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Authors:

Gergely Guszmán
Sára Lafferton
Ágnes Bodnár
Anita Berecz
Eszter Krakkó



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GERGELY GUSZMANN

**Overview on Theories of Nationalism:
Contemporary Shifts and Challenges***

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Introduction

The growing interest in studying the birth and (post-)modern evolution of nation and nationalism has been one of the key orientations of social scientists over the last three decades. During this period, scholars have made serious attempts to create a general (or less general) framework of these terms (nation and nationalism) in an effort to understand the role (and the increasing strength) of nationalism today. The study of nationalism has a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences, and new arguments emerging over the last fifteen years have given rise to debate and as well as providing a better understanding of the emergence of nationalist movements. I argue here that the prevailing post-modernist or instrumentalist stance on nationalism demands that we subject contemporary nationalist movements to a more meaningful and heterogeneous analysis as opposed to an essentialist problematization. The aim of this study is to provide an overview of some subsequent problematics of current nationalist movements and/or manifestations.

The first part of this paper is primarily concerned with the dominant approaches to nationalism and the theories of nation which will provide us with some reference points from which to explain the characteristics of current forms of nationalism. Then, *terminological, socio-political, ethnic, economic, and identity* studies will be presented principally within the (post-)modernist argument in an attempt to reveal certain aspects of contemporary debates on nationalism. These examples are utilized to demonstrate the complexity of current nationalist shifts, which require a rethinking of both nationalism and the study of nationalism in its classical form.

A brief historical overview on the notion of nation

Difficulties of how to adequately define the term *nation* come from its semantically (over) saturated nature. In fact, so contested is the notion that the only consensus in the scientific literature on the definition of *nation* is that it cannot be defined. Additionally, the everyday use of this term in the media makes it difficult to adopt an objective scientific approach. However, it is necessary to at least try and formulate a plausible working definition in order to position myself and enumerate the relevant ideas on interpreting the historic use of *nation*.

In general, the literature has applied a terminology of binary codes. The nation's terminological concept, in a simplified and ethno-centric way, can be divided into a "French" and "German" conceptual model. The *French* concept, in opposition to the latter, is often mentioned as a *state-nation* (*État-nation*) which relies on territorial boundaries (the territory of the French Republic), a common spirit (the idea of a republic, Declaration of the

Rights of Man and of the Citizen, etc.) reflected by state institutions and the prevailing nation-contract. The *German* model can be understood as a culture-nation based on a linguistic community and presumes a common national character manifested in physical, moral, and cultural (myths, traditions, history, etc.) commonalities. The first is in essence an embodiment of a political construction which the society (*Gesellschaft*) of individual citizens is created on the grounds of a territorial-citizenship principle originating from the ideas of enlightenment and the French Revolution. In contrast, a culture-nation is an organic community (*Gemeinschaft*) of individuals of common culture, history and sentiments, resting on an ethnic-genealogical principle and originating from romantic German idealist philosophy.¹ The political-cultural distinction of the concept of nation originated with the German historian, Friedrich Meinecke, who distinguished, after the Prussian-French War of 1870, between a cultural and a political nation. Meinecke's concept derived directly from his historical period and the circumstances of a concrete territorial conflict so this perspective was fixed onto a particular ideological framework.² Despite the particular historical background of the birth of this idea, the dichotomist nation-concept has remained the dominant one among scientists and thus has had a great impact on the research of our times. It is perhaps due to the work of Hans Kohn, who extended this original dualist notion, conceived in the French-German context, onto the global stage.³ According to the conclusions of Kohn, the theoretical distinction of a *voluntarist* Western (French, North-American, British, Dutch, Swiss, etc.) and *organic* Eastern (the rest of Europe and, actually, the world) types of nation reflects a dimensional opposition. This normative dichotomy of Western and Non-Western societies has remained almost unchallenged in the history of research on nationalism. Although there have been slight differences between approaches, these have only been about how to label the types of nations, for instance, Hugh Seton-Watson distinguished "old, continuous nations" and "deliberately created nations,"⁴ or the opposition of nations based on *territory* vs. *ethnicity*

¹ Dominique Schnapper, *La Communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994);

Louis Dumont, *L'idéologie allemande. France-Allemagne et retour* (Paris, Gallimard, 1991).

² Alain Renaut, "Logique de la nation," in *Théories du nationalisme*, ed. Gil Delannoi and Pierre-André Taguieff (Paris: Kimé, 1991), 29–46.

³ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1946).

⁴ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977).

of Anthony D. Smith.⁵ As Roger Brubaker posits the idealized model of the nation-state: “(it) is conceptualized in both social-scientific analysis and political practice as an internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and (sometimes) economic space.”⁶ However, Brubaker also argues that there has recently been a shift in academic papers to defining the nation-state as a membership association. It is fundamentally a territorial organization, but in certain cases, the frontiers of membership extend beyond the territorial borders of the state.⁷

Composing a globally (as a general notion without depending on a concrete space-time coordinate and a context) applicable ideal-typical concept of nation seems scarcely conceivable primarily because of its symbolic saturation and heterogeneity. On the one hand, it is true that in most cases nations are comprised of a mixture of *cultural* and *political*, *civic* and *ethnic*, *voluntarist* and *organic* or *subjective* and *objective* elements; on the other hand, it is necessary to involve specific time factors and other components of a particular context in order to define or re-define a genuine and contextual concept of nation for a given study. Such distinctions as ethnic or civic nationalism can be a useful academic tool for distinguishing various forms of nationhood, but these concepts should not be used in a dogmatic way.⁸

⁵ The binary code, which has been challenged by post-modernist researchers, is grounded in the basis of territory. It has been rejected by Smith who argues for an opposition of *ideal-typical nation* vs. *ethnic community (ethnie)*. The latter also has controversial elements but it can be used to demonstrate the difference between the terms of *nation* and *ethnic group*. “We propose to define the concept of nation as a “named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties of all members.” The concept of *ethnie* can in turn be defined as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites. [...] All this is rather abstract and theoretical. When we move from ideal-types to empirical instances, we find approximations and exceptions.” According to the approach of Smith, these are the “*diaspora nations*,” “*polytechnic nation*,” “*nations within nations*” and “*nations within national states*.” Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 13–15, 39–42.

⁶ Rogers Brubaker, “Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 41, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 63.

⁷ Brubaker, “Migration,” 78.

⁸ Erika Harris, *Nationalism. Theories and Cases*, (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 32.

On the study of nationalism

First, I would like to present the most significant studies and approaches pertinent to this subject in a periodic order. However, since the very beginning of the emergence of the concept of nationalism, it has been a discursive subject, therefore it is important not to simplify the term as possessing a constant meaning. Because of the heterogenic character of nationalism (e.g., over time it has become a fundamental generator of political, cultural, and economic changes), it is necessary to delineate between the various interpretations of the term in different time periods.

1. Phase: birth of the idea of nationalism and its spread across Europe at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries. The most important propagators, promoters and theorists of this idea were philosophers, politicians and statesmen. (e.g. Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Giuseppe Mazzini, Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and also historians like Jules Michelet, Ernest Renan, von Treitschke, or Lord Acton).⁹
2. Phase: the problematic itself has only become a subject¹⁰ for proper analysis during the interwar period, primarily by the two so-called “forefathers” of nationalism studies: Carleton Hayes and Hans Kohn (and later Louis Snyder)
3. Phase: sociologists and anthropologists also commence studying nationalisms between 1945 and 1980 by setting the problematic in an interdisciplinary ground (e.g. Daniel Lerner, Karl W. Deutsch, John Plamenatz, Hugh Seton-Watson, Elie Kedourie, Paul R. Brass).

⁹ The primary aim of all studies on classifying nationalism is to provide a general understanding and basic reference points. The difficulty of studying nationalism is that there is no one great thinker who can be credited with being the ‘founding father’ of the subject. It is a remarkable historiographical feature that authors of maybe the two most influential works on the theory of nationalism share the belief that there is a lack of coherent theories on nationalism, which could have properly interpreted the phenomenon in the golden age of *par excellence* nationalist discourses before the 20th century. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991), 5.; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

¹⁰ The academic survey on nationalism, formulated in the first half the 20th century, considered the phenomenon as a concrete (rational and discrete) subject, which needed to be studied. ‘Nation’ as an academic subject was a positive fact evolved through history and to social scientists of this era this topic seemed to be a scientifically exciting new field of studies. The pioneers of this scientific group studied the term and history of nations applying comparative methods of analysis and neglecting biological or social-Darwinist ideas.

4. Phase: the classical discussion has been overcome by representatives of new approaches such as the modernist school. This school has raised new questions on the role and function of nationalism in modern political, cultural, social and economic contexts. The most dominant scholars here are Tom Nairn, John Breuilly, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric J. Hobsbawm, etc., and we should also mention the founder of the ethno-symbolist school Anthony D. Smith.

In light of recent research findings, I should add that there has been a paradigm shift beginning at the end of the 1980s.¹¹ This transition to a more dynamic and sometimes extremely polyphonic discourse has been expressed by new polemics in the literature on the nature of nations and nationalist movements. Most of the current studies and approaches have become post-modernized and emphasized topics that had been marginally touched upon by the classical debate (e.g. multiculturalism, identity, migration, racism, cultural diaspora, gender, business and marketing, etc.).

The traditional divide of complex theories of nationalism lies in how these theories are fundamentally related to the genetic axis of nation. In other words, how these theories consider the nation: as a modern construction (this approach is the constructivist/instrumentalist or modernist one) or a phenomenon embedded in a sort of ethnic “*longue-durée*” (so-called primordialist/perennialist approach), or a modern entity with an ethnic-core (ethno-symbolists). Thus, three main approaches to the origins of nations can be identified¹²:

- 1.) *Primordialists* (and/or *perennialists*)¹³: the origins of nations prior to the age of modernity, because nations are God-given, organic entities and not constructions.
- 2.) *Modernists*: nations are modern and artificial results of fundamental economic, social and cultural changes that transformed traditional societies into modern, industrial communities (so nations are constructions, not organic entities).¹⁴

¹¹ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction*, (London-New York: MacMillan, 2000), 56; Lajtai L. László, “Trendek és elméletek a nemzet- és nacionalizmuskutatásban: Vázlatos kutatástörténeti áttekintés,” *PRO MINORITATE* 24, no. 3 (2015): 119–31.

¹² Ernest Gellner, “Reply: Do Nations Have Navels?,” *Nations and Nationalism ASEN* 2, no. 3 (November 1996): 366–68.; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998)

¹³ Smith, “Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History”, 50.

¹⁴ Gellner brilliantly points out the difference between the two fundamentally important perspectives that nationalism is basically a *Gesellschaft* phenomenon presenting itself as *Gemeinschaft*. In other words, modern nations described as anonymous and dynamic (or mobile) societies pretend to be (or to be seen as) homogenous and comfortable communities. Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London : Weidenfeld&Nicolson, 1997), 63–74.

- 3.) *Ethno-symbolists*: located in between the two approaches mentioned above; it represents that nations originate from ethnic communities. Through the symbols and myths of these communities, they provide predestinated but shapeable identities to the members of a homogenous community.¹⁵

The basic argument here is centered on whether the nation fostered nationalism or nationalism created the idea of a nation. The primordialist view of thinking tends to accept (in opposition to the modernist approach) the antiquity of nations, whilst modernists claim that modern socio-economic transformations of traditional communities created nations. Ethno-symbolists agree that nations are somehow modern entities but with essential ethno-cultural roots. This methodological triptych can be divided into several sub-approaches (e.g., within primordialism naturalist, sociobiological, and cultural views can be discerned), but essentially this classification contains the relevant elements of canonized consensus of the literature. However, two historiographical remarks need to be added here. On the one hand, primordialists/perennialists owned the scientific discourse on nationalism without any significant rivals until the publication of the work of Hans Kohn and Carleton Hayes in the first half of the 20th century. That is why it is almost impossible to attach the label of complex theories¹⁶ on nationalism in the 19th century when I mention Fichte or Renan or other thinkers. Nowadays, these classical approaches seem to have all but disappeared, however they remain important to current attempts to find a coherent understanding of nationalism. On the other hand, all current academic researchers (except for Anthony D. Smith and his few followers) consider themselves modernists in their shared belief that there is an epistemological rupture between current theories on nationalism and classical views on the existence of proto-nationalism. The mainstream modernist approaches, however, do not seem to be coherent considering the different measures and emphasis on their explicative basis. Those who see the grand economic change that began in the second half of the 18th century as a key element of the rise of nationalism (e.g. the two neo-Marxist social scientists Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter) work with absolutely different argumentative methods than other theorists, who claim that it was the re-structure process of the authority-political sphere during the age of modernity which generated the birth of nationalist movements. Among the latter, we

¹⁵ Christophe Jaffrelot, "Les modèles explicatifs de l'origine des nations et du nationalisme. Revue critique," in *Théories du nationalisme*, ed. Gil Delannoi and Pierre-André Taguieff (Paris: Kimé, 1991), 164.

¹⁶ The concept of a theory of nationalism can be only considered as an emancipated and disciplined field of study since the academic sphere has created the first complex models on modern social transitions and transformations.

can mention the name of John Breuilly, Paul Brass, and Eric J. Hobsbawm. These authors share the idea that components of political transformation (the rise of the bureaucratic state, the institutionalization of the principles of people's sovereignty, the spread of the general and secret right to vote, etc.) are also the *par excellence* factors of nationalism. Representatives of another view (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Miroslav Hroch) agree with the central role played by fundamental political and social changes but emphasize the importance of the impact of these changes on the cultural sphere that transforms pre-modern societies into modern ones.

Nevertheless, from the 1990s new perspectives emerged and challenged the relevance and importance of the arguments that concentrated on how nations and nationalism originated. These approaches did not consider the modernist vs. ethno-symbolist vs. primordialist debate relevant anymore, they rather started to focus on the different representations of nationalisms. The importance of the genealogy of nations seemed to disappear and new methodological tools began to dominate the study of nationalism. The propagators of this perspective (Katherine Verdery, Rogers Brubaker, Daniele Conversy, Craig Calhoun) tend to abandon efforts to create a homogenic and global definition of nationalism and focus on its heterogeneity. According to Brubaker, the current differences between scholars are not based on whether they accept the antiquity of nations or not but between the concepts that accept nations as real entities, *sui generis* substances, and the post-modernists, who try to desubstantialize the term.¹⁷

Contemporary Approaches on Nationalism

Numerous social scientific articles have recently addressed contemporary problems (mixing ethnic boundaries, cultural co-existence, territorial boundaries, new nationalist strands, migration, and social inclusion) within the domain of nationalism. A concerted scholarly attempt, then, has focused on providing answers to these new issues, however, only a few perspectives tend to process the problematic themes in their totality by utilizing the many tools the social sciences have to offer. Rogers Brubaker, in one of his recent studies, highlights three key terms (ethnicity, race, and nationalism) that have not been adequately studied because the literature was fragmented along disciplinary lines. He claims that this fragmentation "has generated a new field of study that is comparative, global, cross-disciplinary, and multi paradigmatic, and that construes ethnicity, race, and nationhood as a single integrated family of forms of cultural understanding, social organization,

¹⁷ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

and political contestation.”¹⁸ According to Brubaker’s argument, this new field has five characteristics or positions (implicitly and explicitly comparative, global, interdisciplinary, multi-paradigmatic, or a single integrated domain) that determine how scholars study the congruence or distinctiveness of ethnicity, race and nationalism. It is worth looking at Brubaker’s categorization on multiple dimensions of distinction:

- I. Categorization and membership
 1. Criteria and indicia of membership
 2. External categorization versus internal self-identification
 3. Identifiability, sharpness/fuzziness, fixedness/fluidity
 4. Naturalization
 5. Hierarchy, markedness, and stigmatization
 6. Transmission and socialization

- II. Social organization
 1. Boundaries
 2. Groupness, salience, thickness
 3. Territorial concentration or dispersion
 4. Economic differentiation and in equality
 5. Institutional separation or integration
 6. Reproduction

- III. Politics
 1. Identification and loyalty
 2. Social closure
 3. Organization and mobilization
 4. Political claims¹⁹

I agree with Brubaker on the simplistic nature of this schematic, however, these dimensions demonstrate the complexity of each term and how they sometimes overlap, intertwine, and traverse each other. The greatest benefit of this new field described by Brubaker is that it allows for the study of contemporary and classical themes with a more interdisciplinary, global and multi-paradigmatic perspective.

Another key issue that has been recently studied is the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism originally (and as mentioned above) discussed by Hans Kohn. The

¹⁸ Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 22.

¹⁹ Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism,” 26–27.

dichotomy of Western/civic and Eastern/ethnic nationalism retains some value when scholars intend to categorize nationalism from a primarily substantialist perspective. However, in its original form (or even with some modifications²⁰) the theory is of questionable value, especially when one aims at classifying/interpreting present nation-building and other forms of nationalist processes. Krzysztof Jaskulowski argues that Kohn's dichotomy has at least two problematic issues. First, it is principally a simplifying typology that tends to blur specifics when characterizing a nation as civic or ethnic. This simplification (by adopting the argument of J. Kiliatis) may result in a loss of the complexity, diversity, and heterogeneity of social reality, institutions, social actors, and an historical changeability dimension of nation. Second, the distinction suggests that purely civic nationalism lacks cultural elements. Yet, typical civic nationalisms (e.g., the USA) are built on traits of common culture, common values, a common past, shared historic experience, myths, memories, historical representations (monuments), and (national) symbols. These symbols, for example, the flag of the USA, represent the unity of the nation, fulfill a significant cognitive function and go beyond rationally motivated membership. The American flag stands for the nation, which means that "the flag is treated as if it was the nation. The symbol takes the place of an abstract idea it represents."²¹ The symbolic relationship between the members of the nation and the nation as an abstraction is primarily a cultural trait. It means that scholars must consider how cultural elements and especially, symbols, contributed to the unity of a nation by creating emotional bonds among the members. It is also a simplification to claim that cultural elements did not have a significant role in the Western-European nation-building processes during the 19th century (e.g., the French monument installation events after the defeat at Sedan or the German cultural festivals from the 1830s).

Aside from the ongoing debate on Kohn's dichotomy, there have been new scholarly perspectives on the discussions of special or current forms of ethnic and/or cultural nationalism. After the disintegration of the USSR, multiple nationalist movements arose developing into a specific form of ethnic nationalism (in this case Russian ethnic nationalism) that cannot be understood from an essentialist perspective. In her recent study, Anastasia Mitrofanova divides contemporary Russian ethnic nationalist movements into three fundamental groups: "1) Orthodox nationalists, who may belong to the Russian Orthodox Church or to uncanonical religious organizations; 2) contemporary Slavic pagans (neopagans); 3) secularists: those who consider religious questions unimportant and do

²⁰ Krzysztof Jaskulowski, "Western (civic) 'versus' Eastern (ethnic) Nationalism. The Origins and Critique of the Dichotomy," *Polish Sociological Review* 171 (2010): 299.

²¹ Jaskulowski, "Western," 300.

not advertise their religious affiliation.”²² Orthodox nationalism is chiefly a religio-ideological trend which emerged during the early 1990s and which is based on “the rejection of the contemporary world, perceived as having abandoned God and fallen under the sway of the Antichrist.”²³ The establishment of the rule of the Antichrist decays the world and it is only the Russian people who are able to stop the collapse by preserving the values of the Orthodox enclave. The Russian (or Orthodox) people are the chosen ones with a unique fate who carry the revelation of God. They believe that aside from their chosenness, Russians carried great sin and for their sins Nicholas II and his family had to die. Because of his sacrifice, Orthodox nationalists tend to be pro-monarchists. Nicholas II and his family were indeed venerated by the Orthodox Church; however, the Church does not support the cultivation of the Tsar and considers this view heretical. This phenomenon is one of the core problematic issues of the Orthodox nationalists and as a result they often find themselves in direct conflict with the Church. Even when there are certain movements within the Orthodox Church, which label themselves nationalist, their nationalistic views do not accord with the official position of the Church. Pagans (or neo-pagans), do not have such conflicts, because they do not belong to any Church referring to themselves as “native believers” (*rodnoveriy*).²⁴ Their vague definition incorporates different forms of rituals and beliefs. They do not have an authentic pagan tradition; thus, they create or reconstruct certain rituals that they contend to be the “national” religion of the Russians. The various pagan groups (who may have their own worldview and rituals) use the Internet to link their members and groups with each other. The members often participate in martial-arts/sport training and learn the use of firearms. These activities give a para-military characteristic to the political movement, which can also be considered as a sub-culture with its own phrases, dress code, and rules. For secular nationalists, religion is not a significant political or ideological issue, which does not mean that among secularists there are no believers of any faith, or that they do not use religious rhetoric to mobilize people. Their political agenda focuses rather on the “main enemy” of the Russian people, namely, culturally alien migrants. They oppose the majority of migrants who are Muslim, claiming that Islam is an aggressive and militant religion and in opposition to this obscure faith they are rational-thinking people. However, they are also against the migration of Christians such as Georgians, Armenians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians.

²² Anastasia Mitrofanova, “Russian Ethnic Nationalism and Religion Today,” in: *The New Russian Nationalism. Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, ed. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 107.

²³ Mitrofanova, “Russian Ethnic Nationalism,” 113.

²⁴ Mitrofanova, “Russian Ethnic Nationalism,” 121.

Today, the Orthodox and pagan nationalists are ideologically stagnating (the ideological foundations for both sections have been laid down in the 1990s) and are failing to attract more followers (the pagans, in particular, have exhausted any potential social base). The secularists seem to be the most dynamic nationalist group. They have new ideas, new leaders, and their social base is growing, in part due to their use of social media as a tool of propaganda (Facebook, *Vkontakte*). In contrast to the Orthodox nationalists, secularists do not have to face internal conflicts (they have no ecclesiastical issues). They use religious rhetoric to attract sympathizers and to impress the authorities, hence, secularism is more a populist device than an ideological stance.²⁵

Another current manifestation of nationalism can be described as humanitarian or economic nationalism. Certain contemporary nationalist movements aim at legitimizing their political actions or their political status by promoting and providing, social services, relief and reconstruction. For the latter, the humanitarian and recovery assistance of Hindu nationalist organizations after an earthquake in rural Kutch is a remarkable example. In short, the Hindu nationalist political group has gradually gained more and more relevance in the political life of post-independence India. Hindu nationalism represents Hindu values; however, when the political body of the movement, the BJP (*Bharatiya Janata Party*) became the governing party in 1998 secular India did not become a religious state. The success of the BJP has recently reached a new level in 2014 when the party gained a landslide political victory in the general elections. As Malini Bhattacharjee states, the source of this victory can be found in the party's "adaptability to the changing sociopolitical landscape," not to mention that it "has adopted various methods, techniques, rituals, and forms of mobilization over the years in an effort to capture the popular Hindu imagination."²⁶ The *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS) founded in 1925, is the cultural and militant body of the Hindu nationalist movement. The *swayamsevak*s (volunteers) provide humanitarian (Hindu refugees after the Partition) and social services (disaster relief) and they also use these opportunities to undertake massive cadre building. In the Hindu tradition the word *seva* means selfless help. The RSS developed a strategy of *seva* for two main reasons: 1) aside from benign help, the volunteers' social service mobilize those who show no interest in that Hindu ideology (*Hindutva*) but support their social welfare network; 2) during disasters when the state is often ineffective in handling emergency relief, the deployment of humanitarian aid can serve as a justification for political intervention. The

²⁵ Mitrofanova, "Russian Ethnic Nationalism," 123–29.

²⁶ Malini Bhattacharjee, "Sevā, Hindutva, and the Politics of Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction in Rural Kutch," *Asian Ethnology* 75, no. 1, (Special Issue: Salvage and Salvation: Religion and Disaster in Asia 2016), 76.

relief and rehabilitation operations of the RSS after the 2001 Bhuj earthquake enabled the Hindu nationalist movement to find new beneficiaries, patrons and contacts with the media, civil society, and the local communities. The reconstruction works provided opportunities to further broaden the social base of the movement and due to their compassionate contribution, their popularity measurably increased.²⁷

One of the most fundamental goals of nationalist movements is to construct a collective image of a nation relying on the glorious events of the past. The idea of collecting the characteristic features of a nation in order to represent or symbolize the members of a nation is not unknown. However, the case of Iceland, where the textbook image of a courageous and fearless Viking is believed to depict a successful businessman, highlights some current issues of gender and relations between nationalism and business. Kristín Loftsdóttir argues that nations can be branded (just like companies with their trademarks) on the basis of cultural traits. These brands, nevertheless, project the image of a nation as a community of males. In Iceland the construction of a nation also relied on gendered ideas and “crucial symbols of ‘Icelandicness’ such as logic, courage, and honor were primarily assigned to males.”²⁸ According to the textbooks, Icelandic history was a story of hard-working men who settled on the island (which reflects courage and the image of a self-made man), defied the Danish colonization, inherited Celtic intelligence and Norwegian inner strength. During the 2000s, Iceland became more visible to the global business world due to the successes of Icelandic businessmen who bought up companies in other parts of the world and extended the operation of their companies internationally. The media and politicians interpreted this economic success by using nationalistic rhetoric. The economic boom was explained as a result of the special characteristics of Icelanders and the achievement of “the Icelandic entrepreneur overseas is expressed in terms such as *útrás* (outward expansion) and *útrásarvíkingur* (Business Viking).”²⁹ The individual qualities of the successful entrepreneurs were compared to older concepts of Icelanders such as the male-dominated image of a brave, powerful and smart Viking settler. This global economic success enabled Icelandic nationalism to reinvent itself and to promote nationalistic symbols. Unfortunately, the nationalistic political and public narratives on the economic expansion were not enough to prevent Iceland from the crisis in 2008.³⁰ Economic success can be a powerful device of legitimacy and nation-building when the

²⁷ Bhattacharjee, “Sevā,” 97.

²⁸ Kristín Loftsdóttir, “Vikings Invade Present-Day Iceland,” in *Gambling Debt. Iceland’s Rise and Fall in the Global Economy*, ed. Paul E. Durrenberger and Gisli Pálsson (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2015), 5.

²⁹ Loftsdóttir, “Vikings,” 9.

³⁰ Loftsdóttir, “Vikings,” 10–13.

members of the given community tend to be a part of this glory. Financial expansion can be interpreted as the “expansion of a nation,” however, this vague image of unity disperses in case of an economic downfall.

The idea of belonging has a current aspect that challenges social sciences to provide society with an academic explanation. This aspect is migration. As Rogers Brubaker claims, “migration is as old as human history.”³¹ However, modern nation-states are required to give new answers to current issues because migration (especially cross-border migration) disturbs the congruency between “residence and citizenship, between nation-membership and state-membership, and between culture and polity.”³² The idealized version of modern nation-states is highly problematized by the politics of belonging. Brubaker applies four distinctions to highlight this argument: 1) the main concern of the politics of membership or belonging is that for modern nation-states the question of “who belongs” is still relevant; in other words, the idea of belonging is fundamentally influenced by the current importance of nation-states; 2) certain minority populations have one *formal* state membership, but in such cases, their *substantive* membership, such as their access to substantive rights of citizenship and substantive acceptance as full-members of a nation, is highly contested; 3) the *formal* and *informal* aspects of the politics of belonging both reflect different kinds of membership. Formal membership is legal and administered by an employee of state bureaucracy. Informal, in contrast, does not need an official document to express belonging to a national community. It is rather an everyday practice and the choice of an individual. But this informal membership is supervised by others who decide who belongs and who does not; 4) *Internal* (populations located within the territorial bounds of a state without membership of that state) and *external* (populations located outside the territorial bounds but claim to belong to that state and nation) dimensions of the politics of belonging should be distinguished from each other. The two dimensions are connected in three ways: first, *reciprocally connected between states*, when “a population subject to an *internal politics of membership in one state* may be subject to an external politics of membership in another state”³³; second, intertwined within a particular state, an ethnic population coming from another state enjoys more citizenship rights than foreign immigrants (or their children) who speak the language of the state better than the ethnic migrants; third, the internal and external dimension can be linked *sequentially*: the “homeland state” induces the immigration of external members.³⁴ The external politics

³¹ Brubaker, “Migration,” 76.

³² Brubaker, “Migration,” 77.

³³ Brubaker, “Migration,” 66.

³⁴ Brubaker, “Migration,” 64–67.

of belonging is more emphasized by contemporary social scientists, which indicates new understandings on nationalism such as the struggle of populations to belong in or to a nation-state.

The ways in which the conceptual model of nation-state, nationalism and national identity are interpreted, are shifting towards more complex, interdisciplinary and context-based approaches. The current questions of nationalism have mostly shifted from how *ethnies* were transmitted into modern nations to how modern nations reflect on current socio-economic, cultural, gender, neo-religious, or migration issues. The above examples are far from exhaustive and only cover a small part of current (trans-)formations of nationalism. However, they serve the purpose of demonstrating the wide range of today's challenges to providing a better understanding of nationalistic manifestations and the increasing societal tendency towards the necessity of nation-states. Whether it is a current religio-nationalism, a humanitarian service with political intentions, or a use of the past for marketing and branding reasons, scholarly inquiries should always include classical theories but, at the same time, take all the specifics (religious, socio-cultural, or economic) into consideration and explicitly process all aspects of the given issue.

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SÁRA LAFFERTON

**Conceptualizing the European History of State Sovereignty:
Reflections on Agamben, Foucault and Ranke***

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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to explore how Giorgio Agamben adapts the traditional historiographic school's concept of sovereignty and Michel Foucault's concept of biopolitics in his theory of European state sovereignty. Due to formal restrictions, the aim is not to compare their theories of power (although such comparisons, at certain points, will surely be inevitable), but instead will focus on the theory of history that their theoretical works on European state sovereignty imply. It will be argued that Foucault's novel approach to power and to history, although it initially shook the very foundations of many human disciplines, has been successfully reconciled with historiographic theories I term traditional, in the works of Agamben. The argument set out below, therefore, is two-fold. On one hand, it will attempt to show that for European state sovereignty, as conceptualized by Agamben, the population and the body is just as important as the territory and the juridical order is. On the other hand, it is contested that the theory of history that this conceptualization implies is founded on an intertwined notion of time, which introduces the total narrative of European state sovereignty while simultaneously allowing for rupture and human inventiveness.

In terms of recent developments in the humanities, this theoretical reconciliation is presented as a process of an overarching, yet verifiable development. The novelties the New Cultural History, through the works of Foucault, have contributed to historiography and political thinking which has challenged formerly mainstream traditions of historiographic and political thinking. One could argue that they reached their synthesis in Agamben's theory of sovereignty. It is proposed here that analyzing these theories within this novel framework, defined by interactive dynamism, calls for the reconsideration of relations between various historiographic approaches, as well as the opening up of new paths for further interpretations of history of Western state sovereignty.

In terms of methods, this study of these trends and approaches will be limited to three thinkers, due to in part technical necessity. The three thinkers focused on are generally acknowledged as the major representatives of the developments to be investigated here¹. They are: Leopold von Ranke to represent the traditional school of historiography which focuses on diplomatic and political history; Michel Foucault to speak for New Cultural History; and, of course, Giorgio Agamben, whose theory is the principle focus

¹ For Ranke, see for example: Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics* (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 144. For Foucault, see for example: Patricia O'Brien, "Michel Foucault's History of Culture," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1989), 33.

of this study. There is yet another, perhaps more problematic, methodological point requiring clarification. The fact that Ranke, Foucault, and Agamben problematize European state sovereignty (broadly speaking) by utilizing different concepts and approaches makes it problematic to treat them as analytical equals difficult. That is, Ranke speaks strictly about the sovereignty of the state, whereas Foucault refers to the biopolitical character of modern Western politics, and when Agamben writes on the inherently biopolitical character of the sovereign, by which he means political power in general, and not the *raison d'État* of the modern Western nation–state in particular. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that these conceptual differences are precisely those that make it valuable to study the complex theoretical relations, which are assumed here to be multifarious and dynamic, between these three approaches. Hence, due to the conceptual differences that allow for this research, when their subject matter is referred to collectively, the term European state sovereignty will be used. This term is not an exact one, yet it is precisely for this reason that it presents itself as analytically appropriate and comprehensive expression to which each of the thinkers' key political concepts belong to.

The three thinkers' understanding of the concept of sovereignty is such that it is necessary to establish the borders of the research question, that is, to study the theory of history that their works on European state sovereignty implies. As Ranke did not articulate a theory of sovereignty, secondary sources are necessarily exploited to broadly reconstruct his views on this question. Consequently, we will refrain from drawing far-reaching conclusions from this reconstructed and rather putative position but will try to present his theory on history in general. Foucault, as is well-documented, was interested in sovereignty as only one possible power form, specific to certain historical ages, and not as a comprehensive analytical concept through which European history can be studied. Therefore, in his case, his theory of power forms is presented from which his historiographic approach follows. Finally, the discussion of Agamben's theory of sovereignty will be limited to its political context and relevance, as put forth in his book "Homo Sacer: The Sovereign Power and Bare Life", complemented by "Means without End: Notes on Politics." It is acknowledged here that while Agamben also conceptualizes sovereignty in other registers, e.g. theological,² or ethical,³ which are interrelated with his political theory of sovereignty and at the same time extend and complement it. Nevertheless, due to time and space restrictions the focus is solely restricted to the political horizon of his under-

² Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011).

³ Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999).

standing of the theoretical problem of sovereignty, and then on the theory of history that it implies.

The argument proceeds in three stages. First, a brief introduction into the traditional school is outlined by summarizing Ranke's understanding of sovereignty and history. Then, an outline of Foucault's theory of power forms and its implications for history is given. Finally, we will embark on Agamben's political theory of sovereignty, pinpointing the traces of both previous approaches but presenting the new theory as a radically new way of conceptualizing both Western political thought and Western history. We will conclude by offering a new framework for interpreting the above theories in a dynamic, interrelated, and correlative way.

Ranke's understanding of sovereignty and the ambiguous political history

Ranke's conceptualization of the European state exhibits apparent similarities with that of Hegel. James Alfred Aho, while tracing the origins of American sociology in the 19th-century German historical and social thinking, presents both Hegel and Ranke as two of the "most notable proponents of Realpolitik."⁴ Inspired by Machiavellianism to formulate their critique of Enlightenment liberalism, the theoreticians of Realpolitik contested that "the state in its essence (*Staatsräson*) is organized power over a territory, rather than an institution whose sole purpose is to protect individual rights and property."⁵

Consequently, "in Ranke's view, while the meaning of the state is sovereign independence, no state in historical fact has ever come into existence of its own accords, independently of other states."⁶ In other words, it is somewhat inevitable that a new state will arise in the milieu of war and violence (and not as a result of rational debate), generated by the tension between the legal right to statehood and the territorial claim of already existing states.⁷ This tension—and the international war resulting from it—, however, is portrayed as a productive force. "War is the father of all things... out of the clash of opposing forces in the great hours of danger—fall, liberation, salvation—the decisive new elements are born."⁸

⁴ James Alfred Aho, *German realpolitik and American sociology: an inquiry into the sources and political significance of the sociology of conflict* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1975), 30.

⁵ Aho, *German Realpolitik*, 29, 31.

⁶ Aho, *German Realpolitik*, 35.

⁷ Aho, *German Realpolitik*, 36.

⁸ Ranke, cited in Aho, *German Realpolitik*, 36.

Sovereignty is the pivot around which the political realm is organized into international and domestic spheres. Jens Bartelson, a researcher of international political theory argues that for Ranke, sovereignty is both an organizing principle of the international political system, established at the Peace of Westphalia, as well as an invariant, characteristic only to the modern state.⁹ Therefore, the state, born out of the violent clash of opposing forces of the international and the domestic spheres, seeks to establish and maintain its sovereignty. To preserve it, the state must stand on firm legal grounds. Bartelson points out that “to Ranke, the superiority of Europe consists in its ability to resist hegemony in all guises, this being so since ‘it is not always recognized that the European order of things differs from others that have appeared in the course of world history by virtue of its legal, even juridical nature.’”¹⁰

Briefly, Ranke regards the state as organized power over a territory. For him, it emerges as a sovereign entity from the productive tension, i.e. international war, that results from the inevitably antagonistic interests of the international and the domestic realms, that is, the territorial claim of existing states and the legal right to statehood. Therefore, law and territory constitute the foundations of its sovereignty, and, somewhat paradoxically, also the conditions for further international wars. Sovereignty is thus the key organizing principle for Ranke by which politics at the international as well as the national level becomes comprehensible, and which, at least for the state, determines historical dynamics. All this notwithstanding, no articulate theory of sovereignty can be traced in Ranke’s works.

How did Ranke relate to the study of history? For Ranke, history can be understood at two levels, which are nevertheless in antagonistic position to each other. The Rankean understanding of history, as it is synthesized by Leonard Krieger, a historian of modern Europe in general, and Germany in particular, is to be located at the intersection of the science of history as Ranke propounded, and the philosophy of history he subscribed to. To present the ambiguities in Ranke’s understanding of history by breaking down his “dubious legacy,” Krieger develops a complex analytical framework comprising of two opposing sets of principles. “The four Rankean principles which have constituted

⁹ Bartelson phrases it as follows: “That is, sovereignty not only organizes relations between states by drawing them together into a system of states; it gives the modern state a past proper to its present, and a present proper to its past, and this by drawing them together in a unity. With Ranke, the international is constituted as a genuinely historical mode of being, logically inseparable from the existence of states, but with its own organizing principles that are corollaries to internal sovereignty.” Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge – New York – Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 225–226.

¹⁰ Bartelson, *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, 231.

the canon of scientific history are the objectivity of historical truth, the priority of facts over concepts, the equivalent uniqueness of all historical events, and the centrality of politics.”¹¹ Later, Krieger adds that “Ranke announced four principles of philosophical or theological history which may be placed in explicit counterpoint to his four principles of scientific history.”¹² He goes on by pointing out that Ranke had a “profound conjoint belief in both particularity and generality as ultimate forms of truth, in both individuality and universality as ultimate forms of reality, in both freedom and necessity as ultimate conditions of action, and in both national and world history as ultimate frames of disciplined knowledge.”¹³

Probably the best-known contribution of Ranke to history as a science was his unwavering commitment to the objectivity of historical truth. As he put it in his famous book entitled *Histories of the Latin and Teutonic Peoples from 1494 to 1514*, “history has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of ages to come. The present study does not assume such a high office; it wants to show only what actually happened” (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*).¹⁴ Krieger argues that this commitment was countered by Ranke’s critical reflection on the crucial role that the historian assumes, in order to be able to work: “Ranke acknowledged the constructive role of the subject *qua* historian—not merely in the sense of inevitable private limitations, but in principle... The object to be uncovered was not ready-made in the past, lying there to be simply copied by the historian; the historian’s activity was necessary to its constitution as a historical object.”¹⁵

The canon of the primacy of facts over concepts resulted from Ranke’s conviction that meaningful knowledge in history can only be gained through particular facts, not from general concepts, as the former always conveys the latter. He argued that “true doctrine lies in the knowledge of the facts... An idea cannot be given in general; the thing itself must express it.”¹⁶ Elsewhere, he wrote that “from the particular you can perhaps ascend... to the general. But there is no way of leading from general theory to the perception of the particular.”¹⁷ Krieger indicates, however, that Ranke also regarded facts as means to greater knowledge, made available precisely by this greater knowledge: “Not only were historical facts for him instrumental to a kind of understanding that trans-

¹¹ Leonard Krieger, *Ranke: The Meaning of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 4.

¹² Krieger, *Ranke*, 10.

¹³ Krieger, *Ranke*, 14.

¹⁴ Cited Krieger, *Ranke*, 4.

¹⁵ Krieger, *Ranke*, 10.

¹⁶ Cited in Krieger, *Ranke*, 5.

¹⁷ Cited Krieger, *Ranke*, 5.

cended factuality, but this larger meaning was what the historian had in common with the otherness of the historical fact and what thus made the knowledge of the fact possible at all... For Ranke, then, what was beyond the fact was more valuable than the fact itself.”¹⁸

Ranke’s praise for individual and unique epochs in history was enshrined in his book *On the Epochs of Modern History*. Here, he states that “every epoch is directly under God, and its value depends not on what comes from it but in its existence itself, in its own self. Thereby the consideration of history, and indeed of the individual life in history, acquires a wholly distinctive stimulus, since each epoch must be seen as something valid for its own sake and as most worthy of consideration.”¹⁹ Contrary to this position, Krieger reminds us of Ranke’s belief in progress and universal history. “He always postulated the idea of a developmental totality which was axiologically superior to his individuals and made some of them more valuable than others in the light of it. Ranke’s commitment to universal history, literally fulfilled only toward the end of his long life, was paramount for him in principle from the very beginning of his career as an historian.”²⁰ Formulated somewhat differently, Krieger argues that Ranke was against synchronic “dominant ideas” as “something conceptual” which reduces men to “mere shadows or schemata incorporating the concept;” and against the diachronic “concept of progress,” which reduces the history of one generation to “a stage of the next.”²¹

The centrality of politics in history, also remarkably characteristic of Ranke, has remained probably the most unchallenged creed of all in traditional historiography. His primary unit in history is the state to which he attributes ontological priority. As Krieger argues, “states, he wrote, are ‘ideas of God.’ By this he meant to indicate both that as ‘spiritual substances’ states are themselves ‘individualities,’ each, like other historical agents, ‘a living thing... a unique self,’ and that states are a special kind of individual through which the collective historical destinies of men can be followed, since each state in its own way manifests ‘the idea that inspires and dominates the whole’ of human institutions, determines ‘the personalities of all citizens,’ and embodies the discoverable ‘laws of growth.’”²² Nevertheless, a glance at Ranke’s works—comprising 54 volumes of “Universal History”—may arise questions with regard to his philosophy of history. As for this latter, Krieger asserts that for him, “the state is a ‘modification’ of both the nation and humanity: it is man in his orientation toward ‘the common good.’ Nations, in this view, are the orga-

¹⁸ Krieger, *Ranke*, 12.

¹⁹ Krieger, *Ranke*, 6.

²⁰ Krieger, *Ranke*, 16.

²¹ Krieger, *Ranke*, 17.

²² Krieger, *Ranke*, 7.

nizations of humanity through which its universal history as a whole must be studied; states are the national organizations... through which the history of nations—and thus of humanity—in modern times must be studied. Nations and states [are] articulations of humanity.”²³

One could conclude that Ranke’s view of history is a peculiar ensemble of dualities. Krieger summarizes vigorously and succinctly that “his inconsistencies, therefore, stemmed from the contradictions within his theory itself, and these, in turn, stemmed from his deliberate neglect of its internal relations; his theoretical propositions were aligned not with one another but rather with the specific facets of actual history that instigated them, and what were differences in the degree of generality for actual history became categorical differences of kind in the derivative theory. Ranke was, in short, an *ad hoc* theorist and an integral practitioner of history; the internal connection between the different levels of history he worked with cannot be found in any logical coherence, which he did not even attempt, but in a temporal coherence, which he could not avoid.”²⁴

Foucault’s theory of changing power forms and the discontinuous European history

One could argue that Foucault did not develop a general theory of power.²⁵ Instead, he divided European history into three ages, analytically speaking, according to dominant pow-

²³ Krieger, *Ranke*, 19–20.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 22.

²⁵ “The analysis of these mechanisms of power that we began some years ago, and are continuing with now, is not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory. This analysis simply involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what effects, power is applied. If we accept that power is not a substance, fluid, or something that derives from a particular source, then this analysis could and would only be at most a beginning of a theory, not of a theory of what power is, but simply of power in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when they are unsuccessful, of securing power.” Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 16–17. Later, at the very beginning of his study titled “The subject and power,” he makes the same statement in relation to his own work of the preceding decades: “I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the past twenty years. It has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” Cited in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 208.

er forms.²⁶ He distinguished sovereign power, disciplinary power, and regulatory power or biopower. He showed that the theoretical foundations of these power forms was duly established in their respective ages.²⁷ According to Foucault, “the juridico–political theory of sovereignty—the theory we have to get away from if we want to analyse power—dates from the Middle Ages. It dates from the reactivation of Roman law, and is constituted around the problem of the monarch and the monarchy.”²⁸ The sovereign power “consisted in the power to take life,” was exercised primarily through ritual killings.²⁹ The sovereign power is founded by the social contract, therefore it addresses and is exercised over the “contracting individual and the social body.”³⁰

With the emergence of disciplinary power, we are drawing closer to what, for Foucault, is currently the appropriate site for analysing power relations. The disciplinary form of power prevailed over the sovereign form from the end of the 17th century to the end of the 18th century.³¹ Its main end is normalization: “disciplines will define not a code of law, but a code of normalisation, and they will necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon

²⁶ I will refrain from discussing Foucault’s concept of governmentality, not only because Agamben himself does not refer to it, but rather because, as scholar of philosophy Sven-Olov Wallenstein notes it in a book devoted to “Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality” that “biopolitics’ ... merges with the problem of ‘governmentality’ to the extent that Foucault, especially in the subsequent ‘The Birth of Biopolitics,’ almost seems to lose interest in the topic.” Sven-Olov Wallenstein, “Introduction: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality” in *Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality*, eds. Jakob Nilsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstein (Södertörn: Södertörn Philosophical Studies, 2013), 12. Indeed, Foucault himself argues at the first seminar of the course titled “The Birth of Biopolitics” that “the analysis of biopolitics can only get under way when we have understood the general regime of this governmental reason I have talked about, this general regime that we can call the question of truth, of economic: truth in the first place, within governmental reason... So, forgive me, for some weeks – I cannot say in advance how many – I will talk about liberalism.” Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 21–22. This promise was duly kept up to the very end of the course; Foucault acknowledges in the course summary that “this year’s course ended up being devoted entirely to what should have been only its introduction. The theme was to have been ‘biopolitics.’” Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 317.

²⁷ Foucault reconstructs the basic tenets of each three from the then contemporary literature on the foundations of political power. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 111–145.

²⁸ Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”: *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 34. He ascribes the development of the “know-how” of the “art of being Prince” to Machiavelli. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 131.

²⁹ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 247.

³⁰ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”. He also argues that “sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory.” Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 25.

³¹ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 250.

that is not the edifice of law, but the field of the human sciences.”³² Through surveillance and control as means for normalization, it addresses not the subject, nor the social body, but the individual body.³³

With the rise of the regulatory power or biopower, life has entered the conceptual horizon of politics, and this entry, i.e., the inclusion of life into politics, is what defines our days in terms of power. Biopower has emerged at the end of the 18th century, because of the birth of capitalism. Therefore, it aims primarily at maximizing the productive potential in the population, in order to maintain political hegemony.³⁴ As economic production is surmised upon healthy society, biopower is articulated through the state-level care for life: the state observes the biological processes of masses, “a set of processes, such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on.”³⁵ Consequently, it addresses “the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem, and as power’s problem.”³⁶ These changes in the focus of power result in the emergence of new scientific disciplines: demography, statistics, and social medicine, by which the state could rationally control and manage the natural processes of the population.³⁷

To sum up Foucault’s theory of power, the above scheme outlines a gradual increase in the complexity of power. The power forms did not follow each other in chronological order, the older disappearing with the emergence of the more recent, but instead have layered upon each other, resulting in the coexistence of the various forms.³⁸ Although not dominant, disciplinary mechanisms are still at operation today, and yet there is ample room for the sovereign power to return, or, as Foucault famously put it, “we still have not cut off the head of the king.”³⁹ Nevertheless, political power shifted its focus from juridico–political subjects and society, in order to devote almost sole attention to life, around the end of the 18th century. The modes of its articulation have been tempered from exemplary ritual killings, through surveillance to explicitly provident ways of taking care for

³² Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 38.

³³ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 250.

³⁴ As Ádám Takács, a Foucault-scholar notes, “for Foucault, the rise of biopolitics and biopower appears as distinctive mark of the birth of late modernity – or that of capitalism, if you like.” Ádám Takács, “Biopolitika és nemzeti állapot: egy foucault-i problematika rekonstrukciója,” in *Kötőerők*, ed. András Cieger (Budapest: Atelier, 2009), 19.

³⁵ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 247.

³⁶ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 245.

³⁷ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 145–146.

³⁸ Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 25.

³⁹ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. An Introduction*, trans. David Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 88–89.

the biological well-being of the population. The European state today, for Foucault, is not so much concerned about its legitimacy anymore, as it is about expectable profits resulting from the productive forces of the human resource.⁴⁰

	sovereign power	disciplinary power	regulatory power/biopower
<i>time period</i>	from the Middle Ages	from the end of the 17 th century	from the end of the 18 th century
<i>problematique</i>	legitimate rule of the monarch	normalising the individual body	maximising the productive potential in the population
<i>articulation</i>	ritual killing	surveillance, discipline	care for life
<i>focus</i>	the individual and the society (territory)	individual body	population

Table 1. Power forms of the Western state, according to Foucault

For Foucault, the history of European state sovereignty consists first of all in ruptures and dissimilarities, as Table 1. seeks to demonstrate. The most important rupture for this paper, what Foucault calls the “threshold of modernity,”⁴¹ is to be located around the end of the 18th century, when life enters the sphere of politics and immediately becomes the center of political strategies. This shift results in the reconceptualization of power that Foucault terms biopower.

With regard to historiography, Foucault makes it explicit in the “Introduction of Archaeology of Knowledge” that his interest in the discontinuities and ruptures in history clearly separates him from the traditional form of historiography and philosophy of history. His approach shares several patterns with the what he calls new history (*nouvelle histoire*): its aim to construct series in history (as opposed to “great ages,” “great units,” or

⁴⁰ Of course, Foucault is not naïve to assume that by today, violence would have withdrawn from the realm of politics. Quite the contrary, he argues that biopower, precisely because of considering life as the only value, is in position to expose war (and killing in general) as the legitimate means to defend ourselves, i.e. life, the only value, through the discourse of racism (Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 258). Nevertheless, he himself devotes incomparably more attention to the economic rationality of the government, unfolding this theory under the term “governmentality,” than to state-level racism implemented by explicitly violent measures. This is precisely the feature of Foucault’s theory that is later identified as a blind spot by Agamben, and thus addressed and developed into a novel theory of European state sovereignty.

⁴¹ Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*”, 143.

“civilizations”), its application of discontinuity both as instrument and object of research, and its dismissal of the possibility of writing a total history, aiming instead to write a general one.⁴²

At the same time, Foucault and the scholars of new history challenge not only the postulates of the internal dynamic and development in history, but also that of “the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism,” also characteristic to the traditional form of history.⁴³ Also, human agency and socio-economic structures are no longer in the focus of historical research. As Raymond Caldwell, researcher of agency in organizational theory puts it, “Foucault’s ideas have led to a rejection of agency–structure dichotomies and a move towards process-based ontologies of ‘organizing/changing’ that create new problematics of agency as discourse.”⁴⁴

It is through the analysis of power relations and of discourses that one may gain knowledge about the social world and the subject. “Power is everywhere... Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter. Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”⁴⁵ That is, the social subject participates in power relations in various social contexts by both resisting power and at the same time imposing it, being interim dominated and dominant.

But how is it possible that the subject is simultaneously placed in these seemingly antagonistic forms of power relations? For Foucault, it is allowed for by discursive practices that form the subject by decentering it.⁴⁶ The subject is thus not a pre-given, stable

⁴² Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 7–11. Here, Foucault exposes the projects of total and general history as remarkably distinct from one another: „the project of a total history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle – material or spiritual – of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion – what is called metaphorically the ‘face’ of a period... The problem that now presents itself – and which defines the task of a general history – is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming; what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between them; what may be the effect of shifts, different temporalities, and various rehandlings; in what distinct totalities certain elements may figure simultaneously; in short, not only what series, but also what ‘series of series’ – or, in other words, what ‘tables’ it is possible to draw up.”

⁴³ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12–13.

⁴⁴ Raymond Caldwell, “Agency and change: Re-evaluating Foucault’s legacy,” *Organization* 14, no. 6 (2007): 769.

⁴⁵ Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 93–95.

⁴⁶ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 31–32.

and constant element marching through history, but is discursively formed in relation to various fields that do not necessarily converge towards an integrate hidden locus, nor they are historically persistent. The subject is discursively decentred and thus is uncertain. As Foucault's *œuvre* demonstrate, there are multiple fields of discourse: penal institutions, prison, school, psychiatry, sexuality, society, population, security, medicine, self, body, insanity, abnormality—but a few of the sites of discourse. Regarding historical research, this implies that a study may be conducted on the phenomena of everyday life (school, body, sexuality, mental hygiene, for instance) and yet be able to contribute to scientific knowledge with something relevant to say about power relations.

To sum up, the history of European state sovereignty as Foucault frames it is built upon discerned discontinuities and differences, and it has changed fundamentally at the end of the 18th century, as a result of life's entrance into its conceptual horizon. It is indeterminate, its subject is decentred, and considers both human agent and structure secondary from a historiographical point of view. For the major drivers or producers of history for Foucault are power relations and discourse. As a result, history, as he sees it, can be studied using various resources, focusing on various subject matters of everyday life. Nonetheless, the study of history does not conclude in complete narrative for Western politics or Western man but will provide a general framework for understanding and interpreting them.

Agamben's biopolitical sovereign and an intertwined notion of time

Agamben's political theory presupposes the equal importance of the juridico-political concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state and the concept of the biopolitical care for the individual body and the body politic. To reconstruct the very structure of sovereignty, as it is conceptualized in the nation-state, he applies philology, cultural anthropology, legal and political theory amongst other scientific disciplines.

In order to understand the horrific history of 20th century Europe in conceptual terms, when nation-states turned from democracies into predators trying to annihilate their own citizens, and then back to democracies again as welfare states, Agamben returns to Aristotle and the ancient Greek language.⁴⁷ He shows that the Greeks had two words to express what we understand by "life:" *zōē* to denote mere biological existence, shared by all living beings; and *bios* to indicate politically qualified life, the proper way of living for an

⁴⁷ Although Agamben is, among others, a political philosopher, here I am going to present not his philosophy on what politics *should be*, but only his theory on what it apparently *is*.

individual or a group.⁴⁸ He argues that this distinction is reflected in Aristotle's definition of man, the political animal (*ζῷον πολιτικόν*), or, as Foucault famously formulated, a "living animal with the additional capacity for political existence."⁴⁹

Agamben's argument is based on the fact that in conceptual terms, with Aristotle, the relation between life and politics is that of inclusive exclusion. Politics, understood as an "additional capacity" referred to above, is defined by the exclusion of life. Nonetheless, it does not cease to maintain relation with life, as it cannot be made sense of without it. That is, to define politics, we need the concept of life. Therefore, in terms of conceptual history, life from the outset has been the constitutive concept of politics.⁵⁰

This argument on the inclusively exclusive relation between life and politics constitutes the core of Agamben's political theory. He shows that the issues of the *polis* (what does good life consist in? what is the purpose of this community? how to reach the immortal fame?) concern certain problems *beyond* the problematique of the biological existence of man (how to harvest more crops? whom should I marry my daughter to? how to be cured of illness?), which is confined to the household, the *oikos*. Nevertheless, the possibility of the former is always premised upon the wise management of the latter (in technical terms, as Arendt contested),⁵¹ but also upon the separate existence of the latter (in conceptual terms, as Agamben argues).

Therefore, when he writes that "the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of the sovereign power," he means that to maintain and distinguish the *oikos* and *zōe* from the *polis* and *bios* is the most important task of the sovereign, for otherwise it would conceptually, and hence technically, cease to exist.⁵² To further support this conceptual argument, Agamben turns to cultural anthropology for empirics. He brings legal examples from Antiquity through the Middle Ages, and on up to pre-Modern Europe to cases when a community deprived its own member from his political existence, thus relegating him from *bios* to *zōe*, expelling him from *polis* to *oikos*.⁵³ Agamben exposes these examples as evidence that the production of the biopolitical body has always been a systemic phenomenon (and not merely a set of contingent cases), and served to re-enforce the sovereignty of the community by re-drawing its boundaries, by re-articulating the definition of politics through the inclusive exclusion of life.

⁴⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.

⁴⁹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 7.

⁵⁰ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 7.

⁵¹ Arendt, *Promise of Politics*, 121.

⁵² Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 6.

⁵³ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 71–115.

Nevertheless, the conceptual (and hence technical) indistinguishability of *oikos* and *polis*, *zoe* and *bios* was precisely what was aimed at from the end of the 18th century onwards. As Agamben reads the history of European state sovereignty, “the categories whose opposition founded modern politics (right/left, private/public, absolutism/democracy, etc.)” entered into the zone of indistinction, from the decisive moment when political power appeared as committed to integrate *zoe* into the *polis*, i.e. to concern biological problems as political problems, to turn every human being into a citizen at the moment of their birth (targeting the individual body with means of control and surveillance, and thus creating the body politic), etc. This decisive moment is the emergence of the nation–state, around the time of the publication of the *Des Droits de l’Homme et le Citoyen*, during the French Revolution.⁵⁴ To formulate this commitment as a logical statement, one could say that the nation–state has been authorized to perform the following syllogism: it is the citizen who is the sovereign; but every man is a citizen; therefore, every man is sovereign.

Although the head of the king had been cut off by then, and sovereignty was shared among the collective of citizens, sovereign power has proven remained, both in conceptual and in technical terms. Despite the steps that were taken to reduce omnipotent sovereign power by means of the law (through the constitutional establishment of the rule of law), sovereign power itself could not be weakened. The reason for this is that there are exceptional cases for every community when, for the sake of its survival, the rule of law must be suspended and direct sovereign rule be applied. And since it is the sovereign who decides on the state of exception, as Agamben argues in line with Carl Schmitt, at the end of the day “the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order.”⁵⁵

This means that on every site which is normally regulated by law – which, since the rise of what Foucault calls biopower, have belonged first and foremost to life – under the state of exception, the sovereign is free to exercise power which in legal terms is limitless. Normally, under the rule of law, it is the legal order that is exclusively entitled to rule within the nation–state, and the sovereign power is suspended. But, as the sovereign is authorised to decide on the state of exception (that is, the suspension of law), it may at any point in time return to “produce a biopolitical body,” that is, bodies over which sovereign power is not mediated by law.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *Means without End: Notes on Politics*, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000), 19–20.

⁵⁵ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 15.

⁵⁶ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 15–29.

For Agamben, the sovereign is who decides on the relation of law and life, that is, who decides which regularities or areas of life it wishes to bring under legal control.⁵⁷ To give just a few examples, these areas cover euthanasia, abortion, eugenics, definition and care of incurable patients, but even the official, medical definition of death—and consequently, life itself.⁵⁸ Once brought under legal control, the application of law on these areas can be suspended at any time, and direct sovereign power can be exercised upon it, without the need to justify it in any terms. Thus, the sovereign of the nation–state does not aim to carry out economic calculations to maximize the potential in the population, as it would with Foucault, but instead to take care of the individual body *and* to safeguard the survival of the body politic—by any means, be that, paradoxically, the individual body itself.

As the founding principles of the nation–state, “the trinity of the state–nation–territory” were exposed as invalid after the First World War (as a result of the Peace of Versailles which testified to the fact that the actual sovereign is not man, as part of a nation, but the strongest, the victor),⁵⁹ the nation–state has sought to consolidate its sovereignty by any means, which was, as argued above, the continuous interruption of the legal order, and thus the production of biopolitical bodies.⁶⁰ 20th-century Europe bore witness to the fact that this means was often exploited; most remarkably when, having risen to power through democratic elections, the Nazi government in 1933 suspended the application of the law for some 12 years,⁶¹ constructed the legal categories of first- and second-class citizen, and established the concentration camp.⁶²

For Agamben, the paradox of the nation–state can be explained only at this conceptual level. The nation–state is only considered legitimate insofar it is committed to the pursuance of the syllogism according to which every man is citizen and is thus sovereign. The nation–state has been equipped with all the necessary means to carry out this task, the history of which is written by Foucault: administration, state medicine, disciplines of statistics, demography etc. At the same time, the sovereign power is free to suspend the

⁵⁷ With regard to the definition of the sovereign, what Agamben does is the logical completion of the Schmittian definition (the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception by suspending the law). Agamben points to the fact that law can be suspended only if it has formerly been introduced. So, the logical order is the introduction of law first, and its suspension only later. Therefore the *differentia specifica* of the sovereign for Agamben is the decision on the relation of law and life, i.e. that it decides on which regularities of life it wishes to apply law to, which then later may be suspended.

⁵⁸ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 137, 162.

⁵⁹ Agamben, *Means without End*, 21.

⁶⁰ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 12.

⁶¹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 168.

⁶² Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 149.

application of law at any time it pleases, and if it does so—Agamben asserts that it certainly does, as it is the only site for the application of its power—it produces biopolitical bodies (which in this case means that it produces men that are citizens of no state, i.e., men who are not sovereigns). It is only by looking at this paradox from this historical and conceptual position that we can understand why and how democracies caring for the lives of their citizens were able to become totalitarian regimes annihilating their own citizens, and then turn back into democracies again.

What does this theory of sovereignty imply for historical studies or historiography? If at all, what kind of theory of history can be extracted from it? It appears that for Agamben, time does not induce qualitative change on its subject matter, as if only quantitative changes occurred throughout history, with all the creative work being done already. As he argues in his early essays, “our culture should conceive from its very origins a split between two different, correlated and opposed notions of time,” that history is to be found at the intersection of cyclical time and linear time.⁶³ Cyclical time is “measured by the movements of the stars, motionless, synchronic temporality,”⁶⁴ with fixed structures in which no proper actions are performed. Linear time, on the other hand, is cumulative, diachronic temporality with fluid structures and events taking place, one after the other. As Agamben summarises, “the Western experience of time is split between eternity and continuous linear time.”⁶⁵

From the point of view of the cyclical experience, it seems that Western history is nothing but the total and fatally determinate narrative of the continuous unfolding and realization of the Aristotelian definition of man. This definition (man as “political animal,” or as rephrased by Foucault, “animal with the additional capacity for political existence”) points straight to the fact that what is political in man is necessarily metaphysical and thus has no empirical existence, which makes its precise analytical understanding highly problematic.

This problem, at least in Agamben’s argument, has not been overcome in the past two millennia. This is not the result of the incapacity of political thinkers after Aristotle to reflect on the meaning of politics but demonstrates rather the adequacy of the Aristotelian definition. Exposing Western political thinking in this light would amount to the recognition of the Aristotelian definition as the “best we can ever have,” the “furthest we can ever go.” Nevertheless, what his definition performs, as we tried to demonstrate above, is

⁶³ Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience* trans. Liz Heron (London – New York: Verso 1993), 73–74.

⁶⁴ Agamben, *Infancy and History*, 73.

⁶⁵ Agamben, *Infancy and History*, 104.

rather the critical delimitation of the problem of politics than the precise denomination of what exactly it is. Therefore, what has been left to be done is the theorization of this critical delimitation, that is, the relation of politics to life.

This is precisely the point where the linear experience of time enters play, that is, where intervention in the cyclical motion becomes possible. For there is at least one shift that this theory appears to identify. Agamben does not state, as Foucault does, that life entered the conceptual horizon of politics only at the end of the 18th century, as for Agamben, life has been present there from the very outset by definition. Nevertheless, the mission that modernity assumed (i.e., integration of *zoe* into the polis, i.e. the performance of the syllogism of man/citizen/sovereign) had not been formulated beforehand. Therefore, the juridico-political conception of the sovereignty of the nation-state—central for traditional historiography—which first appeared as the carrier of this mission, is certainly worthy to be further studied.

So, for Agamben, there is an exit from the gloomy and totalizing narrative of European state sovereignty. The exit way, which sometimes appears only as a theoretical possibility perhaps, presents itself as a rupture of the cyclical order, a breaking point, a window of opportunity for intervention. This intervention must address the conceptual relation of politics to life, to establish what he calls “form-of-life” or “happy life.” By form-of-life, Agamben denotes a way of overcoming the distinction between bare biological existence and political life, between *zoe* and *bios*, “in which it is never possible to isolate something like a naked life.”⁶⁶ Form-of-life is “a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold,”⁶⁷ which thus implies an “irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty.”⁶⁸ That is, what a potential intervention has to address is the abandonment, or at least the fundamental reconceptualization, of the concept of sovereignty.

⁶⁶ Agamben, *Means without End*, 8.

⁶⁷ Agamben, *Means without End*, 114.

⁶⁸ Agamben, *Means without End*, 7.

	Ranke	Foucault	Agamben
<i>stable element in the history of European state sovereignty</i>	state	discourse and power relations	the conceptual–linguistic threshold separating and connecting politics and life
<i>driver in the history of European state sovereignty</i>	productive tension (often war and violence) between opposing international and domestic forces	discourse and power	the conceptual–linguistic barrier (yet, we are within the Aristotelian conceptual horizon)
<i>foundation of the sovereignty/ legitimacy of European state</i>	law and territory	life	law, life and territory
<i>focus of historic study of European state</i>	sovereignty	population	the sovereign and the biopolitical body
<i>lineage of history</i>	meaningful, developing, but neither synchronic nor diachronic	unknown, consists in ruptures, indeterminate with no stable focal point	emanates from the split between cyclical, synchronic and linear, diachronic time

Table 2. Comparison of the implications for historiography of Ranke, Foucault and Agamben’s political theory of sovereignty

As Table 2 above tries to show, Agamben’s political theory of sovereignty and theory of history refer both to traditional historiography founded by Ranke and to the new history established by Foucault. He regards the state as a significant historical executive of the logic of sovereignty, which is based on the conceptual barrier separating and connecting politics and life. But the state is by no means the only executive, as the same logic conceptually appears in various historical and linguistic contexts, from the distinction of *bios* from *zoe*, the citizen from the man, the first-class citizen from the second-class citizen, to name only a few. Therefore, one can conclude that from the point of European state sovereignty, the conceptual–linguistic threshold comprising the unequal conceptual pair

of life (undefinable but empirically existent) and politics (undefinable and empirically non-existent) is determinant in historical terms. Also, it is this threshold that should be abandoned or reconceptualised by addressing a form-of-life.

The foundations of sovereignty are both law and territory, which are the tenets of the Rankean state, and biological life as well, fundamental for Foucault as legitimacy of the biopower—this is what for Agamben “the trinity of the nation–state–territory” means. Consequently, while it is sovereignty for Ranke and population for Foucault that is the ultimate *raison d’État*, Agamben argues that both are fundamental for the European state, as they mutually refer to and posit each other. Regarding the lineage of the history of European state sovereignty, Ranke holds the peculiar duality of rejecting both synchronic and diachronic temporality, and at the same time assumes history to be the meaningful and developing narrative of individual ages. For Foucault, this history cannot be known *a priori*, can be studied from various angles, and exhibits several discontinuities. For Agamben, history emanates from the split between cyclical and linear time, results from the opposing but correlated experience of synchronic and diachronic temporality. With regard to European state sovereignty, historical time has not yet exceeded the Aristotelian conceptual horizon of the threshold of life and politics, but apparently allows for such an exit.

Concluding remarks

Agamben’s political theory of sovereignty seems to be radical, as it is able to apply the concepts and approaches of both traditional historiography (universal history, sovereignty, state, juridico-political order, territory) and that of New Cultural History (discursively formed subject, life, biopolitics, individual body, body politic), but combines them in a qualitatively new way, which produces a theory of sovereignty and of history that is unlike either of its forerunners. Our aim was not so ambitious as to draw far-reaching conclusions concerning historiography in general. Instead, we were trying to provide a new analytical framework for understanding, on the one hand, Agamben’s political theory of sovereignty, building on both the traditional and the new conceptualizations of European state sovereignty and power, and on the other hand, his theory of history, relying on mainstream as well as postmodern historiography. What is yet to be done, at least if we take Agamben’s insights seriously, is the theorization of the threshold of politics and life, which in other words is the identification of points of intervention in the cyclical motion of the Western experience of time.

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ÁGNES BODNÁR

**The Road to Subjectivation: Women Captives at
the American Frontier**

Pro&Contra

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I.

Indian captivity narratives report on the ordeals of white settlers seized by Native Americans in response to Anglo encroachment threatening indigenous life and culture. The victims were commonly women, and older children, while men's captivity often ended in death. The forcible removal of women from the private sphere of WASP society characterized by "sexual inequality, unremunerated work, and seething discontent"¹ not only resulted in the crossing of literal frontiers, but also implied the trespassing of cultural and ethno-racial barriers. The captivity experience frequently coincided with personal trauma and a loss of identity. The concept of subjectivation, or, the achievement of subject status in relation to contemporary power, along with the respective gaps and its two subtypes, performativity and performance offer a research apparatus in which investigate how women captives reconstructed their lost selves.

The purpose of this paper is to retrace the main stages of the subjectivation process of Indian captives at the North American frontier. This will be realized via the examination of three texts considered mainstays of the captivity narrative genre. A framework utilizing the ideas of Michel Foucault, Enikő Bollobás, Émile Bienveniste, Louis Althusser, and Judith Butler is employed to explore selected examples of confinement reports in an attempt to retrace the major milestones in the respective identity rebuilding effort and subjectivation process. Furthermore, I will investigate how the protagonists either defied or confirmed mainstream stereotypes in responding to the gaps revealed in the power structure of the Native American captors. The inquiry focuses on the narratives of Mary Rowlandson (*The Sovereignty and Goodness of God* (1682)), Hannah Dustan (*A Narrative of Hannah Dustan's Notable Delivery from Captivity in Mather's Decennium Luctuosum*, 1699), and Rachel Plummer, "A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer" (1838). First, I briefly describe the main features of the given genre, provide the historical context of the texts, I then introduce the relevant theoretical background, before undertaking the respective analysis.

¹ Joan B. Landes, "Introduction," in *Feminism, The Public and the Private*. ed. Joan B. Landes (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1.

II.

The genre of the Indian captivity narrative commemorates the experiences of women forcibly taken from their frontier home. This form of narrative spans three centuries starting in 1682 with the publication of the Rowlandson Narrative and culminating in the first half of the nineteenth century.

These accounts are among the first representatives of autobiographical writing at the frontier and played a very important role in American literary history and as such they provide an excellent ground for my inquiry. As John Barbour highlighted, the two principal forms of American autobiography are the captivity narrative and the slave narrative.² While the research focus here is on the female-authored autobiography, a variety of life writing texts have been produced. The American version of the genre includes narratives of explorers, spiritual narratives of the colonial period, the Indian captivity narrative, the Barbary Coast narrative, the slave narrative, and multicultural and ethnic narratives.

According to Roy Harvey Pearce, the captivity narratives served three purposes: they functioned as justifications for the Westward Expansion and further encroachment on Indian land, offered the means of anti-Indian and in some cases anti-French propaganda, and defended the Puritan faith.³

Consequently, the texts emphasize religious aspects as they functioned as a form of conversion narrative while promoting the Puritan ideology: the white settlers despite their being targeted maintained their faith in God thereby asserting their moral superiority over Native Americans. The religious experience and personal testimonial of faith was the first form of American expression. They all supported the basic idea of John Winthrop's famous concept of the "city upon a hill" expressed in his "A Model of Christian Charity" (1630). This trope not only laid the foundations of American exceptionalism, the idea that Americans are a separate breed to whom the laws of history do not apply, but placed a tremendous burden on the colonists, or later Americans. Namely, being a member of an exemplary community, they had to behave as such, and any shortcomings in this regard caused major personal crises as attested in the journals of John Winthrop or Jonathan Edwards. Mary Rowlandson is the author of one of the best-known captivity narratives: *The Sovereignty and Goodness of GOD, together with the Faithfulness of his Promises displayed: being a Narrative of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson*

² Susan Juster et al, "Forum: Religion and Autobiographical Writing," *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation*, 9, no. 1, (1999):1.

³ Roy Harvey Pearce, "The Significances of the Captivity Narrative," *American Literature*, 19, no.1 (1947): 9.

(1682). It commemorates eleven weeks of confinement among the Wampanoag Indians. Mrs. Rowlandson, the wife of a Puritan minister, Joseph Rowlandson was captured after her settlement, Lancaster was attacked during King Philip's War in February 1675. King Philip, or Metacomet, had united three Indian tribes into a confederation and waged a war against the settlers to respond to the encroachment on native land and the undermining of indigenous culture. The narrative displays the three structural elements identified by Richard VanDerBeets: separation, transformation, and return. While Mrs. Rowlandson initially refuses any communication or interaction with the Indians, her response changes as a consequence of her captors helping to bury her daughter Sarah, her becoming accustomed to Native food, and through her performing productive labor; as a result of these events she gradually rebuilds her broken self and displays a partial identification with her captors.

Hannah Dustan is captured after the attack on Haverhill Massachusetts by Abenaki Indians on March 15, 1697, during King William's War (1688-1697). Being bedridden, she was nursing her eighth child with only the assistance of a nurse, named Mary Neff. Although her husband rushed home to save the family, on seeing Hannah's condition he rescued the other seven children. Hannah and her infant, along with Mary, and twenty more settlers were taken by the Indians. After the Abenaki murdered Hannah's child, she took brutal revenge as Dustan, Neff, and a young captive ambushed their sleeping guards killing them, subsequently taking their scalps. Upon their return the governor of Massachusetts awarded fifty dollars for the ten scalps.

Rachel Plummer became the captive of Indians after the Comanche attacked her settlement Parker's Fort on the Texas frontier in May 1836. While her narrative contains similar elements to that of Mrs. Rowlandson's in so far as she is taken with her child, loses her infant to Indian brutality, and eventually gains her freedom, unlike Mrs. Rowlandson she never gives up her ethnocentric WASP point of view and her report is dominated by the permanent rejection and hatred of her captors.

The main concern of any autobiography or autobiographer is the subject himself or herself, in other words, the subjectivation process. The individual becomes a subject during the process of encountering power. According to the post-structuralist view the subject is not a defined, stable concept, but a fluid, shapeable entity in the state of continuous inscription.⁴

⁴ Nóra Séllei, *Tüköröm, tükröm... Író nők önéletrajzai a 20. század elejétől* (Debrecen: Orbis Litterarum, 2001), 10.

Furthermore, Bollobás asserts that the subject is “a discursive construct [...] a catachresis,” in other words “a metaphor without a referent,”⁵ and Benveniste, a structural linguist holds that “language provides the very definition of man,”⁶ and considers language as a catalyst toward achieving subject status.

Bollobás also argues that the subjectivation process can be either performance or performative. As she posits, subjects are created in the acts of speaking and doing, thus via performative acts with ontological force. Performativity refers to the construction of new subjectivities via acting against the prevailing social scripts and expectations, while performance implies “mimetic replaying of norms and replaying of ruling ideologies when constructing the subject”.⁷

Along with autobiographical literature emerges the question of power, that is, how the subject is constituted in relation to the contemporary power. Subjectivation has a dual connotation referring to an individual or person becoming a subject to a given power on the one hand, and progressing from an object status to that of a conscious agent, an entity with the capability of shaping his or her fate on the other.

Foucault identifies two forms of the construction of subjectivity. Accordingly, he distinguishes between subjection producing the passive subject implying subordination or submission to the given regime of power and subjectivation resulting in the active subject via a “process by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, [...] which is obviously only one of the given possibilities for organizing self-consciousness.”⁸ He also recognizes gaps along the heterogeneous surface of power as the motivators of subject formation while testifying to the feasibility of the latter via confession in relation to the pastoral power. Consequently, the captivity narrative can be considered as a type of confession for perceived or assumed sins, or for negligent fulfilment of religious duties. At the same time resonating with Foucault’s subjection theory, Althusser’s idea of interpellation: a process during which “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects”⁹ implies the presence of the passive subject.

⁵ Enikő Bollobás, *They Aren't, Until I Call Them* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 84.

⁶ Émile Benveniste, “Subjectivity in Language.” in *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971), 224.

⁷ Bollobás, *They Aren't, Until I Call Them*, 21.

⁸ Mark G. E. Kelly, *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault*. (New York: Routledge, 2009) <https://books.google.hu/books?id=FNyPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT126&lpg=PT126&dq=assujettissement+Foucault+english&source=bl&ots=wgONUjZZzh&sig=1flmgJ2mKrOs6eCHsMZpfGdpbU&hl=hu&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjMi-2PpK3ZAhVBuhQKHWHiA34Q6AEITDAD#v=onepage&q=assujettissement%20Foucault%20english&f=false>

⁹ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (Monthly Review Press, 1971), 115.

In the case of captivity stories another issue is raised, the reliability of the narrator, or in Butler's words, the ability to give an account of oneself. One way to give an account of oneself is through a narrative of a life, or autobiography. Butler challenges the possibilities of self-narration and the constitution of the self. She casts doubts on the ability to answer questions about oneself. The main question the author poses: "Does the subject who is not self-grounding, that is whose conditions of emergence can never fully be accounted for, undermine the possibility of giving an account of oneself?"¹⁰ In other words, can we assume responsibility and give an account of ourselves if we are oblivious to where we came from, of who we are? Butler suggests that there is no possibility of a complete account.

The narratives of Mary Rowlandson, Rachel Plummer, and Hannah Dustan provide excellent illustrations of the various forms of subject formation. Foucault's dual model of subjectivation, namely becoming a subordinated subject and one with agency can be matched with Bollobás' concept of performance and performativity respectively. Accordingly, the texts under analysis here show both variations.

Women captives often started their ordeal showing a performance, that is, acting according to current social requirements (scripts) describing the captivity experience from the point of view of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant society while upholding the given stereotypical descriptions of Native Americans.

Rowlandson's description of Native Americans in a negative way calling them "wolves," "ravenous Beasts,"¹¹ "wild beast of the forest," or "barbarous Enemy"¹² in the beginning of her account later changed into a more understanding attitude as she depicted them with less derogatory more lenient adjectival phrases such as "roaring Lyons" or "Salvage Bears."¹³

Rowlandson confesses that the reason for finding herself in captivity is that she was not pious enough in her everyday life. She deserved her punishment for disappointing God with her misbehavior. Still she receives God's grace demonstrating the immense mercy of the Lord:

I then remembered how careless I had been of Gods holy time; how many Sabbaths I had lost and mispent, and how evily I had walked in Gods sight; which lay so close unto my spirit, that it was easie for me to see how righteous it was with God to cut off

¹⁰ Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 19.

¹¹ Mary Rowlandson, "The Sovereignty and Goodness of God," in *Held Captive by Indians. Selected Narratives. 1642-1836*, ed. Richard VanDerBeets (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 45.

¹² Rowlandson, "The Sovereignty and Goodness of God," 46.

¹³ Rowlandson, "The Sovereignty and Goodness of God," 84.

the thread of my life, and cast me out of his presence for ever. Yet the Lord still shewed mercy to me, and upheld me; and as he wounded me with one hand, so he healed me with the other.¹⁴

Capture is considered as submission, the captive is put under Indian control. Rowlandson described her abduction: “like a company of Sheep torn by Wolves.”¹⁵

The basic motifs of the narratives are the journey from sinner to saint, encountering God and the devil sometimes physically, such as with pain in the body, like in case of Rachel Plummer who is often tied up tight, whipped, and beaten with clubs: “my flesh was never well from bruises and wounds during my captivity.”¹⁶ Another motif is the transformation of the self, which as Calvinism holds was originally burdened with sin and that a traumatic event such as captivity among heathens led to conversion, or a wholesale acceptance of the doctrines of Puritanism.

Autobiography is not only a documentation of the author’s religion in life but it is a religious act, according to Barbour. Thus it functions as an attempt to perceive the important role of God in one’s life and from this perspective to reorient the values of the author, the readers, the religious traditions, and American culture in general.¹⁷ The conclusion that Rowlandson draws from her experience is simply explained in this quote: “we must rely on God Himself, and our whole dependence must be upon Him.”¹⁸

Rowlandson also encounters the regime of power when she asks for a day of rest due to the Sabbath: “I told them it was the Sabbath day, and desired them to let me rest, and I told them I would do as much more to-morrow; to which they answered me, they would break my face.”¹⁹

The same idea appears in her lament of being abandoned in her faith: “The Indians were as thick as the trees: it seemed as if there had been a thousand Hatchets going at once: if one looked before one, there was nothing but Indians, and behind one, nothing but Indians, and so on other hand, I myself in the midst, and no Christian soul near me.”²⁰ At the same time Rowlandson, describing herself as the lone Christian among the heathen

¹⁴ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 48.

¹⁵ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 45.

¹⁶ Rachel Plummer, “A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself.” in *Held Captive by Indians. Selected Narratives. 1642-1836*, ed. Richard VanDerBeets (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 337.

¹⁷ Hisayo Ogushi, “A Legacy of Female Imagination. Lydia Maria Child and the Tradition of Indian Captivity Narrative.” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 15, (2004): 13.

¹⁸ Rowlandson “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 90.

¹⁹ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 54.

²⁰ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 55.

subjectivates herself to a transcendent power as according to Althusser in order for one to identify as a Christian one must already be a subject.

Althusser argues that the subject is created through interpellation or the hailing process, during which, the state either relying on a repressive apparatus or an ideological one addresses the individual. He considers interpellation a procedure during which ideology constructs the individual as a subject. Althusser's Marxist terminology, (class struggle, hegemony, exploitation) and the term *ideological state apparatus* can be applied to colonial New England promoting the notion of chosenness, predestination, and the covenant. Rowlandson was hailed or addressed twice: once by the WASP male society, and once by the Indians. In both cases she was subordinated, but she rebuilt her identity and achieved subjecthood against the Indians and in some sense the WASP male dominated state.

The ideological state apparatus differs from the repressive state apparatus in that people are not forced to accept it but are socialized into it. In the case of Rowlandson, she is a Puritan, thus is socialized to believe in the covenant, that is, she has a contract with God. She was socialized into that by the church and even her husband, as Joseph Rowlandson was a minister. Thus, the act of being captured by Indians can be imagined as an interpellation, that is the Indian tribe places the captive in a subordinate position.

The Rachel Plummer narrative contains the elements of performance as well. The Indian attack is described as a cowardly act full of cruelty, thereby reinforcing the negative stereotyping of Native Americans. The feigned friendliness throws the settlers of Fort Parker "off their guard,"²¹ and instead of making a treaty they engage in the "work of death."²² Plummer's observation upon being carried away reflects Foucault's subjectivation as subordination to a regime of power: "As I was leaving, I looked back at the place where I was one hour before, happy and free, and now in the hands of a ruthless, savage enemy."²³ The depiction of the Indians killing her newborn with unheard of cruelty also promotes anti-Indian propaganda.

The conscious subject status of the captive women is often achieved through performative acts. Mrs. Rowlandson defies her stereotype for instance when she is removed from her private sphere into the Native American public sphere, becomes accustomed to the harsh environmental circumstances in the wilderness, and begins engaging in productive work within the Native American community. The achievement of subject status is

²¹ Plummer, "A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself," 335.

²² Plummer, "A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself," 337.

²³ Plummer, "A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself," 337.

further implied by her overcoming of the respective harsh conditions and the resultant more accommodating feeling for the wilderness: “They gave me a pack, and along we went cheerfully.”²⁴ Moreover, producing the narrative itself is a performative act as at that time women did not write stories; in fact she was the first woman to publish her experiences of American colonial history.

During an altercation, Rachel Plummer fights back against an aggressive squaw and gains the respect of the Indian chief: “You are brave to fight— good to a fallen enemy— you are directed by the Great Spirit.”²⁵ Yet the very functions of the narratives, especially defending the Puritan faith and the anti-Indian propaganda, even if indirectly, indicate a performance. The patriarchal WASP male-dominated frontier community viewed women as a weaker sex and the romantic paternalist attitude emphasizing the need to defend female virtue assigns women the role as victims of Indian cruelty. The emphasis on the female captive as a mother, originally restricted in the private sphere is especially discernible in both the Dustan and Plummer narratives.

Another focus of the Indian captivity narrative is the struggle to obtain agency, that is the ability of the person to shape her own life and destiny. The accounts describe the white settlers’ main concern to define their own identities while expressing their faith in God and meeting the other, the Native Americans, in other words, outlining the religious dimensions of individualism. The captive woman is struggling for agency as the only means to survive in the wilderness. She transgresses racial borders and finds herself in a lawless place out of the bounds of the Puritan community. Although in such a space Rowlandson, Plummer, or Dustan suffer, still it is the place where they become self-aware and self-made women, whereas within their original community they are expected to be in a partially subordinated position as pious and humble people.

In these accounts of captivity, subjectivation can be interpreted in both Foucauldian ways. The first type of subjectivation implies being subordinated to another’s control, while the second involves overseeing oneself or being conscious of one’s identity. According to the latter, the captive taking charge of herself achieves subject status. Rowlandson participates in the negotiation for her release and sets the amount of her ransom. Foucault also asserts that subjectivation is created through the gaps in the wall of the regime of power, so power is not homogenous. In case of Rowlandson the road to agency is opened by getting a Bible and writing her story on its pages. The Bible becomes a solace for her and helps her make sense of the happenings, as she puts it: “My Guide by day,

²⁴ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 71.

²⁵ Plummer, “A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself,” 353.

and my Pillow by night.”²⁶ In effect, Hannah Dustan created an Indian identity when she managed to escape from her captors using their own method by killing and scalping them. In her case it was through violence that her agency came about. A physical or actual gap in the regime of power appears in this instance as after catching her abductors off guard she can murder them and escape.

Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson point to the primary role of experience in subject formation. The milestones that are emphasized by the captive women help them to achieve subject status. Thus when Rowlandson refuses to smoke with King Philip, or sews for the tribe, and Plummer fights with the squaw, or Dustan takes revenge on her captors by scalping them, such experiences reinforce the achievement of subject status.

Butler says that one way to give an account of oneself is through a narrative of a life, or autobiography. However, her main question is: can we really give an account of ourselves, is it reliable or not? The authors of the Indian captivity narratives are giving an account of themselves, they are writing their autobiographies. The adventures of Hannah Dustan are commemorated or narrated by Cotton Mather, an unreliable narrator, a fact which denies the very foundation of the genre, the ability to provide a reliable personal account. Moreover, since giving an account of oneself, like in the case of Rowlandson, is undertaken along the externally imposed norms and guidelines of the WASP-dominated society, such an account can only be partial at best.

III.

This paper has illustrated that the road to subject status is far from clearly defined. Subjectivation is more than the achievement of identity, as the fluctuating aspect of the subject is well illustrated by Foucault’s multiple interpretation or Althusser’s notion of interpellation. The captivity narratives prove that subjectivation takes place via both language and action, yet the very process has to be commemorated in writing testifying to the heretofore (partially) objectified and muted white woman gaining the power of expression. Consequently, in Joan B. Landes’ words, the author of the Indian captivity narrative uses “public language to express private despair.”²⁷ One becomes a subject in context of the Self, that is, one refutes his or her original status as the objectified Other and strives for the power of agency and expression. In the context of female-authored captivity narratives, it is the white woman forced into the private sphere of the WASP (M) society and

²⁶ Rowlandson, “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God,” 67.

²⁷ Landes, *Feminism, The Public and the Private*, 1.

deprived of the expressive and political power required for the existence of the subject²⁸ that qualifies as the Other against the white male Self. While the above discussed texts display various routes to subjectivity including overcoming one's personal and physical limits implied by Rowlandson or engaging in violence in self-defense or revenge in the cases of the Plummer and Dustan texts, respectively, they are considered significant milestones on the road leading toward the inscription of women into the society and culture of North America.

²⁸ András Tarnóc, "Énteremtés és érveszítés a szabadulástörténetekben—A szubjektum szerveződése Mary Rowlandson fogságnaplójában." in *A nő mint szubjektum, a női szubjektum*. Szerk: Séllei Nóra. (Debrecen: Orbis Litterarum, 2007), 125.

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ANITA BEREZCZ

**Burghers of the Privileged Market Town of Eger
in the 18-19th Century***

Pro&Contra

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Introduction

This essay endeavors to describe the social composition of the burghers of the town of Eger during the period when estate society was in decline, in doing so it offers a socio-historical analysis of an urban government in transition at the beginning of the 19th century. After providing a framework within which to understand the development of the urban hierarchy during the Reform Age as well as an outline of the composition of the local administration, an analysis is undertaken of the proportion of individuals who obtained suffrage after the Revolution of 1848. In other words, the distribution of those who obtained the right to vote under the old law due to their rights as burghers. This analysis reveals a correlation between the members of the urban administration and those who gained voting rights because of their burgher status. The study then turns its attention to the social composition of local government and the rate of personal continuity between 1848 and 1872. As the local administrative system and the suffrage legislation was regulated by different laws in 1848 and after the Compromise, I will attempt to establish the degree of continuity between the first circle of representatives in 1848 and those of 1872.

The second part of the essay addresses this continuity by focusing on the level of the family in order to examine how individuals could maintain their positions in local government taking the cases of family examples. These factors alongside others are crucial aspects in the examination of the parliamentary representatives. Despite parliamentary representation and electoral behavior having a broad and complex historiography¹, researchers have paid scant attention to the local/urban politics of the second part of the 19th century. Nevertheless, national politics is built on urban politics and constituted by complex subsystems in urban areas. The electoral dimension, in addition, is a key aspect of urban politics and can determine local public policy and political behavior generally.

In the field of Hungarian social history studies, studying of the burghers during the decline of estate society has become one of the most emphasized fields of studies and come into focus over the past three decades. Recent historiography on the burghers is highly diversified and includes studies on their rights, their social description, and their

¹ For the most recent academic literature in relation with this topic see József Pap, *Parliamentary Representatives and Parliamentary Representation in Hungary (1848–1914)* (Peter Lang, 2017) and Judit Pál, Vlad Popovici (eds.), *Elites and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe 1848–1918* (Peter Lang, 2014).

origins.² Moreover, historians have paid particular attention to the necessity of employing an empirical approach since it is difficult to emphasize the homogeneity of individuals obtaining burgher rights in the towns. It is also not possible to draw any general conclusions from the particular relations of the late phase of estate societies through the application of purely statistical methods. Therefore, recent research has suggested a different approach that is the utilization of a diverse selection of methodological tools. The reason for such a method lies in the complexity and diversity of the urban society of the first part of the 19th century in particular the personal-familial relations, marriage customs, and economic network of such a community. In light of this complexity, this study adopts a prosopographical approach and is predominantly based on family-based nominal record linkage, using all the contemporaneous (or near contemporaneous) sources to the individuals (voting lists, census records, baptism, marriage, burial records, religion, occupation, habitation). Distinctions are made between a connubial indicator (father-in-law, brother-in-law) and primary familial relation (father, son, brother). In case the family was indigeneous, vertical (grandparent, parent, and child) relations can be modelled retroactively onto more generations. The crucial contribution of using a database system is that it enables complex genealogical structures to be modelled and allows for analysis of typical cases illustrated by the families, in detail. In addition to this, changes in or permanence of relationships among representatives will be a relevant question in the old-new elite approach.

Urban hierarchy of the Age of Reform

Initially, we must turn our attention to the terminological problems in connection with the towns and the burghers. Although the urban population continually increased numerically, the number of burghers as a proportion of the urban population decreased in all towns from the second half of the 18th century, at this time a burgher is identified as such only if they held a burgher right in the free royal towns (“civitas”). However, from the second half of the 18th century, the settlements that were considered towns in legal terms, such

² For the most recent academic literature on this topic see Árpád Tóth, *Polgári stratégiák. Életutak, családi sorsok és társadalmi viszonyok Pozsonyban 1780 és 1848 között*. [Strategy of the Burghers. Career Path, Families, and Social Conditions in Bratislava between 1780 and 1848] (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2009); Gábor Czoch, „A városok szíverei”. *Tanulmányok Kassáról és a reformkori városokról*. [Essays from Košice and from the Town at the Reform Age] (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2009); Vera Bácskai, „A régi polgárságról” [On the old Burghers], in *Zombékok. Középosztályok és iskoláztatás Magyarországon* [Tussocks. Middle Classes and Schooling in Hungary], ed. György Kövér (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 2006), 15–37.; Gábor Gyáni, *Az urbanizáció társadalomtörténete*. [Social History of Urbanization] (Kolozsvár: Korunk, 2012), 67–87.

as the free royal towns, increasingly differed from the settlements that had actual central functions and those with large populations. In Hungary, based on the 1828 census, a quantitative analysis of the urban system reveals a contrast between the settlements as a result of legal status and market functions because half of the free royal towns (22 in 57) that enjoyed parliamentary rights did not meet the criteria for a city as determined by Vera Bácskai.³ In connection with this, the academic literature emphasizes the territorial rearrangement in which the economic activity gradually relocated from the borders of the country to the center.⁴ The transformation of the town network had a wider adverse impact on the exclusive role of the free royal town in the urban hierarchy. These developments indicated that the significance of the free royal town decreased, and market towns became more important in the town hierarchy. On the other hand, as a result of these developments burgher rights underwent a comprehensive change and the descriptions of those who qualified as burghers changed during the early 19th century.⁵ Besides free royal towns, significant episcopal market towns (“oppidum”) also developed the administration procedural order (burgher right, payment of its fee) in order to identify themselves as a burgher.⁶ Thus, the inhabitants of these towns with broader municipal rights referred to themselves as real burghers in the same way as those in free royal towns in the feudal sense with the same behavioral characteristics. In these towns they could become a burgher but were under the authority of a landlord so their real legal status was “zsellér” (Zinsbauer). The same process took place in Pápa, Szombathely and Nagykanizsa as these towns had the same legal position in the urban hierarchy as Eger.

The focus of this research, the town of Eger, provides a good local case study from which to examine these developments. Although this town did not enjoy free royal town

³ Vera Bácskai, *Városok és városi társadalom Magyarországon a XIX. század elején*. [Towns and Urban Society in Early Nineteenth-century Hungary], (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988). The definition of towns underwent a remarkable interpretation from the 1960s. Before this decade, Hungarian historiography only recognised free royal towns as towns even if this legal category was somewhat inflexible. Then, the reconstruction of the urban hierarchy began to be based on the functional aspect highlighting the connection of the town and its region and its central functions. This reconstruction was begun by Vera Bácskai, Lajos Nagy, and Sándor Gyimesi.

⁴ Vera Bácskai – Lajos Nagy, *Piackörzetek, piacközpontok és városok Magyarországon 1828-ban*. [Market Areas, Market Centers and Towns in Hungary in 1828] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984); Gábor Czoch - Gábor Szabó - László Zsinka, *Változások a magyar város- és településrendszerben 1784 és 1910 között*. [Changing Tendencies in the Hungarian Urban Hierarchy between 1784 and 1910] *Aetas* 8, no. 4 (1993): 113–133.

⁵ Bácskai, „A régi polgárságról”, 15–37.

⁶ Basically, we can distinguish three types of settlement before 1848 in Hungary: free royal town, market town, and village.

status, it was the seventh most densely populated town in the country and was ranked forty-sixth by function.⁷ The population was around 17,000 by the middle of the 18th century and scarcely increased until the 1850s, when nearly 19,000 individuals were listed in the town. Being an episcopal market town, there was a constant effort to attain free royal town status and the legal recognition of town duties. But these efforts failed since many nobles were opposed to increasing the number of enfranchised towns. Consequently, the burghers in Eger were not considered “genuine” burghers like those in free royal towns despite having almost the same privileges in urban life. They wished to increase their social prestige in the town and to mitigate their weakening economic position by insisting on their privileges. In short, like their counterparts in the free royal towns, they attempted to prevent the weakening of burgher rights.

In light of the above, it is timely to outline what privileges were available for those with burgher rights. Why did one part of society aspire to acquire such a right? Overall, the burgher rights in the market towns granted privileges only to those living within urban society. The conditions imposed for acquiring the right were significant: from the middle of the 18th century the fee for acquiring burgher rights grew larger every year. In addition, the applicants had to be proposed by a current rights holder and be in possession of house in the inner town. The son of a householder who had previously held the burgher right in the same town received special dispensation as their fee was reduced. Nonetheless, acquiring the burgher right insured economic and political rights within the town.

Before 1848 only the free royal towns had the right of representation in the Diet which allowed them to send one envoy. They had autonomy in local matters but this power was centered upon the narrow circle of individuals with burgher rights and they were identified as holding an exclusive role in urban governance. Their power was exercised by the main magistrate and 12 councillors. Alongside them, the 60-membered elected community—the outer councillors (*electa communitas*) represented the burghers. Local administration and the structure of local government was almost identical in the market towns under county or landlord authority as in the free royal towns and they were entitled to propose officials and a judge for election but the final decision in the nomination was made by the landlord. Their autonomy depended on the contract concluded by the landlord. Their general protection of interest and enforcement of their rights depended

⁷ If we examine Eger in the hierarchy of the urban network in a legal sense the role of the town was the most significant at the time. Its importance lessened until the turn of the century due to a lack of development in infrastructure (strong industry, major railway networks). Pál Beluszky–Róbert Győri, *Magyar városhálózat a 20. század elején*. [Hungarian Urban Network at the Beginning of Twentieth century], (Budapest–Pécs: Dialóg Campus, 2005), 152.

on how the inhabitants reacted to them. What follows, then, is a description of the sociological characteristics of the burghers from the perspective of those burghers who take these privileges considerable.

Sociological characteristics of the burghers

There is another issue that requires examination before analyzing the social composition of the burghers: the proportion of individuals with newly received burgher rights compared with the overall population of the town. According to the census data of 1787, the number of individuals who were registered as burghers was 553.⁸ The proportion of burghers living in the town did not increase significantly until 1828 when their number was 650.⁹ The spatial distribution of the burghers in the town of 1828 was as follows: from the total inner town's head of households (numerically 1,003), 424 householders (23%) obtained burgher rights and from the periphery of the inner town (numerically 3,414), only 226 householders (4%) were registered. It seems clear from the data that as a percentage of the town's population, those with burgher rights was fairly low as only 3 percent were entitled.¹⁰ Considering the list of burghers in the examined period there is further information about the number of burghers after the year of 1828, too.¹¹ This list of burghers was made retrospectively in the year 1828, and includes the name of burghers, their trades and the date of the council decision on their burgher right. Consequently, we can trace the precise number of burghers after that year too: approximately 204 new burghers were listed between 1825 and 1840. Overall, comparing this data originating from the same period (between 1780 and 1840) with Szombathely, a town with similar legal status, the number of burghers (810 burghers) surpassed that of Eger. The

⁸ National Archives of Hungary-Archive of Eger IV-34/1 Népszámlálások (1786–1844) Eger város házakát és famíliákat egybefoglaló II. József-kori népszámlálás.

⁹ National Archives of Hungary-Archive of Eger IV-7/a/9. *Conscriptio Regnicolarie Archi Eppalis Civitatis Agriensis*.

¹⁰ The whole population of the town in 1787 was 16,770 which slowly increased until 1828, at that time approximately 17,487 individual were registered.

¹¹ National Archives of Hungary-Archive of Eger V-2/a/1. k Egri polgárjogot nyert egyének betűrendes jegyzéke [Burgher list of the town of Eger in alphabetical order].

same trend can be witnessed in Pápa where 992 individuals became burghers in 1828.¹² Regarding this social composition, the most striking point is that individuals who gained burgher rights can be identified as traditional master artisans who were involved with their guild organizations. Merchants as well as the educated did not consider it important and therefore did not aspire to acquiring burgher rights (only one notary and a pharmacist obtained burgher right in the period under examination). As is witnessed from the evidence, bootmakers represented one-third (187 individuals, 27%), furriers 15% (98 individuals) and tailors 14% (96 individuals) of those who sought to obtain the burgher right.¹³ It is important to bear in mind that obtaining the burgher right for such craftsmen was essential as it provided them with the possibility of becoming involved in the guild organizations and to practice their trade in this way.

It is necessary now to scrutinize the issue of the origins of burghers as this could prove a valuable source in determining the functional significance of the burgher right. There exists data on the place of birth of 196 of the burghers.¹⁴ In this analysis in the first three decades (between 1797 and 1828) 28% of the burghers can be considered as newcomers, not local (20 out of 78); subsequently this rate increased: 37 out of 177, which consisted of only 20% of the newcomers burghers between 1828 and 1840. In the meantime, it signified at the other part 74 - 68 percent of individuals among the local burghers in the whole period. Considering also the geographical aspect, the newcomers had their origins in the surrounding counties, occasionally from the same county an indication of the significant role the town played within the region. Recent research has highlighted the importance of the burgher right and that its attraction was dependent on the local context. This may be attributed to the fact that one part of society aspired to acquire the burgher right in order to maintain their social prestige in the given community resulting in a tight attachment to the urban level. On the other hand, another subgroup of burghers, mainly the newcomers, exploited these privileges to integrate and ensure a commitment to the town. Acting upon this approach, a closer examination of the social description

¹² József Hudi, "Pápa szabadalmas mezőváros polgársága a 18–19. században," [Burghers in the Privileged Market Town of Pápa in the 18–19th Centuries] In: Á. Varga László (Ed.): *Vera (nem csak) a városban*. [Vera (not only) in a town] (Debrecen, 1995), 95–106. and György Tilcsik, "Adatok Kőszeg és Szombathely polgárságának etnikai összetételéhez a 19. század első felében," [Ethnical Composition of the Burghers of the Town of Kőszeg and Szombathely] In: *Előadások Vas megye történetéről* [Essays about the History of Vas County] 4. László Mayer (Ed.) (Szombathely, 2004) 129–169.

¹³ According to the tax census of 1828 we can summarize the following occupational composition of the town: 608 master artisans, 36 traders, 60 intellectuals and the large majority were vintagers and got involved to the agriculture.

¹⁴ This rather small number of elements call us for caution however when comparison with the other elements, the tendency points to the same trend.

and the burghers' origins show that this segment of the urban society was socially closed. The reason for this can be found in fact that the rate of population growth slowed from the first quarter of the 19th century because of the ongoing diminishing role of trade. This economic decline was somewhat counterbalanced by the central role played by Eger in the county and the Church. It can be attributed to the fact that the local burghers made efforts to retain their privileges against those individuals moving into the town from elsewhere (who had no intention of claiming burgher rights anyway). Taking these sociological characteristics of the burghers into account, what follows is an analysis of the opportunities that remained open to them for participating in local government after 1848, or whether this was their intention at all.

Reorganization of the local administration

Though many significant changes took place after the revolutionary period of 1848/49, the local government and the local administration were set aside. The Hungarian Parliament only reconvened again on April 6th, 1861, after the period of absolutism. As a result, the urban government were again also permitted to elect representatives. Subsequently, the next election was held in the year 1867. After the Compromise, the statutes concerning the regulation pertaining to municipal government were enacted in 1870 by Act XLII and in 1871 by Act XVIII. In this process the autonomy of the municipalities was reduced and of local government as well as the basis for their independent political role. This meant that the state had the right to supervise and discipline municipal administrations and to promote governmental aims through the "főispán" (Lord Lieutenant) of the counties whose authority was based on personal loyalty to the government. However, municipal governments maintained their significance in the regulation of local government. Besides introducing the authority of the Lord Lieutenant, another drawback was the leading in the list of "virilis" (the highest taxpayers) which adversely affected the traditional urban elite participating in urban government.¹⁵ With the rise of broader political participation through the course of the 19th century, education and wealth gained a central role while the circulation of elite positions was accelerated.¹⁶ Members were elected for six years and every three years, half of the members completed their term but had the opportunity to be re-elected for another six-year term. Half of the local government held

¹⁵ István Kajtár, *Magyar városi önkormányzatok* (1848–1918), [Hungarian Local Government (1848–1918)] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992).

¹⁶ Gábor Gyáni, "Az elit fogalma és történeti változékonysága," [Definition of Elite and Its Variability] *Korunk*, 20, no. 3 (2009): 3–9.

their positions due to their wealth whereas the other 50% was elected. In the following section I attempt to determine the continuity between 1848 and 1872 since after this period, voting rights altered considerably (after 1874).¹

Thus, we must turn our attention to the suffrage, one of the key elements in participation at the level of local government. With the Revolution in 1848, a considerably wider suffrage based on liberal principles was introduced. The first suffrage legislation, Act V of 1848 on suffrage, clearly defined the framework of parliamentary voting rights as well as membership of the urban government. This act was only emended by Act XXXIII of 1874 and remained in place until the First World War.² The extension of voting rights brought considerable changes nationwide creating the possibility of policy making at the local level, too. Individuals could vote if over 20 years of age and if they fulfilled one of the minimum requirements of the census: property, trade, education, income, or old law. Political rights, which were restricted to the burghers of the city and burgher rights were transformed into census. Those individuals who formerly had the suffrage in the feudal representation (nobles) retained it, regardless of whether they met the condition of the newly formed census or not. At the same time, Act V ensured suffrage—namely “old law” —to the burghers of privileged settlements. Though this legal regulation did not apply in the market-episcopal towns, in the case of Eger a substantial number of electors were entitled to vote under the old law. Even though they were not considered to be a privileged social group in the feudal sense, they behaved as the burghers in the free royal towns. In this way, the gradual loss of power of the traditional families was a somewhat long drawn-out process due to their maintaining their right to vote. Detailed research on this topic in the case of Kassa shows that a radical change in personnel did not occur, a high proportion of individuals who gained the suffrage, almost 70 percent, were in possession of burgher rights.³ Thus, a high proportion of burghers in Kassa could take part

¹ For the detailed analysis of these different legal regulation of the voting right see József Pap, “A városi képviselő, városi képviselők a dualizmus időszakában,” [Town Representation, Town Representatives During the Time of Dualism] In: *Városi érdekvédelem a rendi és polgári parlamentarizmus időszakában*. [Protection of Town Interests During the Time of Feudal and Parliamentarism] Eds. Péter Kónya – H. Németh István. (Presov, 2016).

² However, in 1913, there was an effort to adopt the new law on suffrage but that process did not occur and the proportion of electors did not change throughout the Age of Dualism. For debates on the electoral extension and its appearance in the local context, in the case of Eger in 1913 see József Pap, “A választójog kiterjesztése körül folyó vita és az egeri közélet a huszadik század elején,” [Debate about the extension of the suffrage and public life in Eger at the beginning of the 20th century] In: Ballabás Dániel (ed.) *Trianon 90 év távolából*. (Eger: Líceum Kiadó, 2011) 68–95.

³ Gábor Czoch, “Városi tisztújítás Kassán 1848-ban,” [Urban Re-election in Kassa in 1848] *Századok* 149, no. 5 (2015): 1113–35.

in the work of urban government after 1848. At this point, it is necessary to consider those individuals who not only had the vote but could also stand for election. Studying the early electoral register, the conclusion can be drawn that in 1848, 2,062 individuals gained the suffrage in the town and the possibility to participate in urban politics. Individual eligibility based on old law constituted the second largest group of electors (225) in the town (also including the nobles). However, their number gradually decreased: in 1848 only 181 individuals had the right to vote under old law thanks to their burgher rights while in 1869 this number had fallen to 34. The high proportion of individuals therefore who remained among the electors under old law in the next election were entitled to vote due to their noble privileges. There are two major reasons for this: on the one hand, in the case of the 1860 electoral register, the census takers applied this old law category more consistently. In this sense, the number of individuals who got the vote thanks to their previous burgher rights decreased suddenly.⁴ On the other hand, it is also noteworthy that the average age when individuals could afford to obtain the burgher right was between 24 and 28. However, in the case of Kassa (free royal town) the average age of the burghers was between 35 and 43.⁵ This difference between the two towns can be located in the fact that the burghers of Eger appealed for their rights as burghers at the same time they were involved in their guild organizations. Although, the age of death for the majority of Eger's burghers is unknown, it seems logical from the above data that the high mortality rate was an important factor and it can be assumed that it was one of the main reasons why they were not able to retain their voting rights. Therefore, this continuity is worth examining from another perspective.⁶

The relationship between the structure of the entire urban population and the electoral register can be examined with the support of the population census. According to the census data of 1857, the population of the town was 17,688⁷ and from among them 11% had the suffrage in 1848. This rate was fairly high in comparison with the census rate nationwide as that rate scarcely exceeded 6%.⁸ In 1872, 19,150⁹ were listed in the town

⁴ For detailed examination on this process in connection with that town see József Pap, "Eger választópolgárai a 19. század közepén," [Voters of Eger in the Middle of 19th century] *Történelmi Szemle* 58, no. 1 (2016): 149–164.

⁵ Czoch, "A városok szíverek". *Tanulmányok Kassáról és a reformkori városokról*, 185–197.

⁶ With regard to the continuity of the parliamentary representatives in this early period see József Pap, "Az első népképviselők és a népképviselőlet kezdetei Magyarországon," *AETAS*, 31, no. 1 (2016): 21–44.

⁷ National Archives of Hungary-Archive of Eger V-44/c 5.

⁸ Andor Csizmadia, *A magyar választási rendszer 1848–1849-ben*. [Electoral System in 1848–1849] (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1963).

⁹ Hungarian Statistical Yearbook. 1912. 53.

and more than 2,000 inhabitants were eligible to enter urban government, 10 % of the population.¹⁰ According to the census data of 1857, of the proportion of individuals who were registered from the population census due to their owning property, 81% were entitled to vote under any census in 1848. This rate among the intellectuals (96 individuals) and master artisans (133 individuals) was only 18% compared to the whole population. While the proportion of those who were entitled to vote because of property ownership decreased compared to the data from 1848, until this point we can observe a constant increase in the list of electors receiving suffrage based on their education and their trade. It seems apparent from the data of the altered census of the electoral register that the social character of the urban population was changing and was accompanied by the altered circle of probable representatives. Nevertheless, the proportion of individuals with newly received suffrage remained stable throughout the period under examination. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that only those electors were included on the voting list who chose to register to vote until the Act XXXIII of 1874. After this, it became an administrative role and it took place every year not only before the elections.¹¹ The following table demonstrates the different censuses and the proportion of individuals with newly received suffrage during the examined period.

Year	Property	Industry	Income	Trade	Education	Old law	Total
1848	1,442	133	152	12	96	225	2,062
1860	894	267	9	-	82	27	1,279
1869	1,436	167	8	29	171	218	2,029
1901	845	-	710	-	217	10	1,782


Examining the census during this period is revealing as it is the census that determined the social composition of the urban government and the recruitment base for the urban elite. In attempting to describe the social composition of those individuals intending to participate, it becomes clear that it effectively corresponds to the same social groups' efforts. Professionals dominated in number and maintained a steady presence throughout the examined period. They represented one-third (26%) of the total positions in the initial period and their participation was based on their awareness in the town. Their rate exceeded 35 percent by the end of the period. Among them, those in the legal profession dominated reflecting the county character of the town and a consistent increase in their numbers can be observed: from 14 percent at the beginning of the 50s to 23 percent

¹⁰ National Archives of Hungary-Archive of Eger IV-254/5. 1869.

¹¹ Magyar törvénytár. [Hungarian code of laws] 1874. XXXIII. 36. §.

by the end of the 60s. Among the professionals, there were only one or two members from the medical profession and the proportion of pharmacists was not noteworthy but still representative. Another identifiable cohort consisted of the master artisans as their representatives were present in the highest proportion among the groups. Craftsmen made up 45% at the beginning of the period displaying a slight decrease over the next few years: from 43 individuals to 35. Another interesting change in comparison with the beginning of era was that the number of vintagers increased slightly, from 15 individuals to 26. The tradesmen were unable to keep their positions as their representatives varied in number and by the end of the period only 3 individuals were represented. The reasons for this can be found in the fact that the traders had little commitment to the town due to their relatively transient business. The verifiable differences in occupational structure among the members became ever more visible, signalling a considerable shift from the beginning of the years of 1850.

On the basis of the above, it is possible to analyze how the social composition of the urban government impacts on the rate of fluctuation as the number of elected members was numerically quite large and based on my database, 244 individuals can be studied between 1848 and 1872. The fluctuation in representatives can be demonstrated by examining the proportion of new representatives, if we assess the issue of how often the same representatives appeared repeatedly. The first striking aspect is that after the year 1872 signs of stabilization can be witnessed, although the new voting law (accepted and introduced in 1874) slightly reduced the number of people who were entitled to vote. The following chart demonstrates this personal continuity throughout the examined period.



As illustrated in the chart, the number of newly entered individuals occupied more than half of the entire government between 1861 and 1872, signalling a destabilization throughout this period. Therefore, it has to be taken into consideration how these representatives were impacted on by the newly introducing the list of the highest taxpayers in the year of 1872. Since only 25 previously elected individuals were from among the highest taxpayers and 31 previously elected individuals were among the newly elected

members, it is clear how significantly this new regulation changed the composition of the urban government, affecting adversely the participation of the traditional urban elite in the local government.

Returning to the primary research question, the real question is to what extent the burghers could maintain their positions in this urban context. In attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to attempt to describe their kinship networks. Based on the nominal-record linkage database, it is intended to examine the question of what happened to those householders and families who were less able to stabilize their positions in the local government after 1848. Examining the causes for this inability to preserve their position, two categories of burgher can be posited. The circle of “old burghers” who obtained the right to vote under any census can serve as a basis for this categorization. In the first, the burghers won the right to vote after 1848 and represented their families at the beginning of the period and two decades later he or, later, his descendants continued to participate in local government. They represented both individual and family continuity. The greatest chance of acquiring the right to vote was for those who were able to validate their right to vote from the census of old law into the census of property or trade. On the other hand, relationships were maintained through marriage and kinship links enabling the representatives to pursue a consistent local policy and strategies over an extended period. It also seems possible that they used these connections as a conscious strategy to reinforce their positions. These connections were underpinned through family trees.

Based on this approach, 14 families were classified as belonging to this category. Elder József Komáromy (born in 1800) was registered as a furrier and became a burgher in 1828. He was entitled to vote in 1848 under the old law but at the next election he was eligible under the property-based census, thus could participate in the urban government in 1861, too. Then, his son, younger József (born in 1834) working within the same profession, was eligible to vote thanks to his trade and after the death of his father, he inherited the family's inner-city house. It enabled him to acquire the right to vote and to maintain his position in the local government for almost 30 years (1861–1890). Ferenc Glósz (1796–1870) was born in Eger and became a burgher as a button maker in his twenties. Then, he earned the right to vote owing to his burgher rights under the old law and his inner-city house. Presumably, he left his trade because he was later registered as a tradesman and vineyard owner and he received suffrage under the property census due to his new profession. His son, Károly (born in 1836) trained as a baker and was entitled to be elected due to property ownership and thanks to his inheriting the inner-city house and vineyards. Ferenc Ruzsin (1793–1874) was eligible for burgher rights as a tanner and received the suffrage under the old law. It appears he abandoned his trade since he was later registered as a vineyard owner, too. He played a role in the government in 1861, 1867, and

1872. After his election, at the age of 81, he died. His son, Bódog (born in 1836) worked as a baker and was elected the same year as his father. However, after 1872 he was a civil servant in the town. Elder Károly Károly (born in 1810) became a burgher as a tailor in 1835 and was elected in 1848 and 1861. His eldest son, Károly (born in 1838) was entitled to vote due to his occupation as a bookbinder and at the age of 37 was elected throughout the next 12 years (1875–1887). His nephew, János Béla (born in 1869) trained as a gingerbread maker, played a role in the urban political life at the same age of 37 (1905–1911).

The following examples display a similar trend. Elder József Balkay (born in 1820) became a burgher as a master carpenter in his twenties and won the right to vote owing to his trade and his ownership of an inner city-house. He was elected as a representative in 1861 and 1867, and later was registered at the town hall as a civil servant. He was added to the electoral register thanks to his occupation and his inner-town property. He married Teréz Boma, the daughter of a well-known gunsmith and a holder of burger rights and they had three children: a locksmith István (1855–1931), who owned an inner-city house due to his wife's inheritance, was elected and was able to maintain this role from 1893; a baker Béla (1862–1925), who was a new member in 1905 at the age of 43, and their younger brother, József (born in 1850), who was the only child who pursued the same occupation as their father (carpenter) and he held membership too. He went on to marry the daughter of József Urbán, who was also a well-known master artisan in the town.

János Miticzky (1806–1886) was born in Eger and became a burgher as a tailor. He acquired the right to vote as a result of his owning an inner-city house and his work in trade. He was an elected member until his death. Though his eldest son, József (born in 1838), did not inherit the inner-city house, he continued his father's trade, procuring the right to vote due to that. His marriage to Mária Urbán, the daughter of a well-known tailor and member of the local government, implies that marriage among those practising the same trade was influential and was reinforced by their election. It also enabled him to maintain his position in local government for 35 years (1867–1902). His elder sister, Teréz, inherited the house and she married a master blacksmith, Sámuel Elek, who was also born in the city in 1859 and who also became an elected member (1890-1908). His younger sister, Mária's (born in 1840) marriage displays a similar pattern: her husband, Sándor Morvay (born in 1831) was born in the same town and became an elected member (1878–1886).

Within the other category, a significant proportion of the individuals represented themselves in only one or two elections, as many died due to their advanced age. It must be noted that losing the right to vote or a lack of descendants was an important factor in the disappearance of these individuals/families. For instance, József Leszkovszki was registered as a carpenter and burgher in 1828. He was entitled to vote in 1848 under the old


law and the property-based census. Despite his participation in the urban government of 1848, he lost his vote, although still alive. Then, his son, Mihály (18?–1892) working within the same profession, represented the family from 1872 but after 1881 his age barred him from re-election. Antal Árvay (1790–1859) applied for burgher rights in his twenties, and was registered by the census takers in 1848, meaning that he was not able to meet the minimum census requirements. He did not live to see the next election and his inner-town house was inherited by his daughter, Katalin, with her husband. A gingerbread-maker, Fülöp Hoffmann (born in 1795), acquired the right to vote due to his burgher rights, obtained in 1828. He was still alive in 1867, but after the 1850s, he does not appear on the electoral lists leading to him also losing the right to participate in urban government.

Conclusion

Based on the statistical data, considerable divergence among the individuals who were entitled to vote under any census throughout the period under examination can be observed. The transformed circle of electors was accompanied by a relatively high rate of fluctuation and frequency of new representatives. As the proportion of individuals with lengthy service was low, it is possible to infer a change concerning the social composition. Thus, the local government went through a noteworthy transformation during this period. On the other hand, based on the statistical data, a high continuity among the old traditional elite, who intended to apply for the right to vote cannot be established. As previously mentioned, these families' presence in the urban government was increasingly small which was caused by the changes in participating representatives' social composition. This local government transformation had a negative impact on the traditional urban elite. However, some continuity can be observed due to their descendants and, despite the high fluctuation rate, a strong familial permanence can be observed.

It seems that this group, the master artisans, represented the traditional local elite as the majority were descendants or close relatives of established, traditional families whose members maintained their positions in the local government in the second half of the 19th century through their prestige. Thus, it cannot be ascertained that members of the urban government in the second half of the century in Eger were new settlers or "homo novus". Close analysis of the members showed that the majority were born locally. Therefore, they were established and accepted members of the community. Those who were born in Eger were given preference, however the new arrivals were not entirely excluded from becoming members of the local authorities. A closer look at the kinship network of craftsmen showed that their relatives were engaged in the same trade. There was a typical father-son succession among artisans, but typically only one son followed the father's

trade while the others turned to other trades. This family relations-based network resulted in a fragmented society partly owing to the nature of marriages and it is also determined by these family strategies if these interlinking marriages are defined as “survival strategies.” Though, the network analysis links the elite to the institutional framework in which it functions, it must be borne in mind that examining one aspect, such as in this case the operation of kinship networks in the institutional background, is not sufficient for the understanding of these networks. That is why attention ought to be paid to the micro-analytical level to reveal how decisions, choices, behaviors of individuals are conditioned in practice and how the conflict between the families and the local community operated. Such findings would also be helpful in highlighting the functioning and workings of local politics.



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ESZTER KRAKKÓ

Győri Zsolt and Gabriella Moise, ed. Travelling around Cultures: Collected Essays on Literature and Art. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. xii + 280 pages. ISBN 9781443809962. Hb. £52.99.

Review

Pro&Contra

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Introduction

Although the subtitle humbly suggests that this volume is a “mere” collection of essays, on reading the book, one immediately notices that it undertakes a challenge of thematic coherence that exceeds the usual aims and scope of “regular” conference proceedings – and meets this self-imposed requirement perfectly. The common denominator that connects the individual essays and the various chapters alike is the theme of *journey*. As co-editors Zsolt Győri and Gabriella Moise (both affiliated with the University of Debrecen, Hungary) claim, the chapters of the volume undertake “a temporal and/or spatial journey – already hinted at in the title – crossing historical and geographical borders but reaching beyond the frontier between them, as well as linking classical literary studies with a culturally sensitive approach” (10). But what makes this journey *Central European* and one in *English and American Studies*? The answer to both questions lies in the “publication history” of the book: its idea was conceived during the 12th Biennial Conference of the Hungarian Society for the Study of English (HUSSE), which was organized by the University of Debrecen in January 2015.

HUSSE, founded in 1993, serves as the umbrella association for those Hungarian scholars whose fields of interest lie within the scope of English and American Studies in the broadest sense (although there also exists a Hungarian Association for American Studies – HAAS, functioning independently from HUSSE), gathering established and internationally renowned professors, junior scholars, as well as doctoral students. Currently, it has almost two hundred members, all of whom are automatically members of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE) as well and thus, belong also to a larger, international community of scholars devoted to a more thorough understanding and the advancement of English Studies in Europe (more information is available at www.husse-esse.hu). Traditionally, HUSSE Conferences are major international events dedicated to the celebration and promotion of English and American Studies within the borders of Hungary and beyond, with presenters from several European countries and even from overseas. The 2015 Conference was no exception either: linguists, historians and scholars of literature and of cultural studies, representing countries from Spain and Poland to South Korea, gathered to present the results of their scholarly research and to initiate and participate in intellectual dialogues.

There was, however, a radical diversion from the tradition of previous Conferences in the sense that instead of adhering to the customs and preparing one gigantic volume of conference proceedings that one would only reluctantly take off the shelf, the organizers (rather sensibly) decided to publish several smaller, but thematically more coherent collections of essays – the present volume is one of them. As the co-editors state

right at the beginning of their complex and insightful Introduction (which serves also as Chapter One), the idea of bringing together the concept of journey and that of artistic accomplishment came quite naturally, since “[a]rt shares a lot in common with traveling as the artist, in the quest for heightened experience, often finds himself or herself on unfamiliar terrain following signs, in search of causes, recognizing hidden correlations, and [...] exploring the human sphere” (1). But embarking on an intellectual journey is by no means the privilege of the artist. According to Győri and Moise, as “[t]he experience of traveling is hardly ever grounded in perceptions of distances covered but in networks of conscious and unconscious associations” (1), so are the readers and audiences invited by artists (including authors) either consciously or unconsciously to take part in the creative process (or processes of creation) and “to consider the often invisible mechanisms at work in social systems, be they gender, class, or ethnic conflicts, stereotypes, and cultural discourses that solidify hegemonies” (1).

One finds that references to the mechanisms mentioned above are also present in the thematic arrangement of the essays (each of which makes up an individual chapter); furthermore, this arrangement is carefully, as well as creatively combined with spatial, social and temporal metaphors of travelling that are represented in the titles of the main parts. In this manner, cultural and social discourses, together with the social constraints that possibly frame the route of the text from authors to readers (who, in turn, may become authors themselves) come to the forefront in the four essays comprising Part I entitled “Censorship, Readership, Fanfiction.” Conversely, (re)visiting the (in)glorious past constitutes the central theme of the four texts belonging to Part II, “Traversing Victorian Culture.” In the two essays of “Her Ways” (Part III), past and present questions of gender (politics) are interpreted through the lens of Post-Modernism and popular culture. In “Lyrical Wanderings” (Part IV), another two texts provide analyses of selected poems and a poetic oeuvre from the perspective of memory politics and (gay) identity construction. Finally, the four essays of Part V, bearing the title “Intermedial and Interartistic Journeys,” examine images and visual practices that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of past and present cultural discourses.

This list is already convincing enough, but one should also note that the interrelatedness of the individual chapters, which are to be mentioned later in detail, extends the constraints of this classification. For instance, Andrea Kirchknopf’s essay on recent TV adaptations of Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes-stories, which is included in “Her Ways,” could just as well be part of the “Traversing Victorian Culture” section. Conversely, the chapter on the subversion of Victorian ideals of femininity in Charles Dickens’s *The Old Curiosity Shop* by Rudolf Nyári (in “Traversing Victorian Culture”) or Nóra Séllei’s “Whose Cup of Tea? Katherine Mansfield in Post-1956 Hungary” and Judit

Kónyi's "Emily Dickinson and Her Readers" (presently both in "Censorship, Readership, Fanfiction"), as texts dealing with idea(l)s and idols of feminism, could easily find their places in "Her Ways." The editors also reflect on this multifarious nature of the essays and point out their ability to offer resistance to the arbitrariness of any kind of classification (an inevitable imperative of any compilation of contributions by multiple authors) by stating that the themes "tackled by the authors of the present volume are pieces of a puzzle to be assembled by the prospective reader" (10). One could extend the puzzle-metaphor and say that the texts resemble pieces of a mosaic or snapshots taken on a journey, which then one can either contemplate separately or assemble into collections or montages of variable elements, thus attributing them with new meanings.

Another shared characteristic feature of the essays is their ability to stand in their own right. According to the editors, the "[i]ndividual chapters [...] have lives of their own and serve as plausible illustrations of how texts [...] can be explored as products or critical reflections of cultures" (10). This claim is also supported by the editors' rather unusual decision not to present the essays in the introductory chapter in the order according to which they are arranged in the volume but rather, offer another possible chain of thought (out of the many) on which they can be strung. In the same manner, Győri and Moise characterize the leading theoretical approach of the volume as "culturally sensitive." This critical approach, in the wake of Michel Foucault, entails "explorations into the dynamics of power which have their resonances in the artistic and cultural artefacts and styles of various eras" (1); a perspective that provides a common theoretical background for the texts represented.

The intellectual journey, for which the point of departure was provided by the Introduction, reaches its first point of junction with the essays grouped under the title "Censorship, Readership, Fanfiction." In the opening essay, Nóra Séllei aptly demonstrates how, "[d]ue to the changes in the dominant aesthetic values, the framing and conceptualization of oeuvres and authors can also fluctuate" (12) through an insightful and informative interpretation of Katherine Mansfield's changing reception in post-1956 Hungary. This is followed by Judit Kónyi's elaborate study on a segment of Emily Dickinson's poetry, aiming "to discuss the reader's role in the process of interpreting Dickinson's poems and the poet's expectations of her audience" (31). Following the two case studies on established figures of Anglo-American literature, Larisa Kocic-Zámbó's theoretically well grounded, as well as highly engaging "Resounding Words: Fan Fiction and the Pleasure of Adaptation" focuses on the relatively undervalued, yet rapidly emerging field of fan fiction studies, which she discusses from the pertinent but largely unexplored aspect of "the repetitive nature of fan fiction plotlines" (53). Part I concludes with "British Novelists on Censorship: A Historical Approach" by Alberto Lázaro, who elaborates on the

repressive nature of censorship and on how authors have (un)successfully fought against it from Jonathan Swift to the present day.

Artistic practices of the Victorian period and their Post-Modern interpretations come to the forefront in the texts belonging to the theme “Traversing Victorian Culture.” Balázs Keresztes explores how the artistic oeuvre of 19th-century author and craftsman-archeologist William Morris can be re-evaluated through considering how “the interlacement of architecture and book design” (85) contributed to his views about the ideal relationship between “design and craft” (98). Eszter Ureczky presents a much bleaker picture of the Victorian era in her insightful analysis of Matthew Kneale’s 1992 neo-Victorian novel, *Sweet Thames*, “the fictional recreation of the devastating 1849 London cholera epidemic” (103). In “Cultural Subversiveness in Charles Dickens’s *The Old Curiosity Shop*,” which is yet another example of an effective close reading, Rudolf Nyári investigates the potentials a fatherless Victorian household with an empowered female figure entails – nothing but grim prospects. The Victorian cycle becomes complete with Božena Kucala’s “The Myth of Paradise in Graham Swift’s *Ever After*” (published in 1992), which she reads as “a secularized version of the overarching grand narrative of the loss of paradise” (133).

Both “Her Ways” and “Lyrical Wanderings” present two essays with shared thematic foci. The underlying theoretical background for the first pair of texts is provided by feminism and Gender Studies. Dóra Vecsernyés addresses in “Voicing Silence: Music and Language in Janice Galloway’s *Clara*” how, even though via “the indirect mode of the narrative itself” (180), contemporary Scottish writer Galloway still manages to give “voice to the often suppressed and forgotten female genius of Clara Schumann” (165), while Andrea Kirchknopf narrates a much bleaker story when picking a BBC and a Russian serialization of Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes-stories for a parallel analysis. Her overall conclusion is that “Irene Adler’s character becomes increasingly flat in the two adaptations” (159) due to the “consolidation of conventional gender boundaries strengthening patriarchy” (161); but these are not, as one would think, the boundaries of the 19th century, but those of today. Similarly, István Rácz’s “Experience in Thom Gunn” focuses on a by-and-large marginalized figure when choosing to reflect on the elegies of excellent 20th-century gay poet Thom Gunn, while Kristóf Kiss provides insight into the workings of memory in yet another parallel analysis: that of a poem by W. B. Yeats and of another one by William Wordsworth.

In Part V, entitled “Intermedial and Interartistic Journeys,” each text emphasizes “the critical relation that exists between artistic practices and the social reality in which they take place” (8) from the Middle Ages until the present. For instance, Zita Turi deals with instances of (at times commercialized) re-enactment of “Medieval and Early Modern Pageantry in Contemporary British Culture,” while Efterpi Mitsi analyzes early 19th-cen-

ture British travel writing as a manifestation of “colonial identity politics” (4). Perhaps it is not by chance, and it shows yet another sign of thoughtfulness on the editors’ part that the last two essays of the volume take the reader back to its opening with addressing questions of text, authorship and readership either through interpreting “Novelization as ‘image X text’” (Emma Bálint) or through investigating texts in which “visual elements interrupt the narrative and the reading process” (259) and therefore, they create moments of “connection between reader, character and author” (274), in other words, involvement (Eszter Szép).

Providing a circular structure of interpretations, however, does not mean that the compilation closes up the possibility of future interpretations. On the contrary, it invites its readers, let them be established scholars or only novices in the field of English and American Studies, to follow the route paved by the close readings in/of literary and cultural studies it provides and to embark on new intercultural journeys, opening up new vistas and exploring into yet unvisited terrains – this book will serve as a perfect itinerary along the way. A perfect itinerary that has two limitations as a scholarly volume: including an Index at the end would help those having special scholarly interests (a minor limitation), while listing the contributors according to their surnames instead of their first names would facilitate finding more information about them (a diminutive one). These minute things not considered, the compilation aptly fulfils the role it was destined for and “illustrates the diversity of cultural products and phenomena while bringing to view the way texts emerge, engage with real life, and become consumed” and at times also “commodified” (10). Perhaps the editors agree with the hope that this excellently edited volume of cutting-edge scholarship will be consumed by many but never commodified.

