

CONTENTS

<i>Jaroslav Dvorak – Remigijus Civinskas – Gintaras Šumskas:</i> Beyond the Front-Line: the Coping Strategies and Discretion of Lithuanian Street-Level Bureaucracy During COVID-19	3
<i>Boglárka Herke – Kitti Kutrovátz – Veronika Paksi – Éva Ivony:</i> Career Types and Career Satisfaction Among Sociology Doctoral Graduates of Corvinus University	29
<i>Barbara Ilg:</i> The Representation of Trianon Trauma as a Chosen Trauma in Political Newspapers (1920–2010) in Hungary	51
<i>Gopalakrishnan Karunanithi:</i> Changing Social Values in Contemporary Tamil Society, India: a Qualitative Inquiry	95

FORUM

<i>Bertalan Decmann:</i> Essential Notions Concerning the Integration of Refugees	121
<i>Linh Mai – Hoa Thi Kim Nguyen:</i> Voluntary Social Insurance Policy Through the Evaluation of Workers in Tay Ho District, Hanoi City, Vietnam	143
<i>Artem Zakharchenko – Olena Zakharchenko:</i> The Influence of the ‘Tomos Narrative’ as a Part of the Ukrainian National and Strategic Narrative	163
<i>Zharas Taubayev:</i> Pragmatics of Eponyms in Political Discourse (On the Material of the Speeches of Politicians)	179

REVIEW

<i>Péter Futó:</i> Britain and Europe at a Crossroads. The Politics of Anxiety and Transformation, by Andrew Ryder	197
<i>Majd Jamal Hammoudeh:</i> McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became the New Capitalist Spirituality, by Ronald Purser	201

EDITORIAL

Thank you to the peer reviewers of previous issues	207
--	-----

BEYOND THE FRONT-LINE: THE COPING STRATEGIES AND DISCRETION OF LITHUANIAN STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY DURING COVID-19

REMIGIJUS CIVINSKAS – JAROSLAV DVORAK – GINTARAS ŠUMSKAS¹

ABSTRACT: *This article presents the results of a project funded by the Research Council of Lithuania: ‘Public policy solutions and their improvement to overcome the COVID-19 crisis in Lithuanian municipalities: solution tools and service delivery.’ The research methodology is based on street-level bureaucracy theory and ongoing qualitative research in the form of interviews with social workers and doctors. Interviews were conducted in the Lithuanian municipalities which became the first COVID-19 hotspots in March-April 2020. The aim is to identify the response and coping strategies of street-level bureaucracy. The findings of current research suggest that the workload of street-level bureaucrats increased, the situation changed very rapidly, and there was a constant need to adopt rules and even recommendations issued by the ministry. Fear of COVID-19 infection, a lack of accurate information, uncertainty, and the possibility of allowing staff with children to leave the workplace led to staff shortages. This in turn motivated the administration and the remaining employees to look for suitable coping strategies.*

KEYWORDS: *COVID-19, street-level bureaucracy, crisis response, social workers, Lithuania*

¹ *Remigijus Civinskas* works at Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania; email: remigijus.civinskas@vdu.lt; *Jaroslav Dvorak* works at Klaipėda University, Lithuania; email: jaroslav.dvorak@ku.lt; *Gintaras Šumskas* works at Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania; email: Gintaras.sumskas@vdu.lt This project received funding from the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT), agreement No. P-COV-20-59.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic forced governments at all levels to seek solutions by developing specific crisis-response policies, which were shaped by the adaptation of public health or other crisis management models or the development of new, completely specific response tools (Weible et al. 2020). Research shows that the COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis is unique and distinctive in most respects (Hsiang et al. 2020; van Bavel et al. 2020). The complex public policy challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis elicited a response from governments and sub-national actors. These policies began with an initial response and later shifted to the mitigation of constraints and consequences (Hale et al. 2020). These heterogeneous responses and crisis-response policies differ somewhat in their design, objectives, formulation, and implementation processes. The question is to what extent the success of anti-crisis policies (effective feasibility) depends on their formation (the formulation of appropriate goals, and the choice of coordination model), and to what extent this can determine the implementation thereof. It is understandable that government-led crisis-response policies (the so-called top-down model) are critical.

On the other hand, research shows that responsive policies are highly unstable, as well as often poorly coordinated (Hale et al. 2020; Turrini et al. 2020). One of the unknowns concerns uncertainty with regard to the conclusions of public policy decisions. Policy implementation is also critical, especially the involvement of epidemiologists / public-health professionals, doctors, social service providers and other staff working on the frontlines of the battle with the COVID-19 virus.

The implementation of COVID-19 crisis management policies in the field of personal health and health services was selected for the empirical study. The areas of social and personal health services were chosen for several reasons: (1) they were important in the context of crisis management during the coronavirus pandemic and were addressed by COVID-19 crisis management policy; (2) in terms of the implementation of policies, a significant part of the responsibilities (prevention of the spread of infection, management of the epidemiological situation, etc.) fell on the municipalities; (3) in the context of COVID-19 crisis policy, the functioning of some officials (mainly front-line staff) with wide discretion was crucial. Physicians and social workers were able to compensate for inadequate crisis management solutions and failed measures.

The current research aims to investigate the effectiveness of the implementation of COVID-19 crisis management policies in Lithuania for social and personal health services. Based on the theoretical approach of street-level bureaucracy, the aim is to determine the coping strategies and changes in the discretion

of street-level bureaucrats (i.e. how did changing public policy decisions [emergency decisions] change the discretion of the street-level bureaucracy?). The key question is what coping mechanisms and strategies for overcoming the problems caused by COVID-19 have been developed by doctors and social workers working directly with patients and clients. The results of the study should explain the gaps in health and social services systems and help to improve existing emergency management systems. The research will also be significant in terms of the application and development of the theory, and help explain how the theory of street-level bureaucracy can be adapted to the study of crisis management policies.

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE THEORY OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

The work of street-level officials (doctors and social service providers) in providing services to clients was important in the implementation of the policies that responded to the crisis caused by COVID-19 (especially in providing services to the population). The analytical perspective of the study will be presented in this section in order to systematically analyze employee behavior (coping strategies) and determinants (situational conditions of service provision, the effects of the identities of close employees, and the importance of discretion).

Working conditions of street-level bureaucracy

Lipsky (2010), the pioneer of the theory of street-level bureaucracy, in defining the concept of a street-level servant (“street-level bureaucrat”), noticed that the latter are employees who are in direct contact with customers and undertake their work – the provision of public services – under severe constraints (structural constraints). These disadvantages are primarily due to limited resources. Many resources (time, material, financial, knowledge, etc.) that are required to ensure the proper provision of services are lacking (see Figure 1). This lack of resources is usually due to practical constraints arising from requirements related to the large number of patients, the requirement of filling in forms in electronic systems/registers, etc. (Lipsky 2010). Street-level staff often lack resources due to structural factors such as the underfunding of services or the unequal distribution of budgets. On the other hand, the growing demand for services may also lead to a lack of resources, which hinders the provision of

services that meet customer expectations. Consequently, street-level servants face dilemmas on a daily basis – involving a lack of resources and increasing demand for services. The emergence of such a dilemma has been underlined by many theorists who seek to develop the theory of street-level bureaucracy (Brodkin 2020; Maynard-Moody–Musheno 2003), and the phenomenon has been confirmed and revealed in detail by numerous empirical studies (Small 2006; Spitzmueller 2014; Trappenburg et al. 2020).

Street-level employees are faced with large workloads (a large number of customer services, the additional workload related to documentation management, information systems, and other similar activities). This is another factor (in addition to the lack of resources and the desire to respond to the individual needs and expectations of the client) which causes tension (Lipsky 2010; Dvorak–Savickaitė 2018). It is important to note that heavy workloads can begin to emerge not only during seasonal peaks, but also during unexpected crises. Street-level servants look for solutions to such problematic situations by trying to redistribute workloads or choose other coping strategies (Maynard-Moody–Musheno 2003; Hupe–Buffat 2014). The biggest problems which they face are caused by two factors that often go together – a large workload and a lack of resources. This combination is difficult to endure when working on the front lines on a daily basis. Major crises exacerbate negative effects and can be very difficult to overcome. These factors are not the only ones that complicate work. In difficult situations, street-level officers are also affected by the uncertainty associated with the contradiction of implementing policies that are “dropped” on them from above (see Figure 1).

Uncertainty in the implementation of public policies

Street-level bureaucrats face uncertainty when making decisions. This arises from the heterogeneity, ambiguity, contradiction, etc. of the public policies that are implemented (on the basis of which they participate in the process of providing services to customers). More specifically, feelings of uncertainty (and thus doubts about the provision of solutions and services) often arise for street-level bureaucrats due to the contradiction or incompleteness of policy objectives. Regulatory procedures created by public policies are also unclear (Raaphorst–Groeneveld 2019). Feelings of uncertainty about policy implementation affect employees in the context of their day-to-day decisions. On the one hand, the latter have some freedom of choice and can choose how to act. On the other hand, they work with clients, which poses some challenges (Raaphorst 2018). However, in the case of major crises, managerial referrals may be acceptable

to them. Raaphorst (2018) systematizes research on feelings of uncertainty for close employees and their impact on decision-making.

The uncertainty factor is often intertwined with the attitudes and emotions of close employees, possibly even leading to physical fatigue. Researcher Van Engen and her co-authors examined how so-called reception staff (those working on the front lines) evaluate (accept, justify, understand as significant, and react to the activities related to the implementation of) national public policies (Van Engen et al. 2019). The results of this study show that policy integrity and continuity are important for reception staff, even if public policies need to change.


The discretion (power of self-determination) of street-level employees and the changes during the crisis

Autonomy in the provision of services is important for the functioning of street-level employees (see Figure 1). Decision autonomy allows employees to work according to their ideals, professional competencies, and ethical norms (Lipsky 2010). Indeed, the conceptualization of the phenomenon of the discretion of street-level servants is a central element in the theory of street-level bureaucracy.

The conceptualization of the study of the discretion of street-level servants involves two fundamental difficulties. The concept of discretion has changed in the theory of street-level bureaucracy. Lipsky (2010), refining his theory, noted that discretion and contact with citizens are important concepts that distinguish status. In the theoretical scientific approach in question, the concept of discretion is defined and used slightly differently depending on certain contexts. Specifically, researchers have not developed a coherent concept of discretion (Tummers–Bekkers 2014; Hupe 2013; Pivoras–Gončiarova 2017).

Lipsky (2010) sees the discretion of a street-level servant as a gift – a degree of decision autonomy is given to the servant by the ruler (usually “top-down”). In this case, it is understood as a prescriptive right (understood through the development of differences – public policy “as written” and “public policy as an activity”). According to another, revised approach, discretion is defined as the actual autonomy of a staff member’s decisions or conduct which may be exercised in a particular environment (Tummers–Bekkers 2014; Buffat 2016). Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) rightly observe that discretion “is defined in many pieces of legislation as a certain legal heritage.” Consequently, a public official must create landmarks within his or her frame and “travel through them” according to the many possible limitations.

Figure 1. *The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the behavior of street-level officials*



Source: Authors' construction

Discretion is divided into two forms: legal / de jure (“as described”), and factual (“as it is”). Obviously, this difference needs to be taken into account. On one hand, when analyzing the performance of street-level employees, the actual autonomy of their decisions in providing services to customers is more important for many reasons. However, it is vital to note that the effectiveness of the services provided and the implementation of public policy may depend on discretion. This aspect of outcome and impact is crucial (Hupe 2013). For example, with de facto discretion, street-level employees can focus on meeting customer needs, showing more empathy, devoting more resources to them, and so on. On the other hand, such discretion can lead to malfunctioning (or inaction) and even abuse. Thus, the choices of a street-level servant depend on how they understand and interpret the rules.

The discretion of a street-level employee depends on the individual position (whether one is, e.g., a doctor, nurse, or social worker), service institutions (one form of discretion will apply to a social worker working in a social care home with the elderly, and another in a hostel for the homeless). More specifically, employee discretion may depend on the legal regime of the service, the institution’s internal rules, and so on. In some studies, groups of close employees are distinguished according to the level of decision autonomy available to them: administrative (Sowa–Selden 2003), narrow (Pivoras–Gončiarova 2017), or reception discretion (Ellis 2014; Scourfield 2015).

The concept of the discretion of street-level employees in the public policy literature is related to the differentiation of implementation methods. Under traditional policy implementation schemes, two interpretations of street-level bureaucratic discretion are possible: (1) a top-down, and (2) a bottom-up formation (which can be called actual discretion). According to the latter interpretation, discretion is understood as a condition that helps employees to effectively implement public programs or provide services (i.e. they can properly allocate limited resources and prioritize complex tasks) (Maynard-Moody–Mushano 2003; Watkins-Hayes 2009). In addition, empirical research has shown that the discretion of street-level employees (bottom-up implementation) shapes and strengthens the employee’s orientation towards the client (understanding the significance of the client, and aspiring to help them) (Tummers–Bekkers 2014).

Studies of street-level bureaucracy have shown that the discretion of public sector employees is changing due to one noticeable trend – modern management systems (quality, performance, human resource management, etc.) along with individual measures (service standards, decision and monitoring systems, performance evaluation, etc.) (Evans–Harris 2004; Ponnert–Svensson 2016; Brodtkin 2007; Hupe 2007). On the other hand, a number of public services and authorities are contracted out from the private sector, using mixed (so-called public-private partnership) organizational models. It is important to take this into account when public services are introduced during crises (such as epidemics) (on the basis of the imperative or voluntary involvement of the authorities) and private institutions (clinics, doctors’ offices, social service companies, etc.).

Strategies for coping with the problems of street-level employees

As already discussed, the activities of street-level employees are influenced by different and simultaneously existing factors – difficult working conditions (a constant lack of resources, uncertainty about ‘drop-down’ policies, a large number of tasks), changing discretion, and varying identities. These factors determine the behavior of employees (based on certain conditions or decision guidelines) who are in direct contact with customers during the provision of services. However, problem-solving behavior is a key concept that explains the gaps in the implementation of public policy and best reveals the difficulties that employees may face. There is a consensus in research that coping techniques (sometimes expanded to include forms, strategies, and styles) are the basis for helping individuals to meet the challenges they face (Dubois 2016; Tummers et al. 2015).

The concept of coping behaviors was first introduced by Lipsky in developing the theory of street-level bureaucracy. According to Lipsky:

[...] I sought to find out the coping behaviors of street-level servants. In analyzing this, I highlighted the gap between the idea of ideal services and practical situations. [...] In addition, coping behaviors of street-level officials increase the differences in public policy in the implementation process between how it is written and how it is actually implemented. Other coping strategies reflect trade-offs between the policy formulated and the needs of a street-level bureaucracy. (Lipsky 1980)

This quote reveals that street-level employees use problem-coping techniques (mechanisms and strategies) to realize their ideals in their daily activities. To achieve their ideals, they have to overcome two common obstacles: a lack of resources, and operational constraints due to limited discretion. According to previous research, it is no simple task to do this successfully.

Coping with the problems of service providers is one of the key concepts in Lipsky's theory (together with the concepts of formalist service, and people processing) (Lipsky 2020). As previously mentioned, this explains the gaps in the policy implementation process, while revealing how officials reduce the latter through their behavior. On the other hand, Lipsky (2020) did not clearly reveal this concept and did not conceptualize the types of coping mechanisms and their application. In other words, the creator of street-level bureaucracy did not provide explanatory (so-called operational) concepts. Its interpretations do not reflect the realities of the operation of today's street-level bureaucracy in relation to the application of public management and market measures in the public sector.

The concept of coping with problems was further developed by many of Lipsky's followers. The most striking of these are the contributions of Tummers and his colleagues. These scholars singled out and described the coping strategies, mechanisms, and styles used by street-level employees (Tummers et al. 2015). They also explained the factors (linked to those already singled out in the theory of street-level bureaucracy and supplemented by psychological interpretations) that determine the emergence of one strategy or another, the changes thereto and the impact of their application on public policies. Consequently, this group of scientists (who have collaborated on many publications) developed a unique method for the development of the theory of street-level bureaucracy that has three striking directions: (1) clarifications of the definition of the concept of coping; (2) a presentation of classifications of coping mechanisms (types); and

(3) analysis of the factors influencing (positive or negative) coping and the impact thereof.

The impact of COVID-19 on street-level bureaucracy

The performance of public sector employees during times of crisis has seldom been addressed through the theoretical approach of street-level bureaucracy. For example, several publications examined the activities of social service providers during the refugee crisis in 2015–2017 (Sigling 2020; Fontana 2019; Giudici, 2020; Borrelli–Lindberg 2018). Henderson (2012) discussed the roles of street-level servants during natural cataclysms and crises. He noted that such roles are critically significant. However, the main researchers of street-level bureaucracy paid relatively little attention to the topic of crises. This is likely to be due to the short duration of these crises and the unsuitability of the topic for research. Some front-line workers often work in conditions that are similar to some crises. Thus, the question why delve into short-term crises individually arises.

First, the potential approaches to research in the framework of public policy research, and more narrowly in terms of the study of street-level bureaucracy, have been discussed by two groups of theorists. Dunlop et al. (2020) highlighted the study of street-level bureaucrats as one of the most appropriate top-down approaches to implementing public policies. A team of Brazilian scientists led by Alcadipani et al. (2020) analyzed the work of police officers as street-level bureaucrats during the COVID-19 pandemic. The team of researchers arrived at several important conclusions based on the data they obtained. The researchers noted that the behavior of policemen was determined by both identification with the needs of society and other factors, such as conflicting public policy decisions (between presidential, federal, and state-level institutions), elements of professional culture, and a lack of resources.

In our view, it is important to continue the study of changes in discretion, assuming that the autonomy of service providers decreases during a crisis. It should be noted that the conceptualization of the phenomenon of discretion in street-level bureaucracy is a central element in the theory of street-level bureaucracy. Lipsky (2010), similarly to most of his followers, saw the discretion of a street-level bureaucrat as freedom to make decisions within the scope of the policy-making process, as encouraged by certain incentives and limited by sanctions. The decisions of a doctor or a social worker can be determined by contextual factors pertaining to normative and public policy, a lack of resources, or the complexity of assigned tasks (or policy goals).

During the COVID-19 crisis, the uncertainty of decisions increased several times for street-level bureaucrats. This was due not only to the effects of the crisis and changing discretion, but also to atypical interactions with clients. Street-level bureaucrats encounter heavy workloads, conflicting requirements (as set out in public policy documents), a lack of resources, and other difficulties when working with clients (Lipsky 2010; Tummers et al. 2015). This eventually puts them under stress during the provision of services and leads to emotional ‘burnout’ situations. In applying the theory of street-level bureaucracy, the effects of a lack of resources and emotional effects (the anxiety of street-level bureaucrats about personal and family security) were also examined. In this way, the theoretical model under consideration was extended.

THE COVID-19 RESPONSE IN LITHUANIA

A state of emergency in Lithuania was declared on February 26, 2020. With this decision, the government sought to facilitate the coordination of preventive action, prepare for the spread of COVID-19 in the country, organize the work of the responsible institutions, and use the state reserves of medical resources to implement procedures faster and easier. On February 27, 2020, the Minister of Health was appointed head of the operation and took over the command of the National Emergency Situations Center. Despite the fact that the state was said to be ready to meet the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, it soon became clear that the most basic protective measures (masks, disinfectant, protective equipment for doctors) were lacking (Dvorak 2020). The testing of the population began to flounder because the aim was to implement testing by sending the tests centrally to the capital city, Vilnius.

As the scale of the pandemic accelerated, the number of infected medical staff began to grow. According to data from April 7, 2020, 154 health care professionals in Lithuania became ill. Due to the strict lockdown, the activities of many business organizations and public sector institutions (e.g. schools and universities) were limited, though not including grocery stores, gas stations, and pharmacies. The borders were closed, except for shipments of protective equipment through Vilnius Airport and the return of Lithuanian residents by ferry through Klaipeda State Seaport. Thanks to these measures, the situation was managed from a short-term perspective. Indeed, on May 15, 2020, the freedom of movement of the population was restored, leading the global media to refer to the area as the *Baltic Bubble* (Dvorak 2021).

At the same time, the Lithuanian government approved a COVID-19 management strategy, which was designed to be implemented within two years and could be reviewed if a vaccine and / or drug were to be developed. Although the summer of 2020 seemed to indicate that COVID-19 would be controlled and overcome, morbidity rates began to rise rapidly in early September. Until the present date, it can be stated that they are higher or similar to those of many EU countries.

METHODOLOGY

Qualitative research involving street-level employees. In analyzing the performance of street-level employees, a qualitative research method was used to select the form of individual and group interviews. Data were collected consistently based on sound methods. Initially, preparatory informal interviews were conducted with social workers and doctors. Later, after the preparation of the study (the selection criteria, research topics and questions, etc.) and the planning of its implementation, the collection of qualitative data began.

It is important to note that the study was conducted in five municipalities. The municipalities with the largest populations – namely, Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda – and the municipalities of districts with a higher incidence of COVID-19 than average (Marijampolė and Ukmergė) were selected (April – May 2020). Experiences of street-level bureaucrats with outbreaks of infection (including both those in direct contact with the institutions, and indirectly, those who knew about the situation in the municipality, took preventive steps, and prepared for virus control) were analyzed. According to these criteria, five groups of informants were distinguished (see Table 1).

Table 1. *Qualitative research informants, street-level employees*

Employees of social care homes and hostels (social workers, nurses)	Staff of inpatient personal health institutions, doctors at infection clinics, nurses	Social service providers (social workers) providing services at home	Social service providers (social workers) providing services at home*	Doctors who provided services remotely*
9	10	7	10	3

*During the quarantine period, from March 14 to June 16, 2020; after the quarantine period, who worked with clients and had contact with them.

Source: Prepared by authors

This choice of groups of informants was required to meet several main selection criteria: (1) the latter should be involved in the response to the dissemination of a wide range of services (which were provided rather than terminated during the first quarantine); (2) the attention of employees to the risk of coronavirus should be elevated, or include those with experience working with at-risk groups.

Two forms of interviews were chosen: individual and group interviews. Thirty-two individual and two group interviews were conducted (with social service providers in Marijampolė and Klaipėda). A total of 39 interviewees participated in the study. In terms of occupational distribution, most informants were social workers and their assistants (24), with slightly smaller numbers of doctors (14) and nurses (3). The distribution of interviews by municipalities was as follows: Marijampolė district municipality (10); Kaunas city (6); Vilnius city (9); Klaipėda city (5); and Ukmergė district (4). The interviews were conducted in September–November 2020.

Individual interviews lasted between half an hour and an hour and a half. About half of the interviews were conducted during face-to-face meetings, mostly at the premises of health and social services. Some informants refused to take part in face-to-face meetings due to the deteriorating epidemiological situation and the threat of coronavirus. Another reason for refusal was their increased workload (especially in the case of doctors). Therefore, some of the interviews took place over the telephone and several in separate rooms. Interview conversations were recorded on digital media and then transcribed and prepared for analysis. Between 15 and 20 interviews were planned, but not all interviews were informative, so additional interviews were conducted (usually in the same municipality). The selection of interviewees did not involve strict criteria. Calls were most frequently made to municipal institutions, which were asked to be involved in the investigation. In several institutions, interviewees were assisted by representatives of the administration.

Two forms of data collection were used during the interviews: (1) the story-eliciting form of data collection, designed by adapting the data collection strategy of Maynard-Moody and Musheno. The aim was to share experiences during and after the quarantine period while asking participants in the qualitative research to share stories of customer interactions (Maynard-Moody–Musheno 2003). This method of data collection proved its worth during the following research process; (2) a semi-structured form of interviewing.

A cumulative data collection strategy was chosen to explore the roles and involvement of municipalities in the implementation of COVID-19 crisis management policies. The survey of Lithuanian municipal representatives was supplemented by a qualitative study (interviews with municipal heads, heads of administrative units, and council members).

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the ‘burdens’ of street-level bureaucracy

Physicians, social workers, and case managers who work with citizens (and have sufficient discretion) are classified as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) in street-level bureaucracy studies (Lipsky 2010; Evans 2020). Employees of this public sector professional group usually have a wide level of discretion, and seek to expand and secure it by providing services directly to patients (Checkland 2004; Virtanen et al. 2018). Many front-line workers (especially those working in social care homes, hospital receptions, and with people at social risk) face high levels of uncertainty and pressure arising from a lack of resources and from changing policy requirements. Such practices exist on the service front-lines even during periods of stability.

In the face of the outbreak, street-level bureaucrats not only lacked colleagues to help provide services, but also time. Clearly, this problem was primarily encountered by employees of hospitals and social care institutions where the so-called foci of infection are located. As the interview reveals, the increase in workload was large, and sometimes huge, for a number of reasons. In particular, those working in ‘reactors’² were affected by infection control and prevention requirements (appropriate clothing required for working with sick patients, the provision of services according to new procedures/algorithms, etc.) (see Table 2). Second, the workload was increased by staff shortages due to peer isolation or COVID-19 itself. The remaining employees of the institution took over the work of the missing employees. Third, staff were hampered by petty work that “deprived informants of significant minutes or hours from their core business.”

Physicians and social service providers spent a lot of time preparing reports (reports and questionnaires were new, and often required submitting to several institutions), delving into the decisions of the heads of operations, documents of municipal administrations, or new methodological material (recommendations, manuals, professional literature, etc.) (see Table 2). Almost all the informants spoke about this with one voice. To reinforce their experience, interviewees repeatedly used the dramatic connotation “insanely” (“insanely increased response to SPPD municipal letters, reporting”; “insanely time-consuming thing [...] We had new orders every day”; “... Yes, that documentation, I will

2 In the jargon of practitioners, specialized COVID-19 treatment units or other units of institutions that were faced with an outbreak of infection were known as “reactors.”

say, was very desperate”³). Such rhetoric testifies to the enormous (often almost impossible to manage) workload and other negative effects of constant frustration, tension, and even some signs of alienation from politics.

Table 2. *Interview Data: Huge Workload*

Topic	Interview Response
Lack of time due to new infection prevention and control procedures	“Those dressing processes get stuck, literally. Because you have to follow the requirements, you have to take the overalls off in the infected room, put on clean overalls, which takes a lot of time. [...] Apparently, those safeguards make it cruel, if we were in sweaters, it would be a whole other thing here. [...] Clearly, fatigue. Let’s think logically, you’re used to sitting at the computer all the time, and now you need to be here all day on your feet. All day – work, go, carry everyone to the room to eat because they cannot eat in common areas. You have to climb from the first floor to the second floor seven times during the feeding process alone. Just take the food away and still collect it. And that process happens three times a day. Such physical exertion is definitely not for everyone.” (Interview_25, 10-28-2020)
Load due to complex needs and new activities	“We really didn’t work for eight hours. We worked, say, for days, and twelve hours and fifteen hours.... Because it was still necessary to take those people out in the evening or there were illnesses among the employees in the team, some of them became infected. [...] But we also had eight hours to rest. Clearly, those eight hours we didn’t go out all the time to rest. We made the schedule like this, and changed over – one works and the other goes to rest. [...] The workload was very high, first of all it was much harder for me because my work is more psychological, with documentation, with all the paperwork, and there was physical work here. And until a person is accustomed to that physical work, until a person adapts, the fact is that it is very difficult. It was hard for me personally, but there was no time to think about whether it was hard for you, good for you, or bad for you. You just know you have to go and you have to do it, you just don’t think about yourself, and you think about those people [...] to be good for those people because the fact is: some people won’t eat, some won’t go to the toilet, some can’t really do anything. Because there was a real need for all kinds of nursing care, help from the staff because people are really dependent on themselves. It was really very difficult at times, especially until you adapt to that new situation.” (Interview_24, 10-27-2020)
Time to delve into new procedures and fill out reports	“Paperwork and extra [work] contributed greatly. For example, sheet ... [vague observation] must be filled out, and watched as it is filled out. Whether a survey has been done or a survey response has been received ... There are so many extra things that take a lot of time. And how does it complicate the main job – treatment? [...] Treatment takes up a small portion of the work. I can’t say the percentage, but really ...” (Interview_4, 10-20-2020)

Source: Prepared by authors

³ Interview_34, 10-14-2020; Interview_15, 10-18-2020; Interview_10, 10-21-2020

Decreasing discretion

It can be assumed (although this has scarcely been explored in empirical studies to date) that the discretion of street-level officials changes in the context of a crisis. This is due to several factors. First, in the early stages of a crisis, public policy objectives are not clear or are subject to frequent change. Another important factor, for both physicians and social service providers, is that employees are generally perceived as having wide discretion in decision-making. It is true that a number of studies have revealed that this concept is stereotypical, and the actual discretion of these groups of employees is diminished by detailed operating rules, widely used management standards, information systems, and strict controls (Evans–Harris 2004; Ponnert–Svensson 2016; Brodtkin 2007).

Empirical evidence suggests that crisis management policies have had an ambiguous impact on SLBs. On the one hand, the level of discretion involved in working with patients decreased due to the need for documentation of activities, reporting requirements, and the introduction of stricter rules (such as stricter hygiene standards). This was complemented by controls, inspections, and cultural measures introduced by the administration (involving values of mutual support, adjustments to the cooperation and communication style of executives, informal rituals at work – such as signs and remarks about the correct use of self-protection measures, etc.). Staff and physicians felt constrained in their interactions with patients, the application of treatment protocols, etc. Indeed, as some interviewees revealed, some of the staff adapted by overcoming policy constraints. This was revealed in one interview:

[...] Now those rules, recommendations, orders were formed. Not like it was in the beginning. They had become clearer to work with. But when it was said yesterday [interview from the beginning of October 2020] that COVID-19 patients would be here again, I was angry even. I was angry. That's what I thought, that patients from that ward would need to be put here again. [Laughs ironically] A lot of patients are suffering, even [in ways] unrelated to the infection. There are a lot of neglected patients. Really very serious patients, well, well ... (Interview_31, 10-01-2020)

Interview data suggest that uncertainty about the effect of the coronavirus and the COVID-19 disease also shaped the effects of counseling. Specifically, many medical and social service providers had minimal knowledge of epidemiology and responding appropriately. This unclear situation led not only to the aforementioned need for consultations (from the team positioned under the head

of operations, to epidemiologists accountable to the ministry) but also to stricter protocols (such as detailed explanations of the implementation of procedures in practice). This was particularly important for the organization of work teams, the assignment of tests, the isolation of patients, and so on. Thus, the SLB wanted stricter standards (non-general recommendations with a large number of unknowns) and less discretion in areas related to infection or other issues less familiar to them. This was partly due to highly labile and reactive policies. On the other hand, feelings of uncertainty and the impact of an emotional environment were also important.

THE COPING STRATEGIES OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

As already examined, some SLBs faced a heavy workload, conflicting requirements (as set out in public policy documents), a lack of resources and other difficulties in working with clients. The situation of some of them led to *burnout* situations. However, others isolated themselves and moved to work in a safer situation of partial isolation (remote working tools were used for activities, such as video chat platforms, or working with clients by phone). In such different situations and circumstances, SLBs had to overcome the challenges posed by crisis-response policies and other factors and deliver services to the clients. Understandably, SLBs chose slightly different coping strategies. The current research is based on the preconceived theoretical notion that front-line employees engage in similar behaviors (Lipsky 2010) due to their similar working conditions (or what the theorist called “structural” conditions) in their interactions with clients and the effects of public policy. On the other hand, modern empirical research reveals that the concept of coping with a problem depends on its operationalization (Tummers et al. 2015). The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences affected SLB work as a structural factor. The effects of crisis management policies have also been taken into account.

The first clear strategy is breaking the rules when serving a client. Such a strategy is based on identifying with clients, and taking an active professional role. The interviewees shared their experiences of how they had violated rules during or after quarantine. These strategies were used by social workers and physicians in small towns to provide services to clients at home. Social workers shared their experiences of visiting clients at home in violation of the requirement to provide services remotely:

We visited some families at home. We were just worried about them. Well, they [the clients' families] were unattended, out of control, and during the quarantine, alcohol abuse increased. I visited some clients. [I] just cared, I felt responsible. After all, we are responsible for them, and you can't do a lot over the phone. [...] Not at the beginning of the quarantine, but after a few weeks. Most importantly, you got it. They were so 'isolated, independent' and then we arrived. And the message spread: 'the social worker came' [laughs] [...] It was a good way. They began to feel again that someone was 'taking care' of them. (Interview_12, 10-09-2020)

This particular interview reveals that social workers exercised their discretion (in their opinion, this did not actually decrease during or after the period of quarantine) and chose a more efficient way of working with clients (client processing). In hospitals and social care homes, this strategy had a slightly different form of expression. First, it was related to visits by patients' or clients' relatives to hospitals and care homes. An analysis of interview data reveals that some hospital physicians did not follow the requirements pertaining to the length of time which patients could spend on visits in the post-quarantine period, and allowed relatives to stay with patients for more than 15 minutes (i.e. these were procedures that were partially followed). The duration of visits to patients in a terminal condition was completely unlimited in practice. The participants of the qualitative research noted that the issue of identity based on humanity was more important than following the rules to the letter.

Another strategy was moving away from the client during the period of quarantine. During the qualitative research, interviewees often mentioned the provision of services in relation to use of the terms 'before quarantine,' 'during quarantine,' and 'post-quarantine.' They also emphasized the change in the way services were provided, emphasizing their experience (many of them worked remotely). After sharing their experiences of the transition to telework, the interviewees immediately moved on to their assessment of aspects of personal acceptability, innovation, or impact on clients, and the overall quality of services. Some clients noted that the 'distance' from clients and use of telephones for consultations (in relation to outpatient treatment, the provision of some social services, or reductions in clients' workload) was acceptable to them because it reduced workload and stress. They emphasized that they continued to work with clients, but only the methods of working and the environment changed in part. According to some participants of the qualitative research, this strategy led to unexpected results, suggesting that some problems could be solved by working with clients over the phone. It should also be emphasized that both teleworking

and offering outpatient medical services by telephone are possible. At the same time, it was argued that telephone or consultation via Zoom (or other video-conferencing platforms) reduced the accessibility of services to some clients and was of lower quality.

We, here ... [a reference to institution] were uncertain and somewhat confused about the fallen [top-down] instructions from the head of the operation, the ministry, and the municipal administration. And anyway, at the beginning of the pandemic, everything was very, very unclear. But when we moved to remote working during the quarantine, it might have been a new experience. It's like working without clients. Some of us worked from home, some from the office. We rotated [work] among four colleagues. For me, some functions were 'dropped' – some social services were missing, but other work had to be done. I worked almost constantly with clients. [...] It was something new, some procedures were simplified and it was more convenient for clients. [...] But this was only during the quarantine. After quarantine, things got back to normal. And then it collapsed – there were about three times as many requests as before the quarantine. And customers came back, well, some at least. Everyone is tense, annoyed, dissatisfied with not receiving services in polyclinics. We have become such 'absorbers' here. (Interview_6, 10-14-2020)

This episode of the interview shows that quarantine management policy and changes in service delivery created distance between some SLBs and their clients. Most SLBs understood the short-term nature of the situation and the shortcomings for clients. It should be noted that interviewees who used another approach (a previously examined strategy for overcoming breaches of rules in relation to approaching clients) were very critical of 'telephone counselling' and of reducing the availability of services.

'Service rationing' was another way of coping with problems during and after the quarantine of close officials. 'Service rationalization' is understood as a reduction of service availability or expectations by applying various techniques (queuing, defining service plans for the customer, or limiting contact time). The relevant employees can reduce or postpone individual procedures (e.g., diagnostics, therapy, etc.), limit the time available for consultation, and so on. It is important to note that 'service rationalization' (as a way of overcoming problems) can be multifaceted in nature and application.

An analysis of the qualitative study data revealed that 'service rationing' became an unavoidable means of coping with problems due to the complex

effects of COVID-19. More specifically, street-level staff were limited not only by resources (some services or procedures were not provided or were severely limited; there were not enough colleagues in the workplace, etc.), time constraints, changes to service delivery (e.g., non-contact) etc., but also extended to protecting the client (or clients, if this was related to a branch or institution). Consequently, the ‘rationing of services’ could be understood as creating ‘distance from the customer’ (justifying their potential needs and expectations), but was also justified by the need to ensure security.

One informant, a resident hospital doctor, described her experience of emerging dilemmas and justified the appropriateness of ‘service rationing’:

And now that goes on as well... Let's say I call a cardiologist or another doctor today and say, 'There are restrictions on certain tests.' You have to explain to him why you are doing this and that. Because in the past, things were really freer. Now you know clearly what you're doing research on, and you change your mind about whether you really need to do it. I think there is a decline in doing excess research [...]. And even consultation. Because now you're doing just what's necessary and thinking hard about whether you really need to drag the patient into another building. And I really felt this a great deal during that quarantine. Because you alone could make decisions. [Take], for example, some bleeding. This used to make people fume, why here, now?! [...] When problems need to be solved, they are solved more quickly [now]. For example, a radiologist used to call and take up some time, listen to what you're doing, this and that, didn't just write down, 'Oh, the residents have come up with something.' Because it used to be that way in the past. You had to defend your decision if you didn't come up with it yourself. And now [the new situation] enables us to take responsibility. I really like that. A few days ago, I had a situation where I found a new clinic for a person, I had to do a whole 'comp' [computed tomography], with the whole spine, it was absurd ... I defended this [process] and said that I had organized it urgently. And there was no particular objection: 'Why are you doing this here?' (Interview_15, 10-18-2020)

In the present case, ‘service rationing’ is linked to a more precise, narrower allocation of service procedures (mainly diagnostics). The informant mentioned that this practice developed during the first quarantine, and later partially persisted in the post-quarantine period (it was partially abandoned when the number of doctors returning from self-isolation increased, etc.)

In summary, SLBs used the three most significant coping strategies, driven by the coronavirus pandemic and changes to public policies. The new regimes of service provision only partially reduced the autonomy of their decisions, but changed the way services are delivered. In this case, identities played important roles. Some SLBs identified with customers and violated established rules for the provision of services, while others adapted to new forms of work and the reduced workload.

DISCUSSION

Empirical research suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in public policies (social- and personal-health-related) and crisis management solutions affected SLBs differently. The discretion of some of them (those usually found on the frontlines of responding to the virus, institutions with hotspots of infection, hospital receptions, infection hospitals, or their branches, etc.) was significantly reduced. Meanwhile, the decision-making autonomy of most SLBs did not change significantly, nor did workloads increase significantly (on the contrary, they may have decreased slightly during the period of quarantine, while later congestion occurred for only some SLBs).

How has this affected service systems? The findings of qualitative research show that changes to service regimes, persistent uncertainty about policy changes, and a modified service system (often due to the introduction of teleworking, consultation, and reduced access to services for residents) have had the greatest impact. We found that SLB did not substantially conflict with crisis management policymakers regarding significant gaps in interactions with customers. In a crisis environment, the behavior of SLB changed, and they relied on new coping strategies. This is confirmed by other studies of Lithuanian street-level bureaucracy associated with little discretion (Pivoras et al. 2016; Pivoras–Kaselis 2019). Identifying with clients and other cultural factors seems to have played an important role in this, and further analysis thereof would be of interest.

The current research focuses on the coping strategies of SLBs as they pertain to changes in service delivery due to COVID-19. According to research findings, some SLBs did not act according to their typical behavior in a time of crisis management, but developed specific strategies for working with clients. The question remains for further research to what extent SLBs changed or modified strategies throughout the pandemic crisis while working on the frontlines. Also relevant is the question of how institutions (hotspots) and their experiences influence behavioral changes during and after a pandemic. This research agenda

requires the selection of suitable (key) informants. SLBs who work on the frontlines can reveal the factors that change their roles and their decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

This article focused on the roles of SLBs in service transformation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. A lack of resources put pressure on medics, as well as social service providers, to find ways to overcome this issue. It was much more difficult for the political-administrative elite and the management of the institutions to solve the problem of the shortage of doctors, nurses, and other specialists in hospitals or social care institutions. This, of course, affected street-level bureaucrats as they began to feel the lack of colleagues on the frontlines of the fight against the spread of the disease. Such pressure-related factors and restrictive conditions associated with the provision of services did not occur for all street-level employees. Further from the front line, the situation was much calmer. The workload of some liaison officers decreased, sometimes significantly. The relaxation of COVID-19 policy also ensured the gradual recovery of services. It also changed the workload of street-level bureaucrats, who gradually returned to their original positions, and part of their workload even increased. On the other hand, gradual easing meant balancing between certain constraints (the partial remote provision of services) and the full resumption of service provision. The interview material reveals that workloads increased significantly for some street-level employees. This was first felt by doctors who worked in a non-contact format in both outpatient and inpatient settings. The noticeable increase in social services was felt by daycare centers and other social service providers. Relatives of street-level servants were negatively affected by a feeling of uncertainty in relation to many 'grey' areas in the application of the legislation. Most of the problems arose at the beginning of the first period of quarantine, while later, with the development of so-called algorithms, the description of procedures and operational standards became somewhat clearer. Another area is 'restrictive' public policy decisions or measures (restrictions on access to services, controls on movement, and restrictions in hospitals and social care homes, visits to relatives, etc.) that involved relationships between relatives and their clients. Understandably, clients were often perceived differently because they could limit their needs or behavioral requirements were introduced. It can be concluded that procedures that involved defining different operating conditions than usual resulted in unexpected emotional reactions, loss of control, and some discomfort.

The constant changes in the decisions of heads of operation reduced the legal ('as described') and de facto ('as affected') discretion of street-level staff. These included activities such as (1) the use of safeguards when working with clients; (2) customer interactions; and (3) teleworking and the provision of services in limited forms. The decision-making autonomy of street-level staff was also reduced due to the assignment of new tasks (the widely used infection control and prevention measures). Clearly defined ('often unchanged or not specified') requirements set forth related to procedures and guidelines for infection control and prevention were relevant to street-level staff working with clients. On the other hand, during quarantine, the former's ability to work with clients in conditions when there was a high risk of infection was formed. SLB were also burdened by excessive monitoring or control of their professional activities, which reduced the autonomy of their decisions.

The forms of problem-solving developed by street-level employees were successful during the quarantine (tightening period), but were too 'alienated' from clients and were only partially appropriate at the end (during the mitigation period). As the qualitative study revealed, some of the established behaviors became strategies for long-term functioning.

REFERENCES

- Alcadipani, R. – S. Cabral – A. Fernandes – G. Lotta (2020) Street-level bureaucrats under COVID-19: Police officers' responses in constrained settings, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 42, No. 3., pp. 394–403, DOI: /10.1080/10841806.2020.1771906.
- Borrelli, L.M. – A. Lindberg (2018) The creativity of coping: alternative tales of moral dilemmas among migration control officers. *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3., pp. 163–178, <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMBS.2018.093876>
- Brodkin, E. Z. (2007) Bureaucracy redux: Management reformism and the welfare state. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 17, No.1., pp. 1–17, DOI: doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muj019
- Brodkin, E. Z. (2020) Discretion in the welfare state. In: Evans, T. – P. Hupe (eds.): *Discretion and the Quest for Controlled Freedom*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 63–78, DOI: [10.1007/978-3-030-19566-3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19566-3)
- Buffat, A. (2016) When and why discretion is weak or strong: The case of taxing officers in a Public Unemployment Fund. In: Hupe P. – M. Hill (eds.): *Understanding Street-level Bureaucracy*. Bristol, Policy Press, p. 79.

- Checkland, K. (2004) National Service Frameworks and UK general practitioners: Street-level bureaucrats at work? *Sociology of Health & Illness*, Vol. 26, No. 7., pp. 951–975, DOI: 10.1111/j.0141-9889.2004.00424.x
- Dubois, V. (2016) *The Bureaucrat and the Poor: Encounters in French Welfare Offices*. Abingdon (UK), Routledge
- Dunlop, C. – E. Ongaro – K. Baker (2020) Researching COVID-19: A research agenda for public policy and administration scholars, *Public Policy and Administration*, Vol. 35, No. 4., pp. 365–383, DOI: 10.1177/0952076720939631.
- Dvorak, J. (2020) Lithuanian COVID-19 lessons for public governance. In: Joyce, P. – F. Maron – P. S. Reddy (eds.): *Good Public Governance in a Global Pandemic*. Brussels, The International Institute of Administrative Sciences, pp. 329–338.
- Dvorak, J. (2021) Response of the Lithuanian municipalities to the First Wave of COVID-19. *Baltic Region*, Vol. 13, No. 1., pp. 70–88, DOI: 10.5922/2079-8555-2021-1-4
- Dvorak, J. – S. Savickaitė (2018) Psichosocialinių paslaugų personalizavimas onkologiniams ligoniams: Lietuvos ir Anglijos lyginamoji analizė. *Regional Formation and Development Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1., pp. 133–144, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15181/rfds.v23i1.1689>
- Ellis, K. (2014) Professional discretion and adult social work: Exploring its nature and scope on the front line of personalisation. *The British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 44, No. 8., pp. 2272–2289, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bct076>
- Evans, T. (2020) *Professional Discretion in Welfare Services: Beyond Street-Level Bureaucracy*. London, Routledge.
- Evans, T. – J. Harris (2004) Street-level bureaucracy, social work and the (exaggerated) death of discretion. *The British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 34, No. 6., pp. 871–895, DOI: doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bch106.
- Fontana, I. (2019) The implementation of Italian asylum policy and the recognition of protection in times of crisis: between external and internal constraints. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4., pp. 429–445, DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2019.1680027
- Giudici, D. (2020) The list. On discretion and refusal in the Italian asylum system. *European Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 23, No. 3., pp. 437–448, DOI: 10.1080/13691457.2019.1696754
- Hale, T. – A. Petherick – T. Phillips – S. Webster (2020) Variation in government responses to COVID-19. *Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper, BSG-WP-2020/031*, No. 31., pp. 24–25.
- Henderson, A. C. (2012) The critical role of street-level bureaucrats in disaster and crisis response. In: Schwester, R.W. (ed): *Handbook of Critical Incident Analysis*. New York, Routledge

- Hsiang, S. – D. Allen – S. Annan-Phan et al. (2020) The effect of large-scale anti-contagion policies on the COVID-19 pandemic. *Nature*, No. 584 (7820), pp. 262–267, DOI: 10.1038/s41586-020-2404-8
- Hupe, P. (2007) The frontline supervisor: On the study of leadership at the street-level. *Workshop 5 'Leadership and the New Public Management'*. Leading the Future of the Public Sector: The Third Transatlantic Dialogue, Newark, Delaware, USA, University of Delaware
- Hupe, P. (2013) Dimensions of discretion: Specifying the object of street-level bureaucracy research. *Der Moderne Staat–Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management*, Vol. 6, No. 2., pp. 425–440.
- Hupe, P. – A. Buffat (2014) A public service gap: Capturing contexts in a comparative approach of street-level bureaucracy. *Public Management Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4., pp. 548–569, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.854401
- Lipsky, M. (1980) *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, New York, Sage
- Lipsky, M. (2010) *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service*. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 14–15.
- Maynard-Moody, S. W. – M. Musheno (2003) *Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service*. Michigan, University of Michigan Press
- Pivoras, S. – R. Civinskas – E. Buckienė – M. Kaselis (2016) The Role of Administrative Identities in Assuring Accountability of Street-Level Bureaucracies to Citizens: Case of two Lithuanian Agencies. Conference paper: EGPA Annual Conference, August 2016, Utrecht, NL. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316621260_The_Role_of_Administrative_Identities_in_Assuring_Accountability_of_Street-Level_Bureaucracies_to_Citizens_Case_of_two_Lithuanian_Agencies
- Pivoras, S. – N. Gončiarova (2017) Valstybės tarnautojų profesinė diskrecija aptarnaujant valstybinės įdarbinimo tarpininkavimo agentūros klientus: Lietuvos darbo biržos atvejis. [Professional Discretion of Civil Servants in Serving the Customers of Public Employment Intermediation Agency: The Case of Lithuanian Labour Exchange.] *Viešoji Politika ir Administravimas*, Vol. 16, No. 3., pp. 424–437, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.16.3.19340>
- Pivoras, S. – M. Kaselis (2019) The impact of client status on street-level bureaucrats' identity and informal accountability, *Public Integrity*, Vol. 21, No. 2., pp. 182–194, DOI: doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2018.1433424
- Ponnert, L. – K. Svensson (2016) Standardisation—the end of professional discretion? *European Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 19, No. 3–4., pp. 586–599 DOI: 10.1080/13691457.2015.1074551

- Raaphorst, N. (2018) How to prove, how to interpret and what to do? Uncertainty experiences of street-level tax officials. *Public Management Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4., pp. 485–502, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2017.1299199
- Raaphorst, N. – S. Groeneveld (2019) Discrimination and representation in street-level bureaucracies. In: Hupe, P. (ed.) *Research Handbook on Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 116–127
- Raš, K. (2020) The Baltic States and COVID-19, *PISM Bulletin*, No. 96, pp. 1–2.
- Scourfield, P. (2015) Even further beyond street-level bureaucracy: The dispersal of discretion exercised in decisions made in older people's care home reviews. *The British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 45, No. 3., pp. 914–931, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bct175>
- Sigling, F. (2020) 'Mutatio Sub Pressura': An exploration of the youth policy response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Germany. *Journal of Social Policy*, July, 2020, pp. 1–19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000392>
- Small, M. L. (2006) Neighborhood institutions as resource brokers: Childcare centers, interorganizational ties, and resource access among the poor. *Social Problems*, Vol. 53, No. 2., pp. 274–292, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2006.53.2.274>
- Sowa, J. E. – S. Selden (2003) Administrative discretion and active representation: An expansion of the theory of representative bureaucracy. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 63, No. 6., pp.700–710, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00333>
- Spitzmueller, M. C. (2014) *The Making of Community Mental Health Policy in Everyday Street-Level Practice: An Organizational Ethnography*. Chicago, The University of Chicago. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, UMI: 3615678.
- Trappenburg, M. – T. Kampen – E. Tonkens (2020) Social workers in a modernising welfare state: professionals or street-level bureaucrats?. *The British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 50, No. 6., pp. 1669–1687, <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcz120>
- Tummers, L.G. – V.J. Bekkers – E. Vink – M. Musheno (2015) Coping during public service delivery: A conceptualization and systematic review of the literature. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 25, No. 4., pp. 1099–1126, DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muu056
- Tummers, L.G. – V.J. Bekkers (2014) Policy implementation, street-level bureaucracy, and the importance of discretion. *Public Management Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4., pp. 527–547, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.841978
- Turrini, A. – D. Cristofoli – G. Valotti (2020) Sense or sensibility? Different approaches to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 50, No. 6–7., pp. 746–752, DOI: 10.1177/0275074020942427

- Van Bavel, J. J. – K. Baicker – P. S. Boggio et al. (2020) Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response. *Nature Human Behaviour*, No. 4., pp. 460–471, DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z
- Van Engen, N. – B. Steijn – L. Tummers (2019) Do consistent government policies lead to greater meaningfulness and legitimacy on the front line? *Public Administration*, Vol. 97, No. 1., pp. 97–115, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12570>
- Virtanen, P. – I. Laitinen – J. Stenvall (2018) Street-level bureaucrats as strategy shapers in social and health service delivery: Empirical evidence from six countries, *International Social Work*, Vol. 61, No. 5., pp. 724–737, DOI: doi.org/10.1177/0020872816660602
- Watkins-Hayes, C. (2009) *The New Welfare Bureaucrats: Entanglements of Race, Class, and Policy Reform*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 187.
- Weible, C. M. – D. Nohrstedt – P. Cairney – D. P. Carter – D. A. Crow – A. P. Durnová – T. Heikkilä – K. Ingold – A. McConnell – D. Stone (2020) COVID-19 and the policy sciences: initial reactions and perspectives. *Policy Sciences*, No. 53., pp. 225–241, DOI: 10.1007/s11077-020-09381-4

CAREER TYPES AND CAREER SATISFACTION AMONG SOCIOLOGY DOCTORAL GRADUATES OF CORVINUS UNIVERSITY

BOGLÁRKA HERKE – KITTI KUTROVÁTZ – VERONIKA PAKSI – ÉVA IVONY¹

ABSTRACT: *The academic profession has significantly transformed in the past few decades due to the industrialization of higher education and research. Based on sixteen career path interviews, the study investigates how the career paths of sociology doctoral graduates who obtained their master's or PhD degree at Corvinus University of Budapest have been formed within this changing environment of the academic profession. The study distinguishes four researcher career path types and describes attached job characteristics and career satisfaction. Hungarian and international academic researchers have spent most of their careers at Hungarian or renowned foreign universities. Hungarian academic researchers performed a high volume of teaching, while international academic researchers primarily focused on research. The career paths of market researchers were formed by their positions at research firms, where they were involved in applied research projects. Researchers of the mixed career type alternated between the different sectors throughout their career paths that led to dissatisfaction with their careers. Interviewees of the other three types were generally satisfied with their careers, however, the reconciliation of teaching, research and organizational tasks in the case of Hungarian academic researchers, the measurement of publication performance against Western scholars regarding international academic researchers, and the choice between academic and market activities among market researchers all emerged as sources of frustration in the narratives.*

KEYWORDS: *professionals, academic profession, sociology, researcher career paths*

¹ *Boglárka Herke* is Junior Research Fellow at Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, email: boglarka.herke@gmail.com; *Kitti Kutrováztz* is Research Fellow at MTA-BCE Social Epidemiology Research Group, email: kitti.kutrovatz@gmail.com; *Veronika Paksi* is Junior Research Fellow at Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, email: Paksi.Veronika@tk.mta.hu; *Éva Ivony, PhD* is Associate Professor, Department of Social Work, Theological College of Veszprém, email: evaivony@gmail.com. Research supported by the 'From Talent to Young Researcher. Project aimed at activities supporting the research career model in higher education' (identifier EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007), co-supported by the European Union, Hungary and the European Social Fund.

INTRODUCTION²

The academic profession has significantly transformed in the past few decades due to the industrialization of higher education and research (Gumport 2000; Musselin 2008). On the one hand, research funding is increasingly based on personal publication performance, its objective evaluation, and international embeddedness (Evetts 2014; Harley et al. 2004; Musselin 2008). On the other hand, the career paths of researchers have become more uncertain due to the rising number of fixed- and short-term, as well as project-specific contracts that encourage doctoral graduates to build their careers outside the academic sphere (OECD 2012; ESF-Science Connect 2017). Differences can also be observed in the attitudes of academic generations. Younger researchers who were socialized under the new system consider the rules of the transformed academic profession to be clear: they are more motivated to publish in international journals, to build cross-border professional relationships, and to obtain funding for their research. In contrast, older researchers are often more satisfied with their embeddedness in science at a national level and have a greater interest in educational tasks (Kwiek 2015).

Opinions regarding the aim and utility of a profession can also differ among researchers. In sociology – similarly to in other disciplines – the type of research and the sector of employment are also important markers of career paths, and can be sources of professional conflict. In the US, academic sociologists tend to ignore professionals working in practice as they believe that applied sociology lessens the prestige of the profession (Spalter-Roth 2007). Meanwhile, public sociologists, who attach great importance to the dialogue between the public and scholars, often accuse professional academic sociologists of testing only narrow hypotheses and using overcomplicated academic language that is understandable only to professionals (Berger 2002; Patterson 2002). Finally, policy sociology is located between public and professional sociologies, embodying the world of applied research, where sociologists work on demand (Burawoy 2005).

In this study, we investigate how the career paths of sociology doctoral graduates who obtained their master's or PhD degree at Corvinus University of Budapest (CUB) have been formed within this changing environment of the academic profession. Based on sixteen career path interviews, we explore different career paths/types of researchers, attached job characteristics, and graduates' evaluations of their own careers. We focus on researcher careers, as in line with previous international and Hungarian findings (ESF-Science

2 The authors are grateful to Professor György Lengyel, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of the journal for their helpful comments and feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Connect 2017; Inzelt–Csonka 2018), the results of the career track survey of CUB from 2018 show that around seventy percent of social science doctoral graduates work at universities or research institutes. The rest of them work for the government or in the business sector in equal proportions.

In the following, we first introduce previous investigations into research careers, then briefly review the methodological background of our research. Afterwards, we move further to the results, distinguish four different types of research career paths (*Hungarian academic, international academic, market, and mixed*), and describe their main features based on their major stages, individual positions obtained as teachers, researchers, and at the managerial level, work-life balance, and evaluations of career paths and future aspirations. We conclude our study with a summary.

TYPES OF RESEARCH CAREERS

Relatively few empirical studies have investigated not only the start of a career in science (e.g. Fox–Stephan 2001; Lindholm 2004), or career transition (e.g. Barabasch–Merrill 2014; Mulvey 2014), but the entire research career. Below, we present related findings of an international (Angervall–Gustafsson 2014) and two Hungarian studies (Inzelt–Csonka 2018; Pálincó 2010).

Angervall and Gustafsson (2014) identified two career types of young researchers working in the field of educational sciences using semi-structured interviews: namely, successful researchers, as well as responsible and supportive researchers. Successful researchers build high-level research careers due to a conscious process of construction and associated institutional support, and have international publications. In addition to research, they teach and conduct advisory, review-, and opponent-based activity, but their researcher identity is more prominent. Responsible and supportive researchers, on the other hand, are characterized by their working as teachers or social workers prior to graduation, while after graduation they become employed in higher education. They are usually dissatisfied with their research careers, are excluded from professional networks, have no institutional support, and have no time for research alongside teaching, while academic career advancement is closed to them. These results confirm previous findings about the gradual differentiation of the less active researcher role with a greater educational burden, and the active researcher role (Harley et al. 2004; Musselin 2008).

Pálincó (2010) distinguished four ideal types of research careers based on semi-structured and narrative focus group interviews with biologist researchers.

Automatic job receivers immediately get a job in a Hungarian academic research facility or at a university after completing their PhD, and measure their scientific performance against their Hungarian colleagues. The second type includes those *going abroad*. They find employment in the international academic sphere immediately after graduation. They have high professional expectations, are particularly interested in research jobs, and measure their performance against international colleagues. Those *distant from research* constitute the third group. These individuals do not get appropriate researcher status after returning from abroad, so they work in middle-management positions in the industrial sphere. They later move away from a research career. *Survivors* have to wait for the right job, as vacant researcher positions are not available for them after obtaining a PhD degree. They try to get through this transitional period in a compromised academic position.

Inzelt and Csonka (2018) investigated the career paths of PhD holders in the field of social sciences and humanities based on administrative data, interviews, and an online survey. In addition to the two main internationally accepted career path types (working inside and outside the academic sphere), they identified four subtypes they called “career mobility schemes,” “pre-doctoral job keepers,” “post-doctoral job keepers,” “intra-sector job changers,” and “cross-sector job changers.”

In our study, we rely on these earlier typologies, but we distinguish career path types based on our empirical data. In the following, we describe our method of analysis in detail.

DATA AND METHODS

Our qualitative research was part of a broader project initiated by Corvinus University of Budapest conducted in the spring of 2018. First, a survey was sent out to graduates of all doctoral schools of the institute to track their careers. Second, at the Sociology Doctoral School, we complemented this quantitative research with interviews in order to better understand the formation of the career paths of sociologist PhD graduates who work as researchers.

We conducted sixteen career path interviews. Most of the interviewees obtained their PhD degree at CUB (or at one of its predecessor institutes), but the sample also contained two sociologists who did their master’s studies at CUB but obtained their PhD at a non-Hungarian university. They were added to the sample to help map the career formation of those former students who had selected a non-Hungarian doctoral school for their studies. In addition,

there was one interviewee who finished her university studies at CUB before the introduction of the new doctoral training system in the 1990s, and who obtained a candidate of sciences degree under the old system at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Having CUB as an alma mater, either regarding master's or PhD studies, however, was a common characteristic of the interviewees. Furthermore, as sociology could be studied only as a specialization of training in economics at this university until the 2000s, most of the interviewees had obtained a joint master's degree in economics and sociology.

All sociologists were partially or fully engaged in a research career. Those who were very detached from research and were pursuing careers in the government or business sector (such as politicians or analysts, etc.) were not part of the target group, as the aim of the research was to explore researchers' careers. The interviewees were selected through a targeted stratified sampling procedure to cover the core population in terms of gender, age, geographical location (capital and city-rural region), and workplace. The sample included nine men and seven women. Most of them were in their mid-forties, four were in their fifties, while the two oldest interviewees were between 60 and 70 years old. Most of the interviewees had a family. Everyone worked in Budapest, except for two interviewees who periodically commuted from the countryside to Budapest. One interviewee was retired.

We conducted career path interviews that mainly relied on the narratives of the interviewees but we also asked questions tailored to our pre-established research goals. For the analysis, we used the narrative analysis method (Remmik et al. 2013): we read the interviews several times to identify common and unique elements of career paths. The stories told during the interviews were arranged in chronological order. Then, from the perspective of the narrator, we explored the interviewee's career report and supplemented it with data from biographical documents (CVs) as well as using our own knowledge (based on the interviewer-interviewee relationship) (Merrill–West 2009).

Similar to earlier career path research (Angervall–Gustafsson 2014; Pálinkó 2010), different career types were identified by comparing narratives. The types thus distinguished are based on our empirical data, do not represent pure ideal types, and may not be generalized to all sociologists with a PhD degree. These types rather indicate potential career paths for researchers in this field.

RESULTS: RESEARCH CAREER TYPES AMONG SOCIOLOGY DOCTORAL GRADUATES

The most important distinguishing aspects were sectoral location (academic or market sphere), movement between the sectors, and attachment to Hungary. Our types, therefore, not only help map mobility paths between sectors, as in the study of Inzelt and Csonka (2018), but similar to Pálinkó's (2010) study also take into account attachment to Hungary.

The four identified career paths are (1) *Hungarian academic*, (2) *international academic*, (3) *market*, and (4) *mixed research careers*. In the following, we will provide a detailed overview of these career paths based on their major stages, individual positions obtained as teachers, researchers, or at the managerial level and their reconciliation, work-life balance, and an evaluation of career paths and future aspirations.

As most of the interviewees had a joint master's degree in economics and sociology, or a master's degree in economics, we also describe the role of having a degree in economics in the formation of sociologist researcher career paths. Furthermore, we highlight the gender of the interviewees, as – in line with previous literature (Allard et al. 2011; Knudsen 2009; Paksi et al. 2016; Wattis–James 2013) – we found that work-life balance varied in the career paths of the two genders. Finally, we also mention some other socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. generation, and social position), insofar as we found that these factors played a role in the formation of the career paths.

Hungarian academic career

The *Hungarian academic career* was the first and most unambiguous career path. Individuals with this type of career started working in research and/or teaching positions in a Hungarian higher education or academic institution relatively soon after graduation. A common feature of the latter involved combining research, teaching, and managerial/organizational roles. These different roles were present in varying intensities throughout the careers of such individuals. These career paths can be described as taking advantage of opportunities rather than conscious career building. Although shorter experiences abroad, international projects, and relationships appeared in the career paths, the embeddedness of this type into domestic professional networks was stronger. All six interviewees in this group had either a joint master's degree in economics and sociology, or a degree in economics, and five of them were women. At the time of the interviews, four interviewees were associate

professors and two of them were professors. One of them had a second part-time job as a senior research fellow at an academic research institute.

As stated above, different roles – researchers, educators, and managers – were fulfilled in parallel, and the interviewees achieved success in all areas. On the one hand, the latter mentioned that research and education fit together well and complement each other. For example, courses could often be tailored to specific research projects. On the other hand, interviewees also highlighted that teaching and especially related organizational tasks took time from research. For this reason, it was not uncommon that one area or another appeared more prominently in their career paths.

Generational differences also appeared in relation to the researcher-educator identity. Publishing was the primary activity and the basis of success from the beginning of the careers of the youngest representatives of this career path type. Members of the older generation, on the other hand, pointed out that having a conscious career-building or publishing strategy was less of a requirement for them.

The duality of teaching and research was also a challenge in terms of Hungarian embeddedness. The prestige of the two professions has depended on and changed according to the social and historical context. The following quote highlights this issue and the teaching-related burden:

(...) and then I was dreaming again about how great it would be to get into the Academy.³ I declined it because I thought that going to the Academy was for losers, but in the meantime I realized that there was no cooler job than the Academy, because you can receive the same basic salary as at the university, but there are no students there. (Interviewee 8, Male)

The interviewees struggled with another duality – namely, the reconciliation of work and private life. This was mainly mentioned by interviewees who had small children at the time of graduating and starting their careers. Parents reported difficulties balancing the different areas and they usually pushed research tasks to the background.

Also connected to having children is the fact that many interviewees emphasized the importance of flexible and home-based work. A quote from a mother of four children summarizes the benefits of working as a researcher:

3 Hungarian Academy of Sciences

How can it be reconciled?... well, it is very hard, it takes a lot of organization... but if I had not started working in the university sphere but instead had gone into the market sphere, then I would surely have been in a decision situation about whether to choose family or work. (Interviewee 15, Female)

Flexible working, however, was perceived as a disadvantage as well, due to “endless work.” One interviewee, for example, was forced to take one year of unpaid leave because she had become exhausted from the huge amount of work involved in having a senior leading position at a university.

Researchers with this career path type had a very mixed view of their careers. First, some of them were satisfied with their development so far. They mentioned external determinants, especially a supportive and inspirational environment, and good co-operation at their workplaces. Only one interviewee highlighted the importance of her own merits, and structured and disciplined work. She also considered her career to be unique because of her ‘advocacy’ activities. It is a characteristic of this type of career path that individuals measured their success using far fewer objective measures of scientific performance. Second, other interviewees of this type clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with their research careers. They mentioned that they had not achieved their goals as researchers, and maybe they should have decided differently in the past and built their careers more consciously. Most noticeable was the dissatisfaction of an interviewee who had not had time or energy to build her research career because of her high level position at a university.

We used to say that nobody would ever thank me in this life, because everyone will calculate how many publications I have, what research I have done, how much money that is worth, etc. But how the university faculty was built, or how international training was started, how faculty marketing was strengthened, what programs were created within this dean’s cycle, we might notice them, but in the end, everyone else will say ‘all right, and what about publications?’ (...)
(Interviewee 16, Female)

Some of the interviewees also reported on the positive effects of having a degree in economics on their research career as sociologists. For instance, one of them found it beneficial that she could combine economic and sociological knowledge in her research, while another researcher highlighted the high prestige of the degree in economics that had helped him to gain recognition when working together with economists.

Regarding professional aspirations and plans, members of this group most often formulated medium-term research plans, such as wishing to complete an ongoing project or to explore a new research topic. Depending on in which area they felt they were weaker, they planned to reinforce their identity either as lecturer or researcher. There was a need for career advancement in both areas – interviewees aimed to habilitate and obtain the title of Doctor of Science. Only one researcher stated that they aimed to make a lasting contribution to science and to obtain international recognition. In one case, the idea of going abroad arose.

International academic career

Researchers with an *international academic career type* were internationally mobile even during the time of their university and PhD studies, and their interest in sociology was identified and reinforced by both Hungarian and international teachers. Receiving one or more scholarships from prestigious American or European universities, they partly or completely pursued their PhDs abroad. Their professional careers were much more consciously planned than the careers of *Hungarian academic researchers*. All three researchers belonging to this group were men in their forties, and all had a joint master's degree in economics and sociology. At the time of the interviews, all of them had returned to Hungary and were working as associate professors at universities in Hungary, and one of them also had a position as a senior research fellow at an academic research institute.

Their career paths were characterized by conscious planning, but in their case we also encountered some decisive decision-making situations. These included whether to take up a position in the government sector as an economist, which would have meant better financial conditions, or whether to follow their original professional interest as a researcher. One of them described his dilemma as follows:

I asked myself, how would I make a living out of this? I have a degree in economics, and all of my former classmates here quickly found themselves in important positions while earning more money, and here I am now – anxious to decide whether to read the files here... or to do what I am interested in, but who knows if I will ever make a living out of it.
(Interviewee 5, Male)

Professional networks played an important role in each interviewee's career: apart from their strong motivation and excellent achievements, cooperation between institutes, individual college contacts, and their international publications and conference attendances created international opportunities, which built upon each other. Their networks helped them to get positions at Western European or American universities.

Actually, these two fellowship periods allowed me to finish a couple of PhD articles, and in the meantime I was asked if I could apply for a postdoc, so they actually created an application for me. (Interviewee 13, Male)

However, even international experience did not automatically guarantee a job, either in Hungary or abroad. The following interview quote highlights the relevance of opportunities and luck as a factor:

I think it was an eternal question at that time, so even as a graduate PhD it was still so uncertain whether one could find a job. Jobs were not just given to anyone in Hungary either, so it was really fortunate that there was a job here just then. But then there were 7-8 years when there was no opportunity to employ a new person at the department, and a generation gap was thus created (...). It is quite incidental when job opportunities are available, and a lot of things depend on the European market too. In hindsight, postdoc jobs are there, you just have to find them. (Interviewee 13, Male)

All of the interviewees maintained their international relationships, and their work in Hungary has linked them to the international scene ever since. Many had chosen an area or approach to a PhD topic that was well suited not only to particular sociologies, but also to other disciplines and areas, especially abroad. They maintained their research topics throughout their careers, and they mostly worked with foreign professionals, while their domestic network was less extensive. The latter derived not only from their orientation but also from the marginal position of their topic or preferred methodology in Hungary. At the same time, they strove for domestic professional integration as well.

While each researcher undertook teaching tasks, they all preferred research. Those with more research tasks coordinated the two fields quite easily. Teaching appeared to be a constraint in one interviewee's life – he did not consider himself a good teacher, and did not like teaching as such. However, a certain attachment to education could be identified when he said that he regretted that he had

not been able to teach subjects related to his specialty in Hungary, because – despite his international experience – those subjects were taught by more senior teachers in Hungary. A researcher who took a more active educational role found it difficult to reconcile his tasks with research. Meanwhile, he had strived to achieve balance because he found it important to train students and monitor their careers. Nevertheless, these professionals in our sample were forced to choose between the two tasks at a later career stage because Hungarian or European research grants had defined the time available for the two activities. These choices, however, were mostly welcomed by the interviewees, since they preferred research over teaching.

All *international academic researchers* were married, their spouses worked in the same profession, and they had children. Reconciling work and private life was not a challenge for the interviewees after returning to Hungary. They all utilized the flexible working conditions and family-friendly environments of universities and research institutions. However, when working abroad, the birth and education of their children were key issues in their work-life balance. *International academic researchers'* professional life events were subordinated to the anticipated time of birth of children – for example, interviewees had delayed scholarships because they wanted their children to be born in Hungary, or they had wanted to seize the opportunity to get more experience abroad before the planned arrival of their next child. Regarding their wives' career paths, those were almost entirely subordinated to husbands' professional careers. In contrast to the situation in Hungary, wages in Western Europe made it possible to have a single-income household. Two wives of interviewees were also educators and researchers, although they played the role of housewives abroad. However, reasons for returning home included not only the schooling of children but starting or continuing wives' careers.

Researchers in this group were fundamentally satisfied with their careers. Despite this, they measured their performance against that of members of the international research community, thus their career evaluation led to discrepancies. One of them measured success in terms of publications, and was dissatisfied with the result: “it is very difficult to achieve from here on the periphery” (Interviewee 10, Male). It was common that *international academic researchers* could not plan their careers for the long term. Their plans included publishing more research findings, obtaining the title of Doctor of Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, implementing numerous research ideas, participating in further international projects, and – in one case – searching for a new position abroad.

Market research career

In relation to the career paths of *market researchers*, an applied research profile was dominant, but researchers of this type were also associated with the academic sphere in numerous ways. Working in the market sphere was determined by the availability of a job at an early stage of their professional careers. The latter worked for a long time at the same company or research institute, where they could deal with areas that coincided with their professional interests. Three of the four interviewees in this group were men, and all of them either had a joint master's degree in economics and sociology, or a degree in economics. At the time of the interviews, all of them were working at private research institutes / international organizations, while at earlier phases of their careers some of them worked at government research institutes or market companies that were not specialized in research.

Due to their duties and responsibilities at work, doctoral studies were usually not started immediately after graduating. These interviewees already had significant professional experience at enrolment, which was considered an advantage in meeting requirements. They were much more aware of their research preferences and could better synthesize the knowledge they accumulated during their education. One of them explained the situation as follows:

And now it was good, both when I graduated and after that, to have hands-on experience, and I had already seen how organizations work, how diplomacy works, and so on. So that I had been in contact with quite a few stakeholders to see scientific theories through a kind of practical prism in that sense. (Interviewee 12, Male)

The choice of doctoral topic was influenced by the tasks and research topics completed at the workplace, so besides supervisors, colleagues and superiors were also often mentioned as an intellectual influence. These interviewees not only used the experience they obtained at the workplace, but also used data available there to write their dissertations.

They remained in the market sphere after completing their PhDs, and most of them also remained at the same companies. As a result, they did not think that obtaining a doctorate had made a significant difference in their professional careers, but they rather considered it a formal title that would allow them to return to the academic sphere if needed.

Although they sought a link to the academic sphere, their perception of the academic environment was varied. On the one hand, we identified a kind of

separation from formal science. In this respect, the interviewees criticized the fact that the Hungarian scientific profession appreciates texts that are formulated in a more complicated way, which makes the understanding of findings difficult for the public. They also complained that in many cases formality is considered a more important aspect than content. All of this highlights the difference in the target audience: *market researchers* make materials primarily for non-professionals, therefore public comprehensibility is much more important in their work. One of them criticized formal science as follows:

Correct spelling rules and literary references are almost more important than having some sense of what they are describing. (...) If I write a study, I get it back with comments that it has a tabloid smell (...), the more boring it is, the more 'scientific' it is. (Interviewee 1, Female)

On the other hand, a need to return to the academic world was also perceived, so some interviewees were trying to suppress their market-related activities and increase their scientific activity as much as possible. For some of them, teaching was the first step in returning to the academic community. They, however, also gave university lectures because the courses were closely related to their research activities or to a field that was prominently a part of their careers. Interviewees of the *market researcher type* were also tied to the formal scientific community in other ways, as even non-educators were regularly asked to review scientific papers, and they often published in scientific journals.

Most interviewees in this group had also had leadership roles at some stage of their career path. Some of them had even started their own businesses, where they carried on their previous activities according to their individual preferences. In their case, entrepreneurial insecurity often appeared to be characteristic of their career paths. For instance, they highlighted their unpredictable monthly income, unlike that associated with a teaching career. Leadership tasks, furthermore, resulted in less time for teaching and research, but also for private life.

Starting doctoral studies at a later age also caused difficulties regarding the reconciliation of work and family life, as many of them already had children while completing their studies. One of the interviewees explained that in order to write her dissertation while working, she had to relegate her private life to the background, which created a very difficult time for the family.

Market researchers were generally satisfied with their careers and considered work in the private sector as a positive thing, as they could learn about applied research. One of them highlighted its advantages as follows:

It is an attraction in the sense that it is much more important for applied research that it is not the researcher who is asking the question, but the researcher's client, and then it is the researcher's responsibility to answer the research question in a suitably chosen way. The client can be the state administration, one of the ministries, and in many cases is the private sector and international organizations. (Interviewee 11, Male)

The advantage of having a degree in economics was also mentioned regarding market activities. For instance, one interviewee explained that economic knowledge had helped her with leadership tasks. Furthermore, another interviewee emphasized that sociology and economics could hardly be separated in practice, and because he used these two kinds of knowledge together in his work, it created a much broader perspective for him compared to his economist colleagues.

However, frustration also emerged during the interviews, some of which was related to the market-related activities of the interviewees. For example, the latter mentioned the lack of state support – namely, that their private companies were conducting the type of research that should be the responsibility of the state. On the other hand, there was a feeling of something lacking in connection with the careers of researchers who sought to return to formal science. They said that they would be way ahead in their scientific career if they had made a different decision at the start. Nonetheless, they did not regret their earlier decisions, and instead were focused on their plans. Some of them identified plans related to their company, such as stabilizing returns, or developing the methodological apparatus. Other interviewees planned to write books and high-quality publications, as well as strengthen their international connections.

Mixed research career

Unlike researchers of the *international academic* type, the careers of *mixed researchers* were characterized by slow career advancement, and full-time, peripheral jobs that lacked professional embeddedness, resulting in a constant sense of frustration. Two interviewees in this group were men, and one was a woman. Two interviewees had a master's degree in sociology, and one had a master's in economics. Moreover, two of them had an additional master's degree in another discipline. At the time of the interviews, one of them was taking a one-year period of unpaid leave from a research position at a university; another interviewee worked at a market research company, while the third interviewee was a retired associate professor.

The development of the interviewees' professional careers was primarily characterized by late or ad hoc specialization and the lengthy acquisition of doctoral degrees. Their primary choice of profession either involved a sudden decision or a different discipline, and was motivated in some cases by their family milieu and values, or even caused by a breakup with the latter, while in other cases it was due to the effects of the political system change. Based on their narratives, the rapid socio-economic transformation in the 1990s brought about by the regime change did not allow them to acquire those additional skills that enabled students from the upper-middle class and higher social groups to pursue a barrier-free, smoother research career. Their decisions regarding their studies, therefore, were not made as a result of conscious career-building. After obtaining a first university degree, their career progression was determined by the completion of a second degree, family formation, and independence after graduation. The interviewees did not work or worked only for a short period in the field of their first degree, and were able to enter the labor market in other specialties. Their full-time jobs supported them by providing an existence, but the lack of time for studying significantly limited the circumstances of their late specialization, leaving them with little time to become familiar with the new field of science (sociology). One interviewee summarized this issue in relation to obtaining a PhD while holding down a full-time job outside of academia:

... So, my difficulty was that the work I had at that time was not about my research, so my research – but that was [also] already the case with my doctorate and PhD – was not related to my actual job. So, if I had had some kind of status at the Institute, I would probably have written my dissertation much more easily. But first I had to earn some money, and then, quasi in my free time, I did the research from which I wrote my dissertation. (...) ... So there was this kind of duality because this was not my main topic at my main job... .
(Interviewee 6, Female)

Researchers of this type, therefore, took a long time between obtaining a master's degree and their doctorate – in most cases, this took 20 years. In the case of one interviewee, for whom sociology was the primary field of study, it took 10 years to complete a PhD, but this was accompanied by commitment to a research topic and a high degree of personal motivation. In other cases, obtaining a doctoral degree was motivated primarily by work obligations and not by individual interests, as the following quote highlights:

I did the doctorate because it was my job obligation. Otherwise, I would never have done it. I could have published without it. I did also publish. My books were published. (...) so I started my doctorate in 1998. In 1998, they told me to either obtain a doctorate or go away... so I said I would do it. (...) I wanted to close this research area... it was not a start for me, it was rather a closure. (Interviewee 7, Male)

Another characteristic of the *mixed career path* was a minimal or total lack of professional embeddedness. Several factors influenced the development of a professional network. For instance, one of the interviewees was not integrated into the research projects of the alma mater institution during his university years, nor did his research topic fit into the scientific workshops of the university. He was only involved in another university's doctoral program. For another interviewee, obligations at work (namely, preparation for research projects in different topics) did not provide an opportunity for further study in the latter's research field. Therefore, she was not able to achieve more with her research, appear at national or international conferences, or participate in workshops of international research groups.

Interviewees with this career path perceived that the factor they described as a "negative institutional environment" had played a significant role in their having a marginalized researcher career path. On the other hand, the *mixed research career* alone did not hinder the publishing activity of any of these researchers – all of them had published studies in scientific journals, and had either co-authored or single-authored books. Their activity, however, can be said to be irregular both in terms of topic and frequency.

Over the past decade, a lack of further development in their field of research, a peripheral research topic, a non-specialist workplace, and a lack of professional embeddedness have caused cumulative disadvantages for researchers of this type. Their knowledge in the field of science and the doctoral training, however, made it possible for them to take advantage of opportunities that arose in different spheres. They alternated between the market sphere, university research projects, politics, or the public sphere, resulting in a "drifting" career path. Unlike interviewees of the other types, two researchers of the mixed type did not have a degree in economics, therefore they could not rely on that knowledge. The lack of expansion of their research area, its peripheral nature, and workplace failures all led the interviewees to experience a periodic or a constant sense of frustration and a sense of distance from their profession and academic career. The following quote is a good example of this feeling:

... So, I was left out everywhere, I have to say. I have not become a researcher because I didn't want to [i.e. this was not the reason] – I really wanted to be a researcher, but I haven't really had the opportunity (...) to this day, I'm still waiting for this big opportunity. I practically graduated in 2006 and have been on hold since then. (Interviewee 2, Male)

In one case, abandonment of the profession was also mentioned. Another interviewee took up employment at a higher education institution after finalizing his PhD at a later age, and worked there as an instructor until his retirement. Nevertheless, he did not consider his career to be a research career. The interviewees briefly talked about their research plans. Compared to their original doctoral topic, the new topics were either peripheral, or they were not planning to conduct any research at all.

CONCLUSION

In our study, we examined researchers' career paths, job characteristics, and career satisfaction in the field of sociology. Our research was based on the analysis of sixteen career path interviews with researchers with a PhD degree in sociology with a connection to Corvinus University of Budapest. We defined four types of career paths, which we created based on previous empirical results and elements identified during the analysis.

The first career path we identified is the *Hungarian academic*. Researchers of this type started working in research and/or teaching positions in Hungarian higher education or an academic institution relatively soon after graduation. Their careers were rather shaped by opportunities that arose, but not conscious career building. Education and the organization of education played a significant role in their careers, and research activity was less dominant. The second type is made up of *international academic researchers* who spent a significant amount of time abroad during their university years and during their PhD studies, while later they received jobs at renowned Western European or American universities, or at an international university that was based in Hungary. Their professional careers were much more consciously planned than the careers of *Hungarian academic researchers*. They also gave university lectures, although their primary professional activity was research.

These two types of academic careers (*Hungarian and international*) strongly vary according to the individuals' attachment to Hungary. Their researcher

identity, professional expectations, and especially reference groups – as in Pálinkó's (2010) classification of “automatic job receiver” and “going abroad” groups – were significantly determined by their affiliation to a Hungarian or foreign institution. In the case of our *international academic type*, the results also echo Kwiek's (2015) findings for younger Polish researchers. *International academic researchers* are also members of the younger generation who were socialized after the change of regime, and who are well-adapted to the changes and new rules of the academic profession. In addition, our *international academic researchers* are comparable to the successful researcher type identified by Angervall and Gustafsson (2014), whose research careers are dominated by conscious career-building and international publications. They received significant institutional support, while researchers of the *Hungarian academic career* type often did not have time to pursue research that would have permitted them to enter the international scientific field. Thus, the duality of the teacher-researcher role (Harley et al. 2004; Musselin 2008) was mainly manifested in the narratives of *Hungarian academic researchers*. This also raised the issue of publication pressure, and – similarly to with supportive researchers (Angervall–Gustafsson 2014) – dissatisfaction was mainly due to their lower level of publication performance. In contrast to the results of Angervall and Gustafsson (2014), however, we found that *international academic researchers* were also somehow dissatisfied with their achievements so far, which is explained by the fact that they measure their performance against that of Western researchers.

In the case of *Hungarian academic researchers*, who were mainly women in our sample, the burden of being young parents, a lack of time, and the stress of reconciling work and family life were influential factors. However, the flexible working conditions available in research positions were partially able to mitigate these difficulties. These results are consistent with previous domestic and international experience (Knudsen 2009; Paksi et al. 2016; Wattis–James 2013). Difficulties with achieving work-life balance, especially the timing of life events, also emerged in the narratives of *international academic researchers* (consisting only of men in our sample).

In relation to future plans, we found that researchers of the *international and Hungarian academic career types* primarily aimed at advancing in the scientific hierarchy. It was common to them that, given the importance of professional networks (Adams et al. 2005), neither type was satisfied with their degree of embeddedness. *Hungarian academic researchers* mainly aimed to build relationships with foreign partners, while those with stronger international ties wanted to develop their domestic professional embeddedness.

The third type we identified is the *market researcher career path*, within which an important element is the applied researcher identity. Researchers

with this career path were employed at market companies or research institutes outside the Academy. Working in the market sphere was determined by the availability of jobs at an early stage of their professional careers. Most of them were also engaged in review activities or teaching at a higher education institution, although this was limited to one or two courses per year. In general, they sought a link to the academic sphere, but in the narratives of some interviewees, we discovered a kind of separation from the formal scientific environment, which reflects the conflict between public and professional sociology (Berger 2002; Burawoy 2005; Patterson 2002). While market researchers correspond more to the policy sociologist type of Burawoy (2005), their target audience, who are usually not professionals, appears to encourage a public sociologist identity. Leadership roles were also frequent elements of this career type, therefore the issue of work-life balance mainly arose in narratives regarding the reconciliation of managerial tasks and family life. Their future objectives consisted of plans related to managership, teaching, and research.

Finally, we defined a *mixed research career path*, the most characteristic feature of which was that the material livelihood of these researchers was not supported by activity in a discipline that was their primary focus. Despite this, we defined these careers as research careers because the individuals in this group had a loose relationship with the university/academic community and their field of science. Interviewees of this type were those most likely to have experienced the uncertainties associated with the transformation of the academic profession (OECD 2012; ESF-Science Connect 2017). Their careers could not be associated with one sector or one institution, in contrast to the other three types; they alternated between the market sphere, university research projects, politics, and the public sphere and were often employed in fixed-term research projects that were not their primary scientific interest.

Similar to the *international academic type*, in the case of the *mixed career type* the effects of the change of the political system on careers could also be observed – in this case, however, the interviewees reported the negative effects of the rapid socio-economic transition. Sociologists with careers of this type did not have the opportunity to effectively overcome their disadvantages in relation to their fellow students from more advantaged social groups. The drifting career path, furthermore, was caused by factors such as late and ad hoc specialization, unconscious career building, a lack of attachment to institutions (either academic or non-academic), a low level of scientific embeddedness, and a marginal research topic. The period of late specialization also coincided with the time of family formation in the case of some of the interviewees, although work-life balance did not emerge as a major issue in the narratives

of *mixed* researchers. We heard less about future plans for the *mixed type*, although changing their current peripheral situation was a standard plan for the future.

To sum up, the changes in the academic profession were manifested in the narratives in several ways. Frustration regarding not having enough time for research due to educational and organizational tasks affected *Hungarian academic researchers*; the importance of international experience (and consequent embeddedness in international networks) was typical of *international academic researchers*; and the uncertainties of having project-specific contracts experienced by *mixed* researchers are all associated with these changes. These changes were less salient in the career paths of *market researchers*, who mainly worked outside the academic sphere. *Market researchers* were also those individuals who typically experienced the advantages of having a degree in economics and sociology, as they could combine these two kinds of knowledge in both market activities and research.

The four career types distinguished here are based on a small sample narrowed down to one university, thus limiting the transferability of results. Our interview partners, however, were probably socialized in more or less the same professional environment as their cohort and colleagues in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, where the management of science involves many similarities due to the common social-historical development of these ex-state-socialist countries. Further studies might extend the investigation to the regional level, and compare sociologists' career paths on a country basis.

REFERENCES

- Adams, J. D. – G. C. Black, J. – R. Clemmons – P. E. Stephan (2005) Scientific teams and institutional collaborations: Evidence from U.S. universities, 1981–1999. *Research Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 3., pp. 259–285, DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2005.01.014.
- Allard, K. – L. Haas – C. Ph. Hwang (2011) Family-supportive organizational culture and fathers' experiences of work-family conflict in Sweden. *Gender, Work & Organization*, Vol. 18, No. 2., pp. 141–157, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0432.2010.00540.x
- Angervall, P. – J. Gustafsson (2014) The making of careers in academia: Split career movements in education science. *European Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 6., pp. 601–615, DOI: 10.2304/eerj.2014.13.6.601

- Barabasch, A. – B. Merrill (2014) Cross-cultural approaches to biographical interviews: Looking at career transitions and lifelong learning. *Research in Comparative and International Education*, Vol. 9, No. 3., pp. 287–300, DOI: 10.2304/rcie.2014.9.3.287
- Berger, P. L. (2002) Whatever happened to sociology? *First Things*, October 2002, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/10/whatever-happened-to-sociology> [Last access: 07 07 2020]
- Baraway, M. (2005) For public sociology. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1., pp. 4–28, DOI: 10.1177/000312240507000102
- ESF-Science Connect (2017) *Career Tracking Survey of Doctorate Holders*. Project Report. Strasbourg, European Science Foundation – Science Connect, http://www.esf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/esf/F-FINAL-Career_Tracking_Survey_2017__Project_Report.pdf [Last access: 01 23 2020]
- Evetts, J. (2014) The Concept of Professionalism: Professional Work, Professional Practice and Learning. In: Billett, S. – Ch. Harteis – H. Gruber (eds.): *International Handbook of Research in Professional and Practice-Based Learning*. Dordrecht, Springer, Netherlands, pp. 29–56, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-8902-8_2
- Fox, M. F. – P. E. Stephan (2001) Careers of young scientists: Preferences, prospects and realities by gender and field. *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 31, No. 1., pp. 109–22, DOI: 10.1177/030631201031001006.
- Gumport, P. J. (2000) Academic restructuring: Organizational change and institutional imperatives. *Higher Education*, Vol. 39, No. 1., pp. 67–91, DOI: 10.1023/A:1003859026301
- Harley, S. – M. Muller-Camen – A. Collin (2004) From academic communities to managed organisations: The implications for academic careers in UK and German universities. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, Vol. 64, No. 2., pp. 329–345, DOI: 10.1016/j.jvb.2002.09.003
- Inzelt, A. – L. Csonka (2018) A PhD-fokozatot szerzettek karrierje a társadalom- és humán tudományokban. *Educatio*, Vol. 27, No. 1., pp. 30–45, DOI: 10.1556/2063.27.2018.1.3
- Knudsen, K. (2009) Striking a different balance: Work-family conflict for female and male managers in a Scandinavian context. *Gender in Management: An International Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 4., pp. 252–269, DOI: 10.1108/17542410910961541
- Kwiek, M. (2015) Academic generations and academic work: Patterns of attitudes, behaviors, and research productivity of Polish academics after 1989. *Studies in Higher Education*, Vol. 40, No. 8., pp. 1354–76, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2015.1060706

- Lindholm, J. A. (2004) Pathways to the professoriate: The role of self, others, and environment in shaping academic career aspirations. *The Journal of Higher Education*, Vol. 75, No. 6., pp. 603–635, DOI: 10.1080/00221546.2004.11773579
- Merrill, B. – L. West (2009) *Using Biographical Methods In Social Research*. London, SAGE Publications, Ltd. DOI: 10.4135/9780857028990
- Mulvey, R. (2014) ‘While I’m retraining, I get the full whack’: Illuminating narratives of career change. *Research in Comparative and International Education*, Vol. 9, No. 3., pp. 328–340, DOI:10.2304/rcie.2014.9.3.328
- Musselin, Ch. (2008) Towards a sociology of academic work. In.: Amaral, A. – I. Bleiklie – Ch. Musselin (eds.): *From Governance to Identity. A festschrift for Mary Henkel*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 47–56, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8994-7_5
- OECD (2012) *Careers of Doctorate Holders*. Key findings of the OECD-KNOWINNO Project on the careers of doctorate holders. <http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/CDH%20FINAL%20REPORT-.pdf> [Last access: 01 23 2020]
- Paksi, V. – B. Nagy – G. Király (2016) The timing of motherhood while earning a PhD in engineering. *International Journal of Doctoral Studies*, Vol. 11, pp. 285–304, DOI: 10.28945/3544
- Pálinkó, É. (2010) *Fiatalkutatók életútja és szakmai identitása. (The Career and Professional Identity of Young Researchers)*. PhD dissertation, Budapest, BCE Szociológia és Társadalompolitika Intézet, <http://phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/451/> [Last access 01 23 2020]
- Patterson, O. (2002) The last sociologist. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/19/opinion/the-last-sociologist.html> [Last access: 01 23 2020]
- Remmik, M. – M. Karm – L. Lepp (2013) Learning and developing as a university teacher: Narratives of early career academics in Estonia. *European Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 3., pp. 330–341, DOI: 10.2304/eej.2013.12.3.330
- Spalter-Roth, R. (2007) Sociologists in research, applied, and policy settings: Bringing professionals in from the cold. *Journal of Applied Social Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2., pp. 4–18, DOI: 10.1177/193672440700100202.
- Wattis, L. – L. James (2013) Exploring order and disorder: Women’s experiences balancing work and care. *European Journal of Women’s Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3., pp. 264–278, DOI: 10.1177/1350506813484241

THE REPRESENTATION OF TRIANON TRAUMA AS A CHOSEN TRAUMA IN POLITICAL NEWSPAPERS (1920–2010) IN HUNGARY

BARBARA ILG¹

ABSTRACT: *The Treaty of Trianon and its consequences continue to be considered traumatic by both scholars and much of society in general. Trianon's identification as a social or historical trauma not only spread amongst the public in general, but also penetrated historical discourse and journalism. A rather complex and controversial concept has been transposed from psychology to historiography. Hungarian historians generally use trauma in the classical social-psychological meaning: trauma is a social construct based on actual experience (Kovács 2015). In social psychology, the concept of trauma is based on the threat from the outside world to the individual and their identity. However, social trauma has much in common with individual trauma (László 2005). Inevitably, the question arises as to why the concept of psychic trauma seems to be an appropriate scientific description of the effects of Trianon. In my research, I undertook longitudinal content analysis of articles about Trianon and its consequences published in newspapers of various political orientation, divided into five-year periods between 1920 and 2010. The study uses the theoretical construction of social psychology, which involves examining the chosen trauma as a narrative structure. In this study, I present how the concept of the chosen trauma can be applied to describe Trianon trauma through the corpus that includes texts from these ninety years. To illustrate this, I use narrative psychological content analysis.*

KEYWORDS: *chosen trauma, collective trauma, individual trauma, narrative psychological content analysis, Treaty of Trianon, narrative framework*

¹ *Barbara Ilg* is a PhD candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest; e-mail: ilgbarbi@gmail.com. This publication is part of the EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007 project entitled 'Young Researcher Talent – Activities Supporting Researchers' Careers in Higher Education.'

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty of Trianon that ended World War I was signed at the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles on June 4, 1920 by the representatives of the Entente Alliance and by Ágoston Benárd and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár, representing the Simonyi-Semadam Government. With the entry into force of the Treaty, Hungary's territory and population decreased by nearly two-thirds, and the ethnic Hungarian population became part of the successor states as a result of the disannexation of those territories. Following the Treaty, Hungarian governments strove for its revision, which was partly accomplished as a result of Hungary's alliance with Germany, which enabled the reannexation of Upper Hungary in 1938, Sub-Carpathia in 1939, and Northern Transylvania in 1940. However, after the end of World War II the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 restored the Trianon borders. The Treaty and its consequences resulted in collective trauma among Hungarians both in the disannexed territories as well as within Hungary's revised borders, and the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 repeated the shock.

During the period of socialism in Hungary, little was said about Trianon, which came to the fore again in the public domain after the political changes of 1989, especially regarding the situation of ethnic Hungarians living in former Hungarian territories. In 1990, newly-established democratic parties in Hungary signed a declaration stating that the then-prevailing borders were considered permanent. In 2004, Hungary's accession to the European Union raised the expectations of the Hungarian minorities, only to be followed by the failure of a referendum on dual citizenship in the same year. In 2010, the Hungarian Parliament passed legislation making June 4 the Day of National Unity.

The ongoing awareness of Trianon and its continuing presence in historical narrative by Hungarians as a threat to their identity indicate its recognition as a traumatic event in the nation's collective memory. When a group of forbearers experiences a traumatic event that is passed on from generation to generation in the mental representations of a group as an identity threat, and even becomes a basis of group identity in intergroup conflict, Volkan refers to this as the group's "chosen trauma" (Volkan 1998, 2007).

I undertook a longitudinal analysis of articles on the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences published in newspapers of various political orientation, divided into five-year periods between 1920 and 2010, applying an understanding of chosen trauma as a narrative structure. In this study, I present how the concept of chosen trauma can be applied to describe the Trianon trauma through the corpus that includes texts from these ninety years. To illustrate this, I use narrative psychological content analysis.

I consider the successive texts through time to be progressive or ascending narratives aimed at a positive goal, the stages of which can be aligned with the symptomatic and healing stages of the chosen trauma. At the end of each section, I postulate narratives corresponding to the trauma codes.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS

The concept of chosen trauma

Volkan's concept of chosen trauma refers to a group's collective memory of a tragedy suffered by their ancestors. Naturally, it is not the group that chooses to become a victim. The word 'chosen' implies that the injured self, inherited through generations and infused with the memory of the trauma of its predecessors, becomes an unconscious element of the wider group's identity. The function of the chosen trauma is to determine the identity of the group according to the trauma of predecessors. The mental representation by the present group of the trauma(s) is much stronger than memories of ancestral glory, as bygone glory does not leave behind unfinished psychological tasks. The tasks given to the new generation confirm their identity with the adults of the previous one. In the development of the chosen trauma, psychological challenges await a solution to end the process of mourning the previous generation, and to avenge shame and humiliation associated with the stored images. The psychological tasks related to the chosen traumas make the same an essential feature of large groups and a powerful engine of social and political movements (Volkan 2007).

Some triggering events cause more traumatic symptoms than others. Natural disasters and unintentional tragedies committed by other human beings are less likely to cause long-lasting trauma than affronts committed deliberately by one group of people against another. A deliberate attack resulting in such a loss of human life may cause members of a group to fear the extinguishment of the group. As a result of such events, the victimized group emerges from the conflict humiliated and deprived of human dignity. Such deliberate attacks often occur among neighboring peoples.

Volkan (1998) makes parallel between individual grief and group grief. As the elaboration of individual mourning is more difficult in the case of a suicide or murder because the former are unprepared for the blow, events which threaten the identity or existence of a group are likewise complicated. Members of groups sharing the same collective loss go through the same psychological process of

mourning. After the initial shock, the traumatized agent attempts to reverse the loss of the object. Society elaborates it with cultural or religious rituals and then, over the years, repeats the rituals with decreasing intensity, usually on the anniversary of the event. Then collective mourning subsides and society as a whole adjusts to the loss, which will slowly fade away. In the case of other types of tragedies which directly affect a considerable part of the group or cause more lasting damage, such as the killing of a highly respected political leader, commemorative acts recur for several years. Their elaboration may be helped by the erection of a monument, such as the Vietnam Monument, which represented the pain of Americans related to losses in the war condensed into an object.

However, there are situations in which shared grief makes group members feel stupefied, helpless, and humiliated, or too angry to mourn or even to begin the mourning process. In these cases, the members of the group are unable to respond collectively, since these types of losses disrupt the fabric of society and produce traumatic symptoms in members of society. The trauma is then inherited and its elaboration is left for the next generation. Survivors are doomed to pass on the memory of the tragedy and their feelings to descendants so that later generations can elaborate the mourning process that their forbearers were not able to accomplish.

Trauma is transmitted in two ways: by projection, or by alienation – that is, denial. In the course of projection, an older person unconsciously externalizes and projects their traumatized self into the personality of the developing child. The child becomes the gathering point, retaining the worry of previous generation, absorbing their desires and expectations and feeling the urge to work on them, thus the mourning process will become their task (Volkan 1998).

The other manner of coping with the effects of a blow is alienation or denial: those who did not directly experience the tragedy in the group avoid those who were directly affected. For example, after World War II many Israelis looked at the Holocaust with shame and avoided Holocaust survivors. The denial that occurred with Holocaust survivors and their contemporaries also appeared among the victimized generation and their children. Subsequent generations may try to erase the bygone event from their memory, and thus it remains dormant in the psychological DNA of group members for many years.

However, it reappears in some circumstances. Political leaders, for example, can be remarkably successful at awakening the memory of a sleeping group. When the mental representation of the original loss is revived, it can distort the perception of the wider group, and new enemies can be perceived as ones known from the old historical event. Although the original event was undoubtedly humiliating, the function of the mental representation is modified when it is evoked, and it now serves to connect the individual to the group, raising

members' self-esteem and charging them paradoxically by calling on them to avenge the humiliation of their ancestors.

However, if historical circumstances do not allow the next generation to escape their powerlessness in relation to the past, the mental representation that is retained of the common tragedy serves to hold the members of the group together. Instead of increasing the group's self-esteem, the mental images of the event result in people sharing the powerlessness of victimhood. Consequently, the chosen trauma is not necessarily obvious on the surface of current mental representations of the present group, but it is triggered by certain historic circumstances (or political leaders), most often in the case of identity threats (Volkan 1998).

The chosen trauma is preserved in the collective memory of groups and passed on from generation to generation. Historical memory and personal or group memory are not clearly separable entities in collective memory. Modern historical consciousness is also part of the collective memory, together with personal memory and tradition (Gyáni 2010).

The group trauma model in scientific narrative psychology

Social psychology discusses the concept of trauma in the context of dealing with a threat to the individual from the outside world and, in conjunction therewith, in the context of identity. At the same time, it shares many features with psychic trauma. The individual is forced to cope with the threat from the outside world, which leaves a mark on their identity. When a coping mode fails, the individual is forced to reconsider and re-construct their identity (László 2005).

The traumatic theory model of scientific narrative psychology juxtaposes collective identity and personal identity – that is, just as we infer an individual's identity state from their personal narrative, group identity states and identity construction processes are derived from group history. Symptoms triggered by a traumatic event affecting either an individual or a group threaten the continuity and stability of identity, and so narratives and stories about the trauma are embedded in the actual life history of the individual or the group. In a parallel way to the elaboration process of individual trauma, the group, like the individual, strives to rebuild its identity that has disintegrated as a result of the traumatic event; that is to say, to create a new identity history acceptable to all members of the group. In this way, group histories provide an insight into not only the current state of injuries to group identity, but also the processes of identity recovery – that is, the trauma elaboration process in collective memory.

Narratives that deal with the traumas affecting groups are those most suitable for examining the elaboration of collective traumas when there is a consensus within the group that the event did indeed have a traumatic effect. Starting from the psychological model of individual trauma elaboration, the following structural and content-related features in a narrative suggest that a trauma has not been elaborated yet:

(1) re-experiencing of trauma: present-time narration, interjections; (2) strong emotional involvement reflected in a high number of emotional expressions: explicit emotions, emotional evaluations and extreme words instead of cognitive words; (3) regressive functioning: primitive defense mechanisms, such as denial, splitting (devaluation and idealization) in extreme evaluations, distortion through biased perception and a self-serving interpretation of events, projection of negative intentions and feelings in hostile enemy representations (hostile emotion attribution); (4) narrow perceptual field: inability to change perspectives; (5) paralysis: perseverance of cognitive and emotional patterns; (6) a sense of losing agency and control: transmission of causal focus and responsibility to others; (7) polemic representations instead of hegemonic representations; (8) intense occupation with the topic in social discourse, a pressing need to share the topic with others and a constant flow of trauma-related narratives (Fülöp et al. 2012).

In contrast, the narrative of elaborated trauma conveys a positive identity that is coherent with the whole of group history and accepted by everyone within the group. It contributes to the maintenance of a positive national identity, and represents the event as part of the past, which has no effect on present-day relations in relation to the groups concerned (Csertő–László 2016).

From a narrative psychological perspective, the trauma affecting the group can be examined if it is the result of intergroup conflict (war, genocide, etc.) since the narratives of the trauma in this case are narratives of an intergroup conflict in which the participants, according to the dialectic of trauma, are as follows: victims and perpetrators – that is, clearly identifiable participants. Narrative psychology relies on classical intergroup research (intergroup agency, intergroup evaluation, intergroup emotions), and so derives the state of trauma elaboration from the narrative representation of the relationship of the groups involved in the conflict to one another and the event.

Narrative psychology has developed the method of narrative psychological content analysis for analyzing texts, which is a computer-based quantitative content analysis methodology that looks for psychologically measurable linguistic features of narrative composition and narrative categories. The Content Analysis Suite called NarrCat has a variety of dictionaries which contain words which are relevant to personal or group identity, together with grammatical structures which also transmit information about the individual

or group identity states beyond the semantic meaning of the words (László 2012). These dictionaries are organized into various modules, which have been developed within the framework of the computer software called NOOJ and are suitable for identifying the linguistic markers of psychological content and measuring their frequency automatically.

Conceptualizing Trianon trauma as chosen trauma

There is a clear correspondence between Volkan's concept of chosen trauma and the pattern of psychic trauma, the major elements of which are as follows: the unexpectedness and severity of a traumatic event – that is, the fact that it breaks the identity or the 'fabric of society.' Additionally, the dichotomy between the victim and perpetrator (that is, between 'good' and 'bad'), which offers the opportunity to identify oneself with the victim or the witness, and the emergence of the traumatic syndrome in the form of bursts of memory and narrowing down, and finally the stages of healing, such as resistance, projection, interpretation and reworking. Trauma implies doubts and anxieties about incompleteness, thus in normal cases the national group seeks to eliminate these.

I consider the Trianon trauma to be the chosen trauma of the Hungarian national group, since it appears in the group's collective representations of the past as an identity threat, and is therefore suitable as the basis for group identity when called upon. The use of the word "trauma" in the case of the Treaty of Trianon legitimizes the incompleteness of the story and the unprocessed nature of the trauma, so that it can be retrieved time and again as an unsolved task. Imagining the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences as a trauma suggests hope for healing, a positive conclusion to the story, while it also exempts victims from responsibility.

The framework of the chosen trauma (similarly to with individual trauma) is in fact the same narrative structure, from the occurrence of the traumatic event through the symptoms to healing – however, without aiming at closure. Accordingly, resolving individual and collective trauma is in itself a progressive narrative which aims at restoring the positive identity of a person or group. The narrative structure of trauma consists of invariable elements – these are the triggering event, the symptomatic stages, and the healing stages. Each phase is also accompanied by a narrative with a constant pattern, which also provides information about the state of the elaboration. For example, a disaster narrative arises when a triggering event occurs, a denial narrative in the denial phase, and a scapegoat narrative in the projection phase. Thus, the constant elements of the narrative structure indicate which traumatic narrative typical of which stage of

the trauma is currently in circulation in the mental representations of the group. However, even though the structure of the chosen trauma is the same as that of the collective trauma, the chosen trauma is a victim's narrative, the purpose of which is to prevent trauma elaboration, which is why it can repeatedly be encountered in the life of the group.

The mental representations of Trianon trauma in collective memory can be organized into the narrative structure of the trauma from the time of the treaty to the present day. Trianon trauma representations which have developed over time during the past one hundred years are imprints of the elaboration process of the Hungarians, through which, according to my assumption, the group is progressing towards trauma elaboration over time.

The stories of Trianon trauma are passed on in collective memory and are manifested in personal narratives, historiography, and the media. Both the narrative patterns of each phase and the current state of trauma elaboration can be described by means of the longitudinal cross-sectional study of the narratives of Trianon trauma. Narratives of such trauma can be texts about the chosen trauma of the group in historiography or in the media, since the chosen trauma begins with a triggering event that occurs in the canonical history of the group and reoccurs as the story of the group is told. To explore the structure of the trauma, I have chosen the method of psychological content analysis, since this uses language modules that can provide relevant information about the state of trauma, in parallel with the emergence of traumatic symptoms and phases of the healing process.

RESEARCH

For the purpose of exploring the longitudinal structure of narratives and the states of trauma, I examined texts that appeared in the media since the First World War. The printed press has played an important role in the formation of collective memory and in the discussion of collective trauma. On the other hand, the media present the views of different political and social interest groups according to the conditions of democratic publicity (Habermas 1993).

From 1920 to 2010, broken down into periods of five years, I analyzed articles that discussed the Treaty of Trianon in five or six newspapers with differing political orientations. I assumed that the topic had been on the agenda of the media since June 4, 1920, and has been recalled on anniversaries, so I searched for items published in the interval preceding and following June 4 by one week – that is, between May 25 and June 11.

HYPOTHESIS

Hypotheses for the entire text corpus

H1: My assumption is that, applying the structural elements of the ninety-year trauma narrative to the whole text corpus, the trauma representation appertaining to the entire Hungarian group organized in the period between 1920 and 2010 is as follows:

(1) Signing of the peace treaty: sudden shock; (2) 1930. Memorial services, re-emergence of the trauma: anger, denial, resistance, revenge, demanding reparations. The loss becomes a traumatic event upon the effect of revisionist propaganda; (3) 1935. Successful foreign policy: demanding legitimate reparation; (4) 1940. Area reannexations: Legitimate expectations are fulfilled; (5) 1947. Paris Peace Treaty: retraumatization (no data are available about this); (6) 1945–1990 no news: a period of suppression, latency; (7) 1990–2010. Trauma narratives that serve for the restoration of identity and healing.

H2: In the course of the longitudinal study of right-wing and left-wing newspapers, the extent of the trauma elaboration as well as the trauma narrative of right-wing and left-wing groups will also be different.

Hypotheses about the correlation between narrative psychological language markers and trauma elaboration in texts

Narrative psychology builds on classical social psychological intergroup studies, so collective trauma is actually seen as the result of group identity damage in an intergroup conflict. Examining the trauma elaboration process in the group, we may distinguish in the texts conflict between cognitive and emotional content attributed to ingroups and to outgroups. However, it is an important stipulation that trauma is considered to affect one's own ingroup, and it is one's ingroup that endows itself and the outgroup with cognitive and emotional content. Although in intergroup conflict the ingroup and the outgroup appear as single groups, it should not be forgotten that large national groups consist of smaller groups and individuals.

Using the research method of narrative psychology, we may filter out the linguistic features of mental content attributed to groups involved in conflict from the text, and construct hypothesis about trauma processing. That is, we look for correlations between the frequency of language markers and the

narrative representations of trauma that appear in the text. Such language traits manifest intergroup emotions and intergroup evaluations.

In my own research, I examined what kind of trauma narratives with which psychological traits were in circulation at the time of the traumatic event – i.e., the signing of the Treaty of Trianon – until 2010.

Regarding the correlation between trauma elaboration and narrative psychological linguistic content in the texts, I define the following hypotheses:

H3: The ingroup and the outgroup both consist of smaller groups: the narrator of the texts, who is a member of the ingroup, attributes the mental content to the large group, smaller groups, and individuals. These groups may vary from year to year and from newspaper to newspaper.

H4: Ideally, the progress of time will be the most important factor in relation to the trauma elaboration.

H5: According to my hypotheses, the correlation between the intergroup evaluation and trauma elaboration is the following:

An unelaborated trauma is defined when there is a sharp difference in the evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup; and the ingroup assessment is characterized by positive while that of the outgroup by negative bias. In the case of the ingroup, this pattern implies shifting the responsibility to the outgroup, and implies a narrative in which the ingroup insists upon restitution, since the responsibility for the negative event is borne by the negatively evaluated group. The progress of trauma elaboration is indicated by the fact that both the positive evaluation of the ingroup and the negative assessment of an outgroup also decrease (thus responsibility is divided, and the role of the ingroup will be emphasized in the narrative of the negative event).

H6: In the period immediately following the traumatic event, both in the ingroup and outgroup, the traumatic event narrative has strong emotional saturation and little cognition. High emotional involvement entails the use of numerous emotional terms: these include explicit emotions, emotional evaluation, and the use of strong emotional words compared to cognitive expressions.

H7: Early narratives will show a regressive mode of action: to include primitive countermeasures, such as denial and the projection of negative intentions and feelings.

H8: I assume the following relationship between the relative frequency of collective emotions and the linguistic forms of denial and the trauma elaboration process: in the first stage of trauma elaboration, the number of these indicators will be high, but will decrease simultaneously with the trauma elaboration process over time.

METHODOLOGY

Test sample: selection of newspapers

I examined newspaper articles about the Treaty of Trianon that were published within a period of one week before June 4 and one week after.

The first consideration in selecting the newspapers was the continuous publication of the newspaper over the ninety years under review. If this was not the case, then I selected the successor newspaper or a similar newspaper along the same political lines. In 1920, papers still reflected a broad political scale, ranging from extreme right-wing opposition pages through liberal newspapers to leftist radical ones, but by the late twenties they had shifted to the right. In December 1944, all Budapest newspapers were banned, and in February 1945 only *Népszava* was restarted. Between 1945 and 1990, the media served the single-party system, and after the political system change the press was mostly bipartisan, rather than becoming independent (Buzinkay 2016). Therefore, the political orientation of the newspapers selected for research can best be determined by the categories of political left wing and right wing in the text corpus that spans 90 years.

However, to select the contemporary dailies (published in 1920) and to identify policy orientations, I had to consider the following historical aspects:

Between 1867 and 1918 Hungarian journalism was strongly characterized by party-biased journalism, meaning that contemporary newspapers reflected the views of a given political party, organization, or political trend. ‘The period from 1848 to 1918 was the era of national liberalism² in Hungary, and this ideology determined public policy after the Austro–Hungarian Compromise of 1867. The constitutional monarchy created by the compromise provided an opportunity for parliamentary development based on the principle of popular representation’ (Körösényi et al. 2007:18). The vast majority of the Hungarian press can be identified on the scale as liberal before the First World War. However, from the outbreak of World War I war censorship came into effect, which also involved the censorship of newspapers and the periodical press, and control of correspondence between the front and the hinterland. As a result of Hungary’s defeat in the war,

² National-liberalism: In Europe, for much of the nineteenth century, liberalism was the ideology, and the Liberal Party was the force that defended constitutionality against absolutism and developed the agenda for a modern, progressive, civilized European middle-class society. To this end, its main goal was to create an independent and strong nation state. Later, at the turn of the century and between the two world wars, liberalism and nationalism separated (Dénes 2008:5).

revolution broke out in Budapest on October 30–31, 1918, which led to its withdrawal from the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy and Hungary becoming a republic. The new government was forced to maintain the newsprint-related restrictions introduced at the beginning of the war, but in a law of December 7, 1918, it restored press freedom – that is, it abolished war censorship, and introduced newspaper street sales. Shortly afterwards, the communist council government, which came to power on March 21, 1919, enshrined press control and the nationalization of press life in the constitution. A few days after the proclamation of the Council Republic, the elimination of newspapers began, and by June 1919 there were only five daily newspapers in Budapest and 25 in the countryside, almost all of which operated as newspapers of the Communist Party (Buzinkay 2016). After the overthrow of the Hungarian Council Republic, a counter-revolution against the communist revolution came to power and the surviving papers were republished on September 28, 1918 based on prior permission and the amount of paper allocated to them. Between the fall of 1919 and 1922, each of the new power groups regarded the liberal press as an enemy. The liberal press as the cause of the loss of the war, the enemy of national aspirations, and even of the loss of historical Hungary, appeared in counter-revolutionary discourse. The incumbent powers exercised their right to censorship and classified liberal newspapers as destructive and partly problematic. The latter were opposed by the Christian-national ‘reliable’ press. The products of the Christian national press were newspapers founded after 1918 (Buzinkay 2016).

In the period between 1920 and 1944, I examined seven political dailies.³ Three of them were founded in the late 1800s during the era of national liberalism: the first in chronological order was *Népszava* (1873–), the newspaper of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, founded in 1873. The second was the national-liberal *Pesti Hírlap* (1878–1944), founded in 1878, and the third high-volume daily was the conservative-liberal *Budapesti Hírlap* (1881–1933). I chose two of the dailies published after the turn of the century but before the First World War: the civil-liberal *Az Est* (1901–1939) and the civil-radical *Világ* (1910–1926), which under the civil government was a pro-government newspaper. Among the Christian-national newspapers founded after 1918, I included the radical right-wing *Új Nemzedék* (1919–1944) and *Magyarság* (1920–1944) in 1930 (*Világ* ceased to exist in 1926, so it was replaced with the *Magyarság*).⁴

3 The political classification of the newspapers was based on the studies of Sipos (2011a), Klestenitz (2013) and Litván (1984).

4 The seven dailies are presented in the *Appendix*.

However, in 1925 the peace treaty was not on the agenda for the two weeks under examination. A completely different issue dominated the columns of the newspapers: On May 31, 1925, the newspaper *Újság* published a report on the confession of Ödön Beniczky, former Minister of the Interior about the *Somogyi–Bacsó murder*, in which he called the Regent (Horthy) an instigator. Therefore, in 1925, during the two-week period, I did not find any newspaper articles about the Treaty of Trianon in the seven dailies.

The treaty was mentioned in all six newspapers involved in the study in 1930, while only in four in 1935, and only in the editorial of *Pesti Hírlap* published on June 4 in 1940. As for 1945, I was unable to create a corpus of texts because the newspapers involved in the research were abolished by the decree dated December 15, 1944. Although *Népszava* resumed on February 2, 1945, it did not publish any articles about Trianon around the anniversary. After 1945, I examined three newspapers which continued to exist even after 1990 that could be located on the political left and right wing after the political system change. These are *Népszava (1873–2019)*, *Szabad Nép*, published in 1944, the legal successor of which was *Népszabadság*, published in 1956 (1944–2016), and *Magyar Nemzet (1938–2018)*. After 1945, the media were aligned with political powers – for example, *Népszabadság* was the organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, and Trianon was a silenced topic. Accordingly, no pieces were published in the three daily newspapers around the anniversary between 1945 and 1990. However, after the political system change, all three newspapers kept the issue of Trianon on the agenda in all five years studied during the period under review.

I formed nine corpuses of texts from the collected newspaper articles, one for each year, and conducted a political media-agenda settings analysis (Török 2005) to explore the main issues and events that occurred in the examined two weeks.

Grouping the texts according to the hypotheses

At first I formed nine text corpora from the newspaper texts (1920, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010), thus in the course of the longitudinal study I revealed the structure of the trauma narrative of the chosen trauma of the Hungarian group, and made findings about the trauma elaboration processes. The right-wing and left-wing classification of the newspapers also made it possible to examine the trauma representations of the right-wing and left-wing groups throughout the sample; accordingly, I compiled a right-wing text corpus and a left-wing text corpus.

Table 1 comprises the newspapers classified as right-wing or left-wing newspapers broken down into years.

Table 1. *Composition of text corpuses formed according to newspapers and their political orientation between 1920 and 2010*

	1920	1930	1935	1940	1990–2010
Right-wing	<i>Budapesti Hírlap</i> (1883–1939) <i>Pesti Hírlap</i> (1841–1944) <i>Új Nemzedék</i> (1919–1944)	<i>Budapesti Hírlap,</i> <i>Pesti Hírlap,</i> <i>Új Nemzedék,</i> <i>Magyarság</i> (1920–1944)	<i>Budapesti Hírlap,</i> <i>Pesti Hírlap,</i> <i>Magyarság</i>	<i>Pesti Hírlap</i>	<i>Magyar Nemzet</i> (1938–2018)
Left-wing	<i>Népszava</i> (1873–) <i>Világ</i> (1911–1949) <i>Az Est</i> (1914–1939)	<i>Népszava,</i> <i>Az Est</i>	<i>Népszava</i>		<i>Népszava,</i> <i>Népszabadság</i> (1944–2016)

Source: Author's compilation

Grouping the texts by year provides an opportunity to examine the first hypothesis – i.e., what the dominant trauma narrative is in a given year from the perspective of the ingroup. The current trauma narratives are determined by the topics kept on the agenda in the two-week period in each text corpus. The victim and perpetrator groups can also be identified in the trauma histories of the text corpora, starting from the dialectic of the chosen trauma.

The left and right divisions of the nine text corpora provide an opportunity to test the second hypothesis: i.e., to outline the trauma narrative of the politically left- and right-wing groups within their own groups, highlighting possible differences.

However, to determine who belonged to the right-wing and left-wing group, and to the whole nation and the outgroup, and what mental content these groups were endowed with, I grouped the texts by year and newspaper, and created a total of 32 corpora.

Method for screening dominant groups: word frequency analysis

In the narrative of Trianon trauma (from the point of view of the Hungarian group), the Hungarian nation as a whole is the victim, and the perpetrators are members of the Entente and nations neighboring Hungary – mainly Romanians and Slovaks, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In newspaper articles, at first

the national groups appear as a whole (for example: Hungarians, the nation, Hungary, people, Slovaks, etc.). However, both the ingroup and the outgroup consist of smaller groups and individual actors. To screen out the dominant groups and actors, I performed word frequency analysis from each text corpus. Then, from each of the most common words per corpus I selected words referring to the ingroup and the outgroups and their subgroups, and counted them. Words of at least three letters, occurring at least five times that referred to ingroup or the outgroup were included in the glossary denoted as agents.

The examination of intergroup evaluation

I ran the NarrCat computer program evaluation module on the 32 text corpuses, which binds the keywords to their word classes and evaluation marks, then sorts them in a separate dictionary. The modules of NarrCat run in the language-technology system of Nooj, which allows the analysis of morphological and syntactical texts in different languages.

Table 2. *Dictionaries of the NarrCat evaluation module*

Word class		Positive	Pcs.	Negative	Pcs.
Adjective		wise	317	undue	582
Verb		to brave, to cheer	122	to exploit, to protest	317
Noun	from an adjective	wisdom	317	injustice	582
	from a verb	cheering	122	protestation	317
Adverb	from an adjective	wisely	317	unduly	582
	from a verb	cheering	122	protesting	317

Source: Bigazzi et al. (2006)

The evaluation keywords, considering their word class, can be adjectives, verbs, or adverbs. The lexicons of verbs and adjectives were compiled by the narrative psychological research group using the digital lexicons of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Linguistic Science by frequency of use (Bigazzi et al. 2006).

The evaluation module is at the moment capable of recognizing evaluative and conjugated keywords in texts, and identifying separable verbs and adverbs from verbs. For the identification of references of evaluations (i.e. who evaluates

whom), and the classification of emotional-cognitive content, the use of software-supported manual analysis is required.

I ran the evaluation module on the texts, grouped by newspaper and year specification, in the Nooj computer analysis program, which provides its findings with their close context (the 3-4 words before and after the word), and also assigns them their valence value. As it is hard to determine the reference subjects of the evaluations this way (because it is not certain that the subject of the predicate is in the highlighted context, or its object), I determined the subject of the evaluation based on the context of the found word.

Using the results of the word frequency test, I reversed the order of the research and examined, in the context of the words denoting the most common agents, whether there were evaluative words or phrase relative to the agent. After that, I checked in the context of the words referencing these groups for positive or negative evaluations of the respective group.

The subjects of the evaluation 'Hungarians' were put into the Hungarian category labelled 'the nation as a whole,' including Hungarians living in the disannexed areas, the political organizations within the nation, associations, the political elite (government, the National Assembly or the House) and political party groups and political actors. In the texts, the composition of the ingroup varies based on the period under analysis. Similarly, the composition of outgroup is made up of smaller groups – basically, the nations, ethnicities, and their representative political parties and figures that were either allied with or against Hungary in the First and Second World Wars.

The narrative perspective of the ingroup according to political orientation

I differentiated the Hungarian group along political lines, so I assigned a political group, party, or line for every political daily newspaper of its time, and I assumed that specific political daily newspapers represented the evaluations of the group. These political orientations were then evaluated as right-wing and left-wing. In the case of daily newsletters with different political orientations, the narrator and the group's perspective are biased in terms of both the ingroup and the outgroup in terms of political group membership.

I studied ingroup evaluations from the perspective of political orientation in all the 32 sub-corpus.

I subjected the ingroup evaluations from the perspective of political orientation to a longitudinal study so I could draw conclusions about the processes of recovering from trauma of the left and right.

Examining the relative frequency of emotions

I examined the full frequency of emotions attributed to ingroup and outgroup and narrator in chronological order, as well as the emotions attributed to the ingroup and outgroup and the narrator in the newspapers of the right and left.

Automated examination of the texts from the perspective of emotions was carried out by Éva Fülöp with the help of the NarrCat computer program and its emotion module. The emotion graph was developed in 2006 by Éva Fülöp and János László.

The words in the dictionary of the emotion module were selected from the words in the Hungarian Interpretative Dictionary. A total of 700 words were added to the dictionary. The words of the emotion dictionary are descriptive emotional markers that refer to emotional processes and states, such as anger, joy, etc. (Fülöp 2010). The emotion words in the module are organized into separate categories: positive and negative emotions, depressive emotions, moral emotions, and historical emotions.

The relative frequency of emotions in the right-wing newspapers and the left-wing newspapers is presented as a percentage in my own study.

The relative frequency of negation

Study of the relative frequency of negation was done with the negation graph of the Nooj language system (Hargitai et al. 2005).

Negation can be explicit or open. Negation words include ‘no,’ ‘none,’ ‘non-,’ ‘un-’ (in Hungarian: *nincs, sincs, nem, ne*) or ‘denial pronouns:’ ‘nobody,’ ‘nothing’ (*senki, semmi, sehány*) adverbs: ‘nowhere,’ ‘never’ (*sehol, soha*). Denial can also be implicit or hidden in the Hungarian language using privative suffixes like *-tlan, -tlen, -talan, -telen*, etc. (suggesting negation, a lack of something or without something).


In my own research I constructed an extreme emotion graph and a negation graph on 32 sub-corpus, then showed the relative frequency of negation in the right-wing and left-wing newspapers.

RESULTS OF THE NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Results of the intergroup evaluation in 1920

Hypothesis 5, concerning the validity of intergroup evaluations, was that after the occurrence of the traumatic event the narrative psychological characteristics of the strong shock in the texts of the 1920s would be positive for the ingroup and negative for the outgroup from the perspective of intergroup evaluation. I present the negative and positive evaluations of the intergroup as a percentage of the total number of words in each newspaper (I divided the number of negative and positive evaluations by the number of word corpora grouped by year and daily and multiplied this by a hundred). The results of the 1920 text corpus are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Ingroup's evaluations as a percentage, 1920, evaluator: Hungarians (%)



Source: Author's construction


The positive evaluations of the ingroup are almost as numerous as the negative evaluations of the Hungarian group in terms of the distribution of the intergroup evaluations according to valence. Moreover, two newspapers included more negative evaluations of the Hungarian group than positive ones. The reason for this is that *Budapesti Hírlap* and *Új Nemzedék* negatively evaluated the *government* and the *national assembly* within the ingroup strikingly often, and

since these evaluations formed one set with the evaluations for the Hungarian group, the number of negative evaluations for the whole group also increased.

This result suggests that the *government* and the *national assembly* are hostile groups for the members of the political groups represented in these two newspapers. This is explained by the conflict between the government and the parties as to whether the government should sign the treaty. In contrast, the word *government* is most often mentioned in a positive context in the text of *Pesti Hírlap*. On the other hand, the newspaper *Világ* reports in detail on the demonstration of Transylvanian *refugees*. The positive evaluations of the *refugee* group push the evaluation of the Hungarian group into the positive in this newspaper. However, during the examination of *Népszava*, a separate group emerged within the Hungarian group – namely, a group of social democrats. This group is considered the own group or ingroup in the texts of *Népszava*, and is always evaluated positively. As I defined the social democrats as part of the Hungarian group, the ingroup evaluation in *Népszava* is distorted in a positive direction in the text corpus from the 1920s.

Another result of the intergroup evaluation in the corpus of 1920s is that there are more negative evaluations of the outgroup than positive evaluations. The positive and negative evaluations for the outgroup are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Outgroup's evaluations as a percentage, 1920, evaluator: Hungarians (%)



Source: Author's construction

In five of the six newspapers included in the study, the proportion of negative evaluations of the outgroup is much higher than positive ones. Only in *Népszava*

is there a little more positive evaluation than negative. Overall, the occurrence of outgroup evaluations is very low in all of the newspapers in the 1920s, at between 0.3% and 1.3%. The most frequently evaluated group is the Entente – the most important topic in the examined period is the signing of the treaty, in which the Entente is deemed the main enemy. The Entente, without exception, receives negative evaluations, as do the French and English. In *Új Nemzedék*, the negative evaluations of the outgroup are outstanding. On the one hand, this is because only this newspaper reports in detail about the visit of the English workers' delegation, who came to investigate the atrocities of the counter-revolution (white terror) in Budapest. On the other hand, in *Új Nemzedék* the Czechs, Romanians, and Serbs are portrayed as the greatest enemies, as their aspirations for independence from Hungarians were fulfilled. The Germans, Slovaks, and Vendis in Hungary are sympathetic groups because they do not want to break away from the motherland. Romanians, Czechs, and Serbs are also negative characters in other dailies, except in *Népszava*. The positive outgroups in the 1920's text corpus are also Germany and the League of Nations.

In summary, in the 1920 corpus, the positive evaluations of the ingroup are relatively strong, and the negative evaluations of the outgroup are more plentiful than the positive evaluations. Immediately after the traumatic event, both values should be extremely high according to the hypothesis – this pattern would refer to the emotional shock suffered by the group.

Results of intergroup evaluation 1930–2010


In 1930, however, during the examination of the intergroup evaluations, the Hungarian group receives a strikingly high positive evaluation, as we can see in Figure 3.

This result is explained by the fact that 'Hungarians worldwide' support the revision. Hungarians worldwide include the parties in Hungary, the Hungarians beyond the borders, and the Hungarian friendship societies which were created in the great cities of the Western Great Powers due to Revisionist League propaganda. The secretaries of the associations were in direct contact with the Budapest headquarters and provided members with the latest propaganda publications. Such societies also operated in London, Milan, Paris, Amsterdam, Geneva, Berlin, Warsaw, South America, and New York (Zeidler 2009).

At the same time, the evaluations for the outgroup are surprising: namely, the positive evaluations for the outgroups are twice as plentiful as the negative evaluations. This result is possible because only a single hostile outgroup appears in the texts, this being the Czechs; all the other outgroups referred to in the texts

are national groups who support the Hungarian revision of the peace treaty. The most positive evaluations are of the Italians, followed by the English (because of the ‘Justice for Hungary’ campaign of Lord Rothermere) and the Dutch, as these countries have the most active associations. This relates to the editors’ agenda-specifying function and the effectiveness of revisionist propaganda. Indeed, in the examined period in 1930, the central theme of the dailies was the assemblies and demonstration organized for the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon; that is, the replaying of the events of 1920 and a pro-revision demonstration. This was supported not only by Hungarians in post-Trianon Hungary, but also by Hungarians living abroad, including in Western Europe, and even in those countries that were formerly their enemies.

Figure 3. *Ingroup’s evaluations as a percentage, 1930, subject evaluator: Hungarians (%)*



Source: Author's construction

Thus, the two indicators, the values of which according to the fifth hypothesis should decrease in parallel with time, do not decrease, but the positive evaluations of both the ingroup and the outgroup increase in comparison to 1920, while the negative evaluations decrease. From the point of view of trauma processing, this suggests that the self-assessment of the ingroup is positive, and that the group has grown stronger. The evaluation of the ingroup strengthened not because it took responsibility for its past action, but because it was preparing for revenge. This occurs when the ingroup revives the chosen trauma.

In 1935, the positive evaluations for the Hungarian group are slightly less numerous than negative ones; conversely, the negative evaluations of the

outgroup are exceptionally high. Such extreme evaluations indicate that elaboration was not underway.


In 1940, a single newspaper, *Pesti Hirlap*, remained on the right wing, and both evaluations of the ingroup and outgroup were positive. The outgroups here are the allied German and Italian groups who helped with achieving the objective; i.e. territorial revision.

In the 1990–2010 corpus, the negative evaluations of the Hungarian group are clearly more numerous than the positive evaluations of the Hungarian group in each year. The negative evaluations of the ingroup point towards emotional elaboration in terms of trauma elaboration if they are equivalent to the positive evaluations, and the negative and positive evaluations of the outgroup are also at a low level. However, in my own survey, the raw frequency of negative evaluations for the Hungarian group was much greater than the number of positive evaluations in all five-year periods surveyed. Likewise, the number of negative evaluations for the outgroup is also high. A plausible explanation for the high number of negative evaluations for both groups from the perspective of trauma elaboration may be the fact that the ingroup attributes the same responsibility for intergroup conflict to itself and the outgroup alike, indicating trauma elaboration has begun.

Intergroup evaluation in right-wing newspapers, 1920–2010


Negative evaluations attributed to the Hungarian group are not due to the fact that the group has faced the past and holds itself responsible for grievances. In the text corpus of 1990–2010 it becomes obvious that there are opposing groups within the Hungarian group that can be clearly classified as right wing and left wing (the right-wing daily newspaper in the period 1990–2010 is *Magyar Nemzet*; the left-wing daily newspapers are *Népszava* and *Népszabadság*). The Trianon anniversary is juxtaposed by both sides with current political events, which may be commemoration or a political act linked to the treaty. Such events present an opportunity to view the opposing side negatively. For example, when the right-wing evaluates the Hungarian group, it actually evaluates not only itself but also the actors of the left wing, mostly negatively. Thus, these negative evaluations increase the number of negative evaluations of the entire Hungarian group. It can be clearly seen in Figure 4 that the Hungarian group received at least twice as many negative evaluations as positive ones in the right-wing newspapers since 1990. This trend also applies to outgroup evaluation since 1990 (see Figure 5).

Figure 4. Right-wing evaluation, 1920–2010, subject of evaluation: Hungarians (%)



Source: Author's construction

Figure 5. Right-wing evaluation, 1920–2010, subject of evaluation: outgroup (%)



Source: Author's construction

Since 1990, the only representative of the right-wing text corpus was the *Magyar Nemzet*. Through the texts of the *Magyar Nemzet* from 1990–2010 I present how the commemorations, the defining of the media agenda, and the political orientation of the newspaper influence intergroup evaluation. I also point to those ingroups and outgroups that were negatively evaluated.

After the change of political system in Hungary, the right-wing government indirectly privatized *Magyar Nemzet* by supporting the conservative French group Hersant at the time of purchase. The incumbent MDF believed that extraordinary media support was due to the new system. Important topics in the paper included national affairs and the Hungarian minority in the disannexed territories. While in 1990 the paper was still publishing the articles of left-wing historians such as Mária Ormos (1930–2019) and Magda Ádám (1925–2017), in 1991 the tone of the paper became more exclusionary and judgmental under the influence of right-wing Hungarian writer, journalist, and politician István Csurka,⁵ and in 1991 eight left-wing journalists were fired from the paper.

According to the assessment of these historians, the following processes led to the unfavorable treaty: Hungary's repressive ethnic policy, and consequently the dissatisfaction of other ethnic groups living there; the irredentist aspirations of the new states on the southern and eastern borders (Italy, Serbia, and Romania); and the strategic considerations of the Entente aimed at avoiding German influence in Central Europe. This was compounded by the chaotic political situation in Hungary and the erroneous activities of the peace delegation (Romsics 2001). The authors expressed these arguments in newspaper articles, giving negative evaluations of both the Hungarian group and the outgroup. Within the Hungarian group there are a few actors and events perceived negatively: these are the right-wing and revisionist propagandists, Hungarian public opinion, and the revolutions in 1918–19. Among Hungarian politicians, Albert Apponyi⁶ is evaluated negatively while the negative actors in the outgroup are the Entente, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Wilson,⁷ Clemenceau,⁸ Beneš,⁹ and Masaryk.¹⁰

5 István Csurka (1934–2012): playwright, right-wing politician. After the change of regime, he was one of the founding members of a party called the Hungarian Democratic Forum. In 1993, he was expelled from the MDF and founded the Magyar Igazság és Élet Party, of which he was president until his death. Parliamentarian 1990–1994 and 1998–2002.

6 Albert Apponyi (1846–1933): conservative-liberal politician, Minister of Religion and Public Education 1917–1918. Head of the peace delegation in 1920. Member of Parliament for Jászberény.

7 Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924): President of the United States (1913–1921) and creator of the 14 points, which included validation of self-determination for the small Central European states.

8 Georges Benjamin Clemenceau (1841–1929): French politician, 40th and 53rd Prime Minister of the Third Republic. At the end of the First World War, he was one of the founders of the Treaty of Versailles – and the Treaty of Trianon, which divided Hungary.

9 Edvard Beneš (1884–1948): Czech politician, founder and second Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. His operations contributed greatly to the negative perception of Hungary and the loss of territory defined in the Treaty of Trianon.

10 Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937): First President of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1935).

In 1995, *Magyar Nemzet* became state-owned indirectly through Postabank, but the left-wing Horn Government continued to fund the opposition daily. The articles cover the reasons for the unfavorable peace treaty and blame outgroups such as the Czech politicians Beneš and Masaryk and British historian Seton-Watson's¹¹ anti-Hungarian propaganda. The reasons given for the unjust peace are that Wilson's points were applied only to the victors, the French dislike of the Hungarians, and the pacifist policies of Károlyi¹² and Béla Linder.¹³ The articles of *Magyar Nemzet* evoke the tone of *Pesti Hírlap* from 1920.

In 2000, the length of text in the right-wing newspaper was double that of 1995 – a total word count of 12,482 words. In 2000, *Magyar Nemzet* merged with the radical right-wing newspaper *Napi Magyarorszá*g and was published specifically as a newspaper supporting the Fidesz–MPP¹⁴ party. Most of the moderate right-wing journalists were replaced by the staff of *Napi Magyarorszá*g, and a radical perspective characterized the newspaper (Monori 2006). The radical tone appears in the reports on the commemorations of MIÉP, an extreme right-wing party. The daily published a speech by István Csurka given at an assembly entitled *Justice for Hungary!*, in which Csurka claimed that the Horn Government¹⁵ was guilty of failing to request the repeal of the Beneš decrees when concluding the Slovak Treaty. There are a large number of articles in this text corpus about the commemorations of Hungarians living abroad.

In 2005, the radical tone did not change, despite the fact that *Magyar Nemzet* became an opposition newspaper, and the Medgyessy Government withdrew state support. However, the construction of the right-wing media network continued, and Viktor Orbán called on his supporters to subscribe to *Magyar*

11 Robert William Seaton-Watson (1879–1951): British publicist, historian, and political activist.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, many people, typically in Anglo-Saxon and Pan-Slavic circles, considered him one of the most renowned international experts on the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy and South-Eastern Europe. It is probable that he was significantly involved in preparing the Treaty of Trianon, so on the Hungarian side he was considered the grave-digger of historical Hungary.

12 Mihály Károlyi (1875–1955): politician, Prime Minister, first President of the Republic of Hungary. A radical democrat, leader of the bourgeois democratic revolution (October 31, 1918) and the first bourgeois government.

13 Béla Linder (1876–1962): Military officer, Minister of Defense in the Károlyi Government.

14 FIDESZ–MPP: FIDESZ – Alliance of Young Democrats, MPP – Hungarian Civil Party. Right-wing national conservative party. The party had three names: (1) FIDESZ: Alliance of Young Democrats (1988–1995); (2) FIDESZ–MPP (1995–2003); (3) FIDESZ–MPSZ: Hungarian Civic Association (2003–)

15 Horn Government (1994–1998). This was the third government of Hungary after the change of regime, and was formed from a coalition of two parties, MSZP and SZDSZ.

Nemzet, so the right-wing bond remained. The number of words in the text of 2005 is 10,442.

In this corpus, events related to the Treaty of Trianon are the movements of extremist groups (Jobbik, Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom) and the activities of cross-border organizations. One of the demands of the extremist right-wing demonstration in front of the embassies of neighboring states was autonomy for cross-border minorities. Another topic that the demonstrators associated with the Trianon anniversary is the referendum on dual citizenship. Demonstrators, domestic and cross-border commemorators also sharply criticized the Gyurcsány Government.¹⁶ Journalists also evaluated the past, focusing on the contemporary politics of successor states, especially the Czechs and Romanians.

In 2010, the parliamentary vote on the enactment of National Unity Day as a national day of remembrance was the central issue in the largest right-wing corpus. The delegates of MSZP¹⁷ voted against the enactment, while LMP abstained. According to László Kövér,¹⁸ the purpose of the memorial day is to ‘start discussing the national trauma caused by the decision 90 years earlier.’ MSZP did not attend the parliamentary memorial day on June 4, so all these events deepened the divide between the two political sides. A sarcastic article was published in *Magyar Nemzet* about the absence of the MSZP. As National Unity Day supports conversation about the trauma, and MSZP did not participate in it, this means that the party does not want to participate in this conversation; i.e. in the healing process. Thus, paradoxically, MSZP contributed to the right-wing expropriation of Trianon.

The longitudinal examination of the intergroup evaluation in the right-wing text corpus showed that in each examined year there are subgroups within the Hungarian group that were in conflict with the ingroup regarding Trianon.

Also in the left-wing text corpus there are some enemy groups within the Hungarian group. These are mostly the opponents of the Social Democrats; these ‘mouth-breaking patriots’ are the Hungarian ruling class who signed the


16 Gyurcsány Government (2004–2009): The government called a referendum on dual citizenship on December 5, 2004, which ultimately ended in failure because neither the votes in support of nor the proportion of votes reached the 25% required for validity. On the other hand, the government’s campaign against dual citizenship weighed on the long-term relationship between Hungarian politics and Hungarians living abroad.

17 MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party. Center-left social democratic party in Hungary. This was founded in 1989 from the former members of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Between 1994 and 1998 and between 2002 and 2010, it was the ruling party of Hungary.

18 László Kövér (1959–). In 1988 he was a founding member of FIDESZ, and since 2010 he has been the Speaker of Parliament.

treaty. The pattern of intergroup evaluation in the left-wing text corpus is very similar to that in the right-wing text from 1920 to 2010 (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Left-wing evaluation, 1920–2010, subject of evaluation: Hungarians (%)



Source: Author's construction

However, between 1920 and 1940 the opposing groups did not organize according to political orientation, but rather by their acceptance or rejection of the treaty. From 1990 onwards, the central theme of Trianon was the search for a scapegoat, and since 2000 both political sides have developed their own version of the issue of responsibility.

Another important result in the longitudinal study is that the events occurring in parallel with the Trianon anniversaries and their social representations in the media texts influence the narrative psychological characteristics in the text corpora. This is because the actors in these present events are also part of the ingroup or the enemy group and their evaluation influences the outcome of the intergroup evaluation. Therefore, in the course of examining the media texts, it would have been more worthwhile to consider only the opinion genres in the intergroup evaluation. However, by introducing the news genres into the research, we gain insight into the fact that current political events which threaten the group identity evoke the chosen trauma of the group. Respectively, the traumatic event, the anniversary of Trianon, evokes the current identity threat to collective memory.

Trauma elaboration and emotion


Based on Pennebaker (2001), I presumed that the trauma-induced shock would initially imply an emotionally saturated narrative, but that after time emotions would be replaced by cognitive expressions, which tendency can be observed in personal life events as well as in group events.

Likewise, according to the sixth hypothesis, in the period immediately following the traumatic event, both in the right-wing text and the left-wing text, the traumatic event narrative has strong emotional saturation and low cognitive content.

To examine the frequency of emotional references, I compared the number of words that express all kinds of emotions found in texts to the word count of the right-and left-wing newspapers grouped annually. (I undertook the percentage calculation by dividing the number of emotional words found in the right-wing and the left-wing corps in the given year by the word count of the text multiplied by one hundred).

Figure 7 clearly shows that the relative frequencies of words related to emotions measured in the years immediately following the traumatic event (in 1920 and 1930) are relatively high. Moreover, they were highest in 1930 in the right-wing text corpus, at 1.66%.

Figure 7. *Relative frequency of words expressing emotions in left-wing and right-wing newspapers in 1920–2010 (%)*



Source: Author's construction based on Fülöp's research in 2012

Trauma elaboration and negation


The common use of denials and ‘no, no, never’-types of tropes is discernible in the press corpus on Trianon. The first phase of the elaboration of individual traumas and losses (the process of mourning) involves the denial of loss based on the chosen trauma model of Volkan (1998).

According to the seventh hypothesis, the early trauma narratives show a regressive mode of action: this involves primitive countermeasures, such as denial and the projection of negative intentions and feelings.

I examined the proportion of denials per year in the right and left-wing corpora, similarly to the examination of emotions.

Figure 8 clearly shows that the relative frequency of denials is highest in the right-wing text corpus of 1920, but it decreases in 1930; however, then it rises on both political sides and remains relatively high, at between 2 and 3 percent.

Figure 8. Relative frequency of denials in left-wing and right-wing newspapers in 1920–2010 (%)



Source: Author's construction based on Hargitai's research in 2005

DISCUSSION

The results reveal that the nationwide traumatic nature of Trianon appears in the media texts, too. In the period of the historical trauma, politicians, witnesses, contemporaries, and those who experienced the loss, the characters of

communicative memory, speak. In the media texts on the treaty, the expression of collective emotions and denial of the loss, as well as the high self-esteem of the ingroup and the devaluation of the outgroup are characteristic of Hungarians, which indicates an identity threat. In the 1930s and 1940s, this trend does not decrease, either in the right- or left-wing media texts. A strong downward trend in denials cannot be detected either. Contrary to the eighth hypothesis, in reference to which I assumed that the relative frequency of collective emotions and denials would be high in the first stage of trauma processing and decrease with time, it did not decrease on either political side. In fact, the downward trend is only discernible in the positive evaluation of the ingroup in the media texts after the political changes of 1990. But meanwhile, the negative evaluations of ingroup are greater than positive evaluations, both on the right and the left after 1990, and show no declining trend as the years progress. At the same time, the negative evaluations of the external group are also high. This trend contradicts Hypothesis 5 about intergroup evaluation and trauma evaluation, as in fact both positive and negative evaluations should decrease over time for both the ingroup the outgroup. The predominance of negative evaluations of the ingroup after 1990 implies a special so-called scapegoat narrative. These texts refer to seeking, on both political sides, those responsible for the Treaty of Trianon within their own group. Thus, the predominance of negative evaluations in the case of the ingroup can be understood.

But the continuous presence of collective emotions and denial, as well as the negative evaluations attributed to the outgroup and the ingroup in both the right- and left-wing texts, indicate a lack of advance in trauma elaboration.

CONCLUSION

Trianon trauma, viewed in relation to the occurrence of the traumatic event until 2010, based on Volkan's scenario of chosen trauma, can now be depicted as follows:

In the texts of the 1920s, narrative psychological references to anger and denial are signs of sudden shock. Demonstrations are organized against the treaty, which are backed by the government and organizations close to the government.

In 1930, these rituals are repeated on the anniversary of the event (most newspaper articles render the account that life stops for five minutes, just as in 1920, and the associations representing the revision involve commemoration); that is, the purpose of the repetition is to strengthen the identity of the group, which is based on a common grievance, and whose keystone is legitimate

reparation – that is, revision.

In fact, the latter repeat protests that deny rather than accept the treaty. Many of the texts of the 1930s speak about nothing but the commemoration of irredentist organizations, which almost encompass the whole world and involve sending memoranda to the League of Nations giving voice to their claims. It is easy to see that revision, which is the same as irredentism in public opinion, did not stimulate the national group in the direction of reconciliation with the lost object (in this case, lost territories). Indeed, an article from 1940 after the partial restoration of the pre-Trianon borders is hopefully triumphant rather than mournful, as *Pesti Hírlap* writes:

By the twentieth anniversary of signing the Treaty of Trianon, some of the borders of Trianon have already collapsed, and two parts of the country have returned happily to the bosom of the mainland. We hope that the anniversary when the entire border will only be a memory and all the injustices and stupidity of the Trianon Treaty will vanish is not far away. (Pesti Hírlap, June 4, 1940)

Historiography taught us that the triumph did not last long, as the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 essentially restored the Trianon borders. Since the Soviet leadership, together with the Allied powers, also played an important role in determining the conditions of the Paris Peace Treaty, Hungarian politicians completely abandoned their revisionist aspirations after the Second World War.

Trianon became righteous in Hungarian propaganda, in official historiography, in newspapers columns, and in history books. The nationalities revolted against the 'prison of folks' – that is, against the Monarchy, so according to the official attitude, the aspirations of the Romanians and the Czechs of becoming independent were merely justified and sanctioned by the treaty. The hopes of Hungarians remained with Lenin only, who, declared the whole procedure a robbery. But Lenin was buried a long time ago. (Ormos 1990:2)

This Trianon narrative dominated the years of socialism until the 1980s, and research on the topic was banned, and an even deeper silence surrounded the situation and fate of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries. (Ormos 1990:2)

Among the newspapers I examined, *Magyarság*, *Pesti Hírlap*, *Népszava*, and *Új Nemzedék* existed until 1944, and of these, Trianon was only commemorated in *Pesti Hírlap* in 1940. In 1945, only *Népszava* resumed from these newspapers

(on February 2), but I did not find any texts about Trianon around June 4, either in the 1945 issue or later, until 1990. *Magyar Nemzet* was started in 1938 under the editorship of Sándor Pethő, who left *Magyarság*, and was permitted to appear until 1944, but I did not examine it regarding this period. While the newspaper resumed publication on May 1, 1945, and it is still published today, I found no articles about the Trianon anniversary in it during the period of socialism. The third newspaper examined after the change of regime was *Népszabadság*, whose predecessor was *Szabad Nép*, published since 1942. *Népszabadág* was first published under this name on November 2, 1956; however, neither *Szabad Nép* nor *Népszabadság* write about Trianon around the time of the anniversary until 1990.

This means that the newspaper texts I have examined longitudinally tell the story of a drama whose outcome is actually not really considered tragic between 1920 and 1940. Thus there is no material in my research about the really tragic ending, the conclusion of the Second World War.

Despite the fact that at the conclusion of the Second World War the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) meant nearly the same loss of territory as occurred after the First World War, almost fifty years of silence followed the claim that Trianon led to the Second World War. In contemporary texts, this claim is constantly displayed in a context in which the parties dictating the peace are the perpetrators, and the Hungarians are the victims. As we can read in *Pesti Hírlap* in 1940:

However, the dictators of peace around Paris were not driven by insight, but blinded by hate bringing to the negotiating table the glowing hatred of the war-torn masses. Instead of wisdom, bias and draconian austerity dictated these contracts. There could be nothing else, but hatred, another despair, another war. Those who were pure-eyed had already seen this, – Clemenceau, the evil spirit of the peace conference, immediately cynically noted that their work had sown the seeds of a new war. (Pesti Hírlap, June 4, 1940)

After the political changes of 1990, this explanation returned and it is now very easy to draw a parallel between the two treaties, for the perpetrators are the same and the loss is also similar. Thus, it is not only the traumatic event that is repeated in the picture of the Paris Peace Treaty, but also the mental representations associated with that event. We can say that this sacrificial narrative is in circulation even today.

Obviously, in the period I call latent there were references to Trianon,¹⁹ if not always around the anniversary, but to prove this statement requires more thorough research.

In aggregate, I used narrative psychological content analysis in my research to support Volkan's chosen trauma concept when examining post-1990 and contemporary newspapers. The hypotheses related to the trauma-processing indicators of narrative psychology were not always confirmed in the longitudinal examination of the full text corpus, indicating that the Trianon trauma is not heading towards elaboration, but rather acts as a trauma that is chosen for its effect on current political events and political forces.

REFERENCES

- Bigazzi, S. – I. Csertő – A. Nencini (2006) A személy- és csoportközi értékelés pszicho-lingvisztikája. Magyar Számítógépes Nyelvészeti Konferencia (4.), Szeged, pp. 267–276.
- Buzinkay, Géza (2016) *A magyar sajtó és újságírás története a kezdetektől a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Wolters Kluwer Kft.
- Csertő, I. – J. László (2016) A csoportközi értékelés, mint a csoporttrauma érzelmi indikátora a nemzeti történelem elbeszéléseiben. In: Sepsi, E. – K. Deres – A. Czeglédy – Cs. Szummer (eds.): *Studia Caroliensia: Nyelv, Kultúra, Identitás: A Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem 2015-ös évkönyve*. Budapest, L'Harmattan and Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem, pp. 305–331.
- Dénes, I. Z. (2008) Liberalizmusok és nacionalizmusok. *Magyar Tudomány*, No. 2008/01, p. 5.
- Fülöp, É. (2010) *A történelmi pálya és a nemzeti identitás érzelmi szerveződése*. PhD-értekezés. Pécsi Tudományi Egyetem – BTK BTK Pszichológia Doktori Iskola
- Fülöp, É. – B. Ilg – I. Csertő – Zs. Szabó – B. Slugoski – J. László (2012) Emotion elaboration of collective traumas in historical narratives. <http://www.sydney-symposium.unsw.edu.au/2012/chapters/FulopEASP2012.pdf>
- Gyáni, G. (2010) *Az elveszített múlt*. Budapest, Nyitott Műhely

19 “However, little by little, the Hungarian intellectuals found a way to start talking about Trianon by avoiding the word Trianon. They collected more and more materials and wrote more and more articles, essays and books that indirectly referred to Trianon. Then, at the beginning of the 1980s even the word ‘Trianon’ also appeared.” (Ormos 1990)

- Habermas, J. (1993) *A társadalmi nyilvánosság szerkezetváltozása. Vizsgálódások a polgári társadalom egy kategóriájával kapcsolatban.* Budapest, Századvég
- Hargitai, R. – M. Naszódi – B. Kis – L. Nagy – A. Bóna – J. László (2005) A depresszív dinamika nyelvi jegyei az én-elbeszélésekben. A LAS-vertikum tagadás és a szelf-referencia modulja. *Pszichológia*, Vol. 25, No. 2., pp. 181–199.
- Klestenitz, T. (2013) *A katolikus sajtómozgalom Magyarországon 1896–1932.* Budapest, Complex
- Klestenitz, T. (2018) Katolikus sajtó és nyilvánosság a második világháború éveiben. In: *Útkeresés két korszak határán.* Agyagosszergény, Közi Horváth József Népfőiskola, pp. 39–52. http://real.mtak.hu/122715/1/KlestenitzTibor_kesz0818.pdf
- Kovács, É. (2015) Trianon, avagy a „traumatikus fordulat” a magyar történetírásban. *Korall: Társadalomtörténeti Folyóirat*, No. 59., pp. 82–107.
- Körösényi, A. – Cs. Tóth – G. Török (2007) *A magyar politikai rendszer.* Budapest, Osiris Kiadó
- László, J. (2005) *A történetek tudománya. Bevezetés a narratív pszichológiába.* Budapest, Új Mandátum
- László, J. (2012) *Történelemtörténetek.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó
- Litván, Gy. (1984) A Világ 1910–1926. In: Czére, Gy. (ed.): *Világ Repertórium.* I. köt. 1910–1912. A PIM bibliográfiai füzetek. Napilapok repertóriumai. Budapest, Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, p. 412.
- Monori, Á. (2006) Médiaháborúk. In: Bajomi-Lázár, P. (ed.): *Magyar médiatörténet a Késő-Kádár kortól az ezredfordulóig.* Budapest, Akadémia Kiadó, pp. 259–290.
- Ormos, M. (1990) Elhallgatások nélkül. *Magyar Nemzet*, June 4, 1990.
- Pennebaker, J. W. (2001[1993]) A stressz szavakba öntése: egészségi, nyelvészeti és terápiás implikációk. In: László, J. – B. Thomka (eds.): *Narratívák 5. Narratív Pszichológia.* Budapest, Kijarat Kiadó, pp. 189–205.
- Ricoeur, P. (2006) *Memory, History, Forgetting.* Chicago, Chicago University Press
- Romsics, I. (2001) *Magyarország története a 20. században.* Budapest, Osiris Kiadó
- Sipos, B. (2011a) *Sajtó és hatalom a Horthy-korszakban.* Budapest, Argumentum Kiadó
- Sipos, B. (2011b) Rákosi Jenő: Emlékezések. http://www.irodalomismeret.hu/files/2011_3/sipos_balazs.pdf [Last access: 01 11 2020]
- Szabó, M. (2015) *Az újkonzervativizmus és a jobboldali radikalizmus története: 1867–1918.* Budapest, Új Mandátum
- Török, G. (2005) *A politikai napirend: politika, média, közvélemény.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó

- Volkan, V. D. (1998) *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux Inc.
- Volkan, V. D. (2007) Massive trauma: The political ideology of entitlement and violence, *Revue française de psychanalyse*, Vol. 71, No. 4., pp. 1047–1059; <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfp.714.1047>
- Zeidler, M. (2009) *A revíziós gondolat*. Pozsony, Kalligram

APPENDIX: HISTORY OF RELEVANT NEWSPAPERS FROM THE BEGINNING TO 1944

Népszava and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (1873–)

When *Népszava* started (1873), it was a newspaper of the labor movement, edited by Jakab Meyer (Viktor Külföldi), published weekly in German and Hungarian. It officially became the newspaper of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in 1880, and a daily newspaper in 1905. At the turn of the century, the party's main aspirations included the struggle for a civil, European Hungary, the introduction of universal and secret suffrage, the satisfaction of the social needs of workers, and the fight against violent Hungarianization. *Népszava* at first opposed the war, with a full-page headline appearing in its July 26, 1914 issue entitled "We Don't Want a War!" By the autumn, however, it had already accepted the government's argument about the inevitability of war, shifted responsibility to the enemy, and encouraged workers to fight. During the four years of the war, it mainly reported on war fronts, and despite censorship, it also managed to report on most of the anti-war Social Democratic movements. At the time of the October Revolution, *Népszava* was close to the government, demanding a just peace and the autonomy of Hungarian nationalities. During the Council Republic, *Népszava* was the official morning paper of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the number one pro-government daily. After the fall of the Council Republic, *Népszava* again became the newspaper of the Social Democratic Party, and its editor-in-chief was Béla Somogyi, who published articles with his colleagues about the atrocities of the Counter Revolution. In the second half of 1919, after the victory of the Counter Revolution, the Social Democratic Party re-formed and became a mass party with 14,000 party members and 200,000 union members, its own cultural, sports, and leisure associations, and its own press. At that time, the party demanded an end to the aggression of the Counter Revolution, the suppression of anti-Semitism, and general and secret elections. The Social

Democratic Party took part in a coalition government led by Károly Huszár, also recognized by the Entente powers, the latter who wished to run in the January 1920 parliamentary elections. However, many candidates were prosecuted for their role in the Council Republic, and authorities detained or insulted them, and the party withdrew from the coalition government and did not run in the elections. Thus, when the Treaty of Trianon was signed, the Social Democratic Party supported the signing of the peace and demanded a peaceful revision, referring to the right of peoples to self-determination and the friendship of peoples living side by side – these demands also appeared in *Népszava*.

Pesti Hírlap (Pest Newspaper) (1879–1944)

Pesti Hírlap started on January 1, 1879 as the daily newspaper of the Légrády Brothers Book and Newspaper Publishing Company. It was loyal to the contemporary government of Kálmán Tisza. Its purpose was to serve and satisfy the needs of the audience, but in addition, the owner, Károly Légrády, wanted to dictate the content of the newspaper. A business focus dominated the newspaper, which resulted in a large number of ads. The paper provided up-to-date news by many means, building its own network of correspondents both abroad and at home. At the turn of the twentieth century, *Pesti Hírlap* became a popular daily newspaper for liberal metropolitan citizens and was removed from party politics (Buzinkay 2016).

After the loss of the First World War, the journalists of *Pesti Hírlap* first raised the idea of a national independent kingdom, then during the October Revolution they sided with the civilian government for a short time, but their dislike of the workers and the Communists was undisguised.

Pesti Hírlap was banned during the Council Republic in May 1919, along with other civilian dailies. When the daily was able to reappear (on September 28, 1919), it supported the Horthy regime and reported with satisfaction on the executions of the Communists, and associated retaliation. The Trianon peace treaty was called the “paper rag” by *Pesti Hírlap*. In the weeks leading up to the signing of the peace treaty, it argued against the signing. In the 1920s, *Pesti Hírlap* was in the service of revision, reporting even the slightest irredentist movement. It also spread strong revisionist propaganda abroad, publishing issues in French, Italian, and English protesting against the peace in the 1920s and 1930s. The Lord Rothermere campaign also received the most publicity in its pages.

On June 21, 1927, English newspaper magnate Lord Rothermere published an article in the Daily Mail entitled *Hungary's Place in the Sun – Safety for*

Central Europe. Rothermere argued for the return of the Hungarian-inhabited areas along the border. This article was published in full translation in the next day's issue of *Pesti Hírlap*, and was commented on by editor-journalist Jenő Rákosi. The impact of the events of The Revision League (July 27, 1927) that was formed in Hungary brought together advocacy economic organizations. From then on, the Revision League and its president, Ferenc Herczeg used *Pesti Hírlap* as a mouthpiece. The issue of revision remained a central topic in the newspaper in the 1930s, while during the reign of Gyula Gömbös (1932–1936) the newspaper supported the head of the government's foreign policy efforts at revision, the alliance with the Italians and Germans, and Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor.

Thanks to the two Vienna Awards, the *Pesti Hírlap* could enthusiastically celebrate the return of a part of Slovakia in 1938 and the return of north Transylvania in 1939, and considered the Rothermere initiative and its own efforts to have played a part in this. *Pesti Hírlap* reported with confidence on World War II, which increasingly seemed to have been lost. At the end of the war, in March 1944, the Germans occupied Hungary and power was taken over by the pro-German Sztójay Government, which sought to oust anti-German forces from public life, arresting many members of the civil opposition and dissolving opposition parties. One-hundred-and-fifty magazines and 18 Budapest and rural dailies were banned. *Pesti Hírlap* did not cease to exist, but most of its employees were forced out of work. In the summer months of 1944, war coverage covered the front pages of the *Pesti Hírlap*, while in October the newspaper headline greeted the Hungarian Nazi Government of Ferenc Szálasi, who had come to power with German help. German and Hungarian fascist troops occupied strategic points in the capital on October 15, and in the evening Szálasi announced the takeover and the resumption of the war. Thus, from November onwards the propaganda in the *Pesti Hírlap* urged the defense of the capital against the Red Army. Finally, a government decree published in December 1944 suspended most of Budapest's dailies. After 1945, *Pesti Hírlap* reappeared under the title *Hírlap*, while the owner of the newspaper was still the Légrády Brothers Limited Liability Company. However, in August 1949, *Pesti Hírlap* was finally closed down.

Budapesti Hírlap (Budapest Newspaper) (1881–1938)

This publication started on June 16, 1881, edited by József Csukássy. Most of the staff consisted of journalists who had been fired from *Pesti Hírlap* who did not agree with the influence of the owner of *Pesti Hírlap*, Károly Légrády, about

the content of the paper. Jenő Rákosi, who was the co-owner and editor-in-chief of the paper, became the sole owner in 1891. Rákosi built the headquarters of *Budapesti Hírlap*, where the publishing office, the editorial office and its own printing house operated. The spirit of the newspaper was basically determined by the political views of Jenő Rákosi, who supported all movements that supported the Hungarians. Rákosi was convinced that the nationalities living in Hungary could and should be assimilated into Hungarian society, and he opposed all attempts at Germanization. The claim to the conservatism of the *Budapesti Hírlap* is supported by its position on the Church Policy Act, as it opposed civil marriage. This mostly reflected the opinion of Count Albert Apponyi, the conservative politician. Until 1905, *Budapesti Hírlap* was an opposition paper, which opposed the Liberal Party and the Government of Kálmán Tisza. The *Budapesti Hírlap* played a major role in the 1905 victory of the conservative opposition. From 1910 onwards, Rákosi supported the policy of Prime Minister István Tisza, as both considered certain financial and educational guarantees essential for the extension of universal and secret suffrage. *Budapesti Hírlap* also agreed with István Tisza's war aspirations, based on the principle of one state, one nation, so it welcomed the outbreak of war. The *Budapesti Hírlap* was banned during the Council Republic, and Jenő Rákosi was arrested. The daily reappeared on September 28, 1919 during the Counter-Revolution. The signing of the Treaty of Trianon was opposed by the *Budapesti Hírlap*. In the Horthy era, Rákosi did not fully support the system, speaking out against the terror in Budapest and the countryside. After Rákosi's internal struggles, he left the paper on January 6, 1925, and became a journalist for *Pesti Hírlap*. With Rákosi's exit, the *Budapesti Hírlap* steadily declined in popularity. The *Budapesti Hírlap* closed in 1938.

Az Est (The Evening) (1910–1939)

Az Est was first published on the afternoon of April 15, 1910. It was founded by Andor Miklós, who previously wrote a column on economics for the daily *Pesti Napló*. *Az Est* is often considered a tabloid, but it was not one. It was an American-style political daily that took advantage of the business opportunities available to the press, employed sensationalism, and gave ads a particularly prominent place. It was a liberal daily newspaper, at most temporarily committed to any political direction or politician. It was characterized by an ambivalent attitude toward the horrors of the Counter Revolution, fighting, anarchy, and atrocities, but supporting Horthy and the National Army in their evasion. The daily later supported the Government of István Bethlen. *Az Est* argued for the

signing of the peace treaty, but considered the peace to be temporary. In the 1920s, *Est* newspapers (three dailies) moderately criticized the government (Bethlen), condemned anti-Semitic jokes, and the university numerus clausus, but considered the expulsion of Galician Jews from the country to be appropriate. With the death of Andor Miklós in 1933, concern with the press also began to decline, leaving the ownership of the company in the hands of his wife, while the editor-in-chief became Imre Salusinszky. With the coming to power of Gyula Gömbös, the pages of the liberal press were allowed to prevail less and less, and as a result of the shift in politics to the right, the editorial board also changed. With the enactment of the first and then the second Jewish law, journalists of Jewish descent were also fired from the editorial office of *Az Est*. In the summer of 1939, the increasingly threatening war was the subject, with the daily supporting Mussolini's policy. Eventually, the Est Publishing Company was nationalized, and *Az Est* was last published on November 17, 1939.

Világ (World) (1910–1926)

The strengthening radical civil democratic position of 1905/1906 did not have its own daily newspaper. There was a need for such civil radicalism with its own program to have its own newspaper, so the Masonic daily *Világ* was launched on March 30, 1910. An extensive network of Masonic lodges operated in Hungary at the turn of the century but the Freemasons had their own internal documents. Eventually, *Világ* was financed by the Eötvös Lodge and published by Dr. Lajos Bálint. The launch of *Világ* was definitely a success, with the number of copies soon growing to ten thousand, while its readership consisted of the educated strata of the city's progressive intellectuals and bourgeoisie. In 1913, an editorial change took place, and under the leadership of Lajos Purjesz the newspaper adopted a more radical tone. After the formation of the Civil Radical Party in 1914, *Világ* became the party's paper and thereafter officially represented a radical program. The party's program was formulated by Oszkár Jászi: he spoke of a radical policy of independence that would create economic independence from the monarchy and local governments, in addition to public education reform, the secularization of church property, freedom of thought and the press, freedom of assembly, and avoidance of Hungarianizing minorities.

In the summer of 1914, most of the dailies were pro-war, but the *Világ* was one of the few exceptions, although at first it was not consistent enough on this issue (Litván 1984). From 1917 onwards, *Világ* fully supported the formation of a democratic national unity front under Károlyi's leadership. This alliance served as the basis for the National Council formed in October 1918, and then

for the Károlyi Government. Later, members of the Civil Radical Party also took part in Károlyi's Government. The opposition *Világ* became a pro-government newspaper after the bourgeois revolution (October 31, 1918), representing the government's middle-class policy. The newspaper had declined in popularity by early 1919, fueled by the disintegration of the governing coalition and the Radical Party's decision not to run in the April elections but rather to support Social Democratic Party candidates. Elections did not take place after that, because the Berinkey Government resigned on March 20, 1919, and the Social Democrats agreed with the communists to take power and introduce a proletarian dictatorship without Károlyi's knowledge. The Social Democrat leaders Sándor Garbai and the communist leader Béla Kun proclaimed the Council Republic.

As a result of the events, the Civil Radical Party disbanded itself on March 22. *Világ* was still published under the name *Fáklya (Torch)* during the five months of the proletarian dictatorship, and had a focus on public-education-related issues.

At the time of the Counter Revolution, *Világ* was published on September 28, 1919, but struck a much more moderate tone. The freedom of the press was formally restricted by a return to the liberal but non-democratic press law of 1914, which was further tightened in the 1920s. Thus, the reintroduction of censorship and the regulation of paper distribution also hit the *Világ*. Most of the daily's old main staff and editors (Jászi, Bíró, Szende, Bölöni) were forced to emigrate.

Világ's sixteen-year existence was finally ended by the franc counterfeiting scandal. The scandal erupted in Hungary in 1925 when it emerged that right-wing circles wanted to take revenge on the Trianon peace treaty by producing and distributing fake thousand-franc notes in France – a move that would also have financed revisionist propaganda. This French franc counterfeiting took place at the Cartography Institute in Budapest, which was part of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, not only the perpetrators and their helpers, but also politicians from higher circles such as Pál Teleki and István Bethlen were subjects of suspicion. *Világ* also admitted the complicity of the National Bank in the Franc-counterfeiting affair. The radical right demanded a ban on the paper, which eventually occurred on May 1. The interior minister banned the paper indefinitely – that is, permanently.

Új Nemzedék (New Generation) (1913–1944)

Új Nemzedék was first published in 1913 as a weekly political journal, edited by right-wing journalist István Mlotay. Members of the paper's editorial staff

were initially radical pro-independence advocates. The magazine was militantly anti-war and from the beginning it was opposed to an alliance with the Germans (Szabó 2015)

However, the tone of the *Új Nemzedék* became more and more radical as a result of the events of 1916–17 (the Romanian invasion of Transylvania and the fall of the Tisza Government). Moreover, the newspaper's new ally became aristocratic great capital, which, for all its flaws, was considered to be much more the bearer of national values than Jewish great capital. The change of attitude of Milotay and his co-editors was most pronounced during 1917–18, when Milotay began to approach the group most strongly associated with right-wing radicalism – the circle of Béla Bangha. The Bangha group eventually took the first steps towards launching Christian newspapers, but *Új Nemzedék* was also involved in the propaganda battle for an independent Christian press. *Új Nemzedék* was finally purchased in December 1918 by the Central Press Company (KSV).

The Central Press Company was founded as a joint stock company by Jesuit Pope Béla Bangha and his supporters. His goal was to create a self-run publishing unit, with its own newspapers, capable of addressing the masses, as opposed to the mass press responsible for disrupting traditional values. Newspapers that built on disseminating rapid, up-to-date news and entertainment, such as *Az Est*, did not discourage the audience with their preaching.

Both the Central Press Company and *Új Nemzedék* were banned under the proletarian dictatorship. When the papers were relaunched on September 28, 1919, the *Új Nemzedék* was one of the most important dailies of the Central Press Company, edited by Milotay again. Initially, the newspapers of the Central Press Company were also dominated by petty-bourgeois, Christian socialist elements, and the unity of Christianity against the destructive dailies was demonstrated. A popular column in *Új Nemzedék* was the “Pardon” column, edited and written by Dezső Kosztolányi, a respected writer of the age. In the column, journalists favored the new system, which condemned the revolutions, the Social Democrats, the bourgeois radicals and the Communists. Jews and Freemasons were held responsible for the Red Terror and denied the White Terror.

In November 1920, Milotay left *Új Nemzedék* and was replaced by two more radical journalists, Lehel Kádár and István Lendvai. The fight against the destructive press continued even more strongly, with KSV journalists demanding state control of the press and the establishment of a chamber of journalists. *Új Nemzedék* was most vehemently opposed to the signing of the Trianon Peace. István Friedrich's speech against the signing of the peace and the Entente was published in full by the newspaper. Later, during the years of the Bethlen Government, *Új Nemzedék* served as the government's right-wing

opposition, but pursued a loyal opposition policy. The first step was a change of editor on October 1, 1921, when the new editor-in-chief became the liberal-Catholic László Szabó. Szabó removed the radical Kádár and Lendvay from the paper. The KSV papers returned to proclaiming Christian-national unity, which was fully in line with government policy (Klestenitz 2013:517). By the mid-twenties, *Új Nemzedék* and KSV newspapers in general had declined in popularity due to the unsatisfactory financial situation of the publisher, the fierce competition for an audience, and the latter's declining purchasing power. By 1925, *Új Nemzedék* was being published in 18-19 thousand copies a day, and KSV was struggling with enormous financial problems. Eventually the state rushed to help with a loan, sparking displeasure among conservative Catholic circles. While during the reign of István Bethlen (1921–1931) the synthesis of religiosity and nationalism was the ideological basis of politics, Gyula Gömbös (1932–1936) sought to suppress the influence of the church and wanted to hand over the task of national education exclusively to the state. The high priests realized that the realization of Gömbös' program would lead to the disintegration of the Catholic unification system in the long term, so they sought to strengthen the institutional system. Therefore, in the 1930s, the main goal of the Catholic press movement became to establish the independence of Catholic newspapers (Klestenitz 2013:612–617).

The outbreak and antecedents of World War II in the late 1930s also marked a turning point in journalism. The first Jewish law, passed in 1938, made the setting up of a Press Chamber obligatory, so journalism became strongly regulated in Hungary (the Press Chamber selected journalists on racial, religious, and political grounds). In 1938, about four hundred papers were discontinued for political reasons. At the outbreak of World War II, the Government of Pál Teleki introduced compulsory press censorship. The press increasingly became a tool of foreign policy (Klestenitz 2018:2). The KSV papers, including *Új Nemzedék*, were committed in many directions, including to the high priesthood, the Christian party, the legitimists, and the government of the time, but they were consistent in two things: they opposed the spread of German National Socialism and Hungarian far-right agitation. The KSV's newspapers were last published on December 16, 1944 (Klestenitz 2018:19).

Magyarság (1920–1944)

After leaving *Új Nemzedék*, István Miltay, with Sándor Pethő, started the daily newspaper *Magyarság* in December 1920 on behalf of the leader of the moderate legitimate opposition, Gyula Andrassy Jr. The paper soon became the

right-wing opposition to the Bethlen Government and enjoyed the support of the middle classes.

The newspaper attacked liberal values in every forum, its biggest target being Klebelsberg Kuno, a Minister of Culture who was too liberal, according to Milotay. The *Magyarság* were anti-communist and anti-liberal, and had well-known journalists: Sándor Pethő, János Komáromi, Jenő Miklós, Jenő Gagyí, András Dékány, János Makkai, György Oláh, Endre Radnai, and Ella Megyery (Buzinkay 2016:1325).

Magyarság went into crisis in the 1930s, and in early 1934 the owner, Olivér Rupprecht Jr., took over the responsibility of editing the paper. Milotay left the paper in 1934 with 16 colleagues and founded *Új Magyarság*, which supported radical right-wing politics. Sándor Pethő thus became the editor-in-chief of *Magyarság*, and Gyula Hegedűs the responsible editor.

The newspaper then turned against the policies of the Gömbös Government and represented moderately liberal legitimist views, taking a foreign policy direction against Nazis and the Soviet Union until 1938, when Sándor Pethő was replaced. Kálmán Hubay became the editor-in-chief of *Magyarság* and thus the paper became an important press body in support of National Socialism, an important German news center, and a distributor of Nazi German money (Buzinkay 2016:1328). It then became the mouthpiece of Nazi movements – first the Szálasi movement obtained the paper until 1941, then it became the forum of another Hungarian Nazi movement until December 16, 1944.

CHANGING SOCIAL VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY TAMIL SOCIETY, INDIA: A QUALITATIVE INQUIRY

KARUNANITHI GOPALAKRISHNAN¹

ABSTRACT: *Social values in Indian society in general and Tamil society in particular are subject to fluctuation, in accordance with on-going social changes ushered in by various modern forces. Consequently, these values metamorphose and degenerate into counter-cultural practices that pose a threat to traditional culture. Modern people attribute new meanings to the unethical practices that they engage in by emphasizing their immediate relevance and necessity for their changing life styles. They believe that their willingness to follow them instead of social values will help them make a profit that sustains their livelihood in this time of change.*

KEYWORDS: *generosity, greediness, hospitality, inhospitality, gratitude, ingratitude, truthfulness and untruthfulness*

ABOUT SOCIAL VALUES

Social values are beliefs about appropriate behaviors. They are standard measures that guide people's thoughts, speeches, actions, and also judgments. Primarily, they are not innate, but are learnt through people's observations, interactions, and experiences within family, as well as in society, and are passed on through successive generations. They are influenced by the socio-

¹ *Karunanithi Gopalakrishnan* is retired Professor of Sociology, School of Social Sciences & Languages, Vellore Institute of Technology University, Tamil Nadu, India; a former Visiting Professor of the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary, email: karunanithig@gmail.com. The author is highly thankful to Dr. Nehamathullah, former professor of English, Sadak Abdullah Appa College, Palayakottai, Tamil Nadu, India, and Prof. M. Manoharan, Vellore Institute of Technology, Vellore, Tamil Nadu, India, for their constructive comments and valuable suggestions in relation to developing this paper.

cultural environment in terms of family, community, religion and the like. They convey what is important for people to lead a respectable life. According to Bardi et al. (2008), Maio (2010), and Roccas and Sagiv (2009), values guide people's perceptions, goals, attitudes, and behaviors. By and large, they serve as motivators that facilitate these components of people's lives. Therefore, Konty and Dunham (1997) point out that those values are expected to be less amenable to changes than attitudes and needs.

Values have cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (Rokeach 1973): (1) a value is a cognitive component, in that it refers to some kind of perception or knowledge about a correct way of behaving, (2) a value is an affective component, in that people can feel emotional about it, and (3) a value is a behavioral component, in that it is an intervening variable that leads to action when activated. The values discussed here are explained from the point of view of normative theories. Pauls (1990) explains that normative theories of value make judgments about what "ought to be" in the realm of values. For instance, they make claims about what constitutes "just," "good," or "moral" behavior for an individual, as well as for society.

Ergil (1984) sees social values as moral beliefs and principles accepted by the majority of people so as to ensure the continuity of their bonds in society. Inkeles (1964) mentions that the social values indicate not what is there, but what *should* be there in a society in terms of moral imperatives. From this point of view, social values are accepted as undisputed facts that are expected by a society. They are social standards that help individuals understand the difference between right and wrong – hence they signify "it is not doing things right, but doing only the right things." They enable individuals to live together in harmony and peace and hence are the foundations of every culture. When they are lacking, all sorts of social problems may arise, eventually resulting in culture degradation followed by social disorganization.

Fichter (1990) specifies some of the functions of values: (1) they show ways of thinking and behaving ideally; (2) they are used as a means of judging; (3) they make people focus on useful and important cultural objects; (4) they play a role as a guide to adhering to and performing social roles; (5) they are the agents of social control; and (6) they provide solidarity. While controlling people's behavior, values maintain social order. Here arises a question: what is the difference between values and norms? Values are general guidelines, whereas norms are specific guidelines. Values are general standards, which help decide what is good and what is bad, whereas norms are like rules that specify how people should and should not behave in various social situations.

METHODOLOGY

Objective

This review as well as descriptive paper aims to analyze some social values such as generosity, hospitality, gratitude, and truthfulness, which are practiced by the elder generation of people in Tamil society (in Tamil Nadu State of India), and to explain how they are being replaced by a set of unethical practices by the younger generation.

Methodological tools

Primarily, two qualitative methodological tools are used to collect data: case studies, and focus group discussion. Elaborate interviews were conducted with nine knowledgeable persons (four middle-aged men; two middle-aged and an elderly woman; and one male and one female adolescent graduate student) from rural as well as urban areas of Tamil Nadu. All of them were interviewed through video conferencing due to COVID-19. Additionally, a focus group discussion was held with a group of five elderly rural literates (three men and two women) and six urban adolescent graduate students (three boys and three girls) with the help of the same technique. In addition to this, a literature review forms a part of the methodology – in relation to which several reviews of relevant published articles and books were completed in order to prepare the conceptual foundation for the paper. Though a number of works were reviewed, they are not all presented due to limits to space, but some of them are referred to in various appropriate places in the paper.

Limitations

One of the major limitations of the paper is that it confines its discussion to India in general and Tamil Nadu State in particular, due to limitations on space. The other one is that, for the same reason, only four values (generosity, hospitality, gratitude, and truthfulness) are discussed. These values may be universal in the sense that they are common to people who live in all civilized societies in the world, including Indian society as well as Tamil society. The paper also limits its scope to discussing these values in terms of how members of the elder generation continue to follow them on the one hand, and how those

of the younger generation prefer to follow a set of practices that contrast with those values on the other hand.

GENEROSITY vs. GREED

As mentioned in the Oxford Dictionary, the term “generosity” is derived from the Latin word *generōsus*, which means “nobility of birth.” It is often used to denote charity. The wealth amassed by an individual is meant for not only living a luxurious life, but also for charitable purposes. Ancient literature and religious scriptures in Indian society in general and Tamil society in particular glorify the value of charity (a product of generosity) and encourage people to practice it. For instance, Thiruvalluvar, a Sangam² Tamil poet, mentions in his work (*Thirukkural* 1931:385) that an efficient king is able to think of right ways to acquire wealth and safeguard it in order to spend on increasing the welfare of his country. Another Sangam literary work, *Purananuru* (1950:189), stresses that wealth is destined for charity, i.e., for giving generously to the poor. The *Bhagavad Gita* (1971:17:20) declares that “charity given to a worthy person simply because it is right to give, without consideration of anything in return, at the proper time and in the proper place, is stated to be in the mode of goodness.” The gospel of Jesus Christ (*The Holy Bible* 1970: Acts 20:35) states that “[it] is more blessed to give than to receive.” While advocating charity, the *Quran* (*The Holy Quran* 2018: *Surah Baqarah* 2:271) points out that “[if] you do deeds of charity openly, it is well; but if you bestow it upon the needy in secret, it will be even better for you...” Concern for others is one of the main teachings of Sikhism, which advocates charity, especially giving food to hungry people, because this is considered equivalent to giving food to God (Singh 2001).

Charity is one of the predominant social values practiced by the elder generation of people in Tamil society, as elsewhere in other societies in India, out of their concern for the well-being of humanity. It involves selfless service helping the poor in terms of providing money, food, clothing, or shelter. Like philanthropists elsewhere in India, some of their counterparts in Tamil society run charitable organizations that support the well-being of the poor. For example, a well-known philanthropist in Tamil Nadu, Chengalvaraya Naicker (1829–1874), made a munificent contribution for relief work during the worst

2 During the Sangam Age (the period applicable to ancient parts of Tamil Nadu and Kerala and parts of Sri Lanka spanning from c. 6th-century BCE to c. 3rd-century CE), varieties of Tamil literature were contributed by poets as well as poetesses. This period was named after the term “Sangam” (which means organization). The Sangam poets and scholars used to gather at Madurai, the second largest city in Tamil Nadu State of India.

famine in Orissa in 1866, and later on wrote a will donating his entire assets (amounting to a huge sum of money) to trusts, particularly the Pachaiyappa Trust – named after its donor, Pachaiyappa Mudaliar (1754–1794) – for charitable and religious purposes.³ In a similar way, Nawab C. Abdul Hakeem Saheb (1863–1938) founded the Muslim Educational Society⁴ in 1918 at Melvisharam in Tamil Nadu (a business center in northern Tamil Nadu), which became a great educational hub for catering to the educational needs of rural students (C. Abdul Hakeem College Committee 1990). Likewise, some other state-level as well as national-level religious organizations are engaged in charitable activities for the destitute and orphans.

Thus, a person's generosity is understood as his selfless charitable service to the poor. In ancient Tamil society, some philanthropists donated valuable things to needy persons. They believed that the purpose of accumulating wealth is to help the poor and perform righteous obligations. For instance, in the Sangam period, seven great philanthropists (Pari, Valviloori, Malayaman Thirumudi Kaari, Paeghan, Adhiyamaan Neduman Anji, Nallaai and Aykandhiran.) were very well known for their selfless charitable service (Jagannathan 2014). Nevertheless, others who were not rich were also engaged in charitable activities according to their capacity to donate. Additionally, in India including Tamil Nadu State, certain religious mutts⁵ and several religious institutions have been engaged in charitable activities. However, at the present, most of them have given up those activities and some others have confined themselves only to providing religious services for various reasons. However, a religious organization established by a Tamil Saint, Swami Ramalinga (1823–1874), at Vadalur (a town situated almost in the middle of coastal Tamil Nadu) still continues to serve food to thousands of hungry people every day. Of all forms of charity, feeding the hungry (*annadhanam* – etymologically *anna* means food; *dhanam* means charity) is the best, because the Tamil poets, Kudapulaviyanar (*Purananuru* 1950:18) and Chathanar (*Manimekalai* 1989:11:92) emphasize that “the giver of food is the giver of life.” This is perhaps the reason why in big temples in Tamil Nadu the poor and destitute are provided with food every day in the afternoon. Some of the charitable trusts also perform a similar service. During an interview undertaken through video conferencing on March 27,

3 Pachaiyappa Mudaliar (1754–1794) and Chengalvaraya Naicker (1829–1874) were known philanthropists in Tamil Nadu who donated huge sum for establishing educational institutions. Extract from Pachayyappa College Centenary Commemoration Book (Tiruvankataswami 1942).

4 <https://cahc.edu.in/about/management> [Last access: 06 10 2020]

5 Mutt refers to a Hindu religious institution with properties that is presided over by a religious person whose duty it is to impart religious dogmas or render spiritual service to a body of disciples (Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951– Madras Act XIX, 1951, p. 10).

2020, a middle-aged follower of Swami Ramalinga who frequents Vadalur town explained this form of service as follows:

According to Swami, there is no better prayer or ritual than annadhanam. It is, by all means, the greatest contribution and an essential element of Sanatan Dharma.⁶ Swami was unable to bear the sufferings of starving people. To him, kindness or love of a person is no use if it fails to satisfy the hunger of a fellow human being. Therefore, he initiated the selfless service of feeding hungry people on May 23, 1867. With the support of his friends and well-wishers, land was acquired in Vadalur town and a modest building was constructed to house a mega kitchen. Donations of food grains and vegetables were accepted from generous people to keep the kitchen always engaged. Since day one, food has been served thrice a day to the hungry without caste or religious discrimination. Every day about 1,000 people in and around the town are fed. I used to dine there twice a month, as I am living in a neighboring township.

Similarly, Kunjarathammal, a wealthy *devadasi*⁷ fed thousands of people in Madurai (the second largest city in Tamil Nadu State) during the most horrible famine of 1876–1878.⁸ During the initial period of famine, she was moved by the sight of hundreds of people starving and dying. Consequently, she started serving porridge prepared at her home to a small group of hungry people. After sometime, a large crowd of people started lining up in front of her house to get food. Prompted by this, the then District Collector of Madurai (an Englishman) started serving food in a similar manner with the help of district administration. However, Kunjarathammal continued to feed hundreds of people over a period of thirteen months by selling her properties one after another, including her jewels and two bungalows. Consequently, she was forced to live in a small tiled house and died after the famine (Narayani 2020). Her willingness to feed

6 In Hinduism, *Sanatanadharma* denotes a set of duties or religiously ordained practices obligatory for all Hindus regardless of caste, class, or sect. These duties and practices are considered timeless values.

7 In the past, in south India, *devadasis* were women who were dedicated to rendering certain specific religious services in temples throughout their lives. In addition to this, they used to perform classical Indian music and dance during temple ceremonies. Hence, they enjoyed a significant social status. But later, by exigencies of circumstances, they ended up as concubines of wealthy persons and were held in low esteem. At the present, the *devadasi* system is not in existence.

8 This began in 1876 after an intense drought that resulted in crop failure in the Deccan Plateau. It affected south and south-western India (the British presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and the princely states of Mysore and Hyderabad) for a period of two years.

these hungry people came from her genuine concern for the poor, who were living in despair. This is perhaps why she was able to sustain her charity until the end of the famine. This shows that charity of any kind, if it is performed wholeheartedly, motivates the giver and sustains them.

The service “Food for Life Vrindavan” (FFLV 2007) started in 1991 by the International Society for Krishna Consciousness in *Vrindavan*⁹ has been providing food on a daily basis to several thousand poor people. Similarly, this society’s temple at Dwarka Township in Delhi has also been feeding millions of poor since the declaration of nationwide lockdown on March 24, 2020 due to COVID-19 (Ghosh 2020). In the same way, the *Gurudwara* (temple of Sikhs) Management Committee in Delhi set up a mega kitchen to feed about 40,000 people daily, who are unable to get food during this time of pandemic (*Times of India* 2020). In Tamil Nadu State, a number of voluntary organizations have also put up community kitchens to supply food to pavement dwellers and the poor who have been hit severely by the lockdown. For instance, in Coimbatore (the third largest city in Tamil Nadu State), some volunteers from the Catering Owners Association have been delivering about 2,000 packets of food three times a day to hungry people since the commencement of the lockdown (*The Hindu*, April 6, 2020).

Though a limited number of organizations have served the benefit of the poor and the needy for several years, the charitable activities in Tamil Nadu as well as in other states of India are shrinking significantly. This may be due to the impact of capitalism on people, in terms of how it encourages them to achieve economic power by obtaining access to resources. They feel that nothing may be achieved if their economic condition is weak. Their desire for wealth accumulation seems to have limited their involvement in charitable activities. The profit motive has become a factor underlying their interactions and interrelations and made them selfish and parochial, ultimately making them idiosyncratic and greedy. This greediness may perhaps be a means of coping with the present fast-moving capitalist societies.

Recently, in India, the corporate sector has been instructed by the government to contribute (*Times of India* 2020) to a fund earmarked for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for a COVID-19 Relief Fund (this qualifies the fund as CSR expenditure according to the Companies Act, 2013). Companies have responded probably with the hidden agenda of increasing brand value, for obvious reasons. However, some of them have contributed large sums out of their own free will to charitable activities during this pandemic period. Similarly, wealthy film artists,

⁹ According to ancient Hindu scriptures, Lord Krishna spent most of his childhood days in *Vrindavan*, situated in Uttar Pradesh State of India.

particularly from Chennai (the capital of Tamil Nadu State) and Mumbai (the capital of Maharashtra State) have donated substantial sums of money to the Relief Fund. If such wealthy donors across India often contributed a part of their earnings mainly to feed millions of starving people, the problem of hunger could be significantly resolved, despite the fact of overpopulation. However, the sharp decrease in charitable activities in India may be an important reason for the increasing number of hungry people on pavements and streets, who will be permanent beggars in the course of time.

One virtuous practice insisted on by all religions is giving alms to beggars. For instance, pious Hindus believe that this practice will bring them *punya*.¹⁰ Whenever they come across beggars, they provide them with food or money. In the past, in Tamil society, only fresh food was given to beggars before the givers themselves ate, meaning that it would be the same food that the givers also ate. This tradition was encouraged, promoted, and transmitted through generations by the joint family system. Of late, beggars have usually been provided with leftover food (or food left overnight) because they beg mostly in the morning hours. Especially in some Hindu orthodox families, this tradition is still followed by giving a little portion of freshly cooked food to crows before lunch, and also leaving another portion in folded plantain leaves after lunch to feed dogs. The belief behind their customary practice is that ancestors in the form of crows will visit them, hence they are fed first. Since dogs are loyal to givers, they are fed next. Thus, hospitality is extended to birds and animals.

However, educated young people presently living in nuclear families interpret the act of giving alms to beggars in a more rational way. In an interview with two graduate students (one male and another female) in a town situated in southern Tamil Nadu through video conferencing on May 5, 2020, they expressed the following views:

We don't mind giving alms to the physically handicapped or blind or aged beggars, but we can't do it for the physically fit who can work and earn their livelihood. Since people here would like to help those begging at their doorsteps, in public places, or pilgrimage centers in order to get puniya, a large number of poor resort to begging throughout their life without toiling. This is why beggars in India have multiplied over years resulting in serious social problem of beggary, a formidable challenge to the government. We don't have any hesitation saying we are all solely responsible for causing yet another social problem in India. We are

10 As prescribed in the Hindu religious scriptures, *punya* refers to the good deeds of individuals that bring them benefits in this as well as in next birth. It can be acquired through charitable activities.

also against those physically fit lazy beggars for the reason that they will lose their self-respect by being beggars. We should not give up self-respect in our lives, because it is an important value that qualifies all of us as dignified individuals.

Possibly this may also be the view of many followers of Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, who led the Self-Respect Movement¹¹ in Tamil Nadu State against Brahmanism.¹²

It is important to note that, in Tamil Nadu State, as elsewhere in other states of India, there is a perpetual relationship between pilgrimage centers and temples on the one hand, and swarms of beggars in these places on the other. As mentioned earlier, in order to gain *punniya*, pilgrims give alms to beggars. Moreover, there is an association between begging and Hinduism. Wandering monks and mendicants continue to survive by begging only in times of need. Hinduism encourages people to help beggars because this is, according to the Hindus, the best way to practice charity. Further, it prescribes that *Bhiksha* (begging) is a religious practice for achieving spiritual purity that involves detaching oneself from worldly pleasure. Venkatesan (2016) mentions that *Bhiksha* signifies the Hindu tradition of begging for alms with the purpose of self-effacement or ego-conquering. Therefore, in India, begging has been accepted as a way of life for monks and mendicants who have renounced worldly pleasure. Over centuries, the practice of giving alms to the needy has been built into the social fabric of India.

But the notion of begging is now completely different from what it was in the past. At present, most beggars are no way connected to spirituality, but are after money rather than food. Therefore, begging is not the last resort for them to survive, but has become a way for them to earn money. In fact, population growth in India is not healthy because a sizeable proportion of able people become beggars under the pretext of religion. Consequently, begging has presently assumed huge magnitude in India. Especially in urban areas, it is the only means of earning a livelihood for thousands of destitute. In India, there are more than 400,000 beggars, which shows that human resources remain unutilized. Hence, the alarming number of beggars has become a threat to India.

11 The Self-Respect Movement is a South Asian movement that started in 1925 with the aim of achieving a society where backward castes have equal human rights. It encourages them to have self-respect.

12 Brahmanism is an ideology and a way of life that originates from the history of the Vedas, often called a philosophy practiced by the Brahmans (the priestly caste in India) on the basis of specific inferred beliefs.

With reference to the subject of this paper, greediness in contrast to generosity signifies an intense and selfish desire to amass wealth. Presumably, strongly profit-driven people are, in one way or another, greedy. They keep on accumulating wealth for their own comfort and also for the benefit of their children, but they do not want to donate even a small portion of it to the poor. Their selfishness and greediness can be understood through their habitual consumption behavior. The “mass consumption culture” acquired by people in contemporary India makes them attribute new meanings to leading a materialistic life,¹³ as well as the habit of greediness in relation to leading a luxurious life. They make all efforts to amass wealth to meet their growing material needs. This consumer behavior is reflected in their day-to-day activity. Milton Friedman, an American economist, during an interview in 1979, expressed his views about greed as follows:

Is there some society you know that doesn't run on greed? You think Russia doesn't run on greed? You think China doesn't run on greed? ...The world runs on individuals pursuing their separate interests. The great achievements of civilization have not come from government bureaus. The world runs on individuals pursuing their separate interests. Einstein didn't construct his theory under order from a bureaucrat. Henry Ford didn't revolutionize the automobile industry that way.... (Friedman 1979)

More precisely, he says, the free market system combines with people's self-interest in such a way as to benefit everyone monetarily, especially the poor.

Here, self-interest refers to individuals' interest in achieving what they want, but they are unmindful of social interests, i.e., of helping the poor to get some benefit. All their activities and decisions are centered on their own interests. However, it is not right to equate the term “self-interest” with the word “selfishness” because the former may facilitate an individual's development and achievements, whereas the latter pushes them into a state of unhealthy competition and retrogression. The free market system promotes self-interest as regards creating wealth. In some extraordinary circumstances, one's self-interest may result in a social interest in helping the poor.

Growing “global consumer culture” makes people greedy, because their unrelenting self-interest forces them to purchase material goods beyond their actual requirements. Their greediness drives their indomitable passion to acquire such goods. It seems reasonable to claim that their greediness and their

13 <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/consumer-behavior>; <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/out-the-darkness/201203/the-madness-materialism> [Last access: 05 05 2020]

consumption behavior are mutually reinforcing. In other words, their greediness does not allow them to be satisfied with what they possess in relation to having a decent living. On the one hand, they are often unmindful about the unnecessary consumption of goods because it may be that they are proud of it. For instance, when seeing their neighbor's latest-model car, or mobile phone, they would like to buy the same thing to satisfy their ego, despite the fact that they already own a car or mobile. On the other hand, as they become trapped in "global consumer culture," they would like to update their knowledge about the launch of new products on global markets. They are often tempted to buy products that may not be immediate or essential requirements.

As they are under pressure to increase their earning ability so as to purchase more and more goods, they explore different means of accumulating money. Thus, consumer culture pulls them into its fold and changes their attitude in line with consumer behavior. Since material possession is perceived by others as affluence and aristocracy, global companies take advantage of this idiosyncrasy of people and accordingly popularize their products through the media to increase their sales. One of the adverse changes ushered in by consumer culture is that it never lets people become satisfied with what they possess, but makes them suffer from an excessive hunger for the "over-possession" of goods. Eventually, their craving for material possession makes them greedy.

In contemporary India, the charitable activities of trusts are at low ebb because of the government's pressing new regulations. Gangad (2020) says that charitable trusts and institutions are the most over-regulated sector in India. Similarly, Kably (2019) observes that the Indian government makes life more difficult for charity trusts. Therefore, in contemporary India, the charitable activities of trusts are in a depressed state. As regards individuals, the money earned by most of them is not sufficient to meet some of their essential needs. Therefore, in being greedy, they have compulsion to earn more money to boost their family income. Their primary concern is to attain material well-being, rather than to help starving people. Are they like to be generous in terms of helping poor people? As a matter of fact, most of them are unlikely to be generous, except for some who engage in charitable activities. A middle-aged woman respondent from a bank from a northern district in Tamil Nadu State shared the following views about charitable activities during an interview through video conferencing on 29 April, 2020.

My husband provides security in a bank where I serve as an assistant. The salary we receive is inadequate to meet expenses related to family maintenance, medical items, our children's education, and the payment of loan installments. Because of these commitments, we are unable to

save any money to manage unforeseen emergencies in our life. Now our immediate concern is to generate income from other sources to boost our family income. In this situation, unlike a wealthy philanthropist, we can't think of charitable activities. Moreover, we have no money and time to engage in such activities. By all means, self-interest is the only means for us as well as for millions of marginalized people in India to improve our family economy. It serves as a foundation for us to acquire the things required to live a frugal life.

The opinion of many people in Tamil Nadu as well as in other states of India may perhaps reflect this view because of their similar experiences. The interactions and interrelations of the present generation will tend to be materialistic and parochial. Their latent humanism will be overshadowed by their growing greediness. In this situation, they may not be truthful and trusting of each other. Since their activities are somehow grounded on a commercial basis and the need for personal gain, they will be reluctant to render selfless service to benefit starving people. In contemporary times, this more or less becomes a way of life for a large proportion of Tamil people, as well as their counterparts elsewhere in India.

HOSPITALITY vs. INHOSPITALITY

According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, the term “hospitality” is derived from the Latin *hospitalitas*, which in turn derives from *hospes*, referring to both guest and host. This means that a host offers a friendly and warm reception to their guests, be they visitors or strangers, and entertains them with food and gifts. Later on, this concept was extended to business clients, religious leaders, official visitors, and the like. The term “hospitable” is thus associated with the value of hospitality. A hospitable person is likely to exhibit a spirit of generosity and enduring sincerity and festivity. Although ways of expressing hospitality differ from culture to culture, they uniformly signify the virtue of cordiality shown by hosts to their guests. This often depends on social situations, ethical issues, religious beliefs, and traditional practices. *Taittiriya Upanishad*, a Vedic-era Sanskrit text, states “Atithi Devo Bhava,” which literally means “be one for whom the guest is God.” In other words, “the guest is equivalent to God” (*Taittiriya Upanishad* n.d.). Therefore, hospitality is considered a unique feature of Hindu culture in general and Tamil culture in particular. Specifically, it is interwoven with family life, through which both husband and wife jointly extend hospitality to guests. According to the Hindu way of life, neither husband

nor wife alone should invite guests to visit. For instance, Sita (Kambar, Kamba Ramayanam: Sundara kanda :344), wife of Rama (king of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh State, India) and Kannaki (Elango Adigal, Silappadikaram: Kolaikalla Kaathai :72–73), wife of Kovalan (son of a wealthy merchant in Poompuhar situated in southern Tamil Nadu State), were portrayed as being in a sorrowful state in one place in the great Tamil epics because they were deeply worried about their inability to feed and honor their guests, because somehow they were unexpectedly separated from their husbands. Thiruvalluvar (1931:81) claims that the purpose of leading a domestic life and earning and protecting wealth is to extend hospitality to guests.

Thiyagarajan (2015:16–22) points out that, since Vedic times (c.1500 – c.1100 BCE), hospitality has played an essential role in the social life of people in India. It unites hosts and guests through their mutual understanding, spirit of generosity, expression of love, and renewed openness. It is the way that an individual treats his guests, and in the same way, they would like to be treated. It is a form of constructive social action for the reason that it facilitates the consolidation of human relations, including intra- and inter-family relations through courteous social interaction. Sometimes, it proactively redresses the grievances of rival factions and resolves conflicts within communities through commensality (inter-dining) or community dinners.

A host always has to be conscious of taking care of visiting guests unhesitatingly. In support of this, Thiruvalluvar (1931:83) says that “the domestic life of the man who daily entertains visiting guests shall not be wasted due to poverty.” It is understood from this that the host advocates selfless, unconditional, and unmotivated hospitality in contrast to motivated and benefit-driven hospitality. On the one hand, the former behavior of the host was part of domestic life in ancient Tamil society, but it is rare to see this behavior in present society. On the other hand, the latter behavior of the host is prevalent throughout contemporary Indian society. With the expectation of material or non-material benefits, the Hindus perform hospitality as motivated by their religious leaders and astrologers. For instance, on some religious occasions, devotees, at the end of their fasting, invite their friends and relatives for a religious dinner, hoping to get some benefits through God’s blessings. Sometime they organize with temple priests to distribute *Prasad* (food offered to God) among those visiting the temple in the belief that God will bless them with prosperity. In a real sense, God may perhaps bless them provided they give something to the needy and poor without expecting anything in return. In favor of this approach, Thiruvalluvar (1931:221) states that giving something to the destitute with no ulterior motive is charity, but all other approaches are investments aimed at making a return.

The joint family system in India fostered mainly the first type of hospitality, and made it a way of life of Tamil people. This value, an important component of Hindu as well as Tamil culture, was passed down through generations of joint families. During an in-depth interview with an elderly woman from north-eastern Tamil Nadu State on May 10, 2020, she explained that:

For a period of 17 years, from 1958 to 1975, I lived in a joint family with my husband, my two grown-up children, my husband's brother's family, with a child, aged in-laws, and their unmarried daughter. All of us were accommodated in a fairly big house in our village. Almost every day, we used to provide food that we prepared to 4-6 persons, including relatives, friends, visitors, and strangers in and around the village, as well as from far-off places. Especially at festival time, a large quantity of food prepared by professional cooks was served to many guests who visited us at our invitation. On several occasions we used to cook food after lunch or dinner to feed belated guests. Every day, my father-in-law was keen on inviting at least one or two local friends to join him for lunch. It was rare to see him taking lunch alone. In the same way, and in the same spirit, on many special occasions we were invited by our relatives and friends for a get-together over lunch. Since our family depended (for its livelihood) on large-scale cultivation, we were able to continue this hospitality as a core value of our family until 1975. After the partitioning of our family property in the same year, my husband shifted me and my children to a big city owing to his employment and my children's education. Since then, we started living in a nuclear family. But now, at the age of 80, I hardly ever see such sort of hospitality in the present generation.

After the advent of industrialization, increasing commercial relations in Indian society overshadowed the generosity of people, and shifted their focus from social interests to self-interest. This shift in focus was systematically facilitated by the nuclear family system. The state of independence or individuality of a working husband and wife (custodians of hospitality) decreases their social interest, and increases their self-interest regarding seeking more and more financial gain and personal benefit. The tendency of nuclear family members to accumulate wealth is perhaps enhanced by the capitalist culture that flourishes in a globalized era. Goode (1963:10–18) stresses that the nuclear family is more suitable for dealing with modern economic conditions than a joint family is. In support of this claim, Freed and Freed (1982:189–202) claim that the nuclear family is suitable for the present labor market situation. It is inferred from this that expanding business

enterprises associated with labor market situations will determine the type of families that exist. The husband and wife in a nuclear family have complete freedom to enhance their economy through their independent earning and saving, as they plan. Their economic freedom drives them to amass wealth to become prospective buyers in the global market. In contrast, the head of a joint family was an authoritative person and had the responsibility of pooling family income (which flowed in from different sources, including the earnings of all other members). Therefore individual members in a joint family were not given the right to control the family economy.

In some cases, in a nuclear family, the participation of husband and wife in more than one job from dawn to dusk to advance the family economy may be the main cause of aggressiveness. Since both of them are employed, their long working day leaves them with little time to attend to others' needs, including the needs of their children. They are typically away from home for 6-8 hours or more. In their absence, a servant maid may take care of their youngest, as well as school-going children. Moreover, their mobile phones may consume the little time otherwise available for this routine. In this situation, they prefer to deliberately avoid hospitality.

Their individual preferences, coupled with self-interest fostered by the nuclear family system, steer them to acquire personal gain and comfort by enhancing their family economy. If a householder and his wife would like to host their friends or relatives on certain special occasions, such as birthdays or on the event of a marriage, they often like to take them to a hotel for dinner instead of cooking food for them in their home itself due to the lack of time. Presently, many dual-earning couples in nuclear families would prefer to host such events conveniently within their homes by placing online orders with Zomato¹⁴ to entertain their guests. For instance, a middle-aged husband and wife employed in different private companies in Chennai city (the capital of Tamil Nadu) jointly shared their experience of hospitality during an interview through video conferencing on May 21, 2020.

We are busy on all working days. When we find some leisure time at the weekend amidst our household work, we invite guests once in a while for a dinner. Our easy way to provide them with a variety of tasty food is to take them to a local luxury hotel. Sometimes, for a change, we place online orders with Zomato to supply food to our home to entertain our guests. However, this could not happen while living in a

14 Zomato is a comprehensive “restaurant search and discovery app” available in several countries, including India.

joint family for a decade, since it was in fact a habitual practice in most joint families. The food was prepared jointly by women and served to guests. After we started living in a nuclear family, we restricted this practice for obvious reasons. To our surprise, we hosted only one guest during the whole of last year. In the current year, COVID-19 has prevented us from hosting guests. Presently, due to the intensity of the pandemic, the Tamil Nadu government again imposed restrictions on people in several districts, banning them from moving around for some more weeks by extending the curfew. Presumably, a nationwide curfew may perhaps be reintroduced sooner or later, as the pandemic is not under control in many other states. If this happens, we need not think of hospitality until the restoration of normalcy at the national level.

Probably, in days to come, people may go a step further by directing food suppliers Zomato to deliver food directly to guests' homes in order to save time by avoiding getting together in this situation. However, of late, people in Tamil Nadu State and elsewhere in India have hazily kept up the practice of hospitality as a formality, without real involvement. Like other degrading values, the value of hospitality is not a matter of regret to people because of their changing attitude to the value system. Their attitudinal changes are influenced by the rapid changes taking place in their lives in contemporary Tamil, as well as in Indian society.

GRATITUDE vs. INGRATITUDE

According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term "gratitude" is derived from Latin word *gratus*, which means pleasing or thankful. It is also known as thankfulness or gratefulness. These three words are used synonymously in the following discussion. According to several researchers, gratitude is an emotional reaction shown by a recipient to someone in response to receipt of a gift or benefit (Roberts 2004). It is the moral obligation of a recipient to show gratitude to the benefactor, who may be God or anyone else. Thiruvalluvar (1931:102) points out that the timely help of someone, even if small, means much more than the world. He further specifies that the benefit of help rendered by someone affectionately without expecting any return is larger than the sea (Thiruvalluvar 1931:103). He also stresses that there may be redemption for those who have killed any kind of virtue, but there is no salvation for a person who has killed gratitude (Thiruvalluvar 1931:110). *Purananuru* (1950:34) proclaims that anyone who cuts the udders of a cow, kills a woman's fetus, or abuses teachers, is able to get

relief from these sins through atonement, whereas there is no relief for someone who has killed gratitude. This shows the fact that there is a close relationship between thankfulness (gratefulness) and truthfulness (honest), hence they are inseparable. In other words, being thankful to a giver depends on being truthful to everyone.

While expressing gratitude to the benefactor, a recipient not only feels happy, but also likes to reciprocate in the same way. Further, this may prompt them to help others. Likewise, any two individuals can express gratitude to each other for mutual help. This facilitates them to keep on helping others, besides reciprocating their benefactors. This is a positive chain reaction to be encouraged in the family, neighborhood, community, workplace and the like. Algoe et al. (2010) state that individual expressions of gratitude by individuals to others who have helped them strengthen and promote their relationships with others.

The value of gratitude is undergoing phenomenal changes in contemporary times. In ancient Indian society, including Tamil society, parents were highly respected and even worshiped by their children. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* (n.d.) says: “Matru Devo Bhava, Pitru Devo Bhava,” which literally means “be one for whom the Mother is God, be one for whom the Father is God.” Further, it adds that this is a cultural value of Hindus. Touching the feet of parents with utmost respect is an integral part of the life of Hindus. Avvaiyar¹⁵ glorifies parents (mother and father) by saying they are the first known Gods.

In changing times, the gratitude of sons and daughters to their parents is subject to change. In thousands of families, parents are treated humiliatingly and are left to fend for themselves or sent to old-age homes by their sons, who are insensitive to their plight. In a personal interview with a 57-year-old construction worker from Vellore city in north Tamil Nadu on May 10, 2020, the latter explained how his son has ill-treated him.

My wife and I have been jobless for about a couple of months due to the nationwide lockdown for the pandemic. Now we have no resources to sustain our livelihood. My only son, who is married and employed in a private hospital, is in no way helpful to us in this critical situation. We educated him and secured a job for him through a known source. Last year, we spent a lot of money on his marriage and also for setting up his home after the marriage. He knows that we have no money at the present to buy essential things to prepare food. Recently, I approached him three times to get some money, but in vain. He shouted at me, perhaps due to his wife's instigation, and asked me to borrow from a

15 Avvaiyar, a Sangam Tamil poetess, glorified parents in her work, *Kondraivendan* (Avvaiyar n.d.).

lender, with interest. He is ungrateful to us and not concerned about our plight. Before marriage, he was not so. But now his attitude is different and his relationship with us is not cordial.

In some lower-class and lower-middle-class families, aged parents seek shelter in old-age homes because their sons shirk the responsibility of caring for them. Their son's keen interest is to settle down in a nuclear family. Akbar and Kumar (2014:55–61) and Lalan (2014:21–23) hold more or less a similar view. Moreover, the uncompromising lifestyles of parents and sons seem to be an important cause of the latter's preference for living in a nuclear family. Though this sort of family preference of sons is prevalent in middle- and upper-class families, parents may not be serious about their sons' priorities regarding family preference, besides professional ones. But one point to be stressed here is that helpless daughters may sympathize with their parents, as they move to their husbands' residences after marriage.

However, in many families, sons and daughters are grateful to their parents. For instance, a known bank manager employed in a city bank situated in northern Tamil Nadu explained over mobile on May 25, 2020 about what his parents had done for him.

I am grateful to my father and mother for their selfless efforts to make me a successful man. They are still caring, supporting, loving and guiding me even at my age of 54. They have helped me achieve all my goals and rise up to this level with all comforts in life. During my school days, my mother used to be with me often as a moral supporter in times of academic problems, and my father used to provide me with quick remedies for overcoming such problems time and again. In fact, they were the constant motivators and supporters behind all my successes. I am very grateful to them for all their support, encouragement, and hardship, and for making me what I am now.

In this case, the son's gratitude to his parents depended on his intimate relationship with them. But in the previous case, the son's ungratefulness to his parents depended on his cold relationship with them. Therefore, it is observed that within the family and outside it, a person's feeling of gratitude to others is associated with the kind of relationship they maintain with them.

When a couple cultivates the practice of expressing their gratitude and appreciation to each other for every little thing they do, without ego, they experience a high level of satisfaction in their conjugal life. This makes them faithful and trusting of each other. Consequently, their marital bond becomes

strong and keeps their union in a healthy state throughout their lives. On the other hand, unlike this situation, a vast majority of couples in Tamil community, as well as in other communities elsewhere in India, are not able to be compatible with each other with respect to several issues. In other words, their egos will not let them express their gratitude and appreciation for each other. They think that mutual help among family members is obligatory; hence they feel no need to contribute. Sometimes they become reliant on attending to most of their work on an individual basis, including receiving food through online orders. This situation is mostly prevalent in dual-earner families in towns and cities. Since their working times are typically different, especially the working times of employees of the information technology (IT) sector, their inter-personal interactions are conveniently limited to mobile phone communications.

In a fast-moving materialistic life, working couples want to be independent in their family lives. This is highly pronounced in the families of those employed in the IT sector in Tamil Nadu as well as in other states of India. A known family court judge in Madras High Court, Tamil Nadu explained that about 80 per cent of divorce cases registered in his court are initiated by young couples working in the IT sector. He pointed out that the ego conflict between spouses is the major cause of this problem. Since both of them get a lucrative salary and enjoy equal work status, they want to be independent of each other, particularly with regard to savings and expenditure, besides sharing household work. Conflict between them arises when one questions the other relating to these matters. Despite their desire to be independent, they can find a viable way to continue to live together if they remain simply grateful to each other and recognize each other's talents and contributions. This is perhaps the reason why in Europe the youngsters prefer relations with partners¹⁶ (living in a relationship) as an alternative to legal marriage.

Crafty people seek any help unhesitatingly from others. Until they get it, they visit them repeatedly and falsely flatter them. Soon after getting their help, they forget this in no time. But if someone expresses gratitude to the right person who helped them at the right time, they will be reciprocated by the latter in the same way some other time. A truthful person will remember even a small instance of help throughout their life, because they are always conscious of the value of help.

Thus, it is understood that truthfulness and thankfulness are inseparable and reinforce each other. However, many people are unthankful to those who have

16 Partner relationship refers to a living arrangement in which an unmarried couple live together. They cohabit, but remain unmarried for a variety of reasons. They may perhaps want to test their compatibility before they get legally married.

helped them because they are, by habit, untruthful to them, as well as unmindful of their help. They have no sense to appreciate the help they have received, but will not hesitate to ask again for another favor. Therefore, parents and teachers have to assume the important role of teaching children to be truthful, along with imparting the value of thankfulness.

TRUTHFULNESS vs. UNTRUTHFULNESS

The Sanskrit word *Satya* or *Satyam* (truth) is derived from *sat* and *ya*. *Sat* means being or reality, while *ya* and *yam* mean “advancing, supporting, holding up, sustaining, one that moves.” As a composite word, *Satya* and *Satyam* imply that “which supports, sustains and advances reality, being”; it literally means that “which is true, actual, real, genuine, trustworthy, valid” (*Online Encyclopedia of Buddhism*). Truth is often associated with honesty, as both values sprout from the same root. Hence, in the following discussion, both of them are used synonymously. It is relevant here to briefly explain Mahatma Gandhi’s message about truth. In his English weekly newspaper, *Harijan* (Children of God), he wrote: “My prayerful search gave me the revealing dictum Truth is God, instead of the usual one God is Truth” (Gandhi 1942:8–9). His autobiography *My Experiments with Truth* itself is testimony that shows his boundless love for truth. He himself tried to remain truthful through his life (Gandhi 1990 [1948]). He was prepared to sacrifice even that which was dearest to him in pursuit of truth, because this is the essence of all morals in life. According to Gandhi, truth grows in magnitude every day, hence his definition of it also widened. Throughout his political-cum-religious journey, he followed the truth and proved that he was a real messenger of truth in the twentieth century. However, he attached equal importance to *Ahimsa* (non-violence). He wrote in *Harijan* (Gandhi 1940:2–3):

Ahimsa is my God, and Truth is my God. When I look for Ahimsa, Truth says, ‘Find it through me.’ When I look for Truth, Ahimsa says, ‘Find it out through me’.

Further, he wrote in a paper in English in *Young India* (Gandhi 1925:4–6):

My faith in truth and non-violence is ever-growing, and as I am ever trying to follow them in my life... I see them in a newer light every day and read in them a newer meaning.

Gandhi’s view about truth was irrevocable in different contexts. As a case

in point, while launching the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920–1922) against colonial rule in India, he advised the satyagrahis¹⁷ to follow the path of truth while taking part in nonviolent resistance. In the middle of the movement, to every one's surprise, he withdrew, because the satyagrahis had deviated from what he really wanted them to do, besides indulging in violent activities. He was truthful in thought, in speech, and in action, i.e. whatever he thought about something, he spoke about it honestly, and put it into his action undeviatingly. In other words, he always synchronized the three activities to uphold the supreme value of truth.

On the contrary, if a person is untruthful, he thinks about one thing, speaks of another thing, and his action reveals some other thing. Undoubtedly, he is a hypocrite, as he does not like to harmonize all three actions with a binding thread of truth. Moreover, it is very difficult for him to get along with relatives, friends and others, as he is untruthful to them and hence unmindful of gaining their confidence. All of the former feel like distancing themselves from this kind of person. In contrast, Thiruvalluvar (1931:294) says, a truthful person lives in the minds of all people.

Unlike the present generation, the people who lived in the Sangam period cherished truth and hence were scared of telling lies. Tamil people believed that some specific village deities whose temples are situated in different parts of Tamil Nadu help with safeguarding the truth. It was particularly rural people who used to bring alleged liars to these temples to make them make vows in front of those deities (Karunanithi 1988:15–27). Since time immemorial, during the engagement ritual, an essential part of the marriage ceremony in Tamil, as well as in some other religious communities elsewhere in India, the bride as well as bridegroom have to enter into mutual agreement, i.e., to make a vow that cannot be violated by both parties. All arranged marriages are solemnized only after the accomplishment of this promise. Here, the truth in the form of a vow unites a man and woman in marital life. But presently, on some occasions, either one of the parties particularly the groom's parents may violate this vow mainly for monetary gain in the form of dowry.¹⁸ These illustrations clearly disclose how the previous generations of people upheld the value of truth in their social life.

Presently, in India, as well as in Tamil Nadu, some people seem to think that the task of learning how to interact with others untruthfully is clearly the way

17 Satyagrahis are those who hold onto the truth while taking part in any nonviolent resistance against any social injustice.

18 A dowry is an amount of property, mostly jewels and money, given by a bride to her husband on the occasion of their marriage. That is, it is obligatory on the part of the bride's parents to give these things to the groom's parents at the time of marriage.

to live gainfully. If some individuals remain truthful or honest, most people will criticize them as stupid and useless because, from their point of view, this truthfulness or honesty will not earn them wealth quickly. They will be easily exploited by untruthful relatives and friends, whereas some individuals' dishonesty, deceptiveness, exploitation, and other such habits will enable them to gain the support of these corrupted people and live profitably. In a way, these unethical habits have become characteristic features of some of the present generation of people. For instance, in not adhering to business ethics, a grocery shop owner will cheat his customers by adulterating his stock. Likewise, he will be cheated in terms of paying an exorbitant fee for his treatment in a private hospital. When this hospital owner wants to admit his son to a private medical college, he will have to pay a huge sum unlawfully to have him accepted. This college proprietor will pay a very large amount to a higher officer to get approval to introduce new courses at his college. In turn, this officer will bribe the relevant ministerial secretary with millions of Indian rupees to secure a top post in his department. Like this, cheating and corruption percolate down through all areas of life. It is like a double-barreled gun, which keeps hitting the minds of people. Thus, corruption in public life becomes cyclic and endemic.

It may be observed that professionals, corporate leaders, the labor force and the like cheat people unethically to obtain benefits. For instance, mostly in the public sector, a culture of work evasion is prevalent among employees not only in Tamil Nadu, but also in other states of India. In unorganized sectors such as agriculture, cottage industries, and building construction, a sizeable proportion of workers are untruthful to owners in terms of their work output. This practice also finds its way into educational institutions, where teachers shirk their responsibilities. In the same way, reckless students tell lies to their teachers in order to escape their academic dishonesty. Cheating teachers to get some benefits has become a common unethical practice in educational institutions all over India.

In families, members cheat each other to obtain joint properties or plunder commonwealth amassed by their ancestors. Time and again, there are cases of husbands and wives who are untruthful to each other. They unhesitatingly tell lies to each other to get momentary escape from their untruthful activities. Similarly, in many situations, some working people attempt to safeguard themselves from their employers by suppressing the truth. They use lies as a shield to protect them. On the other hand, a section of well-to-do and powerful people use the same as a weapon to suppress the poor. Though their intentions are different, the technique they use is the same.

Generally, in present Tamil society, the passion for work among the people is decreasing, whereas the tendency to evade work is increasing. As a result of this, people become unjust to their work, as well as untruthful to their employers.

This sort of tendency downgrades their working culture by demoralizing them and eventually diminishing productivity. Their deception is like a poisonous plant that spreads widely and sprouts into a wild forest. Probably the dishonesty starts at the top, i.e., if a top leader is dishonest, presumably many of their subordinates or followers will, in one way or another, pursue the same line. For instance, people will accept the ideas of their unscrupulous political or religious leaders without interrogating them. They simply act as in the proverb, “as the king is, so his subjects are.”

CONCLUSION

The “mass consumption culture” of people in contemporary Indian society, including Tamil society, makes them acquire consumer behavior. This in turn makes them greedy and materialistic in relation to accumulating wealth. Unlike the web of social relations that bound past generations of people and made them generous to others by promoting their social interests, the increasingly commercial relations of the present generation of people limit their generosity by fixing their focus on self-interest. This influences them to choose to live in nuclear families, which in turn gives them large scope to be independent in decision making in connection with all family matters. Now the disappearance of true hospitality is not a matter of regret, because of their changing attitude to value systems in the globalized era. Many individuals have no sense to express their gratitude to those who have helped them, and do not even think of appreciating their help. On the contrary, past generations of people were conscious about the value of help and keen on expressing their gratitude to those who helped them. Unlike the former generations of workers, who were truthful to their employers by undertaking their work effectively, many of their counterparts in the present generation are somewhat untruthful to their employers by evading work. The degradation of values seems to be the main cause of all these adverse changes in the lives of people. Therefore, what is needed at the present is for parents and teachers to impart values to children in order to make them truthful persons in the future. In view of this, the University Grants Commission (UGC), New Delhi, India, prepared guidelines entitled the “Inculcation of Human Values and Professional Ethics in Higher Educational Institutions” in 2019 to nurture human values amongst students. The Chairman of UGC has urged upon the vice-chancellors of the universities, directors of institutions, and principals of colleges to take appropriate measures to implement these guidelines to make the young generation adopt such values.

REFERENCES

- Adigal, I. [1950] *Silappadikaram: Source and interpretation*. 3rd ed. Interpretation by N. M. Venkatasamy Nattar, Tirunelveli, The South India Saiva Siddhanta Publishing Society, Tinnevely Ltd.
- Akbar, S. – A. Kumar (2014) Reasons for living of elderly to in old age homes: An exploratory study. *The International Journal of Indian Psychology*, Vol. 2, No. 1., pp. 55–61. DOI: 10.25215/0201.029
- Algoe, S. – S. L. Gable – N. C. Maisel (2010) It's the little things: Everyday gratitude as a booster shot for romantic relationships. *Personal Relationships*, Vol. 17, No. 2., pp. 217–233, DOI:10.1111/j.1475-6811.2010.01273.x
- Avvaiyar (n.d.) *Kondraivendan*. <https://www.chennaiilibrary.com/avvai/kondraivendan.html>. [Last access: 11 27 2020]
- Bardi, A. – R. M. Calogero – B. Mullen (2008) A new archival approach to the study of values and value-behaviour relations: Validation of the value lexicon. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 93, pp. 483–497, DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.93.3.483
- Bhagavad Gita* (1971) Tamil translation by Atma Thathiva Doss. Chennai, Bakthi Vedanta Book Society
- C. Abdul Hakeem College Committee (1990) *Philanthropy Thy Name is "Hakeem": Biography of Nawab C. Abdul Hakeem Sahib*, 1st edition, Melvisharam, College Committee
- Chathanar, Ch. (1989) *Manimekalai*. English translation by Prema Nandakumar, 1st ed. Thanjavur, Tamil University Press
- Ergil, D. (1984) *Society and Human*. Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi
- FFLV – Food for Life Vrindavan (2007) <https://iskconnews.org/food-for-life-serves-vraja-residents>, 250/ [Last access: 05 13 2020]
- Fichter, J. (1990) *What is sociology?* Translated by N. Celebi. Ankara, Attila Bookstore
- Friedman, M. Quote (1979) <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/241181-well-first-of-all-tell-me-is-there-some-society>
- Gandhi, M.K. (1925) article in *Young India*, June 4, 1925, p. 191.
- Gandhi, M.K. (1937) article in *Harijan*, May 1, 1937, p. 93.
- Gandhi, M.K. (1942) article in *Harijan*, August 9, 1942
- Gandhi, M.K. (1990 [1948]) *Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Mineola, N.Y., Dover Publications
- Gangad, G. (2020) Charitable Institutions are over regulated in India. *The Hindu*, March 12, 2020
- Ghosh, Sh. (2020) Divine service: ISKCON temple in Dwarka feeds lakhs of poor. *The Hindu*, April 19, 2020

- Goode, W. J. (1963) *World Revolutions and Family Pattern*. New York, The Free Press
- The Hindu* (2020) Community kitchens reach out to needy during lockdown. By special correspondent, *The Hindu*, April 6, 2020
- The Holy Bible* [1970] Acts 20:35
- The Holy Quran* [2018] 1st edition, English translation by Abdullah.
- Inkeles, A. (1964) *What is Sociology?* USA Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall
- Jagannathan, Ki. Va. (2014) *Kadai Ezhu Vallagal: Seven Great Philanthropists of Ancient Tamil Nadu*. Chennai, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
- Kably, L. (2019) Government makes life more difficult for charity trusts. *Times of India*, July 7, 2019
- Kambar [1927] *Kamba Ramayanam*. examined by T. C. Prthasarathy Iyyengar, Chennai, Pumagal Vilasa Press
- Karunanithi, G. (1988) Changing social values. *Tamil Kalai*, Vol. 6, No. 1–2., pp: 15–27.
- Konty, M. A. – C. C. Dunham (1997) Differences in value and attitude change over the life course. *Sociological Spectrum*, Vol. 17, pp. 177–197. DOI: 10.1080/02732173.1997.9982159
- Lalan, Y. (2014) A sociological study of old persons residing in an old age home of Delhi, India. *International Research Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 4., pp. 21–23, ISSN: 2319-3565
- Maio, G. R. (2010) Mental representations of social values. In: Zanna, M. P. (ed.): *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. New York, Academic Press
- Narayani, P. A. (2020) The woman who fed hundreds during the Madras famine. *The Hindu*, April 30, 2020
- Online Encyclopedia of Buddhism*. https://encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Satya_in_Indian_traditions [Last access: 05 18 2020]
- Pauls, R. (1990) Concepts of value: a multi-disciplinary clarification. Information Paper No. 20, New Zealand, Centre for Resource Management Lincoln University and University of Canterbury.
- Purananuru. Source and interpretation* (1950) 4th edition published by U. V. Swaminatha Iyer, Chennai, Jothi Press
- Roberts, R. C. (2004) The blessings of gratitude: A conceptual analysis. In: Emmons, R. A. – M. E. McCullough (eds.): *The Psychology of Gratitude*. New York, Oxford University Press
- Roccas, S. – L. Sagiv (2009) Personal values and behavior: taking the cultural context into account. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, Vol. 4, No. 1., pp. 30–41, DOI:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00234.x

- Rokeach, M. (1973) *The Nature Of Human Values*. New York, The Free Press
- Singh, I. (2001) Traditions of giving in Sikhism. *Alliance Magazine*, June, 2001
- Taittiriya Upanishad* (n.d.) <https://www.hinduwebsite.com/taittiriya-upanishad.asp> [Last access: 10 10 2020]
- Thiruvalluvar (1931) *Thirukkural*. Commentary by Parimelazhagar, Chennai, Pumagal Vilasa Press
- Thiyagarajan, R (2015) Vedic Hospitality. *AVAHAN: A Journal on Hospitality and Tourism*, Vol. 3, No. 1., pp. 16–22.
- Times of India* (2020) COVID19: Delhi's Gurudwara Bangla Sahib is serving 40,000 meals a day. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/food-news/covid19-delhis-gurudwara-bangla-sahib-is-serving-40000-meals-a-day/photostory/75066404.cms> [Last access: 05 13 2020]
- Tiruvenkataswami, V. (1942) *Centenary Commemoration Book 1842–1942*, Madras, Pachayyappa College
- Venkatesan, S. (2016) Giving and taking without reciprocity: Conversations in South India and the anthropology of ethics. *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, Vol. 60, No. 3., pp. 36–56, DOI: 10.3167/sa.2016.600303

FORUM

ESSENTIAL NOTIONS CONCERNING THE INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES

BERTALAN DECMANN¹

ABSTRACT: *The latest wave of refugees, which peaked in 2015, raises the question of what we mean by integration, not only in terms of the rules adopted in the EU, but also in terms of the social inclusion of individual refugees and their families. This is because the concepts in the literature, in EU documents on asylum, and in individual sectoral policies (e.g. social, employment, housing, health and public education) are not necessarily harmonized. Therefore, the aim of the study is not only to review integration outcomes, but also to distinguish concepts related to migration, asylum, and refugee discourse, such as exclusion, disintegration, acculturation, and assimilation. Only clarification will bring us closer to selecting the most important social policy and asylum measures. This clarification is also urgent because a coherent integration policy must comply with both cultural diversity and non-discrimination requirements in the EU.*

KEYWORDS: *refugee, integration, acculturation, exclusion, inclusion, assimilation, disintegration*

INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the 2010s, a flood of asylum-seekers arrived in Europe² – the biggest wave of displaced people since World War II (Stearns 2020) – causing changes not only in the European Union’s system, but also in the lives

¹ Bertalan Decmann is PhD Student at the Doctoral School of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest; email: decmann.bertalan@tatk.elte.hu. This work was supported by the EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007 project.

² In the EU, the number of first-time asylum applicants was 1,322,850, in 2015, 1,260,920 in 2016 and 712,250 in 2017. Source: <https://tinyurl.com/2r2j4wpx> [Last accessed: 09 20 2020]

of Member States. The arrival and protection of asylum-seekers was not new and unknown for Member States – some of the latter were already destination countries of massive immigration over the last decades (such as France and Britain) – but in the middle of the last decade, they were unprepared for the high number of newcomers.

The terms used in EU policies by various governments and in scientific circles, including exclusion, disintegration, inclusion, integration, and assimilation, can be considered policy goals, outcomes, or outcomes of the integration process. Further, some can also serve as indicators of the effectiveness of programs or measures.

What are these terms used for, and when? In this paper, we will clarify the concepts of exclusion, disintegration, acculturation, assimilation, integration, and inclusion. These terms have an important place in the discourse about asylum-seekers and refugees, in their integration, and in research concerning them. The concepts have been selected because they are the most common policy goals/outcomes related to asylum-seekers and refugees. Acculturation is not considered a political strategy or individual outcome of integration, but rather a process of “changes in cultural mores resulting from direct and continuous contact and interaction between groups of different culture.”³ Precise knowledge of the concept of acculturation is necessary, therefore the study will begin by describing this.

The main focus of the paper is multiple European countries, including Germany, France, Spain and the UK,⁴ which are the main destinations of massive immigration. From the point of view of immigrants and asylum-seekers, Hungary is not a target destination but a migration transit country. According to statistics from the Asylum Information Database,⁵ in 2019 there were 468 first-time asylum applicants in Hungary: of these, only 22 persons were granted refugee status, and 31 persons were granted subsidiary protection. However, the content of the paper is relevant to all countries which receive immigrants and asylum-seekers. The way a country treats immigrants and asylum-seekers contributes to how newcomers adapt to society. Inadequate immigration policy can lead to serious problems in the future – for example, see the failure of integration policy in France and Britain (Schain 2009).

3 <https://tinyurl.com/35427ek3> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

4 <https://tinyurl.com/tt3trw3s> [Last accessed: 09 30 2020]

5 <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/statistics> [Last accessed: 09 30 2020]

ACCULTURATION

A person's individual behavior is influenced by the culture (environment) which surrounds them. Acculturative change occurs when one's culture of origin and culture of residence differ. According to Akarowhe (2018), "acculturation is a process in which an individual adopts, acquires and adjusts to a new cultural environment." When a person starts to adopt the host society's culture, they undergo not only cultural but also social and psychological change. During acculturation, people can change their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The process starts automatically after an individual arrives in a culture which differs from theirs. Another term for consideration, but one not to be used as a synonym of acculturation, is deculturation, which means abandoning old values and behaviors.

The concept of acculturation dates back to European colonization. At that time, according to Berry (2003), there was concern regarding the effects of European domination over indigenous peoples. The focus of acculturation later shifted to how immigrants changed following their entry and settlement into receiving societies. More recently, the main question associated with acculturation concerns how ethnocultural groups relate to each other as they try to live together in a multicultural society (Berry 2003:17). The acculturation process concerns how immigrants sustain ties to their culture of origin, and how they develop ties to their new destination's culture. Previously, it was only conceivable as a one-way process, whereby newcomers gave up their own identities and cultures and fully adapted to host societies (Gordon 1964) – i.e., a process according to which minority groups adopt the host society's cultural patterns. In the course of acculturation, the level of prejudice and discrimination decreases. We can also define acculturation as the result of continuous, direct contact between two or more different cultural groups and/or individual members (Fox et al. 2013).

At the micro level, acculturation means the psychological change that results from cross-cultural contact and the alteration of daily behavior patterns (Berry 2003). The condition for change is long-term exposure to a cultural environment that is different from the one in which an individual was socialized (Ward–Geeraert 2016).

Acculturation, according to Berry, is the effect and consequence of a prolonged encounter with another group, along with the changes and behaviors that occur as a result of this (Berry 1997). Acculturation as cultural adaptation has multiple components, some of which are easier to adapt, such as eating habits. Some of them, on the other hand, are more complex, like the formed attitudes, norms, and values of the host society. An important indicator of acculturation is that subcultures generally survive. As reported by Berry (1997), the process of

acculturation has four possible outcomes: integration, separation, assimilation, or marginalization.⁶ The outcome depends on the degree of identification with the culture of origin and the host culture.

The European Commission's definition of acculturation is as follows: "A series of changes in cultural mores (ideas, words, values, norms, behavior, institutions) resulting from direct and continuous contact and interaction between groups of different cultures, particularly through migratory movements or economic exchange, the media and other channels."⁷

In conclusion, acculturation is a process whereby a person lives in a foreign culture for a longer period of time and accepts and takes on the value system and the way of thinking of that culture over time through a process of cultural and psychological change (Bogáromi–Malota 2017). The notion is not used as a measure of integration, or as a political strategy, but instead refers to a process, the outcome of which depends mainly on the social policy of the host society and the will of the immigrant, refugee, individual, or group. These interactions are present from the beginning of the migration, and the longer the migration lasts, the stronger the effect.

WHAT IS EXCLUSION?

The notion of social exclusion was originally used by the French socialist governments of the 1980s. In social policy, the term refers to a disparate group of people living on the margin of society without access to the system of social insurance (Percy-Smith 2000). Exclusion – from participation in communities, cultural, political, social, and economic life – is one of the greatest problems facing individuals in society today. Social exclusion is the opposite of inclusion. It is based on group membership, such as ethnicity. Max Weber refers to social closure as one of the collective manifestations of the competition of social groups; i.e., when one group excludes another, based on its external attributes, from (economic) competition. External features can be ethnicity, religion, language, or social background (Brown–Crompton 2000).

Exclusion could mean protecting a group by removing individuals/groups (who are immoral or disagreeable individuals – in other words, unwanted members)

6 *Assimilation*: when the culture of the host country replaces one's own. *Separation*: when refugees retain their own culture and reject the host society's. *Marginalization*: when one belongs to neither the culture of the host country nor the culture of one's origin.

7 <https://tinyurl.com/35427ek3> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

that are threatening others (Doolaard et al. 2020). In this way, exclusion could be a beneficial for a group. However, immigrants, ethnic groups, and asylum-seekers do not necessarily represent a threat to a population, yet they are often the target of exclusionary policies. In practice, governments exclude individuals or groups that are – in their opinion – threatening others.

Exclusion may be distressing for the actors who exclude others (Doolaard et al. 2020). Research shows that “people suffer psychological costs when they comply with directives to cause others social pain because doing so thwarts basic psychological needs” for autonomy and relatedness (Legate et al. 2013).

Social exclusion can have effects on a person’s health and well-being. Victims of social exclusion can perceive themselves as less human than others. It “reduces the extent to which people believe that they possess attributes that are fundamental to our shared humanity (i.e., human nature)” (Bastian–Haslam 2010). It is common for people to blame victims and have negative attitudes toward the targets of social exclusion, like minorities (Beißert et al. 2020).

Social exclusion also involves different levels of deprivation. One of the most obvious factors of exclusion is poverty, but the term also refers to inadequate education, health, housing rights, and access to services (Percy-Smith 2000). It affects individuals and groups that are in some way subject to discrimination or segregation.

The exclusion of immigrants and asylum-seekers by governments involves a narrower meaning of social exclusion, whereby the target of exclusion is a specific group. According to Castles (1995), there are different levels of exclusion which governments can apply to individuals or groups. The strongest level of exclusion is total exclusion, in which governments try to prevent the entry of immigrants into a country. However, the power of global migration and a country’s economic power may be more decisive factors than governmental decisions, so it is very difficult to maintain total exclusion. Another type of exclusion, according to Castles, is differential exclusion. In this case, immigrants are allowed to participate in specific areas of society (like the labor market), but their access to other segments (citizenship, the welfare system, or political participation) is denied. This can easily be made effective through legal mechanisms (rejection of naturalization, or sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and non-citizens) or with informal practices (racism or discrimination). If a government acts this way, refugees can become ethnic minorities that are part of society, but excluded from full participation in cultural, social, and economic relations. The motivation for differential exclusion is that the reception of migrants and refugees is just a temporary solution.

According to de Haan and Maxwell (1998), there are three areas of social exclusion: rights, resources, and relationships. A lack of rights is visible in

the fact that – for example – the excluded are not eligible for federally funded support, family reunion, employment, or a basic income. Second, in the field of resources, many refugees arrive in the host country poorly educated, without any skills and without knowing the official language. Another key factor of exclusion is relationships – the negative impact of experiences of racism and victimization.

Poverty is one of the key aspects of social exclusion, but there are other dimensions which are also relevant, especially considering the situation of refugees. Asylum seekers may be excluded nowadays because of the suspected correlation between them and economic factors or criminality (such as unemployment and terrorism). Asylum seekers are usually detained after arriving in a country, thus they experience physical exclusion first. Sometimes they are held in detention centers, transit zones, or in refugee camps for years. These places are remote areas enclosed with fences, just as asylum-seekers are physically and symbolically separated from national territories. Those who are in detention receive basic security, get access to health care, training, etc., but some of their basic rights are suspended (such as the right to free movement, to gather, or to work). They are thus excluded from these rights and freedoms (Neto 2018).

Although this paper is not specifically about Hungary, but more about the countries of mass immigration, Hungary's former transit zones can be considered an example of exclusionary practice. Transit zones were built at the country's southern border with Serbia. Asylum seekers were held there until the end of their asylum procedure, which in some cases lasted more than 28 days. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) classified these zones as detention zones, in which no one should be detained for longer than 28 days.⁸

Asylum seekers and refugees are often excluded from resources, rights, services, and activities, as well as relationships with people in society. Social exclusion includes legal sanctions involving systematic discrimination. This can also indicate the malfunctioning of society because the latter cannot provide for the needs of particular groups (Correa-Velez et al. 2013). In a new cultural environment, refugees face socio-economic disadvantages, a lack of social support, and experience discrimination. They have often had traumatic experiences in their home countries or during transit to the new host country. Factors like their lack of citizenship and knowledge of the country's official language and experiences of racism and discrimination can "contribute to anxiety, depression and feelings of social isolation" (Correa-Velez et al. 2013). These definitions from the literature can be clearly examined if people who have

⁸ <https://tinyurl.com/pda95txs> [Last accessed: 10 06 2020]

received international protection in a country are granted the same or quasi-identical rights as citizens (for example, in Hungary) because they do not have the proper conditions to exercise them (if, for example, they do not speak the country's official language; lack social capital and culture-specific knowledge; have difficulty of accessing to public services), so they will actually be excluded. In other words, legal regulations alone cannot be a tool for calibrating the effectiveness of measures.

DISINTEGRATION

The EU's integration *acquis* has been severely weakened by economic, political, and external relations crises of recent years. However, we are not referring here to the institutional weaknesses of the EU and (nationalist, sovereign) aspirations that undermine integration (e.g. EuroMemorandum 2017), but about social disintegration in the context of migration processes. Disintegration is opposite of the process of integration, as “the process of coming to pieces” or, in other words, “the process of losing cohesion or strength” (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2020).

The notion is not strongly related to immigrants or refugees; nevertheless, it is often observed in discourses about migration and its consequences, especially since 2015. Many articles, debates and pieces of research that consider disintegration are about the European Union's disintegration. Articles (like that of Tassinari 2016) discuss how the process of the renationalization of European policymaking begun with the migrant and refugee crisis, especially in the field of security policy. Tassinari argued that earlier integration represented the European response to every major shift in Europe, and nations endeavored to create stability by opening their borders to each other. This integration ended with border closing and barrier erecting. National-level responses involve a variety of emergency measures, like border controls and border fences, that are aimed at restricting the number of border crossings. According to Tassinari, the new direction for the EU points towards to the renationalization of European politics as the best way forward.

Another author, Münchau, claims in an article that Member States have lost their will to solve problems collectively that should be solved at the EU level, not at the national level. This means the beginning of the age of disintegration, after 60 years of integration, and this change will make the EU less effective (Münchau 2016). Individual solutions by Member States have created fragmented, uncoordinated governance. This has challenged one of

the EU's core values: solidarity (Morsut–Kruke 2018). If the EU cannot deal with refugees, the existential *raison d'être* of European integration will fail. The continent's problems can be best solved only by cooperation, as the authors suggest.

In Germany, the word disintegration has been used in debate to refer to the exclusion of certain individuals from society, as well as to the supposed coming apart of society. However, disintegration is not equal to exclusion – it refers to the process of the falling apart of something whole. Disintegration policies can cause the exclusion of certain individuals. Disintegration policies sometimes set out to do harm and discourage the settlement of immigrants. An example is Theresa May's call in October 2013 for a “really hostile environment for illegal immigrants” in the UK. This included actions such as denying asylum-seekers' right to work (Collyer et al. 2020). There are government policies that aim to exclude groups from the beneficial impact of integration policies, and policies which are intended to undermine the integration of a group. Undermining the integration process is the beginning of disintegration (Collyer et al. 2020).

Disintegration policies aimed at refugee or immigrant groups often cause the latter's marginalization, thus their chance for school success or employment is significantly less than that of other citizens.

ASSIMILATION

Assimilation is when adaptation into society is a one-sided process. Assimilation can be a process, as well as the purpose of a policy. It is a political aim which can be only achieved by immigrants or refugees fully embracing the culture, dominant values, and norms of the host country, which will ultimately lead to the “weakening of discrimination based on ethnic origin” (Alba–Nee 2003). The point of assimilation is merging due to the loss of one's own culture. During the process of assimilation, immigrants and refugees must give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural, and social characteristics. During assimilation, individuals or groups lose their own culture through fusion with the host society (Varga 2006; Castles 1995). For individual adaptation, the state must create favorable conditions for immigrants and refugees. For example, by helping them to learn the dominant language and accepting their kids into normal schools among children of native-born individuals.

As an International Organization for Migration (IOM 2019) definition states, the purpose of assimilation is “to become less socially distinguishable from other members of the receiving society.” Essentially, it is a straightforward

and irreversible process (Ladányi 2011). Assimilation was earlier not seen as a process which in all cases ended with the erasure of all signs of ethnic origin. Park and Burgess (1921) by the concept of assimilation meant a social process – a union in which individuals and groups acquire the attitudes and feelings of the host nation and become one with them in shared cultural life. Park (1928) argued that if immigrants meet other people and societies in a country or culture which differs from that of their origin, it will always result in assimilation. In his opinion, during this relationship, competition and conflict develops, which will eventually result in the adaptation of the minority group. However, this process takes a lot of time, sometimes decades. Gordon (1964) argued for a process of assimilation that takes generations, in which cultural assimilation transforms into structural assimilation. According to Gordon, the assimilation process has different stages. Gans holds similar views (1997), according to which immigrants' and refugees' generations are the core of ethnic change. Every new generation represents a new stage of adaptation to the host society. Cultural and psychological processes take place over a long period of time, sometimes years or even decades. The process of assimilation continues as long as culturally different groups are in contact. The European Commission's definition also notes that the process is time-consuming: “[...] gradual process by which a minority group's second and third generations adopt the patterns of behavior of a majority group or host society and are eventually absorbed by the majority group / host society.”⁹

Assimilation policies were popular for a long time until former receiving countries like Britain, Canada, and Australia replaced their assimilation policies with integration policies in most cases. In the 1960s, these countries recognized that immigrants were not assimilating like before – they were rather forming social and political associations and maintaining their culture and language (Castles 1995). Over time, the content of assimilation also changed: it was not the same as in the beginning or in the middle of the twentieth century. Nations, especially the USA, became more complex due to the many ethnic influences that became part of their mainstream repertoire (Alba–Nee 1997).

Different immigrant groups assimilate into different segments of society, which is another factor, and one which could result in either downward or upward assimilation for ethnic groups depending on the culture to which they assimilate. Segmented assimilation theory – as the name suggests – meant the end of straight-line theory, the claim of which was that the mobility of descendants of immigrants would be upwards. According to Gans (1992), changes happened

⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/assimilation_en [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

after reforms in 1965 in the USA.¹⁰ The integration of immigrants and refugees became more difficult and reduced the chances of the second generation being as successful in terms of social mobilization as before. “Many of the post-1965 immigrants are coming into a different economy, in which selective migration may count for nothing after the first generation, and traditional opportunities for the upward mobility of later generations could be absent for some or many.”

Denmark’s refugee policy is labeled assimilation policy. In 2018, the Danish Parliament agreed on the new ‘ghetto plan’ to regulate life in 25 low-income and heavily Muslim enclaves. The plan includes: “Obligatory daycare for children from the age of one. If parents fail to enroll their children, they will lose access to childcare support. Daycare continues to be voluntary elsewhere in the country. Language tests for non-Western children in kindergarten (not required outside of these areas).”¹¹ According to the UNHCR, the plan is hugely troubling. “The coercive assimilation measures run risk of fueling racial prejudice, xenophobia and intolerance” (Barry–Solensen 2018).

Nowadays, assimilation is not a desirable policy approach¹² for integrating immigrants and refugees into host countries, mostly because of assimilation policies’ one-sidedness and lack of focus on social cohesion, trans-nationalism, diversity, and tolerance. Immigrants’ and refugees’ cultural norms and values add more diversity and enrich society. Furthermore, respect for human rights (i.e. the cultural, religious and educational rights of people enjoying international protection) are difficult to reconcile with assimilation policies, although there have been efforts to do this in Europe.

DESIRED INTEGRATION

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum (EU Commission 2020) itself uses the terms quoted so far: these include term ‘re/integration’ in 28 cases, the term ‘inclusion’ in 13 cases, and the term ‘cohesion’ in four cases. However, no reference to either acculturation or assimilation can be found in this latest

10 The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 abolished quotas based on nation of origin for the first time since 1921. “Immigrant were selected based on individual merit rather than race or national origin.” New immigration policies such as reuniting families and giving priority to skilled laborers and professionals occurred as well. These reforms changed immigration demographics and increased immigrant numbers. <https://www.history.com/news/immigration-act-1965-changes> [Last accessed: 03 29 2021]

11 <https://tinyurl.com/hd7vnm5k> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

12 See, for instance, OHCHR (2010:8).

document, which takes a comprehensive approach to migration and asylum, building on new instruments of solidarity to be implemented in the coming years. It is clear that one of the three most common concepts, re/integration, is also the most desirable in the migration context. The new pact supports *effective integration policies* (in plural), which include different types and levels of integration services for newcomers, those in need of protection, for vulnerable groups, and equally the reintegration of returnees from the EU (preferably voluntarily or otherwise), as well as integration into local communities.

Integration, according to the most commonly used definition, means the insertion of separate parts into a larger whole. The word *integer* comes from the Latin which means 'whole.' There is no generally accepted definition, but the IOM's definition (2019) contains the essence of other definitions: "The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion."

Integration has been the goal of policies for the last 50 years or more, not just in liberal democracies. As Castles (1995) writes, the policies of integration are weaker forms of assimilation. The idea is that "adaptation is a gradual process in which group cohesion and interaction play an important part." Integration cannot be mandatory for minority groups; it can only be freely chosen. According to Berry and Kalin (1995), there are three preconditions for integration in societies: openness to the value of cultural diversity; a low level of prejudice; and positive attitudes among ethno-cultural groups. Integration is a two-way process: it requires the host society to be open and welcoming towards newcomer immigrants and refugees. In terms of integration, the host population's attitude is crucial.

Integration, in contrast to assimilation, leaves more room for the preservation of individuals' identities, values, and attitudes in the acculturation process. The cultural identity of minorities becomes of value to the host society and its preservation is an important part of successful integration (Bándy 2019). Integration also means the acceptance of multicultural policies, the recognition of immigrants' cultural identity, and tolerance of cultural diversity. In the integration process, it is assumed that immigrants and refugees who are also workers strive to integrate into the majority culture, and, in parallel, the host society treats the process with sufficient sensitivity, helping them to preserve their cultural identity (Barcy 2012).

Another difference between assimilation and integration is that the process of integration is faster. Second and third generations of immigrants' descendants

do not have to integrate or adapt because they will be born and raised in the host society. They will face other types of difficulties, like structural barriers in education, or on the labor market (Collett–Petrovic 2014). In societies where the level of diversity is higher, these barriers are lower, but in homogenous populations, the descendants of immigrants will face these difficulties.

It is commonly accepted that integration is a *two-way process*, yet in theory, policy, and practice, the focus is more on refugees and immigrants themselves (Phillimore 2020). Policies tend to make the process one-way, and in practice immigrants play a major role, although society should also be actively involved in the process. In an integrating society, there is no difference between the native population and non-native population. These kinds of one-way integration models assume that a society is made up of domestic individuals and groups (non-immigrants) who are already integrated and who have better access to all types of capital (e.g. economic, political, social, cultural, and symbolic capital) (Klarenbeek 2019). A society like this has never existed. To integrate ‘outsiders,’ the internal – native – population must also change, thus as a result of the integration of immigrants, society must also change. As Klarenbeek writes, changes take place in the size and composition of society, and new institutional arrangements will be made to accommodate the political, social, and cultural needs of refugees.

Schinkel draws attention to another common misinterpretation of the notion of integration. He claims that the notion *integrated* or *disintegrated* cannot be applied to individuals (i.e. applied at the individual level), but only to the social whole, as ‘integrated’ is not an individual state. Despite this fact, the focus of integration policies is always the individual. Society as a whole is against individuals – or groups of individuals – “whose being signifies a certain degree of integration.” As the author writes, research does not usually measure the level of integration of native citizens. Therefore, if the notion of integration is only applied to immigrants but not to society, society “gets purified.” Thereby, if any problems occur – unemployment, or homophobia, for example – it will be shown that “these are not problems that exist and occur within society.” The problems instead originate from outside of society, from individuals who are not integrated yet, thus problems must be solved at the level of groups, not at the national level (Schinkel 2018).

Integration can act as an index for measuring the level of immigrants’ and refugees’ adaptation to the host society. Researchers usually use quantitative techniques to assess the socioeconomic performance of migrants, and these results are usually compared to those for non-immigrants. Most research about integration is “measured by the present state or the final outcome in different domains” (Crul–Schneider 2010). The problem with this is that these appraisals

are only snapshots of a long-term process. In measurement, the context in which immigrants and refugees live is an important factor. If they live in a segregated or ghetto area, where schools or the economy is weaker, these factors could negatively affect their integration.

In France, the Republican Integration Contract is the main tool for integration. This contract refers to a “two-day civic course and up to 200 hours of language training courses to reach an A1 level.” There are various pilot programs, of which the aim is to promote integration in ways like providing support packages for accommodation, language and vocational training, or minimum income support. These programs are usually implemented through collaboration between state and non-state actors (Fine 2019).

The process of integration is thus important, especially because it affects individual well-being (El Khoury 2018), so the details of the integration policies that governments follow are crucial.

INCLUSION

Inclusion is “the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society” (IOM 2019). This definition comes from the International Organization of Migration, but the concept of inclusion was not used earlier in the field of migration.

The notion was not just a response to social exclusion; it was more about making sure that all individuals are able to participate as valued, respected members of society. The idea of social inclusion originates from the 1970s and 1980s. Social inclusion was Europe’s response to the increasing number of people living in long-term poverty caused by the crisis in health and welfare programs (Omidvar–Richmond 2003).

Others (Varga 2015) say that the concept of inclusion was first used in the field of social policy for special education in relation to the successful institutional education of children and students with disabilities. Inclusion – the opposite of exclusion – may increase efficiency if it becomes determining in education and in society (Varga 2006). First, intervention in integrative kindergartens and schools was called inclusive. This meant that the environment was adapted in a supportive way to children and students with different needs (Varga 2015).

In the last decade, the scientific and political approach to this concept has changed in several ways around the world – for example, the range of people and groups who are the focus of action for inclusion has significantly expanded. This occurred after policy makers recognized that there are other individuals and

groups who are endangered by exclusion processes. Today, some democratic principles are grounded on those legal documents which have identified a wide range of groups at risk of exclusion. Also, these documents set out how to pay special attention to preventing the latter's exclusion. At the European level, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950)¹³ defines the basics of the prohibition of discrimination, ensures equal treatment, and defines the scope of directives and protected characteristics. In the EU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000)¹⁴ also prohibits discrimination (Articles 20–21) but requires Member States to respect linguistic and cultural diversity (Article 23). Therefore, equality does not mean uniformity.

The reception of those who belong to other cultures and communities is a never-ending process – it involves constant work towards the idea that the constraints of exclusion in society should be eliminated. It means recognition and appreciation of all aspects of diversity (Kalocsainé–Varga 2005). The European Commission's definition is that social inclusion is a process that enables every citizen (including the most disadvantaged) to fully participate in society.¹⁵ Since the launch of the 'Lisbon Strategy' (2000), the EU has used the notion of social inclusion in legal and strategic documents.

Inclusion is more than just bringing outsiders in. According to Omidvar and Richmond (2003: IX), the following elements are the "cornerstones" of social inclusion:

- *Valued recognition*: conferring recognition and respect on individuals and groups;
- *Human development*: nurturing the talents, skills, capacities and choices of children and adults to live a life they value and to make a contribution both they and others find worthwhile;
- *Involvement and engagement*: having the right and the necessary support to make/be involved in decisions affecting oneself, family and community, and to be engaged in community life;
- *Proximity*: sharing physical and social spaces to provide opportunities for interactions, if desired, and to reduce social distances between people;
- *Material well-being*: having the material resources to allow children and their parents to participate fully in community life."

It is believed by Varga (2015) that the policy of integration has been replaced by the policy of inclusion. In the integration process, the focus is on the individual

13 https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

14 <https://tinyurl.com/b9vvh5rr> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

15 <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1059&langId=en> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

who gets help from society to integrate. Systemic conditions remain unchanged, and change and adaptation are expected from individuals and groups. In contrast, the quintessence of inclusion is focusing on the environment itself. Reception will only be successful if the environment can adequately respond to the needs and requirements of those who exist in society. Hinz's (2002) opinion is that inclusion is an optimized and expanded interpretation of integration. Integration divides individuals into groups, while inclusion involves a large, heterogeneous group. In such a heterogeneous community, coexistence is the key to success. Inclusion is a quality means of practically implementing integration. In a heterogeneous community, interventions will only bring results if society itself becomes more inclusive. This approach argues that the starting point for social inclusion was integration, and the concept of inclusion has led to a new approach. In contrast to integration, inclusion suggests that there are no 'deficient' groups in society whose social integration should be focused on. Inclusion is rather about a heterogeneous group in which coexistence is important (Varga 2015).

Dutch integration strategy can be considered a form of inclusive policy. In the Netherlands, once an asylum-seeker is granted asylum, they are obliged to participate in an integration course. The course takes 600 hours, and refugees need to pass it within three years. The integration course focuses on learning the language and culture, and becoming prepared for the Dutch labor market. Because the participation of refugees in the labor market has been low, the government implanted several programs (tailored support and coaching in relation to finding work, etc.). Moreover, the government focused on providing subsidies to employers to motivate refugee employment (Knappert et al. 2019).

The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005)¹⁶ defines common rules, principles, and points of reference for cultural diversity at the global level, and is intended to "promote respect for the diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of its value at the local, national and international levels." As written in UNESCO guidelines (2005) "inclusion has to be seen as a never-ending search to find better ways of responding to diversity"; i.e. as a process of identification and the removal of the barriers. An inclusive social environment is based on diversity, and for this reason it is important that both immigrants and refugees are equal members of society. Furthermore, their contribution to the economy "increase[s] their independence and boost[s] the economic health of local communities" (UNHCR 2019:3).

16 <https://tinyurl.com/7ka3yf4s> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

SUMMARY

Migration is as old as humanity. However, its form has changed over time, becoming a mass phenomenon, and now taking place in a global context (Csepeli–Örkény 2017). Thus, the immigration and reception of asylum-seekers is not a new phenomenon for European countries. Solidarity and integration are core values of the European Union, thus how Member States treat refugees and immigrants has an important social impact. In the course of promoting cultural diversity and multiculturalism – the coexistence of different groups in society – various expectations and strategies have been developed by the majority and minority. I have outlined different concepts which can refer to policy strategies, and at the same time can be the individual or social outcomes of the acculturation/integration process.

As the motto of the European Union says, “United in diversity.” At first, this slogan came into use in 2000. “It signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent’s many different cultures, traditions and languages,”¹⁷ as the Treaty of the European Union (Article 3) claims. Accordingly,¹⁸ the EU “shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” This therefore requires the simultaneous fulfilment of two requirements together: treating *diversity as a value*, thereby avoiding (forced) assimilation and exclusion because of extremism, and the *integration of people who enjoy international protection*. The order of the notions presented in this paper is based on how the concepts are related to the inclusion of asylum-seekers and refugees based on the strength of their reception. This may be visualized using an imaginary axis that indicates the degree of the latter’s inclusion into the host society. Integration, inclusion, and equal treatment lie on the axis between two extremes (assimilation and exclusion), and it is a shared task of Europeans to foster them effectively.

A nation’s choice depends on the ruling government’s attitude, which may be pro- or anti-immigrant, asylum-seeker, or refugee. At the same time, some of the notions may also be outcomes of the acculturation process. The concepts presented and described here impact the discourse about migration.

17 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

18 <https://tinyurl.com/yc9rkjso> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]

The adaptation of refugees and immigrant to the host society is usually measured by their success in the most important areas of integration (employment, housing, relations, and language). However, researchers must be cautious with their findings, because the latter show only the current integration state of an area, and, as mentioned earlier, the process of integration takes time.

The future of societies and the European Union will depend on how they face the challenge of integrating refugees and immigrants, thus it is essential that their acts and decisions do not run counter to common European interests. Instead of promoting fear and hatred, governments should pursue policies that serve the interest of both the majority and minority. The New Pact (EU Commission 2020) targets lawful and managed migration and includes a wide range of coercive tools, strong law enforcement and control and surveillance measures, while providing money, a solidarity mechanism and professional-administrative cooperation to assist with integration – not only for refugees, but also for Europeans.

REFERENCES

- Akarowhe, K. (2018) Effects and remedies to cultural shock on the adolescent students. *Sociology International Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 4., pp. 306–309, DOI: 10.15406/sij.2018.02.00063
- Alba, R. – V. Nee (1997) Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4., pp. 826–874, DOI:10.1177/019791839703100403
- Alba, R. – V. Nee (2003) *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press
- Bándy, K. (2019) A magasan képzett bevándorló magyar munkavállalók akkulturációs stratégiáinak vizsgálata a munkavállalási brain drain problémakörében. In: Reisinger, A. – P. Kecskés – L. Buics – J. Berkes – B. Balassa (eds.): “*Kulturális gazdaság*”. Kautz Gyula Emlékkonferencia elektronikus formában megjelenő kötete. Győr, Széchenyi István Egyetem, pp. 1–12, <https://tinyurl.com/y94pglky> [Last accessed: 05 28 2020]
- Barcy, M. (2012) *Konfliktusok és előítéletek – A vonzások és taszítások világa*. Budapest, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Társadalomtudományi Kar http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop412A/20100011_konfliktusokeloiteletek/lecke22_lap2.html [Last accessed: 05 22 2020]
- Barry, E. – M. S. Sorensen (2018) In Denmark, harsh new laws for immigrant ‘ghettos’. *The New York Times*, January 7, 2018; <https://www.nytimes.com>

- com/2018/07/01/world/europe/denmark-immigrant-ghettos.html [Last accessed: 10 06 2020]
- Bastian, B. – N. Haslam (2010) Excluded from humanity: The dehumanizing effects of social ostracism. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, No. 1., pp. 107–113, DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.022
- Beißert, H. – S. Gönültaş – K. L. Mulvey (2020) Social inclusion of refugee and native peers among adolescents: It is the language that matters! *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, Vol. 30, No. 1., pp. 219–233, DOI:10.1111/jora.12518
- Berry, J. W. (1997) Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. *Applied Psychology*, Vol. 46, No. 1., pp. 5–34, DOI: 10.1080/026999497378467
- Berry, J. W. (2003) Conceptual approaches to acculturation. In: Chun, K. M. – P. Balls Organista – G. Marin (eds.): *Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research*. Washington, American Psychological Association, pp. 17–37.
- Berry, J. W. – R. Kalin (1995) Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 National Survey. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement*, Vol. 27, No. 3., pp. 301–320, DOI: 10.1037/0008-400X.27.3.301
- Bogáromi, E. – E. Malota (2017) Kultúrák közötti váltás – a fogyasztói akkulturáció irodalmának áttekintése. In: Dr. Bányai, E. – Dr. B. Lányi – Dr. M. Töröcsik (eds.): *Tükröződés, társtudományok, trendek, fogyasztás*. Pécs, Pécsi Tudományegyetem, Közgazdaságtudományi Kar, pp. 291–299.
- Brown, Ph. – R. Crompton (2000) Gazdasági átstrukturálódás és társadalmi kizárás. In: Lengyel, Gy. – B. Nagy (eds.): *Az európai integráció társadalmi feltételei és hatásai*. Budapest, Aula
- Castles, S. (1995) How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3., pp. 293–308, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.1995.9976493
- Collett, E. – M. Petrvic (2014) *The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion*. Brussels, Migration Policy Institute Europe
- Collyer, M. – S. Hinger – R. Schweitzer (2020) An Introduction. In: Hinger, S. – R. Schweitzer (eds.): *Politics of (Dis)Integration*. Cham, Springer, pp. 1–18, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25089-8_1
- Correa-Velez, I. – R. Spaaij – S. Upham (2013) ‘We are not here to claim better services than any other’: Social exclusion among men from refugee backgrounds in urban and regional Australia. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2., pp. 163–186, DOI:10.1093/jrs/fes003

- Crul, M. – J. Schneider (2010) Comparative integration context theory: Participation and belonging in new diverse European cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 7., pp. 1249–1268, DOI: 10.1080/01419871003624068
- Csepegi, Gy. – A. Örkény (2017) *Nemzet és migráció (Nation and Migration)*. Budapest, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, TáTK
- De Haan, A. – S. Maxwell (1998) Editorial: Poverty and social exclusion in north and south. *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1–9, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1998.mp29001001.x>
- Doolaard, F. T. – G-J. Lelieveld – M. K. Noordewier – I. van Beest – E. van Dijk (2020) Get out or stay out: How the social exclusion process affects actors, but not targets. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 88, DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103946
- El Khoury, S. J. (2018) Factors that impact the sociocultural adjustment and well-being of Syrian refugees in Stuttgart – Germany. *British Journal of Guidance and Counselling*. Vol. 47, No. 1., pp. 1–16, DOI: 10.1080/03069885.2018.1520196
- European Commission (2020) European Commission's Communication on A New Pact on Migration and Asylum (COM (2020)
- Euromemorandum (2017) European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe. *The European Union: The Threat of Disintegration – EuroMemorandum 2017*, http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/euromemorandum_2017.pdf [Last accessed: 08 10 2020]
- European Migration Network's Glossary (2020) <https://tinyurl.com/ya3tqoaq> [Last accessed: 22 05 2020]
- Fine, S. (2019) *The Integration of Refugees in France*. In depth analysis requested by the EMPL committee, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg_Data/etudes/STUD/2019/638397/IPOL_STU\(2019\)638397\(ANN01\)_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg_Data/etudes/STUD/2019/638397/IPOL_STU(2019)638397(ANN01)_EN.pdf) [Last accessed: 06 10 2020]
- Fox, R. S. – E. L. Merz – M. T. Solórzano – S. C. Roesch (2013) Further examining Berry's model: The applicability of latent profile analysis to acculturation. *Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development*, Vol. 46, No. 4., pp. 270–288, DOI: 10.1177/0748175613497036
- Gans, H. J. (1992) Second-generation decline: Scenarios for the economic and ethnic futures of the post-1965 American immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2., pp. 173–192, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.1992.9993740
- Gans, H. J. (1997) Toward a reconciliation of “assimilation” and “pluralism”: The interplay of acculturation and ethnic retention. *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4., pp. 875–892, DOI: 10.2307/2547417
- Gordon, M. M. (1964) *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. Oxford, Oxford University Press

- Hinz, A. (2002) Von der Integration zur Inklusion – terminologisches Spiel oder konzeptionelle Weiterentwicklung. *Zeitschrift für Heilpädagogik*, Vol. 53, No. 9., pp. 354–361.
- IOM (2019) *Glossary on Migration*. Switzerland, International Organization for Migration, <https://tinyurl.com/y94hzv6b> [Last accessed: 22 05 2020]
- Kalocsainé Sánta, H. – A. Varga (2005) Az inklúzió mint társadalmi és oktatási idea. *Educatio*, Vol. 14, No. 1., pp. 204–208.
- Kislev, E. (2019) Open markets, closed societies: the dual assimilation of immigrants in Western Europe. *Social Science Research*, Vol. 82, pp. 92–104, DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.04.004
- Klarenbeek, L. M. (2019) Reconceptualising ‘integration as a two-way process.’ *Migration Studies*, pp. 1–20, DOI: 10.1093/migration/mnz033
- Knappert, L. – H. van Dijk – V. Ross (2019) Refugees’ inclusion at work: A qualitative cross-level analysis. *Career Development International*, Vol. 25, No. 1., pp. 32–48, <https://doi.org/10.1108/CDI-01-2018-0021>
- Ladányi, J. (2011) Integráció, asszimiláció, szegregáció. In: Bárdi, N. – Á. Tóth (eds.): *Asszimiláció, integráció, szegregáció. Párhuzamos értelmezések és modellek a kisebbségkutatásban*. Budapest, MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, pp. 49–56.
- Legate, N. – C. R. de Haan – N. Weinstein – R. M. Ryan (2013) Hurting you hurts me too: The psychological costs of complying with ostracism. *Psychological Science*, Vol. 24, No. 4., pp. 583–588, DOI: 10.1177/0956797612457951.
- Morsut, C. – I. B. Kurke (2018) Crisis governance of the refugee and migrant influx into Europe in 2015: A tale of disintegration. *Journal of European Integration*, Vol 40, No. 2., pp. 145–159, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2017.1404055
- Münchau, W. (2016) Europe enters the age of disintegration. *Financial Times*, February 28, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/f9c8bb52-dcac-11e5-8541-00fb33bdf038> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]
- Neto, P. F. (2018) Ambiguous boundaries between exclusion and inclusion. Experiences from the Meheba Refugee Camp (Zambia). In: Aboim, S. – P. Granjo – A. Ramos (eds.): *Changing Societies: Legacies and Challenges*. Lisbon, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, pp. 29–47, DOI: 10.31447/ics9789726715030.01
- OHCHR (2010) *Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation*. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) HR/PUB/10/3, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4db80ca52.html>
- Omidvar, R. – T. Richmond (2003) Immigrant settlement and social inclusion in Canada. Toronto, Laidlaw Foundation
- Oxford English Dictionary* (2020) Disintegration, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/disintegration> [Last accessed: 09 29 2020]

- Park, R. E. – E. W. Burgess (1921) *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28496/28496-h/28496-h.htm> [Last accessed: 09 29 2020]
- Park, R. E. (1928) Human migration and the marginal man. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 33, No. 6., pp. 881– 893, DOI: 10.1086/214592
- Percy-Smith, J. (2000) *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion: Towards Inclusion?* Philadelphia, Open University Press
- Phillimore, J. (2020) Refugee-integration-opportunity structures: Shifting the focus from refugees to context. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, feaa012, DOI: 10.1093/jrs/feaa012
- Schain, M. A. (2009) The success and failure of integration policy in France and Britain: Convergence of policy and divergence of results. In: Prügl E. – M. Thiel (eds): *Diversity in the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, DOI:10.1057/9780230104167_3
- Schinkel, W. (2018) Against ‘immigrant integration’: For an end to neocolonial knowledge production. *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 31., pp. 1–17, DOI: 10.1186/s40878-018-0095-1
- Stearns, J. (2020) Europe’s Refugees. *Bloomberg*, February 28, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/europe-refugees> [Last accessed: 09 30 2020]
- Tassinari, F. (2016) The disintegration of European security: Lessons from the refugee crisis. *PRISM*, Vol. 6, No. 2., pp. 70–83.
- UNESCO (2005) *Guidelines for Inclusion: Ensuring Access to Education for All*. Paris, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- UNHCR (2019) *MUN Refugee Challenge*. Background Guide Economic Inclusion of Refugees, <https://www.unhcr.org/5df9f0bc7.pdf> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]
- Varga, A. (2006) Multikulturalizmus – inkluzív oktatási rendszer. In: Forray, R. K. (ed.): *Ismeretek a romológia alapképzési szakhoz*. Pécs, Bölcsész Konzorcium, pp. 145–158.
- Varga, A. (2015) *Az inklúzió szemlélete és gyakorlata*. Pécs, Pécsi Tudományegyetem Bölcsészettudományi Kar Neveléstudományi Intézet Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék, <https://tinyurl.com/ybzr6az6> [Last accessed: 05 24 2020]
- Ward, C. – N. Geeraert (2015) Advancing acculturation theory and research: The acculturation process in its ecological context. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 8, pp. 98–104, DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.021

VOLUNTARY SOCIAL INSURANCE POLICY THROUGH THE EVALUATION OF WORKERS IN TAY HO DISTRICT, HANOI CITY, VIETNAM

LINH MAI – THI KIM HOA NGUYEN¹

ABSTRACT: *Vietnam's voluntary social insurance (VSI) policy has been in force since 2008 and by 2018 included 270,000 participants (accounting for 0.79% of the labor force). Hanoi City is the capital of Vietnam, with 21,156 participants (0.56%). The proportion of people participating in VSI is still very low. Workers who have at least 20 years of participation will receive a monthly pension and their beneficiaries will receive a death benefit in case of their demise. The opinions of workers about VSI policies are presented in the report through interviews with 170 voluntary social insurance participants and 168 non-participants in Tay Ho District, Hanoi City. The research results in new findings using comparison between participants and non-participants. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with 40 people, including social insurance officials in Tay Ho District, ward officials, and workers, to clarify why the number of VSI participants is low. Based on the research and evaluation of workers concerning VSI policies and regulations, we identify the main causes of this situation, as well as the policy- and communication-related shortcomings, and suggest solutions for improving the social insurance participation rate of individuals in Hanoi City in particular, and Vietnam in general.*

KEYWORDS: *policy, voluntary social insurance, workers*

¹ *Linh Mai Dr*, lecturer of Faculty of Sociology, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU Vietnam, mailinh232000@yahoo.co.uk; *Thi Kim Hoa Nguyen PhD*, Associate Professor and Director of Center for Social Work Application and Development, Faculty of Sociology, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU Vietnam, kimhoaxhh@yahoo.com. This article is based on the research results of the National University Project in Hanoi "Research and evaluation of the current situation to propose solutions to increase the number of participants in VSI in the informal sector in Hanoi city today." This research is funded by Vietnam National University, Hanoi (VNU) under project number QG.18.43. The article authors are the primary participants of the research topic. The authors would like to thank VNU for sponsorship for conducting this study.

INTRODUCTION

The provision of social insurance (SI) is a major policy of the Party and state of Vietnam, and a fundamental part of the country's social security system. A resolution of the ninth National Congress of the Party pointed out that: “[w]e have to step by step firmly expand the system of social insurance and social security towards applying social insurance for all workers and all social classes” (Central Party Committee 2014). However, to increase the coverage of SI, increasing uptake of VSI is the most important step. This involves a lot of challenges, as the number of participants is still very limited.

VSI is a type of social insurance organized by the Vietnamese government through which participants are allowed to choose their premium and method of payment in accordance with their income. The government has a policy of supporting SI participants with a pension and death benefit (Social Insurance Law 2014). Participants of VSI may be Vietnamese citizens aged 15 years or older who are not subject to compulsory SI, or workers who are old enough but are not eligible to a regular pension from the SI system, according to the law on SI. From January 1, 2018, VSI participants have been entitled to a pension ranging from 45% to 75% of the average monthly income earned during the period of VSI, which corresponds to the number of years of SI contribution in which the SI-related contributions of male workers retiring in 2018 are counted as 16 years, in 2019 as 17 years, in 2020 as 18 years, in 2021 as 19 years, and from 2022 onwards as 20 years. The contributions of female workers who retire from 2018 onwards are counted as 15 years. After that period, each year adds 2%. Regarding the entitlement to a death benefit, the burial allowance is equal to 10 times the basic salary due in the month that the participant of voluntary social insurance dies (the funeral allowance is 13.9 million VND). The survivor allowance is calculated according to the number of years of SI contributions: each year of SI contribution before 2014 contributes an equivalent of 1.5 times the average monthly income, and for the years from 2014 onwards it contributes two times the average monthly income (Article 74, Social Insurance Law 2014).

The VSI system in Vietnam came into force on January 1, 2008. To create this policy, researchers carried out research for 10 years to generate the theoretical and practical basis for developing policies that could promote VSI among workers with a mid- and low level income, with special attention to poor workers and ethnic minority workers (Pham 2012). Informal sector workers are also a matter of concern for many scholars. Studies have shown that more workers in informal sectors come from rural and suburban areas (67.0%) than from cities. Women account for nearly 50% of individuals from this sector. The level of education and technical expertise of the labor force is relatively low, as only 15.7% have

a high school or higher degree, while over 90% of workers do not have any skill-related certifications. Moreover, the nature of the work of workers in the informal sector has other noticeable characteristics, such as being precarious and unstable, associated with a low income, a lack of labor contracts, and long working hours. Authors have stated that limitations of VSI policy include the high premiums, long participation period, and low education level of workers – all of which factors affect the latter's awareness of and access to information about the importance of VSI (Bui-Do 2012).

The solutions proposed by the authors include strengthening the promotion of VSI policies, simplifying the administrative procedures in the SI industry and further enhancing the assessment of participation needs and capacity, as well as evaluating the rate of participation among all citizens in general and the poor in particular to make the policy system more appropriate for encouraging the poor and the disadvantaged to participate (Bui-Hoang 2016). A study by Thai (2017) argues that current research in the field mainly considers VSI to be a public policy, but fails to take into account the behavior and intention of participants. In order to measure and evaluate participational intention and behavior related to the uptake of VSI in informal sectors, the authors applied theories and models of behavior such as consumer behavior theory and attitude theory. The survey results show that the factors of 'moral responsibility' and 'communication,' instead of income, are the two most influential factors regarding the intention to participate in VSI among workers in the informal sector. In addition, low education levels also hinder understanding of SI policies. The above research results contributed to the procedure of making further provisions for helping workers to participate in VSI since January 1, 2018 by the State of Vietnam. Despite the new policy, the number of VSI participants has not increased, or has only increased very slowly.

With regard to the factors that previous studies pointed out, we also identified duplicates such as 'communication issues' alongside those that were not mentioned earlier, such as 'payment' and the fact that "the membership benefits of VSI are not as diverse as other commercial insurance." These are useful ideas that we collected from people, based on which we can propose solutions for improving the participation rate and competitiveness of VSI with commercial insurance in Vietnam. The best solution for increasing the VSI participation rate, as suggested in other studies, is improving communication, although there needs to be a change in the method of communication, especially with regard to the occupation and age of employees. Communication can be done via social networks, a very popular means of media nowadays.

In this study, we use Maslow's theory of needs, but we only employ the theory of the need for safety, one of the most urgent needs of humans (an approach

that previous studies have never used). When low-level needs are met, higher needs arise. Therefore, when researching the VSI participation of workers in the informal sector, it is necessary to base the examination on an assessment of workers' satisfaction of their biological needs so that we can assess the demand for, condition of, and obstacles to VSI participation. In addition, we base the analysis on the theory of rational behavior of George Homans, with the desire to understand workers' perceptions, needs, and ability to participate in VSI related to a consideration of the resources required to enjoy the maximum benefits.

Thus the goal of the study is to make sense of the rate of participation in voluntary social insurance (VSI) in Tay Ho District by using Maslow's theory of needs and rational choice behavior in the exploration. Through assessing the expectations of people with regard to VSI policies, we propose solutions – especially in terms of communication – regarding how to improve the awareness of and participation rate in VSI.

This study was conducted in August 2018, after the new policy had been in force for eight months. The media and SI agencies at all levels had propagated the initiative and encouraged people to participate in VSI. During this period VSI was considered a hot topic, since people were then actively discussing VSI policy, which was very convenient for doing research, and at the same time meeting the needs of workers and officials at all levels in the SI industry.

MATERIALS AND METHOD

As of December 2018, Hanoi's population was 8,215,000 people. Fifty-five percent of the population (i.e. 4.5 million people) live in urban areas, and 3.7 million live in a rural area (45%). Hanoi has 30 administrative units, including 12 districts, 17 rural districts, and one town with 584 communal administrative units, including 386 communes, 177 wards, and 21 towns (Chinhphu 2018). After 10 years of VSI policy, although the number of participants has grown from year to year, Vietnam only has nearly 200,000 participants, and this number is still too small compared to the potential and objectives of the Social Insurance Agency at all levels. In 2018 there were about 270,000 people participating in voluntary social insurance from a total of about 34 million workers who were non-participants, accounting for a very low rate of 0.79%.

Hanoi City has the second largest population in the country, after Ho Chi Minh City. In 2018, Hanoi's population was about 7.2 million people, of which 3.9 million are of working age, accounting for 54.2% of the city's population. The number of workers who work in the formal sector, having signed labor

contracts and being subject to compulsory social insurance, is about 1.5 million people, accounting for 38.46% of the labor force.

The data show that there is a huge potential labor force for developing VSI participation in Hanoi. In 2008, participation included 0.03% of total workers. By 2017, after nearly 10 years of implementation, the figure was only 0.56%. The informal labor of Hanoi includes the following groups:

First, those who work in traditional craft villages. Until 2015, Hanoi had over 1,270 craft villages distributed in districts, towns, and rural districts. In particular, there are dozens of industries that are undergoing strong waves of development, such as ceramics, textiles, footwear, sculpture, pearl mosaics, embroidery, silk weaving, lacquer, bamboo and rattan weaving, bronze casting, jewelry, mechanical engineering, sticky rice villages, ornamental plants, and dairy farming.

Second is the group of employees that work in agriculture. After expansion of the administrative boundary on August 1, 2008, agricultural land in Hanoi amounted to about 192,000 hectares, accounting for 57.6% of the city's land area (Nguyen 2018).

The third group is that of freelance workers – those who are self-employed in small-scale business services at home, or who do short-term day-to-day jobs such as manual work, or work as porters or street vendors. The workers in this group are mainly city dwellers who open their own shops and services at home, or migrants from suburban districts of the city, or from other provinces. Basically, this is a group of people the members of which do not register their businesses, nor sign legal labor contracts. Therefore it is difficult to control or statisticize this group accurately.

With such labor characteristics, the proportion of workers in Hanoi that are eligible for VSI is very large, but the actual participation rate is very low at present.

For this study, we chose the Tay Ho District to survey. By the end of November, 2018, the population of Tay Ho District was 127,565 people, with 41,544 households (Pham 2012). Tay Ho District has eight wards: Buoi, Yen Phu, Thuy Khue, Tu Lien, Quang An, Nhat Tan, Xuan La, and Phu Thuong. Tay Ho District has many informal workers in traditional craft villages. Phu Thuong ward is famous for its sticky rice dishes and peach tree planting, Nhat Tan for planting peach blossom trees, Tu Lien ward for decorative kumquat and bonsai, Buoi ward for Do paper, Quang An ward for lotus tea and for renting houses and villas (about 700 families in this ward lease out their estates to foreigners, with 3000 foreigners residing in the area), Xuan La ward has 1,742 households doing business/trading/services (28.84%). Tay Ho District thus has many informal workers and well-off households.

The selection of interview subjects

We relied on lists of voluntary ST participants provided by the ward's People's Committee. The number of participants in VSI in Tay Ho District is limited, so we chose to interview all participants on the list provided by the district social insurance agency. For non-participants, we selected neighbors who live in the same area as the participants. Our purpose was to select samples from the same residential area of individuals with similar living and working conditions who are beneficiaries of similar policies and show certain similarities in terms of social factors such as education level, employment, income, etc. This convenient method of random sampling may not be optimal, but it is perhaps the most suitable for the conditions of the study. The quantitative sample included 338 individuals (170 VSI participants and 168 VSI non-participants), and the qualitative sample 40.

We were required to visit the house of each person for an interview, but some people were working away from home, visiting relatives, or traveling. In some cases, the household was in the ward, but the workers lived in another area, thus the number of interviews did not meet our expectations. Moreover, the number of workers participating in VSI fluctuates constantly: when people enter a new labor market they may have a working engagement with compulsory SI, so they stop paying VSI, or vice versa; in some cases, participants quit VSI due to difficult economic conditions. Therefore, the number of workers paying voluntary social insurance changes every month. Sometimes there are people who no longer participate in VSI but remain on the list, thus making it difficult to find and interview subjects.

Table 1. *Number of interviews with participants and non-participants of VSI in Tay Ho District, Hanoi City*

Location	Number of workers participating in VSI who were interviewed	Number of workers NOT participating in VSI who were interviewed	Total number of interviewees
<i>Tay Ho District together</i>	<i>170</i>	<i>168</i>	<i>338</i>
Tu Lien ward	20	30	50
Xuan La ward	20	20	40
Phu Thuong ward	30	20	50
Quang An ward	17	15	32
Thuy Khue ward	23	16	39
Nhat Tan ward	13	25	38
Yen Phu ward	14	15	29
Buoi ward	33	27	60

Source: Statistics provided by VSI agencies in wards and research data.

Demographic features

The demographic features of the surveyed workers are as follows. In terms of gender, workers in the informal sector are mostly women, therefore the majority of VSI participants are women.

In terms of age, most VSI participants are not young people, with ages typically ranging from 36–45 years old. Non-participants are mostly younger than participants of VSI.

The educational level of workers in the survey area is uneven. At the high school level, 35.9% of workers participate in VSI, and the rate of non-participants is 38.7%. Next is the college level: the proportions of the two groups, respectively, are 32.4% and 28.6%. Workers with university and postgraduate degrees account for 23.5% and 23.2%, respectively. A notable proportion of workers have a low level of education (less than high school level).

Table 2. Demographic features of workers participating and not participating in VSI in Tay Ho District, Hanoi City, based on survey data

Demographic features		Workers participating in VSI		Workers NOT participating in VSI	
		N	%	N	%
<i>Gender:</i>	Male	61	35.9	56	33.3
	Female	109	64.1	112	66.7
<i>Age:</i>	<35 years	49	28.8	87	51.8
	36-45 years	82	48.2	44	26.2
	46 years and older	39	22.9	37	22.0
<i>Education:</i>	High school and lower	14	8.2	16	9.5
	High school	61	35.9	65	38.7
	Vocational training/ College	55	32.4	48	28.6
	University/ Postgraduate	40	23.5	39	23.2
<i>Occupation:</i>	Sales/ trading	62	36.5	84	50.0
	Office workers	30	17.6	31	18.5
	Freelancers	58	34.1	46	27.4
	Unemployed/ housewife	20	11.7	7	4.1
<i>Marital status:</i>	Married	150	88.2	123	73.6
	Single	16	9.4	33	19.8
	Divorced	4	2.4	8	4.8
	Widowed	0	0.0	3	1.8
<i>Total</i>		<i>170</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>168</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Statistics provided by VSI in wards and research data.

Comparison of the demographic structure gives us some findings:

- There is an age difference between two groups: among people under 35, the proportion of people participating in VSI accounts for only 28.8%. It seems that the older people are, and the more stable their income, the greater their desire to participate in VSI, as compared to young people.
- Marital status is also a relevant factor: the majority of people who participate in VSI are married. They may be interested in VSI because they are more worried about the future, and when participating in VSI, they tend to join in households to ensure they receive benefits, as well as discounts.

In terms of occupation, the Workers we surveyed were in a variety of jobs, but mainly sales and freelance. Due to the characteristics of freelance labor, the situation of being ‘between jobs’ was quite common in both groups. Regarding marital status, married people accounted for 88.2% of participants, and 73.6% of non-participants.

In addition, the project involved conducting 40 in-depth interviews, including with the following individuals: one official of Tay Ho District SI; one cadre in charge of collecting VSI in the ward; three vice-presidents in charge of culture-society in Tu Lien, Xuan La, and Phu Thuong; five cadres who collect VSI in Tu Lien, Xuan La, Phu Thuong, Nhat Tan, and Quang An wards; fifteen Workers participating in VSI in eight wards; and fifteen Workers who were not participating in eight wards, for the purpose of comparison.

The questionnaire consisted of three parts: (1) a general information section, including questions about demographic data such as gender, education level, income, employment, etc.; (2) a second part about the status of participation, including questions about the reasons for participating/not participating in VSI and respondents’ assessment of the VSI policy (premium rate, benefits, time of payment etc.); (3) while the third included questions about people’s expectations, and suggestions for changes and solutions for improving the VSI participation rate.

In-depth interviews were built differently for each group of subjects (residents, ward officials, and social insurance officers). The in-depth interviews panel for residents is also divided into three parts, similarly to the questionnaire described above. VSI officials and officers who implement social insurance were addressed in a detailed in-depth interview in connection with VSI policy and solutions for overcoming difficulties with improving the VSI participation rate.

The above-described quantitative and qualitative sample size is appropriate for analyzing the workers’ evaluation of VSI policies.

Before analyzing VSI policy through the opinions of people in Tay Ho District, Hanoi City, we assessed the number of workers participating in VSI in the whole

country and the whole city of Hanoi to be able to give readers more general information about VSI participation.

RESULTS: THE EVALUATION OF WORKERS IN TAY HO DISTRICT, HANOI CITY, CONCERNING VOLUNTARY SOCIAL INSURANCE POLICIES

Respondents' evaluation of the appropriateness of voluntary social insurance policy regulations

The rate of participation in compulsory SI was not yet total, but remained stable at a high level (approximately 80%). It can be said that this stable status reflects the great efforts of the industry and strong coordination among departments that deal with a huge amount of work.

The maintenance and settlement of compulsory SI requires the whole industry to join hands – departments and officials are always overloaded. The resolution of policy issues requires accuracy and thoroughness in relation to individuals and collectives to ensure benefits for participants. We are sometimes overloaded because of heavy workloads, and overtime or weekend work is very normal. In contrast to compulsory SI, VSI seems like a 'stepchild' in the family. While in fact the policies of compulsory health insurance and social insurance are always identified as the main responsibilities of the whole sector, VSI only receives rather superficial attention. (Nam, Social Insurance Officer, Hanoi)

According to *Resolution No. 28-NQ/TW* dated May 23, 2018, in 2030, the number of farmers and workers participating in VSI will account for about 5% of the labor force (Government 2018) – a fairly modest plan, but quite realistic. Hanoi is one of the cities with a large concentration of workers in the informal sector, but the proportion of workers participating in VSI in Hanoi is less than the national average.

From a social perspective, the voluntary participation of workers in social insurance contributes to maintaining social stability, helping balance the social security network, and ensuring a basic living standard for workers at retirement age. In general, workers in the survey area strongly appreciate voluntary social insurance policies and related factors. Specifically, 92.4% of participants

assessed the targets of voluntary social insurance as appropriate, premiums 91.8%; payment location 90.0%; payment method 88.2%; payment time 87.6%; and attendance records 85.9%.

Table 3. *Evaluation of participants concerning the appropriateness of VSI policy regulations*

Regulations	Appropriate		Not appropriate		No answer	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Targeted participants	157	92.4	2	1.2	11	6.4
Insurance premiums	156	91.8	6	3.5	8	4.7
Payment method	150	88.2	7	4.1	13	7.7
Payment time	149	87.6	10	5.9	11	6.5
Attendance record	146	85.9	9	5.3	15	8.8
Benefits	109	64.1	47	27.6	14	8.3
Payment location	153	90.0	5	2.9	12	7.1
State support for participants	78	45.9	40	23.5	52	30.6

Source: Project research results


Thus, this shows that the provisions of the Law on Social Insurance concerning voluntary social insurance are somewhat appropriate in practice and are highly appreciated by workers. The targets of voluntary social insurance are not only workers with labor contracts with less than one-month terms and non-specialized employees working in residential quarters, workers working for their own families, farmers, and freelancers. They also include workers who are old enough but not qualified in terms of their contribution period to receive a pension. From 2016 onwards, if the participant has a social insurance premium of no more than 120 months, they will be allowed to compensate for a full 20 years so they can enjoy a pension. The contribution will be paid once to cover the missing years, provided that the social insurance participants are old enough to receive the prescribed pension, so this regulation is appreciated by workers. The regulations dictate that participants can choose to pay monthly, quarterly, six-monthly or annually, thus helping create favorable conditions for workers to participate more easily than if they were required to pay monthly. Thus, the current regulations concerning payment methods are favored by the majority of workers who are involved in the system.

In the past, there was no VSI because when I quit my job, social insurance was settled at once, so I would not have had a pension when I retired. Now, there is a voluntary social insurance policy that continues paying, so old people will have a monthly pension which is also an amount they can spend. Diversified, monthly, and quarterly

payment methods help workers like us easily choose.... The premium is also suitable in relation to income, if anyone has difficulty, they can pay a few hundred thousand, depending on their condition. (male, security guard, Nhat Tan ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

The new policy introducing voluntary social insurance under the provisions of the new Social Insurance Law now allows workers to freely and easily participate in and enjoy social security policies, contributing to increasing the coverage of these policies. Thus, rational choice behavior theory is shown to operate here quite clearly – the rationalist claim is that individuals normally choose the action that has the greatest probability of yielding results. VSI policy has been supplemented in terms of methods, premium levels, and benefits to best suit the conditions and circumstances of those individuals who participate in VSI. The decision to participate is considered very carefully by people based on many factors, such as policy and economic conditions. However, in terms of benefits, only 64.1% of workers rated the latter as appropriate, and 8.3% did not know/did not comment; the level of state support for participants was also evaluated as low (45.9% said it was adequate). Of note is that up to 30.6% of respondents did not know about the state support for voluntary social insurance participants, which was implemented in 2018.

Figure 1. Level of satisfaction among VSI participants in relation to benefits (%)



Source: Research results

The above table shows that workers strongly appreciate the benefits that workers or family members receive. In terms of retirement benefits, workers rated satisfaction as very high (78.8%), while the death benefit was evaluated by 75% as satisfactory and the one-time settlement 80%.

In the past, I participated in social insurance in the district, in all paperwork procedures – the officers at the district social insurance agency explained very carefully and enthusiastically. I am very pleased with the attitude of the staff.

(female, 45 years old, Meeting Room Assistant, Phu Thuong Ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Besides positive comments, workers also expressed dissatisfaction in relation to a number of factors, such as the pension-distribution locations and pension receipt procedures.

I would not complain about the attitude of the staff or the policy. I participated in VSI in the form of compensating for the missing years so I could receive a pension. When I finished, I received a salary. The following month, I was very excited. The only thing is that the payroll location is a bit cramped, crowded with people waiting, but there are only two payrolls, so they have to wait all day.

(female, 56 years old, Buoï ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Procedures for getting a pension are complicated and we have to wait for a long time. My father is old, so he has to authorize me to go to get his monthly salary, but the authorization papers have to be renewed every year, which is very time-consuming and expensive.

(Nam, 1976, Xuan La ward, Tay Ho District)

Currently, the district has two methods of pension payment – one is through the postal system, and the other is payment via ATM card. For the payment of pensions by post, the post office had a monthly pension plan at the beginning of the year, but in fact there have been regular changes to the system.

I get my pension at the post office. Every five months I go to the ward cultural house to receive a pension issued by postal officials. But there was a time when the post office changed the date [of the time of collection] but only posted the notice at the ward office, so many people who did not know about the salary had their effort wasted.


(Nam, 64 years old, Buoï ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Thus, the qualitative research results suggest that there are still some inadequacies that cause trouble for people regarding their pension payment, as analyzed here.

Supplementation of VSI policies

Through the quantitative survey we collected the suggestions of workers who did not participate in voluntary social insurance. Their opinions both express their own needs and those of their families in particular, and indicate desire for changes in voluntary social insurance policies in general.

Figure 2. Opinions of non-participants concerning how to supplement VSI policies (%)



Source: Research results

Looking at the participants' expectations about supplementing the voluntary social insurance policy, the results are as follows: up to 88.6% of respondents suggested introducing a maternity allowance, followed by a sickness allowance (77.1%), one for labor-related accidents and occupational diseases (72.9%), and unemployment benefits (61.4%) (Figure 2).

The workers who participate in voluntary social insurance have many ideas connected to representing their interests.

The targets of participation, premiums, methods of payment, records ... are all appropriate, only the benefits of workers are not appropriate – we should add a benefit for women who give birth. I expect the state to supplement maternity benefits. However, with different levels of benefits, the contribution level must be different between women and men, as men are not subject to receiving the maternity allowance. (female, 33 years old, university diploma, salesperson of Western medicine, Tu Lien ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

The state should consider adding a maternity allowance – at least there should be allowances for women who give birth, as only then will people participate. It does not have to be much, but there should be a sum for women so they do not feel like parasites, thus encouraging women of working age to participate.

(female, university diploma, LISA cadre in Phu Thuong ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Considering the gender correlation, results show that women are more liable to suggest a supplement than men regarding all four types of VSI benefits, especially maternity benefits (81.6% compared to 70.4%). A labor-related accident and occupational disease benefit ranks second (65.5% and 72.4%).

I think we should add maternity and occupational accident and disease benefits. Because workers like us work in unsecured conditions, there are no labor contracts. In unfortunate cases, having an accident at work but being supported by the voluntary social insurance policy is much better.

(male, 1972, university diploma, Xuan La ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

I think the state should supplement maternity benefits. If voluntary social insurance provides these benefits, it will attract more women participants, because the maternity allowance is both a financial encouragement but also a spiritual encouragement for women. If postpartum women receive support from the state, and also for their children, life will be less hard and much less stressful.

(female, 29 years old, university diploma, Buoi ward, Tay Ho, Hanoi)

Thus, although not really a key condition, benefits are still among the important factors to be considered when workers participate in voluntary social insurance. The need for additional benefits is captured in the wishes and aspirations of people in relation to VSI policies. Above all, this stems from the need for safety, as described in Maslow's theory of needs. This need ranks at the second level, above physiological need, and is connected to the security of health, finance, life, and body. People's decision to invest in voluntary social insurance is clearly affected by health-related, financial, and stage-of-life factors (e.g. in relation to the death benefit of the VSI), as well as a need for psychological assurance in times of unexpected incidents.

Several times I heard the head of the residential area encouraging us to join VSI, but actually considering the long membership period and the benefits, we are very confused. My family currently uses Manulife insurance. Although the premium is higher, the benefits are very diverse, they have a sickness and accident regime, so I still feel more secure. (female, 52 years old, high school diploma, Quang An ward, Tay Ho District)

Thus, although there are different perceptions and needs among age groups, VSI participants are very interested in including more benefits in VSI participation, especially maternity benefits for female workers. This is also a drawback of VSI compared to the commercial insurance on the current Vietnamese market.

Communication about VSI

Sources of information about VSI for workers in the survey area are diverse. However, workers mainly obtain information from local government (47.6%), 35.9% from social insurance agencies, 22.9% from family/ relatives/ acquaintances, while media only accounted for 27.6% and poster leaflets 5.9%. This shows that the communication activities of the local government about voluntary social insurance – directly from SI-collecting agents – have had a partly positive effect, while the impact of mass media has been quite fuzzy in terms of communicating about VSI.

Data show that for the age group 35 and under, the proportion of workers accessing information about SI is 26.1%. For the 36–45 age group, the rates are 48.7% and 47.3%, respectively. For the age group 46 years of age and above, the rate is 25.2% and 18.2%. However, data on the age group correlation also showed that workers aged 36–45 years obtained more information on VSI than other age groups.

In middle age, workers have a family and stable income, but health conditions are affected, and much reduced. Workers pay a lot of attention to obtaining benefits for themselves when they gradually reach retirement age, so they often find out information about VSI and health insurance through various sources, such as officials from the SI agency or government, unions, and mass media and the internet. (male, representative of Xuan La ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)


In terms of gender, the proportion of women accessing information on voluntary social insurance is larger than that of men (the proportion of women is 63.5% and that of men is 36.5%).

Regarding education level, for those with a high-school education or less, the rate of access to information about voluntary social insurance is quite high, at 52.2%, followed by those with a vocational and college education (27.0%), while individuals with a university or postgraduate degree are least likely to seek out information (20.9%).

Similarly to the rate of information access, 47.6% of respondents say that when they have questions they ask local government officials – namely, officials/experts who are agents for collecting VSI. The proportion of people who turn to VSI officials with questions is large, at 63.5%, while 17.1% ask questions from friends/ acquaintances. However, with non-urgent cases, workers, especially young workers, often refer to the internet, using the website of the Vietnam Social Insurance Agency, Hanoi Social Insurance, or websites specialized in addressing legal matters. Accessing help from social workers, legal consultancy centers, and the 1080 switchboard is not an option chosen by many people.

Workers who have not participated in VSI also gave us some of their opinions about the effectiveness of forms of voluntary social insurance.

Figure 3. Means of communication accessed by non-participants of VSI (%)



Source: Research results

The chart above shows that the means of accessing forms of communication about voluntary social insurance are quite diverse. The most frequently chosen option is ‘mass media’ (62.9%), followed by ‘Propagating through social activities and gatherings’ (61.4%) while the least popular are ‘poster, panels

and leaflets' (41.4%) and 'collaborators and agencies with direct contact' (38.6%).

It is clear that with young workers nowadays, communication via traditional mass media such as newspapers, radio, and even television is no longer suitable. Everyone has a smartphone, so communication about VSI must catch up with this trend to be effective.
(male, LISA cadres, Tay Ho District)

In the opinion of workers, mass media such as the internet, especially social networks, are information channels very frequently accessed by people of all classes and ages, so the active dissemination of information about VSI through these media will help communicate information to people as quickly as possible.

I've been retired for 10 years but I still keep up to date with the news. Two years ago, my son bought me a touch phone, which is very convenient. Since then, I have also read fewer books and accessed fewer radio stations. Information about VSI is mostly propagated on newspapers and radio, so I do not know it very well.
(male, university diploma, Xuan La ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Therefore, the selection of methods and forms of communication should be appropriate for the conditions and actual situations of each subject and household. Being faced with the 4.0 era and the use of technology for serving daily needs, media also need to change to suit the needs of people.

I see that if information on the policies and benefits of voluntary social insurance is propagated via means such as television and social networks, it is possible to reach people very quickly and effectively.
(male, high school diploma, Tu Lien ward, Tay Ho District, Hanoi)

Accessing information about voluntary social insurance through mass media is the preferred option among workers who are non-participants, which is quite understandable as access to mass media is currently quite convenient and easy. In particular, all the workers responded that they had at least one social network account such as Facebook, Zalo, or Viber, etc. Accordingly, we propose that sending information through social networks could promote the social insurance policy in the coming years and help workers obtain access to and have a better understanding of the related policy.

DISCUSSION

Voluntary social insurance is a new form of insurance with many advantages. It can give workers the opportunity to participate in social insurance, receive a pension in retirement, and reduce the difficulties and risks associated with aging. The research results show that the demand from workers to participate in voluntary social insurance in Tay Ho District is strong, and this demand increases with age. The number of older workers who desire voluntary social insurance is greater than that of the young, and there are those who have participated in social insurance but were forced to switch.

The number of people participating in voluntary social insurance is tending to increase, but only very slowly, and the level of active participation of workers is not high. Participants mainly participate directly by paying money to benefit from the policy; however, accessing information is limited; and contributing opinions regarding amending and supplementing policies is infrequent. The main difference between participants and non-participants lies in the fact that new participants who used to participate in VSI but for an insufficient number of years need to participate for a few more years to receive any benefits. As such, it is actually old participants who now re-join, not new participants. Increasing the new participation rate is still a big challenge

For workers who are traders and freelancers in the district, the economic factor is not the main determinant of VSI participation. Workers who participate in VSI strongly appreciate the method of payment, payment rates, payment location, and participation records. Rational choice behavior theory partly explains individuals' motives and purposes for participating in VSI. However, the problems of contribution time and benefits (only two benefits: retirement pension and a death benefit) cause many workers to be worried and afraid. The motivation for participating in VSI is derived from the need for security (health, financial, life and non-injury) – some of the important needs that Maslow mentioned in his theory of needs.

This study has obtained quite different results from previous studies by identifying that the low level of contribution and education level are not the decisive factors in the decision to participate in VSI. Also, it has identified people's desire for other benefits and other forms of communication by VSI agencies. In order to improve VSI participation in Tay Ho District, there are many measures that need to be taken. These especially include strengthening communication about the benefits of VSI through currently popular forms of media such as the internet and social networks.

REFERENCES

- Bui, S. T. – M. T. Hoang (2016a) Voluntary social insurance: Opening more opportunities to ensure social security for the poor. *Journal of Social Insurance*, March 1, 2016, pp. 19–21.
- Bui, S. T. – M. T. Hoang (2016b) Applying marketing to develop voluntary social insurance. *Journal of Social Insurance*, April 2, 2016, pp. 15–17.
- Central Party Committee (2014) *Resolution of the 9th Conference No. 33 NQ/TW*.
- Central Executive Committee (2018) *Resolution of the 7th Central Committee Session XII*.
- Chinhphu, T. (2018) Every year Hanoi's population increases equivalent to a large district. *Thoi Bao Taichinh – Vietnam Online*, October 18, 2018, <http://thoibaotaichinhvietnam.vn/pages/xa-hoi/2018-10-18/moi-nam-dan-so-hanoi-tang-tuong-duong-mot-huyen-lon-63276.aspx> [Last access: 03 30 2019]
- Duong, V. T. (2014) *Innovating and developing Social Insurance in Vietnam, Hanoi*. Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), Information Culture Publishing House
- Government (2015) *Decree No. 1342915/ND-CP*, December 29, 2015, Hanoi
- Government (2018) *Resolution No. 28-NQ/TW on Social Insurance Policy Reform*. May 25, 2018, Hanoi
- Government (2018) *Report on the Implementation of Social Insurance Policies and Benefits Management and Use of Social Insurance Fund in 2017, No. 166 / BC-CP*. May 10, 2018
- Labor Code (2012) *Labor Code No. 10/2012/QH13 of the National Assembly*. June 18, 2012.
- Ministry of Labor (2007) *Invalids and Social Affairs in Association with the World Bank*. Ministry-level project 'Survey on the prospect of voluntary social insurance for the informal sector in Vietnam: Recommendations and policies'.
- Nguyen, P. (2018) Hanoi: Increase in agricultural production in 5 years averagely increased by 2.23%. *Thoi Bao Taichinh – Vietnam Online*, September 27, 2018. <http://thoibaotaichinhvietnam.vn/pages/kinh-doanh/2018-09-27/ha-noi-gia-tri-gia-tang-san-xuat-nong-nghiep-5-nam-tang-binh-quan-223-62456.aspx> [Last access: 11 17 2019]
- Nguyen, T. K. H. – T. T. N. Nguyen (2018) Current situation of workers participating in voluntary social insurance. Research in Tay Ho District and Dong Anh District, Hanoi. *Sociology Journal*, No. 3 (143), pp. 118–128.
- Nguyen, X. M. – N. M. T. Tran (2014) Informal economic sector from economic sociological perspective. *Sociology Journal*, No. 1, (125), 2014.
- Pham, D. N. T. (2014a) Proposals to complete the policy of voluntary social insurance. *Social Insurance Magazine*, No. 256, pp. 16–18.

- Pham, D. N. T. (2014b) Proposals to complete voluntary social insurance policy. *Social Insurance Magazine*, No. 257, pp. 12–14.
- Pham, T. D. (2015) Orientation to improve social security and social welfare policies in our country under new conditions. State-level project code KX.04.17/ 11–15.
- Pham, X. N. (2012) Social security system in Vietnam during the renovation period. *Sociology Journal*, Issue 2, (118).
- Social Insurance Law (2014) *Social Insurance Law No. 58/2014/QH13 of the National Assembly*. November 20, 2014
- Tay Ho District Police (2018) *Report of Household Income Data as of November 15, 2018* by Tay Ho District Police
- Thai, D. (2017) For informal workers to access social insurance and health insurance policies. *Social Insurance Magazine*, Issue: November 1, pp. 22–39.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ‘TOMOS NARRATIVE’ AS A PART OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVE

ARTEM ZAKHARCHENKO – OLENA ZAKHARCHENKO¹

ABSTRACT: *One of the most prominent parts of the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election was the mediatized topic of achieving Ukrainian church independence, and its symbol, the tomos document received from the Ecumenical Patriarch in January 2019. This process was a part of incumbent president Petro Poroshenko's electoral campaign. Narrative analysis of this topic showed that it had a structure similar to that of classic Hollywood plots. It is unlike most other media narratives present in the information space. We prove that this topic had a major influence on its audience: media attention to the topic of Tomos was found to be closely correlated to Google search data associated with the 'tomos' search term and with electoral support for Poroshenko. However, this narrative's audience was limited to the patriotic electorate, thus Poroshenko did not win the election. Nevertheless, the Tomos story became so influential that it can be considered a part of national and strategic narratives.*

KEYWORDS: *media narrative, strategic narrative, narrative analysis, electoral campaigns, narrative involvement, media influence, Tomos*

¹ *Artem Zakharchenko*, Ph.D. in social communications, docent in Multimedia Technologies and Media Design Department, Institute of Journalism, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv; research director in the Center for Content Analysis; has 17 years of working experience as a journalist and editor in leading Ukrainian media, email: artem.zakh@gmail.com. *Olena Zakharchenko* works as analyst in the Center for Content Analysis, in Kyiv, besides she is a fiction writer, email: olena.amoli@gmail.com. This paper was funded by Fulbright program of the Institute of International Education and the Center for the Content Analysis, Kyiv, Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION

Media, electoral, national, and strategic narratives

The concept of the narrative is now widely used in the humanities. Scientists particularly emphasize its identity-shaping power. This power is common to different narrative types, such as media narratives, social media narratives, political narratives, electoral narratives, religious narratives, national narratives, and strategic narratives.

All these kinds of narratives are deeply intersecting and may be distinguished only for specific research purposes. They are all dimensions of Lyotard's 'grand narrative' (Lyotard et al. 1984), and could be classified using the criteria of Ochs and Capps' (Ochs–Capps 2001) as nonlinear stories with plural narrators with flexible moral positions, a high level of 'tellability,' and strong embedding in the current context.

Particularly after the emergence of the internet, media narratives became a continuous, non-discrete information flow with a transmedia structure (Herman 2004). This is usually described in terms of 'collapsed context,' which means that nobody can predict the background nor therefore the reaction of recipients who may see it (Musolff 2005). Media narratives consist of many topics of varying duration, integrated similarly to plot lines in TV series (Zakharchenko 2017). Most of these narratives have a chaotic structure and may not be described as good stories: they include sudden breakdowns, and overly long gaps in plot development, etc.

The social media narrative is usually constituted as either a 'breaking news' structure that is open-ended and branching, even in the case of private conversations, or as a so-called 'living narrative' – i.e. involving the tales of average people sat around the fireplace (Ochs–Capps 2001:12).

Among the most powerful narratives are religious ones. For example, the fragments of the biblical narrative are repeated a million times in different contexts and situations as metaphors for everyday life (Pihlaja 2017).

The national narrative is also composed of media or social media texts, as well as of private real-life conversations, official speeches, textbooks, and the whole educational process, literature, and other artistic content. K.V. Korostelina found (Korostelina 2014) that the typical national narrative has three levels: dualistic order (describing in-group and out-group), mythological narratives, and a normative order (explaining the political order typical of a nation). Each of these levels is used for shaping identity and legitimizing power.

The concept of the strategic narrative is very similar to the national one, but it is usually applicable to the area of warfare. Both narrative types unite people

on the emotional level and therefore help to govern military action; a strategic narrative is usually designed especially for this purpose (Pocheptsov 2012). The United States Department of Defense has a similar view of this term: "A key component of the narrative is establishing the reasons for and desired outcomes of the conflict, in terms understandable to relevant publics" (JDN 2013).

Electoral campaigning narratives are described in several papers – for example, in the story of anti-politician superhero D. Trump in the 2016 US electoral campaign (Schneiker 2019), a many-voiced narrative of the 2008 Obama campaign (Capone 2010), the Musharraf campaign in Pakistan in 2008 (Burnes 2011), and even the story of Theodore Roosevelt's tattoos during the time of the presidential election of 1912 (Hoenig 2020).

Narrative involvement

All these narratives are useless if they cannot involve recipients in reading and participating in their creation. Busselle and Bilandzic identify four phases of narrative involvement: understanding, attention focus, emotional engagement, and narrative presence (Busselle–Bilandzic 2008).

The latter authors distinguish three types of mistrust in narratives: perceived fictionality (the least important aspect), inconsistency with external circumstances, and the absence of internal logic. Researchers conclude that only the second and third types lead to a lack of involvement. Accordingly, the persuasive ability of a narrative is determined by its narrative structure and conformity with dominant stereotypes rather than by its factuality (Busselle–Bilandzic 2008:266–267).

Sometimes narrative involvement is so powerful that people 'dissolve' in the narrative and start to perceive it as a part of real life and to identify with the characters. This may happen with a book, film, or video game. The most comprehensive form of involvement leads recipients to act in line with the logic of the narrative. There are three eloquent examples of such involvement.

The first one is game-related engagement. The best example of this is 'Pokemon Go' – the augmented reality game by Nintendo. Nedelcheva notes that this involves a new generation of transmedia storytelling "that takes computer games to the streets and ultimately, beyond" (Nedelcheva 2016:3749). Embedded in contemporary lifestyles, it builds "human-to-human and human-to-technology relationships in the over connected world" (Nedelcheva 2016:3750).

The second example is involvement in the protest narrative mediated by social networks. Gerbaudo called this phenomena 'digital enthusiasm.' It appears as a result of positive emotional interactions between members and administrators of

protest communities, or opinion leaders, leading to a self-reinforcing emotional cycle: “Thus the content of user comments reinforced from the bottom-up the top-down narrative proposed by the admins and strongly contributed to creating a favorable climate of hope and reciprocal trust – the kind known to be propitious for facilitating protest participation” (Gerbaudo 2016:268).

The third example is the involvement of social media users in the “spectacle of the 2016 U.S. presidential election” (Mihailidis–Viotty 2017).

Ukrainian elections 2019 as the identity-shaping driver

The relationship between narrative involvement and people’s identity is strongest in times of huge social upheavals like disasters, revolutions, or elections (Seeger–Sellnow 2016).

Agenda-setting theory postulates that social issues that are more salient in the media are usually perceived as more important by their audience (McCombs–Shaw 1972). As a result, parties or candidates who ‘own’ those issues have higher electoral ratings (Sides 2006).

In the recent Ukrainian elections, there was a varied selection of differing agendas. The incumbent Petro Poroshenko, leader of the party European Solidarity, who became president based on the wave of patriotism that occurred after the Revolution of Dignity but was later repeatedly accused of corruption, owned the patriotic agenda. The social agenda was promoted by some candidates, the most popular of whom was Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the ‘Batktivshchyna’ (‘Motherland’) party, an ex-prime minister who usually used patriotic rhetoric but was accused of being affiliated with agents of Russian influence. The other group of candidates maintained the anti-corruption agenda; this group was led by Anatolii Hrytsenko, ex-Minister of Defence (Zakharchenko et al. 2019). But the leader of the elections became Volodymyr Zelenskii, a former comedian without any political experience, supported at the time by oligarch Igor Kolomoyskii and his TV channel ‘1+1,’ on which Zelenskii’s TV show was broadcast. A unique feature of Zelenskii’s campaign was the phenomena of ‘non-agenda owning’ – meaning that he avoided making any specific statements about political and economic issues, so he enjoyed the support of people with contrasting expectations (Zakharchenko 2019).

In the frame of narratives, there were two big stories told by candidates. The first one involved the ‘Servant of the people’ TV series that described the life of a school teacher, Vasyl Holoborodko, who surprisingly won the presidential elections and started changing Ukraine. Zelenskii’s main role in this series shaped his perception by the electorate. The second was the narrative of *Tomos*:

the story of the process of the acquisition of independence by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), with the direct participation of Petro Poroshenko. This church was created of two unadmitted churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and some of the parishes from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), which is subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This long story unveiled its plot gradually in the media and finished with the receipt of the tomos – the document which certified the church's independence.

The fact is that the story of receiving the tomos for the Ukrainian church lasted much longer than the presidential campaign of 2019. The Ukrainian church came under Russian power in 1686. Since then, the Ukrainian priesthood has tried several times to achieve independence during the periods of national revival, particularly in 1917, 1942, and 1990. These attempts were unsuccessful because of different factors. The tomos as a document became a symbol of religious independence only in 2018, so most Ukrainian people did not know of this word before this time. This canonical document officially established the autocephalous (independent) Orthodox Church of Ukraine. On January 5, 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew and Metropolitan Epiphanius, the newly elected head of OCU, signed it in St. George's Cathedral in Istanbul.

The result of candidates' efforts undoubtedly redirected attention to the main national narratives. As Korostelina showed, Ukrainian society has no single key narrative (Korostelina 2014:169). Instead, it has five narratives which have been present in the minds of Ukrainians during all periods of Ukraine's independence, and compete against each other:

1. The dual (Ukrainian and Russian) identity narrative, wherein the 'Russian side of Ukraine' is imagined as more progressive;
2. The pro-Soviet narrative that describes the 'gold age' of the Soviet era;
3. The fighting-for-Ukraine' narrative based on opposing Ukrainians as victims and Russians as executioners;
4. Recognition of a Ukrainian identity narrative, which contrasts the Ukrainian state with the Russian one, and does not involve a concept of ethnicity. It speaks about a totalitarian Russian and a democratic Ukrainian state.
5. The multicultural civic narrative. This describes Ukraine as a unique multicultural and tolerant society that sees its future in Europe.

Each national narrative includes the so-called 'normative order' – a judgment about the origin of power for the nation and rules concerning this power (Korostelina 2014:31). Thereby, the stories of candidates could fit into some of the

national narratives, look coherent in relation to their proponents, and convince individuals to vote for the ‘proper’ candidate. The story told by Zelenskii was appropriate with regard to the conduits of all competing national narratives. In contrast, Poroshenko’s story meets the requirements of adherents of the third and fourth Ukrainian national narratives. Therefore, during the period of the deployment of the tomos story, Poroshenko’s rating increased from 5.50% in April 2018 to 17% in February 2019. He received 15.95% of votes in the first round of elections in March 2019 and 24.45% in the second one.

HYPOTHESES

Both electoral narratives described above were prominent and influential. No doubt the ‘Servant of the People’ series was made following the typical structure of the TV series. However, we do not know anything about the structure of the tomos narrative. Taking into account its influence, it may be assumed that it also has a well-formed plotline.

H1: The media narrative about the tomos had all the features of well-built classical literature and cinema narratives.

This narrative can be seen on the level of its influence not in its entirety, but through the process of the plot being revealed.

H2: Deployment of this narrative led to an increase in voters’ involvement in it.

METHOD

To test the hypotheses, all mentions of the word ‘tomos’ in a sample of the top 100 Ukrainian news websites were identified (using the common TOP-100 sample of the Center for Content Analysis [Zakharchenko 2018]), central Ukrainian TV channels, and newspapers. For this sampling procedure, a commercial monitoring system ‘Mediateka’ was used. In total, more than 32,000 publications with mentions were found.

Then two trained coders looked through the sample and established the following categories:

- Protagonists (supporters of tomos and Ukrainian church independence)
- Antagonists (critics of tomos)
- Messages used by both sides
- Prominent episodes which influenced the plot.

The narrative structure was compared with the classical schemata of Hollywood scripts (Orr 2007) – which is composed of exposition, inciting incident, rising action, climax, falling action, resolution, and denouement.

The influence of the narrative was evaluated in two ways. First, plot deployment was compared with the intensity of Google searches for the word tomos. This data was obtained through the Google Trends service, which revealed such data in the form of a percentage, normalized to the maximum value. Second, the average dynamics of Petro Poroshenko's support were calculated. The results of polls provided by top Ukrainian sociological services, and acknowledged by the Sociological Association of Ukraine (Texty.org.ua 2019), were taken into consideration. This typically involved 4-5 electoral polls per month, with questions like: 'If the presidential election took place next Sunday, who would you vote for?' The share of the answer 'Petro Poroshenko' among the respondents who intended to participate in elections and had made their choice at the time of the poll were gathered and averaged throughout each month. As these results varied considerably even among trusted services, the average values of all public polls carried out on certain months and published on the websites of these services were used.

The number of contacts with the audience was evaluated by applying the typical methods of the Center for Content Analysis (Zakharchenko 2018). Namely, the latter was calculated based on public metrics of visits to digital media, circulation numbers for the printed press, the number of TV viewers according to the TV panel for TV, and the average number of listeners (data available through public sources) to the radio.

RESULTS

Narrative structure


The media narrative about the tomos had a typical so-called Hollywood structure that most fully involved the audience. This interactive and multi-authorial story was recounted by many people and was shaped by their statements, accounts, reports, and action.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the story started with an *exposition* in January 2018, four months before the appeal was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament. Well-known blogger Yuriy Hudymenko launched a flash-mob by putting toys under the doors UOC MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate) temples after the refusal of a priest to undertake a burial service for a child

who had died. He assured us that he was not doing this intentionally with the election in mind. Therefore, this event refreshed the issue of Ukrainian church independence in the media environment and made it more salient.

The inciting incident was sudden enough. It occurred when the president asked *Verkhovna Rada* (Ukrainian Parliament) to turn to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I requesting that the independence of the Ukrainian church be granted. All parliamentary groups that positioned themselves as patriotic and pro-European had no choice but to vote for this appeal, otherwise they could have been blamed by Poroshenko for having a pro-Russian position. Then the story developed comparatively slowly because of the summer season. Only one meaningful event happened at that time: a prayer meeting dedicated to the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus, which is celebrated by all Ukrainian Orthodox Churches annually and is seen as the core event that proves the authentic nature of Ukrainian Orthodox Christianity.

Figure 1. *Tomos narrative deployment. The number of mentions of the word 'tomos' in the sample and the plot structure*



Source: Data from the Mediateka monitoring system, with authors' explanation.

The real start of *rising action* occurred in September 2018 when a lot of protagonists, as well as antagonists, joined in the narration. After that, the

structure was typical of the plot of a novel: success was interspersed with failure, and vice versa. Moments of optimism alternated with moments of pessimism – for example, at the end of November 2018, just before the constitution of the new Ukrainian church was adopted in Constantinople, two contrasting fake statements in the media were detected and widely shared on Facebook. The first claimed that the tomos had already been received. The second assured the audience that, finally, Bartholomew I of Constantinople had decided to refuse the Ukrainian parliament's appeal. All these messages made the information space more saturated and the plot more exciting.


The *climax* and *resolution* were the phases that took place in the period that followed the end of November 2018, when the church constitution was adopted, until January 2019, when the tomos was officially given to the Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine. After that, attention to the topic steadily decreased and attention overflowed to the election narrative – the so-called 'horse racing' story.

Narrative characters

All the heroes of the news in this topic may be classified as protagonists or supporters of the tomos, or antagonists/opponents. The first category includes predominantly the top officials and other members of Poroshenko's team (Poroshenko, Head of Parliament Andrii Parubii), as well as the hierarchs of UOC KP (its leader Filaret, and its metropolitans Zorya and Epiphanius) and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Patriarch Bartholomew). Russian politicians (president Vladimir Putin, his spokesperson Dmitrii Peskov, and Prime-Minister Dmitrii Medvedev), pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine (MPs Vadym Novinskyi and Yurii Boyko), hierarchs of MOC (patriarch Kirill, Bishop Climent), and UPC MP (metropolitan Onufrii) may be located in the second category.

The protagonists significantly predominated in the story compared to the antagonists. Their actions and speeches reached a much larger audience than those of the antagonists. However, the antagonists also were important (see Figure 2). Their participation was quite well embedded in the story logic and framework. They provided the necessary pungency of the plot. A short-term loss of the protagonists' initiative happened in January 2019 in relation to a media incident concerning the presence of a businessman with a mixed reputation (Olexandr Petrovskii) at the ceremony presenting the tomos.

Figure 2. Key characters and their statements' contact with the audience



Source: Data generated through the semi-automatic coding of Mediateka media publications dataset, applying the audience reach methodology of the Center for Content Analysis.

Narrative messages

The story was saturated with detailed PR messages produced by both sides in the conflict. Along with the critics of the idea of church independence, antagonists tried to depreciate the standing of Poroshenko in relation to this achievement (see Table 1).

There is another interesting observation. The roles of protagonists were clearly divided: political issues connected to the story were commented on by politicians, and religious issues by priests. On the other hand, the opposite occurred with the antagonists: Russian and pro-Russian politicians vigorously commented on political as well as on church issues. This may be attributed to the church's level of separation from the state.

Communication channels

Different media with different political positions – even pro-Russian (Zakharchenko 2018) – provided almost identical stories about the tomos. In each of the analyzed media, the share of texts in which the tomos was mentioned along with antagonists' messages was, on average, 10%, and varied from 8% to 13%. The other share of about 90% was comprised of texts with protagonists' messages. This cannot be attributed to the political commitment of the media, thus the main explanation is the criterion of media logic (Harcup–O'Neill, 2001):


Table 1. Key messages of protagonists and antagonists

	Church issues	Political issues	Russian role	Constantinople's role	Poroshenko's role	Future of OCU
Prota-gonists' messages					Poroshenko has a historic role (Parubiy, Yushchenko)	Lavras will join the OCU soon, and deliberately (Epiphanius)
	The United Ukrainian church emerges (Poroshenko, Filaret, Zorya)	It is an issue of national security (Poroshenko)	We will not ask permission from Russia (Poro-shenko)	Bartholomew will not break ties with the Russia church	Bartholomew got from Poroshenko only sweets instead of a bribe (his joke)	The tomos is already written and will be presented soon (Hovorun)
	Ukrainian church deserve the tomos (Bartholomew)	The church must be separated from the aggressor state, above all (Poro-shenko)	Moscow is roughly interfering with the negotiation process (Filaret)	Exarchs will come to work on the done deal of church independence (Daniil)	I will not intervene in church issues after the receipt of the tomos (Poroshenko)	Church integration will be peaceful (Filaret)
	The Russian church is a daughter of the Ukrainian one (Elpidophorus, Iov)	Historical decision (Parubiy)	Russia is preparing provo-cations (Tymchuk)	It is assumed that Exarchs will work as ambassadors, but not as administrators (Zorya)	Poroshenko assures that he will popularize the tomos at his own expense	OCU will not change the date of Christmas date because this issue divides people (Epiphanius)
Antagonists' messages	It involves a split of the church (Patriarch Kirill, Pyeskov, Boyko, Medvedchuk, Illarion)	The church must be separated from the state (Boyko, Onufriy)	Russia will defend the believers of the Russian church (threats of Pyeskov)	Constantinople is splitting the church and wants to distance the lavras (Kirill, Illarion)	The tomos is a form of Poroshenko's publicity, as he has no other results	The tomos will not be given (Danilevych, Novinskii, Antonyi, Yakubin)
	The church in Ukraine will be united when schismatics repent (Novinskii)	It is a political move, not a religious one (Novinskii)	Kirill considers Ukrainian people to be his own	Exarchs are coming to interfere in the canonical territory of the Russian church (Onufrii)	Poroshenko bribed Bartholomew (Illarion)	The church split and state pressure may lead to war (Boyko, Medved-chuk, Kirill)
	Ukraine is a canonical territory of the Russian church (Medvedev)	The security service of Ukraine is searching for priests, and they need protection (Nivinskii)		The Russian church is breaking off ties with Constanti-nople (Illarion)	Oligarchs raised the money for the bribe for Bartholomew, but Poroshenko kept it for himself	I am going to protect lavras (Novinskii)
	Nothing will change after the tomos (Onufriy)	The tomos is like the Crimean annexation (Climent)		Bartholomew should be excommunicated (Climent)	Poroshenko pays people for public support of the tomos	The new president of Ukraine will repeal the tomos (Mytrofan)

Source: Data generated by coding Mediateka media publications dataset.

i.e. protagonists, especially Ukrainian politicians, are more commonly portrayed in Ukrainian media than the Russian establishment, and have direct connections with them (for example, through the distribution of press releases and giving press conferences in Kyiv). Thereby, the protagonists' messages spread better because of the speakers' importance, as perceived by journalists, the availability of their statements to news editors, the high level of activity of Ukrainian protagonists, topic validity, etc. It should be noted that readers who did not support the church's independence heard the same story about the tomos as their opponents. Thus the only difference could have been in their perceptions. For example, supporters of the tomos could have perceived this story as a kind of archetypical 'Odyssean' narrative about a long journey and ultimate goal, while adversaries saw it as a story about a catastrophe, like the tale about the deaths in Pompeii.

Figure 3. Comparison of media coverage of the tomos with people's engagement (Google search activity and Poroshenko's electoral support)



Source: Data from the Mediateka monitoring system, Google trends, and average data from polls released by the 'Rating' group, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 'SOCIS' company, Razumkov Centre, GFK Ukraine, Ukrainian Institute of Social Investigations (named after Oleksandr Yaremko) and the Center for Social Monitoring.

Readers' involvement

A comparison of the number of mentions of the tomos in media using Google Trends data and polls data (see Figure 3) indicates the good correlation between these three parameters between April 2018 and January 2019 (see Table 2). After this point, diverging trends occur, as followers of the story switched to

the ‘horse racing’ electoral narrative. On the other hand, almost throughout the entire period, Google search interest in ‘tomos’ was less than the media coverage of this topic. Only once was the situation the opposite – in October, when the uniting council of OCU was held – and in January 2019, both indicators reached their maximum. In other words, almost all the time media were more interested in the topic of the tomos than their readers.

Table 2. Correlations coefficients of the number of mentions of ‘tomos’ in media, Google Trends data, and polling data between April 2018 and January 2019

	Media mentions	Google search activity	Electoral support
Media mentions	1.00		
Google search activity	0.96	1.00	
Electoral support	0.82	0.76	1.00

Source: Author's own calculations.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Based on the narrative structure described in the previous chapter, it is clear that hypothesis 1 is true: the structure of the tomos narrative portrayed by Ukrainian media shows that it was similar to that of classic Hollywood plots. It is unlike most other media narratives that are present in the information space.

Therefore, it makes sense that public attention to the narrative and its impact on the electoral decision are clearly supported by the correlation. This proves hypothesis 2. Even people who were not interested in Orthodox Christianity started to root for the result of this story. The proof can be seen in a well-known Facebook meme: ‘I am an atheist. But an atheist of Kyiv Patriarchate’ (*Novoe Vremya* 2018).

As can be seen from Figure 3, the main driver of this public attention was media attention – which, for its part, was constituted by the media logic (Harcup–O’Neill 2001). It may be assumed that the main impact drivers were the media-related weight of the Ukrainian president, the validity of this issue for a big part of Ukrainian society, its singular importance for the Ukrainian political process, and strong resistance from Russia and pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine.

Almost all resistance was inefficient while it remained related to the topic of the Orthodox Church. All the messages of antagonists remained an expected part of the plot. Therefore, supporters of church independence had no reason to change their opinion about the issue. Only at the end of the story did pro-Russian

media manage to make corruption the framing element of the topic (*How the “Narik” ...* 2019). This was the first time that supporters were influenced by opponents’ messages.

Despite the absence of limitations to an Orthodox audience, this narrative was limited to the patriotic part of the electorate. We may assume that people who were neither Orthodox Christians nor pronounced patriots were not involved in this narrative, and were not convinced by it. As a result, Poroshenko’s support did not exceed the 24.45% obtained in the second round of elections.

Nevertheless, the story about the tomos became so influential that it started being used as one of the defining factors of the dichotomy between patriots and non-patriots (Maidanuk 2019); between a spiritual Russian church, and a down-to-earth European church (*Vasiliy Shchipkov: Presenting ...* 2019) – and even as one of the goals in the strategic confrontation with Russia (NISR 2019).

Therefore, the latter can be considered not only a media narrative, but also part of the national narrative (pro-Ukrainian as well as pro-Russian), and even as an element of the strategic narrative. Furthermore, it may be assumed that it was purposefully made part of these larger narratives.

REFERENCES

- Burnes, S. (2011) Metaphors in press reports of elections: Obama walked on water, but Musharraf was beaten by a knockout. *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 43, No. 8., pp. 2160–2175, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2011.01.010>
- Busselle, R. – H. Bilandzic (2008) Fictionality and perceived realism in experiencing stories: A model of narrative comprehension and engagement. *Communication Theory*, Vol. 18, No. 2., pp. 255–280, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00322.x>
- Capone, A. (2010) Barack Obama’s South Carolina speech. *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 42, No. 11., pp. 2964–2977, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.06.011>
- Gerbaudo, P. (2016) Rousing the Facebook crowd: Digital enthusiasm and emotional contagion in the 2011 protests in Egypt and Spain. *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 10., pp. 254–273
- Harcup, T. – D. O’Neill (2001) What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited. *Journalism Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2., pp. 261–280, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700120042114>
- Herman, D. (2004) Toward a transmedial narratology. In: Ryan, M.-L. (ed.): *Narrative Across Media: The Languages of Storytelling*. pp. 43–75, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press

- Hoening, L. J. (2020) Theodore Roosevelt's tattoos and the presidential election of 1912. *Clinics in Dermatology*, Vol. 38, No. 5., pp. 563–567, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clindermatol.2020.08.001>
- How the "Narik" topic was boosted on January 5th* (2019) Facebook of Center for the Content Analysis. <https://www.facebook.com/ukrcontent/photos/a.1028140107204280/2278971735454438/?type=1&theater>
- JDN (2013) Joint Doctrine Note 2-13. Commander's Communication Synchronization. December 16, 2013; https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_13.pdf
- Korostelina, K. V. (2014) Constructing the Narratives of Identity and Power: Self-Imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation. Lanham, Lexington Books
- Lyotard, J.-F. – G. Bennington – B. Massumi (1984) The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. *Poetics Today*, Vol. 5, Issue 4., University of Minnesota Press; <https://doi.org/10.2307/1772278>
- Maidanuk, V. (2019) The dark side of the Tomos. ZAXID.NET. https://zaxid.net/temniy_bik_tomosu_n1473672
- McCombs, M. B. E. – D. L. Shaw (1972) The agenda-setting function of mass media. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, Issue 2., Oxford University Press; <https://doi.org/10.2307/2747787>
- Mihailidis, P.– S. Viotty (2017) Spreadable spectacle in digital culture: Civic expression, fake news, and the role of media literacies in "post-fact" society. *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 61, No. 4., pp. 441–454, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764217701217>
- Musolff, A. (2005) Metaphor scenarios in public discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol*, Vol. 21, No. 1., pp. 23–38, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327868ms2101_2
- NISR – The National Institute of Strategic Research (2019) Tomos about the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Meanings and challenges. <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/analitichni-materiali/gumanitarniy-rozvitok/tomos-pro-avtokefaliyu-ukrainskogo>
- Nedelcheva, I. (2016) Analysis of transmedia storytelling in pokémon go. Open science index, *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, No. 11., pp. 3744–3752
- Novoe Vremya* (2018) Atheist of the Ukrainian Patriarchate. Web jokes about Tomos. *Novoe Vremya*, October 12, 2018; <https://nv.ua/ukr/lifestyle/atejist-ukrajinskoho-patriarkhatu-u-merezhi-zhartujut-pro-tomos-2499977.html>
- Ochs, E. – L. Capps (2001) Living narrative: Creating lives in everyday storytelling. *Language in Society*, Vol. 34, Issue 3, Harvard University Press
- Orr, S. (2007) Teaching play analysis: How a key dramaturgical skill can foster critical approaches. *Theatre Topics*, Vol. 13, No. 1., pp. 153–158, <https://doi.org/10.1353/tt.2003.0015>

- Pihlaja, S. (2017) ‘When Noah built the ark...’ Metaphor and biblical stories in Facebook preaching. *Metaphor and the Social World*, Vol. 5, No. 1., pp. 86–101, <https://doi.org/10.1075/msw.7.1.06pih>
- Pocheptsov, G. (2012) Cognitive approaches to the information space analysis. *Media Sapiens*, https://ms.detector.media/ethics/manipulation/kognitivni_pidkhodi_do_analizu_informatsynogo_prostoru/
- Schneiker, A. (2019) Telling the story of the superhero and the anti-politician as president: Donald Trump’s branding on Twitter. *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3., pp. 210–223, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918807712>
- Seeger, M.W. – T. L. Sellnow (2016) *Narratives of Crisis: Telling Stories of Ruin and Renewal*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
- Sides, J. (2006) The origins of campaign agendas. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, No. 3., pp. 407–436, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000226>
- Texty.org.ua (2019) Rating sellers. The false sociologists list. Texty.Org.Ua. <http://texty.org.ua/d/socio/#good>
- Vasiliy Shchipkov: *Presenting Tomos to OCU is like a terrorist attack* (2019) *Russian Peoples’ Line*. http://ruskline.ru/politnews/2019/yanvar/11/vasilij_wipkov_darovanie_tomosa_pcu_pohozhe_na_terakt/
- Zakharchenko, A. (2017) Феномен сюжетних ліній в інформаційному просторі українських медіа та соціальних мереж. In: Shevchenko, V. E. (ed.): *Crossmedia: Content, Technologies, Perspectives*. pp. 92–101. Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.
- Zakharchenko, A. (2018) How do we explore you: Methodology and samples of the Content Analysis Center. Kyiv: The Center for Content Analysis. <http://ukrcontent.com/blog/yak-mi-vas-doslidzhuemo-metodiki-i-vibirki-centru-kontent-analizu.html>
- Zakharchenko, A. (2019) “Russian style propaganda” and “retired opinion leaders”: How Zelenskyi and Poroshenko fought in social networks. *Ukrainian Pravda*, May 3, 2019, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2019/05/3/7214176/>
- Zakharchenko, A. – Y. Maksimtsova – V. Iurchenko – V. Shevchenko – S. Fedushko (2019) Under the conditions of non-agenda ownership: Social media users in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential elections campaign. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Vol. 2392: COAPSN-2019 International Workshop on Control, Optimisation and Analytical Processing of Social Networks, pp. 199–219, <http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2392/paper15.pdf>

PRAGMATICS OF EPONYMS IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE (ON THE MATERIAL OF THE SPEECHES OF POLITICIANS)

ZHARAS TAUBAYEV¹

ABSTRACT: *Eponyms are complicated, unique constructs named after people and places used in special-professional areas of science. One of those specific areas is politics/political discourse. The main purpose of this article is to investigate the political discourse of politicians (Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin) in the period from 2012 to 2017 to reveal the pragmatic potential and skillful use of eponyms used by the latter when they ran for presidency as a means of influence. Results show that eponyms are becoming powerful language tools of political discourse. At each stage of work, various methods were used to complete the analysis. Such methods include the diachronic method, definition analysis (descriptive method), and discourse analysis. Using different methods, especially discourse analysis, considerably facilitated the research process, enabling the identification of the pragmatic effects of eponyms. The main reasons that eponyms frequently appear in political discourse are the existence of new political eras, modern political events, and controversial political issues.*

KEYWORDS: *eponym, political discourse, politicians, proper names*

INTRODUCTION

The article presents a qualitative study of the role of eponyms in political discourse. The aim of the study was to conduct comparative and definitional analyses of Barack Obama's and Vladimir Putin's speeches to determine which goals their use of eponyms is deployed to achieve.

At the present time in many branches of sciences we have a huge number of terms. These are academic, although some of them become casually and regularly

¹ Zharas Taubayev is at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, z.taubayev@mail.ru.

used in everyday speech. Definitely, people do not think about them, especially where they come from. One of these elements of language is the eponym.

Eponyms developed on the basis of mythical and philosophical concepts of ancient times. This is why the initial eponyms were based on the ancient Greek, Roman, and Chinese sciences: Aristotelianism, Platonism, Socratic thought, Confucianism, and so on. Thereby, eponyms began with a philosophical orientation and then spread to various interdisciplinary sciences.

A range of scholars, linguists, and representatives of other fields of science have devoted their research to topical issues involving eponyms. Non-Russian scientists include Trahair, Teluja, Boycott, Freeman, Gooden, Marciano, Raffner; Russian scientists include Novinskaya, Leichik, Kakzanova, Azimov, Lotte, Blau, Gubina, Shelova, Koroleva, and many others.

Some of the initial publications related to the origin of eponyms include Boycott's *A Little Etymology of Eponymous Words*, and Trahair's *What's in a Name?*

In Boycott's opinion: "An eponymous word is one that has entered the English language because of a person or that person's deeds" (Boycott 1982). According to Trahair: "Eponyms are words that originated with a name of a person. The person may be a living or deceased individual, a hero, or a character from fiction. Persons or give their name or have it attached by others to an event, state of affairs, activity or institution" (Trahair 1990). However, Trahair makes some additions to the definition: "In social sciences, many eponymous events are not associated with the names of people but of important places" (Trahair 1994). Thereby, eponyms are not derived only from anthroponyms, but also from toponyms.

Kakzanova provides a comprehensive definition of the term eponym: "An eponym is a term that contains in its composition the proper name (anthroponym, toponym, mythonym), and also a common name in the designation of the scientific concept (Hopfsche Group / Hopf group). In addition, the term eponym can be formed in a non-affixed way (anthroponym, toponym or mythonym) by metonymic transfer (Ampere). The third group consists of affix derivatives on behalf of one's own (anthroponym, toponym or mythonym) (Jacobian, ulexite)" (Kakzanova 2016).

The given definitions point out that the donor areas for the creation of eponyms are different because proper nouns are comprised of different classes of names: names of people or anthroponyms, geographical names or toponyms, names connected with some religion or mythology, or theonyms.

The structure of an eponym has an onomastic unit, and second, it has characteristics of the term. These factors indicate that an eponym is a compound and complex linguistic unit.

American scientist Morton Freeman's definition of eponym is as follows: "The word was coined from Greek words *epi* – on, upon and *onama* – a name" (Freeman 1997). Thereby, the term eponym means a thing named after a name, and most eponyms are made of anthroponyms or toponyms.

What is usually referred to as an eponym is "the name of a person after who, something (such as an invention or a place) is named" (Crystal 2003). However, since the term *eponym* literally means "upon a name" (from Greek *epi* "upon," + *onyma* "name"), and there is consequently no reference to whether the name is "proper" or "common," nor to whether it refers to a person, thing, or place, in this study not only terms containing proper names of people (real or fictitious), but also proper names of places (toponyms) as well as common names in general will be considered eponyms in all respects.

As shown above, eponyms were first used by scientists, historians, and philosophers of antiquity. By the end of the nineteenth century, eponyms were being actively used (Parkinson disease, Wilm's tumour, Churg-Strauss syndrome, Addison's disease, etc.) in the domain of medicine, where they enriched the vocabulary of medical terms. For example, *Parkinson's disease*. The meaning of the eponym refers to tremors and an aggressive mental disorder in adults. It is named after the British explorer James Parkinson, who first investigated this disease.

Nowadays, there is a tendency for eponyms as proper names to be actively exploited in political discourse. Eponyms are powerful language tools and, as we probably know, politicians struggle for power and to keep it for a long time. Due to this fact, they need strong language units that influence and capture the attention of their audience and even manipulate the consciousness of recipients. For these reasons, eponyms are actively used in the discourses of politicians. Second, mass media is now increasingly important as a conduit between the people and the government. This, in turn, shows the importance of journalists with whose help propaganda and reality are presented in the social environment. Thereby, the latter actively create eponyms (Watergate, Dieselgate, etc.) and use them to attract people's attention to significant events and to change their points of view. But in the given article, we deal with the discourses of politicians.

As noted by Tsutsieva, the politician "realizes himself in discursive actions, transforming into a discursive personality" (Tsutsieva 2013). The actions and statements of politicians that are important for the state and society, as a rule, are based on the speech and psychological characteristics that they possess (Ravochkin 2019).

Since the interests of the masses and politicians often do not coincide, the latter, in order to achieve the desired effect, resort to various methods and strategies of verbally influencing the emotions of the former in an attempt to achieve their

goals. The activities of many politicians are associated with the desire to retain the sympathy and trust of the population of a country with the help of various tactics that affect both the rational and emotional spheres (Besedina et al. 2019). The task of political discourse is to “convince the addressee, entailing their intentions and actions” (Zhabotinskaya 2016). Certain words and expressions used by politicians endow their personality with additional social and political values, which leads to a deeper perception of their image (Gavrillov 2016; Sukhotskaya 2016).

Political discourse is an important element of the conduct of politics and a means of “achieving public peaceful harmony” (Svitsova et al. 2015). According to Urazova, political discourse should be understood as “the entire set of texts created in the linguo-social space of political communication” (Urazova 2019).

The Dutch scientist T. van Dijk offers a definition of political discourse as: “all discourse genres that are used in the realm of politics, or the discourses used by politicians”. Government discussions, parliamentary debates, party programs, and politicians’ words are genres related to politics (Van Dijk 1998). The same author states of political actors engaged in political discourse that they are “participants of political discourse only when acting as political actors, and hence as participating in political actions, such as governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, or voting” (Van Dijk 1997). The latter believes that political actors must exist in demonstrations, legislation, voting, and correspondingly, the institutional environment. We share this view.

Eponyms have strong pragmatic effects that enable the control and management of people. Crystal defines pragmatics as follows: “[...] it has come to be applied to the study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effects their use of language has on the other participants in an act of communication” (Crystal 2003). Politicians take into account the highly pragmatic effects of eponyms and use them skillfully, in a specific order, at specific times.

Although political discourse has received much scientific attention and has been studied from different points of view, and the role of various linguistic tools in it has been described (*metaphors*: Spitsyna–Medvedeva 2012; Urazova 2019; Zhabotinskaya 2016; *euphemisms*: Besedina et al. 2019; Svitsova et al. 2015; Tatsenko–Kravets 2013), eponyms among them have not received enough attention.

As eponyms are powerful pragmatic and cognitive tools, the study aims to present them as part of political discourse, and to reveal and compare peculiarities in their use in speeches of two politicians, thus outlining the role of eponyms in creating the linguistic personality of a politician.

RESOURCES AND RESEARCH METHODS

The object of research in the article is Barack Obama's 306 reports and Vladimir Putin's 350 reports on various topics from 2012 to 2017. Three or four reports were of a dialogical nature, while others remained monologues. All resources (reports) were taken from www.americanrhetoric.com (*American Rhetoric*), www.presidency.ucsb.edu (*The American Presidency Project*) and kremlin.ru official websites (*President of Russia*).

The discourses (reports, statements, etc.) of presidents were analyzed by means of the following research methods:

Diachronic method. This method considers the development and evolution of language and phenomena through history. In order to know if a term refers to the name of a person or a place, I examined the history and etymology of the eponyms. First of all, their meanings were defined and then their peculiarities were examined.

Definition analysis (a descriptive method) was used to depict eponyms in terms of what they mean. I would like to mention that eponyms may be derived from many other proper names, but they are mostly derived from anthroponyms and toponyms. This is why in this work we deal with anthroponyms and toponyms, and how eponyms are formed from them.

Discourse analysis focuses on the cognitive structures, intensities, and pragmatics of the addresser and addressees. The main tasks of investigating using the method involve identifying the ideas implicit in speech, the reasons and motivation for communicating implicit information, and the relationship between power and society. As sources of the article are political discourses, this method enables an analysis of various speeches and their transcripts and the identification of pragmatic effects.

CONSIDERATION AND RESULTS

The speeches of politicians indicate what position the politician seeks to take, what issues to pay attention to, and what to focus on (Tatsenko–Kravets 2013; Sharun 2017). In Obama's speech in the Texas 2012 election campaign, the Obamacare insurance policy was portrayed as a pragmatic approach that addressed a health problem in the community, thereby expressing concern and care for the health of the population. Moreover, Obama pragmatically influenced the public by functionally appraising, positively evaluating, and presenting Obamacare in a positive way.

*Obamacare was the **right thing** to do. And you know what, they're right, I do care. I care about folks who get sick and go bankrupt. I care about parents who don't know whether or not they're going to be able to get treatment for their kids. It was the right thing to do.*

(Barack Obama: Remarks at a Campaign Rally in San Antonio, Texas July 17, 2012).

Obama's speech at Fort Collins on August 28, 2012 used the eponym Obamacare in the form of a metaphor or simile (for a human being): his opponent Romney was reported to want to "kill" Obama's health policy. Destroying the health insurance program Obamacare would mean eliminating part of Obama's policy. This is why electorates supported the latter's campaign – to maintain their favorite candidate and the related insurance policy. The strategy generated maximum support and votes for this candidate. It pragmatically influenced the electorate in a stylistic way.

*Governor Romney has promised that sometime on his first day, he is going to **kill Obamacare**. He's going to sit down, grab a pen – now, this would mean that he – by a stroke of a pen, apparently he thinks that he can kick seven million young people off their parent's plan. He can make [the price of] prescription drugs higher for seniors.*

(Barack Obama: Remarks at a Campaign Rally in Fort Collins, Colorado, August 28, 2012)

Obama used US president *F. Roosevelt's Four Fundamental Freedoms* as a historical realia eponym. The main pragmatics of this eponym were employed to persuade people to support policies that would achieve four freedoms (*freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from need, and freedom from fear*). Security and freedom of speech in the press would be secured within the country. Second, the main component of the eponym – an anthroponym (*F. Roosevelt*) – has a strongly positive reputation in the history of the USA, and Obama used this authoritative model as a future development strategy. This and other techniques in Barack Obama's speeches increased their pragmatic potential and made them more convincing (Spitsyna–Medvedeva 2012)

*One of our greatest Presidents in the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, understood this truth. He understood democracy was not just voting. He called upon the world to embrace (**F. Roosevelt's**) **four fundamental freedoms**: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. These four freedoms reinforce one*

another, and you cannot fully realize one without realizing them all. So that's the future that we seek for ourselves, and for all people. And that is what I want to speak to you about today.

(Barack Obama: Address at Yangon University, Yangon, Myanmar, November 19, 2012)

The word 'boycott' (Charles Boycott) is used with different meanings, depending on the context. In most cases, it is used in a negative sense. But in Obama's speech, sentences included the word *boycott* in reference to promoting freedom, avoiding shame, walking honestly, and preventing racism. After the arrest of one of the most prominent individuals in the history of the USA, Rosa Parks, the leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), teachers, and workers staged boycotts to protect their rights and freedoms.

*A few days later, Rosa Parks challenged her arrest. A little-known pastor, new to town and only 26 years old, stood with her – a man named Martin Luther King, Jr. So did thousands of Montgomery, Alabama commuters. They began a **boycott** – teachers and laborers, clergy and domestics, through rain and cold and sweltering heat, day after day, week after week, month after month, walking miles if they had to, arranging carpools where they could, not thinking about the blisters on their feet, the weariness after a full day of work – walking for respect, walking for freedom, driven by a solemn determination to affirm their God-given dignity.*

(Barack Obama: Address Dedicating Rosa Parks Statue, February 27, 2013)

Obama used the eponym *Berlin Wall* to describe part of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA in the middle of the twentieth century, and the military race that spread to Berlin in Germany. In other words, before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the political pressures between the two countries were high. After the collapse of the Wall, the country embarked on years of peace and renaissance. The pragmatic influence was the victory of capitalism, the end of competition between two countries, the destruction of the history of the great socialist state (the collapse of the USSR), and the emergence of a new democracy that constituted the people's preservation of that democracy.

*With the collapse of the **Berlin Wall**, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home.*

(Barack Obama: Address on Drones and Terrorism at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. May 23, 2013)

Obama used the eponym *Guantanamo prison* to criticize terrorists for attempting to commit a terrorist attack on New Year's Eve in 2010. This reference implies that it might demolish US foreign policy. Obama intentionally referred to it to attract voters – if they voted for him, he would close Guantanamo prison. Thus it was used as a pragmatic tool for the purpose of attracting the electorate, silencing prisoners in order to preserve the peace and well-being of people, and maintaining a *good image* of the country.

*We will close **Guantanamo prison**, which has damaged our national security interests and become a tremendous recruiting tool for al Qaeda. In fact, that was an explicit rationale for the formation of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. And, as I've always said, we will do so – we will close the prison in a manner that keeps the American people safe and secure.*

(Barack Obama: Press Conference on Security Following Christmas Terrorist Attempt, White House, Washington, D.C. December 31, 2010)

Barack Obama's speech at the election campaign in Pennsylvania on June 6, 2012 used reference to *the Hoover Dam* as a *unique structure* to intimate the development of the country and the protection of the population from natural disasters.

*The reason we built **the Hoover Dam**, the reason we sent a man to the Moon or invested in the research that resulted in the Internet, the reason we built an Interstate Highway System, we did those things not for any individual to become rich; we did it so that all of us would have a platform for success, because we understand there are some things we do better together.*

(Barack Obama: Pennsylvania, June 6, 2012)

the last quarter of the nineteenth century, European Jews lived in the suburbs of Mount Zion in Jerusalem to preserve their homeland – the tradition of the *Zionist* movement. Obama said that the Zionist movement has succeeded in many parts of the world; that the objectives of the Jewish liberty are fully reflected in this sacred movement; and that the latter deserve to have a rich independent nation of their own. The eponym *Zionist* is used with a pragmatic sense of precisely asserting that there is a complete basis for freedom, freedom, place, culture and people on earth as a nation. It is always pragmatic in that the use of this language reflects the significant historical value of the concept to a particular nation.

*And while Jews achieved extraordinary success in many parts of the world, the dream of true freedom finally found its full expression in the **Zionist** idea – to be a free people in your homeland. That’s why I believe that Israel is rooted not just in history and tradition, but also in a simple and profound idea – the idea that people deserve to be free in a land of their own.*

(Barack Obama: Address at the Jerusalem International Convention Center, Jerusalem, Israel, March 21, 2013)

On February 23, 2012 in Moscow at the Luzhnikim Stadium, the candidate for the *President of Russia*, Vladimir Putin’s words were:

Мы еще очень многое должны сделать для России, и мы будем делать это, опираясь на талант нашего народа, на нашу великую историю, которая написана потом и кровью наших предков. В этом году мы будем отмечать 200-летие со дня Бородинской битвы, и как не вспомнить Лермонтова и его Чудо-богатырей?

И умереть мы обещали,

И клятву

верности сдержали

Мы в Бородинский бой.

*(We still must do much for Russia, and we will be doing it relying upon the talent of our people, on our great history, which was written with sweat and blood of our ancestors. This year we are celebrating 200 years after the day of **the Battle of Borodino**, and how can we avoid recollecting Lermontov and his Chudo-Bogatyrs?*

And that we’ll die we all then swore,

And th’ oath of loyalty ne’er tore

Neath Borodinian sky). (Translation of poem by Pietr Soloviev)

During the election campaign, politicians try to make a very good impression on voters. Putin, whose image was formed as a “man of action” (Sedykh 2016), used the eponym *the Battle of Borodino* as a deliberate historical realia in the rally to invoke the spirit and unity and victory of the Russian people in this battle in the memory of the Russian population. Use of this historical realia eponym is intended to suggest that every Russian has the power to raise their spirit and to look at the person who says it and receive spiritual power. Putin used *the Battle of Borodino* because of its pragmatic influence on the electorate to win the political race.

Former governor of St. Petersburg Matvienko, in using the eponym *demographic package of Putin* in the Federal Assembly, referred to a positive social situation in the country in relation to the creation of conditions for young families and the demographic potential of the country. By evaluating this positively, showing ‘the right’ political course, people’s attention was captured and a positive image of the president was created, and, as a result, the audience was pragmatically influenced.

Безусловно, очень хорошей, блистательной новостью практически для каждой семьи стал «демографический пакет Путина», как его уже назвали средства массовой информации. И те меры, которые Вы предложили, значение их очень трудно переоценить. И здорово, что именно с таких решений начнётся национальный проект «Десятилетие детства». Сегодня у всех семей России появилось больше оптимизма, они могут планировать рождение семьи, зная, что государство будет их масштабно поддерживать.

(Undoubtedly, the ‘demographic package of Putin,’ as it has already been called among the mass media, became great, splendid news for practically every family. And the measures you offered are impossible to overestimate. It is wonderful that such decisions will start the national project ‘Decade of childhood.’ Today, every Russian family is more optimistic, they can plan starting a family knowing that their government will support them on a big scale.)

(Meeting with the leadership of the chambers of the Federal Assembly, December 25, 2017, Kremlin, Moscow)

Putin, by opposing the facts, tried to show the pragmatic influence of the eponym *the Warsaw Pact* at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2017. *The Warsaw Pact* collapsed with the collapse of the USSR, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still functions. So, one organization does not exist, but another one still does. The president intentionally used this antithesis, pitting the main events or facts against each other by saying *neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union functions, but NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) still functions*. The pragmatic influence of this is to provoke people to think once again about the reason for the functioning of NATO (what is it for if its main rival no longer exists?).

Ссоры вокруг НАТО? Помогают ли они России? Ну, в том смысле, что НАТО может развалиться, – да, тогда помогут.

Но пока что-то мы не видим развала. Знаете, я много раз уже задавался вопросом и публично его ставил. НАТО создавалось как инструмент «холодной войны» в борьбе с Советским Союзом и так называемым Варшавским договором. Сейчас нет ни Варшавского договора, ни Советского Союза, а НАТО существует.

*(Arguments over NATO? Do they help Russia? Well, in the sense that NATO can collapse – yes, they will help. But now we do not see any collapse. You know, I have asked this myself and the public many times. NATO was created as a tool of the Cold War in a fight against the Soviet Union and the so-called **Warsaw Pact**. But now there is neither a **Warsaw Pact**, nor a Soviet Union, although NATO exists.)*

(Plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 2, 2017)

As Bekoeva notes, one of the features of Putin's discourse is "manipulation of linguistic units" and "unpredictability" of speech that attracts the listener's attention and creates an image of "a thoughtful leader and an ordinary person from the people" (Bekoeva 2015). Putin deliberately repeated eponyms several times for pragmatic purposes. The main purpose of this repetition is to draw the attention of the audience to a critical issue and to engage the audience through pauses, since the *Minsk agreement* really aims at solving acute problems in Ukraine. At the same time, eponyms are used as predicative sentences, and referred to as facts that must be carried out («никакого другого пути, кроме исполнения Минских соглашений» – there is no other way but to execute the Minsk agreements), which has a pragmatic influence.

Теперь по поводу Минских соглашений. Я считаю, уже говорил об этом, что никакого другого пути, если мы хотим добиться долгосрочного мира на юго-востоке Украины и воссоздания территориальной целостности страны, никакого другого пути, кроме исполнения Минских соглашений не существует. ... Потому что бесполезно бесконечно обвинять Россию в том, что она не исполняет либо не побуждает власти непризнанных республик на юго-востоке Украины к какимто действиям по исполнению Минских соглашений, если ключевые положения Минских соглашений не исполняются киевскими властями, а они киевскими властями не исполняются.

*(Now, as for the **Minsk agreements**, I believe, and I have already said so that there is no other way if we want to obtain a long-term piece of the south-east of Ukraine and recreate the territorial integrity of the country, there is no other way rather than execute **the Minsk agreements**. ... Because it is pointless to endlessly blame Russia that it does not execute or does not urge the governments of the unrecognized republics on the south-east of Ukraine to perform any action to execute **the Minsk agreements** if the key theses of **the Minsk agreements** are not executed by the Kyiv authorities, and they are not.)*

(Plenary Session of the XII meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 22, 2015).

In the following sentences Vladimir Putin repeated the eponym *Minsk agreements* and noted that, along with the repeated pragmatic effects of the eponym, factual manipulation on the Ukrainian side had occurred. Putin himself mentioned that this involved manipulation. Kiev claimed the *Minsk agreements* (Minsk Protocol) had been formally signed, but in fact they were not effective, and one more article was even secretly added to the agreement. Thereby, the fact was distorted. The eponym *Minsk agreements* is a direct basis for the implementation of the manipulation – in particular, factual manipulation (the distortion of facts).

Наконец, в Минских соглашениях прямо написано: в течение 30 суток после подписания этих Минских соглашений принять постановление Рады о введении в действие закона об особом статусе управления. Он, как я уже говорил, был принят Радой ещё раньше. Что сделали наши партнёры в Киеве? Они приняли постановление Рады и вроде бы формально исполнили Минское соглашение. Но одновременно без согласования с Донбассом приняли ещё одну статью, статью 10, в этот закон, в которой написали, что он будет действовать только тогда, когда выборы там состоятся, то есть опять отложили его введение. Но это просто манипуляции, я так об этом своему украинскому партнёру и сказал. Это просто манипуляции! Хотя формально – сделали. Как у нас классики марксизма-ленинизма говорили, по форме правильно, по существу – издевательство исполняются.

*(Finally, **the Minsk agreements** clearly state: 30 days after these **Minsk agreements** are signed the Rada is to adopt a regulation that a special status of governance shall be introduced in the form of law.*

*It, as I have already mentioned, was already adopted by the Rada even earlier. What did our counterparts in Kyiv do? They adopted a resolution and formally seemed to have executed **the Minsk agreement**. But, simultaneously, without agreeing it with Donbass, they adopted another article, Article 10, in the law, where they wrote that it will act only when elections are undertaken there; that is, they postponed adopting it again. It is sheer manipulation! Although formally it was done. Like our classical **Marxist–Leninist** authors would say, true in form, but derision in nature.)*

(Plenary Session of the XII meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 22, 2015).

Putin by ‘Yalta meeting’ and ‘Yalta system’ is referring to the Yalta conference organized for the leaders of the Allied forces during the Second World War. This eponym is used for evaluation purposes and has a pragmatic effect as a historical realia which is important for mankind.

Напомню, что ключевые решения о принципах взаимодействия государств, решения о создании ООН принимались в нашей стране на Ялтинской встрече лидеров антигитлеровской коалиции. Ялтинская система была действительно выстрадана, оплачена жизнью десятков миллионов людей, двумя мировыми войнами, которые прокатились по планете в XX веке, и, будем объективны, она помогла человечеству пройти через бурные, порой драматические события последних семидесятилетий, уберегла мир от масштабных потрясений.

*(I will remind you that key decisions on the principles of interaction between governments, the decisions about creating the UNO were made in our country at **the Yalta Conference** of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. **The Yalta System** has truly endured, paid for by tens of millions of people, two World Wars which swept the world in the twentieth century, and, let’s be objective, **it has helped humanity go through the stormy, at times dramatic events of the last seventy years**, it saved the world from a large-scale shock.)*


(Meeting of the XIX St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 19, 2015).

To be more specific, the pragmatics of eponyms can be realized through *repetition, metaphor or simile*, and *antithesis* (contraposing important facts).

Furthermore, eponyms have pragmatic effects by being historical, cultural realia; by functioning as a political image of the country and acting as key words in predicative sentences.

Figure 1 demonstrates the pragmatics of eponyms by means of different stylistic devices.

Figure 1. Realization (techniques) of the pragmatic effects of eponyms



Source: compiled by the author

Table 1 illustrates the differences in using eponyms as pragmatic tools in the discourses of Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin.

Table 1. Comparison of the pragmatic techniques used in the application of eponyms in the political discourses of Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin

Obama’s pragmatic use of eponyms		Putin’s pragmatic use of eponyms	
Meaning	Example	Meaning	Example
Using eponyms in the form of metaphor	<i>Obamacare</i>	Using eponym as historical-cognitive realia	<i>The Battle of Borodino, Yalta system, Yalta conference</i>
Using eponym as a reference to convince people to trust	<i>F. Roosevelt’s four fundamental freedoms</i>	Using eponyms to create a positive image	<i>Demographic package of Putin</i>
Using eponym as a historical-cognitive language unit	<i>Boycott, Berlin Wall, Zionist</i>	By means of antithesis (placing facts opposite to each other)	<i>Warsaw Pact and NATO</i>
To maintain a good image	<i>Guantanamo prison</i>	By means of repetition of eponyms	<i>The Minsk agreements</i>
Using eponyms as unique objects	<i>The Hoover Dam</i>	Using eponyms as predicative language units	<i>No alternative to executing the Minsk agreements</i>

Source: compiled by the author

As seen in Table 1, both politicians resorted to using eponyms in their speeches because they seek to deliver certain ideas, or to have a specific pragmatic impact on the listener. However, comparison of the eponyms of the politicians reveals that while Obama mostly uses references to unique objects or outstanding historical figures (*the Hoover Dam, F. Roosevelt*) and semantic stylistic units (*metaphor: Obamacare; metonymy: boycott*), Putin's use of eponyms is mostly syntactic, as he uses them in predicative constructions, in repetition, and in antithesis.

Nevertheless, both politicians use eponyms to maintain or create a positive image of their presidency, referring to their own deeds (*Obamacare, Demographic package of Putin*) or contraposing their deeds with denounced social phenomena (*Guantanamo prison*).

Although there are different types of eponyms, they all serve to address people's emotions and create a positive image or a positive association with speech. Potentially, eponyms may be used to convince people to make certain decisions, build trust in the government, or evoke patriotic feelings.

CONCLUSION

The pragmatics of eponyms in political discourse on the basis of an analysis of the speeches of politicians has been discussed. An adequate method and appropriate sources enabled a proper analysis of political discourse and attained the goal of this research. The pragmatic effect manifests itself in the use of language in a proper way, while taking into account the status quo of the country and needs of society. This is because it is only in the case that people are in need that they are willing to believe.

The eponyms used by politicians can be both evaluative and value-based in nature, reflecting attitudes to the historical and cultural reality that is significant for people. In terms of using eponyms as keywords in predicative sentences, this is realized with the help of repetition, comparison, metaphor, or as a comparison of facts, and is aimed at attracting the attention of the audience to a particular problem.

The investigation of eponyms and their consideration in political discourse has proved that eponyms can be used as pragmatic tools. Day by day, new political eponyms are appearing due to new presidents, new political courses, political issues, conferences, summits, and other events. Eponyms are becoming a part of politics and political discourse and function well. As they are derived from proper names (personal and place names), their use is quite important in official

or daily speech. Because those proper names have connotations in the language consciousness of particular nations, they invoke presuppositions and as a result pragmatically work very well.

In the political discourse of politicians, eponyms have strong pragmatic effects. The main pragmatic content of their influence is creating a positive image (of ideology, freedom, uniqueness, inviolability, or a positive/negative evaluation). Such components are necessary for influencing recipients, because the latter are important values for humanity that can evoke goodness and the revival of a country, including its culture and history. By using these pragmatic techniques, politicians attempt to have the greatest influence on their electorates, to display their common interest with ordinary people, and to suggest stability in domestic and foreign policy. The main pragmatic approach of politicians is attracting the attention of listeners and persuading them to engage in the necessary social activity.

REFERENCES

- The American Presidency Project*. [http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu) [Last access 12 12 2020]
- Bekoeva, I. D. (2015) Osobennosti politicheskogo diskursa V. V. Putina (Features of V. V. Putin's political discourse). *Actual Problems of Philology and Pedagogical Linguistics*, 2015, No. 2., pp. 27–31.
- Besedina, E.A. – T.V. Burkova – A. N. Michurin (2019) Strategiya evfimizatsyi pri formirovanii politicheskogo diskursa rossiyskogo parlamenta v gody pervoy mirovoy voyny (The strategy of euphemization in the formation of the political discourse of the Russian parliament during the First World War). *Questions of Cognitive Linguistics*, 2019, No. 2, pp. 75–84.
- Boycott, R. (1982) *Batty, Bloomers and Boycott. A Little Etymology of Eponymous Words*. London (UK), Hutchinson Publishing Group, p. 423. ISBN: 9780091498504
- Crystal, D. (1997) *English as a Global Language*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 301.
- Crystal, D. (2003) *A Dictionary of Linguistics & Phonetics*. 5th edition, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, p. 536.
- Eidemuller, M. E. (2001–2020) *American Rhetoric*. <http://www.americanrhetoric.com> [Last access: 12 17 2020]
- Freeman, S. M. (1997) *A New Dictionary of Eponyms*. Oxford (UK), University Press. p. 73, DOI: 10.1093/acref/9780195093544.001.0001

- Gavrilov, L. A. (2016) Politicheskii diskurs v zerkalye nauchnogo (Political discourse in the mirror of the scientific). *Political Linguistics*, 2016, No. 2., pp. 50–54.
- Gakzanova, E. M. (2016) Matematicheskiye termini-eponimi kategorii sovkupnosti (Mathematical terms-eponyms of the plurality category). *Vestnik PNIPU (Perm National Research Polytechnic University), Problemi Yazykoznaniya I Pedagogiki*, No. 4., pp. 86–94.
- Ravochkin, N. N. (2019) Avtor v politicheskom diskurse s pozitsiyi psikholingvistiki (An author in political discourse from the standpoint of psycholinguistics). *Studia Humanitatis*, 2019, No. 1., <http://st-hum.ru/content/ravochkin-nn-avtor-v-politicheskom-diskurse-s-pozicii-psiholingvistiki> [Last access: 08 21 2020]
- Russian President Executive Office (2020) *President of Russia*. <http://kremlin.ru> [Last access: 11 06 2020]
- Sedykh, A. P. (2016) K voprosu ob idiopoliticheskom diskurse V. V. Putina, (On the question of V. V. Putin's idiopolitical discourse). *Political Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No.55., pp. 35–41.
- Sharun, Y. F. (2017) Aktualizatsyya kontsepta obrazovaniye v prezidentskom diskurse Baraka Obamy (Actualization of the concept of education in the presidential discourse of Barack Obama). *Nova Philology*, 2017, No. 70., pp. 229–234.
- Spitsyna, N. A. – E. A. Medvedeva (2012) Rol kontseptualnoy metafory v politicheskom diskurse prezidenta SSHA Baraka Obamy (The role of conceptual metaphor in the political discourse of US President Barack Obama). *VSU Bulletin, Series: Linguistics and Intercultural Communication*, 2012, No. 1., pp. 118–121.
- Sukhotskaya, E. B. (2016) Vliyaniye yazykovoy lichnosti na formirovaniye obraza politika posredstvom tsvetovoy metafory v memuarnom diskurse (The influence of a linguistic personality on the formation of a politician's image by means of a color metaphor in memoir discourse). *Philological Science, Questions of Theory and Practice*, No. 7-3(61), pp. 152–156.
- Svitsova, A. A. – M. M. Susloparova – E. D. Dudina (2015) Evfimizmy v politicheskom diskurse (na primyerye publikatsyy The New York Times) (Euphemisms in political discourse (on the example of the publications of The New York Times)). *Philological Sciences, Questions of Theory and Practice, Tambov: Certificate*, Vol. 9, No. (51) in 2 hours Part II, pp. 176–179.
- Tatsenko, N. V. – L. S. Kravets (2013), Leksiko-semanticheskiye osobennosti angloyazychnogo politicheskogo diskursa (na materialye rechey Baraka Obamy) (Lexico-semantic features of euphemisms in the English-language

- political discourse (based on the speeches of Barack Obama)). *Lingua Mobilis*, Vol. 1, No. 40., pp. 89–98.
- Trahair, R. (1990) *What's in a Name?: An Australian Dictionary of Eponyms*. South Melbourne (Australia), Oxford University Press, p. 79, ISBN: 9780195530889
- Trahair, R. (1994) *From Aristotelian to Reaganomics: A Dictionary of Eponyms with Biographies in the Social Sciences*. Westport, Connecticut (USA), Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 72.
- Tsutsieva, M. G. (2013) Yazykovaya lichnost politika kak dinamicheskiy fenomen diskursa i teksta (Linguistic personality of a politician as a dynamic phenomenon of discourse and text). *Izvestia of the St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance*, 2013, No 5., (83), pp. 104–108.
- Urazova, E. A. (2019) *Metafora kak instrument kontseptualizatsyi yazykovoy kartiny mira: osobennosti upotrebleniya v politicheskom diskurse* (Metaphor as a tool for contextualizing the linguistic picture of the world: features of its use in political discourse: monograph), Moscow, Berlin, Direct-Media, p. 89.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1997) What is Political Discourse analysis?. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, Vol. 11, No. 1., pp. 11–52. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij>
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1998) *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London, Sage
- Zhabotinskaya, S. A. (2016) Kontseptualnaya metafora v publichnykh ryechyakh Baraka Obamy i Vladimira Putina (2014–2015) (Conceptual metaphors in public speeches of Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin (2014–2015)). *Cognition, Communication, Discourse*, (Cherkasy, Ukraine) 2016, No. 13., pp. 43–91.

REVIEW

**BRITAIN AND EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS.
THE POLITICS OF ANXIETY AND
TRANSFORMATION, BY ANDREW RYDER
(BRISTOL UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2020)**

PÉTER FUTÓ¹

This is an interesting and coherent book which offers a specific interpretation of Brexit by examining the political discourse and investigating its linguistic and rhetoric context. The author applies the method of critical discourse analysis, which links the micro analysis of speech acts (speeches, public statements, political adverts, and interviews) with a macro approach that critically assesses the relationship between speech acts and the historical and socio-economic profile of Britain. The Brexit debate is used as a case study to demonstrate that power is embodied in discourse and knowledge, and that sophisticated verbal constructs are capable of manipulating a range of dispositions, emotions, and identities to the extreme.

Andrew Ryder's previous work has focused on a range of challenges facing Roma in British and European societies in the context of the policy areas of integration, health, social policy, employment, and education. His previous research on Gypsies and Travellers, as well as this book on Brexit, serve as case studies of how power, control, and justice function in a renewed public sphere, in which authoritarian elites bolster their power by generating discord and binary 'us-and-them' agendas.

The book covers both the "Brexit message" and the media that successfully conveyed the latter to the public. The evolution of Brexit nationalism is analyzed as a paradigm shift brought forth partly by contemporary British history, but currently also caused to a great extent by sophisticated ideological manipulation. Special attention is paid to speech acts that serve the rhetoric

¹ *Dr Péter Futó* is an affiliated professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest and works as a freelance consultant. He teaches and does research and consultancy work in Entrepreneurial Economics, Environmental Economics, Local Development, and Regulatory Impact Assessment, e-mail: peter.futo@uni-corvinus.hu.

of “securitization,” which is a process of transforming policy subjects into matters of security. In the specific case of the Brexit debate, securitization consists of exaggerating the risks...

- of immigration,
- of the danger of parliamentary democracy being undermined, and
- of the handing over of control to the EU (loss of sovereignty).

The analysis shows how various political actors attempted to generate moral panic in the British public. The author identifies the social movements, organizations, parties and influential actors who overtly or subtly manipulated the public by framing the Brexit debate as an issue of identity and nationhood using populist arguments and speech acts. The book tests the hypothesis that the Brexit debate lacks a coherent framework, and highlights the underlying economic, historical, social, cultural and political mechanisms of how the shift towards this irrational framing happened. While chronicling the process of Brexit, the author demonstrates how the debate has undermined democracy, and the public’s attachment to it.

The substantive part of the analysis deals with the Brexit strategies of the Conservatives, of Labour, and of the Nationalists (the UK Independence Party/ Brexit Party, and the Scottish Nationalists), analyzing their strategies and highlighting the complexity and incoherence of their respective rhetorics. It is shown that, in interpreting Brexit policies, a wide range of game theory concepts such as bluff, bravado, and simulated irrationality are relevant elements. In particular, the book demonstrates...

- how the privileges of self-interested elites have been portrayed in the Brexit debate by demagogues as the “will of the people;”
- how antagonistic radicalisms trivialized the political debate by converting respected adversaries into enemies, thereby preventing deliberation and the development of moral consensus, and depriving citizens of choices based on meaningful and feasible compromises;
- to what extent reactive forms of identity, conservatism, and nativism have proved to be fertile ground for the politics of nationalist populism;
- and finally, how a populist goal has been achieved within a political system based on representative democracy by using a sophisticated toolkit of populist campaign tactics, such as surveys, social media, tabloids, technology, and the professional application of the science of marketing.

A recurrent topic of the book is populism and its symptoms, instruments, and representatives. The analysis points out the parallels between various analogous instances of moral panic in Britain.

The author demonstrates the parallels between...

- the Brexit debate on the one hand,
- and the demonization of Gypsies before and during the 2005 election on the other hand.

The latter hysteria was orchestrated by certain conservative newspapers and party leaders in the run up to the 2005 General Election. The demagoguery and the subsequently generated moral panic was witnessed first-hand by the author, who at that time was working as an activist for a campaign alliance of Gypsies and Travellers in the UK. The author feels that the use of race by leading political figures in a national poll was a turning point, as the Conservatives at a national level seemed to admit and apply certain elements of racist argumentation to obtain votes – a development that presaged the manipulation of the Brexit referendum and discourse.

In the case of the Brexit debate, it was migrants who were used by populists as scapegoats and “folk devils,” with the aim of fomenting a previously unknown form of nationalism, which the author calls “Brexit nationalism.”

In both cases, the divisive campaign topoi (i.e. “lines of argument,” or “commonplaces”) were similar, but gradually became more sophisticated. The book argues that controversial strategies for winning elections and referenda were used then, and since have been consciously and intentionally applied. Regarding the issues of race, identity, and migration, populist propaganda has frequently disregarded the truth and launched crude and simplistic slogans. This has revived various concerns and emotions and aroused a level of public anxiety formerly unknown by this generation.

The closing chapter provides an outlook on the expected social, political, and economic impacts of Brexit on the economy, on migration, on social cohesion and tensions, and on elite-driven authoritarian populism. The author recommends developing deliberative democracy based on institutionalized reciprocities, and on informed, collective conversation and decision-making. The deliberative approach can lead to a radical new consensus and to a transformative change which would be a more effective remedy for the current ills of the political system. In particular, and on a personal note, the author remains confident that one day Britain will rejoin the EU.

This book is essential reading for researchers and students interested in British politics, but also for those who wish to gain insight into the nature of populism and the manipulation of the public sphere in times of anxiety.

MCMINDFULNESS: HOW MINDFULNESS BECAME THE NEW CAPITALIST SPIRITUALITY, BY RONALD PURSER (REPEATER BOOKS, 2019)

MAJD JAMAL HAMMOUDEH¹

Roland Purser is a Professor of Management based in San Francisco. According to his personal profile on the College of Business of San Francisco State University's website, his article "Beyond McMindfulness" led to a long series of publications about issues related to introducing mindfulness into secular contexts. He contributed to the writing of two books, the *Handbook of Mindfulness: Culture, Context and Social Engagement* and the *Handbook of Ethical Foundations of Mindfulness*. For later reference, it is worthwhile noting that he is an ordained Zen Dharma Teacher in the Korean Zen Taego order of Buddhism.

The McMindfulness book, with its thirteen chapters and a conclusion, aims at providing a critique of mindfulness as a discourse and a practice and challenges its contemporary usage and its commodification. It questions the credibility of contemporary mindfulness practice, focusing mainly on how it has turned into a movement for privatizing mindfulness and making it a personal issue, whereby each individual is made responsible for applying it to all attributes of life, combined with how capitalist organizations and ventures are using the concept to influence their employees to become more productive while increasing their own profit.

From the first page of the book, Purser begins by challenging the concept of mindfulness and its practitioners who claim that paying attention to the present moment with no judgement can reduce human suffering and transform the world while igniting a global renaissance – from his point of view, it solely represents a coping mechanism being offered as a product – and not a "well packaged" one. Purser perceives that personal stress has a societal cause and effect, thus when talking about suffering this should include the concept of the collective

¹ *Majd Jamal Hammoudeh*, PhD Candidate, Doctoral School of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest, email: majdjh@caesar.elte.hu

so people are not only focused on themselves when they think of mindfulness. The causes of social distress, injustice, inequity, and environmental devastation are the problems Purser seeks to discuss, which, in his opinion, need to be concentrated on – not the ways to reduce the individual suffering that the former phenomena cause on the intrapersonal level, which mindfulness, according to Purser, is all about. Purser points out on more than one occasion in the book that mindfulness is neither a Buddhist practice, nor a method of corporate social responsibility – in contrast to what corporations may claim.

The term “Neoliberal Mindfulness” is introduced in the book in relation to Purser’s discussion of several of the psychological, sociological, and behavioral characteristics of mindfulness: namely, to describe how it became neoliberalized to meet the needs of capitalists by individualizing social problems and ignoring the collective. The definition of neoliberalism by Pierre Bourdieu (a French sociologist and public intellectual known for his work on the dynamics of power in society and the conceptualization of social capital) is used as “the most straightforward definition of neoliberalism,” which is as follows: “A program for destroying collective structures which may impede the pure market logic.” Purser also reflects on Michel Foucault’s (a French philosopher and historian of the twentieth century) theory of governmentality concerning how individuals conduct themselves. In Foucault’s description, there are two different modes of power (“techniques of domination” and “techniques of the self”), both of which may be considered instruments, as Purser puts it, “for the formation of selfhood as a neoliberal subject.” The new forms of institutionalism tolerate mindfulness due to its depoliticized nature: individuals now bear full responsibility for their happiness and well-being, leading to a neoliberal mindfulness which, according to Purser, suggests that “the source of people’s problems is found in their heads.”

Another concept – the “mood economy” – is addressed in the book, with a quote from Jennifer Silva (an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Bucknell University) who describes that latter as meaning that: “individuals [are] solely responsible for their emotional fates.” Purser goes on to describe mindfulness combined with the “science of happiness” (similar to positive psychology) as a “package” which is actually being sold “as a technique for personal life-hacking optimization, disembedding individuals from social worlds.”

Alongside the theories Purser uses to criticize the contemporary uses of mindfulness, he clarifies that mindfulness is not “cruel” in itself; its cruelty derives from being “fetishized and attached to inflated promises” when it is communicated as a means of transformation and a life-changing technique. Quoting from the second chapter: “This is how neoliberal mindfulness promotes an individualistic vision of human flourishing, enticing us to accept things as they are, mindfully enduring the ravages of capitalism.”

John Kabat-Zinn, founder of the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program, and his ideology are the subject matter of chapters three, four, and five. Purser argues how mindfulness is being “sold” in the modern world to scientists and thinkers, emphasizing that it “comes from Buddhism” but has become “decontextualized” to better fit today’s world and psychology. Purser affirms that Kabat-Zinn intends to rebrand the entire concept of mindfulness, eliminating its religious heritage, and focusing on the scientific side. A number of quotes are used to demonstrate inconsistencies in Kabat-Zinn’s approach – for example, a quote from Kabat-Zinn: “[mindfulness was] never meant to exploit, fragment or decontextualized the dharma, but rather recontextualize it.” To Purser, Kabat-Zinn’s intentions with mindfulness are to start a new lineage. Not only does the writer challenge the medicalization of mindfulness, but also how it has become privatized – the fact that each individual is responsible for their own mental well-being. A quote from the book: “mindfulness targets individuals and seems insensitive to social, political, and economic dimensions of suffering,” making individuals, according to Purser, more self-centered and also more accepting of change and challenges, as he clearly states: “It seems to be of no importance whether one’s worldview or choices are dysfunctional, because mindfulness allows one to reduce unwanted symptoms – stress, depression and anxiety – even if one’s way of life is out of balance with reality.” From Purser’s perspective, the privatized spirituality of the mindfulness movement disregards collective happiness and communal well-being.

The author has conducted intensive research and includes over 20 pages of references (books, journal articles, conference proceedings, and online articles) to support and defend his arguments. The concentration on Kabat-Zinn and his ideologies, books, quotes, conference speeches, and other sources is considered important when dealing with mindfulness, as the latter is one of the founders of the modern discourse and has conducted intense scientific research on the issue, which many scientists from different sectors follow, although Purser has contempt for Kabat-Zinn’s work.

Furthermore, Purser recognizes the double-faced characteristic of “mindfulness promoters,” whose first claim that “mindfulness is science” attempts to convince people thus, while in other arguments they try to show that mindfulness “has Buddhist origins,” making it look deep. The writer also criticizes how people have been using mindfulness to serve their own goals – whether to promote success or happiness, productivity at the workplace, wealth, or other side effects of mindfulness – dissimilarly to the objectives of the Dharma (defined in the book as “a collective term for the Buddha’s teachings”), and Buddhist meditation, which is better aligned with promoting collective endeavors and communal well-being than individualization.

Purser details his experience with mindfulness and MBSR programs; he clearly rejected the concept throughout his own journey. While he witnessed people healing, he felt that this was a mistake, and did not feel good himself, thus he questions whether “this mindful revolution was just about coping and fine-tuning our brains so that we can dutifully perform our roles more efficiently – becoming better adjusted cogs in the capitalist machinery?”

Moving to the critical research related to mindfulness, Purser reviewed several research projects and meta-analytical studies of mindfulness and extracted the relevant results. One paper published in *Scientific Reports* in 2018 that is entitled “The limited prosocial effects of meditation: A systematic review and meta-analysis” concluded that meditation interventions increased the levels of compassion *in published studies which had meditation teachers as co-authors and employed passive control groups, not active ones*. The same paper claimed that 61% of studies approving of mindfulness were methodologically weak. Purser offers another point regarding the trustworthiness of measuring mindfulness: “to date, there are at least nine different psychometric questionnaires, all of which define and measure mindfulness differently” – for the author, this raises concerns about reliability, a notable one being the use of self-reported questionnaires, which could cause bias.

The impact on employees and the act of incorporating mindfulness into corporations has a place in the discussion. Purser describes the “Search Inside Yourself” training program at Google and other training programs that have been developed in big multinational corporations. Adopting practices such as mindfulness in corporations to have a “therapeutic focus on individual wellbeing” may disguise the actual reason for the practice: manipulating and controlling employees. Ruminating that the main causes of stress for employees are not taken into consideration (such as a “lack of health insurance, the constant threat of lay-offs, lack of discretion and autonomy in decision-making, long working hours, low levels of organizational justice, and unrealistic demands”) Purse claims that no mindfulness program is actually neutral.

In the latter chapters of the book, Purser sheds light on some mindfulness coaches or ‘gurus’ that have gone to the extreme to deliver the concept of mindfulness to the public, in addition to asking a high price for it (a fee of \$12,000 per day for a corporate mindfulness training event was the answer of Dawa Darchin Philips when asked in a conference about his consultation fees, which did not sound not appropriate compared to the communicated objectives and purposes of mindfulness). Purser also describes events which took place in Davos (at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum [WEF]), including speeches which were delivered on the subject of mindfulness, and related arguments that were made. He comments on and criticizes the

presented research and “proof,” coming up with the conclusion that “[c]orporate mindfulness programs perpetuate the myth that individuals are simply ‘free to choose’ between stress and misery or wellness and happiness.” Not only is the founder of the Search Inside Yourself program, Chade-Meng Tan, known as the Google’s Jolly Good Fellow, mentioned in the book, but so are most advocates of mindfulness and corporations that implement such training: “Jon Kabat-Zinn, Jack Kornfield, Sharon Salzberg, Joan Halifax, Eckhart Tolle, Anderson Cooper, Arianna Huffington, Goldie Hawn and the mindful Congressman Tim Ryan, to name just a few. Corporate sponsors have included Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and MailChimp.”

Throughout the book, Purser focuses on criticizing how mindfulness is being privatized and oriented towards creating benefits for corporate entities: by the end of the book, he further disapproves of mindfulness being introduced in schools and the military, even if it may support the wellbeing of traumatized soldiers after returning from a war zone. He does not overlook the political side of mindfulness – see the integration of mindfulness into the UK Parliament in the form of the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG), established in 2014 in the UK to lead a nine-month study about the matter.

In the final chapters, Purser refers to himself as a Buddhist, which may suggest some bias in the research and book. He includes some comments about how mindfulness neglects Buddhism, even though the basis of mindfulness and its practices come from Buddhism. His critiques are based on some evidence; nevertheless, conflicts of personal interest and his own bias may still be present.

“McMindfulness” helps the reader to understand other perspectives about contemporary mindfulness, and includes reference to a number of research papers and studies in its construction of a comprehensive argument. On the other hand, the topic has been subjectivized, the criticism may involve bias, and, to a certain degree, some statements may be offensive to some readers – the overall tone makes it difficult to comprehend the book in a scientific manner. While Purser proposes that unless the causes of social suffering are examined “along with collective experiences of cultural trauma, systematic racism, and other form of marginalization and displacement that cannot be reduced to psychological maladies” the mindfulness revolution will escalate the problems it is claimed to solve, the book fails to suggest alternatives to those that are rejected with reference to objective and scientific methods – rather, it may offend the mindfulness movement and its proponents.

The book will interest readers who seek further understanding about contemporary mindfulness and those who work on critiquing mindfulness – mainly readers of business ethics, psychology, Buddhist studies, social sciences, and organizational sociology.

EDITORIAL

THANK YOU TO THE PEER REVIEWERS OF PREVIOUS ISSUES:

Umulker Ali Abdillahi	Michael F. Dahlstrom
Anita Abramowska-Kmon	Bruno Dallago
Szilvia Ádám	Angelica de Sena
Carmen Aguilera-Carnerero	Viktor Denisenko
Abisoye Ajibade	Zsuzsanna Elekes
Olayinka Akanle	Julianna Faludi
Milda Ališauskienė	Menno Fenger
Anna Alvazzi del Frate	Éva Fenyvesi
Kata Ámon	Anuska Ferligoj
László Antal	Éva Fodor
Marija Babovic	Attila Forgács
Piroska Balogh	Zsuzsa Füzesi
Gaurango Banerjee	István Gábor R.
Shavana Bangash	Balázs Gosztonyi
Attila Bartha	Trygve Gulbrandsen
István Bartók	Andrea Gyarmati
Eszter Berényi	László Gyurgyik
András Bethlendi	Miklós Hadas
Zsuzsanna Biedermann	Miklós Hajdú
Jack Birner	Max Haller
Zsuzsa Blaskó	Balázs Hámori
Julianna Bodó	Ágnes Hárs
Dorothee Bohle	Rita Hegedüs
Fabio Boncinelli	József Hegedüs
Barry Bozeman	Dezső Helmich
József Böröcz	Mária Herczog
Marija Brajdic Vukovic	John Higley

Egle Butkeviciene	Rosemarijn Hoefte
Christopher Carlson	Masa Filipovic Hrast
Tatsiana Chulitskaya	Ildikó Hrubos
Ágnes Czakó	Ildikó Husz
Bernadett Csurgó	Suzana Ignjatovic
Michal Illner	Annamária Mayer
Gabriella Ilonszki	Attila Meleg
Béla Janky	Károly Mike
Krzysztof Jasiocki	Dusan Mojic
Csaba Jelinek	Viktor Mravcik
Jorgen Jensehaugen	Richard Münch
Pál Juhász	Beáta Nagy
Høgni Kalsø Hansen	Ildikó Nagy
Viktor Karády	Maria Nawojczyk
Gopalakrishnan Karunanithi	Anthony Oberschall
Eszter Kelemen	Emelka Obioha
Attila Kenyeres	Richard Ochanda
Gábor Király	Mannie I. Oimage
Dorottya Kisfalusi	Babatunde Omosho
Márta Kiss	Turkan Frinici Orman
Andrzej Klimeczuk	Antal Örkény
Zoltán Kmetty	Eszter Pál
Bence Kollányi	Viktória Pap
Sokratis Koniordos	Gábor Papp
Mariann Kopasz	Veronika Patkós
Dániel Kovarek	Elena Pesic
András Körösenyi	Attila Pilinszki
Reinhart Kössler	Péter Pillók
Zuza Kusa	Ágnes Pogány
Magesh Kuttalam	Éva Pólya
Olga Kuzina	Branco Ponomarjov
Mihály Laki	Virginija Poškutė
David Lane	Henriett Primecz
Judit Lannert	Árpád Rab

John B. Lengyel	Marta Radó
László Letenyi	Márton Rakovics
László Lőrincz	Jose Real-Dato
Rimple Manchanda Taneja	Gergely Rosta
Zsuzsanna Marjainé Szerényi	Andrew Ryder
József Péter Martin	György Sándor
Irmina Matonite	Dumitru Sandu
Adriano Scribano	Dorottya Szikra
Endre Sik	Emese Szilágyi
Cibele Silva e Souza	Judit Takács
András Simonovits	Károly Takács
Ágnes Simonyi	Róbert Tardos
Neil Smelser	Gábor Tóka
Iris Solano-Cahuana	István György Tóth
Tamás Solymosi	Kinga Tóth-Szabó
Péter Somlai	Lika Tsuladze
Károly Attila Soós	Adrienn Újhelyi
Dragan Stanojevic	Ágnes Urbán
Andrei Stsiapanau	Eric M. Uslaner
Mariana Sueldo	Mónika Váradi
Andrea Szabó	Szabolcs Varga
Laura Szabó	Balázs Vedres
Eleonóra Szanyi	Lilla Vicsek
Gáborné Székely	Natalie Waechter
Levente Székely	Siwar Youssef
Iván Szelényi	Roman Zakharenko

