
 - b. the reproduction of forms of regulation/control of hierarchical social integration,
 - c. the reproduction of forms of symbolic communication;
3. the forms of these three reproduction practices are in different ways systemically integrated into different social formations.

¹² Representations of commonsensical directness are referred to by Kosik as the world of pseudo-concreteness: “... In destroying the pseudo-concrete, dialectical thinking does not deny the existence of the objective character of these phenomena, but rather abolishes their fictitious independence by demonstrating their mediateness” (1976: 40).

The global division of labour within the frameworks of these formations is established primarily depending on the control of overall conditions of the dominant mode of social production in the spheres of economic ownership, political/state authority, and cultural hegemony. It is precisely this division of labour, sustained in relatively lasting forms, which is revealed as the class division of society.

A general connection between the conditions of reproduction of a given/dominant mode of production of society, expressed as the systemic interdependence of economic, political and cultural relations in a society, is necessary to sustain it, because class division essentially represents an order of inequality and domination. This systemic interdependence—the mutual conditionality of assumptions of economic, political and cultural domination, i.e. subordination—leads to a situation where at the global social level class division takes the form of antagonism between two main social classes. This initial general insight, however, must be supplemented in further historical research with the following inferences. In a concrete-historical existence, as already mentioned, the mode of production of social life is not and cannot be “pure” (due to the existence of elements of past and potential/alternative modes of production). Moreover, economic, political and cultural forms of domination have only a systemic link, rather than an identity, because this link takes different degrees in different modes of social production. Furthermore, in their concrete manifestations overall and individual forms of domination are revealed as partial (let us recall only the different status of slaves in ancient societies, or serfs and freemen in feudal society, etc.), which means that they reach a certain level on a dis/continuity scale. All this, finally, means that the basic two-class opposition, as a general characteristic of the mode of a society’s production, is in a concrete-historical sphere broken down into different forms of systems of class relations. In other words, in historically given systems of social relations the two-class system dissolves into multiclass systems, and classes themselves appear as complex groups composed of a larger number of subgroups (strata).

Therefore, any theoretical position on classes must take into account the following facts. The concept of class—its general definition, as well as specific characteristics of class relations, including the modes of action—cannot be defined in the same manner at different levels of abstraction wherein social-historical analysis operates. Namely, this analysis may take place on at least four theoretical levels, which form different analytical frameworks:

- a. a global framework of the mode of production of social life;
- b. a framework of the social-historical system;
- c. a framework of the concrete-historical form of reproduction of a specific society;

- d. a framework of the everyday life of individuals who form a specific social group (class).

It is quite clear that conceptual instruments at these different analytical levels definitely cannot be identical, but must be differentiated in a way which will retain the consistency of the analytical apparatus in the process of differentiation. The following paragraphs will in brief terms show how class may be determined at each of the above-mentioned analytical levels, starting from the most general to increasingly concrete research plans.

Class in the analytical framework of the mode of production of a social life

At the most abstract analytical level, classes appear as social groups formed on the basis of a global social division of labour. This division leads to antagonism between the groups depending on *the control of basic conditions of reproduction of the given mode of social life production*. Bearing in mind that, historically speaking, the conditions necessary for the reproduction of a society (land or capital, for example) appear as scarce resources, their distribution is necessarily unequal. This is why in the process of production/distribution *a monopoly of one group in control of these resources* must inevitably appear (including resources for the securing of the monopoly and of its legitimization), as opposed to *the exclusion of the other group from this control*, on the basis of which relations of domination/subordination are formed. In other words, continuance of the existing mode of reproduction of society implies that a relation of monopoly/exclusion (domination/subordination) is established as relatively lasting, whereby classes are formed by groups who possess that monopoly, or are excluded from the possession thereof (dominant vs. subordinate group). In that sense they appear as internally unified in terms of the relation of monopoly/exclusion, as well as mutually antagonistic. Therefore, the basic interests of these groups may be determined as structurally formed tendencies to retain (discontinue) the basic relation of monopoly/exclusion (domination/subordination). These interests appear as general factors in the internal unification of classes, which at the same time make them mutually opposed (and that is the analytical level Marx retains in his *Manifesto*).

It is therefore important to bear in mind that only in this most general sense can we claim that historical social formations (feudal society, capitalism, real socialism, etc.) rest on the contrariety of two basic classes whose antagonism determines the main lines of social processes (reproduction of the given

mode of production, social conflicts, social changes, etc.). At this analytical level, classes are most often part of the conceptual apparatus in studies that analyse the processes of the establishment of a new—or the destruction of the existing—mode of production of social life and the fundamental relations of the given social formation. In that sense the historicity of a social formation is manifested as a process of its creation and, consequently, its inevitable disappearance. Typical examples of these processes, as well as studies which address them, include transformation of forms of extended personal dependence (feudal society) into relations of limited, economic, dependence (the creation of personally free workers, unlimited disposal of private ownership, etc.; Aston and Philpin eds. 1987); a formation of the “ethos of vocation” (Weber 2003); civilizing (Elias 1978); the suppression of forms of action based on passions by interest-based action (Hirschman 1977), etc.

Class in the analytical framework of the historical system of social relations

In analyses which operate within more concrete research plans, the global social division of labour is manifested as a distribution of the means of material production, means of control of (coercive) social integration, and the means of systemic legitimation; i.e., is expressed in the form of social relations as a division of economic- (ownership), organizational- (political), and cultural resources. Thus, at this analytical level, where the capitalist social formation—for example—appears as a capitalist historical system of social relations, classes may be defined as *social groups which hold, or are deprived of, ownership of the means of economic re/production, control of the means of political domination, and of the means of cultural hegemony.*

The starting analytical point here is the following. A social system represents a complex entity composed of basic subsystems (economic, political, cultural), while these subsystems may mutually interrelate in different ways (and their determinational relations are also changeable). They may be mutually integrated, so that all three subsystems are predominantly merged (as in the feudal, or real socialist orders), or mutually autonomous to a remarkable degree (as in the capitalist order). This is why now the initially “dual” (antagonistic) class relations differentiate into more complex structures, while the initially unique corpus of the class is revealed as internally complex, and composed of subgroups (strata, factions, etc.). These subgroups are formed in subsystems wherein specific rules of reproduction are maintained (but only within the frameworks primarily given by overall conditions of reproduction of the dominant mode

of social life production), thus also producing a differentiation of unique class interests. The securing of overall conditions of reproduction of the capitalist mode of production may, for example, in a specific historical system of relations involve the effort to strengthen the assumptions of political domination of the ruling class (more precisely, domination of its particular stratum which controls organizational resources; i.e. wields political power) by creating in the sphere of material distribution (thus within the economic subsystem) an increased share of income for non-owner groups at the expense of owner profits (“welfare state”). Class interests are here formed as structurally based trends, but are—within wider frameworks of the orientation towards maintenance/abolishment of overall relations of domination—now based on the preservation/change of the special conditions for the reproduction of class subgroups (strata). Studies of the possibilities for a relatively autonomous role of the state in capitalism written by Moor (1966), Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1990) and other authors belong to analyses of this type, as do the studies on welfare state regimes by Marshall (1992) and Esping-Andersen (1990).

It is clear that historicity at this analytical level appears in a more pronounced form as a diachronous as well as synchronous change of systemic assumptions about social reproduction in the form of different mutual relations of individual subsystems. Thus, from a diachronical perspective, different degrees of integration of economic and political subsystems may be observed in capitalism: from early forms with a more forceful integrative role of the mercantile state through the pronounced self-regulatory role of the market in the liberal period, the strengthening of the interventionist state during the twentieth century, to the modern neoliberal period. These different forms of systemic integration also appear at the synchronous level and form the basis for references to Anglo-Saxon, German, Japanese, etc. capitalisms (Gilpin 2001; Coates ed. 2005). In the same way, systemic integration in the economically most developed centre of capitalism in the form of economic self-regulation as a rule differs from the more prominent political mediation in less developed areas.

Class in the analytical framework of a concrete-historical society

Further towards the concretization of analytical frameworks, where they reach the level of a concrete-historical society (US capitalist society, Yugoslav “liberal socialism,” etc.), the concept of class and class relations is further differentiated on the basis of two specific factors.

Firstly, as already emphasized, at the concrete-historical level a specific mode of production of social life is established as dominant, meaning that it is, as a

rule, accompanied by elements of other past as well as potentially new modes of production (those that can be established, or those which in retrospective analysis have been established after the given one). On the basis of these subordinated but actually present social forms, specific groups are also formed. They may have different relations towards the basic classes (formed, in the previously defined sense, on assumptions of the reproduction of the dominant mode of production). For example, Tocqueville (1955) demonstrated that for decades after the revolution in France the ancient regime was present through its institutions as well as in parts of the aristocracy who played an important political role in cooperating with bourgeoisie or opposing it, merging with it or separating from it. Analogously, and approximately at the same time, Robert Owen in Britain organized New Lanark based on principles deduced from a possible type of society (Polanyi 2001).

However, still more important is the second factor, which derives from the above-mentioned differentiation of three social subsystems—economic, political and cultural. These sub-systems create internal unities and are mutually systemically connected, but their structures are not identical. They are namely themselves internally differentiated, because the distribution of resources within them in the spheres of material production, (coercive) social integration and systemic legitimation is hierarchical. Ownership (or economic resources), power (or organizational resources) and cultural resources are unevenly distributed. The unequal distribution of resources is characteristic of the dominant social class (large, medium and small owners). Moreover, control over resources does not necessarily remain within the borders of that class (although it must manage the substantial majority of resources necessary for the reproduction of the given conditions of social life in order to be called dominant at all). The economic capital of modern corporative capitalism has thus partly “spilled over” into the hands of shareholders who belong to the strata of middle level- and even manual workers (as long ago demonstrated in a classic study by Berle and Means (1968), just as the most prominent political positions in Germany or Austria were until a hundred or so years ago held by the representatives of the old regime. Furthermore, while the overall distribution of organizational resources in a society ensures the reproduction of the dominant form of class relations, factions that hold political power in different historical periods particularly promote the interests of the members of one or the other economically dominant faction of the ruling class (to the extent that overall class interests are not jeopardized; see a well-known study by Chandler [1979]). In addition, political domination may be imposed by special actors on the dominant class as a whole, again in a way which does not endanger the reproduction of the dominant mode of production (this historical phenomenon was addressed by Marx [2005], showing that Louis

Bonaparte grounded his autocratic rule *within* a capitalist mode of production on the *lowest* class of French society, the peasantry). It may also protect the interests of subordinate social classes, contrary to the aspirations of a substantial part of the ruling class (as, for example, in the case of the introduction of welfare state policies).

Class interests are thus at this analytical level also revealed as partially differentiated (although they are here still understood as structurally based), so that classes themselves appear as internally divided, and even potentially conflictive, entities. Intra-class conflicts, however, appear as competitive rather than antagonistic. This is the case of conflicts concerning the redistribution of resources, rather than the maintenance/abolishment of the bases of their appropriation; i.e., control. In that framework, classes may be defined as *social groups which are reproduced in similar life conditions (whose members have a similar education, way of life and life chances), and therefore have common interests*. The mutual concordance of these interests is not necessarily all-comprising in everyday life, and appears only in a general sense, rather than directly (therefore, this does not only speak of the “contradictory class locations” addressed by Wright [1985] but class characteristics themselves at this analytical level appear as inconsistent), while general class interests remain in principle opposed to interests of the antagonistic class.

At this analytical level the previous antagonism of class relations is broken down into overlapping systems of inter- and intra-class relations. Strata (factions, etc.) within a class may, for example due to different interests, enter into mutual conflicts. Thus conflicts emerge between large and small capital, skilled and unskilled workers, etc. As already mentioned, however, interest differences, and even intra-class conflicts, have an internal limit, which is given by the previously identified, more general interest in maintaining/changing the overall position of the group in the given conditions of reproduction of the dominant mode of production of society: preservation of private ownership, relations of personal dependence, etc. On the other hand, individual factions of different/antagonistic classes may establish short-term or more lasting coalitions with a view to achieving complementary interests (in this sense, Scott [1992] analyses the formation of a class block between capitalists and parts of the middle class in Great Britain by means of which the ruling class ensures its political domination; the above-mentioned differentiation of “contradictory class location” by E.O. Wright also belongs to this analytical level).

Thus class relations now appear as multiply determined by a combination of historical and conjunctural factors, which is why the former research approach is partly inverted at this analytical level. The problem is no longer the analysis of class relations on the basis of the overall social (structural) position of class, but

it appears necessary to show how specific group situations (concrete-historical conditions of the reproduction of classes and parts thereof, their mutually antagonistic interests, as well as competitive interests of parts of classes) are reconstituted into a single class position. This analytical level is most often reached when, as commonly seen in historiography, or in “statistically reconstructive sociology,” an attempt is made to (subsequently) advance from a descriptive representation and facts as records of the directness of everyday life to a conceptually founded explanation (we have already seen that Savage could not, and indeed failed to, overcome this difficulty). In that sense, historicity, or empirically established social theory, is then revealed as an attempt to fix a hardly discernible cacophony of current events, which due to its continuous vague changeability is precisely shown as essentially static.

Class at the analytical level of everyday life

Finally, at the level of everyday existence of members of a certain society, classes appear as *large groups of individuals who, sharing similar life conditions and life trajectories, form similar patterns of behaviour, social consciousness, etc.* General features, derived from the characteristics of the given system of social relations, are here revealed only as tendencies which have a certain statistical regularity, but in each individual case appear accidentally. Borders between classes at this analytical level appear as provisional and permeable, and the class structure is shown as an intertwining of continuing hierarchies which only partly (sometimes more, sometimes less) overlap. Furthermore, within this intertwining an individual may occupy different hierarchical positions in view of different features such as the disposal of various resources (family status, income, education, political power, reputation; or economic, organizational, cultural resources; stratification studies in a standard functionalist theoretical framework adhere to this research plan as a rule, and the majority of those that criticize the class approach—as entirely inadequate or obsolete—use the data collected in research thus conceived; finally, we have witnessed an abortive attempt by Savage to use that kind of approach himself).

In view of a large number of factors which determine the position of (concrete) individual members of a class, as well as the nonexistence of the necessary interconnection between these factors, the mobility of individuals within position hierarchies (vertical mobility) is possible and they may have different perceptions of their personal and group interests, as well as overall social conditions, and may support different political orientations (for the phenomenon of variability of class votes, see Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993; Evans, ed.

1999; Goldthorp, 1999), etc. In brief, the central subject of research is now the individual, whose membership of a group must be analytically reconstructed, which is a field of operation of empirical sociology. It is there established that the interests of individuals may be structured on different bases. Workers in one capitalist firm, for example, may have interests which are: a. competitive compared with other workers in that firm, involving vying for a work place, size of wage, etc.; b. shared with other workers and opposed to the interests of employers in conflicts concerning appropriations of the firm's revenue for the wage fund, investments, dividends, etc.; c. shared with other workers and employers of the firm and opposed to the interests of workers and employers of other firms under conditions of market competition; d. shared with other workers and employers within one country and opposed to the interests of workers from other countries under conditions of international market competition, etc. In addition, it is empirically possible to establish the existence of problems in the perception of individuals' own interests. Individualist ideology, for example, leads to a situation wherein workers may consider themselves—rather than the character of social relations—responsible for unemployment, or for low income; i.e., for their own poor market prospects.

Finally, it is also empirically possible to observe an endless idiosyncrasy of “personal equations” whereby every decision or consequent act may be interpreted as the expression of subjectivity on the basis of an anthropologically given individuality. Just as at this analytical level groups may be reconstructed on different bases, including those of class, so are the interests understood as interpreted by individuals. Social history now disappears from the analytical horizon and is substituted by eventfulness.

FINAL REMARKS

What should be borne in mind in relation to the overall discussion above is the fact that conceptual delimitations within the frameworks of above-mentioned analytical levels are feasible only in one direction: from general toward individual. In other words, the empirical analysis of given social relations as the epistemological starting point cannot lead to the reconstruction of the concept of class on the most general level; i.e. it may only be conducive to always partial empirical generalizations. On the other hand, this does not mean that its overall scientific status is second-rate, because everyday life cannot be interpreted as the epiphenomenon of overall historical structural movements. This is not only to say that the validity of theoretical derivations lies primarily in the research

fertility they ensure and encourage, but also that the validity of the conceptual analysis must find its confirmation in tendential regularities formed at the eventfulness level, which, through lasting (“longue duree”) existence, constitute the general structural characteristics of social relations that form the starting point of theoretical inference.

Another important thing to bear in mind is that analytical levels are here separated on the principle of economy, which means that elementary, theoretically necessary analytical differentiation has been introduced. The levels of mediation between the most abstract and direct-phenomenal level could be additionally increased or decreased, depending on analytical needs and the specific subject of research. For example, following the level of the “historical system,” the division between central, semi-peripheral and peripheral types of capitalist systems as the next analytical step may be introduced, etc.

In relation to our basic subject we may take as established that the concept of class inevitably “extends” to all above-mentioned analytical levels; i.e., to the whole epistemological “space” where the research into fundamental social relations of inequality takes place. This also means that the specific class analyses, revolving primarily at one of analytical levels, must be mindful of the contents of the class concept at other levels general or less general than those being researched.

Obviously, the definition of the class concept at each of these levels must be different due to added specific characteristics at each subsequent concrete level, although these specific features clearly must be consistent with the more general definition. Thus, in a strict sense, we could say that the concept of class may fully be defined only as a synthetic category which encompasses the totality of definitions of various levels of abstractness. Naturally, in the case of concrete studies this request may be difficult to comply with, and even perhaps unnecessary if the principle of totality itself is borne in mind and reductionist traps or non-systematic movement through different levels of analysis are avoided. The same applies to the criticism of the class approach in the study of social relations. It is completely off the mark if aimed at the totality of approach with only one analytical level in mind. Naturally, under the condition that the adherents of that approach do not so enable it, thereby overlooking the whole epistemological field upon which the class analysis must unfold.

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EFFECTS OF SON PREFERENCE ON FERTILITY: A PARITY PROGRESSION ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT *This article assesses the strength of son preference in Bangladesh, as reflected in fertility behavior. Although the fertility rate for Bangladesh declined from 6.3 children per woman of reproductive age in the year 1975 to 2.3 children in 2014, empirical results show that son preference has still a strong influence on fertility behavior. Keeping cognizant of this fact, this study examines levels and differentials in fertility and also investigates the effects of son preference on fertility in Bangladesh. In addition, the study inspects the underlying factors responsible for son preference. Levels of fertility indicate that the proportion of higher education of a couple is inversely related to fertility, whereas rural and Muslim couples in Bangladesh have more children. The bivariate analysis shows that almost all the independent variables selected for this study have a significant association with parity progression. Findings from multivariate analyses suggest that women with at least one son are less likely to continue childbearing than women without sons at parities 2-3. At most or all parities, continued childbearing is negatively associated with education, access to mass media, and family wealth. A significant source of motivation for parity progression in couples is the desire to have a son.*

KEYWORDS: *fertility, son preference, socioeconomic and demographic variables, parity progression, Bangladesh*

INTRODUCTION

The population of Bangladesh is increasing at an annual growth rate of 1.37 percent (Census 2011), or 1.05 percent according to the World Bank (2017). The present rate of population growth is one of the burdens on the development of Bangladesh. Over the last half-century, the consensus has emerged that the

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growth rate of the population is having substantial effects on the development of the country. For a long time the issue of fertility decline leading to a population decline and its potential link to economic growth has been contemplated. Evidence for the economic effects of fertility is strong. Various factors such as education, industrialization, and the increase of different human indices point out that structural development in a country serve to reduce fertility. This paper aims to bridge the gap between understanding the relationship of fertility and socioeconomic development by studying son preference in Bangladesh.

In demography, the word fertility is used to measure the actual production of children or the occurrence of births, especially live births. One simple measure of fertility is the average number of children born per woman. The estimated quantity of children that will be born to a specific woman at any point is thus a total measure of her lifetime fertility that is valid at the time which the related information is gathered. Without a conscious consolidated push to control the extent of families, the large portion of the population who are within the fertile age group will add to population growth, and this will impact the population structure in terms of reducing the average age.

In a developing country, financial factors significantly affect preferences for children, especially sons. In many Asian countries, married children are required to live with aged parents and provide financial support to them. When a girl marries, she joins her other half's family unit and does not regularly contribute to her own parents' upkeep. Her marriage itself may represent a significant monetary burden due to the desire for a great festival, as is typical in most South Asian countries, as is the payment of a dowry, especially in India and Bangladesh. This dowry tradition is found in low-level income status families in these two regions. Prominently, South Asian countries have seen fertility trends progress in nearly similar ways since the late 1970s or mid-1980s despite the fact that these countries have adequately developed the standard preconditions for a decrease in fertility – for example, massive progress in financial status, positive changes in maternal well-being, a significant reduction in child mortality, an increase in the time between marriage and childbearing, and extensive advances in the status of women (Basu – Amin 2000; Chattopadhyay – Goswami 2007). Huiying (2016) demonstrated that the main reason for son preference in rural China is the patriarchal family system, and also the imbalance in the sex ratio at birth. In Bangladesh, biased gender norms prevail among the Muslim and Hindu community and even at the national level (Visaria 2015). Moreover, the motivation for son preference differs from culture to culture, although the primary driver of son preference is rooted in the organization of society along patrilineal lines. The rigidity and strength of patrilineal practices in many countries affects the preference for sons over daughters (Boer – Hudson 2017).

However, a decrease in fertility is bought about by mortality in all age groups (Kabeer et al. 2014). Therefore, in this study an attempt has been made to quantitatively assess how son preference affects fertility in a developing country like Bangladesh, where initial fertility levels are still high.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Most people in Bangladesh have a strong desire for sons, and it is not difficult to understand the reasons for this. The emphasis may be attributed to the cultural traditions in Bangladesh, which include restrictions on women moving freely outside the home for any purpose, and the culture of awarding men the responsibility of providing for the basic needs of the family. As a result, men are awarded special privileges regarding access to property and jobs.

Women are thus dependent on the male individuals in their families – first to their fathers, then after marriage to their husbands, and finally, at an older age, to their sons – given that they are sufficiently lucky to have sons. Daughters are viewed as an economic liability in many developing countries, mainly South Asian nations, and are pushed to marry as quickly as time permits with the goal of offloading the expense of sustaining them to their husband.

The practice of awarding a dowry is as yet a comparatively new phenomenon in Bangladesh, but has made the related issues worse. Sons represent protection and resources against destitution in advanced age and having a larger family guarantees that in any event some sons will be available to take care of their aged parents. One obvious approach to countering the expense of having numerous children is to let less-esteemed female children perish – most often through malign neglect (Kabeer et al. 2014). National-level gender preferences for children not only give rise to a skewed gender ratio but also change couples' fertility-related behavior. Parents who want at least one offspring of a specific sex tend to have bigger families (Seidl 1995).

For the most part, parents with a preference for children, especially sons, will keep on bearing kids until they succeed in having the number of children of the desired sex, given the family's financial situation (Basu – Jong 2010). Moreover, intervals between births are shorter in many African and South Asian countries after the birth of a daughter compared to the post-birth interval after sons are born (Rahman – Vanzo 1993; Leone et al. 2003; Mace – Sear 1997). The gender of previous children has an impact on couples' fertility expectations, so fertility may even be expected to increase, in contrast to the trend in industrialized nations for standard family sizes to decline, indicating that the factors that influence the choice to have another child are of essential importance (Sloane – Lee 1983;

Wood – Bean 1977). It is along these lines especially fascinating to think about sex preferences and their demographic effects in a contemporary low-fertility setting, which approach has, as a rule, been ignored by demographers so far (Hank – Kohler 2000).

Son preference is by and large seen as a socially decided predisposition; in a male-centric culture, couples prefer to bring up a child who has socially acknowledged attributes, status, and financial potential. This preference typically impacts behavior and may bring about favoritism that adversely influences the welfare, well-being and survival of girls and women. In this way, preferences may prompt gender discrimination (Leone et al. 2003).

Although a preference for children is regularly thought to be a noteworthy obstruction to decreasing fertility, no predictable affiliation has been identified between control of fertility and the sex of children. To better comprehend son preference, it is imperative to understand as a primary driver the financial and social setting of a nation. As son preference is to a great extent a sociocultural phenomenon, its impact ought not to be belittled in traditional poor societies (Khan – Khanum 2000).

The pervasiveness of son preference in itself means lowering the status of women. Wherever a preference for sons is robust, it tends to be accompanied by unjust practices towards daughters, many of which have immediate or potentially long-term negative outcomes for their well-being and prosperity. Quantitative information about the pervasiveness of son preference has been acquired by demographers interested in its effect upon fertility levels.

These days, fewer women need fewer kids, disregarding whether they are boys or girls. Without a doubt, some also express a preference for daughters. Evidence indicates that women are in reality better educated than in the past, and are earning better incomes (Thompson – Sanabria 2010; Schurmann 2009; Ministry of Environment and Forests 2012). Microloans for women have expanded through enlisting women in the expanding area of NGOs, the ascent of an export-oriented garment industry, and even the Green Revolution in farming, which factors have additionally created more interest in women's work (Alamgir 2009; Zaman 2004). Women presently enter marriage on far less needy terms than previously, and are less eager to endure harsh spouses and in-laws.

There are many factors which are having a significant influence on reducing the fertility rate, although son preference is one of the elements which remains a barrier to reducing fertility. Most studies have concentrated on understanding the association between gender-based preferences for children and desired fertility outcomes (Adebowale – Palamuleni 2015; Calhoun et al. 2013; Kamal – Chaudhury 2003). There is less research about how son preference affects fertility that has investigated the probability of parity progression. This paper

addresses the research gap by examining the effects of respondents' demographic characteristics and different socioeconomic factors on fertility using parity progression analysis. Thus the objective of this research is to study the impact of gender preferences for children, especially son preference, on fertility in Bangladesh.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study utilizes data extracted from the 2014 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS 2014), in which fieldwork was conducted from June 28, 2014 to November 9, 2014 in four phases on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh by the National Institute for Population Research and Training (NIPORT), with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A total of 18,245 women aged 15-49 that had married at least once were identified and 17,863 were interviewed, with a response rate of 98 percent.

The principal explanatory variable of interest is son preference in relation to the survival of children. A proxy variable of fertility is used here to estimate the level of fertility, which is defined as the number of living children. To encourage complete reporting, each woman who was interviewed was asked for information about the number of children living with her or living somewhere else, and the number who had died. The study included currently married respondents who have surviving children to measure their level of fertility. The dependent variables of the study are the four binary variables of women's parity progression – i.e. parity movement from 1 to 2, from 2 to 3, from 3 to 4 and from 4 to 5. At each parity, the sample includes those respondents who continued up to parity 6 and further.

The probable consequence of son preference is gender discrimination in education, health, and other outcomes (Chaudhuri 2012). Chaudhuri focused on the implications of different explanatory variables on women's parity progression which is driven by a desire for sons. This study presents a vigorous analysis of the consequence of the desire for sons on parity progression. For this reason, this study considers several explanatory variables to measure the level of fertility which is likely to influence parity progression.

The education of the respondents and their partners (no education, primary, secondary, and higher education) may be an important determinant of fertility. The analysis included socioeconomic measures which included the working status of the respondent (working at the time of the survey or not), religion (Muslim or Non-Muslim), partner's occupation (agriculture, service, business,

and other), and socioeconomic status (poor, middle, and rich). Other measures used in the analysis were age at first marriage (median age was used in recoding), place of residence (urban or rural), and marital duration (the difference between current age of respondent and age at first marriage). A media exposure index indicated whether the respondent used TV, radio or print media (categorized as '0' if they never used any of the media, and '1' if they indicated they used at least one of the media sources).

The relationships between fertility and selected explanatory variables were tested by applying cross-tabulation analysis which is an essential first step for studying the relationship between fertility and several of the respondents' demographic characteristics. However, the cross-tabulation analysis fails to address the predictors of levels of fertility entirely because it potentially ignores other covariates. Hence, multivariate logistic regression analysis was also used with the specific end goal of evaluating the autonomous impacts of every factor while controlling for the others.

THE POPULATION OF BANGLADESH AND FERTILITY TRENDS

Before estimating fertility differentials, it is necessary to know the overall fertility-related patterns of the population in Bangladesh after independence to the present time. The study considered different decennial censuses and organizations' reports containing inter-census data to obtain an idea about the size of the population in the period 1974 to 2017, as displayed in Table 1.

Table 1 Total population of Bangladesh according to different censuses and surveys

Sources	Year	Population (millions)
National Census	1974	76
National Census	1981	87
National Census	1991	112
National Census	2001	129
UN Population Fund	2003	150
UN Dept Economic and Social Affairs	2005	142
UN Population Fund	2006	144
UN	2007	159
World Bank	2008	160
World Population Reference	2010	164
National Census	2011	149.77
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics	2017	158.5

According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the total population of Bangladesh is about 158.5 million, which ranks it as the eighth most populous country in the world. Three decades ago, this figure was only 87 million while it was 129 million one decade later. The increasing population growth is better understood by studying the total fertility rate.

Total fertility rate means the average number of children a woman would have if she were to advance through all her childbearing years in a single year. Moreover, this indicator refers to the number of children a woman would have if her fertility were typical of the prevailing fertility rates of women of all ages in a single given year through the entirety of her childbearing years. The total fertility rate is thus a better index of fertility than the crude birth rate since it is autonomous of the age structure of the population. However, it is a poorer gauge of actual data than the total cohort fertility rate, which is acquired by summing the age-specific fertility rates that are associated with every cohort as women age over time.

Fertility trends in Bangladesh can be examined by comparing age-specific fertility rates over time from the 1975 Bangladesh Fertility Survey (BFS) to data from the 2014 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS). To understand the patterns of TFR at a glance, the computed TFR is also displayed in Table 2.

Table 2 Total fertility rates (TFR) and age-specific fertility rates among women aged 15-49, various surveys in Bangladesh

Age group	1975 BFS	1989 BFS	1993-1994 BDHS	1996-1997 BDHS	1999-2000 BDHS	2004 BDHS	2007 BDHS	2011 BDHS	2014 BDHS
15-19	109	182	140	147	144	135	126	118	113
20-24	289	260	196	192	188	192	173	153	143
25-29	291	225	158	150	165	135	127	107	110
30-34	250	169	105	96	99	83	70	56	57
35-39	185	114	56	44	44	41	34	21	25
40-44	107	56	19	18	18	16	10	6	4
45-49	35	18	14	6	3	3	1	3	4
TFR	6.3	5.1	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.0	2.7	2.3	2.3

From Table 2, it may be observed that the total fertility rate was 6.3 births per thousand women in 1975, and that for 2014 it was 2.3 births per thousand women, which is a decrease of approximately two-thirds over the last three decades. An inspection of the adjustments in the age-specific fertility rates demonstrates that the pinnacle of childbearing age occurred in the age group

20-24, while the most significant total change in fertility likewise happened in this age group, declining from 192 births for every thousand women in the 2004 BDHS to 143 births for each thousand women in the 2014 BDHS.

MEAN NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN ACCORDING TO BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

One simple measure of fertility is the average number of children ever born per woman, and in this study the number of living children is used as a measure of fertility. Since the explanatory variables (such as education, religion, and occupation) may be interlinked, it may be difficult to determine their relative impact on fertility. The socioeconomic differential in fertility occupies an essential position in demographic research (Kabir et al. 1994). Fertility levels are likely to change for different socioeconomic subgroups, while a higher level of fertility is typically observed for those with a lower educational level. On the contrary, lower fertility is observed in the group of those with a higher education. The fertility differential is presented in this analysis to see how it differs according to its various socioeconomic determinants. The study here includes only women married at the time of the survey whose complete demographic and socioeconomic characteristics were identifiable. Table 3 shows that the highest mean number of living children was found among illiterate respondents (3.18) followed by primary educated (2.43) respondents. This study confirms the inverse relationship between female educational attainment and fertility. The husband's educational attainments are also inversely related to the number of children, as with the educational status of the primary respondent.

Table 3 Mean number of living children per respondent according to socio-demographic characteristics

Background Characteristics	No. of Respondents	Mean number of living children
Respondent's education		
Illiterate	3949	3.18
Primary	4916	2.43
Secondary	6503	1.73
Higher	1490	1.24
Respondent Currently Working		
No	11486	2.14
Yes	5371	2.42

Background Characteristics	No. of Respondents	Mean number of living children
Husband's Education		
Illiterate	4715	2.83
Primary	4680	2.30
Secondary	5085	1.86
Higher	2379	1.70
Husband's Occupation		
Agriculture	4264	2.62
Service	4094	2.28
Business	7854	1.97
Others	645	2.49
Type of Place of Residence		
Urban	4709	1.97
Rural	12149	2.33
Religion		
Muslim	15187	2.26
Non-Muslim	1670	2.00
Age at First Marriage		
> 15 years	8614	2.55
≤ 15 years	8244	1.90
Access to Mass Media		
No access	6235	2.66
Access	10622	1.98
Socioeconomic Status		
Poor	6320	2.50
Middle	3394	2.26
Rich	7143	1.98
Marital Duration		
0-8 years	6264	1.06
9-16 years	5500	2.48
17-24 years	3725	3.26
Over 24 years	1368	3.77
Overall	16858	2.23

Source: Author's elaboration using BDHS 2014 survey dataset

The occupation of respondents' husband is considered an index of socioeconomic status in the study of fertility differentials. The study identified that among the four occupational groups the average number of children was highest among women whose husbands were engaged in agriculture and lowest for those whose husbands were engaged in providing services. The reason for the former finding is that such parents desire sons to support them in old age (Sekher – Hatti 2010; Larsen 2011).

Progress with decreasing fertility is much of the time viewed as a phenomenon that begins in urban areas and spreads to the countryside. Surely, urban fertility has more dependably been resolved (i.e. decreased) than rural fertility (United Nations 1987). Table 3 confirms the lower levels of fertility in urban areas than rural ones. Fertility is also affected and influenced by the preaching of the religious. Muslim respondents had more offspring (2.26) on average than Non-Muslim (2.00) respondents in Bangladesh. Table 3 also illustrates that respondents who had access to mass media and belong to the highest socioeconomic stratum had on average fewer children than those had no access to media and belong to the lowest socioeconomic stratum. Thus, such socioeconomic variability should be minimized to reduce the growth of the population. Moreover, duration of marriage may be considered a determinant of parity-dependent fertility (Bavel 2003). Table 3 confirms that the longer the duration of marital life, the higher the average number of living children.

PARITY PROGRESSION OF RESPONDENTS BY DIFFERENT GENDER COMPOSITION

For this study the sample is divided by parity and sex composition; namely: parity 1 (0 or 1 son), parity 2 (0,1 or 2 sons), parity 3 (0,1,2 or 3 sons), and parity 4 (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 sons). In this study “sex composition” indicates different possible combinations of all sons and daughters at a given parity, without considering birth order at different parities. The current analysis considers those women who have at least one child.

In this study, a total of 15,241 respondents satisfied the fertility conditions. Among them, 227 respondents were eliminated because they had one or more multiple births (twins, triplets, etc.) at any parity. After the exclusion of these respondents, the final sample consisted of 15,014 women who had 38,526 living children up to parity 5. Table 4 shows that out of the 15,014 women who had a son at first birth, 75.16 percent had at least one subsequent delivery (76.15 percent of those who had a daughter). At parity 2, 64.32 percent of women who had no sons moved to parity 3; the proportion dropped to 60.37 percent for women with one son and 57.49 percent for women with two sons. At parity 3, 59.56 percent of women with no sons progressed to the next parity, compared with 54.72 percent with one son, 50.45 percent with two sons, and 53.61 percent with three sons. At parity 4, women with no sons had a 51.30 percent chance of moving to parity 5; the proportion was 53.99 percent for women with one son, 50.37 percent for women with two sons, 51.67 percent for women with three sons and 57.87 percent for women with four sons.

Table 4 Percentage distribution of respondents who continued childbearing according to different parity

Parities	No. of Women	Parity Progression
Parity 1 0 son 1 son	15,014	
		76.15
		75.16
Parity 2 0 son 1 son 2 sons	11,279	
		64.32
		60.37
Parity 3 0 son 1 son 2 sons 3 sons	6,765	
		59.56
		54.72
		50.45
Parity 4 0 son 1 son 2 sons 3 sons 4 sons	3,594	
		51.30
		53.99
		50.37
		51.67
Parity 5	1,874	57.87

Source: Author's elaboration using BDHS 2014 survey dataset

At parity 2 and above, respondents with no sons were more liable to continue childbearing than those that have son(s). These results show the effect of son preference on continued childbearing. Therefore, an effective program launched by the government and/or private organizations to discourage son preference might help to reduce the fertility rate. In the next section, we show how at different parities background characteristics were tested to identify the relative importance of different variables on fertility in Bangladesh.

TEST OF ASSOCIATION AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The measures of association refer to a wide variety of coefficients that measure the statistical strength of the relationship between variables of interest; these measures of strength or association can be described in several ways, depending on the analysis. All the independent variables except for religion selected for this study were highly significantly associated with parity 1 (Table 5).

Table 5 Test of association between different parities and individual characteristics of respondents

Background Characteristics	Parities			
	Parity 1	Parity 2	Parity 3	Parity 4
Respondent's education	1338.5***	1293.04***	414.1***	63.29***
Respondent Currently Working	126.9***	2.3	0.07	5.84**
Husband's Education	558.6***	637.9***	146.3***	17.68***
Husband's Occupation	187.5***	189.9***	141.6***	7.30*
Type of Place of Residence	74.1***	98.06***	42.8***	6.21**
Religion	0.5	32.6***	25.1***	3.83*
Age at First Marriage	345.12***	213.4***	76.7***	2.54
Access to Mass Media	264.9***	286.7***	246.1***	25.83***
Socioeconomic Status	159.6***	192.5***	100.8***	9.7**
Marital Duration	5410.8***	2339.6***	697.3***	212.9***

Source: Author's elaboration using BDHS 2014 survey dataset. Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

At parity 2 and parity 3, only the working status of the respondents was not found to be significantly associated with parity movement, whereas at parity 4 age at first marriage was not significantly associated with parity movement.

To identify the relative contribution of the category of different variables, multivariate regression was employed (Table 6) concerning the variables found to be significant in the bivariate analysis.

At parity 2, the odds ratio of respondents with a son in Bangladesh is 0.741, indicating that respondents those who had one son were 25.9 percent less likely to have another child (move to parity 3) than those had no sons, whereas respondents at parity 3 who had one son were 23.4 percent less likely to move to parity 4 than those had no sons (all have daughters). This result is a clear indication of son preference in Bangladesh. At parity 2, the odds of having another child were lower among women with two sons (odds ratio 0.676) than among women with no sons (two daughters). At parity 3, the odds of parity progression were lower among women with three sons (0.646) or two sons (0.599) than among women with no sons (only daughters). The results indicate that women with at least one son are less likely to continue childbearing than women with all daughters. The above findings are supported by Chaudhuri (2012) through multivariate analyses: the author also finds that women with no sons are more likely than women with no daughters to keep childbearing at parities 1-4. Another unique component of the research described in this article is that it inspected parity movement driven by parity progression for sons through formal, parity-specific multivariate regression. The analysis also shows that even after adjustment for socioeconomic and demographic factors, having

a higher proportion of daughters is associated with different demographic and socioeconomic variables. Women with a higher education were less likely to move next parity than those have no formal education. A similar result was found for partners' education. From the analysis it was found that rural respondents are more likely to have subsequent births than their urban counterparts. Clark (2000) identified the fact that less educated, rural, and Muslim couples in India have the highest proportion of sons. The study also reveals the same result in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the study identified that there is a vast difference in fertility behavior between respondents who had access to mass media and those had no access. At parity 2 and parity 3, respondents who had access to any media in Bangladesh were 25.2 percent and 46.5 percent (respectively) less likely to have a subsequent birth than those had no access to mass media.

Table 6 Estimated odds ratio from binary logistic regression models between selected measures and progression to next parity

Background Characteristics	Odds Ratio			
	Parity 1	Parity 2	Parity 3	Parity 4
No. of Sons				
0 (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1	0.941	0.741***	0.766***	1.082
2	n.a.	0.676***	0.599***	0.891
3	n.a.	n.a.	0.646***	0.925
4	n.a.	n.a.	na	1.162
Respondent's Education				
Illiterate (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Primary	0.821**	0.680***	0.742***	0.802***
Secondary	0.611***	0.486***	0.546***	0.693***
Higher	0.360***	0.238***	0.225***	0.719
Respondent Currently Working				
No (RC)	1.00	---	---	1.00
Yes	1.035	---	---	1.174**
Husband's Education				
Illiterate (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Primary	0.889	0.910	1.024	1.276***
Secondary	0.725***	0.678***	0.888	0.977
Higher	0.819*	0.573***	0.989	0.873
Husband's Occupation				
Agriculture (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Service	1.067	1.297***	0.844**	1.176*
Business	0.949	0.947	0.775***	1.103
Others	0.877	1.276*	1.282*	1.207

Background Characteristics	Odds Ratio			
	Parity 1	Parity 2	Parity 3	Parity 4
Urban (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Rural	1.240***	1.19***	1.087	1.15
Religion				
Muslim (RC)	---	1.00	1.00	1.00
Non-Muslim	---	0.637***	0.571***	0.655***
Age at First Marriage				
> 15 years (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	---
≤ 15 years	1.128**	1.138***	0.961	---
Access to Mass Media				
No access (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Access	0.817***	0.748***	0.535***	0.722***
Socioeconomic Status				
Poor (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Middle	0.853**	1.1004	0.986	1.04
Rich	0.901	0.889*	0.927	0.953
Marital Duration				
0-8 years (RC)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
9-16 years	13.62***	5.99***	6.92***	1.93
17-24 years	31.34***	16.34***	16.01***	4.74***
Over 24 years	61.66***	33.48***	28.05***	7.30***
Constant	1.150	0.556***	0.314***	0.282***

Source: Author's elaboration using BDHS 2014 survey dataset. Note: RC (1.00) = Reference Category, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ and (---) indicates insignificant in bivariate analysis. 'n.a.' indicates not applicable.

Wealth index, an indicator of economic development, is significantly correlated to fertility (in a negative direction). This result also indicates the same: the more wealth respondents have, the less likely they are to have a subsequent birth. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the duration of marriage has a positive impact on fertility.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A preference for sons is both a consequence and a cause of the low status of women. It is a consequence because it arises as a result of women being considered as playing only unimportant roles, and thus of less value. This undervaluation, in turn, leads to lower investment in females as a result of which they are only able to play an unimportant role in society, causing further lowering of their status. In all cases, this fosters a preference for sons, whereby the allocation of prestige, power, and resources depend on the physical characteristics of sex. In

addition, findings from the parity progression analysis show that women with only son(s) are less likely to move to the next parity than women with only daughter(s). The result further confirms the son preference among couples in Bangladesh. Thus, similar findings of parity progression confirm that a desire for sons is relatively high among couples, which is one of the prime constraints on the reduction of fertility in Bangladesh.

From the analysis of fertility behavior, it may be mentioned here that there are many different motivations for having sons and therefore changes in a single factor may not be sufficient to spur a fertility decline. The desire to have sons can affect fertility decisions and thus can alter the size and sex composition of children within a given family. However, the findings of this study suggest that the emphasis should be on factors such as education, strictly adhering to the legal age for marriage of females, creating job opportunities, improving the socioeconomic conditions and the status of women, and also reducing parental dependence on living children. These are well-known and oft-repeated recommendations supported by most studies on the determinants of fertility. Therefore, this study confirms the relevance of these factors for fruitful population policy in Bangladesh.

Policymakers have suggested promoting the highest educational attainments to reduce son preference which drives parity progression. Although female education is strongly encouraged in Bangladesh and the government provides a stipend to women to continue until higher secondary education, such efforts are likely to have weak effects in dominantly patriarchal Bangladesh. Therefore, there is an urgent need to deal with patriarchal values which infer that sons are more valuable than daughters. Moreover, if the high fertility in Bangladesh is strictly a consequence of a preference for male children, then a decline in ideal family formation and a weakening of son preference would reduce fertility by bringing it close to the replacement level. This level may be reached by strengthening public programs that promote a better standard of life and equal rights for women and men, thereby helping ensure that a sufficient number of surviving children, irrespective of son preference, can provide their parents with the expected help and security in old age.

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FORUM

STRATEGIZING ROMA IDENTITY FOR INDIA-EU COLLABORATION: STRENGTHENING THE NRIS

MALAY MISHRA¹

ABSTRACT *It is an established observation that the Roma have been one of the world's most impoverished, persecuted and marginalized communities, yet also the least understood. While there have been some estimates of a global Roma population of 20 million, these communities are dispersed throughout several countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas. This article concerns the European Roma and the issues which engage them, the most salient being identity. It seeks to find congruence between the socioeconomic empowerment processes of Dalit (oppressed) communities in India with those of the Roma. There is a historical connection between the Romani language groups and north Indian languages – indeed it is from India where Roma communities are known to have originally migrated from. This article argues for the value of reviving these links by turning the argument around and advocating that aspects of the contemporary Indian experience of socioeconomic empowerment could be applied to Roma empowerment in Europe within the framework of the EU's National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS). This could benefit India through interaction with the Global Roma Diaspora and lead to a win-win situation whereby India would equally obtain advantage from learning about EU-centered models of inclusion. Accordingly, the robust sharing of good practices could benefit both sides.*

KEYWORDS: *Roma; marginalized; Dalits; empowerment; NRIS; Diaspora*

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BACKGROUND

Imagine for a moment that the age-old persecution of Roma communities in Europe² had ceased and that they were integrated as fully fledged “citizens” into the mainstream societies of the host countries; that they were no longer marginalized nor subject to xenophobia, racial slurs or extreme poverty, and no longer seen as socially deviant characters. On the contrary, their skills, both innate and accrued (as part of their social capital as well as through government intervention), were productively utilized in a society where they too stood to gain as equal members. Such a vision seems an ever distant dream when one reviews the trajectory of the history of the marginalization of the Roma until the present day. This paper puts forth some proposals for how India might assist the Roma in their quest for social justice.

The Roma have been persecuted over centuries since their entry into Europe and have been forced to eke out a living on the margins of society or to render manual, and in some cases slave-like, service in countries such as Romania³. Attempts at assimilation have been sporadic starting with the Habsburgs in the eighteenth century and peaking with the proletarianization of the Roma under the communist system⁴, and their becoming part of the labor force for soviet-style industrial production.

This exclusion led, in the 1960s and 1970s, to a backlash as numerous Roma Sinti activists and NGOs originating in Germany spread out over Europe mobilizing in the areas of human rights, social awareness and cultural capital issues (viz. the spread of education, promotion of a common language, culture and heritage), which saw the beginnings of solidarity amongst the Roma, often centered on identity politics and forms of what Spivak describes as “strategic essentialism” (Landry – Maclean 2016). This crystallized in the first International Romani Union (IRU) gathering, otherwise known as the World Romani Congress held in London in 1971 which saw the Romani flag

2 This study is primarily based on the author’s personal experiences and primary data collected during a period of doctoral research in Hungary and India. No accurate census of the Roma has been conducted in any country, in part due to non- or poor ethnic monitoring and/or weak self-ascertainment

3 The Roma arrived first in Romania among all central and western European countries sometime in the 14th-15th centuries and were rendered slaves in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. They later migrated to other provinces and outside the country until they were bonded to a form of slavery formerly little known to them. Slavery was formally abolished in Romania in the 1860s. Currently the Roma population in Romania is the largest in the region at an estimated 2.3 million.

4 This applies particularly to the Roma living in Central and Eastern Europe who lived for nearly 45 years when these countries were under soviet influence until their liberation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

being adopted with the Indian Ashok Chakra (cart wheel) depicted at the center (Acton 1974). This has remained the Roma emblem to this day⁵ despite protests from fringe Roma intellectuals who have objected to the adoption of an Indian emblem because they wanted to negate the Indian origins of the Roma and identify them purely as a European group (Acton 2004). This event also marked the beginning of Roma solidarity as a transnational community capable of promoting the Roma as a single community in a pan-European sense and acting on their own governments and regional institutions as a pressure group (McGarry 2011)⁶.

With the departure of the Soviets from the erstwhile Communist bloc territories and the Soviet Union's consequent break-up, the level of social and economic deprivation of the Roma increased a great deal. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the plight of the Roma particularly caught the attention of the European Union (EU). Persecuted socially, marginalized economically and undervalued politically by the emerging neo-liberal societies of Central and Eastern Europe- themselves emerging from the vestiges of a state-dominated socialist society- they were thrown to the fringes and furthermore subjected to hate politics by almost all sections of the society (viz. governance bodies, extreme-right political parties, media and the mainstream population).

It is surprising that despite the numerous Roma NGO bodies and activists in Europe who work for the Roma cause⁷ as well as pan-European organizations that lobby national governments on behalf of the Roma, and despite ample funds being separately disbursed to member countries by the EU to promote the implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS), any benefits that have accrued to the Roma in real terms are not perceptible (Kostka 2013). Moreover, periodic assessments conducted by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) indicate very little progress in several aspects of Roma inclusion and empowerment on the ground⁸. This claim is also borne out by assessments by Roma leaders on the ground as well as in surveys conducted by Roma researchers (Rovid 2012; Rostas – Ryder 2012; Mirga 2014).

5 The Ashok Chakra was adopted as part of the Indian tricolor (national flag) at the time of India's independence on 15 August 1947.

6 The author posits that although the Roma do possess a transnational identity, this is "highly fragmented and contested". See McGarry (2011)

7 The "Roma cause" is broadly meant to signify the inclusion and empowerment of the Roma in the light of the core objective of the EU-driven NRIS.

8 For selected findings on the Second EU Minorities and Discriminatory Survey (EU-MIDIS II) see <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/eumidis-ii-roma-selected-findings>

With the benefits of the Decade of Roma inclusion flowing into the NRIS⁹, and with the constant pressure of EU on the member states to prudently utilize funds meant for the Roma, the awareness and agency concerning self-development amongst the Roma population has been augmented (McGarry 2011). Being part of the European Open Method of Coordination (EUOMC)¹⁰, EU member countries are also called upon to frame their national policies to facilitate integration and accelerate the process of the socioeconomic empowerment of the Roma in respect of the four pillars laid down by the EU; namely, education, employment, healthcare and housing (EC 2010).

OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIA

We may begin with the postulate that the inhuman conditions associated with the Roma in the public and media imagination as well as governmental thinking could be gradually dissipated if the Roma were empowered to participate in their own development by applying their own experience and knowledge sharing. Thinkers such as Ledwith and Springett (2010) have advocated community participation in grassroots planning¹¹. In my view this could be the basis for Roma inclusion and empowerment. Experiences of countries which have succeeded in raising the levels of socioeconomic empowerment and political participation of marginalized communities should be brought in as reference markers. India in this sense could be of value as it has been able to develop some expertise in harnessing the development and empowerment of marginalized communities at the grassroots level.

Since India's independence and even prior to that, there has been large-scale mobilization of marginalized (Dalit) communities under various leaders,

9 While the Decade of Roma inclusion was convened at an unofficial level among like-minded countries of Central and Eastern Europe with sizeable Roma populations, the NRIs was mandated by the EU for all member states.

10 The EUOMC was meant to generate coordination among all the member states in terms of sharing best practices and building collective data about the various objectives of NRIS and thus reaffirm their position in the Roma empowerment processes and build solidarity amongst Roma by taking advantage of the NRIS being applied to a group of countries, all under the ERU umbrella. It was also meant to be a self-supervisory mechanism for EU Member States.

11 10 basic principles of Roma inclusion, otherwise known as the "Roma platform" have been laid down as part of NRIS for Roma empowerment. These are: constructive, pragmatic and non-discriminatory policy; explicit, but not exclusive, targeting; intra-cultural approach; awareness of the gender dimension; transfer of evidence-based policies; use of EU instruments; involvement of regional and local authorities' involvement in civil society, and active participation of the Roma. See Rovid (2013).

notably Ambedkar and Gandhi, which was followed by various provisions being enshrined in the Indian Constitution to empower these communities in the post-independence period. This has given way to broad-based “affirmative action” policy that has led to the guaranteed representation of Dalit groups in Panchayat Raj Institutions (Mathur 2013)¹², State Assemblies and Parliament as well as job placements and admission into educational institutions (Pai 2013). This is administered through the Ministry for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the central (federal) Government as well as their counterpart departments in all states. Moreover, various statutory bodies have been formed and specific laws have been enacted for the socioeconomic empowerment of SC/ST communities in India.

The above provisions have given constitutional support to the empowerment program for Dalit communities and, with various state-and grassroots-supported measures undertaken by state governments, have further helped to strengthen their institutional and social support. Additionally, various economic support measures aimed at the grassroots level have helped with economically empowering the former and integrating them as members of society.

It is a truism that despite more than seven decades of Indian independence, a significant proportion of citizens live below the poverty level and the lot of marginalized communities remains extremely neglected in several pockets notwithstanding government-induced welfare programs that target so-called “below the poverty line” (BPL) families (Ahluwalia – Little 2012). The current neo-liberal policies that are being applied to social reforms are grounded on the axiom of capitalism-driven social development whereby the state plays a minimalist role¹³. Herein lies the fundamental contradiction in the Indian society: to reconciling the co-existence of the emerging nouveau riche classes (Crabtree 2018) with the poorest sections of the society who indeed constitute nearly a quarter of the country’s population. Here, the state, despite its minimalist stance, has to play a socially balancing role and thus support the marginalized communities through both economic reforms as well as constitutional and legislative measures.

12 PRI consist of the Gram Panchayat (Village Council) at the lowest tier of governance and Zilla Parishad (District Council) atop that. Together they constitute the governance procedure for the village/municipality and represent the lowest political set-up in a decentralized democratic system as exists in India.

13 This is encapsulated in the Modi government’s dictum of “maximum governance and minimum government”, which has since become a guideline for governance in India today.

CONTEMPORIZING THE DALIT-ROMA CONNECTION

Having discussed the constitutional framework of affirmative support measures for Dalit communities in India, I would now like to explore the possibility of sharing empowerment processes between the Indian and European contexts in order to find common ground. Comparison between the two diverse experiences can be built around the contention of a few scholars about the Roma's transnational identity and lack of a 'motherland' (McGarry 2011: 285). It is further argued that the implications of constructing loyalty for the host state may, a) invite recrimination from the governments of those states, and b) absolve host governments of the responsibility for the care and protection of their Roma communities (Ibid: 284). However as pointed out by certain other scholars, asserting the Roma's trans-national identity would in a way rationalize the lack of proper engagement on the part of EU Member States in terms of accentuating the integration of these communities into their respective societies (Dunajeva 2015). On the other hand, such broad-based internationalist conceptions of identity would promote a pan-European solidarity (in contrast to narrow nationalist perceptions) and fit well with the discourse on widening the scope of Roma political solidarity and empowerment processes.

Contrasting with the contemporary political scenario in Europe, where extraneous factors of immigration and terrorism cloud the mainstream perceptions about the Roma in the EU member states – and where such factors are held to be directly related to growing Roma impoverishment- the latter tend to receive the most sordid treatment at the hands of their own governments. Furthermore, the scaremongering and "Roma-baiting" common among extreme-right wing politicians who seem to be in ascendance perversely fuels adverse public perception and defeats moves towards their empowerment notwithstanding the supportive policies of the EU in this regard. It is therefore not surprising to find that current right-wing governments deny the Roma holocaust for fear of furthering political solidarity amongst the Roma and their NGO sympathizers¹⁴.

14 In recent months the Fidesz government in Hungary has completely denied that the Roma were ever Holocaust victims, as attested by senior Minister Balogh's statement quoted in local press reports. See Bayer (2018).

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE ROMA

It would be pertinent at this point to discuss how the Roma are perceived in India. It seems that there is very little existing knowledge about the Roma in India. Except for a few anthropological studies (Rishi 1971; Shashi 1990) and a few organizations that promote Romani studies¹⁵, there is very little in terms of scientific and sustained knowledge about the Roma, nor their Indian connection. Nor is there coverage about them in the national media or in school or college textbooks whereas such engagement would not only be desirable but essential as part of Indian historiography. There is no denying that the Roma were part of a historical migration process from India nearly 1200-1000 years ago (Hancock 2018) and this knowledge could be imparted among the educated class of India as well as incorporated into academic curricula as part of ethnic, immigration and Diaspora studies. As such, there have been very few studies about this unique migration process which has accompanied conquest and slavery. Appropriate advocacy efforts could therefore be made among intellectuals, pedagogues, policy makers and the like. Seminars could be organized in India as well as overseas through Indian diplomatic missions to explore the possibility of engaging with the Roma. Obviously care needs to be taken not to undermine the nationalist affiliations of the Roma who see themselves first as nationals of the countries in which they live, but this still leaves space for the Roma and Indians to celebrate their common links. Thus while ensuring that Roma continue to maintain their local identities of nationality, language, and even the acquired culture of these countries, a fine balance could be struck between their affiliation to the land they live in with the cultural and educational efforts made by the government of India through its representation abroad as well as cultural organizations as regards fostering such links.

ROMA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN MIGRATION

Here we may be stepping into perilous waters. The salient question is, would it be advisable for India to appropriate the Roma as part of its heritage or not? This would amount to laying a direct claim to this older diaspora of

15 The Institute of Romani Studies, Chandigarh set up by Dr W.R. Rishi and Roma Studies and Heritage, Delhi founded by Dr S.S. Shashi are the only two organizations which have generated a sustained interest in the Roma. However, a right-wing Hindu organization named Antar Rashtriya Sahyog Parishad (ARSP), based in Delhi, organized an international Roma conference in February 2016 which was attended by nearly 30 overseas Roma delegates. A similar exercise was conducted by the same organization in January 2019.

some 20 million odd persons dispersed practically throughout the world. India boasts of several diasporas, the oldest recognized one officially dating to the early nineteenth century, comprised of indentured labor migrants. This is followed by the not-so-old diaspora of the early twentieth century involving railroad workers, petty business persons and the like, and the more recent one of the mid-twentieth century involving skilled workers migrating to western countries (e.g. doctors, engineers and scientists) and non-skilled (mostly blue collar workers) to the Middle East and South East Asian countries. Now, to add one more diaspora, also one of a much older vintage, may not be a politically viable proposition and may complicate India's relations with the countries who as such have difficulties handling the Roma in their territories. The safe option is to recognize that the Roma were part of the historical migration out of India, as attested by well known Roma experts¹⁶ and having done that, to work on soft areas such as education and culture to reaffirm the Roma's current identity which would help build a pan-European personality. Not that the Roma would ever want to barter their current nationality and ways of living in their country of habitation for India but the latter could play the role of an older master ancient civilization to which the Roma could find some heritage links and reinforce these. The reverse may or may not be true, in the sense of India gaining some instant gratification out of playing the "Roma card" but it could certainly add to the moral high ground that India has asserted even before its independence under the policies of stalwarts like Gandhi and Nehru.

Such modalities then need to be worked out within the framework of modern day international relations and India's broad-based relations with Europe. To repeat, would it pose a danger to these relations if the Roma took India for their distant motherland? Would this inflame right-wing passions in Europe, mixed up in the contemporary cauldron of the backdrop of economic migration and refugee formation and increasingly make the Roma a target of their xenophobia? Can India adopt a common position towards Roma communities across Europe as part of its distant diaspora?

How can India make the situation a win-win proposition: this is the crux of the matter which in terms of international relation building would make the Roma proposition a viable entity. In addition to the aforementioned, our contention

16 Eminent Roma expert (and himself a distinguished Roma) Ian Hancock attests strongly to the Indian roots of the Roma and suggests that the Roma need to know their Indian past so as to move forward as a community with unity and solidarity (based on the present author's interview with him on March 15, 2018 at his office in the University of Austin-Texas), as well as from his eminently readable tract, *Points of Departure: Routes of the Ancestors out of India*). See references.

is that the most constructive, yet sensitive, step would be for India to help the Roma by seeking to share good practices in governance and empowerment. In this the example of the Dalits, who could be categorized as their counterparts, and their relative success story of empowerment could serve as a marker.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Many Roma experts have posited the need for inclusive development and community participation (Ledwith – Sprigett 2010; Acton – Ryder 2013). However, this strategy has not borne visible fruit largely due to non-engagement with, and a certain indifference of, the Roma elite and local leadership towards engaging the Roma in a bottom-up approach, as well as lack of awareness/advocacy for improving community development as a tool for empowerment (Klahn 2015). Traditionalist Roma leaders are sometimes seen as setting an agenda for the community in their power-grabbing mentality and tendency to prefer hierarchical power structures. This again reinforces the earlier conditioning of Roma to ghettoize, or to remain at the lower end of a political hierarchy with no aspirations to engage in community empowerment. Moreover, institutions like the Hungarian National Roma Minority Self-Government are conspicuous in their omission of Roma women in decision-making positions, although it has been clearly identified that women play as important a role as men in the Roma household. This contrasts sharply with female representation in Indian/local government bodies where women are given due representation, (a minimum of 33% seats in local government bodies, as per a legislative order issued by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India in 1990).

It needs to be acknowledged that although there has been a trend towards greater awareness through education amongst the Roma and the formation of Roma elites (Gheorghe 2015), this has still not reached a critical mass. The numbers of the latter are still too small compared to the total Roma population. It needs mention here that a community development project observed by the author in a backward district of Odisha (India), namely the OTELP has been running for more than a decade with full community participation in both policy-making as well as the implementation of sustainable development programmes at the grass roots level. The goal of the project is to enable poor tribal households to sustainably ensure their livelihood and food security through promoting a

“more efficient, equitable, self-managed, optimum use of natural resources”.¹⁷ Initially implemented in seven of the most seriously Maoist affected districts of Odisha, the OTELP has been running for well over a decade with full community participation in both policy-making as well as the implementation of sustainable development programs at the grass roots level. A sister project, OTELP Plus, was launched in January 2013 in the tribal district of Kandhamal.

The important components of OTELP are a) community empowerment and management, b) beneficiary skill development, c) capacity building, d) land and water management, e) agriculture and horticulture development, livestock and aquaculture, f) forest management, and g) community infrastructure development. It is therefore clear that the scope of OTELP covers almost all sustainable livelihood measures in addition to skill building.

Replicated in several districts of Odisha and some other states of India this scheme, with local modifications and infrastructural availability, could be thought of as an example of good practice that could be shared with the Roma in the Hungarian context¹⁸. Moreover, since the governance infrastructure in respect of the Roma is present in all EU member countries that have been mandated to implement the NRIS, the comparability of certain Dalit-specific areas in the State of Odisha (India) with the Roma of Hungary could be taken forward as part of the NRIS with systemic support and an economy-of-scale effect in terms of costs and personnel. Additionally, a series of advocacy measures could be undertaken in which various other socioeconomic empowerment measures that befit the Roma communities could also be taken up. Instruments such as micro-finance disbursement as well as Self-Help Group (SHG) schemes have been extremely successful in the Indian rural context for women’s groups (Tapan 2010). Both these schemes have been operational in an ad hoc fashion over a period of time since the 1960s in Central Europe, with mixed results.¹⁹

Micro finance (Yunus 1989) pioneered by Nobel Prize winning economist from Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, has been described as a key means of

17 Quoted from a publication by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Odisha Tribal Empowerment and Livelihood Programme (OTELP), Government of Odisha, 2016. The OTELP has been implemented by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Department of the Government of Odisha since 2004 under the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) in 10 districts of Odisha among extremely poor and marginalized tribal communities.

18 I have specifically mentioned about Hungary because of my research interest in the Hungarian Roma who have been studied in terms of their comparability to the Dalit communities of India. Furthermore, having served in Hungary as India’s Ambassador (2013-15), I have had the opportunity to observe the Hungarian political system from close quarters. This issue in Hungary, host to several regional Roma-related bodies and one of the founder-initiators of the EU’s NRIS, has sustained my interest through my doctoral research.

19 See Ivanov – Tursaliyev (2006).

empowering rural women and was extensively implemented in Bangladesh. The scheme basically involves the disbursal of low cost loans mostly to rural women who come together by forming Self Development groups (SDGs). These groups are mostly run by women and are profitable as the investments that are made are small and the products they dealt with are diverse. The SDGs generate employment for rural women while giving them direct access to the village markets and cooperatives. They also encourage the target groups to network and develop businesses from small to medium-sized enterprises. In all these activities, a cooperative bank on the model of Grameen Bank (Rural Bank) is involved and grants are made by the state on the basis of merit and demand (Faizi 2009).

In this context, it is not out of place to point out the necessity of setting up a bank to assist the Roma along the lines of an Agricultural Credit Bank or Grameen Bank such as those found in India and Bangladesh. The proposed bank could be headquartered in a Roma specific Central European country or even Brussels, with branches in similarly placed countries. Since the EU has been the driving force for Roma empowerment, it is essential that this kind of banking has the approbation of the EU and its personnel are commissioned by the EU to work in various parts of Europe wherever the Roma are numerous. However, such initiatives could be implemented on a pilot basis and replicated depending on the success of the latter.

THE NEED FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ROMA IN DECISION-MAKING

Against a background of exclusion and disempowerment, calls for the Roma to be directly involved in decision making among pan-European organizations have become more vocal. The European Commission has stated that “strategies should be designed, implemented and monitored in close cooperation and continuous dialogue with Roma civil society and regional and local authorities” (European Commission 2011:9). An emphasis on poverty alleviation strategies, including micro-credit, skill-building and low-level technology training could be an integral part of such policies. It is felt that social welfare measures such as the Public Works Programme (PWP) has been largely skills-unfriendly and designed to accumulate unproductive unskilled labor, which in the final instance would only relegate the Roma to the parallel market (Orban 2015).

I observed during my field visits to several Roma-concentrated areas of Hungary that while the majority of adult males join the PWP, and it does provide an ample income, due to inadequate skill-building these workers languish

thereafter in poorly-paid jobs and lack further opportunities for development and the accumulation of family income. With large families and wives generally confined to typical Roma homes, this leads to the alienation and the demotivation of the younger generation of Roma.

A principal obstacle to inclusive community development has been the high level of anti-Roma sentiment displayed by power elites at local and national levels, particularly by politicians with extreme right-wing ideologies. However, in the process of dialogue and negotiation, Roma have tended to seek “alternative strategies” calling for “engaged action” (Filchak – Skobla 2012). These have not been successful principally due to weak leadership and the lack of unity amongst the Roma and the absence of motivation of the Roma elites. Despite the presence of a multitude of Roma political parties on the ground, no political party has strong enough representation at the national level barring exceptions, such as those in Romania where one Roma representative is nominated to parliament, or in Hungary where a representative from the Roma National Council (the supreme national level Roma political organization), as one of the 13 national minority groups, is nominated to parliament but cannot take part in parliament sittings. This denotes a cosmetic political presence for the Roma in national legislatures with no effective political representation. It could be argued that the task confronting the Roma communities is to reassemble their forces, starting from grass roots organizations where they may have more strength in numbers, and build solidarity, thus ascending the ladder of political participation.

From the perspective of this discussion, a contextually suitable economic empowerment model could be developed to raise the standard of living of the Roma through skill-enhancement and the development of educational and technological standards to guarantee long-term employability and commensurate mobility within the EU countries. This would help validate the EUOMC among Member States who could also undertake burden-sharing in the true EU spirit (Meyer 2010). It is therefore essential for national governments to ensure that the marginalization and segregation of Roma in their respective societies are progressively reduced which will condition their gradual integration into the host societies. Their political representation at the national level would largely flow from their social integration and solidarity building.

In India, forms of community and social action based upon micro-finance, self-help and collectivity (cooperatives) are part of an important strategy to fight social exclusion. It has been estimated that more than a million SHGs have been formed in India (Tesoriero 2006). Given the efficacy of this strategy it has been demonstrated that while mitigating the effects of extreme poverty such as that which exists in India, collective strategies to upskill the marginalized, bridge the gender gap related to income generation, and generate social empowerment

through social and cultural capital could have transformative potential with regard to decision-making abilities and opportunities (Torri 2012). Such engagement, as pointed out above, has been advocated by the EU within the framework of the NRIS (EC 2011; Acton – Ryder – Rostas 2013).

However, in applying the instruments which have been successful in the Indian context, one has to be cautious about how they could also prove to be beneficial in the European context where many such schemes have floundered or proved short-lived²⁰. In Hungary, for example, it has been noted that a small Roma entrepreneur may need a micro-credit loan of several thousand euros, whereas a similarly placed Dalit entrepreneur in India would need barely a fraction of that to start a new small enterprise, depending on the economies of scale and forces of production, (i.e. cost of labor, land, operating costs, etc.). Similarly, profits generated from agro-business may be much less in Europe as compared to those in India because of the volumes involved and discrepancies in market conditions. Risks may be considerable in the European context since there would be no state guarantor or an agro-credit mechanism such as in India. Moreover, a lack of assets (collateral) or a poor credit history - which are common - may deter the Roma from accessing credit unlike the Dalit communities in India (Moulaert – Ailenei 2005). Despite teething problems encountered by SHGs and micro-enterprises among poor SCs or ST groups in India (Karunanithi 2013), they continue to work even without much hand-holding by the state, which may not be possible in the European context.²¹ Some economists have talked about “time banks” in Hungary, but these have only short-term success (Orban 2015; Primavera 2010). Such banks worked on the fundamental premise that social capital could be generated from marginalized communities, although there was no means of converting this social capital into economic capital which could have stimulated further growth among these communities.

INDIA’S POSITION FROM THE LENS OF TRANSFERABILITY

India thus far has been put forward as a reference country for the Roma in terms of its own experience with the subaltern communities who have some

20 For an excellent overview of the various financial instruments which have been prevalent in Hungary, see Orban, A (2015).

21 The author’s field visits to two predominantly tribal districts of Odisha state – Koraput and Kandhamal – pertinently highlighted that a little hand-holding for marginalized communities goes a long way, increasing income levels and the up-skilling potential of income earners in the family.

degree of sociocultural similarity. Since independence, India has provided constitutional support in the form of the legal framework under which the central and state governments have extended their support in various ways to the related communities. The “distant diaspora” factor also adds to the potential of considering the situation in India to be appropriate on terms of the sharing of best practices for the empowerment of marginalized communities. The fact that Roma communities are embedded in their respective host societies leaves no cause for concern that their integration and solidarity building will have to be encouraged and monitored by the countries through the related administrative and legal frameworks. The fact that these countries are EU members also leaves the door open for the NRIS to expand its scope for further reinforcing empowerment measures through streamlining and effectively supervising stimulus schemes.

However considering India as a reference country what could be an appropriate goal, is the further development of linkages in the areas of education and culture where both India and the countries concerned would stand to gain. This would open the door to the generation of cultural capital, the creation of skilled manpower, and technology dissemination through advocacy efforts, all of which could make the dispossessed more employable in their own countries.

Here we are looking at a win-win situation where both parties would collaborate in particular areas that would benefit their respective marginalized communities, largely in terms of further integration and empowerment. Such a goal could also generate cross-country and multidisciplinary studies. Second, with more knowledge and experience-sharing, India could assist in the conception of a viable model for Roma entrepreneurship, development and governance.

CONCLUSION

As the study contends, India stands to gain from its linkages with the Roma community in “soft” areas in relation to the generation of cultural capital which could, with additional skill building and technology dissemination and the application of the right economic instruments, further develop economic capital. This would be beneficial to the Roma, as well as India, in expanding the latter’s footprint. However, such policy would require careful crafting and imaginative handling so as to avoid problems relating to pre-existing relations with the countries concerned. This would dispel fears of displacement or attempts at obtaining dual citizenship while stabilizing the Roma in the mainstream societies which they inhabit. Strengthening Roma identity through the consolidation of cultural and economic capital would go a long way towards

reaffirming their solidarity and integration.

It is evident that the Roma would like to be European citizens first and foremost, while integrating fully into their respective societies. The India linkage could enhance their identity as a means of social integration and economic empowerment while creating “skill dividends” for them in their respective countries, and an exchange of best practices, partly through coordination among EU member states through EUOMC. This would help change the prevalent discourse of their being treated as different entities which otherwise produces no significant gain despite the substantial disbursement of financial, human and technological resources (Tanaka 2015; Rostas – Ryder 2012)²².

The Roma agenda additionally driven by NGOs and civil society bodies has hitherto not helped matters either (Dunajeva 2015). The time has therefore come to plan medium- and long- term strategies that reinforce Roma identity (while not disturbing or corrupting their ethnic identities and forms of behavior in any way), as a form of mid-course correction for the NRIS while using such linkages to foster cooperation between India and the Roma-specific countries of Europe in a value-for-all model.

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²² In an interview with Ian Hancock (March 15, 2018), the author was given to believe that much of this policy has created no tangible gains for the Roma community as policy was flawed from the beginning and administered by gadjes (non Roma) who have no knowledge of Roma lifestyles nor any idea of how to channelize the relevant resources.

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A LOOK AT LESOTHO GOVERNMENT AND NGOS' ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO RURAL POVERTY REDUCTION

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ABSTRACT *This study examined ongoing economic empowerment programs that are being implemented by both government and NGOs in rural areas of Lesotho. The key objectives were to gain some insight into major government and NGO poverty reduction programs that target or at least include the rural poor, and to establish the challenges encountered by the benefactors in executing their poverty reduction efforts. A qualitative approach involving interviews was utilized to collect data from a sample of six government ministries and six NGOs. The study revealed that various economic empowerment programs were being implemented throughout the country. The main challenges faced by the government and NGOs in their quest to assist the rural poor were constrained resources, inadequate cooperation and/or interference from political leadership, and the insufficient enthusiasm of target groups.*

KEYWORDS: *economic empowerment programs, poverty reduction, Lesotho Government, NGOs*

INTRODUCTION

Lesotho is an African 'third-world' country, which, by both international and regional standards, is ranked among those at the lower end of the economic ladder among its fellow African countries. It is due to this fact that the role of government and NGOs in relation to poverty reduction is central to the country.

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Socioeconomic features of Lesotho

Lesotho is a mountainous landlocked country which is unique by being completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa (RSA). It is geographically located in the south-eastern part of RSA and shares a border with three of RSA's ten provinces – namely, Free State, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. The country has an estimated geographical area of 30,355 sq. km and is divided into ten geopolitical districts (LMS 2013). Its population is estimated at around 2.14 million people (UN/DESA-Population Division 2015). About 76% of the population is rural-based (Taele 2012), and the main economic activities of the former are crop farming and animal husbandry. Lesotho's literacy level is over 90%, while average life expectancy is about 49 years (UNDP/Lesotho 2014). The country's GDP is approximately USD 2,278 billion and GNI per capita for 2015 was estimated at USD 1,280. The unemployment and poverty rates for 2013 were estimated at 57% and 30%, respectively (World Data Bank 2012). Hapazari (2017) attributes Lesotho's high levels of poverty and unemployment to the country's small economy and insufficient arable land. The high level of poverty in Lesotho may also be attributed to poor soils, degraded rangelands and a volatile climate which combine to hold back progress on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (Government of Lesotho 2014). The high levels of unemployment are also accompanied by and/or give rise to under-employment, in relation to which, for instance, the majority of the country's adult females are employed in textile industries and domestic work where they earn very low salaries (Hapazari 2016). The scourge of unemployment is more pronounced in rural areas compared to urban areas. It is the authors' view that the political instability that started around 2012 and continues to this day – which climaxed in the collapse of two governments and the holding of three national elections within a period of five years (2013-2017) – has its roots in the unhealthy economic situation of the country. From this point of view, the authors assert that the holistic economic empowerment of the country's majority poor deserves special attention and could be the ultimate panacea for the country's problems that are manifesting themselves in various ways, such as in political instability.

This study set out to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the economic empowerment programs that are being implemented by the Lesotho government in rural areas?
2. What are the economic empowerment programs that are being implemented by NGOs in the rural areas of Lesotho?
3. To what extent are the programs succeeding in achieving the intended goal of poverty reduction?

4. What challenges are encountered by the benefactors in executing their poverty reduction efforts?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The responsibility for the economic empowerment and advancement of the economically disadvantaged groups of any country squarely rests with their national governments. However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), though not necessarily duty-bound in the same manner as national governments, have traditionally played critical roles in the economic empowerment and advancement of the poor the world over. In essence, it can be argued that NGOs have created some legitimate expectations among the poor of the world, especially in developing countries.

Keman (2017) refers to government as an institutionalized process through which public order is maintained and collective action is organized so as to enhance the welfare of society. The beauty of this definition is the fact that it includes the government's role of enhancing the welfare of society. In short, governments are purposefully created to serve their societies by facilitating prosperity and social cohesion. Arguably, this definition of the role of government would resonate with the majority of the citizenry of countries the world over. Handley (2009) argues that the role of government in social protection and development is now widely acknowledged by both donors and governments themselves as key to poverty alleviation and economic growth. Twala (2012) asserts that poverty reduction and alleviation aims at reducing the negative impacts of poverty on the lives of poor people and includes the state's social grant programs which can reduce the impact of poverty for many people.

The term non-governmental organization (NGO) has been multifariously defined. However, the authors find the definitions by Lewis and Kanji (2009) and Vakil (as cited in Lewis and Kanji 2009, p. 11) very captivating. Lewis and Kanji define NGOs as agencies that are primarily engaged in work relating to some areas of development or humanitarian work at a local, national or international level. Vakil defines NGOs as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people." There is no doubt that these definitions strongly resonate with the majority understanding of what NGOs stand for, and they both capture the critical issue of human development, which cannot in any case be separated from economic empowerment. Suffice to say, while NGOs play multifaceted roles within the societies they operate, their key purpose and underpinning principle is the betterment of the lives of people within their target communities.

Empowerment as a tool for advancing economically and politically disadvantaged groups is an ongoing process and is not in any way confined to any particular continent, region or country. Gender-related empowerment also remains an important issue that is still getting global attention. For example, in 2008 the European Commission adopted regulation which extends the granting of state aid to new enterprises created by women (OECD 2014) as a means of empowering women. The OECD (2014) also states that Norway has the highest proportion of women on the boards of listed companies (at close to 40%) due to its quota legislation of 2006, which is also meant to empower women. The Australian Government (2017) highlights that Australia played a crucial role in establishing Women 20 (W20), a G20 sub-group. The focus of W20 is primarily promoting gender-inclusive growth and advancing G20 commitments related to women's empowerment. In line with these commitments, Australia is working to reduce the gap between women and men in the workforce by 2025 (Australian Government 2017).

Within the Southern African region, various empowerment programs have been implemented and are ongoing in different countries. Beierl et al. (2017) highlights that in 2006 the Malawian government launched a Social Cash Transfer Programme targeting the ultra-poor (10 percent of the poorest households in each district) as well as labor-constrained households. The program's primary aim was to alleviate poverty and food insecurity in rural areas. Diraditsile (2017) noted that, in its efforts to empower youth, Botswana has developed various policies and programs, including the Youth Policy of 1996, and the Revised Youth Policy of 2010, the Out of School Youth Program, the Young Farmers' Fund, Youth Development Fund, Botswana National Internship Programme, and the Graduate Volunteer Scheme. Kumar et al. (2018) states that the RAIN project was implemented in Zambia's Mumbwa district between 2011 and 2015. The project involved an agricultural intervention focused on homestead food production aimed at increasing the year-round availability of and access to nutrient-rich foods at the household level.

Kali (2018) observed that while Lesotho has taken some steps regarding the empowerment of women, the gender-based measures implemented by the government have mostly been flawed and need some rectification if they are to genuinely empower women, otherwise they will remain only good intentions. Sekatle (2010) notes that in 2004 the Lesotho parliament passed legislation reserving at least thirty percent (30%) of its seats for women. Interestingly, soon after this affirmative action by parliament ordinary voters seemed to have taken their cue and responded favorably to women candidates to the extent that women now occupy 58% of the electable positions in the country's local governments. With regard to education, Lesotho's literacy rate has escalated to

95% for women, as opposed to 83% for men, creating an overall literacy rate of about 90% (UNDP 2015). While the literacy gap between females and males cannot be attributed to any targeted program, the country's overall literacy rate, which ranks Lesotho among the top countries in Africa, can very much be attributed to the country's Free Primary Education Policy of 2000 and the subsequent Compulsory Free Primary Education legislation contained in the country's Education Act of 2010.

Rantšo (2015) highlights that the government of Lesotho has partnered with parastatal and private organizations, including the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA), Standard Lesotho Bank, and the Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO) to fight the scourge of youth unemployment through a program called 'Bacha Entrepreneurship.' The program is financed to the tune of M 500,000 (USD 37,313) per year. Assistance from this program is accessed on a competitive basis. For instance, Rantšo indicated that a call for applications for start-up capital from the program from youth business groups had been made in December 2014 for the year 2015. The present authors cite this specific program because it fits very well into the scope of the present study, since it entails empowering the unemployed within the study period under consideration – that is, between 2010 and 2015.

Due to persisting gender inequalities worldwide, most of the literature on economic empowerment only covers women. The research associated with this study sampled both men and women, thereby helping fill this literature gap. This study is also very important as it enriches existing literature by specifically highlighting the Lesotho context.

It is with the aforementioned understanding of the roles of governments and NGOs that the authors found it worthwhile to explore and identify the kind of economic empowerment programs currently offered by these critical players, particularly to poor communities; moreover, also in relation to obtaining insight into the impact of such problems with regard to the need for the reduction of poverty and trying to understand the nature of the challenges the former face as they implement such programs. The driving force is the authors' observation, through various informal and formal interactions with members of society, that there is a lack of information, especially among the poor, regarding government- and NGO poverty-reduction programs of which they may be among the target beneficiaries.

METHODOLOGY

The study adopted a qualitative approach, employing a study sample consisting of six government officials and six NGO officials, each from a different government ministry or NGO, respectively. Polkinghorne (2005) illuminates the fact that qualitative research involves investigations aimed at describing and clarifying human experience as it occurs in people's lives. The ministries and NGOs were purposefully identified. Hence, only those ministries whose main goal is the economic empowerment of disadvantaged groups, and those NGOs identified to be present in relatively high numbers in the country's ten districts, were targeted. Two interview guides were utilized to collect qualitative data from the officials. On the basis of the interview guides, the officials provided information about the economic empowerment programs or poverty reduction interventions employed by their respective ministries or NGOs.

In addition, policy documents, where available, were scrutinized to ascertain official positions on the economic empowerment programs of ministries. Qualitative data analysis was employed. First of all, data were transcribed from the recorded audio recordings. Thereafter, the data were coded according to emerging themes, and in line with the research questions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section reveals and discusses the various ongoing economic empowerment programs of the respondent government ministries and NGOs. Notably, various programs and strategies are employed by different government ministries and NGOs in their pursuit of the economic empowerment of poor and unemployed people in Lesotho.

On-going Government Economic Empowerment Programs

The six ministries targeted for this study due to their central focus on poverty reduction efforts were: 1) the Ministry of Gender, Youth and Sports and Recreation (MGYSR), 2) the Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation (MFLR), 3) the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), 4) the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS), 5) the Ministry of Small Business Development, Co-operatives and Marketing (MSBDCM), and 6) the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE).

The MGYSR economically empowers the poor and unemployed through skills development in technical areas, including jewellery production, shoe-making, crocheting, sewing, and agriculture. The ministry conducts such training at vocational centers across the country's ten districts. The training program includes various aspects of entrepreneurship, financial management, and marketing. Accordingly, those who have undergone such training not only gain technical skills but are also in a better position to start their own income generating projects and to effectively manage them. The ministry also provides assistance to those who already produce or manufacture products by identifying possible markets and even negotiating with the markets on their behalf. Although the researchers could not obtain any quantitative data with regard to the impact of the ministry's efforts, officials asserted that their efforts are yielding positive results. The dominance of the informal industry in a country characterized by a strong presence of craftsmen, many of whom might have benefited from the ministry's programs, to some extent seems to corroborate official assertions.

The MAFS economically empowers poor people through its famous tree-planting-for-poverty-reduction program, which was said to have been running since 2011. This is a countrywide program operated in two different but complimentary modes. One approach involves the ministry supplying target beneficiaries – mainly poor rural people – with young forest- (pine, eucalyptus, and some indigenous) and/or fruit- (peach, apple, and plum) trees for free. Beneficiaries plant these, thereby creating their own woodlots and orchards, from which they benefit both through personal consumption and through the sale of products. Such products include firewood and construction materials in the case of forestry trees and fruit in the case of fruit trees. Furthermore, the ministry also trains people in how to grow and maintain their own forestry plots (woodlots) and orchards.

The second approach involves the ministry training and encouraging people to establish nurseries for fruit and forestry trees which may then be sold to the ministry, which requires them for distribution to the beneficiaries of the first initiative. Hence, there is a symbiotic relationship between the ministry's two approaches. The officials asserted that, although the ministry has its own nurseries in all districts of the country, their own supply capacity is much less than the targeted number of nursery trees they seek to distribute annually, hence the two programs cannot exist independently. It was also highlighted that the ministry has never exhausted its budget for buying nursery trees – particularly fruit trees – since the program started, and moreover, that annual distribution targets are not met due to a supply-side deficiency. Effectively, the ministry would like to have as many people as possible engaged in the nursery programs

so that an adequate supply of trees is available. However, this needs suitable land and a reliable source of water, especially during the summer season.

It was also highlighted that the objectives of the program are multipronged – covering provision of access to nutritious fruit that improves the nutritional status of communities, income generation, and environmental conservation through combating soil erosion. Similarly, Leakey et al. (2003) stress that increasing the number of fruit trees could play a significant role in combating poverty in the forest zone of West and Central Africa.

In addition, the ministry also economically empowers poor and unemployed people by imparting a variety of technical skills, including bee keeping and harvesting and processing of honey, and marketing. Such skills are generally taught to interested groups who normally organize themselves into co-operatives and approach the ministry. The ministry also organizes occasional training programs at its agricultural training colleges that target any interested members of the public.

The ministry, however, lamented the lack of program-supporting budgets as a key challenge. It was highlighted, for instance, that the budget does not provide any funds to support those who want to start income-generating projects such as tree planting and who lack basic infrastructure such as boreholes, water pumps and pipes which would require a capital injection. The lack of capital of the target groups, coupled with the ministry's small budget which excludes financial-support schemes, was highlighted as a major constraint to the ministry's economic empowerment efforts as it has led to a lower uptake of the program than anticipated. Operationally, a lack of cooperation and interference from political leadership at various levels was also noted as somewhat of a source of frustration and impediment to professionals when executing their duties. A lack of enthusiasm and dependence-syndrome was also cited as another challenge. It was argued that there are instances when some poor families have the basic resources to participate in some simple and straightforward programs that would earn them much-needed income, but they fail to engage. Examples cited included poor families who have land with suitable types of soils as well as proximity to a reliable water source who do not participate in the nursery planting program despite being well aware of it.

With regard to the impact of their programs in reducing poverty, the ministry contends that its efforts are going a long way towards meeting objectives, notwithstanding the highlighted constraints. The officials argued that the area covered by forestry woodlots and orchards in the communities across the country has progressively increased over the years. The progressive increase in the number of fruit vendors in city streets and on countryside roads can also be seen as vindication of the impact of the programs. The researchers also

interviewed ten (10) nursery farmers in Maseru district, targeting those who had been farming for at least the past five (5) years. The former reported annual earnings ranging from about USD 1000 – 10,000, with those at the higher end indicating that they get assistance from family members or hired labor, while most of those at the lower end work alone. The researchers found this to be a positive indicator of the effectiveness of the ministry's programs, as they have successfully created employment for such farmers.

The MSD runs a total of five social welfare schemes or programs that target the poor and vulnerable members of the community; namely, a Public Assistance, Cash Grant, Secondary Education Bursary, Social Welfare Institution Grant, and a Vocational Rehabilitation program. The public assistance scheme is delivered either in cash or in kind and targets the poorest of the poor within the communities. Beneficiaries are identified by professionals, especially social workers. Currently, assistance in cash amounts to USD 21 (i.e., about M 250) per beneficiary per month. On the other hand, assistance in kind is in the form of food packages and clothes.

The officials indicated that the program has always been in place – which the researchers understood to simply mean that the program has been in place for a long time and the respondents did not know or could not recall when it commenced.

The cash grant program instituted in 2009 targets poor households that are taking care of orphans. Under this program, needy families who take care of orphans receive varying amounts of cash in the form of grants which currently are paid quarterly and are pegged at USD 30, USD 50 and USD 62.50 per quarter, depending on the number of orphans being taken care of. The lowest payout (USD 30) is offered to households who care for up to two orphans, while the highest (USD 62.50) applies to more than four orphans.

The selection process for the beneficiaries of the cash grant program is fundamentally different from the public assistance program in the sense that it is implemented by Village Assessment Committees (VAC) that are set up at the village level whose members do not necessarily need to have any professional training. The officials could not articulate the wisdom behind the difference in the selection processes, although the researchers intuitively found the use of VAC to be quite suspect. Using untrained village members to make up the VAC and execute a process which ideally requires a high level of impartiality unsettled the researchers, who found it very difficult to imagine that such untrained and neighboring community members are able to fairly adjudicate matters that should benefit just a few of the most deserving cases within their neighborhoods – given that there are always close relatives and friends in the vicinity who may be potential beneficiaries but who are not the most deserving cases.

The secondary education bursary scheme is a cash grant that specifically goes to help pay the school fees of vulnerable learners at the secondary school level. The scheme is accessed upon assessment and verification of the need for such assistance. A basic criterion for selection of potential beneficiaries is that the learner must be attending any class between Form A and Form E at a public or government school, and be either a double orphan or have a single parent who is poor and unemployed.

Through its social welfare institution grant, the MSD provides subventions to orphanages and old peoples' homes as a way of economically empowering the vulnerable groups cared for by those institutions. Notably, Lesotho government currently does not own any orphanages or homes for the elderly; hence, this extension of support to privately owned institutions is critical as it serves as a demonstration of the government's appreciation of the vital societal role being played by those private players in partial fulfillment of its own social obligations. Therefore, collaboration between the government and NGOs in this regard is plausible. However, it would be ideal if government led from the front in terms of taking care of older citizens and orphans.

Last, the MSD also runs the Ithuseng Vocational Rehabilitation Centre where various skills are imparted to disabled people to promote their independence, which is again a very plausible endeavour of the government. The disabled are taught various skills ranging from technical to business skills depending on the nature of the individual disabilities. The training is generally meant to make the individuals economically active in one way or another. In terms of impact, the official narrative is that this a very effective and successful scheme, and that many trainees of the training centre are now formally employed (and the majority self-employed) in the informal sector. The authors are generally in agreement with such assertions because it is indeed true that people with disabilities are quite visible in the formal and informal sectors of Lesotho where they lead normal working lives. In fact, the authors argue that Lesotho is one of the very few countries in Africa where very few disabled people beg for cash or food, etc. on the streets.

With regard to challenges, the officials intimated that their budgets allocations always fall short of the demands of the ministry's mammoth tasks. Consequently, every year the ministry fails to attend to a number of needy situations that have been brought to its attention due to a lack of resources, including manpower. Political interference was also cited as a factor that frustrates professionals in the course of their work. Various political actors very often put pressure on the ministry's staff, either demanding that relatively larger shares of resources are channeled toward particular regions in which they have interests, or that individuals they favor are made beneficiaries ahead of more needy cases.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) indicated that whilst it does not have any economic empowerment programs specifically targeted at poor and unemployed people, it does play a critical role in assisting the broader community through selling farming inputs and products at subsidized prices. Ironically, more than 70% of Basotho are classified as poor, rural-based and agro-dependent [LMS 2013]. Accordingly, one would think this would be the ministry most strategically placed through which the government could channel a plethora of agro-focused rural economic empowerment programs in its effort to fight poverty. In any case, the economic improvement of those living in poverty fundamentally starts with putting food on their tables (Hapazari, 2016). Hence, the confessed lack of any targeted programs such as agricultural extension services to at least boost the rural poor's subsistence farming skills and possibly guarantee the provision of much-needed food on their tables was rather chilling.

The Ministry of Small Business Development, Co-operatives and Marketing (MSBDCM) primarily contributes to economic empowerment through imparting entrepreneurial skills to community members in general. As a result, the ministry does not target any specific group. Its training programs are open to anyone who comes forward and registers as and when such programs are offered, and enrolment is on first-come first-served basis. The ministry basically uses two approaches to deliver its training programs. One is that the ministry mobilizes and encourages people to form groups of sizeable numbers or even cooperatives which can then request training from the ministry, which in turn organizes suitable training venues in the localities of such organized groups. This approach ensures that participants do not have travel to cities or far away from their homes where they would have to incur accommodation and transport costs. Second, the ministry initiates its own public gatherings in the form of training workshops where everyone who can be accommodated at the workshop venue can participate and receive information. It was highlighted that the aim is to train and equip as many people as possible, including the unemployed, with entrepreneurial knowledge and skills, so as to enable them to innovatively identify and/or create viable livelihood opportunities and mobilize the requisite resources to profitably pursue various opportunities. The ministry asserted that the impact of its efforts are hardly quantifiable but it believes that its endeavors are contributing significantly towards poverty reduction poverty and national development. The officials also argue, although they had no quantitative figures, that it was obvious that a significant number of people engaging in some income-generating projects in both formal and informal sectors have benefited from their training programs at one point or another.

The Ministry of Labor and Employment basically plays three key roles in relation to assisting unemployed people. First, it acts as an employment agency – linking job seekers and potential employers. The ministry has an employment helpdesk that maintains a database of job seekers and their curriculum vitae together with other relevant details, and continuously crosschecks advertisements vis-à-vis its database to see if there are any matches. Potential employers are also welcome to approach the ministry, and their requirements are also registered for use in similar employer-employee matching processes. The ministry argues that this is a vital program in the sense that it ensures that prospective employers and employees easily find each other. Furthermore, it ensures that workers are not underemployed by placing individuals in suitable jobs. The ministry also provides pertinent labor-relations-related information to both employees and employers – a role which one official argued to be particularly critical to employees in terms of equipping them with information about their rights as workers. However, while official claims appear very sound on paper, the reality is that suitable jobs are very scarce in the country. Lesotho is characterized by high levels of unemployment, due, among other factors, to its rather small economy with very little manufacturing activity. As such, it could be argued that, noble as it may seem, the program tends to create false hope, especially among new graduates (i.e. prospective employees) of training or learning institutions who may become frustrated and dejected after a long and fruitless wait for a job. The ministry's approach of just assisting job seekers to meet potential employers contrasts with the approach in Botswana whereby the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, through the Ipelegeng Program, strives to fight poverty by creating employment opportunities for poor people (Nthomang 2018).

Second, the ministry encourages unemployed people to form self-financing groups and venture into income-generating projects. Self-financing means that group members have to pool their resources by contributing a pre-agreed amount of cash to enable them to engage in income-generating projects of their choice. The provision of funding is beyond the scope of the ministry's programs. However, the ministry provides such groups and unemployed individuals with business skills, such as knowledge about financial management and marketing, how to identify business gaps, how to run co-operatives, and dispute resolution skills.

The officials reported that their key challenge was the small budgetary allocation which makes it difficult to offer effective training to all those who would be willing. The small budgets restrict the number of training sessions that may be conducted per financial year, the place and venue for training, and the ministry's capacity to recruit sufficiently qualified and experienced personnel

or to outsource consultancy services for training when necessary. It was also noted that the idea of pooling resources as a co-operative does not seem to be well received by the unemployed poor. The success of such a program requires a lot of cooperation from unemployed people who have to be fully committed to participate in the program. The officials believed that their efforts were having a positive impact on the livelihood of the poor, although such impacts could not be easily quantified.

Ongoing NGO Economic Empowerment programs

NGOs also employ a myriad of strategies in their efforts to economically empower Lesotho's unemployed people and the rural poor. The strategies employed by respective NGOs largely depend on factors such as the genesis, nature and agenda of the particular organization. Notwithstanding the existence of a much larger number of NGOs in the country, including those under the umbrella of big international bodies such as the UN, only six NGOs were focused upon here. These were the Ex-miners Association, Caritas Lesotho, United Textile Employees, Lesotho Homemakers Association, Send-a-Cow, and the Rural Self-Help Development Association.

The Ex-miners Association is an association of former South African mine workers whose focus is to assist ex-miners and families, particularly dependents of deceased ex-miners. Fundamentally, the organization brings the former miners together as a united force to advocate and fight for fair and equitable post-employment benefits for both relatives of the deceased, and surviving ex-miners. The association pays particular attention to the ex-miners who worked in South African gold mines under the famous Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), once a recruiting agent for migrant labor which was popularly known across Southern Africa and beyond as WENELA, whose activities are reported to have started in the 1940s and which ended in the early 1980s.

The association gathers all relevant information and documents from the ex-miners or their next of kin to enable them to launch claims for the payment of overdue benefits which are still locked up in the Mine Workers' Provident Fund (domiciled in South Africa). Successful claims are paid to the organization in lump sums, and the organization, which ideally acts as a trustee, provides financial assistance to surviving ex-miners or dependents of deceased ex-miners for subsistence purposes. The organization also provides capital to bona fide beneficiaries for income-generating projects. The funds sustaining the organization are actually the pensions and other benefits accrued by individual

ex-miners during their working lives which have not been paid out over the years. However, the researchers could not establish the proportion of successful claims that are retained by the organization to sustain its activities in relation to those that are paid out to the individual ex-miners or dependents on behalf of which the claims are launched.

Some of the challenges highlighted by the organization included the issue of slow information dissemination processes, meaning that there are still a huge number of ex-miners or dependents of ex-miners across the country, especially in rural areas, who are not aware of the organization's existence. Consequently, many ex-miners or bona fide dependents of ex-miners remain unaware of the existence of funds to which they could be entitled; hence they continue to live in poverty. The lengthy period before such claims can be made was also cited as a huge challenge, as in many cases some of the key documents required for launching the claims have been lost. The secretive culture of some African men was also said to be a problem, since many widows and dependents of deceased ex-miners are unaware of any potential benefits, even though the deceased knew of them.

Suffice to say, any discrepancies and challenges notwithstanding, the researchers got the impression that the organization is doing a sterling job of helping to uplift a very vulnerable group of Basotho people. This claim is in line with the view of Edwards (1999) that NGOs need to operate as autonomous institutions in order to assist the poor effectively. However, it is also the researchers' view that the organization needs to enhance its visibility by engaging in more extensive national awareness campaigns. It was also not very clear to the researchers how transparency is ensured, especially with regard to ensuring that the poor ex-miners, on whose behalf such claims are made, receive their fair share from the organization. Even the role of government, if any, was not clarified, which the researchers found rather startling. One would think – since significant quantities of money belonging to poor and vulnerable citizens are involved – that the government would play a larger role in ensuring transparency.

Caritas Lesotho, founded in 1970, and a member of Caritas Internationals and Caritas Africa, is another prominent NGO operating in Lesotho whose representatives were respondents in this research. The organization receives most of its support from global national Caritas members such as Catholic Relief Services USA. Its economic empowerment activities focus on imparting technical skills by offering and sponsoring the training of vulnerable groups, especially orphans. Inter alia, the technical skills that are offered are in the areas of woodwork and farming, and are largely aimed at fostering self-employment. Apart from imparting technical skills, the organization also offers

career guidance to vulnerable children, particularly in rural areas where a lack of such information is glaringly acute. While the efforts by Caritas Lesotho are commendable, some researchers have argued that NGOs and donor-funded programs normally come with technical staff, a phenomenon that denies recipients the chance to develop their own capacity to design and manage such programs, which is disadvantageous (Del Nnino et al. 2009).

United Textile Employees is another NGO with visibility in Lesotho, and is a brainchild of local people – mainly textile industry workers – who say that their aim is to give back to their community by imparting technical and life-sustaining skills to unemployed people; particularly those skills they have acquired through work experience or training. Hence, the technical skills offered by this NGO are largely skewed towards the textile sector; they include tie-and-dye, knitting, tailoring, and crocheting. In addition, the NGO also trains students in a variety of sporting activities and other life skills. This is probably an organization whose impact cannot be over-emphasized. It is a fact that the textile industry is the largest formal sector (in terms of headcount) in Lesotho. The researchers note that the informal manufacturing sector in most cities of Lesotho is predominantly textile-related. Thus, despite the absence of quantitative data one can reasonably suppose that a significant number of Basotho who are eking a living from textile-related activities have benefited from the activities of this particular organization.

The Lesotho Homemakers Association economically empowers the poor and unemployed through imparting various skills, including those related to cookery, gardening, tailoring, and crocheting. The organization largely operates in Maseru and a few other urban centers, restricting its accessibility to the rural poor. Suharko (2007) emphasized that, due to a lack of resources, some NGOs assist very few people. This is rather unfortunate for Lesotho given that majority of the vulnerable and poor Basotho are rural-based. One can only wish that in due course such organizations will acquire sufficient capacity to take their noble activities to deeply rural areas where most of the poor and unemployed reside. The concentration on urban areas by such organizations will serve to perpetuate the challenges that are associated with the urban-rural economic imbalance such as rural-to-urban migration and its concomitant socioeconomic impact.

Send-a-Cow is an international NGO established in 1988 that has been operating in Lesotho since about 2002. The organization fundamentally helps rural poor people in many African countries through agricultural development programs. Send-a-Cow Lesotho primarily focuses on sustainable farming projects in rural areas. It offers agricultural inputs to its beneficiaries in the form of seeds, fruit-tree seedlings, poultry chicks, rabbits and goats and training in good farming and environment conservation practices to combat harmful

phenomenon such as soil erosion, and builds capacity to sustain the projects after initial assistance is awarded. It also helps by providing nets to protect vegetable gardens (against hail). It was revealed that, to date, the organization has assisted and continues to work with more than 3,000 Basotho households, many of which are severely affected by adverse health and macroeconomics scourges such as HIV/AIDS and climate-related disasters. One can rightly say that this NGO is having a significant impact on the lives of poor Basotho, since reaching 3,000 households, at an average of six people per household, means touching the lives of 18,000 people.

The Rural Self-Help Development Association (RSDA) is another local NGO that focuses on eradicating extreme hunger and improving the lives of rural Basotho by supporting sustainable agriculture, facilitating self-help, and enabling rural communities to become self-sustaining. The institution was established in 1991. Presently, the organization works with over 50 small-scale farming groups: schools, orphans and vulnerable children, and people living with HIV/AIDS support groups. The RSDA provides technical support to these communities through its experienced rural-based project staff. Notably, the RSDA in partnership with another NGO, the Denmark Lesotho Network (DLN), supports 40 farmers' groups in Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek. They build the capacity of groups and individuals by offering savings- and loan strategies. Suharko (2007) highlighted a similar approach in Indonesia, where the unemployed put together their savings to offer each other loans to kick-start their income-generating projects to fight poverty. The RSDA also engages in activities that seek to build people's capacity in terms of advocacy and lobbying to hold government and corporates to account. It is worth noting that, of all respondent NGOs, the RSDA is the only one that reported engagement in advocacy and lobbying activities. The researchers are not entirely surprised because advocacy and lobbying by NGOs is minimal or barely noticeable in Lesotho, especially when compared to other regional countries. The apparent negligence of the NGOs in this regard is rather disconcerting.

Just like the government ministries, all NGOs cited a lack of adequate resources, especially funding, as the key challenge to the implementation of their programs. Some also cited a lack of cooperation and interference by political and community leadership as another impediment. There is also a lack of enthusiasm from target groups, especially when programs are designed to promote skills that would help individuals or groups to fend for themselves. This suggests that poor people are more motivated by programs that hand out consumable materials and much less so with skill-building programs. This was a point also echoed by government officials who vehemently argued that there were numerous government programs that targeted poor people, but whose

potential beneficiaries did not take advantage of them unless they involved the direct handouts of goods, a behavior which the officials attributed to laziness. This contrasts with the Indian situation, where Suharko (2007) reported that the poor were very proactive in terms of seeking out solutions.

However, it is the researchers' view that there may be multifaceted reasons for the cited resistance, including paltry returns, mistrust, and dependence. Naturally, if individuals view what they will get as too little compared to the time and other resources they need to commit, they will surely resist engaging. Previous experiences with promised benefits that have failed to materialize breeds mistrust of any new initiatives. On the other hand, politicians cultivate dependence through their habit of dishing out goodies to poor people during election campaigns and making promises concerning the continuation of such handouts if they are elected. Most likely, a combination of these factors and many others are simultaneously influencing the reported behaviour. Surely, such lethargic attitudes towards government and NGO initiatives have more underlying causes than mere laziness. Such causes need to be unpacked and addressed accordingly if such programs are to achieve the desired results.

Government-NGO coordination and the impact of the programs

Apart from its regulatory role, the government does not seem to play any significant role in how NGOs go about assisting the poor in the country, apart from its provision of grants to those NGOs that look after orphans and elderly people. Both government and NGO officials admitted to a general lack of coordination between government and NGOs with regard to the planning and implementation of poverty reduction programs. As such, the duplication of efforts in some parts of the country is not uncommon, while other parts of the country that are in dire need are left unattended. Furthermore, a lack of coordination was also acknowledged among government departments which deal with poverty reduction issues as well as among the NGOs themselves. Clearly, this was a matter of concern to researchers, who believe a more coordinated approach by the government and NGOs would have a synergic effect and a greater impact on poverty reduction across the country.

Notably, there exists an umbrella organization for NGOs, the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (LCN), of which all respondent NGOs are registered members. The LCN was established in May 1990 with the objective of providing supporting services to the NGO community through providing networking and leadership training and development, disseminating information, capacity building, coordination, advocacy and representation when

dealing with the government and the international community. The researchers observed that any coordination roles by LCN did not affect the operational level at which they could have maximized synergy.

Again, both the government and NGOs have not carried out any systematic assessment of the impact of their programs, although they generally believed that their efforts were indeed yielding desirable results as per their key objectives of poverty reduction and economic development in general. Responding to the researchers' concerns regarding the lack of impact assessment of all those programs, the general position was that, although such assessments were noble, resource constraints always forced the institutions to choose between investing in those assessments and using scarce resources to assist more poor people.

CONCLUSION

There are many economic empowerment programs in operation across the country. According to official narratives, both the government and NGOs are apparently doing commendable work regarding economically empowering the poor, especially in terms of imparting technical and other life-skills such as entrepreneurial skills which enable recipients to become self-employed or enter formal employment. However, both the government and NGOs cited resource constraints as a major impediment to their efforts. Socio-political factors such as political interference by political leaders and a lack of enthusiasm about participating by target groups also render the benefactors' efforts less effective. It is the authors' view that further research that investigates the reasons behind the poor participation of target groups would be worthwhile.

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LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPES IN A WESTERN UKRAINIAN TOWN

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ABSTRACT *In this paper I describe how we identified the language symbols used on street and road signs in Ukraine's westernmost town, Berehove. In linguistic landscape studies, multiethnicity is a significant aspect indeed. Insofar as numerous ethnic groups live in Berehove side by side, it seems plausible to analyze the linguistic landscape of this settlement. In this study, two analyses (involving linguistic landscape items collected in 2013 and 2017) are used to elucidate this settlement's linguistic landscape. I demonstrate the linguistic landscape collections using two methods of analysis (quantitative and qualitative), studied in a town characterized by its multilingual history. I also analyze ethnolinguistic vitality research in bilingual settings of various time lines. Furthermore, I introduce inscriptions and symbols collected at a street fair in relation to their language and its richness.*

KEYWORDS: *Transcarpathia, Berehove, linguistic landscape, multiethnicity*

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, linguistic landscape analyses are applied in many branches of science (Ben-Rafael 2010). The essence of the method is elucidating and accurately explaining the underlying motivation, ideology, and power struggles behind linguistics landscape items of various forms. Linguistic landscape research is predominantly used to analyze the multilingualism of multiethnic territories (Laihonen 2012, Cserniczkó – Laihonen 2016, Landry – Bouris 1997, Scollon – Scollon 2003). It introduces the conditions for the coexistence of languages, their characteristics, the dominant position of some languages, their dissonance or harmonious coexistence, as well as the forms

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the minority and state languages appear in (Barni – Bagna 2015). We collected inscriptions in Ukraine's westernmost town of Berehove. Our analysis was undertaken on the basis of two previous articles in Hungarian (Hires-László 2018a, 2018b). The settlement is relevant for linguistic landscape analysis from three points of view.

First, numerous ethnic groups live in Berehove side by side; a significant feature in multiethnicity studies. The multiethnic character of the settlement has not formed over the past 10-20 years, but over a much more extended period (Csernicskó – Orosz 1999, Csernicskó – Máté 2017). Numerous ethnic groups live side by side, not only in the settlement under analysis; this characteristic is true of the whole region – Transcarpathia. The two dominant ethnic groups in the area and in the settlement include the Ukrainian ethnos belonging to the state-nation (some researchers question the inclusion of the Russian and Rusyn ethnic groups; however, we do not wish to take part in this debate here), as well as the Hungarians that have become a minority as a result of historical changes (Fedinec – Vehes 2010).

Second, Transcarpathian Hungarians are mostly concentrated in Berehove district, which is the reason why this town plays a significant role in the life of local Hungarians. Analysis of the linguistic landscape conducted in the settlement proves suitable for describing the minority Hungarians' fate, and illustrating their opportunities for language use as well as their language prestige. Shohamy (2006, 2015) shows how important the role of the linguistic landscape can be in the process of language choice. Language policy processes include the essence of the linguistic landscape. In its interpretation, the linguistic landscape reveals the ideologies that influence various language policy measures (such as laws and edicts) (Shohamy – Waksman 2009: 314). Language policy analyses related to the linguistic landscape, presuppose, first of all, an analysis of public places (Backhaus 2006, Laihonen 2012, Shohamy – Waksman 2009) that is capable of revealing the symbolic expansion of language. This expansion is mostly provided for and guaranteed by the legal opportunities awarded a language (see further information on the language policy opportunities in Ukraine in Csernicskó 2016). The use of the Hungarian language, as well as of national symbols in the settlement described herein, can nurture Transcarpathian Hungarians' linguistic self-confidence.

The third factor is a tendency that includes an economic process. On the basis of our present analysis, this is the most significant factor. Namely, the settlement has become a place favored- and visited by tourists over the last five to ten years. The evolution of this new economic sector has caused numerous changes in the town's life. Moreover, it has brought about changes in society and culture. Our next step is analyzing the influence of the spread of tourism on the town's

former traditions, as well as studying the inscriptions in the town's public places and at street fairs. In other words, in the process of analyzing the linguistic landscape, we are searching for changes brought about by tourism by means of applying a qualitative research method.

Linguistic landscape analysis is based on two approaches: quantitative and qualitative (Shohamy – Ben-Rafael 2015). We use both methods in our study and compare linguistic landscape elements from two different times (2013 and 2017) based on the three features described above. Such a multifaceted linguistic landscape analysis at a local site can explain some social phenomena and processes. With the analysis hereby presented, we can increase the encounters of the disciplines often mentioned in linguistic landscape analysis, as well as combine the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. In addition, by presenting the linguistic landscape of a Ukrainian, Transcarpathian multiethnic town, we can shed some light on the image of the country and the region that has formed in the media, science and public life. In what follows, one can first read a current policy review. The circumstances of the photos collected for analysis are then discussed, and a deeper analysis is presented.

POLITICAL EVENTS IN UKRAINE THAT ARE RELEVANT FOR OUR LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS

The settlement under analysis is situated in Transcarpathia. This region is one of the 24 regions designated by Ukraine's former and official forms of state governance. Ukraine's territorial military unity has been fragmented by riots and military action that have been going on since 2014. This process started with peaceful demonstrations that resulted in a transition of power and were followed by street fights in Kiev. The demonstration preceding the riot was called *Euromaidan* in the vernacular or the *Revolution of Dignity*. The consequence of this revolution was Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

Furthermore, after the Russian military intervention into Eastern Ukraine, the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk proclaimed their autonomy (Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republic). "Ukraine became the object of suffering in a global geopolitical struggle" (Fedinec – Halász – Tóth 2016: 225). The Russian-speaking population of the eastern part of the country did not want to become victims of anti-Russian political arrangements, and as a result took up arms with annexation in mind (establishing the Donetsk People's Republic on 7 April, 2014 and the Lugansk People's Republic on 24 April of the same year). At this time a cold war started in the country and Kyiv launched an

anti-terrorist military operation on the affected territories (commonly called “ATO”), strengthening of the army commenced (all former soldiers were mobilized), and the national guard was formed. To stop the war in the country’s eastern part, European Union delegates attempted to enforce a ceasefire, although fighting of various intensity has continued (2017 autumn). Eventually, Ukraine signed an association and free-trade agreement with the EU on 27 June, 2014 (Fedinec – Halász – Tóth 2016:109-111; see further information on Ukraine’s present situation and its relations with neighboring states in Fedinec – Csernicsekó 2017a, 2017b). After the outbreak of the war, people’s daily routines involved not only political and economic instability. Men, often married with children, often went abroad to escape joining the line infantry and the military draft. Soon they were followed by the rest of their families with the aim of family reunification. As a result of the 2013-2014 series of events, political and economic instability engulfed the whole country, including Transcarpathia. The situation of minorities became even more problematic after nationalist forces rose to power who wished to follow a nationalist Ukrainian state-building model. In this process, they aimed at assimilating the population with a Russian or dual identity by enforcing the use of the Ukrainian language and promoting Ukrainian national awareness. On 5 September, 2017, the second reading of the law on education was passed. The essence of this is that it obligates the use of the Ukrainian language in all public education institutions, but grants the use of minority languages in kindergartens and primary schools. This law aims at the assimilation of all the minorities in the country (similarly to the 2008 edict) (see continuously updated details about the law on education at the site <http://hodinkaintezet.uz.ua/>). In the spring of 2019 presidential elections were held in Ukraine. After the election, the whole country will look forward to experiencing the new president's promises of change (improvement of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, support for minorities, the eradication of war, corruption, and the recovery of the economy).

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The method essentially comprises qualitative and quantitative elements, as well as their combination (Shohamy – Ben-Rafael 2015). In the process of quantitative analysis, collected illustrations are classified according to various points of view, and their proportion (per cent) or frequency distribution is revealed. For the qualitative analyses, the content and interpretations of readers/viewers in terms of the placement of linguistic landscape items in public places

are much more critical. In the case of content analysis, features characteristic of the direct social setting were interpreted together with appraisals of the languages' symbolic significance. We applied both methods in our analysis. On the one hand, we used quantitative methods to introduce the settlement's traditional multilingualism, while on the other we used qualitative methods to formulate in general the settlement's characteristic bilingualism, and to analyze the inscriptions collected at a street fair.

In relation to the quantitative analysis of the linguistic landscape, Ben-Rafael et al. (2006) elaborated a system of categories whose essence is the study and assessment of the language use of inscriptions in public places that takes into account language policy processes. The appearance of languages and their use in various locations may thereby be investigated: these are assessed not only on the basis of their symbolic meaning but also taking into account language rights and opportunities. In this case, it becomes essential whether inscriptions were initiated by an individual (*bottom-up*) or an administrative unit or organization (*top-down*) (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006).

The authors elucidate the fact that three critical factors are relevant in relation to the symbolic organization of public places:

- *rational consideration*, in essence, this deals with the level of signs at which they attract attention in terms of their practical function for public and clients: e.g. the attractiveness and expected influence of signs on recipients;
- *presentation of the self* for the public: i.e. individual aspirations expressed in community identity markers using various patterns;
- *power relations* – here appear the social and political forces that determine the most important values (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006:7; 9–10).

The essence of the analysis, besides its implications for language policy, relates to the degree of formality of the inscriptions. Thus, the inscriptions in public places are assessed according to whether they were put up by private persons, official (state) organs, or civil organizations.

Table 1 Interpretation of signs registered in the linguistic landscape on the basis of official (*top-down*) and private (*bottom-up*) initiatives (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006:14)

Top-down initiative	Bottom-up initiative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • public institutions: religious, governmental, municipal-cultural, educational, and medical • public signs of general interest • public announcements • street names 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shop signs: e.g. clothing-, food-, jewelry shops • Private business signs: offices, factories, agencies • Private announcements: 'wanted' ads, sales or rentals of flats or cars.

The top-down signs were coded on the grounds of their belonging to local, cultural, social, educational, medical or legal institutions. Bottom-up signs were coded according to the following categories: professional (legal, medical, consulting), commercial (and later its branches, e.g. food, clothes, furniture, etc.) and the service sphere (agencies; e.g., real-estate, translation or workforce) (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006:11).

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

In 2013 we took photos of the linguistics landscape items that can be seen by pedestrians along all busy streets. Then the photos were categorized according to varieties of language use and the meaning, content, and function of the inscriptions. This analysis aimed at revealing who puts up multilingual linguistics landscape items in the multiethnic town, and with what purpose, as well as elucidating the influence of ethnic group's languages on the inscriptions (Hires-László 2015). Following this, in 2017 we took photos of the town's main square and looked for those linguistic landscape items that had changed (statically remained) compared to our 2013 survey. We used social and qualitative analysis with this aim in mind, as well as an assessment of the photos we took at a street fair during a festival in 2017. We tried to assess language use related to the advertising materials and brand names of various products on the basis of local social and economic factors. *We aimed to map the street fairs oriented at Ukrainian tourists that are organized in traditionally bilingual (Hungarian and Slavonic: Ukrainian/Russian/Rusyn) settlements. In particular, we were interested in the social and economic processes that influence the linguistic landscape.*

The study that was conducted in May 2013 (Hires-László 2015) included only those inscriptions that could be seen in public places by passers-by every day. In other words, it did not include the collection of official correspondence, seals, or prospectuses (Tóth 2016a, 2016b). Furthermore, it did not involve the inscriptions on the buildings of institutions, organizations, or official bodies. In 2013 – immediately after the 2012 law on language was passed – 1178 photos were taken. In the process of analyzing the itinerary, we attempted to choose the busiest town districts for the collection and archiving of more inscriptions (Hires-László 2015). From this perspective, the appearance of the town has been continuously changing, and the process is ongoing. The number of service providers is increasing, mostly in the town's main square. In the period after the change of the regime, some soviet-era service-sector business units almost disappeared (e.g. food, household supplies, clothing shopping

centers, shoemakers, ice-cream shops, cafés, etc.). Before the economic crisis, these were minimally present in the lives of the town's population. As a result, commerce predominantly occurred in the outdoor marketplace. Nowadays, the situation has changed completely. The pedestrian precinct in the downtown area has an ever increasing number of businesses and service providers. Thus, in the process of study we took the majority of photos in the town's busiest streets including the pedestrian walkways and major adjacent streets. We applied quantitative methods to analyze the pictures collected in 2013 (see the complete material in Hires-László 2015). Jūratė Ruzaitė (2017) also analyzed symbolic expansion (Landry – Bourhis 1997: 25) using the quantitative method that we introduce here (Scollon – Scollon 2003, Backhaus 2006, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). The former author took 515 digital photos between 2013 and 2014 in three Lithuanian- (Klaipėda, Palanga and Druskininkai) and two Polish cities (Gdynia and Sopot), mainly choosing the central parts of cities that are frequently visited by tourists.

THE LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE OF BEREHOVE IN 2013 AND 2017


The essential purpose of our research itinerary (2013) was to map the busiest squares in the town. To ensure coverage of bottom-up inscriptions relating to the whole town, we walked not only along the central, busy pedestrian precinct, but also along other busy streets in the town, including some side-streets. In the process of analysis we determined what language street-signs we had managed to archive. We classified these according to various criteria depending on whether they were mono- or multilingual ones. Out of all existing language combinations, we drew up a table showing their frequency indices (Table 3). On the whole, we can see that the number of Ukrainian street signs is comparatively high, just like dual Hungarian-Ukrainian ones, but unlike purely Hungarian-language street signs, which are much less common. A situation of parallel multilingualism can be seen in Table 2, while the individual distribution of languages is summarized in Figure 1, which shows that Ukrainian as a state language is much more common in the inscriptions collected in 2013 in public places.

Table 2 Linguistic distribution of inscriptions on photos taken in 2013 in Berehove as part of the linguistic landscape

Ukrainian	514
Hungarian – Ukrainian	449
Hungarian	107
Ukrainian – English	41
Russian	22
English	16
Hungarian – Ukrainian – English	13
Hungarian – Russian	3
Hungarian – Ukrainian – Latin	2
Hungarian – English	2
Hungarian – Ukrainian – Hebrew	1
Latin	1
Hungarian – Russian – English	1
Hungarian – Ukrainian – Russian	0

(Source: Hires-László 2015)

Figure 1 Language frequency in public places in Berehove according to the 2013 linguistic landscape analysis




The situation in Berehove is in general as follows: inscriptions of both official and private individuals testify to the fact that the Ukrainian language dominates. However, the multilingualism that is characteristic of the town prevails in street signs in public places (see more in Hires-László 2015). Hungarian and Ukrainian are present in most inscriptions, even though the Hungarian language is less emphasized. Thus, we have determined that in the public places of traditionally multilingual towns there are still multilingual street signs and inscriptions, and this is true of both the official and private sector. The private sector, first of all, adjusts itself to market mechanisms of demand and supply, while official inscriptions depend on the nationalist politics that influence the country's management principles. The settlement mayor's (Zoltán Babják; first period: 2013-2015, second period: 2015-) management principles influence the micro context of the analysis. After the election of the former to the post of town mayor, he tried to report on his activity both in Hungarian and Ukrainian on his Facebook site. Besides this bilingualism, he respects different cultural characteristics – during Christmas holidays celebrated by Hungarians his greeting message can be read first in Hungarian, and then in Ukrainian. The order changes in the greeting card for those who celebrate Orthodox Christmas. The language order and hierarchy are always adjusted to the topical theme and the content of the news that is to be shared. Both dominant ethnic groups (Hungarian and Ukrainian), as well as their language use and symbolic systems, are respected by the mayor in his announcements and signs in symbolic places. His attitude is in full accord with his management principles of strengthening the town as a locality and fostering good, neighborly relations (Appadurai 1996). Moreover, it is emphasized by the reproduction and putting up of valid street signs throughout the town. The present analysis reveals that linguistic landscape research should include presenting the position of the former in social and cultural media as well (Scollon – Scollon 2003). In 2013, street signs were chaotic (see more in Hires-László 2015), while by 2016 the mayor had eliminated this chaos by replacing all the street signs in the town. Side by side with other information, Babják Zoltán posted information about this decision on his public Facebook site, both in Ukrainian and Hungarian. *“Last year, those bilingual black-and-white street signs with names of streets and squares were approved. The competent work-group experts approved the Ukrainian and Hungarian names, and in one week from now street-sign production will start. For the attention of corner house-owners: the erection of street signs is planned for April.”* Replacement started in early February 2016; then in March, the mayor notified people of the continuation of work. In his bilingual report, the mayor explained the replacement of street signs in the following way: *“The erection of bilingual street signs in our town with the new names of streets and*

squares is going on. This is why we ask the residents of Berehove, especially the owners of houses at crossroads, to take the replacement of street signs with understanding, and to help with the work. Replacement will take place according to the laws that are in effect. In addition, nameplates will help citizens, tourists, the ambulance service and other service providers to find their way in the town” (date of publication: 31 March, 2016).

Picture 1 New and old style bilingual street signs in Berehove



2013



2017

We also analyzed the ethnolinguistic vitality of the languages used in the inscriptions in cases when the interrelation between the languages was characterized by asymmetry or symmetry (Lou 2010, in Laihonon 2012: 28). In the case of asymmetry, minority languages are usually under-represented regarding the style of the inscription (smaller font size, smaller text, lighter shading). The treatment of public inscriptions in visual language use is essentially symmetrical to the number of speakers of the languages of ethnic groups living in the town. However, Ukrainian as the state language enjoys greater emphasis. In the use of the Hungarian language, we often come across grammar mistakes, inscriptions without the correct accents, and even cases when only an abstract or keywords from the Ukrainian text are given in Hungarian. In such cases when the Hungarian language is represented asymmetrically with less emphasis than the Ukrainian language, we considered such street signs to be bilingual and examined the differences in the inscriptions using more detailed analysis (Hires-László 2015). In the analysis of the linguistic landscape of Berehove, ethnic groups are symmetrically represented, except for the Roma and Russians. The language of the Roma community is not present anywhere, although the

number of Roma in Berehove is substantial. One of the reasons for this is that the majority of the Berehove Roma community consider Hungarian to be their mother tongue.

Furthermore, due to their low social prestige and poverty, their vitality is always secondary in the formation of the town's image. The Russian language plays a much smaller role, even though it is the official language of the Soviet Union (Cserniczkó 2013:193–233). We came across Russian inscriptions on street signs that have remained since the change of the regime (Hires-László 2015:174–175). The inscriptions in public places are never in Russian, even though many people in the town use this language in everyday communication. An opinion expressed in a focus group conversation in summer 2016 (Hires-László 2017) reveals that residents of Berehove often use Russian. Although tourists who visit Berehove often use Russian as well, in the case described a tourist demanded the use of the Ukrainian language. In the quote, the informant mentions that in her shop a tourist attempted to correct her with regard to the name of a fruit – asking her to use the Ukrainian equivalent, not the Russian one. The informant had graduated from a Ukrainian-language school and speaks Ukrainian with her husband at home, but she used the Russian equivalent due to everyday routines and customs. Furthermore, this was natural in her immediate environment.

*Marianne: This one had no problem with me speaking Hungarian – sorry for interrupting you – but he objected to my use of a Russian word; when I said **hárbuz**, he said **kávun** [laughs]. Well, he thought it sounded better in Ukrainian because watermelon in Ukrainian is **kávun** [laughs]. Well, this is it. There were only such things; he corrected me from time to time. The fact that I spoke Hungarian did not disturb him. (Fcs01_2016 May 26)*

The prestige of the Russian language in the region has decreased in recent years. TANDEM2016 research reveals the same result: among Hungarian, Ukrainian, Russian, English, and German, the Russian language is considered to have the lowest prestige value (Cserniczkó 2017:9). For tourists visiting Berehove, the use of the Hungarian language is natural, but Russian is not, and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict has intensified these negative sentiments. Moreover, the Ukrainian-Hungarian conflict that started in September 2017²

² The new law on education that passed in 2017 rendered the lives of minorities in the country more difficult. Ukraine's numerous neighbors, including Hungary, opposed this law. It was followed by the country's political forces waging a media campaign against the Hungarians and Hungary itself, and had numerous negative consequences. For instance, Ukrainian extremist forces held numerous demonstrations in Transcarpathia, and in Berehove in particular.

may have a similar impact concerning the use of the Hungarian language in Transcarpathia.

ECONOMIC FEATURES REFLECTED IN THE 2017 LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE

Another significant area of linguistic landscape analysis, besides the illustration of language policy processes, is when linguistic landscape analyses are used in the assessment of the tendencies characteristic of society. Particular emphasis is given to the study of those economic processes that overlap with social ones. This helps with revealing and perceiving various changes in economic activity. The most significant area of study in this field is tourism and the tendencies within it.

Inscriptions have two essential functions: communicative and symbolic (Landry – Bourhis 1997, in Laihonon 2012: 27). Their communicative character lies in the fact that they transmit information to foreigners, while the symbolic one relates to the population's language distribution as well as the status of languages. On 19-21 May, 2017, Town Day was organized to celebrate the town's 954th anniversary. Since 2001, Berehove has celebrated its nomination to a regional-level town on an annual basis. On Town Day, just like during other events (BeregFest, Wine Festival), there are regular two-three day programs, street fairs, and tents with goods displayed on the main square of the town. Transcarpathia – including Berehove – has become a destination point for many tourists. Formerly they came from Hungary; now they arrive from other regions of Ukraine (mainly from Kyiv and its precincts) (Cserniciskó – Laihonon 2016; Karmacs 2017).

Tourists are attracted by the area's variegated scenery and multiethnicity. More and more local people are interested in tourism at different levels. Accordingly, it has become a significant branch of the economy in the region, and this can be perceived in service areas and commercial units and their products. In 2014, the outbreak of the war in eastern Ukraine caused a new wave of permanent and cyclic migration of the population. To support the Hungarian population to stay in the region, the current Hungarian government elaborated the Egán Ede plan,³ which highlighted the development of tourism as a high priority branch of the economy. This led to various investment and development schemes in the area. Various impact assessment studies have dealt with the development of tourism that is giving the area a powerful economic boost (Berghauer 2012, Tarpai 2013).

³ <https://www.eganede.com/egan-ede-terv.pdf>

Over the last two-three years (right after Ukraine lost the Crimean peninsula), the number of tourists visiting the area has increased. The local population of the peninsula decided on discretionary annexation. As a result, tourists travelling within country borders chose to visit Transcarpathia for its beautiful exotic scenery instead of Crimea. The number of tourists may change significantly, taking into account the fact that since the summer of 2017 Ukrainian tourists have been able to travel visa-free to any European Union member state provided they have a biometric passport.

The wine producers participating in the Town Day are not traditional win growers, for their goods include various kinds of home-made alcohol. Wine production in Berehove has a history. Viticulture started and became established as early as the 13th century by the Saxons at the time of King Béla (Lehoczky [1881] 1999:29), while the Counts of Shönborn at the time of their tenure set up state-of-the-art viticulture in the area (Lehoczky 1999). In the course of the collectivization of farms in the Soviet Union, viticulture was transformed into mass production. At the time of the change of the regime, due to economic decline and a lack of capital this tradition fell out of favor and disappeared from the palette of economic activities. One of the reasons for this was the lack of competence and professional skills. Resuscitation of the industry started in the 2000s with some wine producers on several farms and vineyards who possessed the diligence to become engrossed in the craft of viticulture and vinification. Currently, the largest target audience of wine producers includes tourists from Ukraine's other regions, while formerly tourists from Hungary often visited this region. Thus, the region's wine producers and those willing to become win growers build on viticultural and winegrowing cultural traditions to master this craft gradually. The inscriptions and informative brochures of the wine producers participating in the exhibition were mainly in Slavic languages, and the vendors in the stalls mainly used Ukrainian/Russian/Rusyn (Ruthenian) languages. When it comes to small producers, it is generally relatives, family members, or producers themselves who offer their wares. The majority of wine producers came from the Mukachevo district, not Berehove district, which would seem more logical. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the majority of tourists are able to visit these wine-making areas. Moreover, wine tasting for those who were interested was predominantly organized by the wine producers in their wine cellars. However, there is another tendency among wine producers. Those Hungarian-speaking wine producers who formerly served tourists from Hungary now attract and serve Ukrainian tourists and predominantly use the Ukrainian language on labels for their merchandise and in the production of other souvenirs. For instance, to promote their wineries wine producers have fridge magnets produced in Ukrainian/Russian. We found

just one Hungarian inscription on a wine producer's tent. He came from Dercen, a predominantly Hungarian village in Mukachevo district. This was also the case with the Hungarian inscriptions on the stall's main poster that looked incidental next to the Ukrainian ones, and other inscriptions were not translated into Hungarian. A typical example of asymmetry: although the inscriptions were bilingual, the emphasis and priority were given to the language that best serves economic interests; in this case, the state language.

Adjusting to the demands of Slavic tourists, some wine producers make different varieties of home-distilled vodka and cognac. In any case, alcoholic beverages on sale in the street fair were labeled in Ukrainian and Rusyn. The Berehove *Cotnar* wine-making company also presented its goods on the main square of Berehove with Ukrainian labels only. The company name is a historical name that can first of all be connected with the Hungarian ethnos.⁴ The *VIP Bar* company name is English. Presumably by using a world language they seek to follow a middle path and attract both Ukrainian and Hungarian consumers. English company names are successfully used in Transcarpathia (Hires-László 2015, Cserniczkó 2017), and by using a world language such names become understandable to everybody (Ukrainian, Hungarian, and other nationality tourists). The *VIP Bar* on the main square chose this solution as well, and used not the English language, but Ukrainian and Hungarian. The seller was Hungarian-speaking. However, he had a detailed list of cocktails, coffee and alcoholic beverages in Ukrainian. This was the only stall with bilingual inscriptions where Hungarian dominated. However, it was not incidental that this stall did not attract many tourists. In a stall selling jams and decorations the company name, labels, and prospectuses were also in English. The English language was used in company names and on some labels. There were even cases when 'hot-dog' was transliterated into Ukrainian using Cyrillic letters.

English language use covered the inscriptions' informative character. However, the *symbolic meanings* were lost. It would have enriched the goods' ethnocultural character if the languages of the two dominant ethnic groups (Ukrainian/Rusyn-Hungarian) were used side by side (Piller 2003:175). English company, brand and product names were based on the region's characteristic features and their use could have been motivated by *rational consideration* (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006:7). Rational consideration, in this case, means that the use of English-language brand names was more pronounced in relation to the sale of products than the language used by the local population. The use of the

4 The word 'Cotnar' can be etymologically traced back to the Romanian settlement *Cotnari*. According to settlement legends, at the time of King Matthias Corvinus's wedding a grapevine was planted in the settlement, which is now famous for its delicious dessert wine.

English language aims at increasing products' prestige value (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 16). English language could not be found anywhere else at the street fair, except on labels and in brand names. Although this event specializes in tourist merchandise, one rarely sees inscriptions in any other language than Ukrainian.

Alongside wine production, there are two other essential goods at Transcarpathian markets and fairs. Honey (together with its by-products) and cheese-making dominate the Transcarpathian economy. The latter includes, first of all, various kinds of goat cheese seasoned with fresh herbs and other vegetables. Transcarpathian producers make specific goods and sell them at street fairs. These include jam, wooden and fur-based instruments, goods with Ukrainian national motifs (*vyshyvanky*: Ukrainian traditional clothing which contains elements of Ukrainian ethnic embroidery, and *rushnyky*: a fabric used in rituals embroidered with symbols and cryptograms of the ancient world), different kinds of meat products (sausages, bacon and ham), jewelry made of precious stones, medicinal herbal tea, and essential oils. The stalls selling merchandise mentioned above were characterized by Ukrainian language use: there was not a single Hungarian-language inscription (Picture 2). Goat cheese is typically sold to tourists at street fairs organized in the busiest places. The thermal water pool built during the time of the Soviet Union is also now mostly visited by tourists. Due to the medicinal effects of the thermal water, tourists visit the town's pool in high season in large numbers. The settlement also has a much higher level bathhouse built on the same thermal spring. Side by side with the pool there has been a smaller stationary street fair in recent years. In the summer of 2017, labels on goat cheese were bilingual (Rusyn/Hungarian) (Picture 3), while the vendors speak only Ukrainian/Russian. However, abiding by local customs, and even though they serve mainly Ukrainian tourists, the goods are labeled in Hungarian as well. Thus, at the local level in a bilingual town, an ethnocultural emphasis is essential for producers, especially if they are selling Transcarpathian gastronomical specialties.

Picture 2 Monolingual inscription on goat cheese sold at a street fair on Berehove Town Day (May 2017)⁵



Picture 3 Bilingual inscription on goat cheese sold near a thermal water pool that is visited by tourists (August 2017)



Several candy floss vendors offered their goods on Town Day; however, Hungarian-language linguistic landscape items could only be seen in one place (Picture 4). Alongside candy floss, one could buy popcorn, ice creams, hot-dogs and potato chips. English names dominate the latter two products, but other goods had only Ukrainian labels. In general, the language use of the whole street fair was predominantly Ukrainian.

Picture 4 Candy floss vendor with Hungarian and Ukrainian inscriptions



Rovas encoding (an old Hungarian script) can be found first of all on some Transcarpathian settlements' nameplates (Karmacs 2014a, 2014b) but it is less often used for the names of goods and services. Despite the dominant Ukrainian Town Day medium, Szekler script could also be found in the promotional

⁵ The photos used in the research were taken by the author.

poster for Transcarpathian *langos* (fried dough) side by side with Ukrainian and Hungarian inscriptions. To emphasize Hungarian products, national colors were used in the linguistic landscape items. Moreover, the female vendor wore an embroidered dress with Hungarian motifs. We also documented one more specific case of sales with an ethnocultural characteristic – a vendor wore clothes with national motifs, used a particular script, and offered for sale ethnic gastronomy goods with bilingual inscriptions.

SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS OF ETHNIC GROUPS AS ITEMS OF THE LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE

The use of the symbolic system of various ethnic groups becomes the object of analysis in the linguistic landscape. The same tendencies characterize the use of national symbols in Berehove as with language use – the symbols of the two dominant ethnic groups can be found at the entrance to and on the interior walls of the institutions and organizations that function in the town. The use of the system of symbols of minorities in Ukraine is regulated by the law on national minorities in Ukraine adopted on 24 June 1992. Moreover, it is governed by the edict that was enforced by the Hungarian faction functioning in the Transcarpathian Regional Council on 17 December, 1992. These determine the minorities' (mainly Hungarians') system of symbols in the region (Tóth – Csernicskó 2009:82). Now, language use is regulated by the 2012 language law (Csernicskó 2016). The system of symbols of both dominant ethnic groups in Berehove is constantly present both in official (*top-down*) and privately set up (*bottom-up*) places (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006).

The use of colors to represent national symbols, together with inscriptions in different languages, mark the square and make perceptible the presence of the nationalities living on this territory. There are numerous opportunities to elucidate the unique character of ethnic groups. Hobsbawm (1990) claims that the national state tries to make its ideology clear by means of imparting to the square symbolic meanings that have their roots in nationalism. For that very reason, Arjun Appadurai (1996) emphasizes the fact that in the wars these ideologies wage, locality can be and is of vital importance. Locality is not necessarily a spatial notion; it is a characteristic feature of social life “formed through the sense of social immediacy, interaction technology, as well as by the relations between the contexts that have become relative.” The author claims that top-down nationalist ideologies make it hardly possible to create a neighborhood. He interprets the neighborhood as the current social form in which locality is manifested as a dimension or value (Appadurai 1996). Tim

Edensor (2002) claims that the present forms of nationalism should be searched for in popular culture, singling out three critical aspects of the former: (1) nationalism by means of the spatialization of nationhood and ideologically and mythologically significant landscapes and iconic locations; (2) nationalism by virtue of the performative realization of nationhood, including through sports events, carnivals and tourism; as well as, (3) nationalism through learning what a “national consumer” is; i.e., by attracting attention to phenomena such as national car brands.

Anthony D. Smith (1995) differentiates four meanings of the word “nationalism”:

(1) the general *process* of *forming* a nation that is sometimes called *formation of a nation* (however, the phrase often includes the processes of state formation);

(2) a national *idea* or feeling, attitude or *awareness* of belonging to a nation, aspirations for its welfare, strength and safety;

(3) achieving or maintaining a national status (with all its concomitants) as the political aim of a *movement*, including the organization and the activity required to achieve it;

(4) *science*, or in the broader sense *ideology*, that deals with the nation and aims to create its autonomy, unity and a sense of identity.

Even though this notion is strongly polysemantic, in everyday life its negative connotations are most common (Michnik 1992); at events and in day-to-day life we see representations of these symbolic systems with a perceptible locality. Nationalism becomes part of everyday life in the sense that when symbols are used to strengthen and support the national idea, locality is being formed. Therefore, the use of the tricolors of ethnic groups living side by side peacefully for many decades is not meant to strengthen a nationalist movement, but rather to build upon locality (Appadurai 1996).

Further on, through performative realization, we focus on an analysis of tourism whereby economic determination is of high importance. In the study of linguistic landscapes, one can evaluate the analysis of nationalist ideologies (Hobsbawm 1997, Smith 1995, Michnik 1992), localities/neighborhoods (Appadurai 1996), and economic mechanisms, whereby we investigate the essence of “putting up for sale” ethnic and cultural characteristics. The latter analysis is undertaken by searching for the motivation behind the inscriptions, as well as their characteristics, via surveying the linguistic landscape. For example, a message on the town’s dominant building is nationalist in character. However, it is used to represent multiethnicity and the emphasis lays in communicating harmonious neighborly relations to town residents and visitors alike.

Picture 5 *The main square in the colors of the national flags of Ukraine and Hungary (blue-yellow, red-white-green, respectively) on Town Day 2016 and 2017*



Thus, both in language use and in the use of symbols one can distinguish two ethnic groups in Berehove. In the use of symbolic systems, first of all, emphasis on a neighborhood and harmonious living side by side is the centre of attention, playing down extremist nationalist ideologies: i.e., a culture-specific order approved by the state functions in the town (Ilyés 2010:116). In a multiethnic community without extremist nationalist forces, multilingualism becomes natural and routine. As a result, symbolic systems of various ethnic groups coexist alongside each other. Nationalism emerging in a multiethnic community due to the long-term coexistence of such groups may develop owing to transactionalism (Conversi 1998). The essence of transactionalism lies in those exchanges and interrelations between ethnic groups that loosen the borders between the groups (Barth 1969, 1996), thereby making border crossing much easier, unlike the nationalist ideologies that build up borders between ethnic groups.

Picture 6 *The fixed symbolic system of Berehove programs – use of the Hungarian and Ukrainian national colors (on the left of the gate, red, white and green balloons, and on the right blue and yellow balloons)*



We interpret the linguistic landscape used in tourism as the popular culture in which localities and nationalist ideologies emerge (not according to the pejorative meaning of the latter word [Smith 1995]).

Ukrainian nationality- and Ukrainian-speaking people prevail in Lviv. Moreover, it is often a centre of extremist nationalist views. Among the restaurants found at the fair there was a Lviv Cossack restaurant as well, although it was surprising that only (traditionally Hungarian) goulash soup could be ordered there, while Cossack soup was not on the menu. The name and food offerings of the stall built on Ukrainian national ideology and showed that although nationalist ideology is present, it is founded on economic interest and adjusts itself to the area's multiethnicity in relation to the sale of Hungarian cuisine to Ukrainian tourists. There were no Hungarian-language inscriptions anywhere. On the other hand, there was a stall that communicated to passers-by by means of symbols and language that Ukrainian and Hungarian ethnic groups get on well with one another. This example completes our analysis. It clearly shows that in the stalls of local entrepreneurs, friendliness is of particular importance. Symbols emphasize local identity in a popular culture where, through ethnic and cultural characteristics, the goal is to sell goods and make economic profit.

SUMMARY

In 2013 and 2017 we carried out a linguistic landscape study with two similar methods in the western Ukrainian town of Berehove. In 2013, we followed a process of collecting statistical data about the languages used in inscriptions in public places. In 2017 we followed the same itinerary, but besides collecting statistical data we also undertook photo documentation, thereby revealing the changes in the linguistic landscape of the town's public places compared to the 2013 study. The social and political tendencies experienced in the country (Fedinec – Halász – Tóth 2016, Fedinec – Csernicsekó 2017a, 2017b) significantly influence everyday life, and, consequently, the linguistic landscape as well. The decisive political event in the period between 2013 and 2017 was the intensification of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia due to Russia's support for the separatist territories in eastern Ukraine. Thus, our analysis includes a description of the consequences of both political and military battles. Our analysis reveals that bilingualism is still evident in most places in Berehove, and the mayor's management principles strengthen this tendency.

We studied the linguistic landscape not only from the point of view of language laws, but our analysis included social and economic processes as well. To illustrate the changes in economic processes, we analyzed some modifications

in inscriptions and company names that helped in assessing the transformation of economic processes in the area. We tried to elucidate what dynamic changes the linguistic landscape can produce which intensify those shifts that we experience both in economic processes and in politics and society that influence language use. Csernicskó István (2016) drew similar conclusions. He studied the interrelation between the linguistic landscape and language policies over a much longer time interval (1918 to the present day), concluding: “In the process of language policy researches [sic] the analysis of linguistic landscape in its broader sense can offer useful information not only [for] revealing the hierarchical relations of some languages but also [for] achieving and changing language dominance” (Csernicskó 2016:60).

We have come to the conclusion in the process of analyzing the linguistic landscape of the Town Day that Ukrainian-language inscriptions were predominant visible on goods sold at the street fair in the main square of Berehove. Inasmuch as mainly Ukrainian tourists visit this area, the inscriptions are, first of all, oriented at them, which is the reason why they were mostly in Ukrainian. In Berehove, two ethnic groups dominate in terms of the use of symbols and language. However, the street fair organized on Town Day shows a different picture. There are rare cases of Hungarian-language use, but these are not as dominant as they are in general in the town. The buyers’ language use is the dominant factor in relation to inscriptions on goods that represent cultural traditions, and the majority of sales units in the area use the Ukrainian language. Product labels for tourists are adjusted to economic principles of supply and demand. An emphasis on ethnic and cultural character is prioritized to generate more profit. As a result, the bilingual traditions of the region are not displayed in the inscriptions used at the street fair organized on Town Day.

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RESEARCHING THE SPIRIT OF PLACE. MENTAL MAPPING ON SZIGET FESTIVAL

VIKTÓRIA PAP¹

ABSTRACT *This paper deals with the atmosphere of Sziget Festival. My research goal was to interpret and to depict the festival as a socio-cultural environment, an experienced material and spiritual space; a special place that exists only for a week. Based on the results, the mental places of Sziget Festival – i.e. the places that exist in festivalgoers' minds – and the most important values of the venue, the functions of the sites, the forces that create places, the most characteristic atmospheric elements of the place, and the channels of perception of the spirit of place can be described. The applied objective of the research was also to assist in festival development, from the perspective of the formation of the festival image and marketing communication to practical considerations. Thus, the research highlights the usability of both the social sciences and applied research (marketing and market research) of genius loci, and some appropriate methods.*

KEYWORDS: *spirit of place, spatiality, mental mapping, experience research, festival research*

“Participants should – first and foremost – be offered experiences, this builds the brand best. An appealing venue and an excellent atmosphere are just as important as the music.”

(A Sziget ellenfelei [The rivals of Sziget] In: Forbes, June 2016, p. 48.)

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INTRODUCTION

The present research² deals with the atmosphere of Sziget Festival, describing the mental places of the festival – i.e., of Sziget-goers – and its most characteristic atmosphere-related elements, the channels of the perception of the spirit of place, the invisible functions of the sites, and the forces that create places. The results, based on information obtained from participant observation, provide an opportunity to create a deeper understanding of the concept of the spirit of place, as well as – due to the method of mental mapping – to depict the results on a map.

The research started in 2014 when I participated as researcher for the first time at the festival for a week day and night. That year was the foundation of the exploratory research described in this paper. At that time, I conducted introspective participant observation which involved describing my assimilation and my changing attitudes at the festival.

My most fundamental observation was that Sziget was in fact a unique world where there existed an atmosphere characterized by a variety of features and circumstances which was difficult to describe but easy to live through intensely. Indeed, at Sziget, almost every corner and place has a unique character. In the summer of 2015 I attempted to explore this deeply elusive phenomenon; that is to say, to explore and deepen my understanding of the spirit of the place, which I continued in 2016.

My research from 2015 onwards had an applied research goal in terms of how it provided support for the development of the festival, from the formation of marketing communication (experience) to practical considerations (efficiency). Thus, the results indicate the direction of the application of a concept and methods that can be used in the study of both marketing communications and market research.

ABOUT SZIGET FESTIVAL

Sziget Festival, held every August for a week, is one of the biggest music festivals and cultural events in Europe, and has won the title of Europe's Best Major Festival twice. The event, which is organized in Budapest on an island [*Hajógyári-sziget* or *Óbudai-sziget*] in the Danube, is Hungary's biggest festival

2 Our research team, in cooperation with Corvinus University of Budapest and Babes Bolyai University, supported by Sziget Cultural Management Ltd., was present at the festival for the fifth time in 2018 (primarily in the form of a cultural anthropological expedition).

and tourist attraction; it has been organized each year since 1993 and has become increasingly successful and international. It is now one of Hungary's "image elements" that attracts the most foreign tourists. The festival has a budget of € 25 million, and in 2017 hosted more than 450 thousand visitors.³

Sziget Festival has fifty program locations, including five major music stages. It can be argued that the festival is very varied regarding both its music and program offers. In addition to mainstream performers, music shows include world music, blues and jazz performances but also electronic music performances which attract a special subculture. Besides music, one can also find children's programs, the stalls of various social organizations and associations, and also literature, dance, fine arts, and sports. Over the last decade, the event has become increasingly commercialized, so today many sponsors and brands are present. In the visually colourful festival, the organizers have created a unique decorative concept of the "Art of Freedom," which means the placement of colourful, extravagant "eye candy" and a program location called the Artzone. The "Island of Freedom" concept has been present in marketing communications since 2013, and was changed by the organizers to the "Love Revolution" theme in 2018.

According to 2017 check-in data (i.e. demographic data about entry to the Sziget Festival), 56 percent of visitors were non-Hungarian. The most populous nationalities were Dutch, French and German, but the website of the festival is currently available in 12 languages. Sixty-seven percent of visitors were in the 18-30 age group, meaning that the main target group is predominantly people in their twenties.

A questionnaire survey of 1207 people carried out by Ipsos in 2017 for Sziget Cultural Management Ltd. revealed that 74 percent of festival participants were college or university students or graduates. The proportion of this group has increased significantly over recent years. Visitors were in a relatively good subjective financial position in terms of their purchasing power. Fifty-six percent of all respondents were able to comfortably make a good living and save up, according to their own declarations.⁴

THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO "GENIUS LOCI"

Literature that deal with the spirit of place cannot be considered a coherent conceptual unit. On the one hand, it can be said that the topic covers a very wide range of scientific areas – from humanistic geography (see e.g. Pocock, 1981)

3 <https://en.szigetfestival.com/sponsors> (02. 04. 2018)

4 See more: <https://en.szigetfestival.com/sponsors>

through literary theory, architecture and environmental psychology to sociology and even settlement marketing; on the other hand, although the origin of the concept dates back a long time, its utility in the social sciences has not yet matured (Jankó, 2002). The spirit of place is an abstract phenomenon which is difficult to grasp, define and conceptualize. Due to this fact, any social researcher who would like to deal with this topic faces a serious yet beautiful challenge.

The distinction between space and place is based on the ideas of ancient philosophers. For example, Aristotle's theory of categories, Descartes's and Newton's absolutist concepts, Leibniz's relative theory of space, and Kant's a priori concept of space. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries social scientists also began to work on the issue. Their ideas form, as a whole, the social constructivist trend towards "spatiality." The postmodern, so-called trialectic trend towards spatial theoretical concepts (see e.g. Berki, 2015) distinguishes three aspects of spatiality. The first of these is space as we perceive it (perceived space); that is, the space measurable on maps. The second is space as we think of it (conceived space); that is, mental, cognitive space (see e.g. Lynch, 1960; Hall, 1966). The third is space as we experience or use it (lived space); namely, the reality experienced by the subject at a particular moment (smells, colors, lights, sounds, states of mind, etc.). This is the individual experience itself, a subjective experience, a set of individual impressions. In my interpretation, this is the reception and experience of the spirit of place. In Beck's view (1967), these trialectics are divided into objective space (namely, the mathematically descriptive space), ego space (the space of individual psychological operations), and immanent space (the inner, subjective space of the world of representations). The spatial concept associated with Lefebvre (1974) and Soja (1989) emphasizes the subjective perception of space. The former authors distinguish the space we experience, along with perceived space, from conceived space.

Today, the experience society, digitized space usage, and the smart city movement capture space sensations in two important dimensions: efficiency and experiences. There is growing demand for research into how people psychologically perceive the environment. For example, Daniele Quercia, a Spanish computer scientist, presented a so-called Happy Maps application in a TED presentation⁵ which not only focuses on desired routes with a concentration on efficiency, but also takes into account how users like to feel that they are on the move. The application builds on geo-tagged images and uses related metadata to create an alternative form of mapping wherein sites are – in a way – weighted according to human emotions.

5 https://www.ted.com/talks/daniele_quercia_happy_maps (02. 04. 2018)

From an environmental psychological perspective, spatial identity serves to clearly identify place. Physical environments with an identity are able to summon up a specific picture in the observer that is generated by the sum of the effects of sensory organs and which is formed by the subjective perceptions of the individual. Location experience and space sensation is a multichannel process. Sensing the atmosphere of a place affects individuals through various sensory channels. Space sensation is both a physical and an emotional process of interaction that occurs between the individual and the environment. Yi Fu Tuan (1974) defines the sense of space as the personal, psychological and emotional attachment to a given environment. This “bondage” is the love of place, or topophilia.

Theorists who deal with spatial concepts emphasize the multi-sensory nature of spatial experiences. According to Tuan (1977), the experience of location is realized through the synaesthetic interaction of all senses. In his concept of sensory vision, touching, hearing and smelling are taken into consideration. However, Kinayoglu (2009) points to the primary role of vision. Some locations may be better characterized by sounds or odour than, for example, colors. In environmental psychology, the overwhelming dominance of visual perception over other forms of perception is caused by the hierarchization of the distance between the recipient and the subject of perception. Vision is thought to be the most spatial, and therefore the most influential channel of perception. Hearing, touching, smelling and tasting are more intimate channels and are less spatial than vision due to the shorter distances of the stimuli from the perceiver (Rodaway, 1994).

It can be said that different activities require different types of locations. The nature of a site determines the general, comprehensive atmosphere that is to some extent dependent on time. This may involve changes, for example, in seasons, weather or daylight. These factors influence light conditions the most (Norberg-Schulz, 2004).

A place is therefore a distinctive space. Space is formed into a number of individual experiences and thus becomes place. In addition to its physical properties, related experiences and emotions are also constituent elements of places (Dúll, 2002).

My definition – in line with the research field, and based on the literature review – is the following: The spirit of place (*genius loci*) is the atmosphere, mood and emanation of a geographically/spatially identifiable area (with a name, purpose or function) that can only be perceived through experiences locally. The most important elements in this definition are, on the one hand, identifiability and uniqueness – that is, that the atmosphere is typical of only that place in that composition. On the other hand, the spirit of place is an effect on a person that

the subject only senses locally. That is, the spirit of place is a mental perception of subjective experiences and emotions closely related to space. Related issues can thus be approached by investigating the mental representations of subjects.

EXPERIENCE RESEARCH

One of the most popular focus of marketing strategies today is on the implicit, all-pervading delivering, or rather staging experiences, which approach has a clear competitive advantage in the market.⁶ Although experience in the case of festivals in the entertainment industry is explicit, its involvement in market research is also crucial. Tourism as an experience industry creates the conditions for gathering experiences, but the experience is created in the subject (Kovács, 2014). The circumstances in which such experience is acquired (e.g. place, time) and the subject itself therefore both constitute determining factors.

For more than two decades, international literature has focused (even more intensively since the publication of *Experience Society* by Schulze [1992]) on the socio-economic background of experience. The “experience economy” as a new era was coined by Pine and Gilmore (1998). In their description, experience is an economic category with an epoch-making power which is the successor to the service economy.

The marketing of the digital age places great emphasis on experience-centred, customer-focused developments. This is also proven by the fact that there are countless terms for experiences in the professional language: product experience, service experience, brand experience, user experience, consumer experience, customer experience, experience design, etc.

The concept of user experience has been defined primarily in the context of digital device and internet use. According to Solis’s (2015) equation (besides the basic theory that customer experience= $\$$), an experience (henceforth, X) consists of customer experience, user experience, and brand experience ($X=CX+UX+BX$).

The X includes all contacts between the client and the company. During experience research, professionals investigate what kind of feelings people have during their interaction with brands, products, and services. This means that experience research actually deals with mapping feelings and thoughts.

Since X concerns people, feelings and thoughts, its definition and research strongly build on psychology and anthropology. The methods that are primarily

⁶ Based on the author’s experiences and expertise in the field of market research and customer insight management.

involved in experience research include fieldwork, observation, mystery shopping, user interviews, exit interviews, a variety of product tests, and metrics such as the so-called Net Promoter Score (NPS) – an indicator of user satisfaction that shows in a standardized way to what extent the product and service would be recommended by those who know the product or service to others.

Although during an experience design process mapping may be used as a tool, such as for describing and planning processes (mind mapping) and so-called customer journeys, mental mapping as a method has been less used in market research for investigating space-related customer experiences. In this paper I present mental mapping as an appropriate method for use in marketing-oriented research into space-related experiences.

RESEARCH GOALS AND QUESTIONS

The dilemma in the literature that concerns the spirit of place is the connection between space and its parts. That is, if we can talk about the “spirit of place” in the case of a given place, can we do the same for parts of a place? (Jankó, 2002). Considering this important theoretical question, I formulated my main research objective thus: to conduct an investigation of the interpretation and representation of place, namely the socio-cultural environment and lived/experienced material and spiritual space. This generated five associated research questions in relation to Sziget:


1. What are the characteristic spots?
2. What are the evolving/alternative places, in addition to preexisting/established venues?
3. What are the forces that create place and form space?
4. What are the determining elements of the atmosphere?
5. What are the channels of perception of the spirit of place?

APPLIED METHODS

I used three methods to explore and describe the spirit of place. Mental mapping (oriented-recall mental mapping), a questionnaire survey, and participant observation (content analysis of fieldwork logs). My main research method, mental mapping, is an interdisciplinary area that is located at the boundaries of geography, psychology, linguistics and social sciences (for details, see Letenyei, 2006). The other applied methods were designed to complement this method.

In my interpretation, the spirit of place is perceived as the mental perception of subjective experiences and feelings closely related to place through verbally expressible experience. Therefore, I consider mental mapping to be the most appropriate method for its exploration. In order to reveal the elements of the spirit of place experienced by individuals and visualize the places of the festival, we asked interviewees to indicate their own spaces on a blank map showing the whole Sziget (only the main paths), meaning that they should assign cognitive or emotional buzzwords to their important places (see Figure 1). In fact, we actually drew experience maps with respondents.

Figure 1. A mental map about the experiences of a festivalgoer



A total of 225 ($N_{2015}=95$, $N_{2016}=130$) respondents sketched an experience map after having been chosen via random walk sampling. After processing the maps, the mental places of Sziget could be defined. Regarding the gender distribution of the sample, 59 percent of respondents were women, 41 percent male, while 49 percent were Hungarian and 51 percent non-Hungarian.

The example of mental mapping we employed (namely, experience mapping) was designed especially for researching the spirit of place at Sziget Festival, and was used here for the first time. In 2015, when we used the method for the first time in the field, it was important and useful to draw the experience so that we could use it more effectively next year.

Despite some slight difficulties, the festival proved to be excellent terrain for drawing the experience maps. Those who were asked to participate considered

the task to be a form of playing, learning, and self-expression, so they responded enthusiastically to the exercise.

However, the interviewers had a difficult task because, although they were not allowed to suggest answers, it was essential that we did not collect program or performers' names, and that we were not inquiring into respondents' satisfaction. In order to facilitate the desired types of replies, field researchers could use helping, periphrastic, leading questions. These included, for example, "What is the place on Sziget that you are most tied to?" (It could be not only a program venue.), and "Where did the most remarkable and memorable events happen to you (whether good or bad)?"

The most common problem was, in spite of the clarifying questions, that experiences and emotions were not often described by the respondents but rather programs, concerts, performances, or levels of satisfaction. The reason for this is that the desired task required a greater degree of creativity and emotional expression which some respondents did not have the appropriate skills for. Undecodable responses were also a challenge; these were clearly due to the characteristics of the terrain, mainly a lack of concentration. For example, maps with only drawings, unreadable handwriting, or just placemarks were submitted.

We recorded the gender and nationality of respondents on the back of the maps and asked questions to gather supplementary information, including how many times the respondents had been to Sziget and how many days they had spent there that year. The spiritual and emotional intensity of the perception of place is dependent on individuals, their cognition, knowledge, state of mind, and mood, but also significantly on the amount of time they spend at a location; that is, assimilation (Jankó, 2002). Therefore, we started the query in both years only from the third day of the festival. In the middle of festival week there were spectacularly fewer experiences on the cards than at the end of the week. Before starting the fieldwork, Sziget was divided up in terms of areas among the interviewers and we also paid attention to addressing respondents at various times of day. Researchers were asked to record the exact time and location of the interview on the back of each map. On the last day, I also asked each of the participating researchers to draw their own experience maps, which I also included in the analysis.

Responses on a map contain a lot of information for the researcher, not only in terms of content but also visually. Mapping, spatial vision and representation are obviously subjective. This claim is supported by the fact that there were respondents who, compared to most of the respondents, drew their experiences on a blank map from a perspective of 90 or 180 degrees.

Via the questionnaire survey, I mainly sought answers to two questions: "If asked to describe the atmosphere in one word, what would this be? How

would you describe the aura?” and “What is the first word that comes to your mind concerning the citizens of Sziget Festival?” The definitive atmosphere of Sziget Festival can be described in one word (i.e. the one-word expression of the spirit of place), as can the emanation of Sziget society (that is, what kind of determining atmosphere the non-material nature of the spirit of place has, and how it contributes to the atmosphere). As Sziget is a special place – a festival society that exists only for one week per year – the important elements of the spirit of place are social elements, which are also personal and subjective mental elements: namely, feelings, associations, and emanations.

These questions were asked as part of a longer questionnaire survey based on random walk sampling. In addition to the two questions, the questionnaire also contained questions about the most important values of the festival, which also provided useful information about the spirit of place. The database containing the answers to the survey questions also included information about the day the questionnaire was filled in and the number of times the respondent had been to Sziget. These are pieces of background information that were used to filter out respondents who were presumably less receptive to the spirit of place. There were 533 respondents in the questionnaire sample, 44 percent male and 56 percent female, 48 percent Hungarian and 52 percent non-Hungarian. In terms of age composition, the respondents' average age was 23 years (from 16-49 years old).

The third method I employed was the analysis of fieldwork logs. The texts created by the researchers involved in participant observation (that is, the field logs) also contained elements of the spirit of place without the focus of the authors (i.e. researchers in the field). Content analysis can help researchers to obtain relevant information that is observable but which is more difficult to grasp. This method is the least intrusive of the three I employed. In this fieldwork sample, there were 30 individuals (Hungarians and cross-border Hungarians), of whom 43 percent were male and 57 percent female.

In the course of the analysis, I collected the words and phrases regarding the atmosphere-related elements, and created research categories from them. I then supplemented the information derived from the previously analyzed and categorized questionnaires and formerly mapped information. Although most of the journals were written on a daily basis, the analysis was broken down on an individual basis. The analytical unit of encoding is the reception channel, which procedure was carried out with the so-called open coding technique (see e.g. Strauss – Corbin, 1998). Without the mentioned frequencies, every relevant, at least once-recurring term was included in the category system. The result of the analysis was a concept map that presents the elements of the spirit of place and the channels of reception in Sziget Festival that organizes experiences, feelings and attitudes into a structure.

RESEARCH OUTCOMES

Places and mental spaces

After processing the maps, three sites outside the Sziget area became identifiable (see Figure 2). These can be considered the foregrounds of Sziget. It can be seen that the festival as a place in terms of mental space extends outside its geographical boundaries. These outlying places are an Auchan hypermarket, a section of road with cordons (the “check-in path” to the different check-in stations that we call the “baffle in”), and the so-called K-Bridge which is considered to be the main gateway to the festival. From these, Auchan was considered the most significant. On the one hand, this is due to the frequency of mentions and experiences, but also because it is the farthest and most differentiated place which mentally forms a part of the Sziget area, thus its atmosphere is seen as part of the festival. The most important buzzwords related to it are “cheap,” “booze” (alcohol) and “food.” Based on the maps, it can be said that the K-Bridge and the queue there are almost everybody’s remarkable first experience. Here the most striking expressions were “excitement” and “joy.”

Further analysis of the maps made several alternative so-called mental places identifiable. Seventeen places can be specified based on the experience of specific venues (e.g. A38, Volt, Luminarium, Snowattack, Magic Mirror, Cirque du Sziget) and ten places that formed spontaneously – for example, shared mental places at the border of several locations were identified on mental maps in both years. Among the latter, as a shared area of experience and function we can highlight the information distribution area, the “info spot” intersection beyond the K-Bridge, or what we call “Colosseum Square,” which is bordered by the triangle of the Colosseum electronic music venue, a swing installation and the Aréna party tent. The former is notable because of the tobacco shop, Festipay, its meeting point functions, and the large amount of dust or mud that is mentioned; the latter because of the non-stop parties and “party faces.”

The most important sites – i.e. the sites mentioned by most individuals and the most experience associated with them – are the Main Stage and the Beach-Chill area. It can be seen that Sziget has two important basic functions and thus basic forms of atmosphere: partying and vacationing.

The mapping of the experience clearly identifies the most characteristic places as well as the places that might be called “islands on Sziget” (the latter word meaning “island” in English, thus “islands on the Island”). The latter are typical for being somewhat external to the general atmosphere of the island, yet they add something to it overall. Thus, for example, the Boathouse has become a special place primarily because of its Hungarian identity, because it is the only place


where cash payment is an option, and because it is where the only English-style toilet is accessible. “VIP,” for example, is a place whose atmosphere-related elements can be found in the descriptions contained in the field logs:

“... a celeb can come to Sziget to be somewhere else and won’t get dirty. It is good to be here, too, but in a different way.”

In the case of the most characteristic places, however, special markers and experiences that cannot be observed elsewhere make them remarkable and notable, but do not distinguish them from the general atmosphere of the entire Sziget Festival. These include, for example, the Magic Mirror, the Beach, the Colosseum Square and the Cirque du Sziget.

A total of 10 routes from the tangled road network appeared on the experience maps. These markings may refer to small places on roadsides or on-road experiences. After specifying mental spaces, places defined by the experiences, and the most exciting paths on a map, an experience map of Sziget Festival may be drawn.

Figure 2. Visitors’ mental places on Sziget Festival (N=225)



Based on the results of the maps, it can be said that space-forming forces on Sziget basically relate to the following: 1. sleeping, 2. music, 3. eating, 4. alcohol, 5. coolness/shade, refreshment and relaxation, 6. meeting others, 7. dust and mud. Personal, subjective experiences are space-forming forces that affect mental places. Thus, these are all the invisible functions of places that can be recognized directly from a field exploration perspective. It thus appears that exploratory research of this kind can generate important applied research results and contribute to practical considerations about efficiency as well.

The elements of the Sziget Festival atmosphere

When writing their experiences on a blank map, some people noted their experiences and impressions about the whole of Sziget. These are clearly the atmosphere-related elements that can be linked to the spirit of place:

“happiness, remaining, peaceful place in the world, freedom of expression”
“Sziget is something like no other <3”

According to the questionnaire survey, respondents said that the most characteristic elements of the atmosphere were freedom, friendliness, craziness, and relaxation/chill (see Figure 3). While there is fatigue and exhaustion during the week, there is also so much relaxation and “chill.” Sziget is seen both as non-stop party, but also a time for resting and vacation. It is also apparent that weather-related atmosphere elements (e.g. dust and heat) are also important in the experience of place.

Figure 3. Word cloud of Sziget atmosphere, with mood indicated in one word (N=480)
“How would you describe the mood in one word? How would you describe the atmosphere?”



Table 1. “In your opinion, what are the most important values of Sziget Festival?” (N=533)

Value groups	Frequency	Examples
music, line up, artists, concerts, bands	128	“multifaceted”
community, relationships, friends, people	102	“to be together,” “many people become one”
equality, diversity, multiculturalism, internationality, cultural difference, tolerance, open-mindedness	97	“everyone is equal and you can feel free no matter where are you from”
freedom, peace, love	83	“do whatever,” “you can be whatever”
ambiance, vibe, atmosphere, mood, feeling	48	“interesting fake realities,” “it is a special world here”
fun, have good time, party	47	“high quality entertainment”
the place, location	31	“walking area,” “that you can camp inside,” “easy to camp anywhere,” “dome,” “Budapest,” “escape bubble,” “being away from everything”
art, theatre, circus, culture	24	“not just music and drinking, there are other programs
relax, chill, no stress, don't worry, be careless	12	“loose and switched off”
decoration	8	“creative decoration”
food, beverages	5	“good food”
weather, timing	3	“a week long,” “the timing, the middle of August is perfect for festivals”


From 533 respondents, 48 respondents gave a value indicator to the unique atmosphere of Sziget Festival. Considering the frequency of the value groups, in addition to the program offering, the values of the Sziget population are considered to be of the greatest significance and value.

The channels of perception

Information about the atmospheric elements of Sziget Festival obtained through the three methods can be classified into categories of perception. The elements structured this way can be divided into two main categories (see Figure 5). These are sensory experience (material and physical elements) and intersubjective experience (social elements); that is, the characteristics associated with local being. The latter can be divided into two distinct subcategories. On the one hand, there are those elements that refer to ideologies and values, and on the other those that refer to lifestyle and behaviour. Concerning sensory experience, four of the five sensory perceptions are clearly identifiable with

respect to Sziget Festival, while the fifth one, touch, arises within a group called weather. Here, it is not possible to classify all of these experiences into a single perception. For example, “rain” or “dust” can refer to the receipt of experience through sight, touch or even smell.

Figure 5. Concept map – Constituents of the spirit of place according to the channels of perception on Sziget Festival



* The figure is based on information obtained via the three analytical methods

In addition to the two main areas of “receptions” (sensory and socio-cultural reception channels), there is also a group into which more abstract experiences are classified that cannot be placed into any other category. This mostly includes adjectives for the place as a whole, may indicate tangible and intangible experiences and sensations.

CONCLUSION

A festival which is geographically distinct exists far beyond its spatial and physical boundaries. The atmosphere of the event and the experiences associated with it outline the place more clearly than objective, physically tangible, measurable boundaries. In the case of Sziget Festival, the event venue

is a special, isolated area surrounded by water. However, even outside the defined area of Sziget, places closely related to the atmosphere of the festival can be identified. Beyond these, one can identify not only the experiences that are connected to official sites, but also those that are spontaneously created. The forces that create places at the festival prevail along natural and cultural conditions. Although some sites emerge that are indirectly and unconsciously the result of organization, they are still defined by the individuals who use them and the recipients and the functions that are created, which by their very nature can only be seen from the bottom and very close up.

The most important natural factors pertaining to atmosphere are weather conditions (shade, dust, mud) and the location itself (Danube Island). In the field of cultural characteristics, it is not only activities which meet basic needs (such as sleeping or eating) which are considered essential, but music and meeting are also of primary importance in the creation of place.

Thus the festival as a “place of experiencing” is made up of a combination of several places and venue-defined atmospheres. There are places that stick out, but which still emblematically form a part of the Sziget atmosphere. If they were omitted, the nature of the festival would radically change. Accordingly, identification of the characteristic places or the emerging mental places that are not program places is also important in this respect.

Freedom, art and decoration as marketing themes clearly appear among the elements of the atmosphere. In the case of venues for festivals, place marketing and place branding supported by research might prove to be of great importance. The location itself and its atmosphere provide an experience for visitors (i.e. visitor experience, or VE). As a result, the atmosphere of the place may be considered an essential component of marketing communication and festival development. This is why the involvement of experience research in marketing and market research can provide new information for various forms of business development (commercial-, tourism-related, etc.).

The atmosphere of Sziget has been described as unique by many people. Although we have not undertaken a comparative analysis, the present research suggests that a festival as a periodically created place is able to create its own atmosphere: a spirit of place.

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THE USE OF PUBLIC SPACES IN RELATION TO DOGS IN THE CITY OF DEBRECEN

ANTAL LOVAS KISS¹

ABSTRACT *In my study I present the urban environment as a space for walking a dog from the perspective of the dog owner. I analyze the activity of walking a dog as the most characteristic manifestation of the contact between public space and the dog owner, and using the method of mental mapping. I explore how dog owners perceive public space when walking their dogs. The initial hypothesis of my research was that dog owners use public spaces differently from others when they try to construct and satisfy the (assumed) needs of another creature from their viewpoint. During walks, owners use public spaces in a way that, according to their conception, suits their dogs the most. We could also say that they aim to use space from the dog's perspective, as they can conceive of this. Urban dog keepers vary in terms of motivation, dog-keeping practices and lifestyle, thus we cannot speak about them in general. However, through examining different individuals and groups it is possible to identify some features of the "dog lifestyle." This is important as there is a growing need to identify and understand this specific lifestyle model. In today's urbanism, the role of multifunctional spaces is increasingly significant as such spaces are being created not to the detriment of the different sub-social groups, but by taking specific needs into consideration.*

KEYWORDS: *mental mapping; dog walking; perspective of the dog; using urban space; urban dog owners*

PREFACE

Everybody desires something. Some would like a parking space next to their house. Others would like to see parks when they look out of their windows, whereas people with kids desire more playgrounds. There are those who want

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stores near their homes so they can immediately obtain what they want. Public spaces are the meeting hubs of these different, and sometimes diverse, needs and interests. One demand among many is that of the dog keepers' community for the use of public spaces. The present research focuses on urban life from the perspective of dog owners.

The central element of the study is walking, since I assume that walking a dog, as an everyday practice, is the most characteristic contact between the owner and the public space. In my investigation I studied this practice with the method of mental mapping and participant observation; the aim was to analyze how owners perceive public space through the act of walking. My hypothesis was that owners use public spaces differently from others as they use them with and for other beings: i.e. their dogs. Therefore, the routes of these everyday walks are designed from the imagined perspective of the dog. The mental maps of walks thus involve human conceptions of dogs' visual-spatial perception.

However, walks do not only involve owners and dogs. Keeping a dog in an urban environment is one lifestyle among many others, and when keepers step into a public sphere they necessarily become the object of other people's reactions. Consequently, there are two angles to this research: a desire (I) to better understand the relationship between owners and dogs, and (II) to describe the relationship between dog owners and the community.

As far as I am concerned, I hope this research will help to create more livable public spaces that support many different lifestyles. This specific study focuses on the first angle; namely, a description and understanding of the lifestyle of "urban dog owners," their habits, needs, and the way they perceive public spaces through their activity with dogs.

METHOD

According to the "spatial turn" in twentieth-century social science, space is neither static nor objective, thus there are several different ways of understanding its nature. Many theorists claim that space is a social construction that constantly changes through human activity. People produce and reproduce spaces and their meanings. In 1960, Kevin Lynch was the first to describe human spatial perception with the notion of mental and cognitive mapping. Lynch, and later Stanley Milgram (1972), saw cognitive maps as images that one inherently develops about a space. Individuals understand and arrange information about their environment through this cognitive and mental map (Downs et al. 1977). Cognitive maps are comprised of a person's subjective judgments and emotions about the given space (Didelon et al. 2011).

The present research, which I carried out in the summer of 2017, is based on how dog owners construct their cognitive maps around their personal feelings and judgments of public spaces. To unfold these subjective judgments, I used different techniques such as the mental mapping of dog-walking routes. Keeping dogs in an urban environment is very popular nowadays, but there are substantial variation in how people walk their dogs. I assume that, due to their dogs, dog owners perceive public spaces differently. Spatial perception depends on how the perceiver uses the space. As the hypothesis assumes, how people perceive public spaces changes when they walk their dogs, as they would like to create the most optimal route for their animals. Mental mapping is suitable for describing subjective imaginations and attitudes towards certain spaces (Uszkai 2015), thus I applied to the study of dog owners' spatial perception.

I asked 18 informants, dog owners and inhabitants of Debrecen to draw a map of their everyday dog-walking route and attach comments to it. The informants were requested to make the map as if they were recommending it to other dog owners. Later, I also undertook structured interviews with the informants: this method generated a more precise picture of the owners' personal opinions than a simple questionnaire could. Besides, mental maps are not informative enough and their outcome also depends on the applied research method (Devlin 2001 in Mester 2007; Kiss 2005). For this reason, I used both visual and text-based techniques at the same time. As Barbara Tversky emphasizes, cognitive processes are very complex and often indivisible, thus the researcher must apply a complex method to unfold them (1993). A cognitive map is not only a picture of the physical space in our mind, but a complex mental representation (Wilhelm 2005).

The mental mapping in this research focused on the dog walking routes. The drawings mainly captured directions, not spaces, expenses, borders or hubs. Hence, the structured interviews concentrated on these missing features. Questions concerned the time of the walk, its duration, and how the owner developed the direction and the purpose of the walk. I wanted to know which places were considered appropriate for walking, and which factors could generate potential conflict between the owner and other users of the public spaces, and why.

For the present research, I also applied the method of field-site exploration. Instead of drawing a map, I accompanied two of my informants on their daily dog walks and asked them to comment on what they were doing and why. I was interested to know how the owners perceive the space in which they walk, what they pay attention to, what their memories about it are, and what the characteristics of the chosen route are. Field-site exploration is a more precise method of understanding informants' personalized cognitive maps and their

actual environments at the same time (Mester 2007). According to George E. Marcus's concept of multi-sited ethnography (1995), ethnographers should follow the object of their research, since this grounds the field of research (Marcus 1995, 1986).

The present investigation is exploratory research that supports a wider and more complex study of the relationship between dog owners and their urban environment. Therefore, the data I obtained are not representative (they cannot be, as there is no information about the approximately 25,000 dog owners in Debrecen in any database; Kemecei 2015). As we are not able to collect data about walking habits, my data may not represent dog owners' attitudes more generally. For instance, three out of the twenty informants said that they put their dog's excrement into trash cans. However, this proportion does not represent the situation in the city center. (Interestingly, these kinds of questions and answers indicate how informants try to show that they conform to social norms, even if they do not keep to these rules in reality.) In addition, this exploratory research may show some of the individual tendencies involved in owning a dog, and thus suggest further directions for investigation.

I identified my informants from a local dog school. I assumed that people who regularly attend such lessons are liable to pay attention to their dogs' needs consciously. This group, however, does not represent the entire community of dog keepers in Debrecen. Hence, as control factors I also questioned some dog owners who were not attending a dog school. The location of the investigation was the city of Debrecen in Hungary. The research did not focus on one commonly frequented space in the town, but more on the act of walking with the dog as one specific way of using public spaces. All the mental maps that my informants made represented different parts of Debrecen.

As I have already mentioned, there are many limitations to the present research. This study does not deal with the different social backgrounds and lifestyles of the owners, or the effect of these factors on walks. My data mainly refer to middle-class dog keepers. Also, this exploratory research could not deal with a very important issue in the wider research effort; namely, the relationship between the dog owners and other people in public spaces and the wider environment. This may be the subject of further investigation.

RESULTS

Mental mapping and structured interviews

The analysis of mental maps is a very complex process which the current article does not attempt to fully explain. The present chapter concentrates only on the factors that shape the dog owners' chosen walking routes. From an anthropological standpoint, we could say that walking a dog is a stereotypical, repetitive habit, thus I assumed that this process could be a suitable basis for an ethnographic description. In contrast to this assumption, when my informants made their maps, they described their walking as an ever-changing process (*"We always take different routes."*) This variability caused difficulties with the analysis of the mental maps. Most of the informants use the same areas for walking, but they often changed the length of walks. Sometimes the owner and the dog take a longer route, and at other times a shorter one. Most of the informants drew all their routes on the same map (Pictures 1 and 2).

Normally, when people draw mental maps they construct them according to the target of their routes. It is the opposite in the case of dog walking, because the purpose of the walk is walking itself. This is the reason why owners pay more attention to the locus of the walk and aspects such as busyness, streetlights, and public security. The mental maps illustrated these routes, but the drawings were not informative enough to reveal correlations between the different loci. The structured interviews, however, revealed these correlations. For instance, those who took different routes of different lengths said that the length of the walk depended on the available time. Before work, owners choose a shorter route, but after work, in the evening, they have sufficient time to go on a longer walk. There is also a difference between weekdays and weekends. At weekends, owners go for longer and more intense walks when they can do more activities with their dogs. (As most of the informants are members of the local dog school, they do the same activities in the lessons.)

The informants also revealed what the most important factors are that influence the direction of the walks. For most owners, the main issues were the weather and the length of the route, but some of them decided on their route by chance or due to their feelings. (*"If I am tired, we take the shorter route."*) Interestingly, the location of walks seems to be very changeable over time. Most owners said that they had made a big effort to obtain their dog as a puppy and had reconstructed their living space to be comfortable for the dog, but none of them constructed the route of their walks in advance. Therefore, they had to adapt to the given urban environment gradually. All the owners claimed that they had had to change their route several times because of the environment.

The most significant parts of the maps are the directions. My hypothesis before the interviews was that the routes would have different meanings for owners when they navigate them with or without dogs. I also assumed that this difference would be measurable on the mental maps, as the owners would distinguish between the desire of the dog and their own desires. However, from the maps this factor was not found to be significant. The owners visualized these differences through only a few signs (e.g. the representation of grass, trash cans, pedestrian crossings, dangerous sections, nice dogs). In contrast to my hypothesis, only a few people tried to “think like their dogs” when they planned the direction of walks. Individuals were more likely to design the routes to meet their own needs and timetables. It was more common that individuals marked places on the map which were important to them personally (banks, shops, churches, etc.) (Pictures 3 and 4).

Walking a dog as a form of self-representation

I identified an interesting practice during the data collection process. The members of the dog school go for collective walks with their dogs. On summer afternoons and evenings, the school members and their dogs walk through the city centre’s most popular parts where there are bars and restaurants. They take these walks not to fulfil the dog’s needs, as the dogs are on leashes during the whole time, but to present how disciplined their dogs are. These walks are designed to demonstrate to local people that dogs can be present in any public spaces without any problems (Gyáni, 1990). Such events are planned, but the directions of the route take shape spontaneously (Picture 6).

One of the members of this group drew a map. The fixed point of the walks is a meeting point: a pancake restaurant in which dogs are allowed. In contrast to the normal dog walking routes, the primary issue here was not the direction of the walk: the informant only specified the potential direction of the walk, not the actual route, as this always changes (Picture 5).

Joint walks with research participants in different field sites

My analysis of the given mental maps was centered round the direction of walks. As opposed to this, in the case of the exploration of field-sites I wanted to describe the data in terms of owners’ control of their dogs. In public spaces, one of the most important issues is controlling dogs, as such spaces are shared areas for different people with different attitudes towards dogs. This is an issue that

cannot be visualized on a map, but is the key element of participant observations. In the case of walks, it is essential to keep dogs under control for two main reasons: First, it is important for the dog's own safety near busy city streets. Second, in the process of walking public spaces become "semi-public spaces" for owners and dogs as their use is connected to specific legislation. According to one such law, dogs in public spaces in the city must wear a leash (Government regulation 41/2010. 17§ (1)). Even if owners do not comply with the legislation, this situation influences walks. Consequently, the method of participant observation was considered appropriate for describing the relationship between dogs, owners and public spaces through the notion of control.

I followed two informants on their everyday walking routines. During the walk, the owners shared their experience with the locus and, as we went along the route, had a chance to demonstrate them (Mester 2007). Field-site exploration, without doubt, was the most appropriate method for investigating the walks, including their motivations and the owners' usage of the given space. First, the keepers described what the most suitable route was for them. The best routes were those that were visible to keepers at a distance of at least ten meters. Consequently, they could see all potential difficulties such as pedestrians and vehicles. In some cases, when the owner could not avoid nearing a difficult section, they had to minimize potential conflict. They did this by restricting the dog's personal space. In the case of my informant, the strongest form of control was the spoken command "to me," which the owner had learnt at dog school. This strong form of control was needed only in a few cases – at crossroads, on busy streets, and while walking through a shopping center. (An informant said during the walk that owners could nowadays enter malls with their dogs. When he saw I was surprised by this fact, he demonstrated it to me and said he and his dog often do this when they would like to shorten their walk home) (Picture 7).

Similarly to owners, dogs also pay attention to potential risks as they have learnt about these on their relatively repetitive walks. Therefore, they automatically initiate the "to me" practice in uncertain situations. Even while the owner and the dog are prepared for various situations, they sometimes have to change their route if there is no other way to avoid a conflict (e.g., during my investigation, in a narrow street with too many pedestrians, and also when the owner and dog met an unfamiliar dog).

The application of control was different in the case of the two informants. One used a flexible leash with a maximum length of five meters, while the other walked his dog without a leash. In the first case, the length of the leash reflected how safe the owner felt on that particular section of the route. When he sensed a potential risk, he made the leash shorter. As for the owner who did not use a leash, the route was in a suburban district without significant traffic. In spite of

the fact that this form of walking seemed to be most uncontrollable, it rather involved a more complex level of control. All the time the owner interpreted what he was doing and why he was doing certain things. The dog had attended training for five years and knew the place he was walking well, thus the owner walked confidently with the dog at a 5-10 meter distance. This distance was enough for the keeper to intervene in the case of possible risk (Pictures 8 and 9).

As I found out, there are some typical sources of risk for owners during walks. Open gates and front doors could mean potential danger, as could other dogs or vehicles, while the owners' dogs could enter houses as well. Another problem involved the risk of dogs destroying the flower gardens in front of houses, in which case the landlord could forbid the owner from walking there in the future. Sometimes pedestrians were frightened of the dogs. Therefore, street corners around which the owners do not know if people might becoming represent another source of risk. As a result, owners have to pay attention to multiple factors during their walks. There are many risk sources for dogs in public spaces such as vehicles, other dogs, or pedestrians who do not trust dogs for any reason (Pictures 10 and 11). Another thing that owners have to keep in mind is the legislation pertaining to the locus of the walk. (My informant walked without using a leash even through legislation forbade this.) The last group of risk sources includes anything that might frighten the dog. Owners have to avoid all factors that could be harmful to their dogs.

CONCLUSION

The correspondence of the method with the results

The present exploratory research generated many different results. The results of the field-site exploration suggest that owners try to think from their dog's perspective during their everyday walks. In contrast, the results of the mental maps were the opposite. There are several possible reasons for this difference.

On the one hand, the method of mental mapping has a focus different from that of field-site exploration. When my informants were asked to draw their routes, they made an attempt to summarize their everyday practice on one sheet. Since they highlighted the essential parts, they universalized their walking route. On the other hand, the field-site exploration gave a subtle picture of un-generalizable, sudden situations. During this form of investigation, I had a chance to observe how owners and their dogs perceive their environment as "phenomenal reality." In other words, during the process of mental mapping, the informant generalizes the perceived space and activity ("I do this in general").

However, the method of field-site exploration is more like an event (“this is how I am doing it now”).

Another reason for the differences is the informants’ intentions. Mental maps are interpretations that the informants construct for the researcher. For this reason, they use human language for the explanations, not the signals that they use with their dogs. The maps show walks that are designated for dogs, but without the involvement of the dogs.

The third reason is that small-sized dogs on a leash become a part of the owner’s body (Merleau-Ponty 1945 [2014]), hence owners can use their own cognitive maps without the influence of the dog. The informant who walked his dog without a leash during the field-site exploration had the opposite experience. Although the dog’s position was directed by the former, the dog was permitted a relatively wide space to move freely. It was this form of walking that involved the most intense interplay between the owner and the dog, and a high degree of attention and control.

Results in the context of theory

To analyze the results of mental maps, I used Edward W. Soja’s theory of trialectics. According to Soja’s theory (1996), I divided the space of the dog walks into three components – objective space, conceived space, and lived space.

Objective space is basically empirical. In the case of the present investigation, this is the urban environment that architecturally establishes the use of the space. This is well-defined – it is the space where locals can walk, drive, play, rest, etc. Cities are also spaces where different and diverse lifestyles must coexist, and public spaces are their representative loci. Nowadays, because of consumer culture and its economic arrangements, public spaces have to satisfy different needs. Walking dogs in public spaces is a practice whereby owners and dogs become manifest to other people. A walk in this sense is one specific way to consume public space. Dogs have special needs, such as parks, special trash bins, city lights, etc. that public spaces cannot always satisfy, as one of my informants complained. However, there are not only the needs of dogs and owners, but also expectations toward them. Dogs have to be safe with respect to people, and owners have to keep parks clean after their dogs (Picture 12).

The second dimension of space is conceived space. This is formed in the mind (i.e. is an entirely mental space). In this dimension, all individual experiences about space are subject to subjective filters (Makádi 2012). Through mental mapping, I made an attempt to obtain data about this mental representation.

Every time we speak about public spaces, we must also speak about power. The notion of power is even more relevant in the case of urban environments, as they are mostly juridically and politically governed, unlike mere geographical places. As Foucault says, cities are fields governed by power (Foucault 1980). When dealing with urban dog keeping and walking in public spaces, we must thus also consider the issue of power. Owners should keep their dogs under constant control outside their private property, and they must do this because of legislation. Control over dogs is an iteration of control over owners by law.

Mental spaces are designed by the current power structure (Lefebvre 1991; 1996). Power defines for human beings (or, in this case, for dogs) where they are allowed to go and where they are not. In Debrecen, the only method local authorities have of controlling dog keepers is to limit the playing fields of dogs. Because of legislation, public spaces become semi-public spaces for dogs and their owners, but dogs can only use these areas if they are wearing a leash and muzzle, although many other spaces are not open to them at all.

According to Soja, the third aspect of space is lived space. This form of space opens up the possibility to circumvent power as it is outside the scope of power. Many of my informants, but mainly those who owned a small-sized dog, had no problem with the related legislation and easily complied with it. In contrast, those who had larger dogs typically did not like these rules since they narrowed their capability of moving. Therefore, they broke or ignored these laws. Many informants felt that they could not satisfy their dog's biological needs if they walked them on a leash. As a result, these informants developed their own special strategies for circumventing the law. They go for walks early in the morning or late at night when streets are not busy. Others use parks only in winter when other people do not normally use them.

During my investigation, I found one unique method by which owners break the rules regarding leashes. This is the demonstrative dog walk that the local dog school conducts in summertime. When the members and their dogs walk across the city centre without a leash, they are seeking to demonstrate how well-educated dogs can exist in the public sphere without causing any harm to others. They thus represent self-control, instead of juridical control. Owners do these walks because they have realized that public opinion about dogs depends on how they represent the latter's obedience. These dogs serve as a counter example to the widespread image of the "uncontrollable dog." The work of these members is very important, as in certain places, especially in Hungary, no dogs – not even assistance dogs – are allowed.

The former group's public activities are demonstrative and symbolic at another level. They are a part of a trend which started in the early twenty-first century and which has gradually emancipated the community of dog keepers in public

spaces. The field-site exploration gave me an opportunity to follow dog owners into places which had not been open to dogs before, such as shopping centers. As a part of this trend, places that first accepted dogs are called non-places by Marc Augé (1992). Non-places refer to spaces that do not have enough significance to be regarded as places, such as places of trade, supermarkets, hotels, airports or motorways. Nowadays, this change in the use of public spaces is taking place, but slowly. Some places are already open, but others are not. As one of my informants explained, “*I can go shopping with my kids and dog, but not go to the playground.*” In this process, the most difficult thing to change is access to spaces that are already a part of social memory. Therefore, the dog walks by the training school in the city center of Debrecen are of special importance as they involve a “conquest” of these spaces.

The present research was designed to give a glimpse into a specific form of use of public spaces. I assumed that there was one decisive difference in this regard between dog owners and non-owners: for those who walk with their dogs, the use of public spaces is limited – for example, by regulations.

There are several difficulties involved in the investigation of urban dog keepers in Debrecen. We cannot speak about these individuals more generally as they are a heterogeneous community. We cannot even perceive of them as a group, because they organize themselves rarely, and mostly locally. However, a dog-keeper lifestyle exists, and the needs of this group are becoming increasingly visible in modern urban planning.

For such modern urban planning, the creation of “multifunctional spaces” is central, as policymakers should take into account the demands of various social groups. The present explanatory research may be of use in urban planning by explaining owners’ perspectives and needs. This knowledge may help create more livable public spaces.

Further investigations should focus on four variables: the owner, the dog, the environment, and power. These are the external and internal aspects related to dog keeping. Internal aspects, for example, include the attitude of owners towards their dogs, and the needs of dogs, which are derived from the breed’s characteristics or the dogs’ own temperament. External aspects include national and regional legislation and the design of the urban environment (residential density, parks, local society, etc.).


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
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
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
Picture 1 Multiple walking routes in one map, including pedestrian crossings, trees, grass and blocks of flats (drawing made by a young man who walks a small dog)




Picture 2 Illustration of a one-directional walk with characteristic buildings in Debrecen (drawing made by a young man who walks a medium-sized dog)



Picture 3 Directions for a walk with shops, bank, tram and blocks of flats (drawing made by a young woman who walks a small dog).



Picture 4 Symbolic buildings in Debrecen as reference points (drawing made by a young man who walks a medium-sized dog).



Picture 5 Group dog walking in the city center. In the upper part of the picture (upside-down) the pancake restaurant where dogs are allowed is marked (drawing made by a middle-aged woman who walks two small dogs).



Picture 6 Procession with dogs in the main square (photo taken by a participant)



Picture 7 With a dog at a shopping center (photo taken by the author)



Picture 8 Dog waiting for its owner because of pedestrians (photo taken by the author)




Picture 9 Dog stopping before a corner (photo taken by the author)



Picture 10 In traffic (photo taken by the author)



Pictures 11 In traffic (photo taken by the author)



Picture 12 Owner's drawing of the approximately 500-metre route that she has to take to find a trash can for her dog's excrement (drawing made by a middle-aged woman who walks a small dog)

REVIEW

THE SOCIAL REPORT (*TÁRSADALMI RIPORT*) 2018 AND THE HUNGARIAN SOCIAL REPORT 2019¹

RÉKA KEMÉNY²

The Hungarian *Social Report* series has been published every second year since the first free elections after the collapse of the communist regime (1990) with the aim of documenting and interpreting changes in Hungarian society, always based on the most current and systematically collected data. In the fifteenth volume, entitled *Social Report 2018*, editors Tamás Kolosi and István György Tóth express their wish to always reflect on the important changes in Hungarian society, for which reason, from time to time, they modify the questions that are examined and the approach in subsequent volumes. The series is built upon research undertaken by the leading Hungarian think tank TÁRKI Social Research Institute, but due to editorial intentions it usually contains various analyses from other studies from the Hungarian social research scene (in the current volume, a maximum of one half of the chapters, authors, and research belong to TÁRKI). The Social Report 2018 has five main blocks, which, in order, focus on the structure of society and its more important indices; an analysis of socio-demographic groups and their situation; the economy; indicators of the success of social policies; and last but not least, values and attitudes – in a total of 22 chapters. At the end of the volume, each author is briefly introduced; furthermore, some recollection of individual chapters from the earlier 15 volumes is presented.

In early 2019 the English edition, the *Hungarian Social Report 2019*, was also published. It is the fourth English volume, the last being published in 2004, which is also the year Hungary joined the EU. Besides the year of publishing, not only does the appearance of the English volume differ from the Hungarian one (having a different size and color), but it also contains 19 chapters, out of

1 The first is edited by Tamás Kolosi and István György Tóth; the latter by István György Tóth (Budapest, TÁRKI Social Research Institute, 2018, 2019)

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which 12 chapters are exact translations of those in the Hungarian edition, while 7 chapters are new. The structure of the chapters is also different from that of the Hungarian volume (e.g. the block on the economy has disappeared completely), and although the authors of the English edition are also introduced at the end of the book, there is no recollection of the individual chapters in previous (English) volumes.

In my review, I first introduce the content of the Hungarian edition, and then briefly focus on the new chapters and the differences in the English edition. My main goal is to provide general insights into the Hungarian volume, therefore I introduce each chapter; however, due to considerations of length, the latter descriptions are shorter than they deserve to be.

Social Structure

The first block opens with a study by one of the editors, Tamás Kolosi, and his colleague Péter Szívós, entitled “Is Europe far away?” In this chapter the authors study through the concept of β -convergence whether the old wish of Hungarian society since the change of regime – to catch up with the European economy and living conditions – has happened, and whether specific hypotheses may be confirmed. The researchers compare Hungarian data to the average of the most developed EU-15 countries, as well as four reference countries: developed Austria, Portugal – the least developed Western European country –, and post-communist Poland and Romania. They analyze such “catching up” through a complex approach that involves multiple indicators and find that although Hungary has moved closer to the EU-15, this movement has been slower than in the case of the other two ex-communist countries. The next three chapters are built around the concept of social mobility, while the second study focuses on the closure and fluidity of Hungarian society, as written by co-editor István György Tóth, and Iván Szelényi. Based on international, primarily American, literature, the authors state that fractures in society exist not only between the upper 1 and 99 percent, but the borders are becoming more rigid between the upper-middle class and other strata of society. For this reason, their primary question is whether increasing inequality and decreasing mobility can be detected in the upper 10% and the remaining 90% of Hungarian society. Based on American literature and Hungarian intergenerational income data, the researchers come to the conclusion that although Hungarian society is less unequal than American society, inequality has increased since the regime change. They also find that, despite the low level of inequality, the degree of intergenerational mobility is low, a finding which contradicts the hypothesis of the so-called Great Gatsby Curve.

Researchers Zoltán Kmetty and Júlia Koltai examine social mobility using a network approach. In their study it is outlined how intergenerational mobility has been associated with network resources in the past 20 years in Hungary. The authors state that the direction of causality is not clear in this research situation: networks can increase mobility, but mobility itself can influence the number and quality of connections. The study is based on three periods of data collection, each carried out using a position generator method. The researchers created two indexes to measure nexus diversity and high-status occupations, and contrasted these with educational and occupational mobility, and the supply of material resources of the interviewees. They find, *inter alia*, that from the perspective of a network approach those who are in a bad situation have parents whose status was also low, and they themselves have not been able to escape their situation. In their research, Kmetty and Koltai study not only “good” connections but also “bad” ones and find that while positive connections signal higher status, negative ones signal a lower one. The last chapter, with a focus on social mobility, was written by Péter Róbert who studies intergenerational educational mobility in European countries before and after the global economic crisis at the end of the early 2000s. The aim of the study was to describe and explore the differences between countries from the perspective of educational mobility by analyzing the first seven waves (2002-2014) of the European Social Survey (hereinafter, ESS) in those 16 countries which took part in all waves to assess whether the effect of social origin (the educational attainments of parents) on educational attainment increased or decreased after the crisis. The researcher finds that educational mobility is very low in Hungary, and social origin has a huge effect on the opportunity to obtain a degree in higher education. Another finding of the study is the lack of clustering of countries which typically move together (e.g. Scandinavian countries), although the “qualification surplus” related to an advantageous parental background is found to be higher among the post-communist and Southern European countries. Ágnes Hárs also focuses on mobility, but, differing from the previous studies, approaches the topic from an international context: she scrutinizes the increase in outward migration. The aim of the study is to assess where Hungary is located in the process of the increasing emigration of the Eastern European region, and what the characteristics and the expected effects are for the Hungarian labor market. Based on the EU-Labour Force Survey (hereinafter, EU-LFS) the author states that since the enlargement of the EU in 2004 growth in emigration has been persistent, although Hungary is one of those countries in which the level is moderate. The author contrasts data by educational attainment and age and finds that the “brain drain” is greatest in Hungary, since it is away from this country that most people that obtain a degree migrate. The author also addresses how many people have left and returned

from the three most popular recipient countries (Austria, Germany, and the UK) in recent years, and examines what the characteristics are of this population. At the end of her study, Hárs analyses the factors affecting immigration regarding Hungary, and possible return to the country.

Demographic Groups

The second block opens with a chapter about the connections between household structure and educational attainment, written by Judit Monostori and István Harcsa. The authors analyze data from the three censuses since 1990 and the microcensus in 2016 to identify what the patterns of household structure were during the different stages of the life course, and what the connection of these is with educational attainment. The authors treat youth, having children, and parental status, as highlighted stages. They find that an increasingly large proportion of youth (aged 18-39) live “as children” in the parental household; that leaving the parental home is no longer a one-off, final act, and that this form of co-habitation is greater among people with lower educational attainment. They state that, concerning educational attainment, a realignment has occurred within the group of single mothers, and that after 1990 the proportion of those having children dropped dramatically, and they call attention to the fact that there is very little data about mosaic families. Further main results are that due to the realignment of society according to age, the proportion of households that consist of elderly persons has increased, and the share of households with three or more generations has decreased. Réka Branyiczky and András Gábos study the dynamics of poverty during the economic crisis using the longitudinal database of EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (hereinafter, EU-SILC). In their analysis they find that in European comparison the proportion of cross-sectional and persistent income poverty is low, but both cross-sectional and persistent extreme material deprivation are exceptionally high. The authors observe the dynamics of income poverty and extreme material deprivation and come to the conclusion that the latter is associated with a more powerful, greater out- and inflow rate within certain categories, while members of this group have a better social background than those of the former group. Finally, a multivariate statistical analysis seems to confirm the assumption that it is primarily the situation of groups with a better status (lower-middle class, middle class) that improved with the easing of the economic crisis; i.e. of those who only temporarily found themselves in a tough situation during the economic and financial crisis. Anikó Bernát studied the social integration of the Hungarian Roma in the 2010s. In her research, she investigates whether positive economic

and social processes have reached one of the traditionally most disadvantaged groups in Hungarian society, the Roma. The data are based on a monitoring study that had Bernát as a co-author, and databases from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (hereinafter, HCSO) which include questions on nationality and ethnicity such as those in the EU-LFS and the EU-SILC. All in all, the author finds that the boom has partly reached the Hungarian Roma, and their situation has become better, primarily in terms of employment – but regarding their income, much less so. An important source of the growth in employment is public work, which also accounts for the only weak improvement in income. Furthermore, the author highlights that the situation of the Hungarian Roma within Southern and Eastern Europe can be defined as one of the best. Nevertheless, she calls attention to indices of education which still signal a huge gap between Roma and non-Roma youth in Hungary. Borbála Simonovits and Blanka Szeitl analyze the situation of women and men in Hungary in international comparison. The study is built upon multiple databases, including those of the HCSO, OECD, Eurostat, European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), the Global Gender Gap Report etc., but the researchers have also incorporated relatively “unusual” sources such as the Hungarian edition of the magazine ELLE. The authors study temporal trends in the field of the labor force, education, and political and cultural life. In representing the trends in the field of the labor market, they stress that the introduction of new types of childcare leave and benefits in 2014 and a program named “Women 40” (which in a discriminatory way allows only women to retire earlier than the statutory age) have had the most influential effect on this group. The authors state that the elimination of the gender pay gap in Hungary may be expected in around 2102, and that a sharp difference currently exists within the sectors in this regard. As for political representation, the authors note that the second government of Gyurcsány (2006-2009) and the current, fourth government of Orbán (in 2018) contained the highest proportion of women. In the last chapter of the block Márton Medgyesi analyses the income and labor market situation of youth in the period since the start of the economic crisis in 2008 in EU countries. Based on literature and data from the EU-LFS he states that the unemployment rate of youth is always higher on average than the total unemployment rate, but the crisis has deepened the difference: the unemployment rate increased more among youth, and the NEET-rate (Not in Education, Employment or Training) also rose during the crisis. Furthermore, forms of atypical employment such as fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs have become more widespread, too. The author finds that, since 2014, the youth unemployment rate has decreased in most EU member states to a greater extent than the total unemployment rate, and, in parallel with this, that the increase in the poverty rate between 2010 and 2014 has ceased in most countries too.

The author also reveals that the consequences of the economic crisis were more severe among young adults from low-status families, and shows that the family background of youth served to protect against unemployment in wealthier families, and that the children of these families were also more likely to count on assistance from their families when unemployed.

Economy

Éva Palócz and Péter Vakhal study the formation of the stratum of medium-sized companies from 2000-2016 in the frame of an extended case-study. Based on literature and a database of Structural Business Statistics, the authors point out there is a correlation between companies of a larger size and a higher level of production; it is for this reason they found it important to examine whether there has been a change in company size in Hungary since the millennium. The researchers studied what kind of changes happened between 2000 and 2016 in medium-sized companies with 50-249 employees which were operating in 2000 through an analysis of the databases of the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary. The result is that out of the 3350 enterprises in 2000, 1800 companies had ceased business, 600 had shrunk to become small-sized ones, and 300 to micro-sized businesses. Only 600 companies had remained medium-sized, and only half of these had increased their headcount. From the starting population, only 50 businesses had managed to become big enterprises. The same authors investigated Hungarian competitiveness according to objective and subjective indices. First, they present objective indices such as Unit Labour Cost, Real-Exchange Rate, and Revealed Comparative Advantage. They then turn to the competitiveness index of the World Economic Forum (WEF) which gives a much broader overview of the subject of research. Seventy percent of this index is subjective, based on the Executive Opinion Survey, while 30% is constituted of objective indices. Through applying the WEF-index Palócz and Vakhal analyze the competitiveness of Hungary and the three other Visegrad Four countries, plus Austria and Romania in the last decade. They find that among the countries under scrutiny the subjective indices worsened in each case except for in Poland, while executives judge the Hungarian economic situation to be the worst. Attila Wieszt and György Drótos conducted a survey between September 2017 and February 2018 among the total population of Hungarian family-owned businesses to explore their general statistical patterns, internal distribution, and internal working mechanisms and to obtain a wider picture of them. In the analysis, the authors point out that family-owned businesses make up the majority of the economic entities in Hungary, but as for the size of the

enterprises, the proportion constantly decreases from small-sized companies to big ones. The researchers also demonstrate that family-owned businesses are capable of developing from micro-sized ones into strong, small-sized enterprises in the case that the founder(s) constantly incorporate more family members into their operations. However, these businesses are less likely to become medium-sized companies from small-sized ones by involving external expertise into management besides/instead of family members. Imre Kovách's study is entitled "Land-use and Land-ownership." The author introduces the historically and internationally significant concentration of land-use in post-regime-change Hungary based on databases from the HCSO and the Single Area Payment Scheme of the EU. Kovách points out that land ownership in Hungary now typically involves areas of a significant size which have partly been created using EU resources. According to his assessment, the concentration of land-use and land ownership is the result of poor settlement and enforcement of the land compensation law, a rapid and radical reduction of agricultural support, and also serial political interventions. Furthermore, the author calls attention to the fact that, in parallel to the increasing concentration, the number of land users has dropped dramatically, with up to a million individuals having stopped farming by 2016, which may be one cause of the rural poverty in Hungary.

Human Infrastructure

Judit Lannert's study is about Hungarian education and the challenges of the twenty-first century. Based on thus far available data, the education researcher analyses why Hungarian pupils constantly underperform in maths and digital literacy and explains why family background is still the most influential factor in the educational results of children in Hungary. The author shows that talent fostering does not work in Hungary either, while the proportion of those who underperform in all three fields of the PISA measures is growing, and the school system is selective. Based on the results of a national competence study, Lannert analyses the effect of pedagogical assessment on pupils' performance, and from analyzing education-related public opinion surveys finds that not only has the motivation of learners dropped in the last couple of years, but the adult population has no motivation for learning either. Gabriella Lantos examines the development of the Hungarian private health sector. The author explains that although private healthcare existed during communist times, at that time it was still a luxury, while during the last ten years it became a part of everyday life and a system at the same time. Lantos introduces private service providers and also the characteristics of those who pay for the services of private healthcare

and their underlying motivations. There is little data at the author's disposal, but from analyzing it she comes to the conclusion that demand for private healthcare has been continuous for years and will not decrease due to the lack of reform in the public sector. The fact that doctors and medical staff have shifted to the private health sector and have not migrated abroad (but stayed within the borders of Hungary) is evaluated positively by Lantos, since in her interpretation this is a sign that private healthcare represents a true alternative. József Hegedüs, Eszter Somogyi and Nóra Teller study the housing market and housing indicators. They describe the trends in the housing market and the regime of housing policies after the millennium, the boom in the housing market in 2000-2008, the long-continuing effects of the economic crisis until 2014, and the signs of a revival in the housing market after 2015. Based on the Housing Survey of the HCSO in 2003 and 2015, the authors introduce the position of certain social groups in the housing market. Finally, the researchers analyze why the current housing market situation is similar to that of the period 2000-2008 with a presentation of the differences (e.g. forms of housing support now and then). Marianna Kopasz and András Gábos are the first to put under scrutiny how the support-related behavior of local governments changed after the modification of the Social Law of 1993 (which came into force in March 2015), since the modification granted greater decision-making authority to local governments regarding both the number of people who receive aid and the related expenses. Short-term effects were studied for the year before the modification, the year of the modification, and the subsequent year. The authors find that between 2014 and 2016 the number of people who received any form of the aid under study did not change essentially, but significant realignment happened among the aid objectives: fewer people received housing aid (which was earlier based on normative principles), but the proportion of people receiving "other" forms of aid increased significantly.

Attitudes

Gábor Tóka analyses Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2018, stating that it is a unique phenomenon in a democracy for one party to win two-thirds of all mandates for a third time. After a short overview of election results, Tóka analyses in a detailed way the unexpectedly high (the highest among Hungarians living within the territory of the state since 1990) turnout and the potential cause of this. After this, the author explains party popularity after 2014 by claiming that making the refugee crisis after 2015 a topic of public policy led to new votes for the governing party. However, Tóka points out that one explanatory

variables of party sympathy is the index of consumer confidence, and it is visible that the former index of the Hungarian population in 2014-2018 was uniquely high and increased between 2016 and 2018. Social psychologist Péter Krekó studied the “image of Russia” in Hungarian public opinion. He argues that, in spite of the historical view which claims that in matters of public opinion surveys public opinion is formed by historical experience, public opinion can be shaped by political impulse without restraint. The research is based upon a large sample survey which the author uses to review the changes that have happened in Hungarian public opinion regarding Russia and its leader in the last couple of years – and puts the outcomes into international context. Krekó points out that despite the characterization of Hungary as having a Western-friendly attitude, which is especially high in regional comparison, and despite the fact that the majority of the Hungarian population imagine the country’s role as a bridge between the East and the West, a Russia-friendly attitude has been constantly strengthening since the regime change, and was highest during the third government of Viktor Orbán (2014-2018). András Jakab and György Gajduscek analyze the situation of the rule of law, legal awareness, and the following of legal norms. They find that the state of the rule of law has been in constant decline in Hungary for a couple of years, following a downward trend. To demonstrate this, the authors use various rule-of-law indexes which focus on legal practice (e.g. how many days it takes to accept a new law), not on an analysis of formal laws. They analyze legal awareness with the help of the World Value Survey and the ESS and find that the feeling in Hungary that breaches of the law remain unpunished has become general; moreover, that to become successful one has to break the law. Furthermore, the authors analyze through the application of different indices to what extent legal norms are adhered to. Márton Medgyesi and Zsolt Boda’s study is entitled “Trust in institutions in Hungary and in the countries of the European Union.” The authors study changes in institutional trust based on data from the Eurobarometer (2007-2016) and the Quality of Life Survey (2007-2016). Their most important finding is that institutional trust has increased in most European countries in the last couple of years, and the level is higher than prior to the economic crisis. They also find that while in most countries the level of trust decreased during the crisis (2007-2011), there was no decrease in the case of Hungary since the recession started earlier here, in 2006, and thus the level of trust also fell earlier.

As mentioned earlier, the English edition varies from the Hungarian one in terms of structure and number of chapters, too. From the 22 chapters of the 2018 volume, 12 have been incorporated into the English edition. The seven new chapters include an analysis by Zsolt Spéder, director of the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, on trends in fertility, mortality, and age

distribution and ageing in Hungary after the regime change. Réka Branyiczki and András Gábos have a second chapter in the English volume, together with Péter Szívós, in which they assess the level of poverty and social exclusion in Hungary and the EU over the past 10-15 years based on the EU-SILC database. The main difference compared to their other study is that this new one analyses cross-sectional data, while the other one focuses on the dynamics of poverty using longitudinal data. The editor of the volume, Tamás Kolosi, and his colleague Krisztián Pósch analyse Hungarian society's social class structure and social stratification together with society's self image from the early 2000s until 2012. Judit Lannert's study of the Hungarian education system is not part of the English edition, but instead a chapter by Benő Csapó et al. has been included. This reviews changes in educational outcomes since 1970 and compares them with results from other countries. Furthermore, the authors shed light on the relationship between educational results and family background and social inequalities. Likewise, Gabriella Lantos' study of the development of the public health sector has been removed, and a chapter by Éva Orosz and Zsófia Kollányi that includes an assessment of Hungary's position in terms of health status and health inequalities in the European context, and between different social groups within the country, has been added. Bori Simonvits and Blanka Szeidl wrote about the attitudes of Hungarian and European citizens towards asylum seekers before, during, and after the peak of the migration crisis that affected Europe in around 2015. István György Tóth and Iván Szelényi's analysis of social closure and fluidity has been enriched with new parts in the English edition. The only question which is left unanswered by the editor of the English volume is why it consists of different chapters, and why an exact translation of the Hungarian edition was not provided for an international audience. It would have been interesting to read about what the selection criteria were for the studies in the 2018 volume, and moreover, why new ones were included in the 2019 volume.

In my opinion, the strength of the volumes is that besides the interpretation and evaluation of various surveys and data sources (which is the defined goal of the Social Reports), the studies include a variety of figures and tables which help readers to understand the phenomena concerned. However, the figures are hard to read sometimes – perhaps bigger, color versions could solve this problem in the next edition. Furthermore, the editors have made a fantastic job of referring in one chapter to others when the topics or findings are related: e.g. in the chapter on the closure and fluidity of Hungarian society in the Hungarian edition the results of the analysis on educational mobility are noted.

As the editor puts it in the English edition, “the readership of the Hungarian Social Reports is very wide,” which proves to be true of the Social Report 2018 and the Hungarian Social Report 2019 as well, in part due to the clear,

interpretative language of the authors. The series represents a good start for anyone (social scientists, policy makers, as well as laymen) who wishes to understand contemporary Hungarian society.

BIOECONOMY: SHAPING THE TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE, BIOBASED ECONOMY, edited by Iris Lewandowski (Springer, 2018)

MERVE BURÇAK KETENE¹

Today's increasing demands for food, feed, products and energy, in conjunction with the security concerns brought about by a growing global population and anthropogenically induced climate change, are making the need for a sustainable system more pressing than ever. In this context, to reflect the need for a comprehensive societal transformation, the bio-based or knowledge-based economy is targeting a reduction in the present dependency on fossil fuels along with other forms of finite resources through their gradual replacement by renewables. However, while the objectives of such a major system change are mainly agreed upon, the pathway to achieving them is still a subject of dispute. Having the purpose of engaging in the debate, and attempting to lay the keystones for shaping the future, this book, *Bioeconomy*, explores and conveys the advantages of a sustainable, innovative and knowledge-based bioeconomy from an inter- and transdisciplinary perspective. Its aim is to advance the existing knowledge and to pioneer national as much as international cooperation in the field. The book's editor, *Iris Lewandowski*, is known for her involvement in national and EU-funded bioeconomy research projects. One of these is called "Accelerating the transition towards a BioBased Economy via Education – ABBEE" which was initiated as of September 1, 2018 with the objective of creating new educational materials for students and professionals that incorporate the key elements of a biobased economy. Currently, the author is affiliated with the University of Hohenheim, where she is the Chief Bioeconomy Officer, and is also responsible for an international master's program on Bioeconomy. Taking these facts into consideration, and framing them in the form of a textbook, this joint venture of the University of Hohenheim's educators and students has resulted in *Bioeconomy*, which

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combines principles from agriculture, biotechnology and macroeconomics, while presenting the complexities of the field holistically.

The book has three major parts that contain 12 chapters in total, each investigating a different aspect of the concept of bioeconomy. Right from the very start – the first chapter of Part I – the authors present the contextual background of the topic and introduce some key terminological notions such as the difference between fossil energy reserves and resources, greenhouse gases (GHG), climate change, biobased resources, planetary boundaries and limits to natural resources, food security and sustainable bioeconomy. Among these, the sub-chapter entitled “Planetary Boundaries and Limitation of Natural Resources” is of particular value since it underlines the fact that climate change is only one of the nine planetary boundaries which are crucial in terms of the carrying capacity of the Earth – in other words, crucial for humanity’s continuing existence. While “climate change and land-system change processes are already beyond the safe operating space,” as reported by the authors, there are two specific categories of planetary boundaries that indicate much greater risk. The first is biosphere integrity, particularly in terms of genetic diversity; and the other is the biogeochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus to the biosphere and oceans “as a result of various industrial and agricultural processes.” In this regard, because the need for food is not likely to decrease, the authors stress the benefits of the intensification of sustainable agriculture. Two terms should be clarified here: first of all, sustainability is amongst the major goals of the bioeconomy. Being directly dependent on the availability of natural resources, the reasonable and efficient utilization of these and therefore their sustainability is prioritized within this system. Second, agricultural intensification is a process that is based on the principle of producing more without additional land. This, of course, makes innovation an integral part of production processes. Remarkably, the authors highlight that 70% of total factor productivity in agriculture is actually created by innovation, whereas the expansion of land area accounts for a share of only 12%. Added to this is increasing concern about food security resulting from global population growth. When these factors, taken together with the fact that meat production requires more land than the production of crops, and the authors’ observation concerning an upward trend in meat consumption, particularly within emerging economies, the need for a sustainable solution becomes urgent as regards to such global challenges. Recall that the bioeconomy itself is highly dependent on the availability of natural resources, thus it is also subject to the need for innovative sustainability. Thereof, the authors lay emphasis on the following:

“In a sustainable bioeconomy, the use of biobased resources should be optimized with regard to two main criteria: First, the demand for high-quality food for the world’s population should be satisfied. Second, the remaining biobased resources should ideally be allocated with regard to the maximal ecological, social and economic benefit.” (p. 14)

This holistic resource allocation principle, along with a call for a knowledge-based transition to a system that is both sustainable and innovative, and which perceives the willingness to participate of consumers and producers as indispensable, are the distinguishing elements of the bioeconomy. For all that, the presented discussion lacks explicit attention to the areas of waste management, water utilization, and issues with logistical concerns regarding bio-based production. It is true that the bioeconomy has the potential to revitalize rural areas through creating new job opportunities, particularly in places where fossil resources are scarce but biobased ones are abundant. However, “the transportability of biomass is often limited due to its low density and susceptibility to decaying” – which puts the whole process in jeopardy of being bounded and having only regional applicability at most. Ways of overcoming such barriers, on the other hand, are not thoroughly explored, apart from the flatly underlined requirement for strong regional cooperation. Having made these observations, the authors then continue in Part I with explanations of the origin and evolution of the bioeconomy, wherein they identify *the biotechnology innovation perspective* and *the resource substitution perspective* as two dimensions of this concept. Thankfully, they do not neglect to mention the existing criticisms of bioeconomy; namely, the “fundamental critique” that refers to the discourse as dominantly siding with “neoliberal ideology,” and the “greenwashing critique,” which acknowledges the potential of the bioeconomy while trying to “ensure that the label 'bio' is not misused to portray an essentially non-sustainable economic system as environmentally friendly.” Later on, the concept of circular economy and its links with the bioeconomy are explored; moreover, the “Diamond Model” of gaining competitive advantage through bioeconomy is introduced as a country-dependent strategy. The last chapter in Part I addresses the “wicked” problems of bioeconomy that are complex, in addition to being economically, environmentally and socially interwoven. These problems require researchers to synthesize knowledge from various sources by putting inter- and transdisciplinary research into practice, while being cautious about the potential impacts of their individual norms and values on research outcomes in such participatory cooperation processes.

Part II complements Part I in terms of knowledge building. As the authors regularly emphasize during the previous chapters, and stress further in the last

chapter of this book called *The Bioeconomist*, professionals working in the field of bioeconomy must possess certain skills and a sophisticated understanding of almost all areas of bioeconomy to be able to design and conduct transdisciplinary research. Based on this view, the second part of *Bioeconomy* offers an in-depth exploration of biobased resources. Although the chapters are elaborative, particularly in the areas concerning primary production, regarding bioenergy there is disappointingly limited coverage. The latter is briefly addressed as an important sector of the bioeconomy that “requires subsidies to be economically viable” – while further discussion of these subsidies is missing. Also, since this topic is strongly connected to the food vs. fuel debate, as logic dictates, the issue of energy security should not be an area of neglect. Forging ahead with the upsides, several important concepts emerge from the chapters of Part II. One of those is biobased value chains that “describe[...] the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production [...], delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use.” These are considerable assets for stakeholders and for innovation purposes, and within the bioeconomy they take the form of a cascade that can be used to maximize “socioeconomic value given the constraint of resource limitation.” Thus, cascading biobased value chains can be understood as biomass application management that transforms “linear production processes into circular or closed ones, accordingly reducing the generation of waste.” Yet, of course, such activities require close cooperation among many different sectors and a change in mindset, not to mention dealing with questions about how to decide which values should be prioritized to facilitate the arrangement of the sequential utilization of biomass. However, if these issues can be overcome, according to the authors’ experience, the development cycles of biobased products could be decreased by half. Another important concept that emerges from the chapters of Part II is the “infant industry” argument put forward for the benefit of fostering the bioeconomy. In a nutshell, the argument is derived from the fact that:

“[A]n increase in the demand and supply of biobased products, and consequently an increase in the amount of crops produced for the biobased market are only possible by a reallocation of land from the production of food to the production of biobased resources. This increase in the demand for land leads to an increase in the price of land, which increases input costs and thus, makes production of biobased products less cost efficient.” (p. 241)

In this framework, if governments introduce temporary support policies for biobased products, which are categorized as *biofuels*, *biochemicals* and

biomaterials, they could compete with existing, already established products. This argument specifically lays emphasis on the market influencing capabilities of bio- and fossil-fuels, since in the case of the latter the environmental (or external) costs, such as their contribution to high carbon emissions, are not reflected in their market price. In addition to government interventions into the market, the authors also focus on the promising potential of private initiatives led by entrepreneurs. Four different types of trends are mentioned that could presumably trigger entrepreneurial opportunities: incongruences and information asymmetries, exogenous shocks, changes in demand, and changes in supply. In any case, it should be mentioned here as a side note that, even if certain initiatives are put forward by various actors from the bioeconomy, there is still the risk of one-way communication that would lock novel innovations and ideas into areas only known about by specific sectors or institutional clusters. This, in turn, could affect the willingness of potential consumers to pay premium prices for bio-based products since this key information has not been transmitted to them. One such issue concerns the existence of hybrid bio-based products that are not communicated to the public properly. The authors of Part II provide an exquisite example of this matter called the lotus effect. In this particular application of biological knowledge to the industry, the self-cleaning properties of the lotus plant are technically applied to numerous everyday items such as paints, coatings and roof tiles. Practical and intriguing as this is, unless novel innovations of this kind are duly introduced to consumers, their relevance to markets will continue to be limited. Hence, to lay the ground for triggering the development of bioeconomy, a business model canvas is offered based on what the authors call the *lean startup approach*. This approach brings forth “an iterative and agile method to develop a startup, (...) [whose] focal question is whether the product or service solves a real problem from real customers and whether a valid business model can be developed.” Because the required time span for biobased products is usually longer than conventional ones (the former are sometimes planned far into the future), the proposed lean startup method grounds itself on a *minimum viable product* that involves testing entrepreneurs’ hypotheses in the bioeconomy market as early as possible by helping create a reduced offering to which customers can give immediate feedback. One example that the authors provide is the German startup Betula Manus and their market testing of tree bark, which is a waste product of the paper industry. As is the case here, through the medium of different minimum viable products startups and entrepreneurs can observe potential failures, and identify areas for improvement in their product or service ideas.

In connection with call for the knowledge building required for a sustainable bioeconomy, the final part of the book puts the transition process under the

microscope. However, such a complex system transition cannot be rolled out only on paper, and it cannot cover just technological or economic issues – it must be preferred and supported by people too. Therefore, to help with understanding and depicting possible transition paths, with all of their uncertainties and variables, researchers rely on certain scenarios and models. To speak bluntly, throughout this entire book on bioeconomy as a new governance system, it is here that the authors have decided to specifically address the role of bioenergy – that is, within the modeling techniques. As one of humanity’s biggest sources of dependency, the issue of the constant need for energy and the search for diversified sources, in my opinion, should have received its own chapter. Nevertheless, during the discussion of “techno-economic optimization models” the authors mention bioenergy combustion plants and biorefineries as presenting challenges for model building, and thus needing optimization. Although leaving room for further work, valuable examples are provided throughout the chapter about specific models that particularly focus on the energy sector – such as BeWhere, or BiOLoCaTe mixed linear programming models. Keeping these in mind, the first chapter of Part III in *Bioeconomy* presents an overview of both scenario and model approaches, while notably distinguishing *Integrated Assessment Models* (IAMs). By definition, IAMs “describe and assess the interactions between human activities and (global) environmental processes. They include descriptions of socio-economic systems as well as environmental systems and the interactions between the two.” These characteristics of IAMs do indicate a relatively more advantageous approach compared to other topic-specific model options, given their holistic nature. Furthermore, IAMs are claimed to have the potential to assess the long-term contributions and impacts of the bioenergy segment of bioeconomy by integrating various different systems into one model – an example of this, as highlighted by the authors, is TIMES PanEU, a multiregional model of the European energy system. The scope of this model includes all sectors of energy supply and demand on the national level; however, when coupled with different sectoral models through IAMs it could become a single part of a much wider system analysis. At the same time, the authors also warn against overestimating the power of IAMs or any other kinds of models to predict the future. They can assist with revealing possible transition paths, yet the actual transformation depends on people and their willingness to change. In explicitly emphasizing the importance of societal and governmental involvement for the transition to a sustainable bioeconomy, the next chapters in Part III analyze the concept of sustainability, the causes of market failure in the environmental sector, social welfare-maximizing functions of government, the transformation of production systems, the neo-Schumpeterian approach, and of course, the bioeconomist as a collaboration catalyst. Taken together,

all of the arguments that are presented signify the importance of knowledge-based, sustainable production and consumption patterns, in which the conscious involvement of every person *indeed* makes a difference.

The challenges and the issues of the twenty-first century are overwhelmingly “wicked.” They are wicked in the sense of being complex, and undeniably global. They concern the accelerating deterioration of the human environment, as much as of natural resources, and the resonance of these for socio-economic systems. They involve each and every one of us, yet they are also personal. Thus, they do not require simple answers, but effective solutions. Solutions that we can all be on board with, that can be used to sustainably meet today’s needs while preserving the same chances for future generations. And this is precisely what *Bioeconomy: Shaping the Transition to a Sustainable, Biobased Economy* sets its sight on. It explores a variety of perspectives within the field, from biological to economic, presents the current state of existing research, along with the knowledge, and offers pathways for change. The book, throughout its 355 pages, does what it promises to do, introducing various aspects and elements of the bioeconomy while providing concrete instructions for making the desired transition to a sustainable, biobased economy. It is a comprehensive book that, on occasion, will challenge the reader to grasp all of the details, case studies, economic calculations and topic-specific terminology. However, such a challenge emerges from the aim of contemplating *Bioeconomy* as a text book rather than a light read. On this note, certain areas of further attention, some of which are mentioned earlier in this review, should not be overlooked. Briefly addressing a few, first of all, there is an absolute lack of discussion about energy options – be they renewables, biofuels or nuclear power. A short chapter on biofuel types and biobased resource processing, without a presentation of related energy charts, cannot be sufficient for educating the future’s experts about crucial aspects of the bioeconomy. Also, given the fact that all technologies have their own challenges that must be resolved, national self-sufficiency and energy security concerns would surely benefit from resource diversification techniques that can secure supplies – supplies that, among many other uses, will also be needed at every stage in the cascading use of biomass. In this context, energy generation options associated with zero CO₂ production, such as nuclear power or renewables, should not be disregarded in any discussion of non-biological alternatives to biomass sources. Second, water utilization and especially pollution needs much more attention since it is an active issue in biorefinery operations. Likewise, the drawbacks of biomass use are not thoroughly explored. Questions remain regarding the risk of reducing the overall carbon storage capacity of forests through their over-exploitative use, the difference between intact and selectively logged forests in terms of carbon sequestering, and pollutant-related issues with

biofuels and biomass which, much like with fossil fuels, occur when they are not combusted properly. These cases should be addressed and take their place on the agenda of creating solutions for a sustainable, low-carbon future. And finally, although there is substantial discourse about the transition process, the book does not provide an approximate timeframe for it. This is of considerable importance, because, depending on whether such a system change occurs tomorrow, in five years' time, or in ten, there will be a drastic difference in cost – both in terms of the environment, and the socio-economic systems. Nevertheless, these considerations are presented to support the transition from a fossil-based economy to a biobased one; to identify the scope of this participative governance system and work on expanding it through proper management and constant technological development; but most of all, to reduce our current dependency on fossil fuels, perhaps for good. From this perspective, the authors of this book make *Bioeconomy* a must-read for experts and students, as well as for those interested in the topic, who are wondering about how to become more consciously involved in our century's increasingly interconnected challenges. After all the analyses, models and discussions about the role of the bioeconomy in “shaping the transition to a sustainable” future, this is the underlying purpose of the book in terms of its readers: Obtain the knowledge, and get involved.

UNDERSTANDING BYZANTIUM, by Radi Dikici (Remzi, Turkey, 2017)

SEDEN EREN¹

Understanding Byzantium provides a general image of the Byzantine Empire, starting from approximately 300 A.D. (the rule of Constantine the Great) until the 1200s (rule of Manuel I Komnenos). The book briefly explains the social relationships, values and lifestyles of the society and fundamental historical incidents of the era. Moreover, it attempts to emphasize the influence of religion over governance and society. The author first published his historical research findings as newspaper articles for two-and-a-half years, and only later expanded them into a book. Therefore, *Understanding Byzantium* is an unusual history book which contains ten different chapters.

The Byzantine Empire, commonly known as the Eastern Roman Empire, or Byzantium, was the heir to the Roman Empire. The Byzantine Empire prevailed in the eastern territories of the Roman Empire from Late Antiquity until the Middle Ages. Even after the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, the Byzantine Empire survived for approximately another thousand years. It fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1453.

Instead of concentrating on a shorter timeline and giving detailed information about Byzantine high society, the book attempts to provide a sketch of Byzantine society over a thousand years. Furthermore, it functions as guidance for audiences who seek to understand the basics of the inner dynamics of the Byzantines and their relationships with other countries in an easily digestible way.

The book presents readers with snapshots from over 1000 years to help visualize daily life in Byzantine, such as family structures and their lifestyles. It includes short chapters, starting from the breakup of the Roman Empire into two parts. While the author explains the historical facts, he also specifies the current geographical location of historical events and their connection to the

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current era to help the reader locate the events on modern map. Due to the size of the book (216 pages), the author only gives us cherry picked, fragmented information that may stimulate the further discovery of the topics.

At the end of some chapters, based on his research, the author draws the reader's attention to incorrect historical references at historic sites. He explains the reasons behind his suggested changes and offers to help authorities reflect the historical facts better.

The chapters mostly cover the main emperors and empresses of the era. In general, the book presents us with their achievements and failures using specific examples. The decisions they made and the changes that occurred in society based on these decisions are discussed in the chapters. The author gives us his assessment of these initiatives and changes that were introduced by the rulers. The influence of these revisions and differences on society and social life are broadly argued for. In addition to this, some interesting facts about their private lives are expressed. In almost all chapters, the influence of philosophers, religious leaders, aristocrats and diplomats is plainly discernible.

Moreover, the author mentions the importance of the Byzantine universities and their impacts on society as well. A chapter called "Pandakterion" summarizes educational life in the Byzantine Empire. Emperor Theodosius the Great (379-395) established the basis of a seven-year educational system. This was the first school system in history to introduce the idea of continuous and long-term system of learning through classical studies such as history and philosophy. At that time, the educational system could be used as a social elevator to obtain government positions within the empire. According to this system, successful students had the opportunity to be employed by the state.

The grandson of Theodosius I, Theodosius II, enhanced his grandfather's ideas and officially inaugurated the first Byzantine University in Constantinople in 425. Pandakterion (the name of the first university) provided a wide range of educational courses, from law and architecture to medicine and engineering. In the following years, some of the graduates were promoted to the top positions in state affairs. In coming years, successful alumni played a vital role in establishing schools and universities across the Empire.

The author connects some fundamental shifts in history to the modern era. He emphasizes how the events of the past affect our society today. Especially the chapter about "Empress Theodora" is of significant importance due to its perspective on gender equality and the recognition of women's rights. According to the book, Byzantine law included articles such as *women's rights* and *secularism* which are commonly used in contemporary law. The book claims that the wife of Emperor Justinian, Empress Theodora, awarded women the right to trade, to be the legal guardians of their children, and to

own private property. Furthermore, the death penalty was excluded from the list of punishments under family law. Although the legal commission repeatedly objected during discussions, due to pressure from Empress Theodora all articles were legalized. However, the author does not provide us with more information about changes in society or elaborate on the results of such groundbreaking changes. The author claims that the judicial system that was used in the 500s in Byzantine Empire which originated in Roman law is the root of the current, modern “Western-style” judicial system.

The chapter “Corpus Juris Civilis” gives detailed information about how standardization was introduced into legal arrangements. After becoming a sovereign state, even though it inherited Roman legislation, Byzantine did not maintain the idea of one common legal system. Due to the expansion of the state and the large volume of migration, there were different interpretations of the law in each region. To establish a governing order, during Emperor Justinian’s reign all laws, regulations, and decrees inherited from the Roman Empire until his time were identified and reviewed. With these new arrangements, all law departments in universities taught the same laws and all courts within the country practiced law based on these new arrangements. Thus, the legal system was merged using common ground and a unified legal system was created.

A chapter about Leo VI the Wise (886-912) proves the importance of law and the legal system in the Empire. The author claims that Leo VI was the greatest legislator after Justinian in the Byzantine Empire. During his time, “Basilika,” – one of the most comprehensive legal works of the time, which covers 60 books – was completed. Later on, he ordered details of the changes initiated under his reign to be collected and published them under name “Novella.” These new changes included laws related to administration, social affairs, the military and religion.

In the author’s opinion, some of the prominent books and literary works of the era have effects even now – especially those books written by Emperor Constantine VII (*De Administrato Imperio*; *De Thematibus*) that give advice about how to run an Empire, foreign policy, methods of diplomacy, the geographical arrangement of countries and the legal system of empire. Besides writing his own books, he supported many literary initiatives in his era in order to promote and spread scientific and cultural knowledge. With the guidance of these books, audiences today can obtain more detailed information about the empire, its relationship with its neighbors, and its history.

The book also provides a snapshot of how the different dynasties changed during the given time period. Furthermore, it explains how the power handovers between the dynasties. With the examples and cases that are provided, audiences are able to perceive the influence of the architectural, legal and social activities

of these various dynasties on society. In addition to this, changing international relations and political movements based on the changes of dynasties are discussed.

Although the chapters inform the audience about the Byzantine Empire, some questions remain unanswered. The chapter “Crux Vera” promotes the author’s research findings about the “Holy Cross” myth. As a matter of fact, in this chapter the author points out the potential current location of the Holy Cross. His arguments have attracted the attention of Orthodox Churches in many countries. Some Greek, Serbian, Montenegrin and Romanian media have paid significant attention to this information. The author mentions some other theories as well, but the current location of the Crux Vera is still a question mark.

The Halki (*Heybeliada*) Seminary chapter highlights a fundamental issue in the contemporary international relations of Turkey. The Halki Seminary was established by Patriarch Photius I in 878 as an Orthodox monastery. Approximately a thousand years later, the Theological School of Halki was founded on the same site in 1844. The school provided theological education until 1971 (except for a short break during World War I) and was considered one of the top theological schools. The seminary had around 900 alumni, the majority of whom became Orthodox patriarchs, bishops and priests. Halki Seminary was a theological school which had an international reputation in its field and welcomed Orthodox Christian students from all around the world.

In 1971, the Constitutional Court of Turkey ruled that all private higher education institutions should be affiliated with state universities. After this decision, the seminary was closed down. The issue of Halki Seminary is a sensitive subject which has attracted the attention of leaders in the United States and the European Union. There have been many discussions about how to re-open the school, but the seminary currently remains closed. To reach a mutually acceptable conclusion for all sides, the author suggests agreeing on new legal regulation that would result in the re-opening of the seminary in the foreseeable future.

In spite of some restrictions due to the long period of time, the density of the incidents and information, the book highlights cherry picked but crucial historical facts about the Byzantine Empire between 300 A.D. and the 1200s. It is therefore an instructive and significant book which should increase understanding about one of the biggest and most influential empires in history. The book covers many of the latest findings about the Byzantine Empire. Accordingly, reading this book is essential to understanding the influence of history on the present world. The book may be useful for an audience who would like to obtain a quick, high-level overview of the rise and existence of the Byzantine Empire in an entertaining way without being overwhelmed by academic jargon.

Understanding Byzantium paints a general picture of the changing situations and circumstances through a historical perspective. The author presents written historical documents, agreements and codes as evidence to support his findings. The language which is used in the book is understandable, although the reason for the division of the chapters is less clear. Some chapters are clearly separated according to specific eras in time, while some chapters cover longer time periods. In fact, while some chapters are clearly dedicated to one event, others compare history to current conditions. Despite this, audiences might still be inspired by reading the different articles in each chapter rather than by reading a comprehensive book. However, for this reason, in some cases it is not easy for the audience to connect the chapters and fully understand the book.

The author prefers to use extensively simplified terminology to ease the process of understanding the information he introduces. He has the ability to present historical subjects in a mystical and mysterious way in order to grab the attention of audiences outside of the academic community. Furthermore, he supports the context with pictures, illustrations, and blueprints. This approach helps the audience to visualize and grasp the content of the chapters from the relevant historical perspective.

The author Radi Dikici is a Turkish researcher, known for his research, articles and books about the history of the Roman and Byzantine Empire. So far, he has published 15 books, mostly in Turkish, and mainly about Byzantine history. This book ought to be very useful and helpful to those people who are interested in the subject, while it should also reach different audiences in different countries.

THE HAPPY YOUTH OF A DESPERATE COUNTRY: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN JAPAN'S MALAISE AND ITS MILLENNIALS, by Noritoshi Furuichi (Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, Japan, 2017)

OTGONBAATAR TSEDENDEMBEREL¹

In this book, with its seemingly self-explanatory title, Noritoshi Furuichi argues that, despite Japan's desperate situation amidst decades-long economic recessions, a deteriorating birth rate, an ageing population, the immediate aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the majority of its youth (nearly 80 percent) seem to be "happy" nonetheless. Noritoshi Furuichi is a young Japanese sociologist, a senior researcher at the Keio Research Institute, a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of the University of Tokyo, and a dedicated commentator on youth and political issues. *Zetsubō no kuni no kōfuku na wakamonotachi* (the Japanese title of the book) reports how Japanese youth deal with desperation and despair in their own terms based on the author's articulations of youth theory, various interviews with young people, an extensive review of government surveys and publications, as well as his own observations as a sociologist and a young member of Japanese society.

The book is unique in the sense that it documents young people's reactions and moods right after the 3/11 natural disaster, reflecting the aspirations and frustrations of youth. At the same time, it is a book about youth by a young scholar who has thought much about youth theory and youth issues and debates with the former through multiple channels, including on Japanese television. This book is original and novel because Furuichi critically analyzes what it means to be a youth or young in today's Japan with its challenging political, social, economic, and cultural realities. The 2015 paperback edition and the much-needed English translation of 2017, comprised of over 280 pages, are empirically-informed, scholarly, yet very enjoyable books on youth theory

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by a youth; Furuichi himself was only twenty-six years old when he released the original book in 2011. Writing extensively about topics such as the war museums of the world, with an analysis of the intersection between war and memory, generation-gap-related issues, and women's solutions to childcare, Furuichi's other books include *Nobody Can Teach War*, Kodansha, 2015; *That's Why Japan is Off*, Shinchosha, 2014; and *Making Nursery Schools Compulsory*; Shogakukan, 2015.

The title of the book is neither self-explanatory nor misleading, as the author challenges and unpacks common assumptions and (mis)perceptions that have to do with young people in Japan. Furuichi speculates, contrary to common belief, that those who lived and worked hard during the period of high economic growth of the 1980s were not necessarily "happy" given the extended working hours required from young employees who joined the infamous "rat race" characterized by a post-war modern business management model ("the good school, the good company, the good life") and the excessive competition involved in entering university of high school pupils, as represented in the so-called "exam wars." Compared with these arguably miserable, "misfortunate" lives led by their counterparts of more than 30 years ago, the "happy" youth of today enjoy the effects and products of highly developed information and technology, benefit from reasonably accessible, available, and affordable services in terms of food, shelter, and clothing, participate in neo-liberal capitalist consumerism, and are presented with abundant life choices and opportunities. Furutoshi claims that young people are "happy" and satisfied with the present because "they do not believe that tomorrow will be better than today."

Through this book the author attempts to start a dialogue by looking into the essence and dynamics of contemporary youth in his society, but, more importantly, fills in the gaps in the youth-related arguments and theories proffered thus far. In six chapters, the author aptly questions the meaning of "young people" as an entity, concluding that the expression is merely an illusion based on his conversations and analysis of youth discourse; he also demystifies various perceptions and stereotypes surrounding youth through a rigorous review of survey data; presents fieldwork findings with a special focus on events such as the World Cup and youth participation in protests and demonstrations; and discusses generational disparities and problems with labor. Addressing the hope and anxiety, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, as well as dreams and despairs of youngsters in tough times is not unique to Japan; just as financially challenging circumstances gave rise to the phenomenon of "parasite singles" in Japan – young people who live with their parents beyond their late twenties – equivalent terms emerged in other developed nations, such as *twixter* in the United States, *nesthocker* in Germany, and *mammoni* in Italy.

Youth theory, or theorization about the young people of Japan (*seinen-ron*) itself, should be a part of the famous *Nihonjin-ron* arguments (theories and discussions about the allegedly common traits of the Japanese), but youth discourse is largely absent of this umbrella theory. Or rather, as the author suspects, youth discourse merely serves as a means for adults to enrich the overall *Nihonjin-ron*. In this sense, Furuichi establishes that we should consider the particular phenomenon not as an issue that concerns individual young persons but as one that should be understood together with the realities of the existing social structure. This brings the author to iterate the purpose of his book: “to structurally portray as social issues the issues of ‘young people,’ which are prone to being appropriated – that is to say, co-opted – for personal identity purposes and cultural matters.” Having defined the theoretical or conceptual frameworks with regard to the “young people” under discussion, Furuichi tackles the empirical data in the subsequent chapters and refutes a series of myths surrounding young people: they are not necessarily “inward looking”; they are not reluctant consumers, but they consume carefully; although young people do not show up to cast their votes at the ballot box, they are politically active in terms of participating in protests and relief campaigns. Methodologically, the author sees the *Public Opinion Survey on Social Awareness* as an excellent source as it has been asking same questions for more than thirty years, making it possible for researchers to analyze shifting attitudes.

Furuichi tackles youth theory from four major perspectives: “alien others,” “expedient allies,” “cultural argument,” and “empirical studies,” in which he argues that the older generations’ bashing of young people as “alien others” has been ongoing for more than a century, whereas the wartime period saw young people prominently being viewed as “expedient allies.” However, modern youth discourse started together with the so-called “fantasy of the classless society” in which young people were discussed as if they all came from the middle class, glossing over their local differences, economic disparities, and gender. Therefore, the author focuses his analyses and arguments on young people in their twenties who lived in the immediate aftermath of the period of economic growth that ended in 1991. With the bursting of the economic bubble, which started in the 1970s, “the good school, the good company, the good life” model, consequent life-time employment prospects and related guarantees for life collapsed at the same time. The lost decades, which stretched from 1991 until 2011, are well-known as a time of prolonged economic recession(s) in Japan which saw the 3/11 earthquake and nuclear disaster at the end. Thus, this is the story of how Japanese young people have been dealing with such a desperate climate and dark clouds over their heads.

Central to the author's main arguments is his attempt to redefine what it means to be young – youth theorization. Whereas the term “*wakamono*” (young people) refers to those in their twenties and thereabouts, “*seinen*” (youth) means the young generation, a term which was commonly used until the 1970s. The former replaced the latter due to the undesirable normative nuances expressed by the latter. In claiming that “young people are our/nation's hope” or that “young people these days are [such and such] (usually negative adjectives or connotations),” adults impose high expectations on youth as a group, or “youth-bash” or blame them for just being themselves. Young people, while required to be patriotic and nationalistic, and often glorified in the media and by an integral part of society, are also considered expendable as they were required to sacrifice their lives for the country, first during times of war (from the second Sino-Japanese war to WWII) and then for the so-called economic war. In discourse, it appears that life for Japanese youth is often characterized as a “war,” ranging from a real war to the “rat race” to achieving well, financially and collectively (an “economic war”), and to performing well academically and individually (“exam war”), to climbing up the increasingly crucial social, economic, academic, and professional ladders. Youth discourses about post-war democracy and post-WWI liberalism, especially the criticisms expressed by the older generations, are painfully similar to how some post-Soviet countries criticize their youth for interpreting democracy as “anarchism,” and human rights and gender issues as “unacceptable ideologies.”

In other words, from being the “nation's hope,” “consumer” citizens, warriors in all sectors of life, to “outrageous” in the eyes of adults, “capsule beings,” or “moratorium beings,” young people as a whole and as a generation are portrayed as either “alien others” or “expedient allies.” Youth are seen as a hope and “ally” one day and “alien others” the next, being subjected to the mood and the sway of adults. Furuichi is overly critical of the dangerously harmful term “*generationalism*,” as it tends to overlook the individualistic and hierarchical diversity inherent in a “generation,” and neglects all other signifiers such as race, gender, and community. Moreover, there are cultural arguments that contribute to the emergence of the siloed, individualized *wakamono*. Along with strong economic growth, the first baby boomers who were born between 1947 and 1949, and those who have not experienced war, created their own unique culture, further complicating the definition of young people as an entity. On the other hand, the culture of copycat (replicated) experiences afforded by the information society of the mid-1970s made young people “together-separate,” united through distant “experiences,” similar to today's online culture in which young people of all societies connected through the internet can have common, shared experiences despite space, time, and location. Thus, the concept of

wakamono emerged somewhere between the late 1960s and the 1970s to define a homogenous group whose attributes other than age did not matter. Therefore, the author avoids employing a single, unified definition of “youth,” or “young people” in this book, let alone deploying today’s commonly used definitions of youth created by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and other similar institutions.

Apart from the signifiers such as race, gender, age, and community, another dimension which enriches the arguments in the book is class. The 1960s, along with post-war economic growth and media representations of youth, witnessed the fantasy that the class system had been abolished altogether, wherein people mistakenly thought that Japan had become a classless society, evidenced by the “*one-million-member-middle-class*” myth. In this, age was the only thing people focused on, while expressing disillusionment that all young people were from the middle-class, whereas in reality disparities still existed. The author is understandably and justly skeptical about the notion of “youth as customer” and the “*ichi-oku sō-churyū*” myth (“*one-million-member-middle-class*” myth) which is still relevant and valid today given the recent advent and promotion of a minimalist culture among youth, both in developed and developing countries.

Of relevance to the field of sociology, it is intriguing to discover that in 1953 the first full-scale sociological study of young people in Japan reviewed the then-available research on youth in Europe and America, applying it to concrete cases observed in the country. In this study, a group of Japanese sociologists discussed *seinen* as a generation, a diverse entity, through a compilation of scholarly essays. Unlike how some contemporary psychologists viewed youth as a “biological generation” and thus those of urban and rural environments as one and the same, sociologists, focusing on the social relevancy and social disparity of youth, decided otherwise. On the other hand, Furuichi confesses that his understanding of the modernization of Japan shifted from a “textbook understanding” to a better place following the launch of a book by the 85-year-old sociologist Hidetoshi Kato in 2015, *Media no tenkai* (“The development of media”). Whereas Furuichi had thought the Edo period (1603-1868) was “pre-modern,” Kato’s claims proved that it was “early modern” in the sense that by the mid-eighteenth century changes deemed to be the signs of “modern times” were already underway. An example of this is the mass tourism that started at that time, refuting some misperceptions that the freedom of movement was then altogether prohibited.

Although Furuichi succeeded in starting and intensifying the debate about youth in Japan with his book, he also was able to promote inter-generational dialogue among sociologists and social scientists. One of the formidable examples of this has been presented above. Throughout the whole book,

Furuichi meticulously details the age and hometown of each and every author he references, the young people he interviewed, and even foreign authors and scholars he quoted both in and off text in brackets. This might validate some readers' prejudices about the thoroughness and meticulousness of the Japanese. However, these minor references help readers to follow who proposes or opposes which arguments, and where these individuals might have come from in terms of age and background. Not that it matters a lot, but it is a helpful tool.

Furuichi proposes and backs up many fascinating arguments to full satisfaction with the relevant empirical data in a true sociological sense. To experience this pleasure, readers should choose this book – either the Japanese or English edition – in anticipation that the adept, skillful translation does not lack the sarcastic and ironic tone and caustic wit of the author in either language. More importantly, the book is a living document as the author has been able to update the content, to converse with himself and other contributors and scholars, as well as his critics, since the first launch and paperback edition of the book. In sum, Furuichi, by re-defining and problematizing the notion of youth in today's Japanese society as an illusion but a diverse entity, critically questions how young people as a whole can contribute to society by seeking ways to solve some of the social, economic and political dilemmas involved with this desperate situation. Endorsed by empirical data and sound analyses that are both based on research findings and in-depth interviews and observations, the author presents possible interpretations of consummatory or self-sufficient young individuals who are somewhat satisfied with their way of living, but increasingly anxious and adamant about where all this is leading.

EDITORIAL

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