

## IT'S ALL OVER YOUR FACE: IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AMONG SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANTS OF CHINESE DESCENT IN THE CROSS-HAIRS OF LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM

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In this paper, I discuss the conjuncture of extraterritorial nation-building intentions of the People's Republic of China and the experience of second generation migrants. I will argue that the intention of rehomeing the descendants of emigrants who might lack any sort of connection with their ancestral homeland can be very effective, especially because these young people embrace hybrid identities that serve as a fertile ground for such initiations, particularly because of their unsettled and contested nature. I will briefly look at the government-initiated Root seeking camp and its impact on one participant's identity constructions.

Ever since the flow of migration of people, goods, ideas and capital has been maximized due to current developments in information and transportation technology, a new phase of globalization characterizes the world we live in. There is a certain anxiety—both in civil and academic society—that these new circumstances facilitate the viability of transnational practices to a high extent, which will, as never before, lead to the weakening of the nation-state.<sup>1</sup> This approach must be critically reviewed, as it exposes expressions of methodological nationalism: it focuses exclusively on the receiving country while neglecting that the sending country is a nation-state as well (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). In spite of weakening, as I will argue, the sending country in fact has gained a new opportunity: the opportunity for extraterritorial nation-building (Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003). “From this standpoint, the politics of belonging is about maintaining ties with emigrants; mobilizing their resources and expertise; making it easier for them to retain citizenship, even when they acquire citizenship elsewhere; and facilitating home-country involvement in such matters as voting, property ownership, and remittances” (Brubaker, 2015). What has really changed due to globalization is not the strength and capability of the nation-state as a category of (and for) practice and authority, but its territorial boundedness. However, becoming territorially unbound, nation-states are likely to exist even more vigorously than before.

The growing literature on ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992; Osmanbegovi, 2001; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Schiller, 2005; Brubaker, 2015) is characterized either by the uncertainty of who the agent behind this phenomenon is, or focuses exclusively on one of several agents. Existing literature lacks the analysis of the combination of possible agents, such as the nation-state (the sending country), the expatriate individuals, and the diaspora on a communal level (outstanding examples are Chiu, 2010; Louie, 2001). I would like to contribute to this less studied area with a special focus on second-generation migrants through the lens of transnationalism

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Eriksen, 2002: “Long-distance nationalism, or politics via remote control, can be effective and illustrate how transnational connections weaken the authority of the nation-state.” Also, Appadurai, 1996; in Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003.

(Lee, 2004; Levitt, 2009; Levitt & Waters, 2006). Research on second-generation long-distance nationalism in most cases uses the individual as the focus of analysis. The nation-state, as an actor of long-distance nationalism, is not yet studied from the point of initiations specifically targeted at the second (and subsequent) migrant generation. With this paper, through the analysis of the 'Root-seeking camps' organized by the People's Republic of China (PRC), I would like to contribute to this less studied area located in the convergence of literature on long-distance nationalism and second-generation migrants.

The existence of second-generation migrants gives rise to questions that problematize our current understanding of ethnicity, cultural and national belonging to a high extent. Who are they? Where are they from? What should be named as their "place of origin"? The complexity that underlies these seemingly banal questions reveals a very important psychological drive that characterizes second-generation migrants' identity constructions. These contested identity constructions become sites for extraterritorial nation-building that aim at establishing enduring (and potentially economically beneficial) relations with people, who do not necessarily have any sense of belonging due to the lack of any sort of experience. How can you call a place home where you never set foot before?

While analyzing identity constructions of second-generation Chinese migrants I will draw on Ang's (2001) concept of hybridity that proved to be a useful analytical tool when it comes to simultaneously existing controversial emotions, such as the contested sense of belonging. Through juxtaposing the concept of hybridity with that of long-distance nationalism I will argue that the hybrid identity constructions of second-generation migrants serve as fertile ground for extraterritorial nation-building practices. This hypothesis will be developed through the analyses of an institution of the PRC that aims to arouse nationalist sentiments among young people of Chinese descent born outside the territorial boundaries of China: the government-organized "Root-seeking in China" camps for overseas youth. I will argue that the hybrid identity constructions of second-generation migrants stand a good target for such extraterritorial nation-building practices. The initiative of root-seeking camps draws on a racial discourse of ethnicity that coincides with the experience of racial exclusion common among second-generation Chinese migrants in Hungary, thus it is successful in shaping these contested identities. However, as we will see below, not in the way it was intended.

I will use one pilot interview to illustrate how the theoretical concepts and nationalist policies operate on the level of the individual. This paper is part of a broader thesis research project on hybrid identity construction. I have selected this interview for its special interest in studying long-distance nationalism and its impact on identity construction. In the broader research for my thesis (Beck, 2015) I have examined through the means of discourse analysis how the same person identifies him or herself in different contexts as Chinese, Non-Chinese, Hungarian, European, or explicitly as a hybrid. I have conducted in-depth interviews with 8 young people of Chinese descent from 2013-2015 in Budapest.

Before turning the focus of the analysis to these extraterritorial nation-building initiatives in particular, I would like to introduce the actors who take part in this play, namely the PRC and second-generation migrants who are in the cross-hairs of those policies.

## Building the nation abroad

The PRC is an illustrative example of the nation-state that, despite weakening, has seized the opportunity that lies in emigration. In her analysis of overseas Chinese policies of the PRC Barabantseva argues that through the incorporation of overseas Chinese into the Chinese modernization strategy “Chinese leadership utilizes the global regimes of migration, trans-nationalism, media, and multiculturalism to affirm the CCP’s political legitimacy, to extend China’s political standing, to reassert Chinese culture, and to benefit China’s economic performance” (Barabantseva, 2005). By exercising an all-inclusive politics of belonging, the PRC has established one of the largest<sup>2</sup> and probably one of the most economically successful diaspora, a diaspora of global importance (Chiu, 2010).

In 1978, the PRC decided to legitimize the already established practices of its expatriates (Nyíri at Nyíri, Fullerton, & Tóth, 2001). To signal this political shift, a new term was introduced to describe migrant subjects: *xinyimin*<sup>3</sup>. This shift in language illustrates the general change in the attitude toward emigration (Liu, 2005). In a short while leaving the country has become celebrated as a modern, patriotic act and has been indeed encouraged through both institutional and discursive means. The image of the emigrant is that of a brave bridge builder who is instrumental in easing his or her country into the modern world (Nyíri et al., 2001; Ong & Nonini, 1997). Recognizing the economically beneficial aspect of maintaining good relationships with its expatriates, the government of China has been an effective contributor to the imagination of a transnational community of the Chinese diaspora.

Long-distance nationalism of the PRC operates through the root ideas of blood and heritage (Louie, 2001). Before the appearance of the second—not to speak of latter—generation of emigrants it was evident that national consciousness arises naturally out of Chinese racial heritage. This discourse was absolutely in sync—as Nyíri puts it, in a “honeymoon stage”—with the discourse of the first generation migrants’ desire: as racially distinct thus excluded, marginalized members of their host society, they have been eager to belong to an accepted community of high status, i.e., the highly appreciated overseas community of their loving motherland (Nyíri et al., 2001).<sup>4</sup> Using traditional nationalist slogans that draw on nostalgic sentiments might work well with those who have actual experiences and memories of the motherland, but does not operate so efficiently with those who have never been outside from a Hungarian town like Esztergom, for example. The presence of the second-generation faces this sort of nation-building discourse with new challenges: it is difficult to retain nostalgic sentiments about something one has never experienced and even more difficult if she/he has no knowledge of it at all.

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<sup>2</sup> According to Sheng Ding, the overseas population consists of 38 million “ethnic Chinese” (Ding, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Literal translation: new migrants.

<sup>4</sup> For the emotional logic of diaspora building see Brettell, 2007

## Hybridity: the constant state of being suspended in-between

Turning the focus of the inquiry to the subjects of the nation-building policies in particular requires a deeper understanding of who these people are: they were born and raised outside China, but their physical characteristics bear an undeniable “Chineseness”. Following Jenkins’s notion of the entangled relationship between ethnicity and race, I argue that self-identifications are inseparable from externally imposed categorizations (Jenkins, 2008). To interpret this ambiguity of the exterior (the look) and the interior (the way of thinking), hybridity is a useful analytical tool. The concept of hybridity should not be regarded as a solution, but rather a heuristic device for analyzing the complicated entanglement of being permanently suspended in-between (Ang, 2003 quoted in Árendás, 2014). Hybridity allows for the unresolvable contradictory feelings of claiming one’s difference and the wish to belong to be demonstrated simultaneously, instead of expecting them to be either united or to fall apart, as it argues the very impossibility of resolving them (Ang, 2003; Zsuzsa Árendás, György Szeljak, 2014).

Identities are always formed in contrast to certain others; they can never be seen as settled, fixed entities. The same person can define him or herself as Chinese, European, Hungarian or as a hybrid according to the changing of the reference point his or her identity is constructed against at the moment.<sup>5</sup> What remains permanent throughout these discourses is the cleavage between the way persons look (Chinese) and the way they think (Hungarian, or more broadly European). This leaves them, as one of my interviewees put it, with “not having one’s own, proper nationality,” corresponding to Said’s term ‘generalized state of homelessness’ (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). As I will argue, the state of being constantly suspended in-between serves as an ideal target for nationalist initiatives.

## Demand meets supply

While growing up in countries which are not known for favoring multiculturalism, like in Hungary<sup>6</sup> for example, Chinese children experience exclusion and are constantly reminded of being different. This can happen even in friendly ways, for instance, when someone praises their fluency in Hungarian language presuming that he/she is more fluent in Chinese, which is not true in many cases. Under this sort of pressure, children or youth of Chinese descent are forced to forge a Chinese identity, to “fill their face with purport”. And this is exactly the point where the PRC’s long-distance nation-building policy finds a way to enter the discourse: the discourse of the racialized body. According to Louie (2000), PRC officials believe that Chinese loyalty to native place, and therefore to the Chinese motherland/nation, is embodied in overseas Chinese through their racial heritage.

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<sup>5</sup> This is what literature on the subject area refers to as ‘employing hybridity strategically’ (Poynting, 2004). I do not prefer the expression ‘strategic’ because it suggests a sense of purpose in the act of self-identification that is not there in many cases.

<sup>6</sup> As surveys conducted since 1989 show, Hungarian society is extremely xenophobic, especially in relation to the proportionally small number of migrants it receives.

Therefore, the image of “Chineseness” is conceived as a racial essence connecting people through their blood to the Chinese nation regardless of which part of the globe they live in or were born in.

I argue that despite the PRC’s and Chinese folk culture’s assumption, in most cases national consciousness does not arise *naturally* out of Chinese racial heritage, but through the process of being repeatedly confronted with it. The necessity of searching for roots can be regarded as the (unwilling) adoption of externally imposed categorization (Jenkins, 2008). Since this demand has been produced in the “host” society, the PRC is eager to supply it. The following citation from Nam (a young man born in 1992 in Santiago, who resided in Budapest at the time the interview took place), illustrates how efficiently China engages people who face such difficulties in their self-identification.

Chinese culture is really strong, as I said, and I would say once you were born this way, you have two choices. One is just accepting that you are Chinese, and then you will definitely feel like you are part of it. The other one is just to negate the fact that you are Chinese, and I wouldn’t recommend it, because it’s all over your face. It’s just too strong, and you can never separate yourself from Chinese culture.

As Dikötter exposes in his studies about the history of race in China, the notion of race became equivalent with that of the nation when China turned from empire to nation. The colour yellow represented “a racial cohesiveness that would subsume regional alliances in the face of foreign aggression” (Dikötter, 1997). I agree with Ang (2001), when she argues that the presumption of internal ethnic sameness and external ethnic distinctiveness is fundamentally proto-nationalist. The discourse of racial cohesion opposed to the foreign-other operates in reverse situations as well: i.e., when the foreigner is at home where the Chinese “other” enters through the act of migration. Confusing this discourse with the deterritorialization of ethnic identities shows that territory is of little concern in this situation. The possession of a Chinese face in itself functions as an externally imposed identity: no matter where and by whom, “*once you were born this way*” you have unavoidable obligations to wear it.

The appearance of the overseas youth, referred to as *hua yi*<sup>7</sup> by the Overseas Affairs Committee, embodies a contradiction that challenges the discourse of equating race with nation: even though they retain the physical, racial markers of Chinese ethnicity, they lack the cultural knowledge and attachments to mainland China that are assumed to follow these physical characteristics (Louie, 2000). The initiation discussed below stems from the Chinese government’s fear concerning the future of relations with its overseas population as the political and cultural gap becomes wider with each generation of migrants. Let us turn our attention to the PRC Overseas Affairs response to this challenge: the next sections of the paper discuss the intentions and assumptions regarding the root-seeking initiative and their outcome in practice.

In Search of Roots.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed explanation on categories used to describe certain groups of overseas Chinese, see: Louie 2000. *Huayi* literally means ethnic Chinese.

## Intentions

The root-seeking camps for overseas youth stand as a great example of how the difficulty of hybrid identity constructions intersects with extraterritorial nation-building politics. Given the certain physical characteristics second-generation migrants bare, the society of the country they reside in marks them as perpetual foreigners and constantly reminds them that they are Chinese. Yet, as it is an externally imposed identity, many of them have only a vague idea of how they *should be* Chinese. On the other hand, we have the PRC, which is eager to train them how to be Chinese. Demand meets supply. However, as we will see in the following discussion, the camps do not operate in accordance with the governmental expectations. The impact of experiencing China on the participants' self-identification is quite contrary to the assumptions.

The motives of establishing overseas camps are expressed outright in a 1993 publication by the Guangdong Province Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, which claims:

Members of [t]he younger generation of overseas Chinese living abroad have little understanding of their forefathers' traditional culture, to say nothing of national consciousness. Therefore, we've based the camps upon Chinese national culture.<sup>8</sup>

In the same publication, the list of intended effects and main goals reveals the assumption lying beyond the initiation: if only the candidates knew their motherland, they would love it.

1. "Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness";
2. "Deepen the knowledge of the motherland and strengthen the national recognition";
3. "Foster the participants' attachment to their native village and arouse their nostalgic emotion";
4. "Intensify the exchange and cooperation between Chinese and foreign youths and enhance solidarity and friendship."

Andrea Louie (2000, 2001; Louie in Levitt & Waters, 2006) conducted the most thorough ethnographic research on root-seeking camps, in the 1994-1995 'In Search of Roots Camp' in particular. When studying current overseas camp activities, it is important to take into account the differences listed in the footnote,<sup>9</sup> because

<sup>8</sup> Guangdong Sheng ren min zheng fu qiao ban gong shi (Guangdong Provincial Government Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs) 1993 *Xin ji mu bang, gen zai hua xia* (The Heart is Tied to the Motherland, Roots are Abroad). Guangzhou, China: Guangdong Provincial Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs Press. In: Louie 2001

<sup>9</sup> The "In Search of Roots Camp" is different from those discussed here in four important aspects: 1) it is preceded by a semester-long genealogical research project by the participants; 2) there are only 10-20 "interns," who are chosen to participate each time; 3) they are exclusively from the USA and Canada; and 4) it is organized only once a year.

they result in a much more selected and homogenized group of participants, whose motivation can be very distinct from those participating in mass summer camps running under the umbrella name of ‘*Zhongguo xun gen zhi lu* - Overseas Chinese Youth Summer Camp’.<sup>10</sup> The candidates differ from the “In Search” candidates significantly in that most likely the majority of them see this as an opportunity for travel. They do not care so much about their Chinese roots, but they hope to have fun.<sup>11</sup> The internationality—opposed to the ‘In Search’ camps national homogeneity—of the mass camps is also a significant marker, because it provides a foreground for trans-local identifications (Raffaetà, Baldassar, & Harris, 2016) and transnational third place communities (Parker & Song, 2007) that come to life as a result of the camps.

These camps of the latter kind resemble assembly-line production: they are jointly organized and sponsored by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the respective Provincial People’s Government, and are held during almost the whole year. They gather thousands of young people of Chinese descent from all over the world for 5 to 10day trips that do not aim to help the participating individuals find their own, personal roots, but rather to “experience the profound Chinese culture and civilization”<sup>12</sup> in general. A great example of the shift to a more generalized term of “Chineseness” can be found on the official website of Chengdu,<sup>13</sup> notably under the label “culture and tourism”, where one participant is quoted in order to explain the reason for taking part in the camp: *“Although we are from different countries and speak different languages, we’re all rooted in China.”*<sup>14</sup>

The shift from tracing someone’s own ancestors in rural villages to finding them in China in general reflects the change in the official discourse on “Chineseness”. Until the presence of the second-generation became so apparent, ties to one’s hometown, in accordance with the historically and culturally rooted idea of “loving and strengthening one’s native place” was a key aspect of being “morally excellent” (Goodman, 1995 in Louie, 2000), which was of greater importance as it had the practical side of maintaining family relationships. As decades passed, the faces of hometowns changed dramatically: most of the actual relatives died, and the significance of native places has faded in the eyes of overseas-born Chinese youth. Therefore, the use of the idea of native places in order to arouse nostalgic, patriotic sentiments proved to be obsolete. This explains the shift in the narrative that now draws on a more general idea of “the profound Chinese culture and civilization”. Touring hastily through the vast images of Chinese cultural heritage, such as the Great Wall, in addition to the achievements of the last decades, such as meeting astronauts from the Chinese space program, are supposed to increase pride in being Chinese in general.

<sup>10</sup> The Chinese name literally means “Root-seeking journeys in China”. Official website: <http://summercamp.hwjyw.com/#>

<sup>11</sup> In this aspect, camps are notably similar to “Taglit” organized by the state of Israel.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted from online recruitment material.

<sup>13</sup> “Go Chengdu” website discussing root-seeking camps: <http://www.gochengdu.cn/news/culture-tourism/young-overseas-chinese-attend-root-seeking-summer-camp-in-chengdu-a618.html#sthash.eJP9ftWc.dpuf>

<sup>14</sup> I am using citations from official PRC campaigns precisely because I am aware that these are not sounds of a certain personal opinion, but illustrations of the official narrative.

Adding images of China's transformation into a modern, international country has been a recurring element of the official narrative during the past decade.<sup>15</sup> The contribution of overseas Chinese capital to this transformation is highly emphasized in the lectures campers receive during their education in China. There has been another significant shift in the narratives of foreign capital since Louie's research. The outright intention of encouraging future investments (Louie, 2001; Nyíri et al., 2001) is not interpreted as a truly patriotic act any longer, but the narration skillfully moves toward a give-and-take approach: "With China's progressive integration into the world and its huge market potential, more and more people are studying Chinese to expand their job prospects," as a quotation from Shan Chun, a senior expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences informs us in a promotional campaign that can be read on China Daily online.<sup>16</sup> This approach resonates with a common sense among Chinese youngsters abroad, who see the largest—if not the only—benefit of being Chinese in the opportunity to do business in or with China. Adopting the individualistic attitude of Western-raised youth, the basis for encouragement is not that they should do good for the country, but do good for themselves. As the following quote from Nam reveals, this discourse proved to be successful because it draws on the participants' experience of exclusion from the local labor market of the country in which they live.

That is the most difficult, for example, in the aspect of if you are looking for a job, I told you it has some advantages, but it has some disadvantages, too. For example, if I apply for a job, and there is someone who is competing with me, and we are exactly the same, they would take him, just because he is Chilean, because they suppose that they share the same culture. Most of the countries it would happen the same... I definitely would like to live there [in China], not permanently, but maybe for 2-5 years, to master my Chinese, and to get to know this part of our culture, which is working there and having your life there. But not in the near future, I'm not still...? ...to go to China. Maybe if I get an opportunity with my job, to move on there I would be happy to consider it, but not at the moment.

## Outcome: counter-effect

What the program engineers did not take into account is one banal aspect: the cultural shock of experiencing China for the very first time. As Nam puts it:

Yeah, it's.... so, the Chinese culture is quite... strong, if I can say it like this. For most of the foreign people, including me, going to China is quite shocking. A lot of people, just to be on the street, it's a sea of black haired people, that is quite shocking, especially if you don't come from a big metropolis.

<sup>15</sup> An interesting example of this regard is the national image video of China. "After 30 years the world has seen how much China's profound history and cultural essence has given, giving us flexibility and unity when facing fast transformation." <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KI2YHzy7bIQ>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOuqVq2LfZU&list=PLGQ21jyFnHVDPRCvLRyXQsICy4Zw583jz>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.china.org.cn/english/16706.htm>

It is obvious from the quotation that the interviewee perceived himself in this context as a “*foreigner*,” and he experienced the same culture shock all other foreigners who set foot in China do. Except that his shock differs from other foreigners’ in a very important way: like most of his peers, with the experience of being excluded from the country he resides in, he had expectations of coming home. Instead of feeling at home, he was more alienated than ever.

I think that’s a crucial point about if I have to tell you who I am. From the very beginning, when I was in school, primary school, and I was always different to other people, because I was Chinese, but I was not Chinese too, at the same time. But therefore, I didn’t feel 100% Chilean<sup>17</sup>, when I was growing up there. And then I went to China: I look Chinese, I do speak Chinese, but Chinese people treated me as a foreign person. And then I got the feeling that I wasn’t Chinese either. So mostly for the foreign people, that are half Chinese, like me, we are from nowhere. We are mixed from our country and China.

According to the quotation, despite reaching its intended aim, the camp had a rather counter-productive effect. Although, upon closer examination we can see that there is an—presumably unintended—impact: as it appears in the usage of the first-person plural (the only time it happened during our conversation), it has created a community of those people “who are from nowhere”.

I think, the most important thing to me was, how this experience for other foreign people to be in China was.

The experience of being constantly suspended in-between, being dis-embedded from everywhere is a burden difficult to deal with. Especially because in most cases it is seen as an anomaly, and individuals are left on their own with it. This is why McLennan states that the problem with hybridity is “that it does not easily produce a people” (McLennan, 1995 in; Ang, 2001), which, according to this phenomenon, I have to argue against. It is true in the sense that normally there is no occasion to gather “hybrids” together, where they can share their experiences. But as we see, the overseas camp serves as exactly such an opportunity. Youngsters—notably referred to as “*other foreigners*” in the quote—who share more or less the same sort of exclusion from their own host society because of their racial characteristics, set for China, where they were meant to belong, but experience being different once again. The complexity of this feeling seems to trigger the creation of friendships that can serve as a transnational network in the future, one that is viable and maintainable through the means of global social media like Facebook, Tumblr or Instagram.<sup>18</sup> How viable these communities are and what use they have is a topic for future investigation. What we can see now is that Facebook groups are established for each camp, which serve as virtual places where the “alumni” can get together. Further more, root-seeking hashtags are proliferating on Instagram.

<sup>17</sup> The interviewee was born in Chile but resided in Hungary when the interview was conducted.

<sup>18</sup> An outstanding illustration of how these means of globalization are used in transnational identity construction is a video, that can be found on the webpage “Friend of Roots” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\\_continue=140&v=gaaLZsV7P1g](https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=140&v=gaaLZsV7P1g)

As we see, although the outcome of the initiation is not in line with governmental assumptions, it has a certain utility in creating a sense of belonging for a transnational community of youngsters, who share the inescapable heritage of Chinese characteristics. Additionally, even though in a roundabout way, it has reached its purpose regarding the consolidation of the candidates' ties with China.

## Conclusion

Events of this sort intentionally confront the participants with the complexity of their ethnic and national identities, and urge them to draw a line where their Hungarian (in this special case Chilean)/European/Western part ends and where the Chinese begins. They can be seen as means of long-distance nation-building as they reflect the PRC's ambitions about maintaining relationships with second- (and latter) generation migrants. The initiative is feeding on the participants' experience of exclusion due to their physical appearance, which the PRC tries to fill with meaning, thereby making the participants proud "messengers of the Chinese civilization".<sup>19</sup>

As seen in the discussion, the initiation does not work in accordance with PRC governmental expectations. However, by consolidating the participants' ties to China, it has served extraterritorial nation-building in other ways. The overseas camp catalyzed a dense, transnational network of Chinese youth that can possibly have economic manifestations. Aiming at second-generation migrants is very effective in the sense that to certain extent they all construct hybrid identities. Hybrid identities are worthy targets precisely because they are unsettled and constantly contested.

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted from Go Chengdu, promotion for overseas camps.

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